Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Thesis Format

Monograph

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Program

Theory and Criticism

Supervisor

Biswas Mellamphy, Nandita

Abstract

This thesis centres two research questions. First, are the principles of critical post-humanism consistent with its aims? Second, if the principles of critical post-humanism are inconsistent with its aims, what might constitute a veritable post-humanism? I begin by diagramming the stated goals of critical post-humanism, tracing its ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ conceptualizations—a connected ontology, relational epistemology, and situated ethics—in contradistinction to Kant’s transcendental humanism’s commitment to a separated ontology, reflective epistemology, and deontological morality. Building out from this point, I question whether these commitments are sufficient in the pursuit of a post-humanist philosophy. Focusing on the realm of political ontology, I argue that the promotion of connection, relation, and situatedness can already be found in the ethico-political commitments of Hegel, a thinker many align with the problems of humanism. It follows that, in addition to its initial goals, critical post-humanism requires further—and more thorough—critiques of Kantian-Hegelian rationalism and teleology. The critique of rationalism is explored through the development of a post-humanist ‘ethics’ that would be both non-universal and non-rational. To do this, I highlight work focused on bodies and embodiment, asking what a physiological ethics might look like for critical post-humanism. The critique of teleology, in particular Hegelian teleology, is explored by way of Gilbert Simondon’s anti-hylomorphic philosophy. Drawing out the role of formal and final causality in the latter parts of Hegel’s Science of Logic, teleology is understood as akin to hylomorphism. Together, these discussions centre the question: is it possible to determine a normative position or political ontology without an appeal to ends [telos]? This question continues to reverberate through the close of the thesis, which focuses on questions of race and inclusion in critical post-humanism.

Summary for Lay Audience

During the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, the ‘human’ became increasingly central to the way people thought about being (i.e. ontology), knowing (epistemology), and morality. Where God had once been the standard by which these values were measured, the human being increasingly took God’s place. This constituted a shift from theocentric models to human-centric models, or ‘humanism.’ However, within humanism not all humans were counted as human. Most populations—those who were non-white, non-male, non-heterosexual, etc.—were not included as the arbiter of measure but were instead designated under the category of ‘things.’ As designators of value, humans were understood as separate from ‘being’ or ‘nature.’ This allowed humans to both accurately represent non-human ‘things,’ and justified their domination of those ‘things’ towards human ends. In many ways these ontological, epistemic, and moral ways of thinking remain in place today. Inspired by a multitude of critical discourses, some theorists have suggested that it is necessary to overcome humanism by pursuing a post-humanism. Post-humanism would replace the ontological, epistemological, and moral values of humanism with more relational, caring, and respectful values. This dissertation works to both draw out these alternative values before questioning whether they are sufficient for escaping humanism. I focus on issues of rationalism, ethics, finality, and inclusion.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

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