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DOWN THE DARK HALL, UP THE STAIRS: The Uncanny, Nostalgia, and Uneasy Dwelling

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the house as a simultaneous location of ease and dis-ease, familiarity and estrangement. With particular focus on architectural motifs and domestic space, it is proposed that there is potential for a compatible or even complementary relationship between a critical or reflective nostalgia and the Freudian uncanny. It is suggested that these two concepts function as potential doubles, and that through their pairing, a nuanced analytic space for examining the contradictions inherent in the homely and unhomely, as well as in notions of memory, is forged. This conceptual framework is further explored in relation to artistic practice, through focused analysis of Gregor Schneider's *Haus ur* and Toba Khedoori's architectural drawings.

Keywords: uncanny, unheimlich, nostalgia, memory, drawing, sculpture, domestic, house, home, architecture, Svetlana Boym, Gregor Schneider, Toba Khedoori, Elspeth Probyn, Sigmund Freud, Anthony Vidler.

For my family.

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Drawing from analyses of both memory and architecture, the following thesis examines the potential for the house—specifically that of the domestic interior—to function as a simultaneous location and motif of both potent nostalgia and uncanny estrangement. Focusing on the dynamic intersections of memory and imagination, time and space, desire and longing, and architectural structure and visual image, I suggest that the house provides an affective and physical palimpsest that can mirror and be intimately tied to the mechanisms of individual memory and narrative.

The argument posed by this thesis emphasizes the ability of nostalgia to function in a way that is distinct from other forms of recollection. Within the first chapter, I outline the historical construction of nostalgia, and explore nostalgia's relationship to affective experiences of longing and desire. This exploration acknowledges and makes use of discourse that presents nostalgia and the nostalgic impulse as frequently regressive and/or conservative. However, I align my position on and understanding of nostalgia with that posed by contemporary cultural theorists who emphasize its potential to function as a productive, progressive, and/or creative engagement with the past. Specifically, I make use of the theoretical framework provided by Svetlana Boym's concept of a "reflective" nostalgia, and a notion of a "critical" nostalgia developed in the work of Elspeth Probyn, and extended in that of Sinead McDermott. In contrast to a more regressive type/form of nostalgia, which acts as a refuge for an idealized, static and ultimately impossible past, Boym's "reflective" and Probyn's "critical" nostalgia make

room for the gaps and disparities which are inherent to the process of memory, and problematize assumptions regarding teleological origins.

The suggestion of a form of memory and longing that emphasizes and embraces an "estrangement" from an idealized past, in favour of one which is dynamic and potentially multiple, opens a (metaphoric) door to the alignment of "critical" nostalgia to the Freudian concept of the uncanny—or, adopting the terminology of architectural theorist Anthony Vidler, the *un-homely*. Chapter II presents the uncanny as a psychological phenomenon of estrangement, founded in understandings of memory and repression. Furthermore, the uncanny is characterized by a somewhat ambiguous relationship to/between notions of the domestic, desire, and anxiety that extends beyond a simple experience of mere defamiliarization. Making use of oft-noted etymological and thematic links between homesickness (*heimweh*) and the uncanny (*unheimlich*), as well as an extension of the uncanny tropes of the double and interchangeability, Chapter II argues that nostalgia can at times be viewed to function within or as double of the uncanny.

Chapters III and IV serve as distinct but related case studies that extend and illustrate the pairing of nostalgia and the uncanny introduced within the first two sections of the thesis. As such, I focus on two artists whose works I posit as engaging with a simultaneously nostalgic and uncanny interpretation and exploration of architecture and domestic space. To be sure, the works and approaches of Gregor Schneider and Toba Khedoori are extremely different. However, I identify within the two artists a mode of

inquiry that hinges upon the motif of the house and an excavation—both metaphoric and literal—of dwelling and memory. It is my hope that the disparity between each artist's approach will illuminate the potential of the fusing of uncanny/nostalgia as mode of critical inquiry that extends beyond an application to a specific form of artistic practice.

Chapter III examines Schneider's decades-long project of spatial duplication and reconfigurement of his family home in *Haus ur* (1985-2002), which serves as an exhaustive exploration into domestic space presented as both malleable physical structure and site of identity. Unknown past events appear to have influenced (or, perhaps more accurately, infused) the present space; the viewer is left to deduce their own relationship to anxiety-inducing space. Schneider's works offer an intriguing overlap between the domestic interior as lived space and as mental space, and blur the distinction between a remembered reality and what could be termed a "remembered" imaginary.

These themes echo within Chapter IV, although on a more subtle scale. The work of Toba Khedoori plays upon a less obvious spatial estrangement. While making explicit reference to the familiar vestiges of domesticity, the actual domestic perspectival 'space' of Khedoori's drawings remains undefined and unframed. Despite their elusiveness, visually evocative of a fragment of thought or memory, the drawings reference a more concrete passage of time. Khedoori's signature use of wax, a traditional preservative, captures studio detritus during the pieces' production, thus suspending evidence of their performative duration. Here, as with Schneider's, the work is suggestive of a spatial temporality specific to the piece's production and viewing.

At first glance, it appears that the uncanny is a fear of the familiar, whereas nostalgia is a longing for it; yet for a nostalgic, the lost home and the home abroad often appear haunted. Restorative nostalgics don't acknowledge the uncanny and terrifying aspects of what was once homey. Reflective nostalgics see everywhere the imperfect mirror images of home, and try to cohabit with doubles and ghosts.

Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 251.

CHAPTER I. Of Longing, Lack, and Home-sickness: Forms of Nostalgia

Within cultural criticism and theory, the concept of nostalgia has frequently been critiqued as regressive. As a mode of memory intimately associated with the lure of the domestic sphere and the idea of "home-sickness," nostalgia has tended to be linked to conservative cultural and political tendencies, anti-progressiveness, and maladjustment—be it a maladjustment to modern life (Boym 54), or to adult life (Starobinski and Kemp 102). However, while some theorists have argued that nostalgia's emphasis on longing for things past translates into counterproductive politics, in the following I explore how affective investments in the nostalgic also pry open psychic and emotive spaces that offer potential for more active and critical engagements with the past. Indeed, while it is difficult to separate nostalgia from a larger theme of memory, nostalgia will nevertheless be understood to function in a way that underlines its distinctiveness from other forms of

recollection—providing the potential for the experience of imaginative, and even playful, ways of critically examining and engaging with the past.

The Home-sick, the Nostalgic

At the outset, a clarification of terminology and some historical grounding is appropriate. In relative contrast to contemporary understanding and use of the term, nostalgia has its etymological roots as a descriptor of what was understood to be physiological disease. Early descriptions of concerns surrounding what was labeled (or, rather, diagnosed) as nostalgia focused upon cases of disabling homesickness. Cultural theorist Jean Starobinksi identifies the origin of the term nostalgia—or *heimweh*—in the work of Johannes Hofer (84). A young student in 1688, Hofer's medical dissertation attempted to explain and give name to what appeared to be a specific form of melancholy, a malady of 'home-sickness' that afflicted Swiss mercenary soldiers in exile and, significantly, incapacitated troops (Starobinski 84). Despite Hofer's initial assessment of an ailment of *national* character, the affliction was—not surprisingly—in no way limited to the Swiss. Instead, diagnosis of the condition became increasingly and problematically prevalent during subsequent decades, seeming in part to correspond to widespread shifts in mass mobilization (Bullard 188). Significantly, in this early classification of nostalgia as medical-pathological, there was potential for remedy (Hutcheon 1). In returning home—or even with the promise of the return home—the ailment would (in theory) dissipate.

Over time, however, nostalgia semantically slipped from its original medical meaning to one substantially more generalized. As the credibility of strictly physiological explanations began to wane, nostalgia was increasingly attached to literary and psychological concepts. As theorist Linda Hutcheon notes, this broadening of meaning and increased attention from psychological study altered understandings of nostalgia in a number of significant ways by the nineteenth century. Importantly, nostalgia became much less a physical, curable condition than a *psychological* condition—pushing it firmly into the realm of the psychically internalized (Hutcheon 1). In part a result of these generalizing shifts, nostalgia took on a cultural meaning that placed it as a condition firmly related to the temporal, as opposed to its previous association with a longing for the spatial.

The relationship between nostalgia—or, more precisely, homesickness—and time was early noted by Immanuel Kant, who, while exploring the power of imagination, wrote of a disappointment frequently experienced by those who did in fact return home (54). Noting that interest appeared to lie less in the return to *place* than in the return to *time* (ie: that of childhood or youth), for Kant the possibility of true or full return remained, ultimately, an impossibility (54). The remembered place is structured temporally, and a temporal loss can never be recovered. However, perhaps a further (and more contemporary) distinction can be made, underlining the role of time in determining the affect of place. In an exploration of 'maladies' that he feels uniquely relate or belong to the places in which we live, architectural theorist Georges Teysott distinguishes between nostalgia and homesickness. Proposing that the understanding of everyday life

(the everyday) is dependent upon its consideration through two main categories—that of the spatial and that of the temporal—Teysott suggests that while homesickness relates to space or place (ie: the yearning for home), nostalgia can more accurately be understood as a longing for the past, for time (46).

