Event Title
Nature-nurture revisited: The dualist underpinnings of social constructionism and evolutionary psychology
Start Date
28-6-2010 9:00 AM
End Date
28-6-2010 10:30 AM
Description
This presentation is part of the Gender in Evolutionary Psychology track.
There is widespread consensus among scholars and scientists that the nature-nurture dichotomy is ill conceived. Heir to the Cartesian split of body and mind, the nature-nurture debate concerned the question whether human behaviour has biological or socio-cultural causes. The present shared understanding is that Cartesian dualism and the subsequent nature-nurture dichotomy need to be rejected because behaviour has both biological and socio-cultural causes. Instead of dualism, interactionism is the preferred stance nowadays, that is, the belief that biological and socio-cultural factors interact in various ways and together shape behaviour. This transition from dualism to interactionism and the implications of this transition play out in a particularly interesting way in gender research. This should come as no surprise because the sex-gender distinction which is foundational for gender studies constitutes an incipient form of interactionism. Though the introduction of the distinction served the purpose of clearing the field for the study of gender, i.e. the social-cultural constructions of and meanings attributed to sex, most gender studies scholars and researchers assume that some basic factors of sex – for instance the binarity of sex and the reproductive role of the female body – interact with gender.
The aim of my paper is to show that this standard solution of the nature-nurture debate is spurious. Interactionism does not so much overcome dualism as continue it with other means, and under other names. Though gender theorists like Butler (1990, 1993), Grosz (1994), Gatens (1996), Fausto-Sterling (2000) and others have provided influential theoretical deconstructions and critiques of the dualist underpinnings of the sex-gender distinction, this work has hardly influenced empirical gender research, nor has it resulted in new, non-dualist approaches in empirical gender research. For example, Judith Butler’s fundamental critique of gender binarity has not been picked up in empirical research. In the overwhelming majority of empirical studies on gender the binarity of gender is assumed instead of investigated. The underlying reasoning for the assumption of gender binarity is probably interactionist. Most gender studies scholars take sex binarity as an indisputable biological fact constraining the variability of gender. Gender varies, but only within the two – in their attributes partially overlapping – groups delimited by sex. Yet, why should there be only two genders? Or any gender, for that matter? Apart from patriarchal norms of masculinity and femininity imposed on behaviour, the assumption of gender binarity only makes sense if one believes that male bodies cause masculine behaviour and female bodies feminine behaviour. In other words, the unquestioned status of gender binarity appears to rely, unwittingly, on a biologically essentializing view that, if made explicit, many gender studies scholars would shun or contest.
In this paper I will investigate the interactionist stance by examining the, presently, most influential approaches in empirical gender research, i.e. evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory. A relatively recent follow-up theory of social constructionism, biosocial theory has integrated biological and social factors in its theory in order to meet the challenge of evolutionary psychology’s claims about sex differences in behaviour. Over the past decade, evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory have produced various empirical studies on behavioural sex differences. The most compelling ones are the 2002 study of the designers of biosocial theory, Alice Eagly & Wendy Wood, and the 2005 article by evolutionary psychologist David Schmitt. Both articles report extensive research on behavioural sex differences and consider social constructionist as well as evolutionary psychologist explanations. Their aim is to evaluate which theory explains the reported behavioural sex differences best.
I will focus my investigation on these empirical studies because they are exemplary for the interactionist stance. Moreover, as noted above, theoretical deconstruction of dualism has already been done; what is needed is an extension of these theoretical insights to empirical work. The point of the article is not only to show how and why the interactionist approach of evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory doesn’t succeed in leaving Cartesian dualism behind. It will also become apparent that evolutionary psychology and social constructionism have more in common then adherents of both theories and the general academic public seem to be aware of.
The paper starts with an introduction of the two studies, outlining the most important theoretical hypotheses and outcomes. Subsequently I will discuss the explanatory and methodological framework of evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory. I start with evolutionary psychology’s claim concerning human nature because it provides a good starting point to explain this theory’s take on evolution. Then I discuss the way both theories handle the question of the causes of behaviour, relying on the cognitivist paradigm, and I elucidate the deeply anchored dualist framework of this paradigm. I conclude with an inquiry into the methodological framework both theories have in common. In the final section I will summarize the reasons why interactionism is not a solution to nature-nurture dualism, and suggest some new non-dualist approaches which are worth exploring (i.e. developmental systems theory and embedded embodied cognition).
