Organizational Governance of Event Impacts

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Graduate Program in Kinesiology  
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Abstract and Keywords

This study explored the governance of event legacy and/or leveraging. More broadly, this project examined the specific organizational forms that are responsible for delivering event legacy and/or leveraging strategies. This was done using a combination of organizational theories and theories of public policy to understand the unique environment surrounding event legacies. Three distinct phases were utilized in this study. I used a research synthesis to investigate what previous scholars have found regarding event legacy delivery. Next, comparative cases from the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games and the 2015 Toronto Pan Am/Parapan American Games were used to examine what mechanisms previous host cities have used. Finally, theories of organizational learning were utilized to understand the organizational learning that occurs between Games and hosts, and how knowledge transfer is integral in the governance process. Findings indicate that localized organizational forms, distinct from the organizing committee were able to successfully leverage event outcomes. The collaborative nature of these organizational forms provided opportunities for organizations to increase their leveraging capacity. A conceptual framework is provided as a starting point for organizers looking to leverage specific outcomes from an event, as well as for scholars examining event legacy and/or leveraging strategies.

KEYWORDS: special events; governance; sustainability; mega-events; sport management; legacy; leveraging; organizational studies;
Summary for Lay Audiences

This study explored how outcomes from events are strategically generated and organized. Specifically, this project examined how the lasting impacts (or legacies) of sport mega-events such as the Olympics, are planned, organized, and governed. I provided a thorough overview of previous research and findings using a systematic review. Using the cases of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games and the 2015 Toronto Pan Am/Parapan American Games, I compared their unique legacy strategies. Finally, I investigated how the organizers of these events learn how to implement these strategies, and how crucial the transfer of knowledge is within sport mega-events. Findings indicated that groups separate from the organizing committee were able to lever impacts as they did not have to focus on hosting the event itself. As well, groups that collaborated together lessened the negative effects of low capital, expertise, and/or knowledge. I developed a conceptual framework for future hosts looking to gain specific outcomes from an event.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to Sadie Evelyn Foster, the perfect dog and companion. Your love, support, and kisses were a crucial component of my enjoyment, persistence, and completion at Western.
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### List of Abbreviations, Symbols, Nomenclature

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADO</td>
<td>Accessibility Directorate of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AODA</td>
<td>the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Canadian Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Canadian Paralympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Canadian Tourism Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWG</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLO</td>
<td>Games Legacy Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Host City Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Paralympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Multi-Party Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Multi-Sport Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLA</td>
<td>Non-Commercial License Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Sport Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Organizing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Coordination Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGKM</td>
<td>Olympic Games Knowledge Management Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCRF</td>
<td>Ontario Sport and Communities Recreation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASO</td>
<td>Pan American Sports Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLG</td>
<td>Parasport Legacy Group</td>
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PPP………………………………………………………………...Public Private Partnership
PSO…………………………………………………………Provincial/Territorial Sport Organisation
RQ………………………………………………………………Research Question
RWC………………………………………………………………Rugby World Cup
SME………………………………………………………………Sport Mega-Event
SOPA…………………………………………………………Sydney Olympic Park Authority
TOK……………………………………………………………Transfer of Knowledge
TOOC…………………………………………………………Toronto 2015 Organizing Committee
VANOC………………………………………………………Vancouver 2010 Organizing Committee
Chapter 1: Introduction

Sport-mega events (SMEs) have played a significant role in many cities’ development agendas for their opportunities for global media exposure, international partnerships and the enticing potential to unlock federal government funding (Black, 2008). With the high public cost of hosting such events, and reported negative lasting impacts (e.g., the 30-year public debt from Montreal 1976), governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) shifted their rhetoric to focus on sustainability. As a result, the event’s legacy, or the lasting impacts that remain after the event has concluded, have become a central focus of SME planning. In contrast, strategic leveraging focuses on the ways in which resources associated with event hosting are used to create other local opportunities in the urban context (Chalip, 2014). Leveraging and legacy, while similarly concerned with the event's potential impact, are divergent in their focus and approach. The intersection of public policy, event-development strategies and notions of sustainability provide an interesting multidisciplinary area for academic inquiry.

The IOC Charter was amended in 1996 to reflect the ongoing shift towards sustainability, and again in 2004 to include the “promot[ion of] a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2015, p.19). While this continued focus on sustainability and lasting outcomes has been noted extensively throughout IOC documentation (I.E., IOC 1999, 2013, 2016a, 2016b), host cities have continued to demonstrate cost overruns in public funds, evicted and/or displaced residents, undelivered benefits, poor urban design or community integration and other lasting negative outcomes or legacies (Cashman, 2006; Lauermann, 2015; Lenskyj, 2002; O’Brien, 2007; Preuss, 2004, 2007; Smith & Fox, 2007; Vigor, Mean, & Tims, 2005). Legacy has been a highly debated term for both its’ conceptualization and use within the events literature, but is generally agreed upon as the lasting outcomes that remain after an event
has concluded (Preuss, 2007). Since 2004, organizing committees (OCs) have included specific mandates in bid documents dedicated towards legacy planning for sustainable outcomes. Despite the aforementioned negative legacies, several scholars indicate that the inclusion of legacy in IOC bids has been used to position the event to potential host communities as a community-wide, broad serving spectrum of positive impacts (Ginsberg, 2010; Kohe & Bowen-Jones, 2015; Sant & Mason, 2015). Still, SMEs have continued to be heavily-sought out opportunities for developmental agendas for those bidding and hosting. While OCs and the governing arrangements surrounding event legacy planning have been extensively studied by scholars (Christie & Gibb, 2015; Davies, 2012; Fairley, Lovegrove, & Brown, 2015; Girginov, 2012; Leopkey & Parent, 2012, 2016; Ma & Kaplanidou, 2016; Parent, 2016), less central to the focus has been how sustainable outcomes are generated and planned for.

Chalip (2014, 2017) has argued for the use of a leveraging approach over legacy when pursuing outcomes ascertained from an event, as it implies an active, embedded, ex ante focus. Event leverage assists in describing how benefits are acquired within an event model, and implies that the mere hosting of an event is not enough on its own (Chalip, 2004). Specifically, leveraging theory breaks down and identifies “the strategies and tactics that can be implemented prior to and during an event in order to generate particular outcomes” (Chalip, 2006, p. 112). Where legacy implies that the event in isolation is of central focus, leveraging focuses on pursuing strategic goals which integrates the event within the destination’s existing strategic plans (Chalip, 2017). While this may appear to further convolute the rhetoric surrounding legacies, it is important to note that regardless of strategy the event will have various impacts on its host residents and communities, but strategically obtaining outcomes can only be achieved through an active, leveraging process.
While there has been an influx of literature surrounding event leveraging, there is not a solid understanding of where the locus of responsibility should fall for delivering outcomes. According to Chalip (2017), “there is no readily identifiable entity to which event leverage naturally falls” (p. 414). The language surrounding legacy positions event outcomes as naturally occurring, or being emphasized post-event. OCs have a particular interest in participating in legacy organization, as legacy claims are most often the justification for hosting the event. As a result, OCs are usually involved in the control of and governance of the event’s official legacy. Public governance can also be conceptualized by its’ distinct dimensions: policies (policy instruments), politics (both public and private actors), and polity (institutional properties) (Treib, Bähr, & Falkner, 2007). The organizational exploration of these individual dimensions of governance, that is the governance structures and policy instruments, provide an opportunity to examine how legacy objectives are pursued and delivered within the multi-layered policy environment. As Treib and colleagues (2007) have called for further research that identifies “meaningful cross-linkages between institutional structures, actor constellations and resulting policy instruments” (p.15), the governance surrounding legacy is a particularly interesting arrangement. Research has not clearly demonstrated what strategies and mechanisms are utilized in the pursuit of delivering event-related outcomes, as well as the role within the intersection with public policy.

The involvement and blurring of overlapping policy sectors is both crucial and inevitable in the delivery of legacy, as notable legacies have been observed throughout the sectors of sport, economic, education, politics, infrastructure and public imagery (Cashman, 2006). Various ‘hybrid’ organizational forms have been documented throughout sport literature (e.g., booster/growth coalitions, regimes, public-private partnerships), particularly surrounding SMEs within bidding, planning, organizing and legacy. The term organizational form describes a
combination of organizational structure and organizational strategy (Ingram, 1998). In particular, various organizational forms have been used in governing sport throughout Canadian history, through a combination of commercial, public and voluntary sectors. Research in this area has indicated that in response to the blurring of traditional sectoral boundaries, new organizational forms emerge (cf. Misener & Misener, 2017). With the multiple, often competing legacy demands of OCs, SMEs provide an excellent context for studying hybrid organizational forms in the delivery of legacy.

While several SME host cities have boasted sustainable, long-term outcomes, such as Barcelona’s tourism legacy after the 1992 Olympics (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006), authors have noted that legacies often fall short of their expectations (Phillips & Barnes, 2015). Given the varying degrees of sustainable outcomes there is a major gap in understanding how previous events have managed attempts to deliver sustainable outcomes from an event-hosting model.

**Statement of Purpose**

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how legacy is delivered; that is, what organizational mechanisms are utilized in the delivery of legacy and who is delivering outcomes related to the hosting of an event? I utilized institutional theory and theories within public policy to explore mechanisms and structures of legacy delivery in SME’s. The following research question (RQ), and sub-questions guided my research:

RQ: How are sustainable outcomes leveraged from event-hosting models?

a. How have scholars addressed responsibility for mega event legacy in empirical events-based research? (Chapter 4)

b. What have previous host cities used as legacy and/or leverage delivery mechanisms? (Chapter 5)
c. What organizational learning has occurred between events and hosts around legacy and leverage? (Chapter 6)

d. What frameworks moving forward would be appropriate for sustainable outcomes? (Chapter 7)

Three distinct phases were used in my doctoral dissertation in order to address my research questions. As previously mentioned, the literature regarding legacy governance is sparse and the very definition of legacy is highly contested, with no concrete direction for the best practices of how to pursue intended event benefits. Thus, this first stage of the project was to conduct a research synthesis of existing literature regarding past legacy-delivering organizational forms, with a specific focus on the locus of control to deliver legacy. Building on those findings and concepts from synthesis, I examined the legacy and leveraging groups from two Canadian SMEs through a comparative case study. Stage two involved primary and secondary data collection, including the analysis of interviews and documents to directly compare two Canadian host cities. The context for the SME cases were the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games and the Toronto 2015 Pan and Parapan American Games. Vancouver 2010 was the first Olympic and Paralympic Games where “tangible legacies were identified and developed” (Weiler & Mohan, 2009, p.2) in conjunction with the event bid via an external not-for-profit organization (Legacies Now). Building on the case of Vancouver, the Toronto 2015 Organizing Committee (TOOC) aimed to set up a similar initiative to formalize legacy outcomes. During this time, knowledge transfer emerged as such a prominent and distinct theme, that I revisited in relation to knowledge transfer with regards to organizational forms. Specifically, I examined how organizational forms used knowledge transfer in governing legacy and/or leveraging strategies. This further contributed to the thick description of the cases, as well as highlighting how knowledge transfer is integral to
the governance process. Drawing upon the findings of stages one and two, stage three involved a coalescing process of stages one and two to develop a theoretical framework, in order to leverage sustainable outcomes from event hosting models.

The three stages of this dissertation are presented throughout seven chapters in monograph format and presents an in-depth examination of event legacy responsibility. The introductory chapter provides the research rationale and establishes the research purpose. In Chapter 2, I provide a review of relevant legacy, governance and organizational literature and used to frame the analyses. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical and methodological perspectives underpinning the research. Chapter 4 is comprised of a research synthesis summarizing previous event legacy strategies. In Chapter 5, I compare two cases of legacy governance and leveraging in Canadian SMEs using comparative cases. Chapter 6 uses knowledge transfer theories to present a model for sustainable organizational forms. Finally in Chapter 7, implications and future directions are described, as well as a potential framework for consideration, and final conclusions.

Philosophical Paradigm

I situate my research within an ontological view of “time-space as constitutive of social practises” (Giddens, 1984, p.3). In utilizing organizational theories, I am unquestionably noting the influence of Max Weber, who was the first to classify organizations and bureaucratic networks and is often linked to interpretivism (Crotty, 1998). Weber suggested that Verstehen (understanding), or the interpretative approach is needed for examination of the human and social sciences, versus Erklären (explaining), an approach focused on causality regarding the natural sciences (Crotty, 1998). However, Crotty (1998) notes that interpretivism is largely uncritical as it focuses on societal interpretations and “emerged in contradistinction to positivism in attempts to
understand and explain human and social reality” (p.66-67). Structural concepts are notably absent from interpretive sociologies, as described by Giddens (1984):

The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practises ordered across space and time...It is in the conceptualization of human knowledgeability and its involvement in action that I seek to appropriate some of the major contributions of interpretative sociologies. In structuration theory a hermeneutic starting-point is accepted [only] in so far as it is acknowledged that the descriptions of human activities demands a familiarity with the forms of life expressed in those activities (p.2-3).

Giddens (1984) proposed that structures represent rules and resources continually being produced and reproduced by actors. An actors’ individual capability to act upon their own free will, or agency, is thusly constrained and enabled by the structural requirements within a social system (Giddens, 1984a, 1984b). Within these structures, the sources of power are found within the ability to yield causal powers over resources, including that of influencing others (Giddens, 1984a, 1984b). Societal structures, through policies, organizations and networks, function to allow or impede certain people, groups, or organization from exerting their power or agency. Structures exist throughout our society, within organizations that many individuals negotiate on a daily basis. Indeed, Preuss (2007) explained that all SMEs utilize both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (or human) structures, namely infrastructure, knowledge, networks, culture, image and emotions, respectively. This rhetoric of distinction not only between hard and soft, but also specifically binary opposition (MacAloon, 2008), is echoed throughout legacy and sport event research. This ties back to Giddens (1984), who argued in his theory of the Duality of Structure that structures are both the medium and outcome of social life, particularly social interactions occurring within said structure. Duality of structure is a pervasive theme within SME as a [mega] structure as it is both the medium (where a collection of individuals participate, spectate, consume etc.) and outcome (result of planning, meetings, collaborations etc.) of social interactions (Giddens, 1984).
Therefore interpretivism alone cannot account for the many structures within SME particularly the multi-layered nature of governance. Marsh (2008) argued for the use of critical realism, to include a focus on the individual level of governance networks, versus the typical agentless approach previously used. I thus take the theoretical position of ‘hard’ interpretivism bordering constructionism in line with Goodwin and Grix’s (2011) emphasis on structures, institutions and their influence on individuals, their beliefs and their actions (Grix, 2010). In this way I consider individual “actors’ beliefs and ideas, but also leave room for structures and institutions in the explanation could be termed ‘hard’ interpretivist” (Grix, 2010, p.164). While this is epistemologically differing from the more objectivist interpretivism, constructionist theories like critical realism emphasize similar ontological questions about how the social word is, which fits within the interpretivist framework of understanding cultural phenomena in causal terms (Silverman, 1997). Within the lens of critical realism, “structures and agents are seen as factors that combine to determine the out-comes of social phenomena” (Pappous & Haley, 2015, p.672). In this way, ‘hard’ interpretivism is ontologically located at “the point at which anti-foundationalism becomes foundationalism…termed a ‘border area’ between research paradigms” (Goodwin & Grix, 2010, p.540), where epistemologically I retain a focus on structures and institutions while “remain[ing] committed to incorporating meaning and interpretation into explanations” (p.541). Within this perspective, ‘hard’ interpretivism emphasizes “causality and explanation, but not in the manner of a positivist” (Goodwin & Grix, 2010, p.553). Geertz (1973) argued that individuals are born into a pre-existing system with significant cultural symbols, and that the ‘thick description’ of interpreting individuals’ experiences requires genuine historical and social context (Crotty, 1998). Therefore within my examination of legacy and leveraging, it is
crucial that I situate this research contextually, to understand the evolution of utilizing event-related strategies.
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http://doi.org/10.1123/JSM.2013-0294


Chapter 2: Review of Literature

In order to fully conceptualize this research within the existing academic literature, I drew upon several theories and concepts from both business and public policy research. As such, this chapter outlines the key connections and tensions within the realm of event legacies, leveraging, governance, public policy and organizational forms. In particular, I seek to differentiate between the concepts of legacy and leveraging, in order to both understand how sustainable outcomes are leveraged from events, and who is executing and delivering event-hosting these outcomes to communities.

Event Legacies

Legacy, albeit somewhat of a nebulous concept, has penetrated discussions surrounding Olympic Games, and sport mega-events (SMEs) in general (Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2007; Vigor, Mean, & Tims, 2004). Legacy was officially added to the IOC requirements for bidding in 2000 (for the 2010 Games), and Vancouver was the first host city to have concrete legacy plans from the onset of bidding (Leopkey & Parent, 2016). Described broadly as the remaining and lasting impacts after bidding and/or hosting a Games, the term has been deemed “elusive and dangerous” (Cashman, 2006), as a variety of political actors have defined and redefined conceptualizations of legacy as per their changing political, social and economic interests. Legacy has been traditionally conceptualized in vague terms and outcomes, which are difficult to determine and measure (Leopkey, Mutter & Parent, 2010). For example, legacy has been described in terms of health (McCarterney et al., 2010; Thomas, Walker, Miller, Cobb, & Thomas, 2016), culture (Cashman, 1998), environment (Chappelet, 2008; Dickson, Benson, & Blackman, 2011), economic (Gratton, Shibli, & Coleman, 2005; Preuss, 2004), tourism (Sant, Mason, & Hinch, 2014), politics (Grix, 2012), amongst others. Sport participation and sport-related legacies are of course of particular interest and will be discussed in-depth in a later section. Indeed this diversity of legacy has been
reinforced by DeMoragas and colleagues (2003) as seemingly problematic, who argued that the IOC’s vague definition and conceptualization of legacy has contributed to its’ continued ambiguity and confusion. With this, it is important to examine the wide breadth of literature focused on legacy, in both its conceptualization and execution.

Many authors have attempted to identify different dimensions and constructs of legacy in order to better understand how to attain or avoid certain legacies, and to continuously redevelop our understanding of the term. Cashman (2006) categorized legacy into six qualitative categories: sport; economics; infrastructure; information and education; public life, politics and culture; and symbols, memory and history. Preuss (2007) furthered Cashman’s analysis by suggesting that legacy can be positive or negative; planned or unplanned; and tangible or intangible. In addition, Preuss (2007) further expanded upon this concept by suggesting five dimensions of legacy: whether impacts are tangible/intangible, planned/unplanned, positive/negative, the duration vs. time of the event and the spaces that are affected by the event. He further argued that these dimensions effect and are affected by event structures, both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, or human, structures that complement planning, and are usually preserved post-event, namely infrastructure, knowledge, image, emotions, networks & culture has furthered SMEs. In this argument, the use of soft versus hard creates a ‘binary opposition’ that MacAloon (2008) refers to as “both gender-overdetermined and categorically foolish” (p.2064), as it negates the importance of the human element of legacies. Indeed many new bids have changed their rhetoric to emphasize ‘human legacies’ when referring to such impacts as volunteer recruitment and training (e.g., Toronto 2015 Pan American Games Bid Corp, 2008). This indicates that many legacies are mainly distributed on a global scale to organizations removed from the physical event itself (e.g., to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the IOC), versus the community-wide, broad serving spectrum of positive impacts portrayed in media (Sant & Mason, 2015).

While both negative and positive legacies have been observed throughout SME history (Cashman, 2006; Lenskyj, 2002; Preuss, 2007), less attention has been focused on the actual mechanisms contributing to “successful” legacies. Herein successful is defined from evaluative terms, rather than subjective definition purported throughout the media. Taks and colleagues (2013) noted previously how sport organizers assumed local positive benefits (such as increased sport participation) would occur simply through happenstance, rather than utilizing specific strategies and tactics. To capture and understand the specific processes for attaining outcomes from an event, I draw upon the leveraging literature for context and clarification.

**Event Leveraging**

Chalip (2004; 2006; 2014; 2017) has advocated for the use of ‘leveraging’ surrounding sport event benefits, deeming it more indicative of the effort required. Leveraging sport events “divides into those activities that need to be undertaken around the event itself, and those which seek to maximise the long-term benefits from events” (Chalip, 2004, p.228). Chalip’s model for general event leveraging shown in Figure 2.1, positions an event, or an events portfolio as a leverageable resource (Chalip, 2004) “by providing opportunities for economic growth via business and tourism processes” (Taks, Chalip & Green, 2015, p.113). In this way, leveraging focuses on “the means to optimize desired event outcomes by integrating the event strategically into the destination's product and service mix” (Chalip, 2017, p.6). Leveraging theory indicates that in order to gain targeted positive impacts through an event, rigorous planning and efforts are required pre-event, during and post-event (Chalip, 2004). This active process is encouraged by researchers in order for groups to utilize events as opportunities to benefit host
cities and communities. Herein lies an important difference, as legacy and leveraging are frequently used interchangeably. Chalip (2017) has made a “subtle, but important” (p.415) difference between the terms (noted in Table 2.1), in that legacy is event-centered and driven by the event elements themselves. In contrast, leveraging is conceptualized as strategic-goal-centered, alliance-driven, and focused on integrating the event into the host destination’s product and service strategy (Chalip, 2017). In short, leveraging focuses on the strategy at hand, versus the event itself.

Table 2.1

*Leverage vs Legacy: subtle (but important) differences* (adapted from Chalip, 2017)

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<td>• Event centered</td>
<td>• Strategic goal centered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evaluate with reference to post-event outcomes</td>
<td>• Evaluate with reference to strategic effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on event components</td>
<td>• Focus on synergizing the event with the host destination’s product/service mix</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Elementally driven</td>
<td>• Alliance driven</td>
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</table>
Sustainable legacy strategies through leveraging are in stark contrast to the typical SME organizational strategy, which is purposefully short-term in design (Phillips & Barnes, 2015). The very definition of legacy, that is the lasting impacts of an event, is at contrast with intentionally temporal nature of the SME and its’ organizational forms. Leveraging focuses on tactics and strategies before, during and after the hosting of the event itself, rather than expecting that planning efforts alone will carry event legacies after the event. Smith (2013) outlined the ‘traditional’ planning approach to legacy has been ad-hoc in nature and typically by those without long-term stake in the host city (Smith, 2012). As such, if legacy was previously conceptualized as ex-post, short-term and outcome-oriented; then leveraging is characterized by an ex-ante, long-term approach focused on strategic sustainable impacts (O’Brien & Chalip, 2007). A wide variety of outcomes can be pursued using leveraging strategies, although most common are economic and social objectives (Chalip, 2006; Chalip & Leyns, 2002; Misener, Darcy, Legg, & Gilbert, 2013; Smith, 2014). Herein I return to the key difference between legacy and leveraging strategies – whether the focus is on the event itself, or the effectiveness of the outcome(s). Several notable outcomes from the event literature are described here.

**Social Outcomes.** Social outcomes have been more prominently featured in the past ten years of mega event bidding, such as London’s unsuccessful pre-event push for nation-wide physical activity increase. The potential benefits and outcomes of SME are generally portrayed in the media as broad-serving and contributing to a more positive future for all residents (Horne, 2015). It is true that social outcomes can be observed from special events such as sport events or other forms of public performance, as a result of engendering a feeling of liminality. Liminality is a magical, feel-good feeling of shared belonging and warmth, that creates opportunities where seemingly-impossible or even threatening tasks can be accomplished. An example is in the movie
Remember the Titans, where against all odds the football team comes together to win the state football championship. Liminality is that celebratory feeling and accompanying sense that social roles and regulations are relaxed or suspended within the liminoid frame or space of an event (Chalip, 2006). Festivals and events act as an imaginative presentation of society (Gluckman & Gluckman, 1977), where “symbolic forms are not only a reflexive interpretation of social life, but also a means through which people discover and learn their culture” (Manning, 1981, p. 617).

Within the liminal space of events, two opportunities for social leverage are generated: the volume and content of media exposure surrounding the event, and ‘communitas’ (Chalip, 2017). Media, particularly new media, has the unique opportunity to explore various social issues and forms within the space of an event, and bring forward important messaging and engagement. Communitas refers to the sense of community engendered amongst those in attendance, and includes feelings of “new energy flowing through the social atmosphere” (Chalip, 2017, p.410), which gives the opportunity for social leverage. Canadians may remember experiencing feelings of communitas following the Vancouver 2010 Olympics when they saw individuals wearing the trademark red ‘Olympic mittens’ following Canada’s best ever performance at a Games. Communitas is seen as a “raw, leverageable resource” (Chalip, 2006, p.122), for agendas such as social action or community development.

Included in social legacies and agendas are improved social progress, health, impact on the general population and marginalized populations, and civic engagement (Leopkey & Parent, 2012). These outcomes are heavily featured throughout media and bid documents in order to justify the massive cost required to facilitate and execute events of this scale (Horne, 2015). The most controversial social legacy claims have surrounded improved health and sport for the general public. Sport development and participation outcomes are also be considered a social outcome, as
they frequently boast outcomes for the general population. The most ambitious and recent example is from the 2012 London Olympics, where officials published a legacy goal of having two million more people active in four years by Games time (Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2008). A systematic review by McMartney and colleagues (2010) for the British Medical Journal (BMJ) concluded that little evidence points to any major multi-sport event between 1978-2008 having delivered positive health outcomes to host citizens. In addition, authors Murphy and Bauman (2007), concluded that the “health potential of major sporting and physical activity events is often cited, but evidence for public health benefit is lacking” (p. 196). Many of the sporting legacies claimed by SMEs surround the creation or modification of sport facilities and infrastructure. Since many of these facilities are designed for high-performance athletes or events, the opportunity for the general population to regularly access or benefit from the facilities is questionable. In their 2015 systematic review of Olympic Games and demonstration effects, Weed and colleagues asserted that there may be a potential opportunity in the pre-Games period to “increase participation frequency in sport, and perhaps to re-engage lapsed participants. The evidence also suggests that relying on an inherent demonstration effect to bring new participants into sport is not likely to be successful” (p.20). Countless events tout that the very hosting of the event will provide a demonstration effect for its’ citizens, also referred to as the trickle-down effect, where the high performance sport demonstration will trickle down to the lowest levels of a society/community (Misener, Taks, Chalip, & Green, 2015). While this theory is logically not impossible, this effect is practically improbable to measure and evaluate. There was only one study available in English, published by Frawley and Cush (2011) that demonstrated improved sport participation from hosting an event, the 2003 Rugby World Cup. Mass health and sport benefits are continuously
publicized in the bidding and promotion of large-scale events, despite the lack of evidence supporting these claims.

Much critical speculation has surrounded the legacy promises put forward in the bid document to ‘sell’ the Games to not only the IOC, but the citizens within a host city. While many events may boast of benefits to disadvantaged or marginalized groups in order to win public support (Carey, Mason, & Misener, 2011), evidence has indicated that specific and dedicated initiatives are required in order for these groups to see any benefits (Smith, 2013). Authors Sant and Mason (2015) found that officials from the Vancouver 2010 Organizing Committee (VANOC) were eager to frame hosting the event as good for the entire city, region and “country as a whole” (p. 46). In addition, the authors concluded that bid proponents frame and reframe, and define and redefine legacy issues “depending on hanging social, political and economic conditions, as well as their [own] interests at a particular time” (Sant & Mason, 2015, p.53), in order to gain public support and/or quell opposition to the event. It appears that promises are made within the bid document based upon current social, political and economic influences, and not wholly based upon conditions requiring amelioration, such as declining physical activity or marginalized populations.

