Event Title
Epistemic responsibility and listening
Start Date
25-6-2010 1:00 PM
End Date
25-6-2010 2:30 PM
Description
This presentation is part of the Testimony and Listening track.
In Ecological Thinking, Lorraine Code’s emphasis on listening is a vital part of positioning oneself as an advocate in order to confront the epistemic, hegemonic practice that renders Others as listeners, silent, and, therefore, non-participants. The knowledge of these Others, consequently, is not integrated into the social understanding. Despite her valuable contribution to the role of listening as a means for creating equitable epistemic status, I find that her view of listening encounters double bind problems. Code’s discussions of listening as a disruptive practice often simply assert the value of listening as a viable resource of disruption or adversarial communication. Questions remain, however: How does listening function as a practice that disrupts the social imaginary of mastery while being a part of that imaginary in the first place? When listening is already established as a marginalized practice, associated with marginalized people, how is this practice able to work from the outside as a mode of challenge or from the inside as a mode of disruption?
Part of the problem of listening for advocacy is that listening itself, within the social imaginary of mastery that Code details, is conceived of as a passive activity, whereby rationality is extracted from its more receptive feature, forging a communicative rift between interlocuters. The fluid interchange Code imagines does not exist within the current normative understanding of speakers and listeners. Not only are Others marginalized as listeners, but, listening itself is considered the less valuable act. The question becomes, “How does this view of advocacy address that those reared in the normative framework of mastery are rendered passive listeners?” In reference to Purdy, I will propose that responsible knowing must entail responsible listening, reminding us that advocacy can only work when listening becomes a consistently reflexive process in terms of ones own listening practices, as well as the listening practices of those with whom we communicate. Hence, listening as a practice of advocacy faces an initial double bind of being perceived as both an inferior and a passive activity that puts into question the viability of listening as a form of adversarial communication.
Gendered or Other associations of listening present another double bind problem confronting listening for purposes of advocacy. It is your gender role to be receptive (i.e., a listener), but it is this very receptivity and listening that is required to break free from such associated roles. I will look at Belenky, et. al.’s focus on how women understand knowledge and their role in its production. Two key issues will be developed in relation to Code’s work from this discussion: First, the problem of the substantiation of epistemic boundaries that perpetuate a gap between perceived authorities and their audience, resulting from women’s perception of their credibility in relation to epistemic authority figures. Second, the problem of using a model of friendship that facilitates listening, trust, and voice, but suffers from women’s understanding of epistemic authorities as the credible source of truth. However, if one is to stand as an authority, one may render the other purely receptive and silent. Hence, potentially disruptive encounters may fail on the conditions set forth in Code’s view of empathic listening. If Code’s mission is to reconcile the situatedness/diversity of communicators with the commonality co-created between mutually exchanging interlocuters, how does one do so in an encounter with someone whose epistemic framework alienates their self so radically from their role as a diverse contributor of knowledge construction, whereby even their listening is not seen as a form of adversarial communication that can enable democratic voice.
Code does address some of these issues by defining listening as (inter)active. She also looks to restore the important role of receptivity as a feature of rationality itself. My concern is that the treatment of listening practice from the standpoint of the advocate or the advocatee is approached with less reflexivity and critical attention than it needs. The implications of Code’s vital research on ecological thinking provide a rich terrain in which to articulate such concerns. Work like Coles’s emphasis on the corporeal reality of situatedness, whereby advocacy takes lesson from activist training and listening takes root from immersion into the lived conditions of those one advocates for, highlights a penetrating feature of good listening that can enable one to move beyond the abstractions of trying to imagine another point of view even if responsibly accomplished. This idea may set the groundwork for further investigation into the role of listening for advocating those marginalized from democratic participation and social transformation.
Epistemic responsibility and listening
This presentation is part of the Testimony and Listening track.
In Ecological Thinking, Lorraine Code’s emphasis on listening is a vital part of positioning oneself as an advocate in order to confront the epistemic, hegemonic practice that renders Others as listeners, silent, and, therefore, non-participants. The knowledge of these Others, consequently, is not integrated into the social understanding. Despite her valuable contribution to the role of listening as a means for creating equitable epistemic status, I find that her view of listening encounters double bind problems. Code’s discussions of listening as a disruptive practice often simply assert the value of listening as a viable resource of disruption or adversarial communication. Questions remain, however: How does listening function as a practice that disrupts the social imaginary of mastery while being a part of that imaginary in the first place? When listening is already established as a marginalized practice, associated with marginalized people, how is this practice able to work from the outside as a mode of challenge or from the inside as a mode of disruption?
Part of the problem of listening for advocacy is that listening itself, within the social imaginary of mastery that Code details, is conceived of as a passive activity, whereby rationality is extracted from its more receptive feature, forging a communicative rift between interlocuters. The fluid interchange Code imagines does not exist within the current normative understanding of speakers and listeners. Not only are Others marginalized as listeners, but, listening itself is considered the less valuable act. The question becomes, “How does this view of advocacy address that those reared in the normative framework of mastery are rendered passive listeners?” In reference to Purdy, I will propose that responsible knowing must entail responsible listening, reminding us that advocacy can only work when listening becomes a consistently reflexive process in terms of ones own listening practices, as well as the listening practices of those with whom we communicate. Hence, listening as a practice of advocacy faces an initial double bind of being perceived as both an inferior and a passive activity that puts into question the viability of listening as a form of adversarial communication.
Gendered or Other associations of listening present another double bind problem confronting listening for purposes of advocacy. It is your gender role to be receptive (i.e., a listener), but it is this very receptivity and listening that is required to break free from such associated roles. I will look at Belenky, et. al.’s focus on how women understand knowledge and their role in its production. Two key issues will be developed in relation to Code’s work from this discussion: First, the problem of the substantiation of epistemic boundaries that perpetuate a gap between perceived authorities and their audience, resulting from women’s perception of their credibility in relation to epistemic authority figures. Second, the problem of using a model of friendship that facilitates listening, trust, and voice, but suffers from women’s understanding of epistemic authorities as the credible source of truth. However, if one is to stand as an authority, one may render the other purely receptive and silent. Hence, potentially disruptive encounters may fail on the conditions set forth in Code’s view of empathic listening. If Code’s mission is to reconcile the situatedness/diversity of communicators with the commonality co-created between mutually exchanging interlocuters, how does one do so in an encounter with someone whose epistemic framework alienates their self so radically from their role as a diverse contributor of knowledge construction, whereby even their listening is not seen as a form of adversarial communication that can enable democratic voice.
Code does address some of these issues by defining listening as (inter)active. She also looks to restore the important role of receptivity as a feature of rationality itself. My concern is that the treatment of listening practice from the standpoint of the advocate or the advocatee is approached with less reflexivity and critical attention than it needs. The implications of Code’s vital research on ecological thinking provide a rich terrain in which to articulate such concerns. Work like Coles’s emphasis on the corporeal reality of situatedness, whereby advocacy takes lesson from activist training and listening takes root from immersion into the lived conditions of those one advocates for, highlights a penetrating feature of good listening that can enable one to move beyond the abstractions of trying to imagine another point of view even if responsibly accomplished. This idea may set the groundwork for further investigation into the role of listening for advocating those marginalized from democratic participation and social transformation.