2010

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WHAT’S IN A NAME? DARFUR, THE GENOCIDE DEBATE, AND POLITICAL WILL

Kim Cura

In 2004, the United States officially declared the crisis in Darfur, Sudan to be “genocide”. After much international debate, the International Criminal Court issued a second arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir, charging him for three counts of genocide six years later in July 2010. This paper analyzes various sides of the lengthy debate, from the influences of Rwanda to the varied responses of the international community, and concludes that mere semantics is insufficient in addressing human rights violations, particularly such atrocities as those in Darfur. As ever, political will remains incredibly important.

On the 12th of July, 2010, the International Criminal Court issued a second arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir, charging him for three counts of genocide according to Article 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c) of the Rome Statute. This is the first—and so far the only—incident of genocide that the ICC has officially recognized in its young history. The warrant states that, in their counter-insurgency campaign, President Bashir’s government has inflicted serious mental and bodily harm, committed acts of forcible transfer and created conditions of life tantamount to physical destruction, on members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in the Darfur region.

This indictment also comes a startling seven years after the conflict first started in February 2003, owing to the long line of international inquiry and controversy over the actual scale of the Darfur conflict. While many, including the United States, believed the killings to be acts of “genocide,” others chose to describe them as “ethnic cleansing” or “crimes against humanity.” Following a very brief overview of the conflict to date, this paper will analyze various sides of the genocide debate by looking at the possible influences of Rwanda’s legacy on the decision to collectively label the atrocities as genocide, the resulting terminological dispute, and how international actors have responded to the crisis.

2 Ibid., 7.
Ultimately, this paper will argue that while describing Darfur as the “twenty-first century’s first genocide” is certainly groundbreaking, mere semantics are insufficient in addressing the conflict in Darfur, where many thousands continue to suffer. Political will of important actors remains a crucial factor in addressing not only the crisis at hand, but also all human rights abuses around the world.

Many consider the Darfur conflict to be “a problem within a problem”—yet another pocket of violence in Sudan’s already bloody history. Since its independence from Britain in 1956, the northern and southern regions of Sudan have been in a near constant state of civil war, stirred by successively oppressive regimes in Khartoum and the perpetuation of the biased economic strata developed by the British to serve their colonial interests. Darfur is yet another one of several marginalized regions in Sudan whose people have suffered “at the hands of the political and economic elites of the Nile valley and central Sudan.” The rebel attacks on government troops in 2003 were representative of long-standing grievances with the Khartoum government for its continued hoarding of wealth and resources, as well as a call for the marginalized groups to be included in power-sharing negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) for a resolution to the north-south conflict. In response, the Sudanese government, with its proxy militia, the Janjaweed, carried out a brutal campaign targeting specific civilian groups and villages to which members of the rebel groups—the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—belong. The result was large-scale violence that has since displaced upwards of two million people; there are also many

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5 Ibid., 241; Prendergast and Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” 209.
reports of sexual violence, torture, and mass killings. Following his first warrant of arrest issued by the ICC in March 2009, President Bashir expelled thirteen international humanitarian organizations and shut down the three largest domestic relief groups in the region, thereby exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Overall, the UN estimates that 4.7 million people, including the roughly two million displaced, are still grossly affected by the conflict.

The memory of Rwanda rings poignantly in the international community’s response to the Darfur conflict. From 2003 to early 2004 the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide played a key role in shaping the world’s response to the crisis in Darfur, invoking the world’s failure to intervene in Rwanda in April 1994 as well as to recognize the violence as genocide. Many international human rights NGOs, including the prominent US-based group Save Darfur, were also quick to use Rwanda to call attention to the Darfur crisis, using the evocative slogan, “Never again.” Fusing together Rwanda and Darfur in their reports, they effectively used the memory of the 1994 genocide to play on the shame and “failure” of the international community in order to spark a response to the emerging violence in Darfur. Following suit, national and international policymakers found many similarities between the two cases and used them to launch their appeals for action in the international community. Kofi Annan called upon the anniversary of the Rwandan genocide to state his appeal to the international community for action in Darfur, and former U.N. force commander Roméo Dallaire also invoked his own experiences during the Rwandan genocide to plea for action. Even in the U.S., Rwanda’s

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7 Predergast and Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” 211.
10 Ibid., 32.
11 Ibid., 32.
legacy became a recurrent theme throughout the U.S. Congressional discussion on Darfur, which eventually led to the passing of a resolution labelling the Darfur conflict as genocide in the summer of 2004.12 Finally, early in his presidency, George W. Bush famously wrote “NOT ON MY WATCH” in the margins of a National Security Council report detailing an investigation into former president Clinton’s response to the violence in Rwanda and Burundi.13 Hence, through the framework of the Rwandan genocide, Darfur became something like a reincarnation of the 1994 crisis—a chance for the international community to redeem itself by responding promptly to the conflict and not to shy away from investigating the potential for the occurrence of genocide.

