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WEATHERING THE STORM:
ASSOCIATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING ERA*

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The growth of international competition and trade in the postwar period, at first blush, would not appear to provide a context especially favourable for the assumption of governance roles in the economy by interest associations. In many capitalist states, neo-liberal ideologies that favour the globalization of economic relations have gained significant influence within the classe politique. These ideologies celebrate the virtues of markets as the pre-eminent governing mechanisms, laud their efficiency, and postulate their capacity to increase the general good of all. Championed as extraordinary, "natural" allocative instruments, markets, it is suggested, must be left free to weave their magic. Consistent with this neo-liberal ideology are policies that promote markets at the expense of other governing structures and that seek to dismantle alternative governance arrangements when they exist. The ideologically committed dismiss all attempts by the state to approach economic policy in an anticipatory fashion. The idea of state intervention is attacked as protectionist, inefficient, and self-serving for backward private interests.

Interest associations might not be expected to fare well as governance mechanisms in this neo-liberal world. At the sectoral level, neo-liberals perceive them to be the servants of corrupt special interests that refuse to face the bracing world of international competition. At the macro level, they are branded disdainfully as "corporatist," a term that hints at market interference and at collusion among the state, big capital and big labour. The reactive approach to policy favoured by neo-liberal governments has little room for associations. Willis and Grant's (1987) concept of the "company state" underlines these implications. Governments have dismantled sector branches or sponsorship divisions in industry ministries in order to place more emphasis on direct relationships with the "real" economic actors, individual entrepreneurs. Associations are dismissed as hide-bound purveyors of the lowest common denominator sectoral view.

Yet, despite these pressures, many associations have survived as governance mechanisms in the present wave of globalization and neo-liberal hostility. Several factors help
to explain this survival. First, the neo-liberal perspective on economic and social policy has yet to displace many of the on-going routines of the policy process. Even neo-liberal governments continue to make commitments to particular sectors, whether these be agriculture, defense industries, electronics components, or financial services. Even neo-liberal governments find a need to react to market failures and their impacts on workers, on the environment, on consumers, or on the infirm. Policies continue to be developed to deal with these problems and the policy process in these circumstances remains ongoing, technical in orientation, and complex. Policy development and implementation require negotiation between state agencies and societal actors and often some sharing of responsibilities and of expertise. As long as these characteristics of the policy process remain, so too will associations as governance mechanisms.

Second, the commitment to neo-liberal ideology varies significantly among the capitalist powers. Outside the Anglo-American states, governments have more of a tendency to balance the virtues of markets against some of their vices: the concentration of wealth and power, the inability to take account of "externalities" - environmental destruction, unsafe workplaces, depressed living conditions - and the tendency to foster collusion and monopolies. In short, markets are not seen always to work best when left alone. Rather, governments view them as institutions like others that can be molded and shaped to accomplish a variety of ends. Alternative social orders, where various intermediary institutions including associations organize and regulate markets in highly dense arrangements, appear to perform as effectively, if not more so, as orders stripped of most intermediation save market relations. (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1991; Streeck 1991). In these circumstances, state intervention is not necessarily forsworn and, when pursued, its logic often dictates close reciprocal relationships between state agencies and various intermediaries representing firms and workers in a sector.

Finally, a commitment to neo-liberal ideology at the macro plane may or may not have a determining impact on policy-making at the sectoral plane. In the adversarial Anglo-American polities in particular, the lack of a state tradition (Dyson 1980), the tendency to diffuse power to autonomous bureaucratic agencies, and the fragmentation and low integration
of business associational systems (Coleman and Grant 1988; Coleman 1990), all create conditions that allow for considerable variation in approaches to policy and in state and associational structures at the sectoral plane. Individual sectoral bureaucracies, as a result of historical conditions, can concentrate considerable expertise and develop significant autonomy of action in their own right. Associations long versed in the sharing of state authority can adapt creatively and find new governing niches. In the process, they may encourage the organizational development of companion intermediary associations and, with the state, may embark on an anticipatory path to policy-making. A highly dense and mediated social order of production may develop in a sector embedded in an otherwise neo-liberal state. To a certain extent, part of the past history of the US dairy industry (Young, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1989; Young 1990) or the securities industry in the US, Britain and Canada (Moran 1989, 1990; Coleman 1989a) illustrate how sectors in adversarial polities can follow a different policy path, with associations acting as governance mechanisms.

This paper examines the governance roles of interest associations in three steps. First, the concept of associational governance is analyzed conceptually by reflecting briefly on the likely effects of economic globalization on the organizational development of associations. Second, the paper assesses the impact of internationalization on associational governance at the national level. Two scenarios are studied: sectors in decline and sectors at a maturation stage. Finally, the paper reviews the prospects for associational governance at a supra-national level. It argues that, at present, such developments remain highly unlikely, but that supra-national governing arrangements among states may lead to an increase in the governing powers of national-level interest associations.

INTERNATIONALIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Interest associations assume governance roles as intermediary organizations, a status that distinguishes associative action from other governing mechanisms. The comparative economic governance project has defined governance broadly to include the totality of institutional
arrangements that coordinate and regulate transactions inside and across the boundaries of economic sectors. Associations act as governance mechanisms by defining and procuring public goods through organizing and enforcing cooperative behaviour among their members, by engaging in collective contracts with other associations, and by securing delegations of state authority to be used to the advantage of their members (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck 1992). In order to assume such a governance role, associations must reach a certain level of organizational development (Schmitter and Streeck 1981; Coleman and Grant 1984). A developed association is one first that is capable of ordering and co-ordinating the complex range of information and activity that it is asked to assume by its members and by other organizations, particularly the state (Coleman 1988). Second, such an association is autonomous from its members and the state. It takes on a life of its own and is able to rise above the short-term, particularistic interests of its members.

