Event Title
Reproductive beneficence and the repugnant conclusion: A feminist critique
Start Date
25-6-2010 1:00 PM
End Date
25-6-2010 2:30 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Ethics and Parenthood track.
Apart from the abortion issue, topics in reproductive ethics were originally of interest primarily to feminist philosophers. More recently, some questions about procreation have been discussed at length by non-feminist philosophers.
Two of the main foci for non-feminist philosophers are the so-called “Repugnant Conclusion” (RC) (Parfit 1984, 2004; Ryberg and Tännsjö 2004) and so-called “Procreative Beneficence” (PB) (Savalescu 2001, 2007; Parker 2007). Both concepts are said to apply to the ethics of individual decisions about whether or not to procreate; that is, they have immediate implications for women’s reproductive obligations. And both are based on a direct application of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism implies that we have an ethical obligation to bring many children into the world, provided that doing so will increase total wellbeing (Hutchinson 1982). Thus Torbjörn Tännsjö, for example, states, “The mere addition to the world of a person leading a life worth living makes the world better” (Tännsjö 2004, 232). He adds, “Such a want of generosity, if we do not welcome such a creature!” (Tännsjö 2004, 233). Taken to its limit, Derek Parfit calls this idea the “Repugnant Conclusion”: “Compared with the existence of very many people—say, ten billion—all of whom have a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger number of people whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though these people would have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 2004, 10). Although Parfit himself does not accept the RC, some do, and it has spawned an entire generation of debate.
According to the RC, a woman has an obligation to have as many children as she possibly can. Once she reaches the tenth child—for some it might be the seventh or the fifth—she may no longer be capable of offering it a good life. But given that each new individual adds some good to the world, and that her children—while crowded and lacking parental attention—still have lives worth living, she should go on reproducing.
Julian Savalescu also uses utilitarianism to introduce the concept of “Procreative Beneficence” (PB) (Savalescu 2001, 2007), which he defines as “the moral obligation to have the best children”: “[C]ouples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (Savalescu 2001, 415).
As Savalescu points out, complying with the obligation of Procreative Beneficence requires the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD): “Procreative Beneficence implies couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence and that we should allow selection for non-disease genes in some cases even if this maintains or increases social inequality” (Savalescu 2001, 415). In order for PDG to occur, a procreating woman’s ovaries must be subjected to hormonal stimulation to produce multiple eggs, which are then extracted from her body and fertilized in vitro (IVF) by the sperm of the woman’s partner or another man. The fertilized eggs are then screened to determine which one(s) have the best characteristics, and those are implanted in her uterus. Interestingly, Savalescu claims that IVF and PGD have “fewer psychological sequelae” than one main alternative form of eugenic selection, prenatal testing followed by abortion (Savalescu 2001, 416), but he provides no empirical evidence for this claim.
In effect, the Repugnant Conclusion attributes to women an obligation to create the highest number of children possible, while the goal of Procreative Beneficence attributes to women an obligation, if they procreate, to create the best possible children, and possibly also an obligation not to procreate, if they cannot or will not produce the best children.
There are three serious problems with these claims, which undermine the tenability of the RC and PB.
1) The debate about whether or not to accept the Repugnant Conclusion, and whether or not there is an obligation to conform to Procreative Beneficence, is conducted with complete disregard of the fact that it is human persons—women—who are necessary to produce children. Non-feminist philosophers who write about these problems fail to even mention the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks to women of gestating and giving birth to fifteen or twenty children, especially if the woman wants fewer or no children. They also fail to mention the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks to women of undergoing hormonal stimulation, the removal of ova, and the subsequent insertion of fertilized eggs into the uterus.
2) Even without feminist insights, however, those who support the RC and advocate for PB fail to acknowledge that their own utilitarian principles require them to take into account women’s physical, psychological, and material wellbeing, and the negative effects on women of striving to have as many children as possible or of trying to produce the best possible children.
3) Finally, both the RC and PB require that women maximize certain reproductive outcomes. Yet in discussing procreation proponents of the RC and PB do not require maximization from other persons, the state, or institutions—even though there are other methods, far less costly to women, of attaining at least some of the procreative goods that the RC and PB allegedly offer.
For these three reasons, the RC and PB fail to generate any genuine obligations on women’s procreative behaviour. Some non-feminist philosophers have argued that the problems imposed on women by procreation can be conquered by ectogenesis—the gestation of a fetus outside a woman’s uterus. Gregory Pence, for example, argues that “the artificial womb would free women from the tyranny of gestation” (Pence 2006, 83). However, ectogenesis does not succeed in obviating the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks for women caused by the RC and PB, since it would still require either the hyper-stimulation of a woman’s ovaries and subsequent removal of ova, or the extraction of the fetus from a woman’s uterus at some point during gestation.