Similarly, the concept of nostalgia which literary theorist and critic Susan Stewart endorses is one which exists as a form of constructed narrative about the past. However, the narrative of nostalgia is one which presents and is specific to an experience of *lack* felt in the present. More than just the missing of things or times past, nostalgia is "the desire for desire"; as such, it is, according to Stewart, an inauthentic sadness—inauthentic in its somewhat ironic recognition of the impossibility of returning or regaining (23). In fact, nostalgia is dependent upon the past's irretrievability for its appeal—in distanced memory, things which have been passed can be idealized, sanitized, and crystallized in what is often harsh contrast to the pressure and complexity of the present. "By the narrative process of nostalgic reconstruction," observes Stewart (23), "the present is denied and the past takes on an authenticity of being, an authenticity which, ironically, it can achieve only through narrative. Nostalgia is a sadness without an object." The past takes on an aura of "authenticity" (as problematic as the term may be) that cannot be replicated in the present. As such, the present is denied immediacy and authenticity, as immediacy is located in the past, which is absent. Yet as suggested above, because nostalgia does not take part in *lived* experience, it cannot be truly authentic.

Furthermore, as Stewart indicates, nostalgia is profoundly ideological, as "the past it seeks has never existed except as narrative. ... Hostile to history and its invisible origins, and yet longing for an impossibly pure context of lived experience at a place of origin, nostalgia wears a distinctly utopian face ... that turns toward a future-past, a past which has only ideological reality" (23). Hutcheon places this approach to the past in Bakhtinian terms, relating the operation of nostalgia to the concept of historical inversion, in which an ideal past is presented as a future ideal to be sought after. As such, that which is absent or lacking in the "lived now" is projected into the past (Hutcheon 1). Again, the past of nostalgia is one of imagination and idealization, distanced in time and reality from the present. To a certain degree, this separates nostalgia from what would otherwise be a logical and direct connection to memory or remembering. Instead, in this view nostalgia forges a simultaneous relationship with *forgetting*.

In his exploration of the meaning/aesthetics of ruin and nothingness, philosopher Dylan Trigg approaches the topic of nostalgia from the perspective of a past that can become unfamiliar and detached. According to Trigg, "if lived places contain memory, then by returning to them the likely result is estrangement and not affirmation. As the reality of the original memory becomes an object external to us, so the spectral quality of past experience becomes lucid. This realization that space and place fall from certainty coincides with the experience of nostalgia" (55). In other words, and not dissimilarly to Hutcheon and Stewart, Trigg sets up the relationship of spatial experience as dependent upon time; place does not necessarily determine our sense of time, but instead, specific

qualities of place *are determined* by time (Trigg 57). The stability of place is thus established as a fiction, albeit a sometimes useful one.

Interestingly, Trigg too draws attention to the appeal of nostalgia by emphasizing its relationship to desire. "Looking back on the past with melancholy pleasure, knowing that any return is impossible, induces happiness but also gloom. *Nostalgie de la boue* ["yearning for mud"] suggests that even a past marked by dissension and discomfort is preferable to a present, the appeal of which is its passing" (58). Like Stewart, Trigg identifies a pervasive pull in the frustrating unattainability of the retrieval of time and the nostalgic object, and indicates the importance of its appeal:

> Already plans are made when the return to remembered place fails to align with the memory of that place. Instead of conceding to the mutability of place, the nostalgic shifts the ideal so that its location remains hidden but not annihilated. In this way, memory refuses to exhaust itself of desire. What lacks in the incomplete present is compensated by the absent past. In compensating for disenchantment, nostalgia discloses its mournful character. (58)

The unattainability of the retrieval of time is particularly pertinent when dealing with built form. For Susan Stewart, the result of *idealized* built space can be found in the example of the miniature model and its specific relationship to an ambiguous concept of *longing*. As physical representation of (or signifier for) a signified that is otherwise unavailable, the function of the miniature can be viewed as its ability to bring an event or context "to life" in a way that is uniquely tied to narratives of nostalgia. Stewart links

miniature form in Western culture to themes of excursion and transcendence—to the escape and play function commonly found in amusement parks, historical reconstructions, and models (60). While the immediate "purpose" of varying categories/types of miniature may vary, the miniature frequently presents a link to a specific reality which does not exist (and, in fact, likely has not existed). Out of these examples, Stewart positions historical re-creations as perhaps the most blatant example of the ways in which traditional model miniatures present spatial transcendence. By bringing historical events to immediacy (or "to life" in the present), understanding of the event and its causality or context through time and history is lost—placing the locus of the miniature firmly in the realm of the nostalgic (Stewart 60). This is not to suggest, however, that the nostalgic is limited to the strictly historical model. Instead, Stewart points to an "interiority" characteristic of the way that most, if not all, miniatures function (61). This interiority refers to the internal space and time of the perceiving individual.

As cultural anthropologist Kathleen Stewart notes, this process of engagement with the nostalgic miniature and collection has the potential to also exaggerate an "enclosure of style": static and distilled characterization based on meticulous but potentially simplified and essentialized representation (230). As a result, and as Susan Stewart alludes to as a possibility as well, the places and spaces illustrated through miniature act as a refuge for an idealized past (or, in fact, present). According to Kathleen Stewart, "each 'moment' [is] meant as a monument against instability, randomness, and vulgarity, but also crushed under the weight of a visual code that has been given the power to capture particular times, places, identities, and ways of life in a

single image... Meaning hemorrhages out at the rate of a flood, leaving in its wake a cultural landscape littered with signs" ("Nostalgia" 230).

While Kathleen Stewart sets up the nostalgic as a potentially dangerous (and counterproductive) way of producing and re-producing meaning, Trigg, although less polemically, in his own explorations also acknowledges that the present is endemically formed and familiarized through understandings of the past (Trigg 59). In both cases, nostalgia is set up as a way of presenting or re-membering that hinges upon lack and absence in the distanced "now." It is perhaps for this reason that nostalgia has been viewed as regressive by numerous cultural theorists and commentators.

If memory is the means by which past and present can be connected and constructed, nostalgia at first might appear to present a model for complacency. This is not a position without foundation. In fact, feminist scholar Gayle Greene identifies nostalgia as antithetical to remembering. In part drawing from the etymology of nostalgia—the Greek *nostos*, meaning 'to return home,' and *algos*, meaning 'pain' (Starobinski 85)—Greene posits that nostalgia can be distinguished from what she terms "more productive forms of remembering" (297). Whereas "memory may look back in order to move forward and transform disabling fictions to enabling fictions, altering our relation to the present and the future," nostalgia, to Greene, "is a forgetting, merely regressive" (*Ibid.*). In addition to pointing to nostalgia's potential relation to the act of forgetting, implicit within Greene's description is an assertion of agency (ie: as transformative, connective, forward moving, etc.) attributed to the act of 're-membering,'

in opposition to the passivity or retreat of nostalgia (298). In contrast, nostalgia is presented as an unquestioning form of recollection, characterized by the acceptance of a "re-written" past in which the unpleasantness, conflict, and struggle of the everyday is obscured and forgotten (297).

A Critical Nostalgia

However, as cultural theorist Sinead McDermott indicates, the potential for nostalgia to act outside of the simply escapist does—or, at least, could—exist. In an attempt to counter assumptions regarding the concept of nostalgia as contrary to memory, McDermott presents nostalgia as in need of recuperation as a "politically valid strategy" (389). Directly challenging Greene's conception of nostalgia as a conservative tendency, McDermott refuses to distinguish between memory and nostalgia based on assumptions regarding disparate potential agency (390). Instead, nostalgia is unburdened of any *necessarily* complacent impulses, and is presented as having the potential to work against static relationships to the past. This argument draws from the work of three contemporary theorists—Leo Spitzer, Elspeth Probyn, and Svetlana Boym—who suggest strategies through which the nostalgic narrative might offer progressive potential. While McDermott illustrates these potential strategies by focusing specifically upon literary examples that question gender assumptions and memory, I would like to argue that the possibility for nostalgia to function in a similarly expansive way within a visual field is not precluded.

Drawing first from recent work of Leo Spitzer, McDermott presents nostalgia as a possible means or mode of defiance, whereby the (or *a*) past might be recalled not as a form of regressive replication of an idyllic past, but instead as an insistence of a forgotten or erased history (400). Perhaps more pertinent, however, is McDermott's citation of the perspectives found in the work of gender and cultural theorist Elspeth Probyn. Within her exploration of childhood and nostalgia within queer literature, Probyn advocates less a *recuperative* approach to memory and the past, favouring instead a more *critical* nostalgia. In this construction of nostalgic recollection, the emphasis is placed upon the potential for a non-linear, dynamic relationship with/to the past, in which an assumed alignment of the past with the present is productively problematized (Probyn 111-116). Rather than functioning as a way of restoring or recuperating a cohesive or explanatory past, the present is unsettled—or, at the very least, the path *to* the present is unsettled (McDermott 403). Instead of presenting only a reassuring, idyllic narrative, by bringing the past into the present the irretrievability of the past becomes the more apparent.

This approach to nostalgia and memory echoes and complements the work of cultural theorist Svetlana Boym, whom McDermott also identifies as a key figure in debates regarding the potential for a more creative and productive understanding of nostalgia (McDermott 402). In her exploration of nostalgia and the nostalgic, Boym outlines an important distinction between forms of nostalgia—what she terms "restorative" and "reflective" nostalgias. Significantly, however, Boym's restorative and reflective nostalgias are not set up as specific typologies, but rather as "tendencies [or] ways of giving shape and meaning to longing"—tendencies that characterize "one's

relationship to the past, to the imagined community, to home, to one's own self-perception" (41).