The emergence of these organizational characteristics for an intermediary like an association depends on relations with its membership and with key actors in its environment. Schmitter and Streeck (1981, 1985) have suggested two organizing concepts for studying these relationships. First, they emphasize the importance of how an association defines its domain of potential members. This definition constrains the size of the association, the pattern of industrial organization and geographical location characteristic of its members, and its degree of sectoral specialization. In short, the domain sets in motion a particular logic of organization, the "logic of membership." Second, they take note of the environment within which an association acts on behalf of these members. Always complex, this environment is populated by various actors, of which the most important normally is the state. The characteristics of the state, including its own organizational capacity and its specific needs and objectives, have a further impact on the organizational characteristics of an interest association, an impact assimilated by Schmitter and Streeck under the concept of the "logic of influence."

As intermediary organizations, associations must accommodate the often competing demands of these two logics. Certainly, their assumption of governance roles in a sector is
based on a set of conditions involving the balance between the logics of membership and influence and on the impact of this balance on internal structures for goal definition and implementation (Schmitter and Streeck 1981; Streeck 1989). What is evident nonetheless is that associations take on governance roles in the context of a broader institutional environment that favours dense social organization around market allocations. Any assessment, therefore, of the fate of associations as governance instruments in the present era requires a consideration of the impact of increased global competition and its supporting neo-liberal ideologies on such patterns of social organization. Changes here, in turn, may affect the ability of associations to order and co-ordinate complex information and to maintain autonomy.

More international competition may alter the logic of membership in ways unfavourable to organizational development in the following ways. For example, it may encourage the rationalization of production within the nation-state leading to increased concentration of ownership and centralization of production. Consequently, the number of firms eligible for membership in a national association may diminish, the geographical distribution of production sites may change, and the very definition of the sector may broaden or narrow. Such revisions in the membership will have an impact on the internal organization of an association and on relations with other associations. Members may see less need for collective action. Or mergers may follow, new information may need to be studied and learned, and internal procedures and structures may be redefined. These kinds of changes will also affect an association's resources including its funds, the quality of its staff, and its ability to draw on the expertise of its members. To the extent that these kinds of changes hamper the ability of an association to define collective interests, to co-ordinate with other associations, or to retain resources, associational governance becomes less likely.

As we indicate below, large-scale, mass production national sectors faced with serious decline in the wake of internationalization are most likely to possess associations with declining levels of organizational development. By contrast, diversified quality mass production or flexible specialization sectors that stabilize or even expand growth in the globalization process
are more likely to be able to maintain and even advance developed associations.

Globalized economic competition may have an impact on the logic of influence in ways that might also retard organizational development. The liberalization of trade relations and financial markets has reduced the use of tariffs, quantitative barriers to trade, and controls on foreign exchange and interest rates. Policy-makers find themselves with fewer policy instruments available for promoting or defending any given sector. Accordingly, individual states may be faced with very difficult questions about how to react to the rapid decline of a poorly competitive sector when the traditional remedy of higher tariffs is no longer available. Yet it is in the definition and management of these kinds of distributive or regulatory instruments that state actors have often sought to involve interest associations. In other sectors, increased global competition may foster the emergence of supra-national "regimes" for managing the rules of the game. Not only must national governments adopt new strategies for negotiating in these fora, but also associations must assimilate a new definition of what the state entails. The complexity of this new state environment, in particular the diffusion of authority, may render more difficult the delegation of state authority that is often central to associational governance.

A revitalized commitment to neo-liberal principles by state actors has often accompanied the internationalization of production relations and may bring attacks on associational governance. Such a commitment entails giving primacy to markets among governance mechanisms. Neo-liberals have advocated less political intervention into markets and have attacked other governance structures whether associations, informal collusive practices, or excessive state regulation that restrain the "freedom" of markets. These attacks extend, in many instances, to trade unions which are viewed as nefarious obstructions to the free development of labour markets. In short, the ideological changes among some national ruling classes that have accompanied globalized competition will affect the perceived legitimacy of associational governance. The general political environment may become considerably less hospitable to close working relationships between the state and associations and to co-operative
behaviour within associations.

In short, generally speaking, the processes involved in the internationalization of economic activity do not appear to favour associational governance. They promise to destabilize memberships, possibly to the point that the association may be defined out of existence. They favour developments in the policy process that will undermine co-operative behaviour between the state and collective interests. As co-operation decreases, associations will lose their capacity for information management and their autonomy from members. As such, they become less able to exercise a governance role.

