Construct stabilization and the unity of the mind-brain sciences
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-1-2016
Journal
Philosophy of Science
Volume
83
Issue
5
First Page
662
Last Page
673
URL with Digital Object Identifier
10.1086/687853
Abstract
© 2016 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. This article offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is put forward, and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered.
Notes
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