THE MORAL LAW
XX
CONTENTS

...INTRODUCTION....

The Genesis and Source of the Moral Faculty.
The Foundation of the Moral Law.
A Statement of the Problem.

...DISCUSSION....

Several Definitions of Moral Law.
The difference between Moral and Physical Law.
The Scope and Content of Moral Law.
Some Characteristics, Elements, and Principles.
Its Relation to other Forms of Law.
The Evolution of the Moral Standard.
Freedom and Necessity essential to Morals.
The Growth of the Moral Judgment.
The object of Judgment and the Judge.
The Satisfaction of the Social Self.
An Examination of certain Theories of the Standard.

...CONCLUSION....

A Variety of Failures to be Studied and Avoided.
The Relation of Moral Law to Personal Reformation.
An Appeal for its Universal Obedience.
In presenting this essay we are aware of the fact it is almost impossible to cover all the ground and make a perfectly logical discussion in the time at our disposal. Mr. Bosanquet said that the scholar's golden rule is never to quote from a book which he has not read from cover to cover. This would also be impossible for us but we have read some of all, most of some, and all of some and have made it a point to acquaint ourselves with the portions relative to our topic. Why should one read more? Must a person read universal history to learn of Alexander the Great or the Fall of Rome? The attempt to be exhaustive on such a subject would doubtless lead to results more voluminous than luminous.

If, however, there are criticisms to be made we hope they will be made before the author has to retire to his long home so that the faults may be corrected or removed so that they will not be left as a stumbling block in the path of future progress. We trust also that any embryo artium baccalaureus who may in future peruse these pages will do so in clear carefulness that he may not be the sudden magical development of mole-hills into mountains or some frightfully narrow escapes that are dexteriously accomplished by the deft manipulation of a split hair.

The only suggestion we offer is that the reader make a critical study of all authors that deal with this problem before attempting to scan the work before him. A critic must be highly prepared to undertake such a task.

Few great works appear without a halo of romance about them, so with this, the manuscript, just at the most critical moment, of its development, was surreptitiously appropriated by some unmoral individual and the author for a time was forced to pursue other lines of thought.

In conclusion may we venture to feel assured that the effort to give some idea of the nature of Moral Law will not, in the words of Lotze, be thought of as "a hasty scaffolding full of instability, made faulty everywhere by the inexactness of half true analogies", but as a wellplanned effort to fight our way through the thickets of thought to the open sky and the clear air.
The nature and development of the moral faculty is primarily concerned with the principles of duty and right action known as the moral law and understood to be of Divine legislation. It stands above all other rules of life although much of its content is contained in the ordinary national and local codes which have evolved from custom, tradition and habit and have gradually taken the form of social law. The most remarkable transition of this kind came about when the aid of Roman philosophy and jurisprudence reduced the ancient forms to the medieval, out of which Christian theologians were able to force it to the flower of modern thought.

The moral faculty, Conscience, according to most writers, began with the race processes which have influenced and moulded mankind. In a study of the growth activities is not necessary although Mr. Spencer and others would urge such a scientific claim, for when we read the story of human progress we see that there has always been a moral nature in man which has sought and even struggled to press its claims and enforce its demands for a proper rational recognition.

In the Avesta the Persians spiritualized the great physical forces and surrounded the heavenly bodies with a supernatural atmosphere so that the highly wrought oriental imagination was enswathed in a mystic halo and he thought of many natural objects as his gods. The powerful teaching of such leaders as Manu, Zoroaster, Confucius and Mencius made a lasting impression on the minds of the people. It is true that many of the very ancient myths were still held in great veneration but these teachers were the moralists of that time and as a sample of their work may I quote the "Ten Precepts" which were so important in their moral observance. Contentment, returning good for evil, resistance to sensual appetites, abstinence from illicit gain, purification, coercion of the organs, knowledge of the writings, knowledge of the supreme Spirit, veracity, and freedom from wrath. Besides this, one must strictly perform his duties as prescribed in the Veda.