Yet upon examining the empirical studies in the comparative economic governance project and other research in comparative public policy, it is evident that a secular decline in associational governance does not emerge as clearly as might be expected. Two factors appear to counter the trend. First, despite the efforts of neo-liberals, the ongoing, technical and complex character of public policy has remained and this character demands close working relationships between the state and affected interests. The maintenance of organizationally developed interest associations remains in the interests of many state officials. Second, the compelling logic of internationalization does not affect all social systems of production in the same way. Internationalization tends to favour stripping bare the institutional environment around markets in large-scale and small-scale mass production systems. In contrast, some evidence suggests that it promotes a redefinition and retention of associational governance in flexible specialization and diversified quality mass production sectors. Here associations appear to be capable of drawing on their own organizational resources to participate in the reshaping of their environments. Once in position to play a governance role, associations often "stick" and find new ways to maintain their governing status. The importance of these two factors is illustrated in the following two sections of the paper.
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Policy Approach: The Importance of State Structure

Resisting the pressures against associational governance posed by internationalization depends on two broad factors, state structures and the historical development of reliance on associational governance. State structures is an encompassing term that refers to the arrangements governing relations between executive and legislature, the role of the constitution, corresponding administrative practices and goals, and what Hall (1989: 383) has termed the "structure of political discourse." This structure includes "shared conceptions about the nature of the society and the economy, various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of common political ideas, and collective memories of past political experiences." When compared to the operation of the policy process at the sectoral level, these state structures would appear to be relatively fixed. In speaking about a developmental model of national policy networks, Lehmbruch (1990) writes that such broad state structures tend to be set in the context of major crises and then proceed to constrain national politics for a considerable period of time. Such an interpretation is quite consistent with Dyson's (1980) work on state traditions and his attempt to define a set of ideal typical polities.

A given complex of state structures will have a variable relationship with policy-making at a sectoral level. As Maurice Wright (1988: 594) has noted: "What actually happens within the policy process within a particular industrial sector may not only be different from what happens in other industrial sectors (and other countries), but the behaviour of policy-makers may also appear inconsistent with conventional explanations of, for example, the `role of the state', the bureaucracy, representative associations and financial institutions." Hence national state structures and the policy process in a particular sector may appear to have little in common. We should recognize that some state structures may even be particularly favourable to widespread experimentation with policy processes and instruments at the sectoral level. Yet there will be situations where national state structures have a direct impact on the organization of policy networks at the sectoral level. In particular, instances where the very fate of the sector
is at stake are particularly likely to bring out nationally characteristic responses.

Obviously in a paper of this length and scope, we cannot expect to trace out in detail differences in state structures and their individual impact on sectoral policy-making. Rather we propose to use a summary variable, policy approach, a variable that draws an implicit contrast between two broad constellations of state structures. Policy approach refers to the method that a government uses to solve problems faced by a sector. Although a number of typologies exist for characterizing variations in approach, we retain for the purposes of this discussion only one of these, the distinction between anticipatory and reactive approaches. This distinction was first advanced by Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan (1982) and has been elaborated in subsequent work by Dyson (1982), Hayward (1982), Shepherd and Duchêne (1983), Duchêne (1987), and Atkinson and Coleman (1989a).

An anticipatory approach to problem-solving emphasizes the importance of acquiring information and knowledge in order to provide a foundation for activist, innovative government (Dyson 1982: 17). It presumes the presence of highly capable state agencies and a set of political ideas that treats skeptically neo-liberal admonitions against state intervention. Anticipatory policy-making gives precedence to medium- and long-term objectives; it sacrifices short-term economic growth for longer term economic stability; and it may involve significant intrusion into the affairs of private firms. "The working assumption is that for many purposes market signals will not be in accord with overriding national goals, especially the preservation and nurturing of what are considered strategically important industries" (Atkinson and Coleman 1989a: 24). The investment decisions of individual firms are not assumed to be completely private; indeed their public character, the way in which they affect the lives of workers and other capitalists, makes them matters for public discussion.

In this sense, then, anticipatory policy-making has a broad range - it will look at a whole sector rather than one firm - and a pronounced depth - it takes into account the detailed characteristics of firms in a sector. Finally, anticipatory policy normally involves the integrated application of a series of policy instruments. "Strong efforts are made to achieve a measure of
complementarity, with special attention being paid to backward and forward linkages among industrial sectors" (Atkinson and Coleman 1989a: 25).

An anticipatory approach to policy-making will often require associational governance to be successful. The degree of co-ordination of diverse policy instruments, the level of information on the strengths and weaknesses of firms, and the need for co-operation between state actors and industry - all of these factors create conditions that favour associational development. It is true that the state can act on its own and impose a policy on a sector, but these circumstances are actually quite rare in market economies. They are used only as a last resort in order to encourage participants in the policy process to make negotiation work (Dyson 1982), at very early stages in a sector's development when no association has yet formed (Atkinson and Coleman 1989a: Chapter 5), or in special policy areas such as monetary policy where the state wishes to limit state-society contacts (Woolley 1984; Coleman 1991).

Normally, if an anticipatory approach is favoured, state officials must set up a "negotiated order" (Whately 1987) or pursue what Richard Samuels (1987) calls "the politics of reciprocal consent" between state and civil society.

Anticipatory policy will rest then on the presence of strong, highly organized interest associations capable both of developing a longer term view of the sector's development and of convincing members to abide by that view. The relationship between the state and industry in this policy environment is ongoing, intense, and highly technical in approach. Without a developed associational system, it becomes very difficult to sustain anticipatory policy-making.