As an acknowledgement of the possibility of the nostalgic impulse to manifest itself in the reconstruction of an idealized version of what ostensibly remains a fictional past, *restorative* nostalgia maintains a problematic relationship to longing and loss. Characterized by an emphasis on *nostos,* or "the return home," it manifests itself or is demonstrated through a simultaneous emphasis on the longing for reconstruction and for replication in totality, in/through which disparities between the past and present are erased—or perhaps more accurately, covered over (Boym 41). The restorative nostalgic thus frequently does not recognize herself as strictly nostalgic; instead, the relationship to the imagined past is understood as a relationship to past as truth, lending restorative nostalgia particular potency in the process and manifestation of historical myth-making. As such, Boym identifies a particular correlation between extreme forms of restorative nostalgia and politically and culturally motivated violence under ostensible goals of "restored" homeland or aggressive nationalism (43). In any case, even less extreme forms of restorative nostalgia eschew signs of historical time; according to Boym:

> What drives restorative nostalgia is not the sentiment of distance and longing but rather the anxiety about those who draw attention to historical incongruities between past and present and thus question the wholeness and continuity of the restored tradition. ... Restoration signifies a return to the original status, to the prelapsarian moment. The past for the restorative nostalgic is a value for the present; the past is not a duration but a perfect snapshot. Moreover, the past is not

supposed to reveal any signs of decay; it has to be freshly painted in its "original image" and remain eternally young. (43, 49)

However, as an alternative to the limitations of restorative nostalgia, the act of *reflective* nostalgia is less an attempt to reconstruct a pleasant and *impossible* past, or to return to the lost site of home, than it is a way of dwelling in an "imperfect process of remembrance" (McDermott 402). As such, and with the removal of emphasis upon total reconstruction, reflective nostalgia presents a more critical nostalgic stance, in and through which the past can be viewed as fragmented, susceptible (and receptive) to reconfiguration, and as existing in complicated but not unproductive concert with longing and desire. In fact, Boym emphasizes reflective nostalgia's intimate association with *algos*—or pain—in longing and loss, and *imperfect* processes of remembrance (41). By questioning continuity and wholeness, reflective longing is presented as not necessarily oppositional to critical thinking. According to Boym, unlike restorative nostalgia, reflective nostalgia carries with it the potential for humour and for irony that is inclusive and that undermines, productively, nostalgia's associations with attempted recovery of an "absolute truth" (49). Instead, reflective nostalgia is aware of and *revels* in "the gap between identity and resemblance" (Boym 50).

In fact, it is the intimate relationship to the fragmentary and the flexible that perhaps most clearly defines reflective nostalgia—particularly in reference to its understanding of time and memory. Indeed, for Boym, within reflective nostalgia "the past is not made in the image of the present, or seen as forboding of some present

disaster; rather the past opens up multitude of potentialities, nonteleological possibilities of historic development" (50). What makes Boym's (and Probyn's) analysis interesting and relevant is the emphasis upon dislocation and disorientation, and on the possibility of simultaneity. By designating such dislocation as productive, an opportunity arises for engagement with "the difference of the past," in which the possibility for an alternate future is made available (McDermott 405). As such, nostalgia—specifically, *reflective* nostalgia—is presented as a means through which the "past [might] be retrieved differently: not as a single line leading from then to now but instead as a cluster of memories, desires, and possibilities that do not always lead in the direction of the present" (*Ibid*).

While an uncritical subscription to a *necessarily* progressive potential within nostalgia is equally as problematic as an understanding of nostalgia as *necessarily* regressive, by framing the past in terms of a relationship to longing, a fragmented and potentially non-linear path to the present provides particularly interesting and relevant possibilities regarding the exploration of the nature of memory.

[It is] that class of the frightening which lead back to what is known of old and long familiar .. "everything... that ought to have remained secret and hidden that has come to light."

Freud, "The Uncanny," (1-3).

CHAPTER II. Home and the (Un)homely

The idea or concept of the uncanny can be situated within Western culture well before Freud's essay, "Das Unheimlich" (translated as "The Uncanny"), which was published in 1919. Essentially—or, perhaps more accurately, aesthetically—an outgrowth of ideas related to the Romantic sublime as theorized by both Burke and Kant, the uncanny functioned as a (somewhat lesser) subdivision of larger themes of terror and fear. A popular motif within mid- to late-19th century literature in particular, the uncanny had found a home in literary exploration of themes of insecurity, alien presence, and disturbance in the works of E.T.A Hoffman and Edgar Allan Poe, among others. However, the uncanny as presented through literature (the literary uncanny) was typified by characteristics that also closely related to the strangeness and the 'weird' that corresponded with modern anxieties (Vidler 6). According to architectural theorist Anthony Vidler, the uncanny acted as a "domesticated version of absolute terror, to be experienced in the comfort of the home" (3), but was at least in part born out of an increasing unease at individual estrangement and alienation of modern (frequently urban) life.

As film historian Susan E. Linville asserts, Sigmund Freud's work of 1919 nevertheless acts as a canonical opening in the exploration of the uncanny as a psychological phenomenon (16). In fact, it is arguably not until the twentieth century, with Freud's publication of "The Uncanny," that the concept became a *significant* part of broader aesthetic and cultural theory (Linville 26). This is not to say, however, that Freud's approach did not acknowledge the historical relationship of the uncanny to theories of the sublime, nor is it to say that Freud's exploration ignored the concept's relationship to literary genres. Indeed, his examination of the uncanny, which identifies the *unheimlich* as a universal intra-psychic experience, hinges upon key examples of both literary and aesthetic provenance. As such, the work takes on tones more akin to literary theory/criticism than strict or more formal psychoanalytic theory. As Vidler points out, however, in spite of—or, perhaps more accurately, in addition to—the focus on the study of the uncanny as literary genre and aesthetic sensation, the ostensible motivation for Freud's focus on the uncanny appears to be a larger, socio-psychoanalytic interest (6).

Freud's "The Uncanny" begins by acknowledging earlier work on the subject by Ernst Jentsch, who published his own medico-psychological study of the uncanny in 1906. For both Freud and Jentsch, the uncanny is a specific form of anxiety "related to certain phenomena in real life, and to certain motives in art, especially in fantastic literature" (Masschelein 1). While Jentsch's "On the Psychology of the Uncanny" is identified as a "fertile, but not exhaustive paper" by Freud (1), Freud nevertheless takes issue with the study's assertion of a relationship between the uncanny and the novel or unfamiliar. Having privileged the role of a subject's "intellectual uncertainty" within his

understanding of the uncanny, for Jentsch the key factor for the frightening experience of the uncanny is the new. As such, the uncanny "would always, as it were, be something one does not know one's way about in. The better orientated in his environment a person is, the less readily will he get the impression of something uncanny in regard to the objects and events in it" (Freud 2-3). For Jentsch, the uncanny appears to be, or be precipitated by, the unfamiliar.

For Freud, it is the designation of the novel and the new as the *determining* factor for the experience of uncanniness that resonates least convincingly, and against which he bases much of the ensuing text of "The Uncanny." Instead, and in contrast to Jentsch, Freud's uncanny becomes intrinsically linked to what is decidedly not new: the familiar, the (once) known. According to Freud, "the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar" (2). In order to support this construction of the concept of uncanniness, Freud delves into a linguistic and etymological analysis of the usage of two key terms: the *heimlich*, and the *unheimlich,* which can be loosely translated as the German equivalents of the English *canny* and *uncanny*, or, alternately, *homely* and *unhomely*.

As literary theorist Anneleen Masschelein points out, Freud's etymological research, which consists of the reproduction of numerous dictionary entries, effectively underlines the difficulty and duality of the terms heimlich and unheimlich. Unheimlich is, most obviously, "the negation of the adjective Heimlich, derived from the semantic core of Heim, home" (Masschelein 2). As such, and as Freud indicates, " '*unheimlich*' is

obviously the opposite of '*heimlich*' ['homely'] ... the opposite of what is familiar; and we are tempted to conclude that what is 'uncanny' is frightening precisely because it is *not* known and familiar" (Freud 2). Such an assertion would seem, initially, to lend support to Jentsch's designation of the uncanny as hinging upon the new and the unfamiliar. However, and importantly, hiemlich has at least *two* meanings—the first, as noted, most clearly related to "home" (through its root *heim*), as the domestic, familiar, or intimate; the second, however, deviates to a metaphoric sense of the hidden, secret, clandestine, furtive (Masschelein 2). Indeed, heimlich appears to be a word whose meaning "develops in the direction of ambivalence" (Freud 7), looping back on itself until it meets the meaning of its opposite.

This slow "unfolding" of the homely into the unhomely (Vidler 25) fits well into Freud's designation of the uncanny as hinging upon the once-familiar. The idea of the "homely" or "home" on which the ambivalence is based is tellingly ambiguous within the translations explored: a site of coziness and comfort, yet also secret, threatening and strange (Linville 16). Indeed, Freud takes particular interest in a phrase by F.W.J. Schelling, the late eighteenth-century German philosopher, which underlines the familiar-become-strange: "unheimlich is that what ought to have remained secret and hidden, but which nonetheless has come to light" (as cited in Freud 6). Rather than emerging from the new, the unknown, the as-not-yet-experienced, as formulated by Jenstch, the uncanny for Freud becomes intrinsically linked to what has already been, to what is already known—to what *re*-emerges as estranged and unfamiliar even in its familiarity. That which appears to arrive from the outside in fact is presented as "the return of what we

ourselves have placed there—something drawn from a repository of suppressed or repressed memories or fantasies" (Burgin 95). As such, the "return of what ought to have remained hidden" serves as the basis on which Freud introduces the significance of the idea of the "repressed" to the experience and catalysts of the uncanny. Indeed, Freud presents the uncanny experience as occurring "either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed" (25).