The knowledge of good and evil, according to Josiah Royce of Harvard University, is attained by the application of idealism supported by rational empiricism to concrete problems. It cannot be a predetermined product of any particular mind because it would be full of individualistic differentiations. The influence of contemporary speculation induces a tendency to dependence upon the conclusions of others which would reduce the personal value of one's own work. Moral goodness as an attainment is very different from mere innocence, it is much more. Many people owe their knowledge of evil to their lack of innocence. Sin may be a source of knowledge but it is not a legitimate source. The person who pretends that he sins for a moral purpose is a liar, because all organic processes involve a certain balance of opposing forces, the common mistake is made when we deal with half truths which is a trick of the Devil. The essence of moral quality lies in choice, and when we choose we necessarily pass a two-fold judgment which includes both acceptance and rejection. The thing rejected was a temptation or there would have been no choice. Ignorance accounts for the lack of many temptations and also occasions the lack of the corresponding virtues. The strength or knowledge of the temptations cannot be the measure of one's virtues. One should maintain some wilful ignorance of many vices. The progress of the moral man is to be found in the constant victory over his temptations until he gains the habit of victory. The good man is he who has often defeated the foe and stands on the vantage ground of his dead self. He is vastly superior to the man who has gained his knowledge by many defeats. The strong man profits by the failures of the weak man. The experience of passion is not a sin but the experiment of passion is. The moral man not only does not choose the evil but rejects it and accepts the good. It would seem therefore that good and evil are necessary to the development of the moral faculty.
Among the Egyptians also we find a high moral level to which neither
the Greeks nor the Romans ever attained. Homicide was punished by death, parr-
cide with burning, and all similar crimes were equally severely dealt with.
In the Book of the Dead there is the so-called Negative Confession with its
forty-two forms of sin which the good Egyptian must not commit, they also faced
a final judgment when the all-seeing eye of the Deity was known to penetrate
into the innermost recesses of the heart. The object of their moral law, if
we may so term it, was the preservation of life and the redemption of the sinner,
but their morality was merely a way of escape from transmigration to a lower
order of existence, often the one they thought they least deserved.

The Chinese differ from most of the other Asiatic peoples in having
a strong but rude altruistic sentiment which formed the basis of their peculiar
morality. The widespread and abundant traditions of China were collected and
edited by Confucius about 500 B.C. and although he reduced them to a material-
istic basis they have since formed the religio-moral tenets of the higher
classes, while Taoism, Buddhism and Christianity have endeavored to find a place
in the esteem of the common people.

When we examine the growth of the moral faculty among the Hebrews we
discover something very different, their test of morality lay in the willing-
ness of each individual to act in harmony with the will of Jehovah. Such will-
ingness was, for a long time, thought to constitute real morality, and to mark
the Hebrews as the most moral people of all time, but, in reality this attitude
of freely bowing to the will of God is not only highly ethical but also highly
moral and truly religious. Here was the basis of the Moral Law as we know it.
In spite of it they gradually drifted into a much lower plane of morals and the
prophets remind us that they later fell into many immoral practices so that it
was necessary for Jehovah to bring punishment upon them. The claim that they
were chosen because of their inherent moral nature is thus beside the mark,
and yet, when we consider the pagan conditions in the midst of which they had to live
and when we remember that we see them through the field-glass of the prophets
we shall be more lenient and find it not so difficult to believe that their good
qualities had much to do with the choice. They were the best, God could choose
no other race through which to develop a theocracy. The institutions of the
Hebrew moral code, although copied in part from the other eastern nations, has
a distinct moral bearing which is heightened by their natural religious tendency.
Under the leadership of Moses we see the race gradually forming a consolidated
commonwealth and growing up under the influence of a moral code believed to be
handed down by Divine direction.

The Greeks of Homer's time were little more than a nation of barbarous
warriors and robbers like those of the Scottish border with only an incipient
form of morality within the family circle, but that outside it an unbridled
laxity reigned supreme, even to the time of Pericles their social morals were
very loose and the Athenian laws were for the most part bloodthirsty and very
drastic until subjected to the powerful study of such minds as Heracleitus and
Pythagoras, and later Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who reduced them to where the
proud Greeks could praise their humanity which did not permit even a slave to
be outraged and allowed freedom of speech and also freedom of religion.

The Sabellian highlanders who preceded the Roman people had a peculiar
kind of morals and if compared with our modern standards would seem inconsis-
tent and even hypocritical while their successors hurled the false witness
from the Tarpeian Rock, hanged the harvest thief and burned the incendiary.
They believed that their laws were an expression of the will of their gods.
When we examine the Romans for the basis of their meagre morality we are
once face to face with an exceedingly immoral complex against which even the
zealous declarations of the great Cato and the impassioned oratory of his de-
noted colleagues could make no effective impression. The great nation was so full
of internal decay that her irretrievable wreck is a byword in human history.
Christanity alone was able to ease the shock for a few years when the world
of the individual to the interests of the state, its Spartan rigidity
is gradually softened by the great influence of Cicero in his "De Officiis".

