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IS THERE A BOUNDARY TO MORALITY OR JUSTICE? A DESERVINGNESS PERSPECTIVE ON DONATIONS TO CHARITY

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IS THERE A BOUNDARY TO MORALITY OR JUSTICE?
A DESERVINGNESS PERSPECTIVE ON DONATIONS TO CHARITY

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by

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Abstract

For years social psychologists have examined factors that influence the likelihood that people will help others. Recently, theorists in two separate streams of thought have independently proposed that psychological boundaries are an important determinant of helping behaviour. According to boundary models of helping, people help others when they consider morality and/or justice to be applicable—but the application of morality (Reed & Aquino, 2003) and/or justice (Opotow, 1990) is constrained by a psychological boundary. Others who fall outside this boundary do not receive help because morality and/or justice are not perceived to apply to them. Critics of boundary models (e.g. Hafer & Olson, 2003) have pointed out that they conflate morality and justice with prosocial behaviour; negative treatment can at times be just and moral if such treatment is warranted by an individual's behaviour. Thus, proponents of the deservingness perspective (e.g. Olson, Hafer, Cheung, & Conway, in press) argued that morality and justice generally apply to all targets and that targets are allotted what they are perceived to deserve. According to this perspective, some people may receive less help because people perceive them to be less deserving. The current work compared predictions derived from each theory. Two studies provided support for the deservingness perspective: participants generally gave to charities in accordance with what they perceived each to deserve, especially when morality was situationally salient. No support was garnered for a boundary of either morality or justice. Results suggest that efforts to increase aid should focus on improving perceived deservingness rather than the applicability of morality or justice.

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"Justice is the constant and perpetual will to allot to every man his due."

-Domitus Ulpianus, Roman Jurist (100 AD-228 AD).

"For men are not equal: thus speaks justice."

-Friedrich Nietzsche (1883/1995).

Introduction

Three Theories of Helping Behaviour

Social psychologists have long been interested in the underpinnings of prosocial behaviour and have examined a wide range of situational factors that influence whether someone will help another. For example, we now know that people are more likely to help a target when the target is attractive (Wilson & Dovidio, 1985), when they empathize with the target (Krebs, 1975), when they perceive the target to belong to their in-group (Platow et al, 1999), when they are genetically related to the target (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), and when few other bystanders are present (Darley and Latané, 1968).

While social psychologists spent much of the 20th Century investigating features of the helping context, developmentalists were busy examining an individual difference said to drive helping behaviour: morality. Initially morality was conceptualized in terms of reasoning ability akin to object relations reasoning (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1984) but later theorists integrated moral reasoning with the view that morality is an aspect of personal identity (Blasi, 1983; Rest, 1984; Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon & Hart, 1992; for a review of the evolution of developmental theories of moral motivation, see

Bergman, 2002). In essence, developmental theorists argued that moral identity motivates people to help others, such that people with a strong moral identity help others but those without do not.

Recently, Aquino and Reed (2002; 2003; 2007) attempted to bridge social and developmental theories of helping behaviour. They maintained the developmental tenet that morality drives helping behaviour, but argued for a contextualized framework where morality is not always viewed as applicable to a situation. Rather, Aquino and Reed conceptualized a "circle of moral regard" where morality applies only to targets inside the circle but not outside it. They argued that moral individuals have a wider circle, and so are willing to help more distant others. Aquino and Reed also argued that priming moral identity would expand the circle of moral regard, leading people to help more distant others. Thus, Aquino and Reed's model of morality may be considered a "boundary" model: the primary determinant of helping is whether or not a target is included within the boundary of morality.

In this sense, Aquino and Reed's view of morality is similar to some theorists' view of justice. While the study of justice has a long history in social psychology (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Feather, 1999; Lerner, 1980), more recently Opotow (1990; 1993; 1994; 2001) and a host of other theorists (Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Brockner, 1990; Deutsch, 2000; Leets, 2001; Nagata, 1993; Singer, 1996; Staub, 1990) have argued that justice is limited by a boundary called the "scope of justice". According to this model, people only apply justice principles to targets inside a boundary. These targets are helped. However, people do not apply justice principles to targets outside this boundary. Because justice does not apply, these targets may be ignored or even subjected to abuse. Note that scope

of justice theory equates "justice principles" with "helping behaviour," just as the moral identity theory equates morality and prosocial behaviour. In each case the most important determinant of helping is whether or not justice or morality applies—whether one is inside or outside the boundary.

Although there are differences between the boundary models, they make similar claims in that a) justice and morality are presumed to uniformly increase helping behaviour, and b) a proposed limit to the application of justice or morality is used to explain why people may fail to help others. However, neither of these suppositions may be correct. Justice and morality do not necessarily always lead to positive treatment (Hafer & Olson, 2003). There are circumstances where it may be just and fair to treat someone in a negative fashion. For example, it is fair to fail a student who does not complete her coursework, and criminals in legal systems the world over are punished in the name of justice.

Krebs (2005; 2008) has argued that morality functions to uphold the cooperative systems necessary for the operation of human society—that morality entails (in part) righteous anger and a desire to punish those who have violated the social contract by taking advantage of others (see also Bowles & Gintis, 1998; Wright, 1994). There is evidence that cooperative systems endure so long as actors may be punished for selfishly exploiting the group. When defectors cannot be punished cooperative systems break down (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2003). Positive treatment should not be equated with the application of fairness or morality. It may be moral and just to punish others when doing so upholds the cooperative system.

Not only is it unnecessary to invoke a circle of moral regard or scope of justice explain negative treatment of others, but the very concept of boundaries goes against conventional wisdom about morality and justice. Nearly all philosophical and lay conceptions of justice and morality, both religious and secular, depict morality and justice as applying universally (Kant, 1959; Kohlberg, 1984; Krebs, 2005; 2008; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Rawls, 1999; Shweder et al., 1997; Turiel, 2002; Wright, 1994). Likewise, anthropological data suggest that all human societies have a system of morality and justice (Gouldner, 1960). Finally, developmental data indicate that even young children recognize the difference between moral rules (e.g., don't hurt others) and mere social-conventional rules (e.g., a dress code). They judge the former to be absolute and universal, whereas the later are understood to be arbitrary and context-specific (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Therefore, it may be more intellectually conservative to conceptualize justice and morality as universal rather than bounded.

There is an alternative view of morality and justice that does not require that they be hedged in by a boundary: the *deservingness* view[1]. Deservingness plays a central role in many theories of justice (e.g., Feather, 1999; Lerner, 1980; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Recently summarized by Carolyn Hafer and James Olson (Hafer & Olson, 2003; Olson, Hafer, Cheung, & Conway, in press), deservingness theory posits that justice occurs when people receive the kind of treatment warranted by their behaviour. If one is treated positively, this does not necessarily imply that justice and morality are relevant; nor does negative treatment necessarily imply that justice and morality are

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[1] Deservingness researchers concede that there may be a boundary to justice—for example, justice may not apply to plants—but for the purposes of this paper that boundary does not predict helping because justice clearly applies to all human targets.

irrelevant. Rather, justice and morality require that people get the type of treatment they deserve. Failure to help others can be seen as moral and just if they are viewed as undeserving of aid.

The current work examines empirical predictions derived from both boundary theories as well as the deservingness perspective. Participants were given an opportunity to donate resources to a variety of charities that differed in a) social distance from participants and b) degree of guilt. According to moral identity theory, strength of moral identity should predict overall donations and especially donations toward socially distant targets. Additionally, priming participants with morality should activate their moral identity, making them more willing to help overall, and especially willing to help distant targets. Scope of justice theory predicts that people who perceive justice and fairness to apply will help a target. Thus, ratings of the importance of justice when dealing with a target will predict donations to that target. Conversely, deservingness theory predicts that ratings of how much a charity deserves will best predict how willing people are to help. Moreover, deservingness theory also predicts that moral primes will act as a "moral lens," making participants focus on the deservingness of their target. Thus, when morality is salient participants will view innocent targets more favourably and allocate them more aid, but their opinion of guilty targets will decrease—concordantly reducing their willingness to help. Data from two studies speak to the accuracy of these predictions.

The First Boundary Theory: Moral Identity

Numerous theorists have argued for a character-based model of morality focused on personality traits and personal identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Benoît, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007; Blasi, 1983; Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon

& Hart, 1992; Goodman, 2000; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998; Lapsley & Laskey, 2001b; Rest, 1984; Walker & Hennig, 2004). In particular, Blasi (1983) proposed a model of moral identity that integrated moral reasoning with personal identity. He theorized that Kohlbergian (e.g. 1984) moral reasoning alone does not automatically lead to moral action. Instead, he argued that moral action requires a "superordinate overarching central agency" (Blasi, 1983, p. 190) responsible for applying moral reasoning to the self: a *moral identity*. People with weak or undeveloped moral identities may reason well about hypothetical moral scenarios but fail to direct similar reasoning towards their own conduct. Conversely, people with stronger moral identities achieve "integration of moral understanding into [their] personality" (Blasi, 1989, as cited in Bergman, 2002, p. 119) and make "a commitment to [their] sense of self to lines of action that promote or protect the welfare of others" (Hart et al, 1998, p. 515). Although moral identity is often described as a dichotomy for ease of communication, it is conceptualized as a continuous variable in terms of how central morality is to one's self concept. For some people, morality may form the very core of their self-definition; for others it may be a more peripheral concern. The centrality or importance or strength of moral identity may change over time as individuals undergo social and cognitive development or enter new communities with different social norms (Hart et al., 1998). Some theorists (Aquino, Reed, & Levy, 2007) also argue that moral identity varies as a function of contextual cues in the immediate environment. This claim will be examined in greater detail below.

Moral identity purportedly gains motivational power by providing coherence and stability to one's sense of self. People with strong moral identities are likely to identify with moral exemplars such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King and moral organizations

such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International (Colby & Damon, 1992). In the quest to emulate the good deeds of others, people with strong moral identities are theorized to incorporate moral action into their ideal self (Blasi, 1983). Then by engaging in moral action, they can bring their actual self closer to their ideal self—a process that is intrinsically rewarding (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Moretti & Higgins, 1990). Conversely, to the extent that morality is central to one's self definition, failure to act morally undermines the basis of one's identity. For those with strong moral identities, failure to act morally is a "fracture to the very core of the self" (Blasi, 1983, p. 201). Since people with strong moral identities find moral action rewarding and failure to engage in moral action aversive, moral identity supposedly operates as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action: It is "the pivot that transforms a shouldn't (or should) into a mustn't (or must)" (Goodman, 2000, p. 51).

Despite an abundance of theorizing on the subject, direct empirical support for moral identity has only recently been adduced. Work by Aquino and Reed (2002; 2003; 2007) suggests that people with strong moral identities intend to act and actually do act more prosocially than those with weaker moral identities. Aquino and Reed (2002) found that people scoring high on moral identity were also likely to score high on measures of sympathy and moral reasoning, and to spontaneously describe themselves using moral terms. Moral identity scores correlated negatively with a measure of *negative reciprocity norms* (the belief that injuries require retaliation rather than forgiveness) but were unrelated to theoretically distinct constructs such as self-esteem, locus of control, and social anxiety.

Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity scale can be divided into two subscales that differentially correlate with other measures. Reflecting Erikson's (1964) definition of identities as both rooted in the core of one's being and being true to oneself in action, Aquino and Reed's scale taps both *internalization* and *symbolization*. Although they found the two subscales to be moderately correlated ($r = .44$), internalization correlated positively with an implicit measure of association between the self and moral traits, but negatively with a measure of normlessness (the degree to which people feel they can perform any behaviour without sanction). Symbolization did not correlate with those measures, but it did correlate positively with a measure of religiosity. Aquino and Reed also examined the relation between the moral identity scale and charitable behaviour. They found that internalization scores predicted self-reported volunteering and donations to a local food bank.

In a follow-up study, Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) found that people scoring high on the internalization subscale were likely to report a willingness to donate time instead of money to a prosocial organization (the Red Cross) but not a neutral one (the American Marketing Association). Moral identity also moderated the tendency for high-status individuals to prefer cash donations over time donations. Since participants also perceived donations of time to be more moral and self-expressive than cash donations, Aquino, Reed, and Levy interpreted these findings as evidence that people with strong moral identities are more willing to act prosocially.

Although these findings are consistent with the moral identity view of prosocial behaviour, they are not conclusive. It remains possible that a third variable is responsible for the reported effects. For example, people who score higher on moral identity may

tend to view others as more deserving of positive treatment, and deservingness

perceptions, in turn, may be responsible for the increased prosocial behaviour. By

examining both moral identity and deservingness, the current work enables a comparison

of these explanations.

Moral Identity and the Expanding Circle of Moral Regard

Reed and Aquino (2003) expanded on Blasi's (1983) developmental

conceptualization of moral identity by theorizing that it would most strongly impact

prosocial behaviour toward distant others. Whereas even people with weak moral

identities may help friends and family members, Reed and Aquino argued that people

with strong moral identities are likely to help targets who are distant from the self. This is

because moral identity "alters the psychological boundaries that define in-group

membership" (Reed and Aquino, 2003, p.1270), increasing moral regard towards distant

others. Reed and Aquino defined *moral regard* as "showing concern for the needs and

welfare of others" (p. 1271). According to this logic, people who think about the trials

and tribulations of others lament their suffering and feel a greater obligation to assist

them. There is empirical support for this link (e.g., Krebs, 1975; Toi & Batson, 1982).

Reed and Aquino call this the "expanding circle of moral regard" hypothesis:

when morality is of peripheral importance to the self-concept, people restrict aid to close

others like family, friends, and members of their local community. Conversely, when

morality is of central importance to the self-concept, people feel obligated to act

prosocially toward a more inclusive set others. At the extreme, people with strong moral

identities might include all of humanity within their circle of moral regard.

Reed and Aquino (2003) garnered support for the expanding circle of moral

regard hypothesis when they found that people scoring higher on the internalization

dimension of the moral identity measure reported a greater moral or ethical obligation to

show concern for the welfare and interests of distant others (e.g., "strangers") and greater

perceived moral obligation to exchange resources such as love, affection, and status with

a stranger (given an appropriate context).

Reed and Aquino (2003) also investigated attitudes towards real groups that were

meaningfully related to participants. People scoring high on internalization more strongly

endorsed a United Nations aid mission to help both a neutral out-group (Turkish

refugees) and negative out-group (Afghani refugees)[2], but the difference was larger for

Afghani refugees than for the Turks. Internalization scores were also related to donations

towards an out-group charity (the UNICEF Emergency Effort for Afghan Children and

Families), at the expense of donations to an in-group charity (the New York Police and

Fire Widows and Children's Benefit Fund). Finally, both internalization and

symbolization were associated with lower numbers of "acceptable Afghani civilian

casualties" as American forces pursued the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in

Afghanistan.

Reed and Aquino argued that, taken together, these results indicated that people

with stronger moral identities act more generously towards distant others: they report

greater obligation to show concern for distant other's welfare, advocate policies to aid

distant others, donate larger sums of money to distant others, and are more likely to

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[2] Because of the conflict between America and Afghanistan at the time of the study, Afghani refugees were presumed to be viewed more negatively than Turkish refugees. The Afghanistan government of the time was accused of supporting terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks.

condemn actions that harm distant others than people for whom morality is a peripheral rather than central self-defining characteristic. However, this conclusion is open to alternative interpretations. For example, it may be that people who score high on the moral identity measure tend to perceive others as more deserving of positive treatment, and that deservingness, in turn, drives the effects reported by Reed and Aquino. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that moral identity was negatively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism, suggesting moral identity scores are systematically related to assumptions about who is to blame for the war in Afghanistan. Linda Skitka and colleagues (Skitka, Mc Murray, & Burroughs, 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993) found that conservatives held Iraqis to be more responsible for the Persian Gulf War, and were consequently more likely to withhold aid.

If people scoring high on moral identity (and low on right-wing authoritarianism) tend to view Afghani refugees as less responsible for the war than those scoring low on moral identity, then high scorers should also view them as more deserving of aid. If so, then people scoring high on moral identity may have given more to Afghanis not because their circle of moral regard was larger, but rather because they perceived the Afghanis to deserve more aid. The current work sought to disentangle mere social distance from deservingness considerations by offering participants an opportunity to donate to several distant charities that clearly differed in terms of guilt.

