Canadians Misbehaving: A Quantitative Analysis of the Factors Contributing to Perceived Frequency of Organizational Misbehaviour by Employees and Employers

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Abstract

Individuals do not always follow the rules at work, yet it is not entirely clear what conditions generally contribute to higher rates of misbehaviour. Much of the research on organizational misbehaviour is ethnographic or based on limited sample populations (single organization, single industry, etc.), so there remains a gap in the literature for findings representative of a wider population and comparison across occupational classes. Additionally, there has been an over-emphasis on the study of misbehaviour by employees, while employer misbehaviour remains relatively unexplored within the literature. Organizational misbehaviour is also often treated as an objective act with little recognition for how individual attitudes and structural position shape perceptions of what constitutes ‘proper’ behavior and, in turn, misbehaviour. This dissertation reconnects the study of organizational misbehaviour with Marxist class analysis and examines the connection between the structural conditions of work and employee and employer misbehaviour, also incorporating a study of how individual reporting of misbehaviour frequency is influenced by respondent class consciousness. Each integrated chapter uses nationally representative data for Canada from the 2016 Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE) survey (N=3007). Methods utilized include chi-square, gamma and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Findings contribute to a growing section of the literature focused on identifying the structural determinants of organizational misbehaviour, examine the link between individual subjectivity and perceptions of misbehaviour frequency and provide unique initial exploratory research into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour.

Keywords

Organizational misbehaviour; Occupational class; Employer misbehaviour; Class consciousness; Perceptions of misbehaviour; Structural predictors of misbehaviour; Quantitative methods
Co-Authorship Statement

There are no co-authors to declare.

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Chapter 1

1 Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations

1.1 Introduction

The practice of workplace misbehaviour – for example loafing on the job, vandalism, absenteeism, sabotage and theft – is at least as old as the experience of wage labour, and likely much older. Though one might be inclined to focus on the early days of industrialism, organizational misbehaviour remains widespread in modern times. Some scholars have estimated that 33% to 75% of employees engage in at least one of the practices of misbehaviour outlined above (Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007), but even these figures might be conservative: Several notable studies have suggested that – at least in the case of service sabotage – more than 90% of informants believe misbehaviour to be an everyday occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989). The figures differ somewhat based on one’s definition of what misbehaviour entails, but the phenomenon is clearly widespread. It is also evident that this abundance of organizational misbehaviour can be quite costly, with some parties estimating annual business losses due to misbehaviour as high as two-hundred billion dollars in the United States alone (Lee & Ok, 2014; Murphy, 1993). These figures, which at first might seem surprising, seem a lot more reasonable with the knowledge that the average worker spends approximately two hours of their workday engaging in activities which are not related to their paid work (Paulsen, 2014). However, it is not just because of profit-loss that we should be concerned with the study of misbehaviour: The prevalence of these behaviours suggests widespread discontent and enduring conflicts of interest within the contemporary workplace.

With these figures in mind, the study of workplace misbehaviour should be of utmost priority to any who concern themselves with the study of organizational behaviour because it has become increasingly clear that most individuals do not blindly follow the rules at work (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979).
However, there is still much to be learned about the phenomenon of organizational misbehaviour: The literature has rarely touched on misbehaviour in Canada or considered misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than non-managerial employees. Additionally, while qualitative methods have taught us much about misbehaviour, there remains a gap in the literature for quantitative and nationally representative results. This dissertation is positioned to address each of these current limitations of the literature.

1.1.1 Outline of the Study

This dissertation will explore multiple dimensions of organizational misbehavior in Canada, many of which have not received attention in the past. In particular, our decision to examine employer misbehaviour and include class as a key explanatory variable represents a unique approach to the study of organizational misbehaviour.

This chapter (chapter 1) provides a review of the literature, describes the theoretical framework which later chapters build upon and outlines our general methodological notes.

Paper 1 (chapter 2) advances the study of employee misbehavior within Canadian workplaces, focusing on the structural determinants of employee misbehavior for non-managerial employees. Taking our cue from the organizational misbehavior literature, we examined the relationships between worker autonomy and injustice and the perceived frequency of employee misbehavior. Additionally, we incorporated occupational class in our analysis as a key explanatory variable – one which has been left out of previous studies on organizational misbehavior. Paper 1 also contains a supplementary multivariate analysis of managerial employees to compare with our primary results for non-managerial employees.

Paper 2 (chapter 3) explores the often-overlooked phenomenon of employer misbehavior. First, we consider how the reported frequency of misbehavior varies by the occupational class of the respondent – and compare the perceived frequency of employee versus employer misbehavior. Second, we explore whether economic pressures on employers
and the vulnerability of their workforce relate to the amount of employer misbehavior reported by employers.

Paper 3 (chapter 4) examines the relationship between the class consciousness of the individual and their perception of the frequency of both employee and employer misbehaviour in the workplace. Here, we suggest that the perception of organizational misbehavior as a more frequent phenomenon is incompatible with ideological assumptions about harmonious industrial relations and unity of interest between workers, managers and employers and hypothesized that those who were more critical of the capitalist system would perceive misbehavior as more frequent.

The final chapter (5) summarizes the results of the previous chapters, discusses their significance and suggests directions for future research.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

1.2.1 Defining Organizational Misbehaviour

There are several definitions of organizational misbehaviour – many of which are coloured by the interests of stakeholders – but we believe the best working definition is one which is quite general, allowing for the comparison of a diversity of behaviours which might not seem immediately comparable and reminding us that misbehaviour is always shaped by prevailing expectations of proper behaviour. Therefore, we chose to adapt the definition outlined by Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7).

To some extent, misbehaviour should be understood as inevitable. There will always be a limited number of pathological cases and interpersonal conflicts that will contribute to our statistics on workplace misbehaviour. However, there is evidence to suggest that many cases of misbehaviour are instead linked to conditions of structural inequality and conflict of interests within the workplace: Analoui observed that ‘65 percent of all acts
of unconventional practice [sabotage] stemmed from the discontent experienced in the workplace, with management and its behaviour at the heart of the dispute’ (Analoui, 1995).

Understanding that misbehaviour is often connected to structural factors and unequal power relations in the workplace also raises the question of when organizational misbehaviour is more properly understood as an act of resistance against capitalist relations of production. In a later section, we will explore this question in greater detail. However, it is advantageous here to outline our specific focus in the study of organizational misbehaviour and clarify this phenomenon’s relationship with worker resistance in the context of alienating and exploitative working conditions and the struggle for greater autonomy for workers.

It is clear to us that not all employee misbehaviour should be understood as authentic resistance: The range of activities properly understood as misbehaviour is far too vast for such a conclusion. Additionally, resistance is also not necessarily a form of misbehaviour, as certain avenues for disaffected workers to advance their interests will be permitted or even encouraged – though the effectiveness of any sanctioned resistance should always be questioned.

Clearly, not all misbehaviour is resistance and not all resistance is misbehaviour, but we are most interested in when these two activities may coincide – and how they may both be provoked by the alienation and exploitation experienced by the worker under the capitalist mode of economic production. Correspondingly, our treatment of employee misbehaviour emphasizes those activities that are best understood as a reaction to the enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and the ability of the phenomenon to act as an indirect measure of the class conflict present under the surface of most modern work organizations.
1.2.2 The Enduring Relevance of Marx

The theoretical work that is most foundational for our understanding of organizational misbehaviour is that put forth by Karl Marx and many of the ideas he originally outlined remain important to our contemporary understanding of the social world. In a study of Marx, one is continually reminded of possible motives for why a worker might choose to misbehave at work and what follows hereafter is a limited summary of only those concepts most central to our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour.

Marx recognized exploitation in the wage relationship between owners and workers as a prerequisite for the production of profit under the capitalist system. In his theory of surplus value, Marx outlined how profit is extracted from the labour process through the exploitation of the worker – paying her a wage which is lower than the true value of her labour (1867). Without this exploitation, it is usually not possible for the capitalist to maintain profitability and – because the driving motivation towards production under the capitalist system is to increase profit and further concentrate capital – exploitation remains present in the standard wage relationship to this day.

However, wage work under capitalism is damaging to the worker not only because she is systematically underpaid, but also because of the alienation that she feels because of the degraded circumstances under which she must labour. Correspondingly, Marx argued that workers were bound to become increasingly dissatisfied as they came to recognize how the structure of capitalist production rendered them separate from the product they create, any meaningful control of the work process, their human counterparts – both capitalists and workers – and their very species-being (1844).

The concepts of surplus value and the exploitation and alienation of the worker are important because they demonstrate how the economic interests of the owner and the worker are always in opposition to one another within a capitalist system of production: The former always striving to create surplus value by paying wages that are less than the true value of the labour derived while the latter seeks to regain control over her labour and the value she produces. Marx’s observations were based on capitalism at an earlier
stage of development, but his account of this essential class conflict remains relevant to this day.

This point on the enduring role of class antagonism within the contemporary workplace is particularly important to our understanding of misbehaviour in two specific ways. First, if we accept that much of Marx’s critique of capitalism remains relevant and that class conflict endures, we can recognize that contemporary workers are also alienated and exploited and could reasonably be expected to be motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour in the face of a system of production which does not serve their best interests. Second, if one were to instead argue that class conflict no longer exists – or is at least greatly diminished – one might be inclined to perceive alienation and exploitation as being in decline and individuals’ dissatisfaction with work largely traceable to external factors unrelated to class – such as bureaucracy, mass production or poor management (Adler, 1999; Ashforth, 1994; Matheson, 2007; Sanders, 1997; Sarros et al., 2002).

From this second perspective, a decrease in direct confrontation in the workplace, and the conspicuous lack of the revolution predicted by Marx, might be portrayed as evidence of a new alignment of worker and owner interests within the capitalist workplace. We can understand this perspective as being generally in line with the premature declaration of the end of class conflict, the triumph of the capitalist model of progress and the rise of the classless society – viewpoints which came to political prominence with the Thatcherism of 1990s and Fukuyama’s declaration of the end of history (Blair, 1999; Fukuyama, 1989, 1992A, 1992B; Kingston, 2000; Oakley, 1990; Thatcher, 1992).

However, in response to general acceptance – or habituation – to the ideologies of capitalism and sustained efforts to discredit class as a useful unit for social analysis, numerous scholars have illustrated how the line of exploitation and alienation – originally outlined by Marx – has continued unbroken into the present – and perhaps even intensified (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa, 2010).

Even with the expansion in popularity of the human resource style of management and various participatory and enculturation schemes, the alienation and exploitation of
workers remains prevalent. Many workers still find themselves confronted by more
traditional managerial regimes and – even for those who do find themselves invited into a
more participatory role in the organization of production – the reality is often
underwhelming: Worker input is too often restricted to a limited range of topics or
perspectives predetermined by management to be complementary of established
organizational goals (Talwar, 2002; Vallas, 2003, 2006). Even where participatory
strategies appear successful and employees come to identify with their work organization,
it does not automatically follow that this extra commitment is always in the worker’s best
interest – external exploitation can easily be replaced with self-exploitation, overwork
and peer-pressure (Hodson, 2001; Rinehart, 2006). Now, this is not to say that all worker
participation programs must necessarily result in failure or further intensification of
alienation and exploitation – where a rhetoric of empowerment or inclusion is backed up
by substantive structural changes, workers may come to see significant improvement in
working conditions (Poole, 1978).

The body of literature critiquing the popular narratives of the classless society and the
new harmonious work relations of advanced capitalism is extensive – we have cited only
a portion of it above – but it should be clear that the study of workplace misbehaviour has
been greatly informed by this scholarly work.

1.2.3 Pitfalls in Misbehaviour Research

The study of misbehaviour as a structurally-derived phenomenon is in part a
contradiction of perspectives like the following: ‘[v]irtually all available evidence
indicates that actual behaviour is orderly and purposeful, and appears to support the goals
of the organization’ (Luthans, 1972). This normative assumption of compliance is
widespread, to the extent that the common admonishment ‘to behave one’s self’ is
synonymous with being told to obey (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). Working from the
assumption of general employee compliance has led some to pathologize workplace
misbehaviour as originating from a small group made up of staunch anti-authoritarians
(Leavitt, 1973) and the unreasonable or criminal (Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).
There is a well-established history within the literature of looking toward individual deficiency and weakness of character as explanations for employee misbehaviour. This perspective persists in the academic realm but thrives within the workplace as a popular assumption among managers and employers that the misbehaving individual is necessarily ignorant, undeveloped or undisciplined in some manner (Analoui, 1995; Edwards et al., 1995). There is much talk of a lack of discipline, but some authors have added additional layers to the pathological theory of misbehaviour by incorporating explanatory concepts like “emotional intelligence” (Lee & Ok, 2014). The implication of this research being that the misbehaving employee is underdeveloped or perhaps less evolved in a manner that makes it difficult for them to engage in harmonious work relations (Bibi, 2013). Still others have discussed misbehaviour as the result of moral failings and ‘ethical misconduct’ on the part of the employee (Henle et al., 2010).

In more extreme accounts, misbehaviour is sometimes even defined as anti-social and a manifestation of destructive, aggressive and violent impulses born out of unconscious mental disturbances (Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Kets de Vries, 2017). This view of misbehaviour as violence has been widely publicized in the past, and Giesberg (2001) explains how American media coverage of sabotage as a form of violence has served to discredit it as a legitimate tactic that could be used by organized labour. Finally, while some have gone as far as to compare sabotage to homicide (Laabs et al., 1999), it will not surprise the reader to hear that this perspective represents only a fringe element within the literature on organizational misbehaviour.

Those familiar with the counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) literature may already be familiar with efforts to explain the phenomenon of organizational misbehavior through the individual characteristics of the employees who engage in it. A major current within the CWB literature makes use of the Five-Factor Model of Personality to document how the individual characteristics of conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability correspond with a lower likelihood of counterproductive work behavior (Berry et al., 2007; Berry et al., 2012; Jensen & Patell, 2011) – counterproductive work behavior here being defined as ‘deliberate actions that harm the organization or its members’ (O’Boyle et al., 2011). Much of this work is valuable and interesting and a number of the studies in
this area provide us with useful quantitative results for identifying individual predisposition towards counterproductive work behavior which – considering the similarity between the phenomena of CWB and organizational misbehavior – can also contribute to a more complete scientific understanding of the latter. However, the main weakness in the CWB literature surrounds its characteristic focus on only individual explanations, with very limited effort to include structural factors. Contemporary additions to the CWB literature suggest this trend is likely to continue, with recent explorations of the phenomenon focusing on either the interactional and mediational effects of Five-Factor Model personality traits (Hofstee et al., 1992; Hogan et al., 1996; Jensen & Patel, 2011; Sackett & DeVore, 2001; Witt, 2002; Zaccario, 2007) or incorporating other individual psychological concepts – such as the dark triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy – into the CWB literature (Cohen, 2016; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2012). This primary emphasis on individual-level explanations – though not exclusive (Hershcovis et al., 2007; O’Boyle et al., 2011; O’Boyle et al., 2012) – can be easily understood in the context of the traditional scientific purview of psychology. However, the general failure to control for relevant structural measures makes for significant validity issues and provides little indication of the actual explanatory power of the personality traits predictors favored by CWB researchers compared to any other potential motivators. Until this field of scientific research incorporates a greater awareness of the structural motivators towards CWB, it is likely that the chief contributions of this work will be limited to the provision of new employee-screening techniques for interested managers/employers.

Now, while many, unlike those referenced above, succeed at avoiding the trap of individualizing and pathologizing misbehaviour, another theoretical misstep to be avoided concerns the overestimation of the effectiveness of new managerial initiatives aimed at incorporating the modern worker into the work organization and rendering her compliant to its aims.

A particularly popular turn in the human resource and organizational behaviour literature is to focus on developing corporate culture in such a way as to foster high commitment from employees towards organizational interests (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999). It is
common within this literature to argue that employee misbehaviour and resistance have largely been eliminated through the process of corporate enculturation (Frenkel et al., 1998). Combining this focus on fostering organizational commitment with more traditional management techniques is thought to have resulted in the rise of a successful new managerial regime based on the twin pillars of ‘fun and surveillance’ (Kinnie et al., 2000). Under this ‘fun and surveillance’ model of management, the typical worker is portrayed as primarily content with her lot and comfortably invested in organizational interests, while the misbehaving worker is cast as an exception explained either by pathological deviance or by a breakdown in effective communication between management and employees (DiBattista, 1991, 1996; Giesberg, 2001).

Perspectives on misbehaviour such as those above rest heavily on the assumption that the workplaces of today are generally free of class antagonism, alienation and exploitation, so we should remain suspicious of any premature celebration of modern working conditions.

1.2.4 Neo-Marxist Lessons on Contemporary Work

Though the realities of the contemporary workplace are very different to those experienced by the factory workers of the 1800s, the structural foundations of class inequality and derived motivations toward misbehaviour endure into the present. It has been the constant task of more than the few referenced here to remind the wider community of the relevance of a structural approach informed by Marxist theory to the study of contemporary workplace phenomena (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Rinehart, 2006; Thompson, 2016). What follows is an outline of some of the major contributions of a neo-Marxist approach towards improving our theoretical understanding of contemporary work.

Faced by the popular conflation of technological innovation in production with the liberation of the worker, it is necessary to remind ourselves that technological
development should never be understood as taking place within a vacuum and that the
direction and pace of technological development is determined by the dominant social
currents of the time. If we do not keep this social-technological connection in mind, we
risk technological determination and the denial of human agency.

In any social system, substantial technological development will make the labour process
more efficient but, under capitalism, machinery is also set to the task of exploiting the
worker and separating her from control over her own labour – except in those
circumstances where expanding worker discretion will result in increased profitability
and productivity (Braverman, 1974; Noble, 1986; Rinehart, 2006).

Technology, as a tool which is developed in concert with human society, contains a wide
range of possibilities. However, technological development as the actual process by
which a potential technology is brought into reality is not neutral and is guided by
dominant interests. In contemporary times, the general direction of technological
development is determined by the imperatives of the capitalist organization of society and
is directed towards further improving the position of the economic elite and other
powerful interest groups (Braverman, 1974; Chun et al., 2010; Goldhaber, 1986; Kraemer
& King, 2006; Mergel et al., 2009).

Instead of granting the labourer a shorter work day or freedom from drudgery,
advancements in efficiency are channeled into efforts to increase the amount of surplus
value that can be extracted from her and divesting her of what little control she has over
the production process. In this context, it is not hard to understand why workers of the
past and present have sometimes expressed their discontent with degraded working
conditions by attacking the very machinery which is instrumental to their exploitation –
the Luddites are probably the most famous example of this behaviour (Fox, 2002; Sale,
1996). In the future, it may be possible to harness the latent possibilities within human
technology in the service of the true liberation of the worker – or to aid in combatting the
threat of climate change – but this moment in history yet eludes us and cannot be
expected to arrive spontaneously.
Continuing our comparison of the capitalist production of today with that of the past, it behooves us to emphasize that – while the typical workplace of the advanced capitalist world is often assumed to be qualitatively different from the shop floors central to Marx’s original critique – the assembly lines have not disappeared. Corporations have extended assembly-line labour processes into the service sector and moved manufacturing plants overseas, in order to exploit new pools of cheap and insecure labour power provided by a global labour force fragmented by the national boundaries which capital crosses with relative ease (Bieler et al, 2008; Robin-Olivier, 2012).

While the character of modern capitalism is distinctly international, it has primarily been the labourers residing within the wealthiest nations which have benefited from any improvement to working conditions derived from the advent of late capitalism. In addition, even these limited advantages gained by the privileged workers of advanced industrialized nations may have been overstated: While the turn towards office work at first appeared to offer knowledge workers a sanctuary from the alienation and exploitation of the shop floor, this new reality of work was only temporary, as further rationalization of the office quickly reversed these circumstances (Braverman, 1974).

The distinction between the mental work of the office and the manual work of the factory has broken down as management increasingly takes on the role of administrating all intellectual processes required for production and office workers are increasingly confronted by routinized, rationalized and alienating work (Braverman, 1974; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Rinehart, 2006). It is worth remembering the revulsion displayed by the workers of the past when confronted by the reality of a life working on the assembly line: Their reaction was a natural resentment towards the alienation of work under capitalism. This resentment remains present, even as the advance of capitalist hegemony casts any alternative methods for organizing human production as unrealistic pipe dreams and can reappear wherever it finds traction – often in the form of employee misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974).
1.2.5  **Basis for a Structural Perspective on Misbehaviour**

As outlined above, treating the misbehaving worker as deviant, criminal or at least atypical can lead to major theoretical oversights – such as the mistaken assumptions that misbehaviour is not widespread or that it is only engaged in by a minority. Such a perspective on misbehaviour offers little more than the dismissal of misbehaving workers and the adoption of new surveillance and social control strategies. There is no recognition of – or effort to rectify – the structural circumstances which contribute toward an individual’s decision to misbehave.

It is only by reconnecting our study of misbehaviour with an appreciation of the structurally-derived conflicts of interest present within the workplace that we can move forward to a better understanding of the phenomenon: “Recent attempts to unravel the nature of sabotage have taken a broader and more realistic view – one which sees conflict as related to clashes of interests and values at work and which is an important index of underlying industrial conflict…a contemporary example of neglected grass roots action” (Analoui, 1995, p. 3).

By acknowledging the fundamental conflict of interests between employees and employers, we emphasize the important structural determinants of misbehaviour and develop a frame through which misbehaviour might come to be recognized as a potential form of resistance. More than a few authors have characterized misbehaviour in the workplace in this manner, demonstrating how workplace conflict continues to be located surrounding issues of the employment relationship – the amount of pay, the amount and intensity of work – the effort bargain – or control over the labour process (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Courpasson, 2016; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Mulholland, 2004; Thompson, 2015). This developing focus on misbehaviour for its potential as worker resistance runs the gamut of a variety of types of misbehaviour, from cynical joking and withholding effort to destruction of company property and sabotage. Whether each of these forms of misbehaviour is equally deserving of an association with resistance is a question examined in a later section, but it is sufficient
here to note that much of misbehaviour will function as resistance – by undermining efforts to organize work in a way that violates worker interests and by reducing the absolute effort expended in the production of profit for the owner (Hodson, 1995; Mulholland, 2004).

1.2.6 For Justice and Autonomy

Even from a recognition of the association between class conflict and misbehaviour, the task remains of determining the specific conditions under which misbehaviour is likely to take place. Correspondingly, much of the literature on misbehaviour has been committed to narrowing down the circumstances which are most likely to give rise to it.

DiBattista (1996) focuses on how the hierarchical structure of many organizations facilitates a culture whereby thinking is done by those at the top and those at the bottom are expected only to follow orders. Others have emphasized how the particular form of power that is exercised within an organization (influence, force, discipline or domination) can help to predict the amount and type of misbehaviour engaged in by employees (political, personal aggression, work limitation or theft) (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007). Still others have highlighted the importance of looking at the presence (or absence) of a union in the workplace and its relative strength and influence (Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt, Mills & Mills, 2015). However, the most relevant current within the misbehaviour literature – at least for our purposes – is concerned with how the phenomenon of misbehaviour is linked to worker autonomy and the injustice experienced by them within the workplace.

Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the research on employee misbehaviour and is frequently identified as a – if not the – central variable for understanding the prevalence of misbehaviour within any given organization (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang & Koslow, 2015; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014). These theorists identify autonomy as an important requirement for an individual to experience
their work as meaningful and misbehaviour as a likely result whenever autonomy is threatened or managerial control is perceived as excessive. The desire of the worker to be meaningfully engaged in the labour process as an active agent runs deep and cannot be satisfied by the relatively shallow employee-engagement strategies often encouraged by the human resource style of management – for example, employee feedback systems functionally limited to topics of relative insignificance or those deemed appropriate by management (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattisita, 1996; Edwards et al., 1995; Mulholland, 2004).

The second most important motivation towards misbehaviour is the experience of injustice in the workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Sheppard et al., 1992). The theory here goes that ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed triggers retaliatory tendencies… [towards misbehaviour]’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008). In this way, misbehaviour functions as a method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of whatever source of injustice is present within the workplace (Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 2008). And it appears that employees are mostly accurate in directing their misbehaviour only towards the source of the perceived injustice: Collateral damage would undermine the legitimacy of the act of misbehaviour (Paulsen, 2014) or increase the psychological cost of performing the retaliatory action for the individual – who most often prefers to act positively at work (Hodson, 2001).

Some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace is a result of interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the unequal exercise of power. The poor treatment of service personnel by belligerent customers is one good example of such non-structural interpersonal injustice. In these cases, employees will be more inclined towards retaliatory misbehaviour directed towards a specific offending customer – though this misbehaviour may become endemic if mistreatment by customers is routine (Ang & Koslow, 2015; Ferris, 2012; Harris & Ogbonna, 2006; Skarlicki et al., 2008).

On the other hand, much of the injustice experienced by workers is linked to the exercise of power over them and it follows that much of the retaliatory misbehaviour undertaken by employees will be directed towards management and employers (Hodson, 1995;
In a fascinating study of sabotage by Ambrose, Seabright and Schminke (2002), the authors provide evidence for several important claims about retaliatory misbehaviour in general – and sabotage more specifically. First, it was discovered that perceived injustice yields considerable explanatory power with regards to employee misbehaviour and is perhaps the most common cause of sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002). Second, the source of injustice and the target of sabotage is most frequently the same, but the type of misbehaviour – retaliatory or equity focused – may differ based on the source of unfairness (interactional or distributive injustice) (Ambrose et al., 2002). Finally, Ambrose and colleagues determined that sabotage increased in intensity in situations of greater organizational injustice and that a combination of different forms of injustice increased the intensity of sabotage even further (2002).

So far, we have discussed autonomy and justice separately in terms of their relationship with employee misbehaviour, but these variables are frequently brought together as primary prerequisites of meaningful labour or the ability to work with dignity (Hodson, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Marx, 1844; Rinehart, 2006). Employees’ need for autonomy and fairness are of central importance in attaining a more complete understanding of workplace misbehaviour, and the frustration of either of the former should be expected to consistently lead to an increase in the latter (Lawrence & Robinson, 2007).

1.2.7 Innovation and the Dialectic of Employee Misbehaviour and Managerial Control

In the previous section, we have explored how the need for autonomy and fairness relates to employee misbehaviour, but this section introduces the dynamic interaction between the actions of management and the misbehaviour of employees.
In any work organization, managers have numerous options of how to deal with misbehaviour and their chosen strategy for doing so will shape how employees decide to misbehave. Because misbehaviour does not take place in a vacuum, it should not come as a surprise that the sort of misbehaviour expressed in a particular organization can be related to the character of the managerial regime: Every organization features a set of unique strengths, weaknesses and organizational contradictions which incentivise the deployment of particular types of misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards, 1979; Hodson, 2001; Mulholland, 2004). For example, it has been argued that where the managerial strategy of technical control exists, misbehaviour will tend to take forms such as playing dumb, restricting output, being late or absent and work avoidance to best challenge management’s efforts to regulate work intensity and duration (Hodson, 1995).

