Event Title
Start Date
28-6-2010 10:45 AM
End Date
28-6-2010 12:15 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Objectivity and Impartiality track.
Feminist epistemologists have long been concerned with clarifying the legitimate roles that social and ethical values might play in the acceptance or justification of empirical theories and beliefs. Their concern stems, at least in part, from what Louise Antony has defined as the ‘bias paradox’ (1993). Since to be a feminist is, at least, to be committed to a cluster of political and ethical values about the injustice of discrimination against women, feminists cannot claim value neutrality for their inquiries. But, if knowledge requires value-neutrality, then feminist values cannot play any legitimate roles in the justification of empirical theories.
This paper is divided in two sections. In the first, after providing some background discussion about the role of values in empirical research, I present a defence of the view that neither autonomy nor value neutrality are desirable ideals for the justification of theories and beliefs. My argument here is greatly indebted to Elizabeth Anderson’s defence of the situatedness of knowledge. As I also make clear in this section, Anderson remains committed to the necessity of impartiality for knowledge. In the second section I offer an argument for the claim that knowledge does not require impartiality because practical interests can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief (Cf, Stanley, 2005). I conclude the paper with some observations about how the rejection of impartiality for knowledge offers a vindication of some versions of standpoint epistemology against the challenges posed by feminist empiricism.
There is widespread agreement on the claim that all kinds of values may, even in quite bizarre ways, lead individuals or communities to formulate theories and hypotheses or to acquire beliefs that happen to have quite a lot of epistemic mileage. In other words, it is undisputed that contextual social and political values, of all sorts, might play helpful or not so helpful roles in the so-called context of discovery. Feminist values and commitments to the promotion of women’s interests can play the same roles.
There is no necessary relation between the endorsability of the values driving a bit of research and the epistemic value of the theories or beliefs produced as a result. Good values can lead to bad theories. That is, theories which are false or empirically inadequate or with little explanatory power. Bad values, on the other hand, can lead to good theories. Hence, the mere fact that bad values played a role in the formulation of a view is not sufficient to determine that the theory is epistemically bankrupt (Anderson, 1995a, p. 76). It appears reasonable, however, to take the bad history of a theory to license the need for a thorough scrutiny of its empirical adequacy.
The need for scrutiny in such cases does not imply that values can or should always be screened out when we consider the justification of theories or beliefs. Quite the opposite might be true, if, as feminist epistemologists hold, enquiry is inevitably value-laden in the sense that allows for the unavoidable presence of values in the justification of theories and beliefs. The value-ladeness of justification in the natural sciences is a consequence of the under-determination of scientific theories by all available empirical data (Quine, 1980). Often whether any given observation conflicts with, or offers evidence in support of, a given theory might well depend on the background assumptions of the theorist.
It is not just factual assumptions that feature in the background and contribute to justification, values can play the same role. Cognitive values might directly lead one to prefer a theory to another on grounds such as simplicity, ease of applicability, or prospect of future explanatory fruitfulness. But contextual values can also play a similar role; they may offer support to background assumptions which are not at stake when the justification for specific theories is being considered.
The point can be further strengthened if we note that much knowledge, including scientific knowledge is concerned with social kinds. This is especially true in the social sciences, but it is equally applicable to medicine where many of the classifications used are driven by a concern with promoting human health. The very distinction between a pathogenic and non-pathogenic element is drawn so as to track human health (Anderson, 1995b, p. 44). In this way, contextual values become embedded in the very content of theories. Their influence goes well beyond the mere context of discovery.
Feminist empiricists are committed to the claim that the grounds for accepting a theory should only make a reference to factual evidence and to cognitive values. This position is best understood in terms of the notion of impartiality as developed by Hugh Lacey (2005). A theory’s acceptance is said to be in accordance with impartiality when the theory is best supported by the empirical evidence and manifests the cognitive values to a higher degree than its rivals (p. 230). Thus, impartiality requires that moral and political values do not appear among the grounds for accepting a theory so that its justification is rationally binding on all irrespective of the contextual values they might endorse. Contextual values, however, are permitted to play numerous roles in accordance with impartiality. First, they are embedded in the research programmes or strategies that lead to the formulation of any theory. Second, contextual values are crucial to an assessment of whether applying the theory in practical contexts is at all useful. That is to say, these values are essential to assessing the significance of the theory. Third, contextual values play a role in the selection and classification of the empirical data that can count for or against a theory. Thus, for instance, interest in the promotion of human health is at the basis of the classification of some agents as pathogenic. This is a classification that is deployed in the description of the phenomena that can count as evidence for or against medical theories about the causes and natures of some diseases. Fourth, since contextual values play a role in the selection of the factual data against which the theory is measured, and since supporters of different values might use different data as the phenomena that might confirm or disconfirm their theories, if the domain of study is amenable to study under more than one research programme, then before any theory can be accepted more than one programme needs to be developed so that the theory that is finally accepted is better confirmed by the data selected under its research programme (and manifests the cognitive values more highly) than any other competitor theory is confirmed by the data selected under its own programme (Lacey, 2005, p. 230).