Moral Identity and Contextual Activation

Reed and Aquino (2003) also extended Blasi's (1983) developmental model of moral identity by conceptualizing moral identity as one of many social identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that co-exist in a social self-schema, an organized and unique

knowledge structure in memory that links social identities to the self-concept (Markus, 1977). According to social identity theory, each aspect of identity not only defines the self, but simultaneously links it to a social referent group. When building one's identity, one also builds a psychological connection to others that share one's characteristics. Because people possess multiple social identities based on different individual traits, not all aspects of the social self-schema are active simultaneously. Contextual factors that highlight the salience of some social group memberships or individual traits activate corresponding aspects of identity, whereas less salient aspects of identity attain lower levels of activation (Abrams, 1994).

Which social identity is contextually activated is important because people generally act in identity consistent ways—thus, their behaviour changes in accordance with the currently salient social identity (Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed, 2002). For example, when Asian females are primed with their Asian identity, their performance on a math test improves relative to controls, whereas when the same individuals are primed with their female identity, their performance declines relative to controls. Their performance is in line with the contextually salient identity: people generally hold positive stereotypes regarding Asian math ability but negative stereotypes about female math ability (Shin, Pitinsky, & Ambady, 1999).

Reed and Aquino (2003; 2007) argued that moral identity operates analogously to any other social identity: it links an individual to a social referent group (other moral people) and may be more activated in some contexts than in others. The implication of this claim is that in addition to operating as a chronic individual difference variable, moral identity may also vary across contexts that either enhance or suppress moral

thinking. Therefore, people primed with moral identity should act in a similar fashion to those who score high on the individual-differences measure: they should act more prosocially, particularly toward targets distant from the self.

Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) obtained some initial evidence to this effect. First, they noted that the moral identity measure has low test-retest reliability, consistent with a contextual-activation view. Second, in study 3, they primed participants by asking them to write self-referential stories using either moral or neutral words. Those primed with morality acted similar to people who scored high on internalization in studies 1 and 2: they reported greater willingness to donate time (vs. money), but only to a prosocial organization (Red Cross), not a neutral one (The American Marketing Association). Smeesters and collegues (2003), and Kraut (1973) also found evidence that priming morality increases prosocial behaviour.

Although Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) argued that moral primes activated participants' moral identity, they failed to measure moral identity. Therefore, it remains possible that moral identity itself did not drive the observed effects. Perhaps priming morality made participants more sensitive to the target's perceived deservingness, and this, in turn, made them more willing to donate time. This would explain why the moral prime increased willingness to donate time to the prosocial—but not neutral— organization. The current work examined whether moral primes enhance deservingness perceptions by offering participants an opportunity to donate to both innocent and guilty targets. Priming morality might act like a "moral lens," making participants more sensitive to the moral status of their target. If so, then primes might increase helping toward innocent targets, but actually decrease helping toward guilty ones. Moreover,

Aquino, Reed, and Levy only examined the effect of priming on hypothetical donations, rendering their conclusions vulnerable to the possibility that participants were responding to moral primes by increasing socially desirable responses rather than moral ones. Conversely, the current work examined whether priming impacts donations of actual resources.

The Second Boundary Theory: The Scope of Justice

Reed and Aquino's theorizing about the circle of moral regard suggests that the boundary of morality is an important determinant of whether people will help others. They argue that targets falling within the circle of moral regard will be helped because morality applies to them, whereas those falling outside the boundary will not be helped because morality does not apply to them. In this respect, Aquino and Reed's circle of moral regard hypothesis mirrors work in the justice literature on a concept labeled "the scope of justice."

Scope of justice researchers propose that there is a psychological boundary to justice considerations, and this boundary influences helping behaviour (Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Brockner, 1990; Deutsch, 2000; Leets, 2001; Opotow, 1990; 1993; 1994; 2001; Nagata, 1993; Singer, 1996; Staub, 1990). Justice principles (conceptualized as concern for a target's welfare and interests, willingness to allocate resources to the target, and willingness to make sacrifices for the target; Opotow, 2001) pertain to outcomes and procedures affecting targets within the boundary; justice principles are irrelevant to outcomes and procedures affecting targets that fall outside the boundary. The former are said to be "within the scope of justice" whereas the latter are not. Thus, the scope of justice has been defined as the psychological boundary for justice and fairness, such that

"moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply only to those within this boundary" (Opotow, 1990, p. 3). Targets outside the boundary are perceived to be "expendable, undeserving, exploitable, or irrelevant" (Opotow, 2001, p. 156).

The scope of justice has been invoked to explain extreme harm doing such as mass internment (Deutsch, 2000; Nagata, 1993; Staub, 1990). According to scope of justice researchers, victims of extreme harm are excluded from perpetrators' scope of justice. In the eyes of the perpetrators, the welfare, interests, and outcomes of victims are irrelevant. Therefore, the victims are rendered vulnerable to what the perpetrators consider to be "legitimate" harm. Scope of justice explanations have also been used for less extreme examples of harm doing such as rudeness, bullying, or mild harm (Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Brockner, 1990; Singer, 1996). The same process is presumed to underlie each instance. Exclusion from the scope of justice can invite a range of behaviors from active harm doing to passive acceptance of harm being performed by others. It may be uncommon in some societies, whereas others are rife with it.

There is disagreement about whether the scope of justice is best conceptualized as a dichotomous or continuous variable. Some researchers (e.g., Opotow, 1990) discuss scope of justice as a dichotomous construct; targets are either in or out of the scope of justice. Justice considerations are either relevant or not relevant. Others (e.g., Leets, 2001) describe scope of justice as a continuum ranging from total exclusion to total inclusion. In this manner, targets that are mildly harmed (e.g., inconvenienced) are assumed to be mildly excluded. As the extent and severity of harm increases (e.g., torture), targets are assumed to be increasingly excluded from the scope of justice. Hafer

and Olson (2003) criticized Leets for confusing the outcomes of exclusion with exclusion itself.

Opotow (1994) outlined several variables that she argued operate as antecedents to exclusion from the scope of justice. Presumably, targets with certain attributes are more likely to be excluded. By measuring these variables, researchers should be able to predict whether a target will be included within the scope of justice; by manipulating these variables, researchers should be able to vary whether a target will be included or excluded. The first antecedent of exclusion identified by Opotow was dissimilarity. Targets that are more similar to the self are presumably more likely to be included within the scope of justice. The more features a target shares with the self, the more justice principles are seen to apply. Second, conflict is hypothesized to impact the scope of justice. Relationships of high conflict presumably involve a process of psychological distancing between competing parties. As the severity of conflict escalates, it becomes more likely that conflicting parties exclude one another from their respective scopes of justice. In times of war, soldiers do not consider their enemy's interests and welfare before aggressing against them. Third, exclusion from the scope of justice is presumably a function of utility. Beneficial or useful targets are more likely to be included within one's scope of justice, whereas detrimental or useless targets are more likely to be excluded. For example, an immigrant who brings needed medical skills to a community is more likely to be included in the scope of justice than one who relies on government handouts in order to live.

Empirical Work on the Scope of Justice

Most empirical work on the scope of justice has involved a manipulation of one of the three antecedents to exclusion identified by Opotow and a measurement of participants' willingness to help or harm targets (e.g., support for policies detrimental to the targets' well being). Brockner (1990), Foster and Rusbult (1999), Opotow (1993; 1994), and Singer (1998) have examined the role of similarity between the target and participants. In general, findings suggest that similar targets are treated in a more lenient fashion than dissimilar ones. Leets (2001) and Opotow (1993; 1994) examined the role of utility. They reported that targets that were viewed as more useful to society were treated with greater deference than targets viewed as less useful. Additionally, Opotow (1993; 1994; 1995) investigated the impact of conflict. She found evidence that targets whose outcomes appeared to conflict with society to a greater extent were treated more negatively than low conflict targets.

For example, in a classic scope of justice study, Opotow (1993) examined participants' judgments about a species of beetle. She operationalized harming/helping as support for or opposition to a construction project that would eliminate much of the beetles' territory. Some participants read that the beetles benefit human crops (high utility), whereas others read that they destroy crops (low utility). Additionally, conflict was manipulated by characterizing the construction project as important for human welfare (a needed water reservoir) or less important (a low priority apartment complex). Opotow found that participants supported the construction project to a greater extent when they read about low (vs. high) utility beetles in a high (vs. low) degree of conflict with humans (two main effects).

Opotow interpreted these findings as evidence for the scope of justice perspective. She argued that support for the construction project was tantamount to a violation of the beetles' interests. She reasoned that such a violation could only occur if participants considered the beetles' interests to be unimportant, irrelevant, and unnecessary to consider. In other words, participants in the low utility and/or high conflict condition excluded the beetles from their scope of justice. Exposure to the low utility and/or high conflict information led participants to narrow the boundaries within which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness applied. Once these boundaries were narrowed, participants were free to advocate harming the beetles.

Criticisms of Scope of Justice and Moral Identity Research

The scope of justice perspective has been challenged by Hafer and Olson (2003). Essentially, Hafer and Olson questioned whether the conclusions drawn by scope of justice researchers were warranted by the data. They raised three specific concerns: that scope of justice researchers often failed to measure the presumed mediator (relevance of justice), that when justice was measured it was poorly operationalized and therefore confounded with other constructs, and that scope of justice effects were open to alternative interpretations—namely, that the manipulations supposedly altering justice boundaries actually altered how much targets appeared to deserve.

The outcomes usually measured in scope of justice research involved support for social policies that aid a target (Opotow, 1994; Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Singer, 1996), denial of legal rights (Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997), or apathy in response to negative treatment (Brockner, 1990; Foster & Rusbult, 1999). Typically, researchers manipulated or measured the antecedent variables identified by Opotow (1990) and found that people

who regarded targets as less similar to themselves, less useful, or in greater conflict advocated less positive or more negative treatment of that target. It was presumed that variations in the relevance of justice mediated the measured outcomes, but justice itself was not measured in a manner that allowed it to be disentangled from other constructs. Thus, Hafer and Olson recommended that future research in this area clearly measure perceptions of the relevance of justice to see if it truly does play the mediational role suggested by the scope of justice perspective.

Sometimes, the relevance of justice has been measured in scope of justice studies, but the manner in which justice was operationalized obscured clear interpretation of the results. For example, Beaton and Tougas (2001) used a nine-item scope of justice scale in which six of the items arguably tapped perceptions of discrimination rather than the relevance of justice per se (e.g., "I believe that [women] are unfairly treated in this country;" "[Women] do not have the same hiring opportunities than [sic.] [men]"). The remaining three items assessed the extent to which participants would be willing to make sacrifices for or spend resources on the target (e.g. "I believe that [men] should be ready to make some sacrifices such as putting aside scholarships for [women]..." "The Faculties of science and engineering should use funds to evaluate the needs and progression of [women] who are pursuing their studies in science and engineering"). None of these items appear to directly assess whether participants believed that justice was an important component of the decision to aid disadvantaged groups. Similar items have been employed by Opotow (1993; 1994) and Leets (2001). Because items on these scales were aggregated, it is difficult to clearly interpret the findings based on them.

Moreover, by aggregating items on this scale, scope of justice researchers equated the allocation of resources with the application of justice. This conflation occurs throughout the scope of justice literature—in fact, Opotow (2001) defined justice, in part, as "willingness to allocate resources to the target, and willingness to make sacrifices for the target." However, there may be circumstances where it is fair and just to treat someone in a negative fashion. For example, it is fair to discipline an employee who fails to live up to their contractual obligations, and justice may be served by incarcerating a felon. Positive treatment should not be equated with fairness.

Theorists in the moral identity tradition commit the same error; they conflate moral treatment with positive treatment. The assumption is that people with stronger moral identities will view others with "moral regard"—concern for their welfare and interests. Moral regard, in turn, will motivate positive action toward the target in question. This certainly holds for positively-valenced targets that are worthy of aid, such as those investigated by Aquino and Reed (2002; 2003; Aquino, Reed, & Levy, 2007): refugees, widows, orphans, the Red Cross, and recipients of food bank donations.

However, morality is a double-edged sword. It is moral to feel righteous anger toward those who have harmed others or otherwise violated the social contract (Kant, 1959; Krebs, 2005; 2008; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wright, 1994). One of the functions of morality is to uphold a system of cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 1998); without the ability to punish those who violate that system, cooperation breaks down (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2003). Withholding positive outcomes or inflicting negative ones on people who deserve negative treatment is not merely permitted under the rubric of morality—it is demanded (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Harvey, 1981). Aquino and Reed

overlooked this aspect of morality. They implicitly assumed that moral regard will automatically lead to positive treatment towards the target in question, whereas it may lead to negative treatment if that person is perceived to deserve such treatment.

The Role of Deservingness

Both boundary models appear to be flawed in that neither considers the impact of deservingness on the outcomes allotted to a target. Researchers from both the moral identity and scope of justice perspectives explain helping behaviour (or lack thereof) in terms of boundaries: targets inside the circle of moral regard or scope of justice are presumed to receive help because morality and justice apply to them, whereas targets outside those boundaries do not receive help because morality and justice do not apply. Because they conflate moral and fair treatment with positive treatment, researchers in the moral identity and scope of justice traditions overlook the possibility that justice and morality may be relevant even when targets are denied positive outcomes or receive negative ones.

In contrast, researchers advocating a deservingness perspective (e.g., Hafer & Olson, 2003; Olson, Hafer, Cheung, & Conway, in press) acknowledge that morality and justice may lead to either positive or negative outcomes depending on what the target is perceived to deserve. Negative outcomes need not imply the absence of justice or morality; they may signify that people perceive the target to deserve negative outcomes. According to this perspective, the relevance of neither morality nor justice drives people's decisions to help or avoid a target. Instead, people help others to the extent that they perceive them to deserve aid. Consistent with this view, deservingness has been found to play an important role in judgments of fairness (Feather, 1999), for both

distributive justice (e.g., Freudenthaler & Mikula, 1998; Olson, Roese, Meen, & Robertson, 1995) and procedural justice (e.g., Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Sunshine & Heuer, 2002).

Note that a deservingness explanation can account for both moral identity and scope of justice findings. It may be that people who score high on measures of moral identity perceive others—especially distant others—to deserve more positive treatment. If so, then it should be unsurprising that they act more prosocially than people who score low on moral identity. Similarly, it may be that the antecedents of exclusion identified by Opotow (1990)—similarity, utility, and conflict—actually alter perceptions of deservingness, rather than the relevance of justice. According to Olson and colleagues (in press), deservingness exists when "the value of a target's actions correspond appropriately to the value of his or her outcomes" (p. 7). Thus, targets that are more useful may be perceived to deserve better outcomes. Similarly, the actions of targets engaged in conflict with perceivers may be viewed in a negative light, leading to a reduction in perceived deservingness of the target. Similarity may also operate as a heuristic people use to infer deservingness. People tend to view themselves in a very positive fashion (see Roese & Olson, 2007) and extend these biases to similar others. Because good people deserve good outcomes, those who are similar to oneself may be viewed as sharing one's entitlement to positive outcomes.

Recent work by Olson and colleagues (in press) adduced evidence in support of the deservingness view. Across four studies, they found consistent connections between participants' perceptions of a target's deservingness and the treatment they advocated for that target. Moreover, mediation analyses indicated that perceived deservingness often

mediated the impact of experimental manipulations on treatment outcomes. In contrast, the relevance of justice did not significantly predict target treatment in any of the four studies, nor did justice mediate any of the manipulations on treatment recommendations. Although these findings are encouraging, they each involved responses to hypothetical scenarios rather than actual real-world behaviour. The current work seeks to replicate and extend these initial findings by examining perceptions of the deservingness of real charitable targets, as well as allocation of actual resources to those targets.

The current work is also the first to examine the effect of priming on deservingness perceptions. Making morality salient to participants may not increase perceptions of their own moral character as predicted by moral identity theory. Rather, it may incite a focus on the target's moral character. In other words, moral primes may not activate *moral identity*, but instead activate a *moral lens* through which participants view others. After priming, innocent targets may appear even more deserving, while guilty ones appear less deserving. If so, then participants primed with morality ought to donate more to innocent targets but less to guilty ones. If moral primes activate a moral lens, then the increased willingness to donate time evidenced by participants primed with morality by Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) may have reflected an increased willingness to help a deserving target (the Red Cross) as opposed to an increased motivation to act in accordance with their moral identity.

In summary, deservingness offers a powerful and useful model for explaining people's inclination to help or harm others. Deservingness is consistent with a full and rich view of both morality and justice, one that recognizes that moral and just treatment may be either positive or negative, but should apply universally to all people.

