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Let's Agree that All Dictatorships are Equally Bad*

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Abstract

A social policy is a rule which assigns each possible set of endowments an allocation of these endowments among members of society. This paper assumes that individuals have preferences over private consumption and preferences over all possible social policies. I offer a set of axioms which imply that the best social policy is to maximize a weighted sum of individual utility levels. The weight of an individual given a certain bundle of resources is the inverse of the maximal utility gain this person may enjoy from this bundle. The key axiom is that all individuals agree that giving all the resources of the economy always to the same person is bad, regardless of who that person is. Members of society may have different preferences over social policies, but they all agree that the above social policy is best.

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1 Introduction

At the core of all approaches to social choice lies the dissonance between selfish individuals who are seeking the largest possible share of the community wealth for themselves, and the necessity for a compromise. This paper presents a model where individuals who have different tastes, and different notions of justice, will nevertheless be able to agree on one policy as being the best. Obviously, if society is to reach an agreement, then it is imperative that its members forego some of their selfish claims. But as the paper shows, this does not mean that individuals have to lose all self interest, or that they have to agree with other people preferences over social policies.

Harsanyi [11, 12, 13] offered two different solutions to the conflict between selfishness and compromise. The first requires members of society to give the same weight to the well-being of each one of them, and is achieved through the invention of the following hypothetical lotteries. Suppose there are \( n \) individuals, and let \( p \) be a social policy, that is, a lottery yielding social state \( s_j \) with probability \( p_j \). Each member of society will perceive it as a lottery that yields him the outcome "be person \( i \) at social state \( j \)" with probability \( p_j/n \). The expected utility of such a lottery is \( \sum_i \sum_j p_j u_i(s_j)/n = \frac{1}{n} \sum u_i(p) \). In the literature, this is called the impartial observer theorem.

An alternative approach assumes the existence of a social order over policies, that is, over lotteries over social states. Individual and social preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility, and in addition it is assumed that if all members of society prefer lottery \( p \) to \( q \), then so does society. It follows that social preferences can be represented by a weighted sum of individual utilities of the form \( \sum a_i u_i \).

Both approaches are unsatisfactory. The first requires a person to evaluate his and everyone else’s well-being equally.\(^1\) Arguably, it also requires a person to be able to identify with each other member of society to such a degree that he can understand and evaluate each social outcome from other people’s perspective. Many social thinkers contend that the lack of such ability taints gender and racial relations in modern societies. Moreover, the assumption that all individuals receive the same probability \( \frac{1}{n} \) forces all the coefficients \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) to be the same, thus ruling out the possibility of policies

\(^1\)Since people know who they are, this must be the meaning of putting oneself behind a veil of ignorance.
like affirmative action.

The second approach relies on the existence of a social order, whose existence is doubtful. Which economic agent holds these preferences? On the other hand, I do not think that these preferences can be viewed as an aggregate of individual preferences, because in that case we should not make independent assumptions about the social preferences, but on the way they are aggregated.

These two approaches offer opposite views on how to solve the conflict between individual selfishness and the necessity for a compromise. The first proposes to internalize this conflict by assuming a mental exercise where individuals identify with other members of society. The second approach makes both components explicit and removes any elements of preferences for social welfare away from individual preferences (see Harsanyi's [12, sec. IV] and Section 3 below). Alternatively, it requires all members of society to agree on one social order.

This paper seeks to make concerns for social justice an explicit part of the personal characteristics of members of society. This is done by assuming that individuals have preferences over social policies. Since a policy is defined for all possible initial endowments, such preferences are defined not over the allocations of one set of social endowments, but over functions that assign each possible initial endowments a possible allocation. These preferences involve some limits on individual selfishness, but these limits seem quite benign. The key axiom is that all individuals agree that giving all the resources of the economy always to the same person is bad, regardless of who that person is. As a result, I am able to show that even though personal tastes and notions of justice may differ, members of society will nevertheless unanimously agree on one social policy being the best. This optimal policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utility levels, where the weight of an individual given a certain bundle of resources is the inverse of the maximal utility gain this person may enjoy from this bundle. Note that these weights change from one set of social endowments to another.

This paper differs from other models in some major aspects, the most important of which is the fact that it shows the ability to reach social agreement even when members of society have different notions of justice. This is partially achieved through the extension of the domain of social preferences. Whereas most models of social choice deal with the allocation of a given set of endowment, this paper deals with preferences over allocation rules that
apply to all possible endowments simultaneously.

The main theorem is presented in section 2. I discuss some possible objections to the paper's analysis in section 3, and relate the results to the literature on section 4. All proofs are in an appendix.

2 Social Welfare

Consider the following social choice problem. A group of people has to find a way to allocate a bundle of goods between them. Society is to choose a (possibly degenerate) lottery $p$ over such allocations, provided the sum of allocated bundles, over individuals, in each outcome of $p$ will not exceed the available resources. Such a lottery induces lotteries over individual consumption bundles. Each person has preferences over such lotteries. Which allocation should society pick?

In this framework, the chosen lottery may be a function of individual preferences over lotteries over private consumption and of the given bundle of goods. One may ask how will it react to changes in individual preferences, as is done, for example, by Maskin [16] or Dhillon and Mertens [7]. Alternatively, one can ask how it will react to changes in the bundle of goods available to society (Yaari [23]).\footnote{For a similar distinction in the bargaining problem, see Rubinstein, Safra, and Thompson [19].} In this paper I adopt the second approach.

Consider a given $n$-person society. A social state $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is an allocation of $t$ goods between members of society, where $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^t$ is the outcome of person $i$. For $i = 1, \ldots, n$, person $i$ has strictly monotonic preferences $\succeq_i$ over lotteries over consumption bundles (with $\succ_i$ and $\sim_i$ for the strict and the indifference relations). Assume

**E (Expected Utility)** For every $i$, the preference relation $\succeq_i$ satisfies the axioms of expected utility.

It follows that the preference relation $\succeq_i$ can be represented by $V_i(x^1, p^1; \ldots; x^m, p^m) = \sum_{j=1}^m p^j u_i(x^j)$, where $(x^1, p^1; \ldots; x^m, p^m)$ is an arbitrary lottery with outcomes in $\mathbb{R}^t$. By strict monotonicity, $x \succeq y$ implies $u_i(x) > u_i(y)$. The functions $u_i$ are unique up to linear transformations, so pick for each person one such utility function. It turns out that in the present
model, the choice of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions makes no
difference (see below).

