Start Date
25-6-2010 2:45 PM
End Date
25-6-2010 4:15 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Feminist Perspectives in the Sciences: Physics, Chemistry and Climate Science track.
Feminist science criticism has overwhelmingly concerned itself with biological theories on sex and gender difference. Feminist critics (Bleier, Hubbard, Fausto-Sterling, Haraway) have discredited these theories by arguing that gender bias resulted in cognitive distortions and misrepresentation of the subject of inquiry. Feminist philosophers of science (Harding, Longino, and Nelson, among others), elaborated epistemological frameworks to account for these gender biases in science. There is nothing specific in their theories which would limit their validity to the social and life sciences, and yet no case studies have been done on gender ideology in any particular physical science (such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, or earth science), except for the work of Potter on the parallel emergence of the mechanistic paradigm and a new social order in the aftermath of the English Revolution. The reception of this claim was highly controversial (see Rolin 1999 and Potter 1994).
Present paper aims to contribute to the debate on whether gender ideology can or does influence the content of the physical sciences. We believe this is a conceptual problem, rather than an empirical one, as the answer depends on what theory of gender, science, knowledge and culture we are committed to. It would then seem that the lack of case studies is itself a consequence of the lack of a coherent philosophical framework which would specify these concepts and their relationship. In our paper, we ask: what conceptualizations of gender, science, knowledge, and culture allow for or even necessitate the conclusion that gender ideology is part of the physical sciences?
Four groups of arguments will be proposed and discussed: 1) the concept of gender 2) various philosophies of science on the role of values in science; 3) the unity or disunity of culture 4) the relation between social and natural worlds in standpoint theory. We discuss these rather complex issues with reference to the possibility of the manifestation of gender ideology in physical science only.
The point of departure is the understanding of gender as a socio-cultural construct, arguably the most important achievement of feminist theory. Gender is about the production of men and women, but also about the production of social relations and cultural meanings that are structured by gender. On this account, gender ideology is a set of beliefs that naturalize and legitimate unequal gender relations. If gender is thought of as the feature of social and symbolic systems, this allows us to consider it as a relevant category of analysis in disciplines which do not make claims about sex and gender difference.
The second point concerns the type of philosophy of science one is committed to. One of us has argued before that analytic philosophy of science (influenced by logical positivism and philosophy of language) is but one of the possible ways to deal with the philosophical problems of the natural sciences. Social constructivism and hermeneutic/phenomenological approaches to science provide viable alternative answers to the same types of questions that analytic philosophy of science raises. The three traditions differ radically in their conceptualization of the relationship between facts and values. In the social constructivist (Latour, Collins, Pinch, Knorr-Cetina, etc.) and in the hermeneutical (Heelan, Kockelmans, Ihde etc.) approaches, facts and values are inextricably intertwined, whereas they are distinct in the analytic tradition. The reason for this difference is that for constructivism and hermeneutics of science, the social and cognitive aspects of science are one and the same. That is, a practice that is interest- and value-laden necessarily leads to an (intellectual) product that reflects that same values and interests. We can thus conclude (as many of the proponents of the above mentioned two traditions have) that social interests and cultural values are necessarily part of the content of the physical sciences.
The remaining question is if all the values of the broader socio-cultural context find their way into scientific theories and if they have the same importance within science as outside of it. The answer ultimately depends on our views on the unity or disunity of culture. If culture is conceptualized as a compact unit, then the same set of values, with the same significance, characterize any particular part of it (the scientific community) as the whole. The sex-gender distinction and related ideologies are among the most important axes around which Western society and culture are organized. If we adopt the view that all important values of a culture go into the science it produces, then gender ideology will certainly be part of any physical science.
Our last point concerns (feminist) standpoint theory, which is often invoked to legitimate feminist knowledge claims in the social sciences and humanities. The extension of standpoint theory to the physical sciences is controversial, as the epistemic privilege which standpoint theory confers on women, and marxism, on the proletariat, is rooted in the oppression of the respective groups and is therefore associated with phenomena in which this subjugation is implicated. If social reality looks different from the perspective of different social groups, does the natural world also look different? To answer this question, we invoke the concept of work in the writings of Georg Lukács. For Lukács, the most fundamental human activity is work as it is through work that human beings create themselves. Nature and society are thus connected through human work, and social groups are defined with reference to their position in the social division of labor. As a consequence, people experience reality as unified. The unity of the natural and social worlds imply that in a sexist society, gender ideology will be part of the physical sciences.
In conclusion, we have argued that the question of gender ideology in the physical sciences hinges on what we think about the unity of culture and of reality. If culture and reality are conceptualized as unified, the same set of values will characterize physical science as broader culture. The proper way to identify gender ideology in physical science is then to identify the values in scientific theories, and in the broader cultural context in which they were born. Often the claim is made that in order to qualify as a case of gender ideology in science, the causal role of gender ideology in the genesis or acceptance of the scientific theory should be demonstrated. In contrast, our analysis suggests that scientists can and do represent cultural ideologies in their work irrespective of their being aware of it.