A reactive approach to policy-making operates according to a different set of assumptions; it "rests on a neo-liberal view of the importance of the state-society distinction and of the impartial role of government as a referee" (Dyson 1982: 17). Such assumptions dictate first that governments have limited and short-term objectives when it comes to sectoral development. Structural adjustment should be left in the hands of market forces; the state only intervenes to correct short-term failures of the market mechanism. Strong government here does not necessarily mean an extensive and highly capable state bureaucracy. Reactive policy
does not involve intrusion into the affairs of individual firms; rather it gives primacy to "environmental" intervention - the development of an appropriate climate for investment through the tax system, industrial relations law, and monetary policy. Reactive policy does not appear planned and co-ordinated like anticipatory policy; it gives the appearance of a series of ad hoc measures applied to firms and sectors as the need arises.

By implication, reactive policy-making is much less likely to require associational governance in its implementation. Indeed under most, but not all, conditions, associations play an ancillary role in the delivery of reactive policy. The major exception involves situations where regulatory policy instruments are used in a reactive manner. Specifically, the likelihood of associational governance increases significantly in two different instances.

In the first situation, a group seeks to exercise authority over economic activity in a sector on behalf of its members, a move largely unopposed by other potential interests (Hayes 1978). In these circumstances, a state agency may be persuaded to delegate some of its regulatory authority to the association. In exchange, the agency experiences less conflict and delay in the administrative process, possibly lowers its costs, and receives added political support in disputes with its political masters (Chubb 1983: 32). Such an outcome is characterized as self-regulation in the public policy literature (Hayes 1978; Peters 1977), with common examples being advertising (Boddewyn 1985), accounting (Willmott 1985), the dairy industry (Traxler and Unger 1992) and securities (Moran 1989, 1990; Coleman 1989a, 1992).

In the second situation, conflict develops between a group that supplies a particular good and another group that receives the good (Hayes 1978; Chubb 1983). Politicians react by passing evasive legislation that delegates broad administrative authority for resolving the conflict to a bureaucratic agency. Once transferred to the administrative realm, resolution of the conflict depends heavily on the group resources of the associational actors involved. Chubb (1983: 78ff) argues that the stakes are normally higher for those supplying the good, the "cost bearers" of the regulation, than for those receiving the good. In addition, expertise on the modalities of supplying the good is more likely to reside with the cost bearers than with the recipients. Such
circumstances favour what many call agency capture; in order to accomplish its programmatic and political objectives, the agency incorporates the association representing the cost-bearers into the policy process and gives it some responsibilities for the implementation of the regulation. Prominent examples of this phenomenon are found in the regulation of pharmaceutical pricing (Sargent 1985) and of safety and quality in food processing (de Vroom 1987).

Internationalization promises to destabilize these reactive forms of associational governance. The "privileges" of associational monopolies tend to be challenged from within the nation-state and from without. As a consequence, state supervision tends to increase as the securities (Coleman 1992; Moran 1991) and the dairy sectors (Traxler and Unger 1992) indicate. In some scenarios, associational governance crumbles completely as the California dairy sector (Young 1990) and the French securities sector (Cerny 1989; Demarigny 1988) illustrate.

Nonetheless, an anticipatory approach to policy-making or a particular constellation of reactive policy and regulatory instruments are not sufficient conditions for the emergence of associational governance. It would seem that associational governance in such sectors will hinge very much on the level of associational development reached prior to any crisis precipitated by the internationalization of economic relations. High levels of associational development will be more likely in sectoral production systems whose characteristics resemble diversified quality production or flexible specialization. The focus on quality rather than price as the measure of competition in these sectors invites an anticipatory approach to policy by the state and dense social networks of organizational arrangements including associations. When these sectors are faced with increased international competition, one should not underestimate the capacity of associations to transform themselves and to adapt to new conditions.
Management of Decline

Perhaps the most difficult political problem that emerges in the wake of increased international competition involves what to do when a sector can no longer compete in world markets. Two ideal typical responses might be distinguished. In the first, the state in co-operation with the sector develops a medium- to long-term plan directed either at rationalizing production to favour the firms most likely to be competitive or at abandoning the sector. Such options require an anticipatory approach to policy utilizing redistributive policy instruments. In the second response, business, possibly in conjunction with labour, pressures the state to subsidize and protect existing firms, while they seek to adapt individually to the new competitive conditions. The state responds with the required assistance when it has the resources and when it feels the pressure the most intensely. In this scenario, the state reacts rather than anticipates, and utilizes distributive (what Strath (1992) calls the "slice of pie" approach") rather than redistributive policy instruments. If the first anticipatory-redistributive approach is followed, we would expect associations to assume some sort of governing role. By contrast, a reactive-distributive response is unlikely to require a governing role for associations.

The empirical evidence suggests that only some state structures appear open to anticipatory policy and that associations will not emerge to play a governance role in support of an anticipatory-redistributive strategy if they had not already become involved directly in the management and development of the sector at a previous stable and mature stage of the industry. Historical sediment matters. An industrial order that rests on highly concentrated, vertically integrated firms engaged in mass production seems least likely to have encouraged the requisite associative actions. Examples from the US steel industry (O'Brien 1992), the US machine tool industry (Herrigel 1992), and the German shipbuilding industry (Strath 1992) illustrate this point. There are exceptions to this general trend: Swedish shipbuilding and British consumer electronics. The first indicates the importance of broader political institutions where neocorporatist thinking is applied to a crisis; the second illustrates how the state's predisposition for anticipatory policy-making might encourage associational governance.
In the postwar period, interest associations in the US steel industry such as the American Iron and Steel Institute played a classic advocacy role. Political relationships between the industry and its environment were highly adversarial; firms and associations sought to deflect government pressures to increase capacity and fought bitterly against labour unions representing steelworkers. When competition from Europe, Japan and Korea began to threaten the US industry in the 1960s and 1970s, the steel sector found itself lacking both the experience of association self-government and the will to co-ordinate and plan the sector’s future with state agencies. Reactive policy based on subsidies and trade restraints was the result, with associations continuing to play their lobbyist role. The "industry adjusted through a slow, painful and costly process of lagging competitiveness, falling sales, staggering losses, and company failures. Given the American system of industrial governance, no other method of adjustment was feasible" (O’Brien 1992: 28).