Let $0 \leq \omega, \overline{\omega} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be lower and upper bounds to all imaginable resources
society may have, and let $\mathcal{G} = \{\omega : \omega \leq \omega \leq \overline{\omega}\}$.
For each $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$, let $\mathcal{L}(\omega)$
be all the possible lotteries over allocations of $\omega$ or less between society's $n$
members. The lottery $L \in \mathcal{L}(\omega)$ induces the lotteries $L_i$ over consumption
bundles for consumer $i$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$. A social policy $f$ is a function assigning
each $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$ an element of $\mathcal{L}(\omega)$. (So a policy may allocate less than what
is available to society, but not more). Denote by $f_i(\omega)$ the outcome person
$i$ receives under $f$ when the available resources to the economy are $\omega$. This
outcome may be a lottery. I assume that once goods are allocated, individuals
will not transfer them further between themselves.

It may be argued that social policies should be continuous. That is,
small changes in $\omega$ should result in a small change in the chosen lottery. But
there are many social policies that are discontinuous. In the United States,
a person is either eligible for Medicaid or not. Federal job training programs
are available in full to people with family income below a certain level, and are
unavailable to anybody else. Disaster assistance programs are discontinuous
in the size of the disaster, etc. I will therefore assume that policies are only
measurable functions, and denote by $\mathcal{F}$ the set of all such policies. Denote
by $f^\star_i$ the policy in $\mathcal{F}$ yielding person $i$ the outcome $\omega$ and all other players
zero, for all $\omega$. So for all $\omega$, $f^\star_i(\omega) = (0, \ldots, \omega, \ldots, 0)$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

Two policies can be mixed as follows. For $f, g \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, the
policy $(f, \alpha; g, 1 - \alpha)$ assigns the endowments $\omega$ the social policy $f(\omega)$ with
probability $\alpha$ and the social policy $g(\omega)$ with probability $1 - \alpha$. Since $f(\omega)$
and $g(\omega)$ are lotteries over possible allocations, so is $[(f, \alpha; g, 1 - \alpha)](\omega)$. In
other words, $(f, \alpha; g, 1 - \alpha)$ is a social policy in $\mathcal{F}$.

Most people probably have some feelings about what social policies are
good and what social policies are bad. It is evident from the vast literature
concerning social choice that different policies may have different sources of
appeal, thus it may be too much to require all members of society to have
the same ranking of social policies. I assume therefore that each member of society has complete and transitive preferences $\succ_i$ on the set of social

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3The definition of $\mathcal{G}$ does not rule out the possibility that $\omega = \overline{\omega}$, although in that case
the paper's results are less interesting. I discuss this point in Section 3 below.

4See Appendix A for details concerning the mathematical properties of the model.
policies $\mathcal{F}$. These preferences represent individual notions of justice, and may vary from one individual to another. Denote by $\succ_i$ and $\approx_i$ the strict and indifference relations obtained from $\succeq_i$, respectively. On $\succeq_i$ assume:

**C (Continuity)** $\succeq_i$ is continuous.

**M (Monotonicity)** If for all $j = 1, \ldots, n$ and for all $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$, $f_j(\omega) \succeq_j g_j(\omega)$, then $f \succeq_i g$. If, in addition, there exists a set of positive measure $\mathcal{G}' \subset \mathcal{G}$ such that for every $j$ and for every $\omega \in \mathcal{G}'$, $f_j(\omega) \succ_j g_j(\omega)$, then $f \gg_i g$.

**I (Independence)** $f \succeq_i g \iff \forall h \in \mathcal{F}$ and $\forall \alpha \in (0, 1], (f, \alpha; h, 1 - \alpha) \succeq_i (g, \alpha; h, 1 - \alpha)$.

**D (Dictatorship Indifference)** $f^{1*} \approx_i \cdots \approx_i f^{n*}$. Moreover, let $\mathcal{G}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{G}_n$ be a partition of $\mathcal{G}$. If $f \in \mathcal{F}$ is such that for every $\omega \in \mathcal{G}_j$, $f(\omega) = f^{j*}(\omega)$, then $\forall j, f \succ_i f^{j*}$.

Condition C relates to the orders $\succeq_i$, and does not imply continuity of policies. Condition I does not follow from the assumption that all $n$ players have von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities, as these utility functions represent individual preferences over uncertain consumption, while the relations $\succeq_i$ are over policies. Recall that such policies are functions whose outcomes are individual lotteries over bundles of commodities. Condition M rules out Rawls’ [17] maximin social welfare function, or the possibility that $f^{*}$ is not better than the policy that gives everyone always zero. Also, conditions M and E imply indifference to correlation as defined by Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler [1]. I discuss this issue in Section 3 below.

The first part of condition D states indifference between all $n$ possible pure dictatorships. The term dictatorship is to be understood as a situation where one person can impose his selfish preferences over society. In this case, such a person will always receive all the social resources (recall the assumption that individuals do not transfer goods between themselves after an allocation is made). The second part suggests that “mixed dictatorship,” in the sense that each person is a dictator only for some values of $\omega$, cannot be worse than a pure one. It turns out that at the presence of the rest of the assumptions, mixed dictatorships are indifferent to pure ones. I try to justify this result below.

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$^{6}$ $\mathcal{G}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{G}_n$ is a partition of $\mathcal{G}$ if $\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{G}_i = \mathcal{G}$ and $i \neq j$ implies $\mathcal{G}_i \cap \mathcal{G}_j = \emptyset$. 

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Condition D seems plausible if $\succsim$ is the preference relation an arbitrator has over policies. Impartiality is an essential part of arbitration, and it seems to be at least partially captured by this axiom. But condition D is much stronger, as it assumes that each individual is indifferent between all forms of pure dictatorships. Obviously, if members of society are to agree on what social policy to employ, it must be based on individual willingness to consider each other's well-being. Unlike the first of Harsanyi's [12] models, where individuals pretend not to know who they are and therefore give the same weight to everyone, condition D is much weaker, as it only requires indifference between the extreme cases of dictatorships. This assumption requires no knowledge of other people preferences, except for the fact that they are strictly monotonic.\(^6\) Also note that condition D does not state indifference regarding who will receive everything for just one value of $\omega$, but for all such values.

Condition D assumes that people realize that dictatorship is morally wrong on its own ground, and not only because someone else may be a dictator. The higher is the value of $\omega/n$, and the higher is the number of commodities $t$, the more obscene the idea of giving all of it to one person will seem. Hence the requirement that $\omega \geq \omega$. Moreover, if people realize that some degree of selflessness is required for agreement to be reached, and that any condition that is strong enough to guarantee agreement will have to be symmetric, then condition D seems to be a minimal requirement.

