Date of Award


Degree Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy


This thesis develops various extensions and applications of applied general equilibrium modelling techniques. Essay I deals with the modelling of labour migration and builds on the regional numerical general equilibrium model of Canada developed by Jones and Whalley (forthcoming). Their limited migration decision rule is extended to involve a comparison of relative utility levels across regions. The major implication for model results is that measured migration responses may be dampened under certain policy simulations; this can result in different conclusions being drawn from simulation exercises.;Essay II considers the application of this model to the study of the Canadian equalization system and its influence on interregional labour migrations in Canada. While authors such as Courchene (1984) have argued that equalization may result in labour allocation inefficiencies in Canada, Boadway and Flatters (1982) have proposed that due to the existence of regionally concentrated resource rents, properly allocated equalization may result in increased efficiency in the allocation of labour in Canada. Simulations are performed to assess the effects of equalization payments and regional resource rents on labour allocation efficiency in Canada. The results suggest that the interactions required by the Boadway and Flatter's analysis may not exist; equalization may be reducing gains which could arise from the migration incentives of the regional resource rents.;The analysis of Essay III involves numerical simulations using a pure exchange model with three countries and three goods. Non-cooperative strategies are characterized by Nash retaliatory tariffs and customs union formation is analyzed for the case when the union's external tariffs are strategically set to benefit the union and lump-sum intra-union transfers are not available. The use of non-zero intra-union tariffs as an alternative transfer mechanism is explored. Results presented here suggest that the presence of non-zero intra-union tariffs may reduce the gains which can arise from union formation. More importantly though, these tariffs can alter the strategic options available to the trading nations. Non-zero intra-union tariffs can allow a union to be the optimal strategy for all its members, whereas in the intra-union free trade case the union is an inferior strategy for some.



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