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The Only Absolute Guarantee

Doug Roche
Canadian Pugwash Group

Erika Simpson
University of Western Ontario, simpson@uwo.ca

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‘The Only Absolute Guarantee’

A Brief on Canada’s Nuclear Weapons Policies

**Presented to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade “Dialogue on Foreign Policy”**

By the Canadian Pugwash Group

April, 2003

The Canadian Pugwash Group¹ submits this Brief on Nuclear Weapons Issues to the Government of Canada for its Dialogue on Foreign Policy. The Brief responds to two Questions for Discussion:

- “What should be our distinctive role in promoting global security?”
- “Should Canada do more to address conditions giving rise to conflict and insecurity beyond our borders? If so, where?”

A. Current Canadian Policy

Foreign Minister Bill Graham recapitulated the priorities of Canada’s non-proliferation arms control and disarmament policy in his address to the Conference on Disarmament March 19, 2002.

We seek the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. To that end we will work to achieve the full implementation of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In that context, we want early entry into force of the CTBT and, in the interim, the most effective organization we can devise to support the treaty regime. The political value of nuclear weapons must be devalued, particularly because their purpose is primarily political. The negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT are a vital element in international security and must be preserved and respected. ...

The Minister called for vigilance in protecting the legal regime that underpins the multilateral system.

¹ The Canadian Pugwash Group is the Canadian branch of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which, along with its then President, Sir Joseph Rotblat, was awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to diminish such arms.”.

Our societies are based on the rule of law, and the sustainable, shared global future we seek must have the same basis, however difficult it may be to obtain universal acceptance of the rules and establish effective means of enforcement.

Canada showed its commitment to the NPT 13 Steps (see Appendix “A”) by voting in favour of the New Agenda Coalition omnibus resolution, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” at UNGA 57. Canada was the only NATO country to vote yes.

The resolution upheld *inter alia*:

- A call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
- Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and maintenance of the moratorium on test explosions;
- Resumption of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials;
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- Nuclear Weapons States to maintain security assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
- Destruction of all nuclear warheads affected by the treaty process to make nuclear disarmament irreversible.
- Requirement, ultimately, of a universal, multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

At the same time, Canada abstained on a second New Agenda Coalition resolution calling for tactical nuclear weapons to be included as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. The resolution was aimed at the removal of the 180 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed on the soil of six European NATO countries, which call themselves non-nuclear: Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and

Turkey. The abstention was caused by Canada's reluctance to oppose NATO policy. The NATO Strategic Concept holds that nuclear weapons are "essential" and must be kept up-to-date as "credible deterrence." Referring to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in European countries, NATO says: "There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much reduced, presence of sub-strategic forces in Europe."

Canada's efforts to get NATO to review its nuclear weapons policies flowed from the 1998 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Committee, chaired by Bill Graham, M.P. (before he assumed his present portfolio), urged Canada to "argue forcefully" within NATO for a re-examination of the nuclear component in the Strategic Concept. A review of sorts was started, but it came to naught, with NATO re-affirming the central tenet of the Strategic Concept: nuclear weapons are "essential". While the NATO document makes it clear that the "Paragraph 32" process is finished, the door was left open to further discussion on the question. Paragraph 96 of the NATO Report of December 14, 2000, said: "... The Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement with interested nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and the general public." NATO further acknowledged that it is important for NATO Allies to maintain and reinvigorate the flow of information with and about relevant international bodies in this field (Paragraph 115).

The Government of Canada should be commended for having raised this issue in NATO, but its efforts cannot stop now. The gravest threat to the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now posed by the actions of the United States, our closest ally. Canada, to be true to its deepest values centering on the rule of law, cannot be silent.