Condition I may be the less acceptable of the four. The rational for this condition is that since in both mixtures the $1 - \alpha$ event yields the same policy $h$, the preferences between $(f, \alpha; h, 1 - \alpha)$ and $(g, \alpha; h, 1 - \alpha)$ should be determined by the preferences between $f$ and $g$. As observed by Diamond [8], this condition implies that if $f \approx_i g$, then for every $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, $f \approx_i \alpha f + (1 - \alpha)g$. Roemer [18, p. 140] considers this to be a knockdown argument against using the independence axiom in social choice.

Although I agree with Diamond's criticism (see Epstein and Segal [9]), I find it less forceful in the present context. In harsanyi's framework, the essence of the criticism is based on the observation that for the different policies $f$ and $g$ to be socially equally attractive, it is necessary that some people prefer $f$, while some other people prefer $g$. Randomization seems to

\(^6\)Possible allocation rules in situations where some people do not care for all goods are discussed in Yaari and Bar-Hillel [24].
sooth away such conflicts. But in the present model there may be other reasons for indifference between policies.

Break $G$ into $G_1$ and $G_2$, and let $f$ and $g$ be two social policies such that for $\omega \in G_1$, everyone receives more from $f$ than from $g$ (hence for all $j$, $f_j(\omega) \succ_j g_j(\omega)$), but for $\omega \in G_2$, everyone receives more from $g$ than from $f$. It may well happen that $f$ and $g$ are equally attractive in $\succeq_i$, but there is no interpersonal conflict to be solved by randomization. The only case in which we know such a conflict to exist is when there are two individuals $j$ and $k$ such that for all $\omega$, $f_j(\omega) \succ_j g_j(\omega)$, but $g_k(\omega) \succ_k f_k(\omega)$. This is obviously just a small part of the indifference relation $\simeq_i$, and even then, randomization is not necessarily desired. For example, if $f$ and $g$ are two dictatorial solutions ($f = f^{j*}$ and $g = f^{k*}$), then there is no conflict because by condition D, everyone, including $j$ and $k$, agrees that the two dictators are equally bad. If there is no conflict, there is nothing to be gained by randomization. Moreover, the justification for the dictatorship indifference assumption is that the situation where one person receives everything is so appalling that the identity of this person makes no difference. In that sense, a random dictator is not better, as he still is a dictator. For the same reason, mixed dictatorships (where in each case one person receives everything, but it is not always the same person) are not necessarily better than pure dictatorships, as their final allocations are of the same type.

Another justification for randomization preferences is that there are situations where ex post equality is impossible, for example, when an indivisible good is to be allocated. Randomization yields ex ante equality, which is better than no equality at all. However, if all good are divisible, and if the individual utility functions are concave, then both ex ante and ex post equality are feasible without randomization. To sum, even though there are in the present model situations where randomization may be desired, they are less frequent than in Harsanyi's framework, and are not always easy to detect. Condition I may therefore be less objectionable than it is elsewhere.

For each possible lottery $L \in \mathcal{L}(\omega)$ over allocations of $\omega$, the functions $u_1, \ldots, u_n$ determine a utility allocation between the $n$ members of society. Define $S(\omega) = \{(u_1(L_1), \ldots, u_n(L_n)) : L_1, \ldots, L_n$ are induced from $L \in \mathcal{L}(\omega)\}$ to be the utility opportunity set from lotteries in $\mathcal{L}(\omega)$. Since $u_1, \ldots, u_n$ are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities and all lotteries over allocations are possible, $S(\omega)$ is convex. And since giving everybody zero is a possible allocation, $S(\omega)$ is comprehensive with respect to the point
\[ z^* = (u_1(0), \ldots, u_n(0)) \]. That is, \( x \in S(\omega) \) and \( z^* \leq y \leq x \), imply \( y \in S(\omega) \).

Although each social policy \( f \in \mathcal{F} \) specifies for each \( \omega \) a unique utility allocation in \( S(\omega) \), the opposite is not true, as different policies may yield the same allocation of utilities. By condition \( M \), all such policies are indifferent to each other in the relation \( \precsim \).

Define the set of policies \( \mathcal{F}^* \) to include all the policies \( f \) such that for each \( \omega \), they yield a utility allocation \( (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \), satisfying

\[ (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \in \arg \max_{v \in S(\omega)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{v_i}{u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)} \]  

(1)

Policies in \( \mathcal{F}^* \) maximize for each bundle \( \omega \) a weighted sum of the individual utilities, where the weight of person \( i \) is the inverse of the maximal gain in utility he may receive from this endowment, that is, \( 1/[u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)] \). Notice that physical allocations leading to utility allocations in \( \mathcal{F}^* \) do not depend on the particular choice of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities \( u_i \). Taking positive linear transformations of the utilities will add a constant to summation in eq. (1).

This functional form was suggested in the context of the bargaining problem by Cao [6], and in the context of social choice by Dhillon and Mertens [7], who call it relative utilitarianism (see also Karni [14]). I discuss the differences between their approach and the present one in section 4 below.

Let \( H(\omega) \) be the hyperplane through the points \( (0, \ldots, u_i(\omega), \ldots, 0) \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), and let \( H^*(\omega) \) be the highest hyperplane that is parallel to \( H(\omega) \) and tangent to \( S(\omega) \). Policies in \( \mathcal{F}^* \) pick for \( \omega \) a lottery over allocations that yields a utility distribution at such a tangency point. Fig. 1 depicts the case \( n = 2 \) for one particular \( \omega \). In this picture, \( z^* \) denotes the utility allocation obtained from giving both players 0, \( a \) and \( b \) denote the utility allocations corresponding to \( (\omega, 0) \) and \( (0, \omega) \), respectively, and \( c \) denotes the utility allocation under any policy in \( \mathcal{F}^* \). These policies enjoy the following property.

**Theorem 1** Suppose that the preference relation \( \precsim_i \) satisfies conditions \( C, M, I, \) and \( D \). Then all policies in \( \mathcal{F}^* \) are \( \precsim_i \)-best policies in \( \mathcal{F} \).

This theorem leads to the major conclusion of the paper, namely that agreement is possible even if individuals have different notions of justice.
Figure 1: The case $n = 2$.

**Conclusion 1** If for each individual $i$, the preferences $\succsim_i$ satisfy conditions C, M, I, and D, then everyone will agree that all policies in $F^*$ are best.

To ensure that the theorem is not empty, one has to show that the four axioms are consistent, that is, that there are preference relations satisfying all of them. For non-emptiness of the conclusion, one has to show that these preferences are not uniquely determined. Both are done in the next example.