“Not another Rwanda” became a very important theme in the United State’s response to Darfur in particular; indeed, it was the U.S. that took the lead in condemning the atrocities in Darfur as acts of genocide, perhaps largely as a way of avoiding the same mistake of not intervening in the Rwandan genocide. The rhetoric of genocide reached a fever pitch in the U.S. in 2004 due in significant part to the evangelical Christian community, which had taken interest in the plight of black Christians in southern Sudan.14 Moreover, there was a growing left-right coalition on Darfur, with human rights advocates and high-level U.S. officials calling on the government to prevent the emergence of genocide in the region.15 This domestic political pressure, coupled with the Bush administration’s determination not to fall into the same trap as its predecessor, eventually led to the creation of an investigative team for Darfur (discussed in

further detail below) and the U.S.’ official declaration of genocide in Darfur in the summer of 2004. The Rwandan analogy therefore transformed Darfur from another case of massive human rights violations to a severe humanitarian crisis and high-level security concern, thereby creating the circumstances for swift and appropriate action, especially from the U.S.16

In their 2005 op-ed that was published in The Nation, Africa Action directors Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan wrote that “we should have learned from Rwanda that to stop genocide, Washington must first say the word,”17 referring to the international community’s reluctance to use the “g-word” with regards to Rwanda. Avoiding the use of “genocide” in the case of Rwanda was once symbolic of resistance to action; now, the application of pressure not to make the same blunder in the case of Darfur became symbolic of positive action on the part of the international community. The legacy of Rwanda certainly had a profound effect on the way prominent international actors chose to address the Darfur crisis; however, the official U.S. statement that the Darfur crisis indeed constituted genocide incited not immediate action, as would have been ideal, but further debate. A terminological discussion on what exactly constituted genocide and whether or not the Darfur crisis fit the genocide category continued for a few years after the U.S. statement. Interestingly, the greatest scepticism came from the United Nations itself.

The determination of “genocide” followed a detailed and substantially-funded process. Spurred by domestic pressure and its retrospective regret towards the Rwandan genocide, the U.S. State Department sponsored the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP) in 2004, a field investigation whose main goal was to determine whether acts of genocide had been and/or

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17 Ibid.
were continuing in the region. Working closely with the American Bar Association, the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT) conducted interviews with Sudanese refugees and displaced persons in Chad and compiled detailed reports of their findings. Their collected evidence includes personal witnessing or experiences of killing of family and nonfamily members, shooting, death from displacement, abduction, beating, rape, hearing racial epithets, village destruction, theft of livestock, aerial bombing, and destruction and looting of personal property. In regard to the perpetrators, forty-eight percent (48%) of the refugees identified both the Janjaweed and the Sudanese military. Furthermore, the investigation revealed four more key findings: that villages of black Africans were attacked and destroyed while nearby Arab villages were not; that a large number of men were killed, while a large number of women were raped; that the means for existence like livestock and water were respectively killed and polluted; and that the Sudanese government prevented both medical care and humanitarian assistance from being delivered to IDP camps. All in all, the ADP revealed that Khartoum’s strategy was essentially to arm and provide air support to the Janjaweed, who were allowed to attack villages, kill, rape, and forcibly displace at will members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes—large components of the “non-Arab” population. All of this evidence points to a distinct genocidal pattern. As such, then Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate in September 2004 that “the evidence leads us to the conclusion [...] that genocide has occurred and may still

22 Ibid., 201-2.
be occurring in Darfur. We believe the evidence corroborates the specific intent of the perpetrators to destroy ‘a group in whole or in part,’ the words of the [Genocide] Convention.”

This declaration marks the first time that the Genocide Convention has been used to diagnose genocide; however, even with this historic declaration, the international community, particularly the U.N., remained sceptical for a very long time, owing to the ambiguity of intent in the Darfur conflict. The Convention defines “genocide” as,

any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.25

In keeping with the findings of the ADP, the U.S. believed that the Sudanese government, along with the Janjaweed, carried out a systematic campaign to eliminate the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups from Darfur. However, prior to the official statement by the ICC, the European Union and other humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International avoided calling the conflict a “genocide,” preferring instead the term “ethnic cleansing,”26 which denotes the massive killings of a certain section of the population in order to frighten the survivors away and occupy their land, but without the intent of eliminating the entire group.27 Furthermore, shortly after the U.S. declaration, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan decided to convene a team of experts in October 2004 to conduct their own investigation into the possibility of genocide in Darfur. The U.N. Commission of Experts then concluded in

24 Quoted in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, xviii.
the negative, claiming that it could not determine the specific intent required to classify the crimes as genocide; it chose instead to label the atrocities as “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.”

