Welcoming Strangers: Race, Religion, and Ethnicity in German Lutheran Ontario and Missouri, 1939-1970

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Abstract:

This dissertation examines how German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County, Ontario, constructed their ethnic identities from the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 to 1970. Did German Lutherans understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth preserving? What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic identities? It argues that German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods constructed a hybrid identity that sought to balance their competing ethnic, religious, racial, and national identities. It charts their experiences negotiating discrimination during the Second World War, their efforts to bring German immigrants to North America through lobbying for immigration policy changes, and their struggles to resist pressures to assimilate throughout the postwar period. Contrary to popular assumptions, German Lutherans did not abandon their ethnic identities during the twentieth century, but rather continued to practice a German ethnic identity within the ethnic boundary zones of their churches. They continued to justify speaking German as a theological necessity, formed alliances with new German refugees and displaced persons to continue their ethnic traditions, and resisted exclusionary mainstream Anglo-Canadian and American nationalisms by advocating for a pluralistic understanding of their past through cultural and commemorative events.

By drawing on developments in critical race theory and whiteness studies, this dissertation argues that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for understanding how German Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. While it was controversial during and after the Second World War to openly identify as German, German Lutherans successfully mitigated these stigmas through their white privilege and ability to form political alliances with white government officials. Moreover, German Lutherans maintained an ethnic identity because they excluded other immigrants and racialized North Americans from attending their congregations by supporting Jim Crow segregation. By keeping their churches white, they were also able to keep their churches “German.” This study urges immigration historians to look more closely at how whiteness and ethnicity in the twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one another.

Keywords: German Canadians, German Americans, St. Louis, Waterloo County, Whiteness, Race, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Canada Synod, North American Lutheranism, Transnationalism, Second World War, Cold War Immigration, Displaced Persons
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List of Abbreviations

**BAM:** Board of American Missions

**CCCRR:** Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees

**CLC:** Canadian Lutheran Council

**CLWR:** Canadian Lutheran World Relief

**CWS:** Commission for War Services

**EPC:** Emergency Planning Council

**HMC:** Home Missions Committee

**HMB:** Home Missions Board

**IISTL:** International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis

**IRO:** International Refugee Organization

**KWCF:** Kitchener-Waterloo Council for Friendship

**LWA:** Lutheran World Action

**LWF:** Lutheran World Federation

**LWML:** Lutheran Women’s Missionary League

**NLC:** National Lutheran Council

**OWI:** Office of War Information

**ULCA:** United Lutheran Church in America
A Note on Terminology

Scholarly terms used to define ethnicity and race are often problematic due to the imprecise and subjective nature of both identities. Many racial and ethnic labels fail to capture the fluidity of each of these identities. This study discusses German-speaking Lutherans in Canada, the United States, and Germany. Generally, I use the term “German Lutherans” as an all-encompassing and less cumbersome term to refer to the German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans that lived in St. Louis and Waterloo County. When referring to only one of these communities, I specify their nationality with the hyphenated term. “German Lutherans” does not refer to people living in Europe unless otherwise specified in the text.

Critical race theorists employ a wide swath of terms to refer to the different “races” they study. In his critical examination of white culture, Richard Dyer describes how many of these terms, such as “nonwhite” or “people of colour,” are problematic because they reinforce troubling power relations wherein “white” is normalized and those outside of this category are othered.¹ As a result, I use the term “racialized” Canadians and Americans to refer to nonwhite people, out of recognition that white people are not yet racialized in North American society. I have also elected not to capitalize racial labels such as “white” or “black” to better reflect the descriptive nature of these terms and reflect their artificiality.²

² Other scholars have decided to capitalize “White” alongside other racial categories such as “Black” or “Asian.” Respectfully, I have chosen the opposite approach as I feel it better conveys the artificial nature of racial categories, whereas capitalization makes them more concrete. See Sharron A. Fitzgerald and Alicja Muszynski, “Negotiating Female Morality: Place, Ideology and Agency in Red River Colony,” Women’s History Review 16, no. 5 (2007): 677.
The outbreak of yet another world war in September 1939 generated significant anxiety among North America’s German immigrant communities. Those of German heritage recalled the discrimination and harassment the Great War created in their communities and they worried that another war would place their safety in jeopardy once again. C.H. Little, a Lutheran professor of theology in Waterloo County, Ontario, grimly greeted the news of the Second World War’s beginning: “The die has been cast, hell has broken loose, and we are in a world war again.” The outbreak of war was not a time of patriotism for Little and his peers. Instead, he believed the war was “a tragedy beyond all calculation…undoubtedly dark days are ahead of us here in Canada.”

A few weeks later, German-American Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, echoed Little’s concerns. The Reverend Rudolph Meyer, pastor of St. Louis’s oldest Lutheran church, prayed “that our beloved country will enact a neutrality law that will not entangle us in the European War. We have not forgotten the heartaches of the [last] World War.” Although separated by the Canadian-American border, German Lutherans in both Waterloo County and St. Louis worried that another war with Germany would make them feel like outsiders in their communities once again.

A fear that they would become strangers in their new North American homes characterized much of German immigrant experience in the mid-twentieth century. Described by one historian as a period of Anglo-conformity, German immigrants worried

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1 Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Carroll Herman Little fonds (hereafter CLF), C.H. Little to Candace Little, 27 August 1939.

2 Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Bulletin Box, Bulletins Folder, Trinity Bulletin, 17 September 1939.
that their culture, language, and ethnicity would make them outcasts in Canada and the United States. The Second World War prompted North Americans to associate German culture with Nazism and opened German immigrants to accusations of disloyalty. Even after the war concluded in 1945, Canadians and Americans still connected the German people with Nazi war crimes and favoured restricting the number of German refugees who could migrate to North America. These stigmas and negative associations disproportionately impacted German immigrants of the Lutheran faith. Many Canadians and Americans considered Lutheranism an inherently Germanic religion due to its historic ties to Martin Luther and its traditional popularity in modern Germany. Although North American Lutheran groups had few, if any, direct political ties to Germany, nativists worried German Lutherans harbored a secret loyalty to Germany instead of their Canadian and American communities.

How did German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans combat these negative stereotypes surrounding their ethnicity and faith? Did German Lutherans understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth preserving? What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic identities? This dissertation aims to answer these questions by drawing on two case studies. It examines how the German Lutheran communities in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County, Ontario, debated their ethnic identity from the beginning of the Second World War in 1939 to 1970. It argues that German Lutherans in these two communities maintained a German ethnic identity despite the challenges that controversies such as the Second

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World War and postwar associations with Nazism posed. German Lutherans did not “lose” their ethnic identities during the mid-twentieth century, nor did they completely assimilate into mainstream Canadian and American society. This dissertation contends that German Lutherans created a hybrid ethnic identity that attempted to reconcile their German heritage with their nationality and religion. They crafted an ethnicity that acknowledged both their German roots as well as their new status as citizens of Canada and the United States. While German Lutherans closely identified with their ethnicity and faith privately within their communities and churches, they found that appealing to broader racial and religious identities as white Protestants and Christians helped them to mitigate the discrimination they faced in the public sphere. By performing this careful balancing act, German Lutherans were able to maintain a distinct ethnic identity during a period that stressed Anglo-Canadian and American conformity.

Debating Assimilation, Hybridity, and the German Ethnic Identity

This dissertation is not the first historical study to examine the extent to which German immigrants in North America maintained a distinct ethnic identity. The search for a German ethnic identity sits at the crux of the literature on German immigrants in Canada and the United States. The majority of historians who have examined the experiences of German immigrants in North America generally conclude that they assimilated into mainstream Canadian and American society during the twentieth century. It would be repetitive to describe in detail every historical study that makes this argument, but it is important to recognize the pervasive nature of this interpretation of German-
Canadian and German-American history. Historian Angelika Sauer remarked upon this interpretation in 1998, arguing that previous German-Canadian scholars imposed a “very specific yardstick against which to measure” the assimilation of German immigrants. This tendency to emphasize German assimilation, she argued, dominated the literature to such an extent that it appeared as though historians seemed motivated exclusively by their search for the “Ideal German” immigrant that always fell short of their expectations.

Historians often found that German immigrants had little attachment to their homeland in Germany; they rarely promoted the German language among their children; they were largely invisible when compared with other North American ethnic groups. By measuring German immigrants against the broader pattern of ethnicity in twentieth-century North America, historians concluded that German immigrants abandoned their former ethnic identities and embraced assimilation into mainstream culture.

The First World War featured prominently within the scholarly discussions of German immigrant assimilation. Historians focused disproportionately on mainstream hostility in Canada and the United States towards German immigrants. They argued that this hostility caused German immigrant groups to abandon their German ethnic identity.

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Historians Leslie Tischauser and Frederick C. Luebke, for example, described the hardships that German Americans encountered during the Great War. They explain how Germans continued to speak their language at their clubs and churches, and kept German flags throughout cities with large German-immigrant populations. The entry of the United States into the war in 1917, however, transformed these earlier displays of ethnic identity into signs of their “disloyalty.” As a result, historians argued that the war resulted in the “disappearance” of the German language and culture in American life. Canadian historians have echoed this narrative of cultural loss. The decision of Berlin, Ontario, to change its name to Kitchener, after the famous British military commander, in 1916 is one of the most frequently cited examples of identity loss among German Canadians. Historians concluded that Berlin/Kitchener’s German identity “thus died” symbolically and practically after the name change. These historians also pointed to the closure of German ethnic clubs, the elimination of the German language press, and the public assaults on the German language as evidence for the disappearance of a German ethnic identity. According to these historians, German immigrants wanted to avoid discrimination in the future and therefore assimilated into Canadian and American society. According to Sauer, the historiography of 1970s to 1990s led to the “image of German Canadians as permanent victims.”

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9 Tischauser, 39, 45-46.
10 Luebke, 309-311, chapter ten more generally.
12 Sauer, 232. Although less prominent than in previous decades, historians still occasionally portray the two world wars as destructive, despite several calls within the field to move away from the singular importance placed on the wars. See for example LaVern J. Rippley, “Wisconsin German-Americans and World War I: Wisconsin ‘The German-American Homefront’,” *Yearbook of German-American Studies* 50 (2015): 129-150; Gregory Kupsky, “‘We, Too, Are Still Here’: German Americans in St. Louis, 1905-1941,” *Missouri Historical Review* 103, no. 4 (2009).
The victimization thesis Sauer identified remains resilient within the historiography, despite recent advancements in the field that no longer focus disproportionately on the world wars.\footnote{Several scholars should receive credit for revising the previous emphasis on the wars. See Matthew D. Tippens, Turning Germans into Texans: World War I and the Assimilation and Survival of German Culture in Texas, 1900-1930 (Austin: Kleingarten Press, 2010); Barbara Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity: Listening to German North America, 1850-1914 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Petra DeWitt, Degrees of Allegiance: Harassment and Loyalty in Missouri’s German-American Community during World War I (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). Lorenzkowski’s arguments, in particular, are expanded upon in Benjamin Bryce, “Linguistic Ideology and State Power: German and English Education in Ontario, 1880-1912,” The Canadian Historical Review 94, no. 2 (2013): 207; Mario Nathan Coschi, “‘Be British or be d-d’: Primary Education in Berlin-Kitchener, Ontario, during the First World War,” Histoire sociale/Social History 47, no. 94 (2014): 330-332.} By the early 2000s, historians focused less on the wars and instead explored the social and cultural lives of German immigrants by using oral histories, transnationalism, and whiteness studies.\footnote{The edited collection A Chorus of Different Voices did a great deal in shifting the literature towards an exploration of German immigrants rooted in their social experiences. See the various essays in Angelika E. Sauer and Matthias Zimmer eds., A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1998). For other studies more concerned with social experience of ethnic identity retention see, Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Alexander Freund, “Troubling Memories in Nation-building: World War II Memories and Germans’ Inter-ethnic Encounters in Canada after 1945,” Histoire sociale/Social History 77 (2006): 129-155; Hans Werner, Imagined Homes: Soviet German Immigrants in Two Cities (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2007); Pascal Maeder, Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2011); Alexander Freund ed., Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).} This emphasis shifted the literature towards discussions of immigrant agency and away from identity loss. When historians did discuss German ethnic identity, however, they remained focused on an immigrant group that lost its distinct identity. Historian Russell Kazal argued that German Americans in Philadelphia articulated a white racial identity during the interwar years in place of a German ethnic identity. His work highlights the informal alliances that formed between German and Irish Americans to “protect” their neighbourhoods from black newcomers purchasing or renting homes near theirs. In doing so, Germans responded to these new arrivals by moving to other parts of the city, thereby dissolving their ethnically-
homogenous neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{15} Kazal described how German newspapers and organizations decried these losses and legitimized their entitlement to these areas as “white” or “old stock” Americans. Germans joined a broader community of “white Americans” instead of reverting back to their traditional ethnic ties.\textsuperscript{16} Historian Pascal Maeder argued that German refugees and displaced persons gradually lost their German ethnic identities after the Second World War. Maeder examined how postwar associations with Nazism deterred German immigrants from actively maintaining a German identity. Instead, they “adopted a Eurocentric immigrant identity” with other European immigrants on the basis of their shared status as displaced persons.\textsuperscript{17} Historian Hans Werner described a similar scenario in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Postwar German immigrants in Winnipeg benefitted from Canada’s “history of accommodating itself to a diversity of ethnic groups” and eventually “came to feel at home” as “Canadians.”\textsuperscript{18} Although historians on both sides of the border do not focus on the “destructive” nature of the world wars as their predecessors did, the emphasis on assimilation continues to perpetuate the notion that German immigrants assimilated or lost their ethnic identities throughout the twentieth century. These scholars do not demonstrate how adopting new “old stock” or “displaced person” identities reshaped their German ethnicities. Although they succeed in demonstrating that German immigrants adopted these new identities, they do not demonstrate that these identities completely eclipsed their old German ethnic identities.:

Historians of German immigrants are also some of the staunchest advocates for a history of immigration that focuses on assimilation. Although assimilation has fallen out

\textsuperscript{15} Kazal, \textit{Becoming Old Stock}, 248-250; 223-226.
\textsuperscript{16} Kazal, \textit{Becoming Old Stock}, 3, 6.
\textsuperscript{17} Maeder, \textit{Forging a New Heimat}, 220-222, 232.
\textsuperscript{18} Hans Werner, \textit{Imagined Homes}, 223-227
of favour among immigration and ethnic scholars since the 1980s, historians of German immigrants continue to argue for the importance of assimilation in North American life.

In 1995, Kazal defined assimilation as:

> processes that result in greater homogeneity within a society…They may operate within different arenas, with groups, for example, drawn together in terms of culture, or intermarriage, or shared political institutions, or shared elements of identity, such as class consciousness. And they may operate to varying degrees within and across different arenas… I find it most useful to define assimilation in the immigrant context as referring to processes that generate homogeneity beyond the ethnic-group level. Such processes bring different immigrant ethnic groups, or their members, together in any number of arenas, creating common ground among them, or between them and a socially dominant group. Thus understanding assimilation requires understanding how ethnic groups relate to one another within the larger society. 19

Unlike the social historians of the 1980s and 1990s that focused on closely-knit immigrant groups preserving their language and identities, Kazal believed assimilation still offered a valuable framework through which to understand immigrant life in the United States. He argued that social historians too often “neglect, deny, or minimize assimilation’s role in eroding” ethnic identities. 20 Historians of German immigrants in Canada have since echoed Kazal’s assertion to renew the emphasis on assimilation in their work. In the Canadian context, Werner argued that while the notion of a culturally-constructed ethnic identity helps explain the attitudes of third and later generation immigrations, “the concept of assimilation still offers explanatory power for first-generation immigrant behaviour.” 21 Thus, the idea of the “assimilated German immigrant” remains a powerful narrative within the current literature.

This dissertation rejects the assimilation model in favour of a definition of ethnicity that is flexible and constantly changing. I demonstrate that adopting new

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21 Werner, 9-10. Werner defines “integration” somewhat more liberally, stating that integration includes “adjustments made by both the host society and an immigrant group that reduce the tensions of difference to make these tensions no longer distinguishable from other processes of social and cultural change in that society.”
identities as “old stock” or “Canadian” identities reshaped German ethnicities, rather than erasing them. Sociologist Milton Gordon defined an ethnic group as “a group with a shared feeling of peoplehood.” While perfunctory, this simple definition masks the complex processes that shape and mold ethnic identities. In an influential 1992 article, Kathleen Neils Conzen and others argued against “ethnicity as primordial (ancient, unchanging, inherent in a group’s blood, soul, or misty past).” They argued instead that ethnicity functions as “a process of construction or invention” that could change and adapt over time. Although rooted in lived experience, ethnicity is “reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group and the host society.” This framework acknowledges that ethnic identities occasionally weaken, but can later recover and become more pronounced as social and cultural contexts change. The definition of ethnicity as a mutable identity in flux provides this study’s methodological foundation.

Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski’s scholarship on German-Canadian and German-American identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries builds on the idea of an “invented” or “performed” ethnic identity. By examining German communities in Waterloo County, Ontario, and Buffalo, New York, Lorenzkowski reveals the “invented” nature of her subjects’ ethnic identities by employing the concept of hybridity. She often describes her subjects with a hyphenated “German-Canadian” or “German-American” label. In contrast to other historians, however, she does not use the hyphen as an indicator of loss or a compromised ethnic identity. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s observation that hybrid cultures “must learn to inhabit at least two identities, to speak two cultural

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languages, to translate and negotiate between them,” Lorenzkowski suggests that the hyphen denotes “a space of cultural interaction” between German immigrants and their host society that produced a new hybrid identity. This hybrid or hyphenated identity reflected both their ethnic and national identities.\textsuperscript{25} Lorenzkowski applies this framework most clearly to her discussion of the German language. She describes how German immigrants in late nineteenth century Waterloo County and Buffalo spoke a “local German” dialect that combined English phrases and syntax with the German language.\textsuperscript{26} While previous historians viewed the lack of “pure” German as a sign of assimilation, Lorenzkowski argued that hybridity better encapsulates how German immigrants perceived their linguistic abilities as a valid compromise that recognized their ethnic heritage and North American circumstances. In this sense, Lorenzkowski’s hybrid German-Canadian and German-American communities align with what Homi K. Bhabha calls “\textit{partial} culture” or “culture’s in-between,” wherein the “connective tissue between cultures…[is] bafflingly both alike and different.”\textsuperscript{27} This study builds on Lorenzkowski’s analysis of hybrid identities in German immigrant communities, albeit later in the twentieth century. Against the backdrop of another world war, the Cold War consensus, and an American and Canadian nationalism that stressed Anglo-conformity, German Lutherans had to craft an “in-between culture.” This dissertation examines the process whereby German Lutherans constructed a hybrid ethnic identity during a time when identifying as both “German” and “Canadian” or “American” seemed incompatible.


\textsuperscript{26} Lorenzkowski, \textit{Sounds of Ethnicity}, 44-47, 77.

In order to better understand how German Lutherans constructed a hybrid identity in the mid-twentieth century, I look at Lutheran churches as an “ethnic boundary zone.” In his influential 1969 essay, anthropologist Fredrik Barth described how ethnic groups maintained distinct identities by constructing “boundaries” in which to separate themselves from mainstream society and practice their unique culture. Ethnic groups, he argued, should be recognized by “a membership which defines itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other(s).” Lutheran churches functioned as important ethnic boundaries where German immigrants defined both their ethnicity and faith. Physical markers as well as cultural practices demarcated the church as an ethnic boundary, both in the eyes of German Lutherans as well as Anglo-Canadians and Americans. For the first half of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches in Missouri and Ontario generally consisted of German immigrants and their descendants. These “immigrant churches” bore several markers of difference that distinguished them from their Anglo-Canadian and American neighbors. Most churches had German-language signs displayed in their yard, and Lutheran pastors routinely preached in German. Examining Lutheran congregations as an ethnic boundary creates the possibility of locating the voices and perspectives of German immigrants. As historians Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen suggest, looking at ethnic boundaries “probes [the immigrant] imagination, seeks to understand their vocabularies, retells their stories. And it subverts the notion of hapless victim of assimilation.”

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29 On Lutheran churches as immigrant churches, see Carol K. Coburn, *Life At Four Corners: Religion, Gender, and Education in a German Lutheran Community, 1868-1945* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1992).
are vitally important for the history of German immigrants who have thus far been characterized as assimilated. For many immigrant communities, places of worship “provided the immigrants not only with a focal point of social interaction, but a world view, a cosmology that explained the costly migration, a belief system that ordered their worlds.” Churches operated as sites where German Lutherans gave meaning to their lives in North America, and their records provide a way in which to understand how they constructed a hybrid ethnicity in the company of their fellow coreligionists and ethnic community.

By placing the Lutheran church and its institutions at the center of this study, the voices and perspectives of Lutheran pastors appear most frequently. For German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, pastors operated as religious, ethnic, and community leaders. My focus on pastors as “ethnic elites” or “ethnic brokers” follows the methodological approach of other Canadian immigrant historians who have increasingly returned to the study of so-called immigrant leaders. Historians Lisa Rose Mar and Aya Fujiwara both argue for the importance of studying ethnic elites as a way to examine immigrant history from “the middle, from neither top-down nor a bottom-up perspective.” Examining history from “the middle” allows historians to examine “the constant interplay between mainstream and ethnic communities.” By looking specifically at Chinese-Canadian elites who “brokered” labour contracts between poor Chinese workers and Anglo-Canadian businessmen, Mar suggested that “a new view of

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31 Loewen and Friesen, Immigrants in Prairie Cities, 13.
32 This was common in many immigrant communities, but particularly true of German Lutherans. See Coburn, Life At Four Corners, 5.
the boundaries between the Chinese and Anglo worlds and the political interactions between them” emerges.  

I employ the term “ethnic broker” to refer to German Lutheran pastors who acted as cultural intermediaries between their ethnic followers and Anglo-dominated host society. As Fujiwara notes, “ethnic elites were groups of people who discovered their role as intermediaries between Canadians and their ethnic people.” These elites “knew about the histories, politics, and languages of both Canada and their respective homelands” and used their influence so to help their followers “maintain their in-between identity and comfortably live in Canada.”

Born primarily between 1880 and 1910, the German Lutherans in this study consisted of a mix of individuals born in Germany who later migrated to North America, as well those born in Canada and the United States whose parents or grandparents migrated during the mid-nineteenth century. This generation of Lutheran pastors not only acted as spiritual leaders in their communities, but also emerged as ethnic elites that tried to reconcile their immigrant status with their Canadian and American realities.

My usage of Lutheran churches as an ethnic boundary and Lutheran pastors as ethnic brokers unfortunately replicates some of the power structures of these institutions throughout this work. Lutheran archival records tend to favour the voices of pastors and all-male church councils at the expense of Lutheran laypeople and women. I am conscious of historian Mary Todd’s assertion that it is both “remarkable and tragic” that Lutheran women appear so infrequently in historical studies. This has wrongly perpetuated the assumption that “women’s roles have been marginal at best” within the

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35 Mar, Brokering Belonging, 4.
36 Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity, 3, 5.
37 Biographical entries at the Laurier Archives and Concordia Historical Institute are particularly useful in establishing the genealogies of prominent individuals examined in this study.
Yet, this study hopes to show that Lutheran women are not as unrepresented in the archive as is often assumed. I have endeavored to highlight when the viewpoints of Lutheran women and laypeople diverged from those of their ethnic elites in an effort to create a more complete portrait of how German Lutherans discussed their ethnicity. I have therefore attempted to display the diversity of opinion within these German Lutheran communities, even if the voices of ethnic elites still dominate.

Moreover, the ethnic elites examined in this dissertation held beliefs that modern readers will both approve and disapprove of. The pastors profiled in this study often emerge as early advocates of a “multicultural” nation wherein linguistic and ethnic differences are not only tolerated, but also celebrated and encouraged by all North American citizens. A desire to be accepted by mainstream Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American society motivated ethnic elites to support pluralistic ideas of belonging and acceptance. Yet, many Lutheran pastors also supported the unequal status-quo facing North American women and racialized people. Male pastors maintained patriarchal gender norms within their congregations and often made sexist comments or assumptions about Lutheran women, and downplayed their essential contributions to the church. Certain pastors also openly supported Jim Crow segregation, disparaged black activists, or ignored the unequal living conditions of many of North America’s racialized communities. Rather than interpreting German Lutheran support for ethnic diversity and support for patriarchal and racist norms as contrary behaviour, this study interrogates these differences to demonstrate how these ideologies worked in concert. Celebrations of ethnic and religious diversity did not necessarily extend to an acceptance of racialized

others, and male ethnic elites predicated their authority on subservient and agreeable followers. These pastors were complex figures, and this dissertation aims to untangle and explain their seemingly contradictory behaviour.

This dissertation argues that this particular generation of German Lutherans crafted a different ethnic identity than the nineteenth century German “pioneers” and the post-1945 German displaced persons. This generation actively grappled with the hybrid identities highlighted by Lorenzkowski. I argue that they constructed an ethnic identity that sought to reconcile their competing ethnic, national, and religious identities throughout the mid-twentieth century. German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity in several ways. First, the German language remained an important marker of identity for many practicing Lutherans in this study. Language emerges as an important subject of discussion in this dissertation more broadly, as scholars in ethnic studies have affirmed that language consists of “societally linked human codes, as well as the attitudes, behaviors, functions, and usage conventions” that define a community. In particular, ethnic studies scholars pay attention not just to the standardization of immigrant languages, but also the “internal within-group evaluation of varieties” of syntax, word choice, and frequency of use. Through observing how and when immigrants speak their native language, scholars can gain better insight into how immigrants dialogued with their ethnicity.39 In this sense, I examine the pastors that preached sermons in both English and German, and the congregants that maintained a strong belief in conducting important worship services and celebrating holidays in the German language. Lutherans placed a particularly high importance on speaking German at church, as they believed that in order

to truly practice Martin Luther’s teachings, they needed to speak, write, and read, religious writings in the same language Luther used. Situated in a North American context, speaking German developed an ethnic importance as community elites used it as a way to retain markers of ethnic difference. While speaking German may have lost its practical conversational usage in the public sphere by the early twentieth century, Lutherans continued to speak German as an integral component of their religious lives.\(^\text{40}\)

Moreover, Lutheran churches provided German Lutherans with a private space to voice their ethnic sympathies with Germans in Europe outside of the purview of the state and Canadian and American society. They expressed their ethnicity by resisting Canadian and American attempts to vilify the German people, both during and after the Second World War. Within their churches German Lutherans could articulate their fears surrounding the Second World War and lament the hardships postwar German refugees faced without being labeled as Nazi sympathizers. They also resisted Canadian and American nationalisms that often alienated them as a result of national emphases on Anglo-pioneers, British traditions, or “American” founders that rarely recognized North America’s immigrant populations. By the mid-twentieth century, German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County tried to expand these cultural narratives by incorporating their experiences as immigrants into the pre-existing national mythologies. Their expressions of ethnicity were not rooted in political connections to the “homeland,” as with other North American ethnic groups.\(^\text{41}\)

\(^{40}\) Lorenzkowski, *Sounds of Ethnicity*, 213-216.

\(^{41}\) Connections to the “homeland” remain an important theme in ethnic histories and are often used by historians to show how immigrants practiced their ethnic identities after migrating. See for instance, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Frances Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes: Ethnic-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010), chapter 5;
ethnicity rooted in flexibility. It allowed members of the community to be openly “German” at church, but to argue for their status as “Canadian” or “American” when in contact with government officials or nativists in times of uncertainty. Thus, German Lutherans sought to construct an ethnicity that gave voice to their unique experiences as immigrants as well as recognizing their “new” homes in Canada and the United States. Its flexibility helped German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County create a single hybrid identity out of their varied ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds.

In suggesting that German Lutherans maintained distinct ethnic identities, this study is not implying that these immigrant communities did not also identify as Canadians and Americans. However, identifying with national labels defined by citizenship does not mean German Lutherans assimilated or stopped practicing their ethnic identities. As Lorenzkowski reminds us, German immigrants have a history of wearing their ethnicity or nationality “as a mantle to don when it fit the occasion.”42 Nor does this dissertation suggest that German Lutherans practiced the same ethnic identities as the German immigrants of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. It is not advocating for a long unbroken pattern of ethnic identity and behaviour. Instead, it suggests that a sense of being German remained important to Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, even when their ethnicity acted as a barrier that separated them from mainstream North American society. Moreover, this study does not explore how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans maintained their ethnicities through cultural and symbolic expressions, such as food, dress, parades, and other manifestations of “folk” or “festive”

\[\text{Aya Fujiwara, } \textit{Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971} \]
\[\text{(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 132-139.} \]
\[\text{42 Lorenzkowski, } \textit{Sounds of Ethnicity}, 215. \]
cultural
text. Instead, it looks at the ways in which ethnicity informed how German Lutherans responded to issues such as wartime discrimination, immigration policy, Lutheran theology, and other debates of both national and local importance. In this sense, I follow Royden Loewen’s footsteps in an attempt to understand how immigrants understood their ethnicity “not of a statically conceived way of life…but rather a constantly renewed experience that was recreated every day and every year.”

By looking at these prominent debates in St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities, it sheds light on how these groups made sense of their ethnic identities and the resulting “cultures they created.” My goal is to highlight how ethnicity continued to inform the worldview and perspectives of German Lutherans living in St. Louis and Waterloo County.

Transnational Histories of St. Louis and Waterloo County

North American historians of ethnicity and immigration have frequently employed a transnational approach in their scholarship. Although “transnationalism” has several,

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45 Royden Loewen, Diaspora in the Countryside: Two Mennonite Communities and Mid-Twentieth Century Rural Disjuncture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 9.

occasionally competing, definitions, migration historians Benjamin Bryce and Alexander Freund define transnational approaches as examining “the flow and circulation of people, ideas, and objects within a region that is not contained by national boundaries and national historiographies.” A transnational approach better reflects how their subjects, primarily immigrants and their descendants, maintained global ties and connections that expanded beyond national borders. Transnationalism remains a useful framework for this reason, and holds particular promise for the study of German immigrants. Because the literature on German immigrants continues to stress assimilation and the formation of national identities, a comparative approach allows me to examine whether Canadians and Americans of German heritage continued to interact with one another on the basis of their ethnicity across the forty-ninth parallel.

Comparative studies are most effective when symmetry exists between the two points of comparison. To this end, I focus specifically on German Lutherans in Waterloo County, Ontario, and St. Louis, Missouri. Both immigrant communities trace

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their origins back to philanthropic groups in eighteenth and nineteenth century Pennsylvania. The German Company and the *Deutsche Ansiedlungs-Gesellschaft* each sponsored German immigration and purchased lands in what became known as Waterloo County and St. Louis respectively.\(^51\) These small German settlements later expanded significantly in the 1830s and 1840s, as Lutherans fled religious persecution in the various German states and made new homes in North America. By the mid-nineteenth century, both Waterloo County and St. Louis had reputations as German settlements and the two communities continued to grow as a result of family and chain migration. They developed cultural institutions such as German-language newspapers and clubs that articulated and enhanced their reputation as centers of German culture.\(^52\) By the early to mid-twentieth century, Germans constituted the largest ethnic group in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. Germans composed nearly twelve percent of Missouri’s population, and twenty percent of all St. Louis residents identified as either first or second-generation German immigrants. Kitchener established itself as the German capital of both Ontario and Waterloo County, with almost half of its residents claiming German ancestry by the Second World War.\(^53\) Their reputations as German cultural centers continued to attract German immigrants to settle in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the postwar period.\(^54\)

St. Louis and Waterloo County also emerged as important centers for Lutheranism in the American Midwest and central Canada. Both communities acted as the official headquarters of a major Lutheran synod. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,

\(^{51}\) English and McLaughlin, *Kitchener*, 1-8; DeWitt, 10.


\(^{53}\) DeWitt, 12; English and McLaughlin, 235-251.

\(^{54}\) See chapter five for details.
headquartered in St. Louis, was founded in 1847 due to the efforts of C.F.W. Walther, a “Saxon Lutheran” immigrant who arrived in St. Louis in the 1830s. Walther cooperated with other Lutherans in the Midwest to establish conservative Lutherans into a single organizing body, or “synod.” As its first president, Walther opened a “log cabin” school that later became the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. Likewise, the Canada Synod made its headquarters in Waterloo County as a result of the high concentration of Lutherans in the area in 1925. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, established in 1911, was the first of its kind in Canada and trained the majority of the Canada Synod’s pastors. The important roles these two seminaries played in developing North American Lutheranism ensured that many Lutherans had some connection with St. Louis and Waterloo County even if they were not born and raised in the cities.

The German Lutheran populations of St. Louis and Waterloo County both experienced periods of anti-German discrimination during the First World War. Shortly after the war began in 1914, nativists in each community attacked public displays of German heritage in the cities. Under the guise of patriotism, civic leaders in St. Louis embarked on a campaign to “make St. Louis 100 percent American.” These leaders renamed various German-language streets and buildings with more suitable Anglo-American ones. The process of eliminating such obvious markers of ethnicity also occurred in Waterloo County. In 1916 the city of “Berlin” voted to rename the city “Kitchener” in order to demonstrate their loyalty to Canada. German Canadians who

57 DeWitt, 96.
opposed the patriotic name change had their homes vandalized by members of the local militia and other nativists.\textsuperscript{58}

Incidents of violence occurred in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the First World War. Shortly after 1914, members of the local militia in Waterloo County toppled a small statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I and threw it into the nearby lake. The police recovered the bust and placed it in the Concordia Club, one of Waterloo County’s largest German ethnic associations. In 1916, however, another group of soldiers broke into the building and stole the statue once again. Soldiers ransacked the Concordia Club and burned its contents in an open fire in the street. Military officials did not publicly blame the soldiers for their vandalism. Instead, they accused local German residents of inciting the soldiers’ anger.\textsuperscript{59} Although German-Americans avoided such acts of discrimination early in the war thanks to American neutrality, they too experienced harassment once the United States formally entered the war in 1917. Local police in St. Louis acted with force against German-American clubs that they suspected acted as meeting grounds for enemy activity. Police raided prominent German ethnic clubs and investigated the loyalty of club leaders.\textsuperscript{60}

Strong anti-German sentiment in Canada and the United States often manifested in religious forms. German immigrants saw clear links between their ethnicity and faith, and Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans did as well. Even though Lutheranism in North America did not share political connections with Germany, anti-German “patriots” rarely made this distinction. They singled Lutherans out in particular because their

\textsuperscript{58} Hayes, \textit{Waterloo County}, 120-122.
\textsuperscript{60} Detjen, \textit{The Germans in Missouri}, 144-145.
religious texts were recorded in German and the majority of Lutheran churches offered their services in German. They saw Lutheran churches as threatening places of subterfuge. Since Lutheran pastors preached in German to people of German ancestry, the general public feared that pastors encouraged their congregants to carry out acts of sabotage against the war effort by hiding pro-German messages within their sermons.\textsuperscript{61} The German ethnicity of St. Louis and Waterloo County residents placed their loyalties in doubt; their Lutheran faith exacerbated such concerns.

Although the war threatened the use of the German language in both communities, efforts to completely eliminate it failed at both the congregational and state/provincial level. In 1919, Missouri was one of many American states to attempt to ban German language education in public, private, and parochial schools. Theodore Graebner, a professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, responded by joining a coalition of other German-American leaders to lobby Missouri’s state committee on education to allow religious instruction in German. Graebner and his colleagues succeeded and the bill was defeated. As a result, Missouri did not follow the example of other states where German instruction was banned in public and private schools following the war.\textsuperscript{62} Waterloo County’s German language programs also recovered from the war. By the 1930s, several ethnic clubs sponsored a German school in Kitchener where young people could continue to learn the German language.\textsuperscript{63}

Despite the resilience of these German-speaking communities, historians continue to cite the increased use of English among German immigrants as an example of their


\textsuperscript{62} DeWitt, 163.

\textsuperscript{63} English and McLaughlin, 163.
assimilation during and after the First World War. The number of German services conducted within the Missouri Synod as a whole dropped from sixty-two percent prior to the First World War to forty-six percent in 1926.\footnote{Everette Meier and Herbert T. Mayer, “The Process of Americanization,” in \textit{Moving Frontiers: Readings in the History of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod}, ed. Carl S. Meyer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1964), 381.} While a noticeable decrease, these statistics imply that almost half of the Missouri Synod still used German regularly. This hardly suggests the destruction or elimination of a German language and identity as a result of the war. Pastors in particular played a key role in encouraging their congregants to continue speaking German.\footnote{This was due, in part, to the traditional belief that true Lutheran doctrine could only be understood if it was discussed in its original German language. See Mark Granquist, \textit{Lutherans in America: A New History} (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 237-239.} Perhaps more significantly, the Sunday schools at these churches also offered their services in German, providing congregants an opportunity for their children to speak and learn the German language. Moreover, radio stations sponsored by the Missouri and Canada Synod broadcasted German language sermons and programs in St. Louis and Waterloo County well into the 1930s.\footnote{Baepler, 309-312; English and McLaughlin, 162.} While the First World War left its mark on these German communities, Lutheran churches were still preserved as German institutions that reinforced their pre-war ethnic identities.

Although separated by the Canadian-American border, the German Lutheran communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County experienced similar political, social, and cultural conditions that make them worthy of comparison. Each community formed as a part of the migration from Protestant religious groups fleeing the German states to new ethnic and religious enclaves in North America. They faced similar levels of discrimination during the First World War on the basis of their ethnicity, and proved determined to recover from these losses during the interwar years.
Lutheranism as a “Lived Religion”

This dissertation draws upon a “lived religion” framework in order to recognize the ways Lutheranism constituted an important component of the German-Canadian and German-American ethnic identity by the mid-twentieth century. Scholars of “lived religion” eschew a religious history that focuses exclusively on high-ranking church leaders and theological developments in favour of focusing more on how religion informed the daily lives and lived experiences of religious people. They maintain that religion has historically shaped people and their discourses not only inside places of worship, but also in in social, cultural, and political spheres. The lived religion model builds on anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s understanding of religion as source for groups and individuals to gain “conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them.” Geertz argues that “religious concepts spread beyond their specifically metaphysical contexts to provide a framework of general ideas.” It is therefore important to have a close understanding of Lutheran theology, as it inevitably shaped the social and cultural experiences of its practitioners outside the explicit confines of the church.

