Law Publications
Title
Conceiving What Is Not There
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2001
Volume
8
Journal
Journal of Consciousness Studies
First Page
21
Last Page
42
Abstract
In this paper I argue that certain so-called conceivability arguments fail to show that a currently popular version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind is false. Concentrating on an argument due to David Chalmers, I first argue that Chalmers misrepresents the relation between conceivability and possibility. I then argue that the intuition behind the conceivability of so-called zombie worlds can be accounted for without having to suppose that such worlds are genuinely conceivable. I conclude with some general remarks about the nature of conceivability.
Citation of this paper:
“Conceiving What Is Not There,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001): 21-42.
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