However, it is important not to overstate the influence of management in determining the expression of misbehaviour: Workers are creative and always capable of innovating new methods of misbehaving which cannot effectively be contained or controlled by the established managerial regime (Ackroyd, 2015; Burawoy, 1979; Mulholland, 2004; Vaz, 1984). A typical managerial response to employee misbehaviour is the implementation of new policies to crack down on the particular form of misbehaviour which has become most threatening but, once again, employees are ever capable of innovating new ways of misbehaving which evade the controls put forth by the new strategies of management. In workplaces where employees are particularly skilled at finding new ways to misbehave or where past managerial initiatives have been unsuccessful, management can seem almost schizophrenic in its attempts to control misbehaviour – jumping back and forth from coercive strategies to those of seduction or enculturation (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards et al, 1995).

Now, it is not a necessity that management move against every form of misbehaviour and often it is tolerated for a time – particularly if it is not challenging managerial authority, reducing productivity or if the costs of curtailing the misbehaviour are considered prohibitive (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). However, management, in its controlling role over the labour process, decision-making, organizational initiatives and general working conditions, will be inclined to move against any misbehaviour that weakens its authority
or damages profitability sufficiently to raise the ire of the owners. And so, with these processes, we can perceive a dialectic emerge in the actions and reactions of employees and managers as both groups act to advance their interests – or undermine those of the other group (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Thompson, 2015).

1.2.8 The Missing Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour

Until this point, we have focused primarily on the misbehaviour of employees, with some mention of how customers and managers can misbehave. But what remains absent from our discussion – and from the literature at large – is an examination of employer misbehaviour.

One area in which the misbehaviour literature is expanding to include employers is by recent attempts to merge the misbehaviour and entrepreneurship literatures (Barnes & Taksa, 2012; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). This work has linked the two concepts by focusing on misbehaviour as the violation of normative expectations in the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity. Entrepreneurial activity is not fully restrained by the boundaries of normative or legal institutions and employers will often cross these boundaries in the pursuit of their “vision” – usually personal or organizational gain (Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). This work is very promising, but the topic of employer misbehaviour still remains relatively unexplored. Below, we attempt to provide some explanation for this gap in the literature.

We should start here by acknowledging how the hegemony of capitalist logic influences perceptions of misbehaviour in such a manner that the resistant actions of employees against injustice and to expand autonomy (working with dignity) comes to be discredited as anti-social, irrational or criminal, while efforts by management and employers that intensify exploitation and alienation – typically in the guise of organizational efficiency – is perceived as normal and appropriate organizational behaviour. The normalization of capitalist imperatives towards profit maximization and competition presents the
degradation of work life as a necessary component of the production process – regrettable perhaps, but with no viable alternatives. It will likely come as no surprise to the reader that the character of the dominant ideology will significantly influence the popular determination of what constitutes misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt et al, 2015), nor is it surprising that those who are economically dominant also wield considerable ideological influence and political clout (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Marx & Engels, 1846). And so, the actions of employers are already less likely to be defined as misbehaviour because of the privileges of their ownership and the unity of their actions with wider capitalist norms.

One particularly obvious example of the relationship between ideology and misbehaviour comes in the discussion of time theft or time banditry – defined as the unethical or counterproductive involvement of the individual in non-work activities during paid work time (Atkinson, 2006; Brock et al., 2013; Brock Baskin et al., 2017; Henle et al., 2010). This type of misbehaviour is particularly reviled by employers and managers and doing personal work on company time is sometimes viewed as tantamount to sabotage – in fact, Ron DiBattista (1996) included personal work on his sabotage event list. What is left unsaid – and taken-for-granted – in this conceptualization of time theft is the capitalist definition of a fair day’s work as the maximum amount of effort that a labourer is capable of outputting during her shift (Braverman, 1974; Taylor, 1911). Though it makes just as much sense to define a fair day’s work as the amount of effort required to add value to the product equivalent to the worker’s wages, accommodation to the logic of capital accumulation and the primacy of the profit motive will cause many to instinctually recoil at such a suggested alternative. Therefore, the ideological definition of misbehaviour results in the questionable acts of employers being less likely to be defined as misbehaviour. However, there are at least two additional reasons why employer misbehaviour is difficult to detect.

First, many employers are not physically present within the modern workplace. By contrast, in the early days of capitalism, the role of manager and owner were most often located within the same person (Braverman, 1974; Zeitlin, 1989). In those circumstances, it was much easier to assign blame and connect the actions of the
individual misbehaving owner to the resulting outcome. However, in advanced capitalist society, the corporation has taken over the role of capitalist from the individual owner, while managerial duties are now primarily fulfilled by a new labour elite (Braverman, 1974; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Zeitlin, 1989). In contemporary times, even if the results of employer misbehaviour are felt within the workplace, it is rare to assign blame to absent owners – instead, on-site hired management are routinely scapegoated (Ackroyd, 2015; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015). Additionally, the advantages of ownership are such that employees might even be perceived to be engaging in sabotage by reporting the misbehaviour of their employers to their occupational health and safety or union representative – as it is not uncommon for the act of whistleblowing to be regarded negatively as a form of misbehaviour (Ackroyd, 2015; Bigoni et al., 2012; DiBattista, 1996; Jackall, 2010).

In this manner, the structure of contemporary capitalist production protects employers from having their actions defined as misbehaviour, but this protection also extends into the legal realm: The nature of the limited liability corporation makes it difficult to assign culpability to any of the – possibly thousands of – shareholders who may have little individual input on organizational decisions (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Gobert & Punch, 2003; Lamb, 2012; Peston, 2012; Punch, 1995). However, the corporation also benefits from unique legal protections not afforded to most human individuals which make the punishment of employer misbehaviour incredibly difficult.

First, criminal law tends to focus on the prerequisites of individual responsibility and intent to commit the crime – both of which are made harder to prove due to the protection from liability that the corporate entity provides for its controlling executives and large shareholders (Dominoes Pizza, 2006; Edwards et al., 2014; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Wells, 2001).

Second, companies are regulated by a separate set of laws and enforcement agents as compared to those of criminal law and police enforcement. Instead, they are regulated by civil and administrative law and civilian inspectors, many of whom have a close relationship with the industries they are expected to keep watch on and the tendency to
see themselves more as advisors or educators, rather than serious investigators (Barkan, 2013; Gobert & Punch, 2003; Greenfield, 2006).

Third, the complicated nature of a corporate prosecution makes it harder to find jury members capable of following every legal intricacy – a difficulty compounded by the fact that many judges come to be generalists because of the practical demands of their position (Gobert & Punch, 2003).

Fourth, due to the concentration of capital within them, individual corporations and coalitions of corporations are capable of mustering incredible resources to their defence. As a result, they can effectively lobby against legislation that threatens their interests and, if they are brought to court, they can often outmatch any prosecution in the courtroom with a team of high-powered and specialized attorneys (Healy, 2014; Punch, 1995).

And finally, corporations have the option of voluntarily dissolving themselves, significantly complicating the matters of effective prosecution, enforcement of reparations or establishing ongoing liability (Lamb, 2012; Okla, 1927; Rice, 2010).

For all the reasons outlined above, it is difficult to detect and define the misbehaviour of employers or hold them responsible for it – even when this misbehaviour is also illegal. In this context, it is not difficult to understand why employers’ actions are frequently excluded from the general misbehaviour literature or characterized as managerial misbehaviour (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Jackling et al., 2007; Pacces, 2011; Shaban et al., 2017). Either way, serious discussion of the structural factors related to employer misbehaviour remains almost entirely underdeveloped within the organizational misbehaviour literature.

However, the literature on white-collar and corporate crime seems to offer a way back into this discussion – by connecting instances of particularly egregious corporate violence with the ruthless pursuit of profit characteristic of capitalism, a space can sometimes open in the popular consciousness to discuss how employers are also capable of misbehaviour.
1.2.9 Corporate Crime and Employer Misbehaviour

The destructive potential of systematic employer misbehaviour is considerable, and it is people in the highest positions of power who cause the largest number of avoidable injuries and deaths (Box, 1983; Punch, 1995). If we compare the statistics for victims of street crime and corporate crime, the differences are staggering – and worth reproducing here:

*If we take the 19,000 deaths related to street crimes recorded by the FBI in 1985, then we can compare that to the yearly total of victims of 'corporate crime and violence' in the USA.... Almost 800 Americans die every day from cigarette-induced disease. Over the next 30 years, 240,000 people - 8,000 per year, one every hour - will die from asbestos cancer. An estimated 85,000 American cotton textile workers suffer breathing impairments due to cotton dust (brown lung) disease. 100,000 miners have been killed and 265,000 disabled due to coal-dust (black lung) disease. Product-related accidents are said to cause 28,000 deaths and 130,000 serious injuries; there are annually 5.5 million injuries in the work place (of which 3.5 million require hospital treatment); and some 100,000 deaths have been related to exposure to dangerous chemicals and 390,000 deaths to occupational diseases. The figures are staggering, and shocking, and these are only for one country. On a world-wide scale, the amount of suffering and damage, partly unavoidable but also partly avoidable, is immense, virtually beyond measurement, and almost beyond comprehension (Punch, 1995, p. 95).*

*Injury is endemic in Canadian workplaces. In 2012, there were 245,365 accepted workers’ compensation claims for injuries that required time away from work as well as 977 claims for workplace fatalities. These statistics significantly underreport the true level of workplace injury by excluding injuries that did not require time away from work, injuries to those outside the workers’ compensation system,*
and unreported injuries—which some studies put at 40 percent of all injuries (Foster & Barnetson, 2017, p. 612).

Unfortunately, and despite the established historical record of corporate capacity for violent crime, these tragedies of employer misbehaviour rarely result in a serious critique of how the structure of the capitalist system gives rise to such destruction. However, when a moment of corporate crime is well publicized – usually a result of extensive damage to human life – and there is an obvious connection to profit-maximization and corporate disregard for human life or the health of the environment, the true character of employer misbehaviour is rendered clear.

A useful case study can be perceived in the sinking of the ferryboat Herald of Free Enterprise in 1986, when the front-loading doors were left open upon departure from port, resulting in the taking on of water, destabilization of the ship and the deaths of 197 passengers and crew. Though initial blame was placed at the feet of the crew member who had forgotten to close the ferry doors, subsequent inquest revealed a culture of corporate negligence where safety was regularly sacrificed for speed, convenience and profit – in fact, requests by ferry captains for a device which would notify those on the bridge about the status of the bow doors were repeatedly dismissed as too costly (Clarke, 1990; Pontell & Geis, 2007; Sheen, 1996). The calamity aboard the Herald of Free Enterprise may have resulted in new maritime safety regulations, but the prosecution of Townsend Thoresen for corporate manslaughter never went anywhere and the rebranding of the organization as P&O European Ferries was quickly accomplished (Punch, 1995).

Instances of employer misbehaviour featuring a death toll are not necessarily the only ones which receive media attention: The more common forms of employer misbehaviour characterized by a failure to pay workers their earned wages or pensions are also periodically covered – usually in the context of a large organization going under and leaving numerous employees in the lurch. Several recent Canadian examples of this sort of employer misbehaviour can be perceived in the 2016 closure of Ontario Goodwill locations or the declaration of bankruptcy and liquidation of Sears Canada (Kopun, 2017; McFarland & Gray, 2016).
Conspicuous instances of employer misbehaviour provide for moments of awareness of the existence of corporate malfeasant, but the fact that much of this misbehaviour comes about as the result of the regular functioning of the capitalist organization is a point rarely highlighted outside of the academic literature – with notable exceptions such as Bakan’s *The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Power and Profit* (2004) and Nader’s *Unsafe at any speed: The designed-in dangers of the American automobile*.

Nevertheless, there is a significant body of literature which challenges corporate sovereignty and questions the professed ability of corporations to autonomously self-regulate and act ethically (Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Foster & Barnetson, 2017; Mokhiber, 1988; Rhodes, 2016). These works are most important to understanding how the structure of the for-profit corporation and its organizational priority of advancing the economic interests of owners will often result in misbehaviour by employers.

What should now be clear is that there is an asymmetry between employee and employer misbehaviour. This asymmetry is obvious in the motives of the different parties involved, the perception of how common misbehaviour is, the character of the misbehaviour engaged in, and the scale of disruption or destruction that can result. While this asymmetry offers some obvious challenges in comparison between these types of misbehaviour, the present situation whereby the study of employer misbehaviour is largely forsaken represents a dangerous oversight.

### 1.2.10 The Ambiguous Position of Managers

At this point, we have focused on the difference between employee and employer misbehaviour, but how do managers misbehave in the work organization? It is obvious that managers also misbehave at work, but the general character of this misbehaviour can be ambiguous. Often, the misbehaviour of managers can be understood as an extension of employer misbehaviour performed as part of the manager’s duty to uphold the interests of the owners. In this way, managers are often party to employer misbehaviour as the latter’s agent within the workplace (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Jackall, 2010). It is because of their role as the owner’s representative, that managers
will often find themselves engaged with non-managerial employees in the dialectic of misbehaviour and control explained in an earlier section.

However, managers do not always act as good stewards of the employer’s capital and can also misbehave in a way that advances their own interests at the expense of both workers and owners – for example, drawing wages unrelated to productivity, promoting individuals unfairly or dividing work unfairly (Ackroyd, 2015; Barnes & Taksa, 2012; DiBattista, 1996; Sayles & Smith, 2005).

Additionally, some managerial misbehaviour is probably better understood as an extension of employee misbehaviour: Managers have the same need for autonomy and dignity at work and may react similarly to employees when these are threatened (Karlsson, 2012). This is particularly likely to be the case for those lower and middle managers who are better understood as clerical workers engaged in the routine administrative processes of organizational management and without significant personal authority over organizational direction or policy-making (Braverman, 1974).

Unsurprisingly, this last type of managerial misbehaviour – which is very similar in character to employee misbehaviour – is less likely to be engaged in by those managers who identify strongly with employers or have a real chance of breaking into the upper class – only true for a select few of the managerial elite (Zeitlin, 1989). However, it could be that managerial misbehaviour will increasingly come to resemble that of non-managerial employees as the total number of managers continues to increase – diluting their previously privileged control over the labour process – or if they begin to portray economic attitudes similar to those of non-managerial employees (Livingstone & Watts, 2018).

### 1.2.11 Misbehaviour and Resistance

Multiple scholars of misbehaviour have suggested that there is an emerging trend away from organized or formal resistance towards routine and informal resistance in the form of covert misbehaviour by employees in the work organization (Ackroyd & Thompson,
1999; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004; Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016). The decline in influence of more formalized forms of resistance – such as unions – is due to a variety of factors such as the decline in union membership in the private sector, disagreements over the primary purpose of the union and who should be included in the membership, and the added difficulties of reasserting a discourse of workers’ rights perceived by many to be in ideological association with the Soviet Union (Hartt et al, 2015). In reaction to the obstacles faced by traditional formalized and organized resistance, employee misbehaviour has received greater focus because of its potential to function as a more subtle and individual resistance against the enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and new managerial initiatives of normative control and enculturation.

Against the backdrop of a modern workplace commonly assumed to be characterized by relatively harmonious industrial relations, we see that workers are engaging in a wide variety of forms of misbehaviour – but how much of this misbehaviour should be understood as resistance?

There are those who are very optimistic about the possibility for resistance contained within misbehaviour. Not just focusing on the forms of misbehaviour most obviously containing a component of resistance – like sabotage or output limitation – these scholars have examined how even smaller acts of misbehaviour such as feigning ignorance, loafing behind a veneer of false compliance, ironic and overexaggerated compliance with rules and regulations – to the point of inefficiency – and cynical disengagement can introduce significant disruption into a workplace and act as a way for workers to reassert their own identities against corporate ideals (Baines, 2011; De Certeau, 1984; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999).

However, this optimism surrounding even the most seemingly innocuous forms of misbehaviour has led others to question whether we have been too quick to attribute the label of resistance to actions which offer relatively little threat to capitalist relations of production (Contu, 2008; Paulsen, 2014; Prasad, 2008). One of the best examples of this skeptical turn in the misbehaviour literature is contained in Contu’s work on ‘decaf’
resistance”: “These transgressive acts that we call ‘resistance’ are akin to a decaf resistance, which changes very little. It is resistance without the risk of really changing our ways of life or the subjects who live it” (2008, p. 367). The work of Contu and others who problematize the connection between misbehaviour and resistance is particularly useful in raising the question of whether these small acts of misbehaviour should instead be understood as evidence of how capitalist power relations are truly effective – allowing us to imagine ourselves as free-thinking and agentic individuals engaging in a ‘resistance’ that actually contains no significant potential for social change (Contu, 2008; Fleming, 2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014).

While the misbehaviour-as-resistance debate is important – and ongoing – perhaps the most important lesson we should take from it is a recognition that resistance is rarely pure or authentic; rather, it is often ambiguous and complex and may contain some measure of collusion or consent (Burawoy, 1979; Collinson, 1994; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Kondo, 1990). An intriguing suggestion is to dispense with both the effort to draw a line in the sand between authentic resistance and ‘decaf resistance’ and the tendency to readily declare any minute deviation from the strict observance of capitalist organizational standards as a revolutionary act. Therefore, it is probably most useful to treat routine resistance as a local social product – requiring a closer study of how individuals interact with their unique workplace settings, their specific intent and the results of their actions – and appreciate how the same type of misbehaviour can be regarded as relatively unthreatening mischief in one context and a significant act of resistance in another (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Courpasson, 2016; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Prasad, 2008).

However, even with our recognition that both the “resistance is everywhere” and “resistance is nowhere” perspectives are lacking, we can make no meaningful evaluation of resistance without a definition large enough to avoid reification and small enough that we do not declare all misbehaviour as resistance. For these purposes, a good place to start is the definition of resistance put forth by Paul Thompson: “[W]orkplace resistance should be considered an intentional, active, upwardly-directed response to managerial controls and appropriation of materials and symbolic resources” (2016, p. 118). This
definition, as is, continues the trend in most previous research on organizational misbehaviour of leaving employer misbehaviour outside the critical gaze. So, it is necessary to make the addendum that workplace resistance is also an upwardly-directed response against employer control or interests. This is a particularly important addition as the actions of managers are most frequently in-line with and representative of employer interests, and our understanding of the conflict between workers and managers is incomplete without this recognition.

1.3 General Methodological Notes

1.3.1 Data

The data for this study on misbehaviour was gathered as a part of a larger national survey project, titled “Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class Structure, Skill Use and the Place of Professions in Canada”. Two workplace misbehaviour items – employee and employer – were added to the 2016 version of the survey specifically for use in this study and are not included in the datasets from previous years. The other variables drawn upon were already present in the CWKE survey due to its general focus on issues related to work in Canada.

This survey was administered by the Leger research and polling firm through telephone and online questionnaires – beginning with a pilot phone survey in September 2015 – and all interviews were completed by the end of March 2016. Respondents were selected through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random selection of respondents from the Leger web panel (made up of approximately 475,000 members). In total, 1248 respondents were reached through telephone while the remaining 1779 sampled respondents completed their interviews online. Our total sample is comprised of just over three thousand respondents (N=3007) drawn from the Canadian population of adults above 18 years of age who speak one of Canada’s official languages and reside in a private home in one of Canada’s ten provinces (territories excluded). The sample was also intended to include only employed individuals and those temporarily absent from
work (ex. parental leave, vacation, etc.), but 28 unemployed individuals were erroneously included. After removing these unemployed individuals, our final sample is comprised of 2,979 employed Canadians. For the telephone portion of the survey, the response rate was approximately 33%, while the online portion had a response rate of 65%: This resulted in an overall response rate of 52% (for further information on response rate, please see Appendix 1). The survey data have been weighted using information from the 2016 Labour Force Survey on region, age, sex and educational attainment. Our dataset is nationally representative, allowing us to study the general phenomenon of misbehaviour as manifested within the workplaces of Canada and facilitating accurate comparison of different segments of the labour force. This dataset is utilized for the entirety of the analyses that follow.

One common limitation with survey data collected from web panels is under-representation of those without access to the internet (or limited access) and those who are less-skilled in internet use. A second limitation of web panels is that they are often susceptible to self-selection bias. These limitations represent a potential source of error for the 1779 respondents selected from the Leger web panel. However, the Leger Research and Intelligence Group have taken a number of efforts to increase the quality of their web panel and guard against these limitations which are worth mentioning here:

1) 60% of the panel of 475,000 individuals are recruited by phone using RDD (The majority of the rest are recruited through referrals – 25%).

2) The panel is monitored using email verification, digital fingerprinting, quality checks and illogical response detection to remove inactive users, cheaters or “speeders” (those who rush through filling out a survey without comprehension of questions).

3) Respondents for this survey were selected at random from the larger Leger web panel.
1.3.2 Practical Issues Related to the Study of Organizational Misbehaviour

There are two main characteristics of workplace misbehaviour which complicate any study of the phenomenon. First, workplace misbehaviour – by the very definition of it as such – will always be accompanied by some manner of negative connotations. Where the activities associated with workplace misbehaviour are not illegal, they are usually at least frowned upon – if it were otherwise, they would not be perceived of as misbehaviour, after all. Even when an individual does not perceive her own actions as constituting misbehaviour, an appreciation for the fact that others may view the matter differently may cause her to take measures towards hiding evidence of her involvement in questionable practices. As a result, any study of misbehaviour is faced by the usual challenges of research into behaviour widely perceived as deviant or undesirable and requires the addressing of significant ethical considerations and guaranteed protection of the respondent.

Faced with these challenges, much of the study of misbehaviour has taken the form of participant observation with reasonable effort taken to conceal the identity of the involved parties. Participant observation is particularly useful for demonstrating how the expression of misbehaviour is associated with the unique factors and social dynamics present within every workplace, but there are obvious complications with connecting these findings with a more generalizable understanding of the phenomenon.

In the present study, we chose a different methodological approach for dealing with the ethical and practical challenges of studying misbehaviour by requesting only that respondents report their evaluation of the overall frequency of misbehaviour in their workplace – not necessarily including any misbehaviour engaged in by them. An obvious benefit of this approach is to provide protection for respondents and encourage them to answer truthfully – granting them deniability as well as anonymity. A drawback of our approach is that we cannot know how much of the misbehaviour reported by the respondent is also carried out by them, though it is reasonable to assume that our measures of the frequency of misbehaviour within a respondent’s workplace and a hypothetical measure of the respondent’s own misbehaviour might be associated. Our
decision to rely exclusively on survey data allows us to make inferences about the extent of the phenomenon in Canadian workplaces but does prevent us from a deeper understanding of organizational misbehavior which might be provided by qualitative methods.

The second characteristic of misbehavior that needs to be acknowledged in the context of our methodological approach is the element of subjectivity contained within our measures of misbehavior. This is not an issue unique to the present study, as any research utilizing data reported by human subjects will contain some reporting error, but this issue is likely compounded by differences in individual definitions of what constitutes misbehavior. While we expect that our respondents are generally accurate in their evaluation of the frequency of misbehavior within their workplace, it is undeniable that these reports will be coloured by their own subjectivity and the availability of evidence of misbehavior, some of which will be hidden from them. We acknowledge that fact here and move forward with the understanding that this is an inherent limitation of our decision to study misbehavior in general – instead of limiting ourselves to one or more specific manifestations of the phenomenon.

1.3.3 Key Misbehaviour Variables

Our study is concerned with perceptions of misbehavior frequency in the work organization and we have two measures available for examining this phenomenon. Our first measure concerns the most often studied form of organizational misbehavior – employee misbehavior. For this questionnaire item, respondents were asked the following: “How common do you think employee misbehavior such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?” Responses were close-ended with options on a 4-point scale ranging from extremely uncommon to extremely common. Two non-response categories were also available for those who preferred not to answer or said they did not know – around 10% of all respondents chose one of these non-response options.
Our survey also contained a measure for employer misbehaviour. Respondents were asked, “How common do you think employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?” and provided with the same four ordinal response options as for the employee misbehaviour item. Once again, respondents had the ability to give the answers “I don’t know” or “I prefer not to answer” and 13% of them chose to do so.

We conducted a non-response analysis for each of our key misbehaviour variables (See Appendix 2 for detailed results). Self-employed respondents had significantly higher odds of providing non-valid responses to each of these items compared to the comparison category of service workers: They were 3.38 times more likely not to respond to our employee misbehaviour item and 2.10 times more likely not to respond to the employer misbehaviour item. Female respondents (1.64) also had higher odds of nonresponse to the employee variable compared with male respondents. The rest of the significant results of our non-response analyses concerned only the employer misbehaviour item. Higher respondent wealth increased the chance of valid response, with each unit increase in the 15-point wealth variable corresponding with a 7% decrease in the odds of non-response. On the other hand, a higher respondent age suggested greater chance of non-response, with each extra year of life representing a 2% increase in the odds of non-response. Finally, highest level of education received played a role, as both the holders of a non-university post-secondary certificate (.60) or a Bachelor’s degree (.58) had about 40% lower odds of non-response to our employer misbehaviour item, compared with the reference category of those whose highest education is a high school diploma.

1.3.4 Conceptualization of Misbehaviour

The concept of misbehaviour utilized throughout the present study is that advanced by Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) of organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999, p. 7). There are two primary methodological justifications for why this conceptualization is appropriate for our study.
First, we think it is reasonable to suggest that this definition runs close to a layperson’s understanding of workplace misbehaviour and the standpoint from which most respondents would understand our questions as presented to them. Second, the misbehaviour items available to us are not specific in identifying what behaviours respondents should consider as misbehaviour. Aside from the examples included in the questionnaire of taking organizational materials or loafing for employee misbehaviour and not paying out earned benefits or avoiding taxes for employer misbehaviour, we cannot make assumptions about which activities respondents perceive as examples of employee or employer misbehavior. It might also be the case that respondents restricted their answers to primarily those activities described by the examples and other types of misbehavior (ex. sabotage) may be underreported. As a result, our misbehaviour items provide us with a more diffuse measure of the phenomena of interest and it makes methodological sense to make use of a general definition which can be expected to encompass a diversity of perceptions on misbehaviour.

1.4 The Path Forward

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of this dissertation and covered a number of general methodological notes. The following three chapters (2, 3 and 4) contain our data analyses. Our fifth chapter brings together the results of the chapters which precede it and concludes this dissertation.

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mortality increase in California due to the Volkswagen emission control defeat


Chapter 2

2 Canadian Workers Misbehaving

2.1 Introduction

Individuals do not always follow the rules at work and the study of the organizational misbehaviour of employees is concerned with expanding our understanding of why workers engage in activities on the job that they are not supposed to do (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992).