Associations played even less of a role in the US machine tools sector. Herrigel (1992) traces the development of this industry over the present century demonstrating that firms became progressively specialized while concentrating more and more on manufacturing standardized machine tools in long production runs. Hence they adopted a mass production or Fordist strategy. In the postwar period, small and medium-sized firms were absorbed by larger firms and these large integrated firms themselves took on most of the responsibility for governing the sector. Issues related to production strategies, training of workers and product innovation became the internal concerns of the individual companies dominating the sector.

Such a logic of membership provided barren ground for the organizational development of interest associations; associations representing the sector were not central to its governance in the postwar period. Consequently, when new forms of international market competition based on technological innovation emerged in the 1980s, the sector had neither experience with associative action to aid in retraining workers and studying changes in process technology nor had it cultivated expertise in the state agencies responsible for the sector. In the absence of such other institutional supports, it was up to the firms themselves to manage
adjustment. But as Herrigel suggests, even with knowledge of the most advanced techniques, the US firms were unable to adapt the technology for commercial use in response to foreign competition.

The West German shipbuilding industry provides a final example of a concentrated, vertically-integrated sector adjusting to decline without significant previous experience with collective action. In a fashion analogous to the US machine tools sector, the German shipbuilding industry had become dominated by a limited number of large, vertically-integrated firms. These firms all belonged to a trade association, the Federation of German Shipbuilders, that had played no significant role in sectoral governance prior to 1975 (Strath 1992: 7). When markets collapsed in 1975, the association was mobilized to join a "strange coalition" with the trade union IG Metall and with Länder governments in an effort to pressure the federal government to maintain subsidy levels.

In the early stages of this partnership, IG Metall proposed a plan for adjustment involving redistributive policies in an anticipatory framework: it suggested that the shipyards most likely to succeed in international competition should be named and that capacity reduction be reserved for those that were the least competitive. This proposal gave rise to intense internal opposition within IG Metall. In addition, even though it was philosophically acceptable to the shipbuilders association, practically it was not possible to proceed. The association simply had not developed over time any capacity to govern its members behaviour in a way consistent with the realization of such a plan. Not surprisingly, the strange coalition did not become a private interest government overseeing a planned approach to adjustment. Instead it ended up working in pressure pluralist policy networks demanding continued subsidies allocated on a non-discriminatory basis to all yards (distributive policy).

In contrast, the Swedish shipbuilding sector shows that associations may play a governing role even in a Fordist sector. What was crucial here was a macropolitical environment that legitimized corporatism, and particularly a strong role for trade unions. The Swedish association of shipbuilders had always faced a logic of membership that obstructed
organizational development. Individual firms identified with particular localities and local cultures rather than with each other. Consequently, the association never became a strong voice for the industry. But, similar to the German example, the association was mobilized to join a tripartite council formed to deal with the crisis in the sector that developed in the 1970s. The coalition began moving toward an anticipatory-redistributive approach to the problem with the closure of the Eriksberg yard in the mid-1970s. In 1977-78, the remaining shipyards were nationalized, effectively paring the policy network to include the state and labour only.

A number of different approaches to the decline of the sector were tried over the next six years. Ultimately the trade union and the state agreed on a plan to shut down the remaining yards, with Saab and Volvo contracting to take over the facilities and to retool them for the manufacture of automobiles. Strath emphasizes the crucial role of the trade union in these negotiations with the state; in broader neo-corporatist fora, the union had long accepted the need for an active labour market policy that sought to move workers from less competitive, poorly productive sectors to others that were more competitive with high productivity. Its philosophy complemented the state's own anticipatory and redistributive approach to decline.

The British consumer electronics sector illustrates how an activist state can draw an association into a governance role, even in a mass production sector faced with decline. In contrast to the US steel, US machine tools, and German shipbuilders, the industry had not proceeded to a high level of industrial concentration. In the late 1960s, over a dozen firms of medium size were producing televisions in Britain. Such an industry structure was more favourable to collective action than one dominated by only a few, vertically-integrated firms. The approach of state actors also encouraged organizational development. At the time, the British policy style emphasized negotiation and consultation with associations, and different government departments were seen as "sponsors" of particular sectors (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Jordan and Richardson 1982; Grant 1987b). Not surprisingly, then, when international competition, particularly from Japan, began to hurt British firms in the early 1970s, it was the industry trade association, BREMA, that assumed the lead role in negotiations with a Japanese
association that produced bilateral voluntary restraint agreements (Cawson 1992: 19).

The next significant step in the adjustment process was initiated by the Labour government of the mid-1970s as part of a broader attempt to develop an anticipatory approach to industrial policy. With the creation of a Sectoral Working Party (SWP) for consumer electronics, the policy network expanded to include stronger representation of the state and trade unions. By 1979, the parties to this policy network had produced a longer term plan consistent with the anticipatory-redistributive model. It proposed the rationalization of production units, increased incorporation of Japanese technology, more use of cost-saving innovations, and improvements in the quality and supply of UK-manufactured components. The plan collapsed when the newly elected Thatcher government rejected anticipatory approaches to industrial policy. Such a collapse illustrates the vulnerability of associational governance to political attack when it occurs in a mass production sector without a long tradition of private interest government.