Deservingness can account for the empirical findings of work on moral identity and the scope of justice and so far has proven effective at predicting peoples' willingness to help others. The current work extends these findings by examining whether the deservingness view better predicts people's actual helping behaviour toward a variety of charities than the predictions made by either boundary model.

Hypotheses

Moral identity theory, scope of justice theory, and deservingness theory each predict a different pattern of results when people are given an opportunity to help others. According to the moral identity view of helping, moral identity scores will be the best predictor of helping behaviour because people with strong moral identities are motivated to help others. Moral identity should be particularly effective at predicting helping toward distant others because people with stronger moral identities are presumed to have a larger circle of moral regard. Finally, moral identity theory predicts that people who are primed with morality should behave similar to those with chronic moral identity activation: they should act more prosocially, especially toward targets distant from the self. This is because moral primes will presumably activate moral identity, much like ethnic primes activate ethnic identity (Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed, 2002).

Scope of justice theory suggests that the single best predictor of helping behaviour should be the perceived relevance of fairness and justice. When justice principles are perceived to apply, people will be motivated to help; when justice principles do not apply, no such motivation will exist. Scope of justice theory is agnostic about the effect of priming on helping behaviour.

Proponents of deservingness theory argue that the best predictor of helping behaviour ought to be perceived deservingness: targets that deserve help will receive it, whereas undeserving targets will not. According to this perspective, justice and morality are universally applicable, so there should be little variation in the perceived relevance of these constructs. Priming morality will operate as a moral lens, enhancing perceptions of deservingness by making perceivers focus on the moral worth of their target: innocent targets will appear more deserving and thus receive more, whereas guilty targets will appear less deserving and receive less in turn.

To compare these predictions, participants were given an opportunity to rate and donate to three charities in Study 1 that differed both in terms of social distance from participants and in degree of innocence: participants' own university library (close to self), a local elementary school library (distant but innocent), and a local prison library (distant but guilty). Participants in Study 2 had an opportunity to donate to either the school or prison library. Participants also rated the charities on a variety of measures, including deservingness and the importance of justice, and completed a measure of moral identity.

<div align="center">Study 1</div>

<div align="center">*Method*</div>

Participants

78 participants were recruited from a database of people who volunteered to participate in psychology research. Participants were relatively young (mean age = 22.65 years) and nearly two-thirds were female (56 female, 21 male, 1 unreported). Participants were compensated with seven dollars at the end of the study.

Procedure

Participants were run through the study individually. After completing consent forms, they were asked to fill out a form that ostensibly measured "handwriting style" but in actuality was designed to prime participants with either moral or neutral concepts. Participants were presented with a list of nine words, either moral or neutral. They copied each word four times and wrote a short personal narrative using each word.

After completing the priming task, participants were escorted to a different room containing four large red boxes and a computer. At this point, half of participants were seated at the computer and immediately filled out Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity measure (described below). The rest of the participants were seated in front of the four red boxes and immediately began the donation decision task. Participants notified the experimenter when they completed the task they had been assigned, at which point they were instructed to begin the other task (moral identity measure or donation decision task). The order that participants engaged in each task was counterbalanced across priming conditions.

For the donation decision task, participants received a sheet of written instructions and a brief description of three charities (presented in Appendix A). All three charities in this study were libraries in local institutions in order to hold the nature and scope of charitable targets constant. One target was participants' own university library, another was a local elementary school library, and the final target was a local prison library. Charities were selected to vary in terms of similarity to participants, and in terms of guilt or innocence.

All participants were presumed to have direct personal experience with the first target, their own university library, because it is a central feature of the campus where they spend a great deal of time. Donations to it may directly benefit participants themselves by increasing their access to library resources. They were presumed to feel more distant from the second and third targets, the elementary school and prison libraries, because college-age students are unlikely to identify strongly with either young schoolchildren or prisoners. However, schoolchildren are young and relatively powerless, and moreover are busy fulfilling their role in society (learning and preparing for adulthood), so participants were assumed to view them as innocent, upstanding members of society. Conversely, prisoners have violated societal norms in some fashion and have been incarcerated as a result. Therefore, participants were assumed to view them as guilty parties who have wronged others.

Charity descriptions were matched as much as possible for length and content. The university description was 137 words long; the school and prison descriptions were both 133 words long. Each description provided a brief explanation of who the charity serves, what resources it provides, why current funding levels are insufficient, and what donations will be used for.

Participants were aware upon signing up that they would receive seven dollars "over the course of the study." At the beginning of the donation decision task, participants were told that they would now receive "their" seven dollars and they would have to anonymously allocate all of it between the four red boxes. This is important because previous work asked participants to allocate hypothetical resources or resources they did not feel ownership over (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Aquino,

Reed, & Levy, 2007) or simply to rate their favourability toward societal allocation of

resources (Opotow, 1994; Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Singer, 1996; Olson et al., in press).

Each red box had a slot in the top for depositing coins like a piggy-bank. Three of

the boxes were locked and labelled with the name of one of the charities on participants'

instruction sheet. The fourth box was unlocked and labelled, "Myself." Participants were

told that they would retrieve the money contained in the fourth box upon completion of

the study. The order of charity presentation on the charity description sheet and location

of the four red boxes was counterbalanced across both prime and order conditions. For

example, the university charity was presented first on the description sheet and as the

leftmost box for one third of participants, second on the sheet and as the second box from

left for another third, and last on the sheet and third box from the left for a final third of

participants within each cell of the 2 x 2 design.

Participants were under the impression that any money they decided to give came

out of their own pocket; they were ostensibly donating the money they had earned from

their participation in the study (however, all participants received seven dollars at the end

of the study regardless of how much they donated). Participants were assured that all

charities were real and that donations to each charity would be amassed over the course

of the study and actually donated at the end (indeed, the money allocated to each charity

was tallied and donated as promised). To reinforce the idea that experimenters would

tally the accumulated donations only at the end of the study, the experimenter informed

participants that others had donated already. Then the experimenter picked up one box

and shook it so that the sound of change (actually pennies) rattling inside could be heard.

Participant responses during debriefing suggested that the donation task was taken

seriously. Participants thought they were donating their own money to real charities and expected that the red boxes would not be opened until the end of the study.

In order to minimize demand characteristics and self-presentation concerns that might otherwise mask participants' true inclinations, great care was taken to highlight the anonymity of the donation decision task. Participants were informed both verbally and in writing that their donations would not be linked to their personal information. The experimenter informed participants that donations would be compiled only at the end of the study and that other participants had already donated. Participants were also informed about features of the apparatus designed to ensure confidentiality, such as padding installed inside each box to muffle the sound of coins being inserted. Finally, the donation task occurred behind a closed door. Participants were instructed to open it again after they completed the task. Participant reactions during debriefing suggested that they believed their donations were anonymous.

Once satisfied that the participant understood all the donation decision task instructions, the experimenter asked the participant to "think about their choice" and left the room. The experimenter returned approximately two minutes later with seven $1 coins, which were counted and given to the participant. Participants were reminded of task instructions one final time before the experimenter closed the door and waited for participants to complete the task.

Once participants finished the donation decision task they rated each charity on a number of dimensions: charity deservingness, need, utility, and similarity, as well as the relevance of justice when dealing with each charity and how much participants cared about each charity. Finally, participants completed a measure of right-wing

authoritarianism and demographic information (age and gender). They were then

debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Materials

Priming Task. The moral priming manipulation employed here was nearly

identical to the one used by Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007). Participants completed a

measure designed to "examine peoples' handwriting as they tell stories." They were

presented with a list of nine words and were asked to copy each word four times by hand.

On the following page, participants were asked to "visualize each word as it is relevant to

your life" and to write a short personal narrative using each word at least once. The

stimulus words in the neutral condition were the same as those used by Aquino, Reed,

and Levy: "book," "car," "chair," "computer," "desk," "pen," "street," "table," and "trash

can." However, different moral stimulus words were employed here. Aquino, Reed, and

Levy used the nine moral traits that operate as salience induction stimuli in the moral

identity measure: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, hardworking, helpful,

honest, and kind. Different moral traits were selected for the current study in order to

eliminate overlap between the traits presented during moral priming and those presented

during the moral identity measure (note that Aquino, Reed, and Levy did not have this

problem because they did not employ the moral identity measure in their priming study).

The following nine moral traits used here were rated as highly prototypical of each of

three moral exemplars (just, brave, and caring) by a large sample of undergraduates

(Walker & Hennig, 2004): "truthful," "respectful," "responsible," "thoughtful,"

"considerate," "unselfish," "empathic," "sensitive," and "humble." According to Aquino

and Reed (2002) and Lapsley and Lasky (2001a), terms such as these should suffice to

activate people's moral schemas despite representing only a subset of all possible moral

descriptors.

Moral Identity Measure. Moral identity was assessed via a measure developed

and validated by Aquino and Reed (2002). The measure presented participants with nine

moral traits: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, hardworking, helpful, honest,

and kind. The nine traits were designed to activate moral concepts without explicitly

asking participants about them. Participants were asked to "visualize in your mind the

kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel,

and act."

Once they were thinking about moral characteristics, participants responded to 10

items about these moral characteristics on 9-point scales[3] anchored by "not true of me"

and "completely true of me." The items were derived from a scale that taps ethnic

identity (Larkey & Hecht, 1995) and were designed to tap the two aspects of identity

identified by Erikson (1964): identity as rooted in the core of one's being and as being

true to oneself in action. One factor of the moral identity scale, internalization, taps the

degree to which morality is deeply rooted in a person's identity. The second factor,

symbolization, taps the degree to which people report engaging in identity-consistent

behaviour. The scale exhibited reasonable levels of reliability in the current study:

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[3] Aquino and Reed (2002) used a 5-point scale anchored at "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." Given that almost all the responses on the internalization dimension occurred at the extreme of their scale ($M =$ 4.49, $SD = 0.6$) the 5-point version may suffer from a ceiling effect. To reduce the ceiling effect we extended the scale to nine points and altered the response format. We replaced the anchor "strongly disagree" with "not true of me." We changed response choice 3 to "somewhat true of me," the mid-point of the scale to "moderately true of me," and response choice 7 to "very true of me." The end-point "strongly agree" was replaced with "completely true of me." This new rubric was intended to create increased variation, particularly at the high moral identity end of the scale.

Cronbach's alpha was .82 for the overall scale, .72 for internalization, and .79 for symbolization.

Charity Ratings. Participants were asked to rate each charity on six dimensions identified by scope of justice researchers (e.g., Opotow, 1990) and deservingness researchers (e.g., Hafer & Olson, 2003) as affecting decisions about extending aid to others (see Appendix B). Ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Participants indicated their perceptions of charity deservingness (e.g., "Western Libraries deserve financial support"), utility (e.g., "Western Libraries provide services that are useful and important"), need (e.g., "Western Libraries need financial support"), and similarity (e.g., "Western Libraries provide services to people who are similar to me"). Participants also indicated how much they cared about each charity (e.g., "I care about Western Libraries and the people who use them") and how important they perceived justice to be while interacting with each charity (e.g., "In deciding how much money to donate to Western Libraries, it is important to consider what is fair and just for the users of the library").

Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Because past research has documented a negative correlation between moral identity and right wing authoritarianism (Reed & Aquino, 2003), a short (10-item) version of Altemeyer's (1981) right-wing authoritarianism scale was administered. Participants responded to a series of statements such as "Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs" on 9-point scales ranging from "very strongly disagree" to "very strongly agree."

Results

Because so many variables were examined in this study, first the relations among them were examined and compared across gender. Then the main effects of the moral prime and the order in which participants completed the measures, as well as the interaction between these independent variables, was examined for each dependent measure: donations to each charity, charity deservingness ratings, moral identity scores, and perceptions of the importance of justice, as well as ratings of charity need, similarity, care, and utility. Following that, a regression analysis was conducted to determine which variables best predicted donations to each charity. Finally, a mediation analysis examined whether deservingness mediated the relation between the importance of justice and donations, or vice versa.

Correlations

As can be seen in Table 1, most charity ratings (such as need and deservingness) correlated with donations—especially charity deservingness, need, and the importance of justice. Correlations were quite high, in the .3 to .6 range. They were generally specific, such that, for example, university ratings correlated only with university donations (the same was true for prison and school ratings). A few exceptions to this rule were school need and care, which correlated with prison donations, and school justice, which correlated with university donations. Right-wing authoritarianism correlated positively with donations to the university library and negatively with donations to the school library, suggesting that people scoring high on this measure preferred to donate to the higher-status university library than lower-status elementary school library.

Donations to each charity were unrelated to one another, but were related to the

money participants allocated to themselves. The amount that participants opted to retain

correlated negatively university donations, $r = -.34$, $p < .01$, prison donations, $r = -.65$, p

$< .001$, and school donations, $r = -.71$, $p < .001$. This pattern suggests that participants

made independent choices about whether or not to give to each charity at a cost to

themselves, rather than a relative choice about where they should allocate a fixed amount.

Moral identity correlated with nothing except university library need, school library care,

and prison library need, utility, and deservingness—notably, moral identity did not

correlate with donations to any charities. These findings are largely inconsistent with

Reed and Aquino's expanding circle of moral regard hypothesis. Although people with

stronger dispositional moral identity scores did show some evidence of greater moral

regard for the prison library (by rating it as more needy, useful, and deserving), they did

not follow up by actually acting in a more prosocial fashion toward the prison library.

Nor did people with stronger moral identities act more prosocially toward the university

or school libraries. It is also worth noting that ratings of the importance of justice for each

charity were correlated with one another, suggesting that people who thought justice

applied to one charity also thought it applied to the others.

Gender and Age Effects

Gender correlated with ratings of prison library deservingness ($r = .26$, $p < .05$)

and need ($r = .28$, $p < .05$), indicating that women rated the prison library as more

deserving and in greater need than did men. Age was correlated with ratings of university

library utility ($r = .24$, $p < .05$), signifying that older participants believed the university

library to be more useful than young participants. No other gender or age correlations

Table 1

Correlations between Donations, Moral Identity, Deservingness, the Importance of Justice, and Other Charity Ratings in Study 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 University Library Donations	1.0										
2 Prison Library Donations	.03	1.0									
3 School Library Donations	-.17	.14	1.0								
4 Moral Identity	.14	.13	.09	1.0							
5 Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.24*	.02	-.24*	-.03	1.0						
6 University Library Deservingness	.49***	-.04	-.03	.18	-.33	1.0					
7 University Library Justice	.25*	-.04	.20	.22	-.09	.44***	1.0				
8 University Library Need	.48***	.04	.20	.30**	-.06	.73***	.48***	1.0			
9 University Library Similarity	.10	.05	-.05	.16	-.17	.35**	.43***	.39***	1.0		
10 University Library Care	.20	-.05	.11	.15	-.07	.45***	.60***	.44***	.53***	1.0	
11 University Library Utility	.25*	-.04	.20	.05	-.27*	.35***	.50**	.50***	.53***	.49***	1.0

Table 1 Continued

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12 Prison Library Deservingness	.10	.46**	.07	.26*	-.09	.21	.03	.03	.21	-.07	.19
13 Prison Library Justice	.19	.28	.09	.14	-.06	.11	.42**	.26*	-.01	.22	.23*
14 Prison Library Need	.06	.44**	.09	.31*	-.14	.24*	.04	.29*	.19	-.01	.25*
15 Prison Library Similarity	.03	.11	-.17	-.10	.13	.05	-.21	.05	-.17	-.09	-.09
16 Prison Library Care	.07	.46**	.07	.22	.09	.10	.06	.14	-.08	.09	.22
17 Prison Library Utility	-.04	.45**	.22	.14	-.26*	.10	.13	.12	.07	.02	.36**
18 School Library Deservingness	.05	.14	.38**	.19	-.06	.10	.07	.03	.06	.02	.14
19 School Library Justice	.25*	.15	.32***	.22	-.16	.20	.53***	.22	.10	.25*	.21
20 School Library Need	-.02	.30**	.47***	.16	-.25*	.08	.12	.04	.05	.03	.20
21 School Library Similarity	.04	-.03	.26*	.08	.01	-.01	-.07	-.09	-.28*	.04	-.05
22 School Library Care	.03	.25*	.43***	.35***	-.06	-.04	.06	-.06	.00	.25*	.11
23 School Library Utility	-.04	.18	.29*	.21	-.36**	.15	.23*	.11	.31**	.34**	.49***

Table 1 Continued

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
12 Prison Library Deservingness	1.0										
13 Prison Library Justice	.26*	1.0									
14 Prison Library Need	.81***	.34**	1.0								
15 Prison Library Similarity	.18	.04	.15	1.0							
16 Prison Library Care	.56***	.41***	.50***	.35**	1.0						
17 Prison Library Utility	.65***	.47***	.66***	.08	.61***	1.0					
18 School Library Deservingness	.23*	.18	.26*	-.14	.21	.26*	1.0				
19 School Library Justice	.15	.49***	.09	-.17	.24*	.24*	.43***	1.0			
20 School Library Need	.41***	.26*	.42**	.01	.45***	.46***	.72***	.47***	1.0		
21 School Library Similarity	-.08	-.04	-.07	.24*	.21	.03	.11	.15	.21	1.0	
22 School Library Care	.12	.19	.20	-.03	.40***	.34**	.42***	.51***	.53***	.39**	1.0
23 School Library Utility	.19	.19	.24*	-.22	.20	.37**	.51**	.38**	.60***	.10	.44***

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

reached significance, nor did gender yield significant effects in the MANOVA or

regression analyses. Therefore, results are reported collapsed across gender.

