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Howard Peter Langille
Carleton University

Erika Simpson
The University of Western Ontario, simpson@uwo.ca

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ANNEXES

The Premier of Nova Scotia presented the proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre" to the Prime Minister of Canada in September 1991. The proposal recommended that this training base be double-tasked and assigned responsibility to train Canadian Forces, multinational forces and civilians for future peacekeeping operations. An expanded peacekeeping training programme was suggested as a means of supplementing sea-cadet training, reserve training, and the traditional, albeit reduced, recruit training programme at CFB Cornwallis.

The proposal coincided with renewed hope for a 'new world order' and the Government's announcement that Canadian Forces would be reduced to an overall strength of 76,000. It was apparent that some of the defence resources required by the Cold War could be cost-effectively converted to support other Canadian defence priorities. This initiative was a locally developed response to the challenge of defence down-sizing, one that sought to ensure cooperation with all levels of government in the search for a viable alternative to an otherwise difficult situation.

With the renaissance of the United Nations and peacekeeping, internationally recognized experts urged that a higher priority be accorded to peacekeeping training and that Canada develop a peacekeeping training
centre. Whereas Canadians had established a solid reputation for their longstanding commitment to peacekeeping, the proposal noted that the Department of National Defence had yet to develop an institutionalized peacekeeping training programme or assign this task to a dedicated training centre. As the scope of UN operations was expanding to include diverse peacekeeping assignments and new tasks, the need for both general and specialized peacekeeping training was widely recognized.

Upon the invitation of the former Prime Minister, the Province of Nova Scotia developed the follow-up report "CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence" which was presented to the federal government in March 1992. Expanding upon the 1991 proposal, the Blueprint:

- overviewed the international demand for peacekeeping and peacekeeping training;

- documented the Canadian requirement for an institutionalized peacekeeping training centre;

- outlined the proposed centre's organizational structure; annual training activities; potential participants; and a curriculum of general and specialized training programmes for officers, other ranks, and civilians;

- established the personnel and infrastructure requirements of a proposed peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis;
- demonstrated the advantages of CFB Cornwallis as the appropriate location for a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre; and,

- reviewed the successful precedent established by those Scandinavian countries which have already developed UN peacekeeping training centres;

In the 1992 Blueprint, consideration was also accorded to preparing for the unprecedented number of new peacekeeping missions, the growing number of new troop contributors, and the expanding array of peacekeeping tasks.

On December 30, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote that the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis could not be effected. After consultations and what was described as a "meticulous study by peacekeeping experts", it was concluded that there was neither a need for such a training centre nor United Nation’s support for such an initiative. (Correspondence, December 30, 1992)

This position was reiterated in February 1993 by then Defence Minister Kim Campbell who stated that "a peacekeeping training centre is a wonderful idea for most people who do not know anything about peacekeeping. I have had discussions with senior members of the Canadian military who are a bit perplexed as to what you would teach
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn't close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia's proposal in DND's 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence".
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ANNEX B: The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities

Canadian peacekeepers are engaged in very important UN assignments worldwide. Over the past forty years, our regular forces and reserves have performed admirably in many diverse operations earning distinction and a solid reputation for their military professionalism.

We are now confronted by traditional peacekeeping tasks as well as another generation of UN operations -- operations that involve new methods, require new skills, and entail new partners. We can retain a high standard and a solid reputation for professionalism in this field -- but not by resting on past laurels nor by subscribing to outdated practices.

Our current defence training programme was designed in an earlier period to focus on the mid-to-high intensity combat operations envisaged throughout the Cold War. The emphasis has shifted, somewhat, to the development of general-purpose combat capability. Peacekeeping training is deemed to be a very low priority and related efforts are limited. Two short courses are provided for select officers while formed units receive mission-specific training and briefings at their various bases across the country once they have been assigned to a particular operation.
The Department of National Defence has yet to develop a modern, institutionalized peacekeeping training programme. As a result, the Canadian Forces training efforts for UN operations are frequently described as ad hoc, inconsistent and entailing risks.

Defence officials initially responded to the Cornwallis proposal arguing that Canadian Forces are military professionals and, as such, require little, if any additional training for peacekeeping. The military training provided for war -- general-purpose combat capability -- is argued to be sufficient training for peacekeeping. However, as one senior official acknowledged in 1991, "this line is the department's 'sales-job'; it entails risks but serves to protect a number of departmental priorities." Several of the risks have since become apparent.

Over the past two years, senior officials have been repeatedly forced to defend their reliance on general-purpose combat training and decentralized mission-specific briefings. Whereas the 'sales-job' has been institutionalized and accepted by some personnel, others are losing confidence in the training and leadership now provided.

Unfortunately, a cadre of senior officers continue to regard peacekeeping as a low-priority, ancillary role of the Canadian Forces. Training for UN peacekeeping operations is seen by some as an unnecessary departure from
professional soldiering and the traditional emphasis in training on combat
arms skills. This position is reflected in the words of Major-General
Lewis Mackenzie who stated in 1993 that "I think we're unanimous in the
military that there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping

The Cornwallis initiative is, therefore, viewed by sectors within DND as a
challenge to longstanding defence priorities; a threat to the conservative
defence constituency; and a potential drain on both time and available
resources. This has prompted some senior officials to 'close ranks' and
warn Canadian Forces personnel against voicing support for additional
peacekeeping training and the development of a training centre.

As a result, DND's review of the 1992 Blueprint appears to have been
conducted as a response to a perceived challenge; not as an objective
assessment of an initiative that might serve mutual interests. Defence
officials concluded this review arguing that:

Ultimately, the key issue is whether the CF need a
peacekeeping training centre. The DND view remains that
there is no need to substitute a centralized system of training
for peacekeeping to replace the mainly decentralized training
now conducted. Our training now produces a good
peacekeeper, and there is no reason, either domestic or
international, to centralize it.
(Directorate of International Policy, DND, September 1992)
[For a thorough assessment of this paper see "A Response to

There is, however, no longer a consensus within either the Canadian Forces or DND that the current system of training for peacekeeping is adequate.

Four steps will be essential if Canada is to retain a high standard and solid reputation for professionalism in this field. First, it needs to be recognized that current DND/CF peacekeeping training efforts must be improved; second, that all peacekeepers require general peacekeeping training as well as mission-specific training for UN operations; third, that recent efforts to improve training have been minimal and will not remedy the problems inherent in the de-centralized approach to training; and finally, this task must be assigned to an expert staff at a dedicated defence training centre.