Waitt (2003) agreed with this notion in that “a hallmark event’s relevance in addressing … social issues diminishes if such benefits are not sustained after the ‘circus’ has left town” (p. 212). This window of opportunity mimics the public administration term *policy window*, an ideal timing after a problem is recognized and political conditions are appropriate and opportune to facilitate (Brehaut & Juzwishin, 2005). How these events are managed to take advantage of such opportunities, requires an examination of governance, and specifically the governance of legacy.
Governance

Governance is a “form of coordination involving the self-organisation of inter-organisational relations” (Jessop, 1997, p.39), or the process of ruling through and by networks (Leopkey & Parent, 2016). Harvey (1989) distinguished governance from government by power to organize space, “derive[d] from a whole complex of forces mobilised by diverse social agents” (p.6). Girginov (2012, 2018) has framed legacy as a ‘governance issue’, and that the continued use of past tense language surrounding legacy conceptualizations by event organizers is problematic. If organizers steering legacy plans are using a retrospective vs. prospective perspective, they could be missing long-term and continuous opportunities within pre-Games planning. Much research has examined the specific governing arrangements of the OC, which typically controls the conceptualization and delivery of legacy within the scope of SME management (Leopkey & Parent, 2016). What is unclear is who is actually responsible for steering and delivering legacy outcomes, whether it be an individual or organization. Previous authors have noted that actual benefits to community members could be better delivered apart from the event OC, as the OC is exclusively focused on delivering a successful event (Misener & Mason, 2006, 2009; Smith & Fox, 2007; Taks et al., 2013).

Governance surrounding SMEs is particularly confusing as it is incredibly multi-scalar and multi-level in nature (Black, 2007). The motivations for hosting large-scale sport events lie most prominently within economic development - whether it may be improving touristic conditions and infrastructure, or attracting new economic opportunities to the location for attractive conditions portrayed (Gold & Gold, 2016). Within economic motivations, opportunities include: tourism, business, construction/infrastructure development, amongst others (Malfas, Houlihan, & Theodoraki, 2004). These outcomes are connected to the unique policy opportunity that an event
of this size offers – a powerful multi-level public and private partnership that is able to affect policy decisions and fund development projects, and are indeed recognized as the primary drivers of the bid (Burbank et al., 2001; Whitson & Horne, 2006). Indeed multiple levels of a nation-state’s government are required to host an SME, let alone leverage for country-wide benefits. While municipal officials are required to sign the IOC host city contract, approval from provincial/territorial and federal levels of government are needed to facilitate some of the massive policy requirements, such as security (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010). Since many of the controlling relationships governing many aspects of SMEs are federal-local, or even trans-local (i.e., sponsorship regulations on local establishments from transnational sponsors), local governments must simply react to the imperatives of federal and international governing bodies and organizations.

Public Policy. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, understanding governance within urban politics requires examination of actor constellation and power relations. Authors Leopkey and Parent (2016) identified three main groups of actors within their examination of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and the Vancouver 2010 Games: constant actors (key stakeholders involved in governance, typically top-level involvement), emergent actors (new stakeholders who emerged as a result of the event), and context specific actors (organizations and individuals involved with legacy within a context-specific case). A variety of these actors make up the organizational forms governing legacy. By definition governance is categorized by the forging of key organizational alliances or coalitions (Peters & Pierre, 1998), an interdependent sharing of power (Treib, Bähr, & Falkner, 2007). This sharing or plurality is important to recognize, as the public sector needs the resources of the private sector, and the private sector is looking for ways to influence policy making in favour of their business/political interests (such as the pursuit of constructing a sport
arena, or bidding for a sport mega-event). Policies (policy instruments) are one of three dimensions of governance, the others being politics (both public and private actors), and polity (institutional properties) (Treib et al., 2007). The formation of the governance structure is thus surrounding a mutual goal or agenda. Examining governance structures requires evidence from both economic and public policy literature (cf. Girginov, 2012), to understand the specific organizational arrangements between state and private actors and their abilities to affect policy. Treib and colleagues (2007) described four modes of governance within the policy dimension, as seen in Table 2.2, as adapted to include Girginovs’ (2012) observations from the 2012 London Olympics. These policy instruments can be conceptualized as tools to address the problem at hand within the policy cycle. The policy cycle describes the inherently cyclical process by which policies are produced. The simplified cycle includes four essential steps: identification of the problem requiring public action, policy formulation (constructing the alternative solutions), policy implementation (using various instruments) and monitoring and evaluation (Berdegue, &

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<thead>
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<th>Implementation</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Binding</td>
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<td>Rigid</td>
<td>Coercion (e.g., contracts, legislation).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Framework regulation (e.g., public service announcements, surveys, reports/recommendations).</td>
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Table 2.2

Typology within policy governance (adapted from Treib et al., 2007)
Fernandez, 2012). These steps are meant to be repeated in an iterative process when the policy has become outdated or requires improvements, and thus is not a viable solution to the problem at hand. Public-private partnerships as essential policy instruments that partake in various urban development projects linked to key policy areas (Bradford, 2007), such as bidding for the Olympics or building expensive infrastructure. Policy decision-making is further complicated by the multidisciplinary nature of SMEs, as they fall not only between (well-defined) government sectors with their own agendas and initiatives (see Berdegue & Fernandez, 2012), but also across a variety of stakeholder groups, each having leaders with strong claims to power and authority. Sport has been an interdepartmental federal policy since the 1993, when Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell split the Fitness and Amateur Sport Branch into Sport Canada (under Canada Heritage) and Fitness Canada (under the Department of Health Canada). In 2008 the Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events was passed “not only as a stimulus to sport development, but also as an economic and community development tool” (Government of Canada, 2008). Since then, the federal and provincial governments have bid on numerous Olympics and other SMEs for revitalization or development strategies (eg., Toronto Summer Olympics 2008; Halifax Commonwealth Games 2014; Calgary Winter Olympics 2026). Therefore understanding the organizational aspects of governance is crucial in order to examine the formation of these various stakeholder groups and their ability to wield power within the context of SME legacy.

**Previous organizational forms of governance within sport management.** As mentioned, OCs are the main governing body of control within SMEs, typically taking the form of a multiparty organizational arrangement, or a combination of PPPs. Previous literature has indicated that urban regimes or growth coalitions have frequently steered the agendas for SMEs and other forms of cultural-led development (Bennett & Spirou, 2006; Burbank et al., 2001;
Lenskyj, 2004; Misener & Mason, 2008, 2009; Rantisi & Leslie, 2006; Schimmel, 2006; Shoval, 2002; Surborg, VanWyngend, & Wyly, 2008). These coalitions have focused on using the potential image-creation benefits of SMEs, and the opportunity to capture a global audience of millions of potential tourists and consumers. This opportunity for place-branding conforms to the neoliberal narrative that many consumption-based leisure activities promote (e.g., shopping malls, amusement parks, spectator sport-events etc.). Within this narrative, SMEs are the vehicle to sell a host city’s landscape (Burbank et al., 2001; Roberts & Schein, 1993), combined with a city script or ‘myth’ (Quilley, 2000; Rantisi & Leslie, 2006; Zhang & Zhao, 2009), depicting the favourable and selective aspects of a tourist destination. Within these host cities the coalitions or regimes are driving the SME agenda, and connections and linkages of both private and public power can be identified and explored (Misener & Mason, 2008). In order to further explore this power within the context of SMEs, I turn to organizational theories to explore how organizational forms wield and negotiate power.

Public Policy Theories of Organization

The elaborate governance and policy-making environment of SMEs are increasingly multilayered, with a mixture of private and public officials comprising the bidding and s in various organizational forms. As previously discussed, organizational forms represent novel combinations of core organizational features, expressed through organizational structure and strategy. Different types of organizational forms emerged as early as the mid-nineteenth century, when the effects of urbanization and industrialization required private support to help the governments’ various social systems (e.g., social welfare system) (Salamon, 1987). Various forms of public-private partnerships (PPP) both for- and non-profit, have long been examined by political scientists, legal analysts, economists and others within academia. Originally, PPPs were a solution to failing
government structures that failed to “allocate resources efficiently and equitably” (Weisbrod, 1978, p.41). The non-profit, voluntary sector has had a crucial role to play within public governance, particularly in order to supply collective goods that the private market and government failed to adequately provide. Collective goods refers to products or services that “are enjoyed by everyone whether or not they have paid for them” (Salamon, 1987, p. 35). Examples of collective or public goods could include national defense, clean air or street lighting, but it is important to note that “public goods are socially defined and constructed according to what is perceived as a ‘public need,’ rather than containing certain inherent characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry” (Wuyts, 2002, p.3). Hoye and colleagues (2007) argued that while sport could and should be considered a collective good, as the health benefits of physical activity and sport are well-documented and everyone can benefit from being physically active, sport in itself is not considered a collective good. As sport becomes increasingly professionalized, regulations surrounding access become important versus encouraging mass participation. High-performance or spectator sport has greater opportunity to tap into funding at provincial and federal levels in Canada, as the Sport Canada Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF) funds national sports organizations (NSOs) based upon their international standings and based on international federations’ regulations. As a result, many NSOs (and resultantly provincial sport organizations (PSOs)) must prioritize programming to emphasize high performance development. This ideology was reproduced across the Canadian Sport landscape in the 1990s, with many NSOs, PSOs, and other sport organizations undergoing dramatic professionalization, consciously shifting the nature of sport from leisure and recreation opportunities, into competitive, organized activities with spectators (Comeau, 2013). As the 1990s brought tightening public budgets, and increased population and demand for services, it is unsurprising that the Canadian government turned to the
private and voluntary sectors to assist with sport delivery. The result was a proliferation of modified governance forms, generating and delivering sport programming, projects, and policy.

**Hybrid Organizational Forms.** Various organizational forms of PPPs have been documented throughout the sport event literature. These forms can include booster or growth coalitions, contracted-out service delivery structures, various collaborative forums, social enterprises, and systems of network governance (Svensson & Seifried, 2017). These forms can also be classified as ‘hybrid’ organizations, as they blur the traditional boundaries of private, public or voluntary sectors. Organizational hybridity herein refers to the “combination of multiple traditional ways of organizing into new creative hybrid approaches” (Svensson, 2017, p.444). As previously mentioned, in a multi-sector organizational field, institutional logics play a central role in creating new organizational forms, as competing, or even paradoxical institutional logics must be managed. In fact, authors Battilana and Lee (2014) stated that the process of hybridization consists of the combination and management of multiple logics, forms and identities. Thus, hybridization is appropriate for exploring how organizational forms are created and utilized in the face of duelling priorities within the SME organizational environment.

**Knowledge Transfer and Governance.** Theories of knowledge transfer enable a thorough examination of the evolution of organizational forms governing event legacy. Previous Olympic researchers have utilized theories of knowledge transfer in a variety of contexts (Ellis, Parent, & Seguin, 2016; Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001, 2005; Parent, Mcdonald, & Goulet, 2014; Schenk, Parent, Macdonald, & Proulx Therrien, 2015; Werner, Dickson, & Hyde, 2015). The relationship of knowledge transfer to governance has received limited attention to date (Parent, Kristiansen, & Houlihan, 2017).
Nonaka’s (1994) theory of organizational learning describes the transfer and management of knowledge amongst organizations. Nonaka (1994) classifies knowledge as either explicit, the *know what*, or tacit the *know-how*, wherein there is a continuous dialogue between two (Nonaka, 1994). Nonaka (1991, 1994, 2000, 2005), offers four distinct types of learning that coincide with tactic and explicit knowledge: Herein the continuous 'dialogue' between the types of knowledge is critical, as a neglect of tacit knowledge may lack reality, while a lack of explicit knowledge may lack specificity and depth (Nonaka, 1994). The types of learning and knowledge translation described by Nonaka (1994) include socialisation (from tacit to tacit), combination (from explicit to explicit), externalisation (from tacit to explicit), and internalisation (from explicit to tacit). As both organizations from Vancouver and Toronto have been cited by organizers as the model for event legacies, organizational learning allows for an understanding of knowledge transfer within their respective processes, but also to assist future host cities and organizers.
References


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Chapter 3: Theory and Methods

This thesis involved two distinct studies with unique methods in order to examine who is responsible for legacy and what organizational forms have been utilized in legacy delivery. A research synthesis was utilized in Chapter 4 to examine how previous events have managed the development and delivery of their legacies. The results of Chapter 4 informed the framework of Chapters 5 and 6, in order to compare and examine specific characteristics of organizational forms that helped optimize legacy. This research was informed by both institutional theory, as well as theories of public policy organization. In utilizing both of these lenses, I was able to examine not only the structures and forms within the organizational realm of SMEs, but also the influence and effect of the pluralist nature within the SME policy-making environment. Tolbert (1985) acknowledged that organizational phenomena cannot be adequately described by any one single theoretical approach, reinforced by Olafson’s (1990) call for the use of multiple, intersecting theories to enhance the quality and explanatory potential of sport management research.

Theorizing the Event Landscape: Institutions & Public Policy

Institutional Theory. Institutions are structures, including processes, practises, ideas, or ideologies, that have the “capacity to enable or constrain actors, thereby ensuring their own continuity and legitimacy” (Lecours, as cited in Comeau, 2013, p.74). Institutional theory is the notion of structural adaptation, whereby organizations react, and evolve in accordance to their changing environment or field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). An organizational field is conceptualized as ‘those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life’ and can include suppliers, consumers, regulatory agencies and other relevant actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Critically examining the influence of dominant institutions within the field of SMEs is central to understanding the dynamics of power and its’
effects on organizational structures. Quite simply, institutional theory focuses on how institutions shape and are shaped by their environment, and the power that institutions are able to hold and wield over that environment.

Comeau (2013) has extensively commented on the institutionalized nature of the Canadian Sport Policy since 1961 using historical institutionalism to understand how and why institutions are formed. In addition, historical institutionalism explores the construction of the institution through its formal organizations and informal rules of conduct, and ultimately examining how institutions are able to influence policy decision-making (Comeau, 2013). Comeau (2013) identified three main institutional factors in the Canadian Sport System: federalism, institutionalized relations and ideas. Federalism refers to the relationship between the Federal and Provincial/Territorial administration, and the centrality of power and legitimacy within the Federal Government. Institutionalized relations refer to the relationships and social interactions between the Federal Government and various sport, political, economic and social-related actors. (Comeau, 2013). They are regularized pattern of interaction which develop in policy sectors (e.g. such as advocacy relations or policy networks) (Comeau, 2013). The final factor, ideas, refers to the actual sharing of ideas and beliefs flowing through those institutionalized relationships, an example being that objective medals such as world championship medals represent a country’s overall health or fitness achievements.

Green & Houlihan (2004) also examined Canadian institutionalized relations through neo-institutionalism which examines how institutions structure the ‘play of power’. They use neo-institutionalism against the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), in order to compensate for its rather weak theorization of power. Within neo-institutionalism, they seek to uncover how institutions can assist groups in achieving their goals (be it economic development), as well as
hinder or block groups’ efforts as well. Green and Houlihan (2004) also asserted that within neo-institutionalism, institutions can change over time according to their personal interests, playing a large role in effectively framing the structure of power through their various legitimizing and regulatory roles.

Institutional influence pervades structures beyond the sport landscape, as seen in broader urban governance. Harvey (1989) has long noted the use of ‘governance’ when referring to the entrepreneurial activities of cities, as major external players include non-government external actors (confirmed in Burbank, Andranovich & Heying, 2001). Hall and Hubbard (1996) commented that that the crucial to governance structure’s capacity to mobilize resource (and thus power) is key institutional relations within that society or urban area. SMEs’ OCs and bidding committees include multi-level, multi-sectoral government actors and powerful non- and for-profit corporations tied to sponsorships and other partnership strategies (McGillivray & McPherson, 2012). Therefore, institutional theory fits within this research in the examination of the organizational mechanisms of legacy delivery within a host city or municipality.

Public Policy Theories of Organization. Institutional theory alone is not enough to examine the structural arrangements of organizational forms surrounding SME legacy delivery. The elaborate governance and policy-making environment of SMEs are increasingly multilayered, with a mixture of private and public officials comprising the bidding and OCs in various organizational forms. As previously discussed, organizational forms represent novel combinations of core organizational features, expressed through organizational structure and strategy. Different types of organizational forms emerged as early as the mid-nineteenth century, when the effects of urbanization and industrialization required private support to help the governments’ various social
systems (e.g., social welfare system) (Salamon, 1987). Hybrid organizational forms are utilized to describe collectives that blur traditional boundaries of private, public and voluntary sectors.

There is a unique opportunity to examine the organizational forms associated with event legacy delivery. By combining organizational theories and theories of public policy, there is an opportunity to capture specific organizational mechanisms and tactics within event legacy and/or leveraging strategies. Since SMEs have the ability to affect local policy long after the event has concluded (Preuss, 2015), using public policy theories enables a thick description of the local event policies and their relationship within legacy and/or leveraging groups. As an increasing number of scholars turn their attention to leveraging while an increasing number of cities are attempting to implement sustainable legacies, this topic proves both timely and significant. As well, this study provides theoretical and practical implications for researchers and organizers alike.

**Methods**

Multiple methods were used to explore the concepts of SME legacy organization and delivery in order to expose connections and tensions within literature and practise. It is important to note that during this process, I was in constant discussion with the primary investigator from both Vancouver 2010 and Toronto 2015. Firstly, in Chapter 4, a research synthesis was conducted in order to examine empirical evidence gathered from the past 20 years of research at sport events to consider the locus of responsibility of legacy. I sought to synthesize outcomes from previous events in order for a “fuller exploitation of existing data and research findings” (Solesbury, 2002, p.90), in order to enhance understanding of how to organize and execute legacy strategies. I utilize a comparative case study to examine two differing organizational forms and models for delivering SME legacy. The specific steps and processes within these methods are described herein.
Chapter 4: Event Legacy and Leveraging Mechanisms. A research synthesis was conducted to understand how previous scholars have articulated organization forms of legacy delivery. While there are three main methods of research synthesis, a systematic review was for its' ability to provide comprehensive sampling combined with exclusion criteria (Weed, 2005). The other main methods of research syntheses within sport management are the meta-analysis, which aims to provide an ‘effect-size’ of a range of studies; and the meta-interpretation, which does not use primary data, but the interpretations of the data to understand the ‘meaning in context’ (Weed, 2005). The systematic review was most appropriate as use of the meta-analysis requires “comparable statistics and populations” (Weed, 2005, p.80), and unlike the meta-interpretation, utilized primary data collected through interviews and observations. Empirically-based data is recognized as the gold standard for superior evidence quality to assist in demonstrating the ‘best evidence’ (Weed, 2005, p.79). Since this research is based within sociological and management literature, understanding what determines ‘best evidence’ across quantitative and qualitative studies can be confusing. Therefore in the exclusion of articles, only empirical studies utilizing primary data collection and analysis were used. Weed (2005) demonstrated that systematic reviews are widely used in conjunction with policy issues, as they “can ensure full and comprehensive coverage [of a subject] according to specific pre-determined objectives” (p.82). I turn to the systematic review for its ability to produce synergistic insights (Weed, 2005), in-depth understanding, and to “produce new knowledge by making explicit connections and tensions” (Suri, 2011, p.1) that were not previously visible. In particular, systematic reviews are notably useful for identifying gaps where “insufficient research has been performed” (Klassen, Jadad, & Moher, 1998, p.701).
Cooper and Hedges (2009) have identified a six-step process for conducting research syntheses, and specify the procedures for data collection and analysis, as shown in Table 3.1. The research synthesis process begins with the identification of key variables and interrelationships. The key variables chosen were event legacy, legacy organization and delivery, and responsibility for legacy. These variables were selected as they were the key independent (legacy organization and delivery, responsibility for legacy) and dependent (event legacy) variables mentioned in the research question and sub-questions.

Next, sources and relevant terms were identified to extract research results (Cooper & Hedges, 2009). A systematic keyword search was conducted across eight different academic databases (Annual Review of Sociology, EBSCO SportDiscus, SCOPUS, GoogleScholar, Kinesiology Publications, Physical Education Index, PubMed and Google Scholar). Key search terms included ‘events’, ‘sport events’, ‘special events’, ‘Olympics’, ‘FIFA’, ‘Games’, ‘mega events’, ‘sport mega events’ AND ‘governance’, ‘policy’, ‘responsibility’, ‘legacy’, ‘leverage’ and/or ‘strategic leveraging’. A total of 3,436 papers were retrieved, demonstrating the popularity and salience of sport event legacy within the literature. The search results and titles were then examined and sorted based upon preliminary inclusion criteria, including articles published in English from peer-reviewed scholarly sources (n=686). The abstracts of these papers were then read and separated to confirm secondary inclusion criteria of examining the planning, organization and/or execution of event legacies, and as a result a total of 141 articles were downloaded and organized in a reference manager for textual analysis. The articles themselves were then read carefully to match the inclusion criteria of investigating the planning, organization, or execution of event legacy, as well as excluding studies that were purely theoretical or conceptual. A vast amount of literature had to be excluded as they did not actually consider the conceptualization or
Table 3.1

Application of Cooper & Hedge’s Six Step Process for Conducting Research Synthesis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cooper &amp; Hedge’s Six Step Process</th>
<th>My Research Process</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Define the variables and relationships of interest.</td>
<td>• Variables: sport events, legacy organization and delivery, responsibility of legacy.</td>
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| 2. Identify sources (e.g., reference databases, journals) and terms used to search for relevant research and extract information from reports. | • Databases: Annual Review of Sociology, SCOPUS, SportDiscus, GoogleScholar, Kinesiology Publications, Physical Education Index, PubMed and Google Scholar.  
• Search terms: events, sport events, special events, Olympics, FIFA, Games, mega events, sport mega events AND governance, policy, responsibility, legacy, leverage, and/or strategic leveraging (results n = 3436). |
| 3. Identify and apply criteria to separate correspondent from incommensurate research results. | • Primary inclusion criteria: published in English, from peer-reviewed scholarly sources (n=686).  
• Abstracts examined and separated using secondary inclusion criteria: examining the planning, organization and/or execution of event legacies (n= 141).  
• Papers read and analyzed to exclude non-empirical research, and any others based on above criteria that were missed (final n=38). |
| 4. Identify and apply procedures for combining results across studies and testing for differences in results between studies. | • Themes/criteria for classifying studies: government involvement, use of leveraging; modes of governance; actors involved in legacy governance; intended vs. actual outcomes; constraints on legacy delivery; factors supporting success; control of legacy [resources]; recipients of legacy outcomes; and responsibility. |
| 5. Summarize the cumulative research evidence with regard to its strength, generality, and limitations. | |
| 6. Identify and apply editorial guidelines and judgment to determine the aspects of methods and results readers of the synthesis report need to know. | |

Responsibility within the context of legacy delivery. No date restrictions were placed on publication, although since legacy was only added to the IOC Charter in 2004, it is unsurprising that none of the retrieved research was published prior to 2005. A final total of 38 articles remained for the analysis of the study. These 38 articles were then reviewed and categorized according to
the type of event, legacy governance, responsibility of legacy, dimensions of legacy, and leveraging strategies. Within the categorization process, relevant dimensions were highlighted and noted from previous related academic literature, including: government involvement; use of leveraging; modes of governance; actors involved in legacy governance; intended vs. actual outcomes; constraints on legacy delivery; factors supporting success; control of legacy [resources]; recipients of legacy outcomes; and responsibility. Based on the general domain of focus of legacy responsibility, each article was then classified according to the organizational form identified as being responsible for legacy delivery.

**Chapter 5: Long-term Legacy Strategies of Canadian Mega-Events.** This section of research compared two cases from Canadian SME. In order to answer the ‘how’ components of my research questions (I.E., *how* previous host cities have organized and delivered legacies), comparisons are used to examine multiple situations (events) within an overall framework, “investigate complex phenomena[,] and build hypotheses out of a rich contextual framework” (Agranoff & Radin, 1991, p.229). As such, comparing cases is useful for exploring the phenomena of SME legacy, within two real-life SME environments. In fact, Radin and Weimer (2018) asserted that using a comparative approach within policy research can increase the external validity of research by expanding the contexts in which similar policies are created, utilized, and evaluated. The use of comparative case studies is highly noted within public administration literature, while they are still gaining traction within sport management research (Jansson & Ramberg, 2012), particularly in examining SME environments (e.g. Leopkey & Parent, 2009; Naraine, Schenk & Parent, 2016; Parent, Eskerus & Hansted, 2012). Specifically, the comparative case study provides a useful approach to compare policies and related governance structures within distinct SME environments.
Site Selection. The chosen cases for comparison are the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games and the Toronto 2015 Parapan American Games. Each of these events on their own provides a unique research opportunity, and through comparing tactics and outcomes, provides an interesting and unique context to explore how organizational forms affect legacy delivery, and what specific mechanisms were used in the delivery of legacy.

