Paper Abstract
In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors.
Notes
© 2020. Daniel Stermer. © 2020. Marc Bobro. These materials are presented under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International copyright license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
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Start Date
4-6-2020 9:00 AM
Time Zone
Pacific Daylight Time
End Date
4-6-2020 9:55 AM
Location
Keywords
Descartes, modality, possibility, ideas
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Cancelled - The Ontological Status of Cartesian Possibilia
In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors.