Conceptual Engineering & Contextualism
Abstract
In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between conceptual engineering and contextualism in philosophy. Conceptual engineering evaluates philosophical theories about concepts against whether they meet normative and political objectives, while contextualism highlights the influence of context on meaning and truth. I argue that conceptual engineering is subject to contextualism, rendering theories about concepts applicable only in specific contexts.
The first chapter examines essentially contested concepts: concepts inevitably subject to contestation, owing to different, equally legitimate reasons philosophers may have for valuing them. Nevertheless, within specific contexts, these concepts serve particular purposes, and conceptions aligned with those purposes better capture their significance.
Chapter 2 examines the metaphysics of gender, challenging the view that gender categories are both subjective identities and objective social constructions. This view fails to address conflicts between how we subjectively identity and how we are objectively treated by others. I propose a contextualist perspective, according to which gender category meanings vary based on why we use them within particular contexts.
In Chapter 3, I compare the methodology used in the metaphysics of gender with that used in the literature on the moral status of animals. I argue that the justification for employing conceptual engineering in the former applies equally to the latter. Accordingly, endorsing conceptual engineering in one case should lead us to do so in the other. Finally, I propose a contextualist account of moral status.