From Expansion to Maturity

Internationalization gives rise to a second set of changes that also bring into focus the question of associational governance. A sector takes advantage of the liberalization of trade regimes following the Second World War and of the economic boom occasioned by reconstruction to expand rapidly, not only in the domestic economy but also in international markets. But as reconstruction ends and American market domination in many sectors is challenged by European and Japanese competition, international expansion slows. Competition intensifies and a mature sector is faced with a period of adjusting to this changed environment.

Although the evidence remains insufficient for drawing any firm generalizations, these changes do not appear to favour governance roles for national sectoral associations. If the maturing process comes to involve the transfer of some decision-making responsibility from the nation-state to a supra-national level of government, national associations may lose governance powers if they have them. If no supra-national regime develops, associational governance de
novo is also not particularly favoured; evidence suggests that it obtains only when there is a long tradition of associational activity in the sector. Since such a tradition is more likely in sectors with diversified quality mass production or flexible specialization patterns, it is these, in particular, where we find associational governance persisting in the 1990s.

The following three examples illustrate the importance of the historical maturation of associational governance. The necessary organizational development of associations takes place over time and in circumstances much more nationally self-contained than are available in the present era of international competition. The instability brought to domestic sectors in the 1970s and 1980s discourages the development of new associations with governing capacities. Governance thus arises in sectors where this capacity had already been established in past phases of the industry cycle. These examples also illustrate the importance of national state structures. A particular set of norms, norms that value objectivity and Sachlichkeit in Germany (Dyson 1982) and negotiated reciprocal consent in Japan (Samuels 1987), were crucial in providing a fertile national environment for collective action, even in the face of globalization.

Herrigel notes that the German state and the association representing machine tools had co-operated early on in the development of the sector. The state supported vocational training offered through the Handwerk chambers and financed the establishment of research institutes and technical universities. The association became active in co-ordinating research among the various institutions and in advising on emerging needs in vocational training. It thus shared in the governance of the industry with the state and these quasi-public institutions. This role was maintained in the expansionary periods of the 1920s and from 1950 to until 1970.

When the latter boom ended, the German industry found itself faced with increased competition from Japan and with a need to make significant changes in its philosophy of product design. In contrast to the US industry which, as we noted above, followed a standardized mass production approach, the German industry evolved into a pattern of diversified quality mass production (Herrigel 1992; Streeck 1991). The long-standing corporatist network of trade unions, business associations, public law chambers, research institutes and the state refocused its
attention on computerized technology and the problems of microelectronic applications to machine tools. Successful adaptation has followed in the changed, less expansionary era of the 1980s.

In the Japanese printed circuit board sector, the Japanese Printed Circuit Association emerged in 1962, early in the industry's development (Sako 1992). By 1976, it had developed a monopoly on representation and was recognized by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry as the legal representative of the sector. As the sector matured in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Japanese government, in consultation with the sector, developed a series of programmes for the modernization and rationalization of firms. These changes allowed the sector to shift toward diversified quality mass production from standardized, high volume mass production. Responsibility for administering these programmes was delegated to the JPCA and the association was given the power to impose binding decisions on its members. In this instance again, associational governance emerged in circumstances where associational governance was historically established and the state was following an anticipatory approach to policy-making.

Associational governance is not particularly favoured in adversarial polities (Dyson 1980: Ch. 2). But particular configurations of state structures and associations may develop on a trajectory somewhat at variance with overall political arrangements and foster conditions supportive of associational governance. The Canadian pulp and paper sector illustrates such a pattern. This industry had followed a high volume, mass production strategy in the postwar period. Faced by more intense international competition in the late 1960s, it was faced with a period of adjustment if such a strategy was to continue. In fashioning this strategy, it drew upon a rather dense organizational network tying together associative action, research and development organizations, and the state.

The Canadian Pulp and Paper Association was founded early in the sector's development and had joined with the government at the expansion phase in founding and supporting research and development institutes to support product and process innovation.
Concertation involving the CPPA, associated research institutes, and government agencies remained in place during the long period of expansion in the postwar period. Market growth began to slow in the early 1970s with falling demand and increased competition from Southern U.S. and Scandinavian companies. The policy network was then activated to deal with the changed circumstances; the state and the association jointly developed a large modernization programme and worked out the modalities for its implementation. Such an anticipatory approach to policy based on negotiation between the industry and the state would not have been possible if the association had not already long assumed a key role in the governance of the sector.

INTERNATIONALIZATION AND SUPRA-NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONAL GOVERNANCE

If the impact of internationalization is likely to diminish the likelihood of associational governance at the national level, the question still remains whether this diminution might be compensated for by the emergence of associational governance at supra-national levels. In order to investigate this question further, we concentrate our analysis in this section on two related sectors, the buying and selling of securities and banking. Activity in these sectors has moved rapidly onto an international plane over the past quarter century to an extent matched by few other sectors. A qualitative change has taken place in the amount and kinds of international activities carried out by investors, borrowers and financial institutions in much of the capitalist world (Economic Council of Canada 1989; Pecchioli 1983).