**Example 1** Let the measure $\mu_i$ over $\mathcal{G}$ be such that $\mu_i$ and the Lebesgue measure $\lambda$ are absolutely continuous relative to each other.\(^7\) Define $f \succsim_i g$ iff

$$\int_{\mathcal{G}} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{u_j(f_j(\omega))}{u_j(\omega) - u_j(0)} d\mu_i(\omega) \geq \int_{\mathcal{G}} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{u_j(g_j(\omega))}{u_j(\omega) - u_j(0)} d\mu_i(\omega)$$

It is easy to verify that $\succsim_i$ satisfies conditions C, M, I, and D.\(^8\)

It is clear from this example that different measures $\mu$ will imply different preferences $\succsim$.\(^8\) If $\mu$ represents beliefs regarding future endowments, then different beliefs will lead to different preferences over policies. The measures $\mu_i$ do not have to represent probabilities. Let $\mathcal{G}_1$ and $\mathcal{G}_2$ be a partition of $\mathcal{G}$, and suppose that person $i$ believes that $\omega$ is equally likely to be in $\mathcal{G}_1$ as

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\(^7\)That is, for every measurable set $A$, $\mu_i(A) > 0$ iff $\lambda(A) > 0$.

\(^8\)If $\omega = \omega_0$, the only possible measure has all its mass on this single value. To obtain the full flexibility permitted by this example, one has to assume that $\mathcal{G}$ is not a singleton. See more on it in Section 3 below.
in $G_2$. But perceiving the structure of a social policy to be more important in $G_1$ then in $G_2$, (for example, because $G_1$ is the set of “low” endowments, and $G_2$ is the set of “high” endowments), he sets $\mu_i(G_1) > \mu_i(G_2)$. For the opposite reason, person $j$ with the same beliefs about the likelihood of $G_1$ and $G_2$, will set $\mu_j(G_2) > \mu_j(G_1)$.

If the outer boundary of $S(\omega)$ is flat, then the utility allocation of eq. (1) may be not uniquely defined. However, if all the utility functions $u_i$ are strictly concave, then the outer boundary is strictly concave, and all policies in $\mathcal{F}^*$ yield only one possible utility allocation for every $\omega$. This utility allocation is considered best by all members of society, despite the fact that the preferences $\succ_i$ may differ. Society should then use such a policy.

3 Discussion

In this section I discuss some possible objections to the model presented above.

Isn’t this model essentially Harsanyi’s? No. In Harsanyi [12], society has to allocate a given bundle of commodities among its members, and individual and social preferences are over these allocations. Individual preferences are determined by the person’s “‘subjective’ preferences (which define his utility function), [the only preferences to] express [the individual’s] preferences in the full sense of the word as they actually are” [12, p. 315]. These parallel the preferences $\succ_i$ of this paper, but unlike Harsanyi, in the present model they cannot be represented as preferences over social allocations of the resources of the economy. The reason is that here a policy describes allocations of many different possible endowments. Even if the social preferences of an individual are not sensitive to the outcomes to anybody but himself, we need more information (for example, about the likelihood of different values of $\omega$ and the importance he attributes to these values) before his social preferences $\succ_i$ can be determined from $\succ_i$. The distinction is not just that the domain of preferences is different from that of Harsanyi’s, but that the domains of “private” and “social” preferences are different. (This is why the proof of Theorem 1 cannot use standard social choice theorems).\(^9\)

\(^9\)In Harsanyi’s [11, 13] impartial observer theorem the domains of the observer’s preferences and those of the individual preferences are different. But the representation theorem
Another difference is that unlike Harsanyi, this model determines the individual weights, and these weights vary with $\omega$. Nothing in Harsanyi prevents this dependency, but since his model is presented with respect to one set of endowments only, the weights are probably considered fixed. This is certainly the case regarding the impartial observer theorem [11], where the social welfare function is the sum of individual utilities.\(^{10}\) I discuss one more difference in my answer to the next question.

**WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT SOCIAL POLICIES APPLY TO DIFFERENT POSSIBLE ENDOWMENTS?** The most important difference between this and other models is the non-uniqueness of social preferences. Certainly in Harsanyi’s [12] second model there is only one set of social preferences, but even in the impartial observer model it is assumed that all individuals get the same chance, therefore everyone has the same “social” preferences (see fn. 10 above). In the present model the non-uniqueness of social preferences is possible because of the requirement that the domain of these preferences contains allocations of many different possible endowments. If $\omega = \bar{\omega}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ consists of one set of endowments only, the mathematics of the paper will still follow, but the results will be much less interesting, as all the preferences $\succ_i$ will have to be the same.

**IS THIS A MODEL OF UTILITARIANISM?** Yes, is what Binmore [3] would say, although Sen [20], Weymark [22, Section 6], and Roemer [18, Ch. 4] would probably say no. For utilitarianism, they argue, one needs the ability to compare individual utility levels, which this model, like many others (e.g., Harsanyi [12], Maskin [16], or Epstein and Segal [9]) cannot. Moreover, the present model cannot even compare relative utilities, as the $n$ von Neumann–Morgenstern indexes can be chosen independently of each other (cf. Weymark [22, p. 302]). Also, the optimal policy is not sensitive to the particular choice of utilities. If $u_i$ is replaced with $u_i' = a_i u_i + b_i$ with $a_i > 0$, then the vector $(a_1 s_1 + b_1, \ldots, a_n s_n + b_n)$ satisfies eq. (1) with respect to the utilities $u_1', \ldots, u_n'$ and the set $\mathcal{F}$ remain the same. Therefore, a statement like “person i’s utility is twice that of person j” is meaningless in the present

\(^{10}\) In [12, p. 316], Harsanyi explicitly writes that in his view, impersonality in the impartial observer model requires “equal chance of obtaining any of the social positions.” This leads to a social welfare function that is the sum of individual utilities.
context. Although this is true, it should also be noted that no other model of utilitarianism is consistent with the above axioms, as follows from Lemma 1. In other words, even though the aim of Theorem 1 is to find an optimal policy, it also determines individual weights. If, independently of this model, interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, they must use the weights obtained by Theorem 1.\footnote{As argued by Yaari [23], the fact that individual weights vary with the social resources is consistent with utilitarianism.}

**Lemma 1** If \( f \) is a \( \preceq_i \)-best policy, then it agrees almost everywhere with a policy in \( F^* \). Therefore, if an optimal policy yields for all \( \omega \) the utility allocation

\[
(s_1, \ldots, s_n) \in \arg \max_{v \in S} \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i(\omega)v_i
\]

then for almost all \( \omega \), \( a_i(\omega) = 1/[u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)] \).

**Doesn’t this model imply indifference to correlation?** Starting with a symmetric additive social welfare function, Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler [1] observe that if there are two equally probable states of the world \( s \) and \( t \) and two individuals, then the utility distributions \( "(2,2) if s, (0,0) if t" \) and \( "(2,0) if s, (0,2) if t" \) are equally attractive. But if positive correlation between individual well being is desired, then the first policy should be preferred to the second. Since the model presented in this paper is based on linearity, isn’t it vulnerable to the same kind of criticism?