Principle Dependent Measures: Main Effects and Interactions

  Donations. To investigate the impact of moral priming and the order in which

participants completed the experimental tasks on donations to each charity, donations

were examined using a 2 (prime: moral versus neutral) x 2 (order: donation opportunity

before versus after moral identity questionnaire) x 3 (charity target) fixed-effect

MANOVA where prime and order were between-subjects factors and charity target was a

within-subjects factor.

  As can be seen in Figure 1, there was a main effect of target, $F(1.79, 132.26) =$

$10.83, p < .01, \eta^2 = .13$, indicating that participants donated different amounts of money

to the charity targets overall. Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that the school

library ($M = \$1.91$) received more funding than either the prison library ($M = \$1.23$), F

$(1, 74) = 16.05, p < .001, \eta^2 = .18$, or university library ($M = \$0.94$), $F (1, 74) = 9.73, p <$

$.01, \eta^2 = .12$, but there was no difference between amounts donated to the prison and

university libraries, $F (1, 74) = 2.73, p = .10, \eta^2 = .04$.

  No significant interaction emerged between prime and target, $F(1.79, 132.26) =$

$.16, p = .83, \eta^2 = .00$. This suggests that whether participants were exposed to a moral or

neutral prime during the study had no bearing on their donations to the charitable targets.

This finding is in opposition to Reed and Aquino's hypothesis regarding the impact of

priming on prosocial behaviour.

  The three-way interaction between prime, order, and target was also not

significant, $F(1.79, 132.26) = .46, p = .61, \eta^2 = .01$. However, results did reveal a

Note: * indicates that the indicated target differed significantly from other targets, *p* < .05.

Figure 1. Donations, Deservingness Ratings, and Ratings of the Importance of Justice.

marginal two-way interaction between order and target, $F(1.79, 132.26) = 2.87, p = .06$, $\eta^2 = .04$. As can be seen in Figure 2, participants who donated money after completing the moral identity measure gave larger amounts to the school ($M = \$2.10$) and university libraries ($M = \$1.13$) than participants who donated before completing the moral identity measure ($M = \$1.72$ and $\$0.74$ to the school and university libraries, respectively), whereas participants who donated money to the prison library after completing the moral identity measure gave less ($M = \$0.97$) than those who donated beforehand ($M = \$1.49$). Thus, the act of completing the moral identity measure made participants more willing to donate to innocent targets like the school and university libraries but less willing to donate to the guilty ones like the prison library. This conclusion was bolstered by significant post-hoc 2 x 2 order by target interactions between the prison and university libraries, $F(1, 74) = 6.36, p < .05, \eta^2 = .08$, and prison and school libraries, $F(1, 74) = 4.11, p < .05, \eta^2 = .05$.

Participants also had an opportunity to keep money for themselves. Self was not included as a target in the within-subjects donation analysis because doing so would account for 100% of the variance in donations. Nonetheless, the amount of money participants kept was submitted to a prime by order analysis of variance. Results indicated that neither the main effect of prime, $F(1, 74) = .25, p = .62$, nor main effect of order, $F(1, 74) = .21, p = .65$, nor the interaction $F(1, 74) = .20, p = .66$, had a significant effect on the amount of money participants kept for themselves. In order to determine if perceptions of the charities predicted the amount of money participants kept, two regression analyses were also conducted. When variables were entered simultaneously, none were significant predictors (care for the school library came closest, $\beta = -.29, p =$

Figure 2. Order Effect on Donations to Charity Targets.

.08), but when they were submitted to a stepwise regression, school need, $\beta = -.34, p <$ .01, and care, $\beta = -.27, p < .05$ significantly and negatively predicted the amount of money participants kept for themselves. These results suggest that participants with a lower opinion of the school library kept more money for themselves.

Deservingness. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was also conducted on participants' ratings of how much each charity deserved. The analysis revealed a main effect of target, $F(2, 146) = 12.06, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$, indicating that participants believed different charities deserved different treatment. As can be seen in Figure 1, post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that the school library ($M = 4.18$) was rated as more deserving that either the prison library ($M = 3.73$), $F(1, 73) = 10.76, p < .01, \eta^2 = .12$, or university library ($M = 3.43$), $F(1, 73) = 20.60, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$, whereas participants' ratings of prison and university library deservingness did not significantly differ, $F(1, 73) = 3.51, p = .07, \eta^2 = .05$. Thus, participants viewed the school library to be highly deserving of aid, whereas they viewed the university and prison libraries to be less so.

No significant interaction emerged between prime and target, $F(2, 146) = .19, p = .82, \eta^2 = .00$, which suggests that whether participants were exposed to a moral or neutral prime during the study had no bearing on their ratings of charity deservingness. The three-way interaction between prime, order, and target was not significant, $F(2, 146) = .56, p = .57, \eta^2 = .01$; nor was the two-way interaction between order and target, $F(2, 146) = 2.21, p = .11, \eta^2 = .03$. However, because the interaction approached significance and the pattern of means was interesting, we conducted an exploratory analysis limited only to prison and university ratings. This analysis revealed a significant interaction between target and order for the prison and university libraries, $F(1, 73) = 4.06, p < .05$,

η^2 = .05. As can be seen in Figure 3, participants who donated before completing the

moral identity measure rated the university library as less deserving than participants who

donated after completing the moral identity measure (M = 3.26 vs. M = 3.61), whereas

participants who donated before completing the moral identity measure rated the prison

library as more deserving than those who donated afterwards (M = 3.87 vs. M = 3.58).

Thus, the act of completing the moral identity measure made participants perceive the

university library to be more deserving, but the prison library to be less deserving[4].

Moral Identity. To investigate the impact of moral priming and the order in which

participants completed the experimental tasks on moral identity and its components,

internalization and symbolization, these scores were examined using three separate 2

(prime: moral versus neutral) x 2 (order: donation opportunity before versus after moral

identity questionnaire) fixed-effect MANOVAs where prime and order were between-

subjects factors. Neither the prime, F (1, 74) = 1.10, p = .30, η^2 = .02, nor the order, F (1,

74) = .96, p = .33, η^2 = .01, nor the interaction, F (1, 74) = .07, p = .79, η^2 = .00,

significantly affected moral identity scores. Similarly, neither the prime, F (1, 74) = 2.99,

p = .88, η^2 = .04, nor the order, F (1, 74) = .90, p = .35, η^2 = .01, nor the interaction, F (1,

74) = .68, p = .41, η^2 = .01, significantly altered internalization scores. The null finding

was replicated for symbolization scores; neither the effects of the prime, F (1, 74) = .17, p

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[4] Because both donations and deservingness showed the same target by order interaction, it is interesting to examine whether perceptions of charity deservingness mediated the effect of this interaction on donations. Unfortunately, due to the within-subjects design and the fact that each of the three deservingness measures might act as potential mediators, a traditional regression approach could not be employed. Instead, several 2 x 2 x 3 analyses of covariance on donations were conducted with each deservingness rating entered as a covariate (both separately and all together). In each case, the target by order interaction term decreased substantially when the covariate was added. When only one deservingness variable was entered as a covariate, the interaction term decreased from F = 2.87, p = .06 to at least F = 2.47, p = .10, whereas the test of each deservingness covariate was always significant (e.g., F = 4.40, p < .05). These results suggest that perceptions of charity deservingness mediated the effect of the target by order interaction on donations to charity.

Figure 3. Order Effect on Charity Deservingness.

= .69, η^2 = .01, nor the order, F (1, 74) = .64, p = .43, η^2 = .01, nor the interaction, F (1,

74) = .02, p = .89, η^2 = .00, were significant. These results suggest that moral identity did

not vary with context—participants primed with moral identity did not rate their moral

identity any higher than participants who were not primed. Nor did participants who had

just donated to charity rate their moral identity any higher than those who had yet to

donate.

The Importance of Justice. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was conducted on participants'

ratings of how important it was to consider what is fair and just for the users of each

library. The analyses revealed a main effect of target, F (2, 146) = 3.73, p < .05, η^2 = .05,

indicating that participants rated justice as more important to consider for users of some

libraries than others (see Figure 1). Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that

justice was rated as less important for users of the prison library (M = 3.68) than for users

of either the university library (M = 3.96), F (1, 73) = 6.09, p < .05, η^2 = .07, or the

school library (M = 3.91), F (1, 73) = 4.24, p < .05, η^2 = .06, which did not significantly

differ, F (1, 73) = .26, p = .61, η^2 = .00.

No significant interaction emerged between prime and target, F (2, 146) = .44, p =

.64, η^2 = .01, showing that whether participants were exposed to a moral or neutral prime

during the study had no bearing on ratings of the relevance of justice for any of the

charitable targets. Additionally, the three-way interaction between prime, order, and

target was not significant, F (2, 146) = .44, p = .65, η^2 = .01. However, results did reveal

a significant two-way interaction between order and target, F (2, 146) = 4.01, p < .05, η^2

= .05. As can be seen in Figure 4, participants who donated before completing the moral

identity measure rated justice as less important in dealing with users of the university

Figure 4. Order Effect on the Importance of Justice when dealing with each Charity.

library (M = 3.78) than participants who donated after completing the moral identity

measure (M = 4.15), whereas participants who donated before completing the moral

identity measure rated justice as more important when dealing with users of the prison

library (M = 3.82) than those who donated afterwards (M = 3.54). The post-hoc 2 x 2

target by order interaction for prison and university libraries was significant, $F(1, 73)$ =

7.32, $p < .01$, η^2 = .09. Ratings of the importance of justice when dealing with users of

the school library were similar whether participants donated before or after the moral

identity measure (M = 3.95 vs. 3.87). Thus, the act of completing the moral identity

measure made participants believe that justice was more important in dealing with users

of the university library and less important in dealing with users of the prison library.

Need. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of how

needy each charitable target was. The analyses revealed a main effect of target, $F (2, 146)$

= 22.63, $p < .001$, η^2 = .24, indicating that participants rated some charities to be higher in

need than others (see Figure 5). Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that

participants rated the school library (M = 4.14) as having greater need than either the

prison library (M = 3.73), $F (1, 73)$ = 11.29, $p < .01$, η^2 = .13, or the university library (M

= 3.18), $F (1, 73)$ = 13.66, $p < .001$, η^2 = .34. Additionally, the prison library was rated as

being more needy than the university library, $F (1, 73)$ = 13.66, $p < .001$, η^2 = .16. Thus,

participants felt the school library was in greatest need, followed by the prison and then

university libraries. No other significant effects emerged.

Similarity. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of how

similar they saw themselves to users of each library. The analyses revealed a main effect

of target, $F (2, 146)$ = 87.19, $p < .001$, η^2 = .54, indicating that participants rated

Note: * indicates that the indicated target differed significantly from other targets, $p < .05$.

Figure 5. Ratings of Need, Similarity, Utility, and how much Participants Cared about each Charity.

themselves as more similar to users of some libraries than others. As reflected in Figure 5, post-hoc within-subject contrasts indicated that participants rated themselves as more similar to the users of the university library ($M = 4.34$) than the school library ($M = 3.00$), $F(1, 73) = 49.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .40$, or prison library ($M = 2.05$), $F(1, 73) = 163.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .69$. Participants also rated themselves as more similar to users of the school library than the prison library, $F(1, 73) = 69.85$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .36$. Thus, participants felt most similar to university students, less similar to elementary students, and even less similar to prisoners. No other significant effects emerged.

Care. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of how much they cared for each library and its users. The analyses revealed a main effect of target, $F(1.84, 134.03) = 14.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$, indicating that participants reported caring more about some libraries than others (see Figure 5). Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that participants reported caring less about the prison library ($M = 3.27$) than either the university library ($M = 4.03$), $F(1, 73) = 21.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .23$, or the school library ($M = 3.77$), $F(1, 73) = 14.66$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$, which were not rated significantly differently, $F(1, 73) = 3.61$, $p = .06$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Thus, participants seemed to care deeply about both the university and school, but less about the prison. No other significant effects emerged.

Utility. A 2 x 2 x 3 MANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of the utility of each charitable target. The analyses revealed a main effect of target, $F(2, 146) = 18.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$, indicating that participants rated some charities as more useful than others (see Figure 5). Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts indicated that participants rated the prison library as less useful ($M = 3.87$) than either the university

library ($M = 4.49$), $F(1, 73) = 29.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .29$, or the school library ($M = 4.39$),

$F(1, 73) = 21.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .22$, which were not rated significantly differently, $F(1,$

$73) = 1.05$, $p = .31$, $\eta^2 = .01$. Thus, participants felt that both university and school

libraries were useful for society, whereas the prison library was less so. No other

significant effects emerged.

Predicting Donations: Regression Analyses

To test whether moral identity, the relevance of justice, deservingness, or some

other variable best predicted charity donations, donations to each charity were

individually regressed on (a) moral identity scores, (b) ratings of the importance of justice

for that charity, (c) ratings of charity deservingness, and (d) any other variable that

significantly correlated with donations (see Table 1). In order to reduce multicolinearity,

all predictors were centered prior to analysis (Aiken & West, 1991).

University Library Donations. First, a multiple regression analysis was conducted

to determine if ratings of moral identity, the importance of justice for the university,

university deservingness, need, or right-wing authoritarianism significantly predicted

donations to the university library. Each variable was regressed simultaneously to assess

whether they predicted donations above and beyond the prediction offered by other

variables.

Results indicated that only ratings of university library deservingness, $\beta = .30$, $t =$

2.10, $p < .05$, and right-wing authoritarianism, $\beta = .27$, $t = 2.75$, $p < .01$, significantly

predicted donations to the university library[5]. University library need, the importance of

justice, and moral identity were all nonsignificant ($\beta = .28$, $t = 1.90$, $p = .06$, $\beta = .01$, $t =$

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[5] Only standardized regression coefficients are reported.

.04, p = .97, and β = -.01, t = -.08, p = .93 respectively). Moreover, when these predictors were entered into a stepwise regression model, deservingness was found to be the strongest predictor of donations, β = .49, t = 4.92, p < .001, followed by right-wing authoritarianism, β = .26, t = 2.65, p < .05 and need, β = .28, t = 2.05, p < .01. The importance of justice and moral identity were excluded from the model altogether. These results indicate that participants' perceptions of how much the university library deserved predicted how much they were willing to donate, with right-wing authoritarianism and perceptions of university need predicting donations to a lesser extent.

Prison Library Donations. Second, a simultaneous multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if moral identity scores, the importance of justice, or ratings of prison deservingness, need, care, utility, school need, or school care significantly predicted donations to the prison library. Results indicated that only ratings of deservingness, β = .54, t = 2.93, p < .01 significantly predicted donations to the prison library. Moral identity β = -.11, t = -1.00, p = .32, the importance of justice, β = .10, t = .86, p = .39, as well as prison library need, β = -.11, t = -.61, p = .55, care, β = .11, t = .84, p = .41, utility, β = .05, t = .33, p = .74, school need, β = -.06, t = -.44, p = .66, and school care, β = .19, t = 1.49, p = .14 were all nonsignificant. A stepwise analysis duplicated these findings: only deservingness predicted donations, β = .55, t = 5.67, p < .001. All other variables were excluded from the model. These results indicate that participants' perception of how much the prison library deserved predicted how much they were willing to donate to the prison library.

School Library Donations. Third, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine if moral identity, the importance of justice, or ratings of school deservingness,

need, similarity, care, utility, or right-wing authoritarianism significantly predicted

donations to the school library. When donations were regressed on all variables

simultaneously, none significantly predicted variation. School care came closest to

significance, β = .25, t = 1.75, p = .09, followed by right-wing authoritarianism, β = -.19,

t = -1.71, p = .09, school need, β = .22, t = 1.31, p = .20, similarity, β = .11, t = .99, p =

.33, deservingness, β = .13, t = .87, p = .39, utility, β = -.11, t = -.77, p = .44, moral

identity, β = -.06, t = -.51, p = .61, and the importance of justice, β = .04, t = .29, p = .77.

