"Portfolio Pumping and Managerial Structure" by Saurin Patel and Sergei Sarkissian
 

Business Publications

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-2018

Volume

34

Issue

1

Journal

The Review of Financial Studies

First Page

194

URL with Digital Object Identifier

https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa027

Last Page

226

Abstract

Using U.S. equity mutual fund data, we show that portfolio pumping – an illegal trading activity that artificially inflates year-end and quarter-end portfolio returns – is more pronounced among single-managed than team-managed funds. The magnitude of return inflation by team-managed funds is 45% lower compared to single-managed funds at year-ends. In addition, portfolio pumping decreases as team size increases. These results are mainly driven by peer effects among teams and, in some cases, amplified by less convex flows – performance relation in team managed funds. Our findings are robust to differences in fund governance, manager career concerns, local networks, fund-family policies, and regulation changes.

Notes

This is the author's version of the paper published in The Review of Financial Studies, 2021, vol 31, issue 1, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa027.

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