Both banking and securities are sectors where significant self-regulation and bipartite policy co-ordination with national authorities has occurred in the past. When contemporary governance arrangements in these sectors are examined closely, there are as yet only embryonic examples of associational governance at a supra-national level. What changes have occurred tend to be overshadowed by the strengthening of the governance roles of associations at the national level. Continued associational governance is not explained by anticipatory state action. Rather, coping with an internationalized sector has created a need for highly complex public
policy. Managing such a policy corpus forces the state to draw heavily on the sector's own expertise and information base.

Beginning in the late 1960s, pure self-regulatory organizations began to emerge at the international level in the securities sector. Common examples are the Association of International Bond Dealers (AIBD), the International Primary Markets Association and the International Swap Dealers Association. These organizations tended to operate as examples of pure self-regulation—no state authorities provided either direct or indirect delegations of authority. As international business in these sectors grew and had more and more impact on national markets, national state authorities began to seek to supervise the activities of relevant firms. The AIBD illustrates this process well. In exchange for avoiding direct state regulation, the association sought and gained recognition as an "international stock exchange" based in London (Coleman 1992). Consequently, the AIBD remained the regulatory body for international bond trading, but agreed to submit its rules and procedures for approval by British regulatory authorities. International associational governance emerged, but under national supervision!

Such limited governance has been complemented by an increase in the activity of other associations at the international level. The Fédération Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs has emerged as an important body for the exchange of information by national stock exchanges. A similar role is fulfilled by the International Council of Securities Dealers and Self-Regulatory Organizations which represents non-stock exchange self-regulatory bodies such as the National Association of Securities Dealers in the US and The Securities and Futures Association in Britain. At the EC level, the Federation of Stock Exchanges of the EC has awakened from its previous moribund state to play an advisory role in the liberalization of Community capital markets. All of these bodies serve to monitor the progress toward policy coordination being made by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a supra-national organization composed of national securities supervisors.

Yet from the point of view of the governance of the securities sectors, these
developments are less significant than the kinds of changes that have taken place at the national level (Coleman 1992; Moran 1990, 1991). The past decade has seen a significant strengthening of national agencies responsible for supervising securities markets, a redefinition and formalization of the roles of self-regulatory associative organizations, and an expansion and refurbishment of their capacities. National authorities have increased bilateral policy coordination, with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States being particularly active in signing information sharing agreements with companion organizations in other states.

The continuing importance of a strong national state presence in the securities sector is reflected in the evolution of German representation to IOSCO. As the latter organization has become a forum for more policy coordination among nation-states, Germany faced the prospect of being left out. With its particular approach to universal banking, Germany did not have a national securities supervisor like the SEC eligible to join IOSCO. The securities business was supervised either by the banking regulator (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen) or by Länder agencies with no power to act internationally. As a compromise, an interest association representing German stock exchanges, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Wertpapierbörsen, was accepted as a German representative. Yet all parties were uncomfortable with an arrangement that had an interest association acting as a national representative in a forum composed of government agencies. Finally, late in 1990, it was agreed that the federal Finance Ministry would seek IOSCO membership and the ADW would become an associate member. This example illustrates well how international organizations and national state agencies can increase in importance together; there is no necessary inverse relationship.

Developments in the banking sector are even more instructive than securities because already the outlines of an international regime have taken shape. The Group of 10 (G10) central bank governors had begun meeting on a monthly basis at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle (a kind of central banks for central banks) beginning in 1969. In 1974, they set up a working sub-committee on banking regulation. Known informally as the Cooke Committee in
the 1970s and 1980s, the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices has promoted increased harmonization of banking supervision practices at the national level and more sharing of information among banking supervisors.

Increases in interest rate risk, country risk and exchange rate risk in the early 1980s raised the question of whether the capital maintained by banks as a hedge to that risk was adequate and whether different national definitions of this capital were forcing the international banking system to a lowest common denominator definition. Following an Anglo-American compromise proposal in 1987, the Cooke Committee released a consultative paper with proposals for a new definition of capital standards (BIS 1987). The paper proposed a two-tier system for capital composed of core capital and supplementary capital. Components of capital were to be weighted by their degree of risk, particularly credit risk. The paper then served as a beginning point for discussion and consultation within each member country. In July 1988, the central bank governors finally accepted a proposal that defined new minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks operating internationally (Kapstein 1989). Capital adequacy refers basically to the ratio between a bank's total assets and its equity capital plus its disclosed reserves. This agreement set out the new definition of capital, with some discretion left to national authorities, and members agreed to abide by the new standards by 1992.

Several aspects of this international agreement are instructive for assessing the evolution of associational governance. First, to date, the movement toward this international regime has not fostered the creation of any new international association nor has it occasioned any strengthening of the International Bankers Association. Second, the impact on national banking associations is mixed but generally in the direction of increasing their governance powers. Some national associations, particularly those in Canada and Germany, reported being frozen out of the earlier stages of the Cooke Committee's work. Inter-state negotiations on the international level allowed national banking supervisors to take their distance from national associations. Yet the evolution of the supra-national banking regime has also encouraged further associational governance at the national level. The attempts to define capital
requirements and more importantly the design of regulations to put the agreement in place have required very close collaboration in all affected states between banking supervisors and associations. The level of technical detail and the complexity of new financial instruments are such that no agency itself has the requisite expertise to develop policy on its own. Such close collaboration is reinforced in some countries like France (Burgard 1989: 259-60) and Germany (Ronge 1979) by the fact that the state has delegated responsibility for managing depositor protection funds to national bankers' associations.

