Event Title
Revisiting feminist values and science
Start Date
27-6-2010 10:45 AM
End Date
27-6-2010 11:45 AM
Description
This presentation is part of the Reconsidering Values in Feminist Philosophy of Science track.
Feminist philosophy of science represents a wide variety of positions, including those that are critical of non-feminist philosophy of science and others that offer alternative conceptualization of the central problems of philosophy of science. Whereas non-feminist philosophers of science have struggled to articulate the sources of normativity that are able to avoid the trap of foundationalism, feminist philosophers of science have argued for an explicitly political notion of normativity that is nonetheless empirically grounded. The latter suggest that because science is itself a normative enterprise, the norms by which a belief is taken to be justified can be articulated and defended by a scientific theory of knowledge.
Feminist philosophy of science has two central objectives: the first, a critical one, is directed at revealing how gender is employed in science to maintain or reinforce different forms of oppression, including how “sexism and androcentrism” function in scientific reasoning and specific research contexts; the second, a normative one, is aimed at showing that focus on sex and gender is good for science – that is, that the ethical and political commitments of feminists have a justifiable role in good science. More specifically, the starting point of the critical project is the empirical fact that women face inequality. For over a century, feminists have painstakingly identified scientific claims that either distort (that is, dismiss or, if necessary, even stress) the role of women for the sake of efficiency or expediency. This in turn led them to find ways to do science informed by gender. Alison Wylie has, for example, shown how the influx of women into the field of archaeology in the 1970s and 1980s led to the identification and questioning of gender-related assumptions that inform archaeological views about the cultural past, a trend that eventually resulted in changes in research goals and methodology.
By locating cases that reveal how gender has been downplayed (or emphasized) to reinforce pre-conceived notions regarding differences between males and females, feminists concerned with science have cast doubt on the view that gender is not relevant to the production of knowledge and have simultaneously provided the means to bring about changes in the kinds of questions raised, the methods embraced, and the social consequences brought about by traditional scientific inquiry. Thus feminist philosophy of science not only considers the way gender relations influence our knowledge practices, but also attempts to develop social models of knowledge production that make possible normative distinctions between better and worse knowledge. Put differently, feminist accounts of science have established in more than one way that theories that take into account sex and gender are “more empirically accurate,” and that by improving the quality of empirical data we also make better the associated value claims.
In this context, I will attempt to examine what precisely is meant by the claim that theories that take into account sex and gender are “more empirically accurate”. That is, I will undertake the task of clarifying what is implied by the idea that gender-sensitive science can deliver knowledge that will eventually benefit marginalized groups. I will also attempt to analyze the notion of a “feminist approach” to doing science.
To begin with, the term “feminist approach” must be better defined simply because feminism is
not a monolith. If this is true, then what exactly should be understood when we claim to do science in a feminist way? Moreover, if, as is often claimed, a “feminist approach” rests on a specific set of values, then further questions are raised: Are there values that are shared by all feminists? If so, what are these values? If, on the other hand, feminists do not form a homogenous group, then do some feminist ways of doing science provide better knowledge than others? Furthermore, how best ought we to understand the claim advanced by feminist philosophers of science that certain values and goals are worth pursuing? Alternatively, what does it mean to say that feminist values (that motivate research, for instance) are the correct or legitimate ones? If, as suggested above, feminist values provide knowledge that empowers marginalized groups, then is it necessarily the case that non-feminist values disempower such groups?
Perhaps we should question the essentialism implied by the distinction between feminist and non-feminist values. It is, after all, possible for different epistemic groups to adopt a particular value for different reasons, thereby producing conflicting consequences. Indeed it is not uncommon to be told that that any defense of values is “contextual and contingent.” This response, while appealing, ultimately disappoints, simply because it disallows the possibility of drawing lessons from the rich studies that have generated insights about the role of values in science. With the help of a case study, I will attempt to answer some of the questions raised above.
Revisiting feminist values and science
This presentation is part of the Reconsidering Values in Feminist Philosophy of Science track.
Feminist philosophy of science represents a wide variety of positions, including those that are critical of non-feminist philosophy of science and others that offer alternative conceptualization of the central problems of philosophy of science. Whereas non-feminist philosophers of science have struggled to articulate the sources of normativity that are able to avoid the trap of foundationalism, feminist philosophers of science have argued for an explicitly political notion of normativity that is nonetheless empirically grounded. The latter suggest that because science is itself a normative enterprise, the norms by which a belief is taken to be justified can be articulated and defended by a scientific theory of knowledge.
Feminist philosophy of science has two central objectives: the first, a critical one, is directed at revealing how gender is employed in science to maintain or reinforce different forms of oppression, including how “sexism and androcentrism” function in scientific reasoning and specific research contexts; the second, a normative one, is aimed at showing that focus on sex and gender is good for science – that is, that the ethical and political commitments of feminists have a justifiable role in good science. More specifically, the starting point of the critical project is the empirical fact that women face inequality. For over a century, feminists have painstakingly identified scientific claims that either distort (that is, dismiss or, if necessary, even stress) the role of women for the sake of efficiency or expediency. This in turn led them to find ways to do science informed by gender. Alison Wylie has, for example, shown how the influx of women into the field of archaeology in the 1970s and 1980s led to the identification and questioning of gender-related assumptions that inform archaeological views about the cultural past, a trend that eventually resulted in changes in research goals and methodology.
By locating cases that reveal how gender has been downplayed (or emphasized) to reinforce pre-conceived notions regarding differences between males and females, feminists concerned with science have cast doubt on the view that gender is not relevant to the production of knowledge and have simultaneously provided the means to bring about changes in the kinds of questions raised, the methods embraced, and the social consequences brought about by traditional scientific inquiry. Thus feminist philosophy of science not only considers the way gender relations influence our knowledge practices, but also attempts to develop social models of knowledge production that make possible normative distinctions between better and worse knowledge. Put differently, feminist accounts of science have established in more than one way that theories that take into account sex and gender are “more empirically accurate,” and that by improving the quality of empirical data we also make better the associated value claims.
In this context, I will attempt to examine what precisely is meant by the claim that theories that take into account sex and gender are “more empirically accurate”. That is, I will undertake the task of clarifying what is implied by the idea that gender-sensitive science can deliver knowledge that will eventually benefit marginalized groups. I will also attempt to analyze the notion of a “feminist approach” to doing science.
To begin with, the term “feminist approach” must be better defined simply because feminism is
not a monolith. If this is true, then what exactly should be understood when we claim to do science in a feminist way? Moreover, if, as is often claimed, a “feminist approach” rests on a specific set of values, then further questions are raised: Are there values that are shared by all feminists? If so, what are these values? If, on the other hand, feminists do not form a homogenous group, then do some feminist ways of doing science provide better knowledge than others? Furthermore, how best ought we to understand the claim advanced by feminist philosophers of science that certain values and goals are worth pursuing? Alternatively, what does it mean to say that feminist values (that motivate research, for instance) are the correct or legitimate ones? If, as suggested above, feminist values provide knowledge that empowers marginalized groups, then is it necessarily the case that non-feminist values disempower such groups?
Perhaps we should question the essentialism implied by the distinction between feminist and non-feminist values. It is, after all, possible for different epistemic groups to adopt a particular value for different reasons, thereby producing conflicting consequences. Indeed it is not uncommon to be told that that any defense of values is “contextual and contingent.” This response, while appealing, ultimately disappoints, simply because it disallows the possibility of drawing lessons from the rich studies that have generated insights about the role of values in science. With the help of a case study, I will attempt to answer some of the questions raised above.