Interestingly, while the English counterparts of heimlich and unheimlich, *canny* and *uncanny,* do not necessarily present the same linkage to the concept of "home," they nevertheless also enact an ambivalence and synonymity (ie: in that they mean clever and *too* clever). The uncanny, for Freud, begins to be about potentially frightening interchangeablilty; as Linville puts it, "all bespeak anxieties about identity boundaries, including the division between past and present, living and dead, and self and (m)other" (16). Providing aesthetic expression to anxiety based in such a range of distinctions (or indistinctions), the uncanny encompasses a doubleness that extends beyond the seeming duality of the term "(un)heimlich," and serves to challenge the limits of the self.

Indeed, among these interchangeabilities that the uncanny offers, Freud introduces the relationship of the individual to the home—in particular, that home of intrauterine experience. Having presented the origin of the terrifying and potentially uncanny fantasy or fear of being buried alive as, in reality, a transformation of the (pre)birth experience, Freud sets up a parallel to the idea of "homesickness" (21). Thus

the slipperiness within the concept of the uncanny, as demonstrated through the examination of the "unheimlich," provides an interesting and perhaps unexpected link to nostalgia and the nostalgic impulse. In fact, Freud equates the longing for "home" as the longing for the (pre)natal home: "whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is familiar to me, I've been here before', we may interpret the place as being his mother" (22). The idea of longing for the prenatal offers an intriguing image of the uncanny as the replication or "double" of nostalgia.

While a more thorough exploration of the significance of the Oedipal may be set aside within the context of this chapter, the relationship between the idea of the home, the uncanny, and the nostalgic is potentially productive. As previously noted, the word "nostalgia" is derived from the Greek *nostos* (a return home) and *algos* (pain)—indicating a pain or sickness of and for the home—and relates strongly to the German-rooted *Heimweh.* The importance of longing, of the desire for return, in relation to larger themes of repression, proves interesting in association to the *unheimlich,* which itself complicates assumptions regarding the domestic (and, within Freud, the maternal). Susan Linville elaborates on the correlation between the domestic, desire, and repression, identifying within Freud's uncanny the paradoxical state in which "the origin of the larger deadly terror produced by the uncanny is the memory of the domestic and maternal and even of ... a certain 'home-sickness'" (Linville 28). The nostalgia, or *heimweh*, thus does not function straightforwardly within (or, perhaps, as) the uncanny, but instead the

desire appears to be circumvented and problematized through mechanisms of repression. The desired is simultaneously conjured and concealed.

The Creative Uncanny

It is this simultaneity which Linville claims to be a defining characteristic of the uncanny, and which she presents as having creative potential. Although her own work with the uncanny focuses primarily on its relation to gender and nostalgia, it is within Freud's reflections that Linville locates an uncanny that can stand between binarisms, and that can either support or subvert the reflective nostalgic. For Linville, this results in a mechanism that can reinforce or creatively reinterpret particular expectations/ interpretations of gender and history (29-30). Such an adaptation of the uncanny hinges upon the role of memory and the process of reimagining the past creatively. As Vidler points out, the uncanny as a mechanism for innovative reinterpretation and defamiliarization has long been identified among the avant-gardes, who "press[ed] the themes of the double, the automat, and derealization into service as symptoms of posthistorical existence" (8). However, what makes Linville's construction of the uncanny's potential structure and use interesting is its relationship to a disturbance and estrangement that is not necessarily ahistorical. Such a construction of the uncanny will prove useful in my understanding of its role in the work of Gregor Schneider, to which I now turn.

You are walking through the landscape when you suddenly get the feeling that there could have been a house there, because there is still a pavement there or because there are different odd trees that you wouldn't normally find there. That is when you get the strongest sense of a time shift. But it would be a disaster if we really picked up on that sort of thing. We would constantly be running into walls

Gregor Schneider, "I never throw anything away, I just go on...," Gregor Schneider, (68).

CHAPTER III. Dwelling Disturbance: Gregor Schneider's *Haus ur*

It is perhaps not surprising that the idea of the uncanny has been closely linked to that of architectural space, given the relationship between the *homely* and the *unhomely*, the *heimlich* and *unheimlech*. Indeed, even Jentsch's discussion of the uncanny took on a decidedly spatial characteristic, in its focus on orientation. However, Freud insists that the uncanny has little to do with the space itself. While it has found a metaphoric home in architecture, the uncanny "can [not] be provoked by any particular spatial conformation; it is, in its aesthetic dimension, a representation of a mental state of projection that precisely elides the boundaries of the real and the unreal in order to provoke a disturbing ambiguity, a slippage between waking and dreaming" (Vidler 11).

And yet, the idea of an "architectural" uncanny continues to bear weight—perhaps not because particular buildings are themselves possessed of easily definable uncanny traits, but instead because they are invested with what Vidler identifies as the

cultural and spatial characteristics *emblematic* of the uncanny, and thereby act as one of the available "cultural signs of estrangement for particular periods" (11). It is within the space between the cultural and the spatial that the work of installation artist Gregor Schneider can perhaps best be examined.



Fig. 3.1.
Haus u r
12 Unterheydener Strass, Rheydt
1985-present

The façade of the residence at 12 Unterheydener Strasse belies the interior which has so thoroughly occupied Schneider—or which, perhaps more accurately, Schneider has so thoroughly occupied. In fact, the core of Schneider's *Haus ur* encases a labyrinth-like space characterized by dislocation, fragmentation, repetition, and deliberate confusion. If one is to trust the mythology surrounding the site—which is not a venture without some risk, given the artist's predilection for the creation of narrative that challenges distinctions between "truth" and fabrication—the building that has become *Haus ur* was once an ordinary residential home. Located near the periphery of the German industrial town of Rheydt, *Haus ur* borders land connected to a local lead-processing plant, which is in part owned by Schneider's family (Kittelman 11). As a

result of this proximity to the processing plant, the structure was at one point decided unfit for residence, condemned, and left uninhabited. Empty, and of questionable provenance, the structure was nevertheless deemed suitable for a provisional studio and eventual living space for a then-teenaged Schneider who, in part due to familial ties to the property, was given permission to occupy the abandoned house.



Fig. 3.2.
Schneider at work
Haus ur, Rheydt

Over a period of approximately fifteen years, starting in 1985, Schneider turned the structure into *Haus ur* through an endless exercise of obsessive construction and reconstruction. Significantly, Schneider's manipulation of *Haus ur* has evolved without the presence of a formal plan, seemingly the result of intuitive response to specific space and a dedication to a process that privileges ideas of both the meditative and the experiential. Nevertheless, the alterations that he has implemented since his early studio days are extensive and far reaching, unexpected and frequently disconcerting. Within the structure, assumptions regarding rules of

architectural construction are warped and contested: doors open upon doors, or perhaps to nothing at all; windows cannot be assumed to open onto exterior views, and instead are equally likely to open upon repetitive versions of themselves; staircases lead to dead ends and blankness; walls buttress walls or conceal former openings; openings lead not necessarily to rooms, but to cramped hidden passages, gaps, and in-between spaces.[1] Entire rooms have been barricaded, sealed with seamless walls that visually reveal nothing of what lies beyond; others silently shift underfoot, unbeknownst to the viewer. The result places *Haus ur* somewhere closer to the realm of labyrinth than typical domestic space.

Indeed, the idea of a rational, fixed space is challenged throughout *Haus ur*. Schneider admits that he himself is no longer able to confidently identify the boundaries of his own construction relative to the original structure (Bronfen 42-43). The extent of his incessant building and reconfiguration has effectively removed the possibility of ever documenting in full what has happened in and to the house without significant and invasive excavation, to the point that even the use of X-ray would render a limited view, due to Schneider's use of lead as a signature building and insulating material (Schneider and Loock 35). This is in keeping, however, with the importance Schneider places upon the act of "doing," of making the work. As he has stated, the "work is really about the fact that I am always starting work again.... I am always making, I always have to be making.... The work doesn't exist in my head" (Schneider and Loock 36).

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[1] Gregor Schneider's extensive documentation of his work—which includes tours of *Haus ur* recorded by hand-held video—acts as a key source for my own understanding of his practice and pieces. While inarguably offering a mediated experience of the work, the video documentation nevertheless provides an important counterpoint to written, second-hand description, and can be found at <http://www.gregorschneider.de/biography.php?id=video>.

As such, *Haus ur* remains a work that is primarily predicated upon the importance of (actual) spatial experience. As a lived space, *Haus ur* blurs boundaries between the life and the work of the artist, although the distinction is not one that Schneider finds particularly interesting. However, Schneider does privilege the idea of space and place as influencing experience and perception.



Fig. 3.3.
ur 6, Wunderkammer (Curiosity Cabinet), *Haus ur*, Rheydt
1989

Significantly, there is a pervasive and uneasy relationship between what Schneider presents as (personal) history and the idea of memory and repression in the physical structure and configuration of the house. Rooms such as *Curiosity Cabinet, Haus Ur* (1989) house family photographs in various stages of disintegration tucked between windows, remaining out of view to all but the most persistent and/or thorough explorers of *Haus ur*. Other rooms more literally incorporate relics of the past into the construction, as photographs and objects are thoroughly plastered directly into the

wall, leaving only Schneider and, perhaps, the house itself with full knowledge of what lies beneath. Pieces of furniture and entire rooms have been sequestered or entombed, left as invisible fragments of past events and persons connected to Schneider and the house.

