Event Title
Feminism, progressive values and biology: A historical re-examination
Start Date
27-6-2010 9:00 AM
End Date
27-6-2010 10:30 AM
Description
This presentation is part of the Reductionism, Determinism and Feminist Values track.
In the context of second wave socialist feminism, biological knowledge and explanation was assumed to be ideological, a force of socio-political fixation, reinforcing the status-quo of gender oppression, or worse. Indeed this remains a widely held view in materialist feminist circles, in which the term ‘biological’ frequently appears to be synonymous with either ‘patriarchal’ or ‘conservative’ – at least in so far as it pertains to purported differences between men and women (e.g. Jackson and Rees, 2007). A strong affiliation is assumed, in this position, between conservative values, determinist ontology and biology on the one hand, and radical values, contingent ontology and social-constructivism on the other – creating a series of dualisms through which resounds de Beauvoir’s differentiation between being born and becoming woman (see Fraser, 2002:607). Today many feminists question the necessity of this relationship between being, determinism, conservatism, and biology, in part as a response to what has been called the ‘molecularisation’ of biological science itself (Fraser, 2002; Grosz, 2004; Rose, 2006). Few, however, question the association between these temporal categories – being and becoming, conservatism and radicalism, determination and contingency – and the denial or affirmation of emancipation and minority empowerment.
This paper will draw upon the historical relationship between ‘first-wave’ feminism and evolutionary biology in order to question not only the assumed association between biologism and conservatism but also the assumed emancipatory value of radical and constructivist ontologies. It is not my intention to defend conservatism but rather to demonstrate that political radicalism is not the preserve of emancipatory and genuinely progressive ontologies. As post-colonial femininsts have insisted, ethical and ontological commitments to ‘progress’ and radicalism have often served to obscure and thus compound racism or forms of imperialism (Mohanty, 1988). The constructivist denunciation of ‘biological determinism’ has, amongst many things, obscured some problematic continuities between the radicalism of biologism and that of constructivism.
As a starting point the paper will recall an account of the relationship between ‘early’ feminism and Darwinism that is put forward by the iconic (if controversial) second-wave socialist feminist Monique Wittig (1981). Her brief account was grounded in a more extensive history written by Rosalind Rosenberg (1975). Rosenberg paints a linear picture of history in which the movement towards female emancipation maps onto a progression away from biological thinking and Darwin, towards early proponents of social constructivism. Rosenberg recognises that many ‘early’ feminists were committed to Darwinism and the ideas of evolutionary biology. She explains this commitment in terms of an, albeit understandable, lack of radicalism on the part of these feminists. They clung to Darwinism in spite of their feminism almost as to a security blanket. Rosenberg proposes that a commitment to the conservative, established opinion associated with Darwin gave ‘early’ feminists a degree of security in the face of their otherwise radical, transformative politics and view of the world.
Far more is known now about these early feminists and their relationship to biology than was when Rosenberg penned her account – I doubt she would make the same arguments today. Several factors contest the assumed relationship between Darwinism and conservatism in the context of the thought of the ‘early’ or ‘first-wave’ feminists. For a start there was nothing reassuring at that time about a commitment to Darwinism. The ideas of evolutionary biology may have been widespread at that historical moment, but they were decidedly not spread amongst conservatives - social, political or ontological. Socialists, feminists, liberals and various other radicals expounded Darwinist ideas, and they did so precisely against belief in the reality and value of a given order within the world (Taylor Allen, 2000; Weikart, 2004). The ideas of evolutionary biology and the ideals of the political movement that grew out of it, eugenics, were decidedly orientated towards becoming, not being, transformation, not conservation and the celebration of contingency within the world, not determination or, at least, the world as ‘given’. This is reflected in the discourse of first wave feminists, when, Helen Stocker, for example, refers to ‘flow of evolution’ as ‘the eternal becoming’ (cited in Weikhart, 2004:132). Finally the political and social aspirations of many key ‘early’ feminists were drawn not in spite of their commitment to Darwinism, but precisely from the ideas and ideals of evolutionary biology, Darwinism and eugenics. For example the leading proponent of reproductive rights in the US, Margret Sanger, stated that ‘[m]ore children from the fit; less from the unfit – that is the chief issue of birth control’ (Sanger, cited in Weikart, 2004:135). The association between biologism and conservatism, at least in the context of turn of the century feminist and biologist thought is without basis. Whatever the (immense!) dangers and problems associated with eugenics, a lack of radicalism was – in fact tragically – not one of them.
The paper will conclude with the question – if conservatism and stasis is not the issue then what is? The problem with biological thinking as it becomes political is, I will maintain, not its conservatism but its actually dynamic and woefully appealing racism – a racism that was without doubt alive in the ideas and values of a great proportion of those ‘early’ feminists. When second-wave socialist feminism distanced itself (and the belief in and march of women’s emancipation) from biological science the real issue, I will suggest, was not conservatism but the need to distance feminism from the racism with which it has sometimes been intertwined (see Bell, 1999). By bracketing the problems of biologism in with conservatism and determinism, however, the second wave feminist critique of biologism may have – doubtless inadvertantly – obscured not only the nature of past racism but also its rearticulation and renewal in culturalist ontologies.
