Pragmatic epistemology and the importance of descriptive representation
Description
This presentation is part of the Communities and Institutions, Negotiating Differences track.
One of the greatest challenges that Canadian feminist theorists have leveled against our current political and electoral system is its inability to adequately represent gendered, racial, cultural and linguistic minority groups (Young 53). The discrepancy between the proportion of members in a distinct (often marginalized) group within the population and the proportion of representatives in parliament who are members of those groups is empirically evident. Scholars have argued that this absence is problematic because representatives who are also members of these minority groups, having the lived experiences of oppression and marginalization in our society, would be in a much better position to speak on behalf of their communities (Grey 20). That is, representatives in governing assemblies should reflect the characteristics of the population in proportion to their prevalence in the electorate as a whole. Thus, these scholars establish a causal link between two distinct forms of representation: descriptive representation and substantive representation.
More recently, descriptive representation has been criticized as a too narrow conception that simply does not work to increase the substantive representation of minority groups’ interests when exercised in the legislative process (Pitkin 64) (Tremblay and Pelletier 382) (Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation 28). They argue that we should abandon descriptive aims and instead focus our efforts on achieving a form of substantive representation.
In this paper, I will argue that if we are concerned about fair and adequate representation of women and minority groups, we cannot be so quick to dismiss the potential benefits and rewards of adopting a descriptive view of representation. Instead, I contend that a conception of representation must also acknowledge the personal experiences of citizens and the advantage or disadvantage they may encounter as a result of their personal identities within a prejudicial system. In particular, I will argue that these personal experiences are of particular importance in a legislative process that is responsible for the formulation laws and policies that will benefit the greatest number of constituents, and more importantly, harm none of them. In order to achieve this I argue that representatives must have an awareness of the situated nature of their own knowledge, and engage in open-minded and reasoned debate in order to come to a more complete understanding of the effects of the actions of the legislature on the entire population.
In this paper, I will draw heavily on the arguments of Richard Rorty’s “Science as Solidarity” and Melissa Williams’ “The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy.” In “Science as Solidarity”, Rorty argues that the traditional conception of truth as being that which is “in accordance with fact or reality” is problematic due to our human limitations and personal biases ("true, adjective") (Rorty 39). Feminist epistemologists would agree with this argument, claiming that due to the situated nature of our knowledge, and our inability to filter out the incalculable aspects of our own lives that effect our interpretations of evidence, we can never claim to ‘know’ things in isolation (Wylie 569). This epistemological concern is of great importance to the functioning of a democratic assembly that governs a population that is diverse and multicultural. If such an assembly is composed of a homogenous group with similarly situated knowledge, it is inevitable that the legal and political outcomes of their governance will reflect what they see as ‘truths’ regarding the lives and experiences of the entire population. However, if the population is composed of minority groups who differ from those governing, those outcomes will likely not benefit their lives in the same way. This is due to the fact that their lived experiences and ‘truths’ do not correspond to those of their ‘representatives’.
How can this problem be ameliorated? First, these representatives must engage in a deliberative process “with sufficient open-mindedness that [they] can be persuaded by the arguments of others” (Williams, The Uneasy Alliance of Group Represenation and Deliberative Democracy 128). That is, in the process of creating laws and policies, representatives must approach the issue with an understanding that the ways in which these particular proposals will affect the lives of their constituents and members of their own communities will likely differ from the affects that they may have on other communities. The goal of this deliberation must be the minimization of harm to any group, and in order to achieve this goal, representatives must listen loudly. Second, there needs to be representatives of all the various gender, racial, cultural and linguistic groups (though, how these groups are defined and legitimized is complex and far beyond the scope of this paper). Clearly, certain groups have a distinct advantage over others when seeking election to legislative bodies, and this severely limits the opportunity for deliberative democracy to function, as certain views and situated knowledges are simply absent. I argue that this absence is unfair, undemocratic, and unproductive.