67 Historians of German immigrants have commented extensively on the religious diversity among North America’s German population and the problems this religious heterogeneity has caused scholars attempting to understand the singular “German” experience. See Gerhard P. Bassler, “Silent or Silenced Co-Founders of Canada? Reflections on the History of German Canadians,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, 22, no.1 (1990): 42.
Lutherans are Christian Protestants that trace their origins back to Martin Luther and the Reformation in 1517. Luther advocated for reforms of the Christian church in the 16th century that remain essential components of twentieth century Lutheranism. First, the concept of “justification by grace alone” was and continues to be a distinguishing marker of Lutheranism. Luther believed God offers humanity salvation freely through faith. This concept stands in contrast to Catholic or Anabaptist faiths, which teach that salvation can be achieved through performing good deeds and acts. Lutherans also place great emphasis on “Word and Sacrament,” essentially a belief that God reveals himself to humankind through the Bible, baptism, and communion. Lutherans recognize the Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Book of Concord (1580) as their primary theological texts. While the interpretation of these core beliefs continues to be debated between conservative and liberal members of the North American Lutheran community, a shared agreement in the importance of these beliefs unites them under the “Lutheran” label.

This dissertation seeks to use the lived religion perspective in order to demonstrate how Lutheran theology often shaped how Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County constructed their ethnic identities. While many aspects of Lutheran theology played a role in shaping these communities, several specific components played a particular role in determining how German Lutherans negotiated their ethnicity. Luther’s concept of the “two kingdoms” or “Romans 13” was one of the most important theological tenants for Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Based on Christ’s teachings that Christians

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should “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” Luther believed that church and state should be kept separate. As Romans 13 stated that “every soul be subject to the governing authorities,” Luther argued that God granted the church the right to rule over spiritual affairs while the state ruled over civil and legal affairs. Disagreements over how strictly Lutherans should enforce this theological belief became a key point of contention between pastors and their congregants in the mid-twentieth century. Discussions of Romans 13 and the separation of church and state appear frequently in this study, because German Lutherans often interpreted state intervention in religious affairs as a threat to their German ethnicity. The debate surrounding “unionism” or “unity” in the Missouri Synod is another instance of theology shaping ethnicity. Unionism became an effective shorthand in Missouri Synod circles to refer to the official merger or cooperation with other Lutheran bodies that did not practice the same conservative Lutheranism. The Missouri Synod believed that, unlike their liberal peers, they practiced a “true Lutheranism” that worshiped the inerrant Bible, a belief that the Bible was undisputedly God’s word. Cooperation (or “union”) with liberal Lutherans threatened to dilute their conservative doctrine. Throughout most of the twentieth century, synod leaders believed they could not unite with other Lutherans if they did not first achieve doctrinal unity. This emphasis on keeping “pure doctrine,” or \textit{Lehre}, helped shape their German ethnicity. In order to ensure that their doctrine remained unaltered, theological works and sermons needed to be conducted in German, the same language used by Martin Luther. Speaking and writing in German proved the most effective way to ensure that theology was not diluted or altered through translation. This study focuses

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73 Todd, 87.
on Lutheran theology as expressed through Romans 13, unionism, and Lehre in order to understand the relationship between ethnicity and faith.

The emphasis on lived religion holds particular promise for the study of North American Lutheranism. Few professional historians have examined the history of North American Lutheranism, especially when compared to the thriving historiographies of other ethnic and religious groups such as Irish Catholics or Mennonites. The standard works on North American Lutheranism were published mainly in the 1960s and 1970s in what historian Mark Granquist called the “golden age” of Lutheran history. These histories, often published by synod-sponsored publishing houses and written by men associated with the church, produced a teleological narrative of church growth and synod mergers. Historians have criticized the Missouri Synod, in particular, for its synod-sanctioned histories that frame Lutheranism’s history as “celebratory” and “triumphalist.” As recently as 2000, historian Mary Todd commented that the Missouri Synod’s tendency to support a version of its past free of conflict or theological debate has created a vacuum wherein “no scholarly, holistic history of the Missouri Synod” exists. These histories focused largely on prominent Lutheran synods and institutions, and did little to reflect the social and cultural attitudes of Lutheranism’s practitioners.


75 Mary Todd, *Authority Vested*, 1, 13-14.

were originally published to coincide with anniversaries and centennial events, they often took a celebratory and uncritical tone.\textsuperscript{77}

Few scholars have challenged or revised these standards texts from the 1960s. In Canada, Lutheran history has been written by religious scholars who briefly contextualize the history of Lutheranism in Canada before moving onto an analysis of contemporary Lutheranism.\textsuperscript{78} In the United States, however, a small body of scholarship in the last fifteen years has started to examine the social and cultural histories of American Lutheranism that often critique their subjects. Mary Todd and James Burkee both criticize the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology and politics, thereby challenging the Missouri Synod’s oft-repeated claims that their theology is untouched by modern influences.\textsuperscript{79} In a biography of a Missouri Synod pastor, Kathryn Galchutt critiques the ambiguous or hostile responses of the Missouri Synod towards the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{80} These works shift the historiography on the Missouri Synod away from whiggish celebrations of the synod’s past towards a more critical examination of its history. The few other works by professional historians that examine German Lutherans tend to do so alongside German Mennonites and Baptists. These historians inadvertently portray the religious identities and theological differences among their subjects as incidental to their German ethnicities, rather than demonstrating the central


\textsuperscript{79} Todd, Authority Vested, 4-5. James C. Burkee, Power, Politics, and the Missouri Synod: A Conflict that Changed American Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), xiv-xv, 3-5.

\textsuperscript{80} Galchutt, Andrew Schulze, 1924-1968.
connection between faith and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{81} This dissertation only examines the experiences of Lutherans in order to best capture the important links between ethnicity and faith, and recognizes that Germans of different faiths may have constructed different ethnic German identities than Lutherans. It represents one of the first social and cultural histories of Lutheranism in Canada and seeks to continue the revisionist efforts of American scholars of the Missouri Synod.

The Importance of Whiteness

Race also shaped how German Lutherans constructed their ethnic identities in the mid-twentieth century. This dissertation is indebted to the field of “whiteness studies” that emerged as a result of the belief that, like ethnic identities, race is a social construct. As sociologist Vic Satzewich states, race “is not something that is, but rather something that is socially created, negotiated, and reproduced.”\textsuperscript{82} At its core, race does not reflect a biological or epistemological truth, but is rather a “social category into which people are sorted.”\textsuperscript{83}

American historians in the 1990s began employing this approach in order to demonstrate “how diverse groups in the United States came to identify, and be identified

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{81} Linda Schelbitzki Pickle, \textit{Rural German-Speaking Women and Their Families in the Nineteenth-Century Midwest} (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996); Werner, \textit{Imagined Homes}, chapter 7. Carol Coburn is one of the few scholars to pay equal attention to her subjects’ German and Lutheran identities. See Carol K. Coburn, \textit{Life At Four Corners: Religion, Gender, and Education in a German Lutheran Community, 1868-1945} (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1992). Angelika Sauer makes the observation that historians also ignore the possibility that religion mattered more than ethnicity for German-speaking immigrants in North America. See Sauer, “The ‘Ideal German Canadian’”, 232.
\bibitem{83} David R. Roediger, \textit{How Race Survived US History: From Settlement and Slavery to the Obama Phenomenon} (New York: Verso, 2008), Xi-xii.
\end{thebibliography}
by others, as white – and what that has meant for the social order.”

Pioneering works by David Roediger, Noel Ignatiev, and Matthew Frye Jacobson suggested that immigrant groups such as the Irish arrived in the nineteenth century as racialized others and gradually fought to become recognized as white. Other immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, migrated to the United States later in the nineteenth century and occupied an “in-between” or “not quite white” status in the American racial hierarchy. These immigrants, including Greeks, Italians, and Poles later found acceptance as “white” during the Second World War. Historians emphasize that a broad range of forces during the war coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North America viewed “World War II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.” Nazi Germany’s racism shook American faith in scientific racism and subsequently prompted Americans to view tolerance as a key component of their national identity. These “white ethnics” remained content to simply identify as “American” until the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Jacobson argues that the Civil Rights Movement, alongside “the emergence of

multiculturalism,” created a “white ethnic revival” that caused Americans to once again identify with their ethnic heritage.\(^{89}\)

Although often praised for forcing historians to recognize race as a social construction, these foundational texts have since been critiqued by other scholars who believe that transformation from ethnic to white identities “was a more complex process” than historians of whiteness might indicate.\(^{90}\) Thomas Guglielmo, for instance, has argued that Italian immigrants arrived in the United States as “securely white” and did not go through the ethnic-to-white process that the 1990s scholarship often assumed.\(^{91}\) Other critics suggest that historians like Ignatiev and Jacobson occasionally conflate American perceptions of the Irish constituting a distinct race with also being “nonwhite.” Just because the Irish faced hostility, does not necessarily mean Americans perceived them as racial outsiders.\(^{92}\) These critics do not dispute that American nativists discriminated against European immigrants. They are not, however, convinced that they faced discrimination on the basis of their race. Peter Kolchin and Eric Arnesen, for example, point out that whiteness studies generally neglect the role religion played in forming racial identities.\(^{93}\) As a result, historians examining ethnic groups like the Irish may conflate anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States with the assumption that the Irish were not white.\(^{94}\)


\(^{92}\) Arnesen, “Whiteness and the Historians Imagination,” 14-16.

\(^{93}\) Kolchin, 163; Arnesen, 13.

\(^{94}\) Kolchin, 163; Arnesen, 13.
I address some of these concerns in this dissertation by paying particular attention to the way the ethnic and religious identities of German Lutherans interacted with broader ideas of race and whiteness. Although German Lutherans faced discrimination as a result of their ethnicity and religion, it does not mean that they were somehow “not white.” If the transformation from ethnic-to-white is more complicated than historians previously thought, then subsequent works on whiteness must consider whether “after World War II, did a white identity dominate or did the prevalence of national identities persist and, if so, for how long?”95 This study aims to answer this question by looking at how a German ethnic identity continued in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside their racial identities as white. The two identities co-existed, and they did not practice either “ethnic” or “racial” identities exclusively. German Lutherans actively maintained German ethnic and white racial identities simultaneously throughout the mid-twentieth century, even during the “ethnic reverie” of World War II and the 1950s and 1960s.96

The study of whiteness in Canada is underdeveloped relative to the large body of American scholarship.97 Historians James Walker and Constance Backhouse provide several explanations as to why this is the case. Walker suggests that Canadians perceive themselves as “tolerant of racial and cultural diversity” and believe they “possess a history of equal treatment towards all” in contrast to their American neighbours.98 Backhouse agrees, suggesting that Canada’s proximity to the United States allows Canadians to portray themselves as “raceless” in contrast to the Black-white racial

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95 Bayor, “Another Look at ‘Whiteness’,” 15.
96 Jacobson uses the term “ethnic reverie” to the refer to the 1940s and 1950s where European ethnic identities reportedly lay dormant. See Jacobson, Roots Too, 4.
97 Constance Backhouse makes this observation in Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 1999), 12.
animosity in the United States. This “ideology of racelessness,” is a part of the Canadian national mythology that has been unwittingly replicated within Canadian historiography.\(^{99}\) The limited scholarly discussion of whiteness in Canadian history has thus far focused on the nineteenth century.\(^{100}\) When Canadian historians discuss “race” in the twentieth century, they often refer to Canada’s indigenous, black, and Asian populations rather than white Canadians. Race in the Canadian context, Backhouse argues, “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to marginalized groups.”\(^{101}\) However, the “whiteness” of Canadian nativists and politicians discussed in these studies has not yet faced the same level of scrutiny.\(^{102}\) In short, Canadian historians have yet to racialize white Canadians. Migration scholars occasionally make note that certain immigrant groups benefitted from their racial status as white, but such sentiments are generally applied as self-evident adjectives rather than as fully analyzed.\(^{103}\)


\(^{101}\) Backhouse, 12-13.


\(^{103}\) See for example Alexander Freund, “Contesting the Meaning of Migration: German Women’s Immigration to Canada in the 1950s,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 41-42, no. 3/1 (2009-2010): 3-4; Mina,
While whiteness and white supremacy had practical and tangible effects on the daily lives of North Americans through systems like segregation, this dissertation also examines how whiteness was expressed at an ideological and cultural level. Whiteness encompassed more than simply “a location of structural advantage, of race privilege.” As Ruth Frankenberg makes clear, whiteness is also “a ‘standpoint,’ a place from which white people look at ourselves, at others, and at society” as well as “a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed.”

This last definition is particularly important, as German Lutherans in St Louis and especially Waterloo County rarely explicitly articulated a “white” racial identity. By the mid-twentieth century, whiteness achieved such a normative status that it rarely needed to be directly articulated. Daniel Coleman refers to this as the “paradox of white normativity,” wherein whiteness is paradoxically “so obvious that it remains unexamined” in literary and historical texts.

In his survey of Canadian literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Coleman locates several allegorical figures upon which Canadian authors relied to personify the Canadian nation. He notes that the “Loyalist” and “British Settler” are two of the most common symbols used in Canadian literature and culture. The arrival of the Loyalists in Ontario (then Upper Canada) after the American Revolution later functioned as the province’s foundational myth. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Loyalists occupied a place of cultural, historical, and literary prominence in Ontario that scholars have since referred to as the “Loyalist Tradition.” This tradition praised the

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Loyalist “pioneers” for creating a society in Ontario that was devoted “to the British Crown and Empire,” alongside their “elite social origins, and a conservative social vision.” Coleman argues that through repeatedly using the image of the Loyalist, Anglo-Canadians “gradually reified the privileged, normative status of British whiteness in English Canada.” These narratives had a political purpose for their Anglo-Canadian authors. As the Loyalists and their descendants were not native to the land they occupied, stories of Loyalists and other settlers “pioneering” an “untamed wilderness” helped settlers feel entitled to land that actually belonged to the area’s indigenous peoples. By coding this process as a peaceful, nation-building, and a sign of progress, settlers could ignore their own history of violently displacing indigenous people.

While this cultural analysis of the Loyalist Tradition through a racial lens may seem tangential, it illustrates the way in which whiteness often operated invisibly within the social and cultural lives of North Americans. The story of the Loyalists is an inherently white narrative, even if it never directly states so. This dissertation argues that German Lutherans in both St. Louis and Waterloo County engaged with national mythologies like the Loyalist Tradition as a result of their whiteness. A clear example of the inherent whiteness contained in settler stories is the so-called “pioneer myth” in Waterloo County. Labeled as such by historian Geoffrey Hayes, the “pioneer myth” emerged in Waterloo County in the early 1920s. Hayes describes how the pioneer myth

107 Norman Knowles, Inventing the Loyalists: The Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Coleman, chapter 2.
108 Coleman, White Civility, 6-7.
109 Coleman, 16-17.
110 While it currently popular for the Canadian government to celebrate the Black Loyalists that settled in Nova Scotia, this is a relatively new phenomenon. Historians such as Harvey Amani Whitfield have demonstrated that, unlike white settlers, Black Loyalists in the Maritimes practiced a commemorative culture that celebrated Emancipation Day and gratitude to the British Empire for their freedom rather than the same “Loyalist as pioneer” emphasis found in white communities. See Harvey Amani Whitfield, “The Development of Black Refugee Identity in Nova Scotia, 1813-1850,” Left History 10, no. 2 (2005): 9-11.
started as a result of the discrimination Waterloo County’s German population faced during the First World War and the wave of Canadian nationalism that the war produced. After the war concluded, Anglo-Canadians across the country erected monuments and memorials to honour soldiers who died during the war. These memorials portrayed fallen Canadian soldiers as heroic figures, who sacrificed their lives for a just Christian cause that helped establish Canada as a nation.111 German Canadians in Waterloo County could not participate in this process because their wartime experience was not categorized by unity and patriotism, but rather by ethnic tension and discrimination. Yet, local German Canadians could also no longer publicly celebrate the German traditions of “Berlin” without reliving the discrimination they endured during the war. German Canadians could no longer “be loyal to both Germany and Canada,” and therefore needed to craft a new public identity in which to help their community recover.112

The pioneer myth helped German Canadians accomplish this goal by creating a new origin story that focused on the community’s immigrant origins instead of its modern industrious German identity. William Breithaupt, a prominent German-Canadian businessman who opposed the Berlin name-change during the war, initiated a series of commemorative events during the late 1910s and 1920s that tried to integrate Waterloo County’s foundation within the broader narrative of Ontario’s history. Breithaupt used the pre-existing mythology surrounding the Loyalists in Ontario to his own advantage. He sought to shift Waterloo County’s identity away from its strict German reputation by emphasizing the community’s own pioneers, just like other Ontario communities, through

Breithaupt illustrated these themes most obviously with the erection of the Waterloo Pioneers Memorial Tower in 1926. He erected the large nineteen-meter high tower alongside the graveyard of Waterloo County’s first European settlers in order to commemorate their role in “settling” and “pioneering” the community. The many speeches at the tower’s unveiling sought to elevate Waterloo County’s original German settlers to the same important level as the Loyalists by similarly praising them as honest, thrifty, and for their ability to overcome the “the forces of nature.” While speakers compared their pioneers with the Loyalists, Breithaupt ensured that the audience never lost sight that these original pioneers consisted of German settlers. Breithaupt reminded listeners that their Germanic origins was no cause for concern, however, as these pioneers were peaceful agriculturalists absolutely loyal to Britain just like the other Loyalists.

One speaker commented that “we often hear the expression ‘The builders of Canada,’ referring to the statesmen who laid the foundation of Government…but let us not forget the men and women who left their homes in other lands to come to Canada. They were just as truly entitled to the name ‘builders of Canada.’” By situating Waterloo County’s history in the context of the Loyalists, Breithaupt hoped to normalize his community’s German origins within the broader culture of the province. Breithaupt advanced the “pioneer myth” so that German Canadians in Waterloo County could express a form of ethnic pride that English-Canadian society found acceptable. Their ancestors may have been German, but they were also the “nation-building pioneers” that Anglo-Canada celebrated as well.

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113 Hayes, “From Berlin to the Trek of the Conestoga,” 137-139.
114 Quoted in Hayes, “From Berlin to the Trek of the Conestoga,” 141.
115 Hayes, “From Berlin to the Trek of the Conestoga,” 140.
116 Quoted in Hayes, “From Berlin to the Trek of the Conestoga,” 141.
A similar pioneer myth existed in St. Louis, albeit with American terms substituted for the more Canadian-British “Loyalist” figure. In 1938-39, the Missouri Synod celebrated the centennial of the original German Lutheran settlers who traveled from Europe and settled in Perry County, located just outside St. Louis. The pending centennial prompted a flurry of retrospective “histories” produced by prominent pastors within the synod. These publications constructed a founding myth centered on the original generation of Saxon settlers and their religious leader, C.F.W. Walther. Although they recognized that the “entire background of the people was European, German, Saxon,” they often described the group as religious “pilgrims” to better liken their own origin story to that of the United States more broadly. When they discussed the Missouri Synod’s founding, synod leaders stressed the “democratic” origins of the Saxon immigrants. To one commenter, the Saxon immigrants embodied “the Missouri ‘show-me’ spirit which they had imbibed” after living in the region for only a short time. Just like Waterloo County’s pioneer myth, the story of the Saxon Lutherans in St. Louis allowed the modern German Lutheran community to stress its immigrant character within an American or Missourian framework.

While stories about the Loyalists and other “nation builders” do “not overtly call for the subordination of people of colour,” they still convey a narrative “about the

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117 This event is chronicled in Walter O. Forster, *Zion on the Mississippi: The Settlement of the Saxon Lutherans in Missouri, 1839-1841* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1953).
118 Many of these publications are included in CHI, Saxon Immigration Collection (hereafter SIC), Box 5, Folder 72.
119 CHI, SIC, Box 5, Folder 72, Board of Christian Education News Service, December 1938; CHI, Lawrence Meyer Collection (hereafter LMC), Box 9, Folder 53, God of our Fathers, 6 July 1938.
triumph of the white races” in North America.\textsuperscript{121} These state-sanctioned narratives are “not politically neutral” and contain important racial implications, even if those who produced the narratives did not explicitly state so.\textsuperscript{122} If settler stories had the impact of normalizing the presence of white colonizers on indigenous lands, Breithaupt’s pioneer myth helped normalize the presence of German-speaking people in Waterloo County. Rather than an “other” feared during wartime, the pioneer myth helped explain the presence of German immigrants by using a language Anglo-Canadians clearly understood and accepted: pioneering and nation building. Even the very notion of the “pioneer” was coded as white, and typically male, in the early and mid-twentieth century. While German people could be “pioneers,” Anglo-Canadians often portrayed asian immigrants as temporary “sojourners” and not “settlers,” despite living in Canada for several generations.\textsuperscript{123} Thus, racialized immigrants could not access the same coded terms and mythologies available to German Canadians on account of their whiteness.

By examining the implicit racial implications of mythologies like the pioneer myth, this dissertation argues that whiteness played an integral role in allowing St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities to maintain their German ethnicities in the mid-twentieth century. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran religion placed German Lutherans as outsiders due to their associations with Nazism and the enemy, whiteness provided a powerful social currency that allowed German Lutherans to appear as nonthreatening. Whiteness allowed German Lutherans to establish common cultural bonds with Anglo-Americans and Canadians by stressing their own

\textsuperscript{121} Ian McKay and Robin Bates, \textit{In the Province of History: The Making of the Public Past in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), 311-313.
\textsuperscript{122} McKay and Bates, \textit{In the Province of History}, 311-313.
\textsuperscript{123} Fujiwara, \textit{Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity}, 47.
histories of settlement, pioneering, and civic duty that were unavailable to racialized peoples. Religion played an equally important role in this process. While Lutheranism’s German associations and theological peculiarities created distance between them and other North American Protestants, German Lutherans used a broad based “Christian” identity to advocate for their membership in Anglo-American and Canadian communities. This dissertation builds on previous critiques in the field of whiteness studies by looking at how ethnicity, race, and religion intersected and helped German Lutherans maintain their ethnic and religious traditions as a result of their race. It is not a study of how Germans “became” white, but rather how whiteness helped create the conditions for their ethnicity to survive and thrive.

**Organization and Format**

This study begins just prior to the Second World War in 1939 and ends in the early 1970s. I have selected these dates for two reasons. First, previous histories of German immigrants generally frame their studies around either nineteenth century German immigrants or post-1945 German refugees, but rarely both. The pre-1945 studies generally end in the 1930s under the assumption that the German ethnicities of their subjects had by that point faded. The post-1945 studies typically focus exclusively on the postwar immigrants without detailing their interaction with German immigrants from an earlier timeframe. Beginning this study in the mid-twentieth century allows a better exploration of how this particular generation of German Lutherans maintained their

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ethnic identities beyond the Second World War and subsequently interacted with a new generation of immigrants. Second, this study ends in the 1970s primarily because of the cultural and religious changes that occurred in that decade. Historians generally conceptualize the 1970s as a period of “ethnic revival” in the United States and as period of official multiculturalism in Canada. The rise of both trends likely changed how German Lutherans discussed or “performed” their ethnic identities. For North American Lutheranism, the 1970s saw a rise in the ecumenical movement in the Canada Synod, and a return to conservative rather than moderate leadership in the Missouri Synod. This study does not end in the 1970s under the premise that the German ethnicity of its subjects has faded, but rather out of recognition that enough changes within St. Louis, Waterloo County, and Lutheranism occurred that its subjects probably began to conceptualize their German ethnicity in different ways.

This dissertation argues that this generation of German Lutherans maintained a German ethnic identity in seven main chapters. The first two chapters examine how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County responded to the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s and negotiated their way through the Second World War. By using records produced by Lutheran congregations, chapter one argues that the Lutheran churches emerged as spaces of intense debate during the war where pastors, the church elite, laymen, and Lutheran women debated how to reconcile their German ethnicity during yet another war that associated their ethnicity with “the enemy.” Chapter two draws on the diaries and letters produced by Lutheran pastors to chart the numerous strategies ethnic elites employed to downplay their German ethnic identities in favour of a common Protestant and white identity that mainstream North American society deemed acceptable. Both chapters examine how congregants disagreed with their pastors and
remained steadfast in their belief that the church should continue functioning as an ethnic space or boundary.

Chapters three and four both examine how German Lutherans reengaged with their ethnicities following the war by showing a renewed interest in Germany. The devastating impact of six years of war left Germany in shambles, and German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help their “fellow” Germans recover from the war. Chapter three examines the extensive relief campaigns initiated by the Missouri and Canada Synods to raise money, food, and clothing, for their German coreligionists across the seas, all while pastors lobbied the Canadian and American government to admit thousands of German displaced persons and refugees. Chapter four follows several ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods to West Germany on their “missionary” endeavors to provide relief to impoverished German Lutherans. These visits “home” provided an opportunity for German Lutherans to reengage with their ethnic identities as Germans after having to downplay them during the Second World War. Both chapters demonstrate that a German ethnic identity continued in these communities by examining their renewed interest in Germany as the birthplace of their heritage and faith, as well as their ongoing obligation to help those of the same ethnicity and religion overseas.

Chapter five and six examine how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County responded to the new waves of German and Lutheran displaced persons (DPs) and refugees following the war. Chapter five in particular looks at how the German culture of Lutheran congregations and St. Louis and Waterloo County more broadly provided an inclusive atmosphere for German DPs to maintain their own ethnic identities. German DPs benefitted from the established German-English traditions in their
congregations that still functioned as ethnic spaces. Although Anglo-Canadian and American segments of St. Louis and Waterloo County tried to assimilate these newcomers, the hybrid traditions that existed in both communities complicated their ability to integrate DPs. Chapter six looks at how Lutheran DPs from Latvia, Estonia, and Finland challenged the German traditions of Lutheran congregations by advocating for their own linguistic and ethnic traditions. Lastly, chapter seven examines several cultural and commemorative activities in the postwar decades where German Lutherans mediated their ethnic and religious identities to the Canadian and American public. Rather than showing signs of assimilation, these commemorative events once again highlighted the hybrid German-Canadian and German-American identities of St. Louis and Waterloo County.

These seven chapters revise and build upon two portions of American and Canadian historiography. First, this dissertation shifts the scholarship on twentieth century German ethnic identity away from an emphasis on assimilation. It challenges the contention that German immigrants in the twentieth century abandoned their ethnic identity or assimilated into mainstream North America. Ethnicity played an important role in determining how German Lutherans responded to questions of war, immigration, religion, and national belonging. Secondly, the ability of German Lutherans to maintain an ethnic identity during the mid-twentieth century should cause historians to think closely about the relationship between ethnicity and whiteness. For German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, there was no “ethnic revival” in the 1970s, for they never ceased practicing a German ethnic identity. German Lutherans maintained their at times controversial ethnic identities as Germans precisely due to their racial status as whites. German Lutherans did not “become” white and shed their ethnic identities. The legacies
of white privilege and supremacy in North America ensured that their whiteness provided enough social and cultural currency to negotiate and maintain a German ethnic identity during a period of intense Anglo-Canadian and American conformity. In exploring this process, I urge historians to look more closely at how whiteness and ethnicity in the twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one another.

German Lutherans in North America faced many challenges throughout the twentieth century that threatened their ability to maintain German ethnic identities. Wars with Germany and associations with Nazism often placed German Lutherans at odds with their Canadian and American host societies. Yet, German Lutherans demonstrated remarkable flexibility in adapting to these crises. Historians, however, have not always shown the same flexibility in studying these German immigrants. Although they may not have continued the exact same ethnic and religious traditions of their nineteenth century forebears, German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis continued to practice their German ethnicities within the ethnic boundary of the Lutheran church. Their ability to appeal to a broad Protestant identity and their membership in the white race allowed them to navigate potential conflicts with their host societies and ensured that ethnicity remained a potent force in the lives of German Lutherans well into the 1970s.
Chapter 1: The Language of Loyalty: Lutheran Churches as Ethnic and Patriotic Spaces during the Second World War

As another world war approached, German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County were once again concerned with how the public perceived their communities. Pastors and congregants of a certain age recalled memories of the First World War when “patriotic” Canadians and Americans targeted them as a result of their German ethnicity and similarities to “the enemy.” These memories sparked anxieties about another war with Germany generating discrimination that would target their communities and make them outsiders once again. By 1938, German Lutherans on both sides of the Canadian-American border had to prepare strategies to respond to waging another war with Germany. They had to convince the public that they were loyal to Canada and the United States or risk discrimination once more.

The onset of the Second World War provoked intense debates within Lutheran congregations on how Germans could reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national identities during a war that made these identities seemingly incompatible. Should the ethnic traditions of their church be sacrificed in order to appear “loyal” and “patriotic” to the Canadian and American publics? To what extent should the separation of church and state be temporarily blurred to demonstrate cooperation and loyalty during wartime? German Lutherans answered these questions differently depending on their gender and status within the church. Pastors and their church councils, often composed of elite men from the community, believed they needed to transform the ethnic culture and space of their congregations to avoid discrimination. This chapter describes how ethnic elites initiated a number of reforms in the late 1930s and early 1940s that sought to construct an
image of German Lutherans as loyal. They supported eliminating German-language services at their churches; they used patriotic symbols like flags; they emphasized their national American and Canadian identities over their local German ethnic identities. However, this chapter also examines how laypeople resisted these patriotic reforms. Rejecting the patriarchal leadership of their elites, they opposed efforts to remove the German traditions from their churches. German Lutheran women contested what they perceived as the militarization of their churches by hosting social events that advocated for peace. They defended their right to protest the war on the basis of Lutheran theology. As a result, the Second World War divided these communities into two camps consisting of cautiously pro-war pastors and anti-war laypeople.

The wartime debates between pastors and their congregants provide a window through which to view how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County constructed their ethnicity in the mid-twentieth century. This chapter argues that German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity by voicing anti-war sentiments. They resented mainstream Canadian and American attempts to vilify Germany and, consequently, the German people. Once the war began, however, pastors and other elite members of the community quickly sought to suppress these sentiments and instead viewed their ethnicity as a possible target for anti-German discrimination. Their ethnicity became a liability that made them vulnerable to the same attacks that occurred during the Great War. If not suppressed, it could provide grounds for internment on the suspicion of disloyalty. It would hamper the larger project of the German community being accepted into the North American world. Laypeople, however, viewed their religious traditions as explicitly tied to the German language and fought to preserve them within the church, even during the dangers of wartime. The German language was
integral to their faith and they would not let the dangers of wartime prevent them from speaking their language.

This chapter argues that the divisions and debates within these two German communities over wartime accommodation reveals how Lutheran congregations functioned as important ethnic boundary zones. As historians Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen suggest, ethnic boundaries can reflect “the inner workings of ethnic community adjustment” and “their shared symbols and systems of meaning.” The war prompted German Lutherans to confront whether symbols like the Canadian and American flags truly “belonged” within the ethnic boundary of the church, and whether the German language hindered their ability to live peacefully in North America. Lutheran churches became contested space during the war, as ethnic elites sought to regulate their ethnicity while laypeople fought to preserve it. Rather than fitting neatly into narratives of assimilation or cultural maintenance, I suggest that these wartime debates highlight the dynamic hybrid identities of German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans. They struggled to reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national identities. The resulting contest between pastors and laypeople helped solidify a hybrid culture wherein Lutheran churches came to embody the hyphenated German-Canadian and German-American backgrounds of their inhabitants.

Anti-War Sentiment and the Response to Another Conflict

German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County watched anxiously as the Nazis rose to power in Germany during the 1930s. There was little sympathy for the

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extremist fascist response that elevated Adolf Hitler to power. Nazi Germany was not necessarily “their” Germany and therefore the rise of Nazism did little to inspire diasporic feelings of belonging. Many German Lutherans did, however, worry that they might become the targets of anti-German rhetoric or violence. This shared German ethnicity meant that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County initially resisted mainstream media attempts to vilify Hitler and the German people. Their Germany ethnicity shaped their sense of solidarity with the German people, even as their Canadian and American nationalities prevented them from embracing Hitler or Nazi policies throughout the 1930s.

German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods responded differently than other Americans and Canadians to the rise of fascism in Germany: they expressed an instinctual sympathy towards Germany’s economic and political plight. The Treaty of Versailles unfairly punished Germany and they attributed many of the country’s problems to the British, French, and American desire to punish Germany following the Great War. C.H. Little, a professor of theology at Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote that he was “so disgusted with the propaganda that is going on” that portrayed Germany as power-hungry and militaristic. He believed Germany’s current dilemmas were “the result and offshoot of the unfair treaty of Versailles,” and not the German people.¹²⁶ Lutheran periodicals like the Canada Lutheran and Lutheran Witness, both controlled by the Canada and Missouri Synod’s leadership respectively, reported positively on Hitler’s initial economic reforms.

¹²⁶ Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Carroll Herman Little fonds (hereafter CLF), C.H. Little to Candace Little, 23 July 1939; LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 27 August 1939.
in Germany in the early to mid-1930s. They hoped to see Germany continue its recovery from the harsh dictates of the 1919 peace.\footnote{127}

These cultural sympathies with the German people rarely translated into direct political action. Attempts by the Third Reich to establish pro-Nazi organizations disguised as ethnic clubs within St. Louis and Waterloo County failed throughout the 1930s. The Nazi-led \textit{Deutsche Bund Canada} tried to organize cultural events alongside Waterloo County’s German-Canadian ethnic clubs, but most of the clubs refused to participate if the \textit{Bund} was in any way involved.\footnote{128} A subsequent pro-Nazi rally in August 1933 on Kitchener’s King Street was met with an organized counter-protest. The crowd booed and insulted the pro-Nazi transplants until the police finally escorted the \textit{Bund} members away.\footnote{129} German Americans in St. Louis, meanwhile, ignored Nazi agitators in their community. By the mid-1930s, the vast majority of Third Reich sponsored clubs had already left St. Louis due to an obvious lack of support from the local German-American population.\footnote{130} Open displays of sympathy towards Germany and the Nazi regime faded as news of \textit{Kristallnacht} and other anti-Semitic atrocities reached North America in 1938. The Missouri Synod’s flagship newsletter, the \textit{Lutheran Witness}, stopped reporting on Germany entirely.\footnote{131} While initially sympathetic towards Germany, both communities recognized the dangers with being associated with Nazis in North America.

\footnote{127} John Hellwege, “What Was Going On over There?: The Missouri Synod’s Struggle to Understand Pre-war Nazi Germany as Seen in Two Popular Publications,” Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2007): 118.
\footnote{130} Gregory Kupsky, “‘We, Too, Are Still Here’: German Americans in St. Louis, 1905-1941,” \textit{Missouri Historical Review} 103, no. 4 (2009).
\footnote{131} English and McLaughlin, \textit{Kitchener}, 166; Hellwege, “What Was Going On over There?”, 121.
Although few German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County politically supported Nazi Germany, their German ethnicities did lead them to adopt anti-war positions in the late 1930s. German Lutherans largely viewed the outbreak of war in 1939 as a result of British and European policies, rather than a result of Nazi Germany’s militarism. Little believed that the “British policy of interference in European continental affairs” and its desire to “dominate or police” German affairs was the primary reason why the world was once again at war.\textsuperscript{132} John Behnken, the president of the Missouri Synod, agreed and pointedly blamed Britain going to war with Germany. Britain and its allies, he believed, did not want to stop Nazi aggression. Instead, the war resulted from the competing political ideologies in Europe that provoked governments to “constantly fly at each other’s throats.”\textsuperscript{133} These sentiments existed among laypeople in each synod as well. One laymen in St. Louis claimed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “connived with England and they grabbed up all of the gold undoubtedly so Germany couldn’t trade…Churchill said that Germany should be crushed as she was getting too strong commercially.” Europe’s general hostility towards Germany meant the United States had “no business getting into the war.”\textsuperscript{134} While not motivated to directly participate in pro-German or pro-Nazi political activity, elites and laypeople in the Canada and Missouri Synods expressed German sympathies as a result of their ethnic identities at the beginning of the war.

The outbreak of war in 1939 was a major blow to members of the German Lutheran communities that previously witnessed discrimination during the Great War.

\textsuperscript{132} Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Carroll Herman Little fonds (hereafter CLF), C.H. Little to Candace Little, 27 August 1939; LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 14 October 1939.

\textsuperscript{133} Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Office of the President Records, John W. Behnken Administration collection (hereafter Behnken Administration), Box 9, Folder 110, Address on Psalm 46, 17 April 1940.

\textsuperscript{134} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 1, Folder 1, Anonymous to Behnken, 17 April 1943.
With the world at war with Germany again, it seemed logical that their communities would again face discrimination. Memories of the Great War loomed large in Little’s approach to the new conflict. He worried that Canada would undergo another conscription crisis that would force his four sons to go fight overseas and become “cannon fodder.” \(^{135}\) Shortly after the war began, he promised to make few comments on the conflict, because “censorship of all letters will again occur” and any criticism of the war effort was liable to place him in a “concentration camp.” He decided that keeping “mum” on wartime issues was the best policy. \(^{136}\) Little had good reason to fear the revival of anti-German discrimination. Pastors throughout the Missouri Synod feared that “war hysteria and [a] false notion of patriotism” already made them outsiders in their communities. One St. Louis pastor recalled that nativists burned down his church and eventually forced him to leave town due to his German heritage during the Great War. “I see it all coming again,” he confided to synod-president John Behnken. \(^{137}\)

It did not take long for Little and Behnken’s concerns to become reality. Behnken received several threatening anonymous messages delivered directly to his home during the war’s early years. One note stated ominously that “WE UNDERSTAND YOUR ORGANIZATION UPHOLDS GERMAN SERVICES. YOU THEREBY FURTHER GERMAN PRINCIPLES. WE DO NOT CARE FOR THEM.” \(^{138}\) Such threats led the editors of the *Lutheran Witness* to respond that “during the first World War the most shameful outrages were suffered by law-abiding citizens of the United States. These insults and outrages were committed not by foreigners but by their fellow-citizens.

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\(^{135}\) LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 17 September 1939; LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 9 September 1939.

\(^{136}\) LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 27 August 1939. Little largely followed this policy throughout the duration of the war, limiting his critiques to rationing, the United States, and concerns that his sons may be conscripted.

\(^{137}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 34, Folder 439, Martin Graebner to Behnken, 17 September 1941.

\(^{138}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 1, Folder 1, Anonymous to Behnken, 13 November 1941.
Churches were painted yellow, pastors were driven out of their parsonages, innocent citizens were maligned…And the same species of intolerance and tyranny is raising its head even now.”¹³⁹ Members of the Canada Synod agreed. One pastor wrote that the war stimulated Anglo-Canadian “suspicion, greed, [and] injustice” that promoted “racial hatred” towards Germans and their culture.¹⁴⁰ The generation of German Lutherans who witnessed discrimination during the Great War feared anti-German attacks would happen again.

Lutheran pastors generally worried about wartime discrimination more than laypeople. During the First World War, anti-German Canadians and Americans deliberately targeted Lutheran pastors and churches as “enemy” institutions. They believed that Lutheran churches essentially acted as a space for Germans to meet and plan acts of sabotage against Canada and the United States. They often singled out pastors as community leaders who allegedly hid pro-German sentiments in their German-language sermons. Some of the most publicized acts of discrimination in St. Louis and Waterloo County involved physical attacks on Lutheran pastors. These pastors faced imprisonment, internment, and occasionally had to flee the city or face further assault.¹⁴¹ With the onset of another war, pastors recognized that they would once again be vulnerable to anti-German “patriots.”