When the focus of analysis is limited to the more narrow arena of the European Economic Community, again the evidence suggests a strengthening of national associations in tandem with a more prominent role for EC level associations. The development of a Community-wide banking regime has moved quickly since passage of the Single European Act. The Second Banking Directive, plus accompanying directives on "own funds" and on solvability agreed to by the European Council in December 1989, ensure that an "espace financier européen", at least in the area of banking, will be a reality by 1993. National associations have been closely associated by respective nation-states in the negotiations leading up to these directives and in the development of national regulations to put the directives into effect.

In addition, on the EC plane, the European Banking Federation composed of the respective national associations, has become the Commission's channel of communication to Europe's banking sector. The Federation has also been an important site for bargaining among national banking sectors who recognize that their influence is multiplied significantly when they can define a common position. In these respects, the European federation has made significant progress toward assuming a governance role. Yet the Federation remains somewhat dependent on its national members. Its staff complement is barely one-fifth of any of the larger member bankers associations (France, Germany, Britain, Italy). Nor has it shown any ability to discipline its members--when negotiations have broken down, the national associations use their own impressive resources to target the Commission and the Council directly. Some national associations have even set up their own offices in Brussels. In short, on balance, any increase in
influence for supra-national associative action has been countermanded, if not superseded, by increased governing powers for national level associations.

CONCLUSION

Associations continue to serve as governance mechanisms at the national level despite the pressures of internationalization. They have yet to emerge as significant governance structures on the supra-national plane. Yet even the survival of associative governance in internationalizing sectors might not have seemed highly probable. Such governance is often associated in public discourse with loaded terms: corporatism, clientelism, special interests, self-regulation. Frequently, it has served as an obvious object for attack by governing politicians or those in opposition. We have suggested in this paper several explanations for the persistence of associational governance under somewhat trying circumstances: the complexity of the policy process, the desire by some state agencies to pursue anticipatory policy over a longer term, and the resilience of associations as organizations, particularly when embedded in diversified quality mass production or flexible specialization sectors. This latter property deserves some further consideration.

Whatever one's definition of associational governance, it will virtually always involve an interpenetration of state and society and a transfer of public functions to recognized private actors. Associations are closely consulted in the formulation of policy and are involved in its implementation. They are normally embedded in informal networks that include research institutes, training organizations, and local government agencies. In exchange, the state receives a measure of freedom to intervene in the definition of the structure of the association (Jobert 1988) and in the organization of the sector. As such, associational governance is not only an affair of members of the association but also of the state itself. Both parties become highly familiar with one another through working groups and frequent consultation. Both parties gain easier access to informal information and are in a good position to influence decisions taken by the other that may be crucial to the governance of the sector. Consequently,
as Segestrin (1985) has emphasized, associational governance becomes more than a mechanism for regulating a particular market segment. The association becomes an actor in its own right. It develops a collective identity that comes to infuse the consciousness of its members and that is recognized by state actors.

When faced with the challenge of liberalizing markets associated with internationalization, all of these elements of associational governance may come into question. The style and mechanisms of regulation of the given market segment appear restrictive. As an actor, the association takes on the image of a dinosaur—old, lumbering, and soon to be extinct. The collective identity fashioned carefully over time becomes less and less consistent with the reality of the marketplace, provoking dissension in the membership and challenges from outside the traditional domain. All of these changes will be familiar to the state because of its long-standing and close association with the group.

Why then should associational governance survive in the face of such a multi-dimensional challenge? Segestrin (1985: 109-113) replies that the association will draw on its long-standing relationship with the state and seek to negotiate a new order. Both parties are long-conditioned to discussion and are often tied together in a dense network of private and para-public organizations. The association finds itself thus in an organizational environment that favours the pursuit of negotiations of a new, more inclusive arrangement. The continued complexity of the policy process and the presumed benefits of some market stability will often tempt state actors to agree to such negotiations. The weight of historical experience in mutual consultation and the relative familiarity of the partners with one another raise significantly the probability that these negotiations will succeed.

The considerable organizational development of the association also is an asset in this process. As an autonomous actor in its own right, it is able to pursue the redefinition of its domain or the merger with other groups that is necessary to embrace a membership more consistent with reshaped markets. Possessed of a long-standing responsibility for defining the collective identity of its members, the association will usually control educational institutes that
play a central role in the training and accreditation of workers and professionals. Courses can be redesigned, the requirements for certificates reassessed, and new instructors hired. If the manufacture of machine tools must assimilate the concept of computer-assisted design or the business of a stock broker must expand to include futures or swaps, then the association is well-placed to control this process of change. It is also in a strong position to convince the state that necessary adaptations are being made. In the process, the association will oversee the redefinition of the collective identity of its members and will build a new base of support for its own autonomy.

The reconstitution of associational governance in the face of the kinds of crises precipitated by internationalization is by no means a certainty. The process of change may take place so quickly or the decline of a sector may be so precipitous that the association cannot react in time. Yet, as this paper has emphasized, in many instances, the change may be more gradual and the decline far from self-evident. Under these conditions, associations have proved remarkably resourceful in drawing upon their interpenetration with the state, their control over the definition of their domain, their influence over companion research and training organizations, and their responsibility for developing a collective identity. All these factors assist the association to weather the storm of market liberalization prompted by the globalization of markets.
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