Impartiality is compatible with the value-ladenness of enquiry because it is independent of value neutrality, where the latter is understood as the requirement that values play no role in the justification of theories (Lacey, 2005, pp. 240-7; Anderson, 2004, 3). Impartiality requires that cognitive values and factual considerations alone count as evidence for or against the truth of a theory. However, impartiality permits that contextual values are relevant to an assessment of the significance of a theory. In this manner, contextual values can play a positive role in theory choice in accordance with impartiality.
Defenders of impartiality argue that contextual values cannot count as evidence for a theory but can play a role in the assessment of its significance. Their argument presupposes that practical interests cannot make the difference between mere true belief and knowledge, but this presupposition is false. My argument for this claim is based on the well known fact that knowers need not be able to rule out all incompatible possibilities- no matter how remote- in order to count as having knowledge. Instead, being in a position to rule out only those alternatives that are relevant is sufficient. Social and ethical values can play a role in determining which alternatives are relevant in a given situation and in this manner contribute to the evidence for theories and beliefs. For example, in medicine, the important ethical value of not harming patients, makes even quite unlikely scenarios relevant and thus determines that in order to count as having knowledge of the properties of a given compound scientists will have to engage in extensive testing and be able to rule out many alternative possibilities including some that have quite low initial probability.
If these considerations are right practical interests and social values do make a difference to knowledge that shows, contra feminist empiricism, that impartiality is not a desideratum of empirical inquiry.
Included in
Knowledge, Value Neutrality and Impartiality
This presentation is part of the Objectivity and Impartiality track.
Feminist epistemologists have long been concerned with clarifying the legitimate roles that social and ethical values might play in the acceptance or justification of empirical theories and beliefs. Their concern stems, at least in part, from what Louise Antony has defined as the ‘bias paradox’ (1993). Since to be a feminist is, at least, to be committed to a cluster of political and ethical values about the injustice of discrimination against women, feminists cannot claim value neutrality for their inquiries. But, if knowledge requires value-neutrality, then feminist values cannot play any legitimate roles in the justification of empirical theories.
This paper is divided in two sections. In the first, after providing some background discussion about the role of values in empirical research, I present a defence of the view that neither autonomy nor value neutrality are desirable ideals for the justification of theories and beliefs. My argument here is greatly indebted to Elizabeth Anderson’s defence of the situatedness of knowledge. As I also make clear in this section, Anderson remains committed to the necessity of impartiality for knowledge. In the second section I offer an argument for the claim that knowledge does not require impartiality because practical interests can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief (Cf, Stanley, 2005). I conclude the paper with some observations about how the rejection of impartiality for knowledge offers a vindication of some versions of standpoint epistemology against the challenges posed by feminist empiricism.
There is widespread agreement on the claim that all kinds of values may, even in quite bizarre ways, lead individuals or communities to formulate theories and hypotheses or to acquire beliefs that happen to have quite a lot of epistemic mileage. In other words, it is undisputed that contextual social and political values, of all sorts, might play helpful or not so helpful roles in the so-called context of discovery. Feminist values and commitments to the promotion of women’s interests can play the same roles.
There is no necessary relation between the endorsability of the values driving a bit of research and the epistemic value of the theories or beliefs produced as a result. Good values can lead to bad theories. That is, theories which are false or empirically inadequate or with little explanatory power. Bad values, on the other hand, can lead to good theories. Hence, the mere fact that bad values played a role in the formulation of a view is not sufficient to determine that the theory is epistemically bankrupt (Anderson, 1995a, p. 76). It appears reasonable, however, to take the bad history of a theory to license the need for a thorough scrutiny of its empirical adequacy.
