Event Title
Reasoning across differences: A modest proposal for expanding experimental philosophy
Start Date
26-6-2010 2:45 PM
End Date
26-6-2010 4:15 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Facts in Feminist Philosophy track.
Experimental philosophy, (henceforth called X-Phi), represents a departure from traditional philosophy; instead of privileging intuitions of professional philosophers to analyze concepts like moral responsibility, knowledge, intentional action, etc., X-phi catalogs and analyzes the intuitions of ordinary people (that is, non-philosophers) about scenarios designed to uncover the concepts found in standard usage. It formulates explanations of those intuitions that may reveal more complex and nuanced philosophical concepts.
X-philosophers create variations of standard philosophical thought-experiments (like that old chestnut, the trolley case) in order to test out their own hypotheses about what features are morally salient in the process of giving a response. This is standard practice in social science research as well. However, it does sometimes happen that researcher-framed scenarios miss, or over-emphasize or under-emphasize the role of some feature of the situation. It may not be clear, for instance, whether the reason for the divergence of responses in an X-phi survey is epistemic or moral—that is, the data produced (namely quantitative response patterns) underdetermines the underlying psychological processes and moral intuitions of the respondents. In short, these sorts of experiments do not reveal what features of a scenario people think they are reacting to or what reasoning patterns and moral intuitions they think they are using in that situation. Given that X-philosophers take as a guiding principle that what people think their cognitive processes are is relevant to a philosophical investigation of the actual nature of those cognitive processes, this can limit their effectiveness.
We argue that X-Phi could (and in many cases should) go farther into the realm of empirical investigation through gathering qualitative information about real-life experiences that use the philosophical concepts in question. In this way, by allowing ordinary people the power to frame scenarios themselves and identify which features they think are salient for their particular judgments, philosophy genuinely incorporates the experiences of individuals into a coherent, complex and multi-faceted account of important philosophical concepts. Including a multiplicity of voices and views also fits within a view of epistemic practice that recognizes the ways in which value judgments and the social contexts in which they occur exert strong influences on resulting theory.
When examining the sources of complex practices (like formation of moral judgments), an often-overlooked but important resource is those persons whose knowledge is not abstract or principled, but situated within some practice—practitioners with situated, contextual and particular knowledge.
Feminist epistemologists argue not only for the epistemic benefits of inclusion of situated knowers in the arenas of intellectual inquiry, but also for its moral value. Indeed, many critics find the epistemic and moral realms to be inextricable: “to decide what is epistemically valuable we need to decide what kind of knowledge community is desirable, and this can’t help but involve political priorities and political choices”(Haslanger, 1999). By giving situated knowers the opportunity to frame scenarios for themselves, identifying which features of their situation are salient, they are treated with “tempered equality” of intellectual authority (Longino, 2001,); that is, they are given a voice and taken seriously in the course of development and critique of the knowledge-seeking process at hand.
In our proposed methodological expansion, we offer examples of interview scripts that ask questions to elicit detailed and perspectival information from respondents. Qualitative methods are used to explore questions along a continuum of involvement by the researcher – ranging from ethnographic methods of observation where the data collection is determined by the context, to narrative analysis that relies upon content of the informant’s stories in a particular area of interest, to open-ended, in-depth interviews whereby the analyst may provide more or less structure to the interview guide depending upon the nature of the investigation. In one example, the interviewer includes follow-up questions to elicit information about how family relations might be relevant and whether issues of potential discrimination are involved.
In keeping with X-philosophy methods, we also provide empirical data for our claims. We present results of our qualitative study (currently in progress, to be completed spring 2010) of student fast-food workers, examining their attitudes about work, food, and the potential effects of their social network connections on their eating behaviors at work and at home. We discuss the ways in which our interviews contributed to an increased understanding of issues of control, agency, and identity in the social context of eating and working. We also point out limitations of the methods and areas for further study.
In conclusion, we make both a conceptual and empirical case for developing X-phi methods that include and value a multiplicity of perspectives and embrace the complexity of human experience. By doing so, we reap both epistemic and moral benefits. This process of inquiry is parallel to attempts in other disciplines, such as health care, that strive to include the values and experiences of both practitioners with hands on tacit knowledge as well as the disenfranchised for whom public health programs are often designed. Berwick (2008) argues for expansion of the standards for evidence in healthcare to include both the examination of “mechanisms (i.e. ways in which specific social programs actually produce specific social changes) and contexts (i.e. local conditions that could have influenced the outcomes of interest)”. Cartwright (2009) advocates extending those same standards of evidence to healthcare policy, pointing out the need for theories of evidence that deal with both credibility and relevance.
Expanding methods of x-phi to include qualitative approaches has the opportunity to inform both epistemic and moral landscapes and the potential to reinforce these shifts in other areas of inquiry as well. Such an approach in philosophy can enable understanding across differences without eliminating the viewpoints of those who may not be philosophers but whose voices should be heard.