Condition M implies that if two social policies are identical in terms of the utility distributions they create, then they must be equally attractive in all the social preferences \( \preceq_i \). Since the expected utility from both of the above lotteries is 1, it follows by condition E that the present model cannot accommodate preference for this kind of correlation. But consider the following extension of Example 1.

**Example 2** Define \( f \preceq_i g \) iff\footnote{A possible further extension is to let the function \( \tau_i \) to depend on \( \omega \).}

\[
\int \tau_i \left( \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{u_j(f_j(\omega))}{u_j(\omega) - u_j(0)} \right) d\mu_i(\omega) \geq \int \tau_i \left( \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{u_j(g_j(\omega))}{u_j(\omega) - u_j(0)} \right) d\mu_i(\omega)
\]
These preferences satisfy conditions C, M, and D, but violate condition I. Like the preferences of Example 1, they imply that all policies in $F^{-}$ are $\succeq_i$-best in $F$. Following the discussion preceding Example 1, suppose person $i$, believing that $\omega$ is equally likely to be in $G_1$ as in $G_2$, sets $\mu_i(G_1) = \mu_i(G_2)$. Suppose for simplicity that for all $\omega$, $u_1(\omega) - u_1(0) = u_2(\omega) - u_2(0)$, and that $u_1(\omega), u_2(\omega) > 4$. Individual $i$ will thus be indifferent between $f^1 = "(2, 0) on G_1, (0, 2) on G_2"$ and $f^2 = "(0, 2) on G_1, (2, 0) on G_2."$ Let $g^1 = "(2, 2) on G_1, (0, 0) on G_2"$ and let $g^2 = "(0, 0) on G_1, (2, 2) on G_2."$ If $\tau_i$ is a convex function, then $g^1 \approx_i g^2 \gg_i f^1 \approx_i f^2$ (correlation seeking). On the other hand, if $\tau_i$ is concave, then $f^1 \approx_i f^2 \gg_i g^1 \approx_i g^2$ (correlation aversion).

Of course, the correlation of this example is different from the correlation discussed by Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler, (and the above preferences are inconsistent with condition I), but the framework of this paper permits some non-trivial attitude towards correlation.

**Why should the preferences $\succeq_i$ agree with the individual preferences $\succeq_i$?** Consider the following sterilised problem.\(^{13}\) There is a certain number of dialysis machines, which is less than the number of people in need of them. There are (at least) two ways in which society can allocate these machines. 1. First come first serve: When someone needs a machine he joins the line. He may die before he receives a machine, but if he gets one, he will use it as long as he needs it (that is, until he dies). 2. First in first out: When someone needs a machine he gets the machine that was used by the longest served patient. He will then use the machine until he becomes the longest user and a new person needs a machine.

If the economy is sufficiently large and the ratio between the number of patients and the number of machines is bounded away from one, then under both systems all machines will be constantly occupied. In other words, the expected value of the length of time $t$ a new patient will use a machine is the same under both systems. The first, however, is an uncertain distribution over $t$, while the second is close to yielding the average $\bar{t}$ with probability one (excluding the possibility of dying of other causes before the patient becomes the longest user). There is a number of studies suggesting a widespread aversion to gambling with one's life and health (see e.g. Bombardier et al. [4] or Gafni and Torrance [10]). If individuals are risk averse and they do not

\(^{13}\) I am especially thankful to Graham Loomes for many discussions of this example.
have to worry about the allocation mechanism, then they should clearly prefer the second system. Societies tend to prefer the first system over the second, hence a violation of condition M.

Formally, this example does not pose a problem to Harsanyi's "Pareto" assumption, as in his model, individual preferences are over social allocations, and may not represent preferences over personal consumption. However, as mentioned above, Harsanyi's view is that these individual preferences are sensitive only to individual consumption. The dialysis machine example thus challenges all models that use versions of the "Pareto" assumption.

I believe that this example implies that the present model, and other models, should not be applied to situations where attitudes towards an allocation mechanism go beyond the distribution of goods induced by it. In this particular case, there are hidden costs involved in the allocation mechanisms that are not explicit in the induced utility distributions. Condition M, and Harsanyi's "Pareto" assumption, consider only individual preferences over possible allocations. Not surprisingly, they cannot grasp the complexity of the two mechanisms described above.

4 Conclusion

This paper presents a model where individuals who have different tastes, and different notions of justice, will nevertheless be able to agree on one policy as being the best. This is done by separating preferences over consumption from preferences over social policies. A related approach is suggested by Karni and Safra [15], but they assume that all social preferences are symmetric between individuals. (Example 1 shows that this paper's axioms do not imply such symmetry). Also, like Harsanyi [12], these preferences are over the possible allocations of one given bundle ω. (In their paper, ω is one unit of a nondivisible good).

The analysis of this paper can be applied to the bargaining problem. An n person bargaining problem is a pair (S, d), where S ⊆ ℝ^n is the set of possible von Neumann–Morgenstern utility allocations obtained from the game, and d is the disagreement point. A solution is a function F assigning each game (S, d) a point in S. Following Border and Segal [5], one can define preferences over such solutions. The axioms of section 2 can be applied to such preferences. (Condition D will require that F^{1*} ≈_i ... ≈_i F^{n*}, where
always yields player $k \neq j$ his disagreement utility level $d_k$, and player $j$
his highest possible utility from each game). Similarly to Theorem 1, the set
of $\succsim_i$-best solutions include those solutions that maximize a weighted sum of
the utilities for each game, where the weight of player $i$ is the inverse of the
difference between the maximal utility level he can reach in the game and
his disagreement utility level. This solution was first suggested by Cao [6],
but it suffers from some undesired properties, like violation of disagreement
point monotonicity (see Thomson [21, p. 1261]).

An essential assumption of the present paper is that the domain of the
preferences $\succsim_i$ is a set of social policies that apply to all values of $\omega \in
\mathcal{G}$. In this model, individuals know who they are and who else belongs to
their society, but they do not know what resources will be available to them
in the future. In this, I follow Yaari [23], where the dependence of social
policy on the resources of the economy is explicit. Other models hold social
endowments fixed, and analyze social choice as a function of preferences.
This is Sen's [20, p. 1124] understanding of Harsanyi [12], and it is explicit in
Dhillon and Mertens [7], where axioms are based on changing utilities and the
number of players. Such models follow from Arrow's impossibility theorem
(and are also related to the existence of incentive compatible mechanisms),
where policies (and mechanisms) should apply to all utility portfolios. Since
this paper is more interested in justice and possible cooperation, it seems
natural to hold individuals fixed, and vary the resources.