The need for scrutiny in such cases does not imply that values can or should always be screened out when we consider the justification of theories or beliefs. Quite the opposite might be true, if, as feminist epistemologists hold, enquiry is inevitably value-laden in the sense that allows for the unavoidable presence of values in the justification of theories and beliefs. The value-ladeness of justification in the natural sciences is a consequence of the under-determination of scientific theories by all available empirical data (Quine, 1980). Often whether any given observation conflicts with, or offers evidence in support of, a given theory might well depend on the background assumptions of the theorist.
It is not just factual assumptions that feature in the background and contribute to justification, values can play the same role. Cognitive values might directly lead one to prefer a theory to another on grounds such as simplicity, ease of applicability, or prospect of future explanatory fruitfulness. But contextual values can also play a similar role; they may offer support to background assumptions which are not at stake when the justification for specific theories is being considered.
The point can be further strengthened if we note that much knowledge, including scientific knowledge is concerned with social kinds. This is especially true in the social sciences, but it is equally applicable to medicine where many of the classifications used are driven by a concern with promoting human health. The very distinction between a pathogenic and non-pathogenic element is drawn so as to track human health (Anderson, 1995b, p. 44). In this way, contextual values become embedded in the very content of theories. Their influence goes well beyond the mere context of discovery.
Feminist empiricists are committed to the claim that the grounds for accepting a theory should only make a reference to factual evidence and to cognitive values. This position is best understood in terms of the notion of impartiality as developed by Hugh Lacey (2005). A theory’s acceptance is said to be in accordance with impartiality when the theory is best supported by the empirical evidence and manifests the cognitive values to a higher degree than its rivals (p. 230). Thus, impartiality requires that moral and political values do not appear among the grounds for accepting a theory so that its justification is rationally binding on all irrespective of the contextual values they might endorse. Contextual values, however, are permitted to play numerous roles in accordance with impartiality. First, they are embedded in the research programmes or strategies that lead to the formulation of any theory. Second, contextual values are crucial to an assessment of whether applying the theory in practical contexts is at all useful. That is to say, these values are essential to assessing the significance of the theory. Third, contextual values play a role in the selection and classification of the empirical data that can count for or against a theory. Thus, for instance, interest in the promotion of human health is at the basis of the classification of some agents as pathogenic. This is a classification that is deployed in the description of the phenomena that can count as evidence for or against medical theories about the causes and natures of some diseases. Fourth, since contextual values play a role in the selection of the factual data against which the theory is measured, and since supporters of different values might use different data as the phenomena that might confirm or disconfirm their theories, if the domain of study is amenable to study under more than one research programme, then before any theory can be accepted more than one programme needs to be developed so that the theory that is finally accepted is better confirmed by the data selected under its research programme (and manifests the cognitive values more highly) than any other competitor theory is confirmed by the data selected under its own programme (Lacey, 2005, p. 230).
Impartiality is compatible with the value-ladenness of enquiry because it is independent of value neutrality, where the latter is understood as the requirement that values play no role in the justification of theories (Lacey, 2005, pp. 240-7; Anderson, 2004, 3). Impartiality requires that cognitive values and factual considerations alone count as evidence for or against the truth of a theory. However, impartiality permits that contextual values are relevant to an assessment of the significance of a theory. In this manner, contextual values can play a positive role in theory choice in accordance with impartiality.
Defenders of impartiality argue that contextual values cannot count as evidence for a theory but can play a role in the assessment of its significance. Their argument presupposes that practical interests cannot make the difference between mere true belief and knowledge, but this presupposition is false. My argument for this claim is based on the well known fact that knowers need not be able to rule out all incompatible possibilities- no matter how remote- in order to count as having knowledge. Instead, being in a position to rule out only those alternatives that are relevant is sufficient. Social and ethical values can play a role in determining which alternatives are relevant in a given situation and in this manner contribute to the evidence for theories and beliefs. For example, in medicine, the important ethical value of not harming patients, makes even quite unlikely scenarios relevant and thus determines that in order to count as having knowledge of the properties of a given compound scientists will have to engage in extensive testing and be able to rule out many alternative possibilities including some that have quite low initial probability.
If these considerations are right practical interests and social values do make a difference to knowledge that shows, contra feminist empiricism, that impartiality is not a desideratum of empirical inquiry.