Nature-nurture revisited: The dualist underpinnings of social constructionism and evolutionary psychology
This presentation is part of the Gender in Evolutionary Psychology track.
There is widespread consensus among scholars and scientists that the nature-nurture dichotomy is ill conceived. Heir to the Cartesian split of body and mind, the nature-nurture debate concerned the question whether human behaviour has biological or socio-cultural causes. The present shared understanding is that Cartesian dualism and the subsequent nature-nurture dichotomy need to be rejected because behaviour has both biological and socio-cultural causes. Instead of dualism, interactionism is the preferred stance nowadays, that is, the belief that biological and socio-cultural factors interact in various ways and together shape behaviour. This transition from dualism to interactionism and the implications of this transition play out in a particularly interesting way in gender research. This should come as no surprise because the sex-gender distinction which is foundational for gender studies constitutes an incipient form of interactionism. Though the introduction of the distinction served the purpose of clearing the field for the study of gender, i.e. the social-cultural constructions of and meanings attributed to sex, most gender studies scholars and researchers assume that some basic factors of sex – for instance the binarity of sex and the reproductive role of the female body – interact with gender.
The aim of my paper is to show that this standard solution of the nature-nurture debate is spurious. Interactionism does not so much overcome dualism as continue it with other means, and under other names. Though gender theorists like Butler (1990, 1993), Grosz (1994), Gatens (1996), Fausto-Sterling (2000) and others have provided influential theoretical deconstructions and critiques of the dualist underpinnings of the sex-gender distinction, this work has hardly influenced empirical gender research, nor has it resulted in new, non-dualist approaches in empirical gender research. For example, Judith Butler’s fundamental critique of gender binarity has not been picked up in empirical research. In the overwhelming majority of empirical studies on gender the binarity of gender is assumed instead of investigated. The underlying reasoning for the assumption of gender binarity is probably interactionist. Most gender studies scholars take sex binarity as an indisputable biological fact constraining the variability of gender. Gender varies, but only within the two – in their attributes partially overlapping – groups delimited by sex. Yet, why should there be only two genders? Or any gender, for that matter? Apart from patriarchal norms of masculinity and femininity imposed on behaviour, the assumption of gender binarity only makes sense if one believes that male bodies cause masculine behaviour and female bodies feminine behaviour. In other words, the unquestioned status of gender binarity appears to rely, unwittingly, on a biologically essentializing view that, if made explicit, many gender studies scholars would shun or contest.
In this paper I will investigate the interactionist stance by examining the, presently, most influential approaches in empirical gender research, i.e. evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory. A relatively recent follow-up theory of social constructionism, biosocial theory has integrated biological and social factors in its theory in order to meet the challenge of evolutionary psychology’s claims about sex differences in behaviour. Over the past decade, evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory have produced various empirical studies on behavioural sex differences. The most compelling ones are the 2002 study of the designers of biosocial theory, Alice Eagly & Wendy Wood, and the 2005 article by evolutionary psychologist David Schmitt. Both articles report extensive research on behavioural sex differences and consider social constructionist as well as evolutionary psychologist explanations. Their aim is to evaluate which theory explains the reported behavioural sex differences best.
I will focus my investigation on these empirical studies because they are exemplary for the interactionist stance. Moreover, as noted above, theoretical deconstruction of dualism has already been done; what is needed is an extension of these theoretical insights to empirical work. The point of the article is not only to show how and why the interactionist approach of evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory doesn’t succeed in leaving Cartesian dualism behind. It will also become apparent that evolutionary psychology and social constructionism have more in common then adherents of both theories and the general academic public seem to be aware of.
The paper starts with an introduction of the two studies, outlining the most important theoretical hypotheses and outcomes. Subsequently I will discuss the explanatory and methodological framework of evolutionary psychology and biosocial theory. I start with evolutionary psychology’s claim concerning human nature because it provides a good starting point to explain this theory’s take on evolution. Then I discuss the way both theories handle the question of the causes of behaviour, relying on the cognitivist paradigm, and I elucidate the deeply anchored dualist framework of this paradigm. I conclude with an inquiry into the methodological framework both theories have in common. In the final section I will summarize the reasons why interactionism is not a solution to nature-nurture dualism, and suggest some new non-dualist approaches which are worth exploring (i.e. developmental systems theory and embedded embodied cognition).