Included in
Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Philosophy Commons, Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons
Gender Ideology in the Physical Sciences: Philosophical Arguments
This presentation is part of the Feminist Perspectives in the Sciences: Physics, Chemistry and Climate Science track.
Feminist science criticism has overwhelmingly concerned itself with biological theories on sex and gender difference. Feminist critics (Bleier, Hubbard, Fausto-Sterling, Haraway) have discredited these theories by arguing that gender bias resulted in cognitive distortions and misrepresentation of the subject of inquiry. Feminist philosophers of science (Harding, Longino, and Nelson, among others), elaborated epistemological frameworks to account for these gender biases in science. There is nothing specific in their theories which would limit their validity to the social and life sciences, and yet no case studies have been done on gender ideology in any particular physical science (such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, or earth science), except for the work of Potter on the parallel emergence of the mechanistic paradigm and a new social order in the aftermath of the English Revolution. The reception of this claim was highly controversial (see Rolin 1999 and Potter 1994).
Present paper aims to contribute to the debate on whether gender ideology can or does influence the content of the physical sciences. We believe this is a conceptual problem, rather than an empirical one, as the answer depends on what theory of gender, science, knowledge and culture we are committed to. It would then seem that the lack of case studies is itself a consequence of the lack of a coherent philosophical framework which would specify these concepts and their relationship. In our paper, we ask: what conceptualizations of gender, science, knowledge, and culture allow for or even necessitate the conclusion that gender ideology is part of the physical sciences?
Four groups of arguments will be proposed and discussed: 1) the concept of gender 2) various philosophies of science on the role of values in science; 3) the unity or disunity of culture 4) the relation between social and natural worlds in standpoint theory. We discuss these rather complex issues with reference to the possibility of the manifestation of gender ideology in physical science only.
The point of departure is the understanding of gender as a socio-cultural construct, arguably the most important achievement of feminist theory. Gender is about the production of men and women, but also about the production of social relations and cultural meanings that are structured by gender. On this account, gender ideology is a set of beliefs that naturalize and legitimate unequal gender relations. If gender is thought of as the feature of social and symbolic systems, this allows us to consider it as a relevant category of analysis in disciplines which do not make claims about sex and gender difference.
The second point concerns the type of philosophy of science one is committed to. One of us has argued before that analytic philosophy of science (influenced by logical positivism and philosophy of language) is but one of the possible ways to deal with the philosophical problems of the natural sciences. Social constructivism and hermeneutic/phenomenological approaches to science provide viable alternative answers to the same types of questions that analytic philosophy of science raises. The three traditions differ radically in their conceptualization of the relationship between facts and values. In the social constructivist (Latour, Collins, Pinch, Knorr-Cetina, etc.) and in the hermeneutical (Heelan, Kockelmans, Ihde etc.) approaches, facts and values are inextricably intertwined, whereas they are distinct in the analytic tradition. The reason for this difference is that for constructivism and hermeneutics of science, the social and cognitive aspects of science are one and the same. That is, a practice that is interest- and value-laden necessarily leads to an (intellectual) product that reflects that same values and interests. We can thus conclude (as many of the proponents of the above mentioned two traditions have) that social interests and cultural values are necessarily part of the content of the physical sciences.
The remaining question is if all the values of the broader socio-cultural context find their way into scientific theories and if they have the same importance within science as outside of it. The answer ultimately depends on our views on the unity or disunity of culture. If culture is conceptualized as a compact unit, then the same set of values, with the same significance, characterize any particular part of it (the scientific community) as the whole. The sex-gender distinction and related ideologies are among the most important axes around which Western society and culture are organized. If we adopt the view that all important values of a culture go into the science it produces, then gender ideology will certainly be part of any physical science.
Our last point concerns (feminist) standpoint theory, which is often invoked to legitimate feminist knowledge claims in the social sciences and humanities. The extension of standpoint theory to the physical sciences is controversial, as the epistemic privilege which standpoint theory confers on women, and marxism, on the proletariat, is rooted in the oppression of the respective groups and is therefore associated with phenomena in which this subjugation is implicated. If social reality looks different from the perspective of different social groups, does the natural world also look different? To answer this question, we invoke the concept of work in the writings of Georg Lukács. For Lukács, the most fundamental human activity is work as it is through work that human beings create themselves. Nature and society are thus connected through human work, and social groups are defined with reference to their position in the social division of labor. As a consequence, people experience reality as unified. The unity of the natural and social worlds imply that in a sexist society, gender ideology will be part of the physical sciences.
In conclusion, we have argued that the question of gender ideology in the physical sciences hinges on what we think about the unity of culture and of reality. If culture and reality are conceptualized as unified, the same set of values will characterize physical science as broader culture. The proper way to identify gender ideology in physical science is then to identify the values in scientific theories, and in the broader cultural context in which they were born. Often the claim is made that in order to qualify as a case of gender ideology in science, the causal role of gender ideology in the genesis or acceptance of the scientific theory should be demonstrated. In contrast, our analysis suggests that scientists can and do represent cultural ideologies in their work irrespective of their being aware of it.