Sources of Evidence. Yin (2011) noted that high quality cases utilize multiple sources of evidence. As such, both case studies included documents and interviews for analysis. Documentary information can take many forms, including newspaper or mass media releases, letters, memoranda, agendas, reports, proposals and formal studies of the same ‘site’ (Yin, 2006). Documents are regarded as a good source of evidence due to their stability, unobtrusiveness, precision and broad coverage (Yin, 2011). The data utilized for the cases included media articles, IOC documents and reports, OC documents, and website information, and are displayed in Table 3.2. Inclusion criteria consisted of any public documents related to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Authoring Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LegaciesNow Reaching for Dreams in 2000/2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>LegaciesNow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Canadian Sport Policy</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty Agreement for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Olympic Winter Games Bid Book For Submission To The Canadian Olympic Association</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Vancouver Whistler 2010 Bid Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism BC Ten Year Strategy</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Tourism British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Toronto accessibility design guidelines</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>City of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations of the BC Resort Task Force</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Government of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Authoring Organization</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memorandum of Intent between the Government of Canada and the Government</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>of British Columbia on a 2010 Canadian Opportunities Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Update</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Investing in the Future of Tourism</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Government of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill 125: Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Government of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Premier's Tourism Industry Advisory Council Final Report</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>British Columbia Competition Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Strategic</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>City of Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder’s Letter of Expectations</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Government of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Accidental Champions - LTAD for Athletes with a Disability</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destiny Milton 2: Town of Milton Strategic Action Plan</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Town of Milton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2012 Major Events Plan: Catch the Excitement</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>City of Richmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Vancouver Policy Report: Cultural Tourism Strategy - Planning</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>City of Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Action Plan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Government of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Knowledge Management at the IOC</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging Canada's Games: 2008-2012 Olympic Games tourism strategy</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Canadian Tourism Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Report</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Canadian Tourism Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Report: Toronto 2015 Pan American/ParaPan American Games Bid</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>City of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Services Right for Torontonians with Disabilities: Demographics</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>City of Toronto</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Service Delivery Expectations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of North Vancouver Economic Development Strategy 2008</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>City of Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada and First Nations partner in an Olympic legacy agreement</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivering the Dream: 2010 Winter Games Strategic Framework Summary</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Resort Municipality of Whistler</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with key members of legacy organizations and relevant stakeholders associated with legacy. Individuals were selected for their participation in legacy delivery, leveraging initiatives, or the bidding and organizing committee. As there were many, often overlapping organizations involved in legacy planning, I have included a breakdown
of key organizations that were involved within each case, as seen in Table 3.3. Many of those individuals involved within each case were involved in several different initiatives and collaborations and held multiple roles representing different interests at once. Herein the interviewees’ roles are described at the time of the interview (in Table 3.3). Further information is

Table 3.3

**Key Organizations Involved in Legacy Delivery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Consortium</td>
<td>Created to leverage opportunity for provincial tourism strategy</td>
<td>Ontario Parasport Legacy Group (PLG)</td>
<td>Created to leverage for parasport and disability outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games Legacy Organization (GLO)</td>
<td>Leverage 2010 bid and resulting legacies</td>
<td>National Parasport Organization</td>
<td>Drove PLG collaboration, VANOC partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Tourism Organization</td>
<td>VANOC partner</td>
<td>Provincial Parasport Organization</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Tourism Organization</td>
<td>Leverage the 2010 Games for touristic outcomes</td>
<td>Provincial Para Sport Organization</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Tourism Organization</td>
<td>Member of Tourism Consortium</td>
<td>Provincial Disability Organization</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Tourism Partner</td>
<td>Member of Tourism Consortium</td>
<td>Municipal Parasport Organization</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Management Company</td>
<td>Manage legacy facilities and resulting funding</td>
<td>Municipal Recreation Partner</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VANOC</td>
<td>Provide funding and legitimacy</td>
<td>TOOC</td>
<td>Provide funding and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Partner 1</td>
<td>Partner of GLO to deliver localized outcomes</td>
<td>Legacy Partner 1</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy Partner 2</td>
<td>Member of PLG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not available on the interviewees as to ensure their confidential identity. I personally conducted five out of nineteen interviews, was involved in the transcription and verification of nineteen interviews, and performed secondary analysis of all the interviews. In Toronto I assisted the primary investigator throughout data collection, and supervised all other interviewers. I collaborated with the primary investigator who collected all of the data from Vancouver 2010, to have a complete and thorough understanding of the data. Interviews are regarded as essential sources of information for case studies, as participants’ perspectives offer understandings and insights into real-world circumstances (Yin, 2011). Interviews have also been regarded as good sources of contextual information (Creswell & Poth, 2018), as each interview guide was specific to each site. While the interview guides differed in context, questions were centered around the planning and organizational aspects of legacy delivery. In Vancouver 2010 (see Appendix A for interview guide used), individuals associated with long-term tourism legacy and leveraging were interviewed. In Toronto 2015 (see Appendix B for interview guide used), those individuals within the OC associated with legacy or leveraging for parasport benefits were interviewed. Interview guides from both cases were guided by themes emanating from event legacy and leveraging literature. Both sets of interviews from Vancouver and Toronto were pieces of larger studies on event leveraging, noted within the Statement of Author Contributions, and their respective ethics approvals are included in Appendices C and D.

Individuals with key roles or within pivotal organizations were identified through purposive sampling, in order to draw knowledge from the most informed actors involved with legacy. As seen in Table 3.4, a total of 31 interviews were conducted, with 12 individuals from Vancouver and 19 from Toronto. While I managed the overall data collection for Toronto, training and supervising 3 out of 6 interviewers, and conducting 5 interviews myself, I was also involved
in the transcription and secondary analysis of all Toronto interviews. These interviews had to be completed in a short timeframe leading up to the 2015 Games, and were thus completed simultaneously. As a result there was an opportunity to return to a large amount of unanalyzed data.
The interviews from Toronto were conducted before Games, while the interviews from Vancouver were completed two years post-Games. Interviews were completed in person or by phone, and all participants received a letter of information detailing the proposed research project, as well as a consent form approved by Western University (see Appendix E and F). Consent was granted through the return of the signed form by fax, email or in-person. All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis.

**Data Analysis.** I describe the steps of data analysis here using Creswell and Poth’s (2018) data analysis spiral, a useful and synergistic conceptualization of all of the steps within qualitative data analysis. Within the data analysis spiral, the researcher begins with qualitative data and works in analytic circles with the goal of generating specific analytic outcomes. Qualitative content analysis was utilized in order to identify core consistencies and meanings within a volume of qualitative data (Patton, 2002). This research followed Hsieh and Shannon’s (2005) conceptualization of directed content analysis, whereby initial coding began with existing theory and/or research, and as themes emerge from the data new categories and subcategories are built as per the researcher’s goals. As this research aims to unpack the organization strategies and forms related to the responsibility and delivery of SME legacy, this approach is useful to build on existing research and knowledge (Denscombe, 1998; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Five distinct activities are included within the data analysis spiral, beginning with the management and organization of data. All interviews and relevant documents were uploaded onto NVivo. NVivo is a software program that assists with analyzing, managing and shaping qualitative data by storing the database and files together, and enables easy searches within the data (Creswell & Poth, 2018). NVivo facilitated coding and organization of the data, and the files were organized per event with a 1-2 word description.
Next, the data were read through once, and I began the next step of memoing and notetaking emerging ideas to get a sense of the interview and data as a whole (Creswell & Poth, 2018). These notes would assist in the following step of describing and classifying codes and themes. During this time, I constantly triangulated my findings with the primary investigator to ensure credibility. There are three basic types of coding for consideration: open, axial and selective (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The next step involved open coding of the archival material and interviews regarding responsibility and delivery of event legacy. Open coding entails the identification of events, action and interactions. These initial codes reflected the stated legacy goals, modes of policy governance, leveraging strategies, and information related to responsibility. The next step was axial coding, which further develops categories and subcategories through conditions, context, actions/interactions and consequences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). During this time I continuously revisited the literature to ensure consistency as per Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) constant comparison technique. New themes that emerged were continually added to the coding scheme, including: knowledge translation, monitoring & evaluation, and information related to organizational forms. This process was repeated through several rounds of analysis where I continuously re-visited the data and literature, and further identified patterns and relationships between codes. These patterns and relationships were further verified through consultations and conversations with the primary investigator. Finally, selective coding was utilized to connect categories and codes together to form a descriptive narrative account, or theoretical propositions forming a “story” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This is also described as the final step in the data analysis spiral before representing and reporting the data. This involves developing and assessing interpretations around the patterns, themes and categories generated by the analysis (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The result of this coding
process is a thick description of the central or core phenomenon of the research, herein namely related to the organization and responsibility of legacy delivery.

**Chapter 6: Organizational Learning & Governance.** This section of research examined the relationship between knowledge translation and governance of event legacies and/or leveraging strategies. While knowledge translation did not emerge as a prominent theme during the literature review and research synthesis, it was so prominent and distinct within the interviews that I revisited and reanalyzed the data with regards to transfer of knowledge (KOT) with regards to organizational forms. In this section I utilized Nonaka’s (1991, 1994) theory of organizational learning to explore how the governance of event legacy/and or leveraging strategies is further supported by the use of knowledge translation. Specifically, using the data analysis from Chapter 5, I further explored the organizational learning between events and hosts to understand how KOT is integral to the governance process.
References


qualitative research. Chicago: Aldine.


Chapter 4: Event Legacy and Leveraging Mechanisms

After the inclusion of legacy into IOC Host City Contract (HCC) and bidding documents, there has been a proliferation of research examining event legacy (Misener, Darcy, Legg & Gilbert, 2013). With numerous communities reporting negative or unrealized impacts from SMEs (REF), researchers have increasingly turned to leveraging strategies to embed sustainable event impacts into planning processes. As a result, there is a large amount of empirical data from SMEs across the globe, but previous researchers have not yet synthesized this information into consolidated legacy delivery and/or leveraging strategies. This study examined how previous scholars have articulated organizational forms of legacy delivery through empirical data collected from previous events.

Previous researchers (Andranovich, Burbank & Heying 2001; Burbank, Andranovich & Heying, 2001) have demonstrated that private-public partnerships (PPP) surround the event bidding and hosting environment. These interrelated, multi-level organizational forms enable unprecedented access to resources, policy, and power (Andranovich, Burbank & Heying 2001), needed to host an event of Olympic proportions. Within organizational literature these forms are referred to as hybrid organizations, wherein “the activities, structures, processes and meanings by which organizations make sense of and combine aspects of multiple organizational forms” (Battaliana & Lee, 2014, p. 398). There is a distinct lack of research examining the specific relationships within these organizational forms, and the mechanisms by which they deliver legacy and/or leveraging strategies. The organizational forms described within this chapter were built upon previous literature of sport event legacies, wherein multiple organizations and individuals are conceptualizing and delivering legacy. The final typology of organizational forms were based upon consulting and discussing with the primary investigator and a constant revisiting of the literature on organizational governance. Specifically, utilizing the literature describing hybrid
organizational forms was crucial in understanding the purpose and composition of these forms, and how they fit within the sport event landscape.

The systematic review was chosen to be able to provide comprehensive sampling across sport management literature, combined with exclusionary criteria (Weed, 2005). A total of 38 articles matched the final inclusion criteria as described in Chapter 3 in the previous methodology section and were analyzed herein. It is worth noting that there was a vast amount of literature excluded from the initial data collection steps, as very few articles actually examined responsibility within the context of legacy. Since there was a sparse amount of literature with a wide breadth of research directions, I have described each article and categorized it as such per the individual legacy initiative. This specific focus allowed the description of power and responsibility within the individual legacy objective. For example, the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games may appear in more than one category based upon who was responsible for delivering the specific objectives.

While most OCs took similar hybrid organizational forms, they were not the only groups observed responsible for delivering specific legacy objectives. Upon analysis, there were five distinct variations in organizational forms responsible for delivering legacy, seen in Table 4.1, with varying degrees of “success” in their strategic delivery of legacy objectives. As I seek to contribute to the discussion surrounding the rhetoric surrounding legacy versus leveraging posed by Chalip (2017), Table 4.1 also indicates the articles’ position within Chalip’s framing (as previously noted in Chapter 2). This becomes particularly useful when comparing the respective strategies and outcomes for each of the studies, as well as looking comparatively at different Games. The following section describes the different organizational forms taking shape to execute and deliver
Table 4.1

**Synthesis of Empirical Evidence Surrounding Legacy Delivery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Form</th>
<th>General Outcomes of Organizational Form</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Legacy or Leverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Hybrid Organizing Committee | • Very few legacy partners openly prepared to claim responsibility or accountability for achieving objectives pre-Games.  
• Many stakeholders legitimized and authenticated legacy without critically evaluating it beyond the aesthetic surface.  
• Abandonment of pre-Games targets and accompanying policies.  
• Regional legacy definition contested amongst stakeholders.  
• Increased intra-regional collaboration, but weakened capacity with lack of direction and resources.  
• Legacy policy not designed to enable local strategies (vague policy mandates), resulted in many unfulfilled legacies.  
• Formal legacy strategy not conceptualized with no post-event legacy plan.  
• Discrepancy between external requirements and local/national realities.  
• Leveraging data unreliable; impacts/effects thus unknown.  
• Olympic endorsement bestowed legitimacy, but also hindered access to other networks (through IOC sanctions).  
• Increased success with legacy embedded throughout planning processes.  
• Positive benefits delivered to local communities (social, economic) through event-themed programme. | Bell & Gallimore, 2015 | Leverage |
<p>| | | Bellas &amp; Oliver, 2016 | Legacy |
| | | Bloyce &amp; Lovette, 2012 | Legacy |
| | | Bretherton, Piggin &amp; Bodet, 2016 | Legacy |
| | | Chen &amp; Henry, 2016 | Leverage |
| | | Chen &amp; Misener, 2019 | Legacy |
| | | Christie &amp; Gibb, 2015 | Legacy |
| | | Gilmore, 2013 | Legacy |
| | | Kellett, Hede &amp; Chalip, 2008 | Leverage |
| | | Leopkey &amp; Parent, 2016* | Legacy |
| | | Misener, McGillivray, McPherson, &amp; Legg, 2015 | Leverage |
| | | O'Brien, 2006 | Leverage |
| | | Orr &amp; Jarvis, 2018 | Legacy |
| | | Pereira, Mascarenhas, Flores, &amp; Pires, 2015 | Leverage |
| | | Rogerson, 2016 | Legacy |
| | | Samuel &amp; Stubbs, 2012 | Legacy |
| | | Sant, Mason &amp; Hinch, 2014 | Legacy |
| | | Smith &amp; Fox, 2007 | Legacy |
| | | Werner, Dickson &amp; Hyde, 2016 | Leverage |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Form</th>
<th>General Outcomes of Organizational Form</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Legacy or Leverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. Government-Directed Organizing Committee | • Questionable commitment to legacy objectives with some evidence of other positive outcomes.  
• Loss of legitimacy, weakened internal capacity and external support post-event to carry-out further (re)development.  
• Sport infrastructure and education improved, but questionable access for local population.  
• Event assumed as a catalyst for business and networking for long-term economic legacy.  
• Lack of evaluative mechanisms. | Deng, Poon & Chan, 2016  
Jung, Pope & Kirk, 2016  
K Kaplanidou, Al Emadi, Sagas, et al., 2016  
Kristiansen, Strittmatter & Skirstad, 2016  
Tichaawa & Bob, 2015  
Wang & Theodoraki, 2007 | Legacy  
Legacy  
Leverage  
Leverage  
Leverage  
Legacy |
| 3. National Governing Organizations | • Disjunction between national agenda and local realities.  
• Modest increase in rugby participation, although quoted by organizers as “not the sole reason” for increased registration.  
• Increases (albeit inconsistent) in sport participation following event, however local realities suggest that discrepancies exist | Brown & Pappous, 2018  
Frawley & Cush, 2011  
Hayday, Pappous & Koutrou, 2017  
Pappous & Hayday, 2015 | Legacy  
Legacy  
Leverage  
Legacy |
| 4. Individual Tactics | • Mixed positive visitor spending during the event, not sustained.  
• Unintended positive sport development and participation outcomes.  
• Collaboration has the potential for increasing leveraging capacity. | Bek, Merendino, Swart, & Timms, 2018  
Chalip & Leyns, 2002  
Hoskyn, Dickson & Sotiriadou, 2018  
Schulenkorf, Giannoulakis & Blom, 2019  
Taks, Misener, Chalip & Green, 2013  
Wood, Snelgrove, Legg, Taks & Potwarka, 2018 | Legacy  
Leverage  
Leverage  
Leverage  
Leverage  
Leverage |
legacy strategies; some already created and some created by circumstance in order to execute task/legacy at hand.

**Hybrid OC**

Hybrid organizational forms were reported throughout 19 articles (Bellas & Oliver, 2016; Bell & Gallimore, 2015; Bloyce & Lovett, 2012; Bretherton, Piggin, & Bodet, 2016; Chen & Henry, 2016; Chen & Misener, 2019; Christie & Gibb, 2015; Gilmore, 2013; Kellett, Hede & Chalip, 2008; Leopkey & Parent, 2016; Misener, McGillivray, McPherson, & Legg, 2015; O’Brien, 2006; Orr & Jarvis, 2018; Pereira, Mascarenhas, Flores, & Pires, 2015; Rogerson, 2016; Samuel & Stubbs, 2012; Sant, Mason & Hinch, 2014; Smith & Fox, 2007; Werner, Dickson, & Hyde, 2016). Herein they have been categorized into two specific subcategories: hybrid multi-agency OC, and hybrid localized OC. These subcategories were created based upon the increased power to more localized individuals and organizations, versus the standard multi-agency OC, wherein power over legacy delivery was observed at a higher level publicly (I.E., federally).

**Hybrid multi-agency OC.** The most common form utilized by legacy organizers was the traditional multi-agency OC, a version of the PPPs that characterize event execution. A total of 12 articles detailed legacy delivery through hybrid multi-agency OCs (Bellas & Oliver, 2016; Bloyce & Lovett, 2012; Bretherton, Piggin, & Bodet, 2016; Christie & Gibb, 2015; Kellett, Hede &
At the 2000 Olympic Games, authors Leopkey and Parent (2016) found that although the OC both conceptualized and delivered legacy, there was no formalized legacy strategy, including nothing for crucial post-event legacy plans. A New South Wales (NSW) government agency, the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) was responsible for the development and management of the Sydney Olympic Park and Sydney Harbour during gamestime, and over one year after the Games the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) was created by the NSW government to develop and manage the former Olympic site for future sport and event use. Leopkey and Parent (2016) further demonstrated that without post-event legacy plans prior to the Games, SOPA has taken almost a decade to develop into its full potential and have since focused on a strategic plan for future use versus the original design of “trying to be everything to everyone” (p.9).

The Sydney 2000 Games also presented an opportunity for economic development, within the state-initiated program, Business Club Australia (BCA). O’Brien (2006) described the BCA as a positive business networking opportunity to connect and build relationships with many international corporations and to develop Australia’s position within the world economy. The BCA was a leveraging initiative conceptualized by the state government and delivered by a multitude of public and private partners, many with overlapping roles on the OC. While there is a distinct lack of reliable data to determine the impacts and resultant effects of the leveraging initiative, the BCA was still deemed an overall success by organizers.

At the 2006 Victoria Commonwealth Games (CWG), authors Kellett, Hede, and Chalip (2008) uncovered a much different relationship between those conceptualizing legacy and those
delivering outcomes. The state government within the multi-agency OC set the legacy objectives and parameters for municipalities to design their own strategies involving hosting and welcoming international teams during the Games. Kellett and colleagues (2008) further argued that without sufficient direction from the OC, many local organizers were overwhelmed with the creation and steering of legacy outcomes without any resources or funding. As a result of the vague policy mandates, and lack of strategic vision, outcomes varied across municipalities, including many who experienced unfulfilled legacies where nothing was done, and no opportunities were created. In contrast, several municipalities were able to utilize the Games as an opportunity for the creation of human legacies, described by the city of Port Philip as “engaging community-improving existing relationships, forging new relationships, and understanding community groups better” (Kellett et al., 2008). Kellett and colleagues (2008) asserted that while several municipalities were able to capitalize on the Games, the overall legacy of the 2006 CWG was a spectrum of outcomes inconsistent to the original policy design, resulting in many unfulfilled legacies.

Authors Werner, Dixon, and Hyde (2016) studied the 2011 New Zealand Rugby World Cup (2011 RWC), which aimed to increase and facilitate collaboration between tourism partners. While they found evidence of increased collaboration, a competitive dilemma was created as a result, whereby smaller businesses and organizations struggled for inclusion within leveraging strategies (Werner et al., 2016). Werner and colleagues (2016) further found that the intra-regional network of tourism partners experienced increased collaboration, but the lack of a comprehensive strategy resulted in many constraints upon organizations’ capacity, including a lack of common goals, communication and willingness to cooperate; limited resources the exclusion of smaller, local businesses.
Three articles examined the multi-agency OC that conceptualized and executed some of the legacy strategies for the 2012 London Olympic Games. For the 2012 Games, the national Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) defined and published legacy objectives, including the promise of getting 2 million people in the UK more physically active by the time of the Games (Bloyce & Lovett, 2012). Of particular interest is the aforementioned promise surrounding increased sport and physical activity participation, specifically the commitment of getting 2 million more people active by the 2012 Games (Bloyce & Lovett, 2012). In examining policies and documents leading up to the Games, authors Bloyce and Lovette (2012) found that very few legacy partners were openly prepared to claim responsibility for achieving specific legacy objectives or targets, even with the creation of the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012 (CSL 2012) in 2007 to monitor the delivery of legacies. Bloyce and Lovett (2012) asserted that the increasing number of involved actors combined with the numerous outcomes and programmes created made the network surrounding legacy more complex, with diminished control of communication, resources and the execution of legacy itself. The authors further argued that although a ‘plethora’ of stakeholders committed to delivering various aspects of the legacy programmes, “each organization…demonstrated how they will be enabled by their involvement in legacy planning yet avoided taking ‘front-line’ responsibility for being accountable” (Bloyce & Lovett, 2012, p.370).

Further, Bretherton and colleagues (2016) found that multiple agencies within the 2012 OC were attempting to define and plan for the sport and physical activity legacy, with no actual movements forward leading up to the Games. The authors noted that how the legacy was to be executed and measured was strongly disputed across stakeholders, and as a result the pre-Games
targets were abandoned and organizers focused on reaching a young demographic, versus the nationwide benefits originally promised within the bid (Bretherton et al., 2016).

In contrast, Samuels and Stubbs (2012) noted that the less popular legacy objective of environmental sustainability was quietly implanted within the planning process for London 2012, resulting in a deeply embedded commitment to the environmental legacy promise. While no specific department or organization was responsible for enacting the legacy, strategies to embed the legacy included full environmental impact assessments within the bid document, as well as developmental compliance policies with key environmental indicators, to ensure minimal carbon footprinting surrounding Olympic construction and/or staging (Samuel & Stubbs, 2012). This is one particular dimension of the London Olympic legacy deemed successful, as all members of the OC were held accountable to the environmental commitment through the embeddedness of the promise.

Similarly, in preparations for the 2014 Glasgow CWG, several authors noted the unique planning process, wherein the concept of legacy was embedded in order to plan for long-term outcomes, “develop legacy momentum, [and] to co-design legacy alongside delivery” (Rogerson, 2016, p.505). As previously mentioned, the embedding of legacy within planning structures has the potential for positive outcomes, particularly in the inclusion of long-term planning beyond event hosting. According to Rogerson (2016), legacy planning structures were set up from the initial stages of event preparation and all of the main partners involved in delivery of the Games were directly involved in the generation of legacies. As Rogerson’s (2016) analysis was surrounding the framing of legacies, there was no evaluation of responsibility or delivery of legacy.

Authors Christie and Gibb (2015) examined the collaborative processes surrounding legacy delivery leading up to the 2014 CWG. The authors describe the Glasgow Legacy Board (GLB) as
a typical multi-level/agency/actor arrangement created to specifically coordinate the delivery of legacy objectives alongside the OC. In addition the Glasgow City Council (GCC) allocated clear political responsibilities to steer the delivery of CWG responsibilities, including that the political leader of the GCC was to be responsible for the “Social Renewal” legacy (Christie & Gibb, 2015). While no evaluation of legacy or responsibility of legacy delivery was included, Christie and Gibb (2015) assert that the cross-agency synergies created by the new collaborative processes and mechanisms will serve as a valuable legacy in itself. Misener and colleagues (2015) described the multi-layered policy environment surrounding the 2014 CWG as “problematic” (p.465), with the responsibility of objectives difficult to pinpoint. In their examination of disability and inclusion, Misener and colleagues (2015) further argued that the integrated OC (including both able-bodied- and parasport at CWG) was intended to positively affect planning processes in order to create opportunities for community participation, and positively influence attitudes towards disability. In reality, the lack of clear and precise projects relating to the legacy objectives, particularly those pertaining to accessibility and inclusion, demonstrated the discrepancies existing between the bid requirements at the state level, and the social realities of local “recipients” of legacy outcomes (Misener et al., 2015). In addition the authors asserted that the integrated OC may have detracted from leveragable opportunities for improved accessibility and inclusion, as no one person or organization actually ‘owned’ the responsibility for the legacy objectives (Misener et al., 2015).

The 2015 Toronto Pan/Parapan American Games were examined by several authors in two publications. Authors Orr and Jarvis (2018) interviewed various Games stakeholders and found that while some respondents had a basic awareness of the term legacy, very few understood the holistic definition, considering the temporal, hard/soft, or negative elements (Orr & Jarvis, 2018). This was echoed throughout interviews, as “even the respondents with high degrees of
involvement in the Games did not have consistent answers to the question about defining legacies” (Orr & Jarvis, 2018, p.375), demonstrating the lack of knowledge and understanding of organizers regarding the conceptualization of event legacies. Discussion of responsibility was not included in this research.

Lastly, Bellas and Oliver (2016) examined how, in the pursuit of urban revitalization, the 2015 Toronto Pan/Parapan American Games also employed a multi-agency OC for delivering legacy outcomes. Although multiple levels of government are always involved in major event bidding, the provincial government both initiated and designed the Toronto 2015 bid versus the usual public-private sector partnerships, and the province owned the majority of the land where infrastructure construction was to take place. The bid’s legacy commitments centered around two specific promises: improved sporting infrastructure, and a new community generated around the iconic waterfront landscape of downtown Toronto. Herein Bellas and Oliver (2016) noted that the provincial government utilized coercive policy mechanisms (a tripartite agreement), to prioritize the waterfront development and ensure its completion by Games-time, thus ensuring the responsibility of the physical legacy. The authors assert that many stakeholders legitimized the legacy plans without “critically evaluating it beyond the aesthetic surface” (Bellas & Oliver, 2016, p.686). Bellas and Oliver (2016) concluded that the resultant legacy included piecemeal development surrounding the downtown waterfront, but without the envisioned revitalization from the bid document, indicating the prioritization of the commercialization aspect of the Games’ legacies.

**Hybrid Localized OC.** A more localized multi-agency OC was reported in seven (n=7) articles, wherein regional or local organizers were responsible for delivering legacy outcomes (Bell & Gallimore, 2015; Chen & Henry, 2016; Chen & Misener, 2019; Gilmore, 2013; Pereira,
Mascarenhas, Flores, & Pires, 2015; Sant, Mason & Hinch, 2015; Smith & Fox, 2007). While the OC still conformed to the above hybrid organizational form, legacy initiatives and organizers in this category were more locally involved than the standard OC. Smith and Fox (2007) analyzed the unique event-themed legacy programming for the 2002 Manchester CWG, where projects were funded across a wide-range of community objectives. The regional multi-agency OC implemented a state-funded competition for legacy projects with extensive monitoring to ensure communities and organizations were delivering the intended outcomes (Smith & Fox, 2007). Smith and Fox (2007) noted that the roles and responsibilities within each project were described in detail in order to receive funding, as well as the appropriate procedures for measurement and evaluation. As a result, numerous benefits were delivered to local communities through documented evidence: jobs created, volunteer organizations supported, disadvantaged populations engaged etc. (Smith & Fox, 2007).

Several years later upon the win of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic bid, the provincial government of British Columbia (BC) mandated that the tourism sector utilize the Games for increased tourism activity throughout BC and Canada. Authors Sant, Mason and Hinch (2014) described how discrepancies between national and local definitions of touristic legacies provoked the tourism sector to created a regional consortium to fully leverage the event and its opportunities. The authors noted that the consortium employed the use of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in order to better leverage the collaboration of the tourism sector without provincial jurisdiction (Sant et al., 2015). While the related event, sport and tourism infrastructure development will ensure a lasting touristic legacy, actual data is unavailable for publication regarding tourism economic activity.
In Portimão, Portugal, Pereria and colleagues (2015) examined the city’s event portfolio strategy over the course of a year and six events. The localized organizing committee attempted to strategically leverage outcomes based on Chalip’s model for social (2006) and economic (2004) leverage, and worked in accordance with the external private organization that owned the rights to the events (Pereria et al., 2015). The authors determined that while “synergies between economic and social leveraging can be achieved” (Pereria et al., 2015, p.42), there still remained an unclear vision of several strategic goals. While the core strategic goal was to enhance the destination image for Portimão, the actors involved expressed divergent positions regarding the other goals from Chalip’s leveraging models (e.g., foster social interaction, optimize total trade and revenue, etc.).