The weakest part of the model is condition D. But if we seek unanimity,
some consideration for other people's well-being must be assumed. In this
paper people realize that it is in their self interest that society will reach
an agreeable allocation of its resources. It is therefore essential that each
member of society will accept the fact that he will not be able to attain the
highest possible utility level the economy may provide him (that is, $u_i(\omega)$),
and that compromise is necessary for an agreement. In this context, I believe
condition D to be quite convincing. Another reason why condition D may be
acceptable is that it is very unlikely anyone will ever have to make a choice
between pure dictatorships. This may make people more sympathetic to the
moral aspects of this condition, and to its implications.
A  The Structure of Policies

Assume $n$ individuals and $t$ commodities, so an allocation is a vector $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times t}$. The set $\mathcal{G} = \{ \omega : \omega \leq \omega \leq \overline{\omega} \}$ is endowed with the Lebesgue measure $\lambda$ on $\mathbb{R}^t$. For $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$, let $X(\omega) = \{ x : \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \leq \omega \}$ be the set of possible allocations of $\omega$ or less. The set of lotteries over $X(\omega)$, denoted $\mathcal{L}(\omega)$, is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Note that $X(\omega) \subseteq X(\overline{\omega})$ and that $\mathcal{L}(\omega) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(\overline{\omega})$. A policy $f$ assigns to each $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$ a lottery $f(\omega) \in \mathcal{L}(\omega)$. Policies are assumed to be Borel-measurable.

Since $X(\overline{\omega})$ is a compact metric space, the set $\mathcal{L}(\overline{\omega})$ with the topology of weak convergence is a compact metrizable space (see Aliprantis and Border [2, Lemma 3.69]). Denote this metric $d_\mathcal{L}$. The set of all policies $\mathcal{F}$ is a metric space under the metric

$$d_\mathcal{F}(f, g) = \sup_{\omega \in \mathcal{G}} d_\mathcal{L}(f(\omega), g(\omega))$$

The preference relation $\succsim_i$ over $\mathcal{F}$ is assumed to be continuous with respect to this metric (see condition C).

For $\omega \in \mathcal{G}$, let $S(\omega) = \{ (u_1(L_1), \ldots, u_n(L_n)) : L_1, \ldots, L_n$ are the individual lotteries induced from $L \in \mathcal{L}(\omega) \}$ be the utility opportunity set obtained from $\omega$. From a policy $f \in \mathcal{F}$ define a function $\varphi_f : \mathbb{R}^t \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$, given by $\varphi_f(\omega) = (u_1(f_1(\omega)), \ldots, u_n(f_n(\omega)))$. $(f_i(\omega)$, which may be a lottery, is the outcome person $i$ receives under $f$ when the available resources to the economy are $\omega$). Let $\Phi = \{ \varphi_f : f \in \mathcal{F} \}$. Since the utility functions $u_1, \ldots, u_n$ are continuous, each $\varphi \in \Phi$ is measurable. By condition M, if $\varphi_f = \varphi_g$, then $f \succsim_i g$ for every $i$. It follows that the order $\succsim_i$ on $\mathcal{F}$ induces a natural order on $\Phi$, which with a slight abuse of notations will also be denoted $\succsim_i$. That is, $\varphi_f \succsim_i \varphi_g$ iff $f \succsim_i g$.

For $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$, define

$$d(\varphi, \psi) = \sup_{\omega \in \mathcal{G}} \| \varphi(\omega) - \psi(\omega) \|$$

Conditions C, M, I, and D on $\succsim_i$ over $\mathcal{F}$ easily translate into conditions on $\succsim_i$ over $\Phi$. For condition D*, define $\varphi_i^*(\omega)$ to give player $i$ the utility level $u_i(\omega)$, and every other player $j \neq i$, $u_j(0)$.

$C^*$ $\succsim_i$ is a closed subset of $\Phi \times \Phi$. 

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M* If for all \( \omega \in \mathcal{G} \), \( \varphi(\omega) \geq \psi(\omega) \), then \( \varphi \succ_i \psi \). If, in addition, there exists a set of positive measure \( \mathcal{G}' \subset \mathcal{G} \) such that for every \( j \) and for every \( \omega \in \mathcal{G}' \), \( \varphi_j(\omega) > \psi_j(\omega) \), then \( \varphi \succ_i \psi \).

I* \( \varphi \succ_i \psi \iff \forall \rho \in \Phi \) and \( \forall \alpha \in (0, 1], \alpha \varphi + (1 - \alpha)\rho \succ_i \alpha \psi + (1 - \alpha)\rho \).

D* \( \varphi^1 \approx_i \cdots \approx_i \varphi^n \). Moreover, let \( \mathcal{G}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{G}_n \) be a partition of \( \mathcal{G} \). If \( \varphi \in \Phi \) is such that for every \( \omega \in \mathcal{G}_j \), \( \varphi(\omega) = \varphi^j(\omega) \), then \( \forall j, \varphi \succ_i \varphi^j \).

### B Proofs

I start with an outline of the proof of Theorem 1. The mixtures used in condition I* define lotteries over the outcomes of two policies for each possible \( \omega \). Another way in which policies can be mixed is by applying one policy to some values of \( \omega \) and another policy to the rest of \( \mathcal{G} \). (This assumes that \( \mathcal{G} \) is not a singleton. If it is, then condition I* implies linear parallel indifference curves in the utility opportunity set by standard techniques).

The first step is to get a variant of the sure thing principle, stating that if \( \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2 \) is a partition of \( \mathcal{G} \), on \( \mathcal{G}_1 \), \( \varphi^i = \psi^i \), \( i = 1, 2 \), and on \( \mathcal{G}_2 \), \( \varphi^1 = \varphi^2 \) and \( \psi^1 = \psi^2 \), then \( \varphi^1 \succ \varphi^2 \iff \psi^1 \succ \psi^2 \) (Lemma 2). In decision theory, the independence axiom and the sure thing principle are equivalent, but here they refer to different kinds of mixtures. The obtained form of the sure thing principle implies that mixed dictatorships are equally attractive as pure ones (Lemma 3).

For a given \( \omega \), the outcome \( x \) in the utility opportunity set can be identified by \( 1 \). The point \( d \) at which the line through \( z^* = (u_1(0), \ldots, u_n(0)) \) and \( x \) intersects the hyperplane through the points \( \{(0, \ldots, u_i(\omega), \ldots, 0)\} \), and 2. The ratio \( \alpha \) between \( \| x - z^* \| \) and \( \| d - z^* \| \). Given two policies \( f \) and \( g \), I approximate them with sequences of policies that take only a finite number of different values of \( d \) and \( \alpha \). Such policies can be compared by (repeated uses of) the sure thing principle (Lemma 4). By the continuity assumption, the preferences between them imply the preferences between \( f \) and \( g \) (Lemma 5).