As they perceived themselves to be particularly vulnerable, pastors and synod leaders made the decision to downplay their German heritage and the ethnic traditions associated with their church for the duration of the war. The German sympathies Behnken

¹⁴⁰ “For Such A Time As This,” Canada Lutheran, October 1940, p. 7-8.
once voiced, for instance, dissipated once the United States declared war on Germany in December 1941. Behnken sent a telegram to Roosevelt stating that he wanted to “assure you of our prayers in this hour of national emergency” and to “pledge to you the loyal support of our people in the defense of our country.”¹⁴² Likewise, John Reble, the president of the Canada Synod, sent telegrams to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and other government officials to stress the Canada Synod’s “willingness to share in the sacrifices and demands that may be required of us as loyal British subjects.”¹⁴³ Unlike the Great War, Behnken and Reble did not intend to give the government any ground upon which to accuse them of disloyalty. Behnken published a copy of the telegram in the next edition of *The Lutheran Witness* and Reble published a copy in *The Canada Lutheran* to quickly spread news of the synod’s new position on the war. Both synod leaders published their telegrams largely as a political strategy to deflect any criticisms that the Missouri and Canada Synods were unpatriotic. During the First World War, the Missouri Synod’s leadership made few public comments on the war effort, which only served to heighten nativist accusations that Lutherans were not patriotic. Behnken and Reble published their telegrams so as to not make the same mistake again.

Privately, Behnken confessed that he also published the telegram in order to “set some of our people to thinking along those [patriotic] lines.”¹⁴⁴ Pro-German sentiments among the synod’s laity could jeopardize the loyal image he wished to cultivate for his community. He and other synod leaders combined their efforts in order to dissuade members of the synod from expressing pro-German sentiments and to encourage them to

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¹⁴³ See the published telegrams in *Canada Lutheran*, October 1939, 2.
¹⁴⁴ CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 34, Folder 439, John Behnken to Martin Graebner, 23 December 1941.
embrace wartime patriotism. The editors at *The Lutheran Witness* scolded their German-American readership for constituting “the [most] severe critics” of the war. With the United States officially at war by the end of 1941, the editors warned their readers that “the time for such utterances is now past.” They urged all members of the synod to either enlist in the armed forces or purchase war bonds in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the government.145 Behnken agreed, and hoped that the warning would set “people’s thinking aright.” Anti-war sentiments based on their German ethnicities could not be tolerated if the Missouri and Canada Synods hoped to avoid nativist discrimination.

Declarations of patriotic sentiments would not, however, be enough. In January 1942, Behnken met with other synod leaders at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis to underscore the need to eliminate the pro-German sentiments within the synod. The meeting allowed St. Louis’s ethnic elites to ask Behnken for advice on how to deal with community members who expressed pro-German and anti-war sentiments. Behnken replied that laymen would likely disagree with their pastors, but that the church leadership still needed to be seen participating in the war effort. He encouraged pastors to give sound advice and encouragement to their congregants, but also to reprimand and admonish them if the situation called for it.147 Professors at Concordia Seminary agreed with Behnken’s stance. P.E. Kretzmann encouraged pastors “to eliminate the ‘conscientious objector’ with his weak and erring conscience” from the congregation.148 Behnken and Kretzmann believed that pastors needed to maintain their authority in these situations so as to not jeopardize their loyal image.

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146 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 34, Folder 439, Behnken to Martin Graebner, 23 December 1941.
147 CHI, LMC, Box 26, Folder 111, Address at College of Presidents Meeting, 20 January 1942; CHI, LMC, Box 9, Folder 53, The Preacher in a World at War, n.d. 1942.
148 CHI, Emergency Planning Council Collection (hereafter EPCC), Box 2, Folder 14, Our Task in the Present Emergency, 1942.
The outbreak of war led Lutheran pastors to manipulate and control expressions of their German ethnic identity. With war officially declared, pastors and congregants alike could no longer express their previous pro-German sympathies. They needed to engage with Allied patriotism, not ethnic solidarities. The outbreak of war presented Lutheran pastors with a decision on how to best mediate their ethnic identities. Although pastors and laypeople alike initially felt comfortable voicing their anti-war and pro-German sentiments in their letters and publications, the eventual outbreak of war in 1939 and 1941 caused pastors and other German Lutheran elites to stop articulating these views. As ethnic elites, they could not risk appearing as outsiders in the eyes of patriotic Anglo-Canadian and Americans once again.

**Fighting for the German Language**

The reputation of the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone or a German organization caused anti-German patriots to target them as “enemy” institutions during the Great War. Critics cited the Lutheran tradition of preaching in German as the primary reasons why they believed German Lutherans were disloyal.\(^{149}\) Language therefore emerged as the primary contentious issue in most congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo. As one of the most obvious markers of their ethnicity, German-language services were often the first ethnic tradition eliminated from Lutheran congregations. Pastors collectively decided to censor and eliminate the German language from their institutions and periodicals at the start of the war. During its 1939 annual convention, the

Canada Synod passed a resolution to stop producing its records in German, even though thirty-nine out of the synod’s fifty-four congregations ordered its yearly records in German. The St. Louis Pastoral Conference took similar action in late September 1939, even before the United States entered the war. St. Louis pastors decided to cancel German broadcasts on their radio station, KFUO. War, pastors argued, created “emotional thinking” among Americans and they feared their radio station would be forced to shut down. They stopped German language broadcasts on account of “the seriousness of the days ahead, the forces working against anything which bears the Germanic imprint,” thereby making “it imperative that we avoid any possibility of difficulty when it can be avoided.” Elites in both synods united behind the common cause of demonstrating their loyalty to the Canadian and American publics.

Pastors who experienced discrimination during the Great War were particularly eager to eliminate German-language services from their churches. The police in Waterloo County had arrested the Reverend Herman Sperling of St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church during the previous war after several Anglo-Canadians falsely accused him of sending money overseas to help the German military effort. They never found any evidence that these rumors were true, but Sperling spent several days in jail until Little paid for his release. The Reverend Otto Stockmann, of Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, similarly faced incarceration at an internment camp in northern Ontario after the local Member of Parliament called for his arrest on the basis that he preached to a large

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150 LA, ESF, Convention Minutes, June 1939, 85. 151 CHI, Louis John Sieck Collection (hereafter LJS), Box 1, Folder 14, Minutes of St. Louis Pastoral Conference, 25 September 1939. 152 LA, CLF, Little to Candace, 3 December 1917.
body of “Germans” in the language of “the enemy.”

Sperling and Stockmann did not want to risk imprisonment again. Both pastors therefore eliminated German services from their churches early in the war. Sperling suspended German sermons and Sunday school lessons at St. Peter’s owing to the “unsettled condition” in Europe. Likewise, Stockmann converted Trinity’s religious services to English in order to avoid “possible offence or provocation” from the outside community. They did not make this choice easily. Stockmann worried that his language reforms would discourage congregants from attending weekly sermons. He publicly recognized that while the transition to English was not ideal, it was essential that congregants not resist these changes and appear disloyal. He pleaded with congregants to remain dedicated to the church during this “difficult time.”

Breaking with the ethnic traditions of the church did truly threaten the possibility of losing congregants. Although pastors were anxious over breaking Lutheran traditions, they considered sacrificing their language as a necessary strategy to pre-empt anti-German attacks.

Pastors in St. Louis were also willing to eliminate German services once the United States officially entered the war. The Missouri Synod’s adherence to conservative Lutheranism, however, ensured that the decision to switch from English to German did not occur as abruptly as their neighbors in the Canada Synod. Missouri Synod congregations placed more emphasis on congregational autonomy than those in the

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153 The local MP provided these reasons for Stockmann’s internment after Trinity’s congregants demanded to know why their pastor was interned. “Dr. M. Steele’s Report on Rev. Stockman (sic) Case,” Tavistock Gazette, 3 January 1919.

154 LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church (hereafter St. Peter’s), reel 15, Church Meeting Minutes, 6 September 1939; LA, ESF, LM20 Sebastopol-Tavistock Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church (hereafter Trinity), reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 2 May 1940.

155 LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 2 May 1940.

156 Toronto’s churches, for instance, reported a decrease in attendance from their German-speaking members. See Roberto Perin, The Many Rooms of This House: Diversity and Toronto’s Places of Worship since 1840 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 155.
Canada Synod. Thus, the decision to switch to English services first required that pastors obtain the consent, or at least consult with, members of their church councils. The church council at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church, for instance, advised the Reverend Paul Streufert to eliminate German services due to “the present emergency and because the community may misinterpret the holding of German services as indicating a sympathetic feeling” towards Germany. They feared that “such uncharitable judging on the part of the community may do great harm” to their congregation. Streufert promised to meet with those who attended German services and explain to them the necessity of speaking English in order to avoid possible nativist attacks.157

The efforts of pastors and other elites threatened a radical break with the ethnic traditions practiced in Lutheran churches. While pastors proved willing to downplay their ethnicity in order to stress their loyalty, members of their congregations rejected making their churches indistinguishable from other Canadian and American churches. Congregants did not have the same fears of internment as their pastors. More importantly, they resisted what they saw as a broader effort to transform the cultural space of their churches. As cultural theorist Henri Lefebvre notes, “(social) space is a (social) product” and is accordingly shaped by human actors. The human influence on space establishes unspoken norms, and therefore transforms space to take on a “reality on its own.” These unspoken social norms influence those who enter the space and can shape the actions and attitudes of the people that occupy it.158 Since their inception, Lutheran churches functioned as ethnic boundaries in which the German language thrived. Throughout the

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157 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Matthew’s Minutes Board of Elders Box, Board of Elders Folder, St. Matthew Board of Elders Meeting Minutes, 6 January 1942.
early decades of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches took on a particular importance for German immigrants wishing to speak their language. Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski recounts how German immigrant communities in North America spoke a hybrid language in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that combined both English and German, particularly when in public. While ethnic elites decried the loss of a “pure” German language, ordinary German immigrant families largely embraced their new hybrid language and spoke a mix of English and German comfortably. The public use of the German language decreased without protest from most German immigrant communities.159 While true of the public sphere, German immigrants of Lutheran faith could still attend church, and speak and hear German spoken regularly. Their pastors regularly preached in German and social clubs often conducted their business in German. Thus, many German Lutherans became accustomed to speaking English in the public sphere and German in the private sphere or ethnic boundary of their churches by the mid-twentieth century.

Wartime hysteria put these ethnic traditions in jeopardy. The elimination of German services in Lutheran congregations may have appeared as a patriotic necessity for pastors, but it threatened the ethnic identity of congregants who attended weekly sermons. It forced congregants to sacrifice one of their main forms of preserving their ethnicity via the German language. Congregants did not passively accept this sacrifice. By March 1940, members of St. Peter’s congregation organized to protest the Reverend Sperling’s decision to switch entirely to English services. Led by layman John Schell, the protestors circulated a petition to determine if the congregation still desired to worship in German. Schell’s petition gained traction amongst the congregation at large and emboldened him

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159 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 213-216.
to take his demands to the church council. Schell and his supporters requested that Sperling preach at least one or two German sermons a month, and offer at least one German language communion per year. Schell also wrote to the church council detailing his demands and requested to personally meet with them to express his opposition to Sperling’s language reforms. St. Peter’s church council proved hesitant to meet with a congregant so vocally opposed to its wartime actions. They rejected his offer to discuss his opposition in person. Instead, the church council wrote to Schell reminding him of the reasons German language services were suspended at the beginning of the war. Although the church council did not risk association with someone as vocal as Schell, they organized a committee to meet with the more moderate members of the congregation who signed Schell’s petition to reinforce the importance of not speaking German while Canada was at war.\footnote{LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 15, Church Council Minutes, 25 March 1940.} Schell’s protest was exactly the type of behaviour Sperling and the church council wished to avoid. His protest threatened to revive nativist concerns and the church council therefore worked to quell his opposition in order to maintain the image of loyalty.

To make matters worse, Sperling’s health declined in 1940 just as the debate over speaking German divided St. Peter’s. Without Sperling’s assistance, the church council had to confront Schell and his supporters without the authority of their pastor. Schell’s convictions, however, did not waver and he continued to campaign for his cause at St. Peter’s congregational meetings throughout 1940. In a May meeting, Schell once again advocated for reintroducing German services and asked that the church council reconsider its earlier decision. Schell’s efforts occurred at an inopportune period in the war. In the previous weeks, the Nazis had invaded northern Europe. Nazi expansion fueled English-Canadian fears that Canada was subject to internal threats. Rumours circulated that the
Nazis benefitted from the support of “fifth columnists,” citizens who willingly collaborated with the Nazis against their own country. These rumours played on English-Canadian fears that German Canadians were loyal to Germany. As Schell’s demands coincided with a peak period in the fear over German-Canadian saboteurs, the church council proved even less willing to grant Schell’s wishes. Still, the congregation debated Schell’s demands and only stopped when the church received a phone call from the nearby hospital. The call notified the congregation that Sperling had just passed away due to complications during kidney surgery. The symbolism of their pastor dying during a discussion of reviving the German language was not lost on the congregation. The church council interpreted the omen as sufficient grounds to end the meeting and table other discussions for future review. For the remainder of the year, St. Peter’s church council remained preoccupied with finding a suitable replacement for Sperling and had little time to address the concerns of individual congregants. Thus Schell’s efforts to bring the German language back to St. Peter’s failed due to internal and external factors alike.

In contrast, Trinity’s congregation did enjoy one small victory. Several congregants approached the Reverend Otto Stockmann during the winter of 1940 in an attempt to reinstate German language services. Specifically, congregants wished to create an exception to Stockmann’s language reform in order to allow a German Easter service. While Stockmann did not record the exact number, enough congregants approached him with complaints that he felt it necessary to give a public explanation. Stockmann

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162 LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 13, Church Meeting Minutes, 6 May 1940; LA, ESF, 5.0.6 Pastors: Biographical Information, Herman A. Sperling.
addressed the issue at the annual congregational meeting in January 1941. Standing before his congregation, Stockmann argued that it was necessary for him to speak English if Trinity hoped to avoid possible anti-German attacks, at least for the duration of the war. He urged them to accept his decision lest he face internment once again.  

The congregation, however, remained unmoved by Stockmann’s plea for loyalty. They urged him to call a vote on whether to include a German service on Easter. Stockmann had little choice but to oblige. A record forty-three members of the congregation attended the vote, when the average attendance to congregational meetings hovered around twenty to twenty-five. The resolution to hold an Easter service in German received overwhelming support from the congregation and was subsequently passed by the church council. Of the forty-three members present, four congregants voted against bringing German-language services back to Trinity. Stockmann recorded the names of those who voted “no.” The abstainers were members of prominent families in the church who had close ties to the church council.  

As Stockmann and the church council had originally suspended use of the German language, the family members of the church council supported their initial decision. The congregation received its wish at Easter in 1943, when Stockmann conducted a morning Easter service in German and another service later that day in English for those who were not comfortable attending it in German. In the minds of Trinity’s more elite members, the risk of appearing and speaking German was not one worth taking. While the vote to conduct an Easter service in German appears to have had the general support of the congregation, there still remained a divide between

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163 LA, ESF, Trinity, file 3.48.5.1, Congregational Meeting Minutes, 1 January 1941.
164 LA, ESF, Trinity, file 3.48.5.1, Congregational Meeting Minutes, 1 January 1941.
165 LA, ESF, Trinity, file 3.48.5.1, Congregational Meeting Minutes, 1 January 1941.
166 LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 29 March 1943.
the desires of the laity and Stockmann’s wishes. Elite church members were not willing to risk their status in the community by appearing disloyal by speaking German.

St. Louis pastors also had to make certain conciliatory gestures in order to avoid the protests over language that engulfed congregations like St. Peter’s. The church council at St. Paul’s Lutheran Church recommended that the Reverend Rothe consult with laymen who might take issue with their decision to cancel German services in January 1942. Rothe consulted prominent families at St. Paul’s and tried to convince them of the wartime necessity to preach exclusively in English. They agreed, but only on the condition that Rothe continue to discreetly administer communion in German in private ceremonies. Louis Sieck, the pastor at Zion Lutheran Church, agreed to privately offer “spiritual care” in the German language in exchange for the congregation’s public support of his decision to preach Sunday sermons in English. The pro-German lobbies at these congregations therefore extended thanks for “the tactful way the Pastor is handling this delicate matter.”

The disagreement over language in these congregations reveals how central language was to the ways that laypeople in St. Louis and Waterloo County conceptualized their German ethnic identity. Congregants proved unwilling to let the war alter their ethnic traditions because they believed their Lutheranism was intertwined with their ethnicity. Laypeople in Waterloo County and St. Louis petitioned primarily for the opportunity to speak German on days with a specific religious importance or at significant religious rituals, such as confirmation ceremonies, communion, and Easter.

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167 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church Vestry Minutes Box, 1942 Folder, Minutes of the Vestry Meeting, 12 January 1942.
168 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church Voters Meeting Box, 1942 Folder, Minutes of the Voter’s Meeting, 9 February 1942; CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Berea/Zion Box, Zion Newsletter, January 1942.
Language debates demonstrate the degree to which the church evolved into an important German space during the interwar years. Congregants conceptualized their German and Lutheran identities as two halves of a single whole, wherein they needed to speak German on days of religious importance. German immigrants may have allowed English to eclipse German in the public sphere, but they proved unwilling to let this happen at their churches. Rather than treating the switch to English with ambivalence, as German immigrants did in the public sphere, congregants fought vigorously to maintain their church as an ethnic boundary zone immune from the influence of their host society. This difference reveals an important aspect of the development of the German language in immigrant communities. The German language in 1940s St. Louis and Waterloo County became imbedded with religious and cultural importance. The spirited protests that occurred within these three Lutheran churches remains a testament to the cultural significance congregants placed on speaking the language of their ancestors during times of religious importance. To speak German at church contained more than religious meaning or a mere functional use; it also provided an opportunity to practice and commune with one’s ethnic identity. While language in the public sphere was fluid and allowed for change, congregants resisted language reforms that violated their perception of the church as an ethnic boundary zone.

Protesting Patriotic Space

The fight to keep Lutheran churches German spaces did not begin and end with the question of German-language services. Many congregants felt that their pastors were too accommodating to wartime patriotism more generally. They were also concerned by
their pastor’s willingness to allow their religious and ethnic spaces to be marked by patriotic symbols such as flags. These efforts to remake their churches into landscapes of loyalty and patriotism align with Lefebvre’s concept of “representational space.” Representational spaces employ “complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not” that provide its inhabitants with meaning. These symbols can overlay “physical space, making symbolic use of its objects” that would otherwise be meaningless.¹⁶⁹ Pastors who brought Canadian and American national symbols into their churches sought to demonstrate their loyalty, but at the expense of preserving their congregations as German spaces outside the purview of the state. These symbols provided a clear meaning to both insiders and outsiders as to how their pastors felt about the war. Pastors hoped that such changes would demonstrate their loyalty as Canadians and Americans, even if it meant further downplaying their German ethnicities.

Eliminating German services helped pastors avoid accusations of loyalty to Germany, but did little to show their host societies that they were loyal to Canada and the United States. During the Great War, nativists often criticized Lutheran pastors for not upholding Canadian and American norms such as singing “God Save the King” or saluting the flag. Pastors sought to rectify this image by including explicitly patriotic customs and symbols in their churches. Sperling and the St. Peter’s church council realized that they could no longer advertise their church as a “German” church if they hoped to demonstrate their loyalty. As of 1939, the congregation still had its public sign on the church lot written in the German language. By 1941, the church council replaced the old German sign with a new English one accompanied by a Canadian flag.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Lefebvre, 33, 39. ¹⁷⁰ LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 15, Church Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1941.
Canadian flag and an English sign directly outside the church, there were few visible markers to distinguish St. Peter’s from the nearby Presbyterian churches. Other congregations adopted a similar approach. Both Trinity and “Old Trinity” in St. Louis raised flags during the early stages of the war in order to demonstrate to the broader community that they were loyal to Canada and the United States respectively.  

Pastors and the church elite monitored the behaviour of their congregations outside as well as inside the space of the church. St. Peter’s in Kitchener rescheduled its weekly sermon so as to not conflict with a 1939 Remembrance Day ceremony. The church council advised the congregation to take part in the civic ceremony that was held at the community cenotaph in Kitchener. Congregations in St. Louis engaged in displays of patriotism as well. Zion’s congregational newsletter published the names of its congregants who had already joined the armed forces as early as July 1941. It would be difficult, the church council hoped, for “patriots” to attack German Lutheran loyalty when they so proudly displayed the names of members of their congregation who served in the military.

St. Matthew’s in St. Louis implemented one of the clearest threats to the traditional German spaces of Lutheran churches during the early stages of the war. In October 1941, the church newsletter advertised a new initiative pioneered by Erwin Rodenburg, the congregation’s Sunday school teacher. As the congregation’s teacher, Rodenburg had considerable authority within the congregation. Yet, he also had the most to lose as a result of wartime discrimination. Since Rodenburg taught the congregation’s

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171 LA, ESF, Synod Convention Minutes, June 1940, 22; CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Bulletin Box, Bulletins Folder, Trinity Bulletin, 19 November 1939.
172 LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 15, Church Meeting Minutes, 8 November 1940.
173 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Berea/Zion Box, Zion Newsletter, July 1941.
children in German, he was more susceptible to anti-German attacks than other members of the congregation. In an attempt to demonstrate his patriotism, Rodenburg proposed to host soldiers stationed at the nearby Jefferson Barracks at the church for dinner, entertainment, and a brief respite from military life. Elite members of the church saw an obvious benefit in implementing such a patriotic program. Rodenburg recognized that during “this critical time, we should do all we can to aid our boys and thus help promote national unity.”

For the German Lutheran members of St. Matthew’s who supported the program, national unity naturally meant avoiding anti-German discrimination and working cooperatively with American patriots during the impending war.

Rodenburg’s idea, however, militarized church space and brought the congregation closer to the war effort. Rodenburg knew this, and the elite members of the church realized they had to convince the congregation of the program’s necessity. The church council told the congregation that the soldiers in the program were typically Lutheran, but acknowledged that soldiers of varying religious backgrounds would also participate. In an attempt to justify the presence of non-Lutherans, the church council claimed that hosting non-Lutherans constituted “an excellent missionary opportunity” to attempt to convert these non-Lutheran soldiers to the Missouri Synod. Thus, they tried to portray a patriotic activity as a religious one. In doing so, Rodenburg and his supporters attempted to reconcile the congregants’ perception of their church as a distinctly German Lutheran space with the demands of patriotism.

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174 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Matthew’s Church Box, Newsletters Folder, St. Matthew’s Parish Paper, 1 October 1941.
175 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Matthew’s Church Box, Newsletters Folder, St. Matthew’s Parish Paper, 1 October 1941.
Pastors increasingly tried to connect the wartime accommodation of their churches with a general expression of Christian spirit. The language debates made them realize that appealing to their congregation’s sense of patriotic duty or nationality would generate opposition to, rather than participation in, the war effort. Pastors therefore had to somehow confront the attitudes of their congregants that treated patriotism and their ethnicity as incompatible forces. They subsequently worked carefully to encourage participation in the war effort by appealing to their congregation’s identities as Lutherans, rather than as Americans or Canadians. Reverend Lewis Niemoeller at Faith Lutheran Church in St. Louis encouraged his congregation to support St. Louis’s wartime fundraisers because of their faith, not out of patriotic sentiment. He told his congregation that “this work is one way of showing our Christianity to the world” and emphasized that the city’s wartime fundraisers supported Lutheran charities as well as secular ones.\footnote{CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, D-F Box, Faith Lutheran Church Folder, Newsletter, 18 October 1942.} St. Matthew’s in St. Louis adopted a similar approach. It encouraged its congregation to buy war bonds, for as “Christian citizens we want to come to the assistance of our country in its hour of dire need.”\footnote{CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Matthew Lutheran Church Box, Newsletters Folder, St. Matthew Parish Paper, April 1943.} In 1943, Zion started its campaign for war bonds by appealing to the congregation’s religious identity. They titled the campaign “For Church and for Country,” in attempt to reconcile an obviously patriotic fundraiser with the Lutheran faith. Sieck, Zion’s pastor, argued that congregants should purchase war bonds and use a portion of their savings to donate it to the church. He told Zion’s members that purchasing war bonds “proves our loyalty to both of these divine institutions, church and
government.” Sieck argued that “in this way you will be serving both your nation and your church.” The German identities of their congregants ensured that pastors had to find a motivation outside of patriotism to encourage their congregants to support wartime fundraisers. War with Germany did not provide enough impetus for German Lutheran congregants to donate their time and money. By turning wartime fundraisers into church fundraisers, however, pastors hoped to accomplish their goal of appearing loyal without generating opposition among their congregants.

Congregants, however, still did not support their pastors and attempts to combine church and state. They resented their pastors taking such strong patriotic stances on the war as it clearly violated their Biblical understanding Romans 13, which dictated that the state not exert its influence over spiritual affairs. Congregants rejected the demands of patriotism and, unlike their pastors and church councils, often proved reluctant to embrace the war’s impact on their churches. The divide that emerged during the early years of the war between laymen and elite church councils continued to generate conflict within local congregations. One congregant in St. Louis criticized their pastor for preaching “about war every Sunday from the pulpit” and for placing an emphasis on how it “was a privilege to serve.” The congregant complained that “he is a good preacher and his sermons used to be fine before but he sort of detracted from the Gospel by doing that.” Unlike their pastors and the church elite, congregants did not celebrate the wartime “achievements” that their pastors often cited in order to demonstrate their loyalty.

178 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Berea/Zion Box, Zion Newsletter, March 1943.
179 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Berea/Zion Box, Zion Newsletter, November 1942.
180 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 1, Folder 1, Anonymous to Behnken, 17 April 1943.
German Lutheran women put up the strongest resistance to elite attempts to gain acceptance through patriotism. Their protests, however, differed from those of their male peers, as Lutheran women had very few outlets in which to express their opposition to the patriotic reforms initiated by the church’s male elite. Both the Missouri and Canada Synods did not allow women the right to vote in congregational meetings. Nor could women sit on church councils or other advisory boards. While men like Schell could voice their protest via the official channels of congregational meetings, German Lutheran women had to voice their opposition to the war within their own organizations or by refusing to comply with the patriotic directives of their pastors. Their protests reveal the extent to which German Lutheran women voiced anti-war sentiments despite elite attempts to regulate their ethnicity. They conceptualized their churches as a site outside of the purview of the state, and resented attempts by their pastors to bring wartime patriotism into a religious institution.

For women in the Canada Synod, the annual conferences of the Women’s Missionary Society (WMS) provided a space wherein German Lutheran women could articulate their own thoughts on the war. During the early war years, the annual themes of their conferences contained explicit anti-war messages. In 1939, the WMS met at St. James in Waterloo County under the banner “Ambassadors of Peace.” Unlike their male pastors, the WMS did not conceptualize church space as one that needed to support the war effort. They understood their churches as places of refuge where they could practice their religion outside of state influence. They believed that their role in church was to follow “the example of our Lord Jesus Christ” and “solemnly pledge ourselves for further
the realization of peace by bringing the Gospel to bear upon the hearts of men.”  

The WMS’s 1940 convention met under the theme of “Love.” Margaret Kalbfleisch, the conference organizer, wrote that “surely the Convention theme, Love, is most fitting, particularly, in these times of world tragedy, when many nations are engaged in a terrific conflict which is shaking the very foundations of our Christian civilization. The world is in need of more love.”

Denied official recognition by their congregations, German Lutheran women critiqued the war effort in the few spaces they could control.

As the war continued, German Lutheran women became increasingly vocal about their anti-war views. Women, even outside of Lutheran congregations, were expected to volunteer in the war effort due to their “naturally self-sacrificing” disposition. Men saw tasks such as sewing, cooking, and canvassing for funds as extensions of women’s domestic duties, and expected women to complete this work in order to help the war effort. These gendered expectations also existed in the German Lutheran communities of St. Louis and Waterloo County, where pastors expected women to carry out their patriotic wartime efforts in order to stress their loyalty to the state. By cooperating with their pastor’s plans for patriotic fundraisers, women maintained the role of “ancillary partners” that did not challenge the pastor’s authority and leadership in the church. But while pastors expected their congregation’s women to carry out their patriotic fundraisers, they became some of the most chief opponents of their pastors’ patriotic reforms during the latter stages of the war.

181 LA, ESF, 17 Women in the Lutheran Church, Folder 17.1.6.2.3, Women’s Missionary Society Minutes, 20 September 1939.
182 LA, ESF, 17 Women in the Lutheran Church, Folder 17.1.6.2.3, Women’s Missionary Society Minutes, 23 October 1940.
German Lutheran women resented bearing the burden of patriotic war work. In early 1942, Faith Lutheran Church in St. Louis publicized the few women who were “taking the lead” in fundraising activities in hopes that other women would notice and help. However, patriotic fundraisers within the church failed to generate a significant attendance from the congregation’s women. The church leadership pleaded for “all the ladies of the congregation” to attend the patriotic fundraisers, instead of the same handful of women each time. By refusing to participate in patriotic fundraisers, German Lutheran women conveyed their anti-war beliefs to their pastors and the church elite. They rejected the ways that their pastors and church councils transformed their churches from places of worship and ethnicity into patriotic national spaces. As women could not vote or participate in congregational meetings in both the Missouri and Canada Synods, they did not have an official venue in which to voice their protests as with their male counterparts. Remaining silent and ignoring their pastor’s pleas emerged as one of the most effective ways German Lutheran women could express their opposition to the war. If their pastors proved intent on transforming church space, German Lutheran women at Faith Lutheran Church simply stopped attending a space that no longer spoke to their religious and ethnic identities. Denied a voice within their congregation, the women at Faith Lutheran Church let their silence speak for them.

Even the women who did seem to support wartime fundraisers eventually became disillusioned over the theological contradictions of their pastors. In late 1942, a Ladies Aid Society raised enough money from fundraising efforts to purchase a war bond. Purchased under the name of the congregation, some of the women involved with the

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185 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, D-F Box, Faith Lutheran Church Folder, Newsletter, 11 January 1942.
initial fundraiser expressed concern that the congregation should not use the bond as it was “blood money.” They believed the government would use their money for “bad purposes” and felt uncomfortable attaching the name of their congregation to money that would support the government’s war. 186 Although instructed to purchase war bonds by their pastors, German Lutheran women could not ignore that this money could be used to bomb German civilians, including mothers and children overseas. 187 In 1943, another Ladies Aid Society resisted their pastor’s request to cook free meals for American soldiers. The pastor expected his congregation’s women to purchase food for these meals, and subsequently cook and serve them to visiting American soldiers. The women were dismayed to find out, however, “that hardly 10% of the visiting boys are Lutheran” and many of the soldiers they fed were in fact “Catholics and others [taking] undue advantage” of their generosity. They subsequently protested their pastor’s decision over the “waste of money” to the synod’s leadership. 188

Their protests, however, found little sympathy among the synod’s male leadership. Conflict between German Lutheran women and their pastors proved so common throughout the war that The Lutheran Witness eventually commented on the issue. The magazine’s editor, Theodore Graebner, took issue with women who refused to purchase war bonds. Graebner reported that certain women claimed “they had been taught that the Church and State are separate” and that “it was wrong to make such a purchase of bonds.” Rather than acknowledge the valid theological claims made by German Lutheran women, Graebner dismissed them and slandered their reputation. He warned that such

186 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 316, Alvin J. Starke to Behnken, 29 December 1942.
187 This irony was often remarked upon by German immigrants with anti-war sentiments who found themselves inadvertently participating in the war effort by working in war work and other “patriotic” activities. See CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, J. Franklin Yount’s Annotated People Come First, 58-61.
188 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 4, Folder 37, Henry A. Grueber to Behnken, 6 January 1943.
protests meant that their pastor may not uphold their reputation as loyal citizens should these women ever come into conflict with the government or hostile community members. Whereas male objections to synod policy were treated seriously, Graebner believed that women protested the war not “for righteousness’ sake, but as a result of their ignorance of what their Church teaches.”

Behnken dismissed women’s theological challenges with equal arrogance. He challenged one Ladies Aid Society “to prove their assertion” that war bonds were blood money. Unlike male congregants who could voice their protests through official channels and hope for their desired results, pastors generally ignored women’s protests. One pastor refused to cancel his patriotic programs, despite protest from the congregation’s women, because it would “be difficult to discontinue the project now without getting a black eye.”

Whereas pastors relied on the elite men in their church councils to support their patriotic reforms, synod leaders believed German Lutheran women were a problem throughout the war. Specifically, synod leaders saw the tendency for German Lutheran women to view involvement with the military as a violation of Romans 13 as a major impediment to their war effort. If the clearest way for synod leaders to demonstrate their loyalty was to ensure a large number of Lutheran youth enlisted in the armed forces, then Lutheran mothers acted as a significant barrier to their ultimate goal of promoting loyalty. Women had good cause to fear that the military opposed their religious and ethnic identities. After all, wartime propaganda from the American government often portrayed military training camps as a place where Americans of diverse ethnic and religious

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190 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 316, Behnken to Starke, 4 January 1943.
191 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 4, Folder 37, Grueber to Behnken, 6 January 1943.
backgrounds mixed and merged into one “team.” Many German Lutheran women grew up within a Missouri Synod that often stressed the dangers of interfaith unions and discouraged relationships with other ethnicities and religions outside the synod. They saw military training camps as places of assimilation where their sons would stray from their Lutheran faith. As a result, Missouri Synod leaders worried that Lutheran mothers prevented, or discouraged, their sons from enlisting in the military due to their anti-war beliefs. The editors of *The Lutheran Witness* specifically targeted Lutheran mothers in their editorials in an effort to convince them that the military was harmless to their faith. They emphasized the services available to Lutheran soldiers at training camps, ranging from Lutheran chaplains to hymn books. *The Lutheran Witness* editors recognized that few Lutheran mothers ever thought their sons would undertake a career in the military, but still chastised mothers for clinging “to our hopes and dreams of yesterday” during a time “when our Government calls for defense.”

While Lutheran mothers emerged as objects of scorn during the war, certain younger Lutheran women in St. Louis achieved a new measure of authority in their congregations. During the war, a select few young women achieved prominent positions within mixed gender social clubs like the Walther League for the first time. The Walther League lost many of its senior members during the war due to the pressure on its male members to enlist in the armed forces. During the 1942 election of Walther League positions, five women from St. Louis were elected as a result of the absence of men. These young women filled certain positions, such as vice-president and treasurer, which

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193 Carol Coburn charts these views in *Life at Four Corners: Religion, Gender, and Education in a German-Lutheran Community, 1868-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992).
had previously always been occupied by men. However, these women were not elected as a result of gender equality within the Walther League. Its membership suffered as a result of the war and the club needed Lutheran women to participate more actively if the club wished to survive the war years. A newsletter from Holy Cross in St. Louis made the attitude of male Walther League members all too clear. The young men appealed “especially to the young women of our congregation to come and join our…Walther League” throughout the war. However, they told the new female members that their participation in the club was only to “help us ‘keep the home fires burning’ until our boys return home again.” Much like wartime gains for women more generally, German Lutheran men expected that women would only temporarily participate in “male” pursuits.

Historians of North American Lutheranism routinely comment on the absence of German Lutheran women’s voices from the official record. In her feminist critique of the Missouri Synod, historian Mary Todd comments that Lutheran history is “remarkable” for to its “absence of women, both from the discussion forum and from any position of advocacy on their own behalf.” As a result, she states that “women’s roles have been marginal at best” within the church. Yet, pastors could not ignore the important role played by German Lutheran women during the war. Their unwillingness to support patriotic activities threatened the loyal image the church leadership wished to project throughout the conflict. German Lutheran women participated in theological

196 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Messenger Box, Holy Cross Messenger Folder, The Holy Cross Messenger, January 1942.
debates in their congregations via their protests, thereby attracting the attention of Behnken and the church elite. They challenged their pastors’ authority, either overtly or through their silence, in order to communicate that they opposed the war measures imposed on them by their pastors on both religious and ethnic grounds.

The apparent inability of their congregants to understand and embrace the importance of wartime patriotism frustrated pastors. The war split congregations along lay/clerical and gendered lines, causing pastors anxiety over how to unite their congregations behind their need to appear loyal. Reble, for instance, noted that the war split his congregation into those he considered “problems” and those he believed worked towards providing solutions for issues facing the church. The congregants Reble labeled as “problems” included those “who are loudest in their critiques” of the church’s conduct “to the present world situation.”199 The editors of The Lutheran Witness commented on these congregational divides, and lamented the development of “families living in feuds with church officers and the pastors, dissension between older and younger groups,” and believed that “these do more to hinder the growth of the church than the devil himself.”200 The unsympathetic attitudes of pastors and church elites only enhanced the divide within congregations.

By transforming Lutheran churches into patriotic spaces, pastors tried to dispel the rumours that Lutherans held secret “pro-German” meetings. By using the same patriotic symbols and customs as Anglo-Americans and Canadians, German Lutherans hoped to avoid accusations of disloyalty while simultaneously highlighting their own dedication to the war effort in ways readily understandable to their American and Canadian audiences.

Pastors took no chances risking internment or discrimination once again. Just like their language reforms, however, congregants protested such overt changes. German Lutheran women put forward a message of peace in the face of their pastors’ patriotic calls to support the war, and resisted clerical efforts to blur the line between church and state. They intended for their churches to be a refuge from the war, not a willing participant in it.

Relations Between St. Louis and Waterloo County

Examining cross-border collaboration between pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County highlights how pastors tried to use their national identities as Americans and Canadians to their advantage. This strategy angered their congregants who wished to keep their churches as German spaces, but helped provide pastors with a way to appear loyal when negotiating with government officials. The war, however, initially threatened the transnational relationship between St. Louis and Waterloo County. Prior to the war, the Ontario District of the Missouri Synod cooperated easily with their parent body in St. Louis. Charity drives and synod conventions ignored the Canadian-American border as Lutherans in both countries collaborated towards a common cause. The Second World War placed this dynamic in jeopardy due to Canada’s involvement in the war while the United States stayed neutral. Initially, it appeared as though Waterloo County’s relationship with Lutherans in St. Louis would cause problems for the community. American neutrality during the opening stages of the war seemingly placed St. Louis Lutherans at odds with Missouri Synod congregations in Waterloo County. As they were officially affiliated with an American, or “foreign,” entity, Missouri Synod Lutherans in
Waterloo County were placed in an even more precarious situation than their Canada Synod neighbours. Frank Malinsky, the president of the Ontario District of the Missouri Synod headquartered in Waterloo County, wrote to Behnken to make him aware of the problems American neutrality caused for his congregants. He told Behnken that the anti-war messages contained in Missouri Synod periodicals read in Waterloo County may “seem quite harmless to the ears of people living in a neutral country but they offend in a country at war and may cause embarrassment” for his community. Missouri Synod advocates for neutrality could easily provoke accusations of disloyalty if associated with their congregations in Waterloo County due to the image of the Missouri Synod as a “foreign” institution.

