Doctor of Philosophy
Dyck, Corey W.
I argue that we can make use of Kant's metaphysics lectures to have a better understanding of the concepts of practical and transcendental freedom used within the Critique of Pure Reason. Based on Kant's metaphysics lectures I will argue that practical freedom and transcendental freedom are different predicates that apply to our power of choice and that each comprises different sorts of abilities. Practical freedom concerns the abilities we use in choosing the motives for our actions, while transcendental freedom concerns the ability to act otherwise than what nature necessitates through its causal laws. In terms of Kant's free will views, I will argue that Kant is neither a libertarian, nor a compatibilist, but instead is most accurately described as a moral necessitarian.
Summary for Lay Audience
In my thesis, I do historical research concerning Kant's views on the topic of freedom of the will. The free will topic has been relevant for centuries since we need to be free in order to ascribe responsibility for our actions. Free will has constantly been put at risk and there have been numerous attempts at salvaging our free will. Kant is still relevant today as far as this topic is concerned because he was the first to propose that we discuss about responsibility without making use of traditional concepts concerning causation, natural laws, and even social or psychological laws. While these discussions are certainly quite abstract, they have influenced for centuries our own social behavior and even views on life.
Varciu, Alin Paul, "Kant's Concept of Freedom in the Metaphysics Lectures" (2023). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 9772.
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