Date of Award
1991
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, I apply the first-price auction theory to investigate equilibrium queuing behavior, rent distribution, and rent dissipation given that the underpriced consumer goods are distributed through queuing and random allocation mechanisms. Four major results are obtained. First, using the generalized first-price auction framework, two existing queuing models in the literature are unified. Second, it is shown that the equilibrium queuing time can be shorter with a secondary market than without. Third, with rationing by queuing as the allocation mechanism, the emergence of secondary markets does not necessarily lead to Pareto improvement: the low-wage consumers are definitely better off while the high and medium-wage consumers can be worse off. The sufficient conditions for Pareto improvement and less rent dissipation are provided. Finally, it is shown that under certain conditions, random allocation mechanisms may be preferred to queuing allocation mechanisms if less rent dissipation is the objective.;In the second essay, attempts are made to understand the effects of the dual ownership structure on the long-term resource allocation and economic performance in centrally planned economies (CPEs). To capture the strategic interactions between central planners and consumers in CPEs, a game-theoretic framework is employed. In each period, to achieve his goal, the planner decides how to allocate output between consumption and investment, while the consumers, trying to maximize their utility, decides how to allocate their labor endowment between leisure and labor service, given the fraction of output they are allowed to consume. The major results obtained are as follows. First, if the central planner assumes the Stackelberg leadership, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium, which is a saddlepoint. Second, we compare the long-term resource allocation and economic performance of a CPE and a market economy (ME) with the same physical environment. It is shown that the taste parameters of the consumer and the planner play an important role.;The third essay presents a method for assessing the relative importance of price increases and the introduction of the responsibility system for improved agricultural performance in China following the economic reforms initiated in 1978. We employ a production-function approach in which optimizing effort decisions of peasants are captured. Peasant supply of effort expands as either the prices of agricultural products or the fraction of their value marginal product they receive increases. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
Recommended Citation
Zhu, Lijing, "Three Essays On Non-market Resource Allocation Mechanisms" (1991). Digitized Theses. 2014.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/digitizedtheses/2014