For Schneider, however, these are *traces*, and such fragments resonate on a number of levels, in a way that is not entirely dissimilar to his understanding of the structure itself. As curator Paul Schimmel notes, Schneider's fascination with what he considers to be the residue and the potential psychical effect of long-past events, particularly those of violence or passion, is evidenced in how Schneider describes *Haus ur*—as if the rooms of the house themselves recall the people and occurrences that once resided within them (Schimmel 107). Similarly, the fragments that Schneider locates throughout his reconfigured structure, be they hidden family photographs, or less readily interpreted symbolic plaster stones incorporated in walls, are understood by the artist to weigh heavily in the visitor's direct experience of the house on a subconscious level. As Elisabeth Bronfen emphasizes, "all marks of a past reality lie behind the walls Schneider has built to continually change the face of the rooms he inhabits.... Though seemingly empty these [rooms] are actually full with traces that can be perceived once one privileges what is not there over and against a normality of vision that embraces the surface phenomena of everyday vision" (Bronfen 40).

As such, *Haus ur* could be seen to function well within the idea of psychic dislocation discussed by Freud within his exploration of the uncanny. This is acutely the

case in the frequent evocation of the uncanny in its capacity as a descriptor of that which was once familiar, but which through a process of repression has been rendered a forgotten or concealed knowledge that is only available under specific circumstances. Within Schneider's construction of *Haus*, the past has been, often literally, buried and concealed. However, not only have mementos been incorporated into the structure, but the structure itself functions as a site of revealing and concealing.

As has been established, the uncanny has found particular place in the theorization of architecture—and an evocative home within the idea of "house." A favourite trope of Gothic and early-19th century literature, the "spectral" or haunted house served as a recurrent locus of uncanny disturbance. The potency of this relationship between the home and the uncanny can perhaps best be understood by underlining the profound effect of the destabilization of expectations of domestic space—particularly expectations of comfort, security, and protection. This reading leads neatly back to the work of Schneider, which makes much use of the disturbance of spatial and architectural expectation. From an anonymous, unthreatening entrance, the explorer of *Haus ur* gradually encounters spaces of increasing incongruity. Furthermore, by rendering what should be a fixed structure instead shifting and mobile, full of secrets and abysses, Schneider endows *Haus ur* with a foreboding atmosphere that negates domesticity, and that is closely linked to the structure's unnavigability.

It is thus possible to draw a connection to the formulation of the uncanny as defined through Jentsch—most strongly in his emphasis on lack of "orientation" for the experience of the uncanny (as cited in Freud 2). Dis-orientation does certainly act as a potent aspect of *Haus ur.* Not only is the disturbance of spatial and architectural expectation the result of "misplaced" structural form, making futile navigation based on assumptions of how domestic interior space normally unfolds, but Schneider leads visitors into rooms such as *The Kafeezimmer* that imperceptibly rotate on an axis, making entrances and exits to spaces physically shift and alter. However, while Jentsch's explanation of the uncanny partially accounts for the spatial disorientation that occurs within *Haus ur*, alone it does not fully acknowledge the importance of repetition and doubling within the rooms that form the disconcerting interior of the structure.



Fig. 3.4.
Ur 10, Kaffeezimmer (Coffee Room)
Haus ur, Rheydt
1993

In his account of his own tour through the spaces of *Haus ur*, Daniel Birnbaum describes the experience as one characterized by the feeling of potential entrapment, that "behind the window there is a second window. There seems to be no outside. Everything leads back to the house" (Birnbaum 70). The doubling, dividing, and interchanging that so intrigued Freud, and which is so central to the interior of *Haus ur,* is further emphasized within and appears to be the motivation behind a secondary practice—*Totes Haus ur*—which moves outside of the strict boundaries of Schneider's house site.

The making of *Totes Haus ur* extends the process of replication, and involves the re-making (mainly through the imperfect process of memory) of select rooms from *Haus ur* in other locations. Significantly, Schneider views the result from the identical *Totes Haus ur* as somewhat different from the original *Haus ur*, in part due to the inherent artificiality of the end result, and the dissociation of the work from its original context. The extent of this is underlined in the titling of the duplicate rooms—known as Dead (*Totes).* Indeed, Schneider is known to refer to these rooms as "dead limbs" of the main structure (Bishop 44). However, the end effect is nevertheless one of convincing facsimile that calls into question notions of experience and place (Schneider and Loock 54). This is true also of subsequent works, such as *Die Familie Schneider (2004),* in which two identical houses were refitted with similarly identical interiors and inhabitants (Reust 188). Within both the *Totes Haus ur* installations and the interior mirrored and duplicate rooms within *Haus ur*, one is perpetually unsure of the nature of their

location—rooms that seem to hold a sense of normalcy, or of familiarity, are disturbed through an inability of the viewer to fully and specifically *place* herself within it.

While the physical experience of the viewer within the space (or the doubled/duplicated space of *Totes Haus ur*) acts as one point of access to *Haus ur*, it is important to note that Schneider also exposes the interior of the structure through documentation. Photographs of the work in progress reveal moments of the brick by brick construction and reconstruction of the *Haus*. Video documentation—consisting of hand-held footage—takes a somewhat rambling voyage to the centre of the structure, providing an experience for the viewer that perhaps more closely resembles an actual encounter with the *Haus* than photographic documentation alone could afford. Schneider is seldom physically visible in the movement of the camera through the spaces between and below the internally constructed rooms. Nevertheless, he reveals not only the normally exhibited rooms, but, in what appears to be a very labour-intensive process of access, the spaces *between*—which seem as important as the main spaces more frequently encountered by the viewer. However, even in the process of revealing, there is never a point in which the viewer feels that the structure is fully uncovered, fully known. Indeed, the negative spaces behind boarded walls, the scraped out interiors, the tunnels that do not divulge their end, all contribute to a general sense of insecurity, and to a sense of potential consumption by the structure.

Dwelling in Uneasy Nostalgia

Significantly, however, there is something about Schneider's *Haus* that moves beyond merely inducing anxiety. The defamiliarizing effect of the structure—key to the understanding of *Haus ur* as uncanny—is significant also to the linking of Schneider's practice to a critical nostalgic inquiry. Indeed, through Schneider's incessant rebuilding, he is arguably destabilizing more than simply structural walls and boundaries.

To consider Schneider's *Haus ur* a project strongly related to nostalgia or a nostalgic impulse might at first encounter seem surprising or ill-considered. Indeed, the uncanny qualities of the structure initially appear at odds with the trappings frequently associated with nostalgia and nostalgic projects. While a relationship to the past is inarguably an important part of Schneider's sculptural and installation practice, as is a focus upon the house/home-site, as a location meant to inspire or represent a straightforward or easily understood homesickness or yearning, *Haus ur* presents an admittedly dissonant example.

However, as earlier noted, nostalgia itself bears consideration as more than a single construction. As Svetlana Boym outlines in her discussion of nostalgia as divisible into at least two tendencies (if not absolute types), nostalgia need not only function as or dwell within "an emphasis on *nostos* [thereby proposing] to rebuild the lost home and patch up the memory gaps" (41). A nostalgic relationship to the past can, and often does, manifest as a longing for a fully reconstructed and restored time passed, in which the "ache of temporal distance and displacement" (44) is alleviated and an idea of wholeness

is underlined (i.e., a *restorative* nostalgia). However, Boym's concept of a *reflective* nostalgia is considerably more applicable to Schneider's project than that of a restorative nostalgia.

Indeed, *Haus ur* could be viewed as quite sympathetic to Boym's definition of reflective nostalgia as dwelling in "*algia*, in longing and loss, the imperfect process of remembrance [lingering] on ruins, the patina of time and history" (44). Most certainly, *Haus ur* is not a nostalgic space which acts as an uncomplicated refuge for a strictly idealized past—as has been proposed within Susan Stewart's construct of nostalgia (60-61), and is echoed within the work of Kathleen Stewart (230). Where *Haus ur* does not offer a cohesive, singular, or—importantly—*static* view of its own or its residents' past, it does present a decidedly complex, almost durational, relationship to ruin, change, and trace. This is key, for as Boym illustrates, a reflective and self-aware form of nostalgia embraces a relationship to time and memory that does not reside in the deliberate ignoring of the gaps and disparities between the past and present (49).