According to Pereria and colleagues (2015), “an unclear definition of goals and a lack of coordination prompted insufficient implementation processes, which failed to grasp opportunities and consequently achieve the other categories of goals in the economic and social leveraging models” (p.43). The authors demonstrated that the lack of definition of strategic goals within event leveraging groups leads to unfulfilled promises. This is partially attributed to the leadership of the external private organization that owns the events, as local organizers ultimately had to work with and through their institutional influence.

Numerous authors (Bloyce & Lovett, 2012.; Bretherton, Piggin, & Bodet, 2016; Chen & Henry, 2016; Chen & Misener, 2019; Gilmore, 2013; Hayday, Pappous, & Koutrou, 2017; Jung, Pope, & Kirk, 2016; Pappous & Hayday, 2015; Samuel & Stubbs, 2012) noted how the UK government conceptualized legacy as “provid[ing] benefits to communities across the UK” (DCMS, as cited in Bell & Gallimore, 2015), while encouraging localised legacy planning through public policies. As the DCMS was in charge of overseeing all UK-legacy planning, they engaged with local communities and/or burroughs to implement localized legacy processes. Although the
process of legacy conceptualization has been top-down from national government from the outset, the London 2012 OC enabled communities to participate in the conceptualization of localized legacy plans, albeit within the parameters of the DCMS’ objectives. The London 2012 Olympic Games utilized non-host OCs in the delivery of both cultural and physical activity outcomes to communities. Gilmore (2014) examined the regional agency that was developed in the North West of London to deliver “cultural programming” (p. 33), as mandated by the state government. The cultural development program was seen as able to capitalize on social and regenerative outcomes, however the regional legacy definition was strongly contested amongst stakeholders. As a result, localized legacy plans were “pragmatically hazy” (Gilmore, 2013, p. 37) and did not strategically approach the objectives in question, rendering its direct impact unknown.

Also in London, both Bell and Gallimore (2015), and Chen and Henry (2016) analyzed regional steering groups from the 2012 Games and their respective policies aimed at increasing physical activity. Bell and Gallimore (2015) examined how the city of Cheshire utilized the DCMS’ Embrace the Games (EtG) framework to leverage citywide opportunities for sport and physical activity participation. While Games-related activities were well-attended throughout the city, the authors concluded that there were no increases in participation, and that relevant cross-sectoral partnerships and collaboration also ceased upon the conclusion of the Games (Bell & Gallimore, 2015).

Chen and Misener (2019) examined the leveraging strategies of Leicestershire, a nonhost region during the 2012 Games. Local authorities and stakeholders had formulated a leveraging group and strategy that spanned across seven objectives of business, sport and physical activity, health and well-being, children and young people, culture, volunteering, and touristic economy (Chen & Misener, 2019). The dedicated leveraging group was perceived “as being significant in
terms of how the quantity and quality of London 2012–related activities delivered in the subregion compared with other subregions” (Chen & Misener, 2019, p.285). The authors further that nonhost region event leverage is possible with a dedicated leveraging group, even in areas with resource or financial scarcity (Chen & Misener, 2019).

Chen and Henry (2016) also examined a piece of Leicestershire’s legacy strategy during the 2012 Games. Leicestershire’s workplace physical activity policy, enacted by the surrounding county’s sport partnership, Leicester-Shire & Rutland Sport (LRS), who was the agency responsible for delivering the sport strand in the respective region. The authors reported modest improvements to levels of physical activity, but those previously inactive manifested the lowest impact. The most successful workplaces implementing the policy were the local authority offices where the policy was created and initiated, identifying a [non-surprising] link to the embeddedness of the policy. In addition, there was a clear disjunction surrounding data in both Chen and Henry’s (2016) and Ball and Gallimore’s (2015) studies, pertaining to both a lack of data available, and differences between national and local data, where local numbers identified a weak correlation to the policy at best.

Both organizational forms of the hybrid OC demonstrated various mechanisms previously utilized in the delivery of legacy. The increased tension amongst organizers, as well as the unclear definition of legacy and/or objectives, represent the vast number of interests involved in these types of organizations. Within hybrid organizing, these are referred to as competing logics, or the core drivers of the collaboration (Battaliana & Lee, 2014). It appears that without localized engagement, there is a distinct lack of responsibility or accountability for legacy delivery within hybrid OCs.

**Government-directed OC**
Several authors (Deng, Poon, & Chan, 2016; Jung et al., 2016; Kaplanidou, Al Emadi, Sagas, Diop, & Fritz, 2014; Kristiansen, Strittmatter, & Skirstad, 2016; Tichaawa & Bob, 2015; Wang & Theodoraki, 2007) noted that government formally directed the OC in their planning processes. In other words, specific legacy strategies were directly controlled by the government, in contrast to prior categories where state government played a much lesser role in legacy delivery and a greater role in shaping overall SME delivery. As well, private industry had a much lesser role in the legacy processes, both in conceptualization and delivery. The planning in this category is described as strict and controlling in undemocratic nations (China, Qatar), and as a tactical strategy for resources in democratic countries (UK, Austria & Liechtenstein). A total of 6 articles were found to analyze government-led or directed OCs executing the legacy strategy.

In preparations for the 2022 Qatar World Cup (Qatar 2022), Kaplanidou and colleagues (2016) examined legacy preparations and objectives designed by the Qatari state government. The rise of emerging states or BRIC (Brazil, Russia, Indian and China) nations hosting mega events over the past decade has been of particular interest to researchers capturing the ‘soft power’ potential of international mega events, and Qatar is no exception (e.g. Foley, McGillivray, & McPherson, 2012). McGillivray and McPherson (2012) note that the 2022 World Cup was the first awarded to an Arab nation, and that the opportunity for a global media audience is one that the Qatari government intends on capitalising on in order to demonstrate Qatar’s post-oil transformation into a rapidly developing country (Kaplanidou et al., 2016). The main motivation behind hosting Qatar 2022, however, is to use the event as a catalyst for business and networking to leave a long-term economic legacy for the country of Qatar and its hosting communities (Kaplanidou et al., 2016). The multi-agency OC, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (SCDL 2022), was created and directed by the Qatari monarchy, alongside various sport, business and tourism
stakeholders (Kaplanidou et al, 2016). Qatar 2022 epitomises the top-down planning process for legacy, as the national government has conceptualised legacy within the bid document, and has the absolute power to execute them as per their own design. While Qatar’s legacy is yet to be realized for the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup, Kaplanidou and colleagues (2016) found a definitive lack of critical or evaluative mechanisms in place, and assume the event will act as a catalyst for many of the widespread impacts depicted in the bid document.

For the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, authors Tichaawa & Bob (2015) examined the African Legacy Programme initiated by organizers, designed to leave a lasting pan-African legacy. The programme was the joint responsibility of the South African federal government and the local multi-agency OC, and was conceptualized as a catalyst to spur socioeconomic growth and development not just in South Africa, but the African continent as a whole (Tichaawa & Bob, 2015). The authors findings indicated that the definition of legacy was not well-communicated outside of South Africa, and program intentions may have been lost in the many layers of personnel between the OC and local communities, leaving the final legacy unknown (Tichaawa & Bob, 2015).

In their examination of the 2010 Shanghai Expo, authors Deng, Poon and Chan (2016) described how the communist Chinese government created the overarching legacy goal of “Better City, Better Life” (p.167) to revitalise a former industrial area of Shanghai. The bid promised a legacy of urban renewal, and the Chinese government quickly began creating organizations to pursue related legacy outcomes. The post-event strategy lost legitimacy, weakened internal capacity and external support without government association, and was not strategically designed to support the “Better City, Better Life” tagline of the 2010 Expo.
The increased influence of the Chinese communist party is further illustrated by the earlier hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, where Wang and Theodoraki (2007) analyzed how the national government defined and outlined legacy commitments. Within the bidding document, the centrepiece of the legacy objectives was the increase in mass sport participation throughout the Chinese hosting cities (Wang & Theodoraki, 2007). The authors noted that in Qingdao, the city that hosted the Olympic Sailing event, the Chinese national government designed the legacy objectives and then mandated local government to further plan and execute various sport participation initiatives.

For the 2012 London Olympics, it has already been described how the UK government/DCMS conceptualized legacy outcomes relating to sport and physical activity early in the planning process. Jung, Pope and Kirk (2016) examined how the British government also implemented physical education (PE) policies to complement legacy objectives; policies which reinforced competition between schools, while setting rigid guidelines for PE and sport participation. While schools and instructors were ultimately responsible for delivering increased time spent in PE, Jung and colleagues (2016) asserted that the schools “were [also]urged to take responsibility” (p.14) in providing increased competitive sporting opportunities for students. After the 2010 election, the Coalition government ceased their increased attention and funding to PE programmes, and the resultant legacy from the PE policies remains unknown. In addition, the authors described how the policies were intentionally designed to feed national elite sport development programmes, versus engaging more people to be physically active across the nation (Jung, Pope & Kirk, 2016). Herein lies another example of a disconnect between those elite individuals planning legacies, and the realities of those non-elite citizens, particularly within a physical activity participation model.
Kristiansen, Strittmatter and Skistad (2016) found that the 2015 European Youth Olympic Festival (EYOF) did not publish targeted legacy outcomes, but emphasized a legacy of international cooperation through its dual-country hosts of Austria and Liechtenstein. The authors noted the strengthened cross-border relationships between the two host countries regardless of event strategies, due to the close-knit nature of the combined OC. This increased collaborative capacity was the only legacy noted by the authors.

Government-directed OCs demonstrated cohesive attempts at event legacy and/or leveraging strategies. Unfortunately, the opportunities and benefits garnered from these organizational forms faded with the conclusion of the event, and the governments’ resulting lack of prioritization. As well, researchers identified that benefits to local populations was questionable with the lack of evaluative mechanisms within event strategies. The lack of hybridity within these organizational forms decreased the amount of internal conflict, and provided ample resources dedicated to legacy and/or leveraging strategies. Without definitive evaluative or sustainable mechanisms in place, impacts will be unrealized or unequally distributed amongst community members.

**National Governing Organization**

Several authors noted that national governing body (NGB) for sport were held responsible for delivering legacy outcomes. NSOs had a major role in executing legacy strategies in three articles (Brown & Pappous, 2018; Frawley & Cush, 2011; Hayday et al., 2017; Pappous & Hayday, 2015). For the 2003 Australian RWC, authors Frawley and Cush (2011) reported that the rugby NSO articulated a sport participation legacy, but assumed a trickle-down flow of players. While the authors observed a modest increase in junior men rugby participation post-event, it was quoted by organizers as not the sole reason for increased registration (Frawley & Cush, 2011). No
leveraging strategies were utilized, but educational rugby programs in place since the 1990s are suspected to have played a role in increasing participation (Frawley & Cush, 2011). Senior managers referred to the continued investment into their rugby development programming and highlighted its’ importance in increasing long-term participation (Frawley & Cush, 2011).

More recently at the 2012 London Olympics, the DCMS set mechanisms for NSOs to receive funding based on models of increasing sport participation (Brown & Pappous, 2018; Hayday et al., 2017; Pappous & Hayday, 2015). These NSOs, or National Governing Bodies (NGBs), were delegated with the responsibility of According to Hayday and colleagues (2017), while each of the NGBs were responsible for creating participatory strategies, they were not aligned with local clubs, who were responsible for executing the national strategies to their communities, resulting in increased competition between clubs and organization. No evidence of increased participation was noted (Hayday et al., 2017). Authors Brown and Pappous (2018) furthered that the lack of a participation legacy, particularly for those with a physical disability, was due to the NGB’s previously mentioned lack of knowledge and capacity, and a temporal conflict with the OC. As the OC and DCMS administered legacy from the top-down, organizers were focused increasingly on participatory numbers versus creating sustainable structures for participation (Brown & Pappous, 2018). The lack of coordinated leveraging strategies

In contrast, under the same NBG model, Pappous & Hayday (2015) found that small increases in grassroots sport participation, albeit inconsistently across sports. Further, the authors assert that discrepancies were noted between qualitative and quantitative data at the local and national level, and one sport experienced much lower participation numbers in the years preceding the Games (Pappous & Hayday, 2015). These studies, as well as the work of Frawley & Cush
(2011) suggested that there is a detachment between the NGB’s funding strategy and the local realities of clubs and communities, stopping them from delivery legacy strategies effectively.

NSOs/NGBs are a critical component of Australian, Canadian, and UK sport infrastructure delivering both grassroots and high performance sport programming (Hayday, Pappous & Koutrou, 2016). The reliance on NSOs to deliver event legacy objectives is further complicated by the top-down creation of objectives, wherein those targets may not be compatible with both the NSO and its’ member organizations. As well, the lack of organizational mechanisms for local sport organizations to collaborate with either NSO or OC, contributed to increased confusion and conflict. While internal conflict was lessened due to the lack of hybridity, the logics of localized sport organizations was in direct conflict with the NSO and the OC. These competing logics were also prevalent between local sport organizers and the OC, as the OC was focused on the temporal, event-hosting timeline, whereas sport organizers were concerned about sustaining or growing participation in the long-term.

**Individual Tactics/Entrepreneurial Organizational Form**

Several authors (n=6) have noted in the literature where legacy outcomes have been realized or delivered, through individual tactics (Bek, Merendino, Swart, & Timms, 2018; Chalip & Leyns, 2002; Hoskyn, Dickson, & Sotiriadou, 2018; Schulenkorf, Giannoulakis, & Blom, 2019; Taks, Misener, Chalip, & Green, 2013; Wood, Snelgrove, Legg, Taks & Potwarka, 2018). While these outcomes may be regarded as a legacy of the event by organizers, it is problematic to assume that the function of event leveraging is to produce a legacy. Leveraging strategies must be created and produced separately on a distinct timeline from the event. In this way, the organizational form was regarded as more of individual entrepreneurial efforts to leverage the events for various outcomes. At the 1999 Gold Coast Honda Indy (GCHI), authors Chalip and Leyns (2002)
examined local businesses attempting to leverage the event for economic stimulation. Unfortunately, the authors reported that the businesses were poorly coordinated in their attempt to produce sustainable outcomes, visitor spending was not sustained post-event, and many potentials for leveraging were left largely unrealized (Chalip & Leyns, 2002). While the responsibility of executing strategies was left to inexperienced business owners, local organizations did not want an external coordinating body to focus on leveraging strategies, and preferred to execute individual tactics (Chalip & Leyns, 2002).

Authors Bek, Merendino, Swart and Timms (2018) investigated a sports facility legacy project during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. A local organizer and business owner in Gansbaai, a disadvantaged, remote non-host region in the Western Cape, developed a multi-purpose sports facility for the residents in the Gansbaai region, using the 2010 World Cup to garner attention and traction with locals (Bek, Merendino, Swart & Timms, 2018). International funding and government alignment were possible through the individual organizer’s strong business ties, “strong management, good governance and effective networking” (Bek, Merendino, Swart & Timms, 2018, p. 450). The project has ensured long-term viability through funding linked to broader sport NGOs, and municipal responsibility for facility maintenance (Bek, Merendino, Swart & Timms, 2018).

Schulenkorf and colleagues (2018) examined a smaller-sized event in Greece, the Spetses Mini Marathon, where a private communication and public relations company stages an annual, non-elite, mass participation event in conjunction with the local community. The authors determined that the participatory community model surrounding the SMM’s strategy enabled for successful leverage of social, cultural, economic, and sport participation outcomes for the local community (Schulenkorf, Giannoulakis & Blom, 2019). While local organizers do not always have
the capacity for successful leverage of events, the smaller-scale nature of events such as the Spetses Mini Marathon offers opportunities and possibilities that a SME or large-scale event cannot afford. The authors argued that “the small-scale nature of the event was an important factor for the successful generation of community benefits...as the close engagement between the change agent and the local community resulted in a common vision, trustworthy networks, and reciprocal support” (Schulenkorf, 2019, p.515). The smaller-scale nature of this event was found as beneficial for delivering more localized impacts and meaningful community engagement.

Wood and colleagues (2018) examined the leveraging tactics utilized by 16 local restaurants during three medium-sized multi-sport events over the course of two summers. The authors found that the majority of restaurants did not engage in leveraging opportunities due to a lack of belief in leverageable benefits, inconvenient event proximity, and lack of preparedness (Wood, Snelgrove, Legg, Taks, Potwarka, 2018). In particular, the majority of restaurants said that a lack of belief in benefits from leveraging were largely shaped by the lack of trust in city official’s claims of promised impacts. The local tourism organization was constrained in its’ actions and ability to assist local businesses by a lack of event awareness and local engagement, and limited resources (Wood et al., 2018). Wood and colleagues (2018) concluded that if leveraging local benefits from events hosting is important for local organizers, leadership from a supporting agency is necessary, and local businesses need “prioritized attention..., shared financial and human resources and information” (p. 47). Local businesses, including touristic organizations and municipal offices, require additional knowledge and resources to understand leveraging strategies and tactics to accrue beneficial event impacts.

Taks, Misener, Chalip, and Green (2013) examined two events that took place in the city of Windsor, Ontario: the 2005 PanAm Junior Athletic Championships and the 2005 Canadian
National Figure Skating Championships (CNFSC). Both events utilized the typical legacy framework: that the event in and of itself will be enough to generate positive outcomes, and thus sport participation and development were not articulated as objectives. Taks and colleagues (2013) further argued that the only leveraging strategy utilized was CNFSC invited local groups to watch the event, assuming a positive demonstration effect. While neither event generated an actual increase in participation numbers, the authors reported unintended positive sport development and participation outcome numbers (i.e., human and physical capitals enhanced with new facilities, equipment and opportunities for growth) (Taks et al., 2013).

Similarly, authors Hoskyn, Dickson and Sotiriadou (2018) looked at the sport participation leveraging strategy by local clubs from two medium-sized events from the World Tennis Association tour. Organizers offered free lessons to event attendees, in hopes to convert spectators into club members. Although less than 10% of spectators showed interest in the potential opportunity, and at most 4 clubs “recruited at least one new member from the initiative...[t]here was optimism that others would join for the following season” (Hoskyn, Dickson, & Sotiriadou, 2018, p.207). The authors demonstrated that the collaborative capacity of the local clubs has the potential to overcome the aforementioned “capacity or resource-related challenges” (Hoskyn, Dickson, & Sotiriadou, 2018, p.210), and may contribute to assisting local sport organizers with leveraging strategies. The evidence presented by the authors demonstrate that local clubs lack the resources and skills to fully leverage events for participation.

The evidence offered by this organizational form (or lack thereof), echoes previous research that event impacts do not occur by mere happenstance (Chalip, 2006; Misener et al., 2015; O’Brien, 2007; O’Brien & Chalip, 2007). Local organizers lack the knowledge and resources to be able to successfully leverage positive impacts from an event. Without hybridity within the local
organizations, there is a distinct lack of expertise with regards to leveraging strategies. Hybrid structures enable collaboration and a sharing of expertise, knowledge, structure, and programs (Babiak & Thibault, 2009), which would assist local organizers in better leveraging events.

**Non-profit Organizational Collaboration**

The last organizational form describes the not-for-profit collaborations created apart from the OC to deliver legacy (n=3). This applies to the Vancouver 2010 organization *LegaciesNow* (formerly 2010LegaciesNow), which 2 articles examined (Kaplanidou & Karadakis, 2010; Leopkey & Parent, 2016); and the collaborative body the 2010 Tourism Consortium (Williams & Elkhashab, 2012). As previously described, LegaciesNow was created serve external to the OC, while utilizing their associated power and networks, in order to develop legacy strategies and deliver localized objectives. None of the researchers exploring Vancouver 2010 examined how organizational theories could contribute to a broader understanding of event legacy and/or leveraging strategies. In addition, there is a distinct lack of focus on the responsibility for legacy delivery, as well as a lack of exploration into organizational forms and specific mechanisms.

In their examination of legacy as a marketing tool, authors Kaplanidou and Karadakis (2010) noted that amongst stakeholders there was a consensus that the very definition of legacy was a continuation of programs and initiatives post-event, demonstrating the very embeddedness of legacy throughout the planning processes. Authors Leopkey and Parent (2016) further argued that the extensive post-event plans put into place with clear responsibilities allowed for the creation of a surplus budget to finance local sport groups, thus ensuring a lasting sporting legacy. Leopkey and Parent (2016) reported that while the Vancouver OC would be responsible for the main planning and staging of the Games, LegaciesNow focused specifically on delivering outcomes to a myriad of groups, organizations and communities across BC.
In contrast, authors Williams and Elkashab (2012) examined the 2010 Tourism Consortium, a non-profit collaboration between local tourism organizations, also at the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. While Williams and Elkashab (2012) are the only other authors to consider the Consortium’s actions within a leveraging framework, they do not utilize organizational theories to capture the mechanisms and forms relevant to legacy delivery. Within their case study, the authors found that the Consortium was positioned amongst members as an intervention amongst “the traditional Games planning and delivery process” (Williams & Elkhashab, 2012, p.328). The collaborators shared resources, personnel and strategies to cross-leverage the Games in a more meaningful way than any individual organization could. As a result, the Consortium leveraged a range of benefits, particularly social capital, afforded using the described ‘once-in-a-lifetime-opportunity’ of Vancouver 2010.

The non-profit collaborative organizational form demonstrated several opportunities within event leveraging strategies. Firstly, the hybridity of the organizations allowed for the sharing of knowledge, expertise and resources. As well, the long-term focus of the leveraging groups allowed for a sustainable strategy to be developed apart from the Games timeline. As a result, the temporal logic of the organizational form was not in conflict, and organizers could focus on the leveraging strategy and not the competing logic of hosting a successful event.

**Discussion**

From the research synthesis conducted, it is evident that there are many academic discussions occurring regarding event legacy and why it is so important within the event hosting space. It is also evident that scholars are not addressing how legacy is delivered, and who delivers these outcomes. Within a leveraging framework, understanding the mechanisms by which the outcomes are delivered is essential to understand the resulting strategy (and goal-driven approach).
This requires an examination of the level of responsibility and accountability in order to understand who will ‘take hold’ of the outcomes after the event. Further, the language surrounding legacy remains situated post-event, with no organizations taking responsibility prior to the event itself.

This study provides clarity into what previous scholars have found with regards to organizational forms and event legacies. Specifically, this chapter elucidates the organizational forms used in event legacy delivery and/or leveraging strategies. While all previous organizations utilized a form of hybrid organizing, those using a localized structure or distinct non-profit collaboration had an increased number of event impacts delivered and/or realized. Localized OCs, particularly nonhost OCs, may be united by a long-term process view, versus the short-term event hosting timeline. As a result, the lack of competing logics within the hybrid localized OC, has the opportunity for less conflict and increased goal achievement (Battaliana & Lee, 2014). An increasing number of communities are attempting individual tactics to lever event benefits, but without extensive prior planning and collaboration, it is unlikely impacts will be sustainable. Further, this chapter provides insight into how host communities can consider event leveraging even if they are not attached or considered part of the event.

The distinction from the OC allowed some collaborative forms to focus increasingly on delivering localized outcomes, while using the network and legitimacy to execute strategies. As per the evidence provided, this is the only organizational form presenting evidence of clear responsibilities, long-term planning, with a commitment to local sustainability within legacy delivery. Without the connection to the OC, the organizational forms were able to focus beyond the hosting of the event and devise strategies embedded within the local context. A deeper exploration into these organizational forms is needed in order to examine the level of responsibility within these forms, and how they are able to both deliver and be accountable to event outcomes.
References


Chapter 5: Long-term Legacy Strategies of Canadian Mega-Events

In the last thirty years, Canada has hosted the Commonwealth Games (1994 Victoria), the Pan Am/Parapan American Games (2015 Toronto, 1999 Winnipeg), the Winter Olympics (2010 Vancouver, 1988 Calgary), the FIFA Women’s World Cup (2015), and in 2026 will jointly host the FIFA Men’s World Cup with the United States and Mexico (FIFA, 2018). These events each have their own social, political, and economic impacts in the communities that they are hosted in, as well as more broadly on the country as whole. The most recent events, the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games and the 2015 Toronto Pan Am/Parapan American Games, both heavily emphasized legacy, legacy planning, and sustainability throughout their bids and execution. In addition, both events had multiple organizations working in collaboration to deliver legacy. Thus these events present a unique research opportunity to study organizational forms of legacy delivery and/or leveraging approaches in Canada, including the responsibility for positive impact on communities. By drawing upon policy, media, and public documentation, and in-depth interviews with legacy organizers, each events’ strategy and collaborative governance is examined, as well as the managerial implications for organizing and delivering legacy. Within this chapter, each case is presented and discussed, followed by broader discussions and implications.

Canadian sport policy has been largely shaped and driven by SME bidding and hosting. The 2002 Canadian Sport Policy focused on performance-based outcomes to stimulate national pride, unity, and overall sport participation. In 2008 the Canadian government published the Federal Policy for hosting international sport events, which not only emphasized and supported bidding for sport events, but also outlined a hierarchical strategy for SME bidding (Government of Canada, 2008). The 2008 Policy “recogniz[ed] the growing interest in hosting sport events not only as a stimulus to sport development, but also as an economic and community development tool” (Government of Canada, 2008, para.1). Since then the federal government has supported
SME as a tool for local and broader development, through its many bidding and hosting opportunities.

The cases of Vancouver 2010 and Toronto 2015 provide two unique opportunities for studying legacy delivery, both for their strategies and sustainability emphasis, but also for the side-by-side comparison of the organizational forms delivering legacy and/or leveraging approaches. Through careful collection of text; scrupulous memoing, segmenting, and coding of the text into categories; followed by countless re-readings and revisiting of the text, themes surrounding organizational mechanisms, that is, the tactics that allow organizations to pursue strategic objectives or outcomes were developed. As detailed in Chapter 3, 31 interviews (as identified in Table 3.4) and 56 official documents (as listed in Table 3.2) were utilized to construct the comparative cases from Vancouver and Toronto. Interviews were completed with legacy personnel and organizers from each event, including 12 from Vancouver and 19 from Toronto, to understand how legacy was managed and delivered. Documents included policy documentation, municipal planning documents, organizational strategic plans, media and news releases and other organizational reports, to round out each case and corroborate the interviewee’s statements.

Both Games’ collaborations had extensive pre-Games legacy planning using multiple levels of government, legally binding policy mechanisms, and both groups aimed for sustainable, long-term outcomes external to those outlined by their respective OCs. What is important to note is that although the groups in Vancouver and Toronto were pursuing different agendas (tourism and inclusive sport, respectively), both groups delivering legacy were organizations that were arms-length to the OCs attempting to develop specific outcomes. As well, they were both utilizing multiple organizations collaborating to delivery legacy, although their collaborations differed. This chapter follows a sociohistorical approach storying the events from the 2010 bid and onward. Each
case is then discussed individually with regards to organizational forms of legacy delivery, including related policies and responsibility for legacy.

**Historical Timeline**

**Vancouver.** Vancouver was selected as Canada’s bid for the 2010 Games in 1998, and in 2003 was selected as the official host city. While the development-heavy bid was a success abroad with the IOC, the city of Vancouver still held a plebiscite in 2003 to ask citizens whether they supported the bid (“Voters support Vancouver Olympic bid,” 2003). The Vancouver 2010 bidding corporation (BidCorp) was made up of municipal, BC and Canadian government officials, as well as representatives from many non- and for-profit organizations and stakeholder groups across the province. The BidCorp “made a strategic decision to leverage the Olympics to create sport legacies for athletes in the pre-Games period as means of attracting the support of the sport community in Canada” (Weiler & Mohan, 2009, p.2). As a result, the Games Legacy Organization (GLO) was created in 2002 to leverage the Vancouver bid regardless of the outcome. In 2002 the Multi-Party Agreement (MPA) was signed by the Government of Canada, the Government of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee and the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation (2002). The MPA included a mandate for VANOC to “have in place a comprehensive plan” (Government of Canada 2002, p.15) for post-Games management, including numerous responsibilities regarding the dedicated legacy facilities and funds. VANOC’s first step was to establish the Legacy Management Company, to manage the facilities post-Games.