However, when these variables were entered into a stepwise regression model, both

school library need, β = .47, t = 4.57, p < .001, and care, β = .26, t = 2.17, p < .05,

significantly predicted donations to the school library. All other variables were excluded

from the model. These findings indicate that how much participants cared about the

school library and thought it needed help predicted donations toward it.

Mediation Analyses

Although the importance of justice did not emerge as a significant predictor in

any of the multiple regression analyses, justice did correlate with donations to each

charity (see Table 1). It is theoretically interesting, therefore, to determine whether these

correlations occurred because justice was perceived to be less important for those targets

who deserved less, or if the importance of justice predicted donations independently of

deservingness. The former possibility would be consistent with the deservingness

perspective, whereas the latter would provide some support for the scope of justice view.

Thus, we conducted a mediation analysis separately on each charity to determine whether

ratings of deservingness mediated the relation between perceptions of the importance of

justice and donations to that charity, or vice versa.

According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the effect of justice on donations would be mediated by deservingness if (1) the relevance of justice predicted donations, (2) the relevance of justice predicted deservingness, (3) perceived deservingness predicted donations even when the relevance of justice was controlled statistically, and (4) the relevance of justice no longer predicted donations significantly (or was significantly reduced in predictive strength) when deservingness was controlled statistically.

Deservingness Mediates the Relation between Justice and Donations. First, we examined whether perceptions of university library deservingness mediated the relation between importance of justice and donations to the university library. Figure 6 summarizes the results. The regression analyses showed that the importance of justice significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .25$, $t = 2.21$, $p < .05$. The importance of justice also predicted perceived deservingness, $\beta = .44$, $t = 4.29$, $p < .001$. When the importance of justice and deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously, deservingness predicted donations over and above justice, $\beta = .48$, $t = 4.24$, $p < .001$, whereas justice no longer predicted donations significantly, $\beta = .04$, $t = .31$, $p = .76$. A Sobel (Aroian) test[6] revealed a significant reduction in the β for the importance of justice when deservingness was controlled, $z = 2.97$, $p < .01$.

Second, we examined whether perceptions of prison deservingness mediated the relation between the importance of justice and donations to the prison library (see Figure 7). The regression analyses showed that the importance of justice significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .28$, $t = 2.52$, $p < .05$. The importance of justice also predicted perceived deservingness, $\beta = .26$, $t = 2.35$, $p < .05$. When the importance of justice and

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[6] Although standardized regression coefficients are reported here, unstandardized coefficients were used to conduct all Sobel tests.

Figure 6. Deservingness Mediates the Importance of Justice on University Library Donations.

Note: * indicates $p < .05$, *** indicates $p < .001$

Figure 7. Deservingness Mediates the Importance of Justice on Prison Library Donations.

deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously, deservingness predicted

donations over and above justice, $\beta = .51$, $t = 5.13$, $p < .001$, whereas justice no longer

predicted donations significantly, $\beta = .15$, $t = 1.47$ p = .15. A Sobel test revealed a

significant reduction in the β for the importance of justice when deservingness was

controlled, $z = 2.11$, $p < .05$.

Third, we examined whether perceptions of school library deservingness mediated

the relation between importance of justice and donations to the school library, as can be

seen in Figure 8. The regression analyses showed that the importance of justice

significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .32$, $t = 2.92$, $p < .01$. The importance

of justice also predicted perceived deservingness, $\beta = .42$, $t = 4.07$, $p < .001$. When the

importance of justice and deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously,

deservingness predicted donations over and above justice, $\beta = .29$, $t = 2.50$, $p < .05$,

whereas justice no longer predicted donations significantly, $\beta = .20$, $t = 1.67$, $p = .10$. A

Sobel test revealed a significant reduction in the β for the importance of justice when

deservingness was controlled, $z = 2.09$, $p < .05$.

Collectively, these three mediation analyses cast doubt on the scope of justice

model of helping. Although the relevance of justice did predict donations, it did so

entirely through its relation with deservingness in each case. However, it is possible that

the reverse mediation is also significant, and that deservingness predicts donations, in

part, through its relation with the importance of justice. To determine if this was the case,

three additional regression analyses were conducted.

***

β = .42

School Deservingness

***

β = .29

Importance of Justice for School

**

β = .32 $(\beta$ = .20)

**School Donations**

*

z = 2.09

Note: * indicates $p < .05$, ** indicates $p < .01$, *** indicates $p < .001$

Figure 8. Deservingness Mediates the Importance of Justice on School Library Donations.

deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously, deservingness predicted

donations over and above justice, β = .51, t = 5.13, p < .001, whereas justice no longer

predicted donations significantly, β = .15, t = 1.47 p = .15. A Sobel test revealed a

significant reduction in the β for the importance of justice when deservingness was

controlled, z = 2.11, p < .05.

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the relation between importance of justice and donations to the school library, as can be

seen in Figure 8. The regression analyses showed that the importance of justice

significantly predicted participants' donations, β = .32, t = 2.92, p < .01. The importance

of justice also predicted perceived deservingness, β = .42, t = 4.07, p < .001. When the

importance of justice and deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously,

deservingness predicted donations over and above justice, β = .29, t = 2.50, p < .05,

whereas justice no longer predicted donations significantly, β = .20, t = 1.67, p = .10. A

Sobel test revealed a significant reduction in the β for the importance of justice when

deservingness was controlled, z = 2.09, p < .05.

Collectively, these three mediation analyses cast doubt on the scope of justice

model of helping. Although the relevance of justice did predict donations, it did so

entirely through its relation with deservingness in each case. However, it is possible that

the reverse mediation is also significant, and that deservingness predicts donations, in

part, through its relation with the importance of justice. To determine if this was the case,

three additional regression analyses were conducted.

Justice Does Not Mediate the Relation between Deservingness and Donations.

First, we examined whether perceptions of the importance of justice when dealing with

the university library mediated the relation between deservingness and donations to the

university library. Results are displayed in Figure 9. The regression analyses showed that

deservingness significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .49$, $t = 4.92$, $p < .001$.

Deservingness also predicted the importance of justice, $\beta = .44$, $t = 4.29$, $p < .001$. When

deservingness and the importance of justice were entered into the equation

simultaneously, the importance of justice did not predict donations over and above

deservingness, $\beta = .04$, $t = .31$, $p = .76$, whereas deservingness continued to significantly

predict donations, $\beta = .48$, $t = 4.24$, $p < .001$. A Sobel test revealed no significant

reduction in the β for deservingness when the importance of justice was controlled, $z =$

$.31$, $p = .76$.

Second, we examined whether perceptions of the importance of justice when

dealing with the prison library mediated the relation between deservingness and

donations to the prison library. Figure 10 summarizes the results. The regression analyses

showed that deservingness significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .55$, $t =$

5.67, $p < .001$. Deservingness also predicted the importance of justice, $\beta = .26$, $t = 2.35$, p

$< .05$. When deservingness and the importance of justice were entered into the equation

simultaneously, the importance of justice did not predict donations over and above

deservingness, $\beta = .15$, $t = 1.47$, $p = .15$, whereas deservingness continued to significantly

predict donations, $\beta = .51$, $t = 5.13$, $p < .001$. A Sobel test revealed no significant

reduction in the β for deservingness when the importance of justice was controlled, $z =$

1.17, $p = .24$.

Finally, we examined whether perceptions of the importance of justice when

dealing with the school library mediated the relation between deservingness and

$\beta = .44$

***

Importance of Justice for University

$\beta = .04$

University Deservingness

*** ***
$\beta = .49$ $(\beta = .48)$

University Donations

$z = .31$, *n.s.*

Note: *** indicates $p < .001$

Figure 9. The Importance of Justice Does Not Mediate the Effect of Deservingness on University Library Donations.

Figure 10. The Importance of Justice Does Not Mediate the Effect of Deservingness on University Library Donations.

donations to the school library (see Figure 11). The regression analyses showed that deservingness significantly predicted participants' donations, $\beta = .38$, $t = 3.50$, $p < .01$. Deservingness also predicted the importance of justice, $\beta = .43$, $t = 4.07$, $p < .001$. When deservingness and the importance of justice were entered into the equation simultaneously, the importance of justice did not predict donations over and above deservingness, $\beta = .20$, $t = 1.67$, $p = .10$, whereas deservingness continued to significantly predict donations, $\beta = .29$, $t = 2.50$, $p < .05$. A Sobel test revealed no significant reduction in the β for deservingness when the importance of justice was controlled, $z = 1.51$, $p = .13$. Taken together, these results indicate that justice did not mediate the relation between deservingness and donations, whereas deservingness did mediate the relation between the importance of justice and donations.

Discussion

Overall, results supported the deservingness perspective but provided no support for either boundary theory. Ratings of how much each charitable target needed and deserved paralleled the pattern of donations, whereas ratings of the importance of justice showed a different pattern (as did ratings of similarity, care, and utility). Deservingness emerged as the strongest predictor of donations to the prison and university libraries, whereas neither moral identity nor the importance of justice predicted donations. Deservingness accounted for a large portion of the variance in university and prison donations—roughly half the variance in each stepwise regression.

Strength of moral identity did not predict overall donations, nor donations to distant targets, contrary to the hypotheses of Aquino and Reed's (2002; 2003) moral identity theory. The importance of justice also failed to predict donations above and

Note: * indicates $p < .05$, ** indicates $p < .01$, *** indicates $p < .001$

*Figure 11.* The Importance of Justice Does Not Mediate the Effect of Deservingness on University Library Donations.

beyond other predictors, contrary to the predictions of scope of justice theory (e.g., Opotow, 1994). Although justice did predict donations when entered by itself, mediation analyses indicated that this relation was spurious: it was entirely mediated by deservingness (whereas the reverse mediation was not significant). Moreover, ratings of the relevance of justice for each charity were correlated with the relevance of justice for each other charity. Thus, contrary to scope of justice predictions, people who viewed justice as relevant for one charity tended to view it as relevant for all charities.

The morality prime did not alter participants' donations—or, indeed, scores on any dependent measure. The innertness of this manipulation came as a surprize given that Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) used the the same prime to increase participants' preference for donations of time rather than money for a moral organization, a pattern that mirrored those who scored high on the moral identity individual difference measure in their first two studies. They argued that the moral prime activated moral identity, but because they failed to measure moral identity, that conclusion remained to be verified. The present study provided no support for that interpretation. The moral prime and the order manipulation both failed to increase participants' scores on the moral identity measure, and donations were unrelated to moral identity scores.

Unlike the priming manipulation, the order in which participants completed study materials did affect donations—exactly as the morality prime was hypothesized to. In fact, in hindsight the order manipulation appeared to operate as a morality prime. Recall that the moral identity measure presented participants with a list of moral adjectives and asked them to visualize a person described by those adjectives. In so doing, the concept of morality and moral people would have been activated, exactly as priming

manipulations are designed to operate. Thus, in essence, the moral identity measure primed participants with morality. Participants who completed the moral identity measure immediately before donating gave more to the university and school than those who donated before completing the moral identity measure. Interestingly, participants who completed the moral identity measure before donating also gave less to the prison. Thus, this "priming" effect was inconsistent with moral identity theory: participants primed with morality were not more generous overall, nor more generous specifically toward distant targets. Instead, this moral "prime" appeared to operate as a moral lens, making participants focus on the guilt or innocence of their target and adjust their donation accordingly. Consistent with the moral lens interpretation, participants who were "primed" with morality viewed the school library to be more deserving but the prison library less so.

Collectively, these findings suggest that participants gave to each charity in accordance with how much they perceived each to deserve. Differences in helping arose not because of a boundary to the application of morality or justice; both morality and justice applied to each charity target. Rather, differences in helping arose because different targets were viewed to deserve different treatment—particularly when morality was situationally activated. These findings are consistent with previous work on deservingness (Olson et al., in press), but also extend them in three important ways. First, previous work was limited to hypothetical targets, whereas the current work used real charities. Second, previous work involved hypothetical resources, whereas the current work asked participants to distribute real resources that they thought were their own. Third, the current work suggests that deservingness considerations are intensified when

morality is made situationally salient; in other words, moral primes act as a moral lens

that induce participants to focus on the targets' deservingness.

Critics of deservingness theory may note that there was no difference in the

overall ratings of the university and prison libraries in terms of deservingness or

donations, despite the fact that participants indicated they cared more about the university

library, said it was more useful, and rated its users as more similar to themselves. The

fact that these libraries did not differ in deservingness or donations may reflect the fact

that participants had already given the university large sums of money (in the form of

tuition), and so assumed the library there was better funded than the smaller school and

prison libraries. Note that the prison library was rated as needier than the university

library. This suggests that there may be multiple components to deservingness. A target's

guilt or innocence may be one deservingness component, and a target's resources and

capabilities may be another. If so, less capable groups may be perceived as more

deserving of aid. This explanation can account for why the school library was rated more

deserving than either the prison or university libraries: whereas the prison is guilty but

poorly funded and the university innocent but flush with resources, the school is both

innocent *and* in need of funding. Consequently, participants perceived it to deserve the

most, and gave in accordance with that perception.

Limitations of Study 1

Although the results of Study 1 support the deservingness perspective, the

conclusions that may be drawn are limited by features of the research design. Participants

rated each charity only after they had made their donations, so it remains possible that

deservingness ratings reflected justifications rather than the cause of participants'

donation decisions. In Study 2, charity ratings were obtained before the helping opportunity in order to rule out this possibility.

Another limitation of Study 1 was the fact that participants had to choose between three charities simultaneously, a situation that may reduce experimental realism. Although the correlational data suggested that participants made three independent donation decisions, it remains possible that this presentation format affected both the amount participants chose to give and the strategy they used (e.g., the modal donation response was to give one dollar to each charity). In Study 2, charity target was manipulated between-subjects instead.

Third, Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007) found that people perceive donations of time to be more caring, moral, socially responsible, and heartfelt than cash donations. Because participants in Study 1 donated money, it is possible that our findings are limited to this domain and would not be replicated if participants had an opportunity to donate other forms of aid. To explore this possibility, we examined donations of time and effort in Study 2.

Fourth, the moral prime employed in Study 1 did not significantly alter participant responses on any variable, in contrast to the findings of Aquino, Reed, and Levy (2007). Instead, the act of completing the moral identity measure appeared to prime participants with morality. These findings call for replication using a different priming procedure. Thus, Study 2 employed a morality prime manipulation that has proven effective at increasing participants' decisions to volunteer for a student mentoring program (Nelson & Norton, 2005).

Finally, the findings in Study 1 are vulnerable to an alternative interpretation. Brickman and his colleagues (1982) argued that people use a variety of models to determine whether a group is responsible for creating or improving upon their situation of need. Which model is applied has ramifications for how much help a target ought to receive. Targets viewed as incapable of improving upon their circumstances should not receive aid since they are incapable of using it. If participants apply different models of responsibility to each charity, they might donate different amounts regardless of deservingness considerations. Study 2 examined this possibility by asking participants to rate the extent to which people who use the charitable target are a) responsible for creating their circumstances, b) responsible for improving their circumstances, and c) capable of making effective use of charitable donations.

<div align="center">Study 2</div>

<div align="center">*Method*</div>

Participants

One hundred and seven participants, 58 males and 49 females (mean age = 18.71, S.D. = 1.29), were recruited from a university participant pool and compensated with partial course credit. Twenty-seven of these participants, 10 males and 17 females (mean age = 18.27, S.D. = .83) also took part in a separate mass testing session where moral identity was assessed.

Unfortunately, not all participants believed the elaborate cover story (see below), and correctly guessed that the charity was fictitious and that their responses to it were being monitored. Because they responded in an uninterpretable manner, their responses were removed from analysis. Participants were probed for suspicion by asking three

questions of increasing specificity. Suspicion was scored 1 - 4 based on their responses to these questions. Participants who indicated they saw through the deception after the first question ("What did you think about the study today?") scored a 4 (n = 19) and were removed from analysis. 11 people scored a 3 for expressing suspicion after the second question ("Did you think there was anything unusual in the study today?"), 19 scored a 2 for a suspicious response to the third question ("Did you believe the charity was real?"), and 58 scored as 1, as they expressed no suspicion after any question. All individuals scoring a 3, 2, or 1 were retained in analysis, except four participants: two who had personal ties to the prison library and two who failed to follow instructions. This left a final sample of 84 participants, 44 of whom were male and 40 female (mean age = 18.67, S.D. = 1.36).