While cultural theorist Elisabeth Bronfen's discussion of Schneider's *Haus ur* focuses on the more evident reading of the structure as uncanny or *unheimlich*, her analysis nevertheless arguably offers an interesting—and perhaps unintentional—opening to a reading of the structure and project through the lens of an uncanny that is compatible with a critical or reflective nostalgia. Bronfen presents her understanding of *Haus ur* as related, at least in part, to a deliberate conflation of the house as structure and building project, and the concept or idea of "crypt" and "encryption" (33-58). Drawing from the

work of both Freud and the more recent theories of psychologists Maria Torok and Nicolas Abraham, Bronfen establishes the psychological unconscious as analogous to a crypt—preserving knowledge only indirectly accessible and which, distorted through repression, represents itself as phantom or the phantasmagoric (Bronfen 40-42). It is here, according to Bronfen, that a core intent of *Haus ur* can be identified:

> Withheld, obliterated or occluded knowledge is at the heart of [Schneider's] aesthetic project. [The] point in keeping a secret is, furthermore, to visualize that there is a gap in knowledge, so as to keep the spectator's own epistemological desire, and coterminous with it, his or her imaginative reconstruction of the aesthetic project they have partaken in. (42)

As is noted by Bronfen, and has been noted above, an analogy between Schneider's incessant and layered building and the idea of repressed or clandestine knowledge can easily be made, and strongly relates to the idea of the uncanny. Indeed, the metaphor of "crypt" in relation to Schneider's uncanny space holds great appeal. However, what is particularly interesting within Bronfen's exploration is the emphasis on "gaps in knowledge" and creative reinterpretation in relation to memory and space. Bronfen suggests that the anxiety evoked through the experience of *Haus ur* relates strongly to the viewer's—and perhaps even the builder's—destabilization of familiarity, and on a larger scale, locatedness within the world (48). In this reading of *Haus ur*, Bronfen underlines the possibility of *dislocation* offering a productive and important opportunity, in that (in relation to the *unheimlich)* "as we relinquish the illusion that our

existence has ... foundations at all, we actually gain ... grounding by incessantly negotiating how we inhabit the world" (53).

Here Bronfen appears to see Schneider's project as essentially "recuperative"; the experiential qualities of the structure, coupled with the process of building, create a simultaneous situation in which the resulting anxiety is not meant to be fully overcome, but instead acts as a recognition of the unattainability of a full/true state of "being at home." While an act of building as dwelling *is* intended, according to Bronfen, "as an antidote to the uncanny anxiety emerging from an unbearable proximity of the inherent instability of existence in that it allows the human subject to take explicit notice of his or her individual way of being in the world" (57), Bronfen also maintains that *Haus ur* remains equally tied to a recognition that one:

> must learn to dwell—in our psychic apparatus, in our bodies and in our phenomenological environments, albeit in a manner that emphasizes the destability of all habitation. While the former—an acknowledgment of 'Unheimlichkeit'—finds expression in a materialization of existential anxiety, the latter—a practice of dwelling—comes to be articulated in built spaces that are explicitly marked as transitory sites. (55-56)

Such a position appears to echo the importance placed upon the acceptance of destability and the unattainability of past "wholeness" that remains key to Boym's distinction between and identification of multiple nostalgic forms. As such, I maintain that a strong correlation exists between the gesture of Schneider's uncanny construction,

and the idea of a critical or *reflective* nostalgia. Although Bronfen emphasizes what she identifies as a "recuperative" quality to the work, I suggest that within her analysis the term "recuperative" could arguably be viewed as interchangeable with "reflective." For, in fact, the quality that Bronfen appears to find recuperative (namely, a state of self-awareness achieved through an attempt to come to terms with uncanny anxiety) appears allied with an idea of *reflection*, or knowingness, that applies to Boym's reflectivity. Whereas Bronfen emphasizes a relationship to the past, the unseen, and the repressed as manifest through the uncanny, leading to a more productive position of "being-in-the-world" through an acceptance of dislocation, the critical or reflective nostalgic position also provides a relationship to the past that equally embraces the potential of dislocation and fragmentation.

Indeed, the interest and strategies at work within Schneider's project in relation to concealed and unconcealed knowledge, past events, and trace certainly seem more attuned to the key qualities of Boym's take on reflective nostalgia, and, additionally, McDermott's or Probyn's concepts of a critical nostalgia, than one of a strictly restorative or recuperative nature. The nostalgic impulse at play within Schneider's *Haus ur* remains one which does not present itself as at odds with the decidedly—and intentionally—uncanny traits of the structure. Instead, the exploration and "construction" of a past through the *Haus ur* remains importantly problematized through its uncanniness. As such, the nostalgic idea of dwelling through, if not in, the past presented through the structure remains dynamic—multiple and existing between the concealed and unconcealed.

In the end, drawing is rooted in the dematerialized space of the image, privileging more the world of shadows than the world of appearances, confirming the possibility and use of language that, albeit in a fragile way, leaves open an interstitial passage through which the imaginary may realize itself as an image.

Jean Fisher, "On Drawing,"

The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and Act, (223).

Chapter IV. Surface Disturbance and Architectural Interiority: Toba Khedoori's Architectural Drawings

If the work of Gregor Schneider can be understood to invite readings that productively fuse the uncanny and the nostalgic potential of domestic space, it may seem unlikely that work as dissimilar to Schneider's as that of Toba Khedoori offers similar and related possibilities—an analytic leap that I do, in fact, endeavor to make. This is not, however, to suggest that the end results or approaches to artistic practice are in any way identical. In many ways, the spare, two-dimensional pieces that have been the main output of Khedoori's recent practice seem at the opposite end of an artistic and affective spectrum. Where Schneider's work is claustrophobic, Khedoori's is seemingly invested with light and airy qualities; where Schneider's installations and sculptural works are experientially immersive, Khedoori's works are seemingly reserved in both execution and installation, and available to the viewer within the relative distanced safety of the gallery setting. Indeed, Khedoori's architecturally themed works on paper present a counterpoint to the physical and psychological demands of Schneider's constructions and installations.

Khedoori's approach to the execution of her work is integral to the understanding and visual effect of the final pieces, as her pictorial/architectural works function somewhere in a realm between drawing and painting. Making use of vast stretches of paper (layered in multiple strips which often measure upward of 6 feet in length) (Stange 258), Khedoori prepares the surface of the sheets well in advance of any initial marks. Having been laid out on the studio floor, the paper is covered with a layer of melted synthetic wax, which is poured and worked by hand over the full area of the sheets. Only once the immense, "blank"[2] expanse has been fully primed and coated does Khedoori begin to draw an image or series of images upon, and into, the surface. Then, having scored the drawings into the wax with seemingly painstaking precision, the image is carefully painted (or, perhaps more accurately, "coloured") in oil (Stange 258). The resulting images of disembodied, highly detailed architectural "fragments" hovering in a viscous, indeterminate field are generally stapled directly to the gallery wall, allowing the paper to subtly undulate under its own waxy weight.

And yet, despite the contrast in working style and output from that of Schneider—the more marked distinction between production and exhibition, the obvious adoption of two-dimensional representation rather than three-dimensional manipulation and construction—Khedoori's drawings of ascetic architectural interiors and spaces nevertheless share with Schneider's work a preoccupation with residue and recovery.

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[2] While a white ground is most frequently associated with Khedoori's work, more recent pieces, such as *Untitled (Dark Windows)* (2006) and *Untitled (Black Fireplace)* (2006), also make use of a black ground. The process of execution, however, is similarly dependent upon the use of a wax-covered surface.

A Fragmentary Disturbance

While the architectural elements within Khedoori's works may not exist as "ruins" precisely within the construct that Vidler outlines, the drawings nevertheless present a visual world that is simultaneously fragmented and redolent of ghostly traces and disturbances. Indeed, despite the meticulous execution of the drawings, there remains much that (deliberately) undermines a straightforward understanding of the works.

If the depicted structures maintain a narrative silence, slow to offer insight into what may have happened in or to the architectural fragments and ruins, the same cannot be said of the surface of the drawings. While the "blank" field of the background may initially evoke associations to sublime and unsullied expanses, upon closer inspection, it maintains little of such pristine space. Neither is it the reserve typical of Western drawing; its whiteness, while certainly part of the image, is not so in "a neutral sense—an area without qualities, perceptually present but conceptually absent" (Bryson 151). Instead, the waxy surface acts as a collector of detritus, presenting a palimpsest of fingerprints, paw-prints, dust, fingernails, and hair. The disturbance of the surface is thus not only indicative of the passage of time—a time of the studio, and of daily process, rather than simply the time of the illustrated architectural fragment—but also provides a disconcerting connection to the bodily fragment.

The preservative properties of the wax blur the boundaries between the depicted and the *collected*, the spatial and the corporeal, the concealed and the unconcealed. The

residue trapped within the surface of the page in itself should not necessarily be disturbing—in fact, it could be argued that there is something very heimlich, very *homely*, about the debris accumulated. The wax carries a literal function and effect of preserving the surface of the work itself, even while indexing the time that passes during and subsequent to its completion. While admittedly tracing the flow of time within the studio—and, to a lesser extent, after—the surface fragments are nevertheless those that could be associated with a broader definition of daily life less specifically tied to artistic production. The traces of hand, shoe, and paw are equally accumulable within the domestic space, and mark common sources of wear and decay within a typical dwelling. And yet, encountered upon the vertical surface of the drawing, in conversation with the drawn architectural fragment, the debris seems less about daily dust, and more about ghostly trace of moments and peoples passed. Indeed, the actual debris provides an uncanny double to the architectural fragment (or perhaps vice versa), and a bodily counterpart to architectural decay.

The idea of the fragment and the fragmentary as concept and descriptor can be closely associated to both the material and conceptual aspects of the pieces. The fragmentary nature of the surface detritus of the works could be seen as acting in concert with the often truncated and "fragmented" depictions of architectural motifs.

As Anthony Vidler suggests, the usage of the fragment within history of modern art:

> has had a double signification. As a reminder of the past once whole but now fractured and broken, as a demonstration of the implacable effects of time and the ravages of nature, it has taken on the connotations of nostalgia and melancholy, even of history itself. As an incomplete piece of a potentially complete whole, it has pointed toward a possible world of harmony in the future, a utopia, perhaps, that it both represents and constructs. (Warped Space 150)

Although the relevance and symbolic role of the fragment has varied significantly, its ability to be invested, or at least associated, with nostalgic and historicist tendencies and theorization bears consideration. Indeed, the fragment's potential to represent an idealized and easily understood past is intimately related to both its removal from an original, fuller context, and its distance from the time and reality of the present, allowing what is lacking the "lived now" to be projected into it (Hutcheon 1).