The variety of practices understood as misbehaviour is extensive – ex. loafing on the job, vandalism, absenteeism, sabotage, theft – and varies considerably based on one’s own definition of proper behaviour, but it is increasingly clear that employee misbehaviour is pervasive within contemporary workplaces. Several notable studies have estimated that as many as 75% of all employees routinely engage in some form of misbehaviour (Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007) with 90% of informants reporting it as an everyday occurrence in their workplace (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989) and the average worker spending approximately two hours of her workday engaged in activities unrelated to her paid work (Paulsen, 2014).

The aim of this study is to contribute a general study of perceptions of undifferentiated employee misbehaviour that goes beyond individualistic accounts of the phenomenon and illuminates class position, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustices as primary explanatory variables. In doing so, we reconnect the already established currents within the organizational misbehaviour literature surrounding issues of injustice and challenges to autonomy with a Marxist appreciation of alienation as an enduring source of dissatisfaction with work – and motivation towards employee misbehaviour – inherent to the structure of the capitalist system.

A major contribution of this study is located within its provision of results representative of the entire Canadian working population – the first study on employee misbehaviour to do so, according to our knowledge. In fact, the lack of representative data sets in misbehaviour research is not an issue limited to Canadian studies. Due to the negative
connotations associated with employee misbehaviour and the difficulties associated with definition and detection, many studies have opted for a qualitative approach focused on intimate observation of the activities taking place in a single work organization – or occasionally several (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992). These studies are interesting and informative – particularly for their ability to illuminate the motives and varieties of employee misbehaviour – but are limited in generalizability or comparison between diverse types of workers. Our study addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature.

2.2 Background

The activities defined as misbehaviour – and the types of misbehaviour most deserving of attention – obviously differ by the interests and discipline of the individual researcher, but there are still some dominant trends within the literature. Emphasizing employee misbehaviour as a method of output restriction and re-appropriation by workers (Amichai-Hamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Roy, 1952; Taylor, 1911) is one major trend that has contributed to a prioritizing of activities which are readily understood in such a context, such as sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002; Analoui, 1995; Sprouse, 1992; Taylor & Walton, 1971) and pilferage/employee theft (Atkinson, 2006; Brock et al., 2017; Greenberg, 1990, 1993; Henle et al., 2010; Hollinger & Clark, 1983).

This stream of research remains strong, but other new and interesting perspectives on misbehaviour are expanding the range of activities coming under study: For example, the conception of misbehaviour as a coping strategy for disaffected workers has brought previously unacknowledged activities – clowning, cynical joking and gossip – into the picture (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Contu, 2008; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Noon & Blyton, 2007; Noon & Delbridge, 1993; Taylor & Bain, 2003), while the growth of the service industry has prompted understandable interest into the unique forms and characteristics of service sabotage and a new appreciation of the workplace conflict arising from the required interaction with belligerent or harassing customers (Ang &
Almost as numerous as the forms of employee misbehaviour are the diversity of explanatory variables which have been explored, but these factors are generally aligned with either an individual pathological approach to the phenomenon or one that emphasizes the role of structural conditions present within the workplace.

Some of the individual explanatory factors that have received considerable attention in the organizational misbehaviour literature are emotional intelligence (Bibi, 2013; Lee & Ok, 2014), aggression or anti-social tendencies (Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Kets de Vries, 2017) and ethical or moral immaturity (Henle et al., 2010). To some extent, there will always be a limited number of cases of employee misbehaviour traceable to individual pathology or interpersonal conflict. However, any approach to the study of employee misbehaviour that prioritizes individual characteristics will advance an incomplete understanding of the topic – and it is an unfortunate reality that pathological explanations of employee misbehaviour remain popular among managers and other policy-makers (Analoui, 1995; Edward et al., 1995).

Individualistic models of employee misbehaviour draw on a popular assumption of general worker compliance in advanced industrial countries (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999; Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972) and the mistaken belief that most acts of misbehaviour are attributable to a small minority of “bad-apple” employees (Bibi, 2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999; Leavitt, 1973; Wilson & Rosenfeld, 1990). However, it has become increasingly clear that the worker pathology explanation of misbehaviour is untenable in the face of a wealth of evidence that suggests these activities are ubiquitous and engaged in by numerous – if not the majority of – workers (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989).

Correspondingly, the primary trend in the organizational misbehaviour literature has been to approach the phenomenon as a rational reaction by individuals to the conditions of their work environment. A variety of organizational characteristics has been highlighted
as potential predictors of employee misbehaviour, but the structural factors which receive the most attention are those which result in greater dissatisfaction and discontent for the worker – feelings which, according to one source, may account for as many as 65% of all cases of employee misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995). It should come as no surprise that the most influential determinants of employee misbehaviour are also useful for measuring degraded or dissatisfying working conditions – lack of autonomy and the experience of injustice.

2.2.1 Autonomy

Worker autonomy is a variable included in much of the previous research on employee misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose, 2002; Analoui, 1995; Ang & Koslow, 2015; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014) and has received frequent attention as a prerequisite for satisfaction with one’s work. The desire of the labourer to be meaningfully engaged in the labour process as an active agent runs deep and – when this need is not satisfied – employees are more motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Edwards et al., 1995; Mulholland, 2004).

Hypothesis 1: Respondents reporting more autonomy in their work will report less employee misbehaviour in the workplace.

2.2.2 Injustice

Another key variable found to be associated with higher rates of employee misbehaviour is the experience of injustice in the workplace. Here, the literature provides considerable evidence of how ‘the motivation to redress violations of moral norms indeed triggers retaliatory tendencies…’ (Skarlicki et al., 2008) and how misbehaviour can function as a method of retaking one’s dignity in the face of whatever injustice is present within one’s
workplace (Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Sheppard et al., 1992; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 2008).

It is true that some amount of the injustice experienced within the workplace will be the result of interpersonal conflict not necessarily related to the structural characteristics of the organization, but a great amount of the injustice experienced by workers can be linked to causes endemic to the work organization – for instance, unethical operating procedures and hostile or unsafe work environments (Hodson, 1995; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulsen, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999).

Therefore, in accordance with the findings of previous studies, we expect to find that greater injustice in the workplace will be accompanied with greater amounts of employee misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002; Baron & Neuman, 1996; Martinko & Zellars, 1998; McLean Parks, 1997; McLean Parks & Kiddler, 1994).

**Hypothesis 2:** Respondents experiencing injustice at work will report more employee misbehaviour.

### 2.2.3 Occupational Class

Writing before the establishment of organizational misbehaviour as a distinct area of study, Marx’s work on exploitation and alienation of the wage labourer – inherent contradictions of the capitalist system – remain relevant as factors explaining contemporary dissatisfaction with work (Adonis & Pollard, 1997; Marx, 1844, 1867; McGlynn, 2016; O’Donohue & Nelson, 2014; Rosa, 2010). It is evident that the majority of contemporary workplace conflict continues to surround traditional issues related to class antagonism – amount of pay, the amount and intensity of work and control over the labour process (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Thompson, 2015).

A useful method for conceptualizing class in contemporary times is to emphasize the individual’s occupational position within the relations of capitalist production
Taking this perspective is particularly useful in recognizing and accounting for the reality that workers can occupy a variety of class positions and may have interests in conflict with other workers – that is, semi-autonomous workers may share some interests in common with less privileged workers, but more closely align with the interests of employers on other matters.

An approach to class based on occupational position offers a more nuanced understanding of the diversity of interests represented within the employed population. The distinctions between isolated groups of workers enabled by a focus on occupational class is particularly useful for understanding the divergent experiences of workers in the face of the developing knowledge economy in Canada – characterized by growth in the service sector, a higher proportion of labourers attaining post-secondary education, credential inflation and a growing number of jobs requiring specialized knowledge (Adams, 2010; Livingstone, 2014; Livingstone & Guile, 2012). Without a recognition of class divisions between employees, one risks making general assumptions about the experience of work in contemporary society (see the professionalization of everyone vs. proletarianization debate [Bell, 1976; Cotada, 1998; Haug, 1975; Larson, 1980; Wilensky, 1964]). Our occupational class position variable (see Appendix 3 for construction logic) allows us to compare how the unique working conditions faced by different classes of employees can contribute to divergence in the amount of organizational misbehaviour and explain why more privileged workers (professionals) might be less motivated towards engaging in misbehaviour than those who are confronted by less-desirable working conditions (industrial and service workers).

**Hypothesis 3:** Professional workers will report less employee misbehaviour than service and industrial workers.
2.2.4 Social Class

Although the focus of the class analysis presented in this paper surrounds occupational class (outlined in the section above), we had some interest in exploring the relationship between alternative conceptions of class and employee misbehaviour. Correspondingly, we included two alternative measures for class in our study – one an objective wealth measure and the other comprised of a subjective self-evaluation – with the intention to interrogate whether either of these social class measures might have a unique relationship with our dependent variable not already accounted for by the occupational class variable. We expect that individuals of a lower social class are more likely to be exposed to the degraded working conditions that often give rise to a greater frequency of employee misbehaviour.

**Hypothesis 4:** Lower social class (objective economic and subjective evaluation) will correlate with a greater amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.

2.3 Methodology

2.3.1 Data

The dataset for this study is made up of a subsample drawn from the larger Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy: Occupational Class Structure, Skill Use and the Place of Professions in Canada (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians (N=2,979). This survey focuses on examining issues surrounding work and lifelong learning and respondents were selected through random digit dialing (RDD) and simple random selection of respondents from a professional web panel of approximately 475,000 respondents maintained by the Leger Research Intelligence Group (see our general methodology notes in chapter 1 for more information about our data). Our focus on non-managerial workers’ reporting of employee misbehaviour frequency necessitated the removal of all employers and managers from our analytical sample. Using our 9-category occupational class variable as a filter, we removed all large employers, small employers, self-employed, upper managers, middle managers, supervisors and
unclassified individuals from the data set. Our final analytic sample is made up of all the employed respondents belonging to one of the three categories of non-managerial employee: Professional employee, service worker and industrial worker. After the above selection, we were left with 1,880 respondents (from a total sample of 2,979 working individuals).

2.4 Measures

2.4.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for the present analysis measures the most commonly studied form of organizational misbehaviour – employee misbehaviour. The questionnaire item associated with this variable requested that respondents answer the following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?” The valid responses to this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging from extremely uncommon to extremely common, with fairly uncommon and fairly common as intermediary options (See general methodological notes section in chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for a non-response analysis).

2.4.2 Independent Variables

2.4.2.1 Occupational Class

Our original occupational class variable was constructed using detailed job description and job title information (See Appendix 3 for construction logic). After the selection of only non-managerial employees for our analytical sample, we were left with a 3-category occupational class variable: (1) professional employees, (2) service workers and (3) industrial workers. We privilege occupational class over social class in these analyses because of the former’s closer connection with the actual conditions that individuals experience in their work as a result of their occupational position within the relations of
capitalist production (Livingstone & Scholtz, 2016; Livingstone & Watts, 2018; Wright, 1980).

We also regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of production: Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than both non-managerial professional employees and managerial employees. Within the managerial hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle managers, who are themselves lower than upper managers. In the context of this study, we will often refer to industrial and service workers as lower class and we do so in the context of their relatively disadvantaged position in the relations of productions compared with other employees.

2.4.2.2 Social Class

We utilized 2 measures to represent social class: Respondent total net wealth and personal class identification. Our net wealth variable was originally presented to respondents as a 15-point scale ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,” but has since been reduced to only ten categories for ease of analysis and presentation. Our second measure of social class – personal class identification – was selected to complement our wealth measure with one which incorporated respondent subjectivity. Our personal class identification variable was constructed by grouping together the verbatim results of inquiry into what class respondents placed themselves. Respondents were not limited in their answers, but most answers fit cleanly into one of five categories used in the construction of our final personal class identification measure: (1) Poor, (2) Working, (3) Middle, (4) Upper middle and (5) Rich. It will not surprise the reader to hear that our two measures of social class are significantly associated, but we believe both to be important in a discussion of how social class – and the interests derived from it – relates to the amount of employee misbehaviour in the workplace.
2.4.2.3 Autonomy

Our survey data provided us with many potential autonomy measures, but we have limited ourselves to just the two most relevant. The first of these measures provides a local measure of job autonomy and how much control respondents have in relation to the specific circumstances under which their labour takes place, while the second is concerned with employee involvement in general decision-making processes in the work organization.

Our local autonomy variable is composed of responses to the question “How often is it possible for you to plan or design your own work?” recorded on a 5-point scale from “Never” to “All the time”. For our ‘inclusion in organizational decision-making autonomy’ variable, responses to the question “Would you like to have more say than you do now in decisions in your workplace?” are limited to two categories – yes and no.

2.4.2.4 Injustice

The process of selecting appropriate measures to operationalize the experience of workplace injustice was not uncomplicated. In the absence of a straightforward measure of injustice, we have identified four variables which together outline common circumstances experienced by employees which might reasonably result in a sense of unfair treatment: Feeling that one is undercompensated, being discriminated against, feeling one’s health and safety is threatened and expecting to lose one’s job.

Our first injustice measure – related to inadequate compensation – is ordinal and made up of responses to the question “Compared to the value you produce at your workplace, do you think your compensation is much less than you deserve, somewhat less, about right, somewhat more than you deserve or much more than you deserve?”. Our second measure of injustice was measured by asking respondents whether they had been discriminated against by anyone at work in the past year (yes or no). For our third injustice variable, we measured threats to employee health and safety with the question “To what extent, if at all, do you think your health or safety is at risk because of your
job?” Valid responses fell into one of four ordinal categories ranging from “Not at all” to “A great deal”. Finally, the risk of job loss as a source of injustice was measured with respondents’ answers to the question of how likely it was that they would lose their job in the next 12 months. Responses are once again organized into four ordinal categories: (1) Very likely, (2) Somewhat likely, (3) Somewhat unlikely and (4) Very unlikely.

2.4.2.5 Demographic Variables

In preliminary analysis, we examined the relationships between several individual demographic variables that are often influential in sociological research (race, gender and age) and our dependent variable (see Table 2.1). Race and gender were found to have no significant impact on the reporting of employee misbehaviour. Age was expected to show a negative correlation with misbehaviour and we found evidence of a weak relationship in the expected direction. This relationship may be explained by older employees having more to lose from discovery of their misbehaviour or being more content with/acquainted to their position and so less motivated towards misbehaviour. This age effect was relatively minor, however, with only a 18% difference between the youngest and oldest groups in the number of respondents reporting misbehaviour as common in their workplace. All three of these demographic variables were left out of any further analysis.
Table 2.1 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Demographic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percentage % who report employee misbehaviour as common or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1688</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>-0.065*</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.2.6 Organizational Control Variables

Our control variables were selected to avoid spuriousness related to important organizational characteristics which we might expect to be related to the amount of organizational misbehaviour taking place within a workplace.

The first of these control variables is the size of the work organization, represented by the categories of an 8-point scale from “1 to 2 employees” to “1000 or more employees”.

The second organizational control variable is the general industry associated with the work organization: (1) Goods-producing, (2) Mixed (transport, storage or communication) or (3) Service-providing. The final organizational measure accounts for the sector that best characterizes the work organization (private, public or non-profit).
2.4.2.7 A Note on Multicollinearity

To check for potential issues with multicollinearity, we constructed a correlation matrix (see Appendix 4). There are a number of weak or very weak correlations between independent variables that are not particularly surprising (ex. personal class identification and personal wealth). Outside of these weak correlations, the stronger associations are primarily limited to the various categories of the included dummy variables (to be expected and not cause for concern). One relationship of moderate strength that is worth mentioning here is between the industrial worker occupational class category and employment within a goods-producing organization (.42). Again, this relationship is not particularly surprising, but worth noting. Overall, our correlation matrix suggests that there is little reason to suspect multicollinearity of significantly impacting our results.

We conducted a separate multicollinearity check for the supplementary analysis concerning managerial workers and found very similar results (see Appendix 5). The industrial worker association with goods-producing organizations was not present (because there were no industrial workers in this analysis) and every one of the moderate or strong relationships were between the categories of the dummy variables and not a cause for concern in our supplemental analysis focusing on managers.

2.5 Analytical Approach

For the purposes of our analyses, we have divided our independent variables into several modules which group together like measures. This grouping by module acts as a reminder of our underlying conceptual framework, facilitates the evaluation of our hypotheses and provides the basis for how our multivariate analysis is structured. The modules are as follows:

0: Occupational Class

1: Social Class

2: Autonomy
3: Injustice

4: Organizational Controls

Modules 0 through 3 represent our key explanatory variables, with occupational class (module 0) present within most of the following analyses to enable the sustained comparison of employees across occupational category. Module 4 incorporates several organizational characteristics to be controlled for, but the role of these organizational variables in predicting employee misbehaviour is not otherwise emphasized in our study.

Our analysis is composed of two major sections. The first section is made up of the bivariate analyses between each independent variable and the employee misbehaviour measure. Throughout this section, occupational class is controlled for and measures of association and tests of significance are generated for each category of employee alongside the undifferentiated figures for all non-managerial employees.

The second section is composed of multivariate results from four ordinary least squares regression models. The first of these models contains only the independent variables corresponding to modules 0 and 1 – occupational class and social class. The second model retains modules 0 and 1 and adds in our autonomy variables (module 2). The third model retains all the previous modules and incorporates injustice measures (module 3). The fourth and final model also includes organizational control variables (module 4).

For the purposes of the multivariate analysis, we made the decision to treat our ordinal misbehaviour variable as continuous, enabling us to conduct OLS regression. There are several reasons behind this decision. First, we are more interested in measuring increases and decreases in misbehaviour related to changes in our independent variables than documenting the changes in likelihood of a respondent landing in a particular category on our dependent variable. Second, OLS regression allows us to use statistical techniques and methods of presentation which we believe our audience will be more familiar with and the advantage this lends to the communication of our results should not be understated. Third, we believe it is reasonable to assume approximately equal distance between the categories of our employee misbehaviour variable (1 extremely uncommon,
2 fairly uncommon, 3 fairly common, 4 extremely uncommon) and a linear relationship between variables, so OLS regression will provide us with understandable results based on realistic approximations. In bivariate analysis, we used gamma when possible (ordinal by ordinal analysis) and chi² when the independent variable was nominal (including Cramer’s V when strength of association was also required). Gamma makes no adjustment for table size or considers tied pairs so that it sometimes overemphasizes the strength of a relationship in comparison to alternative measures (ex. tau-b and tau-c). However, gamma and tau measures are most often very similar, and the former was chosen for its relative ease of interpretation and familiarity to the author. In preliminary analyses, we examined gamma alongside other ordinal by ordinal measures of association and found no evidence of gamma overexaggerating results.

2.5.1.1 Supplementary Analysis

Following a review of the results for our non-managerial analyses (outlined just above), the decision was made to expand on – and further contextualize – our initial findings with a supplementary analytical section.

This supplementary section repeats the format of the multivariate section for non-managerial employees, but substitutes an analytical sample made up of only managerial employees. Following from the precedent set in the literature on organizational misbehaviour, we excluded managerial employees from our initial analysis because of the significant differences in working conditions compared to non-managerial employees. In most research on employee misbehaviour, the role of managers in decision-making and setting policy and their efforts to control the behaviour of non-managerial workers are the aspects of their position that are emphasized (Ackroyd, 2015; Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Dundon & van den Broek, 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Jackall, 2010; Thompson, 2015). However, managers are still paid workers, so – though excluded from our primary results because of their role in organizational oversight – our supplementary analytical section examines how managerial employees experience organizational misbehaviour.
2.6 Results

2.6.1 Bivariate Analysis

2.6.1.1 Module 0: Occupational Class

The first step of our analysis was to compare perceptions of employee misbehaviour by occupational class. Here we found evidence of a significant relationship between variables (Table 2.2). Only about 31% of professional employees reported employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common, compared with 42% of service workers and 45% of industrial workers.

Table 2.2 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Occupational Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>Chi² =30.79</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.1.2 Module 1: Social Class

Table 2.3 displays the results of our analysis of wealth by employee misbehaviour. Here, we found evidence of a weak negative relationship, with respondents of a lower wealth level reporting more employee misbehaviour (γ = -.06). Interestingly, this relationship appears to be strongest for service workers (γ = -.10) though the association remains relatively weak overall.

Turning to our subjective measure of class identity, we found more evidence supporting the existence of a negative relationship between social class and employee misbehaviour. In Table 2.4, we can see that half of the poor respondents and 41% of the working class reported misbehaviour as being common in their workplace. The percentage of middle and upper middleclass respondents reporting misbehaviour is considerably lower and
only 29% of those employees who identify as rich report common misbehaviour. While this relationship between perceived class and employee misbehaviour is significant, it is relatively weak ($\gamma = -.14$) irrespective of occupational class.

**Table 2.3** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Social Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Wealth ($)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5,000</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 20,000</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001 to 40,000</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001 to 75,000</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,001 to 100,000</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,001 to 150,000</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,001 to 250,000</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,001 to 500,000</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,001 to 1 million</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1 million</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.4** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employee Personal Class Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Class Identification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.6.1.3 Module 2: Autonomy

Looking at the results for our autonomy measures, we found a relationship between lower levels of autonomy and higher reporting of employee misbehaviour in the workplace. This inverse relationship is evident for both of our autonomy measures (Table 2.5 and
Table 2.6) and the general trend holds for all non-managerial employees with some notable differences in magnitude by occupational class.

The relationship between having less local autonomy – the ability to plan/design your own work – and perceiving greater employee misbehaviour was significantly stronger for professional employees and slightly weaker for service employees. On the other hand, the connection between wanting to have more say in organizational decision-making and reporting more misbehaviour was considerably weaker for professional employees ($\gamma = .15$), compared to service ($\gamma = .24$) and industrial employees ($\gamma = .26$).

**Table 2.5** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by How Often Plan or Design Own Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often is it possible for you to plan or design your own work?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About half the time</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the time</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.6** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Want More Say in Organizational Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you like to have more say than you do now in decisions in your workplace?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.1.4 Module 3: Injustice

The first of our bivariate analyses utilizing measures of injustice focused on how respondents’ evaluations of the fairness of their compensation relates to the amount of employee misbehaviour occurring in the workplace (see Table 2.7). Here, we found
evidence of a negative relationship, with undercompensated workers reporting significantly more employee misbehaviour. Those who reported fair compensation (a match between remuneration and value produced) reported the lowest amount of employee misbehaviour. This trend held for all employees, but it appears that the relationship between compensation and misbehaviour is even stronger for industrial employees – and notably weaker for professional employees. Interestingly, the frequencies from Table 2.7 suggest that perceptions of misbehaviour might increase again when compensation is considered more than fair, but only a minority of respondents are fortunate enough to be paid so well and their contradictory results are not influential enough to reverse the general trend already outlined. However, this reversal in trend in later categories does make us question whether the relationship between subjective compensation and misbehaviour should instead be understood as curvilinear.

Table 2.7 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Fairness of Compensation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compared to the value produced, respondent compensation is:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much less than deserved</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat less</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat more</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more than deserved</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.8 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Experienced Discrimination at Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the last year, at work, have you been discriminated against, in any way by anyone you've had contact with?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step in our injustice analyses revealed a significant and moderately strong positive relationship between the experience of discrimination at work and reports of
employee misbehaviour ($\gamma = .39$; Table 2.8). This relationship is even stronger for professional and service employees, in comparison to industrial workers, for whom discrimination and employee misbehaviour are less closely related.

In Table 2.9 the results of the next bivariate analysis respecting job safety are displayed. Unsurprisingly, we found evidence of an inverse relationship between safety at work and reported employee misbehaviour ($\gamma = -.26$). Only 28.9% of the employees whose job posed no risk to their health or safety reported employee misbehaviour as common in their workplace, compared with 48.4% of those whose job posed a great risk to health or safety. Once again, this trend was consistent in direction across all classes of employee, but notably weaker for industrial workers ($\gamma = -.11$).

**Table 2.9** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Safety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your health and safety at risk because of your job?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ((\gamma))</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great deal</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate amount</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.10** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Job Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How likely is it that you will lose your job in the next year?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ((\gamma))</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat likely</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unlikely</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1571</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.10 presents the relationship between job security and perceptions of employee misbehaviour. Those respondents perceiving a greater likelihood of immanent job loss reported more employee misbehaviour in their workplace. This relationship is significant for all non-managerial employees but is notably stronger for industrial workers.
2.6.1.5 Module 4: Organizational Measures

The final section of our bivariate analyses was concerned with observing the changes in the amount of employee misbehaviour according to relevant organizational characteristics. In Table 2.11, there is an obvious progression in the amount of misbehaviour reported according to the size of the organization ($\gamma = .12$) and, for service and industrial workers, this connection between larger organizational size and higher misbehaviour appears to be even stronger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Employees in the Work Organization</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 10</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 49</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 99</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 to 249</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 to 499</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 to 999</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 or more</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking to our second organizational variable, we found some limited – though significant – evidence of a relationship between the general industry of the organization and perceptions of the amount of misbehaviour taking place within it (Table 2.12). Service organizations appear to host slightly less employee misbehaviour than goods-producing or mixed organizations, but this gap only amounts to a difference of about 5% between industry categories.

The final organizational variable of interest to us was the sector of the work organization (Table 2.13). Here, we did not find any evidence that perceptions of the amount of employee misbehaviour vary according to the sector of the organization (private, public or a non-profit).
Table 2.12 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Industry of Work Organization</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goods-producing</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed (transport, storage, communication)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1688</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because industry was treated as nominal.

Table 2.13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Organizational Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector of Work Organization</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Classification of Employee</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>All Employees</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cramer’s V utilized in place of gamma because sector was treated as nominal.

2.6.2 Multivariate Analysis

The results of all four of our multivariate models are displayed in Table 2.14. Model 1 included only occupational class and our two social class measures as independent variables. The results from this model indicate that industrial workers – and service workers to a lesser extent – report more frequent employee misbehaviour than professional workers. Model 1 also identifies a negative relationship between wealth and our dependent variable: Those with more wealth were more likely to report lower levels of employee misbehaviour. In contrast, we found no evidence of a significant relationship for personal class identification, suggesting that there is no unique association between it and the dependent variable not already explained by reference to occupational class or wealth.

Model 2 incorporated all the variables present in Model 1 and introduced our two autonomy measures. With these additions, we see that the higher reports of employee misbehaviour by industrial workers remains significant – and of comparable strength to
the results of Model 1 – while the difference between the amount of misbehaviour reported by service and professional workers loses significance. Model 2 also reports a loss of significance for wealth – leaving both of our social class measures without evidence of association with the dependent variable. On the other hand, there is evidence of significant association between both of the newly added autonomy measures and our dependent variable: Respondents with less ability to plan/design their own work and those who indicated that they want more influence in organizational decision-making reported employee misbehaviour as a more common occurrence than employees with greater autonomy.

