Event Title
Feminism and non-ideal theory: The problem with facts
Start Date
26-6-2010 2:45 PM
End Date
26-6-2010 4:15 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Facts in Feminist Philosophy track.
Due to influence of the work of Carol Gillian (1982), Susan Moller Okin (1989), Nancy Fraser (1990), and Charles Mills (1997, 2005), there has been an assumption among many feminists that political philosophy should take a direction towards facts, toward a greater understanding and appreciation for the lives of actual women, and away from idealizations, which will ultimately be harmful to women. The recent popularity of non-ideal theory in political philosophy has reinvigorated these old debates (see Schwartzman 2006, Sen 2006, Farrelly 2007, Robeyns 2008, Stepmplowska 2008, Swift 2008, Valentini 2009). Some argue that since idealizations are inevitable, moving forward is a matter of choosing nonoppressive ideals and using them wisely (Schwartzman 2006, Valentini 2009), while the rest move to separate ideal theory from non-ideal theory and thus mitigate or eliminate the influence of idealizations entirely. Focusing on this trend in the recent literature, I will show that in general the role of idealizations in political philosophy has been misunderstood and that the move towards a greater reliance on “facts” is in fact a step backwards for the feminist movement.
In a recent article, Laura Valentini (2009) suggests that idealizations of the subject to which the theory applies are often dangerous and will tend to benefit the dominant group or groups, while idealizations of a subject that plays only a theoretical role, and is not the same subject to which the theory is supposed to apply, are benign. Taking this helpful suggestion, we can see why Nancy Fraser’s influential criticism of Habermas (1990) is different, and I argue, more successful, than Susan Moller Okin’s similar and also influential criticism of Rawls (1989). Taking this idea further, I will show that Rawlsian idealizations are not only benign, but invaluable for a feminist philosophy. Unfortunately, this is only true of Rawlsian style idealizations, and not of Rawls’ actual idealizations, for reasons already argued by Buchanan (2000) in his criticism of Law of Peoples.
The reason such idealizations are necessary is because they alone allow for a feminist criticism of the basic structure of society, and without idealizations this criticism is impossible. In fact, a lack of idealizations, coupled with a lack of distinction between principles that apply to the basic structure and principles that apply to individuals, is what has lead recent attempts at producing non-ideal theory to be so concerned with individual charity to the detriment of structural political change (see especially Murphy 2000). A surprising offshoot of this trend toward facts in political philosophy is that it leads philosophers to ignore or deny feminist advances in other fields, most notably the social sciences. A quick look at the remarks in recent philosophy journals asking philosophers to pay more attention to economists, sociologists, and psychologists show a clear preference for methodologies that have been strongly criticized by feminists in those same fields (see especially remarks by Farrelly 2007 and Swift 2008).
In conclusion, I advocate that while interdisciplinary methods in political philosophy are supremely important, they should not take the form of uncritical acceptance of ALL results and methodologies. Instead, feminist political philosophy should be wary of how the methodologies of science and social science can limit or increase the possibility of structural change. Doing this ensures that feminist thought retains the power to imagine new worlds, rather than making only small adjustments to the old ones.
Feminism and non-ideal theory: The problem with facts
This presentation is part of the Facts in Feminist Philosophy track.
Due to influence of the work of Carol Gillian (1982), Susan Moller Okin (1989), Nancy Fraser (1990), and Charles Mills (1997, 2005), there has been an assumption among many feminists that political philosophy should take a direction towards facts, toward a greater understanding and appreciation for the lives of actual women, and away from idealizations, which will ultimately be harmful to women. The recent popularity of non-ideal theory in political philosophy has reinvigorated these old debates (see Schwartzman 2006, Sen 2006, Farrelly 2007, Robeyns 2008, Stepmplowska 2008, Swift 2008, Valentini 2009). Some argue that since idealizations are inevitable, moving forward is a matter of choosing nonoppressive ideals and using them wisely (Schwartzman 2006, Valentini 2009), while the rest move to separate ideal theory from non-ideal theory and thus mitigate or eliminate the influence of idealizations entirely. Focusing on this trend in the recent literature, I will show that in general the role of idealizations in political philosophy has been misunderstood and that the move towards a greater reliance on “facts” is in fact a step backwards for the feminist movement.
In a recent article, Laura Valentini (2009) suggests that idealizations of the subject to which the theory applies are often dangerous and will tend to benefit the dominant group or groups, while idealizations of a subject that plays only a theoretical role, and is not the same subject to which the theory is supposed to apply, are benign. Taking this helpful suggestion, we can see why Nancy Fraser’s influential criticism of Habermas (1990) is different, and I argue, more successful, than Susan Moller Okin’s similar and also influential criticism of Rawls (1989). Taking this idea further, I will show that Rawlsian idealizations are not only benign, but invaluable for a feminist philosophy. Unfortunately, this is only true of Rawlsian style idealizations, and not of Rawls’ actual idealizations, for reasons already argued by Buchanan (2000) in his criticism of Law of Peoples.
The reason such idealizations are necessary is because they alone allow for a feminist criticism of the basic structure of society, and without idealizations this criticism is impossible. In fact, a lack of idealizations, coupled with a lack of distinction between principles that apply to the basic structure and principles that apply to individuals, is what has lead recent attempts at producing non-ideal theory to be so concerned with individual charity to the detriment of structural political change (see especially Murphy 2000). A surprising offshoot of this trend toward facts in political philosophy is that it leads philosophers to ignore or deny feminist advances in other fields, most notably the social sciences. A quick look at the remarks in recent philosophy journals asking philosophers to pay more attention to economists, sociologists, and psychologists show a clear preference for methodologies that have been strongly criticized by feminists in those same fields (see especially remarks by Farrelly 2007 and Swift 2008).
In conclusion, I advocate that while interdisciplinary methods in political philosophy are supremely important, they should not take the form of uncritical acceptance of ALL results and methodologies. Instead, feminist political philosophy should be wary of how the methodologies of science and social science can limit or increase the possibility of structural change. Doing this ensures that feminist thought retains the power to imagine new worlds, rather than making only small adjustments to the old ones.