This is, in many respects, not dissimilar to Susan Stewart's theorization of the nostalgic, in which the concept of longing can be intimately tied to an idealized built space. As discussed earlier, Stewart, in focusing upon miniature reconstructions and models, points to such depictions as bringing past or historical events to an immediacy which necessarily forfeits an understanding of the event, place, or context *within* time or history (60). Stewart suggests that this analysis can be extended toward the understanding of the functioning of most miniatures, emphasizing the role the internal

space and time of the perceiving individual plays in relation to the nostalgic miniature: "this compressed time of interiority tends to hypostatize the interiority of the subject that consumes it in that it marks the invention of 'private time.' In other words, miniature time transcends the duration of everyday life in such a way as to create an interior temporality of the subject" (66).



Fig. 4.1
Untitled (house)
1996
Oil paint and wax on paper
11x16 ft.

Despite the significant scale of the work, it is arguable that the images nevertheless hold congruence with the idea of the nostalgic miniature as discussed by Stewart. In the most obvious sense, and has earlier been indicated, the architectural

imagery is often dwarfed in relation to the overall blank surface, appearing small in comparison. This could be viewed as particularly pertinent to *Untitled, (house)* (1996) (Fig. 4.1 and 4.2), which resembles a doll's house in its revealing of a normally private and enclosed interior, and has the most literal relationship to the types of miniatures referenced within Stewart's text. As Stewart notes, "the miniature, linked to nostalgic versions of childhood and history, presents a diminutive, and thereby manipulatable version of experience, a version which is domesticated and protected from contamination" (69). However, the range of depicted architectural motifs and spaces seemingly also relate well in terms of what has been described by many as their stilled or "hermetic" qualities (Richard 1; Vidler, Warped Space 152). Perhaps not unlike the "enclosure of style" to which cultural anthropologist Kathleen Stewart refers within her own criticism of nostalgia (230), Khedoori's architectural fragments are in many ways simplified, distilled to the basic signs and recognizable forms that could stand in for a substitutable specific. The images lack "particularization," or a specific referent in/to time and place.

However, any assumed relationship between Khedoori's works and a designation of "miniature" is not without contradiction. While the image itself may appear small in relation to both the viewer (ie: bodily) and the overall dimensions of the paper support, the work as a whole frequently dwarfs the viewer. Therefore, on experiential grounds, an argument for Khedoori's works as functioning as "monument" could be equally made.



Fig. 4.2
Detail of *Untitled (house)*
1996

Indeed, a simple application of "fragment" and "miniature" as key descriptive terms for Khedoori's architectural motifs remains somewhat problematic, as does a simple association of the work with more conservative or restorative forms of nostalgia. Interestingly, despite acknowledging a strong temptation to discuss the work in relation to historical notions and models of the fragment, Vidler cautions against categorizing Khedoori's drawings as making a historicist use of fragments per se (Warped Space 152). Indeed, Vidler is by no means unaware of an appealing symmetry between Khedoori's work and the theorization of the fragment at various historical moments—be it a Romantic notion of the fragment as dually "complete in itself, yet pointed to ... the irretrievable past and unknowable future"; a modernist attempt to free itself from

preoccupation with the past by focusing instead on an idea of incompletion as holding a potential for the future; or a postmodern return to the fragment as a "nostalgic and romanticized [version] of a past, both lost and retrieved through the reassimilation of pieces of history into a present that ... ironizes their effect and banalizes their form" (Warped Space 150-151).



Fig. 4.3
Detail of *Untitled (stairs)*
2000
Oil and wax on paper
12x16 ft

However, Vidler argues that the isolated sections of architecture on which Khedoori focuses much of her oeuvre in fact *cannot* be accurately defined as strictly historicist fragments (Warped Space 152). Although such a platform might at first seem

counter-intuitive, given his discussion outlined above, Vidler nevertheless supports this assertion based on an identification of three key and interrelated characteristics of Khedoori's work in relation to the idea of the fragment: the scale of the work, the lack of specific context within the work, and the absence of narrative (or, rather, the absence of the potential for integration into narrative) (Warped Space 152). Each of these elements could together be viewed as negating the categorization of Khedoori's drawings as necessarily playing out the more conservative tendencies of a strictly restorative or regressive nostalgia.

In invoking scale as one of the key points of debate, Vidler is not, in fact, contesting the relationship between image and support, but rather is recognizing the lack of *particularity* in the image's scale/dimension, particularly in the absence of human referent. According to Vidler, "the fragment demands a particular scale, whether small or vast" (Warped Space 152). While an indication of scale can, of course, be achieved in absence of a depiction of actual human form, the lack of perspectival context or specificity surrounding the images precludes identification of the objects as miniature, or alternately, as giant. This lack of context further contributes to Vidler's problematization of Khedoori's use of "fragment." Vidler asserts that without "a possible and easily visualized site from which one might imagine [the fragment] was initially snatched, and to which it might, just as easily, be envisioned returning" (ibid. 152), Khedoori's architectural pieces negate what Vidler views to be a requisite understanding of both—or either—their original condition or their fully restored potential. Similarly, and somewhat relatedly, the removal of site and context factors into what Vidler identifies as a



Fig. 4.4.
Untitled (rooms)
2001
Oil and wax on paper
12x12 ft.

"hermetic sealing" *against* the easily symbolic or the allegorical potential of Khedoori's imagery (ibid.). Indeed, the isolation of architectural fragments such as that of *Untitled (house),* but also those of *Unitled (stairs)* (2000) (Fig. 4.3.) and *Untitled (rooms)* (2001) (Fig. 4.4.) complicate any expectation of a larger or explanatory narrative of the sort referred to by Susan Stewart—namely, that of a nostalgic reconstruction or recuperation (23). There is no story of past use, of abandonment, of destructive effect of time or nature; in Vidler's understanding, then, and as earlier alluded to, Khedoori's architectural elements are and can be neither past ideals nor contemporary ruins (152). Instead,

Khedoori's works exist outside of any easy designation as necessarily restorative or recuperative in nature.

Time and Imagery

Thus, while Khedoori's drawings *do* present a relationship to an irretrievable past, the relationship is not an easy one. Instead, the architectural fragments, if not, in fact, the material entirety of the drawings, resist the production of the cohesive wholeness that Svetlana Boym identifies as a defining characteristic of a restorative nostalgia (43). However, it is the resistance to an uncomplicated relationship to time and memory which contributes to Khedoori's drawings' ability to be considered within the realm of both a more reflective or critical nostalgia—a nostalgia which resides in the acknowledgment of gaps and disparities, the creative potential of a self-aware imperfect process of remembrance (Boyme 49)—as well as the uncanny.

While the imagery with which Khedoori chooses to work varies considerably, it can at the same time be argued that key themes are nevertheless identifiable from within her most frequent subject matter. As is pointed out by critic Raimar Stange, *much* of Khedoori's material focuses upon spatial and architectural motifs, despite the fact that other subjects have at times also been explored (258). Meticulously drawn, and generally isolated within a relatively small portion of a white expanse, Khedoori's readily identifiable architectural elements, explosions, geological formations, trains, and boats hover within an indeterminate waxy surface. Often existing in isolation, occasionally doubled, or, in other instances, repeated in deliberate multiples across the papers, the

images generally present a surface impression of illusory or perspectival space, in which shadow and light seemingly correspond to expectation. However, and as is particularly evident within Khedoori's drawings of architectural motifs, the images exist without context, without landscape, without more than a minimal indicator of relationship to ground.

In part, what initially makes Khedoori's use of such motifs relevant within the context of this discussion is the unique usage of the imagery in relation to the larger surface. Frequently making use of only a small portion of the paper, as earlier noted, the images act as a pictorial anomaly on an otherwise blank expanse, where absence becomes arguably as important as presence. According to art critic and writer Hans Rudolf Reust, the resulting effect is somewhat oneiric, presenting a localized and specific point of contemplation amidst an otherwise vast space (140). However, Reust makes an important distinction, noting that Khedoori's scapes:

> are not dream worlds but rather exterior and interior worlds open to dreams. Details as the instigators of certain phantasms are intentionally omitted. The neutral motif as a whole stands for that smallest particle, where the work of memory sets in: memory as recall and ultimate presence in the exchange between long forgotten worlds and their recall. The most unassuming objects serve to kindle the feelings and thoughts of placeless subjects. (140)

The relationship to memory alluded to by Reust seems particularly pertinent in reference to Khedoori's drawings of architectural spaces and structures. In fact, the

drawn stairways, empty rooms, facades, windows, railings, and hallways arguably present themselves (in their neutrality) as familiar to the viewer. However, removed from specificity of context, and often from structural support, the image seemingly acts as remnant—albeit one infused with an aura of nostalgia or unidentifiable familiarity.

For example, within *Untitled (house)*, Khedoori depicts a house partially dismantled, situated in a characteristically vacant expanse. Not unlike a doll's house, the frontal façade is missing, or, perhaps more accurately, appears to have been cut away, allowing a view of the multi-storied, but ultimately empty, interior space. Some specific detail has been maintained; the subdued colouring and patterning of peeling wallpaper, as well as indicators of tiling and flooring materials, are all made visually available to the viewer. And yet, the structure exists without clue to its context, without grounding, hovering alone within a greater white expanse, seemingly at a point of frozen decay or disassembly.