With the announcement of the successful bid in 2003, the Canadian Tourism Association tasked Tourism British Columbia (BC) with strategically leveraging the Vancouver Olympics for increased tourism revenues and outcomes. As a result, Tourism BC created an aligned
collaboration of tourism stakeholders from across the province, the Provincial Tourism Consortium. The aim was to combine their resources, networks, and power for strategic leveraging purposes. After the 2010 Games concluded, the Tourism Consortium pivoted to become the Provincial Tourism Industry Association, in order to not only maintain and continue to leverage the alliances built, but to also advocate for the tourism industry in BC. The GLO also shifted its structure and vision to become a Post-Games Leveraging Organization focused on venture philanthropy within BC. As a result five organizations were involved with legacy throughout the entire timeline of the games: VANOC, the GLO, the PTC, the Provincial Tourism Industry Association, and the Post-Games Leveraging Organization.

**Toronto.** After Vancouver the Canadian government continued to pursue mega-event bids, including for the 2008 Olympics (Toronto), the 2010 Commonwealth Games (Hamilton), the 2014 Commonwealth Games (Halifax), and the 2011 FIFA Women’s World Cup (Edmonton, Moncton, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver & Winnipeg). During this time policy imperatives in the province of Ontario mandated accessible public facilities and opportunities for individuals with a disability. Compliance of accessibility standards by 2012 was mandated in the *Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act* (AODA) (*Bill 125: Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005*). In this way, federal funding for the Games would assist city planners in making many touristic and sporting infrastructure more accessible.

Toronto was announced as a candidate city for the 2015 Parapan/Pan American Games by the Ontario provincial government, and officially won the Games in 2009 (Bellas & Oliver, 2016). The bid was unique from Toronto’s previous attempts, featuring a multi-city hosting strategy with Toronto as the main candidature city, and surrounding municipalities in the ‘Greater Golden Horseshoe Area’ (GGHA). The Games would utilize various hosting competition venues
surrounding Lake Ontario across a radius of 129km from Niagara to Oshawa (Canadian Consulting Engineers, 2008). At this same time in 2009, the Canadian Paralympic Committee received a grant from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Growth through the Accessibility Directorate of Ontario (ADO). This funding was to supply steady, long-term funding, as well as assisting with augmenting the current corporate leadership model (Canadian Paralympic Committee, 2010). That same year the Canadian Paralympic Committee, in conjunction with the ADO and the TOOC, hosted the inaugural Ontario Parasport Summit, where opportunities to address the legacy of the Toronto 2015 Games were discussed. Stakeholders at this meeting included leaders from local, provincial, and federal accessibility and parasport organizations. As parasport in Ontario is delivered through both non-profit organizations (e.g., disability sport organizations (DSOs) or multisport organizations (MSOs)) and public recreation programs (e.g., municipal recreational programming), the amount and type of stakeholder groups varied. At this meeting, the 2015 Games were recognized as an opportunity to align the Canadian Paralympic system, and to establish a meaningful Paralympic legacy.

An MPA for the 2015 Games was signed in 2009 between the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario, the City of Toronto, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee, and the 2015 Pan Am Games Bid Corporation (BidCorp). Similar to Vancouver, the MPA included provisions for the Toronto Organizing Committee (TOOC) to provide comprehensive post-Games legacy plans. Herein TOOC’s legacy planning truly began. During this time, the TOOC also created several advisory councils to ensure community participation, to build new networks throughout the city, and to engage and consider the needs of various represented groups (e.g., Accessibility Advisory Council, Arts and Culture Advisory
Council, Community Engagement Council etc.). As a result, the TOOC’s legacy strategy was influenced by the input of each of these groups.

In 2013 under the guidance of the CPC, the Parasport Legacy Group (PLG), was formed as a multi-organization alliance to strategically leverage the Games for parasport and accessibility-related outcomes. This group, separate from the OC, was designed to engage and deliver a meaningful parasport legacy, and included a manager from TOOC’s Parapan team to assist with facilitating legacy planning. In 2013, the CPC held a forum engage its’ stakeholders, and determined that municipal governments would be targeted as members of the PLG. The recreation departments of these regional municipalities were recognized as being better equipped to participate in sustainable legacy programming than MSOs.

Post-Games, the PLG shifted its’ structure and focus to aligning the province’s parasport providers within a unified and sustainable alliance, named the Parasport Collective. Over the timeline, this effectively resulted in three organizations total involved with governing legacy, including: TOOC, the PLG, and the Parasport Collective. These groups, along with the organizations previously mentioned within Vancouver, are represented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations Involved with Legacy Governance</th>
<th>Vancouver 2010</th>
<th>Toronto 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Games Legacy Organization (non-profit)</td>
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<td>Parasport Legacy Group (non-profit collaboration)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver Organizing Committee (Hybrid OC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Toronto Organizing Committee (Hybrid OC)</td>
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<td>Tourism Consortium (non-profit collaboration)</td>
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Comparing the Cases: Vancouver 2010

From the start it was clear that the Vancouver Olympic Games included a focus on delivering tangible outcomes to communities and groups over the long-term. The bid document itself stated that extensive legacy plans had been developed to ensure “sustainable legacies for sport and communities” (Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation, 2002, p.3).

Legacy Delivery. Three organizations came together to officially work towards a legacy in Vancouver: the Games Legacy Organization, VANOC, and the Provincial Tourism Consortium. Legacy planning officially commenced when the MPA was signed in 2002, which included a mandate for VANOC to have a post-Games plan in place for legacy facilities and strategic fund management (Government of Canada et al., 2002). As a result, the Legacy Management Company was established to manage the facilities post-Games.

In 2002 the Games Legacy Organization (GLO), a non-profit organization designed to leverage the Vancouver Olympic bid regardless of the outcome, was created and became the second organization involved in legacy delivery. A number of researchers have focused on GLO as an organizational collaboration as it was the first distinct organization within the Olympic space focused on legacy delivery that was external to the OC (e.g., Kaplanidou & Karadakis, 2010; Leopkey & Parent, 2016; Weiler, 2011; Weiler & Mohan, 2009). The GLO helped create programs and distribute funds by partnering with local community organizations in order to leverage the Games for social, sport, arts, and community-driven outcomes.

In 2003 the Canadian Tourism Association tasked the Provincial Tourism Organization with strategically leveraging the Vancouver Olympics for increased tourism revenues and positive impacts. As a result, the Tourism Organization established an aligned collaboration of tourism
stakeholders from across the province, the Provincial Tourism Consortium. Along with the GLO and VANOC, this Consortium became the third and final organization to focus on legacy delivery within the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games.

There are several aspects of this three-pronged legacy approach that are notable. The interrelationships between organizations delivering legacy is quite intricate, and as a result a model was designed to demonstrate the relationships and respective legacy focus. Figure 5.1 depicts the complete overview of legacy delivery during the Vancouver Olympics from the point of the bid until post-Games, as well as identifies the three primary organizations focused on delivering legacy including their individual objectives. VANOC’s key legacy objectives, as outlined within the bid and MPA, lay within the Games infrastructure (i.e., sporting facilities) and tourism during the Games. As the Games finish, so does their responsibility for and connection to legacy. The GLO focused on funding long-term community projects, as well as building awareness within broader BC networks to sustain momentum post-Games. The GLO, although evolved into a new organization post-Games, continuously planned for long-term objectives and outcomes throughout the duration of the Games. They continued to fund targeted local projects and programs with contributions from the legacy funds from the Vancouver 2010 Games. The Tourism Consortium’s objectives were building relationships and leveraging them for post-Games tourism revenues and resource-sharing.

Besides the unique aspect of three distinct organizations delivering legacy with their own strategies, many individuals involved in the planning and delivery of legacy had several different roles representing multiple interests with the event hosting and tourism realms. This is best demonstrated by the overlapping areas in 5.1 wherein individuals were sometimes part of multiple organizations governing legacy delivery. These individuals within the overlapping areas were
involved in the interviews, and provided key insights into how legacy delivery was managed across and between the three organizations.
After the Winter Olympics had concluded, the Tourism Consortium redirected its focus to become the Provincial Tourism Industry Association, in order to maintain and continue to leverage relationships, and focus on tourism revenues. The GLO also shifted its structure and vision to become a Post-Games Leveraging Organization focused on venture philanthropy in the province of BC.

**Legacy Strategy.** GLO’s primary legacy focus was on “ensur[ing] a stronger sport system for BC” (LegaciesNow, 2001, p.1) through sport development, community capacity building and a community outreach program (Weiler & Mohan, 2009). The strategy was to strategically partner with programs and community organizations to deliver outcomes that could be sustainable. Darryl (Senior Executive VANOC), expressed that “we [at VANOC] never saw that our participation in the Games were an end in themselves. We actually saw the Games as a vehicle to help us accomplish some of our long-term strategic plans.” Early and strategic planning was a key part of the strategic discussions. David (Associate, National Tourism Organization), expressed the very limited and temporal nature of the Games: “you have to understand there is a big train coming towards you and you can choose to get in the way and try to change it or you can jump on board and leverage it for your benefit.” A huge piece in VANOC’s understanding the onus of starting early within the legacy timeline came from visiting previous sites, and speaking with former Games officials. Meredith explained:

> We didn’t wait until the year before…[we wanted to start] as early as possible which is why we started four years before not just right before the Games. We did this in an effort to maximise whatever we could leverage…whatever we could get out of them.

As a result the National Tourism Organization published three strategy documents leading up to, during, and following the Games for leveraging. Their objectives included: accelerating National Tourism Organization corporate strategy to differentiate Canada as a destination; add depth and
dimension to Canada’s unique destination image; build a new tourism brand personality for Canada relevant to consumers; ensure lasting, positive effects for the tourism sector; and promote the 2010 Winter Games as Canada’s Games (Canadian Tourism Commission, 2008, 2011).

The MPA demonstrated the commitment to sustainable financial legacy, particularly cemented within Section 34: the Legacy Endowment Fund (LEF). The LEF was to support the future costs of the sporting facilities. The Legacy Management Company, was developed to manage the legacy facilities post-Games (Government of Canada et al., 2002). GLO further emphasized financial sustainability in that it focused on investing money and building capacity within the sport system. The MPA helped solidify the approach as described by Michael (CEO Legacy Management Company):

I was put on the Board of Directors, or the Founding Board for the Legacy Management Company that was mandated in the multi-party agreement…It’s quite a valuable document. So that caused the creation of the Legacy Management Company to look after these venues post-Games. So I sat on that Board as we developed everything from the Society’s bylaws, it’s purpose, going right through to some preliminary business planning for the venues, for post-Games operations, and just kind of setting all the legal framework, financial all the other pieces in place for post-Games.

In 2003, the Provincial Tourism Organization was tasked with leveraging the event for specific touristic outcomes, namely increasing media coverage, improving travel trade and visitor awareness, improving tourism capacity, promoting the province’s existing tourism products and experiences, and ultimately converting increased awareness into tourism revenues (Tourism British Columbia, 2003). These objectives and strategies were to be external from the OC’s activities. In response the Provincial Tourism Organization drove the formation of a collaborative partnership to strategically pursue those goals alongside but aligned with VANOC’s tourism agenda and organization.
Similarly, the local and regional tourism organizations all sought to leverage the 2010 Games for increasingly similar and aligned touristic outcomes: increased destination awareness; enhancement of touristic image; increased visitor expenditure; and increasing overall visitors pre-/post-Games (City of Richmond, 2007; City of Vancouver, 2006; Government of British Columbia, 2004; The Resort Municipality of Whistler, 2008; Tourism British Columbia, 2003, 2004, 2008). Organizers from the Provincial Tourism Organization expressed that although initially “partners [we]re often confused as competitors” (Parent & Smith-Swan, 2013, p.195), the group recognized that they could not all successfully leverage the Games with the limited available resources. The actual organization of the Consortium seemed simple in theory according to Dwight (CEO, Games Legacy Organization), “You know who the players are that you need to bring in the room to start that conversation and to get them a part; so get clear who are the right players to meet.” As a result, the Tourism Consortium was formed; a partnership of the Provincial Tourism Organization, the National Tourism Organization, several Municipal Tourism Organizations and a Municipal Tourism Partner. This collaboration also involved the Olympic and Paralympic Games Secretariat (Ministry of Tourism Sport and the Arts 2005), the British Columbia Ministry of Tourism, Sport and the Arts, and other local and regional tourism organizations (Tourism British Columbia, 2008). The Consortium was designed “to coordinate tourism strategies and to speak with a coordinated voice to Government, VANOC, media, sponsors and [national organizing committees]” (TBC, 2008, p.11). While the Tourism Consortium was considered to be a positive outcome from the event, there were also several revealing issues about the importance of the Games as a catalyst, as described by David (Associate, National Tourism Organization): “what was great about that group is that they collaborated, they didn’t compete; and we’ve been known
to compete in the past.” Meredith (Associate Municipal Tourism Partner) expressed the relief at working with a joint agenda and collaborative efforts:

I think partnerships and collaboration is the way to go and I think there’s partnerships and collaborations that no one will ever know about that have made significant differences and it’s just how people do business today….People can’t have isolated agendas or have multiple people dealing in a small way, we need to pull together and pull resources and I guess leveraging to make a bigger difference.

**Legacy Policies, Guidelines, and Documentation.** With the collaboration and resultant alignment with the National Tourism Organization’s Olympic mandate, the Consortium drafted a joint 2010 Tourism Strategy (Tourism British Columbia, 2008, p.11). Within the Strategy, the Consortium set out specific initiatives, particularly the alignment of local, regional and provincial tourism organizations with VANOC’s Olympic Games Tourism Strategy. The Strategy also indicated the group’s ‘guiding principles’, or guidelines within the collaboration. Members viewed the principles as “a code of conduct for stakeholder collaborations both within and beyond the Consortium’s immediate network” (Williams & Elkhashab, 2012, p.321). These guidelines enabled the unified group to design leveraging strategies with clear responsibilities, outcomes, and lines of communication. An *ex ante* approach was reinforced through both the OC and the Tourism Consortium, as per the National Tourism Organization’s three-phase, long-term strategy, and delivered throughout discussions with future Games planners. Long-term planning was embedded within every aspect of the Consortium, as described by Kevin (Director 2010 Tourism Consortium):

> We knew that we don’t live in a long-term world, the world is so dynamic…so nothing was done on a short-term basis without looking at the medium or long-term, but we certainly used all three in terms of our organization.
Long-term jargon was also used frequently throughout all Consortium documentation, and it was clear that this aligned group intended to push this as the new standard both within the IOC, as well as within their own collaboration.

Although the Consortium’s strategies were aligned with VANOC, they formally separated using a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Parent & Smith-Swan, 2013), while also entering into a Non-Commercial License Agreement (NCLA) to be able to use the Olympic brand (CTC, 2008a). The MOU was a critical piece in gaining legitimacy and autonomy from the OC. This use of coercive strategy by the Consortium can be viewed as an expression of interorganizational power (Babiak, 2007). While federal investments enabled primary stakeholders to take action, different policy mechanisms were required to sustain participation from other stakeholders:

They didn’t get our branding and how we did it and they were probably a little worried at the beginning. Are we going to run on the agenda because we’re really associated very closely to the Games but they have no authority over us. But we definitely didn’t want to be known as one of the first ambushers of the Games. (Dwight, CEO 2010 Legacy Partner 3)

Both the MOU and NCLA were crucial in the Tourism Consortium’s success and ability to leverage the Vancouver Olympics and maintain their distinction from VANOC. The distinction from VANOC enabled greater freedom in their execution and focus by not having to follow the OC’s mandate. As a result, they were able to successfully collaborate on more event-themed leveraging for the future, as well as directly benefit from association during and after the Games.

While Consortium legacy organizers were distinct from VANOC’s legacy organizers, they both constantly referred back to the bid document and policy mandates as evaluative indicators for success, as the Consortium’s strategy was aligned with VANOC and the National Legacy Partner. The onus of responsibility of the sport and tourism legacies belonged to the GLO and Tourism Consortium, respectively, outside of the specific facilities within the MPA designated to the
Legacy Management Company. There appeared to be a conflict with the IOC’s position on the responsibility of Olympic legacy, and the role of the OC, as described by members of VANOC:

To be honest to me it’s the responsibility of the IOC fundamentally. But they’re a funny group because as soon as our games are done we’re done – we don’t exist anymore. They’re onto the next one. It’s like a World Cup, you’re only as great as your last event then they get on a plane and they’re off to the next one. And really the IOC is quite like that. The only time they really care is when they get embarrassed…I mean in my view it’s their responsibility but they don’t worry about it in my view (Jim, Senior Executive VANOC).

Certainly the IOC doesn’t really care as much, if at all, about whether Canada will have sport facilities at the end, but it is an important part of it. Legacy of the Games for them though is to travel around the world to various host cities and to meet many, many different needs; so Canada’s sport legacies are a small part of it. They just want to make sure the Games look and feel and are good (Ryan, Senior Executive VANOC).

It appeared that the IOC was not concerned with the local, domestic legacies for Vancouver or Canada, and that to them responsibility was domestically-driven. The IOC is not beholden to the host city for fulfilling any legacy commitments, as they carefully outline within IOC regulations and the MPA. The IOC was not the only organization with confusing roles over responsibility of legacy; VANOC was frequently cited as an issue by Legacy organizers. There was confusion over who ‘owned’ certain legacies, and the resultant roles that GLO and the Consortium would have.

Dwight (CEO, GLO) describes the early tension between VANOC and external legacy organizers:

During the bid we were not hand in hand but we were very supportive of each other. We were set up to create the legacy that was committed from the bid so our values were bid values, we had no other mandate, just to do that. Then the Games are won and the new management team came into VANOC and then here we were as a growing organization and our first meeting was VANOC was not a good meeting. The Management Team across the table, some of them who I know very well now and have gotten involved in some of our projects post-Games. I would say to them, you didn’t want us there, you felt you could do it all. You were this great Management Team that was brought in, you were going to deliver the Games and more. And you hadn’t fully known all of your portfolio and all the challenges.
Leadership and Responsibility. The leadership, particularly within the personnel, of the OC was noted as problematic and conflicting with the long-term nature of legacy plans. Michael (CEO, Legacy Management Company) stated that “the biggest change was more in the leadership, in that those people that were there during the Games have somewhat moved on and are doing other things.” The only long-term focus of VANOC was the connection to the LEF through the facilities, and the successful handoff to the Legacy Management Company. Jim, a Senior Executive with VANOC, acknowledged the temporal nature of legacy planning:

I think the model of The Games on how Games are delivered creates challenges for Legacy…I think just the structure of how games are delivered – Legacy is always the last piece of the pie…The challenge with [Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games] (OCOG) is it goes away…I think that’s part of the problem with the OC too is that they have a shelf life, they’re just trying to run the games.

This model allows the IOC to keep legacy responsibility distinct from their organization and entities, and able to move on to the next city for the next Games. Many members of OCs are specialists or contractors who are hired for the duration of the Games before they move onto another bid or Games delivery. Due to the MPA the Consortium was distinct from VANOC, but still had to involve them for alignment and funding. A partner from the Consortium explained:

I think that we were in some respects, we were beholden to the Organizing Committee. We very much respect the job that they had to do and the restrictions that they were under and we always tried to do things with the Organizing Committee’s permission and/or knowledge. But I think that in some cases we might have forged ahead with plans regardless or waited too long to get permission or waited too long to do things that we needed to do. (Oscar, Associate Municipal Tourism Organization 2)

Although there were not specific variables that the Consortium was individually pursuing, there was sufficient research conducted “prior to the Games taking place our tourism organization, in
conjunction with other tours and organizations, has spent some time surveying awareness levels of Whistler in some of our key markets” (Darryl, Senior Executive VANOC). Organizers also pointed to other quantifiable data as clear indicators of success:

We have incremental export tourism revenue, job creation and taxation that we can point to. It all gets audited by the Auditor General, so it’s pretty solid data. (David, Associate National Tourism Organization)

The power of the OC has considerable weight leading up to and during competition (from the MPA), but the power attributed to the arms-length association fades considerably for external organizations and groups after the event. The Tourism Consortium attempted to mitigate these effects with their alignment with the National Tourism Organization and tie to the federal government, as well as GLO, who would be continuing on as a non-profit organization focused on venture philanthropy post-Games. The Consortium currently acts as a Tourism Alliance that focuses on advocating for tourism opportunities, growth and a sustainable tourism industry across the province. GLO’s current form utilizes venture philanthropy to fund local organizations and programming that provide various development opportunities for individuals and groups.

Comparing the Cases: Toronto 2015

After two failed Olympic bids, the city of Toronto finally won the bid to host the 2015 Parapan/Pan American Games in 2009 (Bellas & Oliver, 2016). The connection to Vancouver 2010 was clear from the repeated references throughout the bid, to the measured language around sustainability and legacy. The bid was embedded with legacy rhetoric, as upon analysis the word legacy is found 76 times throughout the document with an entire chapter focused on outcomes.

Legacy Planning. Two distinct groups, TOOC and the PLG, were involved with legacy delivery, although many stakeholders had influence over legacy planning during the Toronto
Games. The MPA for the 2015 Games was signed in 2009 between the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario, the City of Toronto, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee, and the Ontario 2015 Pan Am Games Bid Corporation (BidCorp) (Government of Canada, 2009, p. 2). The MPA included a mandate for the TOOC to provide post-Games legacy plans, including the management of legacy facilities and funding. Here TOOC became the first organization involved in legacy delivery in Toronto.

The AODA played an influential role in Toronto’s Games legacy. The Games presented a catalytic opportunity to fast track accessibility development for the province’s capital city. The AODA arguably generated a need and urgency for accessibility-related projects and legacies, which helped inspire the generation of the PLG. Ministry officials continued to be involved with the PLG and its’ plans throughout the Games timeline. The AODA’s mandate and focus on the 2015 Games also pushed TOOC to consider the input of community members for accessibility and other aspects of event execution. As a result, TOOC and its’ legacy planning was advised by several community and minority groups.

The legacy planning of the 2015 Games was influenced by many different groups and stakeholders, but dominated by two distinct organizations: the TOOC and PLG. There was again an overlap between the legacy organizations, indicating that individuals sometimes represented different groups and interests. A visual depiction of the legacy delivery of the 2015 Games is presented in Figure 5.2. TOOC’s legacy focus surrounded Gamestime objectives in the sporting facilities and infrastructure, and in ensuring a post-Games management strategy. The PLG had a different, more targeted focus on parasport outcomes, specifically improving and increasing recreational participation, and enhancing awareness about living with a disability. The AODA and the advisory councils played an influential role on TOOC, and as a result, its’ legacy delivery and
strategy. The PLG has also used the AODA to secure funding, as well as related personnel. Similar to Vancouver, there was a noted overlap of individuals involved with the two legacy organizations. While this overlap was not as profound as Vancouver, it is interesting to note the structural similarities within the cases, as well as the implications therein. Post-Games, the PLG shifted its’
structure and focus to aligning the province’s parasport providers within a unified and sustainable alliance, named the Ontario Parasport Collective. Over the Games timeline noted in Figure 5.2, this effectively resulted in three organizations involved with legacy.

**Legacy Policies, Guidelines, and Documentation.** While the Toronto bid outlined a multitude of possible impacts and outcomes throughout the Games, there was a section dedicated to “Paralympic-specific” legacies (herein referred to as parasport), which included: accessible facilities, training and development, grassroots parasport development, and volunteer recruitment (Toronto 2015 Pan American Games Bid Corp, 2008).

The AODA, published shortly before the Games bid, required compliance of accessibility standards by 2012 (*Bill 125: Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005*). While not related to the Games, the AODA, combined with IPC (International Paralympic Committee) accessibility guidelines, encouraged businesses to make accessibility-related changes and contributed to the emphasis on a legacy of accessibility. The 2015 Games presented a leveraging opportunity for municipalities, businesses and organizations, particularly the Parapans, for accessibility-related opportunities. TOOC’s engagement with local advisory groups indicated that accessibility was a priority for local citizens. The 2005 AODA was tremendous in encouraging businesses and organizations to comply with accessibility standards, as it was noted throughout several municipalities’ strategic plans (City of Hamilton, 2012; City of St. Catharines, 2013; City of Toronto, 2008, 2013; Town of Markham, 2010).

Interviewees from Toronto indicated that legacy planners learned from Vancouver as they too embroiled their legacy plans within coercive and regulatory policies. Similar to Vancouver, the MPA was an incredibly valuable document that outlined many roles, regulations, and responsibilities within the event space. Within the MPA, a section on “Games Legacy
Administration” (Government of Canada, 2009, p.32), outlined the future of the LEF as well as the use of the sport facilities, arguably the centrepiece of Toronto’s legacy. Of the parties listed on the MPA, the National Parasport Organization was the only organization clearly focused on the Parasport-related legacy objectives. As a result of the AODA and the MPA, the National Parasport Organization “managed to get a seat and were part of the decision-making process” (April, CEO National Parasport Organization).