Intent is a crucial factor in the genocide debate. While the systematic nature of the attacks by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed may reveal genocidal intent, there are many other elements that suggest the lack of such intent. The U.N. Commission insisted that those who planned and organized the attacks on villages aimed to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for counter-insurgency warfare and not to eliminate the groups completely. In a number of villages that they had attacked, the Janjaweed and government forces refrained from killing the people who had not fled, but rather killed selectively groups of young men. Furthermore, until recently, the Sudanese government generally allowed humanitarian organizations to work in refugee camps, calling into question its supposed genocidal intent to bring about the extinction of the pertinent ethnic groups. However, many scholars also criticize this reasoning, pointing out that substantial portions of the attacked groups were in fact killed during the attacks, with many more dying in the aftermath—which is in keeping with the language of the Genocide Convention that refers to the intent to destroy a protected group “in whole or in part.”

Furthermore, the “beyond reasonable doubt” assumption that the U.N. Commission took might have set too high a standard for the purpose of the investigation; many find this problematic, considering that the commission was convened merely to create a threshold finding.

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28 Ibid., 32.
31 Ibid., 36.
upon which the U.N. Security Council would determine additional action and not to determine the fate of individual defendants. Nevertheless, the Security Council did pass Resolution 1593, after reviewing evidence collected by the U.N., in March 2005, thereby referring the case of Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also included a list of fifty-one names of people suspected of grave crimes under international law, as well as nine boxes with more than 2500 pieces of evidence, including photos, video footage, interview transcripts, and other documents. Shortly after, in June 2005, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo declared that there was sufficient evidence to put the case of Darfur under the Court’s jurisdiction. An official ICC investigation was then opened.

This prolonged debate can be viewed in two ways, on opposite sides of the spectrum. On one hand, never before has a case of alleged genocide been studied so thoroughly by both countries and international organizations. It is also the first time that a country has accused another country of genocide using the 1948 Genocide Convention. Moreover, it is again the first time that the U.N. has commissioned an investigation into an ongoing crisis to assess the possibility of genocide and then refer the case to an international court. Considering the reluctance of the international community to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, these breakthroughs are significant. They certainly indicate a willingness on the part of important international actors to establish a rule of law in the international system and exact punitive action on perpetrators of human rights violations. On the other hand, mere study is not enough, and the length of time with which the international community debated over what label to use was a wasted opportunity to halt the atrocities in Darfur at an earlier time. One does not deny that the

33 Ibid., 104.
34 Ibid., 105.
36 Ibid., 106.
evidence collected and the studies conducted will definitely benefit future investigations into human rights abuses, but both the length of the debate and the label of “genocide” now seem to have had minimal effects. It has yet to be seen how the international community will respond to Darfur now that the ICC has charged President Bashir with genocide, but since the start of the conflict in 2003 the international community has done very little beyond conducting investigations and referring the case to the ICC.

It would seem that the genocide debate has brought with it confusion in the international community about what to do with the Darfur crisis, as well as illustrated that mere declaration is insufficient; it must be accompanied by the political will to act. The world was presented with two verdicts: the unambiguous U.S. position that Darfur was indeed the site of an ongoing genocide, and the ambiguous U.N. position that the actions of the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, while not genocidal in nature, were nonetheless directed against civilians in the form of war crimes and crimes against humanity. With the delay in responding to the crisis when it first began in 2003, and then with the ongoing debate about semantics that followed in succeeding years, it would seem that genocide must actually happen before the international community is willing to intervene.  

Moreover, political interests also overrode intervention in Darfur, particularly for the United States. Even with its certainty that genocide was indeed occurring in Darfur, the U.S., through Colin Powell, maintained that “no new action is dictated by this determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly.”


was the significance of calling the Darfur crisis an incident of genocide in the first place? Understandably, the U.S. had its hands tied militarily, with two wars concurrently ongoing since 2003. With its military personnel thoroughly preoccupied in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. could not expend more resources on Darfur, and the several phases of military disintegration in both wars are likely to take up most of the attention for the next few years.\footnote{Todd Michael Lane and Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, “‘Too little, too late’? A Strategy for the Prevention of War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity in Darfur (Sudan),” \textit{Journal of Peace, Conflict, and Development} 14 (2009): 24.} Additionally, for much of the Bush administration, the war on terror took precedence over genocide. There are reports in 2005 of Sudan being a “crucial intelligence asset to the CIA,” given that Osama Bin Laden resided in the country for some time.\footnote{Caplan, “From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?” 178.} Indeed, it was revealed that the CIA had sent a plane to Khartoum to bring General Salah Abdallah Gosh, one of the fifty-one suspects named by the U.N. Commission in Darfur, to Washington to discuss terrorism with the administration.\footnote{Ibid., 178.} Declaring genocide created the appropriate legal and political space for intervention, but in the few years following Colin Powell’s speech, the U.S. has not carried out any concrete action for Darfur. This could, ironically, render the genocide determination to be counterproductive, as lack of tangible results may eventually minimize the “weight” and significance of such a finding.\footnote{Totten, “The U.S. Investigation,” 218.}

