NATO's Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan
Abstract
This study aims to understand the security policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and investigate whether NATO’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) approach in Afghanistan was a mixed record of success and failure between 2003 and 2014. In terms of NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan, what worked, what did not work, and why did certain aspects of SSR fail? The analysis sheds light on the policy-relevant, logistic and doctrinal intricacies associated with NATO’s now almost twenty-year record of involvement in Afghanistan, as well as liberal institutionalism’s policy relevance. This research benefits the security policy community by asking whether NATO's SSR agenda in Afghanistan was successful, and whether its weaknesses call for the reform of its approach and execution – or its abandonment. The research findings indicate there were faults with the SSR project in Afghanistan, and modes of execution and stages of policy development were incoherent and inconsistent, but liberal institutionalism helps explain how to establish vital institutions and ensure more democratic transitions of power so that the international community and multilateral institutions like NATO remain engaged.