Somewhat dissimilarly, *Untitled (rooms),* while more expansive in terms of the image's relation to the larger surface, involves even less specific detail, and instead focuses on a monochromatic unfolding of unfurnished and unoccupied room opening upon room, opening upon room. A reduction in specific detail is also the case within *Untitled, (stairs)* (2000), in which an ascending and descending concrete staircase is featured, similarly monochromatically, and similarly recalling the subdued palette of an institutional or strictly utilitarian space. However, despite shifts in scale and detail, and between location in the domestic and the presumably institutional, each depicted space

and structure is joined in an uncanny familiarity that pervades—perhaps in part from the very estrangement of the image, as well as a removal from full integration into a ground or context that would more fully explain its presence within the void.

Drawing Dwelling

To shift attention at this point to the importance of *drawing* within Khedoori's work, particularly given the focus of previous inquiry, may seem unexpected. However, interestingly, and perhaps ultimately most importantly, it could be posited that there is something simultaneously both *heimlich* and *unheimlich* in the act and process of drawing itself—lending a further credence to the complicated relationship between familiar and unfamiliar resonances within Khedoori's works. Indeed, there is something almost ubiquitous about the act of drawing. In the words of Emma Dexter, to draw is, arguably, to be human:

> Drawing is everywhere. We are surrounded by it—it is sewn into the warp and weft of our lives... Footprints in the snow, breath on the window, vapor trails of a plane across the sky, lines traced by a finger in the sand—we literally draw in and on the material world. Drawing is part of what it means to be human—indeed, it would be ridiculous to apply this statement to other, more specialized media...but somehow applied to the medium of drawing, the idea is easier to grasp. (6)

If drawing is frequently associated with the intimately familiar, the heimlich, with the early creative acts of childhood and youth, of art-encounters within the home, it nevertheless maintains a unique relationship to both time and desire.

Architectural theorist Jennifer Bloomer elaborates on the associative potential between longing and drawing, particularly in an architectural context:

> The building is the material object for which the architect longs when she draws. And architectural drawings, compositions of lines suggesting form, can be construed as the longing marks of architecture, or perhaps more precisely in this analogy, of the architect who is, within his conception, development, and delivery of product, a kind of mother. (288)

While Bloomer focuses upon the relationship between the repression of the nostalgic and repression of materiality in certain strains of contemporary architecture, the evocation of the figure of "mother" in relation to architectural planner provides an interesting corollary to the Freudian understanding of heimlich/homely space. As has earlier been discussed, a relationship between nostalgia (*heimweh*) and the uncanny (*unheimlich)* can be drawn through the ideas of desire and longing. While the Freudian uncanny, as the darker double of nostalgia (Linney 27), dwells in a relationship to the past and home through the repression of the familiar and a submerged connection to the maternal, the uncanny in the drawing of architectural and domestic motifs can be related to the (submerged) desire of the artist and the viewer.

It is the interstice in desire, and the complicated space between past and present, memory and imagination that attracts art theorist Jean Fisher to drawing:

> Drawing makes reversible the movement of desire, suspending it in a place that is not that of the battle, but of the armistice, understood as a place of projection and reversibility...[the drawing] elaborates its own presence through the transparent

> mark that allows desire to retrace its steps and to remain at rest. The imaginary keeps its own status of impalpability and moves in the interstitial, where it loses the confines of here and now, inside and outside... Desire does not allow any unidirectional movement, but is a circularity that returns to its point of origin, a position typical of indeterminacy, in which the mark, more than being imprecise, is directly linked to the imaginary. (Fisher 223)

Admittedly, Khedoori's approach to "drawing" perhaps fits more readily within a schema offered through architectural rendering and diagrammatic draftsmanship. The architectural images are frequently illustrative, offering a fetishistic, albeit somewhat indeterminate, point of focus. The idea of reversibility and extendability (ie: potential for continuance, the "unfinished" qualities frequently associated with drawn work) is less straightforward and available within Khedoori's wax-suspended works. Indeed, the drawn-line's relationship to the idea of reversibility in Khedoori's images is further complicated by its relationship to the waxy ground: despite the breadth of the "blank" page, which normally is associated with the suggestion (or, at least, possibility) of further work, Khedoori's wax-trapped line is suspended. As such, Norman Bryson's description of the temporally "open" nature of much drawing may seem anachronous:

> However definitive, perfect, unalterable the drawn line may be, each of its lines—even the last line that was drawn—is permanently open to the present of time that is always unfolding; even that final line, the line that closed the image, is in itself open to a present that bars the act of closure. The present of viewing and the present of the drawn line hook onto each other, mesh together like interlocking

> temporal gears; they co-inhabit an irreversible, permanently open and exposed field of becoming, whose moment of closure will never arrive. (150)

However, perhaps here the term "suspended" becomes important. The line, the *drawing* of Khedoori's works, is not halted, but merely delayed. Denied direct contact with the surface of the paper ground, instead floating on/in the wax, the drawn image can in fact be viewed to be in the process of simultaneously emerging and submerging—in the process of becoming, yet maintaining a relationship with a past inferred. Indeed, I argue that the works of Khedoori move beyond merely illustrative or straightforwardly, and hence *conservatively*, nostalgic views of the domestic site. Instead, while evocative of the mechanisms of memory and longing, Khedoori's architectural drawings are complicated by elements of the familiar become strange—opening the potential for a *reflective* or critical relationship to nostalgia, released through elements of the uncanny.

CONCLUSION

As much as the preceding text has commenced from a theoretical engagement with memory and a broad idea of the "past," so too has it at times seemed to presume—perhaps even fetishize—the importance of "dwelling" and relationships to structures linked to sustained or intimate personal history. This is particularly the case with the work of Gregor Schneider, although arguably also to a lesser degree true to the work of Toba Khedoori. Admittedly, the impulse for this project resides in my own fascination with architectural space and second-hand experiences with construction. Early memories of playing in the newly poured concrete foundations and emerging skeleton of the family "new house," of the seemingly endless presence of building materials, blueprints, and design magazines,[3] are juxtaposed with recollections of crossing the yard to the "old house," which after our relocation was haphazardly filled with uncurated relics of not only my own past inhabitation, but also those of previous family generations. I am hesitant to align my motivations to an uncomplicated romanticization of my prairie-farm experience, characterized by the continued presence of abandoned but still sentinel buildings dotting fields; the impulse to replace the old with the new has often defined ideas of prairie progress. Broad critiques of such regionally-specific motifs lie outside of the scope of this research. Rather, my primary interest lies in the "residue" attached to individual structures, new or old, and ways of engaging with those structures. While my relationship to "home" does likely border on the sentimental, it is not uncomplicated, and not without hauntings, of a sort.

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[3] This has likely doomed me to a lifetime addiction to home-improvement and design catalogues and programmes.

The "dwelling" which is intended to occur within this thesis, and which is extended into my thesis project, "houseworks," is as much about the often assumed familiarity of domestic spaces as it is about a continued residence in memory. While the motif of the house that has been used to propel the arguments of this thesis is thematically linked to both nostalgia (critical and otherwise) and experiences of the uncanny, it can be argued that physical space is less important than mnemonic or psychical space. The remembered or imagined house and experience is potentially as significant as any physical structure. In emphasizing the creative potential of an engagement with a past/memory which involves the dual relationship between a critical nostalgia and a creative uncanny, the structure and an individual's relationship to the structure is one of suggestion, rather than proscription.

Indeed, the uniting theme of this thesis has been the pairing of the Freudian concept of the uncanny with arguments regarding the potential for a critical or reflective nostalgia. While the uncanny's relationship to the (often submerged or repressed) past has long been established, I suggest that coupling the uncanny with notions of nostalgia allows for more nuanced understandings of ideas of longing. Critical or reflective nostalgia does not eschew the unnattainability of passed time and is aware of the gaps and disparities between past and present. In acknowledging the potential for metaphoric domestic hauntings, the uncanny unsettles assumptions about domestic site and comfort.

Art theorist and critic Margaret Iversen suggests that "while nostalgia assumes the past is safely dead, the uncanny brings it to the present... A condition of ... nostalgic yearning is that the past is *safely* lost" (411) and that:

> if nostalgia is the desire for the *heimlich* object, then that object is likely to prove highly unstable. However ... nostalgia is for a past safely lost which may yet serve as an ideal for the future. The uncanny, in contrast, returns unbidden in the present. (426)

While I agree that the object of desire within nostalgia remains unstable, if not entirely elusive, I suggest, in concert with Boym and Probyn, that the definition of nostalgia can be extended to such that the "safety" of a past lost is eschewed in favour of a critical, highly individual and investigative relationship to the past, memory, and longing. Furthermore, in the acknowledgement of a form of memory which may be simultaneously uncanny, redolent of re-emerging trace, a relationship to a static, idealized, and unchanging past becomes impossible. Instead, a non-linear route to the present emerges, in which the object of desire is simultaneously conjured and concealed.

While the daily processes of engagement with the past through memory are potentially myriad, as a strategy of defamiliarization and interpretation applied to the artistic process and project, the recognition of the potentially concurrent roles of nostalgia and the uncanny presents a framework through which the understanding of the work of such artists as Schneider and Khedoori may be broadened. Indeed, the relationship between the individual and the temporal, actual and psychical space, remains multiple and new, despite its foundation in the mechanisms of memory.

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