Procedure

This experiment employed a classic 2 x 2 between-subjects design. Participants were exposed to either a moral or neutral prime and given information about a charity that aided either a school or prison library. They rated the library on the same dependent measures employed in Study 1 plus some additional ones, and were given an opportunity to help the charity. In order to make the helping opportunity seem realistic, an elaborate cover story was required.

Upon arrival in the lab, participants were informed that they would be participating in "three separate" studies, and that the third study would be run by another experimenter who was to show up at that time. The "first study," ostensibly a pretest for an upcoming experiment, actually consisted of a moral priming manipulation. Half of the participants spent 5 minutes writing a paragraph describing the "behaviour, values,

lifestyle, and appearance" of superheroes (moral prime), whereas the other half described their kitchen (neutral prime). Nelson and Norton (2005) found that people who described superheroes in this manner were more likely to volunteer for a student mentoring program and to remain with the program six months later.

Next, participants completed a consent form for the "second study," ostensibly part of a survey of local institutions but actually a charity rating task. Participants read a description of either the library of a local prison or the library of a local elementary school (same materials as in Study 1, see Appendix A). Then participants were seated at a computer and asked to complete a variety of measures (see below). They were instructed to find the experimenter in a nearby room once finished.

While participants completed the priming task and measures, the experimenter went to the nearby room and could be heard typing rapidly. When participants informed him that they had completed the "second study," they could see that he was working on a charity pledge list. The experimenter asked the participant to wait a moment while he finished typing a line of information, as if completing the document was a high priority. Then the experimenter checked his watch and feigned surprise that the "other experimenter" had not yet arrived, and invited the participant to wait in the room where he was working. This room contained a selection of magazines for participants to read as well the experimenter's unfinished document on the computer screen.

After a brief wait to reinforce the cover story, the experimenter asked the participant if they could ask them a question that was usually reserved for the very end of all the studies. All participants assented. The experimenter explained that he was in contact with the library involved in the "survey of local institutions" (either the prison or

school library) and it had asked him to help organize volunteers for a book drive called

the Bridge to Learning. Volunteers would be provided a vehicle in which to pick up

books from local residents—thus, no direct contact with the library was required.

Participants that did not drive were told they would be paired with someone who did.

Participants were asked if they would be willing to volunteer for the book drive.

Those that did wrote their email address on a sheet and indicated the number of hours

they were willing to volunteer "in the next month."[7] The amount of time participants

were willing to volunteer formed the first dependent measure of helping.

The experimenter then checked his watch and acted surprised that his tardy

colleague had *still* not arrived, and announced his intention to phone her from the next

lab. Just before leaving, the experimenter asked a second request of participants: That

they help the charity by working on a task while waiting. The task entailed typing lines of

charity donor information (name, address, phone number, and times available for book

pickup) from a paper list into a computer file. 20 such lines had been entered thus far,

with many more yet to be entered. Ostensibly, the purpose of this task was so a copy

could be distributed to each book drive volunteer, and the charity had requested the

complete file by the end of the day. The number of lines each participant copied within a

10 minute period was recorded. The amount of effort they expended on the task,

operationalized as the number of lines copied, formed the second dependent measure of

helping.

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[7] The volunteering timeframe overlapped almost completely with students' final exam period.

Materials

After the priming manipulation, participants completed a charity rating task under the guise of a survey of local institutions. They read a description of either a prison or elementary school library (see Appendix A), and then indicated agreement with the six statements in Study 1: charity deservingness, the importance of justice when dealing with the charity, and charity need, similarity, care, and utility (see Appendix B). In order to examine the responsibility models, participants also indicated how responsible the users of the charity were for creating their need, improving on their circumstances, and how capable they were of using donations. Finally, an additional measure of the relevance of justice was adopted: "The 'Golden Rule' is to treat others the way you would wish to be treated. This rule applies to how we should treat users of the library." All ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

In order to ensure that participants did distinguish the moral worth of the two charities, participants also rated agreement with 15 moral adjectives describing charity (e.g., "Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are honourable"). They also rated themselves using the same 15 adjectives (see Appendix C).

Participants completed Paulhus's (1991) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding to assess impression management (with 20 items, such as "I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught") and self deception (with 20 items, such as "I am fully in control of my own fate"). Participants recorded agreement with each statement on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Participants also completed a measure of religiosity based on the work of Koenig, McGue, Krueger, and Bouchard (2005). Participants responded either "yes" or "no" to 10

items, such as "I frequently seek guidance, help, or forgiveness through prayer" and "I

am a member of a religious youth or study group." Scores were summed (10 was the

highest and 0 the lowest one could score, with higher scores indicating more religiosity).

Finally, at the very end of the study (and in some cases also during a prior mass testing

session), moral identity was assessed using Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity

measure.

Results

As in Study 1, many variables were examined in this study. The first step in

analysis was to correlate all of them and determine if they varied according to gender.

Then the main effects and interaction of the prime and charity target manipulations were

examined for each dependent measure. Again, a regression analysis was conducted to see

which variables best predicted the amount of time and effort participants expended

helping the charity. Finally a mediation analysis examined whether the effect of the

manipulations on effort was mediated by deservingness perceptions.

Correlations

As can be seen in Table 2, only ratings of charity deservingness correlated with

the amount of effort people expended helping the charities. Deservingness also correlated

positively with ratings of charity need and utility and (surprisingly) negatively with

perceptions of charity morality[8]. Only perceptions that the golden rule was relevant

correlated (negatively) with the amount of time participants were willing to volunteer.

Moral identity correlated with ratings of participants' own morality, religiosity,

and impression management, perceptions that the charity was similar to the self,

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[8] An examination of the scatterplot of this relation indicated an extreme outlier. Once this outlier was removed, the correlation was no longer significant.

perceptions that the golden rule was relevant, and professed caring about the charity. Of the two scope of justice items, perceptions that fairness was important in dealing with the charity only correlated negatively with age. Perceptions that the golden rule was relevant, however, correlated positively with moral identity, impression management, caring about the charity, and negatively with the amount of time participants volunteered. This pattern provided some support for the deservingness view, but not either boundary theory, as only deservingness was positively related to helping behaviour.

Gender and Age Effects

Gender correlated with ratings of charity need ($r = .23, p < .05$) and deservingness ($r = .40, p < .001$), indicating that women rated the charities more favourably than did men. Age was negatively correlated with the belief that the golden rule was relevant when dealing with the charities ($r = -.27, p < .05$), signifying that older participants believed the golden rule to be less relevant. No other gender or age correlations reached significance, nor did gender yield significant effects in the ANOVA or regression analyses. Therefore, results are reported collapsed across gender.

Principle Dependent Measures: Main Effects and Interactions

Donations of Time. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of moral priming, charity target, and the interaction on participant willingness to volunteer hours for the charity book drive. Participants volunteered an average of 1 hour for the prison library when primed with morality and .89 hours when not primed. They volunteered .70 hours for the school library when primed with morality and 1.08 hours when not primed. Results revealed that neither the prime, $F(1, 80) = .25, p = .62, \eta^2 = .00$, nor the charity target, $F(1, 80) = .04, p = .84, \eta^2 = .00$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80)$

Table 2

Correlations between Helping Effort, Moral Identity, Deservingness, the Importance of Justice, and Other Charity Ratings in Study 2

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 Time Volunteered	1.0										
2 Effort Expended	.11	1.0									
3 Charity Deservingness	-.02	.27*	1.0								
4 Moral Identity	.09	-.01	.05	1.0							
5 Justice is Important	.19	-.12	-.06	.05	1.0						
6 The Golden Rule is Relevant	-.25*	.00	.03	.30**	.13	1.0					
7 Morality of Self	.11	.07	.00	.45***	.03	.19	1.0				
8 Religiosity	.15	-.08	.04	.38***	-.01	.10	.08	1.0			
9 Impression Management	.09	.02	.00	.43***	.12	.23	.29**	.20	1.0		
10 Self-Deception	.01	.11	.04	.18	.14	.13	.38***	-.04	.32**	1.0	
11 Charity Need	.09	.19	.32**	.12	.11	.09	-.13	.09	-.04	-.18	1.0
12 Charity Similarity	.04	.10	-.07	.24*	.06	.14	.15	.04	.10	.10	.09
13 Care about Charity	.10	.18	.15	.31**	.01	.28**	.19	.14	.18	.10	.25*

Table 2 Continued

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
14 Charity Utility	-.05	.14	.57***	.15	-.42	.11	.13	-.01	.02	.17	.31**
15 Charity Morality	.02	-.01	-.22*	.07	.04	.14	.17	.08	-.06	.13	-.04
16 Responsible for Creating	-.04	-.01	.00	-.10	.10	-.05	-.12	.03	.09	-.07	.06
17 Responsible for Improving	.16	.10	.10	-.08	.10	.05	-.13	-.01	.12	.03	.06
18 Capable of Using Donations	-.06	.04	.11	.05	-.08	-.10	.14	-.05	.05	-.06	.18

Table 2 Continued

	12	13	14	15	16	17
12 Charity Similarity	1.0					
13 Care about Charity	.50***	1.0				
14 Charity Utility	.06	.31**	1.0			
15 Charity Morality	.33**	.25*	-.06	1.0		
16 Responsible for Creating	-.18	-.32*	-.26*	-.32**	1.0	
17 Responsible for Improving	-.14	-.19	-.08	-.29**	.58***	1.0
18 Capable of Using Donations	-.05	-.02	.07	-.15	.28*	.20

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

$p= .77, p = .38, \eta^2 = .01$, significantly altered the number of hours participants were

willing to donate[9].

Donations of Effort. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the

effort expended by participants to help complete charity materials (see Figure 12).

Participants copied an average of 9.71 lines of text for the prison library when primed

with morality and 11.89 lines when not primed. They copied 12.10 lines for the school

library when primed with morality and 11.04 lines when not primed. Results revealed no

significant effect of prime, $F(1, 80) = .43, p = .51, \eta^2 = .01$ or target, $F(1, 80) = .80, p =$

$.37, \eta^2 = .01$, but the interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 80) = 3.59, p = .06, \eta^2 =$

.04. This pattern suggests that when participants were primed with morality they worked

harder for the school library charity, but less hard for the prison library charity. Post-hoc

analyses did not indicate a significant difference between charity targets in the morality

prime condition, $t(39) = -1.78$, p = .08, or neutral prime condition, $t(41) = .79$, p = .43.

Nor was there a significant difference between the prime conditions for the school, $t(42)$

= 1.19, p = .24, or prison, $t(38) = -1.45$, p = .16.

Deservingness. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was on ratings of charity

deservingness (see Figure 13). Participants rated the prison library deservingness an

average of 3.71 when primed with morality and 4.00 when not primed. They rated school

library deservingness 4.30 when primed with morality and 3.63 when not primed. Results

resembled donations in that there was no significant effect of prime, $F(1, 80) = 1.05, p =$

$.31, \eta^2 = .01$ or target, $F(1, 80) = .31, p = .58, \eta^2 = .00$, but there was a significant

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[9] This pattern of results was replicated when donations of time were dichotomised. Neither the main effect of target, $F(1, 80) = .22, p = .64$, nor main effect of prime, $F(1, 80) = .40, p = .53$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .95, p = .33$ significantly affected whether participants volunteered time or not.

Figure 12. Effort Spent Helping the Charity by Prime and Target.

Figure 13. Ratings of Charity Deservingness by Prime and Target.

interaction, $F(1, 80) = 6.40$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .07$. When participants were primed with morality they viewed the school library charity as more deserving but prison library charity as less so. Post-hoc analyses indicated that the school deserved significantly more than the prison in the moral prime condition, $t(39) = -2.19$, p $< .05$, but not the neutral prime condition, $t(41) = 1.39$, p $= .17$. The school was also rated significantly more deserving in the moral prime than neutral prime condition, $t(33) = 2.82$, p $< .01$, whereas prison deservingness did not significantly differ between the two priming conditions, $t(38) = -1.01$, p $= .32$.

Moral Identity. Moral identity scores were examined via a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA. Participants' moral identity scores in the prison charity condition averaged 4.87 when they were primed with morality and 4.91 when they were not. Participants in the school charity condition averaged 4.94 when primed with morality and 4.73 when not. Results revealed no significant effects. Neither the prime, $F(1, 80) = .21$, $p = .65$, $\eta^2 = .00$, nor target, $F(1, 80) = .10$, $p = .75$, $\eta^2 = .00$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .46$, $p = .50$, $\eta^2 = .01$ reached significance. Thus, moral identity scores did not vary by condition.

Twenty-seven participants in the current study also completed the moral identity measure during a separate mass testing session sometime during the school year. It is interesting to compare these scores in order to examine test-retest reliability and to increase confidence that moral identity scores were not affected by the events of the study. A paired-sample t-test indicated that moral identity scores did not significantly differ between the mass-testing session ($M = 5.95$) and the current study ($M = 6.04$), $t(26)$ $= -.05$, $p = .96$. Moreover, these scores correlated significantly with one another, $r = .60$, $p < .01$, indicating somewhat higher test-retest reliability than that reported by Aquino

and Reed (2002). Both moral identity scores correlated in a similar fashion with other variables. The only exception was ratings of the morality of schoolchildren: these ratings correlated with the moral identity scores obtained in mass testing, $r = .55$, $p < .05$, but not those obtained during the study itself $r = .13$, $p = .41$.

The Importance of Justice. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on each of two items designed to tap the perceived importance of justice when dealing with a charity. Participants considering the prison library agreed with the first item, "It is important to consider what is fair and just for the users of the library," at an average of 3.71 when primed with morality and 3.89 when not primed. Those considering the school library agreed at an average of 3.65 when primed with morality and 3.96 when not primed. Results indicated no significant effect of prime, $F(1, 80) = 3.37$, $p = .07$, $\eta^2 = .04$, target, $F(1, 80) = .00$, $p = .99$, $\eta^2 = .00$, or the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .23$, $p = .63$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Participants considering the prison library agreed with the second item, "The 'Golden Rule' is to treat others the way you would wish to be treated. This rule applies to how we should treat users of the library," at an average of 3.76 when primed with morality and 3.89 when not primed. Those considering the school library agreed at an average of 3.85 when primed with morality and 3.96 when not primed. Results indicated no significant effect of prime, $F(1, 80) = .49$, $p = .48$, $\eta^2 = .01$, target, $F(1, 80) = .20$, $p = .66$, $\eta^2 = .00$, or the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .01$, $p = .94$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Responses to both items indicate that participants viewed justice to be equally applicable to each charity regardless of priming.

Need. Perceptions of charity need were examined via a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA. Participants rated prison library need an average of 3.86 when primed with morality and 3.89 when not primed, and rated school library need 3.85 when primed with

morality and 3.71 when not primed. Results revealed no significant effects: neither the prime, $F(1, 80) = .10$, $p = .75$, $\eta^2 = .00$, charity target, $F(1, 80) = .36$, $p = .55$, $\eta^2 = .00$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .31$, $p = .58$, $\eta^2 = .00$, significantly perceptions of charity need.

Similarity. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was also conducted on participant perceptions of how similar charity patrons were to themselves. Those primed with morality rated prisoners 2.05, whereas those not primed rated them 2.21. Those primed with morality rated schoolchildren 2.85 whereas those not primed rated them 3.04. Results indicated that neither the prime, $F(1, 80) = .78$, $p = .38$, $\eta^2 = .01$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .01$, $p = .94$, $\eta^2 = .00$ affected similarity ratings. However, participants rated schoolchildren to be more similar to themselves than prisoners, $F(1, 80) = 16.45$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$.

Care. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on how much participants cared about the charity. Participants rated their level of care for the prison library as 3.00 when primed with morality and 3.16 when not primed. They rated their level of care for the school library as 3.65 when primed with morality and 3.71 when not primed. Results indicated that neither the prime, $F(1, 80) = .44$, $p = .51$, $\eta^2 = .01$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .09$, $p = .76$, $\eta^2 = .00$ affected ratings of care. However, participants cared more about schoolchildren than prisoners, $F(1, 80) = 13.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .15$.