The Monastic, Ecclesiastic and Ceremonial morality of the Middle Ages
long with the Scholastic method and Casuistry showed a more thoroughly ethical
tendency although in many cases its quality became marked by its almost endless
arbitrary and meaningless detail. The books on Casuistry, particularly, robbed the
morality of much of its spirit by endeavoring to lay down rules for breaking rules
and not being able to cope with the tangled mess of some cases, they thought out
system of Probabilism which gradually gave way before the heat of the Lutheran
Reformation which spread over the continent and England.

Having now covered in a very limited manner the rise and growth of the
oral Faculty we shall briefly consider the foundation of the moral law from the
physical the social and the psychical points of view.

From our cursory examination of the evolution of the moral idea we may
easily infer that it was but natural that such a universal feeling should result
in what we call moral law, the physical basis may have been in the occurrence of
variety of natural phenomena such as great storms, earthquakes, deluges and fires
which were continually displaying their apparently infinite power, each, in its tum
liciting wonder and reverence as well as trembling awe.
The psychical basis may be seen in the mental effect caused by the physical
phenomena mentioned above, the study of mythology, tradition and custom as well as
the peculiar mental constitution of the race, but most of all in the remarkable
outburst of philosophical reflection among the Greeks during their Golden Age.
The Social basis of the moral idea may be found, as Darwin says, in the law
of affinity by which individuals are drawn together into twos and threes and
larger groups such as tribes, clans and nations. Necessity was the mother of this
unique moral invention, for in studying the powerful springs of action we recog-
nize the universal desire for security, property contract and stedfast family re-
relationships. Man acts as man should when he acts according to reason, and such ac-
tion has always thrown him into certain faintly rules which, as time passes, and
conditions become more complex, are strengthened, corrected and developed in the
form of laws. The harsh letter of these laws gradually comes into conflict with
some well defined necessity of conduct and there is then produced a new idea that
we call the spirit of the law and which, in its essential significance, is the real
foundation of Moral Law, and finally the spirit and the body of the law come to-
tgether and we call it The Moral Law.

Morality differs from legality in the same sense that moral law differs
from state law, that is, the former lays down principles such as "Thou shalt not
steal" while the latter merely states what is the difference between one man's
property and another's and so on through the whole category of these two laws
wherever they sustain a mutual relation. On this threefold foundation man has
constructed a most elaborate system of regulations and precepts of which there
are three notable examples - The code of Confucius with its endless observations
and details, The Talmud of the Jews of which Christ said, "They bind heavy burdens
and put them on men's shoulders", and the books of Casuistry whose intricate
system defeated its own purpose. It was this wordy compilation that called forth
the vicious denunciations of the great mathematician Pascal and definitely turned the more spiritually minded Christians to the Bible for their moral guidance. The moral law and the law itself is the plan on which the whole structure is built. Socrates said that morality had two sources: the law of God and the law of man, and that as these were understood and codified the real moral law in its fully developed form appeared. We must now determine the thought area of our field Moral Law. Before we can proceed however, let us add a few more explanatory words. Perhaps we should think at once of the Ten Commandments or the Decalogue as possessing a close relationship with the moral law. Our subject therefore, may be best thought of as the content of the law, and our object the application of it in everyday living. The Moral Law is the supreme rule of action intended for man by his divine Creator, and Whewell said that it is the law of God and the will of God which is made intelligible in its existence and operation by means of certain basic ideas of rightness such as wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, truth, purity, order, benevolence and reflection together with faith, hope and love, all of which are constituents of the internal standard of action which forms the content of conscience and is the so-called Voice of God. Webster said that the Moral Law is the will of God as the rule for the disposition and conduct of all responsible beings toward Him and toward each other, a rule of living conformable to righteousness, the rule of action obligatory on the conscience or the moral nature. The Jewish or Mosaic Code and that part of Scripture where it is written, in distinction from the Gospel.

