Event Title
Start Date
27-6-2010 10:45 AM
End Date
27-6-2010 11:45 AM
Description
This presentation is part of the Reconsidering Values in Feminist Philosophy of Science track.
During the last three decades feminist philosophers of science have argued that the traditional ideal of value-free science should be replaced because either it is not feasible – or even if it is feasible, it is not a desirable epistemic goal. The traditional ideal of value-free science is the normative claim that social and moral values are not allowed to play a role in the reasoning and decision-making processes that scientists are engaged in when they decide to accept something as scientific knowledge, either individually or collectively. The arguments for the inadequacy of the traditional ideal fall roughly into three categories. (1) Some philosophers have argued that social and moral values should be allowed to play a role in the acceptance of hypotheses because scientists are morally responsible for the practical consequences of errors they can make in the acceptance of hypotheses (see e.g., Douglas 2000 and 2009). (2) Other philosophers have argued that social and moral values can play a legitimate role in the acceptance of hypotheses and theories insofar as they are encoded in the background assumptions that are necessary for evidential reasoning (see e.g., Anderson 1995 and 2004; Longino 1990 and 2002; Wylie 2002; Wylie & Nelson 2007). (3) Yet others have argued that social and moral values can legitimately bear on the acceptance of theories because the conventional distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values breaks down at crucial points (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Longino 1995 and 2008; Rolin 2002; Rooney 1992; Solomon 2001).
Whereas feminist philosophers of science seem to be unanimous about the need to replace the traditional ideal of value-free science, their views diverge on the question of what the successor to the traditional ideal should be. In my presentation I discuss four candidates for a novel normative approach to values in science: Heather Douglas’s conception of scientific integrity, Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism, Helen Longino’s social conception of objectivity, and Janet Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science. Not all of these approaches are put forward as explicitly feminist solutions to the problem; nevertheless, they are of interest to feminist philosophy of science which aims to develop not only a descriptive but also a normative account of values in science. In this extended abstract I will explain the four normative approaches to values in science and outline their shortcomings. In the full-length paper my goal is to argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility is needed to account for the shortcomings in the four approaches.
By epistemic responsibility I refer to a particular conception of epistemic justification. A scientist is epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view if she provides sufficient evidence in support of the view. Some philosophers, most notably Michael Williams, argue that a scientist can be epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view under more relaxed conditions. On Williams’s view, one is epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view also if one adopts a “defense commitment” with respect to the view (Williams 2001, 25). A defense commitment means that one accepts a duty to defend or revise one’s view provided that it is challenged with an appropriate argument. As Williams explains, epistemic justification is “like innocence in a court of law: presumptive but in need of defense in the face of contrary evidence” (2001, 25). The notion of epistemic responsibility has the interesting implication that epistemic justification is necessarily social. What counts as sufficient evidence or as a default entitlement depends on the social features of the claimant’s situation.
Scientific integrity: In Heather Douglas’s view, scientific integrity consists in keeping values to their proper roles, not in limiting the values that have a role to play in science (2009, 176). In order to define a proper role for values (not only social and moral but also cognitive), Douglas makes a distinction between a direct and indirect role. Values play a direct role when they act as reasons in themselves to accept a hypothesis or a theory and an indirect role when they act as reasons to accept a certain level of uncertainty (that is, what counts as sufficient evidence for the acceptance of a hypothesis or a theory given that an error might have more or less severe consequences). Whereas a direct role is unacceptable, an indirect role is acceptable (Douglas 2009, 96). Indeed, it is necessary that scientists make value judgments about the acceptability of uncertainty in order to take moral responsibility for the unintended but predictable consequences of their actions. While I agree about much that Douglas says about the moral responsibilities of scientists, I argue that her normative approach to values in science is not adequate because it does not address those cases where social and moral values motivate the pursuit of theory. In these cases moral and social values do not function as evidence for a theory; nevertheless, they play a crucial role in scientific inquiry. Given Douglas’s normative approach, it is difficult to say whether this role is indirect or direct; consequently, it is difficult to say whether it is or is not legitimate. Thus, I turn to Solomon’s and Longino’s normative approaches to values in science which have the virtue that they attempt to account for this kind of value-influence in science.