1. DND/CF Peacekeeping Training Efforts Must Be Improved.

Recent events as well as departmental studies and evaluations prepared over the past three years indicate that there are serious problems inherent in present methods and related training efforts.
For example, a 1991 staff paper prepared within DND's Directorate of Peacekeeping for General de Chastelain states that:

There has been in the Canadian Forces a prevailing attitude that we need do very little in the way of preparation of our peacekeepers because of the basic military skills already learned. Unfortunately, this attitude is causing difficulties in competing with other peacekeeping contributors which are paying attention to the expressed wishes of the UN, and which are gradually upgrading their peacekeeping skills. The result is that a Scandinavian Reserve Officer, who receives a grounding in the subjects listed in the UN Training Guidelines could easily be a more knowledgeable, more sophisticated peacekeeper, at the start of his tour of UN duty, than his Canadian counterpart. If we resist acceptance of the Guidelines for refresher Trg as well as for knowledge specifically related to UN staff work, such as mission orientation and negotiating skills, we will begin to fall behind. Trg must be given an appropriate priority. Attempts to downgrade the need for training for UN duty in order to save resources will only lead to a deterioration of our overall contribution. ("Peacekeeping Training—Staff Paper", 4500-1, DPKO 4, July 8, 1991, pp. 2-3)

Another short report on training prepared by the former Director of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that, "the comparison of Canadian training [for UN duties] with that of other countries is not always favorable for Canada." This Colonel writes that, "it is apparent to many who have served with a peacekeeping mission that some Canadian officers arrive for their mission unprepared mentally to accept the methods and idiosyncracies of other systems/nations."
Canadians are known as complainers, with an attitude of superiority based in part on a lack of knowledge". ("Peacekeeping Training Officers", 4500-1, February 1991, p. 2)

In 1991, the Special Peacekeeping Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reported that Canada's peacekeeping training efforts were not effective. As this Brigadier-General wrote, "the training of our personnel selected for UN operations is not well managed as a CF-wide task. Most training activities are ad hoc and, with a few exceptions, occur only due to the initiative of field commanders." The Advisor conceded that in the ONUCA operation, both the Spanish and Venezuelan contingents "were quite superior to the Canadian contingent, when compared across the board". Among the wide range of concerns cited in his report were: the organization of peacekeeping training; the lack of directed training packages; the need to authorize responsibility for training; the need to establish training criteria and standards; the need to improve selection processes; and the requirement for special training for both officers and other-ranks. The Special Peacekeeping Advisor concluded with a strong recommendation for a review of Canadian peacekeeping training. ("Peacekeeping Review", 1850 -1/90, SPA/DCDS, January 23, 1991, pp. 9-14)
As one of those tasked with training Canadian personnel for a specific UN operation recently stated:

We are sending unqualified people to do qualified jobs. I am sorry to put it that way, but...we don’t have enough training when it’s time to get jobs like this done...There’s never enough time. It would help if we had our own training centre. ("Canadian peacekeepers unqualified, says expert", The Chronicle-Herald, April 11, 1992)

The 1992 NDHQ program evaluation on peacekeeping also reports that while conventional military skills must be the first priority, troops need an overlay of special peacekeeping skills. This survey evaluation confirmed that, "various sources had commented on the shortfalls and inconsistencies of the training ranging from UN Headquarters to the national level. It was also noted that, in the modern environment of peacekeeping, training deficiencies could eventually lead to serious failures in operations." Again, it was noted that "peacekeeping matters are covered only briefly, if at all, in the curricula at staff colleges and some CF schools."(1258-77 DGPE, June 30, 1992, pp.253-256)

Reports from Commanders of Canadian peacekeeping contingents continue to document problems arising as a result of inadequate preparation and training.
Among the concerns frequently cited by UN veterans and officers are:

- the absence of peackeeping courses, seminars or instruction in the regular training programme of the Canadian Forces as well as in Canadian military colleges;

- the lack of a focal point for training or responsible peackeeping training organization. Training for UN operations has yet to be incorporated into the Canadian Forces Training System or into the regular training of personnel. As a result, Canadian formed units now receive little, if any, advance preparation for UN assignments prior to mission-specific briefings;

- the lack of training in areas such as conflict analysis and conflict resolution. While it has been recognized that problems in the field should, where possible, be quickly resolved prior to escalation, insufficient attention has been accorded to providing the appropriate skills;

- assignment briefings and debriefings have been frequently overlooked, thus diminishing the potential store of 'lessons learned'. Moreover, there have been numerous occasions when Canadian personnel have been deployed to peacekeeping assignments without adequate information on the mission area, the conflict or their responsibilities as part of a UN force;

- the shortcomings in the current selection and review process. Attention should be accorded to determining those officers and other ranks appropriate for UN service;

- the risk of 'falling behind' those countries that provide peacekeeping contingents with general and specialized training programmes. While emphasizing professional military skills and a high level of proficiency in the related areas of
communications and logistics, there is a concern DND has failed to consolidate the expertise derived from experience in the majority of peacekeeping operations to date. The current emphasis in preparing Canadian personnel for UN service is merely on providing administrative guidelines and a basic acquaintance with the mission.

The extent to which peacekeeping training efforts continue to be downplayed is indicated by a closer examination of current programmes: the contingency training of Canada’s UN Stand-By Force tends to focus on combat operations and not on peacekeeping skills; the replacement/reinforcement/rotation training course tends to be for one mission (UNDOF) and, as is also the case for Military Observer Training, much of the emphasis throughout the week-long programme is accorded to hasty briefings and administrative requirements, not training.

DND’s curricula do not cover all necessary subjects nor do existing courses cover topics related to peacekeeping in sufficient depth. To cite examples from the officer’s training courses for Cyprus, for UNDOF, and for observers, some of relevant subjects are included, but the time spent on each general category averages well under two hours. For example, courses in important areas such as conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation are not yet routinely provided and have only recently been conducted in a few experimental exercises. As one of those responsible for
a pilot project on mediation training writes, "This is an area which deserves some attention, as soldiers face increasingly risky peacekeeping environments in the future...Eventually a common clearing-house for this sort of information should be established, to permit units to prepare for missions quickly and efficiently."

(Major D.M. Last, "Training Officers to Mediate", April 1992, p.2) In some cases, DND only provides a briefing package which suggests recommended readings, placing the onus on the individual to be prepared. On a range of complex and important topics, personnel now occasionally receive a number of short seminars but seldom a thorough assessment and understanding of their mission and their role.

Overall, it is clear that DND has yet to develop an effective peacekeeping training programme. Priority is accorded to general military training, particularly combat-arms skills. Mission-specific training is now provided when time permits and when there is a will. This essential training, however, all too often consists of make-shift courses and briefings with the onus on the quick development of operational readiness. It tends to be conducted in an ad hoc manner with little support from experts; few established training standards; and insufficient consideration of UN peacekeeping skills and responsibilities.
It is evident that there are serious problems inherent in DND’s current system of preparation and training for UN missions. A number of these problems stem from the 'sales job' of military professionalism and the specious claim that no special training is required for the peacekeeping soldier. This is not a sound military practice.

2. All Peacekeepers Require General and Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training.

Training is a strong determinant of performance. Soldiers must train for the task assigned and this is particularly the case when the task may have 'life and death' or international implications. As their performance not only reflects upon Canada, but also upon the United Nations, peacekeepers must be well-prepared to manage situations which could have high stakes and serious political consequences.