From a general point of view it has been described by Baldwin as including: first, the analysis of moral conceptions such as what is necessary or required by Plato and Aristotle; second, the influence of the Stoic writers who held that that which is fitting should be determined by reason apart from the emotional nature of man; third, the Jewish or Christian conception of the law as declared and enforced by God. According to Lyall man is a helpmeet in creation because he thinks, feels and wills within the law of right and wrong, and although this law is not arbitrary it is eternal and enters into the essence of morality. It is our moral nature which possesses this law, which admits of it, which gives it concrete existence and which keeps it before our minds. And this law would be the same even though no human being were here to use it. It is this law, universal and eternal and working out through man's being that we gradually come to recognize as authoritative as the inner voice that halts, corrects and guides us if and when we are willing to obey in thought and conduct. Fleming said that moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God and the character and condition of men and may be understood and adopted by men as those endowed with intelligence and will, and therefore capable of understanding their meaning and significance.

In a still more general sense the Moral Law is the only essentially altruistic law in existence. It is the law of sympathy and reasonable self-sacrifice and the only law by virtue of whose observance one can transcend all other manmade laws. Moral Law has two forms:—that which is stated in the indicative mood and that which is stated in the imperative mood. There is also the positive and the negative statement of which we shall have more to say soon. The spirit of the law never changes but its form may be slightly altered from generation to generation. In spite of the fact that it is superior to all other laws, it still possesses some features common to them. Comte said that all phenomena without exception are governed by invariable laws with which no volitions either natural or supernatural ever interfere, but we are not clear as to his meaning of the word interfere. We interfere with but we do not violate the laws.
Physical law calls for neither consent nor dissent from its agents but moral law is much concerned with both, for as Mr. Arthur very nicely puts it, "These conscious ground of mind." and further on he sums up the essential difference between the two by saying that on the one hand physical law is imposed by relentless will; while on the other the moral law is given by an intelligent being to other intelligent beings to specify and determine his proper relations, first, to other intelligent beings, secondly, to nonintelligent creatures, thirdly, to unconscious matter of obedience and disobedience. Its object is to aid goodness and disband the specific nature of the moral law, although difficult to state, will gradually reveal its purpose to all members of the human race. Human conduct will be judged always, the paramount duties of man as an individual are self-preservation, self-control, he should have, as Juvenal remarked, "Hons same in corpore sano," he should be clean, decent, industrious, careful, frugal, educated, aesthetic, strong, courageous, patient, just, and even beautiful or handsome, he should be master of his appetites, passions and desires as well as of his thoughts, volitions and actions and what is more he should be willing to become, as Wordsworth suggested, duty's bondman glad and free.

From the social point of view his duties include an all-embracing altruism, a sound sense of social relation, a clear conception of the interdependence of individual and social interests, an unprejudiced understanding of the requirements of moral law, in short he must respect life, freedom, character, property, order, truth and progress, as Mackenzie says, and that although some duties are, according to Kant, perfectly obligatory as "Thou shalt not kill" or imperfectly so as "Thou shalt be benevolent" yet they all demand a just proportion of obedience and must be performed if one wishes to maintain his position as a representative member of society. One should always strive to secure the "Satisfaction of the Social Self." Now the virtues that form part of the content of the moral law are very various and although they have been classified by nearly every writer since Aristotle it seems very difficult to reach any generally acceptable conclusion. Mackenzie points out that courage and loyalty were probably the first to be recognized; courage meaning valor, fortitude and hopefulness, while loyalty means fidelity, perseverance and enthusiasm; and later on, when the individual was more fully recognized as such, the higher virtues of temperance and prudence made their appearance. As soon as personal relationships were established it was natural for fairness and friendliness to become a part of moral practice and these were followed by reverence and worship. Whewell says that the virtues belong to a deeper part of our nature than do the duties because they are the sources out of which our acts of duty spring." Virtues are what we are; duties are what we do. It is the one law that leads to the highest good, The Summum Bonum.