Pragmatic epistemology and the importance of descriptive representation
This presentation is part of the Communities and Institutions, Negotiating Differences track.
One of the greatest challenges that Canadian feminist theorists have leveled against our current political and electoral system is its inability to adequately represent gendered, racial, cultural and linguistic minority groups (Young 53). The discrepancy between the proportion of members in a distinct (often marginalized) group within the population and the proportion of representatives in parliament who are members of those groups is empirically evident. Scholars have argued that this absence is problematic because representatives who are also members of these minority groups, having the lived experiences of oppression and marginalization in our society, would be in a much better position to speak on behalf of their communities (Grey 20). That is, representatives in governing assemblies should reflect the characteristics of the population in proportion to their prevalence in the electorate as a whole. Thus, these scholars establish a causal link between two distinct forms of representation: descriptive representation and substantive representation.
More recently, descriptive representation has been criticized as a too narrow conception that simply does not work to increase the substantive representation of minority groups’ interests when exercised in the legislative process (Pitkin 64) (Tremblay and Pelletier 382) (Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation 28). They argue that we should abandon descriptive aims and instead focus our efforts on achieving a form of substantive representation.
In this paper, I will argue that if we are concerned about fair and adequate representation of women and minority groups, we cannot be so quick to dismiss the potential benefits and rewards of adopting a descriptive view of representation. Instead, I contend that a conception of representation must also acknowledge the personal experiences of citizens and the advantage or disadvantage they may encounter as a result of their personal identities within a prejudicial system. In particular, I will argue that these personal experiences are of particular importance in a legislative process that is responsible for the formulation laws and policies that will benefit the greatest number of constituents, and more importantly, harm none of them. In order to achieve this I argue that representatives must have an awareness of the situated nature of their own knowledge, and engage in open-minded and reasoned debate in order to come to a more complete understanding of the effects of the actions of the legislature on the entire population.
In this paper, I will draw heavily on the arguments of Richard Rorty’s “Science as Solidarity” and Melissa Williams’ “The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy.” In “Science as Solidarity”, Rorty argues that the traditional conception of truth as being that which is “in accordance with fact or reality” is problematic due to our human limitations and personal biases ("true, adjective") (Rorty 39). Feminist epistemologists would agree with this argument, claiming that due to the situated nature of our knowledge, and our inability to filter out the incalculable aspects of our own lives that effect our interpretations of evidence, we can never claim to ‘know’ things in isolation (Wylie 569). This epistemological concern is of great importance to the functioning of a democratic assembly that governs a population that is diverse and multicultural. If such an assembly is composed of a homogenous group with similarly situated knowledge, it is inevitable that the legal and political outcomes of their governance will reflect what they see as ‘truths’ regarding the lives and experiences of the entire population. However, if the population is composed of minority groups who differ from those governing, those outcomes will likely not benefit their lives in the same way. This is due to the fact that their lived experiences and ‘truths’ do not correspond to those of their ‘representatives’.
How can this problem be ameliorated? First, these representatives must engage in a deliberative process “with sufficient open-mindedness that [they] can be persuaded by the arguments of others” (Williams, The Uneasy Alliance of Group Represenation and Deliberative Democracy 128). That is, in the process of creating laws and policies, representatives must approach the issue with an understanding that the ways in which these particular proposals will affect the lives of their constituents and members of their own communities will likely differ from the affects that they may have on other communities. The goal of this deliberation must be the minimization of harm to any group, and in order to achieve this goal, representatives must listen loudly. Second, there needs to be representatives of all the various gender, racial, cultural and linguistic groups (though, how these groups are defined and legitimized is complex and far beyond the scope of this paper). Clearly, certain groups have a distinct advantage over others when seeking election to legislative bodies, and this severely limits the opportunity for deliberative democracy to function, as certain views and situated knowledges are simply absent. I argue that this absence is unfair, undemocratic, and unproductive.