American neutrality posed further problems in Waterloo County. In 1940, Waterloo County Lutherans petitioned the Department of National Defense to obtain a Missouri Synod chaplain to serve in the army. Traditionally, Behnken and the synod’s leadership in St. Louis handled any interaction with the federal government. War disrupted this tradition. A Waterloo County pastor informed Behnken that “because of the strong nationalistic tendency of the Canadians, we deem it wise that a committee of resident Canadian citizens should be appointed to look after Lutheran chaplaincy work in the present war.” He felt that the “Department of National Defense would not entertain such a request were it to come from outside of Canada. Of that I feel quite certain.” The Ontario District concurred, and asked Behnken to formally establish “a Canadian military and navy Board” of the Missouri Synod so they could collaborate with Canada’s military

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201 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Frank Malinsky to Behnken, 26 April 1940.
uninterrupted.\textsuperscript{202} Behnken agreed. He appointed three pastors from Ontario to act as the Missouri Synod’s representatives for Canada. He deliberately did not choose pastors either born in the United States or Germany. Instead, he selected Alfred Dashner, a Canadian-born pastor. He also selected M.J. Michael as another representative because he was a Canadian citizen. Behnken told Michael that “since you were born in Denmark, your status in the eyes of the government should cause no difficulty whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{203} None of these men had obvious ties to Germany and were therefore prime candidates to demonstrate German Lutheran loyalty to the government.

Despite these early issues surrounding American neutrality, German Lutheran leaders in both St. Louis and Waterloo County eventually used their national identities as a way to moderate problems with the Canadian federal government. Pastors readily emphasized whichever portion of their hyphenated identities as German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans suited them at the time. Much as they did during the debates on language and church space, pastors consciously emphasized their national identities as a way to mitigate their ethnicity. This strategy proved particularly effective when, during the opening stages of the war, the Canadian federal government passed an order-in-council that forced aliens (or non-citizens) who had arrived in Canada since 1929 to register with the federal government if their father or grandfather was born in Germany. Malinsky wrote to Behnken for assistance regarding the order-in-council, which he considered to be nothing more than “war hysteria” on behalf of the government. Malinsky worried that government authorities would abuse this law and “may cause our church much embarrassment” by forcing Lutherans to register. According to Malinsky’s records,

\textsuperscript{202} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Harold Merklinger to Behnken, 10 April 1940; CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, H. Huth to Behnken, 21 May 1940.
\textsuperscript{203} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Behnken to M.J. Michael, 28 October 1940.
there were six pastors in the Canadian districts of the Missouri Synod who fell under this category. As these pastors were all born in the United States with German ancestors, the order-in-council would force them to register with the Canadian government as aliens.\textsuperscript{204}

Protests to the government proved difficult under the strict conditions of wartime. If Behnken, Malinsky, and their Canadian colleagues protested the order-in-council too vigorously, they risked being misunderstood as disloyal or pro-German. Thus, German-Canadian Lutherans carefully constructed their criticism of the order-in-council as an “American” instead of “ethnic” problem. Traugott Herzer, a Canadian Missouri Synod Lutheran, told government officials that the order-in-council wrongly included “American citizens whose fathers or grandfathers had been born in Germany.” To further point out the absurdity of the law, he declared that if Wendell L. Willkie, the presidential candidate for the Republican Party in 1940, lived in Canada, he would also be affected by the law. In order to voice their opposition, Malinsky enlisted Behnken’s aid. He implored Behnken to travel to Ottawa to meet with government officials and use his prestige as the leader of the synod to protect those affected by the order-in-council. After Behnken agreed to meet with Canadian government officials, Herzer made sure to stress Behnken’s American, not German, roots by reminding the government that Behnken “is a native of Houston, Texas.”\textsuperscript{205} As a result, German Canadians portrayed Behnken’s intervention as an American interested in the treatment of his countrymen, instead of pro-German and disloyal. Ultimately, Canadian Lutherans needlessly worried about the order-in-council.

\textsuperscript{204} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Malinsky to Behnken, 3 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{205} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Traugott Herzer to S.T. Wood, 13 August 1940.
The final law did not include any stipulations about ancestors from Germany, thereby eliminating the formerly affected pastors from having to register as enemy aliens.\textsuperscript{206}

The early stages of the war had ambiguous effects on the relationship between German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Although American neutrality created the potential for nativists to accuse Waterloo County Lutherans of disloyalty, Behnken’s willingness to let Canadians operate independently seemed to mitigate this possibility. However, ties with St. Louis became beneficial when German-Canadian Lutherans used the guise of American concern to help protest discriminatory legislation. Wartime issues ultimately prompted Behnken to recognize the national character of Missouri Synod congregations in Canada. He wrote that Americans “are often apt to write and act as though, because they are our fellow Lutherans, they are also Americans. The truth of the matter is that all these folks are Canadians” and encountered different challenges than Lutherans in the United States.\textsuperscript{207} Although war generated a greater awareness of national difference between St. Louis and Waterloo County, it could not overcome the shared bonds of ethnicity and religion. Behnken, Malinsky, and their colleagues successfully collaborated to overcome the challenges that the nation placed on their German and Lutheran identities.

Although Canadian congregations affiliated with the Missouri Synod relied on its support early in the war, St. Louis quickly realized there were several problems with running a national war effort in a transnational church. The symbols and rhetoric that motivated German-American Lutherans did not always resonate with Canadian Lutherans in the same way. Many Canadian Lutherans read the Missouri Synod’s primary

\textsuperscript{206} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Herzer to Behnken, 27 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{207} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, Behnken to Thomas Coates, 12 November 1940.
periodical, *The Lutheran Witness*, and Canadian pastors complained that it offered very little use for Canadian congregations. One pastor objected to the photos of American soldiers and flags, and noted that it did little to inspire Canadians to enlist. He hoped that the synod would stress the international character of their war work, and perhaps even include a Union Jack flag on its cover. Another pastor noted that he could not use *The Lutheran Witness* in his patriotic fundraising campaign because “it was ‘all Stars and Stripes’.” While not entirely unsympathetic, the *Witness* editorial staff defended their decisions by noting the lack of Canadian material available to them.

The wartime patriotism in Canada and the United States strained the transnational ties that existed between German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Patriotism inevitably included embracing national symbols that alienated German Lutherans in the neighboring country. Despite sharing similar goals, wartime patriotism ensured that German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County had to express these aims with nationalist symbols and language instead of ethnic ones. Although German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County shared an ethnic and religious heritage, the war made them recognize their distinct national identities whether they wished to or not.

**Conclusion**

German Lutheran pastors and elite laymen in St. Louis and Waterloo County worried that the onset of war would provoke attacks against them. Their memories of the

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208 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 5, Folder 46, W.C. Eifert to Behnken, 2 March 1942; CHI, Lawrence Meyer Collection (hereafter LMC), Box 2, Folder 12, R.E. Meinzen to Lawrence Meyer, 13 April 1944.

209 CHI, LMC, Box 2, Folder 12, Meyer to R.E. Meinzen, 13 April 1944.
First World War, coupled with some signs of discrimination, motivated these ethnic elites to implement patriotic reforms in their churches. They worked cooperatively to eliminate German language services and transform their churches into patriotic spaces. For ethnic elites, their German ethnicity acted as a handicap that needed to be downplayed and overcome. Their efforts do not indicate that these individuals were either victims or fully assimilated. Rather, the very fact that these pastors and elite laymen took such an active role in demonstrating their patriotism and downplaying their ethnicity shows that a German consciousness still remained strong within these communities. The actions of pastors and their church councils should not be seen as agents of assimilation, but rather as individuals attempting to reconcile their ethnic and national identities to avoid discrimination. The partnership between synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County showcases their ability to simultaneously use their ethnic and national identities to their advantage. They collaborated and used their national identities as Americans and Canadians as a way to negotiate ethnic issues. Wartime cooperation shows that the ethnic and religious bonds between these two communities remained strong during the 1940s. They deliberately used their nationalities as a vehicle for ethnic maintenance, not disappearance.

Congregants, especially women, were less willing to embrace the national and patriotic symbols sanctioned by their pastors and the state. Although the strategies implemented by pastors and elite laymen tried to alter the physical and ideological space of Lutheran churches, the strong protests on behalf of the congregants demonstrated a continued German ethnicity during the early stages of war. The willingness of congregants to protest elite reforms ensured that Lutheran churches did not fully transform from German to patriotic spaces. Their resistance shows that they
conceptualized their ethnicity as intimately connected to their Lutheranism during their struggle to maintain German language services at their churches. Furthermore, German Lutheran women rejected the militarization of their churches, as it did not resonate with their own perception of what it meant to be a German Lutheran. They could not support a Lutheranism or church space that called for war, when they believed strongly in working towards peace. Pastors ultimately advocated a wartime patriotism that did not reflect the ethnic identities of their congregants. Lutheran churches functioned as important places to perform their ethnic and religious identities, and congregants were unwilling to silently accept the reforms implemented by their pastors and church councils.

The Second World War strained the church’s historic function as an ethnic boundary zone. The war made being both “German” and “American” or “Canadian” appear incompatible, thereby forcing pastors to emphasize their nationality while congregants fought to keep their ethnic traditions intact. The war therefore prompted German Lutherans at all levels of the congregation to confront, and, for some, to defend their ethnic identity. Far from victims or seamlessly integrated Canadians and Americans, pastors and congregants alike took the steps they felt necessary in negotiating their ethnic identities in wartime. Regardless of how they felt about the war, another war with Germany ensured they were acutely aware of their German heritage. Pastors saw their ethnicity as a source of anxiety whereas congregants saw their German ethnic identity as closely related to faith and as a vehicle for expressing anti-war and pro-peace sentiments. German Lutherans did not assimilate during the early stages of the war, but rather tried to balance their hybrid German, Canadian, American, and Lutheran identities.
Chapter 2: Between Church and State: Race and Religion during the Second World War

Lutheran pastors and synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County had their authority challenged not only from within their congregations, but also from outside. While the previous chapter examined the internal debates and controversies that divided Lutheran churches, this chapter examines how the German Lutheran elite mediated their ethnicity in the public sphere. As ethnic elites and leaders in their communities, pastors vocally advocated support for the war through speeches, publications, and correspondence with government officials to prove their loyalty. Government officials ultimately determined whether or not pastors would face incarceration or internment, and leaders in the Missouri and Canada Synods eagerly cultivated political alliances to ensure they endured the war unscathed. The Missouri Synod cooperated with several government agencies throughout the war to highlight their patriotism. They worked alongside the Office of Civilian Defense to produce propaganda booklets, such as People Come First, and also reported to the Office of War Information (OWI) about how ethnic and racial tensions impeded the war effort. Canada Synod leaders, meanwhile, established connections with some of Canada’s leading politicians such as Prime Minister Mackenzie King over shared notions of citizenship and history by discussing their loyalty in the context of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth. This chapter examines these points of contact between ethnic elites and government agencies in order to examine how German Lutherans mediated their ethnicity and faith in these interactions.

German Lutheran elites on both sides of the border worried that their governments doubted their loyalty as a result of their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith. This chapter argues that although their ethnicity and religion may have placed their loyalty in doubt,
German Lutheran appeals to a shared Protestantism and whiteness provided valuable strategies to negotiate wartime hostility. Critics both inside and outside the Missouri and Canada Synods often viewed Lutheran theology as a barrier to participation in the war effort, and synod leaders worked consciously to portray Lutherans as part of North America’s broader community of Protestants. They depicted Lutherans as the “original” Protestants and utilized the patriotic discourse of Canada and the United States as Christian nations to integrate their Lutheranism into the fabric of Protestant North America. Similarly, synod leaders mitigated the negative associations with their German ethnicity by appealing to a shared whiteness with government officials. Although government officials associated their German ethnicity with Nazism, synod leaders proclaimed the common bonds of whiteness, a privilege that nonwhite Americans and Canadians could not access. Synod leaders successfully avoided the same level of discrimination that nativists inflicted upon their communities during the First World War by consistently invoking the Protestant and white backgrounds of their churches and communities.

The ability of German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County to maintain both ethnic and racial identities challenges the standard depiction of the Second World War as a period when European immigrants adopted uniform “white” identities. David Roediger, one of the leading historians of whiteness, notes that “scholars have most often seen World War II as such a turning point” when immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe joined “old stock” immigrants, such as the Irish, in a community of “white Americans.”210 Historians generally claim that a broad range of forces during the war

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coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North America viewed “World War II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.” Most notably, historians argue that the overt racism of Nazi Germany shook American and Canadian faith in scientific racism and subsequently prompted them to view tolerance as a key component of their national identities. The armed forces, and the war effort more generally, functioned as a “melting pot” wherein Americans and Canadians of all backgrounds overcame their ethnic and religious differences in order to achieve the common goal of defeating Nazi Germany. In his history of whiteness in the United States, Matthew Frye Jacobson describes the Second World War as a moment when European ethnic groups achieved acceptance as whites in contrast to the “colored races.” He argues that “not only did these [European] groups now belong to a unified Caucasian race, but race was deemed so irrelevant to who they were that it became something possessed only by ‘other’ peoples.”

Historian Gary Gerstle agrees, describing the Second World War as a period when “Euro-Americans achieved a unity and a sense of common Americanness greater than what they had previously known. Full acceptance into American life finally seemed within” their grasp. Several case studies subsequently confirmed these assertions. Historian Thomas Guglielmo describes how Italians during the Second World War increased their likelihood “to identify as whites” in public, while Eric Goldstein states the Immigration and Naturalization Service started recording Jews as “white” instead of

“Hebrew” during the war.\textsuperscript{215} The Canadian scholarship supports similar conclusions, albeit less explicitly about race. Historians Aya Fujiwara and Ivana Caccia both describe how successful participation in the war effort ensured that “ethnic groups took a critical step in the pursuit of full partnership in Canadian society.”\textsuperscript{216}

The German Lutheran case complicates the previous emphasis on a coalition of white ethnic groups working cooperatively during the war under a banner of acceptance. Although not completely shunned by Anglo-American and Canadian political leaders, the ethnic elite in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not feel welcomed as “100 percent Americans” or Canadians. The coercive nature of wartime patriotism alienated German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County from their national communities because of their German ethnicity. Ethnicity and religion prevented German Lutherans from participating in the coalition of accepted white ethnics during the Second World War. Yet, whiteness, and the ability of German Lutherans to portray themselves as Protestants, remained important in St. Louis and Waterloo County. White and Protestant identities helped create common links with Anglo-Canadians and Americans in instances where their ethnicity and religion would have “othered” their communities. The German Lutheran wartime experience therefore characteristically positioned these communities as “in-between” group. They did not face the same racial discrimination as black or Japanese citizens, nor did they obtain the same level of acceptance that other European groups received. Their ethnicity and faith made them outsiders while their race and Christianity prevented their complete exclusion.


The Protestant Appeal

Fear over discrimination against German Lutherans motivated John Behnken, president of the Missouri Synod, and John Reble, president of the Canada Synod, throughout the war. Both leaders realized that public declarations of loyalty would not be enough to guarantee their status as good citizens. In order to ensure their wellbeing, they needed to explicitly work with their national governments to demonstrate that they deserved the reputation of loyal citizens. Although government agents primarily targeted recently arrived German immigrants with ties to fascist clubs and not established German-Canadian and German-American communities, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County were unaware of such sentiments in the 1940s.217 Behnken and Reble worried about “this new era that is upon us” and wondered whether their churches would “occupy the place [it] should, or will [it] perchance be left our in the cold, or shoved back into the corner.”218 They made cooperation with the government one of their most important wartime goals in the hopes of gaining the prestige and respectability granted to other Protestant groups. As ethnic elites, they believed Lutherans could not be second-class citizens in the eyes of the government.219 Rather than the suspicion and discrimination that German Lutherans faced during the Great War, synod leaders hoped that collaboration with the government would alleviate any doubt in the public perception over German Lutheran loyalty.

219 LA, ESF, Commission for War Services Constitution, (hereafter CWS), Article 1.
This proved to be a difficult task given the public associations between Lutheranism and German culture and Nazism. Canadians and Americans hostile to Lutherans often pointed to Romans 13 and Luther’s concept of the two kingdoms to question German Lutheran loyalty. Since Lutherans were loyal to both church and state as separate institutions, some critics worried that Lutherans could profess their loyalty to Canada and the United States while also secretly holding a religious obligation to support Nazi Germany. Lutheranism had no political connections to Nazi Germany, and yet critics in *The Canadian Baptist* distorted Lutheranism as a religion “well adapted to German nature.” One article stated that German Lutherans were not inherently bad people, but rather “they are only too German and too Lutheran” to be trusted.220 Other editorials condemned Lutherans for perpetuating a “German institution” in North America. These critiques believed that Hitler was “the spiritual successor of Luther” because of their shared history of anti-Semitism. It concluded that if the Allies wished “to undo the work of Hitler, it is necessary first to undo the work of Luther.”221

Reble and Behnken needed to combat the popular perception that Lutheranism and Nazism were synonymous if they hoped to make a case for their loyalty. Pastors started to downplay their “Lutheran” identity in favour of a vague “Protestant” or “Christian” identity in order to disassociate themselves from the negative associations between Lutheranism and Nazism. In a 1941 article, *Canada Lutheran* editor Douglas Conrad tried to create a different association in the minds of his readers: namely, that Canadian citizenship and Christianity were inherently linked: “Because Canadians are free, they have always treasured the Christian religion…The Christian people of Canada

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221 Theodore Graebner, “Blaming the War on Luther,” *The Lutheran Witness*, 16 March 1943, 83-84.
realize that the only hope of the world is Christianity, and not in any manmade doctrines.”
As Lutherans were Christians, Conrad suggested that they too belonged to “a Christian
nation and be an example of right and justice to all the other nations of the world.”222 The
fact that Lutherans could portray themselves as the “original Protestants” helped pastors
argue that their religion should be connected to Christianity instead of Nazism. The
Missouri Synod’s Lutheran Witness echoed Conrad’s sentiments in its editorials
throughout the war that also sought to construct the idea of Lutherans as loyal Christian
citizens. It suggested that “our greatest statesmen, like Lincoln, Washington, and Grant,
have testified to the liberating and purifying power which proceeds from this Holy Book.”
These men gained their insights from the Bible, a text Lutherans shared with other
Protestant Americans. Unlike Baptists or Anglicans, however, Lutherans had particular
claim to the modern Bible because it could be traced back to “the foundation which
Luther had laid.”223 Instead of the whiggish narrative of Luther’s anti-Semitism
influencing Hitler, Lutherans hoped their Canadian and American peers would see
Luther’s important religious contributions to modern Christian North America. As
Christian citizens, they too belonged to their national communities.

These discourses had practical applications for Lutheran pastors throughout the
duration of the war. Pastors used their Christian and Protestant identities as discursive
tools in which to advocate for their loyalty. In 1942, the police arrested a young German
war worker in St. Louis for committing an act of sabotage at the factory that employed
him. The police alleged that this German immigrant deliberately caused the factory’s
machinery to malfunction so as to slow production and stall the American war effort. The

223 “Who Are the Makers of America?” Lutheran Witness, 7 January 1941, 3.
episode troubled St. Louis’s German Lutheran population. They worried this act of sabotage would reflect poorly on their community and further embolden their anti-German neighbours. In an effort to defuse the situation, the Reverend Louis Sieck argued that the act of sabotage never would have happened if the young man was a Christian. He argued that “the Christian is indeed a nation’s best citizen,” who “will cooperate even though his government’s policies are not entirely to his liking.”

Sieck hoped his congregation’s Christianity would overcome any negative associations their German heritage created.

A broad Christian, instead of Lutheran or German, label became even more important when dealing with government officials. Behnken and Reble both worried that their Lutheran faith would cause government agencies to look upon them with suspicion and mistrust. As a result, they both created wartime organizations that aimed to establish political connections with the government as Christian rather than Lutheran organizations. In April 1940, Reble met with other synod leaders across Canada to form the Commission for Wartime Services (CWS) so that Lutherans across Canada “prove [the synod’s] vitality and determination” to the Canadian public in waging a patriotic war effort.

The CWS aimed to promote Lutheran loyalty in Canada and act as an intermediary between the various synods and the Canadian government. They publicized their wartime fundraising campaigns to demonstrate that they were loyal

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224 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Messenger Box, Holy Cross Messenger Folder, The Holy Cross Messenger, September 1942.
225 LA, ESF, 30.2.11 CWS Council Minutes, 2 April 1940; LA, ESF, Convention Minutes, June 1940, 25.
226 LA, ESF, CWS Constitution, Article 2.1.
citizens.\textsuperscript{227} Operating under much the same pressures, Behnken established the Emergency Planning Council (EPC) in 1942.

The CWS and EPC both petitioned their respective governments to help assist German prisoners of war held in North America as Christian, rather than Lutheran, organizations. Synod leaders expressed sympathy with the interned Nazi prisoners throughout the duration of the war. They believed that many of these soldiers should be granted access to spiritual assistance during what was surely a lonely and foreign experience. Both synods proposed programs that sought to alleviate what they perceived as German suffering in these prisoner of war camps. The CWS and EPC contacted pastors stationed nearby these camps and prompted them to visit prisoners weekly and deliver sermons, as well as distribute Bibles and hymn books so that prisoners could worship even when the pastors were absent. They furthermore intended to send relief packages containing small gifts, food, and other means to make their imprisonment less isolating.\textsuperscript{228} As Germans, synod leaders believed they had a “distinct obligation” to provide for the spiritual needs of prisoners while other religious groups would merely forget about them.\textsuperscript{229}

Helping German prisoners, however, threatened to dismantle the “loyal” image synod leaders attempted to cultivate throughout the war. Such efforts would inevitably lead them to form relationships with Nazi prisoners, a group that their governments considered dangerous. After trying to downplay their ethnicity throughout the war, contact with German prisoners threatened to raise government suspicion. Harvey H.

\textsuperscript{227} LA, ESF, CWS Constitution, Article 2.2.
\textsuperscript{228} CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 8 October 1943; LA, ESF, CWS Constitution, Article 2.2.
\textsuperscript{229} CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 8 October 1943.
Budny, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, expressed concerns over the Missouri Synod’s increased contact with imprisoned Germans. He asked synod representatives if distributing German-language hymns could “in any way be used by German political organizations of Gestapo character” to undermine the American war effort. He questioned if Missouri Synod efforts would allow a pro-Nazi German to “spy on the activities” of the synod and pass these secrets back to Germany.\footnote{CHI, LMC, Box 79, POW Strieter Folder, Memorandum Re Conference in Washington About Establishing Theological Seminary Camp for German Prisoners of War, 20 February 1945.} In order to overcome Budny’s suspicion, synod leaders relied on portraying their support for German prisoners as a religious rather than ethnic duty. In outlining their reasons for helping prisoners of war, members of the Missouri Synod stated they felt “a distinct obligation to bring them a spiritual ministry which is in harmony with their convictions.”\footnote{CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 8 October 1943.} Their job was “to supply appropriate hymnals, prayer books, and devotional literature for the spiritual care of war prisoners” and “to foster general welfare of prisoners of war,” and nothing that might give reason to suspect the synod of disloyalty.\footnote{CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 5 November 1943.}

Internally, the EPC reminded pastors who preached to prisoners of war to “be discreet in your public utterances by speaking objectively in terms of spiritual values.”\footnote{CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 5 November 1943.} Government officials needed to feel secure that they ministered to prisoners out of a religious desire, and not because of their ethnicity or pro-German attitudes. “Do not allow your sympathy to run away with better judgment,” one pastor reiterated. “Your mission is
By framing their desire as a religious over ethnic obligation, German Lutherans tried to avoid raising the old wartime suspicions that they preached to “the enemy” in their own language. While the Protestant label did not fully shield Lutherans from suspicion, it provided a strong enough argument that they could carry out their work with permission from the government.

The People Come First Controversy

The separation of church and state, or Romans 13, complicated the Missouri Synod’s attempt to cultivate a public Protestant identity. Because Romans 13 stated that political and religious affairs must be kept separate, many members of the Missouri Synod were more hesitant to explicitly cooperate with the federal government than other religious groups. This proved particularly problematic, because the American government had little interest in working individually with each religious denomination to ensure cooperation on the home front. They preferred to work with large interfaith groups composed of different Protestant denominations. This tactic, however, sparked fear of “unionism” within the Missouri Synod. They worried that cooperation or “union” with these other liberal Protestant denominations would dilute their conservative theological convictions and understanding of the Bible. Cooperation might have the unintended consequence of weakening the Missouri Synod’s doctrine and dilute their “pure doctrine” or Lehre that synod officials fought to preserve since the synod’s nineteenth century foundation. Concerns that contact with liberal religious groups would furthermore

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234 CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 5 November 1943.
weaken their use of the German language, which proved insight into Luther’s understanding of the Bible, often went hand-in-hand with these fears.235

Anxieties over Romans 13 and unionism shaped the Missouri Synod’s initial meetings with government officials in 1942. In late November, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) contacted the EPC and asked them to send a representative to a meeting in Washington to advise the government on how to best promote wartime patriotism and cooperation on the home front with other American religious leaders. Lawrence Meyer, the EPC’s executive director, attended the meeting as the synod’s representative. Meyer discovered that the OCD planned on creating a pamphlet to be disseminated to congregations of all faiths in order to promote patriotism on the home front and justify controversial government policies such as food and fuel rationing. This plan, however, violated the Missouri Synod’s conservative stance on Romans 13 and unionism by encouraging both cooperation with the state and other religious groups. The OCD’s proposed pamphlet promoted a general and theologically unspecific text meant to appeal to all Christians, regardless of how closely they followed the Bible. It seemed to promote what Meyer conceived as a bland “social gospel” rather than a religious view centered on the Bible and Christ’s teaching. Meyer made his disdain clearly known at the meeting and promised that the Missouri Synod could not work alongside other religious groups with such a loose understanding of the Bible. He voiced his displeasure and left the meeting before it even concluded.236

Meyer realized the poor impression he had made during the meeting with the OCD and other government officials. He remained true to his theological convictions but

235 Todd, Authority Vested, 87.
236 CHI, LMC, Box 2, Folder 11, Meyer to Maynard Cassady, 20 November 1942.
these same convictions threatened the loyal image he and other synod leaders wished to cultivate. Concerned that the government would question his loyalty, Meyer apologized and admitted he was “rather ashamed of my outspoken suggestions and criticism” but that “such topics as ‘Inter-faith’…are too controversial at the moment to foster a spirit of unity in the nation.” Meyer worried his criticism reflected poorly on the synod’s loyalty and took pains to remind the OCD of the Missouri Synod’s allegiance to the government. He told Maynard Cassady, the OCD’s representative on religious matters, that “wherever we can be of service we are at your command.”

Meyer could not risk the government thinking he was disloyal or uncooperative. He ultimately decided to suppress his theological concerns and promised to work with Cassady and the OCD in the future. Cassady subsequently made Meyer one of the lead writers of a propaganda pamphlet titled *People Come First*, a booklet intended for American pastors. The booklet provided pastors of all different faiths with advice on how to discuss the war with their congregation. It recognized Americans might have a difficult time adjusting to new wartime policies such as food and fuel rationing, and provided short explanations on how pastors could convince their congregation to support these government policies. Meyer worked alongside Cassady to ensure that the pamphlet emphasized the government’s aims of promoting a united war effort on the home front.

While Meyer recognized that his involvement with the government could emphasize the synod’s loyalty, he also knew that such a blatant display of interfaith cooperation with other Protestants exposed him to criticisms within the synod of advocating for unionism. When the OCD released *People Come First* in mid-1943, Meyer

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237 CHI, LMC, Box 2, Folder 11, Meyer to Cassady, 20 November 1942.
238 CHI, LMC, Box 2, Folder 11, Cassady to Meyer, 28 November 1942; CHI, LMC, Box 2, Folder 11, Meyer to Cassady, 16 December 1942.
sent out a press release to all Missouri Synod pastors explaining his rationale for endorsing the book. He explained that the war made him more aware of his “duties to community and State from which we derive the benefits of life, liberty, and freedom of worship.” In his defense of *People Come First*, Meyer encouraged German Lutheran critics of war not to view the state as a threat to their ethnicity and faith. Instead, he claimed that the American government protected religious freedom and therefore deserved to be respected. He encouraged pastors to read *People Come First* and implement its recommendations as a way to demonstrate that they too were good citizens.

More significantly, Meyer believed that the synod needed to increase its involvement in the war effort as a “lack of cooperation, inefficiency, and low-gear work is labeled ‘sabotage’” in American society. Meyer’s message was clear. If pastors wanted to avoid wartime discrimination, they needed to follow the patriotic steps outlined in the booklet. In publishing *People Come First*, Meyer hoped that the government would no longer see German Lutherans as saboteurs, but as loyal American Protestants.

*People Come First* provoked a strong reaction among synod members who did not agree with the Missouri Synod leadership’s emphasis on government cooperation. Critics objected to the pamphlet’s interfaith character. The OCD distributed the pamphlet to all Protestant congregations in the United States and *People Come First* accordingly emphasized cooperation among all Americans without consideration of religious doctrine. To many, it triggered fears that the Missouri Synod was heading towards a violation of their position on “unionism” that encouraged religious cooperation without due consideration of the Bible. Several pastors wrote to synod leaders, like Behnken and Meyer, in St. Louis to voice their disgust over what was clearly one of the “sinister

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239 CHI, LMC, Box 19, Folder 74, Meyer to Missouri Synod Pastors, 21 October 1942.
tactics” employed by synod leaders “to bring our beloved Synod into fellowship with another church body with which we are not yet in doctrinal agreement.” Opponents believed that in a time of crisis such as war, the synod should focus its attention on “purity of doctrine instead of social gospel.” Critics also believed that the booklet’s emphasis on participating in public life through wartime charities violated the Missouri Synod’s traditional stance on Romans 13. By encouraging Lutherans to participate in state sanctioned wartime activities, critics argued that the church moved beyond the realm of spiritual care. Many critics accused Meyer of “distorted doctrine” that “commits the church to a political philosophy” thereby violating Romans 13. The clearest indication that the booklet violated scripture was contained on the first page of the booklet, which contained a message that stated the booklet had the approval of the OCD. One pastor expressed shock that “what the church teaches & does must be submitted to government censorship!” The strict adherence to Romans 13 and policy on union that synod leaders stressed prior to the war became a significant source of tension as synod leaders violated these theological positions in an effort to gain government approval.

The booklet also angered Missouri Synod members on the basis of their ethnicity. *People Come First* contained several political cartoons and illustrations within the booklet. While many tried to depict amusing observations on the American home front, others ridiculed Germans and Germany. The illustrations often featured Germans dressed in Gestapo uniforms or as personified by Hitler. These cartoons upset many members of the synod who felt it attacked their own ethnic identities as Germans. One district of the

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240 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, B.F. Prange to Missouri Synod Pastors, 15 February 1944.
241 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, Northwestern Pastoral Conference to Louis Sieck, 1 December 1943.
242 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, J. Franklin Yount’s Annotated *People Come First*, September-October 1943.
synod protested to the leadership in St. Louis that a cartoon featured within *People Come First* “expresses an improper contempt for the enemy.” Other pastors went further and stated that the portrayal of Germans within the booklet was “grotesque and hideous.”

Critics similarly objected to attempts to justify war with Germany. On the opening page of the booklet, Meyer described how “the messy business of the world” required the church to take a leading role in the war effort. J. Franklin Yount, a pastor from Ohio and Meyer’s most vocal critic, referenced this passage and questioned why, instead of preparing for war, the church did not instead work towards peace. Meyer replied that Americans who did good Christian deeds during the war were doing the charitable work of Christ. Because all good deeds could be considered Christian, Meyer told Yount that helping win the war ultimately helped create a peaceful world. The irony of this statement did not escape Yount. He wryly asked Meyer that if participating in the war was to do Christ’s work, “what about the Germans?”

In a passage describing the importance of rationing so that American farms could help feed the British, Yount quoted the Biblical passage “If thine enemy hunger, feed him” to demonstrate the hypocrisy of Meyer’s statements. Yount went so far as to comment that American soldiers were overseas to “bomb, blast, and butcher the innocent victims” of Germany.

The Missouri Synod’s pro-German attitude influenced their opposition to American militarization of the home front. One section of the booklet discussed local Defense Councils in glowing and positive terms. Meyer encouraged Christians to work alongside their Defense Councils so that they could be seen as loyal members of their
community. Once again, critics rejected this overt patriotism by questioning the practicalities of Defense Councils that were surely run by “ungodly men.”

Another section of *People Come First* encouraged young people to engage in war work, to which one critic replied that these workers only helped “to make hell in [the] world.” Such critiques of war industries were common. Yount, for instance, rejected all portrayals of heroic women war workers who, as Meyer portrayed them, should still have time to spend looking after their children. Yount replied that Meyer “forgot one picture” of the American family, namely the mother who works all day to create bombs that kill “the children of other mothers!”

To critics, *People Come First* was just another instance of the Missouri Synod becoming “a mere adjunct to a military machine in an all-out war program.”

Yount commented that virtually every pastor he spoke to objected to the booklet’s publication, but that “few of any will have the courage under present conditions to write to you.”

Fear of appearing disloyal over not supporting a government publication motivated pastors to stay silent in fear of anti-German reprisals.

The *People Come First* controversy highlighted the precarious position the war created for ethnic elites such as Lawrence Meyer. Even in instances where Lutherans could successfully portray themselves as Protestants and mitigate wartime discrimination, they faced internal critics that felt the synod’s position on the war violated their Lutheran faith. Lutheran theology problematized the Missouri Synod’s ability to participate in the war effort, both in the eyes of nativists who did not trust their faith and among their peers who believed that it violated Romans 13. Synod leaders and pastors seemed increasingly

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247 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, J. Franklin Yount’s Annotated *People Come First*, 6-7.
248 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, J. Franklin Yount’s Annotated *People Come First*, 10.
249 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, J. Franklin Yount’s Annotated *People Come First*, 58-61.
250 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, Yount to Meyer, 29 September 1943.
251 CHI, LMC, Box 71, Folder 481, Yount to Meyer, 29 September 1943.
caught in the middle between church and state. Regardless of what strategies they engaged in to appear loyal, it seemed to officials like Meyer that German Lutherans would not be able to unite behind the war effort without theological reservations.

**Whiteness and Race Relations in St. Louis**

Unlike their attempts to appeal to a Protestant identity, efforts on behalf of synod leaders to benefit from their racial status as whites proved less controversial and far more effective. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran theology may have placed their loyalty in doubt, the ability of synod leaders to appeal to a shared whiteness with government officials proved effective in negotiating wartime tensions. While government officials sometimes expressed doubts about German Lutheran loyalty, they also saw synod leaders such as Behnken as possible allies due to their shared racial attitudes towards racialized Americans. Although their German ethnicity kept them outside of the coalition of “white ethnics” during the war, their whiteness prevented their complete exclusion from North American society.

Created in June 1942 by President Roosevelt, the Office of War Information (OWI) sought to provide Americans with an authoritative voice on the war. The OWI encouraged Americans to unite behind the war effort in order to defeat fascism abroad and reached the American public through an extensive propaganda campaign that utilized films and posters.252 The OWI often viewed any home front tensions as possibly detrimental to the war effort, and therefore sought to promote an American identity based on tolerance and democratic values. In arguing against the necessity to defeat a Nazi

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Germany fuelled on hatred and militarism, the OWI crafted a narrative of a United States founded on acceptance and freedom. Their propaganda efforts often targeted American ethnic and religious groups like Jewish, Catholic, Polish, and Greek Americans who previously had not felt fully embraced as “100% Americans.”\(^{253}\) The image of an American platoon featuring soldiers from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds helped cultivate an image of a country where all white ethnics could find acceptance due to their shared belief in defeating fascism overseas.\(^{254}\) As whiteness historians have demonstrated, the OWI’s attempts to promote equality throughout the nation gave white ethnic groups an unprecedented level of acceptance as unhyphenated “Americans” throughout the war.\(^{255}\)

German Americans, however, were left out of the newfound state-sanctioned definitions of tolerance and respect towards ethnic communities. While other ethnic groups saw themselves represented in Hollywood films and propaganda posters contributing to the war effort, portrayals of Germans were limited to menacing depictions of the enemy. Yet, the OWI was interested in working with German Americans as part of their outreach program to monitor how various American ethnic groups participated in the war effort. As part of their study to see the effects of their propaganda campaign, the OWI contacted various ethnic leaders “in key situations throughout the country” to ask them questions on how they could improve their propaganda efforts. In the summer of 1942, Keith Kane, Chief of the Bureau of Intelligence, contacted Behnken under the pretense of accomplishing this goal. Kane explained to Behnken that the OWI chose to correspond with him as they often selected individuals who they felt were able to best represent

\(^{253}\) Fleegler, 63
\(^{254}\) Fleegler, 69.
\(^{255}\) Gerstle, 206-207; Fleegler, 63, 69.
“members of the group with which they are best acquainted.” Without explicitly stating so, Kane referred to Behnken’s connection with German Lutherans, particularly in St. Louis. Kane hoped that Behnken would provide the OWI with information on how German Lutherans in St. Louis responded to the war effort. After a few relatively non-controversial questions on food rationing, Kane and the OWI’s employees started to pressure Behnken to answer questions relating to German-American loyalty. In March 1943, an OWI employee bluntly asked Behnken to tell him about “the present attitude of the people with whom you come in contact toward the Germans.” Specifically, the OWI wanted to know whether German Americans distinguished between the various groups in Germany, ranging from German students to members of the Schutzstaffel, commonly referred to as the “SS.” The OWI also asked Behnken whether any of these groups “could be relied upon to support a democratic” government after the war and what measures Behnken’s “people” believe should be adopted “toward the Germans” after the war ended.

The OWI’s questions placed Behnken in a difficult position. The synod leader knew that many members of the Missouri Synod had ambivalent or outright hostile responses to the war and did have sympathies for Germany. Instead of lying to the government or exposing German-American hostility, Behnken embraced his role as an ethnic elite. He tried to broker a better understanding between the OWI and his German-American followers by contextualizing German-American responses to the war. Behnken had to provide the opinions of his community while ensuring they did not appear as pro-Nazi. Behnken began his response by noting there were “divergent opinions” regarding

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256 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Kane to Behnken, 20 July 1942.
257 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Warner to Behnken, 4 March 1943.
Germany. Although the OWI expected Behnken to describe how German-Americans felt about Nazism, he subverted their expectations by describing the uncritical and biased view of most American nativists. Alluding to the discrimination he previously faced, Behnken reported how Americans “whom I have heard from even without making any inquiry have expressed themselves in sharpest terms about all the people of Germany.”