The elements of moral law are those pronounced attributes which distinguish it from all others; its manifest authority, its stand regarding right and wrong, its inherent strength and progressive purpose, its universality and eternity, and its absolute obligation. Butler said its authority is simply the subtle expression of its categorical character which Kant so formally and stringently upheld, and added further that this authority is threefold: first, it is simple authority, second, sought authority and third, must authority. The first is based on factual evidence, the second is backed by the persuasive power of universal rightness, the third is supported by irresistible force and is categorical in its very nature. It is with the second that we wish to discuss a little further - Bound up with the authority of a law there are the sanctions or punishments which, according to Bentham, are physical, political, moral, and spiritual, all of which are prescribed conditions in the face of which disobedience is perpetrated and by virtue of which order is restored. In Worcester, Mass. on Court House, Obedience to law is Liberty.
The importance of conscience is revealed when we discuss it in more detail. To begin with, we fully agree with the statement that it is not only to be considered as having some influence in the lowest order of morals but likewise as being superior to all others. This is a constituent part of the idea or the mind with its nature. If it had strength as it has right, if it had power as it although conscience is not absolute in authority it nevertheless creates a principle that there is an internal aspect of the moral law called the conscience reason enters and bids fair to be what Kant calls the only ultimate authority in moral life; an idea held, as MacKenzie shows, not only by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, but by the Stoics and some of our modern schools. But neither sanctions the obligatory nature of moral law which is absolutely imperative, ultimate and eternal and which can be found only in the Satisfaction of the Social Self.

With reference to the principles of moral law we find some writers the chief principle in morals; another claims that will holds the highest place, and still another demands that place for Wisdom, while Hume the Scotch philosopher does not regard it to a large extent because some of the elements are also principles, but in a strict sense principles are those fundamental bases by which a law is sanctioned and by virtue of which it operates. Discarding the claims of the authors just mentioned we shall discuss them in the order named and add one or two which seem equally important such as Truth and Justice. Our list then consists of conscience, Will, Wisdom, Truth and Justice. The conscience or sense of duty then is one of the basic principles, it is as we have seen, a very remarkable so-called faculty which, according to some writers, mainly of the Intuitionist School, is inexplicable while others add that it may be educated and sufficiently understood for all practical purposes, whereas the Rationalistic School maintains that it is capable of scientific explanation although weaker Rationalists only assert that it should be possible to write a working definition. Lyall makes a strong claim for conscience as the chief principle, and here we take our stand. The position of will among the principles is unique since it has attracted so much attention from all psychologists. The assumption put forward by Aristotle and others that actions are moral only when they are voluntary and rational has served to place this principle in a strong light where it has been subjected to the attacks of modern psych-ethical critics. Kant stoutly maintains that the rational will is the paramount principle. Wisdom, no doubt the fundamental basis of the virtues, has always held a high rank among the principles of moral law. It is the right use of knowledge and since one's actions depend to some extent on insight so also do the virtues and since the virtues are the product of habit and volition so also is wisdom the basis of the virtues but it is not on that account necessarily supreme. Whewell decided that wisdom as a principle is paramount. Truth and Justice have stood as principles in moral legislation vaguely or clearly since the race began. They are the essential boundaries within which the other elements and principles develop and without which they would become distorted, abnormal and unbalanced. Justice is the expression and maintenance of equality between individuals, corporations and nations and is based upon equality of subjection to law whether moral social or natural. Yet law is not the mother of justice but justice of law as a product of man's moral development. But for anyone to advance an argument for the supreme of one principle over another or all others is manifestly supercilious and pedantic because these are things that are not to be compared, each in its own sphere is paramount while no one would be complete without the modifying influence of some other or others.
In a former paragraph we called attention to the difference between the physical and the moral law. Let us look briefly at the relation of moral law to other laws. With natural law it stands related through the physical and psychological channels for it can have its effect upon rational beings only by means of the body and the mind. Here again, as in the choice of a supreme principle in morals, we find nearly every scientist of note making his own definition of physical or natural law. Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, all different yet to some degree alike though this is no doubt on account of the nature of the laws they are defining. But brushing these split hairs to one side we all accept the more general and comprehensive view outlined by Mackenzie where we says,"It may be sufficient for the present to distinguish between different kinds of law such as those that are changeable or unchangeable, violable or inviolable; this gives us four classes in which nearly all laws may be arranged e.g.:

1. those that can be both changed and violated -- national laws;
2. those that can be changed but cannot be violated -- natural laws;
3. those that can be violated but cannot be changed -- normative laws;
4. those that can neither be changed nor violated -- nature's laws.

National law e.g. against murder, states that which MUST take place if the safety of society is to follow.

Natural law e.g. gravitation, states that which does take place under conditions.

Normative law e.g. moral matters, states what ought to take place in the life and conduct of a respectable person.

Notation law e.g. numbers, states that which always takes place arbitrarily, reluctantly and universally.