Utility. Perceptions of charity utility were examined via a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA. Participants rated prison library utility 4.05 when primed with morality and 3.95 when not primed. They rated school library utility 4.40 when primed with morality

and 4.17 when not primed. Results revealed no significant effects: neither the prime, $F(1,$

80$) = .89, p = .35, \eta^2 = .01$, charity target, $F(1, 80) = 2.62, p = .11, \eta^2 = .03$, nor the

interaction, $F(1, 80) = .14, p = .71, \eta^2 = .00$ significantly altered perceptions of charity

utility.

Responsibility Attributions. It is possible that participants applied different models

of responsibility to the school and prison libraries, which, in turn, affected donations. To

examine this possibility separate 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on

three items. First, participants were asked how responsible the people who used the

charity were for creating their position of need. Participants rated prisoner responsibility

an average of 3.43 when primed with morality and 3.26 when not primed. They rated the

responsibility of schoolchildren 2.45 when primed with morality and 2.21 when not

primed. Results revealed a significant main effect of charity target, $F(1, 80) = 33.31, p <$

$.05, \eta^2 = .29$, whereas the prime main effect and two-way interaction were not significant

$(F[1, 80] = 1.34, p = .25, \eta^2 = .02$ and, $F[1, 80] = .05, p = .83, \eta^2 = .00$, respectively).

Thus, participants viewed prisoners as more responsible for their plight than

schoolchildren.

Second, participants were asked how responsible the people who used the charity

were for improving upon their circumstances. Participants rated prisoner responsibility

for improvement an average of 3.00 when primed with morality and 3.32 when not

primed. They rated the responsibility of schoolchildren 2.65 when primed with morality

and 2.04 when not primed. Results revealed a significant main effect of charity target,

$F(1, 80) = 13.47, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$ and a significant two-way interaction, $F(1, 80) =$

$4.36, p < .05, \eta^2 = .05$. The prime main effect was not significant, $F(1, 80) = .44, p = .51,$

$\eta^2 = .01$. Overall, participants viewed prisoners as more responsible for improving on their circumstances than schoolchildren, but when participants were primed with morality, they viewed prisoners as somewhat less and children as somewhat more responsible. Post-hoc analyses did not indicate a significant difference between charity targets in the morality prime condition, $t(39) = 1.00$, p = .32, but did indicate a difference in the neutral prime condition, $t(41) = 4.62$, p < .001. There was a significant difference between the prime conditions for the school, $t(42) = 2.12$, p < .05, but not the prison, $t(38) = -.93$, p = .36.[10]

Finally, participants were asked how capable the charity was of utilizing the donations bequeathed to it. Participants rated the prison library's ability to use donations as 3.62 when primed with morality and 3.84 when not primed. They rated school library's ability 3.30 when primed with morality and 3.17 when not primed. Results revealed a significant main effect of charity target, $F(1, 80) = 6.34, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07$, whereas the prime main effect and the interaction were not significant ($F[1, 80] = .052, p = .82, \eta^2 = .00$ and, $F[1, 80] = .81, p = .37, \eta^2 = .01$, respectively). Thus, participants viewed the prison library as more capable of using donations than the school library.

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[10] Results varied little whether responsibility attributions were examined separately or whether they were combined to create four distinct model categories. Participants (n = 16) who rated targets as high (a 4 or 5) on both responsibility for creating and improving upon circumstances were categorized as employing the moral model, whereas those who rated the target as low (2 or 1) on both responsibility attributions were categorised as employing the medical model (n = 30). Those who rated targets using a mixture of high and low attributions were categorized as employing either the empowerment model (n = 3) or enlightenment model (n = 3). A chi-squared analysis was performed on each model separately to determine if the frequency with which participants employed each model varied according to the target they rated and the priming condition they were exposed to. Results for the moral model indicated a significant main effect of target, $\chi^2 = 12.25, p < .001$, but not prime, $\chi^2 = 2.25, p = .13$. Thus, participants used the moral model to evaluate prisoners more often than schoolchildren, regardless of priming condition. Results for the medical model were similar but reversed: there was a significant main effect of target, $\chi^2 = 13.33, p < .001$, but not prime, $\chi^2 = .53, p = .47$. Thus, participants used the medical model to evaluate schoolchildren more often than prisoners, regardless of priming condition. There were no significant effects of either target or prime for both the enlightenment and empowerment models. Thus, the application of different models cannot easily explain the interactive effects of prime x target on donations.

Morality Ratings of Charity and Self. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA

examined the effect of moral priming and charity target on participant perceptions of

charity morality, as averaged across the 15 moral adjective items. Participants rated

prisoner morality an average of 3.11 when primed with morality and 3.01 when not

primed. They rated schoolchild morality 3.43 when primed with morality and 3.43 when

not primed. Results revealed a significant effect of charity target, $F(1, 80) = 30.87$, $p <$

.001, $\eta^2 = .28$, whereas the prime and interaction were not significant ($F[1, 80] = .60$, $p =$

.44, $\eta^2 = .01$ and, $F[1, 80] = .56$, $p = .46$, $\eta^2 = .01$, respectively). Participants viewed

schoolchildren as more moral than prisoners.

Participants also rated their own morality on the same 15 items. Participants in the

prison charity condition rated their own morality 3.95 when primed with morality and

4.03 when not primed. Those in the school charity condition rated their own morality

3.93 when primed with morality and 3.94 when not primed. Results revealed no

significant effects: neither charity target, $F(1, 80) = .47$, $p = .49$, $\eta^2 = .01$, nor prime, $F(1,$

$80) = .40$, $p = .53$, $\eta^2 = .01$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 80) = .20$, $p = .67$, $\eta^2 = .00$ were

significant. Participants viewed themselves as equally moral regardless of the prime or

comparison target.

It is interesting to examine whether participants rated themselves as more moral

than the charity targets. To answer this question, participant ratings of their own morality

and those of the charity targets were submitted to two paired-sample t-tests. Results

indicated that participants in the prison charity condition rated their own morality ($M =$

3.99) higher than that of prisoners ($M = 3.06$), $t(39) = 15.76$, $p < .001$. Likewise,

participants in the school charity condition rated their own morality ($M = 3.93$) higher

than that of the schoolchildren (M = 3.43), $t(43)$ = 7.68, p < .001. Taken together, these

results indicate that participants rated their own morality higher than that of the school

children, whose morality, in turn, was rated higher than that of the prisoners.

Predicting Help: Regression Analyses

As in Study 1, multiple regressions were conducted in order to determine if moral

identity, deservingness, the relevance of justice, the application of the golden rule, or

some other variable best predicted helping behaviour above and beyond the main effects

and interaction of the manipulations. As it turned out, no other variables significantly

correlated with either donations of time or effort. In order to reduce multicollinearity, all

variables were centered prior to analysis (Aiken & West, 1991).

Results of the simultaneous regression indicated that, surprisingly, the relevance

of the golden rule negatively predicted donations of time, β = -.33, t = -2.94, p < .01. No

other predictors were significant. A stepwise analysis confirmed that the golden rule

negatively predicted the number of hours participants were willing to donate, β = -.25, t =

-2.29, p < .05, although now the importance of fairness was a significant positive

predictor, β = .22, t = 2.08, p < .05. All other variables were excluded from the model.

Given that opposing effects were found for two items purportedly measuring the same

thing, these results do not seem readily interpretable.

Results of the simultaneous regression indicated that only deservingness predicted

the effort that participants put into helping charities, β = .26, t = 2.43, p < .05. Neither

moral identity, β = -.02, t = -.22, p = .83, nor the importance of fairness, β = -.10, t = -.94,

p = .35, nor the relevance of the golden rule, β = .01, t = .13, p = .90 predicted effort. A

stepwise analysis confirmed these findings; only deservingness predicted effort, $\beta = .27$, t = 2.52, $p < .05$. All other predictors were excluded from the model.

Mediation Analysis

Because the ANOVA interaction term significantly predicted deservingness perceptions and marginally predicted helping effort, a mediation analysis was conducted to determine if deservingness mediated the relation between the interactive effect of the manipulations and donations, controlling for both main effects. Figure 14 summarizes the results. The analysis indicated that the interaction of prime and target (controlling for each main effect) marginally predicted participants' effort, $\beta = .21$, $t = 1.89$, $p = .06$. The interaction term also predicted perceived deservingness, $\beta = .27$, $t = 2.53$, $p < .05$. When the interaction and deservingness were entered into the equation simultaneously, deservingness predicted effort over and above the interaction, $\beta = .24$, $t = 2.13$, $p < .05$, whereas the interaction no longer predicted donations even marginally, $\beta = .14$, $t = 1.89$ p = .20. However, a Sobel test was not significant, indicating that deservingness only partially mediates the effect of the interaction term on helping effort (controlling for both main effects), $z = 1.56$, $p - .11$.

Discussion

As in Study 1, the findings of Study 2 provided some support for the deservingness perspective but no support for either boundary theory. Deservingness perceptions predicted the amount of effort participants expended helping the charities, whereas neither moral identity nor scope of justice did. Moreover, deservingness partially mediated the interaction of the manipulations on the amount of helping effort participants expended.

Note: † indicates *p* = .06, * indicates *p* < .05

Figure 14. Deservingness Partially Mediates the Effect of the Interaction on Effort Expended for Charity.

Importantly, this pattern was observed even though deservingness ratings were obtained before donations. Therefore, perceptions of deservingness do not merely reflect justification of past donation behaviour. Likewise, this pattern emerged even though participants only had the option to help a single charity—it was not necessary to make participants choose between several charity targets simultaneously. Study 2 also extended the findings of Study 1 from donations of cash to donations of effort, suggesting that deservingness is an important determinant of a variety of forms of helping, rather than one specific type.

Although the relevance of justice did predict the amount of time participants were willing to volunteer (in the stepwise regression once the golden rule was controlled for), the relevance of the golden rule *negatively* predicted volunteering time. Given that both items tapped the importance of justice, no clear support for the predictive role of justice considerations was obtained, contrary to the predictions of scope of justice theory.

The priming effect in this study replicated the "moral prime" order effect in Study 1. In contrast to the predictions of moral identity theory, the moral prime operated like a moral lens: participants worked harder to help innocent schoolchildren but less hard to help guilty prisoners when primed with morality. Only ratings of charity deservingness paralleled this pattern; moral identity scores did not vary with condition, nor did they predict helping behaviour. Thus, moral identity theory received no support from these findings.

Study 2 clarified the role of priming in helping behaviour. The priming manipulation in Study 1 failed to affect helping behaviour but the order in which participants completed measures did—thus, it appeared that the act of completing the

moral identity measure primed participants with morality. Study 2 used a more effective prime that altered participants' helping in a similar fashion to the order effect in Study 1. This suggests that the failure of the priming manipulation in Study 1 had to do with the nature of that specific priming task rather than the ineffectiveness of moral primes in general. It may be that participants found it more difficult to write a serious self-referential moral paragraph than to describe superheroes. If so, they may have felt less engaged with the first task, leading to priming failure in Study 1.

The priming manipulation in Study 2 affected the amount of effort participants expended for charity, but did not affect the amount of time they were willing to volunteer. This may reflect a ceiling effect due to demand characteristics. Donations of time were completed directly in front of the experimenter, who immediately saw the number that participants wrote down. The pressure to appear generous in front of the experimenter may have constricted variation in participant responses that otherwise would have manifested. Note that the measure of effort was obtained while the experimenter was in absentia. Therefore, the degree of effort may have more sensitively assessed participants' "true" donation inclinations because the measure was less confounded with social desirability concerns.

General Discussion

Collectively, the results of Study 1 and 2 provided support for the deservingness view of helping behaviour. There was no indication that a boundary of either morality or justice influenced donations. Participants helped charities to the extent that they perceived each to deserve help. Moral primes appeared to operate as a moral lens.

Deservingness

Whether measured before or after participants' donation decision, perceptions of charity deservingness were strong predictors of helping behaviour—in most cases, stronger than perceptions of charity need, similarity, utility, and care, stronger than the perceived relevance of justice, and stronger than individual differences in moral identity. This held true regardless of whether participants gave money or spent time helping the charity, and regardless of whether they had to choose between several charities simultaneously or not. When participants were primed with morality, deservingness perceptions were enhanced as if they viewed charity targets through a moral lens: innocent targets were viewed more positively, whereas guilty ones were viewed more negatively. Clearly, deservingness is a powerful indication of the likelihood that a target will receive help, particularly when morality is contextually salient.

These conclusions accord with those of Olson and colleagues (in press), who also found deservingness to predict helping behaviour. However, the current work extends previous findings in three important ways. First of all, previous work examined deservingness perceptions of hypothetical targets, whereas Study 1 used real charity targets. Second, previous work asked participants to make judgments about how a target should be treated, whereas the current work asked participants to allocate actual resources to the targets. Finally, the current work is the first to examine the effect of priming on deservingness considerations. Results suggest that moral primes make deservingness judgments more extreme. It may be that moral primes operate as a "moral lens," inducing participants to scrutinize targets' moral worth more closely, altering deservingness perceptions accordingly. In turn, these perceptions altered participants' willingness to

help the target. The fact that deservingness perceptions mediated the interaction of the manipulations on the amount of helping effort participants expended in study 2 provides some support for the moral lens interpretation.

Moral Identity

The findings of this investigation largely failed to confirm any of the predictions derived from Aquino and Reed's (2002; 2003) conceptualization of moral identity. The strongest evidence in favour of moral identity came from the correlational data. In Study 1, people who scored high on moral identity tended to rate the university library as more needy, the prison library as more needy, useful, and deserving, and said they cared more about the school library (see Table 1). In Study 2, moral identity again correlated with care for the charities, as well as with religiosity, ratings of how well moral terms describe the self, perceptions of similarity between the self and charity patrons (similarity, in turn, correlated with ratings of the charity's morality), and with perceptions that the golden rule is relevant in the charity context (see Table 2).

These findings suggest that there is something cogent about moral identity. It is a real construct in that some people see themselves as more moral than others. These findings also suggest that people who score higher on moral identity have greater "moral regard," or concern for the welfare and interests of others. These data even hint at the possibility that people with strong moral identities extend moral regard toward more distant targets than people with weak moral identities, since people scoring higher on moral identity appeared to harbor more benevolent attitudes particularly toward the prison library, which participants perceived to be highly dissimilar from themselves. In these respects, the data accord with Aquino and Reed's model.

Yet, results also indicated that moral identity was unrelated to real moral action.

Moral identity scores did not correlate with or predict donations of cash, time, or effort to

any of the charities in these studies—even distant charities, contrary to the expanding

circle of moral regard hypothesis. Nor did moral identity scores increase when morality

was primed through any means in either study. This failure cannot be attributed to poor

psychometric properties, as the scale exhibited reasonable levels of reliability, similar to

those obtained by Aquino and Reed (2002). Nor can this failure be attributed to

ineffective primes, as the order manipulation in Study 1 and priming manipulation in

Study 2 altered perceptions of charity deservingness and the allocation of resources

towards them. Moreover, priming participants with morality did not uniformly increase

helping toward distant targets, as predicted Aquino and Reed. Rather, moral primes

appeared to act as a moral lens, increasing help toward innocent targets but reducing help

toward guilty ones.

The disjunction between the other-centric attitudes and self-centered behaviour

characteristic of people high in moral identity can be explained if we view moral identity

as an impression management device. Numerous theorists have argued that moral

systems operate in part through reputation (e.g. Alexander, 1987; Axelrod & Hamilton,

1981; Krebs, 2005, 2008; Krebs, & Janicki, 2004, Trivers, 1971; Wright, 1994), and that

maintaining a reputation as a fair and honorable exchange partner is important in human[11]

social systems. People will be aided by others when they are perceived to be good

interaction partners, even if it is clear that they will never repay the donors directly

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[11] As well as other social species (de Waal, 1996; DeNault & McFarlane, 1995).

(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind, & Milinski, 2000). Therefore, it is adaptive[12] to advertise one's compassion for and willingness to help others in the hope that one will receive similar aid and goodwill. One way this may be achieved is by developing an identity as a caring, helping, moral individual—an identity that one believes wholeheartedly so that it is convincingly communicated to others. Consistent with the model of moral identity as moral reputation, moral identity scores in Study 2 correlated with scores on Paulhus's (1991) impression management scale.

Although helping may be necessary at times in order to convince the self and others that one's moral reputation is true, helping others is costly behaviour. When people help others they suffer a personal deficit, either in terms of direct resource loss or in lost opportunities that could have otherwise been pursued. Costs are maladaptive. Thus, it would be surprising if people jumped at every opportunity to help everyone all the time. Rather, people ought to be selective about when they actually help, while maintaining the illusion of being perennially willing to help. For example, people should be more inclined to help when it comes at a low cost (e.g. donating someone else's resources), or when the benefits to one's reputation are large (such as naming a university building though a large donation). Evidence indicates that people advocate more generous resource distribution principles in public than in private—especially if they respect and value the members of their audience (Austin, 1980). By carefully balancing the impulse to uphold one's moral reputation with the temptation to avoid associated costs, a person can maximize personal benefits while maintaining the goodwill of interaction partners.