Social empiricism: Whereas Douglas’s normative approach to values in science is individualist, Miriam Solomon’s approach is thoroughly collectivist. Solomon claims that a normative theory of values in science should not discourage the influence of social and moral values (or “non-empirical decision vectors” as she calls them) at the individual level in determining a scientist’s choice of one theory over another (Solomon 2001, 120). She argues that we should accept this view because social and moral values can play a positive role in the production of scientific knowledge by generating and maintaining an efficient distribution of research effort amongst those theories that have some empirical successes. Solomon develops this argument into a thoroughgoing criticism of individualism in philosophy of science. She claims that instead of evaluating the reasoning and decision-making of individual scientists, philosophers should evaluate scientific communities on the basis of how well they succeed in distributing research efforts. Thus, a normative theory of values in science should address the role of social and moral values at the community level by determining a rational distribution of research efforts in the community (Solomon 2001, 150). A rational distribution of research efforts requires that social and moral values are equally distributed among those theories that have some empirical successes (Solomon 2001, 117-118). I will argue that Solomon’s normative approach to values in science suffers from two shortcomings. First, her argument for the controversial claim that a normative theory of values in science should not set any constraints on the role of social and moral values in the reasoning and decision-making of individual scientists fails. Second, it is difficult to see how we can have an adequate account of community-level rationality without having an account of individual-level rationality. Even if we cannot reduce community-level to individual-level rationality, we cannot fully severe the connection between the two (see also Rolin & Wray 2008). I will argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility is needed to set more demands for individual scientists than Solomon’s social empiricism.
Social account of objectivity: As an alternative to the traditional ideal of value-free science, Helen Longino introduces a “social value management” ideal of science (2002, 50). Longino’s normative approach to values in science differs from Douglas’s approach in that it does not assume that individual scientists as individuals are capable of realizing the alternative ideal. And it differs from Solomon’s approach in that it does not assume that scientific communities are capable of realizing the alternative ideal without assigning epistemic responsibilities to individual scientists. The “social value management” ideal requires that scientific knowledge be justified in a scientific community which is bound by the four norms of public criticism, uptake of criticism, shared standards of argumentation, and tempered equality of intellectual authority. Ideally, a well-designed community practice of science forces scientists to examine critically the background assumptions which facilitate evidential reasoning as well as the social and moral values which may have motivated the choice of certain background assumptions. Longino’s alternative ideal has been criticized on the grounds that it implies a kind of relativism with respect to moral and social values because it does not explicitly set constraints on the kinds of moral and social values which are allowed to play a role in epistemic justification (Intemann 2008; Kourany 2008). As Kourany explains, “According to this ideal, all social values should be welcomed into science – indeed, encouraged – and all social values, and the science they engender, should be subjected to criticism” (2008, 90). Thus, the critics do not think that Longino’s ideal of “social value management” is sufficiently normative to count as a feminist philosophy of science. In my presentation I will argue that a normative conception of epistemic responsibility is needed to provide a normative account of social and moral values in science.
Socially responsible science: In a recent paper “Replacing the Ideal of Value-Free Science” (2008) Kourany introduces an alternative to Longino’s social value management ideal of science: the ideal of “socially responsible science” (2008, 95). As Kourany explains, “Rather than strive to exclude all social values from science, as the ideal of value-free science directs scientists to do, or to include all social values in science but subject them all to criticism, as Longino’s social value management ideal of science directs scientists to do, the ideal of socially responsible science directs scientists to include only specific social values in science, namely the ones that meet the needs of society” (2008, 95; italics mine). In my presentation I will argue that Kourany’s normative approach to values in science is problematic because it implies dogmatism with respect to moral and social values in science. I will argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility will provide a solution to this problem.