Model 3 retains all previously included variables and introduces our four injustice measures. Of these measures, we found two to be positively correlated with perceptions of employee misbehaviour – employees experiencing workplace discrimination or working in an unsafe or unhealthy workplace tended to report higher levels of misbehaviour. Workplace discrimination seems particularly influential here (β= .16). Additionally, this third multivariate analysis saw our autonomy measures lose statistical significance. Meanwhile, service employees were again found to report significantly more employee misbehaviour than professionals with a notably larger difference between the two classes than that seen in the second model – bringing the amount of misbehaviour reported by service workers closer to the figures for industrial workers.

In our fourth and final multivariate model, we included several organizational measures alongside all variables from model 3. Here, we found evidence of a positive relationship between the number of individuals in a work organization and the frequency of misbehaviour taking place. There were also indications of significantly more misbehaviour within goods-producing organizations, compared to service organizations. Meanwhile, employees of mixed industry work organizations (i.e. communication, storage, transport) reported significantly less misbehaviour than the employees of both goods-producing and service organizations.
Table 2.14 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour (Non-Managerial Workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Module 0: Occupational Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.08* (.075)</td>
<td>.072 (.077)</td>
<td>.105* (.079)</td>
<td>.136** (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>.134***</td>
<td>.128***</td>
<td>0.119** (.086)</td>
<td>0.129** (.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 1: Social Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Wealth</td>
<td>-.078* (.011)</td>
<td>-.069 (.011)</td>
<td>-.046 (.012)</td>
<td>-.058 (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Class</td>
<td>-.06 (.038)</td>
<td>-.053 (.039)</td>
<td>-.040 (.041)</td>
<td>-.067 (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 2: Autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance to plan or design own work</td>
<td>-.075* (.024)</td>
<td>-.057 (.025)</td>
<td>-.052 (.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want more say in organizational decisions</td>
<td>.07* (.064)</td>
<td>-.001 (.068)</td>
<td>-.017 (.069)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 3: Injustice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced</td>
<td>.000 (.038)</td>
<td>-.008 (.039)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced discrimination at work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.16*** (.089)</td>
<td>.134*** (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety at work</td>
<td>-.147*** (.017)</td>
<td>-.132*** (.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>.046 (.039)</td>
<td>.026 (.040)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 4: Organizational Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.204*** (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods-producing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.085* (.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.076* (.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.055 (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.022 (.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).

No notable relationship was discovered between organizational sector and employee misbehaviour. And, once again, no evidence of significance was found for any of the social class or autonomy measures. However, the relationships between two of the injustice measures – discrimination in the workplace and threats to health and safety – and the dependent variable remained significant and of comparable strength to previous
models. Finally, occupational class also remained a significant indicator of reported organizational misbehaviour with both service and industrial workers reporting considerably more misbehaviour than professional employees.

2.6.3 Supplementary Analysis for Managerial Employees

Table 2.15 contains the results of the supplementary multivariate analysis for managerial employees. The variables and order of inclusion in these models largely match those of the multivariate analysis for non-managerial employees, with the only real difference limited to the change in categories of occupational class resulting from the change in sample.

Model 1 included only occupational class and social class measures as explanatory factors. The results linked to occupational class follow the general trend established by the non-managerial employees of lower occupational class corresponding to more employee misbehaviour – supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour ($\beta= .245$) than higher level managers.

As before with the non-managerial employees, Model 2 of this supplementary analysis incorporates our two autonomy measures alongside the variables from Model 1. Here, we found evidence of a relationship between wanting more influence in organizational decision-making and reporting higher amounts of employee misbehaviour ($\beta= .118$). Occupational class remained relevant with supervisors reporting considerably more misbehaviour ($\beta= .279$) than higher-level managers.

Model 3 incorporates our four injustice variables alongside those of Model 2. Once again, supervisors reported significantly more misbehaviour ($\beta= .285$). However, we found that the relationship from Model 2, concerning the connection between the desire for more influence in organizational decision-making and reporting higher amounts of misbehaviour, lost significance in this new model. On the other hand, appropriateness of compensation (amount received vs. value of work) emerged as a significant factor, with
Managers reporting less misbehaviour as the appropriateness of their compensation increased ($\beta = -0.164$).

**Table 2.15: Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour (Managerial Workers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module 0: Occupational Class</th>
<th>Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper manager (ref.)</td>
<td>Middle manager</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.118 (.185)</td>
<td>.164 (.188)</td>
<td>.183 (.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.245**</td>
<td>.279**</td>
<td>.285**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.211)</td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 1: Social Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Net Wealth</td>
<td>- .052</td>
<td>- .061</td>
<td>- .75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Class Identification</td>
<td>- .026</td>
<td>- .004</td>
<td>.054 (.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.069)</td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 2: Autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allowance to plan or design own work</td>
<td>- .020</td>
<td>- .005</td>
<td>- .009 (.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Want more say in organizational decisions</td>
<td>.118*</td>
<td>.057 (.121)</td>
<td>.065 (.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 3: Injustice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced</td>
<td>- .164*</td>
<td>- .172**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Experienced discrimination at work</td>
<td>.066 (.159)</td>
<td>.075 (.160)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Safety at work</td>
<td>- .083</td>
<td>- .081 (.033)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>- .049</td>
<td>- .033 (.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module 4: Organizational Measures</td>
<td>Number of employees</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>- .007 (.028)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Goods-producing</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed industry</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>291</th>
<th>280</th>
<th>261</th>
<th>257</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).
Finally, the addition of our organizational control variables in Model 4 revealed no notable difference from the Model 3 results – supervisors and undercompensated managers continued to report significantly more misbehaviour than those who received better compensation or who occupied a higher position in the managerial hierarchy.

2.7 Discussion

Throughout all our analyses, respondent occupational class emerged as a variable wielding considerable influence over the perceived amount of employee misbehaviour reported. From a perspective on employee misbehaviour that understands the phenomenon as a reaction by workers to the negative working conditions that confront them at work, we would expect those occupying lower occupational classes to endure the most degraded working conditions, experience the greatest alienation and to most often find their own interests in conflict with organizational imperatives (Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Marx, 1844, 1867). It would follow that workers of lower occupational classes will be most motivated towards misbehaviour and our results appear to reinforce previous work that has emphasized the potential for employee misbehaviour to act as a form of worker resistance (Analoui, 1995; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Mulholland, 2004). It is not clear to us whether employee misbehaviour should be understood as resistance, but it seems obvious that there is a positive correlation between the perceived frequency of misbehaviour and the experience of degraded work.

In addition to the above general finding, we found that professional workers reported significantly less employee misbehaviour than both industrial and service workers. There are several potential explanations for the lower rates in perceived misbehaviour by professional employees. One explanation is that misbehaviour is no less frequent among professionals, but that professionals are less inclined to report the misbehaviour of their peers. The literature suggests that many professionals are often hesitant to report even the most serious misconduct by their professional peers (Coburn, 1999; Collier, 2012;
DesRoches et al., 2010; Fesler, 2015), so it is reasonable to assume that less serious misbehaviour by others of their profession would frequently pass beneath notice.

A second explanation for the lower reporting of misbehaviour by professionals could be differences between their definitions of organizational misbehaviour compared to the definitions of non-professionals. Our misbehaviour survey item provides employee theft and loafing as examples of misbehaviour and it could be that these examples are less applicable to professional work. A review of the professional literature reveals much emphasis by professional organizations on preventing unethical behaviour that violates the public trust in the profession (Bakre, 2007; Golden & Schmidt, 1998), and so it is possible that professionals interpreted our misbehaviour measure differently than non-professionals.

A third explanation for a lower perceived frequency of misbehaviour among professionals could be related to the behavioural regulation provided by a strong conception of occupational identity. Previous work has outlined the importance of jurisdictional claims in the process of professional recognition (Abbott, 1988; Adams, 2010) and the conception of a distinct professional identity is central to this process (Cruess, 2014; Procter, 2017). Correspondingly, individuals seeking to break into professional work must do more than simply acquire the requisite technical skills and knowledge – they must construct a new personal identity in line with the values, beliefs and relations characteristic of the profession (Williams, 2013; Webb, 2017). We suggest that the personal regulation required for a professional identity may inhibit employee misbehaviour because of the dissonance brought on by engaging in misbehaviour while also trying to maintain one’s conception of self as upholding the ideals of the profession.

Perhaps the best way to understand the lower reported frequency of misbehaviour by professionals is with reference to the unique privileges enjoyed by these employees over non-professionals. Professional workers generally enjoy more autonomy and authority in their work, greater protection through work-related rights and privileges and a higher social status than non-professionals (Abbott, 1988; Adams, 2010; Leicht & Fennell, 2001; Wilensky, 1964). Though the extent of these advantages will understandably vary,
it is evident that most professional employees enjoy some unique benefits over their non-professional counterparts and partial protection from the conditions of degraded work that often motivate employees towards misbehaviour.

In parallel with previous research, we found evidence of a relationship between workplace injustice and greater employee misbehaviour (Ferris et al., 2012; Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Hollinger & Clark, 1983; Karlsson, 2012). However, not every injustice measure was a significant predictor of the perceived frequency of misbehaviour in our multivariate model: For non-managerial employees, we found no evidence of association for the injustice measures related to compensation or job security, so it was only injustice related to discrimination or unsafe working conditions that predicted a higher reporting of misbehaviour. It is not entirely clear why these two measures of injustice are particularly influential, but there are some clues in the literature, as it has already been established that the type and source of injustice experienced by the worker is associated with the type and target of retaliatory misbehaviour (Ambrose et al., 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Skarlicki et al., 2008). It could be that the injustice of working in unsafe conditions is particularly motivating towards misbehaviour because of its stark demonstration of a lack of regard by employers/managers for the safety and wellbeing of the worker. In these circumstances – with a clear source of injustice and an obvious division between the interests of workers and owners/managers – it is easier to understand why we find evidence of greater employee misbehaviour than when the source of injustice is less obvious and the type of injustice less offensive. Following this line of argument, the lesser effect of injustice related to compensation and job insecurity on the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour might be explained by difficulties in locating the source of the injustice or assigning culpability – for example, inadequate reimbursement might be perceived as an organizational necessity dictated by market forces/competition, rather than as a concerted effort by owners to expand their profits at the expense of workers’ wages.

We were interested to find that, among the managerial employees, misbehaviour was reported as significantly more frequent by those in lower managerial positions (supervisors). The explanation of these results is not entirely clear, but we suggest the
systematic perception of greater misbehaviour by those in lower-management is likely connected to the expectations of their position within the work organization. The job of supervisor or foreperson will usually entail some element of responsibility for the routine discipline of workers and the detection of – and intervention against – employee misbehaviour, and it makes sense that those who are paid to be on the lookout for misbehaving employees will more often find them. In contrast to supervisors, middle and upper managers have a certain distance from the day-to-day activities of employees, so routine and minor misbehaviour might often go beneath their notice.

Considering their strength of influence in our main analysis, it was surprising to find that working in an unsafe job or being discriminated against in the workplace were not also associated with higher amounts of reported misbehaviour by managerial employees. Instead, only the inappropriate pay injustice measure was significantly associated with a higher reporting of misbehaviour by managers. These results may reflect class differences in the interests and priorities of managerial versus non-managerial employees – it is for this very reason that we conducted a supplementary analysis for these managerial employees and did not include them in our primary analysis of non-managerial workers.

The role expected of managerial employees in the work organization is to act as the employer’s agent and to represent the employer’s interests. It is reasonable that a well-compensated manager will be less motivated towards misbehaviour – as their interests are best served by maintenance of the status quo and the smooth-running of the organization. Correspondingly, managers will usually be those most motivated towards the curtailing of organizational misbehaviour – and it is for this reason that they have often been overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming, 2002; Giesberg, 2001). The results of our study could suggest that managers might also be inclined towards misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are not sufficient to insure their loyalty to employer interests – i.e. when compensation is too low – but we cannot be sure how much of the employee misbehaviour reported by managers is carried out by the
manager themselves: it is possible that managers who feel undercompensated are simply reporting more frequent non-managerial employee misbehaviour.

Initially, we were surprised to find only limited multivariate evidence for the relationship between a lack of autonomy and increased misbehaviour, considering this relationship has been emphasized by numerous previous studies (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014). However, this finding may be explained by our inclusion of occupational class as an explanatory variable – a measure left out of most other research on organizational misbehaviour. In an additional multivariate model not reproduced here, we found that the removal of class measures – occupational class and social class – saw every injustice and autonomy measure emerge as significant predictors of the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour.

Therefore, we suggest that fairness of compensation, job security and greater autonomy correspond with a lower amount of perceived employee misbehaviour, but that these variables are so closely related with class that they have little unique influence on the dependent variable once class is already controlled for.

Finally, though organizational characteristics were not a focal point of our study, we did find evidence to suggest greater misbehaviour within larger work organizations. This relationship was significant in the multivariate analysis for non-managerial workers ($\beta = .204$). This relationship between organizational size and the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour may be the result of the additional cover granted by the relative anonymity in the large organization (Ashforth, 1994; Roscigno et al., 2009). Alternatively, the intensification of alienation and heavy rationalization characteristic of many large organizations might act as additional motivation towards employee misbehaviour (Braverman, 1974; Hodson, 2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006; Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997).
2.8 Conclusion

In accordance with previous research on organizational misbehaviour, we found lack of autonomy and workplace injustice to be important predictors of the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour. However, by incorporating and controlling for occupational class – a variable not present in much of the previous work – we found the unique explanatory power of these factors to be considerably weaker. Our results revealed a trend towards greater employee misbehaviour at lower class positions with industrial and service workers perceiving it as more frequent than professionals.

Professional work seemed to correlate with lower perceptions of misbehaviour, and these employees reported it as much less frequent than industrial and service workers. Taken together, these results make a case for the inclusion of occupational class as a general measure of the degraded working conditions that motivate employees towards organizational misbehaviour – and a measure that largely incorporates the roles of autonomy and injustice emphasized by previous work.

Furthermore, even after occupational class is controlled for, certain injustice measures – discrimination at work or unsafe working conditions – remain significantly associated with the amount of employee misbehaviour reported. Exploring the unique character of each different type of workplace injustice in relation to its impact on rates of organizational misbehaviour may provide one interesting direction for future research.

In our supplementary analysis of managers, we found a considerable divergence from the factors of significance which predicted employee misbehaviour for non-managerial employees. Appropriateness of compensation and managerial class emerged as factors of central influence and we found that managers who are lower in the hierarchy or who feel underpaid reported perceptions of employee misbehaviour as more frequent. On the other hand, middle and upper managers – and well compensated ones – can be expected to be among those most opposed to employee misbehaviour. It may be worth exploring managers’ ambiguous relationship with misbehaviour further in future work and exploring how differences in their working conditions – compared to non-managerial employees – may uncover unique predictors of organizational misbehaviour.
Finally, while our conclusions are based upon a number of significant relationships, the overall explanatory power of our models remains limited (Non-managerial analysis: Adjusted $R^2$=.10; Managerial analysis: Adjusted $R^2$=.09). These figures tell us that there is still considerable unexplained variation in our dependent variable. While this does not invalidate our findings, it does suggest that there is still room to expand our understanding of the phenomenon of organizational misbehaviour.

2.9 References


*INSEAD Articles.*


Richards, J. (2008). The many approaches to organisational misbehaviour: A review, map and research agenda. Employee Relations, 30(6), 653-678.


interpersonal injustice and employee sabotage. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 93(6), 1335-1347.


Chapter 3

3 Exploring the Neglected Phenomenon of Employer Misbehaviour

3.1 Introduction

A more general definition of organizational misbehaviour as ‘anything at work that you are not supposed to do’ (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Sprouse, 1992) has been available since the 90s but, nearly three decades later, there has been very little effort to examine misbehaviour engaged in by anyone other than the non-managerial employee. This overemphasis on the misbehaviour of low-level employees has contributed to a lack of systematic study into the misbehaviour of employers – a gap in the literature the following study is positioned to begin to address.

Extending the general definition of organizational misbehaviour advanced by Sprouse (1992) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), we define employer misbehaviour as anything to do with work that employers are not supposed to do. With this general definition, there are obviously a wide array of activities that can be understood as employer misbehaviour, but some easily recognized examples are denying employees earned benefits or pay, expecting unpaid overtime by workers, fraud and tax evasion.

In the present study, we do not focus on any specific type of employer organizational misbehaviour but make use of an undifferentiated measure to expand our general understanding of the structural conditions that motivate or constrain employer misbehaviour. Additionally, our sample of employers contains only a small number of corporate capitalist executives. This group is too small to appear in most national samples, but their misbehaviour can often be the most consequential, with the greatest reach and capability to adversely affect the lives of thousands of employees, customers and other stakeholders. Our findings suggest significant asymmetry between the phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour, as economic pressure to increase profit and worker vulnerability to exploitation emerge as key predictors of the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.
3.2 Background

The phenomenon of employer misbehaviour differs from that of employees in a variety of ways. One distinction between employee and employer misbehaviour is that the former is assumed to be far more common than the latter. The near-complete absence of any inquiry into employer misbehaviour is understandable in the context of its presumed rarity compared to the misbehaviour of employees, and there are numerous explanations for why this assumption might be well-founded. One obvious reason to suspect that employer misbehaviour might be less common is because there are fewer employers than employees and, therefore, fewer potentially-misbehaving employers than potentially-misbehaving employees. However, there are additional explanations outside of the simple employee-employer ratio to expect employer misbehaviour to be less frequent than that of employees.

In the previous chapter, we found that employee misbehaviour generally increased when workers were exposed to more degraded working conditions. The general thrust of the organizational misbehaviour literature echoes this finding, emphasizing how dissatisfaction with work, lack of autonomy or feelings of injustice motivate workers towards greater misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Paulson, 2014; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skalicki et al., 2008). Because the structure of capitalist production tends to produce these outcomes of degraded work (Marx, 1844, 1867) – and capitalist organizations most often do not adequately represent the best interests of their workers – we can expect employee misbehaviour to remain frequent – manifesting routinely in reaction to the degraded working conditions typical of capitalist production (Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Thompson, 2015). On the other hand, employers would not be expected to share this routine motivation towards misbehaviour, because their best interests are generally already well-represented within the structure and standard operating procedures of a privately-owned work organization. The typical capitalist organization is designed to produce the best return on investment for the owner – who
also has the freedom to withdraw her capital where this fails to be the case – so status-quo economic production generally complements employers’ interests and would not be expected to foster employer misbehaviour to the same extent that it does for employees.

**Hypothesis #1: Employee misbehaviour will be reported as more common than employer misbehaviour.**

In addition to the above reasons to expect employer misbehaviour to be less prevalent than employee misbehaviour, it is also true that the dominance of capitalist hegemony will contribute to a general underestimation of the phenomenon by promoting the perception of employers as individuals largely incapable of misbehaviour.

If misbehaviour is defined as activity that you are not supposed to do – and the structure of the capitalist work organization is designed to best serve the interest of the employer – then the activities of the employer – far from being perceived as misbehaviour – are much more likely to be presented as a model for ‘proper’ behaviour within the work organization, against which others’ actions can then be defined as misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hartt et al, 2015). While much of the routine behaviour of the employer could rightly be defined as misbehaviour under another production system, the guiding principles of capitalist ideology lend legitimacy to actions by the owners of capital (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Marx & Engels, 1846), so that they are only really seen to misbehave when their actions infringe on the interests of other capitalists in ways that are generally accepted as illegitimate and illegal or when their misdeeds are exposed by regulators, whistleblowers, and muckraking journalists. An expansion of the range of activities studied as examples of employer misbehaviour requires the challenging of the popular assumptions of misbehaviour as an activity engaged in only by employees. Unfortunately, awareness of employers’ capacity to misbehave remains seriously limited in the main body of the organizational misbehaviour literature, where searches utilizing the keywords “employer” and “misbehaviour” will lead one towards work that questions only the extent to which employers should be liable for the misbehaviour of their employees (for examples, Bonner, 2017; Mustafa, 2016; Qiasi & Heidari, 2017; Rideout, 2014; Warburg, 2014)
Fortunately, this lacuna in the academic literature is not absolute and the adjacent fields of white collar and corporate crime research can contribute knowledge to our understanding of the misbehaviour of employers. Although researchers in these areas generally prioritize the study of crime over misbehaviour more generally, it should be obvious that crime is also a form of misbehaviour – of a sort that is particularly well-defined or generally denounced. And so, even within these areas, the study of employer misbehaviour is limited primarily to activities which are unequivocally illegal or result in social damages both great and conspicuous – activities such as stealing employee pensions, killing workers or consumers with inadequate safety provisions or rampant pollution of the environment. (Arrigo & Lynch, 2015; Foster & Barnetson, 2017; Punch, 1995; Stretesky & Lynch, 1998).

Unfortunately, even in circumstances of blatant and pronounced illegal and immoral activity, the misbehaviour of employers still receives significant ideological justification and preferential media coverage (Burns & Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; McMullan & McClung, 2006; Michel et al., 2016; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995). Adding to this ideological protection, misbehaving employers will also often benefit from a variety of legal protections that make it difficult to assign culpability or punishment to individual owners – the limited liability corporation is particularly influential here, leveraging legal privileges not afforded to most human individuals (Bakan, 2004; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Peston, 2012). As a result, even the most destructive and illegal forms of employer misbehaviour often go unpunished or unresolved, so it is likely that less extreme forms of employer misbehaviour may routinely go unnoticed, contributing to a further underestimation of incidences of employer misbehaviour.

In the previous chapter, we saw that members of lower occupational classes reported more employee misbehaviour – a result of their greater familiarity with degraded working conditions and higher likelihood of being an employee in the first place. We suggest that there might likewise be a relationship between class and the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. We suspect individuals of a higher occupational class – who find their economic interests generally well-represented within the capitalist system of
production – will be less likely to perceive employer misbehaviour to be a common occurrence, reframing activities that others might properly define as misbehaviour (ex. cutting worker benefits) as effective – or even proper – behaviour in the advancement of the bottom line. Therefore, comparing perceptions of misbehaviour by class, we would expect respondents of a lower occupational class, who are more likely to find their best interests in conflict with capitalist hegemony, to report both employee and employer misbehaviour as more frequent than their upper-class counterparts.

**Hypothesis 2: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employee misbehaviour than other classes.**

**Hypothesis 3: Respondents of lower occupational classes will report more employer misbehaviour than other classes.**

So, employer misbehaviour is a social phenomenon liable to be underreported and downplayed, but the literature does fortunately offers us a few clues as to the factors which might act to constrain or encourage it.

An important and reoccurring finding within the academic literature associated with white collar and corporate crime – and one that is reinforced by the investigative journalists behind the most famous exposés on employer misbehaviour – is the pursuit of profit-maximization at the expense of wider values, ethics and normative expectations. Though the misbehaving employer, company or corporation will almost always seek to deny their involvement or redirect blame – citing the incompetence of managers or employees is a favoured strategy. Concerned or affected parties (journalists, researchers, investigators, families of workers, etc.) have most often referenced how the maximization of profit came to outweigh all other considerations within a particular organization, creating an environment where immoral and illegal activity was permissible if it would help the bottom line (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982). Though the sorts of employer misbehaviour that are most often studied are primarily criminal, we predict that the drive towards greater profit will remain an influential
predictor of employer misbehaviour even when a more general conception of employer misbehaviour is utilized. In the present study, we make use of several economic indicators expected to influence the amount of reported employer misbehaviour connected to the pursuit of profit.

**Hypothesis #4:** Less wealthy employers will report more frequent misbehaviour.

**Hypothesis #5:** Employers who report compensation lower than they feel they deserve will report more misbehaviour.

**Hypothesis #6:** Employers who believe it is likely that they might lose their business will report more misbehaviour.

Another question of interest to us is whether certain characteristics of an employer’s work force might influence the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. More specifically, we are interested in measures of employee vulnerability to employer misbehaviour.

The central purpose of a labour union is to advance the interests of workers by maintaining or raising wages, protecting benefits and working standards, and providing collective representation for those who would otherwise be fundamentally disadvantaged in individual employment negotiations (Behrens, 2014; Fernandez, 2016; Marx, 1867; Webb & Webb, 1898). While it is true that not all unions are equally effective – and they may offer little protection to customers, the wider public or the environment – we think it is reasonable to expect that their presence in a workplace will act as a constraint upon employer misbehaviour by opposing at least those instances of misbehaviour which threaten workers’ safety or economic interests.

In contrast to unionized workers who might be expected to be better protected from employer misbehaviour, temporary or part-time workers facing precarious working conditions could be more vulnerable to employer misbehaviour because they lack the protections generally afforded to permanent employees (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan, 2012; Underhill & Rimmer, 2015; Vosko, 2006). We hypothesize that the relative vulnerability of an employer’s workforce will influence the frequency of employer
misbehaviour – with a union presence acting as a constraint on misbehaviour and increased employment of part-time or temporary workers motivating greater misbehaviour by employers.

**Hypothesis #7:** The presence of a union in the workplace will be associated with less reported employer misbehaviour.

**Hypothesis #8:** Employers who report a recent organizational change towards greater employment of part-time or temporary workers will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.

### 3.3 Methodology

#### 3.3.1 Data

The analyses associated with this study make use of two different samples, both of which are drawn from the larger Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE) 2016 data set focused on issues of work and lifelong learning. This data was gathered through random digit dialing and simple random selection of respondents from the Leger Research Intelligence Group’s professional web panel of 475,000 individuals. Our larger CWKE data set is representative of the national working population and comprised of 2,979 adult Canadians (more information on the data set and sampling methodology is available in the general methodology notes section of chapter 1). In the following analytical approach section, we include an explanation of the two subsamples utilized for the analyses in this chapter.

#### 3.3.2 Analytical Approach

The following analysis is separated into two distinct modules. The first and shorter of these modules is focused on comparing the perceived frequency of employee and employer misbehaviour, while accounting for any differences in perceptions of
misbehaviour by occupational class (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). Because we were interested in perceptions of employee and employer misbehaviour by respondents across the entire occupational hierarchy, our sample includes everyone from the CWKE data set that provided information on their class category (N=2881; about 97% of the complete CWKE data set of working Canadians N=2,979). While some respondents in our sample chose not to answer one or either of our misbehaviour items, the response rate for both items remains respectable (N=2,613 and N=2,544). This analytical module consists of only bivariate analysis.