Professional soldiers who have been trained to fight and to pursue victory aggressively against an enemy may find it difficult to adjust their attitude and behaviour to the equally demanding requirements of peacekeeping. While combat arms skills are a prerequisite, so too is appropriate professional training for peaceful third-party intervention. Last year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that:
The Canadian Forces have been adamant that training as a soldier to use force is precisely the training needed to be a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it. (Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response To A New Generation Of Peacekeeping, February, 1993)

Mediation training is essential to instill confidence, to perform effectively and to ensure that small problems do not escalate. Moreover, it is important not only for officers, but also for other ranks, reserves and even civilian peacekeepers. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence last year, it is essential that all ranks receive the necessary understanding and skills:

In a peacekeeping operation, it is important to appreciate that negotiation and mediation often take place at all levels, even at the lowest levels of military representation and at the most isolated outposts. Experience has taught that incidents that are not resolved effectively at this lowest level, or in soldiers terms "at the sharp end", have the potential for rapid escalation and a high probability of resulting in a serious outbreak of hostilities. (The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993)

Professional military skills must be supplemented with professional peacekeeping skills. Many recognize that these skills are not synonymous.
Frederich Hessel of the Austrian Ministry of Defence acknowledges that their peacekeeping training centre "focuses on skills needed by UN soldiers which are often diametrically opposed to the ordinary military training which a soldier receives." (Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1991)

Experience has demonstrated that well-trained soldiers have both the organization and numerous capabilities often required in UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly evident, however, that this task also calls for different skills and significant adjustments in approach and action from those developed in combat training. It should be understood that these skills are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory. General combat training must simply be supplemented with general peacekeeping training. Effecting such a change will require a new training programme and a new training system.

All peacekeepers have responsibilities and all ranks deserve adequate training. A comprehensive four-week course of general peacekeeping training for all ranks would provide the basic skills and understanding required in UN operations. With the background provided in the four-week general training course, soldiers and units would be well prepared to move on to either specialized training courses or mission-specific training.
Another advantage provided by advance preparation is that personnel provided with a general training programme for UN peacekeeping would likely require a shorter refresher devoted to upgrading routine skills once assigned to a particular mission. As a result, the time allocated to mission-specific training might be shortened thereby facilitating a more rapid deployment. Such training will be all the more essential if Canadian Forces are to participate effectively in new tasks such as preventive deployment called for in the UN Agenda for Peace.

General peacekeeping training as well as appropriate mission-specific training will also be increasingly important for Canadian Reserves. This is essential as Canada is now moving away from an all-professional armed force towards a total force entailing the integration of more reserves than regular land forces into our defence effort. The Department of National Defence is already deploying a considerable number of reserves to various UN operations. In some serving battalions, reserves have constituted up to one-half of the Canadian contingent. As these are not full-time military professionals, concerns have been expressed as to the adequacy of their preparation and training. To date, the practice has been to use volunteers who, upon notice of an assignment, review general military training, particularly combat arms skills, and then proceed into a period of mission-specific training with their assigned units.
The new reliance on the reserves to fulfill UN peacekeeping duties clearly calls for advance peacekeeping training, a more structured training environment, standardized courses, and strict selection procedures.

The use of Canadian reserves in UN peacekeeping has prompted questions as to how they can be cost-effectively provided with adequate training. Consider the example of the 350 Nova Scotian militia initially selected to serve in UNPROFOR: first they were sent from their home province to Gagetown, New Brunswick to review combat-arms skills; then they were flown to Winnipeg to join their assigned infantry unit; together they were sent to California for training at Fort Ord; then they returned to Winnipeg and some were flown back across the country prior to final staging for deployment. Apparently, there are considerable shortcomings, as well as considerable costs, with the current approach to training Canadian reserves for peacekeeping.

Recent UN operations have also been characterized by the frequent use of civilian peacekeeping contingents. As the UN Secretary-General noted in *An Agenda for Peace*, "increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military."

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The trend toward deploying civilians, as well as large multi-dimensional operations involving both military and civilian contingents, is expected to continue. As previously noted, these operations have also demonstrated the need for appropriate training and joint exercises to clarify the various roles and responsibilities of civilian and military participants.

Current efforts to prepare Canada’s civilian peacekeepers are now limited to several short courses and briefings managed as the need arises by the UN, the Department of External Affairs, CIDA, the RCMP, Elections Canada, and several non-governmental organizations. Canada is well positioned to host a peacekeeping training programme for civilians at a dedicated centre. To date, Austria and Sweden are the only countries providing such a service.

Among the areas that warrant civilian peacekeeping training courses are: human rights work; democratic development; election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; civil administration and rehabilitation; refugee work; policing and customs; as well as conflict management and problem-solving. Consideration could also be devoted to the new roles of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace building'. Experience has demonstrated that appropriate time must be allocated for civilian training.
As noted in the Austrian training program for civilian peacekeeping "a high quality training programme needs a minimum of four weeks".
(ASPR, Stadtschlaining, March 1993)

Whereas it is recommended that civilian peacekeeping training requirements be incorporated into the planning and development of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre, the short-term priority must be on improving Canadian Forces training for UN operations.


Since the Cornwallis plan was initially presented, a few steps have been taken to rectify deficiencies, as cited in the reports of the Special Peacekeeping Advisor and the Director of Peacekeeping Operations.

The 1991 UN Guidelines have been circulated, although some officers indicate they are not widely adhered to in training. And, although it is important to ensure that Canadian training is improved to meet the requirements set forth by the UN, it should be recognized that many member states have already institutionalized peacekeeping training programmes which exceed the standards called for in the UN Guidelines.
DND also authorized a short pilot course on negotiation that prompted a follow-up study on negotiation and mediation in peacekeeping. A new Canadian manual to guide peacekeeping training is being drafted and should shortly be available. One officer is developing a new curriculum to include the study of peacekeeping in Canadian Staff Colleges; another is preparing instructions and a curriculum to be used in the training of formed units.

The Directorate of Peacekeeping [formerly DPKO and now J3PK] is also attempting to improve training but it is ill-equipped and under-staffed to consolidate the lessons learned and the knowledge derived from Canada’s extensive experience in UN operations. Five officers are currently assigned to this Directorate. Their primary task is to coordinate all national activities related to the deployment, maintenance, and withdrawal of Canadian commitments in support of peacekeeping operations worldwide. As they now manage an enormous peacekeeping effort, insufficient resources and time are available to consolidate the lessons learned, to evaluate performance, to brief and debrief, and to effectively modernize Canadian training. Although there is a concern that immediate control over training be retained by those currently assigned the task, a few options are being reviewed.
A number of officers within DND are promoting the development of a small peacekeeping centre or privatized peacekeeping college with limited responsibility to train select officers. By training these officers under the auspices of a privatized institute, it is suggested that the appropriate knowledge and skills will be passed on by word-of-mouth through mission-specific training at the various units.

Providing excellent training to future trainers and officers must be a high priority. However, the very limited nature of this proposed option would do little to enhance the prospect of hosting joint peacekeeping exercises, large-scale simulations, and the training of Canadian or multinational formed units. It is also unlikely that a training programme for officers only would suffice to rectify the numerous problems cited in DND’s own reports on peacekeeping training. Whereas this small-scale approach might have been a valid option in the early 1980s, when UN peacekeeping was an occasional assignment, the UN General Assembly is asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. By comparison, it is doubtful that this option would be viewed domestically or internationally as a serious contribution to the United Nations or peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now Canada’s dominant defence activity. To assign this training task to a small centre or privatized college would be viewed as a negligent deferral of responsibility.
Training Canadian Forces personnel for UN operations is, and should remain, the obligation of the Department of National Defence.