Included in
Normative Approaches to Values in Science
This presentation is part of the Reconsidering Values in Feminist Philosophy of Science track.
During the last three decades feminist philosophers of science have argued that the traditional ideal of value-free science should be replaced because either it is not feasible – or even if it is feasible, it is not a desirable epistemic goal. The traditional ideal of value-free science is the normative claim that social and moral values are not allowed to play a role in the reasoning and decision-making processes that scientists are engaged in when they decide to accept something as scientific knowledge, either individually or collectively. The arguments for the inadequacy of the traditional ideal fall roughly into three categories. (1) Some philosophers have argued that social and moral values should be allowed to play a role in the acceptance of hypotheses because scientists are morally responsible for the practical consequences of errors they can make in the acceptance of hypotheses (see e.g., Douglas 2000 and 2009). (2) Other philosophers have argued that social and moral values can play a legitimate role in the acceptance of hypotheses and theories insofar as they are encoded in the background assumptions that are necessary for evidential reasoning (see e.g., Anderson 1995 and 2004; Longino 1990 and 2002; Wylie 2002; Wylie & Nelson 2007). (3) Yet others have argued that social and moral values can legitimately bear on the acceptance of theories because the conventional distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values breaks down at crucial points (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Longino 1995 and 2008; Rolin 2002; Rooney 1992; Solomon 2001).
Whereas feminist philosophers of science seem to be unanimous about the need to replace the traditional ideal of value-free science, their views diverge on the question of what the successor to the traditional ideal should be. In my presentation I discuss four candidates for a novel normative approach to values in science: Heather Douglas’s conception of scientific integrity, Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism, Helen Longino’s social conception of objectivity, and Janet Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science. Not all of these approaches are put forward as explicitly feminist solutions to the problem; nevertheless, they are of interest to feminist philosophy of science which aims to develop not only a descriptive but also a normative account of values in science. In this extended abstract I will explain the four normative approaches to values in science and outline their shortcomings. In the full-length paper my goal is to argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility is needed to account for the shortcomings in the four approaches.
By epistemic responsibility I refer to a particular conception of epistemic justification. A scientist is epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view if she provides sufficient evidence in support of the view. Some philosophers, most notably Michael Williams, argue that a scientist can be epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view under more relaxed conditions. On Williams’s view, one is epistemically responsible in believing or accepting a view also if one adopts a “defense commitment” with respect to the view (Williams 2001, 25). A defense commitment means that one accepts a duty to defend or revise one’s view provided that it is challenged with an appropriate argument. As Williams explains, epistemic justification is “like innocence in a court of law: presumptive but in need of defense in the face of contrary evidence” (2001, 25). The notion of epistemic responsibility has the interesting implication that epistemic justification is necessarily social. What counts as sufficient evidence or as a default entitlement depends on the social features of the claimant’s situation.
Scientific integrity: In Heather Douglas’s view, scientific integrity consists in keeping values to their proper roles, not in limiting the values that have a role to play in science (2009, 176). In order to define a proper role for values (not only social and moral but also cognitive), Douglas makes a distinction between a direct and indirect role. Values play a direct role when they act as reasons in themselves to accept a hypothesis or a theory and an indirect role when they act as reasons to accept a certain level of uncertainty (that is, what counts as sufficient evidence for the acceptance of a hypothesis or a theory given that an error might have more or less severe consequences). Whereas a direct role is unacceptable, an indirect role is acceptable (Douglas 2009, 96). Indeed, it is necessary that scientists make value judgments about the acceptability of uncertainty in order to take moral responsibility for the unintended but predictable consequences of their actions. While I agree about much that Douglas says about the moral responsibilities of scientists, I argue that her normative approach to values in science is not adequate because it does not address those cases where social and moral values motivate the pursuit of theory. In these cases moral and social values do not function as evidence for a theory; nevertheless, they play a crucial role in scientific inquiry. Given Douglas’s normative approach, it is difficult to say whether this role is indirect or direct; consequently, it is difficult to say whether it is or is not legitimate. Thus, I turn to Solomon’s and Longino’s normative approaches to values in science which have the virtue that they attempt to account for this kind of value-influence in science.
