Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy
In the first two chapters, a non-negative function defined on the class of subsets of a finite set of players (or factors) describes the technology for producing a single good. Given this aggregate data, the problem of allocation of surplus among individual players (or factors) is studied in two different models.;In Chapter 1, an axiomatic approach is adopted to construct an allocation rule that is immune to positive monotone transformations of the players' utilities. Under this rule, each player is paid a weighted average of his (or her) marginal contributions to various coalitions. In fact, these weights coincide with the Shapley weights. The model also provides a proper framework for interpreting the Shapley value as the ex-ante evaluation of a conflict situation.;Chapter 2 studies an evolutionary bargaining model in which myopic players with limited memory make simultaneous demands, naively based on precedent. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which the long-run equilibria coincide with the core allocations. Refining the set of equilibria by allowing for the possibility of mistakes, it is shown that the unique limiting equilibrium allocation maximizes the product of players' utilities subject to being in the core of the technology.;Chapter 3 studies the effect of different communication possibilities on the coalitional stability of bargained outcomes. Formally, a graph with the set of players as its vertices describes the communication possibilities. A coalition can be a threat if and only if it is connected. It is then shown that, for a large class of environments, stability with respect to coalition formation ensues if each connected coalition is a tree. Conversely, if there is a connected coalition that is not a tree, there are bargaining situations in which no outcome is stable.
Agastya, Murali K., "Three Essays On Bargaining" (1994). Digitized Theses. 2323.