In response to the report of the 1993 Military Board of Inquiry into Somalia, the former Chief of Defence Staff reaffirmed his support for the ongoing reliance upon general-purpose combat training but recommended that sufficient time be scheduled to conduct mission-specific training for the entire deployment group. He also called for a review of peacekeeping doctrine and asked that guidelines be developed to assess the effectiveness of mission-specific training for such operations. (DND, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol.XII, August 28, 93) Within four months, however, the new Minister of National Defence announced another inquiry into alleged violations of UN policy in the former Yugoslavia.

It is apparent that recent refinements by DND to current training practices are inadequate, if not superficial. It could be argued that they constitute more of a political diversion to retain the status-quo than a concentrated effort to improve Canadian peacekeeping training. The serious problems that have been cited in DND reports -- problems that are confirmed by other officers and veterans -- will not be easily remedied or fixed by half-measures such as a new course or manual. Whereas some units and commanders have developed better training procedures than others, the problems are systemic.
4. A Dedicated Peacekeeping Training Centre is Required.

Decentralized training will not suffice to prepare Canadian peacekeepers adequately for future UN commitments. The practice of decentralized peacekeeping training was developed in an earlier period when peacekeeping was less of a priority and only an occasional assignment. In 1994, United Nations peacekeeping can no longer be viewed as a secondary activity requiring minimal and last-minute preparations.

Decentralized training for peacekeeping is conducted in the various home units at bases across the country. This training is seldom supervised by peacekeeping experts and not yet conducted according to a uniform standard. The training varies from unit to unit and remains at the discretion of individual commanders. As specific training for UN operations is not accorded a high priority, it is taken seriously by some units and neglected by others. To cite one example, the officer in charge of Force Mobile Command is assigned responsibility for the training of personnel, units and formations within the Command. Yet a recent DND report acknowledges, "FMC does not have a specific training policy, nor has it issued direction for training for peacekeeping operations." As the author of this report writes, "the lack of direction and guidance by
FMCHQ creates the possibility of inconsistent training and preparations from one contingent to the next". Furthermore, this report on training policy states that "during the course of the Review a search of all policy documents and information gathered in interviews revealed a lack of direction to Commands in the area of training policy and standards in the preparation of units for peacekeeping duty". ("DND Final Report", April 15, 1992, pp. 124-125, 39)

The Special Peacekeeping Advisor also noted the limitations of decentralized training in his review of the options for training replacement personnel. As he wrote:

A centralized CF training centre for deploying personnel using standard training packages in one location has considerable merit, and has been used successfully in CFB Montreal for Op DANACA. Alternatively, course packages could be sent to despatching bases, however, it is probable that this will give an inconsistent and operationally unsatisfactory product.


Many of the problems cited in DND’s reports on peacekeeping training appear to be directly related to the decentralized system. The decentralized approach clearly limits the support that might be provided by established experts and a permanent training staff. By decentralizing peacekeeping training, it remains an ad hoc, low-priority task.
As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs:

A few detractors have finally conceded that our personnel might need to do more peacekeeping training as long as it can be done within individual units at decentralized locations across the country. They like this decentralized idea because it really means occasional training—fragmented and up to the discretion of the unit commander. Decentralized training is de-emphasized training. It does not lead to advanced standardized training. DND’s own reports have indicated that the lack of guidance in such an approach creates the possibility of inconsistent and deficient training. Decentralized training can too easily become a way of doing business as usual, of paying only lip service to the UN’s request. (SCONDVA, Issue No.42, March 30, 1993, p. 8)

Moreover, among Canadian defence tasks, decentralized training is almost unique to peacekeeping. Training for most defence activities is assigned to a training school at a specific base. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Beattie stated:

If you want an important job done well, do it the way Canadian forces have routinely done it for their other priority tasks: develop a training centre. We have land combat training centres, maritime training centres, basic training centres, flight training centres, engineering schools, schools for administration and logistics and so on. It is time DND developed a peacekeeping training centre. (Ibid., p. 9)
Canadian Forces personnel and units routinely travel to dedicated defence training centres in both Canada and the United States for instruction and exercises related to a particular defence commitment. A dedicated peacekeeping training centre in Canada would provide the following advantages:

- peacekeeping training would be established as a priority task;

- a dedicated staff of specialists and trainers would ensure quality control over both the training and the selection of peacekeepers;

- a supportive training environment would restore confidence and help participants understand their required skills, roles, and responsibilities;

- the public and the government would be assured that Canadian Forces are not only well prepared for UN operations but also capable of other potential low-intensity operations such as providing aid to the civil power and domestic constabulary services;

- it would provide an opportunity to run controlled simulations and joint exercises;

- it would facilitate research into peacekeeping and conflict de-escalation as well as help consolidate the lessons learned from field exercises, simulations, and previous operational experience;
internationally accepted doctrine, strategy, and standard operating procedures might be refined in both the contingency planning and training for future operations;

- operations might be mounted or staged out of this centre immediately after mission-specific training thus reducing considerable transportation costs;

- other UN member states and NATO allies would have access to a dedicated facility and modern training programme; and,

- it would demonstrate Canada's enduring commitment to the United Nations and peacekeeping.

DND reports prepared over the last three years have also outlined other reasons and criteria for establishing such a training facility. Under the heading "Establishing a Training Centre", one officer writes that, "in order to maintain, and even more so, improve on current standards, there must be a tri-service center for peacekeeping operations. This center of excellence would handle all DAG (departure assistance groups) duties and act as a repository for corporate knowledge from the field." The author cites the following reasons for a permanent centre:

- peacekeeping is a tri-service commitment, however, many naval and air bases cannot provide the specialist indoctrination and equipment;

- individual commands have their own centres of excellence; e.g., Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax;
- dedicated staff are on call to coordinate contingencies and can routinely analyse lessons learned from field reports (a field reporting system must be instituted to capture experience and share them);

- other nations will increasingly compete with Canada for 'market share'—a dedicated centre is the only way to raise standards;

- a dedicated centre could run specialized briefings for reserves and hence open up an extremely valuable experience and morale boosting opportunity to them. ("Establishing A Training Centre", Annex B to After Action Report, Peacekeeping Officers CRSE, May 15, 1991)

Another 1991 staff paper prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff suggests the following criteria for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre:

- it must be a lodger unit on a Base that can provide quarters (up to 110) and lecture facilities;

- the centre should be a national unit with no bias towards Army, Navy, Air Force or ADM Mat;

- the Centre should be established to provide year-round service, including contingency training and maintenance of the training library. The staff must include expertise (experienced) from each major mission area...;

- must be a bilingual unit; and

The Premier of Nova Scotia presented the proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre" to the Prime Minister of Canada in September 1991. The proposal recommended that this training base be double-tasked and assigned responsibility to train Canadian Forces, multinational forces and civilians for future peacekeeping operations. An expanded peacekeeping training programme was suggested as a means of supplementing sea-cadet training, reserve training, and the traditional, albeit reduced, recruit training programme at CFB Cornwallis.