Social empiricism: Whereas Douglas’s normative approach to values in science is individualist, Miriam Solomon’s approach is thoroughly collectivist. Solomon claims that a normative theory of values in science should not discourage the influence of social and moral values (or “non-empirical decision vectors” as she calls them) at the individual level in determining a scientist’s choice of one theory over another (Solomon 2001, 120). She argues that we should accept this view because social and moral values can play a positive role in the production of scientific knowledge by generating and maintaining an efficient distribution of research effort amongst those theories that have some empirical successes. Solomon develops this argument into a thoroughgoing criticism of individualism in philosophy of science. She claims that instead of evaluating the reasoning and decision-making of individual scientists, philosophers should evaluate scientific communities on the basis of how well they succeed in distributing research efforts. Thus, a normative theory of values in science should address the role of social and moral values at the community level by determining a rational distribution of research efforts in the community (Solomon 2001, 150). A rational distribution of research efforts requires that social and moral values are equally distributed among those theories that have some empirical successes (Solomon 2001, 117-118). I will argue that Solomon’s normative approach to values in science suffers from two shortcomings. First, her argument for the controversial claim that a normative theory of values in science should not set any constraints on the role of social and moral values in the reasoning and decision-making of individual scientists fails. Second, it is difficult to see how we can have an adequate account of community-level rationality without having an account of individual-level rationality. Even if we cannot reduce community-level to individual-level rationality, we cannot fully severe the connection between the two (see also Rolin & Wray 2008). I will argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility is needed to set more demands for individual scientists than Solomon’s social empiricism.
Social account of objectivity: As an alternative to the traditional ideal of value-free science, Helen Longino introduces a “social value management” ideal of science (2002, 50). Longino’s normative approach to values in science differs from Douglas’s approach in that it does not assume that individual scientists as individuals are capable of realizing the alternative ideal. And it differs from Solomon’s approach in that it does not assume that scientific communities are capable of realizing the alternative ideal without assigning epistemic responsibilities to individual scientists. The “social value management” ideal requires that scientific knowledge be justified in a scientific community which is bound by the four norms of public criticism, uptake of criticism, shared standards of argumentation, and tempered equality of intellectual authority. Ideally, a well-designed community practice of science forces scientists to examine critically the background assumptions which facilitate evidential reasoning as well as the social and moral values which may have motivated the choice of certain background assumptions. Longino’s alternative ideal has been criticized on the grounds that it implies a kind of relativism with respect to moral and social values because it does not explicitly set constraints on the kinds of moral and social values which are allowed to play a role in epistemic justification (Intemann 2008; Kourany 2008). As Kourany explains, “According to this ideal, all social values should be welcomed into science – indeed, encouraged – and all social values, and the science they engender, should be subjected to criticism” (2008, 90). Thus, the critics do not think that Longino’s ideal of “social value management” is sufficiently normative to count as a feminist philosophy of science. In my presentation I will argue that a normative conception of epistemic responsibility is needed to provide a normative account of social and moral values in science.
Socially responsible science: In a recent paper “Replacing the Ideal of Value-Free Science” (2008) Kourany introduces an alternative to Longino’s social value management ideal of science: the ideal of “socially responsible science” (2008, 95). As Kourany explains, “Rather than strive to exclude all social values from science, as the ideal of value-free science directs scientists to do, or to include all social values in science but subject them all to criticism, as Longino’s social value management ideal of science directs scientists to do, the ideal of socially responsible science directs scientists to include only specific social values in science, namely the ones that meet the needs of society” (2008, 95; italics mine). In my presentation I will argue that Kourany’s normative approach to values in science is problematic because it implies dogmatism with respect to moral and social values in science. I will argue that a normative ideal of epistemic responsibility will provide a solution to this problem.