The contradiction between what NATO countries say in the NPT context and do in the NATO context is astounding. The very same countries – including Canada – that, in the NPT context, pledge an "unequivocal undertaking" to the total elimination of nuclear weapons then, in the NATO context, reaffirm that nuclear weapons "are essential." Through its commitment to the NPT and the 13 Steps for total elimination of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, its allegiance to NATO, Canada is caught in an incoherent posture. The contradiction of Canada's nuclear weapons policies going in two opposite directions at the same time must be dealt with. Canadian Pugwash subscribes to the analysis of this dilemma presented by Project Ploughshares:

Nearly sixty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward nuclear weapons. The Canadian government rules out acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear proliferation, and asserts that “the only sustainable strategy for the future is the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely.” But it also supports the continued possession of nuclear weapons by its allies, participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and endorses NATO’s plan to retain nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable future.” The Canadian government continues to state that the defence of Canada must rely on the “nuclear umbrella” that the United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this country, and it continues to provide both physical and political support for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those same weapons as a useful – even necessary – element of Canada’s defences and those of its allies.²

B. New Policy Directions on Nuclear Weapons.

Contrary to popular belief, the nuclear weapons problem is not “going away.”

It is staggering to reflect on the total number of nuclear weapons still in existence. The estimated number is 34,145.

² “Canada and Nuclear Weapons: Canadian Policies Related to, and Connections to, Nuclear Weapons,” By Bill Robinson, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 01-5, October, 2002.

Country	Strategic Warheads	Tactical Warheads	Warheads in Storage	TOTAL
United States	7,013	1,620	5,000	13,633
Russia	5,858	4,000	9,421	19,279
TOTAL				32,912
Percent of Total				96 percent

*Data for the U.S. and Russian arsenals is taken from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief23.pdf) and, for the other nuclear weapon states, the Natural Resources Defense Council (see www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp). It should be noted that estimates of the composition and evolution of the arsenals for China, Israel, India and Pakistan are extremely difficult to make and these figures are necessarily estimates.

United Kingdom	200
France	350
China	400
India	35
Pakistan	48
Israel	200
TOTAL	34,145*

It is a counterproductive political policy for the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to think that they can have almost an exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons while other countries are prohibited from acquiring them. The responsibility for the looming prospect of a nuclear war of some dimension can be laid squarely on the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China. They have been warned time and again by both governments and civil society leaders that their refusal to honour their legal obligation to negotiate the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals is leading to the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the nuclear powers made three promises:

- A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved by 1996. Though former U.S. President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the Treaty, the succeeding Bush Administration turned its back on it, and entry-into-force is now effectively blocked.

- Negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would come to an “early conclusion.” With several nuclear weapons states blocking progress, the Conference on Disarmament cannot even agree on a format for negotiations let alone carry them out.

- “Systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate nuclear weapons would be made. It is said that the Moscow Treaty of 2002, signed by the U.S. and Russia, shows compliance because it will reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads on each side to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. But these weapons will be stored in reserve, not dismantled, and there are no verification procedures. The key principle of irreversibility, one of the NPT 13 Steps, is not met.

In short, the pledges made in 1995 have been abandoned. The ruling of the International Court of Justice that states have an obligation to conclude negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons, has been ignored. The “unequivocal undertaking” toward total elimination, given in 2000, has been pushed aside. Jayantha Dhanapala, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, calls the gulf between declaration and deeds “alarming.” Instead of genuine progress in nuclear disarmament, the world has seen the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the development of improved nuclear weapons, the prospect of more nuclear tests, and plans for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon states. Each day, the warning of the Canberra Commission rings more true: “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to others to acquire them.” North Korea is but one current example.

During 2001, the Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which made clear that its nuclear weapons stockpile remains a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. The NPR establishes expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that support them, within a New Triad of capabilities that combine nuclear and conventional offensive strikes with missile defences and nuclear-weapons infrastructure. The NPR assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of U.S. military forces for at least the next 50 years; it plans an extensive and expensive series of programs to modernize the existing force, including a new ICBM to be operational in 2020 and a new heavy bomber in 2040. The NPR says that there are four reasons to possess nuclear weapons: to “assure

allies and friends”; “dissuade competitors”; “deter aggressors”; and “defeat enemies.”

It also lists specific scenarios for using nuclear weapons: A conflict with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbour. The new policy means that the United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not themselves possess nuclear weapons; such an action runs counter to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, under the guise of participating in nuclear disarmament through the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons, the U.S. is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons far beyond the deterrence measures against the former Soviet Union in the Cold War. New U.S. policy directly challenges Canadian policy, which holds that the only value of nuclear weapons is political, not military. U.S. intentions are stated clearly in the NPR:

Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defence capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique proportions that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.