Our second – and larger – analytical module is concerned with exploration of the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour as reported by employers themselves (Hypotheses 4,5,6,7,8). Correspondingly, we used a 9-category occupational class variable to select only small employers (1 to 10 employees) and large employers (11 or more employees) for these analyses. Upper managers, middle managers, supervisors, professional employees, service workers, industrial workers, the self-employed (with no other paid employees) and respondents who could not be classified were excluded. After this selection of only employers, we were left with a total sample of 108 respondents, spanning the range of employers who had only one paid employee up to those engaging as many as two-hundred and forty workers. In this module, we began by conducting a separate bivariate analysis for each of our independent variables by the dependent variable (frequency of employer misbehaviour), and then conducted several waves of multivariate analysis that incorporate all explanatory variables alongside relevant control variables. As with the previous chapter, we treat our ordinal dependent variables as continuous, enabling OLS regression for our multivariate analysis (see section 2.5 for justification of this decision). We note here that a sample of only 108 individuals is a relatively small sample for multivariate analysis; though it would be preferable to have more respondents, our sample size is reflective of the lower proportion of employers within the Canadian work force. For bivariate analysis, each of our independent variables were ordinal, so gamma was available to help describe each relationship. We chose gamma over more conservative measures (ex. tau-b, tau-c) due to our greater familiarity with the measure and for ease of interpretation. Additionally, our preliminary
analyses examining gamma alongside other possible ordinal by ordinal measures convinced us that gamma was not greatly exaggerating the strength of the relationships under study.

3.3.2.1 Summary of Approach

3.3.2.1.1 Module 1

Bivariate Analyses:
N = 2,881 (all working individuals with valid occupational class data)

1) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour
2) Occupational Class x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour

3.3.2.1.2 Module 2

Bivariate Analyses:
N = 97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses according to missing data within independent variables.

1) Employer Wealth x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
2) Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of Employer Compensation x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
3) Likelihood of Business Loss x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
4) Union Presence x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
5) Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers x Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour

Multivariate Analyses:
N = 97 (only employers of one or more other full-time employees, who also have a valid response on employer misbehaviour item). NOTE: Size of N varies across analyses according to missing data within independent variables.

Model 1: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood of Business Loss
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour

Model 2: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
Model 3: Independent Variables: Wealth, Appropriateness of Compensation, Likelihood of Business Loss, Union Presence, Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Labour
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour
Control Variables: Sector, Industry, Number of Employees, Employer Participation in Organizational Decision-making

3.4 Measures

3.4.1 Dependent Variables

The first of our dependent variables operationalizes employee misbehaviour. The item, as it appeared to respondents, read “How common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work? Respondents could answer “extremely uncommon”, “fairly uncommon”, “fairly common” or “extremely common”. This dependent variable is only used within the first analytical module of our study (See general methodological notes section in chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response analysis).

Our second dependent variable – and the one which is used throughout the entirety of our analysis – measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour. The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you think employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?” As with our other employee misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely uncommon” to “extremely common” (See general methodological notes section in chapter 1 for more information about this variable and Appendix 2 for non-response analysis).

It should be noted here that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour, rather than an objective count of misbehaviour events. The measuring of the latter would entail significant methodological difficulties and ethical concerns, including identification of misbehaving individuals, so we move forward with
the assumption that respondent perceptions of misbehaviour – while remaining an indirect measure – will generally reflect the actual incidence of employer misbehaviour.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

3.4.2.1 Occupational Class

The first of our independent variables measures respondent occupational class and was constructed using detailed job description and job title information provided by respondents (See Appendix 3 for construction logic). Respondents could belong to one of nine occupational classes (large employer, small employer, self-employed, upper manager, middle manager, supervisor, professional employee, service worker and industrial worker) or remain unclassified.

This variable was the primary explanatory variable in the first analytical module and was also used to select our sample of employers for the second module. This variable is not further utilized in the second module as the applicable sample is composed of respondents of only two occupational class categories – small and large employers.

We regard certain occupational classes as lower in the hierarchy of the relations of production than others: Industrial and service workers are lower in the class order than both non-managerial professional employees and managerial employees. Within the managerial hierarchy, we consider supervisors as lower in class position than middle managers, who are themselves lower than upper managers. Large and small employers are considered higher in the class order than most other occupational categories.

3.4.2.2 Employer Net Wealth

Our net wealth variable was originally presented to all respondents as a 15-point scale ranging from “less than $5,000” to “Above $10 million,” but has been reduced to only six categories for ease of bivariate analysis and presentation in module 2, which makes use
of ordinal by ordinal measures of association and significance. An additional reason for this reduction of categories for bivariate analysis was because of the small number of cases in some wealth categories (somewhat to be expected with an \( N \) lower than 100). In the multivariate portion of module 2, we incorporate the more specific information provided by the original 15-category wealth variable.

### 3.4.2.3 Employer Self-Evaluation of Appropriateness of Compensation

In the following analysis, we utilize an appropriateness of compensation variable to measure employers’ subjective evaluation of the profit gleaned from their position of ownership. The applicable item posed the following question to respondents, “Compared to the value you produce at your workplace, do you think your compensation is much less than you deserve, somewhat less, about right, somewhat more than you deserve or much more than you deserve?” and provides us with a 5-point ordinal variable for use within our second analytical module. For the purposes of the bivariate ordinal by ordinal analysis, the two categories of “somewhat more than you deserve” and “much more than you deserve” are combined due to the low number of cases within these categories (again, not unexpected when working with a smaller sample size).

### 3.4.2.4 Likelihood of Business Loss in the Next Year

For hypothesis 6, we were interested in whether the economic pressure associated with the loss of one’s business might encourage greater employer misbehaviour. The original questionnaire item associated with this variable requested all respondents answer “How likely is it that you will lose your job/business in the next year?” Moving forward with a sample of only employers for Module 2, we assume that all remaining respondents are commenting on the likelihood of business loss (rather than job loss). The responses to this questionnaire item provide us with an ordinal variable with data points along a 4-point Likert scale ranging from very unlikely to very likely.
3.4.2.5 Presence of Union within Employer’s Work Organization

Our union presence variable is made up of the respondents’ answers to the question “Is there a trade union at your workplace?” with “Yes or “No” as the only two valid response categories (3 non-response categories were also available). Further information on the characteristics of the union, its effectiveness or the rate of unionization among employees within the employer’s organization is unfortunately not available within our data set.

3.4.2.6 Increased Employment of Non-Permanent Workers

For our eighth hypothesis, we are interested in examining whether a precarious workforce will motivate employers towards greater misbehaviour. The assumption here is that the lack of protections afforded to non-permanent workers – and viable options for recourse in the face of employer misbehaviour – will provide employers with greater opportunity to misbehave. We do not have available to us a straightforward measure on the employment status of the employees who make up a respondent’s workforce, but we do know whether an employer’s organization has increased its employment of part-time or temporary workers in the past five years. Two obvious caveats here surround the fact that the magnitude of the increased reliance on non-permanent workers for the employer is unknown and also that it is possible for an employer who has been relying on non-permanent labour for longer than five years – without increasing this reliance – to reasonably answer in the negative to our question “Has your workplace experienced any of the following forms of organizational change in the last five years: greater reliance on part-time or temporary workers?” We acknowledge the possibility of these outside cases as potential sources of error, but still consider it worthwhile to use this variable – the only measure of employers’ engagement of precarious labour available to us. Valid responses to this item are in binary format (yes or no).
3.4.3 Control Variables

The control variables included in our final multivariate model were selected in an effort to avoid spuriousness and separate the influence of our key explanatory variables from that of other potentially relevant variables.

The first of our control variables indicates the sector of the employer’s work organization (private, public or non-profit). In our sample, about 95% of the employers are associated with the private sector.

The second control variable measures the industry the employer is associated with (goods-producing or service providing). About 33% of our sample of employers are associated with goods-producing industries while the remainder are service-providers.

The third control variable measures the size of the work organization defined by the number of employees. This number ranges from one to two hundred and forty, but about 84% of our sample of employers engage ten or fewer employees.

Our fourth and final control variable indicates whether the employer participates in workplace decision-making related to policy on types of products or services delivered, employee hiring and firing, budgeting, determining workload or changing work procedure. Eighty-eight percent of the employers indicated involvement in decisions such as these.

3.4.4 A Note on Multicollinearity

A correlation matrix was constructed to check for multicollinearity (see Appendix 6). This was particularly important considering the high $R^2$ values in our multivariate models (Table 3.7). Our correlation matrix reveals only weak and very weak associations between independent and control variables. The associations between the dummy categories of organizational sector are moderately powerful, but this is to be expected and not cause for concern. Despite their lower strength, there are still several significant relationships worth highlighting here: 1) The presence of a union by employer wealth (-
employer wealth by employer subjective evaluation of compensation (.27) and 3) employer wealth by risk of business loss (-.24). Though these relationships are weak, they are between variables which are all significantly related to the dependent variable and this limited multicollinearity could be inflating our $R^2$ measures to some extent. However, this multicollinearity is still well within tolerance with each of these explanatory variables maintaining significant power of association with the dependent variable. It is likely that the high $R^2$ values have more to do with the limited sample size of later multivariate models ($N=37; N=36$).

Note that the above discussion of multicollinearity applies only to the second and primary module of this chapter, focused on the exploration of the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour. The smaller analytical module concerned with perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour by occupational class features only bivariate analysis, making a multicollinearity check unnecessary.

### 3.5 Results

#### 3.5.1 Module 1: Reported Misbehaviour by Occupational Class

The results for the first module of our analysis is displayed in Table 3.1. First, we can see that, across every occupational class, the perception of organizational misbehaviour as common or extremely common is a minority position. However, while the general trend is to perceive both employer and employee misbehaviour as an uncommon occurrence, there is an obvious difference between these types of misbehaviour in terms of their perceived frequency: Only about 15% of respondents reported employer misbehaviour as common, while 37% of the sample perceived misbehaviour by employees to be a common workplace occurrence. This perception of misbehaviour by employees as being more frequent than that of employers holds across all class positions and provides solid evidence in support of our first hypothesis (see rightmost column of Table 3.1 for magnitude of employee misbehaviour reporting relative to employer
misbehaviour). However, there are also notable differences by occupational class in the reported frequency of both types of misbehaviour.

In the previous chapter, we examined the association between non-managerial employee occupational class and the frequency of employee misbehaviour and found it to be significant, with employees who occupied lower class positions (service and industrial workers) reporting more misbehaviour than employees of a higher occupational class (professionals). Now, comparing all respondents across the full range of the occupational class structure, a general trend whereby employee misbehaviour is reported as less frequent by those higher up in the hierarchy of the work organization is immediately perceptible: Less than 34% of all the employers, upper managers and middle managers report it as a common workplace occurrence. On the other hand, those occupying lower class positions perceive employee misbehaviour as much more frequent, with as many as 48% of the respondents in some categories reporting it as a fairly or extremely common event. Professional employees stand out as reporting considerably less employee misbehaviour than other non-managerial employee categories, with figures much closer to that of employers and upper and middle management. Finally, supervisors – the managerial group most closely observing non-managerial workers – were distinguished as the class category reporting the greatest frequency of employee misbehaviour: Close to half of them (48%) perceived it as a common occurrence in the workplace.

We found a similar trend to that outlined above in the reporting of greater employer misbehaviour by respondents lower in the occupational class structure – service workers and industrial workers reported employer misbehaviour as common in greater numbers than the respondents in any other class category. Once again, professional employees were notable in reporting employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent than other non-managerial employees. On the other hand, supervisors – the occupational class category which reported employee misbehaviour as more frequent than any other – do not particularly stand out with regards to their reporting of the frequency of employer misbehaviour.
Table 3.1 Perceived Frequency of Misbehaviour (Employee and Employer) by Occupational Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as common or extremely common</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as common or extremely common</th>
<th>% difference in reporting of employee misbehaviour compared to employer misbehaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Employer</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Employer</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Manager</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Manager</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Managerial Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Employee</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Worker</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Worker</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed (no full-time employees)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall %</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>2613</td>
<td>2544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though we found considerable evidence of higher perceptions of employer misbehaviour by those at the bottom of the occupational class structure, there is no obvious linear trend that can be perceived across the entire hierarchy: The service and industrial workers did express the highest reporting of employer misbehaviour – around 20% say it is common or extremely common – but the large employers are close behind with 18% in that category of respondent saying the same (note: a 2% difference is not significant for a sample of this size and there may be no practical difference between these groups).

Additionally, it was interesting to find that the lowest reporting of employer misbehaviour was to be found within the managerial class hierarchy – where upper and middle managers reported employer misbehaviour as relatively infrequent (only 4.8% of upper managers and 8.1% of middle managers perceived it to be common).
3.5.2 Module 2: Key Factors Associated with Employer Misbehaviour

3.5.2.1 Bivariate Analysis

The following results correspond to our second analytical module, featuring a sample of only employers, to explore the structural factors associated with the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. Our fourth hypothesis suggested that less wealthy employers would be more likely to report greater misbehaviour and the bivariate results displayed in Table 3.2 provide evidence in-line with this assumption.

**Table 3.2** Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employer Wealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Wealth ($)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Employer misbehaviour fairly or extremely common (%)</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20,000 or less</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001 to 75,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,001 to 150,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,001 to 500,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,001 to 1 million</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1 million</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>-.503</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For every employer wealth category up to $150,000, 25% or more of the respondents reported employer misbehaviour as a fairly or extremely common occurrence – with the percentage of respondents reporting common employer misbehaviour reaching as high as 38% in the lowest employer wealth bracket. On the other hand, employers in wealth brackets above $150,000 reported employer misbehaviour as considerably less frequent: None of the employers possessing wealth between $150,000 to $500,000 and 10% or less of those possessing above $500,000 reported employer misbehaviour as a common occurrence. Our measure of association for the bivariate relationship between employer wealth and the frequency of misbehaviour is significant with a gamma coefficient (γ) of -.503, indicating a negative relationship of moderate strength.
Table 3.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Appropriateness of Compensation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compared to the value you produce at your workplace, do you think your compensation is...</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Employer misbehaviour fairly or extremely common (%)</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much less than deserved</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat less</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than deserved</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>-.443</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second of our economic explanatory variables looked at the subjective evaluation of the appropriateness of compensation by employers (see Table 3.3 above for bivariate results). First, while it was possible for respondents to evaluate the appropriateness of their compensation using any of the five categories from “much less than deserved” to “much more than deserved”, the great majority of employers answered in the range from “much less than deserved” through “somewhat less than deserved” to “about right”. Only 7% of the employers sampled believed their compensation to be “somewhat more than deserved” or “much more than deserved” and were grouped together as one category for bivariate analysis.

This analysis of employers’ evaluations of compensation appropriateness in relation to frequency of employer misbehaviour revealed significant evidence of a moderately strong negative relationship between these variables (γ = -.443): Employers who evaluated themselves as undercompensated reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than those who felt adequately compensated or overcompensated. The results for those few employers who reported overcompensation are harder to interpret for a couple reasons: 1) the number of cases are few, requiring additional caution in our conclusion, and 2) they do not easily fit the established linear trend between variables – the employers who reported more compensation than deserved reported less frequent misbehaviour than those who felt undercompensated, but considerably more than those who believed they were adequately compensated.

Our third explanatory variable, likelihood of employer business loss – like wealth and appropriateness of compensation – acts as an indicator of the economic circumstances or
pressures that employers can find themselves confronted with. In Table 3.4, the bivariate results for this variable are displayed.

**Table 3.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Likelihood of Business Loss**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How likely is it that you will lose your business in the next year?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Employer misbehaviour fairly or extremely common (%)</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unlikely</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat likely</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The employers reporting the most frequent misbehaviour were those who believed it was somewhat likely that they might lose their business in the next year. However, the frequencies for the other categories do not follow any perceivable trend and our test of significance was not passed, so there is little evidence of a bivariate relationship between the likelihood of business loss and our dependent variable.

We next examined the possibility of a bivariate relationship between the amount of misbehaviour reported by employers and the presence (or non-presence) of a union within the work organization (see Table 3.5). Here, we found intriguing evidence in support of such a relationship, but in the opposite direction as hypothesized: 80% of the employers of unionized workers reported employer misbehaviour as common or extremely common compared to only 11% of the employers of non-unionized workers. Additionally, our test of association provides further evidence of a significant and very strong positive relationship between these two variables (γ = .952). It should be noted that only about 5% of employers reported a union presence in their organization, so there is some reason to be cautious in our conclusions regarding this relationship. Nevertheless, the differences in frequency of employer misbehaviour by union presence is particularly pronounced – and there is no obvious reason to suspect that our sampled employers of unionized workers are not representative of the wider Canadian population – so we move forward assuming our results indicate the existence of a real increase in the perceived
frequency of employer misbehaviour explained by the presence of a union within the workplace.

**Table 3.5** Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Presence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Present in the Workplace?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Employer misbehaviour fairly or extremely common (%)</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>.952</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While we expected the presence of a union within the workplace to act as a constraint on employer misbehaviour, an increasing reliance upon non-permanent workers was hypothesized to have the opposite effect – motivating employers towards more frequent misbehaviour. The results of the bivariate analysis displayed in Table 3.6 seem to provide support for a connection between a workforce characterized by non-permanent employment arrangements and greater perceptions of employer misbehaviour – about 13% more of the employers who indicated a recent organizational change towards greater reliance on part-time or temporary workers – compared with those who did not indicate such an organizational change – reported common or extremely common employer misbehaviour. However, our measure of association falls short of statistical significance, so we should be cautious in our interpretation of the bivariate relationship between these variables.

**Table 3.6** Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater reliance on part-time or temporary workers</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Employer misbehaviour fairly or extremely common (%)</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.2.2 Multivariate Models

Following the bivariate analyses, we conducted multivariate analyses for three models of employer misbehaviour, with each subsequent one incorporating additional explanatory
variables (all of which are key variables receiving attention in the preceding bivariate portion of module 2).

**Table 3.7 Multivariate Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β coefficient</td>
<td>β coefficient</td>
<td>β coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pressures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net wealth</td>
<td>-.344 (.029)**</td>
<td>-.439 (.036)**</td>
<td>-.574 (.039)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness of compensation</td>
<td>-.245 (.091)*</td>
<td>-.297 (.117)*</td>
<td>-.439 (.119)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of Business Loss</td>
<td>-.034 (.117)</td>
<td>-.035 (.115)</td>
<td>-.125 (.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection or Vulnerability of Workforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union present in workplace</td>
<td>.459 (.338)***</td>
<td>.369 (.339)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Reliance on Non-Permanent Workers</td>
<td>.205 (.241)</td>
<td>.369 (.253)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>.265 (.015)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods-producing (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-providing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer participates in workplace decision-making</td>
<td>.019 (.271)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 \] .194 .597 .717
\[ \text{Adjusted } R^2 \] .156 .534 .610
\[ N \] 66 37 36

Notes: *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001.
Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes (standard error in brackets).

The first of our multivariate models contained three explanatory variables – total net wealth, appropriateness of compensation and likelihood of business loss. These variables are related to the economic circumstances and pressures faced by employers – identified as potential explanatory factors by the white-collar crime and corporate violence literature that routinely lists profit-maximization as a central motivator towards employer misbehaviour. Unsurprisingly, the two measures most closely connected to employer profits – total wealth and appropriateness of compensation – were revealed to wield
considerable and significant influence, with both lower net wealth and evaluations of compensation as less than deserved contributing to greater frequency of perceived employer misbehaviour. The relative effects of these explanatory variables are similar, but there is some indication that total net wealth may be the slightly more influential of the two measures (\(\beta = -.344\) versus \(\beta = -.245\)). On the other hand, likelihood of business loss appeared to have no significant association with the dependent variable.

Our second multivariate model retains our three economic explanatory variables and adds in our two measures of workforce protection and workforce vulnerability – conceptualized as trade union presence and greater reliance on non-permanent workers. After incorporating these two additional measures, both of the significant economic predictors of employer misbehaviour from the first model retained their significance – with an increase in their estimated influence on the dependent variable. As with the first model, the likelihood of business loss did not appear to be significantly linked with the reported frequency of misbehaviour.

Of the two variables measuring workforce protection/vulnerability to employer misbehaviour, only trade union presence emerged as significantly associated with the dependent variable. As with the prior bivariate results, a union presence in the organization was associated with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more frequent. The estimated strength of this relationship is considerable (\(\beta = .459\)) and union presence as a predictor exceeds the explanatory power of both employer wealth and appropriateness of compensation (\(\beta = -.439\) and \(\beta = -.297\)).

In Model 3, we retained all previous explanatory variables and incorporated four control variables – number of employees, sector, industry and employer involvement in organizational decision-making. One of these control variables – number of employees – was found to have a weak to moderate positive relationship with the dependent variable (\(\beta = .265\)), so there is reason to suspect that employer misbehaviour may be more frequent in larger organizations.

Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of these control variables modified the strength of association for the significant factors already outlined, but none of the predictors of
perceived employer misbehaviour identified in the previous models lost significance through the inclusion of these controls. In this third model, both wealth and appropriateness of compensation once again emerged as the most influential predictors, with lower wealth ($\beta = -.574$) and lower self-evaluated appropriateness of compensation ($\beta = -.439$) corresponding with a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. The presence of a union remained a significant predictor of more frequent employer misbehaviour, but the inclusion of our control variables reduced the influence of this variable slightly ($\beta = .369$ down from $\beta = .459$).

Interestingly, the inclusion of our control variables also resulted in our measure for increased employer reliance on non-permanent labour gaining significance as a moderately powerful predictor of greater frequency of employer misbehaviour ($\beta = .369$). Employers who indicated greater employment of part-time or temporary workers also reported greater frequency of employer misbehaviour.

### 3.6 Discussion

The first analytical module of our study was concerned with evaluating how the perceived frequency of misbehaviour – by employees and employers – was associated with the occupational class of the respondent. In the previous chapter, we studied the relationship between occupational class and reported frequency of solely employee misbehaviour for non-managerial and managerial employees separately. This chapter incorporates employers and compares respondents across the full range of the occupational hierarchy in their reporting of the frequency of both employee *and* employer misbehaviour. These inclusions have provided us a more nuanced understanding of organizational misbehaviour – though there is some limited overlap with our previous exploration of the topic.

One trend which was present in the previous chapter and remains evident here is the reporting of employee misbehaviour as more frequent by industrial and service workers. This finding is not surprising from a perspective which understands the phenomenon of
employee misbehaviour as a reaction by employees to negative working conditions, as industrial and service workers are the occupational groups most likely to be confronted by degraded working conditions on a routine basis (see chapter 2).

However, we also found industrial and service workers to be the greatest reporters of frequent employer misbehaviour – rivaled only by large employers. This higher perception of frequent employer misbehaviour by respondents of the lowest occupational classes supported our third hypothesis and is more easily understood when recognizing the ideological element in the very act of recognizing employer misbehaviour: Those who experience the greatest alienation and whose working lives are in stark contradiction to the promises of capitalist ideology may be more likely to express resistance to hegemonic rule – in this case, by greater recognition of employers’ capacity to misbehave.

Because hegemony is a feature of the antagonistic relationship between classes and constantly leaves room for resistance by exercise of consciousness outside those patterns sponsored by the economically dominant, it can never be fully complete (Connel, 1978; Marx, 1844, 1867; Shapiro, 1984). However, it is those whose best interests are in contradiction to capitalist hegemony that have the most to gain by challenging it, and this is one possible explanation for why industrial and service workers report employer misbehaviour as more frequent than both professional employees and managerial workers – who both generally occupy more privileged positions in the class hierarchy and have less to gain by challenging the popular assumption of employers as less prone to misbehaviour than their employees.

In addition to this ideological explanation, it is also the case that industrial and service workers may report greater employer misbehaviour because they are the ones most likely to suffer from it: The negative working conditions experienced by many lower-class workers can often be explained – at least in part – by an employer’s misbehaviour, negligence or reluctance to take unprofitable action towards improving working conditions (Bakan, 2004; Burns & Orrick, 2002; Greenwood, 2005; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Marx, 1844, 1848, 1867).
In chapter 2, we also proposed that professional employees report less employee misbehaviour than other workers because of their lower inclination to report bad behaviour of peers, the behavioural regulation that accompanies a professional identity and because of the considerable benefits of their position relative to non-professionals. Additionally, professional employees are probably less likely to be the victims of employer misbehaviour, as the privileges and protections of their vocation – as well as the fact that their specialized skills are not easily replaceable – make them harder potential targets for employer misbehaviour.

Previously, we found that the reporting of frequent employee misbehaviour declined as one ascended through the ranks of management and supervisors – those lowest in the managerial hierarchy stood out as the class of worker that reported employee misbehaviour as most frequent. We suggested that this result could be related to job expectations and supervisor responsibility for early detection of employee misbehaviour and routine discipline (see chapter 2). In terms of the detection of employer misbehaviour, however, supervisors do not appear to regard it as a very frequent occurrence – except when compared to other managers who report employer misbehaviour as even more infrequent.

The occupational class that stood out as reporting the smallest amount of employer misbehaviour were upper managers – a distinction they also hold with regards to the reporting of employee misbehaviour. Upper managers’ lower perceptions of employee misbehaviour can be explained by both their relative distance from the routine labour taking place within the work organization and from the negative working conditions which generally give rise to more frequent employee misbehaviour. On the other hand, upper managers’ perceptions of employer misbehaviour as a rare occurrence likely has more to do with the unity of economic interest generally shared by upper managers and employers and the dependence of upper managers on employers for their relative advantages over lower managers and non-managerial employees. While theorists have commented in the past on the numerous distinctions between members of the upper class and problematized the view of this group as monolithic (Bourdieu, 1986, 1996; Dahrendorf, 1959; Flemmen, 2012; Scott, 1997; Weber, 1946; Zeitlin, 1989), at least in
cases of employer misbehaviour which serve the bottom line, upper managers’ general unity of economic interest with owners might contribute to a general overlooking of misbehaviour engaged in by the latter.

Though there are obvious class differences in the reporting of misbehaviour, our results also indicated a relative underreporting of the frequency of employer misbehaviour by respondents of all occupational class positions – compared to the much higher reported frequency of employee misbehaviour. The magnitude of reported difference between employer misbehaviour and employee misbehaviour unsurprisingly varied by class – that is, supervisors stood out as reporting far more employee than employer misbehaviour; however, respondents of every class reported misbehaviour by employees as the more common phenomenon. These results provide support for one of our initial hypotheses and were not particularly surprising: The benefits of ownership extend considerable ideological and legal protection to employers, making it far less likely that their actions will be perceived as misbehaviour.