After receiving a grant from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Growth through the ADO, the National Parasport Organization recognized collaborative efforts would be required in order to leverage any outcomes from the 2015 Games. In 2009 the National Parasport Organization in conjunction with the ADO and TOOC, hosted the inaugural Ontario Parasport Summit, where opportunities to address the legacy of the 2015 Games were discussed. The National Parasport Organization aimed to “align the athlete and coach development system and establish a meaningful Paralympic legacy” (Canadian Paralympic Committee, 2013, p.9), but also realized governance and leadership was needed. TOOC designated a manager from the Parapan team to assist with enabling and facilitating legacy planning (Canadian Paralympic Committee, 2013b). Sport for persons with a disability (PWAD) is largely disorganized, competitively self-destructive, and without alignment, as both capital and human resources are scarce (Misener, McGillivray, McPherson, & Legg, 2018). In 2013 the National Parasport Organization held a forum to engage the Ontario parasport system, and regional municipalities were targeted and contacted for participation, as their recreation departments had sufficient resources and capacity to participate in sustainable legacy programming. A number of municipalities involved in the Games used the opportunity to strategically leverage programs, both new and existing, to increase parasport participation.
In 2013, the aforementioned accessibility and parasport stakeholders met with the interested municipalities to discuss and create the leveraging strategy and overall legacy focus. This group officially became the PLG and quickly identified their organizational nature and mandate:

The TO2015 Parapan Am Legacy partners are comprised of a group of individuals and organizations committed to ensuring a lasting legacy for Ontarians with disabilities to access sport and recreation opportunities. With a specific focus on Participation, Coaching, Awareness, and Accessible Facilities, the Legacy group is committed to provide best practice advice and assistance to Municipalities looking to develop their own Parapan Am Legacy plans and initiatives. Recognizing the significance of this opportunity, as well as the resource limitations that exist within Municipalities, the Legacy group will provide support in establishing a plan that optimizes impact. (Parapan Legacy Intent Form, 2013, p.1)

The municipalities involved had indicated a priority for improving accessibility and opportunities for PWAD within their respective municipal strategic planning documents, either leading up to or as a result of the 2015 Games (City of Hamilton, 2012; City of Mississauga, 2009; City of St. Catharines, 2013, 2014; City of Toronto, 2013; City of Toronto Parks Forestry and Recreation, 2013; Town of Markham, 2009, 2014 Town of Milton, 2006, 2013). The Municipal Recreation Partner’s strategic plan for the period during the Games indicated not only a goal of improving access, decreasing barriers for individuals with a disability, but that “compliance with disability legislation” (City of Toronto Parks Forestry and Recreation, 2013, p.50) was a priority. Harris (Director, Municipal Parasport Organization), described the overall leveraging strategy for the PLG:

Well I think we’re using sport and the profile of the Parapan Am Games to push the agenda forward a little bit on services and programs for people with disabilities...So that has been the catalyst. The Games are coming, there’s an urgency or a sense of urgency around getting ready for all these visitors that are going to come into our municipality. If that urgency wasn’t there, businesses might not feel as compelled to move as quickly as they are. ... So it’s been a bit of a catalyst I think in terms of having people think about these kinds of things in just a little bit different way.
The Parapan Legacy Intent Form was an official document that the municipalities submitted in 2013 to be included with municipal legacy planning surrounding the Games. The forms included basic details about existing personnel, facilities and programming in order to access the advisory support offered by the PLG through the National Parasport Organization. The PLG created the Parapan Legacy Municipal Implementation Plan, a document from a February 2015 planning session where municipal organizers worked with the National Parasport Organization and the member MSOs and parasport organizations to create sustainable leveraging strategies. While it is true that governments have different capacities for interorganizational relationships and collaborations, since these municipalities signed formal Letters of Intent to participate, the lack of involvement was disparaging, as expressed by Jerry. The disconnect between senior leadership and the municipalities was felt, as well as the issue of short versus long-term capacity:

The problem is you’ve got small organizations which are quite busy… they’ve got far more things that you should or could be doing that they have resources to do them in. Sometimes you focus on the urgent and you don’t really necessarily get at the important where you can get longer term leverage (Perderick, Senior Executive TOOC).

Legacy Leadership and Responsibility. The PLG also struggled with planning a long-term vision with a short-termed organizing committee and schedule. VANOC and the PLG stressed long-term, sustainable planning, but provided very little direction:

the value of the Pan Am Games coming is it gives a platform to push these municipalities to try and do something in the short term. But this is a long-term play. This doesn’t end in 3 weeks with the Parapan Am Games are over, to me it’s just actually a starting point …So you have this opportunity for a short period of time to do something and if you let it go by the wayside you’ve lost that opportunity. (Andy, Director Legacy Partner 1)

The PLG lacked formal procedures and mechanisms with their member municipal partners in initiatives moving past the Games. This was echoed throughout the Toronto case as many individuals expressed that the goals were nebulous or unmeasurable; that they were not aware of
any evaluative methods; or that there were simply no methods to evaluate Legacy. This was also reflective of the majority of TOOC’s legacy strategy, which involved specific Gamestime components staged throughout the province. The lack of a formal leveraging strategy, and resulting lack of appropriate evaluative mechanisms, was expressed throughout, including from leadership. As Donna, the Parapan Director for TOOC, and leader of the PLG stated:

There hasn’t been a structure for capturing or evaluating the impacts. It just hasn’t been done. And I’m not convinced about the [Olympic Games Impact Study] (OGI) – we worked a bit on that but we weren’t able to get that to have those clear indicators tracked on the Paralympic side in a very meaningful way. So I think that’s a huge opportunity. Because to be honest I think all of us that do this at these different events, we do it because we care about it and we try and make it happen. But we don’t have a clear blueprint on what we should really be focusing on in order to actually have a tangible impact. So I think we end up probably spinning our wheels in directions that maybe aren’t as fruitful.

It appeared there was no priority for strategic or specific evaluation, and that the group was throwing resources at projects without definitive outcomes or deeper meaning. As Donna was the de-facto individual leader of the PLG and connection to TOOC and they did not have deliberate goals set, I turn my focus to the evaluative methods discussed regarding the municipalities’ plans. From the PLG, the National Parasport Organization was responsible for current and future strategic plans with municipalities. April, the CEO of the National Parasport Organization, described the established process of evaluation for municipalities:

I like to think the municipalities themselves will be doing an audit on what they can provide to ensure they are actually providing options that are available for a full range of needs and interests. I’d like to think the municipalities might take a step back and say before we do that are we accessible and that’s only physically accessibility but let’s look at their language let’s look at the physical accessibility let’s look at how we set people up for success and the kind of skill base we have. So we’re really hoping that those will be some of the markers. I’m really hoping that many of the municipalities will be able to look at their policies to ensure there is a real commitment to this and that then would be translated to a crack-down on their budget, because you know often times when not enough money is the excuse.
While the objectives of increased parasport participation and enhanced awareness and opportunities have the potential to contribute to positive outcomes for communities and PWAD, they were not strategically planned for as a part of many municipality’s existing Strategic Plans. Many plans indicated a priority for improved accessibility (I.E., City of Hamilton, 2012; City of Mississauga, 2009; City of St. Catharines, 2013, 2014; Town of Markham, 2009, 2014; Town of Milton, 2006, 2013), but only Toronto mentioned utilizing the Games, and no municipal plans appeared to be embedded in long-term leveraging. In addition, the PLG would need to have key policy decision-makers from within each municipality to affect and sustain the kind of change that April described.

The PLG obtained several grants based upon its’ aligned, multi-level partnership. The united vision amongst relevant multi-level stakeholders contributed to the success of the equipment and programming grants. These grants were distributed amongst local members for both equipment and programming leading into 2016, but again, with the National Parasport Organization leading policy decision-making, the future strategic direction of the PLG was questionable. The question of leadership throughout the PLG was contested from the start, and the onus on fostering the collaboration was enacted from the bid, as described by April (CEO, National Parasport Organization): “The thinking was that there was great infrastructure to keep the lights on, but in regards to leadership and coaching it’s pretty hard to get things going.” Donna was frequently cited as a crucial piece of the entire operation. This is important to note as the centerpiece of the long-term planning process would not be continuing with the PLG post-Games. This is a flaw within the PLG’s strategy, as having one individual tied to the temporal OC for a sustainable collaboration is problematic, as it brings up issues of longevity and continuity. As a result, the National Parasport Organization not only maintained its’ leadership, and core focus
within the PLG, but also grew in legitimacy and power in being the only member organization consistent throughout the Toronto 2015 timeline. While the PLG agreed that improved parasport participation was a major objective across all partners, it was clear that the National Parasport Organization would be ultimately interested in programs that emphasized or incorporated high-performance sport, as per their organizational mandate. Although Donna was the Director of the Parapan Games, she was hired to work with and through the PLG. Donna was frequently cited as the leader and driver of the leveraging initiatives through her “direction and influence and experience” (Shauna, Parapan Manager TOOC). Donna had previous experience from other parasport Games, and was incredibly influential in shaping strategic plans, but she would be departing with a good portion of TOOC’s SME specialists.

TOOC individuals also expressed inconsistencies with legacy responsibilities. While it was clear that TOOC was not deemed responsible for legacy outside of conditions outlined in the MPA, there was still a sense of unclear localized responsibilities. In particular, the TOOC did not strategically address or embed the accessibility goals identified through the bid and planning documents, from a leadership perspective. While confusion surrounded the actual responsibility for legacy, there was no confusion regarding the role of TOOC:

Accountability of say legacy initiatives – that’ll take a little bit of time. It’s something that’s not going to happen like that right after the games. But we’re gone like that. So that is left to the organizations that sustain us. So I would hope that the COC, the CPC in the Province of Ontario here, talking about Para sport, all the organizations that have been working with us, they’re the ones that have the responsibility of evaluating from a legacy perspective what went well, what didn’t go well, what do we have to change for the next games. And specific initiatives, what do we have to do to ensure that these initiatives continue along the track that was put into place by Toronto 2015. (Chris, Senior Executive TOOC)

The legal Organizing Committee, the staff and volunteers involved, their number one focus is to put on the games. And three months later they’re gone. In that context it can’t be them, and they don’t have a mindset to really do that. They don’t have a mandate to do that. So
they will do things in the lead up and during the games then after the games they’re gone, so someone else has to do it. And that’s where legacies come in, in terms of dollars and to do those evaluation processes, to carry on the work that’s already being done. (Andy, Director Legacy Partner 1)

As mentioned by Chris, it should be the responsibility of leader(s) within the PLG to sustain momentum in its’ legacy mandates moving forward. It was clear that in order for the event-related leveraging to be successful, long-term mandated roles and responsibilities were required. Donna, the Director of Parapan within VANOC, recognized the duality of her role, and the limitations of the OC’s involvement with a long-term leveraging model:

And it’s interesting because we do have a blueprint for how to deliver the games and we’ve been refining it and perfecting it as we go from games to games, and I think that’s a bit of a void on the legacy side, because it’s not ultimately the responsibility of the Organizing Committee. And that’s such a critical time, the games time. And that’s why I also think it just doesn’t make sense necessarily for it ever to be housed fully in the Organizing Committee because a critical time is games time and literally immediately after when we’re otherwise occupied with delivering the event...It’s what the governing bodies are starting to look for so they just need to formalize it in a more clear way and really work with the IOC to make that happen from a bigger perspective.

Legacy organizers also lacked clear objectives and evaluative methods, as confirmed by a Senior Executive with TOOC:

I really haven’t thought much about the evaluation side of things. Because we’re so focused on the games, we get evaluated by a whole myriad of people after the games are over, specific to what their involvement with the games are.... There’s a whole myriad of feedback that we’ll get. How we collect it and evaluate us is an interesting question. I must admit I really haven’t thought too much about it. (Chris, Senior Executive TOOC)

Discussion

Key themes emerged relating to the organizational forms used for legacy/leveraging strategies, as described in Table 5.2. Within this section I discuss leveraging strategies and mechanisms; evaluative methods; knowledge translation between Games, organizations and people; and responsibility of legacy.
### Key themes and findings from Canadian SMEs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Vancouver 2010</th>
<th>Toronto 2015</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging Strategies and Mechanisms</td>
<td>• Using the Games as a Vehicle with clear goals</td>
<td>• Using the Games as a Vehicle without specific targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Planning for the long-term</td>
<td>• Champion-driven leveraging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leveraging partnerships and collaborations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy and Evaluation</td>
<td>• Coercive policies for long-term commitment</td>
<td>• Coercive policies more successful for buy-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of distinct goals and evaluation apart from collaboration</td>
<td>• Lack of distinct targets and strategic evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility of Legacy</td>
<td>• Confusion of responsibility</td>
<td>• Confusion of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conflicting nature of OC</td>
<td>• OC not good fit</td>
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In order to acquire long-term benefits from events, comprehensive strategic planning is crucial, particularly in the early stages before the event (Masterman, 2009; Misener, 2015). Issues surrounding time constraints can affect partnership formation and a resultant focus on ‘quick wins’, and having a phased approach in the pre-planning phase is crucial (Casey, Payne, & Eime, 2009). A comprehensive strategy for leveraging requires that all partners focus beyond the event, that is to say to take an *ex ante* focus (Chalip, 2006; 2017), and have all planning focus on longevity and sustainability. Authors have advocated for event leveraging tactics that focus on long-term planning embedded within existing plans to be become part of sustainable, systematic processes of development (Misener & Mason, 2010; Smith, 2009, 2012; Smith & Fox, 2007).
The Consortium partners recognized the potential impact that the Games could contribute to their existing strategic plans, not how to fit their plans into the Games. This is congruent with Smith and Fox’s (2007) concept of event-themed leveraging. Event-themed leveraging focuses on existing resources and programs, and using Games as a “uniting theme rather than a speculative stimulus” (p.1139). In this way the event itself is not the focus, but a part of the overall tourism strategy or destination marketing mix. This was observed within the Municipal Tourism Organization’s strategic plans for 2012/2013 emphasizing event hosting “to leverage th[e] experience and the infrastructure it enjoys to both enhance existing events and create or attract new ones, particularly those suitable to the first and fourth quarters of the year” (Tourism Vancouver, 2011, p.14).

It was clear that coercive policy and formal documentation was a motivator for contributing to long-term legacy plans in both cases. In Toronto, the PLG’s Legacy Planning Forms were a form of targeting. Targeting “uses non-binding recommendations, but these recommendations are more detailed and thus leave less room for manoeuvre for specification at the implementation stage than is true in the case of voluntarism” (Treib et al., p.15). Casey and colleagues (2009) have argued that the more formalized health, sport, and recreation partnerships become, the more likely their projects will be successfully and sustainably implemented. Spaaij and Scholenkorf (2014) noted that “if poorly designed and managed, sports events or projects can actually be detrimental to local communities, and especially marginalized sections thereof, by strengthening the very social divisions and inequalities that they are expected to bridge” (p.633).

The lack of strategy surrounding accessibility and parasport outside of facility infrastructure was noticeable. The lack of resources and capacity at the local level was indicative of Green and Houlihan’s (2004) observations of “broadened policy objectives within the new
Canadian Sport Policy and Bill C-12, the emergence of a nexus between the sport and health policy sectors” (p.399). Vague policy specification can lead to inconsistent or haphazard implementation, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 by the 2006 Victoria CWG (Kellett, Hede, & Chalip, 2008). This is nothing new, as Comeau (2013) noted the historical use of vague terminology within Canadian sport policy to afford flexibility, but also to be left open to numerous (mis)interpretations. The Canadian Sport Policy (CSP) has been regarded as a roadmap for municipalities and organizations to use as per their broad directions across various sport domains. This was demonstrated by the variety of PLG municipalities’ participation in planning documents, where municipalities indicated clear strategies, targets or pathways into the future, and others contributed the bare minimum of ideas and personnel.

While important for planning and implementing legacy initiatives, the legitimacy and authority attributed to the close proximity of the OCs, are not without flaws. At the same time, legacy organizers have benefitted immensely from the legitimacy and authority of the OC, as well as the authority to participate in key decision-making processes. Authors Deng and colleagues (2016) found that the post-event legacy group from Expo 2010 experienced immense difficulty in continuing initiatives and programs after the event concluded: “[w]e are just a company now, not a government agency which can order people around” (Deng et al., 2016, p.169). The conflicting temporal nature affects all OCs of Games, as they are strategically designed for delivering the Games over a specific time period, versus delivering legacy outcomes to communities (Misener et al., 2015). Therefore I echo previous researchers urging for legacy planning external to the OC. It is crucial to not only create planning and organizational documents with language that resists the temporal framing of legacy, but to also set up sustainable, long-term individuals and organizations tasked with responsibility.
While the viability of leveraging SME for outcomes may be questionable, there is no denying their strong ability to affect and bypass policy. The perfect opportunity, or what might be termed policy window due to the fast-tracking of development agendas (McGillivray & McPherson, 2012), is created as a result of hosting the Games. This comes in the form of a formalized multi-level government partnership across multiple sectors, international dignitary and media exposure, and such speculative economic potential. Within the Vancouver and Toronto cases, many individuals had several different roles with the event hosting space. Within legacy governance, some individuals wore several different hats representing several different interests. This is best demonstrated by the overlapping areas in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, wherein individuals were sometimes part of multiple organizations governing legacy delivery. Herein I propose that those areas of overlap between the OC and separate leveraging efforts are the key aspects in taking advantage of an event’s policy window. Within the intersection of OCs, traditionally the political and economic influencers of a city, and locally-driven leveraging groups, lies a unique access to policy, legitimacy and thus, power. In Vancouver the Tourism Consortium was able to take advantage of several overlapping members within GLO and VANOC to increase opportunities for influence, legitimacy, access and resources. As a result, the Consortium has evolved into a sustainable provincial strategy within a permanent tourism alliance, and maintains many partnerships levered from the 2010 Games.

The National Parasport Organization was also able to obtain legitimacy and trust through organizational planning with the TOOC and member constituents, and as a result afforded access and increased legitimacy to the PLG. Unfortunately, the overlap in Toronto’s legacy governance existed only within the National Parasport Organization’s participation with the OC, as the Parapan staff were temporary and not embedded in the community. In contrast to Vancouver, the
opportunities for influence, legitimacy and power were not as strong for the PLG, and the ability to take advantage of the policy window faded as the Games ended. The overlap between these governance forms is discussed in the next chapter.


Chapter 6: Organizational Learning & Governance

In this chapter, the transfer of knowledge of legacy through the cases of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the Toronto 2015 Pan American and Parapan Games are discussed. First, a brief summary of organizational learning and knowledge is provided, as well as existing transfer of knowledge (TOK) documentation, policies and procedures within the relevant Games context. Next, an examination of specific strategies from Vancouver and Toronto are explored through interviews and documentation, as described in Chapter 3. Finally, practical implications will be discussed for future leveraging organizers.

TOK was cited frequently by organizers as essential in creating unique leveraging strategies. I had previously reviewed IOC TOK documentation and several articles mentioning TOK within the extensive systematic review in Chapter 4, but it did not emerge as prominently affecting legacy and/or leveraging strategies. While I did not enter into this project with an explicit focus on TOK, such prominent themes emerged from the interviews and documents that I needed to emphasize this as a piece of the dissertation. Knowledge creation and management has been frequently promoted by and through the IOC (e.g. “Olympic Games Knowledge Management Programme provides “essential” resource for Games organisers”, (IOC, 2014)). Arguably organizational knowledge is an important organizational mechanism in “understanding about how organizations process knowledge and, more importantly, how they create new knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994, p.14). Within this chapter I argue that TOK was not only a key leverageable resource, but also that TOK provided direct links to sustainable event impacts.

The Olympic Games Knowledge Management Programme (OGKM) was created in 2005 by the IOC as an in-house program to support OCs with planning and delivering the Games. Jim, a Senior Executive with the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC), recalls the formation
of the OGKM during planning for 2010: “Yeah the IOC after Sydney put in the TOK – transfer of knowledge. And it’s kind of shocking when you think about it that it didn’t exist before. The challenge with the TOK is largely [that] it’s [mostly] documents.” According to Philippe Blanchard, the Director of Information and Knowledge Management at the IOC (n.d), the OGKM consists of workshops and seminars, the Observer Programme, Games Debriefing, the Secondment Program, and the Knowledge (Extranet) and Advisor Databases (pp.1).

The OGKM is also built directly into the Host City Contract (HCC), demonstrating another excellent use of coercive policy. Within the HCC, the IOC mandates that multiple strategies and organizations be in place to not only work with previous Olympic hosts, but also provide information for bidding and future host cities. Within the Information and Knowledge Management section, the IOC (2018) claimed responsibility for:

- introducing executive learning and coaching to senior Games organisers to shorten and accelerate their learning pathway
- providing tailor-made learning opportunities to the OC, which address their respective needs, requirements and context
- providing knowledge to support the OC to document its plans in the various key functions such as transport, accommodation, food and beverage, arrivals and departures, etc. (pp.89).

In addition, the HCC outlines clear responsibilities for OCs to participate in the ongoing knowledge transfer process of SME management. Five operational items are within the HCC to fulfill the information and knowledge management requirements, including storage and access to information; Olympic Games Learning Model (OGLM); participation by relevant delivery partners in knowledge acquisition and learning; official reports; and Paralympic Excellence Programme (International Olympic Committee, 2018). The majority of KOT Operational Requirements surround document transfer, as the IOC stores all Games-related documentation in an ongoing data bank, which includes “documents, plans, strategies, processes, maps, still images, audio and video content or other content” (IOC, 2018, p.90). The OGLM is the largest and most
diverse of the requirements, and is composed of three projects, which includes Information Management, a large portion on documentation transfer and access. Observation and Experience refers to the opportunities for organizers to visit and experience other host cities, Games, as well as debriefing processes. The last requirement, Education, involves the creation of workshops and knowledge champions networks for knowledge dissemination and executive learning (IOC, 2018). TOK is mentioned throughout the HCC, and clearly points to the ongoing, embedded nature of knowledge management.

While the TOK within the HCC appears to be a detailed and strategic approach, it lacks depth and is superficial in nature. All documentation must be submitted through and with the IOC and IPC, leaving little space to be overtly critical of the governing body during the Games process. Within hybrid organizations such as an OC, competing institutional logics can result in conflict, depending on compatibility and centrality. As the National Tourism Organization and the National Parasport Organization were setting the agenda for the Consortium and PLG (Parasport Legacy Group), respectively, their institutional influence cannot be ignored. Battiliana and Lee’s (2014) categorization of hybrids was based upon logic compatibility and centrality where “contested hybrids are characterized by extensive conflict, whereas minimal conflict undergirds aligned hybrids due to a higher degree of logic compatibility” (p.178). Compatibility refers to how compatible the logics’ prescriptions for action are, whereas within an estranged hybrid organization, one dominant logic leads, while other competing logics are in constant opposition. While logics of the National Tourism Organization and the National Parasport Organization were certainly a priority and focus for the respective leveraging groups, the organizational logics of the other collaborating partners were not in opposition. This is best representative of the dominant hybrid, where one logic is central to organizational functioning and other logics are peripheral
(low centrality) and there is high compatibility between logics (Battiliana & Lee, 2014). An example of competing logics is the deliberately short-term timeframe of the OC, versus the long-term nature of social leveraging objectives. The competing logics of the leveraging organizations from the OC, demonstrate why a distinct organization is needed to leverage sustainable long-term event impacts, rather than focus on hosting a successful event.

While the Pan American Sports Organization (PASO), the NGO administering the Pan Am/Parapan American Games, may have TOK or knowledge management policies and procedures, none were publicly available. Nonetheless, legacy and leveraging organizers from Toronto 2015, as well as Vancouver 2010 described different forms of knowledge creation and transfer is embedded throughout both cases, they are expanded upon in the Discussion of Chapter 6.

Within the event hosting context, individuals often simultaneously represent several different organizations and represent unique interests. The overlapping Venn diagrams of legacy delivery in Chapter 5 describe the interrelated, multi-layered environment surrounding SME governance. While the distinction from the OC was necessary to focus on long-term, goal-driven strategies, the alignment and working relationship with the OC was crucial in lending legitimacy and access to those leveraging groups. Not only was the overlap between those groups governing event legacy delivery necessary, the temporal overlap of key stakeholders was crucial during the phases of event planning and organization. The conflicting temporal nature affects all OCs of Games, as they are strategically designed for delivering the Games over a specific time period, versus delivering legacy outcomes to communities (Misener et al., 2015). It is crucial to not only encroach planning and organizational documents in language that resists the temporal framing of legacy, but to also set up sustainable, long-term individuals and organizations tasked with
responsibility. The use of binding policy appeared to be the main (if only) mechanism holding both public and private organizations accountable within both Games environments. The Multi-Party Agreement (MPA), in particular, served as the primary directive for OC-related legacy delivery, and solidified access and structure within both cases. Unfortunately, within both cases, the majority of structure and responsibility outlined focused on the sporting infrastructure, and not any broader outcomes. Within Vancouver, the immense overlap within the Games Legacy Organization (GLO), VANOC and the Tourism Consortium was also demonstrated by the increased use of policy mechanisms, namely the MOU and NCLA. This allowed for an increased number of organizations gaining power, legitimacy and access through these mechanisms, and as a result the Consortium’s present form is now a powerful actor driving and advocating for the broader provincial tourism industry (Tourism Industry of BC, 2018). Key members within the Consortium remain embedded within those important intersections of public, private and non-private organizations, heavily interacting and influencing policy opportunities, particularly within the events-hosting realm. In Toronto, the MPA was less specific, and focused heavily on sustaining the use of sporting facilities versus leveraging for future opportunities post-Games. As well, the PLG had less overlap with the Toronto Organizing Committee (TOOC), affording considerably less legitimacy and access that the Consortium had. Temporally, the PLG missed out on crucial opportunities for sustainability with the disjointed nature of the leadership structure. Without meaningful, long-term connections across policy sectors, the PLG has less opportunity for access, legitimacy, and thus power to accomplish leveraging strategies. In order to be able to successfully leverage the SME policy window, an assortment of overlapping stakeholders within the legacy delivery sphere with access to government agencies are required. This is partially due to immense amount of knowledge transfer that occurs within these overlapping spaces.
Organizational Knowledge and Learning. Within this research, knowledge was transferred from previous events, OCs, the IOC and individuals. Senge (1992) argued that “organizations learn only through individuals who learn” (p. 139). While organizations such as Tourism Consortium, the Parasport Legacy Group (PLG), VANOC, TOOC and GLO acquired and conferred information throughout the event process, it is truly the individuals within these organizations that transfer and manage knowledge. Knowledge can be classified as explicit or tacit knowledge, wherein there is a “continual dialogue” (Nonaka, 1994, p.15) between the two. Explicit knowledge, referred to as the know what, is transferable through formal, systematic language into documentation, while tactic knowledge, or the know-how, is “highly personal and hard to formalise” (Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000, p.7), and can sometimes only be learned through practise. Nonaka (1991, 1994, 2000, 2005), the premier scholar on organizational learning and knowledge, offers four distinct types of learning that coincide with tactic and explicit knowledge. Herein the continuous 'dialogue' between the types of knowledge is critical, as a neglect of tacit knowledge may lack reality, while a lack of explicit knowledge may lack specificity and depth (Nonaka, 1994). The types of learning and knowledge translation described by Nonaka (1994) include:

- Socialisation: from tacit to tacit
- Combination: from explicit to explicit
- Externalisation: from tacit to explicit
- Internalisation: from explicit to tacit (pp.19)

Socialisation, where tacit knowledge is converted to new tacit knowledge, and “can be acquired only through shared experience, such as spending time together or living in the same environment” (Nonaka et al., 2000). Examples include apprenticeships or face-to-face meetings (Werner, Dickson, & Hyde, 2015). The process of combination, where explicit knowledge is acquired and “combined, edited or processed to form new knowledge” (Nonaka et al., 2000, p.9). Computer
systems and document transfers are examples of combination processes. The idea that both explicit and tacit knowledge can be related within patterns of knowledge conversion and transfer is attributed to the theory that both are “complementary and can expand over time through a process of mutual interaction” (Nonaka, 1994, p.19). *Externalisation*, or the process of specifically articulating tacit into explicit knowledge, allowing it to be shared with others and “become the basis of new knowledge” (Nonaka, 2000, p.9). In contrast, within *internalisation*, or more commonly learning by doing, individuals internalize explicit knowledge (such as documents) into their own body of experience (Skyrme, 2011, para 2.1). Nonaka and colleagues (2000) further argue that explicit knowledge must be actualized through both action and practice, in situations like liaising activities, simulation, and experimentation. Each of the types of knowledge and translation have their own changing contextual strengths and weaknesses based on many factors. Werner and colleagues (2015) stress that most important is the “effective application of intellectual capital within the company or network to achieve certain objectives. However, for effective transfer to occur within a network, all partners must participate, as each partner controls access to certain knowledge” (p.175). Within the multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder context of SME planning, understanding the flow of knowledge is critical to exploring how the organizational mechanism of knowledge transfer operates.