Behnken recounted how many Americans believed all Germans blindly supported and idolized Hitler. This lack of nuance led Americans to believe that the German people willingly allowed Hitler to come to power because “they all favor his policies.”

Behnken contrasted these opinions with his own views. He reported that unlike nativists, his “people” differentiated “between the ordinary [Germans] and the party in power.” Behnken stated that he personally believed ordinary Germans were not responsible for the war and “have gotten into evil hands and are not able to remove the shackles which have been placed upon them.” In adopting this more critical approach, Behnken still made sure to sufficiently critique the Nazis so that no reader could question his loyalty. He labeled Hitler an “unprincipled demagogue” and said that he had “heard no one attempt to defend the present party in power.” Behnken concluded his assessment on Germany by describing his hope that Germany could be reformed as a democracy once the war ended.

As an ethnic elite, Behnken sought to broker a better understanding between his German-American community and his Anglo-American hosts. Behnken demonstrated his fluency in both German and American worlds by describing both nativist and German-American responses to the war. Most importantly, providing the OWI with the nativist

258 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Behnken to Warner, 21 March 1943.
259 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Behnken to Warner, 21 March 1943.
reaction allowed Behnken to insinuate that it was the nativists who had an extreme opinion, not German Americans.

The OWI responded with a lukewarm letter that, despite Behnken’s best efforts, situated him exclusively as a “German.” An OWI official replied that Behnken and “the people with whom you have talked” considered German politics much more than most Americans. The employee lectured Behnken on the “correct” and “American” stance on the German question. He informed Behnken that most Americans believed “the German people, not alone their leaders, are responsible for the war.” The Nazi indoctrinated German youth ensured there was “relatively little hope” in finding a group in Germany to support democracy. The OWI’s hostile anti-German response to Behnken stands out in contrast to their treatment of other American ethnic groups. Although historians have singled the OWI out for wartime achievement in combating nativism on the home front through their pluralistic films and propaganda posters, Behnken’s sympathetic interpretation of Germany received little of this charity. The OWI’s traditional portrayal as an organization that accepted a broad coalition of immigrant groups into white mainstream America had little resonance with Behnken. Germany’s status as an enemy combatant country meant OWI employees treated any signs of German sympathy with mistrust. The OWI listened to Behnken’s point of view on rationing and other wartime issues, but admonished him for his “un-American” stance on Nazi Germany. While Behnken tried to advocate on behalf of his German-American community, the OWI’s responses indicate that his ethnicity continued to place his loyalty in doubt. Their

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260 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Warner to Behnken, 24 March 1943.
German ethnicity prevented German Lutherans from joining other white ethnics in the OWI’s coalition.

The OWI’s vision of a tolerant and united America that could overcome ethnic and religious difference furthermore could not incorporate racialized Americans. The OWI hoped to portray a united American populace working harmoniously to support the war effort via war production on the home front. Racial tensions and Jim Crow segregation in the work place, however, complicated their ability to incorporate black Americans into their idealized vision of a unified America.262 Several cities in the Midwest enforced strict segregation practices that excluded black workers from working in the war industry, or gave them the most dangerous and undesirable jobs. A 1942 study, for instance, found that over seventy percent of employers refused to hire black workers in the war industry.263 Black activists calling for an end to segregation or equal pay in the work place brought attention to the inequalities racialized Americans faced and challenged the OWI’s propaganda efforts to portray their nation as founded on tolerance and equality.

If Behnken’s ethnicity placed him outside the patriotic mainstream, his whiteness and hostility towards black workers granted him the respectability his ethnicity denied him. The OWI corresponded with Behnken not just over issues relating to German Americans, but also over racial tensions in the Midwest. These opportunities provided Behnken with the chance to firmly support the war effort by condemning striking black labourers alongside OWI officials. Black labor unrest throughout the country and in St. Louis prompted the OWI to ask Behnken about the “tension(s) between Negroes and

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263 Roediger, 213.
whites” in St. Louis in 1943. Race riots between white and black Americans made national headlines throughout the war and repeatedly called attention to the racial inequalities faced by many Americans.\textsuperscript{264} Several protests over the poor working conditions black Americans faced in St. Louis occurred throughout the war. Black labourers staged peaceful protests to call attention to segregation in the city throughout 1943 and 1944. Black workers employed in segregated factories found they were often refused service at the local lunch counters throughout the downtown core. The Citizens Civil Rights Committee of St. Louis organized several “sit-ins” at local restaurants throughout the war in order to demonstrate the racial disparities that existed within the city.\textsuperscript{265} Although minor compared to the race riots that occurred in Harlem and Detroit, such protests showed the growing tension between white and black workers in St. Louis and jeopardized the OWI’s ability to portray the United States as a nation of freedom and equality.

The OWI was not interested in how black workers felt about labor unrest, nor whether the government provided them with enough assistance. Instead, the OWI wanted to learn how white Americans responded to these racial conflicts. For once, Behnken easily met the OWI’s expectations. Behnken told the OWI “there can be no doubt that [hostility] between Negroes and whites” existed throughout St. Louis. Personally, he believed that “the white man” should generally follow a policy of “live and let live” with his black neighbors. However, he joined other Americans in condemning “the colored people” when they became “too bold…as soon as social equality is demanded you notice the tension.” He told the OWI that he and other Americans believed the government

\textsuperscript{265} Betty Burnett, \textit{St. Louis at War} (St. Louis: Patrice Press, 1987), 144.
should intervene only if “the Negro became too forward” in demanding equality.\(^{266}\)

Behnken’s critical response towards black protestors echoed the fears of many white workers and union leaders who rejected racial equality in the workplace. Black workers entered war industries such as shipbuilding in greater numbers in the 1940s and wanted membership in preexisting unions. Unions resisted these efforts as they felt black workers would take this as a sign of racial equality. They argued that allowing both white and black workers in the same union threatened the superiority of the white worker.\(^{267}\)

Behnken’s statements echoed arguments in the mainstream press that viewed blacks who made demands for workplace equality as “troublemakers” and “uppity” more generally.\(^{268}\) He believed the government should not force the issue of equality and let time ease the nation’s racial tensions. Behnken believed race riots occurred during the war because of “pushy” black workers, not because white employers denied them equality. He told the OWI that the more black activists “insist upon their privileges [the] longer we will have these problems before us.”\(^{269}\)

Condemning labor unrest provided Behnken with a rare opportunity to demonstrate his support for the war effort. Government officials and branches such as the OWI placed the highest importance on achieving unity on the home front. Racial and labor unrest therefore emerged as one of the main obstacles to maintaining wartime unity. The Labor Department emphasized throughout the war that each strike represented hours or days wasted in wartime production. Many politicians, especially those from the southern states, condemned black protests on the basis that they hampered both wartime

\(^{266}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Behnken to Warner, 21 March 1943.
\(^{269}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 25, Folder 315, Behnken to Warner, 21 March 1943.
unity and war work simultaneously.\textsuperscript{270} Although Behnken’s ethnicity and religion put him at odds with the war effort, his race and hostility towards black issues allowed him to join mainstream America. Behnken’s whiteness positioned him firmly on the side of capital and elite whites, over labor and nonwhite workers. In doing so, Behnken allied himself firmly with the war effort.

Behnken’s precarious relationship with the OWI highlights the complex interplay between race and ethnicity that emerged during the war. Ethnicity and race operated in tandem for German Lutherans during the war and played an integral role in how OWI employees interpreted Behnken’s comments. Behnken’s German ethnicity created tensions with the OWI and effectively placed him on the “wrong side” of the government and its positions on Germany. However, Behnken’s whiteness created an avenue for him to bond with and voice the “agreeable” wartime positions on matters relating to labour and race relations. Unlike the black labourers he so readily condemned, Behnken managed to advocate for tolerance during the war without facing possible incarceration as result of his white skin. In this instance, Behnken’s whiteness made his advocacy work on behalf of a stigmatized ethnic group possible.

**Whiteness and the Pioneer Myth**

Race played an equally important role in determining loyalty at the cultural and ideological level. In particular, German-Canadian Lutherans most often drew on their whiteness through the covert language surrounding their Canadian citizenship and through the pioneer myth that emerged during the interwar years. The story of German

\textsuperscript{270} Brandt, *Harlem at War*, 132, 149, 151.
immigrants and “Loyalists” arriving in early nineteenth century Waterloo County followed a narrative typical in many settler societies. Historian Lorenzo Veracini describes “settler colonial narratives” as linear stories of “progress,” wherein settlers narrate their arrival on unoccupied land where they built new homes or nations. By focusing on establishing new communities on the “frontier,” these narratives convey the idea that settlers are entitled to or deserving of the land they occupy. They help settlers imagine themselves as the “natural” or even “indigenous” inhabitants of their land. By describing the process of settlement as “peaceful” and “nation-building,” these stories tap into broader racialized discourses that often associate governance and leadership with whiteness. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, centuries of imperial and colonial rule convinced Europeans that the white race had a natural aptitude to constructing and ruling new nations. Portraying the settlement process as “peaceful” furthermore allows settlers to ignore their own role in deliberately and violently displacing the region’s indigenous inhabitants. In doing so, these narratives help craft the idea of the “innocent settler” that disavows their complicity in marginalizing indigenous peoples in favour of crafting an image that portrays them as the legitimate owners of the land. The pioneer myth, with its emphasis on peaceful German immigrants “taming” the “wilderness,” very much fits the settler colonial narrative, with German settlers joining the ranks of Anglo-American settlers. The pioneer myth functioned as a coded narrative only available to white Canadians that allowed German Canadians to argue for their loyalty throughout the war.

272 Coleman, 50, 57.
274 For specific examples of various settler “moves to innocence” see Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-40.
German Canadians risked being portrayed as “enemy aliens” or “foreigners” by discriminatory Anglo-Canadians and therefore needed a way to demonstrate that they belonged in Canada. The pioneer myth served this function during the early years of the war. Carl Klinck, a professor of English at Waterloo College and Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, drew explicitly on the pioneer myth in a 1939 article titled “Waterloo College and the Nazi Issue.” Klinck intended the article to act as an early argument against the possible attacks he and German Lutherans in Waterloo County could face on account of their ethnicity and faith. He wrote that that the Second World War once again revived the “falsehood, perpetuated since the Great War by…mistakenly patriotic enthusiasts, that Lutheranism and Pro-Germanism (now known as Nazi-ism) are synonymous.”

Klinck’s paper combatted these public perceptions by using historical and contemporary references framed in the pioneer myth. He noted that the 1931 census stated only six percent of Canada Synod members were born in Germany. He argued that even this minority was not cause for concern, as most of this group “are old people” who came to Canada as “youthful pioneers,” long before Hitler’s rise to power. Reble drew on similar themes in a 1939 speech that connected the synod’s current membership with their “Loyalist” ancestors. He described how many Lutheran churches in Ontario and Quebec originally formed as a result of the Loyalist migration to Canada and were “at all times loyal and faithful citizens of King and country.” The long history of Lutheranism in Canada demonstrated, according to Reble, that the church “is native to [Canadian] soil” and could therefore work in cooperation with the Canadian state.

St. Louis-based pastors drew on similar themes as well. Paul Koenig, the pastor at Holy Cross Lutheran

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275 LA, Carl Klinck fonds (hereafter CKF), Klinck Papers, 2.1.3 Waterloo College and the Nazi issue, 1.
277 LA, ESF, Synod Convention Minutes, June 1939, 14.
Church, preached that “the Saxon Immigrants who settled in our country one hundred years ago were patriotic Americans.” He quoted C.F.W. Walther’s positive thoughts on the Declaration of Independence extensively to show the unbroken link of loyalty that existed from the initial generation of pioneers to present day. Koenig urged his congregation to “follow in the footsteps of the fathers…and let us prove by our actions that true Lutherans are patriotic Americans.”

The pioneer myth proved particularly potent when paired with the Lutheran strategy of appealing to religious or Protestant-based identities. H.T. Lehmann, the president of Waterloo College and Seminary, gave a speech during the war that tried to insert Lutherans into Canada’s national mythology by drawing on the pioneer myth. He argued that they, like their other Anglican and Presbyterian peers, also helped contribute to the Canadian nation. Lehmann deliberately downplayed the church’s German heritage by eschewing “the custom in Canada to evaluate the contribution of an individual or a group of individuals to Canadian national life…largely on a racial basis.” Lehmann proposed that Canadian society examine the accomplishments of religious groups, wherein Lutherans played an important role. He went on to emphasize the role of “Lutheran Loyalists” who “contributed to the prosperous development of this section of Canada through thrift and industry” alongside the current generation of Lutheran soldiers “paying the greatest price anyone can pay” overseas. He believed that the Lutheran sacrifice, both in the past and present, ensured that future Canadians would evaluate their “contributions to Canadian Culture…from a religious rather than a racial point of

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278 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Messenger Box, Holy Cross Messenger Folder, The Holy Cross Messenger, June 1939.
Lehmann described the ancestors of his church not as foreign German immigrants, but as dedicated Lutheran Loyalists who contributed to the nation alongside Loyalists of other religious denominations.

Reble, Klinck, and Lehmann’s use of the pioneer myth contained many contradictions. While all three men mythologized the original wave of Lutheran “Loyalists,” very few members of the Canada Synod could trace their own ancestry to the Loyalist migrations. In fact, most of the synod leaders and pastors praising the so-called “Lutheran Loyalists” were first or second-generation immigrants. Reble, for instance, was born in Germany and only migrated to Canada shortly before the First World War. Moreover, their attempt to demonstrate the “indigenous” or “Canadian” character of Lutheranism was particularly dubious given Lutheranism’s historic connections to the German states and Protestant Reformation. Yet, this is precisely why the pioneer myth resonated so strongly in Waterloo County. Unlike other narratives used by settlers, German-Canadians did not deliberately use the pioneer myth to displace indigenous people, even if it did implicitly do so by ignoring and erasing their presence.

Instead, German Canadians used the pioneer myth because it deployed Anglo-Canadian narratives of colonization against nativist assertions of German disloyalty, even as it also provided a sense of belonging for German Lutherans and normalized their presence in Canada. Transforming “foreign immigrants” into “indigenous inhabitants” with legal and

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279 LA, ESF, 5.14 John Reble, Folder 5.14.9, The Lutheran Church and Canadian Culture by H.T. Lehmann, 4 October 1944.

280 Indeed, historians have started to question whether the “loyalist” label can even be appropriately applied to the German-speaking immigrants that arrived alongside other Anglo Loyalists in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See Ross D. Fair, “Model Farmers, Dubious Citizens: Reconsidering the Pennsylvania Germans of Upper Canada, 1786-1834,” in Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures, ed. Alexander Freund (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 80-81.
social rights was the primary function of settler colonial narratives.\textsuperscript{281} By using a settler colonial narrative like the pioneer myth, German Lutherans normalized their existence in Waterloo County as loyal citizens rather than “dangerous foreigners.” The pioneer myth recounted German-Canadian Lutheran history in a language readily understandable to Anglo-Canadians. Thus, the pioneer myth did not try to disrupt the Canadian racial hierarchy or challenge Canadian supremacy. It merely sought to broaden the definition of who could be considered Canadian by framing German Lutheran history in a manner that resonated with Canadians who might otherwise demonize them on the basis of their ethnicity.

The inherent whiteness built into the pioneer myth helped German-Canadian Lutherans cultivate alliances with certain members of the Anglo-Canadian political elite. Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King emerged as a staunch ally to German Canadians in Waterloo County during the early years of the war as a result of his long history with the region. King was born and raised in Waterloo County as a part of the community’s minority Scottish and English population. Yet, as German culture dominated the community, King grew up learning German in school and studied abroad in Germany during his university career. During the 1908 federal election, King campaigned in Waterloo County by giving speeches in German that emphasized the cooperative bonds that existed between German and English Canadians in the area.\textsuperscript{282} King’s belief in a “cultural partnership” between Germans and Anglos did not wane during the interwar period. King embraced the county’s pioneer myth and continued to

\textsuperscript{281} Veracini, \textit{Settler Colonialism}, 96-98.
remember his hometown in idealized and romantic ways throughout his lifetime.\textsuperscript{283} King knew of the ethnic antagonism that occurred in Waterloo County during the war, but did not let it deter his positive associations with the area and with German Canadians more generally. King expressed regret that Berlin changed its name to Kitchener during the Great War, and as late as 1939 still conceptualized the area as “a portion of Germany transplanted in this distant land.”\textsuperscript{284} The prime minister still felt a strong connection to the region as Canada edged closer to war with Germany. Passing by Waterloo County on a train in the summer of 1939, he thought of “Berlin” as his place of birth and “the place ordained” for him.\textsuperscript{285} Thanks to his ties to the community, King rejected any ethnic antagonism towards German culture or Waterloo County, even as other Canadians expressed mistrust of German Canadians during the two world wars.

As a result, German Canadians found an ally in their prime minister when Canada went to war with Germany once again in 1939. In the days proceeding Canada’s official declaration of war, various members of the House of Commons gave patriotic speeches that called upon Canada to do its duty and fight alongside Great Britain. Caught in the spirit of nationalism, several Members of Parliament (MPs) extolled the virtues of Canada’s “two great races,” namely the French and English, and how it was their duty to defeat fascism abroad. This was precisely the same type of jingoism that generated xenophobic attitudes in “Berlin” during the previous war. On 8 September, King gave a speech in the House of Commons that called “for toleration and moderation” and cautioned MPs against saying “many bitter things and express words the like of which


\textsuperscript{284} Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), William Lyon Mackenzie King, Diary, 6 June 1939, 2-3.

\textsuperscript{285} LAC, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Diary, 6 June 1939, 2.
they would never express save under the provocation of the hour.” While King did not directly ask other MPs to stop praising the virtues of English and French Canada, he interrupted the proceedings by asking if he could “go a step further…and make a plea for the toleration on behalf of the German people themselves?”[286] King recognized that German Canadians would be disproportionately impacted by the war. As such, he took pains to emphasize their loyalty in the House of Commons.

King defended German Canadians in two ways. First, he argued for German Canadian loyalty based on region. Just like Reble and Klinck, King drew upon the pioneer myth to demonstrate German Canadian innocence and loyalty. He told the House of Commons that he knew “something of the German people” and described both his time abroad and the first sixteen years of his life he spent living in Waterloo County. He rearticulated the pioneer myth by telling the House of Commons that Waterloo County consisted of “many other communities made up very largely of German settlers, some of whom came to this country to get away from forms of oppression” in Europe.[287] In doing so, King restated one of the pioneer myth’s most integral components. German-Canadian leaders specifically emphasized the pacifist origins of Waterloo County’s German settlers to disassociate their community with accusations of disloyalty during the First World War.[288] The emphasis on “peace” contained in the pioneer myth and other settler colonial narratives provided a useful counterpoint to nativist fears of German saboteurs lurking in Canada. Although the German Canadians’ use of the pioneer myth was designed to help

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mitigate discrimination during the Great War, its themes continued to resonate as King and German Canadians fought for a loyal reputation once again in the 1940s.

Secondly, King argued for German-Canadian loyalty broadly based on citizenship. Throughout his speech, King reminded the House of Commons that his political career actually started in Waterloo County. He reminisced about the 1908 federal election and believed that he won the election as a young MP as a result of Waterloo County’s German constituency. King believed that “if the votes could have been separately identified it might have been found that there were more votes cast from those of German descent than from those of the English or any other race, to send me to this parliament.” King’s status as prime minister lent significance to this example. By crafting a narrative of his career that intrinsically included Waterloo County and its German inhabitants, King made it difficult to critique German-Canadian loyalty in Waterloo County without simultaneously critiquing him and his hometown. King’s defense situated German Canadians as upstanding citizens who deserved the reputation of loyalty during a period where their ethnicity might suggest otherwise.

Without explicitly stating so, King based both of his arguments for German Canadian loyalty on a common and shared whiteness. Nonwhite Canadians could not articulate their presence in Canada the same way, as Anglo-Canadian conceptions of race framed them in the exact opposite light. Japanese Canadians, for instance, could not craft a similar pioneer myth that focused on Anglo-conformity and loyalty because many English Canadians saw the Japanese as inherently “unassimilable.” Regardless of how long the Japanese lived in Canada, English Canadians believed them too racially distinct and tied to their homeland to ever fully become “Canadian.”

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Canadian families may have lived in Canada for several generations, English-Canadian society largely saw the Japanese as temporary “sojourners,” not permanent “settlers.”\(^{290}\) As the pioneer myth was tied explicitly to settlement, Japanese Canadians could not cultivate a similar myth that tied their community to Canada’s founding. Other nonwhite Canadians, such as Canada’s black and indigenous populations, were presented as ill-suited to Canada’s environment and as a premodern or dying race, respectively.\(^{291}\) With such popular and dominant discourses on race, racialized Canadians could not access the same Anglo-Canadian narratives of loyalty and conformity as easily as the white German immigrants in Waterloo County. The success of the pioneer myth ultimately hinged on Germans’ ability to claim a settler colonial narrative due to their whiteness.

The pioneer myth normalized the presence of German settlers to such a degree that King, a Canadian of Scottish and English heritage, purported it himself. By portraying the German settlers as the definitive story for Waterloo County, the pioneer myth and other symbols allowed white Canadians to “ignore the oppressive conditions suffered by racial and ethnic minorities.”\(^{292}\) The ultimate impact of symbols like the pioneer myth implicitly suggested that racialized people never actually belonged in Canada.\(^{293}\) Furthermore, King’s defense of German-Canadian loyalty on the basis of their voting record also shows how German-Canadian Lutherans benefitted from their white privilege. The ability for German Canadians in Waterloo County to vote for King was a privilege few racialized Canadians had in the early to mid-twentieth century. The vast

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\(^{290}\) Fujiwara, *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity*, 47.


\(^{292}\) McKay and Bates, *In the Province of History*, 311.

\(^{293}\) McKay and Bates make this point about “Tartanism”, a Scottish variant of the German “pioneer myth” in McKay and Bates, 255-256.
majority of Japanese Canadians were barred from voting in both provincial and federal
elections at the start of the Second World War. Most did not have the ability to vote until
1949, after a long campaign to receive civil rights in the name of postwar democracy.\textsuperscript{294} Japanese Canadians lacked other basic rights and opportunities that were available to
white Canadians. For example, King “exempted” Japanese Canadians from serving in the
armed forces in January 1941, long before Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{295} German Canadians, despite
also sharing an ancestry connected to an enemy nation, faced no such restrictions and
were expected to enlist in the armed forces alongside other white Canadians. If members
of the government like King viewed fulfilling the duties of citizenship, such as voting or
enlisting in the army, as a condition to be considered loyal, Japanese Canadians could not
prove that they were good citizens. As Germans belonged to the same white race as
Canada’s “two founding” French and English populations, they could easily demonstrate
their value as citizens to Canada as “pioneers” or as members of the electorate. By
portraying German immigrants as “pioneers,” King’s advocacy did not appear overtly
radical and posed little risk at alienating his primarily Anglo-Canadian audience.

The racial implications of King’s defense are further clarified when contrasted
with his attitude towards Japanese Canadians and their eventual relocation and
incarceration during the war. King defended German Canadian loyalty, even though he
recognized that such a direct appeal for tolerance towards “the enemy” could be
considered controversial by some members of parliament. Although no MPs voiced their
opposition to King’s claims, the prime minister’s defensive attitude suggests he knew
other MPs disagreed with his plea for tolerance. To his critics, King responded that “I am

\textsuperscript{294} Patricia E. Roy, \textit{The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-67}
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), chapter five.
\textsuperscript{295} Fujiwara, 82.
not going to be false to my whole inheritance by refraining to take any step that may be necessary to preserve freedom.” If Canada was going to war to protect democracy and “freedom,” this democracy needed to be extended towards the people of Waterloo County.

King’s charitable attitude, however, did not extend to Japanese Canadians. King based his advocacy for German Canadians largely on his familiarity with living among them in Waterloo County. Yet, as historian Stephanie Bangarth points out, King had a great deal of familiarity with Japanese Canadians compared to most other Canadian politicians. King had considerable experience dealing with British Columbia’s Asian population following the 1907 Vancouver Riots. King witnessed firsthand the destruction white Canadian nativists caused on Japanese and Chinese businesses and properties. King saw Canada’s Japanese population as a clear threat within Canada, even if he never fully joined the type of wartime hysteria that shaped British Columbia’s politicians. Just a few days prior to his speech defending German-Canadian loyalty, King stated that he believed the Japanese would indeed bomb Canada’s west coast or participate in “hit and run” tactics. While King situated Germans as loyal pioneers, he still associated Canada’s Japanese population with the actions of their country of origin.

King and the Canadian federal government more generally recreated racial assumptions about the white and “Asiatic” races in their treatment of German and Japanese Canadians. Historian Aya Fujiwara notes that government officials viewed Japanese Canadians “collectively and monolithically” and paid little to no attention to the

differences in politics and generation that existed within British Columbia’s Japanese-Canadian community. She suggests that Canadian politicians saw the Japanese “as a single dangerous ethnic community.” Yet, as King’s House of Commons speech made clear, he did not view Germans in the same monolithic light. Both in the House of Commons and within the Department of External Affairs, King encouraged members of the government to view Germans in a nuanced manner. King described how the current war did not reflect the attitudes of Germans, both “in this country and in the old world.” He encouraged his peers to blame Hitler and his government for the current conflict.

Under King’s guidance, the Department of External Affairs and the RCMP did not suspect all German Canadians of disloyalty arbitrarily. Instead, government officials largely saw German Canadians as either “good Germans” or “bad Nazis.” The government constructed the latter category as German immigrants who explicitly had membership in fascist organizations, recently migrated to Canada, or lived in large urban centers where they could potentially disrupt war work. Thus, the vast majority of Waterloo County’s German population avoided government persecution as a result of the “good versus bad German” binary that King and the Liberal government enforced. This nuanced approach to German Canadians ensured that only around 850 Germans were interned during the war, compared to the 22,000 Japanese Canadians who were forcibly relocated during the war.

Leaders in the Canada Synod advocated for such a nuanced approach in their speeches and writing. Klinck, for example, argued that if the Canadian

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299 Fujiwara, 78, 81.
301 Lorenzkowski, “‘Spies’, ‘Saboteurs’, and ‘Subversives’”, 168-169; Keyserlingk, “The Canadian Government’s Attitude Toward Germans and German Canadians in World War II.”
302 This is not to say, of course, that Japanese Canadians were exclusively passive victims to their circumstances. See, for instance, Stephanie Bangarth, *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in North America, 1942-1949* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
public had to associate Canadian Lutherans with any movement in Nazi Germany, they should think of the anti-Nazi movement of Martin Niemöller, a German Lutheran clergyman who was imprisoned in a concentration camp for opposing Hitler. By using Niemöller as an example, Klinck hoped to demonstrate that “Germans” and “Lutherans” were a diverse group that did not all share the same views and opinions. Thankfully for Klinck, King and other government leaders largely saw the German-Canadian community in the nuanced and multifaceted way he suggested. Membership in the white race allowed German Canadians to be treated as individuals, whereas the attitudes of government officials towards the Japanese reinforced racist ideas that they constituted a single monolithic race.

As pioneer stories are predicated on creating an ideology for white settlers to “become indigenous,” German-Canadian Lutherans could argue that they had just as much a claim to Canadian citizenship and belonging as other Anglo-Canadians who celebrated their Loyalist ancestors. Even though some Japanese-Canadian families lived in Canada longer than German Lutherans like John Reble, racialized communities could not successfully advocate for their belonging on the basis of being “pioneers.” Within this context, Waterloo County’s white image proved an even greater marker of belonging than any flag or patriotic fundraiser could provide.

**Conclusion**

Debates over church, state, and patriotism waned as the war came to a close. The tensions between pastors and laypeople began to dissipate with the successful Allied

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invasion of Normandy in June 1944. Military victories overseas signaled to German Lutherans that the war, and their need to appear loyal, was soon coming to an end. Pastors and congregants alike largely stopped the contentious debates that occurred in St. Louis and Waterloo County as the need for wartime fundraising, chaplaincies, and declarations of loyalty started to come to an end. Instead, synod leaders shifted their attention to the rise of “broken families,” juvenile delinquency, and “newly orphaned children” that increased casualties in Normandy inevitably created.\textsuperscript{304} Organizations such as the Canada Synod’s CWS and the Missouri Synod’s EPC adjusted their mandates accordingly, and shifted their goals from one of wartime patriotism to general humanitarian aid. The tensions between pastors, congregants, and synods slowly started to dissipate as these various groups started to once again collaborate over Europe’s pending refugee crisis.

Germany’s formal military defeat in May 1945 prompted many congregations to slowly reintroduce German language services to their churches. In St. Louis, the vestry at St. Paul’s passed a resolution petitioning that the Reverend Rothe reintroduce German language services in the fall of 1945. The Board of Elders approved the congregation’s desire and Rothe preached his first German language service since Pearl Harbor in December 1945. In Waterloo County, Stockmann started preaching predominantly in

\textsuperscript{304} LA, ESF, Convention Minutes, June 1944, 75; LA, ESF, Convention Minutes, June 1944, 87; Nils Willison, “Rolling Echoes,” The Canada Lutheran, February 1945, p.9.
German again at Trinity in January 1946.\textsuperscript{305} Other congregations in both St. Louis and Waterloo County followed suit as it became clear the war was finally over.\textsuperscript{306}

The German Lutheran communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not assimilate during the war. They perceived of themselves as Germans and were also perceived as such by Anglo-Americans and Canadians. Both before and during the war, certain members of the community resented mainstream attempts to vilify the German people and the Lutheran faith. Pastors and congregants alike opposed projects such as \textit{People Come First} for their negative portrayal of Germans in a war that they felt demonized their ethnic identities. Members of the government, most notably Mackenzie King, still strongly associated Waterloo County with its German ethnicity. Neither the host society nor the German Lutheran communities themselves responded as though this group had lost their German ethnicity. Although the war prompted pastors and synod leaders to express their national identities more frequently, their German ethnicity and that of their congregations continued once the need to demonstrate their loyalty passed. As a result, government officials and members of the public occasionally expressed uncertainty about whether German Lutherans could truly be loyal to the Allied cause throughout the war.

\textsuperscript{305} CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church Vestry Minutes Box, 1942 Folder, Minutes of the Vestry Meeting, 1 October 1945; CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church Vestry Minutes Box, 1942 Folder, Minutes of the Vestry Meeting, 5 November 1945. Trinity’s church council did not switch back to German with complete confidence. They decided to withdraw advertisements about their weekly sermons from the \textit{Tavistock Gazette} at the same time so as to not attract greater attention. See LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 24 September 1945; LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 26 November 1945.

\textsuperscript{306} St. Peter’s, in Kitchener, reintroduced German services in early 1948 and felt confident enough to publicize this fact in the local newspapers. See LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church (hereafter St. Peter’s), reel 17, Annual Congregation Meeting, 8 March 1948. Of course, not all congregations eliminated German language services entirely. Trinity, in St. Louis, continued its German language services throughout the war and therefore maintained them moving into the postwar period as well.
These fears, however, never manifested via the extreme acts of discrimination that occurred during the First World War. The ability of German Lutherans to portray themselves as Protestant and white help explain why they were able to negotiate their way through the Second World War while still maintaining their ethnic identities. By emphasizing a shared Christian heritage, racial views, and a common history, German Lutherans established enough links with Anglo-American and Canadian political elites to avoid the widespread discrimination many pastors endured during the previous war. Although their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith were undesirable during the war, their whiteness and Christianity prevented them from facing the same racial persecution as racialized communities like the Japanese Canadians and Americans. Whiteness and Protestantism allowed their ethnic identities to survive, even if their German ethnicity occasionally placed them at odds with mainstream society. Their wartime experiences therefore do not lend themselves to the story of assimilation or complete acceptance into white North America, but a complex middle ground. Their race allowed them to avoid the same fates as other racialized groups, but their ethnic associations with “the enemy” kept them outside the coalition of “white ethnics” that found inclusion within a larger, unmarked “white” category in Canada and the United States. Their wartime experience was characterized by debate and contention, not assimilation or destruction. The war provoked a struggle in which German Lutheran ethnic elites, congregants, and women had to balance their racial, ethnic, national, and religious identities. Although the war did not destroy the ethnic identities of Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, the tensions it generated had lasting consequences. With the war officially over, community leaders now needed to figure out how they would put their communities back together.
Chapter 3: “I Was A Stranger”: Confronting Europe’s Refugee Crisis Through Transnational Ties

“World War II left in its swirling wake the most tremendous population dislocation in all recorded history. Some of the movement was in a sense voluntary; the greatest portion was forced. Large groups of people were forced to move as an element of the Nazi program of slave labor, other groups were swept before invading armies, others [fled] to escape hostile occupying forces, still others are fugitives from political oppression and religious persecution. Most of these people found themselves, at the end of the war, in Germany, Austria, or Italy...After VE-day, the Allied armies were faced with the grave problem of these millions of homeless persons.”

– The Reverend Louis Sieck, President of Concordia Seminary

The devastating impact of the Second World War on Europe troubled German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans after 1945. Reports of poverty and starvation along with images of displaced persons (DPs) living in makeshift camps featured prominently in the secular and Lutheran press. Pastors and laypeople agreed that they needed to work together to help alleviate German poverty, hunger, and suffering overseas. North America’s German Lutheran communities were not alone in this regard. Jewish, Catholic, and Mennonite communities also worried about their coreligionists in Europe and formed organizations following the war that sought to provide aid for their European brethren.

food and clothing to Europe’s most desperate while trying to solve the problem of homeless DPs and refugees.  

This chapter examines how the Missouri and Canada Synods organized campaigns to provide relief to postwar Germany and advocated for liberalized immigration laws to allow more German immigrants entry to Canada and the United States. It describes how Lutherans created several organizations, such as the Canadian Lutheran World Relief, in order to meet the needs of impoverished German civilians, refugees, and displaced persons. Germany’s humanitarian crisis motivated Lutheran organizations in both St. Louis and Waterloo County to collaborate and form a transnational relationship that spanned across the Canadian-American border. Drawing on their shared religious and ethnic backgrounds, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County combined their financial resources in an attempt to provide for Germany’s poor. Moreover, the two groups used their transnational relationship to mitigate the restrictive immigration policies of their respective nations. American immigration policy placed greater restrictions on DPs arriving in the United States and enforced small quotas in contrast to Canada’s comparatively liberal postwar immigration policy.  

St. Louis Lutherans had little success lobbying their government for policy changes, whereas Waterloo County Lutherans succeeded in changing immigration policy to admit more German DPs to Canada. St. Louis Lutherans worked alongside their counterparts in Waterloo County to

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309 Although “displaced person” and “refugee” refers to a specific legal category of persons, Canadians and Americans often used terms such as refugee, displaced person, and immigrant interchangeably. I have elected to use the term DP for the sake of consistency. For a discussion of these legal categories and how the DPs defined themselves, see Pascal Maeder, Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2011), 23.

encourage German immigration to Canada in an effort to save their Lutheran brethren overseas from poverty and hardship.

The transnational relationship that formed between St. Louis and Waterloo County following the Second World War helped reignite the ethnic identities of German Lutheran pastors. After years of downplaying their German ethnicity during the war, pastors once again embraced their role as ethnic elites in an effort to mobilize their North American followers to help the German “homeland.” As ethnic elites, pastors “knew about the histories, politics, and languages of both [North America] and their respective homelands,” thereby making them ideally suited to act as brokers between their Lutheran followers and Germans abroad. Their ethnicity ensured they resisted Canadian and American attempts to vilify the German people and brand them all as “Nazis” undeserving of North American aid. By arguing against the popular perception of Germans as Nazis, pastors simultaneously hoped to shed the negative associations North Americans projected onto their ethnic identities. They were not Nazis, but rather informed experts who could help address the unique needs of German Lutherans abroad. Moreover, pastors found a new utility for their ethnic identities following the war. They appealed to their congregants’ German ethnicities in an effort to mobilize the financial and charitable resources necessary to assist impoverished DPs. They discursively drew upon their ethnic identities to motivate their followers to help the “homeland,” while also combating negative stereotypes associated with their ethnicity and place of birth. This newfound emphasis on ethnicity at the elite level follows Kathleen Conzen’s observations about the malleable nature of ethnicity. She argues that “ethnicity is continuously being reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group and the host society.” Ethn
identities can appear, disappear, and reappear as historical circumstances change. Pastors downplayed their ethnicity during the war in order to avoid possible internment or discrimination. With the war concluded, pastors remobilized their ethnic identity in order to combat anti-German stereotypes and alter immigration policy in the hopes of bringing more German migrants to North America.

Race, gender, and theology also shaped German Lutheran efforts to help German DPs and relief work. This chapter argues that German-Canadian Lutherans succeeded in changing Canadian immigration policy to allow for greater German migration as a result of their whiteness. Canadian government officials initially limited immigration from Germany following the war because they subscribed to the belief that former “Nazis” should not be admitted to Canada. Pastors, however, argued for the acceptance of Germans, regardless of their former political ties, by arguing that they were “racially suited” to migrate to Canada as whites. Germans, they reminded the House of Commons, were pioneers, farmers, and had a history of “settling” the land. German Lutheran women helped their male peers with all aspects of immigration and relief work, although they received little credit due to the patriarchal gender norms in the Lutheran Church. These customs ensured that pastors continually portrayed themselves as the leaders of immigration work and discredited the important role Lutheran women played in admitting DPs and conducting charity work for Germany. Theology played a similar role in determining how Lutherans engaged with relief work. The Missouri Synod’s conservative Lutheranism caused the synod to be less engaged with immigration work than their colleagues in the Canada Synod due to their fear of union with other Lutherans. Because

the Canada Synod held more liberal beliefs on unionism, they cooperated with other
Lutheran groups and became the de facto champions of Lutheran immigration to North
America. This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of the
intricacies and bureaucratic implementation of postwar immigration policy. Rather, it
looks at the ethnic motivations behind these policies and examines how racial,
thecological, and gender relations in St. Louis and Waterloo County influenced relief and
immigration work.