Reasoning across differences: A modest proposal for expanding experimental philosophy
This presentation is part of the Facts in Feminist Philosophy track.
Experimental philosophy, (henceforth called X-Phi), represents a departure from traditional philosophy; instead of privileging intuitions of professional philosophers to analyze concepts like moral responsibility, knowledge, intentional action, etc., X-phi catalogs and analyzes the intuitions of ordinary people (that is, non-philosophers) about scenarios designed to uncover the concepts found in standard usage. It formulates explanations of those intuitions that may reveal more complex and nuanced philosophical concepts.
X-philosophers create variations of standard philosophical thought-experiments (like that old chestnut, the trolley case) in order to test out their own hypotheses about what features are morally salient in the process of giving a response. This is standard practice in social science research as well. However, it does sometimes happen that researcher-framed scenarios miss, or over-emphasize or under-emphasize the role of some feature of the situation. It may not be clear, for instance, whether the reason for the divergence of responses in an X-phi survey is epistemic or moral—that is, the data produced (namely quantitative response patterns) underdetermines the underlying psychological processes and moral intuitions of the respondents. In short, these sorts of experiments do not reveal what features of a scenario people think they are reacting to or what reasoning patterns and moral intuitions they think they are using in that situation. Given that X-philosophers take as a guiding principle that what people think their cognitive processes are is relevant to a philosophical investigation of the actual nature of those cognitive processes, this can limit their effectiveness.
We argue that X-Phi could (and in many cases should) go farther into the realm of empirical investigation through gathering qualitative information about real-life experiences that use the philosophical concepts in question. In this way, by allowing ordinary people the power to frame scenarios themselves and identify which features they think are salient for their particular judgments, philosophy genuinely incorporates the experiences of individuals into a coherent, complex and multi-faceted account of important philosophical concepts. Including a multiplicity of voices and views also fits within a view of epistemic practice that recognizes the ways in which value judgments and the social contexts in which they occur exert strong influences on resulting theory.
When examining the sources of complex practices (like formation of moral judgments), an often-overlooked but important resource is those persons whose knowledge is not abstract or principled, but situated within some practice—practitioners with situated, contextual and particular knowledge.
Feminist epistemologists argue not only for the epistemic benefits of inclusion of situated knowers in the arenas of intellectual inquiry, but also for its moral value. Indeed, many critics find the epistemic and moral realms to be inextricable: “to decide what is epistemically valuable we need to decide what kind of knowledge community is desirable, and this can’t help but involve political priorities and political choices”(Haslanger, 1999). By giving situated knowers the opportunity to frame scenarios for themselves, identifying which features of their situation are salient, they are treated with “tempered equality” of intellectual authority (Longino, 2001,); that is, they are given a voice and taken seriously in the course of development and critique of the knowledge-seeking process at hand.
In our proposed methodological expansion, we offer examples of interview scripts that ask questions to elicit detailed and perspectival information from respondents. Qualitative methods are used to explore questions along a continuum of involvement by the researcher – ranging from ethnographic methods of observation where the data collection is determined by the context, to narrative analysis that relies upon content of the informant’s stories in a particular area of interest, to open-ended, in-depth interviews whereby the analyst may provide more or less structure to the interview guide depending upon the nature of the investigation. In one example, the interviewer includes follow-up questions to elicit information about how family relations might be relevant and whether issues of potential discrimination are involved.
In keeping with X-philosophy methods, we also provide empirical data for our claims. We present results of our qualitative study (currently in progress, to be completed spring 2010) of student fast-food workers, examining their attitudes about work, food, and the potential effects of their social network connections on their eating behaviors at work and at home. We discuss the ways in which our interviews contributed to an increased understanding of issues of control, agency, and identity in the social context of eating and working. We also point out limitations of the methods and areas for further study.
In conclusion, we make both a conceptual and empirical case for developing X-phi methods that include and value a multiplicity of perspectives and embrace the complexity of human experience. By doing so, we reap both epistemic and moral benefits. This process of inquiry is parallel to attempts in other disciplines, such as health care, that strive to include the values and experiences of both practitioners with hands on tacit knowledge as well as the disenfranchised for whom public health programs are often designed. Berwick (2008) argues for expansion of the standards for evidence in healthcare to include both the examination of “mechanisms (i.e. ways in which specific social programs actually produce specific social changes) and contexts (i.e. local conditions that could have influenced the outcomes of interest)”. Cartwright (2009) advocates extending those same standards of evidence to healthcare policy, pointing out the need for theories of evidence that deal with both credibility and relevance.
Expanding methods of x-phi to include qualitative approaches has the opportunity to inform both epistemic and moral landscapes and the potential to reinforce these shifts in other areas of inquiry as well. Such an approach in philosophy can enable understanding across differences without eliminating the viewpoints of those who may not be philosophers but whose voices should be heard.