Reproductive beneficence and the repugnant conclusion: A feminist critique
This presentation is part of the Ethics and Parenthood track.
Apart from the abortion issue, topics in reproductive ethics were originally of interest primarily to feminist philosophers. More recently, some questions about procreation have been discussed at length by non-feminist philosophers.
Two of the main foci for non-feminist philosophers are the so-called “Repugnant Conclusion” (RC) (Parfit 1984, 2004; Ryberg and Tännsjö 2004) and so-called “Procreative Beneficence” (PB) (Savalescu 2001, 2007; Parker 2007). Both concepts are said to apply to the ethics of individual decisions about whether or not to procreate; that is, they have immediate implications for women’s reproductive obligations. And both are based on a direct application of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism implies that we have an ethical obligation to bring many children into the world, provided that doing so will increase total wellbeing (Hutchinson 1982). Thus Torbjörn Tännsjö, for example, states, “The mere addition to the world of a person leading a life worth living makes the world better” (Tännsjö 2004, 232). He adds, “Such a want of generosity, if we do not welcome such a creature!” (Tännsjö 2004, 233). Taken to its limit, Derek Parfit calls this idea the “Repugnant Conclusion”: “Compared with the existence of very many people—say, ten billion—all of whom have a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger number of people whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though these people would have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 2004, 10). Although Parfit himself does not accept the RC, some do, and it has spawned an entire generation of debate.
According to the RC, a woman has an obligation to have as many children as she possibly can. Once she reaches the tenth child—for some it might be the seventh or the fifth—she may no longer be capable of offering it a good life. But given that each new individual adds some good to the world, and that her children—while crowded and lacking parental attention—still have lives worth living, she should go on reproducing.
Julian Savalescu also uses utilitarianism to introduce the concept of “Procreative Beneficence” (PB) (Savalescu 2001, 2007), which he defines as “the moral obligation to have the best children”: “[C]ouples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (Savalescu 2001, 415).
As Savalescu points out, complying with the obligation of Procreative Beneficence requires the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD): “Procreative Beneficence implies couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence and that we should allow selection for non-disease genes in some cases even if this maintains or increases social inequality” (Savalescu 2001, 415). In order for PDG to occur, a procreating woman’s ovaries must be subjected to hormonal stimulation to produce multiple eggs, which are then extracted from her body and fertilized in vitro (IVF) by the sperm of the woman’s partner or another man. The fertilized eggs are then screened to determine which one(s) have the best characteristics, and those are implanted in her uterus. Interestingly, Savalescu claims that IVF and PGD have “fewer psychological sequelae” than one main alternative form of eugenic selection, prenatal testing followed by abortion (Savalescu 2001, 416), but he provides no empirical evidence for this claim.
In effect, the Repugnant Conclusion attributes to women an obligation to create the highest number of children possible, while the goal of Procreative Beneficence attributes to women an obligation, if they procreate, to create the best possible children, and possibly also an obligation not to procreate, if they cannot or will not produce the best children.
There are three serious problems with these claims, which undermine the tenability of the RC and PB.
1) The debate about whether or not to accept the Repugnant Conclusion, and whether or not there is an obligation to conform to Procreative Beneficence, is conducted with complete disregard of the fact that it is human persons—women—who are necessary to produce children. Non-feminist philosophers who write about these problems fail to even mention the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks to women of gestating and giving birth to fifteen or twenty children, especially if the woman wants fewer or no children. They also fail to mention the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks to women of undergoing hormonal stimulation, the removal of ova, and the subsequent insertion of fertilized eggs into the uterus.
2) Even without feminist insights, however, those who support the RC and advocate for PB fail to acknowledge that their own utilitarian principles require them to take into account women’s physical, psychological, and material wellbeing, and the negative effects on women of striving to have as many children as possible or of trying to produce the best possible children.
3) Finally, both the RC and PB require that women maximize certain reproductive outcomes. Yet in discussing procreation proponents of the RC and PB do not require maximization from other persons, the state, or institutions—even though there are other methods, far less costly to women, of attaining at least some of the procreative goods that the RC and PB allegedly offer.
For these three reasons, the RC and PB fail to generate any genuine obligations on women’s procreative behaviour. Some non-feminist philosophers have argued that the problems imposed on women by procreation can be conquered by ectogenesis—the gestation of a fetus outside a woman’s uterus. Gregory Pence, for example, argues that “the artificial womb would free women from the tyranny of gestation” (Pence 2006, 83). However, ectogenesis does not succeed in obviating the physical, psychological, and material costs and risks for women caused by the RC and PB, since it would still require either the hyper-stimulation of a woman’s ovaries and subsequent removal of ova, or the extraction of the fetus from a woman’s uterus at some point during gestation.