Feminism, progressive values and biology: A historical re-examination
This presentation is part of the Reductionism, Determinism and Feminist Values track.
In the context of second wave socialist feminism, biological knowledge and explanation was assumed to be ideological, a force of socio-political fixation, reinforcing the status-quo of gender oppression, or worse. Indeed this remains a widely held view in materialist feminist circles, in which the term ‘biological’ frequently appears to be synonymous with either ‘patriarchal’ or ‘conservative’ – at least in so far as it pertains to purported differences between men and women (e.g. Jackson and Rees, 2007). A strong affiliation is assumed, in this position, between conservative values, determinist ontology and biology on the one hand, and radical values, contingent ontology and social-constructivism on the other – creating a series of dualisms through which resounds de Beauvoir’s differentiation between being born and becoming woman (see Fraser, 2002:607). Today many feminists question the necessity of this relationship between being, determinism, conservatism, and biology, in part as a response to what has been called the ‘molecularisation’ of biological science itself (Fraser, 2002; Grosz, 2004; Rose, 2006). Few, however, question the association between these temporal categories – being and becoming, conservatism and radicalism, determination and contingency – and the denial or affirmation of emancipation and minority empowerment.
This paper will draw upon the historical relationship between ‘first-wave’ feminism and evolutionary biology in order to question not only the assumed association between biologism and conservatism but also the assumed emancipatory value of radical and constructivist ontologies. It is not my intention to defend conservatism but rather to demonstrate that political radicalism is not the preserve of emancipatory and genuinely progressive ontologies. As post-colonial femininsts have insisted, ethical and ontological commitments to ‘progress’ and radicalism have often served to obscure and thus compound racism or forms of imperialism (Mohanty, 1988). The constructivist denunciation of ‘biological determinism’ has, amongst many things, obscured some problematic continuities between the radicalism of biologism and that of constructivism.
As a starting point the paper will recall an account of the relationship between ‘early’ feminism and Darwinism that is put forward by the iconic (if controversial) second-wave socialist feminist Monique Wittig (1981). Her brief account was grounded in a more extensive history written by Rosalind Rosenberg (1975). Rosenberg paints a linear picture of history in which the movement towards female emancipation maps onto a progression away from biological thinking and Darwin, towards early proponents of social constructivism. Rosenberg recognises that many ‘early’ feminists were committed to Darwinism and the ideas of evolutionary biology. She explains this commitment in terms of an, albeit understandable, lack of radicalism on the part of these feminists. They clung to Darwinism in spite of their feminism almost as to a security blanket. Rosenberg proposes that a commitment to the conservative, established opinion associated with Darwin gave ‘early’ feminists a degree of security in the face of their otherwise radical, transformative politics and view of the world.
Far more is known now about these early feminists and their relationship to biology than was when Rosenberg penned her account – I doubt she would make the same arguments today. Several factors contest the assumed relationship between Darwinism and conservatism in the context of the thought of the ‘early’ or ‘first-wave’ feminists. For a start there was nothing reassuring at that time about a commitment to Darwinism. The ideas of evolutionary biology may have been widespread at that historical moment, but they were decidedly not spread amongst conservatives - social, political or ontological. Socialists, feminists, liberals and various other radicals expounded Darwinist ideas, and they did so precisely against belief in the reality and value of a given order within the world (Taylor Allen, 2000; Weikart, 2004). The ideas of evolutionary biology and the ideals of the political movement that grew out of it, eugenics, were decidedly orientated towards becoming, not being, transformation, not conservation and the celebration of contingency within the world, not determination or, at least, the world as ‘given’. This is reflected in the discourse of first wave feminists, when, Helen Stocker, for example, refers to ‘flow of evolution’ as ‘the eternal becoming’ (cited in Weikhart, 2004:132). Finally the political and social aspirations of many key ‘early’ feminists were drawn not in spite of their commitment to Darwinism, but precisely from the ideas and ideals of evolutionary biology, Darwinism and eugenics. For example the leading proponent of reproductive rights in the US, Margret Sanger, stated that ‘[m]ore children from the fit; less from the unfit – that is the chief issue of birth control’ (Sanger, cited in Weikart, 2004:135). The association between biologism and conservatism, at least in the context of turn of the century feminist and biologist thought is without basis. Whatever the (immense!) dangers and problems associated with eugenics, a lack of radicalism was – in fact tragically – not one of them.
The paper will conclude with the question – if conservatism and stasis is not the issue then what is? The problem with biological thinking as it becomes political is, I will maintain, not its conservatism but its actually dynamic and woefully appealing racism – a racism that was without doubt alive in the ideas and values of a great proportion of those ‘early’ feminists. When second-wave socialist feminism distanced itself (and the belief in and march of women’s emancipation) from biological science the real issue, I will suggest, was not conservatism but the need to distance feminism from the racism with which it has sometimes been intertwined (see Bell, 1999). By bracketing the problems of biologism in with conservatism and determinism, however, the second wave feminist critique of biologism may have – doubtless inadvertantly – obscured not only the nature of past racism but also its rearticulation and renewal in culturalist ontologies.