Three of our independent variables were selected to evaluate how economic pressures on the employer can encourage greater employer misbehaviour. The first of these economic variables measured employer wealth and was found to have an inverse relationship with the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. A simple explanation to this result is that less wealthy employers face greater economic pressure and may be more inclined to engage in misbehaviour as a means by which to raise profits. In contrast, an employer of greater wealth may already be doing quite well using more legitimate means of wealth-creation and can afford to avoid the most questionable methods of raising profits. Profit-maximization has been highlighted by the corporate crime literature as a key motivator towards misbehaviour for employers (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), and wealthy owners are surely just as capable of misbehaviour – but it is likely that those who are less wealthy will be more prone to engage in misbehaviour as a means to remain competitive with other capitalists.
Our second economic explanatory variable measured employers’ subjective evaluation of their own compensation, and we found a meaningful relationship whereby employers who believed themselves to be undercompensated reported more frequent employer misbehaviour. Previous work has outlined how envy by the undercompensated can act as a powerful motivator towards unethical behaviour in a variety of circumstances (Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010; John et al., 2014; Toby, 1979), and we suspect we are witnessing a similar effect here. We should note that a true deficit is not necessary for feelings of envy to emerge, and that a simple overestimation of personal contributions to the work environment is more than sufficient to motivate one towards misbehaviour as a means by which to correct the perceived state of under compensation (Zenger, 1994). Therefore, it is not just the less wealthy employers who are motivated towards misbehaviour in this way, as a full 40% of the sampled employers reported feeling under compensated (only 8% felt overcompensated and 52% said their compensation was about right). As such, subjective under-compensation emerged as a powerful predictor of greater perceived misbehaviour for employers of all wealth levels.

We also included a variable for likelihood of business loss and hypothesized that employers who perceived a greater likelihood that they would soon lose their business would report more misbehaviour: The assumption here being that potential business loss would motivate employers towards misbehaviour in hopes of maintaining the viability of their business. However, we found no evidence of such a relationship. On reflection, it may be that the diversity of potential reasons for losing one’s business could make a difference: For example, low profits threatening the longevity of the business might be improved by cost-cutting employer misbehaviour, but it is hard to imagine how this would save a business that sells a newly-obsolete product. Additionally, the loss of one’s business may not always be a wholly-negative experience that employers seek to avoid (ex. being purchased by a competitor), and we might expect less motivation towards employer misbehaviour in such circumstances. However, it should be noted here that only 13% of the sampled employers anticipated business loss as somewhat or very likely in the next year and perhaps a relationship would be discovered with a larger sample and/or information on the reason for an employer’s loss of business.
The last two of our main explanatory variables were chosen to aid in the examination of whether characteristics of the work force might act to motivate or constrain employer misbehaviour. It was hypothesized that greater employment of non-permanent workers (temporary or part-time) would be associated with more frequent misbehaviour by employers, and we found significant evidence of this relationship in our final model.

There is ample evidence within the literature to support the argument that precarious and non-permanent workers are more likely to be victims of employer misbehaviour: Non-permanent workers more frequently suffer psychologically as a result of organizational injustice (Inoue et al., 2013), are more frequently treated as second-class employees by employers (Boyce et al., 2007), are paid less and receive fewer benefits (Kalleberg et al., 2000) and are often employed in hazardous jobs where they are easily replaceable (Kochan et al, 1994). Therefore, despite the advantages provided to employers, non-permanent workers’ vulnerability to mistreatment is salient, while any benefits of a nonstandard work arrangement apply primarily to the highly-skilled and self-employed (ex. lawyers, independent contractors, etc.) (Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998). In less-preferred positions, non-permanent employment is clearly not a first-choice and engaged in mainly out of a lack of other viable options (one study reported that 66% of on-call/day-labourers and 73% of temporary workers would prefer a permanent position [Rasell & Appelbaum, 1998]). We propose that the relative vulnerabilities of non-permanent workers make this group a more enticing target for misbehaving employers, as a lack of job security and few alternative employment options offer scarcer protection from exploitation and ill-treatment.

On the other hand, the presence of a union within a work organization was hypothesized to contribute to a lower perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. Compared to those without collective representation, unionized workers generally receive better employment protection and job training, higher pay and more robust non-wage benefits (health, pension, support for reskilling/upskilling, etc.) (Boheim & Booth, 2004; Kalleberg, 2009; Kalleberg et al., 2000; Oh, 2012; Raymo et al., 2011). In distinction to the expected vulnerability of non-permanent workers to employer misbehaviour, the advantages afforded to unionized workers were expected to act as additional protection
from – and act as a restraint on – employer misbehaviour. However, we were surprised to find significant evidence to the contrary, with employers reporting a union presence in their organization also reporting more frequent employer misbehaviour. We think the most likely explanation for this relationship is that unionization drives will be more successful where there is a recognized history of employer misbehaviour. Martinez and Fiorito (2009) and Eaton et al. (2014) have demonstrated how a negative evaluation of an employer as “bad” was more influential than workers’ knowledge of the instrumental advantages of union membership in predicting whether a particular drive towards union formation would be successful. Therefore, to some extent, we should expect a misbehaving employer to motivate employees towards unionization.

However, there is also some indication that employers might engage in more frequent misbehaviour as a means of combatting union influence or weakening a union’s effectiveness: Blacklisting of union activists, hiring private investigators to intimidate and spy, fostering employee dependency on employer paternalism and the promotion of “company” or conservative unions are all strategies that have been utilized by employers in the past (Cochrane, 1989; Cooper & Patmore, 2002, 2009; Wright, 1995).

While unionization will not always prompt retaliatory employer misbehaviour, Bentham (2002) found that Canadian employers opposed unionization 80% of the time; others have added that incidences of unfair business practice by employers tend to increase in response to unionization drives (Bruce, 1994; Riddel, 2001). Because union-busting activities are often successful, employers may be motivated to participate in these activities in circumstances where the outcome of the unionization drive is uncertain or where union formation threatens to significantly diminish their profits (Freeman & Kleiner, 1990). In this context, our results demonstrating the positive association between union presence and perceptions of employer misbehaviour as more frequent is understandable – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past employer misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form of union-busting activities.
Finally, though an examination of the relationships between control variables and our dependent variable were not a primary focus of our study, there are a few results worth mentioning.

We found evidence of a weak to moderate strength positive relationship between organizational size (number of employees) and the frequency of employer misbehaviour reported. A similar relationship was discovered for employee misbehaviour in the previous chapter and it may be that the additional cover and shielding from discovery – as well as the considerable legal protections – that a large organization provides also motivates greater employer misbehaviour. Additionally, the greater familiarity between employers and employees in smaller organizations might function to reduce employer misbehaviour by increasing the psychological cost of misbehaviour that would negatively impact the lives of employees who they have a personal connection with. On the other hand, the greater distance between larger employers and those they employ likely reduces this cost, allowing employers distance from the consequences of their actions and also the ability to more easily abdicate responsibility for their actions and transfer blame onto upper managers (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Gottschalk, 2012; McMullan & McClung, 2016; Shaban et al., 2017; Trevino, 2005).

Sector was included in this study as a control variable instead of a main explanatory variable for employer misbehaviour because nearly all the employers sampled were owners of for-profit organizations (only 5% were non-profit or public). In the context of our findings that economic pressure towards profit-maximization is a key motivator of employer misbehaviour, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the phenomenon will be more frequent in for-profit environments which prioritize the bottom-line as the primary – or sole – means of evaluating organizational performance. Examining the role of organizational sector with a more diverse sample of employers would surely be a fruitful direction for future research on the topic of employer misbehaviour.
3.7 Conclusion

Comparing perceptions of both employee and employer misbehaviour by occupational class, we found considerable differences in reported frequency related to differences in structural position and divergent economic interests. In addition, across every class group, there was a consistent trend towards the underreporting of employer misbehaviour relative to the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour.

The results of our exploratory research into the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour revealed lower wealth, subjective under compensation, employment of non-permanent workers and union presence within the workplace to be important predictors of a higher perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.

However, while our model boasts a relatively high measure of explained variance in employer misbehaviour (Adjusted $R^2=.61$), it is likely that the relatively small sample size of our final multivariate model is playing a role here ($N=36$). Correspondingly, replication of these results is one obvious and necessary direction for future research into employer misbehaviour.

Two other promising avenues for future research would address the need for a closer examination of the relationship between unionization and employer misbehaviour and a fuller accounting of the differences in employer misbehaviour by sector (for-profit versus non-profit).

3.8 References


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Chapter 4

4 Class Consciousness and Perceptions of Organizational Misbehaviour

4.1 Introduction

In our earlier general methodological notes section (chapter 1), we acknowledged that respondent subjectivity would invariably colour the reported frequency of misbehaviour within a workplace. In the two previous papers (chapters 2 and 3), we focused on the relationships between respondents’ structural conditions and the frequency of workplace misbehaviour reported by them, treating subjective differences in respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour as an unknown – but unavoidable – source of error inherit to our methodological approach.

However, in this chapter we enquire whether an individual’s class consciousness will influence their perception of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour. We highlight three key elements of class consciousness in the present study: (1) Personal class identification (what class does the individual identify themselves as being a part of), (2) oppositional attitudes (recognition of the structural conflict of interest between workers and owners) and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes (believing there are viable alternatives to capitalist economic relations). We find that all three of these elements of class consciousness influence the frequency of misbehaviour reported by respondents: Respondents who identified as a member of a lower class, who expressed a more oppositional perspective or who held more counter-hegemonic attitudes perceived both employee and employer organizational misbehaviour as more frequent than other respondents.

4.2 Background

The literature surrounding organizational misbehaviour provides good reason to examine the connection between ideological attitudes and perceptions of misbehaviour, as their
influence is more than evident within the variety of perspectives taken by those who write on the topic. For example, studies on organizational misbehaviour taking an individual pathological approach – i.e. human-resource or management perspectives – tend towards underestimating the frequency of the phenomenon, denying or ignoring considerable evidence of workplace misbehaviour as a widespread phenomenon engaged in – at least to some extent – by most employees (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989). This downplaying and underestimating of the phenomenon is not particularly surprising for a segment of the organizational misbehaviour literature that is primarily concerned with advancing managerial and employer interests: To acknowledge that employee misbehaviour is widespread invites inquiry into the structural conditions that often give rise to it – degraded work, lack of autonomy and experiences of injustice.

A structural understanding of employee misbehaviour and the recognition of its ubiquity compete with the dominant capitalist narrative of general worker compliance, orderly production and harmony of worker, manager and owner interests (Barker, 1999; Casey, 1999; Frenkel et al., 1998; Kinnie et al., 2000; Luthans, 1972). Therefore, the standard operating procedure of those who are aligned with the capitalist ideological perspective that presents capitalist relations of production as the only viable means by which to organize human economic activity has been to maintain that misbehaviour within the workplace is infrequent and carried out primarily by a small number of pathological individuals (Bibi, 2013; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Laabs et al., 1999; Leavitt, 1973; Wilson & Rosenfeld, 1990).

On the other hand, incidences of misbehaviour might also be overestimated by a different group of stake-holders. Employee misbehaviour is often highlighted for its potential to act as a form of worker resistance that is subtle and individual – in contrast to more formalized or collective resistance strategies such as union representation and negotiation (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; Edwards et al., 1995; Fleming & Sewell, 2002; Hodson, 2001; Muholland, 2004; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Thompson, 2016). Now, while there is good reason to highlight how employee misbehaviour can sometimes function as a form of worker resistance (for example, sabotage or output limitation) there
is also a danger that those who emphasize this potential for resistance may overestimate misbehaviour. In her work on “decaf resistance,” Alessia Contu (2008) is critical of those who are overly optimistic about misbehaviour, too-readily celebrating every small act of misbehaviour as a potentially revolutionary act. Though the objective of Contu and others is to problematize the assumption of misbehaviour as resistance, their evidence suggests that those who are overly-inclined towards identifying misbehaviour as worker resistance – and highly-motivated in their search to find evidence of more resistance – might also perceive greater frequency of misbehaviour (Contu, 2008; Fleming, 2005; Fleming & Spicer, 2003; Paulsen, 2014; Prassad, 2008). For example, a personal cynical disengagement from work that has no effect on production efficiency would not be considered a form of misbehaviour by most, but those who are looking for evidence of grass-roots worker resistance may readily do so (Baines, 2011; De Certeau, 1984; Hodson, 2001; Mumby, 2005; Sotirin & Gottfried, 1999).

It is evident that the political leanings of an individual can affect their perception of the frequency of organizational misbehaviour, but we might expect this relationship to be even stronger where a general definition of misbehaviour – rather than one which is rigidly defined – is utilized. In the present study, we use a definition of organizational misbehaviour that encompasses any activity in the workplace that one is not supposed to engage in (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979; Sprouse, 1992). With this general and non-restrictive definition of misbehaviour, the frequency of misbehaviour reported will be more heavily mediated by the subjectivity of the respondent – as every individual can be expected to have a unique conception of what is, and is not, proper workplace behaviour. For example, is it acceptable to check personal email while at work? If it is permissible to do so, does checking personal email become misbehaviour if engaged in too frequently? If yes, what is the acceptable amount of personal email after which this behaviour becomes misbehaviour? The range of possible perspectives on the activity of checking personal email at work varies widely and whether this activity is deemed to be misbehaviour would depend on each individual respondent’s evaluation of it. This subjective evaluation of misbehaviour is likely impacted by the individual characteristics of the respondent – manners, habits, upbringing, characteristics of the job,
and so on – but the personal characteristics that we take for this study’s primary explanatory variables measure the various elements of the class consciousness of the respondent.

Class consciousness is a concept originally outlined by Karl Marx, but one which has been developed considerably since his time, as later Marxists have come to grips with the reality of a proletarian revolution that seems to be endlessly forestalled. In his critique of capitalism, Marx outlined the objective conditions inherent to this system of production that would produce the circumstances ripe for a proletarian revolution – degraded work, alienation, exploitation and class antagonism (Marx, 1848, 1867) – but the industrial proletariat of the 19th century let him down by failing to develop the requisite popular revolutionary class consciousness (Mann, 1973; Ollman, 1972). Marx originally explained class consciousness as the transition from the proletariat as a ‘class-in-itself’ to a ‘class-for-itself,’ but it can also be understood as the process of psychological development leading to one’s recognition that they are a part of a class and that the members of this class have common interests (Ollman, 1972). Revolutionary proletarian class consciousness would then go one step further by including the recognition that one’s interests are best served by overthrow of the system of capitalist production that exploits the proletariat both individually and collectively (Mills, 1962).

Class consciousness is a useful concept for reminding us how the structural conditions produced by class antagonism inherent to the capitalist system of production – while a necessary condition for proletarian revolution – are not sufficient, on their own, to bring it about. Marx (1852) recognized that proletarian revolution overthrow of the capitalist system was not inevitable and that it would be brought about only by the determined actions of individuals guided by a revolutionary class consciousness. However, Marx might still be criticized for over-simplifying the psychological development of the proletariat to a single step from false consciousness to a fully-formed proletarian class consciousness (Ollman, 1972).

It is necessary to acknowledge that class consciousness can exist in a partially developed form and neo-Marxist theorists have aided us in this recognition by emphasizing how
Marxist class conscious is comprised of several distinct psychological elements, all of which must be present for an individual to be fully class conscious – and free of false consciousness. Michael Mann (1973) outlines (1) class identity, (2) opposition to the capitalist class, (3) recognition of the systemic nature of class antagonism and exploitation under capitalism and (4) believing that there is a viable alternative to the capitalist system of production as necessary for revolutionary class consciousness. These elements do not always arise together and Mann (1973) has noted how the working class has often been strong on solidarity – the first two elements – but weak on their perceptions of alternative political and economic relations to those of capitalism. There is some indication that this trend may be reversing as support for the profit motive has decreased since 1982 and around half of non-managerial workers now believe that effective economic relations are possible without it (Livingstone and Watts, 2018).

Additionally, worker solidarity is not always progressive or revolutionary, as when it is restricted to only those belonging to one’s narrow segment of the working-class: There is a history in North America – and elsewhere – of white, higher-paid and more privileged workers benefitting from secondary exploitation and taking reactionary and racist positions in their dealings with non-white, lower-paid and less privileged workers (Bonacich, 1972; Lapides, 1987; Lenin, 1901; Ollman, 1972).

So, class consciousness is clearly not monolithic, but another way to perceive it is as a scale with multiple points running from false consciousness – or a capitalist ideological perspective – to full proletarian revolutionary consciousness. Bertell Ollman (1972) approaches class consciousness this way, outlining nine psychological steps that a worker must ascend on the path to revolutionary consciousness, beginning with the simple realization that they have interests (step 1), through the realization that their class interests take precedence over interests related to nation, race, ethnicity or religion (step 4) and concluding with the will to take action when the revolutionary moment arrives (step 9). Ollman’s scale approach is interesting because it presumably allows for the evaluation and comparison of individuals by their level of class consciousness: “What we find then is that most workers have climbed a few of these steps (enough to complain),
that some have scaled most of them (enough to vote for working-class candidates), but that relatively few have managed to ascend to the top” (Ollman, 1972, p. 8).

In the present study, we borrow primarily from Michael Mann’s approach (1973) and conceptualize class consciousness using three primary elements: (1) class identity (the individual’s recognition that they are part of a class), (2) an oppositional perspective (recognition of systemic class antagonism and exploitation and opposition to the capitalist class) and (3) a counter-hegemonic perspective (believing that there are viable alternatives to capitalist relations of production and other possible social formations). By focusing on these three elements, we can examine how the class consciousness of the individual is related to the frequency of misbehaviour that they report. Note here, that counter-hegemony is defined in the context of the individual’s questioning of the legitimacy or necessity of primary elements of capitalism and therefore problematizing capitalist hegemony – defined by Mann as the dominant ideological perspective that believes ‘freedom and justice are best secured by “breaking down” man’s [human] needs and activities into separate segments (work, consumption, politics, etc.) and providing each one with a separate market in which individuals can express their preferences and realise their needs’ (1973, p. 19). What makes this ideology hegemonic is its popular adoption and elevation to the level of ‘common-sense’, so that a counter-hegemonic perspective will always require the challenging of the status-quo and popular consensus on the dynamics of social reality (Gramsci, 1971).

Though Marxist class consciousness is generally discussed in the context of the proletarian class, our analytic sample is not restricted and contains individuals of every class. As noted previously, the capitalist perspective on misbehaviour has tended towards underestimation of the phenomenon, pathological explanations for employee misbehaviour and the denial of employers as individuals even capable of misbehaving in the workplace. Correspondingly, we expect those who benefit most from the capitalist system and have the greatest interest in defending it (upper classes) will report less misbehaviour of both types than other respondents.
Hypothesis 1A: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive *employer* misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class identities.

Hypothesis 1B: Upper class and upper-middle class respondents will perceive *employee* misbehaviour as less frequent than respondents with any other class identities.

Class identity is obviously an important element of class consciousness, but we were also interested in how ideological attitudes relate to respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of organizational misbehaviour. The second component of our conceptualization of class consciousness is holding an oppositional perspective – which we operationalize as greater support for workers’ right to strike and agreeing that owners make gains at the expense of their employees. It is predicted that holding more oppositional attitudes will correspond with perceptions of misbehaviour as more frequent, as these respondents are already more critical of capitalist economic relations and interests and will have less inclination to underestimate occurrences of misbehaviour – they have little interest in supporting the capitalist ideological account of misbehaviour as rare and pathological by underreporting or downplaying its occurrence.

Hypothesis 2A: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more frequent *employer* misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 2B: Respondents who support the right to strike will report more frequent *employee* misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 3A: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of workers will report more frequent *employer* misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 3B: Respondents who believe owners make gains at the expense of workers will report more frequent *employee* misbehaviour.

The final element of class consciousness we concern ourselves with here is the development of a counter-hegemonic perspective. Because the capitalist hegemonic
perspective is to present capitalism as – if not the perfect economic system – the only pragmatic means by which to organize human production, those who question the proposed necessities of capitalism – or the entire system itself – can be distinguished as counter-hegemonic by their problematization of “common-sense” notions that often go unquestioned within an ideological domain dominated by capitalist interests. In the present study, we operationalize a counter-hegemonic perspective using two attitudinal variables – the belief that a modern economy is possible without the profit motive and belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective. Respondents holding more counter-hegemonic attitudes are less likely to be convinced by the capitalist hegemonic account of misbehaviour as a minor phenomenon, and so they are expected to report more frequent misbehaviour than other respondents.

Hypothesis 4A: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the profit motive will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 4B: Respondents who believe a modern economy is possible without the profit motive will report more frequent employee misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 5A: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by non-management without bosses will report more frequent employer misbehaviour.

Hypothesis 5B: Respondents who believe work organizations could be run by non-management without bosses will report more frequent employee misbehaviour.

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Data

The data for this study are drawn from the complete Changing Workplace in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE) 2016 sample of employed Canadians above 18 years of age (N=2,979). A detailed description of this dataset (including sampling technique, weighting and response rate) is available in our methodology notes section in chapter 1. The respondents for this study were recruited both through random digit dialing and the
simple random selection from a professional web panel maintained by the Leger Research Intelligence Group (N=475,000). The overall response rate for this data set is 52% (see Appendix 1 for this calculation). For this chapter, our analytical subsamples are reduced as a result of non-response on our two key misbehaviour variables to N=2,663 and N=2594 respectively. For each individual portion of the following analyses, all valid cases are utilized, so the value of N varies according to the response rate of the explanatory variables under consideration in each case.

4.3.2 Measures
4.3.3 Dependent Variables

The first of our dependent variables measures perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour. The questionnaire item associated with this variable requested that respondents answer the following: “How common do you think employee misbehaviour such as taking organization-owned materials or loafing on the job is in places like where you work?” The valid responses to this question make up a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “extremely uncommon” to “extremely common,” through “fairly uncommon” and “fairly common” as intermediary options.

Our second dependent variable measures respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour. The item, as posed to respondents, read “How common do you think employer misbehaviour such as not paying employees some earned benefits or avoiding taxes on earnings is in places like where you work?” As with our other misbehaviour item, the four available valid responses ranged from “extremely uncommon” to “extremely common”.

More information about both of these misbehaviour variables is available within the general methodological notes section of chapter 1 and the results of a non-response analysis can be located within Appendix 2.
It should be mentioned that both of our misbehaviour items measure respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour and should not be conflated with an objective accounting of employee or employer misbehaviour events. Additionally, we cannot know what activities the respondent is considering when reporting the frequency of misbehaviour – though it is reasonable to expect that the examples of misbehaviour we included will be salient for most respondents during their individual deliberations.

4.3.4 Independent Variables

4.3.4.1 Class Identity

Our class identity variable contains respondents’ self-evaluations of their own class membership. The item as presented to respondents read, “IF YOU HAD TO CHOOSE one of the following names for your social class, which one would you say you belong to?” Valid responses were upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, working class and lower class, but several non-response options were available (Don’t know, Refused or I do not think of myself as part of any class). Just over 4% of respondents chose a non-valid response category and are left out of any analyses that incorporate class identity. We have grouped together the original categories to create a new ordinal scale variable: (1) working/lower class, (2) lower-middle class, (3) middle class and (4) upper/upper-middle class.

4.3.4.2 Oppositional Attitude – Right to Strike

The first of our oppositional attitudinal variables measures the individual’s support for the right of workers to strike. The question as it appeared to respondents read, “During a strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of strikers”. Respondents indicated their level of agreement with this statement choosing from one of five Likert-scale categories (1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – Somewhat disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Somewhat agree, 5 – Strongly agree). Respondents who answered with an
“I don’t know” or “Refused” were left out of further analysis utilizing this variable (about 10% of the sample chose one of these non-valid response categories).

4.3.4.3 Oppositional Attitude – Owner’s Gain at Workers’ Expense

Our second oppositional attitude variable is composed of responses to the statement “Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.” Again, respondents indicated their level of agreement along a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. About 7% of respondents refused to answer or indicated they did not know.

4.3.4.4 Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Modern Economy Possible without Profit Motive

Our first counter-hegemonic perspective measure evaluates respondents’ attitude regarding the necessity of the profit motive to effective economic relations. The statement respondents were asked to agree/disagree with was “It is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive” and they did so using the same five response categories as the previous two oppositional attitude variables (from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). Eleven percent of respondents chose a non-valid response category.

4.3.4.5 Counter-Hegemonic Attitude – Employee-Run Organizations Can Be Effective

Our final attitudinal variable measures respondents’ agreement/disagreement with the counter-hegemonic belief that employee-run work organizations can be effective. Using the same answer categories as the previous three attitude variables, respondents indicated their level of agreement with the sentiment “Non-management could run things without bosses”; 6% of respondents chose a non-valid response category instead.
4.3.5 Control Variables

We include several individual demographic variables as controls for our multivariate models. These controls were chosen due to suspected association with key explanatory or dependent variables in effort to avoid spuriousness. We were also interested if there might be additional differences in perceptions of misbehaviour between demographic categories not accounted for by the class consciousness of the respondent.

The first of our demographic control variables indicates the gender of the respondent. We make use of a binary gender variable for our analyses in the present study and our analytic sample is 52% male and 48% female.

The second control variable concerns respondent’s highest level of education attained. This information is represented in a 5-point ordinal scale (1 – No diploma, 2 – High school diploma, 3 – Non-University Post-Secondary Certificate, 4 – Bachelor Degree, 5 – Professional/Graduate degree). Our sample is relatively highly educated with about 68% of respondents attaining a credential above the high-school diploma level – this level of education is comparable to the Canadian labour force.

Our third demographic variable is respondent age. The range for our sample is 75 years, with all respondents being between 19 and 94 years old. The average age of respondents is 43.

Our last control variable is respondent self-identified race. We make use of a 2-category binary variable (white or non-white) for simplicity in presentation of results and to capture the influence of the advantages and privileges afforded to individuals categorized as white. We note here that the respondents who make up the non-white category self-identified as over two dozen distinct racial categories (or a mixture of two or more) and so conclusions about these respondents (except in comparison to their counterparts who identified as white) should be treated with caution. Most (82%) of our sample identified themselves as white, while the remaining respondents associate themselves with a non-white racial group.
4.3.6 A Note on Multicollinearity

In order to check for potential issues resulting from multicollinearity, we constructed a correlation matrix (see Appendix 7). Most of the significant relationships between variables are weak or very weak, with those of moderate strength or greater limited to dummy variable categories (to be expected and not cause for concern). It is worth briefly highlighting the relationships between our attitudinal explanatory variables. Though these relationships are weak (strongest is $r = .30$), every one of these attitudinal variables is related to every other. The strongest relationships between attitudes were always with the complimentary measure – oppositional attitudes are more closely associated with one another than with counter hegemonic attitudes (and vice-versa) – which provides some additional support for our operationalization of these concepts. The associations between our attitudinal explanatory variables are not of sufficient strength to suspect multicollinearity is inflating our measures of $R^2$ but are still useful in reminding us that certain attitudes will tend to accompany one another.