**Ethnic and Religious Motivations for Assisting Germany**

Six years of war created dire economic and social conditions in Germany. Aerial
and land warfare destroyed German cities, industry, agriculture, and left thousands of
Germans homeless. In an effort to cripple German war production, the Allied air force
conducted bombing raids on German cities with large industrial factories that supported
the Nazi war effort. Aerial raids inevitably harmed civilians who worked in factories and
destroyed residential areas where workers lived. From 1943 to 1945, the Allies dropped
over one million tons of bombs on Germany. By the end of the war, roughly half a
million Germans had died as a result of the bombing campaign. In Hamburg, the site of
one of the most devastating bombing campaigns, nearly fifty thousand civilians died from
1940 to 1945 as a result of bombing-related injuries. The city of Kassel fared even

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312 Angelika Sauer provides an overview of immigration policy as it pertains to German religious groups in
“A Matter of Domestic Policy?: Canadian Immigration Policy and the Admission of Germans, 1945-50,”
*Canadian Historical Review* LXXIV, no. 2 (1993): 226-263. See also Alexander Freund, *Aufbrüche nach
313 Jorg Arnold, *The Allied War and Urban Memory: The Legacy of Strategic Bombing in Germany*
worse. Records after the war suggest that only sixteen thousand of the city’s original sixty-five thousand inhabitants survived the Allied the bombing campaign. Yet even these statistics fail to convey how thoroughly the Allied bombing campaign impacted all aspects of German life. Bombing not only destroyed Germany’s war production, but also its food stores, drinking water, and residential areas. This destruction of German infrastructure led to starvation and homelessness for those who survived the bombings.

Thousands of refugees and displaced people, made homeless from the war, fled into Germany’s borders following the war and accentuated the severity of the nation’s broken infrastructure. Germans living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European countries fled west into Germany beginning in 1944. These “German expellees” fled for several reasons. Some voluntarily left their homes in order to avoid the invading Soviet Army. They feared that Soviet occupation of their homes would result in harm or possible death. Reports of the Soviet Army taking “revenge” on German civilians for their wartime complicity caused refugees to flee to Germany for safety from Soviet aggression. Others had no choice but to leave their homes due to the rising nationalism in newly formed Eastern European states. In July 1945, the leaders of the Allied powers met near Berlin to discuss how to govern postwar Europe. The meeting resulted in the Potsdam Agreement, which gave considerable control to recently formed governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. These nations requested that the Allies give them power over their national borders and the ability to determine who would be included in their nations. They argued that their states must be ethnically homogenous and claimed

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315 Arnold, The Allied War and Urban Memory, 192.
316 Overy, The Bombing War, 436.
that they could not risk maintaining sizeable German minorities in their borders. Thus, they proposed to “transfer” or forcibly remove ethnic Germans residing in their territorial boundaries. The Soviet Union supported these requests because they provided useful “buffer states” between the USSR and their old German enemies. With Soviet backing, Eastern European governments successfully convinced the lukewarm United States and Great Britain to support the expulsion of ethnic Germans. Although the Allies requested these governments transfer Germans in an “orderly and humane” manner, the subsequent Potsdam Agreement gave European governments free reign to render its German inhabitants homeless, poor, and vulnerable to expulsion. The resulting deportation led to one of the largest forced migrations in European history. A total of twelve million people arrived at Germany’s borders between 1944 and 1950. The brutal conditions led to approximately half a million to two million deaths along the way from malnourishment, hypothermia, and neglect. Those fortunate enough to survive the journey to Germany arrived in a devastated country unable to provide them with shelter and care. The arrival of millions of desperate refugees accentuated Germany’s housing and food crisis.

The Allied powers felt little sympathy for the homeless and impoverished German refugees. High-ranking politicians and military officials believed that Germany bore “collective guilt” for the war: all Germans, regardless of their civilian or military status, held some responsibility for Nazi Germany’s crimes. There was little sentiment in favour of aiding a population recover from a war that “they” had started. This lack of sympathy extended to an indifference regarding the fate of refugees and displaced people.

318 Douglas, Orderly and Humane, chapter 4.
320 Douglas, 1.
Canadians and Americans alike generally opposed liberalizing their restrictive immigration policy from the 1930s. Some politicians pushed President Henry Truman to organize a committee to examine Germany’s DP problem, but Truman formally denied their request in June 1945. Governments and labour groups worried that an influx of refugees would provoke a crisis in unemployment or unduly burden the state as “public charges.” Memories of the economic recession that followed the First World War provided nativist politicians with the proof they needed to oppose admitting refugees on economic grounds. The Canadian Congress of Labour, for example, told the federal government that “we cannot afford to expose Canadian workers to the constant threat of having their standards undercut by immigrants.” Instead, Canada and the United States prioritized repatriating their soldiers stationed overseas. Only immigrant groups with direct ties to the military received state approval. Canada admitted Polish veterans who fought alongside their military and both countries allowed “war brides” married to servicemen to immigrate.

Civilians shared their government’s indifference towards Germany’s humanitarian crisis. A December 1945 Gallup poll found that approximately seventy percent of all Americans wanted no changes to the country’s immigration policy, or favoured greater restrictions. A 1946 Gallup poll in Canada concluded that thirty-four percent of

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322 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 101.
325 Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates*, 159.
326 Daniels 103.
Canadians supported completely banning future immigration from Germany.\textsuperscript{327} Other polls reflected these sentiments, as a majority of citizens in Allied countries stated they “hated the Germans” and supported the Allied bombing campaign throughout the war.\textsuperscript{328} Even witnessing German poverty firsthand did not change the prejudiced opinions some had towards refugees. While stationed in West Germany, General George S. Patton Jr. opposed those who believed “the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not.”\textsuperscript{329} Although Patton’s comment represented an extreme view, many Americans and Canadians had difficulty sympathizing with a populace that they had spent the last several years fighting.

North America’s German Lutherans, however, mobilized to help Germany recover from the war. As ethnic elites, pastors believed they had a unique ability to “explain” or “interpret” their German homeland to Canadians and Americans of all backgrounds. As predominantly first and second-generation immigrants, they assumed that they possessed specialized knowledge on how to help German and Lutheran people. The editors of the \textit{Canada Lutheran}, for example, called upon its readers to “extend the hand of practical compassion and encouragement” to suffering Germans. Published just one month after the war ended, they told their audience to ignore the wartime patriotism that vilified the German people. “We have had enough of harsh accusations and lofty criticism springing from sheer prejudice,” they concluded. “The people of Europe crave our understanding.”\textsuperscript{330} John Reble made the Canada Synod’s religious obligations to Germany clear during his presidential speech at the 1946 synod convention. He told the

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\textsuperscript{327} Sauer, 251.  \\
\textsuperscript{329} Quoted in Daniels, 99.  \\
\textsuperscript{330} “Understanding is a Virtue,” \textit{Canada Lutheran}, June 1945, p. 4.
\end{flushleft}
pastors and laymen in attendance that the “YOUNG CHURCH in America must save the OLD CHURCH in Europe, so desolate, so shamefully weak and tired, bleeding out of many wounds.” The Missouri Synod’s publicity campaigns reflected the ethnic bonds pastors believed existed between themselves and Germany. Hugo Bloedel, a St. Louis pastor in charge of the synod’s relief program, wrote that “through the Relief Program of our Church our people have become the fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers of thousands of orphans across the sea.” Although separated by an ocean and several generations of immigration, the relief campaign demonstrated that those in St. Louis had not forgotten their “family” across the sea. Lutherans had a special debt to their brethren overseas that North America’s Lutheran community needed to fulfill due to their shared ethnicity and faith.

Sympathetic attitudes towards Germany caused some St. Louis and Waterloo County Lutherans to express anti-American and anti-British sentiments. The mainstream and secular presses often ignored the fact that Germany required relief primarily as a result of destruction caused by the Allied armies. Pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County, however, put the blame solely on the devastating Allied bombing campaigns. Paul Eydt, a Waterloo County pastor, described DPs as “the 12 million people of various countries in Europe [that] have been uprooted due to POST WAR ALLIED ACTION.” Bloedel expressed anti-Allied sentiments in even harsher terms. He described the devastating impact of the Allied bombing campaign as “appalling. Hundreds of cities

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331 Minutes of the 84th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 18-21 June 1946, p. 18.
332 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
were a twisted mass of rubble and ruin.” Bloedel accused the American government of pursuing a policy “motivated by an evil spirit of revenge” following the war in contrast to the Missouri Synod, which “harbored no hate.” Pastors such as Eydt and Bloedel did not call on their followers to help Europeans on a humanitarian basis. Their identities as Germans provided them unique insight into the plight facing Germans overseas. Unlike their Anglo-American and Canadian counterparts, they did not see German refugees as members of a former “enemy nation,” but rather as people deserving help and acceptance. They resented any vilification of the German people, and encouraged their followers to ignore popular images of the German “enemy” in favour of a more sympatric image of a people recovering from a cruel war made worse by Allied involvement.

The hybrid German and Canadian/American backgrounds of the Lutheran leadership led them to believe that they could occupy a place of importance among relief campaigns. Although pastors faced suspicion during the war as a result of their ethnicity and faith, they hoped that their knowledge of European affairs would now prove a valuable asset in North American society. As news of Europe’s humanitarian crisis spread, Anglo-Canadian and American charities such as the YMCA and Salvation Army started to canvass for funds to provide food, clothing, and shelter for those suffering overseas. They felt compelled to help the poor as a way to demonstrate their “true Christian charity.” Initially, Lutherans offered their assistance to these charities. As Germans and Lutherans, they believed they were “experts” who could assist charities in meeting the specific needs of their brethren. While they expected to take on leadership positions at these gatherings, they found Anglo-Canadians and Americans hesitant to

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334 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
335 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
336 Goldberg, Holocaust Survivors in Canada, 19.
accept their role as cultural brokers. Outsiders continued to stigmatize German Lutherans as peculiar and largely rejected their offers to help. After attending a 1949 Canadian Council of Churches meeting, Eydt reported to the synod that he “found a great lack of knowledge in inter-church circles about the Lutheran Church. Indeed, I was amazed at what a strange phenomenon we Lutherans appear to be upon the religious horizon.”

Eydt had cause to worry. A YWCA meeting reported that they did not require Lutheran assistance because “there are deep divisions in the Lutheran Church” due to the ethnic and theological diversity within North American Lutheran groups. The YWCA had no interest in hearing the perspectives of “niche” conservative, liberal, German, Finnish, and other Lutherans spread out across the continent. Pastors worried that misguided perceptions of Lutherans would marginalize them from conducting relief work with DPs. This violated their own self-perception as ethnic elites with a special mission to mobilize North American wealth to help impoverished Germany. Pastors believed that Anglo-Canadians and Americans could not adequately help suffering Lutheran DPs overseas because they did not have the same sympathy that they had towards their coreligionists.

Eydt told his Canada Synod colleagues that “there is reason to believe that some communions are not prepared to recognize that our church has priority towards [the DPs]…If there is no Lutheran representation made at all, the other groups will proceed to take action as though we did not exist.”

Helping DPs therefore took on the added importance of ensuring pastors kept their authority as religious and ethnic experts. Nils

337 Minutes of the 87th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 14-17 June 1949, p. 120-121.
338 Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Eastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada fonds (hereafter ESF), 30 Canadian Lutheran Council (hereafter CLC), Folder 30.4.2.2.1., Arthur Mehlenbacher to Pastors, 16 November 1948.
339 Minutes of the 87th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 14-17 June 1949, p. 120-121.
Willison noted that “other church denominations are organized to help immigrants…Surely we Lutherans must not – we dare not – leave it to them to look after our Lutheran people.” Lutheran pastors recognized shortly after the war that they could not rely on others to look after the needs of German and Lutheran DPs. They would need to create their own organizations and charities if they wished to help their brethren overseas and preserve their authority as ethnic experts.

Creating an Infrastructure for Relief Work

Members of the Missouri and Canada Synods had the motivation to help Germany recover from the war, although it remained unclear just how they would accomplish this lofty goal. A single congregation had little hope of solving hunger and homelessness in Germany. If German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County wanted to make a tangible impact on relief and immigration work, they needed to initiate fundraising campaigns at the synod, national, and continental levels. The years following the Second World War prompted an unprecedented level of collaboration and discussion between Lutheran synods throughout North America. From 1945 to 1947, Canadian and American Lutherans created several transnational organizations in an effort to come to Germany’s aid. Germany’s crisis served as a catalyst for cross-border connection and a reassertion of the German identities of Lutheran leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County.

Theology shaped how Lutherans across North America formed relief organizations. As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod had few qualms about unionism or cooperating with other religious bodies. They demonstrated this during the war, when they included synods based in Western Canada in the CWS. In January 1946, the Canada

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340 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., Nils Willison to Pastors, February 1949.
Synod hosted a meeting at St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener open to all Lutherans interested in providing relief and aid to Germany. The meeting helped “to continue efforts towards reopening the channels for relief to Germany and other nations.” Their shared goal helped ensure collaboration and they decided to continue to “find ways and means for cooperating in sending food and clothing to Europe.”341 This initial partnership led to a subsequent meeting with all members of the CWS in Ottawa in March 1946 to discuss “relief work in Europe, particularly on behalf of sufferers in former enemy countries.”342 As fellow Germans, they expressed a natural affiliation towards helping Germany, even if Canadians still considered it an “enemy country.” The various Lutheran representatives discussed how their organization’s name no longer seemed relevant since the war ended. They decided to abandon their former title and establish a new organization with a new name: the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) with Lloyd Schaus, a Waterloo Lutheran Seminary graduate, as its first executive director. The CLWR was created with the mandate to help Germany recover from the war by sending food, clothing, and other resources overseas. During the first several months of his tenure as executive director, Schaus established shipping warehouses in Winnipeg, Montreal, and Kitchener to help process and ship donations made by Canadian Lutherans.343 In December, the CLWR decided to expand its mandate to include immigration reform as well as relief work “due to the widespread interest of European peoples to move to Canada, and due to the fact that many of these are Lutheran, it was decided that a Canadian Lutheran body or committee should undertake to look into the matter of

341 LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Resolution adopted at the Joint Meeting of Pastors of the Missouri and Canada Synod in St. Peters (sic) Church, Kitchener, 18 January 1946.
343 LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Canadian Lutheran World Relief Meeting Minutes, 28 March 1946.
immigration.” The CLWR’s formation provided Canadian Lutherans with the beginning of a bureaucratic organization that would allow them to conduct nation-wide level fundraisers in order to provide relief for Germany. The Canada Synod’s liberal theology allowed it to justify cooperation with other Canadian Lutherans, even if their doctrines did not perfectly align.

In contrast, the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology prevented them from engaging in the close partnerships the Canada Synod formed via the CLWR. Although the synod also shifted their EPC from war-related work to immigration and relief campaigns, their stance on unionism kept the Missouri Synod on the margins. The Missouri Synod’s resistance to cooperation with other Lutheran bodies dated back to its founding in the mid-nineteenth century. The synod’s founders disparaged other Lutheran bodies in North America for what they perceived as shallow and liberal interpretations of the Book of Concord and other religious texts. They rejected cooperation with other synods on the basis that collaboration would dilute their own theology. Subsequent synod presidents, including John Behnken, held this attitude and maintained that there could be no organizational union without doctrinal unity. In September 1947, Lutherans from various American synods met in Chicago to discuss how to best approach “the care and resettlement of Lutheran Displaced Persons and Refugees.” Most of those present were already members of the National Lutheran Council (NLC), an organization of American Lutherans that formed in the interwar years. The NLC was largely a product of the United Lutheran Church of America (ULCA) and fulfilled a similar function to the Canada Synod’s CWS during the Second World War. Just like their Canadian counterparts, the

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344 LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Resolutions Passed at CLWR General Meeting, 5 December 1946.
NLC switched from focusing on war work to relief campaigns following the war’s conclusion. The Missouri Synod, citing its adherence to conservative Lutheranism, refused to participate with the NLC during the war and instead formed the EPC.\textsuperscript{346} The 1947 meeting threatened to cause further divisions between the NLC and Missouri Synod, because it was not clear to either group whether ethnic solidarity would be enough to overcome theological differences. Louis Sieck, the EPC’s director and a professor at Concordia Seminary, worried that the meeting would “reopen several of the old gripes.” He was pleasantly surprised, however, when all pastors found common ground and sought to work together.\textsuperscript{347} While Sieck did not make any formal commitment to unite with the NLC, he agreed to create a “Joint Committee” of Missouri and NLC pastors to collaborate over future DP work. The Joint Committee consisted of four pastors total, with two representing each group. Sieck subsequently appointed Lawrence Meyer and E.T. Bernthal as Missouri’s representatives.\textsuperscript{348} A desire to help their fellow Germans appeared to allow both sides to worry less about their theological positions, at least initially.

Sieck and the EPC maintained an ambiguous relationship with the NLC until Congress passed the Displaced Person Act in April 1948. After persistent pressure from President Truman, Congress finally created a law that would allow the American government to admit DPs in addition to its preexisting immigration quotas. Congress estimated that the new legislation would permit one hundred thousand DPs entry into the United States over the next four years.\textsuperscript{349} DPs, however, had to demonstrate that they

\textsuperscript{346} Granquist, 242-243, 266.
\textsuperscript{347} CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 48, Louis Sieck to E.T. Bernthal, 7 October 1947.
\textsuperscript{348} CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 48, Sieck to Bernthal, 7 October 1947.
\textsuperscript{349} Daniels, 106.
would not become “public charges” if admitted to the United States. Despite this requirement, the 1948 act did little to provide financial assistance to DPs who wished to migrate. Thus, financial responsibility for newcomers largely fell upon voluntary agencies led by American citizens, which promised the federal government that their sponsored DPs would not become burdens on the state.\textsuperscript{350} After the act passed, the NLC discussed how they could help DPs offset required financial commitments such as passage to the United States. If the Missouri Synod wished to partake in this work, the NLC needed a formal commitment from Sieck and the EPC to help them address the large financial commitment DP work entailed.\textsuperscript{351} Yet, the synod’s tradition of avoiding Lutheran cooperative ventures in the name of guarding against unionism prevented the EPC from finding a consensus over aligning with the NLC. Ethnicity provided an impetus to help Germany, but the Missouri Synod’s theology posed a barrier to completing this goal.

E.B. Glabe, a Lutheran philanthropist and pastor from Minnesota, emerged as a staunch advocate for working cooperatively with the NLC. As Glabe was interested mainly in charity work, he placed little emphasis on maintaining “pure doctrine” and instead sought solutions that would provide the most relief for DPs. “The resettlement of the D.P.’s is going to cost considerable money,” he advised members of the EPC, “and it is for this reason that I believe it should be handled on an all Lutheran basis.”\textsuperscript{352} Glabe repeatedly wrote to Sieck throughout 1947 and 1948 in an effort to force the EPC to clarify its position on unionism and DP work more generally: “The [NLC] has proceeded

\textsuperscript{350} Daniels, 107-109.
\textsuperscript{351} Paul Empie more or less forced the issue at an October 1948 meeting. See CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Minutes of Meeting of Joint Committee, the NLC and the EPC, 26 October 1948.
\textsuperscript{352} CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, E.B. Glabe to Bernthal, 10 June 1948.
with its program on the international, national and local levels. Where do we fit in?”

The EPC’s delayed response to working with the NLC prompted Missouri Synod Lutherans in other states to address the question on their own terms. Werner Kuntz, a Michigan pastor, notified the St. Louis leadership that their lethargy prompted him to align his DP work with the NLC. “When we waited painfully long without any word of plans that might be under consideration,” he wrote, “some of us initiated a program of our own and, having no better resource, we connected our program with the channel of the National Lutheran Council.”

Not surprisingly, Glabe aligned his efforts to help DPs with the NLC in Minnesota as well. Glabe believed Sieck was unwilling to engage with his critiques of the synod’s stance on unionism and believed that the EPC could not possibly hope to conduct a nation-wide relief campaign isolated in St. Louis. “I cannot see how you intend to function only on a national level without working through some local agencies,” he wrote.

Kuntz agreed, stating that he could not “understand how it is possible for you to do this on a National level” without NLC assistance. Exasperated by the EPC’s slow response, both men aligned their local work with the NLC without consulting St. Louis. Both Glabe and Kuntz decided that their theological convictions were ultimately less important than their ethnic obligation to help German DPs. Their loyalty was to their homeless and starving German coreligionists, not to the synod’s theological peculiarities.

The St. Louis leadership, however, proved more conservative than their brethren in other states. During a January 1949 meeting with the NLC, the EPC decided “not to

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353 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Glabe to Sieck, 27 October 1948.
354 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Werner Kuntz to Egon W. Gebauer, 17 December 1948.
355 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Glabe to Gebauer, 15 December 1948.
356 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Kuntz to Gebauer, 17 December 1948.
join the NLC and its Displaced Persons Program.” Unlike Glabe and Kuntz, who both had backgrounds in social work, the EPC’s members consisted of pastors and professors deeply entrenched in the Missouri Synod’s conservative doctrine. While Glabe and Kuntz willingly sacrificed possible theological traditions to support their social mission, Sieck and the rest of the EPC members in St. Louis were steeped in a culture that prioritized maintaining their conservative theology. Although unwilling to align with the NLC formally, the EPC did acknowledge that many of its local branches already collaborated with the NLC regardless of their decision. As a result, they promised to “support up to 40% of all DP work which our recognized Lutheran Welfare Agencies expend on actual regional DP work” so as to not leave DP work completely unsupported. In doing so, the EPC formalized its position as the quiet financial backer to local and national organizations, rather than a direct participant in the process of DP work. Unlike the CLWR, the conservative theology of the synod’s St. Louis leadership prevented them for participating as freely in relief and DP work as their coreligionists in Canada.

Aside from their financial assistance, the EPC published several pamphlets in the late 1940s and early 1950s that advised congregations on how to partake in DP work at the local level. These publications stressed that laypeople interested in helping DPs should cooperate with their local pastor rather than the EPC. Any DPs that Missouri Synod members assisted would ultimately be their responsibility rather than the synod’s. One EPC member wrote that “as soon as a DP enters the midst of a congregation that congregation and that pastor becomes, in a general way, responsible for the social,

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357 CHI, EPCC, Box 1, Folder 10, Minutes of the Meeting of the EPC, 26 January 1949.
358 CHI, EPCC, Box 1, Folder 10, Minutes of the Meeting of the EPC, 26 January 1949.
religious and economical adjustment of the DP.”359 Thus, DP work in the Missouri Synod took a decentralized and local approach that varied from district to district. While the EPC’s hands-off approach and unwillingness to work with the NLC continued to generate criticism, its members reiterated that “we have no animosity with [the NLC] and feel that they are doing a very excellent job as far as the DP program is concerned.” Instead, the EPC “preferred to be independent in our program and are confident that we have also accomplished a great deal, however, on a much less expensive basis.”360 The St. Louis leadership was content to provide advice for local situations while letting the NLC conduct DP work at the national level as a result of their conservative theology.

The different theological positions of the Missouri and Canada Synods directly shaped the ways in which the two synods approached immigration. The Canada Synod’s liberal theology created a highly centralized approach to immigration that operated on a national scale, while the Missouri Synod’s conservatism directed it towards a decentralized and local approach. Far from being insular and academic, theological debates played a key role in determining how each synod responded to the arrival of postwar DPs. Although they worked towards a common goal of helping their fellow Germans, each synod strove to meet the demands of DP work in accordance with their own theological traditions.

Transnational Ties and Early Immigration Schemes, 1946-1950

The Canadian and American federal governments responded much more slowly to the DP crisis than the Missouri and Canada Synods wished. The EPC and CLWR

359 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Gebauer to Louis Wickham, 27 February 1950.
360 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Gebauer to Wickham, 27 February 1950.
discovered that their respective governments often proved unable or unwilling to help them bring German Lutheran DPs to North America. As a result, Canadian and American Lutherans relied upon one another to help meet their common goal of helping Lutheran DPs. United by a mutual desire to help Germany recover, Lutheran organizations collaborated to navigate national restrictions in an effort to address an international crisis.

Canadian and American Lutherans tended to ignore the Canadian-American border if it meant they could better help their German Lutheran coreligionists overseas. Prior to 1946, for instance, Canada and the United States monitored and controlled the extent to which civilians could gain access to Germany. Both countries enacted legislation that prohibited civilians from trading and shipping supplies to so-called enemy nations, thereby significantly hampering early Lutheran attempts to conduct relief work. As of early 1946, it appeared that the American government had no immediate plans to amend their Trading with the Enemy Act to allow Americans contact with Germany. Legally barred from sending relief supplies such as food and clothing to Germany, American Lutherans looked to Canada to overcome their government’s restrictive policy. Unlike the United States, the Canadian government granted permission to the CLWR “to send relief supplies to Europe, including ex-enemy countries such as Germany and Finland,” as of March 1946.361 Franklin Clark Fry, the president of the ULCA, contacted pastors in the Canada Synod for assistance. He initially planned on opening “a second warehouse on the Canadian side of the international border” that Americans could use to ship food and clothing overseas. Since the Canadian government permitted the CLWR access to Germany, Fry hoped the Canada Synod could act as an intermediary that would allow American Lutherans to help Germany as well. “We had made up our minds to

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361 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., Schaus to Pastors, 19 March 1946.
attempt to ship to the British Zone through your nation,” Fry wrote. The plan, however, proved unnecessary. The American government amended its Trading with the Enemy act in the following weeks to allow the ULCA and other charitable organizations to start sending relief to European nations.

The early willingness of Canadian and American Lutherans to collaborate proved essential during the immediate aftermath of the war. As both Canadian and American governments clarified their positions on Germany and the DP crisis, Lutherans on both sides of the border worked towards their shared goal of providing aid for as many Germans and Lutheran DPs as possible. Differences in governmental policy, however, complicated their efforts. In these situations, the transnational connections between St. Louis and Waterloo County Lutherans proved essential in overcoming national policies. In the summer of 1947, a small fishing vessel carrying twenty-four Estonian and Latvian Lutheran DPs arrived illegally in the southern United States. American immigration officials detained the Baltic refugees and moved them to Ellis Island to await deportation. The Baltic DPs contacted the Missouri Synod and the EPC, who later tried to advocate for their formal entry into the United States. Without the proper immigration visas, however, the American government proved unwilling to admit the Baltic DPs.

The EPC reached out to the CLWR in the hopes that the Canadian government might allow the Baltic refugees to enter Canada. The EPC’s faith in their transnational connection with Canadian Lutherans proved well founded. Traugott Herzer, a prominent member of the CLWR, pitched the dilemma to his peers in the CLWR and the Reverend John Schmieder, the pastor at St. Matthew’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener,

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362 LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Franklin Clark Fry to A. Goos, 14 February 1946.
agreed to take action. In the following months, Schmieder contacted Arthur Jolliffe, the Director of Immigration of the Department of Mines and Resources, about possibly admitting the detained Baltic DPs. Schmieder portrayed the DPs as “truly political refugees” who “have a real fear of returning to their former homeland which is now occupied by Soviet Russia.” The Balts, he noted, wished to live “in a country built on the democratic principles in which they believe and for which they stand.” Knowing full well that Jolliffe and the Canadian government viewed immigrants in terms of their labour potential, Schmieder lauded their capacity to join Canada’s work force. “As we have learned from our United States Representative, who has had direct contact with these people, they are an exceedingly fine group of young people, very sturdy physically and very anxious to work.” Schmieder’s lobbying proved successful. When Canadian authorities received word in December 1947 that the Board of Special Inquiry of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service still refused to accept the refugees, they granted the CLWR’s request. They admitted the DPs “providing that Canadian Lutheran World Relief guarantees that the refugees will not become public charges during the next five years.” Schmieder agreed to these terms and subsequently arranged for their arrival in Kitchener. By drawing on the transnational relationship between Canadian and American Lutherans, Schmieder saved these Lutheran DPs from eventual deportation.

St. Louis and the EPC continued to play an important financial as well as moral role during the CLWR’s early years. Unhappy with the minimal changes to American immigration policy in the late 1940s, the St. Louis leadership took advantage of Canada’s

363 LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.1, Minutes of Meeting of Canadian Christian Council for Resettlement of Refugees (Outside the Mandate of IRO), 20 October 1947.
365 LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.1, CLWR to Jolliffe, 24 October 1947.
366 LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1, Open Meeting of the Executive of CLWR, 2 January 1948; “Plans Near Completion to Resettle Refugees,” Canada Lutheran, January 1948, p. 5.
comparatively liberal immigration laws to encourage German immigration to Canada. In early 1948, the EPC’s Lawrence Meyer met with Herzer to discuss how to help young children stuck in Germany’s DP camps. They discussed the possibility of sending young Lutheran DP children to reformatory schools in England and Canada to escape the poverty and hardship commonly found in the camps. Meyer proposed that the EPC grant the CLWR twenty-five thousand dollars as a revolving fund to help these children travel out of the DP camps and subsequently pay for their upkeep.\(^{367}\) The plan represented a compromise to both parties. Without the EPC’s financial backing, the CLWR had little hope of operating a program of this size. St. Louis’s support therefore allowed them to assist Lutheran DP children find new homes in Canada and the United Kingdom. The plan also satisfied the Missouri Synod. The few quotas available for DPs under the 1948 Displaced Persons Act would not allow for the immigration of so many children. Yet, the synod still wished to partake in DP work. Meyer therefore promised to fund the CLWR program only “with the understanding that Missouri Synod take over complete chaplaincy work” of escorting the DPs to their new homes.\(^{368}\) In this way, the synod could still actively participate in DP work even if their government did not permit it. Restrictive immigration policy coupled with the enormity of the DP crisis in Europe prevented both the CLWR and EPC from operating effectively. However, combining their resources in order to help their fellow Germans and Lutherans overseas provided an effective solution to an otherwise insurmountable problem. The EPC and CLWR ignored their national differences in favour of combining their resources to help their fellow German Lutherans abroad.

\(^{367}\) CHI, EPCC, Box 1, Folder 9, Minutes of the Meeting of the EPC, 22 January 1948.  
\(^{368}\) CHI, EPCC, Box 1, Folder 9, Minutes of the Meeting of the EPC, 22 January 1948.
This transnational relationship continued in the CLWR’s early years. The American government did not pass legislation allowing DPs to enter the United States until the summer of 1948. It also failed to match the high hopes of the Missouri Synod. The EPC continued to use the CLWR as a type of surrogate to meet their desire to help DPs, despite their government’s restrictive attitude. In 1947, the EPC worked with other American Lutherans to donate a total of fifty thousand dollars to the CLWR to act “as a revolving fund for the movement to Canada of refugees of German ethnic origin” in 1947.369 This early financial involvement provided the CLWR with the necessary funds to carry out its primary goal of encouraging German and Lutheran immigration while providing the Missouri Synod with a sense that they too could help German DPs even if its government would not.

By late 1946, Canadian immigration policy allowed citizens to sponsor their parents, siblings, or children to migrate to Canada. This policy included people living in Europe’s DP camps, and as a result created a possible avenue for the CLWR to bring DPs to Canada.370 CLWR officials encouraged its laypeople to participate in this “close relatives scheme” because it allowed their German-Canadian laity to reconnect with family members under a policy already approved by the federal government. In this sense, Canadian immigration policy worked in concert with the CLWR’s ethnic goals. Canada Synod members wished to bring family members to Canada to escape Germany’s poverty, and the Canadian government’s policy allowed this to happen.

However, the government failed to make it clear that not all Europeans in displaced persons camps were eligible for migration. The International Refugee

369 LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of General Meeting of CLWR, 28 May, 1947.
Organization (IRO), an agency of the United Nations, did not permit the movement of all DPs. The IRO barred any DPs with German citizenship from migrating. While DPs with Latvian or Estonian citizenship could migrate, DPs with German citizenship could not. DPs with German citizenship were often referred to as Volksdeutsche, a term used to denote people of German ethnic heritage who were not born in Germany. Because these Volksdeutsche had German citizenship, the IRO considered them “the enemy” and regarded these DPs as Germany’s responsibility. While the Volksdeutsche were indeed of German ethnic heritage, the majority did not live in Germany during the Second World War. They lived in territories like Czechoslovakia and other countries later annexed by the Nazis. When the Nazis invaded, the Volksdeutsche received German citizenship as a result of their ethnic heritage. These subtle nuances, however, meant little to the IRO. When the CLWR tried to bring their Volksdeutsche relatives to Canada, they found that the IRO denied their applications. Approximately one-third of the initial requests to bring relatives to Canada were rejected because they asked to sponsor Volksdeutsche relatives. Without IRO support, German Canadians could not bring their German relatives to Canada.

The so-called “Volksdeutsche problem” presented a practical and moral dilemma to the CLWR. The IRO’s decision meant that the CLWR and their German-Canadian members could not help German DPs escape poverty and homelessness in Europe. Despite their success in establishing and financing the CLWR, their project of helping Germany collapsed due to the IRO’s decision. Morally, the plight of the Volksdeutsche

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371 This term is often contrasted against the Reichsdeutsche, which refers to an ethnic German born inside Germany’s borders.
372 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., Herzer to Sylvester Michelfelder, 10 May 1946.
373 Sauer, 239.
resonated deeply with members of the CLWR. After all, as people of German heritage, they too could be considered *Volksdeutsche* in the most liberal sense of the word. If they happened to live in Europe instead of Canada, the Nazis would have just as easily granted them German citizenship, either willingly or unwillingly. The CLWR remained determined to help the *Volksdeutsche* as their fellow Germans, even though the IRO sought to punish them on these same grounds.

Members of the CLWR soon discovered that other German religious groups in Canada also resented the IRO’s strict *Volksdeutsche* policy. German-Canadian Catholics, Baptists, and Mennonites relied on the government’s “close relative scheme” to bring their German relatives to Canada, but found their efforts thwarted due to the IRO’s policy. The CLWR collaborated with these other religious groups to form the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR) to operate outside the mandate of the IRO in June 1947. Although the *Volksdeutsche* could not legally migrate via international programs like the IRO’s, they seemingly conformed to Canada’s pre-existing immigration policy that favoured family reunification. Thus, the CCCRR petitioned the Canadian government that their organization could essentially fulfill the same role as the IRO, but for *Volksdeutsche* instead of general DPs. The CCCRR promised to pay for their passage from Europe’s DP camps to Canada, and promised to work in cooperation with the government to help find DPs who could meet Canada’s labour shortage.\(^{374}\) In doing so, the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO’s authority and succeeded in bringing *Volksdeutsche* to Canada.

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\(^{374}\) LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.1, Minutes of Meeting of CCCRR, 20 October 1947. See also Sauer, 238.
The CCCRR’s success in facilitating *Volksdeutsche* immigration allowed the CLWR to create specific programs to encourage Lutheran immigration. In 1948, the CLWR created a project that later became known as the “Lutheran Labour Scheme” in conjunction with the Missouri Synod and the Department of Labour. The Lutheran Labour Scheme occurred at an opportune moment. In the mid to late 1940s, Canadian cities and farms alike suffered from labour shortages that DP workers could easily fill. Employers proved willing to take on otherwise undesirable and oftentimes unilingual DP workers as a result of these shortages. High employment rates in skilled jobs across Canada furthermore lessened the chance that Canadian workers would see the unskilled DPs as threats to their own economic stability. The scheme suited the needs of both Lutherans and the Canadian government. The Canadian government received its necessary labourers, and the CLWR and Missouri Synod could facilitate the entry of *Volksdeutsche* immigrants.

The Lutheran Labour Scheme once again drew on the transnational connections between the CLWR and St. Louis in order to meet their shared goal of helping fellow Germans. Herzer and Meyer collaborated over the Lutheran Labour Scheme with the intention of using it as a “Seed Movement,” or *Musterknaben*. The so-called seed movement involved “bringing over of Baltic Lutherans, who have no relatives in Canada” with the intention that they would then initiate the legal proceedings under the close relative scheme to bring their family members to Canada. Although the Department of Labour placed a priority on finding DPs with agricultural experience, the CLWR had its

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375 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Executive Meeting, CLWR, 13 September 1949, Exhibit “E”: Memorandum to Clifton Monk from Stewart W. Herman, 5 August 1949.
376 Sauer, 250.
377 LA, ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting, 8 April 1948.
own priorities for Volksdeutsche labourers. “The Seed Movement idea will be the guiding policy in making selections,” the two men decided. The CLWR therefore prioritized Volksdeutsche that did not already have family in Canada, since they could migrate to Canada through other means. The goal, after all, was not simply to bring any DP to Canada. The CLWR and Missouri Synod specifically wanted Volksdeutsche immigrants so that they could encourage as much immigration from Germany as possible. Eydt made it clear to members of the Canada Synod that the “Lutheran Labour Scheme is intended primarily for the assistance of Volksdeutsche who have no relatives in Canada and are thus otherwise ineligible for admission.” Volksdeutsche with relatives in Canada should work with their families, not the CLWR, for assistance. The title “Lutheran Labour Scheme” was therefore rather dubious, given the actual motivations behind the plan. Herzer and Meyer were not concerned about meeting the Canadian government’s labour shortages, but rather saw the scheme as a way to fulfill their ethnic vision of encouraging German migration to Canada.

Connections to St. Louis remained important for the CLWR in order to operate the Lutheran Labour Scheme. Because the very notion of the seed movement involved the constant application and movement of people, it was a costly endeavor in constant need of financing. Herzer routinely visited St. Louis throughout 1949 and 1950 to demonstrate to Meyer, Sieck, and the EPC the continual need to fund the Labour Scheme. During his visits, Herzer made sure to emphasize how the program succeeded in accomplishing their shared goal of encouraging Volksdeutsche migration. “After a thorough investigation

378 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Third Annual Meeting of CLWR, 3 February 1949.
379 Minutes of the 89th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 5-8 June 1951, p. 96.
380 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, CLWR to EPC, 25 January 1949.
on the ground,” Herzer told Meyer, “I am more convinced that our Lutheran Labour Scheme is one of the most effective methods of dealing with many compassionate cases of the refugees in Germany.” Sieck and Meyer echoed Herzer’s message when the EPC met to discuss relief work. The two men “reported that Canada had rescinded many of its immigration restrictions which makes it possible for the immigration of many more refugees.” The EPC passed a resolution granting the CLWR twenty-five thousand dollars to continue its work. With the EPC’s moral and financial support once again, the transnational connection between the EPC and CLWR allowed for the Lutheran Labour Scheme’s success.

Despite the program’s early accomplishment, the CLWR soon found its work again hampered by the “Volksdeutsche issue.” By 1950, the CLWR received multiple reports stating that the majority of Volksdeutsche faced considerable difficulties gaining acceptance to the Lutheran Labour Scheme overseas. Although the program had many applicants, the Canadian government’s immigration agents overseas accepted comparatively few applicants.

Some [Volksdeutsche] were eliminated by the medical examination, some few by the security man, but by far the largest number were rejected because they had acquired German citizenship somewhere in the course of the years 1939 to 1945…This difficulty which is applicable to the greatest majority is threatening to undermine and even bring to a standstill the entire program because of its moral implications…It is a truth that during the course of the war years virtually all Volksdeutsche were repatriated in German occupied territories and in most cases naturalized whether they desired citizenship or not.

