A role for representation in cognitive neurobiology
Document Type
Conference Proceeding
Publication Date
1-1-2010
Journal
Philosophy of Science
Volume
77
Issue
5
First Page
875
Last Page
887
URL with Digital Object Identifier
10.1086/656818
Abstract
What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is needed is for representation to instead play a substantive role. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
Notes
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