4.4 Analytical Approach

Our analytical approach begins with a bivariate analysis of class identity by each of our dependent variables (perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour and perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour).

Next, we ran bivariate analyses for both oppositional attitude variables by both dependent variables to compare the individual influence of each oppositional attitudinal measure as a predictor of respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour. This process is repeated a final time for the counter-hegemonic attitude measures. It was possible to use gamma throughout the entirety of our bivariate analyses (every independent variable was ordinal) and we chose to do so, prioritizing this measure over other more conservative options (ex. tau-b and tau-c) for ease of interpretation derived from our greater familiarity.
with the measure. We did examine other ordinal by ordinal measures and found no cause to suspect that gamma was exaggerating results in the context of this study.

Finally, we ran two series of multivariate regression models (one for each of our dependent variables). The first model of each series contains only our class consciousness variables: class identity, oppositional attitudes and counter-hegemonic attitudes. The second model of each series also incorporates demographic control variables (gender, education, age and race). For the purposes of multivariate analysis, both of our dependent variables were treated as continuous, enabling OLS regression. Our four ordinal attitudinal variables were also treated as continuous. We made the decision to treat these ordinal variables as continuous for several reasons: (1) increases and decreases in perceptions of misbehaviour and movement on the attitude scale were more important to us than comparison between particular variable categories as categorically different, (2) OLS regression allows for use of statistical techniques and methods of presentation more familiar to our readers and (3) it is reasonable to assume approximately equal distance between the categories of these variables – in this case, OLS regression will provide us with understandable and realistic results. Class identity was treated as a categorical variable in our multivariate analysis to enable the comparison between particular class groupings. Dummy variables were created so that a regression coefficient could be calculated for each class category (middle class – as the most-populated category – was chosen as the reference group).

4.5 Results

4.5.1 Bivariate Results

4.5.1.1 Perceived Misbehaviour by Class Identity

The result of our bivariate analysis of class identity and perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour are displayed in Table 4.1. Across every class identity category, the respondents who perceive employer misbehaviour to be a fairly or extremely common occurrence are outnumbered by those who perceive it to be uncommon. However, there
is also an obvious difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour across class groups – there is a linear progression of decreased reporting of employer misbehaviour by those higher up the class hierarchy: Only 12% of upper class and upper-middle class respondents perceived employer misbehaviour to be a common occurrence compared with 22% of the respondents in the lowest class category. Our gamma coefficient of -.158 provides further evidence of a negative relationship between these variables and our test of significance allows us to be confident (at the .001 level) that this result is not due to random chance. Together, these results provide strong evidence to support our hypothesis (1A) of an inverse relationship between class identity and the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour.

Table 4.1 Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour by Class Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working/Lower Class</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle Class</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper/Upper-Middle Class</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2522</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning our attention to Table 4.2, we have reported the bivariate results of our exploration of the relationship between class identity and perceptions concerning the frequency of employee misbehaviour. In comparison with the results from Table 4.1 concerning employer misbehaviour, it is clear that – while the perception of employee misbehaviour as a common occurrence is still a minority position for the respondents of every class – employee misbehaviour is very clearly perceived to be more frequent overall than employer misbehaviour: No less than 30% of even the upper/upper-middle class respondents, and as many as 46% of the working/lower class respondents, perceived employee misbehaviour to be a common workplace occurrence. The reported frequencies in Table 4.2 suggest a linear trend, and our measures of association (γ= -.145) and significance (p=.000) provide verifying evidence of a negative relationship between class identity and perceptions of employee misbehaviour that is similar in strength, direction and level of significance to the results for employer misbehaviour. Once again,
respondents identifying with a higher class perceived misbehaviour to be significantly less frequent than other respondents (support for hypothesis 1B).

Table 4.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour by Class Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working/Lower Class</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle Class</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper/Upper-Middle Class</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2594</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>-.145</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.1.2 Perceived Misbehaviour by Oppositional Attitudes

The next section of our bivariate analysis examines the relationship between agreement or disagreement with oppositional ideological attitudes and respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Through examination of the frequencies for each table, it is evident that agreement with these oppositional statements corresponds with the reporting of employer misbehaviour as more frequent, while the respondents who indicated disagreement with these statements generally perceived less frequent employer misbehaviour (support for Hypotheses 2A and 3A).

The level of significance calculated for both variables’ relationship with the dependent variable is at the .001 level and provides us with confidence that each of these oppositional attitudes are significant bivariate predictors of perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. However, by comparing measures of association (γ) for each attitude, it is possible to evaluate which of our two oppositional attitudes is more strongly related with the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. Doing so, we find evidence that the recognition of corporate owners as deriving profit at the expense of their workers (γ = .206) may be more closely related with the dependent variable than support for the right to strike (γ = .108). However, while absolute difference between these measures of association is not particularly great, the frequency distribution for the
recognition of owners profiting at workers’ expense shows a greater difference in perceptions of employer misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagreed and those who strongly agreed with the associated statement (16%). In comparison, the range of difference in the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour as common by those who strongly disagreed and those who strongly agreed with the statement concerning the right to strike was only 9%.

Table 4.3 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During a strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring workers to take the place of striker.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2413</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class Antagonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2477</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving on to our bivariate analysis of oppositional attitudes by perceptions of employee misbehaviour (see Table 4.5 and 4.6), we find that agreement with either oppositional attitude predicts a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour (both bivariate relationships are positive and significant at the .001 level). These results support hypotheses 2B and 3B, but there is an obvious difference in strength between oppositional attitudes in their strength of association with the dependent variable. Once again, the recognition of class antagonism between owners and workers is distinguished as more influential in
predicting the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour than a respondent’s opposition to strikebreaking ($\gamma = .233$ compared with $\gamma = .075$). It is also worth noting that the lack of a clear trend within the frequency distribution of Table 4.5 gives reason to question whether there is a substantive bivariate relationship between support for the right to strike and perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour. In obvious contrast, the frequency distribution in Table 4.6 demonstrates a clear difference in the perception of employee misbehaviour as common between those who strongly disagree (29.3%) and those who strongly agree (49.4%) with the statement “Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.”

**Table 4.5** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Right to Strike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Right to Strike</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2471</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.6** Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Recognition of Class Antagonism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition of Class Antagonism</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers.</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</td>
<td>Gamma ($\gamma$)</td>
<td>Significance (p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5.1.3 Perceived Misbehaviour by Counter-Hegemonic Attitudes

We next conducted a bivariate analysis for each of our counter-hegemonic attitudinal variables by respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour. For each of these two attitude variables, agreement with the offered statement indicated a more counter-hegemonic perspective on the part of the respondent – a perspective which appears to be related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour. The results displayed in both Table 4.7 and 4.8 suggest a significant positive bivariate relationship for each of our counter-hegemonic attitude variables with the dependent variable. The gamma values suggest our second measure (Non-management could run things without bosses) may be more strongly associated with perceptions of employer misbehaviour than our first counter-hegemonic attitudinal measure (It is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive). However, the magnitude of difference between these measures of association is not particularly great (γ = .132 and γ = .220, respectively), so these variables may still be relatively similar in their influence over the dependent variable.

Table 4.7 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit Economy Possible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2406</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final section of our bivariate analyses concerns the relationship between each of our two counter-hegemonic attitude variables and the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour (see Table 4.9 and 4.10). Examining the frequency distributions for both tables, we find some evidence in support of Hypotheses 4B and 5B (holding more counter-hegemonic attitudes will be related to a higher reported frequency of employee misbehaviour). In a similar fashion to the results pertaining to perceptions of employer misbehaviour, we find that both counter-hegemonic attitudes (Belief in the possibility of
a non-profit economy and support for employee-run organizations) are significantly and positively related with respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour. However, our gamma values here ($\gamma = 0.075$ and $\gamma = 0.111$) suggest that these counter-hegemonic attitudes might be weaker predictors of the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour than they are for predicting employer misbehaviour.

### Table 4.8 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Support for Employee-Run Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-management could run things without bosses.</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2520</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.9 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Believe Non-Profit Economy Possible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive.</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2455</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.10 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Support for Employee-Run Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-management could run things without bosses.</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2568</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5.2  Multivariate Results

4.5.2.1  Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour

Leaving behind our bivariate analysis, we focus on the multivariate relationships between all the elements of class consciousness and the perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour. In the first multivariate model of Table 4.11 (containing only our primary class consciousness variables and our dependent variable), we found several noteworthy results. First, we found that working class or lower-class respondents reported significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour ($\beta = .090$) than the comparison category (middle class respondents), while lower-middle-class and upper/upper middle-class respondents do not appear significantly different from middle-class respondents in their reporting of employer misbehaviour. Second, in examining the multivariate results for our oppositional attitude variables, we found that only one remained a significant predictor of a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour: Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers ($\beta = .105$). Meanwhile, the attitude that strike-breaking should be prohibited by law lost the significance it demonstrated in earlier bivariate analysis with the dependent variable. The results for our counter-hegemonic attitudes told a similar story: Support for the employee-run work organizations was significantly related to a higher reported frequency of employer misbehaviour ($\beta = .132$) while questioning the necessity of the profit motive to the efficacy of a modern economy was not significantly related to our dependent variable.
Table 4.11 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employer Misbehaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identity</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working or Lower-class</td>
<td>.090 (.050)</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle class</td>
<td>.017 (.053)</td>
<td>.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper or upper-middle class</td>
<td>-.018 (.046)</td>
<td>.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppositional Attitudes Strike-breaking should be prohibited by law</td>
<td>.029 (.013)</td>
<td>.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers</td>
<td>.105 (.014)</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Hegemonic Attitudes Possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive</td>
<td>.013 (.014)</td>
<td>.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-management could run things without bosses</td>
<td>.132 (.014)</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables Gender Male (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.094 (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Education Level No diploma</td>
<td>.049 (.085)</td>
<td>.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university post-secondary certificate</td>
<td>-.007 (.047)</td>
<td>.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>-.033 (.053)</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Graduate degree</td>
<td>-.045 (.067)</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.073 (.001)</td>
<td>.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white (ref.)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-.053 (.048)</td>
<td>.014*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² .055 .079
Adjusted R² .052 .073
N 2198 2133

Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.

Once we controlled for individual demographic variables in our second multivariate model of employer misbehaviour (Table 4.11), we see that the results from the first
model remain relatively unchanged. However, the inclusion of these control variables revealed new relationships between respondent demographics and perceptions of the frequency of employer misbehaviour. We found that female (β= -0.094) and white (β= -0.053) respondents reported less employer misbehaviour than their male and non-white counterparts. Age was found to be negatively related to our dependent variable (β= -0.073) with older respondents generally perceiving employer misbehaviour to be a less frequent occurrence. A low level of education is also a significant factor, with those respondents who have not earned a high school diploma reporting more frequent misbehaviour than those with a high school diploma or better (β= 0.049).

4.5.2.2 Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour

For the final section of our results, we repeated the above multivariate analysis of class consciousness and demographic variables by perceptions of the frequency of workplace misbehaviour – this time substituting employee misbehaviour as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.12 and – examining our first model which contains only the elements of class consciousness as explanatory variables – we see many of the same significant factors from our multivariate analysis of employer misbehaviour are relevant for predicting perceptions of the frequency of employee misbehaviour. Agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers (β= 0.166) and the counter-hegemonic attitude that non-management could run things without bosses (β= 0.057) are both significantly related with a higher reported frequency of employee misbehaviour, while our other two measures of oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes are not. In addition, a working class or lower-class identity once again predicts reports of more frequent misbehaviour (β= 0.064) than middle class respondents, but the upper-class and upper-middle class respondents distinguish themselves as reporting employee misbehaviour as significantly less frequent (β= -0.044). This marks a considerable difference from the multivariate results for employer misbehaviour, where upper-class and upper-middle class
respondents were not significantly different from middle-class respondents in their perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour.

### Table 4.12 Multivariate Models of Perceptions of Employee Misbehaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identity</th>
<th>Class Identity</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>Significance (p-value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (SE)</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working or lower class</td>
<td></td>
<td>.064 (.054)</td>
<td>.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td>.028 (0.57)</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper or upper-middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.044 (.050)</td>
<td>.049*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike-breaking should be prohibited by law</td>
<td>Op</td>
<td>-.015 (.014)</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers</td>
<td>Op</td>
<td>.166 (.015)</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive</td>
<td>Op</td>
<td>.014 (0.15)</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-management could run things without bosses</td>
<td>Op</td>
<td>.057 (.015)</td>
<td>.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.022 (.039)</td>
<td>.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Education Level Attained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No diploma</td>
<td></td>
<td>.016 (.091)</td>
<td>.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-university post-secondary certificate</td>
<td></td>
<td>.040 (.050)</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.027 (.057)</td>
<td>.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Graduate degree</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.047 (.072)</td>
<td>.050*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.092 (.001)</td>
<td>.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.014 (.052)</td>
<td>.512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[R^2\] | .048 | .062
\[Adjusted R^2\] | .045 | .056
N | 2230 | 2168

Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
The incorporation of individual demographic variables in our second model (Table 4.12) changes little about the observed relationships between the elements of class consciousness and perceptions of employee misbehaviour frequency, though the lower reported frequency of misbehaviour by upper/upper-middle class did lose significance (indicating that the 6% difference in their reporting of employee misbehaviour as a common occurrence compared to middle class respondents does not constitute a statistically significant difference).

We also found considerably fewer significant relationships between the demographic control variables themselves and perceptions of employee misbehaviour. Age was once again found to be significantly negatively correlated with reported frequency of employee misbehaviour (β= -.092) while the highest category of educational attainment (professional or graduate degree) was related with a significantly lower reported frequency of misbehaviour (β= -.047) than the comparison category (high school diploma holders).

4.6 Discussion

The most important of our findings concern the relationship between the elements of class consciousness and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour (both by employees and employers). The three elements of class consciousness focused on in this paper are (1) class identity, (2) oppositional attitudes and (3) counter-hegemonic attitudes; we found that each one of these elements was significantly related with perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour.

The first step to explaining the relationship between greater class consciousness and respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour is to understand that the recognition of misbehaviour as a frequent occurrence is inherently incompatible with popular justifications for capitalist relations of production. The dominant capitalist narrative for explaining organizational misbehaviour has been to define the phenomenon as being the result of individual deficiencies and weaknesses in character (Analoui, 1995; Biggerstaff
et al., 2015; Edwards et al., 1995; Henle et al., 2010; Lee & Ok, 2014; McMullan & McClung, 2006; Trevino, 2005). Correspondingly, it is frequently assumed that misbehaviour is a rare occurrence engaged in only by a pathological minority of workers and managers – and almost never by employers – in a contemporary workplace characterized by unity of interest between workers, managers and owners and generally congenial industrial relations (Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).

With regards to the misbehaviour of employers, this general denial of the phenomenon is even more pronounced. Not only are employers generally regarded to be individuals largely incapable of organizational misbehaviour, their activities are also those usually set forth as the model for proper workplace behaviour – workers labouring as hard as possible to increase profit. In Richard Nixon’s famous interview with David Frost, the former president said, “when the president does it, that means it is not illegal” (Frost & Nixon, 2007, p. 1). There is a similar power-based justification at work for employer misbehaviour: When an employer does it, that means it is not misbehaviour. The strong influence of this strategy is evidenced by the general lack of inquiry into the misbehaviour of employers within the organizational misbehaviour literature.

Considering the significant ideological protection granted to employers – and the motivation for defenders of capitalist relations to deny the frequency of both employee and employer misbehaviour – we were not particularly surprised to find that the respondents who were most likely to perceive organizational misbehaviour as more frequent were those who identified as lower or working class, expressed oppositional attitudes or held more counter-hegemonic beliefs. These respondents have the least to gain by defending the capitalist system and were correspondingly less likely to underreport the frequency of misbehaviour.

Having established connections between class consciousness and perceptions of misbehaviour, we were also interested in a closer examination of which elements of class consciousness might be most influential as predictors.

Looking at our results for class identity, we found that a working/lower class identity was a significant predictor of a higher perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every
multivariate model. This result is as expected: These individuals’ interests are not best served by capitalist relations of production, so they are less motivated to prop up this system by underestimating the frequency of misbehaviour. However, we were somewhat surprised to see that our multivariate results revealed no significant difference between lower-middle class respondents and middle-class respondents in their reporting of misbehaviour. There are a couple likely explanations for this result: (1) lower-middle class respondents may occupy economic circumstances – and have economic interests – relatively similar to middle-class respondents and (2) the identification of one’s self as lower-middle class, rather than working/upper-class, may indicate individual aspirations of upward mobility and therefore greater support for the capitalist system. Finally, we found only limited evidence to suggest that upper/upper-middle class respondents perceive misbehaviour as less frequent than middle class respondents, so it appears likely that – all other factors being equal – it is only working-class/lower-class respondents who perceive the frequency of misbehaviour considerably differently than the members of other classes.

With regards to our measures of oppositional attitudes, we were somewhat surprised to find that our ‘support for the right to strike’ variable was not a significant factor in any of our multivariate models, while the recognition that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of workers was a significant predictor of a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour throughout. The explanation for this difference in significance is not entirely clear, though it may be partially explained by the more explicit reference to employer behaviour located within the statement “Owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers” compared with “Strike-breaking should be prohibited by law”. The first item requires the respondent to think in terms of class antagonism and conflicts of interest, whereas it is possible for respondents to regard the second question as purely a matter of policy or jurisprudence: In short, the first item may be the better measure of respondents’ oppositional attitudes.

On examination of the multivariate results for our counter-Hegeemonic attitude variables, we discovered a similar trend as that described above: One counter-Hegeemonic attitude was significant across all multivariate models while the other was not significant within
any. Here, we were surprised to find that a questioning of the economic necessity of the profit motive was not related to the perceived frequency of misbehaviour: Because support for the pursuit of private profit is a key element of capitalist hegemony, we had expected to find that criticism of this central ideological component would also signal greater perceived frequency of misbehaviour. This non-significance is particularly striking considering our other counter-hegemonic attitudinal variable – measuring respondents’ agreement that “non-management could run things without bosses” – was significantly related with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour across every multivariate model. This higher significance may be linked to the explicit mention of bosses in the above statement, prompting respondents to consider the behaviour of their employers.

After confirming that a working-class/lower-class identity, recognition of class antagonism between owners and workers, and support for employees’ capacity to self-direct production were related with individual perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour, we examined whether the relative strength of these predictors differed by the type of misbehaviour under consideration – employee or employer. The most striking difference here can be seen in the relative strength of influence of the individual’s support for employees’ capacity to self-direct work – it was a much stronger predictor of the frequency of employer misbehaviour compared to that of employee misbehaviour (β= .138 compared to β= .055). It could be that questioning the necessity of managerial and employer control corresponds with a greater inclination to question the legitimacy of the actions of managers and employers – and correspondingly regard more of these actions as illegitimate, unnecessary or as misbehaviour.

Another notable difference in the influence of our class consciousness variables across type of misbehaviour is demonstrated by our measures of association between the dependent variables and agreement with the oppositional attitude that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of workers. This measure was notably stronger in its association with the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour (β= .161 compared with β= .096 for employer misbehaviour). This difference in strength of association might be explained by a greater likelihood by those who recognize systemic
class antagonism between employers and employees to define employee misbehaviour as a form of worker resistance – and so perceive it as more frequent.

However, it should be noted that the differences in strength of association that we have discussed above are still relatively small – $r^2 = .06$ and .08 in final multivariate models – and our suggested explanations tentative. A fuller understanding of differences in the perceived frequency of employee versus employer misbehaviour that might be attributed to specific oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes is one avenue for future research.

Though they were of secondary priority to our study, we also discovered some interesting results outlining how perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour might be influenced by the demographic characteristics of the respondent. Examining our demographic control variables in the context of our multivariate analysis, we found evidence of a trend towards lower perceptions of misbehaviour frequency – of both types – by older respondents. Additionally, those who have obtained a professional or graduate degree reported significantly less frequent employee misbehaviour.

In the previous two chapters, we found that more privileged work circumstances corresponded with less misbehaviour: (1) More privileged workers are less likely to engage in misbehaviour as they are further from the degraded working conditions that often give rise to employee misbehaviour and (2) Advantageous working conditions characterized by higher wages, job security, collective representation and other benefits tend to act as a constraint upon – and protection from – employer misbehaviour. We should also expect that individuals in more advantageous employment arrangements will identify more strongly with organizational interests and correspondingly overestimate organizational harmony and underestimate the amount of misbehaviour taking place.

Research has shown that wages tend to be higher for those who have completed more years of educational training and those who have lived more years since leaving school (presumably time spent gaining work experience and additional job training) (Lemieux, 2006; Mincer, 1974; Murphy & Welch, 1990). Though the effects of age and education on wage are not necessarily linear – and our understandings of these relationships have
become more nuanced over the last three decades – these factors remain influential in predicting not only wages, but other positive work outcomes, such as permanent employment, job security and job satisfaction (Kalleberg et al., 2000; Muñoz-Comet, 2016; Sapkal & Sundar, 2017; Vosko, 2006).

Thus, while an advanced education and greater age are obviously not guarantees of positive work outcomes, it is evident that higher education and older age (more work experience is often assumed, correctly or not, to accompany more life experience) generally extend some advantage in matters of employment. We suspect the lower rates of perceived misbehaviour by older respondents and those with an advanced degree result from the greater likelihood of working in better employment circumstances – protection from employer misbehaviour and distance from the most degraded of working conditions. On the other hand, a lack of educational credentials clearly puts one at greater risk of undesirable working conditions and offers less protection from misbehaving employers – which explains why our analysis revealed a significantly higher perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour by those respondents with no high school diploma: Unskilled workers are easily replaced and often have few alternative employment opportunities and so are more enticing targets for employer misbehaviour.

Finally, our analysis found no relationship between the race or gender of the respondent and their perception of employee misbehaviour, but both male and non-white respondents reported more frequent employer misbehaviour than female and white respondents.

In the previous chapter, we found that employers of a workforce characterized by increased engagement of non-permanent workers (part-time or seasonal) reported more frequent employer misbehaviour. Our conclusion was that the vulnerabilities associated with non-permanent employment made these workers more attractive targets for employer misbehaviour. This targeting of vulnerable populations of workers by employers may be behind the higher perceived frequency of employer misbehaviour reported by non-white respondents: There is a well-documented history of employment discrimination by race (Cohn & Fossett, 1995; Wilson et al., 1995) where the ascribed status of “non-whiteness” brings a devaluing label to the individual resulting in greater
risk of lower-skilled, menial, low-pay and unsafe work (Beggs, 1995; Kaufman, 1986, 2002; Mason, 2000; McCall, 2001). In the context of the greater risk of non-permanent work for non-white individuals – and the greater motivation for employers of non-permanent workers to engage in misbehaviour – it is unsurprising that employer misbehaviour was reported as more frequent by non-white respondents.

However, it is not clear why we have not found evidence of a similar effect for female respondents, as occupational segregation by gender also puts women at greater risk of non-permanent and non-desirable work compared to men (England, 1992; Padavic & Reskin, 2002; Philzacklea, 1983; Roscigno et al., 2007). Instead, the female respondents in our sample perceived employer misbehaviour to be significantly less common than the male respondents. This difference may yet be explained by gendered differences in definitions of organizational misbehaviour – which could provide an intriguing avenue for future qualitative research into individuals’ perceptions of organizational misbehaviour – but it is likely the result of gender segregation of the Canadian work force. Men are still over-represented in the industrial sector while women predominate in the service sector (see Appendix 8) and the distinctions between these sex segregated work environments may result in different rates of employer misbehaviour.

4.7 Conclusion

Examining the relationships between the elements of class consciousness and individual perceptions of misbehaviour, we found significant evidence that a working class or lower-class identity was associated with a higher reported frequency of both types of misbehaviour. In addition, regardless of respondent class, holding certain oppositional and counter-hegemonic attitudes predicted perceptions of organizational misbehaviour as more frequent.

The results of this study suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped by their class interests and ideological attitudes/beliefs. The acknowledgement of misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon and the recognition that it is not
only employees that misbehave – employers can also, and often do, engage in misbehaviour – represents an ideological challenge to capitalist rule and is a perspective which is most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious.

We also uncovered evidence of demographic differences in perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour. Older respondents and those with a high level of education perceived misbehaviour to be less frequent – likely the result of generally more advantageous working conditions experienced by these individuals. In addition, we found that non-white respondents – and individuals of any race who had not acquired a high school diploma – reported significantly more frequent employer misbehaviour overall. Non-white individuals – and those with a lower level of education – are often segregated into more degraded, vulnerable and precarious employment circumstances – working conditions which tend to encourage greater misbehaviour by both employees and employers (see chapters 2 and 3).

One intriguing avenue for future research would include an examination in greater detail of which attitudes are most strongly associated with a higher reporting of misbehaviour – and whether these attitudes differ in their strength of influence by the type of misbehaviour under consideration. Another possible direction for further research might be concerned with exploring demographic differences in both ideological attitudes and individuals’ perceptions of organizational misbehaviour.

Finally, while our conclusions are based upon several significant relationships, the explanatory power of our multivariate models in accounting for the total variance in perceptions of employer misbehaviour (adjusted \( R^2 = .07 \)) and employee misbehaviour (adjusted \( R^2 = .06 \)) remain modest. There is still considerable unexplained variation in perceptions of misbehaviour frequency to be uncovered by further study.

### 4.8 References


Marx, K. (1867). *Capital, Volume 1*. 


Chapter 5

5 Conclusion

5.1 Contributions

Despite mounting evidence of the general pervasiveness of misbehaviour within the contemporary workplace (Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2007; Lee & Ok, 2014; Paulsen, 2014; Slora, 1989), individual pathological approaches towards explaining organizational misbehaviour remain popular with owners, managers and other policy-makers. According to the individual-pathological narrative of employee misbehavior, the average worker is perceived as relatively compliant and well-behaved and any instance of misbehaviour is blamed on a small minority of “bad apple” employees (Analoui, 1995; Bibi, 2013; Giacalone & Rosenfield, 1987; Henle et al., 2010; Kets de Vries, 2017; Leavitt, 1973; Luthans, 1972; Wilson & Rosenfield, 1990).

Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to a developing body of literature that challenges popular explanations of organizational misbehaviour by illuminating the structural determinants of the phenomenon (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Amichai-Hamburger, 2003; Burawoy, 1979; Flynn, 1916; Marx, 1844, 1867). We utilize the theoretical framework of Neo-Marxist theory to demonstrate how employee misbehaviour should be understood in the context of workers’ reactions to the enduring contradictions of the capitalist system and their experience of degraded work. Our inclusion of occupational class as a key explanatory variable represents a unique contribution to the literature and suggests that the influence of worker autonomy and workplace injustice – characterized as primary determinants by earlier studies (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Ambrose et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 1995; Folger, 1993; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Sheppard et al., 1992; Skarlicki et al., 2008) – may have been overemphasized in the past: Once class is controlled for, we found these factors had much less individual explanatory power in accounting for the frequency of employee misbehaviour. While lack of autonomy and the experience of injustice remain important elements for understanding the motivation towards employee misbehaviour, it may be that these variables can be better understood as intervening variables between class
position and the frequency of organizational misbehaviour (Occupational Class → Injustice, Lack of autonomy → Greater employee misbehaviour).