When the NPR is seen in the context of President Bush’s National Security Strategy, an alarming prospect of the use of nuclear weapons comes into view. The new Strategy says that the U.S. will take anticipatory action to defend itself, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. The Strategy states: “To forestall or prevent ... hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The 2003 war against Iraq flowed from this strategy.

Further, the U.S. has stated that it “reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, *and friends and allies*” (emphasis added). Has Canada given its assent to be included in such a policy? If so, were Canadians ever informed of the implications? If not, has Canada protested being included in a contravention of international law?

Concerned about a widened rationale for the use of nuclear weapons, ten U.S. senators, led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, sent a letter February 21, 2003 to President Bush, expressing “grave concern” about U.S. policy. They rejected a policy contemplating the option of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state:

...Such a shift in U.S. policy would deepen the danger of nuclear proliferation by effectively telling non-nuclear states that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a potential U.S. attack, and by sending a green light to the world’s nuclear states that it is permissible to use them. Is this the lesson we want to send to North Korea, India, Pakistan, or any other nuclear power?

Faced with a constantly modernizing U.S. nuclear arsenal and new high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks. And more states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow India, Pakistan and Israel’s recourse to acquiring nuclear weapons. The danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows.

That catastrophe may well be set off by terrorists. Immediately after September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Ground Zero in New York and said that, as horrible as the destruction was, how much worse it would have been had the terrorists used nuclear devices. He called on nations to “re-double” efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not a multiplication of efforts we are witnessing, but a subtraction.

It is the lack of an enforceable convention to shut off the development and production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials that has resulted in the new risk of nuclear terrorism. There has been resolution after resolution at the U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; the resolutions actually pass with handsome majorities (although Canada has never voted in favour). Public opinion polls throughout the world show that people heavily favour the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But the major states refuse to enter such negotiations, so determined are they to preserve their nuclear strength. Now the world faces not only the traditional prospect of a nuclear war between states but the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists who steal

nuclear materials. In this new age of suicidal terrorism, the threat of attacks using weapons of mass destruction has grown exponentially. Virtually all experts on the subject say it is not a question of whether a nuclear attack will occur, but when.

The new U.S. policies have brought the world to a new moment regarding nuclear weapons. Instead of progress towards elimination, we are seeing the dismantling of the non-proliferation regime, constructed so laboriously over the past three decades. NATO is caught up in this dismantling. And so is Canada.

C. Next Steps for Canada

At the very least, Canada must stop thinking that piecemeal steps, such as formulating better reporting requirements, are enough to save the NPT. A more substantive policy is urgently called for. The erosion of the NPT is occurring before our eyes, and present trend lines will lead to its collapse. The end of the NPT would endanger the full gamut of Canada's security policies.

A regenerated Canadian policy should center around new efforts to give life to the following words, contained in the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review, which all NPT states parties agreed to:

... the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

World pressure must be mounted on the nuclear weapons states to implement these words through the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, banning the production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. An obvious place to start is to call for a U.N. Security Council Summit on all Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the nuclear weapons powers would have to face up to their responsibilities. Since it does not appear that the permanent members of the Security Council (i.e., the declared nuclear weapons states) are disposed to hold such a Summit, then it is logical to advance the longstanding request of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the international community to hold an international

conference on nuclear dangers. All states, not just NPT adherents, would be invited.

In advancing this proposal through a resolution at the U.N., and even offering to hold the conference in Canada, the Government would strengthen both the NPT and the role of the United Nations in nuclear disarmament. It would focus the attention of the world on the overarching fact that the only way to guarantee safety from a nuclear weapons attack is through elimination backed up by an intensive verification regime. This would be a bold move by Canada, wholly consistent with its stated policy of seeking the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, such a concerted campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons would advance another important Canadian objective: strengthening the legal regime that underpins the multilateral system.

This concentrated attention on the objective of nuclear disarmament – the elimination of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a universal convention – will re-focus the attention of the public in an intelligible way. It must be emphasized that the object of this exercise is not just to talk about the growing nuclear dangers, but to take action. The millions around the world who marched recently for peace show the growing public aversion to war. People – and governments – seeking to lessen the risk of catastrophe through the elimination of nuclear weapons must be listened to.

