Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Thesis Format

Monograph

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Program

Philosophy

Supervisor

Mendelovici, Angela

2nd Supervisor

Bourget, David

Co-Supervisor

Abstract

Virtual reality is poised to be increasingly important in our lives. This dissertation investigates the philosophical foundations of virtual reality, probing the metaphysics and epistemology of perceptual experiences of virtual environments. Specifically, it asks 1) what there is in virtual reality and 2) how we perceive virtual things. It defends virtual veridicalism, the view that perceptual experiences in virtual reality are as veridical as ordinary experiences. The defense consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 explains why such questions need to be addressed. Chapter 2 develops a realist view of virtual objects and properties, arguing that virtual objects exist and instantiate properties that may or may not be instantiated by ordinary physical objects. Chapter 3 presents an argument in defense of virtual veridicalism. I argue that the common criterion whereby we consider ordinary experiences veridical justifies the veridicality of perceptual experiences of virtual objects and properties. Chapter 4 looks for a representationalist account of perceptual content that could lend theoretical support to my defense of virtual veridicalism. I argue that none of the currently prominent representationalist views succeed. Rather, Chapter 5 proposes a new account — role representationalism — to achieve the goal. This account claims that, despite some differences in perceptual contents between the virtual and ordinary physical domains, a fundamental aspect of contents remains constant in perceptual experience across both domains, and it is the constant aspect that grounds the veridicality of perceptual experiences of virtual objects and properties. Chapter 6 assesses Chalmers’s (2017) defense of virtual veridicalism and argues that his defense cannot succeed unless presupposing role representationalism as the underlying theory of content of perceptual experiences. Finally, I conclude that 1) there are virtual objects and properties in virtual reality, and 2) we perceive these entities in a way that is as veridical as our perception of ordinary objects.

Summary for Lay Audience

Virtual reality (VR) is becoming increasingly important in our lives. In VR, we perceive and interact with things that never happen in ordinary lives. For instance, in the game Beat Saber, players have to hit the virtual cubes that swiftly fly toward them with the virtual sabers in their hands. To reach a high score, they need to coordinate her movements with the rhythm of the flying cubes. Presumably, their hitting the cubes will succeed only when their visual experiences of the cubes are accurate, or more specifically, only when they see the cubes as approaching in the right position at the right time. In other words, for the players’ movements to be successful, it seems to require that the cubes exist and fly in the game and that the players’ experiences of the cubes’ trajectory be accurate or, in philosophers’ jargon, veridical. It might be hard to explain the success of their movements if they perceive the cubes in the wrong position or if the cubes are not really there.

The reflection above motivates two general philosophical questions of VR: 1) What is there in VR? 2) How do we perceive virtual things? The first question concerns the metaphysics of VR. The second question, on the other hand, focuses on the epistemic foundation of perception in VR. This dissertation aims to answer both questions. Its central thesis is virtual veridicalism, the view that perceptual experiences in VR are as veridical as ordinary experiences. First of all, I contend that virtual objects (e.g., the cubes) are real and instantiate perceptible properties (e.g., the cubes are flying). Second, I argue that our perceptual experiences of them are veridical, i.e., we perceive virtual objects as having the properties that they really have. Eventually, I conclude that 1) there are virtual objects and properties in VR, and 2) we perceive these entities in ways that are as veridical as our perception of ordinary objects.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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