**Organizational Knowledge and Learning of Vancouver and Toronto.** The Vancouver 2010 Games and the Toronto 2015 Games provided interesting cases to examine organizational knowledge and learning. Throughout both sets of interviews, knowledge transfer was identified as a prevalent theme by participants, whether it was recognized or not. The types of organizational knowledge transfer and learning are summarized in Table 6.1, and described below, in order of prevalence.
Table 6.1

*Organizational mechanisms of learning within legacy and leveraging strategies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Learning</th>
<th>Vancouver 2010</th>
<th>Toronto 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation</td>
<td>• Past/current Games visits</td>
<td>• Past/current Games visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Meetings and conference calls</td>
<td>• Meetings and conference calls</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use of key experts/leaders</td>
<td>• Use of key experts/leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalisation</td>
<td>• Previous Games’ bids, and strategies</td>
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<td>• Learning by doing</td>
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<td>Externalisation</td>
<td>• Creation of documents</td>
<td>• Using others’ experiences to inform strategy</td>
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<td>• Creation of workshops and presentations for future Games organizers</td>
<td>• Strategic use of language to influence others in explicit knowledge creation</td>
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<td>Combination</td>
<td>• Circulation of documents, emails</td>
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**Socialisation.** Based upon the design of the OGKM it is unsurprising that socialisation was the most prevalent form of learning observed throughout Vancouver and Toronto. The OGKM heavily emphasizes interaction between previous host cities to learn from each other. As the OGKM was created while Vancouver was preparing their bid for 2010, the learning began almost immediately, as explained by an associate of the National Tourism Organization:

What we learned from Australia was right after the Games ended, they stopped. They high-fived themselves and stopped; and right after our Games is when we put our most media into the marketplace to leverage that effect…Australia was a great example of what to do for the Games, and going back Barcelona in 1992, they really leveraged the Games as a meeting planning opportunity…Atlanta is an example of how not to leverage the Games, because there wasn’t really a legacy there that you could measure in terms of tourism. (David, Associate National Tourism Organization)
The frequent interaction between past and current Games host cities was noted as one of the most valuable forms of knowledge transfer. The opportunity to interact with individuals with similar experiences, led to valuable knowledge creation regarding the challenges and opportunities afforded by hosting such an event. Legacy organizers from both Vancouver and Toronto described some of the most valuable experiences through socialisation:

It was great that Park City [(Salt Lake City 2002)] shared their learnings. We had about 3 or 4 people from Park City come up here to speak to different groups. We had their Director of Communications come up to our Managers’ Retreat. We had the head of their Chamber of Commerce come up to speak to the Board of Directors and another business group so that they could share what they had learned. (Meredith, Associate Municipal Tourism Partner)

A couple of years after Torino we had a conversation with some people there that were trying to set up their Legacy operation – I think this was about six months after the Games – and as we had the conversation it sounded as though they were at about the same point we were at and we were still a few years away from the Games. (Michael, CEO Legacy Management Company)

I was fortunate enough to go to the Torino Games but I went during the Paralympics because I felt I could talk to more people, which was great for us. We went to see all the right people and learn a lot. And we got a transfer of knowledge on some programs that they identified, we figured we could take some of their learnings and bring them here. And then they came over here for that transfer as well. (Dwight, CEO Games Legacy Organization)

I went down to a number of the sessions in Guadalajara, the pre-Games so I saw firsthand how the Para side was struggling for recognition and getting equitable treatment from their Organizing Committee. And they had really great challenges in achieving that objective and I just didn’t want to see the same thing happen up here. (Chris, Senior Executive TOOC)

Nonaka (1994) states that through sharing experiences, mutual trust amongst members can be facilitated, thus contributing to a stronger relationship within a collaboration of multiple cross-sectoral relationships. Organizers trusted that previous Games’ organizers would be transparent and truthful in their sharing.

Socialisation also occurred between leveraging collaborators, wherein constant communication frequent conversions of knowledge throughout the groups:
We brought our group together there were usually 2 or 3 people in the room that no one knew, or they’d heard about them but they weren’t sure why they were here. But after the third or fourth meeting they were like old friends, they brought a different perspective and had different connections which is critical to move the agenda a different way. So everything was done in collaboration and we were also known for setting that really safe table to have a discussion. (Dwight, CEO VAN Legacy Partner 3)

I think we work pretty closely with the [National Legacy Organization] as well so anybody who’s really planning events on our end of things has interaction with them and typically we’re bringing them into that process. We have a weekly call with all of our partners and that includes the COC and the CPC. (Tammy, Senior Executive TOOC)

We have every two weeks we’re on a call with them and we discuss all these issues, we meet more frequently in between face to face. So our communication has been not only frequent but I think very open, transparent and collaborative. (Chris, Senior Executive TOOC)

These frequent collaborative opportunities afforded the space for immediate knowledge conversion amongst members. Collaborative efforts such as the Consortium or PLG, provide “an immediate forum for nurturing the emergent property of knowledge at each level and developing new ideas…it is [also] important that the organization is able to integrate appropriate aspects of emerging knowledge into its strategic development” (Nonaka, 1994, p.17). This is particularly true within the context of TO2105, wherein leadership was brought in for their expertise, and shared their knowledge within their daily role. Individuals with a high amount of experience within the SME legacy or leveraging context were relied upon to assist organizers. “Th[e] tacit knowledge accumulated at the individual level can then set off a new spiral of knowledge creation when it is shared with others through socialisation” (Nonaka et al., 2000, p.10). These leaders become crucial sources of organizational knowledge creation and transfer, as described by a legacy organizer from Toronto:

We have really strong advocates in this organizations. I have to say someone like ‘Donna’ when I first started she was like, okay we’re going to go talk about Para…it’s a busy, busy place and stuff goes really fast, as I think all organizing committees do, so you do need people like her who are going to make sure that it’s top of mind for everybody. (Tammy, Senior Executive TOOC).
Authors Bathelt and colleagues (2004) pointed to the power of individuals throughout the organization to drive change, "even when specializing in performing some particularly trivial tasks, individuals find solutions and notice peculiarities otherwise overlooked....a group...can therefore develop knowledge far beyond the reach of any single member of that group” (p.35). This concept of organizational knowledge through individual leadership was echoed from the National Parasport Organization, if not embedded throughout the PLG strategy. The National Parasport Organization hoped that the individual collaborators would be able to share their new knowledge within their own organizations:

I think that creating those pods or nodes of leaderships in groups to check in on how we're doing and sharing best practices is really important. I think we’re learning a lot in this area where so much of it is unchartered territory that creating that ongoing feedback loop of how were doing, what’s going well, what’s not, what’s best practices in the circumstance, what was the best; and I think just having a tight feedback loop for everyone in the tent so they knows what’s going on and increase their own attention and awareness. (April, CEO National Parasport Organization).

The role of individual knowledge is always at the core of organizational learning. Nonaka (1994) argued that the role of the leader in knowledge creation, surrounds how to balance the appropriate methods, timing and situations for knowledge creation and translation, which is “the process of dialogues and shared experience” (p.24). Therefore the leadership of both the National Parasport Organization and from TOOC, specifically Donna, was crucial and central within the tacit to tacit conversion of knowledge within the PLG.

**Internalisation.** The process of ‘learning by doing’ was also frequently cited throughout the legacy and leveraging organizers of Vancouver 2010 and Toronto 2015 as a crucial mechanism. As previously mentioned, much of the OC were entrepreneurial specialists, who inherently learned through each new Games experience. “Through internalisation, explicit knowledge created is shared throughout an organisation and converted into tacit knowledge by individuals” (Nonaka et
al., 2000, p.10). Legacy organizers discussed taking explicit knowledge from previous cases, and creating new tacit knowledge through their experiences:

Beg, borrow and steal. Look to other destinations that have been successful and what we were able to accomplish, or not. We looked at Sydney who was considered to be the model for tourism marketing to that point and we learned a lot from them. I don’t think we would have learned as much from the likes of Athens, Torino, even Beijing…But I would say look to organizations like the Tourism Consortium to see what we did, what worked and what didn’t work. And maybe even for some things that we might not say publicly that we learned along the way that we might do differently, that I probably shouldn’t say either. (Oscar, Associate Provincial Consortium Partner 2).

It’s a different world and I don’t have a background in accessibility or parasport. I’ve had a lot of learning to do in terms of just even understanding the lexicon, understanding what this means to different people, what the parasport movement is, and where they want to go. And I think I probably would have spent more time learning that when I first got here, because it’s something that I think I picked up more intuitively as I went but I probably would have benefited from it being a lot more deliberate. (Tammy, Senior Executive TOOC)

Other organizers pointed to a rapid cycle of knowledge creation, wherein strategies were changed as per explicit feedback. For example, Stanley (Associate, National Tourism Organization) discussed the ongoing process of knowledge translation: “I think the outcome of the power of social media during the Games was to make us rethink how we do approach our communications.”

In contrast, other legacy organizers identified specific, mandated opportunities for internalisation. In particular the Toronto Games included specific training required for employees, as described by several organizers:

We are connected to the AODA…and so we’ve incorporated all of that into our training for our volunteers and our orientation and we’ve developed a program under that umbrella. (Leslie, Senior Executive TOOC)

Whether it’s games impact training which everyone does, leadership training for leadership volunteers, venue specific training and role specific training – there’s accessibility in all of those levels. But additionally we have an accessibility module that’s been created that every volunteer will go through online, done in consultation with the CPC and AODA. So that’s another I think huge opportunity to send out these 23,000 people with way more information on accessibility from a customer service perspective than they ever had before.
Not to mention all the parasport Parapan components that we’ve also included into all aspects of their training. (Donna, Parapan Director TOOC)

New tacit knowledge was created throughout TOOC, through the consumption of explicit knowledge in training and resultant experiences. This also conforms to Nonaka’s (1994) argument that “hierarchical formal organization mainly carries out the task of combination and internalisation” (p.33) (combination is discussed below).

**Externalisation.** As these two games were seen as new, exciting and unique to the IOC, there was an extensive creation of knowledge translation documents during both Games. Casey and colleagues (2009a; 2009b) argued that organizations with training opportunities such as workshops directly supports internal and system-wide capacity building. Divergence occurred between the Vancouver and Toronto Games in an interesting way: Vancouver organizers described the process of externalisation with a focus on delivering their tacit knowledge to future Games organizers. As many of the legacy plans were unprecedented, organizers from VANOC, the Consortium, and consequently, the IOC, recognized the necessity to share the experiences from Vancouver to perpetuate the cycle of knowledge translation of the Games.:  

I’m also doing some work for the IOC in terms of helping them help the OCs down the road because a lot of the materials and things that you think get passed on or knowledge that gets passed on doesn’t, and also it’s hard with the different cultures. So there’s a lot of material that I’m working with the IOC to say okay just template this stuff because it’ll make life so much easier for everyone. (Jim, Senior Executive VANOC)

I’ve been to two different IOC legacy-related conferences, but we’re definitely showing an example how to do it. So that’s part of the transfer and there’s documentation that goes into their other reports, but it’s really going and presenting at conferences and sitting down with delegations and talking to them. There’s delegations that come through town and meet like this and ask questions and talk and we show programs and we show them to the partners. And then we get invited to go and speak at conferences to share that as well. So the transfer of knowledge, it’s good and our board believes that’s an important part of our work, is transferring that knowledge, as long as it’s not an expense to us as an organization, which is good. And so we try and share as much as we can. (Dwight, CEO Games Legacy Organization)
One of our final documents was to prepare such a booklet for future organizers and what we’ve done is we’ve taken a look at each one of our strategic objectives and we talked about what worked and a little bit of commentary on it. And then we’ve given a kind of a top ten guide at the end in terms of things that you should look out for. (Darryl, Senior Executive VANOC)

In contrast, Toronto organizers expressed influencing others through externalisation, and to provide opportunities to create new explicit knowledge through strategies and planning documents:

Even in the bidding phase it was our job with the [National Parasport Organization] to sort of change mindsets within Vancouver and the leadership there, both politicians and the leaders of the bid to embrace the Paralympic Games, show them what an opportunity it is and leverage that opportunity for themselves and for us. Thankfully there was, I think it’s because we’re Canadians, but it was quite an easy sell for the bid leadership of the Vancouver Games, from the top down…And it manifested itself in a lot of different ways over the course of the 7 years of planning the games and then the staging and the legacies after. (Andy, Director Legacy Partner1)

We have this speaker series that we developed as part of the training for the organizing committee in addition to doing our accessibility training which is mandatory for everybody in the organization. In addition to doing other inclusion training we have this thing called LIDA Leadership Inclusion Diversity Accessibility, it’s our speaker series, we have different people speak, tell their stories. (Joan, Manager TOOC)

Brad McCannell whose an accessibility consultant who I worked with in Vancouver and he’s also on contract with the IPC, so we’ve used his services as well to involve him in some of our reviews – especially of things that we were challenged by in terms of coming up with solutions. (Donna, Parapan Director TOOC)

Both cases represent what Nonaka and colleagues (2000) referred to as “essential dialogue” (p.11), where language is strategic in order to clearly articulate and facilitate knowledge creation. This is central to externalisation, as the tacit information may be abundant and need to be condensed or altered in explicit knowledge creation (Nonaka, 1994).

Combination. Finally, although less prominently discussed, forms of combination learning were also present. This may be since processes like the circulation of emails or documents may not appear as important, although they are a crucial component of knowledge dissemination
amongst members of an organization (Nonaka et al., 2000). The creation and transfer of explicit knowledge was observed similarly within Vancouver and Toronto:

[the MPA] caused the creation of the Legacy Society to...develop everything from the Society’s bylaws, it’s purpose, going right through to some preliminary business planning for the venues, for post-Games operations, and just kind of setting all the legal framework, financial all the other pieces in place for post-Games. (Michael, CEO Legacy Management Company).

The last piece is, and we’re still in the process of this, we developed reports that we shared with all of the venue owners. (Donna, Parapan Director TOOC)

A good example of this is the Province of Ontario developed a Festivals and Events accessibility guide. They brought that to the Accessibility Advisory Committee and as a committee we helped to distribute that. (Joan, Manager TOOC)

Many instances of knowledge creation and transfer were noted throughout the Vancouver and Toronto cases as essential organizational mechanisms of legacy and leveraging. Authors Werner and colleagues (2015) argue that opportunities for knowledge translation must occur ex ante, in line with leveraging literature (Chalip, 2017; Misener, 2015; O’Brien & Chalip, 2007; Smith, 2013).

Prior sport management scholars have examined event knowledge transfer in a variety of settings (Ellis, Parent, & Seguin, 2016; Halbwirth & Toohey, 2001, 2005; Parent, Kristiansen, & Houlihan, 2017; Parent, Mcdonald, & Goulet, 2014; Schenk, Parent, Macdonald, & ProulxTherrien, 2015; Werner, Dickson, & Hyde, 2015). The context of event legacy and/or leveraging has received limited attention. This study addresses this gap by exploring how the groups governing legacy at Vancouver 2010 and Toronto 2015 OCs learned and transferred knowledge of event leveraging and governance through processes of socialisation, internalisation, externalisation and combination. As the TOK has become increasing institutionalized through formal documentation and mandated procedures, this compulsion to perform and act can be recognized as a form of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As a result of
the OGKM, the IOC was able to control many of the structures of externalisation, and therefore the type of knowledge being passed on. In contrast, processes of socialisation can occur within informal settings, allowing non-institutionalized knowledge to flow free, as per Oscar’s suggestion (“And maybe even for some things that we might not say publicly that we learned along the way that we might do differently, that I probably shouldn’t say either.”). This information may be considered more trustworthy, as it is from a neutral source (e.g., a fellow Games organizer), versus from a source of power without shared experience (e.g., the IOC). In their examination of an interorganizational event-related collaboration, authors Ziakas and Costa (2010) demonstrated that “the building of trust and demonstration of reciprocal behaviors in the network are essential to successful collaborations, development of long-term dyadic relationships, and overall stability” (p.143).

While the IOC served as the dominant logic over the entire event space, their influence did not entirely affect either leveraging groups’ efforts or group dynamics. The ability to focus on the central logic of leveraging and not the competing logic of event execution, was incredibly valuable to keeping conflict low. The environment of hybrid organizations “creates heightened risk of intergroup conflict within the workforce regarding organizational values and resource allocations” (Svensson & Seifreid, 2017, p. 178) As a result the Tourism Consortium and PLG’s ability to minimize conflict in such diverse groups also minimized organizational dysfunction, and maximized opportunities for organizational learning.

Important to note, some organizers specifically pointed to a lack of definitive materials available along path of SME leveraging, impeding the process of internalisation. Milton (Senior Executive, VANOC) stated: “So when we got these games I asked where was the manual? We got
nothing, there was absolutely nothing. And what I find quite interesting is everybody looks at all these multi-sport games and the glow of them.”

**Summary**

As previously mentioned, I did not intentionally set out to explore TOK within the context of this thesis, but the prevalence within the data, as well as its’ connection to sustainable event impacts, was too significant to ignore. The result is not only a richer understanding of both the TOK within the space of leveraging and legacy organizers, but also insight into the processes of organizational forms governing event leveraging. The fluid movement of the legacy ‘actors’ throughout the event space, both locally and globally, is also representative of specialized knowledge linked to leveraging events.

This research contributes to a major gap in organizational learning and sport management literature surrounding event leveraging. Limited authors have examined knowledge transfer and institutional theory (Ellis, Parent, & Parent, 2016), and no authors to date have combined organizational learning and institutional theory, for an examination of organization forms. While institutional theorists continue to make positive contributions to the field of sport management, authors Misener and Misener (2018) call for “new ways of thinking about how organizations are traditionally structured and their relationships with other organizations” (p.130). By combining organizational learning and institutional theory, there is a thick description and additional insight offered into the specific mechanisms of legacy and/or leveraging governance. Future researchers should examine how organizers can actually manage diverse interests in order to focus on a common goal and strategy. The combination of these institutional theory and organizational learning provides a starting point for future scholars examining the governance of event legacy and/or leveraging strategies.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion

The overall purpose of this dissertation was to examine the organizational governance of event legacy. This was accomplished through a research synthesis of empirical legacy and leveraging literature, to examine previous event models’ organizational mechanisms and strategies, as well as authors’ positioning of legacy versus leveraging. The findings from this chapter demonstrated that the use of organizations distinct from organizing committees enables a long-term, strategic approach to leveraging outcomes. Secondly, I utilized comparative cases to understand how two organizations distinct from the OC leveraged event models for sustainable outcomes, particularly through the TOK. This was accomplished through critical policy analysis and in-depth interviews with legacy organisers and event personnel. The findings were used to build a model for more sustainable SME leveraging, with the goal of providing more [positive] opportunities for long-term outcomes for communities.

Practical Implications

Both Vancouver and Toronto provided interesting cases for examining the governance and delivery of legacy in their similarities and differences. Both of these cases utilized non-profit collaborations that attempted to leverage the Games beyond the traditional OC. Part of the purpose of this thesis, was to produce insightful findings or framework that would assist in future leveraging efforts or strategies, surrounding SMEs. A summary of recommendations for long-term leveraging strategies surrounding SMEs is provided in Table 6.2

Long-term planning guidelines. From both the Vancouver and Toronto Games, written understanding of shared roles, responsibilities, mandates, clear targets, and guidelines contributed to successful collaboration of legacy organizations. Both the Consortium and the PLG utilized streamlined communication, and frequent contact to maintain internal consistency
Organizational Mechanism Recommendations for SME Leveraging

<table>
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<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Policy Mechanisms</th>
<th>Collaborators</th>
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| Long-term planning guidelines               | • Formal control (e.g. to clarify membership, roles and responsibilities) | • Local non-profit organizations  
• Community members |
| Coercive Policy                             | • Coercive (e.g. to secure funding)  
• Framework Regulation (e.g. for localized planning, implantation and evaluation) | • Local non-profit organizations  
• Multi-level government arrangements (e.g. funding partners) |
| Distinction from OC                        | • Coercive (e.g. MOU, MPA)                           | • Multiple levels of government  
• National governing bodies  
• Local non-profit organizations |
| Clear, Distinct Leadership and Responsibility | • Framework Regulation (e.g. for clear role and responsibilities)  
• Coercive (e.g., to hire leadership) | • Policy entrepreneur knowledgeable in relevant policy domains |

and understanding. However, outside of collaborative goals, the Consortium and PLG lacked definitive leveraging targets and evaluative mechanisms. Misener (2015) explained that “a goals-based approach…enhances the means to evaluate the long-term success and sustainability of the strategies” (p.147). The lack of clear goals and evaluative strategies are the essence of why so many legacies remain nebulous and their benefits undelivered to host communities. Even though these two cases are seen as superior examples for legacy organization, they both lacked clear mechanisms for all legacy objectives and plans, outside of OC-regulated infrastructure.

The strategic long-term nature described here supports with Ziakas’ (2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015) previous advocacy for utilizing strategic event portfolios. Within event portfolios, the focus is shifted from events in isolation, to a series of interrelated events “where synergies among events are identified and cross-leveraged” (Kelly & Fairley, 2018a, p.260). In particular, Ziakas
(2014) has pointed to the alignment of long-term, strategic leveraging framework with the more temporally fluid process of event portfolios. The temporal nature of many organizers was noted as a frequent issue in sustainable planning, as many VANOC and TOOC members indicated that once the Games was over they were moving onto another event or organization. Event portfolios embed events within a dynamic, long-term calendar. Authors Ziakas and Costa (2011) described the synergistic relationship between strategic leveraging from sport events and event portfolios:

if a community hosts events throughout the year and finds means to create synergy among them, then the impact of events can be sustained as long as each event in the portfolio complements or reinforces the benefits bestowed by other events…In addition, different events when bundled in a portfolio can act as hooks for one another and hence bring together segments of the population that might not otherwise meet. Overall, an event portfolio if incorporated in the development policies of cities and regions can yield a range of social and economic benefits. (p. 151)

Simply put, event portfolios embody the long-term strategic planning process, and are associated with knowledge transfer through the symbiotic relationships of events and their organizers. They are a crucial resource for cities and organizations looking to leverage SMEs. Realistically if a city, region or province is bidding for a SME, it would be foolish not to take advantage of an event portfolio during the 8-10 year planning process.

**Coercive policy.** Binding policy was recognized as a major contributor to successful planningm as well as continued collaboration in both Vancouver and Toronto. The attachment to federal and provincial funding assisted in cementing partnerships, and establishing legitimacy. The MPA in particular was foundational in creating structure and accountability within both Games, however Toronto used less specific and targeted language. Multi-level government involvement is crucial in order to access those polices and funding. Planning for strategic outcomes must be driven by the community, and separate from those levels of government. Forms of framework regulation are highly recommended in this instance, in order to bind members’
commitments and responsibilities, while allowing for flexibility in design and implementation, as per the community’s needs. Collaborations or partnerships should pursue opportunities like the Ontario Sport Communities Recreation Fund (OSCRF), a form of framework regulation for community partners to implement their own sport and recreation programs to address specific barriers (Grants Ontario, 2018). The OSCRF is designed for municipalities and non-profit collaboration, are goal-driven and require clear quantitative methods for evaluation.

Clear evaluation must be part-in-parcel within event leveraging, as well as within evidence-base policy making. Kaplanidou and colleagues (2016) noted the clear absence of critically evaluative mechanisms within Qatar’s legacy planning processes leading up to FIFA 2022. Within Chapter 4, even events that emphasized long-term, sustainable outcomes were lacking concise methods for evaluating legacy delivery and execution. The 2014 Glasgow CWG was applauded for the embeddedness of legacy within their planning processes, but several authors noted the absence of legitimate framing of responsibility or evaluation (Christie & Gibb, 2015; Rogerson, 2016). Without specific plans to determine whether legacy was successfully fulfilled, the resulting impact is unknown and its’ legacy unrealized. One exception noted in the literature was the 2002 Manchester CWG, where established methods of evaluation were in place alongside legacy objectives. The Legacy Programme included quantitative output requirements, and while this may negate some qualitative indicators, the evaluation ensures that all data is not self-reported or assumed (Smith & Fox, 2007).

**Distinction from OC.** The prevalence of the OC was discussed throughout this thesis as a major limiting factor to legacy planning. OC members are focused on delivering a successful Games and sustainable, long-term planning is counter to their purpose. Legacy planning must be embedded within communities, in collaborations that are apart from the OC. In this way event-
themed leveraging is most appropriate – leveraging strategies benefit from the association to the Games, but are not behold to its’ expectations. The use of the NCLA allowed the Vancouver group to utilize event-themed leveraging, while directly benefitting off of the association to the 2010 Olympic Games.

While the alignment to the OC grants access, legitimacy and power, it has been demonstrated that leveraging efforts will be focused on the isolated event, rather than its broader strategic function (Chalip, 2017). Authors have identified that localized leveraging strategies should be separate from the OC in order to focus on the specific goal at hand, rather than the event itself (Chalip & Leyns, 2002; Leopkey & Parent, 2016; Misener, 2015). As such, using the rhetoric of leveraging rather than legacy is encouraged throughout the event process, particularly the bid, to ensure transparency. Leveraging versus legacy implies an active process and may encourage participation versus anticipation surrounding the positive opportunities of an event.

**Clear, Distinct Leadership and Responsibility.** Clear leadership throughout the planning process must be sustainable. The Consortium benefitted from having an appointed Director, as well as the Provincial Tourism Organization leading planning and funding during the Games. Afterwards, the distinct goals and strategy of the Consortium appear to be highly connected to the National Tourism Organization. The PLG also was highly connected to the National Parasport Organization’s high-performance strategies. In addition, the leadership of the PLG was further complicated by the TOOC’s Parapan Director, a short-term, but key figure in terms of knowledge and experience, who passed on leadership to the National Parasport Organization. This can be problematic as they are directly connected to federal funding strategies to pursue international, high performance sporting excellence, versus localized, grassroots opportunities (Thibault & Harvey, 2013). I recognize that while the National Parasport Organization felt a sense of
responsibility for ‘owning’ and delivering outcomes, they are also empowered to mutually leverage this opportunity. The 2015 Games and the PLG feed the National Parasport Organization’s long-term, federally institutionalized purpose of perpetuating elite sport. This is further complicated by the public funding of the OLPG (and arguably the high-performance sport initiatives of the 2015 Games), the direct impact/influence on local public policy, and the claims of ameliorating conditions for communities or marginalized groups with no evaluative strategies. Authors Peters and Pierre (1998) summarize this problematic issue within a single question:

If elected political leaders have such limited control over the public administration, is it reasonable to hold them accountable for the decisions and actions of the public service, and if elected officials should not be held accountable, who then is accountable? (p.228)

If public funding is redirected into SME planning, particularly for ‘community-related’ programming, then that funding must be utilized to capitalize on embedded programs or organizations. Future collaborations should look to utilize coercive policy to hire a team, organization or individual to lead leveraging strategies over a long-term period (e.g., 8-10 years). This person must be consistent throughout the event process, and could ultimately be an external individual knowledgeable in the relevant policy realms. Several authors have examined the role of policy entrepreneurs within this realm (e.g., Gilmore, 2013; McGillivray & McPherson, 2012; Misener, 2015), as they have a unique role of operating external to official government operations, while understanding public policy processes in order to “broker relationships between public and private partners to ensure that the common good is achieved” (McGillivray & McPherson, 2012, p.87). This ‘common good’ within an events context is arguably the local community that the benefits are intended to serve. As a result, the leadership required within this type of hybrid-leveraging-collaboration, must “develop a shared understanding of the organization’s multiple and seemingly paradoxical identities” (Svensson, 2017, p.447). In this way, localized coalitions may
be more appropriate for assuming the locus of responsibility for delivering specific outcomes. Many cities pursuing event-hosting strategies are led by an urban regime pursuing a development agenda and have utilized an events portfolio to deliver long-term outcomes (e.g., Manchester, England). Within urban regimes, political and economic elites within multi-level government connections and collaborations have the access and legitimacy to participate within policy-decision making processes and leverage them accordingly. This affords this type of collaboration to navigate the events space strategically. If there is an existing agenda that is aimed at long-term, sustainable urban development for communities, then the controlling organization should assume the locus of responsibility for this type of leveraging strategy (and thus, legacy). The trouble with urban regime theory is that not all cities have a long-standing regime with a strong development agenda.