Behind the law of the tribe there is the must of the majority; within the law of nature there is inevitable with its semi-categorical significance and the fitness of things; back of the law of God, if it were only the law of a superior power we should still find the imperative MUST, but it is not the law of a superior power only, it is the law of a superior intelligence with a supreme sense of justice, a merciful and forgiving attitude, and a universal benignity, and when critics of ethics are confronted by the law of God as the supreme law why do they not discuss it? Is it not relevant in class, book or lecturer's room or do we think that our moral duty is done when we study moral questions and say that to go further is to become involved in theological matters. What if we do have to accept, as an assumption, the righteousness of God, and is there any moral question in which certain hypotheses are not used as the ground work for consideration? This inquiry may appear unsophisticated - and it is, but what is the answer if such there be? Since we all agree that conscience is the Voice of God, it is the major principle of the moral law and therefore it demands the most careful examination. Some of the laws of mathematics are only vaguely related to the moral law but they are connected to the extent of being utilized in the computation of quantity and the ratio of quality in human conduct. We shall not take time to discuss its relation to other specific forms of law such as Canonical, Criminal, Martial, Municipal, and others except to remark that there is evidently a quite close relation with all of them because they come under the general head of social laws. By contemplating the relation of moral law with other laws we also see its relation with ethics and nearly all the logics and isms which are connected with ethics. That morality is different in different communities and at different times is well known, and its evolution is marked by the various forms of the standard which have appeared during the passing centuries. If we glance at the history of ethical theory beginning with pre-Socratic philosophers like Heraclitus and Democritus we shall see that out of the teaching of the former came the Cynics under Antisthenes, followed by Zeno and the Stoics whose system leveled out to Asceticism and found its lasting expression in the monastic institutions of the Middle Ages. Out of the teaching of the later Democritus came the Cyrenaics under Aristippus with the theory,"Pleasure for the moment" or merely present satisfaction of present desires.
Then came Epicurus and the Epicureans with their motto, "Pleasure for Life." Their far-reaching all-pervading theory of Hedonism with its hundreds of devotees and into a peculiar form of Stoicism to which Christianity added its lustre but borrowed ideas. Hume and Bentham taking up the old shibboleth and after a curious system of his widely influential and perennial school may be summed up in its three principle ideas. Here there was the Sympathetic School led by Dr. Adam Smith. The standards of his own school, the Sophists, Plato with his metaphysical theory of ideas, Aristotle with his systematized ethical treatise, and the famous Skeptics since Aristotle. In mediaeval times nearly all the different forms converged in the marvelous system of Casualty and the sceptics, such men as Hegel, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, Clarke, Mill, Spencer, Green, Stephen, Alexander, Caldwell, and the McGill moralists. It might be said that the central idea of this middle, variable and somewhat eclectic school is the concrete personality of man and that the highest expression of the standard which they present is found in perfection.

Although the standards change and local morality follows suit, the law of the moral life remains the same for in spite of the variability of some parts of the text, the evident gradual supersedence of one part over another and the slow accumulation of additions as well as the temporary disuse of some portions, the truth and the authority of the law is not impaired nor its grip on human conduct relaxed, these very portions now in shadow may some day be brought back into the sunlight of universal recognition. We shall now discuss the problem of freedom and necessity as essential elements in morality and thus see another side of the nature of moral law. The freedom of the human will has been a vexed question for ages and we do not think that we shall be able to do it justice in this brief thesis because it would require a lengthy study of theology, metaphysics and general law which would lead us into some phase of the old controversy as to how far the laws of church or state or both have in their keeping the will and freedom of mankind.

