Paper Title
Paper Abstract
Spinoza stipulates in E2def2, his definition of the essence of a thing, that the essence of each particular can neither exist nor, even, be conceived, except alongside its particular. Yet a mere eight propositions later states that God maintains an idea of the essence of nonactual particulars “in the same way as the formal essences of the singular things are contained in God’s attributes” (E2p8). While there are known interpretive controversies with each of these claims, I argue that according to E2def2, essences of particulars can only be and can only be conceived alongside the actual existence of their particular, and that according to E2p8, the essences of nonactual particulars are conceived by God apart from their particular and that the objects of these ideas—formal essences—are things within God’s attributes whether their particulars exist or not. I argue here that Spinoza’s formal essence has two distinct modes of existing. The essence that at all times is contained within God’s attributes and comprehended by God’s intellect may be expressed also as the essence of an actual particular, and when this occurs the instance of the essence within the particular is thereby unique to and even perishes with the particular. I draw upon the corollary and scholium, as well as other important texts, to suggest that the eternal essence is a kind essence, and that instances of this in particulars are unique and durational. The key to resolving Spinoza’s seemingly inconsistent remarks on essences is to recognize the difference between the eternal kind essence and its unique and durational instances in particulars.
Notes
© 2020. Christopher Martin. © 2020. TBA Commentator These materials are presented under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International copyright license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
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Start Date
4-6-2020 2:00 PM
Time Zone
Pacific Daylight Time
End Date
4-6-2020 2:55 PM
Location
Keywords
Spinoza, Essences, Formal Essence, E2d2, E2p8, Kind-essences
Spinoza’s Formal Essence
Spinoza stipulates in E2def2, his definition of the essence of a thing, that the essence of each particular can neither exist nor, even, be conceived, except alongside its particular. Yet a mere eight propositions later states that God maintains an idea of the essence of nonactual particulars “in the same way as the formal essences of the singular things are contained in God’s attributes” (E2p8). While there are known interpretive controversies with each of these claims, I argue that according to E2def2, essences of particulars can only be and can only be conceived alongside the actual existence of their particular, and that according to E2p8, the essences of nonactual particulars are conceived by God apart from their particular and that the objects of these ideas—formal essences—are things within God’s attributes whether their particulars exist or not. I argue here that Spinoza’s formal essence has two distinct modes of existing. The essence that at all times is contained within God’s attributes and comprehended by God’s intellect may be expressed also as the essence of an actual particular, and when this occurs the instance of the essence within the particular is thereby unique to and even perishes with the particular. I draw upon the corollary and scholium, as well as other important texts, to suggest that the eternal essence is a kind essence, and that instances of this in particulars are unique and durational. The key to resolving Spinoza’s seemingly inconsistent remarks on essences is to recognize the difference between the eternal kind essence and its unique and durational instances in particulars.