The proposal coincided with renewed hope for a 'new world order' and the Government's announcement that Canadian Forces would be reduced to an overall strength of 76,000. It was apparent that some of the defence resources required by the Cold War could be cost-effectively converted to support other Canadian defence priorities. This initiative was a locally developed response to the challenge of defence down-sizing, one that sought to ensure cooperation with all levels of government in the search for a viable alternative to an otherwise difficult situation.

With the renaissance of the United Nations and peacekeeping, internationally recognized experts urged that a higher priority be accorded to peacekeeping training and that Canada develop a peacekeeping training
centre. Whereas Canadians had established a solid reputation for their longstanding commitment to peacekeeping, the proposal noted that the Department of National Defence had yet to develop an institutionalized peacekeeping training programme or assign this task to a dedicated training centre. As the scope of UN operations was expanding to include diverse peacekeeping assignments and new tasks, the need for both general and specialized peacekeeping training was widely recognized.

Upon the invitation of the former Prime Minister, the Province of Nova Scotia developed the follow-up report "CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence" which was presented to the federal government in March 1992. Expanding upon the 1991 proposal, the Blueprint:

- overviewed the international demand for peacekeeping and peacekeeping training;

- documented the Canadian requirement for an institutionalized peacekeeping training centre;

- outlined the proposed centre’s organizational structure; annual training activities; potential participants; and a curriculum of general and specialized training programmes for officers, other ranks, and civilians;

- established the personnel and infrastructure requirements of a proposed peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis;
- demonstrated the advantages of CFB Cornwallis as the appropriate location for a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre; and,

- reviewed the successful precedent established by those Scandinavian countries which have already developed UN peacekeeping training centres;

In the 1992 Blueprint, consideration was also accorded to preparing for the unprecedented number of new peacekeeping missions, the growing number of new troop contributors, and the expanding array of peacekeeping tasks.

On December 30, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote that the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis could not be effected. After consultations and what was described as a "meticulous study by peacekeeping experts", it was concluded that there was neither a need for such a training centre nor United Nation's support for such an initiative. (Correspondence, December 30, 1992)

This position was reiterated in February 1993 by then Defence Minister Kim Campbell who stated that "a peacekeeping training centre is a wonderful idea for most people who do not know anything about peacekeeping. I have had discussions with senior members of the Canadian military who are a bit perplexed as to what you would teach
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn't close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia's proposal in DND's 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence".
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ANNEX B: The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities

Canadian peacekeepers are engaged in very important UN assignments worldwide. Over the past forty years, our regular forces and reserves have performed admirably in many diverse operations earning distinction and a solid reputation for their military professionalism.

We are now confronted by traditional peacekeeping tasks as well as another generation of UN operations -- operations that involve new methods, require new skills, and entail new partners. We can retain a high standard and a solid reputation for professionalism in this field -- but not by resting on past laurels nor by subscribing to outdated practices.

Our current defence training programme was designed in an earlier period to focus on the mid-to-high intensity combat operations envisaged throughout the Cold War. The emphasis has shifted, somewhat, to the development of general-purpose combat capability. Peacekeeping training is deemed to be a very low priority and related efforts are limited. Two short courses are provided for select officers while formed units receive mission-specific training and briefings at their various bases across the country once they have been assigned to a particular operation.
The Department of National Defence has yet to develop a modern, institutionalized peacekeeping training programme. As a result, the Canadian Forces training efforts for UN operations are frequently described as ad hoc, inconsistent and entailing risks.

Defence officials initially responded to the Cornwallis proposal arguing that Canadian Forces are military professionals and, as such, require little, if any additional training for peacekeeping. The military training provided for war -- general-purpose combat capability -- is argued to be sufficient training for peacekeeping. However, as one senior official acknowledged in 1991, "this line is the department's 'sales-job'; it entails risks but serves to protect a number of departmental priorities." Several of the risks have since become apparent.

Over the past two years, senior officials have been repeatedly forced to defend their reliance on general-purpose combat training and decentralized mission-specific briefings. Whereas the 'sales-job' has been institutionalized and accepted by some personnel, others are losing confidence in the training and leadership now provided.

Unfortunately, a cadre of senior officers continue to regard peacekeeping as a low-priority, ancillary role of the Canadian Forces. Training for UN peacekeeping operations is seen by some as an unnecessary departure from
professional soldiering and the traditional emphasis in training on combat-arms skills. This position is reflected in the words of Major-General Lewis Mackenzie who stated in 1993 that "I think we're unanimous in the military that there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 12, 1993)

The Cornwallis initiative is, therefore, viewed by sectors within DND as a challenge to longstanding defence priorities; a threat to the conservative defence constituency; and a potential drain on both time and available resources. This has prompted some senior officials to 'close ranks' and warn Canadian Forces personnel against voicing support for additional peacekeeping training and the development of a training centre.

As a result, DND's review of the 1992 Blueprint appears to have been conducted as a response to a perceived challenge; not as an objective assessment of an initiative that might serve mutual interests. Defence officials concluded this review arguing that:

Ultimately, the key issue is whether the CF need a peacekeeping training centre. The DND view remains that there is no need to substitute a centralized system of training for peacekeeping to replace the mainly decentralized training now conducted. Our training now produces a good peacekeeper, and there is no reason, either domestic or international, to centralize it.

(Directorate of International Policy, DND, September 1992)

[For a thorough assessment of this paper see "A Response to
the Review Prepared By DI POL, DND regarding the Province of Nova Scotia’s report, ’CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint...’, May 1993]

There is, however, no longer a consensus within either the Canadian Forces or DND that the current system of training for peacekeeping is adequate.

Four steps will be essential if Canada is to retain a high standard and solid reputation for professionalism in this field. First, it needs to be recognized that current DND/CF peacekeeping training efforts must be improved; second, that all peacekeepers require general peacekeeping training as well as mission-specific training for UN operations; third, that recent efforts to improve training have been minimal and will not remedy the problems inherent in the de-centralized approach to training; and finally, this task must be assigned to an expert staff at a dedicated defence training centre.