Let us first consider some of the arguments against freedom. 1. The universality of the law of causation - but this objection may be used in reference to any of the phenomena of human nature and therefore has no specific bearing on freedom. 2. The strongest motive is always followed, but the motive is part of the self and when a person acts according to the self, that person is essentially free. 3. The influence of circumstances such as habit, heredity, character etc. but man makes and unmakes his own habits even though they may be of a hereditary nature and what man is not held responsible for his own character since there are so many uplifting and helpful agencies and influences which he may utilize? 4. The science of statistics shows that men, the world over, act in a sort of regular uniform fashion, but this again offers no difficulty since it is such a vague generalization that it has no more weight than to say there is no beauty in man because all men have mouths in their faces; the fallacy is in thinking only of the uniformity of men's faces and failing to note the matchless beauty of the lips. 5. Kant claimed that freedom of will could not be proved psychologically, but let us ask if he did not prove it himself in his peculiar manner of life and originality of thought. His own maxim for life was, "Never do that which you would not be willing that all should do the same." A moral man is conscious that he should act in one way rather than in another, in the right way rather than the wrong way, in the good rather than the evil. The fact is that if a man were not free, in an ethical sense, he would not come under the ban of law nor could we identify nor wrongness to his actions, nevertheless one freedom is limited by: 1. The impossibilities inherent in the case. 2. The habitual misuse of his character i.e. himself. 3. The uniformity of activity in the growth of character i.e. there are certain methods which are helpful in developing life.
necessity is within the man himself, controlled by his will, used or not as desired and therefore according to his own free will.

It is time now to ask what is it that is judged and also who is the judge? In general we are safe in saying that the thing judged is voluntary action but we must be more specific or the hair-splitters will be after us. The side discussion that will and act are but the inner sides of the same phenomenon. Some writers assert that judgment is involved while still others argue that the deed is the object of such decision. It cannot be the character but the root of the character which is the intention. Person is not judged for what he is or for what he does but for what he wills, it cause that is nothing more than a mere idea induced by a sensation either subject-symptom of it. This brings us to some of the forms of intention which we have time to name:--they are the immediate or remote, the objective or subjective, the rect or indirect, the conscious or unconscious, the formal or material. These are all but are enough to show that intention is composed of many elements. Now when are told that motive is part of the intention we ask, what part? or is the statement true? Mackenzie says it is and adds that motive includes the greater part of the remote, some of the immediate, generally all of the direct, nearly always the formal, little of the material, and may be either outer or inner or even unconscious, which are doubtless arise from reflex agencies.

From this it is clear that our definition of motive is not sufficiently comprehensive and that the general recognition of the importance of intention is also limited. We are thus brought face to face with the debatable problem, is pleasure the motive? but to undertake such a discussion would at once embark us on the sloughs of a controversial sea and be endangered on every side by the fogs and shoals of Heggianism with its fallacies, paradoxes, ambiguities and sophistries. No, we shall not tempt a discussion of any of these because each one has enough material for a book in itself, a single remark on each will suffice. Regarding pleasure as a motive we say that it is most likely that pleasure is a sequence rather than a motive e.g. we may desire some pleasures as ends regardless of the resultant pleasure which is a feeling whereas pleasures are objects which when gained bring pleasure with them. Some say that pleasures cannot be summed, we may conceive of ultimate pleasure as the sum of all the different pleasures we have enjoyed in life e.g. a large cube may be composed of twenty-seven small ones each self-contained and perhaps of different kinds. Some believe that reason is a motive and we agree that it may be but at it may even be only a part of a motive and then it is not the only motive.

Having discovered the object of judgment let us discuss the Judge or as we say, the point of view from which judgment is given. Apart from the prevalent ideas that God is judge in both the moral and the spiritual realms we must consider the role of man as judge. There are several views regarding this:--Adam Smith, etc. like of the impartial spectator or the sympathetic self whose judgment is always commissurate with the sympathy it has for the one being tried. But in this view there exists to be the fallacy of confounding volitions with the self and calling them two separate selves which is evidently not possible, rather we would say that there are volitions of the self and the self of the volitions. There is but one self which stands back, as it were and judges its own volitions. We thus reduce this theory to the level of the moral agent as in the first case. Another view is that held by Mackenzie who thinks the ideal self is judge but this is not essentially different from the first but is only another way of stating the idea. Nevertheless these and other theories seem to show that there is possibly another point of view somewhat different from and broader than the moral agent by which judgment is pronounced, and it is no doubt the Social Self whose universal nature makes it the most capable, altruistic, rational and reliable Judge of all in whose hands every person will be willing to leave his cause and even his conscience.
The nature of moral law, we trust, is steadily becoming more apparent as a standard and the first thing we have to notice is that the different conceptions of the standard naturally arrange themselves under three heads:—1. That which is external i.e. that which includes conscience, duty, moral sense, and personal obligation. 2. That which is teleological i.e. that which includes the idea of an end, the possibility of ideals, the culture of virtue, progress toward the good, and the attainment of personal and social ideals. The first is prohibitive and negative, the second is positive and imperitive. The third is both positive and progressive. It is hardly necessary to say that all political philosophers will naturally hold that the standard external because they think, like Clifford, of the law of the state; like Martineau, of the law of God; and like the Stoics of the law in their own peculiar sense. Those who believe that the standard is internal and Butler with their commonsense and philosophical view of Conscience; Clarke and Bolaston of the Intuitionist School with its perceptual and philosophical intuitions; as also Kant with his Categorical Imperative. The third group view the standard as teleological and are the Hedonists ancient and modern, the Perfectionists of the Christian School; the evolutionists like Spencer, Stephen, and Alexander with their ideas of adjustment, survival, approximation, and progression. The Idealists represented by Mackenzie and Green. The problem is, can these different views be unified? The answer is yes. For just as soon as an individual becomes perfectly social the standard will assume all three positions. It will be external in the pressure of social requirements; it will be internal in each person who has by now become master of self; and it will be teleological in the fact that the Satisfaction of the Social Self will be the goal of all proper modern social development. This is a new Standard for human conduct and universal acceptance will be closely watched.