It is recognized that advancing such a policy may incur the displeasure, if not the hostility, of the United States. It must be explained that the object of the policy is not to counter the U.S., but to advance Canadian interests in breaking out of the incoherent posture we and NATO are now in, and also to save the legal regime for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is entirely proper for a friendly neighbour to point out to the U.S. that its nuclear weapons policies must implement legal commitments. Moreover, it is also proper for Canada to remind the U.S. of what it promised concerning compliance: “We must ensure compliance with relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.” (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction September 17, 2002, p.2). Canada should point out that the holding of an international conference would be a method of *supporting* the U.S. in building broad international support for universal compliance with existing regimes.

Canada must admit, frankly, that the ambiguities and contradictions of the present moment are no longer tolerable in a world of escalating nuclear danger. U.S. policies, which dominate the NATO position on nuclear weapons, must be clarified. France and the U.K. have been saying for a long time that they will join in nuclear disarmament negotiations once the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia are substantially (and definitively) reduced. Russia, as a “junior” (and aspiring to be a “senior”) member of NATO, will not cling to a nuclear system it can no longer afford. Smaller NATO countries, like Germany, Belgium and Denmark question NATO’s nuclear policy. Many countries outside the NATO club, such as China, have consistently voted at the U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Thus, Canadian leadership at this moment would be realistic as well as courageous. Canada has the credibility to launch such a campaign. It has tried to move NATO forward; it has voted for the New Agenda Coalition omnibus resolution. Canada is now instrumentally positioned to be a “bridge” between NATO and the New Agenda Coalition³. It could meaningfully transmit New Agenda views to NATO and vice versa. Closing the gap between the two would be a signal act of leadership on nuclear disarmament and go a long way to ensuring the survival of the NPT after the 2005 Review.

Canadian Pugwash is not suggesting that Canada’s policies on nuclear weapons elimination should rely solely on the holding of an international conference. Rather, the conference would be a method of stimulating renewed international energy into fulfilling priority steps for nuclear disarmament. The following priorities, suggested by the Middle Powers Initiative,⁴ are endorsed by Canadian Pugwash. We urge the Government of Canada to incorporate them and work actively with the New Agenda Coalition for their fulfillment:

1. *Strategic arms reductions:* Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; de-alert remaining deployed U.S. and

³ The New Agenda Coalition includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

⁴ “Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context:” Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper, August 1, 2002.

Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

2. *Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles:* Negotiate regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevent missile proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

3. *Tactical arms reductions:* Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

4. *Non-use of nuclear weapons:* Reverse trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.

5. *Ban on nuclear testing:* Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing; achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or modified nuclear weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.

6. *Control of fissile materials:* Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all

weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.

* * *

These are the steps the international community and Canada need to take in order to move toward a nuclear weapons-free future and a more secure world. By hosting such an international conference, Canada would be acting consistently, reflecting its record as the only country during the Cold War that had the ability and resources to develop nuclear weapons — but refrained from doing so. The federal government also has considerable experience organizing international conferences where international norms were substantively changed because of Canadian efforts. The Ottawa Landmines Process and the International Criminal Court are only two such examples.

An international conference needs to be preceded by a sustained effort to stimulate the public's interest so that individuals feel they, too, can make a difference. Representatives from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could hold a preparatory conference, attended by experts, concerned citizens and youth from across Canada and around the world. It would also be important to hold prior workshops with leaders in disarmament and experts in arms control from NATO and New Agenda Coalition countries. A Canadian-sponsored conference might help to stimulate a sea change in opinion, prompting politicians, the international media and ministries of foreign affairs and defence to take notice.

The federal government has taken a lead role before in moving world opinion. Canadians are proud of Lester B. Pearson's efforts to establish peacekeeping forces, Pierre Trudeau's opening up to China and his peace initiative, Brian Mulroney's efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, André Ouellet's report to the UN on rapid reaction forces and Lloyd Axworthy's Landmines initiative. With the prospect of nuclear war looming, the time is urgent for Canada to take such an initiative to assure our world a safer future.

APPENDIX "A"

(The following excerpt from the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference contains the 13 Practical Steps agreed to by all parties to the NPT)

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament':

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.