1. DND/CF Peacekeeping Training Efforts Must Be Improved.

Recent events as well as departmental studies and evaluations prepared over the past three years indicate that there are serious problems inherent in present methods and related training efforts.
For example, a 1991 staff paper prepared within DND’s Directorate of Peacekeeping for General de Chastelain states that:

There has been in the Canadian Forces a prevailing attitude that we need do very little in the way of preparation of our peacekeepers because of the basic military skills already learned. Unfortunately, this attitude is causing difficulties in competing with other peacekeeping contributors which are paying attention to the expressed wishes of the UN, and which are gradually upgrading their peacekeeping skills. The result is that a Scandinavian Reserve Officer, who receives a grounding in the subjects listed in the UN Training Guidelines could easily be a more knowledgeable, more sophisticated peacekeeper, at the start of his tour of UN duty, than his Canadian counterpart. If we resist acceptance of the Guidelines for refresher trg as well as for knowledge specifically related to UN staff work, such as mission orientation and negotiating skills, we will begin to fall behind. Trg must be given an appropriate priority. Attempts to downgrade the need for training for UN duty in order to save resources will only lead to a deterioration of our overall contribution. ("Peacekeeping Training—Staff Paper", 4500-1, DPKO 4, July 8, 1991, pp. 2-3)

Another short report on training prepared by the former Director of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that, "the comparison of Canadian training [for UN duties] with that of other countries is not always favorable for Canada." This Colonel writes that, "it is apparent to many who have served with a peacekeeping mission that some Canadian officers arrive for their mission unprepared mentally to accept the methods and idiosyncracies of other systems/nations."
Canadians are known as complainers, with an attitude of superiority based in part on a lack of knowledge". ("Peacekeeping Training Officers", 4500-1, February 1991, p. 2)

In 1991, the Special Peacekeeping Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reported that Canada’s peacekeeping training efforts were not effective. As this Brigadier-General wrote, "the training of our personnel selected for UN operations is not well managed as a CF-wide task. Most training activities are ad hoc and, with a few exceptions, occur only due to the initiative of field commanders." The Advisor conceded that in the ONUCA operation, both the Spanish and Venezuelan contingents "were quite superior to the Canadian contingent, when compared across the board". Among the wide range of concerns cited in his report were: the organization of peacekeeping training; the lack of directed training packages; the need to authorize responsibility for training; the need to establish training criteria and standards; the need to improve selection processes; and the requirement for special training for both officers and other-ranks. The Special Peacekeeping Advisor concluded with a strong recommendation for a review of Canadian peacekeeping training. ("Peacekeeping Review", 1850-1/90, SPA/DCDS, January 23, 1991, pp. 9-14)
As one of those tasked with training Canadian personnel for a specific UN operation recently stated:

We are sending unqualified people to do qualified jobs. I am sorry to put it that way, but...we don't have enough training when it's time to get jobs like this done...There's never enough time. It would help if we had our own training centre.
("Canadian peacekeepers unqualified, says expert", The Chronicle-Herald, April 11, 1992)

The 1992 NDHQ program evaluation on peacekeeping also reports that while conventional military skills must be the first priority, troops need an overlay of special peacekeeping skills. This survey evaluation confirmed that, "various sources had commented on the shortfalls and inconsistencies of the training ranging from UN Headquarters to the national level. It was also noted that, in the modern environment of peacekeeping, training deficiencies could eventually lead to serious failures in operations." Again, it was noted that "peacekeeping matters are covered only briefly, if at all, in the curricula at staff colleges and some CF schools."(1258-77 DGPE, June 30, 1992, pp.253-256)

Reports from Commanders of Canadian peacekeeping contingents continue to document problems arising as a result of inadequate preparation and training.
Among the concerns frequently cited by UN veterans and officers are:

- the absence of peackeeping courses, seminars or instruction in the regular training programme of the Canadian Forces as well as in Canadian military colleges;

- the lack of a focal point for training or responsible peacekeeping training organization. Training for UN operations has yet to be incorporated into the Canadian Forces Training System or into the regular training of personnel. As a result, Canadian formed units now receive little, if any, advance preparation for UN assignments prior to mission-specific briefings;

- the lack of training in areas such as conflict analysis and conflict resolution. While it has been recognized that problems in the field should, where possible, be quickly resolved prior to escalation, insufficient attention has been accorded to providing the appropriate skills;

- assignment briefings and debriefings have been frequently overlooked, thus diminishing the potential store of 'lessons learned'. Moreover, there have been numerous occasions when Canadian personnel have been deployed to peacekeeping assignments without adequate information on the mission area, the conflict or their responsibilities as part of a UN force;

- the shortcomings in the current selection and review process. Attention should be accorded to determining those officers and other ranks appropriate for UN service;

- the risk of 'falling behind' those countries that provide peacekeeping contingents with general and specialized training programmes. While emphasizing professional military skills and a high level of proficiency in the related areas of
communications and logistics, there is a concern DND has failed to consolidate the expertise derived from experience in the majority of peacekeeping operations to date. The current emphasis in preparing Canadian personnel for UN service is merely on providing administrative guidelines and a basic acquaintance with the mission.

The extent to which peacekeeping training efforts continue to be downplayed is indicated by a closer examination of current programmes: the contingency training of Canada’s UN Stand-By Force tends to focus on combat operations and not on peacekeeping skills; the replacement/reinforcement/rotation training course tends to be for one mission (UNDOF) and, as is also the case for Military Observer Training, much of the emphasis throughout the week-long programme is accorded to hasty briefings and administrative requirements, not training.

DND’s curricula do not cover all necessary subjects nor do existing courses cover topics related to peacekeeping in sufficient depth. To cite examples from the officer’s training courses for Cyprus, for UNDOF, and for observers, some of relevant subjects are included, but the time spent on each general category averages well under two hours. For example, courses in important areas such as conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation are not yet routinely provided and have only recently been conducted in a few experimental exercises. As one of those responsible for
a pilot project on mediation training writes, "This is an area which
deserves some attention, as soldiers face increasingly risky peacekeeping
environments in the future...Eventually a common clearing-house for this
sort of information should be established, to permit units to prepare for
missions quickly and efficiently." (Major D.M. Last, "Training Officers to
Mediate", April 1992, p.2) In some cases, DND only provides a briefing
package which suggests recommended readings, placing the onus on the
individual to be prepared. On a range of complex and important topics,
personnel now occasionally receive a number of short seminars but seldom
a thorough assessment and understanding of their mission and their role.

Overall, it is clear that DND has yet to develop an effective peacekeeping
training programme. Priority is accorded to general military training,
particularly combat-arms skills. Mission-specific training is now provided
when time permits and when there is a will. This essential training,
however, all too often consists of make-shift courses and briefings with
the onus on the quick development of operational readiness. It tends to be
conducted in an ad hoc manner with little support from experts; few
established training standards; and insufficient consideration of UN
peacekeeping skills and responsibilities.
It is evident that there are serious problems inherent in DND's current system of preparation and training for UN missions. A number of these problems stem from the 'sales job' of military professionalism and the specious claim that no special training is required for the peacekeeping soldier. This is not a sound military practice.

2. All Peacekeepers Require General and Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training.

Training is a strong determinant of performance. Soldiers must train for the task assigned and this is particularly the case when the task may have 'life and death' or international implications. As their performance not only reflects upon Canada, but also upon the United Nations, peacekeepers must be well-prepared to manage situations which could have high stakes and serious political consequences.

