Quan Wen

Date of Award


Degree Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy


This dissertation consists of two essays related to negotiation and renegotiation in game theory. They investigate the renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games and subgame perfect equilibria in negotiation games, respectively.;The renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games with many players are studied in the first essay. Renegotiation-proof equilibrium requires not only subgame perfectness but also subgame efficiency. The main result of Benoi t and Krishna (1988) who studied the renegotiation-proof equilibria in two-player finitely repeated games does not apply to the games with more than two players. One sufficient condition for renegotiation-proof equilibria to be Pareto optimal in finitely repeated games with a sufficient long horizon is provided. An example shows that this sufficient condition cannot be weakened. The set of payoffs which can be approximated by renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated games with a sufficiently long horizon is characterized such that it must be either Pareto optimal or dimensionally "small". We also show by way of an example that renegotiation-proof equilibria may lead to very different outcomes even in the games whose stage games have identical sets of feasible and individually rational payoffs as well as identical Nash equilibria.;In the standard bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982), the disagreement payoff is independent of players' past strategies. The model of negotiation proposed in the second essay merges ideas from bargaining theory and the repeated games literature. If no agreement has been reached in any period, players must play a stage game in normal form to determine that period payoffs. This model allows us to analyse the importance of strategic behaviour during periods without an agreement in the negotiations. The set of all perfect equilibria in the negotiation model is characterized. Quite generally, many feasible outcomes of the negotiation games can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria. Particularly, many Pareto inefficient outcomes are sustainable even under the presence of perfect information and full rationality.



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