And now we shall briefly discuss some of the shortcomings of several of the foremost theories advanced by the leaders in this phase of moral philosophy. 2. The Conscience Theory is not acceptable because it requires constant revision and education to keep it up to date, it is only a feeling or a consciousness of oneself with respect to moral standing, and although its friends claim that it is intuitive, derived, universal and sovereign, they cannot make it the standard because there are other laws which possess these same characteristics.

The Intuitionist Theory is defective, on the one hand, because its greatest exponent has been unable to formulate a true system of qualities and tried to evade this by saying that the notions about duty are too simple to admit of logical definition. It is in fact out of the question because of the different conditions, education and natural characteristics of men. On the other hand one is not willing to accept any standard without an analysis which in this case is impossible.

The Hedonistic Theory is faulty because of the vagueness, ambiguity and consequent misunderstanding among its followers. Some believe in mental pleasure, some in selfishness, some in the greatest amount of pleasure for the largest number, some in the pleasure of progressive good actions, and some in life according to right reason and correct judgment. These modifications due to the intellectual caprice of the founders of the different schools renders the system as a whole undesirable as a standard for universal human conduct.

The Idealistic Theory with Self-Realization as its standard appears, from strictly rationalistic point of view, to be too intellectual and savors of an individualistic spirit which also makes it unworthy and unsuitable as the Moral Standard which is so essentially social.

The Evolutionist Theory comes short on the one side and overshoots on the other side i.e. its best practical offer is that of progress which is by no means sufficient as a standard, while its best ideal offer is that of perfection which demands a perfectly adjusted person in a perfectly adjusted state amid perfectly adjusted circumstances, but this is Spencer's Absolute Ethics which he himself saw to be almost if not altogether useless as a standard for human conduct.
Now, having examined several well-known theories and found them lacking in various ways, I desire to avoid splitting the hair again and therefore wish, in a satisfaction of the Social Self. In such a many sided theory every rational reason may find just what will suit his or her case best as they advance in the social order and develop their portion of the universal organization.

This theory is upheld on the philosophic side by the fact that it presents no barriers to any recognized philosophic system or school of thought; it is supported on the philological side by the mutual significances and relation of its terms, "ego" and "socius" which, according to Baldwin, are easy to understand, and in we note the meaning of satisfaction we see that it is not the mere fulfillment of desire but the fulfillment of all moral desire. It is maintained on the psychological side by the fact that an individual cannot think of its self as apart from others or outside the pale of the organization. It is supplemented on the ethical side by what is best in the principle theories of all ages. Under such standard, covering as it does, the individual's rights, society's requirements and a moral progress of humanity, every one will be able to realize the Summum Bonum.

Finally we must again call attention to the fact that the nature of the moral law is such that it is impossible to state it in so many words, but that from general critical survey we begin to get at least a partial understanding of what that nature is. Although this limited view is all we can obtain at present, we must remember that when the operation of the law shall have affected the mighty changes which it promises and shall have exalted human nature to highest degree, when mundane considerations and social requirements shall receive their proper recognition we shall be in possession of more complete data and be better able to discover the nature of the law in the brilliant sunlight of its universal sway. Then we may say with Matthew Arnold,

"Then, when the clouds are off the soul,
When thou dost bask in nature's eye,
Ask how she viewed thy self-control,
Thy struggling, strained morality".