Professional soldiers who have been trained to fight and to pursue victory aggressively against an enemy may find it difficult to adjust their attitude and behaviour to the equally demanding requirements of peacekeeping. While combat arms skills are a prerequisite, so too is appropriate professional training for peaceful third-party intervention. Last year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that:
The Canadian Forces have been adamant that training as a soldier to use force is precisely the training needed to be a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it. *(Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response To A New Generation Of Peacekeeping, February, 1993)*

Mediation training is essential to instill confidence, to perform effectively and to ensure that small problems do not escalate. Moreover, it is important not only for officers, but also for other ranks, reserves and even civilian peacekeepers. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence last year, it is essential that all ranks receive the necessary understanding and skills:

In a peacekeeping operation, it is important to appreciate that negotiation and mediation often take place at all levels, even at the lowest levels of military representation and at the most isolated outposts. Experience has taught that incidents that are not resolved effectively at this lowest level, or in soldiers terms "at the sharp end", have the potential for rapid escalation and a high probability of resulting in a serious outbreak of hostilities. *(The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993)*

Professional military skills must be supplemented with professional peacekeeping skills. Many recognize that these skills are not synonymous.
Frederich Hessel of the Austrian Ministry of Defence acknowledges that their peacekeeping training centre "focuses on skills needed by UN soldiers which are often diametrically opposed to the ordinary military training which a soldier receives." (Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1991)

Experience has demonstrated that well-trained soldiers have both the organization and numerous capabilities often required in UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly evident, however, that this task also calls for different skills and significant adjustments in approach and action from those developed in combat training. It should be understood that these skills are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory. General combat training must simply be supplemented with general peacekeeping training. Effecting such a change will require a new training programme and a new training system.

All peacekeepers have responsibilities and all ranks deserve adequate training. A comprehensive four-week course of general peacekeeping training for all ranks would provide the basic skills and understanding required in UN operations. With the background provided in the four-week general training course, soldiers and units would be well prepared to move on to either specialized training courses or mission-specific training.
Another advantage provided by advance preparation is that personnel provided with a general training programme for UN peacekeeping would likely require a shorter refresher devoted to upgrading routine skills once assigned to a particular mission. As a result, the time allocated to mission-specific training might be shortened thereby facilitating a more rapid deployment. Such training will be all the more essential if Canadian Forces are to participate effectively in new tasks such as preventive deployment called for in the UN Agenda for Peace.

General peacekeeping training as well as appropriate mission-specific training will also be increasingly important for Canadian Reserves. This is essential as Canada is now moving away from an all-professional armed force towards a total force entailing the integration of more reserves than regular land forces into our defence effort. The Department of National Defence is already deploying a considerable number of reserves to various UN operations. In some serving battalions, reserves have constituted up to one-half of the Canadian contingent. As these are not full-time military professionals, concerns have been expressed as to the adequacy of their preparation and training. To date, the practice has been to use volunteers who, upon notice of an assignment, review general military training, particularly combat arms skills, and then proceed into a period of mission-specific training with their assigned units.
The new reliance on the reserves to fulfill UN peacekeeping duties clearly calls for advance peacekeeping training, a more structured training environment, standardized courses, and strict selection procedures.

The use of Canadian reserves in UN peacekeeping has prompted questions as to how they can be cost-effectively provided with adequate training. Consider the example of the 350 Nova Scotian militia initially selected to serve in UNPROFOR: first they were sent from their home province to Gagetown, New Brunswick to review combat-arms skills; then they were flown to Winnipeg to join their assigned infantry unit; together they were sent to California for training at Fort Ord; then they returned to Winnipeg and some were flown back across the country prior to final staging for deployment. Apparently, there are considerable shortcomings, as well as considerable costs, with the current approach to training Canadian reserves for peacekeeping.

Recent UN operations have also been characterized by the frequent use of civilian peacekeeping contingents. As the UN Secretary-General noted in An Agenda for Peace, "increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military."
The trend toward deploying civilians, as well as large multi-dimensional operations involving both military and civilian contingents, is expected to continue. As previously noted, these operations have also demonstrated the need for appropriate training and joint exercises to clarify the various roles and responsibilities of civilian and military participants.

Current efforts to prepare Canada’s civilian peacekeepers are now limited to several short courses and briefings managed as the need arises by the UN, the Department of External Affairs, CIDA, the RCMP, Elections Canada, and several non-governmental organizations. Canada is well positioned to host a peacekeeping training programme for civilians at a dedicated centre. To date, Austria and Sweden are the only countries providing such a service.

Among the areas that warrant civilian peacekeeping training courses are: human rights work; democratic development; election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; civil administration and rehabilitation; refugee work; policing and customs; as well as conflict management and problem-solving. Consideration could also be devoted to the new roles of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace building'. Experience has demonstrated that appropriate time must be allocated for civilian training.
As noted in the Austrian training program for civilian peacekeeping "a high quality training programme needs a minimum of four weeks". (ASPR, Stadtschlaining, March 1993)

Whereas it is recommended that civilian peacekeeping training requirements be incorporated into the planning and development of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre, the short-term priority must be on improving Canadian Forces training for UN operations.

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Since the Cornwallis plan was initially presented, a few steps have been taken to rectify deficiencies, as cited in the reports of the Special Peacekeeping Advisor and the Director of Peacekeeping Operations.

The 1991 UN Guidelines have been circulated, although some officers indicate they are not widely adhered to in training. And, although it is important to ensure that Canadian training is improved to meet the requirements set forth by the UN, it should be recognized that many member states have already institutionalized peacekeeping training programmes which exceed the standards called for in the UN Guidelines.
DND also authorized a short pilot course on negotiation that prompted a follow-up study on negotiation and mediation in peacekeeping. A new Canadian manual to guide peacekeeping training is being drafted and should shortly be available. One officer is developing a new curriculum to include the study of peacekeeping in Canadian Staff Colleges; another is preparing instructions and a curriculum to be used in the training of formed units.

The Directorate of Peacekeeping [formerly DPKO and now J3PK] is also attempting to improve training but it is ill-equipped and under-staffed to consolidate the lessons learned and the knowledge derived from Canada’s extensive experience in UN operations. Five officers are currently assigned to this Directorate. Their primary task is to coordinate all national activities related to the deployment, maintenance, and withdrawal of Canadian commitments in support of peacekeeping operations worldwide. As they now manage an enormous peacekeeping effort, insufficient resources and time are available to consolidate the lessons learned, to evaluate performance, to brief and debrief, and to effectively modernize Canadian training. Although there is a concern that immediate control over training be retained by those currently assigned the task, a few options are being reviewed.
A number of officers within DND are promoting the development of a small peacekeeping centre or privatized peacekeeping college with limited responsibility to train select officers. By training these officers under the auspices of a privatized institute, it is suggested that the appropriate knowledge and skills will be passed on by word-of-mouth through mission-specific training at the various units.

Providing excellent training to future trainers and officers must be a high priority. However, the very limited nature of this proposed option would do little to enhance the prospect of hosting joint peacekeeping exercises, large-scale simulations, and the training of Canadian or multinational formed units. It is also unlikely that a training programme for officers only would suffice to rectify the numerous problems cited in DND's own reports on peacekeeping training. Whereas this small-scale approach might have been a valid option in the early 1980s, when UN peacekeeping was an occasional assignment, the UN General Assembly is asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. By comparison, it is doubtful that this option would be viewed domestically or internationally as a serious contribution to the United Nations or peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now Canada's dominant defence activity. To assign this training task to a small centre or privatized college would be viewed as a negligent deferral of responsibility.
Training Canadian Forces personnel for UN operations is, and should remain, the obligation of the Department of National Defence.