Although the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO, it appeared they could not avoid Canadian immigration officials who still rejected migrants they considered “the enemy.” A high number of Volksdeutsche rejections had serious implications for the CLWR and

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381 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Herzer to Lawrence Meyer, 10 May 1950.
382 CHI, EPCC, Box 1, Folder 10, Minutes of the Meeting of the EPC, 4 October 1950.
383 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Executive Meeting, Canadian Lutheran World Relief, 13 September 1949, Exhibit “E”: Memorandum to Monk from Herman, 5 August 1949.
CCCRR programs. If the program did not fulfill their yearly quota of securing seven hundred labourers for government programs, the government could legally cancel the CCCRR’s funding.\textsuperscript{384} The high rejection rate offered a further moral dilemma for the CLWR. Stewart Herman, a member of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) described how the Volksdeutsche were “virtually forced to lie in order to pass the Canadian requirements” or face rejection.\textsuperscript{385} Although they could not condone liars, they also could not condone the policies of Nazi Germany that they saw as unfairly punishing the German people. Herman described the Volksdeutsche who received German citizenship as similar to “hords (sic) of cattle branded without consideration of individual desires.”\textsuperscript{386} The German ethnicities of CLWR employees made them predisposed towards adopting a sympathetic attitude towards the Volksdeutsche. Unlike Canadian immigration officials, they gave Volksdeutsche the benefit of the doubt. They refused to believe that the Volksdeutsche willingly accepted German citizenship by the Nazis, and thus chose to believe this status was forced upon them. This sympathetic attitude prompted the CCCRR and CLWR officials to argue that the federal government needed to lift restrictions facing the Volksdeutsche. Because it was unwillingly forced upon the Volksdeutsche, they argued that German citizenship should not prevent their admittance to Canada.\textsuperscript{387} Their German ethnicity compelled CLWR leaders to continue looking for a solution the Volksdeutsche problem, even if it meant challenging and petitioning the federal government.

\textsuperscript{384} Sauer, 258.
\textsuperscript{385} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Executive Meeting, Canadian Lutheran World Relief, 13 September 1949, Exhibit “E”: Memorandum to Monk from Herman, 5 August 1949.
\textsuperscript{386} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Executive Meeting, CLWR, 13 September 1949, Exhibit “E”: Memorandum to Monk from Herman, 5 August 1949.
\textsuperscript{387} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Executive Meeting, CLWR, 13 September 1949, Exhibit “E”: Memorandum to Monk from Herman, 5 August 1949.
Race, Religion, and Confronting the Volksdeutsche Problem

The CCCRR and CLWR started to lobby the government to permit the entry of Volksdeutsche with German citizenship in the late 1940s. Although Canada was no longer actively at war with Germany, perceptions of Germans as “the enemy” proved difficult to overcome. Canadian politicians did not prioritize accepting more German immigrants to Canada. A 1946 Gallup poll found that thirty-four percent of Canadians supported banning future immigration from Germany. Politicians had very little to gain from supporting this cause, particularly when approximately one-third of their constituents opposed it. The CLWR and CCCRR had to overcome the stigma that the Volksdeutsche were enemies or Nazis. Both organizations succeeded in doing so by relying on tactics they developed during the war. German-Canadian Lutherans once again offset the difficulties their ethnicity posed by cultivating alliances with local political elites and appealing to Canada’s Christian and white character.

Regional ties between political elites and Waterloo County Lutherans once again laid the groundwork for collaboration between government officials and Lutheran interests. Specifically, Waterloo County members of the CLWR and CCCRR used their regional connections to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Senator William Euler, a fellow Lutheran and former Kitchener mayor, to lobby for changes in Canada’s immigration policy. Euler took a particular interest in the CLWR’s work and frequently attended Lutheran meetings in Waterloo County to eavesdrop on their immigration plans. Although he requested his name be kept out of their minutes, Euler used these interactions with the CLWR to keep abreast of their plans to bring

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388 Sauer, 251.
Volksdeutsche to Ontario. This relationship benefitted the CLWR, as Euler subsequently urged Mackenzie King and his fellow senators to study Canada’s immigration policy in greater detail throughout the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{389}

CLWR members from Waterloo County also travelled to Ottawa to meet with King, who approved of their mission based on their Christian principals and his own nostalgia of living in Waterloo County. The night prior to a February 1947 meeting with the CCCRR, King had a dream wherein he briefly found himself on streets that resembled “one leading to Waterloo in old Berlin…During the morning, I thought of it when one of the delegates who was present was a Minister now in Kitchener.” King later recounted that the dream seemed “a sort of vision which seemed symbolical in a way.”\textsuperscript{390} The CCCRR, consisting of “representatives of persons from European countries” asked him if “the door might be opened a little wider for refugees.” Although not generally sympathetic to immigration reform, King conceded that “the pleas made by these man (sic) was very strong. I was again touched by the regard which they seemed to express toward myself for action I had taken, evidencing friendship for the underprivileged etc.”

More significantly, the Christian character of the CCCRR gained King’s sympathies. Although King recognized that the CCCRR was German (or “European”) in background, the CCCRR presented itself as a primarily Christian institution. The Christian and humanitarian aspect to the CCCRR’s work of feeding and clothing the needy appealed to King’s Christian convictions. He later reflected that the CCCRR’s actions demonstrated that “Christian influence was making itself felt more strongly in the world.”\textsuperscript{391} The

\textsuperscript{389} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.2., Minutes of the Committee on Immigration and Resettlement (Eastern Division) of the Canada Committee of the LWF, 21 March 1949; Sauer, 248-249, 254.
\textsuperscript{390} LAC, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Diary, 7 February 1947.
\textsuperscript{391} LAC, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Diary, 7 February 1947.
CCCRR’s collective lobbying and international emphasis served to confirm King’s bias in that regard. By appealing to King as a likeminded Christian, the CCCRR’s liberal position on immigration reform received a warm welcome when it would have otherwise faced scorn.\(^{392}\)

Highlighting the religious, rather than ethnic, aspects of the CCCRR proved a common strategy for the organization and its political allies. The CCCRR made a conscious choice to highlight the organization’s common Christianity, rather than their shared German ethnicity. By emphasizing the humanitarian elements of their work, the CCCRR avoided accusations that they were a pro-German group.\(^{393}\) Although its members recognized that their purpose was to facilitate Volksdeutsche immigration in the privacy of their meetings, they tried to portray their work as based on Christian and humanitarian needs in public periodicals and correspondence. One article reiterated the fact that the CCCRR and CLWR had a higher purpose than simply supplying “the labor market with brawn.” Instead, their “Christian business” was to help “homeless people to find new homes…good Christians homes” throughout Canada.\(^{394}\) Walter Tucker, one of Herzer’s political connections from Western Canada, repeated this language when he advocated for the CCCRR in the House of Commons. Tucker emphasized the Christian, rather than ethnic character, when he stated that the Volksdeutsche already in Canada “never went to bed at night without getting down on their knees and thanking God that they had the privilege to come to this free country.”\(^{395}\) The DPs in Tucker’s speech were not ex-Nazis or German citizens, but rather devout Christians. The CCCRR and Tucker

\(^{392}\) King’s conservative positions on immigration are detailed in Kelley and Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic*, 316-317.
\(^{393}\) Sauer, 247.
\(^{394}\) Stewart W. Herman, “Canada Opens Her Doors To Refugees,” *Canada Lutheran*, March 1951, p. 5.
\(^{395}\) House of Commons Debates, 2 May 1947, p. 2703-2704.
hoped that cultivating a pious image would allow members in the House of Commons to relate to, and perhaps even sympathize with, the Volksdeutsche. Although they may not wish to help members of a former enemy nation, the CCCRR and their allies hoped politicians would want to help fellow Christians.

German-Canadian requests to change Volksdeutsche policy occurred during a time in which the Canadian federal government debated the country’s future immigration policy. At the end of the Second World War, the federal government did not yet have a department to specifically oversee immigration. Instead the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour in 1946 examined the nation’s immigration policies. The committee consisted of an eclectic mix of government officials that met with other branches of the government and the IRO to ultimately determine policy and establish immigration quotas.396 Despite the international emphasis on helping DPs for humanitarian reasons, the Canadian government continued to see immigration as a process that should benefit Canada instead of the DPs. King provided one of the clearest articulations of Canada’s postwar immigration policy in a 1947 speech. “I wish to make it quite clear,” King stated, “that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the person whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a ‘fundamental human right’ of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege.”397 Immigration was not an exclusively humanitarian endeavor, nor did King conceptualize immigration as a process that inherently benefitted them. Immigrants would only be accepted if it suited Canadian interests and conformed to the values they looked for in “desirable future citizens.”

396 Kelley and Trebilcock, 320.
397 Quoted in Kelley and Trebilcock, 317.
Canadian politicians put forward several different approaches to immigration in the late 1940s.\(^{398}\) For some members of Parliament, these debates provoked a fear that Canada was losing its British character. Lawrence Skey and Thomas Kidd, two Conservative MPs from Ontario, believed that any discussion of Canada’s immigration policy needed to include British immigrants. Skey told the House of Commons that many Britons wished to leave the United Kingdom and that Canada “must now be ready to receive the torch from these people.”\(^{399}\) If Canada needed to encourage immigration from any country, Kidd argued, it should obviously be the United Kingdom. Kidd mentioned that his constituents “are greatly disturbed because of the coldness of the government toward British immigration. The citizens of the British isles (sic) have been brought up to believe in the same ideals and the same type of constitutional government as we have. Our soldiers fought side by side for the same way of life.”\(^{400}\) Canada’s history as a white and British nation provided the basis of Kidd’s argument. “England spent millions of dollars in finding homes in Canada for the United Empire Loyalists…Just as those men had the pioneer spirit,” Kidd argued, “so have many of the young men in the United Kingdom who are desirous of living within the empire.”\(^{401}\) Anglophiles such as Skey and Kidd tried to convince their peers of the relevance of British immigration and history in

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399 House of Commons, 2 May 1947, p. 2702.

400 House of Commons Debates, 2 May 1947, p. 2708.

401 House of Commons Debates, 2 May 1947, p. 2710.
Canada. “Let us continue to perpetuate British traditions….Let us keep Canada British,” he concluded.  

While certainly not their intention, Skey and Kidd’s emphasis on keeping Canada “British” opened a door for proponents of Volksdeutsche migration to make their own case. Although Skey and Kidd applied their emphasis on the “pioneer spirit” with his “love of freedom” to potential British immigrants, Anglo-Canadians associated these values broadly with the white race. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, decades of European imperial rule perpetuated popular racial thinking that portrayed whites as inherently suited to nation building and governance. They alone, supposedly, had the genetic stock necessary to pioneer a functioning society. Because Skey and Kidd’s comments employed a coded language to describe broadly the quality of white settlers, advocates for Volksdeutsche immigration used the opportunity to demonstrate how Volksdeutsche could also embody the same “pioneer spirit” as British settlers due to their whiteness. MPs in favour of Volksdeutsche reform used Kidd’s language to demonstrate that the Volksdeutsche could conform to the British model of immigration Kidd described. Tucker mimicked Kidd’s argument by stating “our finest immigrants have been those who came to us from the various countries of Europe, who are of German ethnic origin. We have in Canada literally hundreds of thousands of people who are of that descent.” As whites, Germans embodied Kidd’s “pioneer spirit” and conform to so-called “Canadian” values. J.A. MacKinnon, the Minister of Mines and Resources, expressed sympathy for the Volksdeutsche based on these common cultural understandings of Germans as white and therefore good settlers:

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402 House of Commons Debates, 2 May 1947, p. 2710.
404 House of Commons Debates, 2 May 1947, p. 2704.
“I was brought up in the county of Bruce, Ontario, whose early settlers consisted of highland Scots and people of German origin. We did not know those people as anything but Canadians….In every way they were the best possible settlers and the best people we could have. They have made a great contribution to this country not only in western Ontario but all across Canada. I am very sympathetic to the suggestion that carefully selected people with that background should be allowed into Canada as soon as possible.”

Whiteness allowed German immigrants to historically conform to Canadian standards and would allow the Volksdeutsche to continue to do so as well.

The notion of Germans as “good” settlers proved to be a powerful discursive tool in which to combat the anti-German or anti-European sentiments of other MPs. During a 1949 debate in the House of Commons, Lewis Cardiff, a Conservative MP, suggested that the government’s current labour schemes involving DPs “is absolutely wrong. If you are going to bring d.p.’s out here as farm labour, then we want farmers, not people who merely call themselves agriculturalists and stay on farms for just as short a time as they possible can until they can find themselves a job elsewhere.” Other MPs quickly rallied to the defense of the government’s labour schemes, and the DPs in particular. MPs from across Canada vouched that farmers in their constituencies were overall satisfied with the quality of the DPs that worked on their farms. Wilbert Thatcher stated that “if there is one feature of any governmental policy that I can agree with, it has been their bringing in of these farm workers.” In fact, Thatcher wished “they would extend this program a little further and allow our Canadians of German descent to bring in their relatives from Germany.” Like others before him, Thatcher drew upon Canadian society’s shared understanding of equating whiteness with agricultural suitably. “In the past, Canada’s experience has been that the German people usually have made the best possible settlers,” he argued. “They have made good agriculturalists. I think we are missing a bet if we do

405 House of Commons Debates, 24 June 1948, p. 5776.
406 House of Commons, Debates 3 December 1949, p. 2681.
not take advantage of the huge pool of manpower in Germany at present time."\textsuperscript{407} Of course, Thatcher recognized that any potential \textit{Volksdeutsche} immigrants “will have to be screened” so that they did not admit any Nazis into Canada. With this caveat aside, Thatcher reminded his colleagues that “we are in the process of building a nation, and the manpower that we choose today is going to determine, to some extent at least, the kind of nation we shall have in the future…There are many reasons why we should change our present policy towards Germans.”\textsuperscript{408} If immigrants determined Canada’s future, Thatcher’s speech made it clear that Canada’s future needed to consist of white immigrants who could politically and culturally conform to Canada while contributing to it through their hard work. The cultural characteristics prescribed to the white race allowed the \textit{Volksdeutsche} to appear as ideal immigrants and overcome any associations with their Nazi past.

The frequent associations between the \textit{Volksdeutsche} and white qualities such as pioneering, settlement, and agriculture, eventually paid off for the CCCRR and their political allies. In March 1950, the Canadian government issued PC 1606 which granted the CCCRR’s request that \textit{Volksdeutsche} with German citizenship could now migrate to Canada. A few months later, the government expanded the order by no longer classifying German nationals as “enemy aliens.”\textsuperscript{409} The CCCRR interpreted PC 1606 as an important victory for their organization.\textsuperscript{410} The CCCRR’s persistence, as well as Canada’s desire to establish positive relations with West Germany, played an important role in achieving PC

\textsuperscript{407} House of Commons Debates, 3 December 1949, p. 2682.
\textsuperscript{408} House of Commons, 3 December 1949, p. 2682.
\textsuperscript{410} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Meeting of the Officers of CLWR 12 Sept 1950.
Yet whiteness proved an equally important, if at times invisible, factor in ensuring *Volksdeutsche* admission. While the *Volksdeutsche* were not ideal immigrants, their whiteness gave them enough cultural currency to overcome the political stigma attached to their character.

**Gender Relations and Immigration Work**

If race played an important yet subtle role in framing the *Volksdeutsche* debate in the public sphere, gender played a significant role in shaping the internal dynamics of the Canada and Missouri Synod’s immigration work. The large-scale relief campaigns required that all members of Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County needed to participate if they had any hope of alleviating suffering in postwar Germany. Patriarchal gender relations within Lutheran communities dictated how congregations could participate in this process. As relief fell under the branch of charity, local pastors assumed that German Lutheran women and youth would collectively work towards meeting their fundraising goals. Pastors and synod leaders, in contrast, did not need to do this work themselves. As male leaders, they only needed to inspire others to complete these tasks and to demonstrate their importance through their sermons and newsletters. While relief work therefore involved Lutheran men and women, only men received official recognition for their work. Pastors often commended one another for conducting relief and immigration work, which served to reinforce themselves as the authority figures within their community. Even though it was mainly Lutheran women who actually completed the tasks associated with relief work, gendered notions of “good”

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411 Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry*, 90.
women as inherently subservient and uninterested in leadership roles ensured that pastors took credit for their accomplishments denied them the respect and praise they deserved.

German Lutheran women accomplished the vast majority of relief work for postwar Europe. When the CLWR started its campaign to send food overseas, its leaders recommended that women and youth initiate campaigns at their local congregations. They suggested that each congregation “form a committee representative of the Ladies Aid, Church Council, Young People Society, to promote this programme, or some particular society such as the Ladies should take the lead.”412 As natural caregivers, it seemed obvious to the CLWR’s male leadership that women would extend their other charity work to include food and clothing campaigns in Germany. Their previous experience with fundraising for their churches would help the postwar relief campaign run smoothly. The CLWR’s male leaders believed “the Ladies…are especially able and efficient when it comes to the practical aspects of organizing the gathering, the processing and the sharing of food.” They argued that “the success of this programme depends, above all, on the whole-hearted support of our Ladies!”413 The postwar relief campaign resembled other Lutheran fundraising efforts from previous years. Although the food and clothing campaigns operated on a larger scale than other charities, they involved the same principled skills of purchasing, canning, and preserving food and clothing. Regardless, these campaigns made heavy demands on the women and youth willing to participate. During the early months of the Missouri Synod’s clothing campaign, German Lutheran women and youth in the Walther League gathered at the Concordia Publishing House in St. Louis four nights a week. They worked long hours sorting and packaging acceptable

412 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., CLWR Share the Food Programme, 6 June 1947.
413 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., CLWR Share the Food Programme, 6 June 1947.
clothing, often until after nine o’clock at night. This labour, of course, was unpaid. The synod’s women and youth did the actual work required to send relief to Germany, while Lutheran men more often than not simply wrote about it.

Participating in relief work often became a family affair. Although German Lutheran men rarely discussed the important roles their wives played in relief work, circumstances forced them to tacitly acknowledge their wives’ authority. If a particular CLWR executive happened to be unavailable or away on business, those who wished to reach him would often turn to his wife for assistance instead. In 1954, for instance, Hugh Whitteker needed to reach Arthur Mehlenbacher to discuss the CLWR’s relief program. Away on business in Western Canada, however, he turned to his wife Ruby Mehlenbacher for help instead. After discussing the program’s future, he told Ruby that “in reading this letter over I find that I have set up a sort of puzzle that will occupy some of your lonesome hours while you are alone.” Whitteker referred to the fact that his letter made such frequent use of the pronoun “you,” Ruby would have to determine which “of the pronouns ‘you’ on the preceding page are directed to yourself and which to Arthur.” However, Whitteker recognized that their work “has developed into a sort of family co-operative affair you might just decide that they belong to both.” Arthur’s absence forced Whitteker, somewhat unwillingly, to recognize that Ruby was just as capable as carrying out relief work as her fully ordained husband. Arthur later recognized Ruby’s involvement in their work, but only in the context of a shared error. In the mid-1950s, Ruby and Arthur volunteered to compile statistics for the CLWR’s relief campaign. To their horror, they realized they forgot to include the name of a Canada Synod pastor in

414 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
415 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2., C.H. Whitteker to Ruby Mehlenbacher, 15 May 1954.
their statistics. “This missed statistician Stockmann and our own triple checking,” Arthur wrote. “My wife says she is going to skip to Mexico now,” he later joked.\(^{416}\) Although this comment was made in jest, it suggests the precarious nature of women’s involvement in work that the synod gendered as masculine. Although a minor detail, pastors involved with Lutheran organizations often took the accurate compiling of statistics seriously, and often took offense when any errors were replicated.\(^{417}\) As Arthur’s wife, Ruby knew that any bruised egos would direct their criticisms towards her involvement.

Outside of conducting the daily tasks necessary to carry out relief programs, German Lutheran women who worked as secretaries in the Canada and Missouri Synod often emerged as *de facto* sources of information on immigration policy. Unable to contact any of the Missouri Synod’s leadership, one layman reached out to Olivia Scott, Lawrence Meyer’s secretary, asking for advice on sponsoring DPs. The layman hoped for a more liberal policy that would allow his relatives to come to the United States. He asked Scott about the typical procedures, and who in the government he should contact for more information. “Please look into this for us, since we want action,” he asked.\(^{418}\) Secretaries similar to Scott knew just as much about relief work and immigration policy as their pastor-employers, as they carried out the daily business or organizing and replying to correspondence. Through their important bureaucratic role in the synod, women also became involved in the political aspects of DP work.

The Missouri and Canada Synod maintained traditional gender roles that prioritized men’s work over women’s labour, and only celebrated women’s involvement

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\(^{416}\) LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2., Mehlenbacher to Jacobi, 12 July 1954.

\(^{417}\) As the Canada Synod’s statistician, Otto Stockmann even resented the notion that he could make any errors. To challenge Stockmann’s statistics was to open yourself up to severe rebuttal.

\(^{418}\) CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Hartenberger to Scott, 25 October 1948.
in synod affairs when it related to their role as caregivers. Bloedel, for instance, repeatedly diminished the varied contributions women made to St. Louis’s food and clothing campaign by only praising their charity efforts to help German children. In his retrospective of St. Louis’s relief campaign, Bloedel wrote that providing food and clothes to children “appealed especially to the women, and helping orphans and orphan homes became the particular province of the Luther Women’s Missionary League.”

Bloedel did not need to include why precisely the LWML felt invested in German orphanages. His readers knew too well that, as women, Lutheran women should be predisposed to helping children over the more masculine pursuits of rebuilding churches and theological seminaries. The tendency of synod leaders to write in the passive voice further divested women of any action or authority. In 1947, the Lutheran Women’s Missionary League conducted a fundraising campaign throughout Missouri and Illinois to raise money for Lawrence Meyer to travel to Germany and personally distribute food and clothing to Germany’s needy. Although they conducted one of the synod’s most profitable fundraisers, the synod leadership denied the LWML official recognition. Bloedel later recounted the campaign by stating the local “district has placed at [Meyer’s] disposal the sum of $20,000 for the purchase of orphanage equipment.”

Bloedel’s seemingly neutral account of the campaign embodied the synod’s strong patriarchal assumptions about women’s work. First, Bloedel’s use of the passive voice managed to ensure that he stripped the LWML from their role as the primary actors in the campaign. Instead, he situated Meyer as the one spending and conducting relief work overseas. He portrayed Meyer as the individual taking action and coming to Germany’s aid, not the

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419 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
420 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
LWML. Second, Bloedel made the assumption that the LWML money would be used on orphanages in Germany. Meyer’s account of his 1947 trip to Germany demonstrates that he used this money on a variety of different projects, and not solely on orphanages.\(^{421}\) Bloedel’s assumption that the LWML would express interest in only children’s work, however, prevented him for providing a more nuanced understanding of the variety of charitable work Lutheran women conducted. The patriarchal assumptions by the synod’s male officials wrote Lutheran women out of their contemporary and retrospective writings of the synod’s relief campaign. Dismissing women’s contributions allowed pastors to once again portray themselves in positions of leadership and authority. As both men and pastors in their community, they were used to thinking of themselves as leaders with agency and control, despite the evidence suggesting women took on these roles as well.

Gendered use of religious language further separated the experiences of Lutheran men and women who participated in relief work. Since German Lutherans in both St. Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help DPs on religious grounds, they often used religious language during their relief campaigns. These sentiments often contained gendered language and implications that reinforced patriarchal gender norms within the church. Although both men and women saw their work as a religious calling, they expressed their relationship with God in very different terms. German Lutheran men often compared themselves directly to God or Jesus Christ and believed that the two directly influenced their work. Their roles as leaders allowed them to exhibit Christ-like traits and attributes. Bloedel, for instance, described the EPC’s programs as “glorious, Christ-like

\(^{421}\) Meyer’s visits to West Germany are covered in the following chapter.
and God-pleasing work of mercy.”^{422} Bloedel’s description is tame when compared to hyperbolic comparisons other pastors used to describe their participation in relief work. Other pastors claimed that God almost moved through them in order to complete His will. They continually reiterated that they had God’s blessings and authority to conduct relief work among Europe’s poor. Recounting a 1950 trip to Germany, Herzer told his male peers how “the objective of this trip was to remove, with the Lord’s help, various impediments and difficulties which had bogged down our refugee work in Germany and Austria.” Herzer stated that this was no easy task, but “the knowledge that I was proceeded and accompanied by the prayers of thousands of Christians in Canada not only gave me courage, but accounted largely for the success of my mission.”^{423} By expressing his faith that both God and Canadian Lutherans prayed for him, Herzer reaffirmed his position as an ethnic elite within the CLWR and CCCRR. God and Christ acted as functional metaphors for Lutheran men to use to reaffirm their natural and “God-given” right to lead their institutions and churches.

Men drew upon their perceived commonalities with Christ as a common tactic to encourage and inspire one another to accomplish more work for the church. If “good” Lutheran women were expected to accomplish relief work, it was the duty of a “good” male pastor to inspire his followers to meet their monthly fundraising goals. Responding to the lackluster relief campaigns in the early 1950s, Eric Reble took his fellow pastors to task for not leading by Christ’s example. In a Canada Lutheran article, Eric described how congregations stopped contributing to the CLWR and Lutheran World Action (LWA) charities as frequently as they did immediately following the war. “The

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^{422} CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.

^{423} CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 50, Herzer to Meyer, 10 May 1950.
enthusiasm has gone. The L.W.A. quota is just another burdensome chore to be met by the congregation year after year,” he wrote. “But we know that’s not true. We know that L.W.A. is still an opportunity for us to become Christs to our neighbours.”

By making financial contributions, Eric encouraged other men to demonstrate that they could embody the values of giving like Christ. He told laymen to listen more consciously to their pastors’ attempts to fundraise. He scolded laymen by telling them that Christ certainly would not complain about being asked to feed the hungry or heal the sick. “No, you’re right, that’s not the kind of a Christ we have, is it?” he asked rhetorically. “Nor do I think that you and I have any business saying, ‘Oh, no, not again!’ when Christ comes calling to us for our help. Church Member, you look at the cross of Christ and then decide what you want to do about L.W.A.”

Eric’s article placed the failure of the early 1950s relief campaigns on the shoulders of laymen who did not rise to the level of Christ’s example. Further still, his analogy affirmed the connection between the local pastor as the voice of Christ. Eric’s comparison encouraged congregants not to see their pastor as an adversary nagging them for more money, but hoped that laymen would hear Christ speaking through their pastors. By making this comparison, Eric and other pastors conformed to masculine standards in the church that expected male pastors to lead effectively by meeting synod and congregational goals.

In contrast, German Lutheran women expressed a more passive relationship with God. Women believed they laboured for God rather than the male emphasis on working through God. Strict gender norms within the church prevented women from speaking

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about God and Christ in such exaggerated ways. While men put their actions on equal footing as the charity of Christ and will of God, Lutheran women portrayed their actions as showing subservience to God. This is particularly true of Irma Lehmann and Katrine Petersens, two Lutheran women that the CLWR hired as “port workers” in Halifax and Montreal respectively. As port workers, Lehmann and Petersens greeted newly arrived Lutheran DPs in Halifax and Montreal each week. They had far greater contact with a larger number of DPs than most of the male pastors who championed their own Christ-like behaviour. Yet, Lehmann and Peterson’s language adopted a far more subdued tone than their male counterparts. In their monthly reports submitted to the Canada Synod, Lehmann and Petersens often stressed their subservient position to God and Christ. “I submit this report with a deep sense of gratitude to our Lord and to those in authority over me for having been given the opportunity of reaching out a helping hand to the newcomers,” Lehmann wrote in one report. “I pray for continued strength and guidance in my work ahead.” Unlike her male colleagues, Lehmann hoped for God’s guidance and expressed no certainty that God blessed her work unconditionally. Her uncertainty often dominated her reflections on her own labour. “The outlook on immigration for 1954 is very bright as God willing another 16,000 newcomers are expected and we believe that there shall be a good number of Lutherans among them. We are praying for God’s guidance in our work,” she later wrote. Petersons’s language in her reports matched Lehmann’s emphasis on subordination and uncertainty. Even after receiving the praise of

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426 Katrine’s last name is inconsistently spelt. Some documents refer to her as “Petersens” whereas others list her name as the likely anglicized “Petersons.” I have selected to use Petersons as this is the spelling Katrine personally used most often.

427 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.2., National Committee for Canada LWF, Executive Committee Meeting, 14 September, 1956.

428 Minutes of the 92nd Annual Convention Minutes of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 15-17 June 1954, p. 115.
her male peers, Petersons diminished her own contributions to the church. After receiving accolades, she wrote that “the trust and confidence of the LWF NCC shown to the Port worker is…gratefully acknowledged, with a willing heart and mind to do the best in serving our Lutheran brethren, which is a Service of our Church and our Lord.”

Lehmann and Petersons’s personal writing therefore reflected broader trends in gender relations within the Lutheran community, and within North American culture more broadly. While the synod’s male leaders acted confidently on God’s authority, Lehmann and Petersons expressed doubt. Biblical and theological texts in both the Missouri and Canada Synod stressed the subservience of women to men. Discussion of gender relations within Lutheran communities throughout the twentieth century inevitably involved at least one pastor citing St. Paul’s assertion that he did not “permit a woman to teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet.” Pastors, as community leaders, routinely praised subservience and some Lutheran women came to adopt and enforce these values in their congregations as well. Women’s groups at Lutheran congregations routinely incorporated the theme of servitude into their conferences and meetings. The LWML advertised its 1947 convention around the slogan “serve the Lord with gladness” to stress servitude as not only a positive quality, but also a God-pleasing one. On other occasions, the two port workers directly referenced Biblical passages on gender relations. Petersons wrote that “we pray that the Almighty may continue to bless us and to give us strength for this work in which so much satisfaction and profound

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429 Minutes of the 89th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 5-8 June 1951, p. 91-92.
431 See for example CHI, Luther Women’s Missionary League Collection, Conventions Box, 1947 Convention Folder.
happiness can be found.”

The culture surrounding women’s secondary role in the church shaped their immigration reports to the synod’s male leaders. Their professionalism and knowledge often lay hidden beneath the subservient tone contained in their monthly reports.

The synod’s patriarchal and paternalistic nature shaped relations between the synod’s male leaders and its port workers. Despite their important status in DP work and professionalism, the male leadership routinely diminished their status through comments on their gender. After meeting Petersons for the first time, Hugh Whitteker wrote to a colleague that he was “very favourably impressed with Miss Petersons. She is a girl with a great deal of personality, pleasant mannerisms, attractive, easy to talk to and I am sure she will be easy to work with. She speaks several languages (7 someone told me) and she likes her work very much.”

Evidently, Whitteker’s need to affirm his status as a qualified community leader led him to focus disproportionately on Petersons’s appearance and personality rather than her credentials, which surpassed his own. Despite her many qualifications, Whitteker saw Petersons as a woman first, and a social worker second. Jokes about the “girls” circulated within the synod, particularly when Petersons and Lehmann requested greater rights for themselves in their jobs as port workers. Both port workers had a verbal agreement with the synod that they would be allowed to take several weeks of vacation during the year. Lehmann, in particular, valued this time so that she could return to Germany to visit her ailing mother. When Petersons and Lehmann insisted that the synod uphold its promise of vacation time through a written contract, Mehlenbacher joked to Whitteker that “I’m in the stew again as always.” He told

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432 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.2., Minutes Annual Meeting National Committee For Canada LWF, 30 November 1954.
433 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2., C.H. Whitteker to Gilbert T. Monson, 28 January 1949.
Whitteker that his “two girl friends in Halifax and Montreal want to know about vacation. I must ask for a little information. Had you ever intimated any plan of vacation for these workers?”434 Far from a trivial concern, the synod issued a questionnaire to prominent pastors asking their thoughts on allowing Lehmann and Pettersons to take a vacation. The pastors responded favourably, but debated whether a month was too long or too short and other aspects of their request. Even though pastors took annual vacations without facing any bureaucratic hurdles, pastors scrutinized Pettersons’s and Lehmann’s request for a vacation from their work.435 Pastors rarely faced the same level of paternalism and regulation the two port workers encountered over such a simple request. Although Lehmann and Pettersons rivaled, and often surpassed, the linguistic ability and daily workload of male pastors, their gender allowed the synod’s leadership to place their requests under greater scrutiny than would otherwise be normal.

Bloedel’s management of the Missouri Synod’s campaign for food relief in St. Louis embodies how women’s important role in relief work was undermined by German Lutheran masculinity. Like relief programs carried out at the congregational level, Bloedel relied upon the knowledge of German Lutheran women to help him run food relief program. “Housewives,” he wrote in a later report, “were questioned about food selections. Information was secured about packing techniques.”436 One of the so-called housewives Bloedel consulted was Margaret Graebner, the daughter of Concordia Seminary professor Theodore Graebner. As a woman, Graebner could not obtain a high-ranking position in the synod’s relief program. She therefore sought a position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as a dietitian as it did not have

434 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2., Mehlenbacher to Whittaker, 4 March 1955.
435 See the questionnaires in LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2.
436 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
the synod’s same qualms about hiring women. Before Bloedel sent out the list of acceptable food to the synod, he submitted his list of proposed food items to Graebner to ensure that it met UN approval. “To our great surprise,” Bloedel wrote, “she approved the entire list.” Rather than commend Graebner for her inside knowledge of the UN’s relief program, Bloedel used the opportunity to congratulate himself. “This compliment, coming from a member of the fair sex, schooled and skilled in the art of selecting and preparing food, flattered us – a mere man – and richly rewarded us for our efforts. However, since this may seem to be self-praise, we shall pass over the matter in silence.”

Aside from Bloedel’s ironic use of “silence,” his interaction with Graebner highlights the practice of Lutheran men dismissing the role of Lutheran women from relief work inaction. Their tendency to dismiss Lutheran women while comparing themselves to God or Christ helped Lutheran men to solidify their leadership positions as ethnic elites within the church. Although the amount of work Lutheran women conducted for the postwar relief campaigns surpassed those of Lutheran men, patriarchal gender norms ensured that public discussion of relief work highlighted male achievement over the consistent work conducted by German Lutheran women.

Old and New Directions in Immigration, 1951-1960

The CCCRR and CLWR’s victory passing PC 1606 did not end their struggles admitting Volksdeutsche to Canada. Although a shared whiteness proved effective in mitigating political concerns for most MPs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) still believed certain Volksdeutsche immigrants posed a security threat. William Kelly, an RCMP officer in charge of admitting visas to Europeans, sponsored a directive that

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437 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d.
refused to admit any *Volksdeutsche* involved with the Nazi Party’s most essential military and intelligence communities. This directive encompassed Nazi organizations such as the Waffen-SS or concentration camp guards.\(^{438}\) Thus, another, albeit smaller, group of *Volksdeutsche* found themselves barred from entering Canada just as the CCCRR assumed that the door had finally swung open. Although PC 1606 helped ease restrictions on the *Volksdeutsche* with German citizenship, Herzer realized that “now, many in our camp are being rejected [on] account [of] membership in the Nazi party.”\(^{439}\) The RCMP’s decision to bar even a segment of the *Volksdeutsche* population disappointed the CLWR. The German ethnicities of those involved with the CLWR clouded their ability to see the RCMP’s decision as anything other than anti-German. Their sympathetic attitudes towards the *Volksdeutsche* prevented them from believing that any German would willingly serve in Hitler’s army. This blanket support for *Volksdeutsche* innocence meant the CLWR maintained that they should not be punished simply for being German, regardless of their associations with Nazism.\(^{440}\) The RCMP’s influence of government policy made it clear to the CLWR that the fight for *Volksdeutsche* rights was clearly not yet over. Accordingly, the CLWR reaffirmed its dedication to remain a member of the CCCRR in January 1951. They decided that they would continue their membership in the interfaith organization “until the end of the emergency, i.e. as long as *Volksdeutsche* need our assistance.”\(^{441}\) While the government’s resistance to unreserved *Volksdeutsche* immigration tested their patience, pastors in the CLWR recognized the CCCRR’s necessity as long as their fellow Germans needed assistance.

\(^{438}\) Margolian, 98-101.  
\(^{439}\) LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Meeting of the Officers of CLWR 12 Sept 1950.  
\(^{440}\) LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Meeting of the Officers of CLWR 12 Sept 1950.  
\(^{441}\) LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Fifth Annual Meeting of CLWR, 17 January 1951.
The CLWR’s difficult relationship with the Canadian government over the Volksdeutsche issue soured relations between the two groups. It seemed that they would never be able to admit their Volksdeutsche brethren without stipulations, regardless of how many changes in immigration policy they helped prompt. As a result, the CLWR altered its focus in the early 1950s back to its original aims. A series of meetings in 1951 allowed the CLWR leaders to voice several concerns with the Lutheran Labour Scheme’s future and their relationship with the Canadian government. They noted that the scheme’s collaboration with the government often resulted in the obligation to help non-Lutheran families to appease the federal government. These concessions generated a great deal of cost that the CLWR no longer wished to finance. Paying for labourers that the government wished to help obviously did not fit with the CLWR’s goal of helping their fellow Germans, and CLWR officials grew to resent their obligation to provide a service they believed the government should offer. Furthermore, these non-Lutheran labourers “seem to assume an air of independence” and expected the CLWR to help them with other problems in which the CLWR had no interest. Their charitable attitudes did not extend to all people fleeing Europe, especially when they felt that these individuals simply used the CLWR “as an avenue” to come to Canada. Close collaboration with the government and its disappointing results prompted the CLWR executives to wonder whether they were “losing sight of the fact that ours is a ‘seed movement’” meant for Volksdeutsche immigrants. The CLWR could not hope to, and did not wish to, solve Europe’s many issues regarding homelessness, starvation, and displaced people. They

442 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Report on a Meeting held to discuss the Canadian Lutheran Labor Scheme, 7 April 1951; LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Officers Meeting, 1 October 1951.
443 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Officers Meeting, 1 October 1951.
wished only to help German DPs and started to realize that their relationship with the government pulled them away from their ultimate objective.

The CLWR decided that they needed to begin the year 1952 with a stronger sense of their priorities. They needed to return to their original aims of helping the \textit{Volksdeutsche}, rather than cooperating with the Canadian government. They placed their emphasis on “re-uniting of families where we have already brought a single man or a single girl to this country” through the Lutheran Labour Scheme and finding “single men and single girls, chiefly domestics, who are genuinely interested to act as a ‘seed’ to bring their parents and immediate family to Canada.”\footnote{LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Officers Meeting, 1 October 1951.} Solidifying their firmly pro-German and anti-government direction, Reble passed a motion affirming that the “C.L.W.R. is not in a position to be of assistance financially at the present time” to non-Lutheran labourers that the government wished to sponsor.\footnote{LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting 2 October 1951.} If the Canadian government wished to prioritize their own labourers over the \textit{Volksdeutsche}, the CLWR decided that they could pay for them on their own. As a German and Lutheran institution, the CLWR affirmed it would only help other members of their ethnic and religious group.