**Proof of Theorem 1** The theorem is proved through a sequence of lemmas. For simplicity, I omit the index \( i \) from \( \succ_i \).
Lemma 2 Let \( G_1, G_2 \) be a partition of \( G \). Let \( \varphi^1, \psi^1, \varphi^2, \psi^2 \in \Phi \) such that on \( G_1, \varphi^i = \psi^i, i = 1, 2, \) and on \( G_2, \varphi^1 = \varphi^2 \) and \( \psi^1 = \psi^2 \). Then \( \varphi^1 \succ \varphi^2 \iff \psi^1 \succ \psi^2 \).

Proof: For every \( \omega, \frac{1}{2} \varphi^1 + \frac{1}{2} \psi^2 = \frac{1}{2} \varphi^2 + \frac{1}{2} \psi^1 \). By condition I*, \( \varphi^1 \succ \varphi^2 \iff \frac{1}{2} \varphi^1 + \frac{1}{2} \psi^1 \succ \frac{1}{2} \varphi^2 + \frac{1}{2} \psi^1 = \frac{1}{2} \varphi^1 + \frac{1}{2} \psi^1 \iff \varphi^1 \succ \varphi^2 \).

Lemma 3 Let \( \varphi^1, \ldots, \varphi^n \) be as in condition D*, let \( G_1, \ldots, G_n \) be a partition of \( G \), and let \( \varphi \in \Phi \) such that on \( G_i, \varphi = \varphi^i, i = 1, \ldots, n \). Then \( \forall i, \varphi \approx \varphi^i \). In other words, the weak preference sign in the second part of condition D* must be indifference.

Proof: Assume first that there are \( j \neq k \) such that for \( i \notin \{j, k\}, G_i = \varnothing \). Define \( \varphi^1 = \varphi^j, \varphi^2 = \varphi^k, \) and \( \psi^1 = \varphi \). Also, let \( \varphi^1 = \varphi^k \) on \( G_j \) and \( \varphi^2 = \varphi^j \) on \( G_k \). By Lemma 2, \( \varphi^j \succ \varphi^k \iff \varphi^j \succ \varphi^j \). By condition D*, \( \varphi^j \succ \varphi^j \). Hence \( \varphi \approx \varphi^j \).

We prove the lemma by induction on \( \ell \), under the assumption that for \( i \notin \{j_1, \ldots, j_\ell\}, j_1 < \cdots < j_\ell, G_i = \varnothing \). We proved it already for the case \( \ell = 2 \). Suppose it holds for \( 2 \leq \ell \leq n-1 \), and prove for \( \ell+1 \). Define \( \varphi^1 = \varphi \) on \( \bigcup_{i=1}^\ell G_i \), and \( \varphi^1 = \varphi^{j_\ell} \) on \( G_{j_{\ell+1}} \), \( \psi^1 = \varphi^{j_{\ell+1}} \), and \( \psi^1 = \varphi \). Also, let \( \varphi^2 = \varphi^{j_{\ell+1}} \) on \( \bigcup_{i=1}^\ell G_i \), and \( \varphi^2 = \varphi^{j_{\ell+1}} \) on \( G_{j_{\ell+1}} \). By the induction hypothesis, \( \varphi^1 \approx \varphi^2 \approx \varphi^{j_\ell} \) (the \( \ell \) sets are \( G_{j_1} \cup G_{j_{\ell+1}}, G_{j_2}, \ldots, G_{j_\ell} \)). Hence by Lemma 2, \( \varphi = \psi^1 \approx \psi^2 = \varphi^{j_{\ell+1}} \).

Let \( z^* = (u_1(0), \ldots, u_n(0)) \). For \( \omega \in G \) and \( x \in S(\omega) \), let \( L \) be the line through \( z^* \) and \( x \) and let \( H \) be the plane
\[
\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{x_i - u_i(0)}{u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)} = 1
\]
Denote the intersection point of \( L \) and \( H \) by \( d \) and define \( \alpha = \alpha(x, \omega) = \| x - z^* \| / \| d - z^* \| \). Let \( \beta = \beta(x, \omega) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ \) be given by \( \beta_i = (d_i - u_i(0))/(u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)) \). Clearly, \( \alpha \in [0, n] \) and \( \sum \beta_i = 1 \). In the sequel, for \( a \in \mathbb{R}, [a] \) denotes the largest integer not bigger than \( a \).

For \( x \in S(\omega) \), define \( \langle x \rangle^k \) and \( \langle d \rangle^k \) by
1. \( \langle d \rangle^k \) is in \( H \), and satisfies
\[
\langle d \rangle^k - z^* = \left( \frac{[k \beta_1(x, \omega)]}{k}, \ldots, \frac{[k \beta_{n-1}(x, \omega)]}{k}, k - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} [k \beta_i(x, \omega)] \right)
\]
2. \( \langle x \rangle^k \) is on the line through \( z^* \) and \( \langle d \rangle^k \), and satisfies
\[
\frac{\| \langle x \rangle^k - z^* \|}{\| \langle d \rangle^k - z^* \|} = \frac{\max\{0, [k\alpha(x, \omega)] - n\}}{k}
\]
It follows that \( \langle x \rangle^n \) is in \( S(\omega) \). Define a function \( \theta^k: \Phi \to \Phi \) by \( \theta^k(\varphi)(\omega) = \langle \varphi(\omega) \rangle^k \). Since the sets \( S(\omega) \) are convex, there are policies \( f^k \in \mathcal{F} \) that will generate these utility allocations. Denote \( \langle \varphi \rangle^k = \theta^k(\varphi) \).

**Definition 1** The two functions \( \varphi, \psi \in \Phi \) are said to be equivalent to each other if for every \( \omega \in G \), \( \sum (\varphi_i(\omega) - u_i(0))/(u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)) = \sum (\psi_i(\omega) - u_i(0))/(u_i(\omega) - u_i(0)) \). This relation is denoted \( \varphi I \psi \).

**Fact 1** Let \( \varphi, \psi \in \Phi \). If \( \varphi I \psi \), then \( \langle \varphi \rangle^k I \langle \psi \rangle^k \).