In response to the report of the 1993 Military Board of Inquiry into Somalia, the former Chief of Defence Staff reaffirmed his support for the ongoing reliance upon general-purpose combat training but recommended that sufficient time be scheduled to conduct mission-specific training for the entire deployment group. He also called for a review of peacekeeping doctrine and asked that guidelines be developed to assess the effectiveness of mission-specific training for such operations. (DND, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol.XII, August 28, 93) Within four months, however, the new Minister of National Defence announced another inquiry into alleged violations of UN policy in the former Yugoslavia.

It is apparent that recent refinements by DND to current training practices are inadequate, if not superficial. It could be argued that they constitute more of a political diversion to retain the status quo than a concentrated effort to improve Canadian peacekeeping training. The serious problems that have been cited in DND reports -- problems that are confirmed by other officers and veterans -- will not be easily remedied or fixed by half-measures such as a new course or manual. Whereas some units and commanders have developed better training procedures than others, the problems are systemic.
4. A Dedicated Peacekeeping Training Centre is Required.

Decentralized training will not suffice to prepare Canadian peacekeepers adequately for future UN commitments. The practice of decentralized peacekeeping training was developed in an earlier period when peacekeeping was less of a priority and only an occasional assignment. In 1994, United Nations peacekeeping can no longer be viewed as a secondary activity requiring minimal and last-minute preparations.

Decentralized training for peacekeeping is conducted in the various home units at bases across the country. This training is seldom supervised by peacekeeping experts and not yet conducted according to a uniform standard. The training varies from unit to unit and remains at the discretion of individual commanders. As specific training for UN operations is not accorded a high priority, it is taken seriously by some units and neglected by others. To cite one example, the officer in charge of Force Mobile Command is assigned responsibility for the training of personnel, units and formations within the Command. Yet a recent DND report acknowledges, "FMC does not have a specific training policy, nor has it issued direction for training for peacekeeping operations." As the author of this report writes, "the lack of direction and guidance by
FMCHQ creates the possibility of inconsistent training and preparations from one contingent to the next". Furthermore, this report on training policy states that "during the course of the Review a search of all policy documents and information gathered in interviews revealed a lack of direction to Commands in the area of training policy and standards in the preparation of units for peacekeeping duty". ("DND Final Report", April 15, 1992, pp. 124-125, 39)

The Special Peacekeeping Advisor also noted the limitations of decentralized training in his review of the options for training replacement personnel. As he wrote:

A centralized CF training centre for deploying personnel using standard training packages in one location has considerable merit, and has been used successfully in CFB Montreal for Op DANACA. Alternatively, course packages could be sent to despatching bases, however, it is probable that this will give an inconsistent and operationally unsatisfactory product. ("Peacekeeping Review" SPA/DCDS, January 23, 1991, p. 11)

Many of the problems cited in DND's reports on peacekeeping training appear to be directly related to the decentralized system. The decentralized approach clearly limits the support that might be provided by established experts and a permanent training staff. By decentralizing peacekeeping training, it remains an ad hoc, low-priority task.
As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs:

A few detractors have finally conceded that our personnel might need to do more peacekeeping training as long as it can be done within individual units at decentralized locations across the country. They like this decentralized idea because it really means occasional training--fragmented and up to the discretion of the unit commander. Decentralized training is de-emphasized training. It does not lead to advanced standardized training. DND’s own reports have indicated that the lack of guidance in such an approach creates the possibility of inconsistent and deficient training. Decentralized training can too easily become a way of doing business as usual, of paying only lip service to the UN’s request. (SCONDVA, Issue No.42, March 30, 1993, p. 8)

Moreover, among Canadian defence tasks, decentralized training is almost unique to peacekeeping. Training for most defence activities is assigned to a training school at a specific base. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Beattie stated:

If you want an important job done well, do it the way Canadian forces have routinely done it for their other priority tasks: develop a training centre. We have land combat training centres, maritime training centres, basic training centres, flight training centres, engineering schools, schools for administration and logistics and so on. It is time DND developed a peacekeeping training centre. (Ibid., p. 9)
Canadian Forces personnel and units routinely travel to dedicated defence training centres in both Canada and the United States for instruction and exercises related to a particular defence commitment. A dedicated peacekeeping training centre in Canada would provide the following advantages:

- peacekeeping training would be established as a priority task;

- a dedicated staff of specialists and trainers would ensure quality control over both the training and the selection of peacekeepers;

- a supportive training environment would restore confidence and help participants understand their required skills, roles, and responsibilities;

- the public and the government would be assured that Canadian Forces are not only well prepared for UN operations but also capable of other potential low-intensity operations such as providing aid to the civil power and domestic constabulary services;

- it would provide an opportunity to run controlled simulations and joint exercises;

- it would facilitate research into peacekeeping and conflict de-escalation as well as help consolidate the lessons learned from field exercises, simulations, and previous operational experience;
- internationally accepted doctrine, strategy, and standard operating procedures might be refined in both the contingency planning and training for future operations;

- operations might be mounted or staged out of this centre immediately after mission-specific training thus reducing considerable transportation costs;

- other UN member states and NATO allies would have access to a dedicated facility and modern training programme; and,

- it would demonstrate Canada's enduring commitment to the United Nations and peacekeeping.

DND reports prepared over the last three years have also outlined other reasons and criteria for establishing such a training facility. Under the heading "Establishing a Training Centre", one officer writes that, "in order to maintain, and even more so, improve on current standards, there must be a tri-service center for peacekeeping operations. This center of excellence would handle all DAG (departure assistance groups) duties and act as a repository for corporate knowledge from the field." The author cites the following reasons for a permanent centre:

- peacekeeping is a tri-service commitment, however, many naval and air bases cannot provide the specialist indoctrination and equipment;

- individual commands have their own centres of excellence; e.g., Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax;
- dedicated staff are on call to coordinate contingencies and can routinely analyse lessons learned from field reports (a field reporting system must be instituted to capture experience and share them);

- other nations will increasingly compete with Canada for 'market share'--a dedicated centre is the only way to raise standards;

- a dedicated centre could run specialized briefings for reserves and hence open up an extremely valuable experience and morale boosting opportunity to them.


Another 1991 staff paper prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff suggests the following criteria for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre:

- it must be a lodger unit on a Base that can provide quarters (up to 110) and lecture facilities;

- the centre should be a national unit with no bias towards Army, Navy, Air Force or ADM Mat;

- the Centre should be established to provide year-round service, including contingency training and maintenance of the training library. The staff must include expertise (experienced) from each major mission area...;

- must be a bilingual unit; and
- location should be close to NDHQ for maximum benefit. ("Peacekeeping Training--Staff Paper", 4500-1 (DPKO 4), Annex E, National Peacekeeping Centre July 8, 1991, pp. E1-E2)

This 1991 report acknowledged that "the concept of a National Centre for Peacekeeping is sound." As noted, "it would be cost-effective if there is to be any dramatic increase to the number of peacekeeping missions to which Canada contributes." The increases have been dramatic.