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[12] In both the evolutionary sense and the everyday practical sense.

If moral identity serves as one's personal copy of a moral reputation, the fact that it held no explanatory power in the current experiments while maintaining predictive validity in Aquino and Reed's (2002; 2003; 2007) studies may make sense. Most of their dependent measures were hypothetical self reports: what people *would* donate, or *would like to think of themselves as donating*, given the appropriate opportunity. But as the saying goes, talk is cheap, and we cannot be sure that participants with high moral identity scores actually would have donated in reality.

Critics may be quick to point out that Aquino and Reed have documented a relationship between moral identity scores and actual helping behaviour. In Study 6 of their 2002 paper, Aquino and Reed found that internalization scores predicted donations to the food bank, even after susceptibility to normative influence was controlled. However, they did not assess the value of maintaining a reputation as a moral individual or the cost of this donation in terms of maintaining that reputation. Because participants were high school students, it is possible that many did not personally obtain the donated goods—rather, they borrowed off their parents. For these participants, the cost of the donation to the self was low (they simply had to bring an item to school), yet the act of donating would permit them to bolster their identity—and therefore reputation—as a moral individual. Therefore, people more concerned about their moral reputation may have donated more. In contrast, the participants in the current study personally suffered the cost of lost resources, making the act of bolstering their reputation more expensive. Under these circumstances, people with a strong moral identity may not have felt the need to uphold their reputation.

Participants also donated actual resources in a study reported by Reed and Aquino (2003). Reed and Aquino found that moral identity scores predicted donations to distant out-groups, consistent with the expanding circle of moral regard hypothesis. However, in this study everyone received a fixed sum to be distributed between two charity targets. There was no opportunity to keep money for oneself and so the cost of donating was universally low. Therefore, participants may have taken the low-cost opportunity to demonstrate their generosity toward distant targets as a means of reinforcing their moral identity. Future work should examine cost to self as a boundary condition for when moral identity will predict helping behaviour and when it will not.

Scope of Justice

The predictions derived from scope of justice theory went unsupported in the current work. Although perceptions of the relevance of justice did predict donations in Study 1, they did not do so directly. Rather, mediation analyses indicated that justice predicted donations only because perceptions that justice was relevant were related to perceptions of deservingess. When donations were simultaneously regressed on both justice and deservingness, only the latter retained predictive utility. In the second study, despite the addition of a second measure involving the golden rule, justice again failed to consistently predict helping behaviour. The importance of justice positively predicted the amount of time participants were willing to volunteer (once the golden rule was controlled for in a stepwise regression), but the relevance of the golden rule negatively predicted volunteerism.

If anything, participants indicated that justice remained of moderate importance for all charity targets under all circumstances. Justice was considered slightly less

imporant for the prison in Study 1, and remained invariant across charities in Study 2. These findings are inconsistent with Opotow's (e.g. 1990) theorizing on the scope of justice. It is not true that justice is limited in scope but always leads to helping behaviour when it is percieved to be relevant. Rather, different targets are perceived to deserve different treatment—but they always receive what percievers consider to be fair and just. Justice applies universally.

An Alternative Explanation: Compensatory vs. Enlightenment Models

The findings in Study 1 are vulnerable to an alternative interpretation: that participants applied different models of responsibility to each charity and donated in accordance with the model rather than deservingness per se. This possibility was rendered less plausible by the findings in Study 2.

Brickman and his colleagues (1982) outlined four models that perceivers may apply when ascribing responsibility to other people for causing and solving problems. In the *moral model*, people in need are considered responsible for both creating the problem and engineering its solution (e.g., an addicted junkie). In contrast, the *medical model* depicts individuals as responsible for neither the problem nor its solution (e.g., a cancer patient). The remaining two models involve a mix of attributions. According to the *enlightenment model*, actors are viewed as responsible for creating their problems but incapable of solving them (e.g., a rebellious child). Help must arrive in the form of a dominant social organization (such as a reform school) responsible for reforming errant individuals. The *compensatory model* depicts individuals as striving to solve problems that they themselves did not cause (e.g., women fighting for equality). Under this model,

aid may be given in order to provide the disadvantaged with more resources for their own empowerment.

If participants viewed different targets under the rubric of different models, they might have been differentially willing to help. Brickman and colleagues argued that targets viewed under the moral model, for example, will not be helped because helping is not seen as appropriate. Under the moral model, internal defects (such as lack of willpower) are viewed as the cause of a problem, implying that the solution must also come from within the defective person. External help will not avail change and so will be avoided. In contrast, targets viewed under the medical model will be helped, because the locus of the problem is external to the individual (e.g., a disease) and therefore external intervention will be effective.

Analyses indicated that participants viewed prisoners as more responsible for both creating and improving upon their circumstances than children, suggesting that prisoners were viewed under the rubric of the moral model, whereas children were viewed under the medical model (a model-level analysis confirmed this interpretation; few participants employed either the empowerment or enlightenment model). Thus, if participants gave more to the school overall compared to the prison, the model participants used to evaluate each charity would have confounded our results. However, there was no main effect of target on helping, but rather an interaction of prime x target. As the prime did not affect which model participants employed, there is no clear evidence that the pattern of helping behaviour documented here can be explained by which model was activated or relevant.

Moreover, participants rated the prison library as more capable of using donations than the school library—inconsistent with the tenets of the moral model, which suggests

that those suffering must fight their own battle without aid from others. Since participants did not give less to the prison overall, differences in the extent to which charities could use donations did not appear to dictate helping decisions. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that neither ratings of responsibility for creating, nor improving upon circumstances, nor ability to use donations, correlated with actual donations. Rather, participants appeared to vary in terms of how much power they believed charities to have. Ratings of responsibility for creating one's circumstances correlated positively with responsibility for improving them, $r = .58, p < .001$, and with capability of using donations, $r = .28, p < .05$.

Limitations

Like all scientific endeavors, the current work suffers from a number of limitations. First, the sample consisted largely of Canadian university students, rendering it fairly uniform in terms of age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, education level, political leaning, and cultural background. It remains to be seen whether the findings hold in more diverse populations. In particular, it would be interesting to examine the role that political convictions play regarding attitudes toward prisoners. It may be that conservative individuals regard prisoners as particularly undeserving (see Skitka, & Tetlock, 1993). Similarly, participant age may affect attitudes toward educational institutions. It is possible that older participants may feel more removed from university and school libraries and therefore regard them as less deserving; however, older participants may regard university and school libraries as more deserving because they have children who attend these institutions or they may better understand the role that libraries play in society.

The current work is also limited by the focus on donations to charity. Although charitable donations comprise an important arena for helping behaviour, helping occurs in many other contexts: mundane helping when someone drops a pen, more costly helping when one's friend needs help moving, through to heroic helping in the extreme circumstances of war. It may be that constructs such as moral identity or scope of justice have greater impact in situations other than donating to charity. For example, moral identity may affect whether or not someone defines a mundane context as an opportunity to help others. Similarly, the scope of justice might be more clearly delineated under combat conditions, where justice may be viewed as applicable to one's comrades, but not to civilians caught in the conflict.

Finally, the current work may be vulnerable to criticism that it compares "apples to oranges," in that moral identity is an individual-difference variable, whereas deservingness and the relevance of justice are both target variables. The fact that all three variables were pitted against one another in multiple regression analyses as predictors of helping behaviour may be misleading because the design may highlight target features more than those of the self, making those features appear more powerful than otherwise may be the case. In our defense, the current work used moral identity as a predictor in the same way as Aquino and Reed (2002; 2003; 2007). The fact that they obtained significant results suggest that moral identity can be used as a predictor of helping behaviour. Likewise, the fact that Olson et al. (in press) have successfully submitted both deservingness and scope of justice variables to regression analyses predicting helping attitudes suggests that these variables may also be used as legitimate predictors. Nonetheless, no work (to the author's knowledge) has pitted all three variables against

one another as independent predictors. Therefore, it may be that the pattern of findings was influenced by the experimental context rather than the power of the constructs themselves. Future work should seek to remedy this possibility.

Implications

Each of the three theories considered here posits a different mechanism to explain why people sometimes fail to help others. Consequently, each theory points toward a different mechanism that might be employed to increase helping. According to Reed and Aquino's moral identity theory (2002; 2003), psychologists seeking to increase helping should find ways to situationally activate moral identity or increase dispositional levels of moral identity. Doing so would purportedly expand decision-makers' circles of moral regard, leading them to consider even distant others with moral regard—thereby motivating help toward those others. According to Opotow (1994), psychologists seeking to increase helping toward should find ways of expanding the scope of justice. This could involve manipulating the degree to which participants see justice to be relevant when dealing with a target, leading them to consider others' interests and welfare—thereby motivating help towards them. Finally, Olson et al. (in press) would argue that the best way to increase helping would be to make others appear more deserving of aid. This goal could be achieved by increasing the perception that target groups possess favourable characteristics. Decision-makers who perceive a target as deserving would be motivated to provide help.

The current work provides some insight into which of these strategies may prove most effective at increasing helping behaviour. Findings suggest that manipulating moral identity would have less impact on aid than advertised: neither individual differences in

moral identity nor situational primes uniformly increased helping behaviour. Similarly,

the current findings suggest that manipulating the scope of justice would also be less than

effective. Whether justice was perceived to be relevant or not had no consistent,

independent relation to donations, suggesting that expanding justice boundaries would

not result in an increase in helping behaviour. Fortunately, the current findings appear

more hopeful when one considers the role of deservingness. Participants tended to help

targets they perceived to deserve help rather than those who did not. This suggests that

people would be willing to help a target to the extent that they perceive it deserves help.

Perhaps, then, by increasing the perceived deservingness of a target, psychologists might

be able to spur aid toward that target. Future work might pinpoint practical methods of

doing so, leading to an increase in help towards the many downtrodden persons on our

planet.

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Appendix A: Instructions and Charity Descriptions for Donation Decision Task

Now that you have learned about the charities in this study, you will be asked to make a decision. The experimenter will give you $7 (in loonies). You may donate as many as you like to any or all of the charities and keep as many as you like for yourself. This decision is totally anonymous—no one will be able to link your decision to your personal information. The money you donate will be distributed to the charity (charities) you choose at the end of the study.

Western Libraries Fund, University of Western Ontario

Western Libraries serve the students, faculty, and alumni of the University of Western Ontario, providing an array of resources to enhance student learning. The libraries support all areas of study, providing the foundation for excellence in teaching and research. A strong library enhances Western's ability to attract top faculty, researchers, and students in today's highly competitive environment.

Post secondary libraries require a partnership between public and private financial support, because public funding alone is inadequate. Donors make all the difference, allowing Western Libraries to build upon their reputation as one of the leading research-intensive libraries in Canada. A gift to the endowed Western Libraries Fund will help Western Libraries to upgrade technology in order to better serve their users now and into the future.

The Inmate Library Fund, Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center, London Ontario

The Inmate Library is used by the inmates and officers of the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center in London. The Inmate Library is called upon to provide materials necessary for inmates to enhance their education so they can obtain steady employment

and reintegrate into society after their release. It forms an essential part of the foundation

for their future.

The current reality of correctional institution funding limits the availability of

public funds for library facilities. It is up to private donors if the Inmate Library is to

build upon its history of aiding inmates to enhance their education. A gift to the Inmate

Library Fund will allow Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center to continue serving the needs

of inmates as they strive to change their lives.

School Library, Riverpark Elementary School, London Ontario

The School Library at Riverpark Elementary School serves students in

Kindergarten and Grades 1-6 as they learn to read and explore the world around them. It

offers a variety of fiction and nonfiction books to entice children to read and provides

reference materials for their assignments. There are also some computer facilities that

students use to look up books and learn online.

Primary Education in Ontario is chronically underfunded, particularly schools in

lower-income areas like Riverpark. They must rely substantially on the generosity of

private donors in order to provide high quality educational materials for students. Giving

to the School Library at Riverpark Elementary will help maintain and improve the quality

of materials students can use as they move through primary school to become the citizens

of tomorrow.

Appendix B: Charity Ratings and Responsibility Attributions

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding

Riverpark Elementary School Library [Inmate Library at Elgin-Middlesex Detention

Center] in London Ontario:

1= strongly disagree

2= disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = strongly agree

1. Riverpark Elementary School Library [The Inmate Library at Elgin-Middlesex

Detention Center] deserves financial support.

2. Riverpark Elementary School Library provides services that are useful and important.

3. Riverpark Elementary School Library needs financial support.

4. Riverpark Elementary School Library provides services to people who are similar to

me.

5. I care about Riverpark Elementary School Library and the children who use it.

6. In deciding how much money to donate to Riverpark Elementary School Library, it is

important to consider what is fair and just for the users of the library.

7. The "Golden Rule" is to treat others the way you would wish to be treated. This rule

applies to how we should treat children who use the Riverpark Elementary School

Library.

8. Children who use the Riverpark Elementary School Library are responsible for

creating their own circumstances in which they need help from donors.

9. Children who use the Riverpark Elementary School Library are responsible for improving their own circumstances so that they no longer need to rely on help from donors.

10. Children who use the Riverpark Elementary School Library are capable of making effective use of donations to the library.

Appendix C: Moral Attributions of Charities and Self

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding [yourself] [people who use the Inmate Library at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center in London Ontario] [people who use the Riverpark Elementary School Library in London Ontario]:

1= strongly disagree

2= disagree

3 = neither agree nor disagree

4 = agree

5 = strongly agree

1. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are [Children who use the Riverpark Elementary School Library are] [I am] selfish.*

2. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are deceptive.*

3. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are considerate.

4. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are loyal.

5. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are corrupt.*

6. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are respectful.

7. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are scheming.*

8. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are humble.

9. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are responsible.

10. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are treacherous.*

11. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are empathic.

12. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are honourable.

13. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are reliable.

14. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are shifty.*

15. Inmates at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Center are trustworthy.

Note: * Indicates a reversed item.

Appendix D: Ethics Approval, Study 1

Department of Psychology The University of Western Ontario
Room 7418 Social Sciences Centre,
London, ON, Canada N6A 5C1
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Western

Use of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice

Review Number	07 05 09	Approval Date	07 05 31
Principal Investigator	Jim Olson/Paul Conway	End Date	07 08 31
Protocol Title	Handwriting and attitudes		
Sponsor	n/a		

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Department of Psychology Research Ethics Board (PREB) has granted expedited ethics approval to the above named research study on the date noted above.

The PREB is a sub-REB of The University of Western Ontario's Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario. (See Office of Research Ethics web site: http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics/)

This approval shall remain valid until end date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the University's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the PREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of research assistant, telephone number etc). Subjects must receive a copy of the information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the PREB:
a) changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of the study;
b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that are both serious and unexpected;
c) new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.

If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to the PREB for approval.

Members of the PREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the PREB.

Clive Seligman Ph.D.

Chair, Psychology Expedited Research Ethics Board (PREB)

The other members of the 2006-2007 PREB are: Mike Atkinson, Bertram Gawronski, Rick Goffin, Jim Olson, and Matthew Maxwell-Smith

Appendix E: Ethics Approval, Study 2

Department of Psychology The University of Western Ontario
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Western

Use of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice

Review Number	08 03 11	Approval Date	08 03 11
Principal Investigator	Jim Olson/Paul Conway	End Date	08 04 30
Protocol Title	Description detail, survey of local institutions, and comedy ratings		
Sponsor	n/a		

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Department of Psychology Research Ethics Board (PREB) has granted expedited ethics approval to the above named research study on the date noted above.

The PREB is a sub-REB of The University of Western Ontario's Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario. (See Office of Research Ethics web site: http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics/)

This approval shall remain valid until end date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the University's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the PREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of research assistant, telephone number etc). Subjects must receive a copy of the information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the PREB:
a) changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of the study;
b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that are both serious and unexpected;
c) new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.

If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to the PREB for approval.

Members of the PREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the PREB.

Clive Seligman Ph.D.

Chair, Psychology Expedited Research Ethics Board (PREB)

The other members of the 2007-2008 PREB are: Mike Atkinson, David Dozois, Bill Fisher and Matthew Maxwell-Smith