**Fact 2** Let \( \varphi \in \Phi \). Then \( \langle \varphi \rangle^k \to \varphi \).

**Lemma 4** Let \( G_1, G_2 \) be a partition of \( G \) and let \( \varphi, \psi \in \Phi \) such that

1. On \( G_1 \), \( \varphi = \psi \);
2. For \( \omega, \omega' \in G_2 \),
   - \( \alpha^* := \alpha(\varphi(\omega), \omega) = \alpha(\varphi(\omega'), \omega') = \alpha(\varphi(\omega), \omega) = \alpha(\psi(\omega'), \omega') \);
   - \( \beta^{1*} := \beta(\varphi(\omega), \omega) = \beta(\varphi(\omega'), \omega') \); and
   - \( \beta^{2*} := \beta(\psi(\omega), \omega) = \beta(\psi(\omega'), \omega') \).

Then \( \varphi \approx \psi \).

**Proof:** Suppose first that \( \alpha^* \leq 1 \). By Lemma 3, \( \varphi^{1*} \approx \rho^i \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), where \( \rho^i = \varphi^{1*} \) on \( G_1 \), and \( \rho^i = \varphi^{1*} \) on \( G_2 \). By condition 1*, \( \varphi^1 := \sum \beta^{2*} \rho^i \approx \psi^1 := \sum \beta^{2*} \rho^i \). Let \( 0 \in \Phi \) be the "zero policy," assigning each \( \omega \in G \) the vector of utility levels \( z^* \) (which means that everyone receives the allocation 0). Again by condition 1*, \( \varphi^2 := \alpha^* \varphi^1 + (1 - \alpha^*)0 \approx \psi^2 := \alpha^* \varphi^1 + (1 - \alpha^*)0 \). On \( G_2 \), \( \varphi^2 = \varphi \) and \( \psi^2 = \psi \). (Clearly, if \( \alpha(\varphi(\omega), \omega) = \alpha(\psi(\omega), \omega), \) and \( \beta(\varphi(\omega), \omega) = \beta(\psi(\omega), \omega) \), then \( \varphi(\omega) = \psi(\omega) \)). Also, on \( G_1 \), \( \varphi^2 = \psi^2 \). Therefore, since on \( G_1 \), \( \varphi = \psi \), it follows by Lemma 2 that \( \varphi \approx \psi \).

Suppose now that \( \alpha^* > 1 \). Note that on \( G_1 \), \( \varphi^1 = \psi^1 \). Let \( \varphi^3, \varphi^3 = \alpha^* \varphi^{1*} + (1 - \alpha^*)0 \) on \( G_1 \), and on \( G_2 \), let \( \varphi^3 = \varphi^1 \) and \( \psi^3 = \psi^1 \). By Lemma 2,
\[ \varphi^3 \approx \psi^3. \] Also, let \( \varphi^4 = \psi^4 = \varphi^{1*} \) on \( G_1 \), and on \( G_2 \), let \( \varphi^4 = \varphi \) and \( \psi^4 = \psi \).

Now \( \varphi^3 = (1/\alpha^*)\varphi^4 + [1 - (1/\alpha^*)]0 \), while \( \psi^3 = (1/\alpha^*)\psi^4 + [1 - (1/\alpha^*)]0 \), hence \( \varphi^3 \approx \psi^3 \). Again by Lemma 2, \( \varphi \approx \psi \). \( \square \)

**Lemma 5** If \( (\varphi)^k I(\psi)^k \), then \( (\varphi)^k \approx (\psi)^k \).

**Proof:** let

- \( G_i^1 = \{ \omega : \alpha((\varphi)^k(\omega), \omega) = \alpha((\psi)^k(\omega), \omega) = i/k \}, i = 0, \ldots, nk \)

- For \( j = (j_1, \ldots, j_n) \), \( G_j^2 = \{ \omega : \beta((\varphi)^k(\omega), \omega) = (j_1/k, \ldots, j_n/k) \}, \)
  where \( j_1 = 0, \ldots, k; j_2 = 0, \ldots, k - j_1; \ldots; j_{n-1} = 0, \ldots, k - \sum_{i=1}^{n-2} j_i; \)
  and \( j_n = k - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} j_i \).

- For \( \ell = (\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n) \), \( G_\ell^3 = \{ \omega : \beta((\psi)^k(\omega), \omega) = (\ell_1/k, \ldots, \ell_n/k) \}, \)
  where \( \ell_1 = 0, \ldots, k; \ell_2 = 0, \ldots, k - \ell_1; \ldots; \ell_{n-1} = 0, \ldots, k - \sum_{i=1}^{n-2} \ell_i; \)
  and \( \ell_n = k - \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \ell_i \).

Let \( m^* \) be the number of all possible combinations of \( \alpha((\varphi)^k(\omega), \omega) \)
and \( \beta((\varphi)^k(\omega), \omega) \) (which is also the number of all possible combinations
of \( \alpha((\psi)^k(\omega), \omega) \) and \( \beta((\psi)^k(\omega), \omega) \)). Let \( G_1, \ldots, G_{m^*} \) be all the possible
intersections of the form \( G_i^1 \cap G_j^2 \cap G_\ell^3 \). Of course, for some \( m \), \( G_m \)
may be empty. For \( m = 0, \ldots, m^* \), define \( \varphi^m = \psi^m = 0 \) on \( U_{i\geq m} G_i \), and on \( U_{i\leq m} G_i \),
\( \varphi^m = (\varphi)^k \) and \( \psi^m = (\psi)^k \). Note that \( \varphi_m^* = (\varphi)^k \) and \( \psi_m^* = (\psi)^k \). We prove
by induction that for all \( m = 0, \ldots, m^* \), \( \varphi^m \approx \psi^m \). The claim is trivially
true for \( m = 0 \). Suppose it holds for \( m \), and prove for \( m + 1 \).

Define \( \chi \in \Phi \) such that on \( U_{i\geq m+1} G_i \), \( \chi = \varphi^{m+1} \), and on \( G_{m+1} \), \( \chi = \psi^{m+1} \).
By Lemma 4, \( \chi \approx \varphi^{m+1} \). Also, it follows by Lemma 2 and the induction hypothesis that \( \chi \approx \psi^{m+1} \). Therefore, \( \varphi^{m+1} \approx \psi^{m+1} \). \( \square \)

Suppose \( \varphi I(\psi) \). By Fact 1, for every \( k \), \( (\varphi)^k I(\psi)^k \), therefore \( (\varphi)^k \approx (\psi)^k \).
By Fact 2 and the continuity of \( \approx \), it follows that \( \varphi \approx \psi \). Theorem 1 now follows from condition \( M^* \).

**Proof of Lemma 1** Let \( f \in F \), and suppose that there is \( G' \subset G \) such that
\( \lambda(G') > 0 \), and such that on \( G' \), \( \varphi f(\omega) \notin \arg \max_{u \in S(\omega)} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i/(u_i(\omega) - u_i(0))}{\ } \). By Lemma 4 and condition \( M^* \), \( f \) is not optimal. \( \Box \)
References


