Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Thesis Format

Integrated Article

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Program

Philosophy

Supervisor

Smeenk, Christopher

Abstract

Much of our philosophical understanding of concepts central to the philosophy of science was developed in a context in which assuming that space and time are fundamental concrete constituents of our world was safe. Consequently, much of our philosophical understanding relies either implicitly or explicitly on spatiotemporality. The Quantum Gravity research programs have produced well-motivated theories that seem to lack space and time fundamentally. The clash between these scientific theories and our philosophical understanding leads to a metaphysical gap problem and the problem of empirical incoherence for theories that lack space and time. I argue that adjustments are required of our conceptual understandings to ease this tension and solve these problems. Specifically, I argue for a monistic metaphysic that posits the cosmos itself as the only concrete physical object. All other physical objects are abstractions from patterns inherent in the cosmos. This monistic view streamlines the process of reduction and does not imply that a conceptual discrepancy between theories that are reduction pairs will necessarily entail a metaphysical discrepancy. Space and time are plausibly metaphysically special entities. Thus, I also adopt an idiosyncratic version of functionalism to argue that space and time are not metaphysically special in the ways that would lead to a metaphysical gap. The contents of our spatiotemporal concepts are functions that apply to many different patterns. So, these functions come apart, and I argue that we should expect a different reductive program to be associated with each function. Further, I argue that different spatiotemporal functions may emerge at different reductive “levels”. Finally, I argue that the application metaphor used to guide my research supports a satisfying scientific realist view. According to this view, patterns are the bearers of reality, and an iterative process of trial and error is essential to developing good representations of these patterns and, therefore, knowledge of the cosmos. Adopting this view can underwrite realist intuitions without committing us to the empirical incoherence of theories that lack space and time fundamentally.

Summary for Lay Audience

Philosophers have always had an interest in what a world that lacks space and time fundamentally might be like. Up until recently, though, there was no good reason to think that this situation might be actual. Recent scientific advances have called philosophical attention to the real possibility that space and time are not fundamental. Since the assumption that space and time are fundamental has always been relatively safe, some important philosophical analyses take this assumption for granted. The clash between these scientific results and our philosophical understanding leads to conceptual problems. I argue in this thesis that we should adjust our philosophical understanding to ease this tension and solve these problems. Specifically, I argue that the cosmos is not built up from a plurality of basic objects. Rather, the cosmos itself is the basic object, and all other objects are abstractions from patterns instantiated by the cosmos. I argue that if we understand the cosmos in this way, then we can make sense of the relationships between objects that belong to different theories without having to make use of spatiotemporal assumptions. I also argue that the concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’ are functional—they apply to functions rather than to substances. There are multiple different functional patterns that these concepts apply to, and we can apply concepts to these various functions (like the directedness of time). So, relating theories that make use of spatiotemporal entities requires picking out which of these patterns we expect to relate. Some of these spatiotemporal properties may very well turn out to be fundamental, and others might emerge only in specific situations. Finally, I argue that the theoretical moves made to support these claims make for a satisfying picture of reality. According to this view of reality, patterns are the types of things that are ‘real’, and changing our theories is essential to knowledge. Adopting this view of reality dissolves some of the issues caused by the lack of fundamental space and time.

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