Another major contribution of this dissertation is derived from its unique methodological approach. Much of the previous research on organizational misbehaviour has taken a qualitative approach and focused on intimate observation of the phenomenon within a single workplace – or occasionally several workplaces (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999, 2008; Sprouse, 1992). These studies are interesting and useful for both illuminating the wide varieties of employee misbehaviour and fostering an appreciation for the influence of the unique local dynamics within a workplace – but are understandably limited in their generalizability. This dissertation addresses this general gap in the organizational misbehaviour literature by employing a representative sample of the Canadian adult working population – the first study to do so, to our knowledge.

Finally, the most important contribution of our dissertation follows from our exploration of the topic of employer misbehaviour. In general, the literature on organizational misbehaviour features a near-complete absence of any inquiry into this phenomenon – with a limited number of more recent exceptions (Barnes & Taksa, 2012; Lundmark & Westelius, 2015; Webb et al., 2009). An explanation for this lacuna in the literature can be found in the considerable legal, political and ideological protections that prevent the actions of employers from coming to be defined as misbehaviour (Bakan, 2004; Burns & Orrick, 2002; Commager, 1971; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Greenfield, 2006; Lamb, 2012; Marx & Engels, 1846; McMullan & McClung, 2006; Michel et al., 2016; Peston, 2012; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982; Wright et al., 1995). In our exploration of employer misbehaviour, we have also provided evidence of a general asymmetry between the phenomena of employee and employer misbehaviour. The drive to increase profits, the employment of vulnerable workers and the presence of a union in the organization emerge as key motivators towards greater misbehaviour for employers.
5.2 Summary of and links between findings

Starting within paper 1 (chapter 2) our study of the phenomenon of organizational misbehaviour is grounded in Marxist theory, with an appreciation for structural conditions within the contemporary workplace which motivate individuals towards greater misbehaviour (Analoui, 1995; Edwards & Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1995, 2001; Karlsson, 2012; Lawrence & Robinson, 2007; Marx, 1844, 1867; Mulholland, 2004).

Through the introduction of occupational class alongside more traditional measures – worker autonomy and experiences of injustice – we contribute intriguing new findings to the study of employee misbehaviour.

First, we found that employees of lower occupational classes (industrial and service workers) reported significantly more misbehaviour than professional employees – we suggest this greater misbehaviour is motivated by exposure to more degraded working conditions which typically confront individuals occupying lower class positions.

Second, we found that the inclusion of occupational class in our models reduced the strength of association between the reported frequency of employee misbehaviour and autonomy, unjust compensation and job insecurity, suggesting that lack of autonomy and these forms of injustice are tied to the class position of the respondent. Interestingly, we found that our injustice measures related to unsafe work or workplace discrimination retained a unique association with the perceived frequency of misbehaviour, suggesting that non-managerial employees of all occupational classes may be more prone towards misbehaviour if they are discriminated against or made to work in unsafe conditions.

In addition to our main analysis of non-managerial employees, we conducted a supplementary analysis of managerial employees in paper 1 (chapter 2). Managers have often been overlooked as subjects capable of their own misbehaviour in past research – as they are assumed to generally act as good stewards of employers’ interests. Correspondingly, their treatment in the literature has usually emphasized their efforts to curtail organizational misbehaviour and not their capacity to engage in it (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Fleming and Sewell, 2002; Giesberg, 2001). Having conducted a multivariate analysis of misbehaviour for managers, we
found evidence of considerable differences in the influential factors related to the perceived frequency of employee misbehaviour reported by managers compared with non-managers: A lower position in the managerial hierarchy and the subjective evaluation that one’s compensation is less-than-deserved were most closely associated with a higher reported frequency of misbehaviour. These results may suggest that managers can be inclined towards misbehaviour when the privileges of their position are not sufficient to ensure their loyalty to employer interests (or perhaps undercompensated managers simply perceive employee misbehaviour as more frequent overall).

Additionally, we found evidence suggesting that larger work organizations tend to feature greater employee misbehaviour, likely the result of the additional cover granted to illicit activities by the relative autonomy of having many co-workers (Ashforth, 1994; Roscigno et al., 2009) or because of the intensification of alienation and heavy rationalization characteristic of many large organizations (Braverman, 1974; Hodson, 2001; Matheson, 2007; Rinehart, 2006; Roscigno et al., 2009; Sanders, 1997).

The main priority of paper 2 (chapter 3) was an exploration of the understudied phenomenon of employer misbehaviour. Drawing on the corporate crime literature that connects employers’ illegal activity to the pursuit of profit-maximization (Bakan, 2004; Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Davidson, 1970; Gilbert, 2005; McAdams, 1977; Nader, 1965; Schwartz & Ellison, 1982), we hypothesized that economic pressures would be primary motivators for greater employer misbehaviour. In addition, we suspected that employment of a labour force characterized by greater vulnerability – non-unionized and/or non-permanent workers – would act as additional motivation towards employer misbehaviour, as these employees could be expected to have fewer protections from abusive actions by employers (Letourneux, 1998; Quinlan, 2012; Underhill & Rimmer, 2015; Vosko, 2006). Our results provided evidence in support of these hypotheses and we found that employers that reported lower wealth, evaluated themselves as undercompensated or employed a labour force characterized by non-permanent workers were those who perceived employer misbehaviour as most frequent.
We were surprised to find that – while the presence of a union within an employer’s organization was significantly related to the reported frequency of employer misbehaviour, exceeding both wealth and subjective under-compensation in its explanatory power – this relationship ran in the opposite direction than expected: The presence of a union was related with greater employer misbehaviour, rather than less. We suspect this association is the result of a more complicated relationship between these variables than initially expected – with unionization as both a reaction by workers to past employer misbehaviour and as motivation for further employer misbehaviour in the form of union-busting activities (Bentham, 2002; Bruce, 1994; Eaton et al., 2014; Freeman & Kleiner, 1990; Martinez & Fiorito, 2009; Riddel, 2001).

Once again, we found additional evidence of the relationship between organizational size and the perceived frequency of misbehaviour: Complementing the findings from chapter 2 concerning employee misbehaviour, employers associated with a larger work organization also reported greater employer misbehaviour. This result may be explained by the additional cover provided by a large organization and the unique legal protections provided by corporate status.

A secondary focus of paper 2 (chapter 3) was the examination of the reported frequency of misbehaviour by individuals across the full range of the occupational class hierarchy – as well as a comparison of the perceived frequency of employee versus employer misbehaviour. As they did in our first paper (chapter 2), industrial and service workers once again stood out as reporting more misbehaviour – employee and employer – than most other occupational groups: Members of these occupational groups are more likely to be the targets of employer misbehaviour and also the least likely to benefit from it – and so are less motivated towards underestimating its occurrence. In confirmation of the results from our first paper (chapter 2), we found further evidence of a negative relationship between managerial level and the reported frequency of organizational misbehaviour. Upper managers distinguished themselves as the occupational group that reported the lowest amount of both employee and employer misbehaviour – the privilege of their position keeping them far from the negative working conditions associated with greater employee misbehaviour, while their unity of economic interest with – and
dependency on – owners encourages turning a blind eye to instances of *employer* misbehaviour. It is also important to note that employee misbehaviour was perceived to be more frequent than employer misbehaviour by respondents of every occupational class (37% of respondents perceived employee misbehaviour as a common occurrence compared with only 15% for employer misbehaviour). This finding was not entirely surprising; employers benefit from considerable ideological and legal protection that makes it much less likely that their actions will be defined as misbehaviour.

Paper 3 complements the findings from the previous two chapters by examining how the class consciousness of an individual is associated with their perception of the frequency of organizational misbehaviour. Here, we found evidence of perceptions of both employee and employer misbehaviour as more frequent by respondents who identified themselves as lower- or working-class or who held certain oppositional or counter-hegemonic attitudes (recognition of class antagonism between owners of corporations and their workers and support for the efficacy of employee-run organizations). These findings suggest that individuals’ perceptions of misbehaviour are shaped by the interests of the class they identify with and their personal ideological attitudes/beliefs. The capitalist hegemonic narrative on organizational misbehaviour is to downplay the frequency of employee misbehaviour and deny the possibility of employers to misbehave, and so the acknowledgement of misbehaviour as a ubiquitous workplace phenomenon is a perspective most likely to be taken up by those who are more class conscious.

### 5.3 Limitations and Future Directions

The papers which comprise this dissertation are not without limitation. Details are discussed within each chapter, but the limitations of our study which have specific implications for future research are discussed here.

First, it is worth reminding ourselves that our misbehaviour variables measure the perceived frequency of misbehaviour according to the respondent, rather than actual incidences of misbehaviour, and so respondent subjectivity in the reporting of
misbehaviour frequency represents a source of error inherit to our methodological approach. In addition, in the formation of our hypotheses and the presentation of our findings, we often assume that others in the respondent’s workplace are similar to the respondent on key variables (for example, the employee misbehaviour reported by non-managerial respondents is assumed to be engaged in by an individual or individuals with a similar level of autonomy as the respondent themselves). We cannot be sure whether respondents are reporting the frequency of their own misbehaviour, the misbehaviour of others or perhaps both, and this represents a key limitation to our work.

In this study, we made the decision to use a general measure of organizational misbehaviour. This methodology provides us with representative results generalizable to the Canadian working population but restricts us from drawing conclusions in connection to any one form of misbehaviour. In our examination of employee misbehaviour (chapter 2), this is barely a limitation as there are a wealth of qualitative studies available which fill in these gaps (Ambrose et al., 2002; Brock et al., 2013; DiBattista, 1996; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Muholland, 2004; Shkoler & Tziner, 2017; Skarlicki et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 2008; Sprouse, 1992). However, as our exploration of employer misbehaviour (chapter 3) represents a new direction in the study of organizational misbehaviour – and there are few studies which feature any treatment of the topic – the drawbacks of our methodological approach are more evident there. In future research into the different forms of employer misbehaviour, we expect this limitation will be addressed: More nuanced measures of employer misbehaviour in further studies that identify specific actions would surely be useful. Future qualitative studies to deepen our understanding of employer misbehaviour would also be incredibly helpful – we note here that recognition of how ideological narratives can shape perceptions of what misbehaviour entails and who most often engages in it should be included in future research in this area.

Another limitation of our study is to be found in our coverage of managerial misbehaviour. In paper 1 (chapter 2), we conducted a supplementary analysis concerning managers reporting of employee misbehaviour. The corresponding results may include some element of managerial misbehaviour – or none, if managers interpreted the question
as inquiring after only the frequency of misbehaviour by non-managerial workers – but we have no specific measure of this unique form of organizational misbehaviour. While managerial misbehaviour can take forms similar to either employee or employer misbehaviour, we know that there are also interesting elements of managers misbehaving which are not captured by our two misbehaviour measures. This limitation should provide an intriguing avenue for future research into the character of managerial misbehaviour. In particular, it would be valuable to explore three very different perspectives on managerial misbehaviour: (1) as an extension of employer misbehaviour, (2) as an extension of general employee misbehaviour and (3) as misbehaviour demonstrating unique dimensions dissimilar from both employer and non-managerial misbehaviour.

The results of our third paper (chapter 4) uncovered some indication of demographic differences in the reported frequency of misbehaviour. Older respondents and those with an advanced degree (professional or graduate) reported significantly less employee misbehaviour than other respondents, while older and female respondents reported less employer misbehaviour. On the other hand, employer misbehaviour was reported as more frequent by non-white respondents and those without a high school diploma. We have emphasized the role of ideological attitudes in relation to an individual’s perception of misbehaviour, and so another avenue for future qualitative research might examine whether conceptual definitions of misbehavior differ across social groups – it would be particularly helpful to see whether certain activities are regarded as misbehaviour by one group and as acceptable or even admirable behaviour by another.

Our study also leaves room for alternative explanations concerning organizational misbehaviour. Other as-yet-unaccounted-for structural factors might have an impact on the frequency of employee misbehaviour within a work organization: for example, low levels of monitoring, poor management, frequent downtime or overdeveloped bureaucratic regulations. In the present study, our dataset did not afford us the ability to look at these relationships, but future research should endeavour to explore these relationships. Additionally, while the focus of this study was to illuminate the structural factors related to organizational misbehaviour – in contrast to popular pathological
explanations of the phenomenon – it would be a mistake to suggest that individual characteristics do not also play a role here. We believe that future research that accounts for both individual and structural motivators towards misbehaviour – and compares their relative influence – would be incredibly informative and bridge a notable gap within the literature.

It should also be noted here that the overall frequency of employee misbehaviour reported in our results – 36.7% of all our respondents believed it to be a common occurrence – appears to be considerably lower than the figures provided by several previous studies (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002, 2006; Lee & Ok, 2014; Slora, 1989) though still in-line with the lower-end of more conservative estimates (Harper, 1990; Lawrence et al., 2007). It is quite possible that the lower amount of misbehaviour we report is a result of our use of a general measure of misbehaviour and asking respondents about specific forms of misbehaviour would see the reported frequency increase. Of course, this lower reporting might also be connected with our reliance on respondents’ perceptions of misbehaviour frequency, rather than an objective count, if the individuals surveyed are consistently underestimating the actual incidence of employee misbehaviour. While we think it reasonable that either – or both – of these explanations may account for the observed difference between our figures and those documented within the literature, we are unable to demonstrate this conclusively.

Finally, while our conclusions are based upon numerous significant relationships, the explanatory power of our models remains limited. In Appendix 9 and 10, we conducted supplementary multivariate analyses of non-managerial employees’ perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour, incorporating explanatory variables from chapter 2, 3 and 4, and these combined models still provide us with low r-squared values ($R^2= .12$ and .15; adjusted $R^2= .10$ and .14). There is still a considerable amount of unexplained variation in the amount of organizational misbehaviour and – while this does not invalidate our findings – it does suggest that there is still much work to be done (particularly with concern to expanding our understanding of the phenomena of employer and managerial misbehaviour).
5.4 Concluding Thoughts

Drawing upon Marxist theoretical principles, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of occupational class and other structural factors that predict greater organizational misbehaviour. Rather than framing misbehaviour as resulting from personal deficiencies on the part of the individual, this dissertation argues that misbehaviour can be a rational reaction to the conditions under which work takes place. The experience of degraded work – typical for both industrial and service workers – appears to reliably predict greater organizational misbehaviour by employees and interested policy-makers should look to strategies for the improvement of working conditions as a means by which to reduce incidences of misbehaviour within the workplace.

Second, while employer misbehaviour is often assumed to be a rare phenomenon, the potential impact of misbehaviour by private owners is vast and surely deserving of greater study than it has received up to this point. This dissertation advances an exploratory study of the phenomenon of employer misbehaviour, but adequate treatment of this topic will require further research. In particular, future inquiry should aim to incorporate a greater diversity of employers: Our sample was dominated by private employers with ten or fewer paid employees and it is possible that important dimensions of employer misbehaviour remain to be discovered.

Third, perceptions of the frequency of misbehaviour are very clearly affected by individuals’ support for/opposition to the prevailing capitalist system of economic production, demanding we acknowledge the interests of various stake-holders in defining misbehaviour, estimating its prevalence and making policy decisions concerning how it should be dealt with. Moving beyond simplistic pathological explanations of organizational misbehaviour requires a challenging of dominant ideological narratives of – not only this specific phenomenon – but also other “common sense” assumptions about the nature of contemporary work.
Finally, our findings indicate that class is a primary explanatory factor related to organizational misbehaviour. We suggest that reconnecting with Marxist class analysis can improve our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour in several key ways: (1) Lack of autonomy and injustice (key motivators towards employee misbehaviour) are not distributed evenly across the social hierarchy and those occupying less-desirable positions within the relations of production – industrial and service workers – are those who are most likely to experience these aspects of degraded work that motivate greater employee misbehaviour; (2) The absence of inquiry into employer misbehaviour (and only limited efforts at studying managerial misbehaviour) indicates our theoretical understanding of organizational misbehaviour is still seriously underdeveloped with the primary thrust of the literature concerning only the misbehaviour of workers; (3) Ideological attitudes shape our understanding of organizational misbehaviour – how it is defined, how frequently it takes place, whose misbehaviour is most worthy of study and whose misbehaviour should be excused or even celebrated. The influence of capitalist hegemony in this process must be acknowledged if we are to move towards a fuller understanding of misbehaviour within the contemporary workplace.

5.5 References


Appendices

Appendix 1 Technical Report on Response Rate of Canada-wide Sample for the CWKE Survey

Response Rate

There are numerous ways to calculate response rates in survey.

The response rate for the random phone survey was defined as follows:

\[
\text{Response Rate} = \frac{\text{Completes}}{\left( \frac{\text{Eligibility Rate} \times \text{Unknown}}{\text{Completes} + \text{Eligible}} \right) + \text{Completes} + \text{Eligible}}
\]

\[
\text{Eligibility Rate} \; ER = \frac{\text{Completes} + \text{Eligible}}{\text{Completes} + \text{Eligible} + \text{Ineligible}}
\]

For the telephone survey, the response rate was 33\% using the above calculation.

For the Leger Web panel, 2731 clicked on the link, resulting in a 65\% response rate.

The overall response rate was therefore 52\%.

NOTE: The preceding information was provided to the author by the Leger research group who gathered the survey data for this study.
### Appendix 2 Non-Response Analysis of Key Misbehaviour Variables

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<tr>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>Employer Misbehaviour</th>
<th>Employee Misbehaviour</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0=valid response; 1=non-response)</td>
<td>(0=valid response; 1=non-response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds Ratio (exp B)</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>.45</td>
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<td>.27</td>
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<td>1.16</td>
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<td>.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
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<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional employee</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service worker (ref.)</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial worker</td>
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<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Wealth (15 categories)</td>
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<td>.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>Highest Level of Education</td>
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<td>.31</td>
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</table>

NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01; *** Significant at .001
Appendix 3 Construction Logic for Occupational Class


2) Respondents’ 4-digit CCDO numbers were then coded into one of the following Porter-Pineo categories belonging to a well-known socio-economic index developed by Pineo, Porter and McRoberts (1977), based on the 1971 Canadian Census and updated in 1985 to reflect the 1981 Census.

3) The initial coding of our occupational class variable involved allocating each of the 16 porter-pineo categories to one of our occupational class categories (see below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Porter-Pineo Categories</th>
<th>WALL Class Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>3 Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Employed professionals</td>
<td>6 Professional employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hi-level managers</td>
<td>4 Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Semi-professionals</td>
<td>6 Professional employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Technicians</td>
<td>6 Professional employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Middle managers</td>
<td>4 Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Supervisors</td>
<td>5 Supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Foremen/women</td>
<td>5 Supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Skilled clerical/Sales</td>
<td>7 Service worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Skilled crafts</td>
<td>8 Industrial worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Farmers</td>
<td>3 Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Semi-skilled clerical/Sales</td>
<td>7 Service worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Semi-skilled manual</td>
<td>8 Industrial worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Unskilled clerical/Sales</td>
<td>7 Service worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Unskilled manual</td>
<td>8 Industrial worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Farm labourers</td>
<td>8 Industrial worker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) If respondent reported their employment status as self-employed and was presently in another occupational class category, they were recoded as category 3 Self-employed.

5) Self-employed respondents who had at least one paid employee (aside from themselves) were recoded as either category 1 (Large employer) or category 2 (Small employer) based on the number of employees working for them (1 to 10 employees → small employer; 11 or more employees → large employer).

6) Manager and Supervisor category coding was double-checked using the following managerial-level variable and a number of managers were demoted to the category of supervisor:
Which of the following best describes the managerial role you have at your place of work?

1. Top manager of a plant, branch or division of an organization
2. Upper level manager
3. Middle level manager
4. Lower managerial position
5. Supervisor
6. Foreperson

7) The first two categories of the managerial-level variable above were utilized to promote some of the managerial respondents to a new occupational class category: upper manager.

8) With some reordering of categories, the final version of our occupational class variable comprises 9 categories:

1. Large employer
2. Small employer
3. Self-employed
4. Upper manager
5. Midmanager
6. Supervisor
7. Professional employee
8. Service worker
9. Industrial worker
### Appendix 4 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls
(non-managerial employee analysis)

#### Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s $r$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>OC3</th>
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<th>Auto2</th>
<th>Injus1</th>
<th>Injus2</th>
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**NOTE:** * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

### Legend:
- OC1: Professional Worker
- OC2: Service Worker
- OC3: Industrial Worker
- Wealth: Total Net Wealth
- ClassID: Personal Class Identification
- Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work
- Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions
- Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced
- Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work
- Injus3: Safety at work
- Injus4: Job security
- Org.Size: Number of employees
- Indus1: Goods-producing organization
- Indus2: Mixed industry organization
- Indus3: Service organization
- Sector1: Private sector
- Sector2: Public sector
- Sector3: Non-profit sector
### Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)

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NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01
### Appendix 5 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 2 Independent Variables and Controls (managerial employee analysis)

#### Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s $r$)

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<th>OC3</th>
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<th>ClassID</th>
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**NOTE:** * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

### Legend:
- OC1: Upper Manager
- OC2: Middle Manager
- OC3: Supervisor
- Wealth: Total Net Wealth
- ClassID: Personal Class Identification
- Auto1: Allowance to plan or design own work
- Auto2: Want more say in organizational decisions
- Injus1: Appropriateness of compensation compared to value produced
- Injus2: Experienced discrimination at work
- Injus3: Safety at work
- Injus4: Job security
- Org.Size: Number of employees
- Indus1: Goods-producing organization
- Indus2: Mixed industry organization
- Indus3: Service organization
- Sector1: Private sector
- Sector2: Public sector
- Sector3: Non-profit sector
Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r)

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NOTE: * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01
## Appendix 6 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 3 Independent Variables and Controls
(employer analysis)

### Part 1 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s $r$)

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<td>-.05</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>Decide</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.07</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

### Legend:

- **Wealth** = Total net wealth
- **Subj. Comp** = Appropriateness of compensation
- **Busi. Loss** = Likelihood of business loss
- **Union** = Trade union present in workplace
- **Non-perm.** = Greater reliance on non-permanent workers
- **#employees** = Number of Employees
- **Private** = Private sector
- **Public** = Public sector
- **Non-profit** = Non-profit sector
- **Industry** = Service-providing industry (1), Goods-producing industry (0)
- **Decide** = Employer participates in workplace decision-making

### Part 2 of Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s $r$)

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<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Non-profit</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Decide</th>
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<td>.05</td>
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**NOTE:** * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01
### Appendix 7 Correlation Matrix for Chapter 4 Independent Variables and Controls
(all employed individuals)

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<th>NonProfit</th>
<th>NoBosses</th>
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</table>

**NOTE:** * Significant at .05; ** Significant at .01

#### Legend:
- Low=Respondent identifies as working or lower-class
- LowMid=Respondent identifies as lower-middle class
- Mid=Respondent identifies as middleclass
- Upper=Respondent identifies as upper or upper-middle class
- Strike=Agreement that strike-breaking should be prohibited by law
- Owners=Agreement that owners of corporations make gains at the expense of their workers
- NonProfit=Agreement that it is possible for a modern economy to run effectively without the profit motive
- NoBosses=Agreement that non-management could run things without bosses
- Female=Female respondent (male is comparison category)
- Nodiplo=Respondent’s highest education level: no diploma
- HS=Respondent’s highest education level: high school diploma
- Non-uni=Respondent’s highest education level: non-university post-secondary certificate
- BA=Respondent’s highest education level: bachelor degree
- Advanced=Respondent’s highest education level: professional/graduate degree
- Age=Respondent Age
- White=Respondent identified as white (non-white is comparison category)
### Appendix 8 Work Sector by Gender

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<th>Gender of Respondent</th>
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<th>Mixed (transport, storage, communication)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
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**Chi² = 254.380**

Significance = .000
**Appendix 9** Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour (Non-Managerial Workers)

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<th>Partial Model 2</th>
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<td>.059*</td>
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<tr>
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Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
### Appendix 10 Combined Models of Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour (Non-Managerial Workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Complete Model</th>
<th>Partial Model 1</th>
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<td>.116***</td>
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<td>Class Identity</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.056*</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.116***</td>
<td>.116***</td>
<td>.116***</td>
<td>.116***</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Worker Power/Vulnerability</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
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<td>.-009</td>
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<td>.-057*</td>
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<td>.002</td>
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Notes. *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001. Regression coefficients represent standardized slopes.
### Appendix 11 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Union Membership (non-managerial workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Employee Class</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
<td>667</td>
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<td>Professional</td>
<td>.120</td>
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<td>Union member</td>
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<td>Service</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Industrial</td>
<td>-.046</td>
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<td></td>
<td>All Non-Managerial Employees</td>
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<td>.442</td>
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### Appendix 12 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Union Membership (non-managerial workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Employee Class</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-member</td>
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<td>All Non-Managerial Employees</td>
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### Appendix 13 Perceived Frequency of Employee Misbehaviour by Employment Status (non-managerial workers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employee misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Employee Class</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Non-permanent</td>
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<td>Industrial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>All Non-Managerial Employees</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.569</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Appendix 14 Perceived Frequency of Employer Misbehaviour by Employment Status (non-managerial workers)

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<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% who report employer misbehaviour as fairly or extremely common</th>
<th>Employee Class</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
<th>Significance (p-value)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Non-permanent</td>
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<td>All Non-Managerial Employees</td>
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<td>.117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Curriculum Vitae

Name: Brendan Watts

Post-secondary Education and Degrees:
- University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada
  - 2008-2012 B.A. Sociology (Honors Specialization)
  - 2012-2013 M.A. Sociology
  - 2014-2018 Ph.D. Sociology

Honours and Awards:
- Hugo G. Biegel Award for Research Excellence
- Journal of Sex Research
  - 2016

Related Work Experience:
- Quantitative Analyst
  - Changing Workplaces in a Knowledge Economy (CWKE) project
  - 2015-Present
- Research Assistant
  - University of Western Ontario
  - 2010-2015
- Teaching Assistant
  - King’s University College
  - 2013-2016
- Teaching Assistant
  - University of Western Ontario
  - 2012-2017

Publications:


Kohut, T., J. Baer & B. Watts. (2016). Is pornography really about "making hate to women"? pornography users hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than nonusers in a
doi:10.1080/00224499.2015.1023427