**Proposed Theoretical Framework and Contributions**

Together these findings produce a visual representation of implications for leveraging sustainable outcomes within the complex and multi-level nature of collaboration. Interorganizational collaborations are most often categorized by the sharing of resources, collective goals, some degree of longevity, and some degree of intention or planning (Babiak, Thibault & Willem, 2008). Within these hybrid collaborations, individuals represent multiple interests and organizations, and thus hold differing perspectives and reasons for collaboration. While these partnerships and collaborations originally were a solution to diminished municipal capacity, they presently offer opportunities to access capital, expertise and legitimacy (Babiak & Thiabult, 2009). As sport continues to be a publicly-funded entity, sport organizers lack many of the resources necessary for event leveraging. In contrast, many event organizers lack the knowledge of the Canadian sport landscape to understand how effective leveraging strategies can
be implemented. This collaboration with multi-level networks associated with event hosting, is critical to gain access to scare resources, information, and credibility. Therefore this framework is embedded within a city’s PPPs surrounding the event, sport, and other relevant leveraging organizations. It was crucial to demonstrate the multiple organizations organizing and delivering legacies and/or leveraging initiatives within a single event. In the case of Toronto, external influences were also noted through their official involvement with the OC. It was also necessary to include a temporal element, to situate the respective event organizations and activities appropriately. This was also important to consider as the temporal nature of events affects policy planning, and all legacy and/or leveraging activities.

The framework shown in Figure 7.1 is for future organizers to consider when looking to leverage events for sustainable outcomes. This framework was developed through careful consideration of the event structures described in the 2010 and 2015 events, and also through a constant revisiting of the literature. Specifically, Figure 7.1 points to the overlapping areas of organization between OCs, the events’ legacy organizers, and the external leveraging organization. Important to note is the inclusion of members from the time of the bid, until post-event. This long-term, process view emphasizes continuity and sustainability, if individuals will be committed to the entire timespan of the Games, as well as the future management of legacies post-Games. After the bid, it is crucial that organizations looking to leverage outcomes, have connections and collaborations with individuals associated with the OC and Gamestime Legacy organization. The asymmetry and alignment with the OC enables the opportunity to access decision-making structures, as well as legitimacy in the acquisition of resources (Gerke et al., 2018). External leveragers also need to maintain a relationship with the official legacy organizers, in order to embed their outcomes within the city’s broader legacy plans. As well, collaboration with the OC
provides unprecedent access to information and legitimacy crucial to event legacy. While this aspect of the diagram is not congruent with the bifocal diagram of the Toronto Games, wherein...
legacy organizers were embedded within the OC, the importance lies within the overlapping structures. While the increase of organizations and individuals within the event-legacy space may appear to add to the confusion surrounding responsibility, the opportunity to increase the number of opportunities for overlap may increase, as well as the increased embeddedness of TOK throughout the host city. The framework can be adapted to have less organizations, as per the Toronto case, or greater than 3, such as the 2006 Victoria CWG. Within this framework, it is theorized that an increase in overlapped individuals throughout the phases of the event, from pre-bid to post-Games, would increase the opportunities for sustainable positive outcomes. Although this proposed framework does not assign responsibility, it frames sustainable legacies in such a way that they are the product of leveraging strategies and collaborative efforts.

Ultimately the onus of responsibility for fulfilling legacy mandates fades if not specifically connected to coercive policy. The overlap between the OC and legacy organizers assumes involvement of political decision-makers, as event-hosting is directly tied to multi-level government involvement. As a result, organizations looking to leverage SME for long-term outcomes for communities should look to embed their tactics within broader strategic plans. Specific goals and evaluative methods must be identified at the earliest possible stage. Members participating in event leverage should remain throughout the event phases (pre-bid, bid, pre-Games, Games, post-Games), in order to maintain relationships and promote continuity.

**Theoretical Contributions.** This dissertation provides various theoretical implications for scholars examining event legacies, leveraging, and hybrid organizational forms. Within the systematic review of Chapter 4, I detail the specific organizational forms and mechanisms used in previous events’ legacy and/or leveraging strategies. As well, this chapter gives insight into what previous scholars actually found with regards to organizational forms relating to legacy and/or
strategic leveraging governance. This builds on previous research contending that non-host regions can consider event leveraging (Chen & Misener, 2019; Kellet, Hede & Chalip, 2008), as well as furthering the locally-driven nature of the impacts of smaller events (Chalip, 2005; Higham, 1999; Higham & Hinch, 2002; Wilson, 2006).

The cases of Chapter 5 provided evidence of the mechanisms and tactics utilized in pursuit of legacy and/or leveraging objectives. The comparative case studies also provided a methodological contribution to leveraging research, as few authors have used this approach within sport management (Naraine, Schenk & Parent, 2016). The framework built from this chapter considers a long-term process view of the event space, and gives direction on the management of internal and external leveraging groups. This framework also gives a starting point for future researchers looking to examine event leveraging outcomes within the multilayered environment.

Chapter 6 provided innovative theoretical considerations for the use of organizational learning with institutional theory. Few authors have examined knowledge transfer and institutional theory (Ellis, Parent, & Parent, 2016), and no sport management authors to date have combined organizational learning and institutional theory, for an examination of organization forms. By combining organizational learning and institutional theory, there is a thick description and additional insight offered into the specific mechanisms of legacy and/or leveraging governance. The combination of institutional theory and organizational learning provides a starting point for future scholars examining the governance of event legacy and/or leveraging strategies.

Limitations

While this thesis provides important insights into organizational mechanisms within legacy and leveraging strategies of a sport event, the limitations must be acknowledged. Firstly, the cases for this project utilized forms of SMEs, which many cities and countries do not have the resources
to host or utilize within an event-centred development strategy (Black, 2014). As such, the strategies and inquiry employed for these types of events may not appear congruent with smaller or medium-sized events. In reality, strategic leveraging is applicable for events of any size, and authors have illustrated the use of smaller events as a leverageble resource (Beesley & Chalip, 2011; Chalip, 2004; Kelly & Fairley, 2018b). In addition, the recommended organizational mechanisms are aligned with previous literature noting the use of an external leader/entity to assist local organizations with leveraging strategies within smaller and medium-sized events (Taks, Misener, Chalip, & Green, 2013).

Another limitation to this study is the timing of interviews. As previously mentioned, interviews with Vancouver stakeholders were completed two years post-Games, while Toronto interviews occurred pre-Games. This is a particular challenge within longitudinal research, as both events captured an almost twenty-year time period from planning the Vancouver bid in 1998, to hosting the Toronto Games in 2015. As a result, individuals from each case were at different leveraging and legacy planning phases; where Vancouver was reflecting on what occurred and moving forward through the Consortium and GLO, Toronto was getting ready to host the Games and enact their leveraging strategies. This may have led Toronto organizers to be more optimistic in their answers, whereas the Vancouver stakeholders may have been more grounded or realistic after seeing the results of 2010. As such, a follow-up study is recommended that would follow both collaborations in the 5-10 year period after hosting the Games, to examine the evolution of their organizational strategies and mechanisms.

**Future Research**

This research provided an analysis of organizational mechanisms for delivering legacy within a sport event context. In addition, it furthered the work of Chalip in postulating that the rhetoric of
leveraging should be used over legacy. Within leveraging an *ex ante* focus is utilized versus an *ex-post* emphasis, a key advantage noted throughout previous event literature, as well as the specific cases from Vancouver 2010 and Toronto 2015. Strategic leveraging focuses on embedded the event within local strategies for development beyond the event context. (Chalip, 2017). Important organizational mechanisms contributing to strategic leveraging efforts included consistent, sustainable leadership; clearly defined roles, responsibilities and guidelines of conduct; frequent collaboration from earliest point; the use of binding policy to maintain partnerships; and distinction from the IOC-owned entities (e.g., OC). This project also found that knowledge transfer is embedded throughout all of these organizational mechanisms, through each individual role, as the Games cycle is a fluid process that does not end when the Games leave town.

At the start of this thesis, I claimed that the field of sport event legacy research has been unfocused and cluttered. In particular, many researchers are perpetuating the legacy discourse through uncritical examinations of OC-driven programming. There is a clear dearth of research examining the level of responsibility within event-hosting outcomes and how organizers are held accountable. Future research should be directed away from the rhetoric of legacy and focus on leveraging strategies, where an analytic, *ex ante*, strategic-goal centred approach (Chalip, 2017) is utilized. In addition, researchers should examine leveraging strategies within smaller and medium-sized events, as sport management research has been “overwhelmed” with SME research. In addition, Black (2014) further argued that non-mega events with lower scope and profile are more appropriate for many smaller communities to host, meaning that the implications from research could be more applicable and helpful for many more communities and municipalities. Taks (2013) also called for research examining non-mega event leverage, as “there is reason to believe that
small-to-medium sized sport events have much to offer to local communities if properly leveraged” (p.137), but more evidence is needed.

Future research should also explore the leadership roles and responsibilities within leveraging strategies. In particular, who or what the leadership structure is within strategic leveraging of an event, and the resultant influence on the respective strategy. More research is also needed to examine the dynamic leadership within governance structures, as the competing logics and pressures of such collaborations reveal unique organizational mechanisms to overcome unique organizational constraints. I agree with previous authors who have called for an examination of how and when such leadership occurs, as well as understanding the processes of knowledge translation and management within this context (Greenwood et al., 2010).

Finally, future research in this realm should look critically examine contemporary governance arrangements within Canadian sport, as urged by authors Thibault and Harvey (2013). Future research should also look to the policy mechanisms strategically utilized within alliances for sport, health and recreation, as they are able to access incredible amounts of power and resources when wielded appropriately. A key underpinning of this research is to understand the institutional pressures that are associated with government-related funding, and as such, innovative leveraging should seek out other, non-governmental sources of funding. This will doubtlessly spawn a new generation of research topics and realms, and new relationships of political pull and power.
References


Appendix A: Vancouver 2010 Interview Guide

1. Why do you think Vancouver bid for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games?
2. How did the Winter Olympic Games fit into Vancouver’s tourism and economic development goals?
3. What does the term ‘legacy’ mean to you?
4. What lessons do you think were learned from past Olympic Games that were applied in planning for tourism legacies?
5. What do the terms ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ tourism legacies mean to you?
6. What do you understand by the term ‘event leveraging’?
7. Did your organization prepare an event leveraging strategy?
8. Can you explain the processes involved in the design and implementation of event leveraging strategies?
9. What challenges (if any) did you encounter in planning for and delivering tourism legacies?
10. What do you consider to be the most important tangible tourism legacies of hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games?
11. What would you consider to be the most important intangible tourism legacies of hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games?
Appendix B: Toronto 2015 Interview Guide

1. What is your involvement with Toronto 2015?
2. Please state your understanding of the legacy framework being implemented by Toronto 2015.
3. Are/were you aware of any intentions, initiatives or strategies specifically focusing on accessibility (for persons with a disability)?
   a. To what degree are the intentions/initiatives formal/informal, intended, unintended? Explain.
   b. Please tell us more about how and why these particular strategies were being selected?
4. Do you know of any unplanned or unofficial attempts to increase accessibility in specific communities through the event? Please tell us about them.
5. What are your own expectations regarding the potential effects these games may have on community accessibility?
6. What are your own expectations regarding the potential effects of these games on understanding disability and disability related issues?
7. To your knowledge, did other people express expectations that Toronto 2015 could have an effect on accessibility in the community?
   a. How do you evaluate the impact of the Toronto 2015 on accessibility outcomes in the local community?
8. The OC laid out a legacy plan in the Bid document that included increasing accessibility and awareness about disability. To your knowledge, were specific people, groups, or organizations assigned responsibility for carrying out these specific legacy objectives?
   a. To what extent have any of these Legacy goals been accomplished?
   b. In your view, what could have been done to better facilitate the accessibility and awareness objectives?
9. What lessons have you taken from the event, if any, in regards to how accessibility in the local community opportunities can be created/generated while hosting a sport event?
   a. What special advantages or opportunities can you identify that are associated with using this type of event for increasing accessibility and awareness about disability?
   b. What problems can you identify that are associated with using this type of event for increasing accessibility and awareness about disability?
10. If you were going to leverage future sport events to enhance accessibility and awareness about disability, what strategies or tactics would you employ?
Appendix C: Western University Ethics Approval (Vancouver 2010 dataset)

Principal Investigator: Dr. Laura Misener  
File Number: 101406  
Review Level: Delegated  
Approved Local Adult Participants: 17  
Approved Local Minor Participants: 0  
Protocol Title: Leveraging Sport Events for Sport Development - 183245  
Department & Institution: Health Sciences/Kinesiology, Western University  
Sponsor:  
Ethics Approval Date: May 21, 2013 Expiry Date: September 30, 2013

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

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<th>Comments</th>
<th>Version Date</th>
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<td>Revised Study End Date</td>
<td>The study end date has been extended to September 30, 2013 to allow for project completion.</td>
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This is to notify you that the University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above referenced revision(s) or amendment(s) on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB’s periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grace Kelly</td>
<td><a href="mailto:g.kelly@westernu.ca">g.kelly@westernu.ca</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.
Appendix D: Western University Ethics Approval (Toronto 2015 dataset)

Principal Investigator: Dr. Laura Misener
File Number: 104965
Review Level: Delegated
Protocol Title: LEVERAGING PARASPORT EVENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: Comparing Integrated to Non-Integrated Events
Department & Institution: Health Sciences/Kinesiology, Western University
Sponsor: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

Ethics Approval Date: October 04, 2013 Expiry Date: December 31, 2017

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

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This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000541.
Appendix E: Vancouver 2010 Letter of Information and Informed Consent Form

INFORMATION LETTER TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Title of Study: Conceptualizing Legacy in an Olympic Host City: The Case of Vancouver

You are invited to participate in this research study conducted by Stacy-Lynn Sant (PhD Candidate, University of Alberta), Dr. Laura Misener (Principal Investigator, Assistant Professor, University of Western Ontario) and Dr. Daniel Mason (Professor, University of Alberta). This information letter contains the same information as the consent letter which you may retain for your records.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Dr. Laura Misener at [contact information redacted].

Purpose of the study:

The purpose of this research is to examine the conceptualization of ‘legacy’ in an Olympic Host City through a case study of the city of Vancouver- host of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. The research study aims to explore Vancouver’s conceptualization of legacy by: describing how rhetoric (persuasive language) was used by the Vancouver Bid Corporation/Vancouver Organizing Committee to gain legitimacy for the bid; how mainstream newspaper’s framing of legacy shaped the meaning of ‘legacy’ for the public; and how tourism organizations’ conceptualizations of ‘legacy’ informed their choices of leveraging strategies to optimize Olympic-related tourism benefits.

Procedures:

We are asking you to participate in a 30 to 60 minute face-to-face interview at a time and location of your convenience regarding the conceptualization of legacy in the city of Vancouver. If a face-to-face interview is inconvenient, you have the option to participate in a Skype or telephone interview.

Potential risks and discomforts:

There are no known risks to participation in this study. With the exception of your position in the context of your organization at the time of the bid, no further personal information will be asked. This research will focus on your understanding of the concept of legacy in the Vancouver context; therefore there is little risk physically, psychologically or emotionally. There is a slight possibility of a social risk in that you are being asked to recall events that occurred well in the past and it may be difficult to recall these events. Further, while you are not being asked to judge your performance or others’, it is possible that you may feel uncomfortable presenting information related to your or their actions in the bidding, planning or reporting of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. If you feel uncomfortable with any line of questioning, please feel free to decline to respond or remove yourself from the research study.
Potential benefits to participants and/or to society:

Through the interview, you will have the opportunity to reflect on the intended legacy or benefits of the 2010 Olympic Games to the city of Vancouver, the province of British Columbia, and Canada. Feedback will be provided to you which may in turn help you improve the process of bidding and planning for a large-scale sporting event.

Compensation for participation:

There will be no payment for participation in this study.

Confidentiality:

Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. For example, your position within your organization may be identified in the published findings. If you choose not have your official position revealed, a generic title (i.e. manager) will be assigned to you. To guarantee confidentiality, names will not be released with the results, instead pseudonyms will be used. As such no references to names will be made within the published findings. All interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed. This information will only be accessible by the members of the research team and the audio files will be destroyed when transcribing is completed. The transcribed interviews will be stored on a secure external site and stored for seven (7) years after completion of the study in a secure data storage facility and may be used for further analysis related to this case. After a period of seven years, they will be destroyed.

Participation and withdrawal:

You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. Any participant, who wishes to withdraw from the study will have his/her data deleted and destroyed immediately. You may also refuse to answer any questions you do not wish to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.

Feedback of the results of this study to the participants:

A summary of the research findings will be provided to research participants.

Date when results are available: March 31, 2016

Contact email:

Laura Misener: [Contact Information]
Stacy-Lynn Sant: [Contact Information]
Daniel Mason: [Contact Information]
Rights of Research Participants:

You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant contact: the Research Ethics Office, Western University at 519-661-3036.

Signature of Principal Investigator:

These are the terms under which I will conduct research.

_________________________________                              March 4, 2012

Signature of Investigator    Date
Appendix F: Toronto 2015 Letter of Information to Participate in Research

LETTER OF INFORMATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Title of Study: Leveraging ParaSport Events for Community Participation

You are invited to participate in this research study conducted by Dr. Laura Misener (University of Western Ontario), Dr. Gayle McPherson (University of the West of Scotland), Dr. David Legg (Mount Royal University), and Dr. David McGillivray (University of the West of Scotland). You may retain this letter of information for your records. If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Dr. Laura Misener at 1-519-661-2111 ext. 86000 or by email at laura.misener@uwo.ca.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this research is to examine how the hosting of different forms of sport events for persons with a disability are being leveraged to create opportunities for community participation, and influence community attitudes towards disability. We focus on two different types of large scale sporting events: integrated events where able-bodied athletes and athletes with a disability compete alongside one another (2014 Commonwealth Games – Glasgow, Scotland), and non-integrated events that have a distinct event for athletes with a disability separated by time, but occurring in the same or similar location (2015 Pan/Parapan American Games – Toronto, Canada). We are specifically interested in leveraging tactics being employed in each of the cases to understand legacy tactics, strategies, and programs of integrated versus non-integrated events.

PROCEDURES

We are asking you to participate in a 30-45 minute interview at a time and location of your convenience regarding legacy planning tactics, strategies and programs for Toronto Pan/Parapan American Games 2015.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

There are no known risks to participation in this study. Except for the participants’ position in the context of the legacies of Parasport events, no further personal information will be asked. This research will focus on the participant’s knowledge of any community benefits and legacies left by these events; therefore there is little risk physically, psychologically or emotionally. There is a slight possibility of a social risk in that participants are being asked to recall events that may have occurred in the past and it may be difficult to recall the details of these events. Further, while interviewees are not being asked to judge theirs or others performance, it is possible that interviewees may feel uncomfortable presenting information that would seem that they were
reticent in these Parasport event legacies. If you feel uncomfortable with any line of questioning, please feel free to decline to respond or remove yourself from the research study.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
Through the interview, you will have the opportunity to reflect and learn about the legacies of these events and if there were any beneficial community impacts. Implementing this information may result in a feeling of pride and success when accomplishing these preset goals.

COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
There will be no payment for participation in this study. However participants will gain knowledge acquisition and receive a token of appreciation for their participation.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. If you choose not have your official position revealed in the results, a generic title (i.e. manager) will be assigned to you. To guarantee confidentiality of the participants no names will be released with the results. As such no references to names will be made within the data. All interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed, at which time either your official title or generic title will be assigned to your data. This information will only be accessible by the members of the research team. The audio files will be destroyed when transcribing is completed. The transcribed interviews will be copied on a secure external drive and stored for five (5) years after completion of the study in a secure data storage facility, after which they will be destroyed.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. Any participant, who wishes to withdraw from the study, will have his/her data deleted and destroyed immediately. You may also refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.

FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of the research findings will be provided to research participants.

Contact email: laura.misener@uwo.ca
Date when results are available: April 30, 2016 (interim summaries will be available on a biannual basis from the Principal investigator upon request).

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Office, University of Western Ontario, at ethics@uwo.ca, 519-661-3060.

PUBLICATIONS
The results of this research will be written up in the form of a published report and other outputs. For example, in press releases and scholarly articles. By consenting to interview, you are consenting to allowing us to publish quotes from your interview. The researchers will ensure that you are given the opportunity to see such output before publication should you be quoted in the research and if there is anything you are not comfortable with, we will either remove it or reword it ensuring you are happy with it.

SIGNATURE OF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
These are the terms under which I will conduct research.

_____________________________________          ____________________
Signature of Investigator                                             Date
Appendix G: Curriculum Vitae

**KYLIE WASSER**

#5 - 150 Borden Street, Stratford, Ontario, N5A 4R3
Phone: 905-517-2524

**EDUCATION**

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<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PhD in Management and Leadership in Kinesiology</td>
<td>Western University, London, Ontario</td>
<td>September 2014 - in progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masters of Human Kinetics in Sport Management</td>
<td>University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario</td>
<td>September 2012 - April 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Masters Internship: Ontario University Athletics (OUA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honours Bachelor of Science Kinesiology</td>
<td>McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario</td>
<td>September 2007 - April 2012</td>
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**TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

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<tr>
<td>01/2018-10/2018</td>
<td>Project Manager, SSHRC Connection Grant</td>
<td>Dr. Angela Schneider, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/2017-12/2017</td>
<td>Primary Instructor, Introduction to Management in Kinesiology (KIN 2298)</td>
<td>School of Kinesiology, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>Primary Instructor, Graduate Kinesiology Seminar</td>
<td>School of Kinesiology, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>Research Assistant, SSHRC/Sport Canada Grant</td>
<td>Dr. Laura Misener, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2018</td>
<td>Teaching Assistant</td>
<td>School of Kinesiology, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, Ontario</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Research Assistant</td>
<td>Dr. Warren Foster, Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Student Research Assistant</td>
<td>Health Research Services, Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON</td>
</tr>
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WORK EXPERIENCE

2018-2019  Experiential Learning and Placement Coordinator
Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, ON

2006-2019  Freelance Volleyball Coach
Ontario Volleyball Association (various teams, clubs and institutions), ON

2014-2015  Consultant
Ontario Volleyball Association and ParaSport Ontario, Toronto, ON

2013-2014  Mentor, G.O.A.L.S. (Girls Organizing And Learning Sport)/Trillium Grant
L.A.W.S., Windsor, Ontario

2013  Sport Administrator
Ontario University Athletics, Hamilton, ON

2012  Customer Service Representative (Motivator)
GoodLife Fitness, Oakville, Ontario

2009  Health & Wellness Representative
The Pulse Fitness Centre, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON

AWARDS AND HONOURS

2017  Ontario Graduate Scholarship, $15,000
2011  Frida and Joachim Wolter Bursary, McMaster University, $500
2011  Mary E. Keyes Award, McMaster University
2007  Wayne Olmstead Bursary, $500
2007  McMaster University Honour Awards Entrance Scholarship, $1000

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

External Activities:
➢ Editorial Board, Journal of Emerging Sport Studies
➢ Reviewer, International Journal of Global Environmental Issues
➢ Reviewer, International Journal of Sport Management and Marketing
➢ Reviewer, Event Management

University Leadership:
2018 – 2019  Faculty of Health Sciences Practice Education Conference, Co-Chair
2018 – 2019  Education Policy Committee, Member
2018 – 2019  Practice Education Committee, Member
2018 – present  Sport and Social Impact Research Group (SSIRG), Member
2016 – present  Western Kinesiology Graduate Student Association (KGSA), Chair
2014 – present  Western Certificate in University Teaching and Learning
2012 – 2018  North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM), Member
2018  Western KGSA Conference, Academic Oral and Poster Competition,
Invited Judge

2015 – 2016  NASSM, Elected Student Initiatives Committee
2015 – 2016  Western KGSA, Co-President
2015 – 2016  Western Kinesiology Student Representative, KGAC/KSAC/KEMC
2013 – 2014  University of Windsor Kinesiology Graduate Board, Student Representative
2010 – 2011  McMaster Kinesiology Undergraduate Students Association, Class Representative
2009 – 2010  McMaster Athletic Council, Social Chair
2007 – 2010  McMaster Varsity Women’s Volleyball Team

INVITED LECTURES

Western University, School of Kinesiology in the Faculty of Health Sciences
(KIN 2962): Exercise for Specific Populations, Exploring Parasport: Sitting Volleyball
(KIN 2298): Introduction to Management in Kinesiology, Event Management & Planning
(KIN 2032): Research Design in Human Movement Science, Health & Sport Policy Research

University of Windsor, Faculty of Human Kinetics
(HK 95-306): Obesity and Eating Disorders, Disordered Eating

Ontario Volleyball Association
(Stratford Volleyball Club) Stratford, Ontario, Leadership; Sport & Team Psychology;
(Defensa Volleyball Club) Oakville, Ontario, Disordered Eating; Sports Nutrition
(Forest City Volleyball Club) London, Ontario, Sport & Team Psychology; Leadership

PUBLICATIONS AND RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

Refereed publications


Other refereed contributions


Parasport Development through Events: Challenges and Lessons from the Local Initiatives (oral presentation). Presented at the North American Society for Sport Management Conference in Orlando, FL.


Wasser, K., & Bruce, J. (2015, April). Enhancing capacity for parasport in Ontario (oral presentation). Presented at the PanEx Sport and Exercise Summit in Toronto, ON.


Non-refereed contributions


PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
2014-present  Western Certificate in University Teaching and Learning (WCUTL), Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON.

2017-2019  Community Engaged Learning: Community of Practise, Student Success Centre, Western University, London, ON.

2017  Assessing with Rubrics [workshop], WCUTL, Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON. November 14

2017  Using Assessment to Nurture Critical Thinking [workshop], WCUTL, Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON. August 29

2017  Getting Students to Thinking Critically: Perspectives from the Disciplines [workshop], WCUTL, Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON. August 29

2017  Facilitating Learning in the Intercultural Classroom [workshop], WCUTL, Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON. August 29

2017  Working Effectively with Teaching Assistants [workshop], WCUTL, Teaching Support Centre, Western University, London, ON. August 29

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

2014-2015  Athlete Ambassador
            ParaSport Ontario, Toronto, ON

2010-2012  McMaster Athletic Council

2010  Team Leader
            Project G.O. (Girl’s Only), Hamilton, ON

2004-2007  Event Organizer
            Meco Poliziani Memorial 5k, Burlington, ON