The difficulties that the international community faces in addressing the Darfur crisis stems also from the anarchic nature of the international system. Without a world government, political will of each actor plays a significant role in any global effort, and furthering intervention in Darfur is no exception. Thus far, President Bashir has been staunchly disinclined to cooperate with any international actors, particularly after the two arrest warrants were issued by the ICC. Moreover, the U.N. has faced its own internal difficulties in deploying

\footnote{40 Caplan, “From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?” 178.}
\footnote{41 Ibid., 178.}
\footnote{42 Totten, “The U.S. Investigation,” 218.}
peacekeeping forces to the region. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706, passed in August 2006, was not overly firm, as the first article states that “the U.N. Security Council invites the consent of the government of national unity for the deployment of U.N. troops in Darfur,” as at that time the Sudanese government had a ban on any role for the U.N. in the region.\(^43\) Furthermore, the vote was not unanimous, nor was it clear in the resolution whether consent was necessary.\(^44\) As a result, member states were reluctant to pledge troops knowing that they would be in great danger.\(^44\) Resolution 1769 came a year later, in July 2007, which was unanimously adopted and accepted by the Khartoum government. Unlike its predecessor, this resolution authorized the deployment of a 26000-strong joint U.N.-African Union force (collectively called UNAMID) that would work towards stemming the violence in Darfur.\(^45\) However, after around three years of being stationed in Darfur, UNAMID still has a variety of problems that undermine its efficiency, including command structures and logistical issues like transportation and aviation, funding, human resources, and a lack of sufficient training for troops on the ground.\(^46\)

Geopolitical strategic interests have also made it difficult for the international community to take appropriate action. On one hand, many largely view Sudan as a “rogue” state that breeds terrorism and commits horrific human rights abuses on its own citizens. On the other, many, particularly China, still view Sudan as a country with which it must do business. The Chinese government has been President Bashir’s strongest-albeit somewhat indirect-supporter, particularly because of its US $8.5 billion investment in Sudan’s oil sector.\(^47\) Calling the Sudanese government out on its human rights violations risks large investments for the Chinese; moreover, the Chinese government unsurprisingly remains neutral on the grounds of human rights.

\(^{44}\) Assal, “Locating Responsibilities,” 292.
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 293.
\(^{46}\) Ibid., 293; Lane and Romaniuk, “‘Too little, too late’?” 27.
\(^{47}\) Prendergast and Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?” 211.
rights abuses in Darfur, given that it too commits abuses within its own borders.\textsuperscript{48} It prefers to maintain an economic relationship with Sudan and refuses to comment on any human rights violations, insisting on Sudan’s sovereignty and its right to address issues within its own borders without external judgment or intervention. Given their economic relationship, China is in a prime position to influence Khartoum’s behaviour; however, thus far, it has remained staunchly silent. Sudan’s African neighbours have also been rather inactive, particularly after the ICC issued its arrest warrants; though the majority of African countries are signatories to the Rome Statute, many have allowed President Bashir to visit their countries without arresting him.\textsuperscript{49} Much as with the genocide debate, the international community as a whole remains confused with respect to the best way to intervene in Darfur.

Now that President Bashir has officially been charged with genocide by the ICC, the old adage that “time will tell” certainly stands, which is in keeping with the dominant theme of action taken towards Darfur. It has taken a long time for key international actors to identify the violence in Darfur as an act of genocide, after much confusion and debate. Even to this day, the confusion stands. This confusion can be attributed to various strategic interests and a lack of consensus among major international actors, which leads to varying ways of dealing with the Khartoum government. It is also clear from the case of Darfur that using the term “genocide” may not carry as much weight as many would believe. While major powers may tout the term as a way of sparking a call to action, international intervention depends very much on the political will of all pertinent parties: a move on one hand to extend one’s focus beyond the national interest to help eradicate human rights abuses beyond one’s own borders, and on the other, to be open to external criticism and examine one’s actions with a critical eye. It would seem at the

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 211.
moment that the promise in Rwanda’s legacy of “never again” still hangs in the balance, but that,
on a positive note, the first step of identifying the Darfur crisis and bringing it to international
attention has been taken. Now all that remains is yet another opportunity for the international
community to take a stand—one that, hopefully, will yield encouraging results.
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