The constant advocacy work on behalf of the \textit{Volksdeutsche} caused some CLWR members to express disillusionment with the Canadian government. Although they gave the appearance of a cooperative spirit, CLWR members privately criticized the government and its immigration policy. “The humanitarian aspect of immigration is gone and has been replaced by Labour needs and specifications,” Herzer lamented.\footnote{LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting, 11 May 1954.} Clifton Monk, another CLWR executive, shared these views. “Mass Government immigration
does not always lend itself to the humanitarian approach,” he believed.\textsuperscript{447} In their eyes, the government seemed to treat German and \textit{Volksdeutsche} immigration as secondary or incidental in their policy planning. While they felt motivated to help DPs due to their shared ethnicity, the government seemed motivated only by labour regulations. Statistics presented at the 1953 CLWR meeting seemed to confirm their cynical perspective. They noted that, despite their best efforts, immigration from Britain consisted of over 32,000 immigrants whereas German immigration sat around 25,000. “Apparently Canada’s immigration policy is to maintain British immigration the first place,” Monk derisively stated.\textsuperscript{448} The constant problem surrounding \textit{Volksdeutsche} immigration even made Eydt question whether the CLWR should “get out of immigration work gradually.”\textsuperscript{449} Monk conceded that Germany’s improved economic situation by 1954 might provide “an appropriate time to ease graciously out of the field of church-sponsored immigration.”\textsuperscript{450} However, the desire to continue to help their German brethren ultimately convinced members of the CLWR to continue advocating for \textit{Volksdeutsche} and assisting their immigration. As long as the \textit{Volksdeutsche} required assistance, Monk believed that “it would be wrong for us to step out of the overseas field.”\textsuperscript{451} The government could not be trusted to adequately care for the \textit{Volksdeutsche} and other German DPs. As long the government continued to embody this attitude, they believed the CLWR served a purpose. Their German brethren would not go unrepresented as long as the CLWR remained vigilant.

\textsuperscript{447} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Ninth Annual Meeting of CLWR, 7 December 1954.
\textsuperscript{448} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting, 2 November 1953; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, Memorandum for Albert Jacobi from Monk, 4 November 1953.
\textsuperscript{449} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Committee Meeting, 10 November 1954.
\textsuperscript{450} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Ninth Annual Meeting of CLWR, 7 December 1954.
\textsuperscript{451} LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Ninth Annual Meeting of CLWR, 7 December 1954.
Although the CLWR continued its work with the Volksdeutsche, the organization’s scope broadened considerably starting in the mid-1950s. Germany’s improved economic conditions meant that the organization’s work no longer appeared as immediate and catastrophic as the 1940s. Immigration from Germany continued, but without the pressure and urgency that characterized the previous years. Furthermore, the West German government seemed less interested in promoting immigration, prompting the CLWR to question in 1954 whether “this may be the last big year for migration from Germany.”

Germany’s slight recovery allowed the CLWR to begin looking elsewhere to send its relief. By the early 1950s, the CLWR discussed allocating a portion of their relief work to the needy in Korea, Syria, and Palestine. Relief work in Germany became so routine by 1953 that it barely warranted discussion among the CLWR executive. While the executive started to earnestly discuss providing clothing to other nations around the globe, the program for German relief largely ran itself. In the organization’s minutes that year, the secretary simply recorded “this matter is self-explanatory” under the section for Germany.

By 1953, the clothing and food campaigns for Germany proved well established and in little need of heavy monitoring. The CLWR felt comfortable with their decision to prioritize other nations starting in the mid-1950s largely because their American peers “continued to ship foodstuffs in quantities amounting to thousands of tons” to Germany. With their American peers now helping, they could turn their attention elsewhere.

452 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Officers Meeting, 13 February 1954; LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting, 2 November 1953.
453 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of Sixth Annual Meeting of CLWR, 5 December 1951; LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Officers Meeting, 5 April 1952.
454 LA ESF, 33 CLWR, Folder 33.2.1., Minutes of CLWR Executive Meeting, 2 November 1953.
455 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.23.2., Canadian Lutheran World Relief – This is the Record, 1954.
The Missouri Synod also surrendered its involvement in immigration work to the NLC during the mid-1950s. Their withdrawal from DP work, however, was motivated primarily by theological differences. The Missouri Synod promised to pay for a portion of the NLC’s immigration work, but slowly started to claw back its financial commitments throughout the 1950s. By 1955, Meyer threatened to completely pull the synod’s funding. Although he officially claimed that DP work was simply too expensive for the synod to continue, the synod’s traditional stance on letting individual congregations conduct DP work lay at the heart of his reasoning.\textsuperscript{456} He argued that congregations would be better suited to determine budgets and run DP work than national organizations like the NLC.\textsuperscript{457} Although the synod continued to contribute to DP work financially, their moral investment in the cooperative NLC cause started to wane after 1955.

The CLWR’s slow withdrawal from German DP work strained the previously positive transnational connections between North American Lutherans. With Germany showing signs of recovery, the various groups of North American Lutherans had less reason to cooperate as urgently as before. The internal dynamics of the CLWR also weakened the relationship between American and Canadian Lutherans. Since its inception, the CLWR represented a shaky alliance between Lutherans in Western Canada and Ontario. Pastors in Western Canada interpreted the CLWR as the creation of a united group of Canadian Lutherans that would prioritize Canadian Lutheran affairs and eliminate competition between Lutheran synods. They believed that the CLWR would

\textsuperscript{456} CHI, Eugene C. Gunther Collection (hereafter EGC), Box 1, Minutes Folder, Lutheran Refugee Service (hereafter LRS) Minutes, 20 December 1954; CHI, EGC, Box 1, Minutes Folder, Meyer to Oscar Benson, 17 January 1955.

\textsuperscript{457} CHI, EGC, Box 1, Minutes Folder, Meyer to Paul Empie, 9 March 1955. Paul Empie personally believed that Meyer wanted to withdraw from the program because he disliked the idea that Missouri Synod money was being used at NLC congregations, in any capacity. See CHI, EGC, Box 1, Minutes Folder, Empie to Meyer, 11 March 1955.
grant them a national platform to exercise a political agenda along the same lines as other Protestant denominations in Canada, such as the Anglican or United churches. In contrast, members of the Canada Synod saw the CLWR as the first step to cooperating with other global Lutheran bodies. Pastors from the Canada Synod advocated for cooperation with American Lutherans due to their historic relationships with the ULCA and Missouri Synod. Transnational ties were the norm for both groups, and they hoped to continue working with American Lutherans and international Lutheran institutions like the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). Western Canada pastors saw the CLWR’s creation as a national moment, whereas the Canada Synod saw it through a global lens.

The competing perspectives between CLWR members in the West and in Ontario often led to passive aggressive arguments that motivated both sides to try and claim as many leadership positions within the organization as possible. By the 1950s, however, it became clear to both sides the CLWR’s leadership primarily consisted of pastors from Western Canada. Herzer, alongside his peers Earl Treusch and Clifton Monk, dominated CLWR affairs. Their vision of the CLWR as an independent and nationalist body often came at the expense of American cooperation by the late 1950s. With the actual admission of DPs slowing in the late 1950s, Monk believed that the CLWR needed to transition from encouraging immigration to providing social services for DPs in Canada. Finding housing, employment, and improving language skills were all services that the

458 The frequency with which Western Canadian pastors articulated this view came to dominate historical writing on Canadian Lutherans, as scholars associated with the church reflected on and wrote their histories of the postwar era. See for example Norman J. Threinen, *A Religious-Cultural Mosaic: A History of Lutherans in Canada* (Vulcan, Alberta: Today’s Reformation Press, 2006). Granquist also remarks on this teleological tendency within Lutheran historical writing. See Granquist, *Lutherans in America*, 3.

459 Lloyd Schaus and Norman Berner, both Waterloo Lutheran Seminary graduates, even resigned from their positions due to the perceived hostility against them in the West. Herzer and other Western Canadian pastors reportedly belittled Reble and Canada Synod congregations in the CLWR’s early years as well. See for example LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Lloyd Schaus to John Reble, 26 April 1946; LA, ESF, Folder 50.2.4.2, Traugott Herzer to Reble, 26 April 1946.
CLWR could theoretically provide. Monk, somewhat enviously, noted that the Canada Synod already sponsored several “immigration service centers” in Ontario cities that provided these services. Monk proposed that the CLWR create several of these centers in Western Canadian cities with large DP populations as well. As the CLWR’s future lay in providing social services, he proposed that the CLWR sponsor the creation of these centers while also assuming control of the Canada Synod’s immigration centers. The CLWR would become integral to DP work in Canada at a national level and continue to help German immigrants once they arrived in Canada.

Monk did not have a vision of this future beyond these vague plans of expansion. He did little to account for the Canada Synod’s relationship with the ULCA, which helped them finance these immigration centers. Bengt Hoffman, who had positions in both the ULCA and LWF, doubted the feasibility of Monk’s plan. He told Monk that he assumed “that the ULCA will agree to CLWR taking over their centres…But this approach will not solve the larger question of over-all co-ordination.”

Monk’s imprecise plans did not clarify whether the CLWR would continue a partnership with the American ULCA or terminate this relationship in the name of Canadian nationalism and CLWR independence. Monk contacted Earl Treusch, another ecumenically-minded pastor in Western Canada, in the following weeks in order to devise a budget for the proposed immigration centers. The two men estimated that a $50,000 loan would help them fulfill their vision of opening and maintaining new centers for DPs. They subsequently put forward a proposal requesting funds “for Canadian Missions for the purpose of reclaiming new Canadian Lutherans for the Lutheran Church.”

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concerns, the proposal sat uneasily between CLWR idealism and reality. Monk and Treusch wanted the immigration centers to strengthen Canadian control over Canadian Lutheran affairs, while simultaneously requesting money from global and American Lutheran organizations to do so.

American Lutherans resented the CLWR’s request for money couched in the language of Canadian nationalism. Paul Empie, one of the NLC’s executives, commented that the proposal was “a little peculiar” that the CLWR would ask them to “subsidize work in Canada which was the regular responsibility of the churches which operate there.”462 Empie suspected that Monk and Treusch did not inquire as to whether the Canada Synod and ULCA approved of such a request that would, after all, take away their authority over immigration centers. “I would feel very uneasy in considering a request of this magnitude and significance which had not come before us with the knowledge and approval of the proper officials of church bodies concerned,” Empie later commented.463 The LWF ultimately postponed ruling on the Canadian request for more money. They passed a resolution stating that “since these projects would still have to be discussed between Canadian and US church leaders no action could be taken at this time.”464

The LWF’s decision wounded Monk and Treusch’s egos and emboldened the proposals’ American and Canada Synod’s critics. The latter two groups both felt as though Treusch and Monk overstepped their authority in submitting the proposal prior to receiving proper consent from them. Albert Jacobi, then the president of the Canada Synod, kept careful watch of the whole affair. Jacobi wrote to Treusch to let him know

462 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Paul Empie to Treusch, 4 August 1958.
463 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Empie to Treusch, 4 August 1958.
464 Quote in LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Monk to Albert Jacobi, 15 August 1958.
that he “was never too enthusiastic about the ‘Brief’ which was to have been submitted to the Lutheran World Service, for obvious reasons.” He urged Treusch and Monk to continue working with American Lutherans towards their goals instead of their nationalistic tendency to put Canada first.

“Why not point out to the parent bodies the tremendous needs and responsibilities confronting us in Home Missions etc., advising them that to adequately meet these needs demands more than can be accomplished by the individual church but calls for all bodies to work together. It would be our responsibility to spell out how this could and should be done and it goes without saying that we must give very careful thought to what we submit. In other words Earl [Treusch] I’m suggesting that we discuss this matter…”

Jacobi recognized that cooperating with the Americans could be difficult yet ultimately necessary if they wished to adequately meet the needs of DPs.

Jacobi’s conciliatory tone did little to quell Monk’s temper. Monk took particular offense to the suggestion that Canadian Lutherans needed to work with their American counterparts if they wished to receive “subsidies” from the LWF. “I do not look upon any money received by the CLWR from the LWF, Geneva, as a subsidy,” Monk wrote. “In reality LWF is really contributing money for services rendered.” Monk’s attitude tested the generally patient American Lutheran leadership. Hoffman replied that “I know that the Lutheran churches in Canada would by and large like to be independent in all respects. However, as long as they are not, I see no other solution to the question of new migration projects than clearance with the American Lutheran churches.” The control exerted by Western Canadian pastors tested the previous transnational relationship between Canadian and American Lutherans. While the DP crisis of the mid-1940s provided the impetus for Canadian and American Lutherans to work side by side to help

465 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Jacobi to Treusch, 12 February 1959.
466 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Jacobi to Treusch, 12 February 1959.
467 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.26.1., Monk to Hoffman, 8 December 1958.
their fellow Germans, the Western Canadian attitudes towards immigration work demonstrated that nationality, over ethnicity, became a larger factor by the late 1950s.

By the end of the 1950s, both the CLWR and the Missouri Synod started to reassess their financial commitments to immigration work. The Missouri Synod, for instance, opened its 1958 meeting with the frank declaration that its work for the year 1958 “will probably not be spectacular.”469 Not coincidentally, the ULCA substantially decreased their financial support for immigration work in Canada starting in 1958. They reduced their budget for Canadian immigration by fifty percent in the years 1958 and 1959, causing the CLWR to reconsider its future work as well.470 “In a sense we are now at the cross-roads in the life of C.L.W.R.,” Monk noted. “For a number of years our immigration and resettlement program was operating at full-throttle. Now we are coasting along.”471 Although organizations like the CLWR continued to operate with renewed interest in relief and refugees from Asia, the structures they put in place for German and Lutheran DPs largely started to fade away by the late 1950s and early 1960s.472

Conclusion

Publicity material distributed by the Missouri and Canada Synods often relied on Biblical passages in order to motivate their laypeople to donate charitably to their many fundraising campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. Both synods quoted frequently from Matthew 25:35: “For I was hungry, and you gave me something to eat. I was thirsty, and

469 CHI, EGC, Box 1, Minutes Folder, LRS Minutes, 15 March 1958.
470 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, Franklin Koch to Jacobi, 8 August 1956.
471 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Minutes, 12 November 1958.
472 Minutes of the 97th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 1-4 June 1959, p. 165; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.16.1, Berner to S.F. Friedrichsen, 20 October 1964.
you gave me something to drink. I was a stranger, and you took me in.” The passage aptly represents the charitable spirit pastors wished to instill in their followers and encouraged them to assist a German or Lutheran stranger they had likely never met. Yet, “stranger” does not fully capture how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans conceptualized needy Germans and Lutheran DPs following the war, either. German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County freely gave their time, money, and resources to help German Lutherans in Europe due to a sense of ethnic and religious solidarity. The postwar climate was not inherently friendly to the German people, nor could other religious groups be trusted to help Lutherans DPs with the same understanding and compassion that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County believed they could. Through their involvements with organizations like the CLWR, pastors took leading roles in acting as the voice of the Volksdeutsche overseas. As ethnic elites, they showed compassion to German Lutherans when they felt certain that no others in Canadian or American society would.

Despite the tensions and clashes competing identities posed, the German Lutheran communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County successfully met their goals of providing relief overseas and bringing Lutheran DPs to North America. Theology and gender determined how Lutherans completed this work, but the transnational relationships and white privilege in both Lutheran communities ensured it was successful. Uniting behind their shared ethnicity and faith, organizations like the CLWR managed to fulfill their mandate thanks to their transnational connections with St. Louis. As German-American Lutherans in St. Louis could not help their brethren as easily due to slow-moving immigration policy, they were able to meet their goals by helping DPs find passage to Canada. This transnational relationship allowed both parties to fulfill their goals when
their respective nation states seemed to place them in doubt. Furthermore, organizations like the CLWR and the *Volksdeutsche* alike benefitted from appealing to Canadian politicians as Christians and members of the white race. Lutherans eschewed the religious parochialism government officials resented in order to present a common Christian identity that resonated with Anglo-Canadian MPs and their core values of providing humanitarian relief and charity. The *Volksdeutsche* benefited enormously from the immigration debates of the late 1940s that stoked white Canadian fears that broad immigration reform would diminish Canada’s white character. Canadian politicians willingly looked past the Nazi backgrounds of the *Volksdeutsche* due to their shared whiteness as a result. The transnational connections between Canadian and American Lutherans made German and Lutheran immigration to North America a practical reality, while their race and religion justified it at an ideological level.
“Europe calls for aid!” was a popular phrase within German Lutheran circles in St. Louis and Waterloo County during the 1940s and 1950s. Newsletters and synod-produced material frequently featured photos of West German cities destroyed by the Allied bombing campaign and starving German civilians living in the rubble of their former homes. As presidents of the Missouri and Canada synods, John Behnken and John Reble publicized Germany’s dire political, social, and spiritual conditions after six years of war and thirteen years of Nazi rule. Beginning in 1945, Behnken and Reble mobilized support within their communities to raise money, food, and clothing, to help Germany recover from the devastation of the war. Germany was in a desperate state, and the two Lutheran leaders believed that it was their duty as fellow Germans and Lutherans to return to Germany and help the “land of Luther” recover.

Lutheran efforts to help rebuild Germany from the war did not simply end with raising money and shipping goods overseas. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, pastors travelled to West Germany to distribute aid and assess the needs of the Lutheran church in Germany. While the previous chapter examined how German Lutherans mobilized support to send aid overseas and alter immigration laws, this chapter details two synod-sponsored programs that brought the Missouri and Canada Synods into direct contact with Lutherans in West Germany. First, the Missouri Synod embarked on an ambitious plan to help rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Europe. The war severely damaged Lutheran churches and many pastors had been killed or went missing as a result. Under Behnken’s leadership, the synod created an informal missionary program in which Missouri Synod pastors travelled to West Germany to “educate” German Lutherans about the synod’s
conservative theology. Second, Reble initiated a “chaplaincy program” in the mid-1950s that sent several Canada Synod pastors overseas to accompany German displaced persons from Germany to Canada. Reble’s program was a logical extension of the Canada Synod’s effort to promote *Volksdeutsche* immigration to Canada after their legislative successes.

This chapter examines how both programs highlighted the ways in which pastors continued to enforce their roles as cultural brokers. Efforts to rebuild West Germany caused pastors to use their knowledge of the German language and culture to try to promote positive relations between German civilians and the Allied military governments that controlled West Germany throughout the 1940s and 1950s. As both Germans and Canadians/Americans, pastors believed they had a unique obligation to turn former enemies into new allies. This chapter details several theological conferences known as “Bad Bolls” organized by the Missouri Synod to help “explain” and “educate” West Germans about American democracy and North American Lutheranism. It examines how Reble and Behnken brought West German pastors on trips to Canada and the United States as part of the West’s emphasis on promoting democracy during the Cold War. This chapter also describes the deeply personal, ethnic journeys that North American Lutherans experience as they completed missionary work in West Germany. While working in West Germany, pastors revitalized or “reinvented” their ethnic German identities. During the Second World War, pastors had downplayed their ethnic heritage or centered it within the ethnic boundary zone of the Lutheran church. Postwar engagement with Germany created the opportunity for their ethnicity to once again become associated with the German “homeland.” Indeed, both Reble and Behnken started to value pastors that had an intimate knowledge of the German language, culture, and history. Trips to
Germany functioned as more than mere humanitarian or bureaucratic visits. Members of the Missouri and Canada Synod expected to be welcomed “home” as fellow Germans and coreligionists when they arrived in West Germany.

Missionary activity in West Germany, however, did not lead ethnic elites to once again craft an ethnicity centered around their German homeland, as with nineteenth century immigrants. By examining the relationship between Missouri and Canada Synod missionaries and West Germans, this chapter argues that while missionaries believed they were “true Germans,” the West Germans they encountered treated them strictly as “Amerikaners.” West Germans used the Missouri and Canada Synod for their financial and physical aid, but showed no interest in their imagined ties of ethnic solidarity. After fighting two world wars against Canada and the United States, West Germans had difficulty looking beyond the national identities of their Lutheran coreligionists. Attempts to “educate” Germans on American and Lutheran ways appeared as yet another American attempt to “conquer” and “control” aspects of German life. The lukewarm reception pastors received ensured that the idea of a German homeland was an unsustainable and temporary portion of their constructed ethnicity. Behnken and Reble’s efforts to rebuild Germany once again questions the traditional assumption that Germans in North America ceased practicing an ethnic identity during the first half of the twentieth century. Their renewed relationship with Germany during the 1940s and 1950s demonstrates that a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and Waterloo County well into the postwar period, even if it was not reciprocated by their West German

peers. Ultimately, these trips abroad highlighted the competing ethnic, religious, and national identities of members of Canada and Missouri Synods. While a common ethnic and shared religion created the conditions in which North American Lutherans could create a transnational relationship with West Germans, their nationality prevented this vision from taking root.

**Creating a Policy for Providing Relief to West Germany**

Members of the Missouri Synod began to discuss Germany’s postwar condition after the successful Allied invasion of Europe in June 1944. By combining various media accounts and knowledge of Germany prior to the war, synod officials concluded that Germany’s Lutheran churches experienced persecution under Nazi rule. They estimated that many of the country’s leading seminaries and churches were “bombed out of existence” as a result of the Allied bombing campaign. Synod leaders also worried that the Nazis conscripted Lutheran pastors to fight in the German army, thereby leaving the Lutheran church leaderless.\(^{474}\) Pastors also knew that Lutheranism in Germany was divided primarily into two groups. The first group, the *Landeskirche* or “State Churches,” included a loose fellowship of Lutheran, Reformed, and United churches combined under one governing body. These churches placed little importance on doctrinal unity and treated theological issues more liberally than the Missouri Synod. Shortly after the war, this group organized a formal union called the Evangelical Church in Germany, commonly referred to as EKiD. The second group consisted of the *Freikirche*, or “Free

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\(^{474}\) Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-30 June 1944, p. 393.
Churches.” In an effort to remain conservatively Lutheran, the Free Churches refused to enter into fellowship with liberal Lutherans and declined to join EKiD. Their conservative nature made them natural allies of the Missouri Synod, who even provided them with small amounts of funding before the war began.475

Synod leaders worried that West Germans would lose their Lutheran faith after the devastation of the war. Germany’s Lutherans no longer had the basic infrastructure that pastors, seminaries, and churches provided. The Free Church’s conservative theology ensured that the synod placed its “primary concern” with helping to rebuild the Free Church seminaries and churches.476 However, initial planning at a 1944 synod convention emphasized that the synod would “not confine its postwar relief to the Freikirche.” The synod agreed to also provide aid for the State Churches to help them recover in the aftermath of the war as a “labour of love to the fellow members of the body of Christ.”477 West German Lutherans may have been unable to help themselves, but American wealth could help the Lutheran church abroad recover. Synod leaders hoped that “our Church, blessed as it is spiritually and physically” could help Lutheranism in Germany thrive once more. “The Lutheran Church of Europe is in serious danger of disintegration unless it receives help from the Lutheran churches of America,” they concluded.478

Ethnic elites in St. Louis believed they needed to provide Germans with physical and spiritual relief on the basis of their shared religious and ethnic ties. One pastor commented that “we, as Lutherans and children of the Reformation, believe we have a

475 Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 4-5.
476 Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-30 June 1944, p. 393.
477 Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-30 June 1944, p. 394.
478 Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-30 June 1944, p. 394.
special postwar obligation to fulfill not only in Europe at large, but especially in the land which gave birth to the Reformation.”

Lawrence Meyer, who later travelled to West Germany to distribute aid, became one of the synod’s most vocal proponents for helping Germany. In a public appeal in the Lutheran Witness, Meyer argued that “the Lutheran Churches of America are the children of the Lutheran Church of Europe. Our heritage came from Europe. We must help to preserve Lutheranism in Europe.”

Pastors often relied on the symbol of Germany as the “birthplace” or “parent” of North American Lutheranism to argue for the synod’s obligation to help. One pastor believed that the German people would also understand this relationship. He imagined the German people calling out to “bring us the Gospel as once our forefathers brought it unto you.”

These calls to arms on the basis of a shared ethnic and religious heritage made it clear to synod members why they needed to help Germany. Pastors felt a clear need to help Germany recover from the war’s devastation as the descendants of German Lutheranism.

Declarations of ethnic and religious fellowship, however, did not produce a tangible strategy on how to provide physical and spiritual aid to Germany. In order to solidify a plan, Behnken travelled to West Germany in October 1945 to meet with civic and religious leaders. Aside from the various Missouri Synod chaplains in the military, he was the first representative of the Missouri Synod to visit Germany since war began in 1939. Behnken’s two-month visit made the synod leader realize just how dramatically the war had altered Germany’s religious landscape. From October to December 1945, Behnken met with various State and Free Church pastors and learned that the two groups

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481 CHI, WDC, Box 14, WDC Minutes Folder, Western District Pastoral Conference, 14 June 1948.
had radically different theological positions as a result of their experiences during the Second World War. Behnken discovered that prominent European theologians Karl Barth and Martin Niemoeller had seized control of EKiD and intended to unite all Protestants in Europe within its organization. Unlike the relatively minor theological differences amongst North American synods, Barth and Niemoeller advocated for an extreme and liberal Lutheranism that opposed some of the Missouri Synod’s most important beliefs.

Barth, Niemoeller, and their EKiD allies believed that Germany’s Lutherans were responsible for Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Niemoeller in particular cited Martin Luther’s belief in the “two kingdoms” or Romans 13 as an example of problematic Lutheran theology that allowed Hitler to control Nazi Germany. Just as Romans 13 stated that church and state must be kept separate, Niemoeller suggested that Lutherans passively accepted Hitler and his reign of terror as it was a state, and not religious, affair. He believed that Lutherans needed to believe that state and church should cooperate in order to resist future authoritarian regimes. Conservative Lutheran theology, Niemoeller surmised, helped perpetrate the Holocaust and Hitler’s brutal war.\(^{482}\) Originally from Sweden, Barth was even more critical of Germany’s Lutheran population. Barth believed that Hitler’s hatred of the Jewish people could be traced back to Luther’s anti-Semitic comments and beliefs. Since conservative Lutherans supposedly accepted Luther’s words as unchallenged fact, Barth believed modern Lutherans turned a blind eye towards Hitler’s anti-Semitic crimes due to their own racism justified through faith.\(^{483}\) Thus, Barth and Niemoeller believed EKiD needed to unite Germany’s Protestants into one single

\(^{482}\) Hockenos, *A Church Divided*, 68-70.

\(^{483}\) Hockenos, 57.
body that would work cooperatively with the state to ensure another dictator like Hitler never rose to power again.

Barth and Niemoeller’s comments placed them in opposition to the Missouri Synod’s conservative Lutheran doctrine. The violation of Romans 13 jeopardized, according to conservative Lutherans, their ability to practice Lehre or “pure doctrine.” If Lutherans started blurring the line between church and state as EKiD’s members suggested, the government could begin to influence Lutheran interpretations of the Bible. Any attempts by the state to alter the conservative Lutherans interpretation that the Bible was inerrant and the final authority of God would essentially jeopardize the purity of their faith.484 Free Church pastors believed EKiD wished to dilute their conservative doctrine and resented Barth’s anti-German sentiments. After meeting with these concerned Free Church Lutherans during his trip, Behnken concluded that “Lutheranism in Germany faces a fight for its very existence.” He feared that “decades of liberalism, higher criticism, rationalism at the theological schools” in Germany influenced EKiD, and could even foreshadow “the death-knell of the Lutheran Church in this country.”485 Behnken realized that he could not support EKiD when its leaders so clearly violated Missouri’s theology. As a result, Behnken developed close ties with Free Church pastors in an effort to help them stave off the influence of EKiD’s liberalism during his two-month visit.

Theological meetings with Free Church pastors occupied the majority of Behnken’s trip to West Germany. However, Behnken could not ignore the overwhelming poverty facing many civilians and refugees as he met with Lutheran pastors. Witnessing

485 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 8 November 1945.
the war’s devastating impact on German civilians left a deep emotional impact on Behnken. He often relayed the personal stories of individual Germans he met during his visit and included details of their suffering in his letters home. Orphaned children and homeless families featured prominently in his correspondence. Behnken could not escape witnessing these horrors daily, and German suffering continued to haunt him at night:

> The cruel specters of rubble and debris, of demolished homes and business houses rise up before your eyes like ghosts in the night. These horrible sights haunt you. You lie awake and think of the millions whose properties were utterly destroyed, the hundreds of thousands who lost their lives or were wounded and crippled. You see the streams of homeless and hopeless refugees roaming around for some place to sleep or perhaps to die.\(^{486}\)

Behnken decried the lack of state support available to refugees and noticed that they “are not welcome anywhere.” He believed that if their situation was not remedied soon, that “millions will die this winter because of undernourishment or lack of clothing.”\(^{487}\) He concluded that “Europe’s greatest and most urgent need today is the feeding and clothing and housing of more than ten million refugees.”\(^{488}\)

Behnken bore witness to Germany’s refugee plight as well as EKiD’s movement against conservative Lutheranism during his visit abroad. Both factors shaped how he believed the Missouri Synod should address its campaign to help rebuild Germany spiritually and physically. Behnken reconsidered the synod’s previous policy of providing aid to both the Free and State churches. His meetings with Free Church pastors led to an informal policy of providing aid primarily to churches that supported conservative Lutheranism. For instance, after two Free Church pastors vigorously condemned Niemoeller and EKiD, Behnken declared that these “men are ready to fight and die for

\(^{486}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 21 November 1945.

\(^{487}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 8 November 1945; CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 3 November 1945.

\(^{488}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 21 November 1945.
Lutheranism.” In return for their support, Behnken arranged subsequent meetings with them to discuss how the Missouri Synod could meet “their present physical needs” and discuss “the doctrine of God’s Word.” Behnken continued to conflate doctrinal agreement and relief when he met with more Free Church congregations. He opened a meeting with Free Church Lutherans in the small town of Gross-Oesingen in November 1945 by using expressions of familial solidarity. The Missouri Synod would provide them with both spiritual and physical aid. Behnken told his audience of Free Church Germans that “we come to you as brethren meeting brethren. We are ready to help you in your temporal and spiritual needs wherever you require our assistance.” He told his audience of pastors and refugees that “the Missouri Synod is prepared to support the weak and, above all, to back up the Lutheran Church in the homeland of the Reformation. It will aid the Free Churches in their fight” against liberal Lutheranism and the earthly battle against starvation. Physical aid and theological agreement became increasingly intertwined as Behnken aimed to help his fellow Germans. His concern for the survival of conservative Lutheranism and the German people alike shaped a policy that emphasized physical relief to the spiritually conservative.

A personal connection with German refugees on the basis of his ethnicity and a religious connection to conservative Lutheranism shaped Behnken’s attitude when he returned to the United States in December 1945. He believed that both the German people and conservative Lutheranism could face extinction if the Missouri Synod did not spring to action. The degree to which German Americans came to Germany’s aid, he stated,

489 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 8 November 1945.
“will mean either triumph or defeat for the Lutheran cause” in all of Europe.\textsuperscript{491} Behnken immediately started to collaborate with Meyer and other St. Louis pastors to convince the synod’s laypeople to send money, clothing, and food to Germany. In his articles and speeches, Behnken drew on the synod’s German heritage to motivate laypeople to send aid to Germany. Behnken reminded his audience that “the refugees are people of German extraction” who were incidentally “citizens of Poland, Latvia, Austria, etc.”\textsuperscript{492} In emphasizing the ethnicity of the refugees, Behnken articulated his own understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and nationality. He viewed the nationality of these refugees as secondary to their ethnic identities. Behnken hoped members of the Missouri Synod would ignore both the European nationalities of the refugees, as well as their own American nationality, in order to help their fellow Germans. Cultivating a common identity as ethnic Germans was the most likely way to gain aid for ailing refugees.

As practitioners of the liberal Lutheranism that the Missouri Synod opposed, the Canada Synod felt little need to help Germany theologically after the war. EKiD’s success in uniting European Lutherans into one organizing body ensured that they did not need the Canada Synod’s aid for theological assistance. However, members of the Canada Synod participated in the process of renewing ties to Germany by participating directly in humanitarian efforts to help German civilians and DPs. In 1953, Reble retired as president of the Canada Synod and moved to Bremen, West Germany, in order to dedicate himself to conducting charitable work among German DPs. While overseas, Reble developed a concern that the many DPs travelling from West Germany to Canada lacked spiritual care during their voyage to North America. He worried that the trip

\textsuperscript{491} CHI, John W. Behnken Family Collection, Behnken to Children, 4 December 1945.

\textsuperscript{492} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 2, Folder 13, Behnken to Missouri Synod Pastors, 21 November 1945.
caused DPs undue stress and that their journey could be made less burdensome if a Lutheran pastor accompanied them. In the mid-1950s, Reble devised a plan he called the “chaplaincy program” as a result. The program sought to help DPs by hiring German and Canada Synod pastors to accompany synod-sponsored ships carrying German refugees to Canada. Pastors could preach to the DPs as well as offering more practical advice on life in Canada. While Reble’s plan for postwar Germany did not involve the same theological components as Behnken’s, he nonetheless devised a plan that would strengthen ties between his synod and German Lutherans abroad.

Missionary Work as an Ethnic Experience

Behnken and Reble’s plans to assist West Germany directly influenced how ethnic elites in both synods engaged with their German ethnic identities. Their plans involved sending “missionaries” (or “chaplains”) overseas to Germany to implement their respective relief campaigns. The pastors selected by Behnken and Reble highlight that the two men understood relief work in Germany as a way to reignite the German heritage of their synods. The Missouri Synod’s Board of European Affairs, the committee in charge of overseeing the synod’s relief program, sent Walter Daib and Frank Mayer to West Germany to act as permanent representatives of the Missouri Synod overseas in 1946. As “missionaries,” the Board tasked Daib and Mayer with fostering goodwill between the Missouri Synod and the Free Churches, while trying to convince State Churches to

493 Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Eastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada fonds (hereafter ESF), 30 Canadian Lutheran Council (hereafter CLC), 30.4.2.21.2, Duties, n.d.
remain independent of EKiD. Behnken carefully considered and selected missionaries such as Daib and Mayer due to their familiarity with German culture. By selecting first and second-generation German immigrants like himself, Behnken prioritized pastors with a strong knowledge of the German language, theology, and who often had firsthand experience living in Germany. Reble used a similar criterion for selecting his chaplains. He handpicked pastors that had a similar background to him, especially favouring those from Waterloo County. For example, Reble advocated that the synod accept Otto Stockmann as a candidate for a chaplaincy position. Just like Reble, Stockmann was born in Germany and attended Kropp Seminary before immigrating to Canada in the early twentieth century. Reble favoured Stockmann and pastors of their generation because they were both familiar with the German language and with the immigrant experience. Reble underscored that those selected “must command the German language” so that he could both preach to the immigrants as well as converse with them about Canada. As former immigrants, Reble believed those of his generation would be inherently sympathetic towards the DPs. By selecting first-generation immigrants, Reble also ensured that chaplains would have the unique ability to act as authorities on both Canada and Germany. Their experience living in both countries ensured that they could council the incoming DPs with knowledge of both nations. The selected missionaries and chaplains viewed their positions through a similar ethnic lens. One chaplain reported that “having been in Canada for more than thirty years, I feel I should be able to orientate” the

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495 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Reuben Baetz, 29 April 1955.
496 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Ferdinand Howald, 29 November 1955.
497 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Baetz, 29 April 1955.
new immigrants to Canadian life. He accepted Reble’s offer after “realizing that such a trip to Germany would give me the opportunity of seeing relatives whom I have not seen since 1930.” Whereas first and second-generation pastors like Behnken, Reble and Stockmann had to mediate their German ethnicity during the Second World War, their ethnicity became an asset that could help foster a stronger community among North Americans, Germans, and new immigrants.

Missionary work in West Germany, however, was more than simply a religious endeavor. It also provided a way for missionaries to reconnect with their ethnic identities as Germans. For many pastors, Germany was literally ‘the land of their fathers.’ Missionaries took the opportunity to visit family members or visit sites of familial importance while working overseas. During his 1946 visit, Mayer drove over sixty miles in order to visit his “tante.” He travelled to her home in Muenster where he updated her on “all the happenings in our family since the outbreak of the war.” The visit renewed Mayer’s spirits and he hoped “to be able to see her again” before he had to return to the United States. Similarly, Herman Harms, Vice-President of the Missouri Synod, took time out of his work schedule to visit relatives that he had not seen since his last visit to Germany in 1908. He visited his mother’s hometown where his four siblings still lived. During these “hometown” visits, Mayer and Harms visited the Lutheran churches where their grandfathers, also Lutheran pastors, preached when they lived in Germany. Mayer toured the church cemetery and paid his respects at his grandfather’s grave. Unlike first-generation immigrants who had tangible and existing connections to Germany,
second-generation pastors often did not have living relatives in Germany with whom they remained in contact. Yet, second-generation pastors such as J.T. Mueller also made trips to the hometowns and Lutheran congregations of their parents. During his 1949 trip overseas, Mueller hoped for a break in missionary work so that he could travel to “a little town called Haina, Hesse, from which my father came” so that he could “consult the church records” to find information on his father’s life prior to his immigration.\textsuperscript{503}

Visits with relatives and pilgrimages to churches of familial importance functioned as more than mere personal journeys. These men saw their connection with Germany as important for all North American Lutherans to acknowledge. Reble spent several days touring the small town of Kropp in northern Germany while he lived overseas. Like Stockmann and several other Canada Synod pastors, Reble studied to become a pastor at the Kropp Seminary as a young man before immigrating to Canada in the early twentieth century. Visiting the town prompted Reble to question “where would our Church in Canada be today” if Kropp Seminary had not supplied so many pastors to North America. He believed that if the leadership at Kropp had not sent missionaries to North America beginning in the 1880s, North America “would have suffered even heavier losses among the German speaking Lutherans.” Yet, thanks to Kropp’s training, he and other Canada Synod pastors maintained Lutheranism in Canada decades after their arrival. In his mind, Kropp provided the origin and the growth for Lutheranism in “the Midwest States” and Canada.\textsuperscript{504}

Visits “home” to Germany allowed pastors from St. Louis and Waterloo County to reconnect with their German roots. Most of these trips occurred shortly after the

\textsuperscript{503} CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, J.T. Mueller to Karl Arndt, 30 April 1949.

Second World War, a time in which pastors had to downplay their German heritage for fear of facing government internment or discrimination. After at least six years of viewing their German ethnicity as a source of anxiety, pastors felt relieved to be able to once again openly connect with their birthplace or that of their parents. As Kathleen Neils Conzen and others have made clear, examining ethnicity as a social construct allows for ethnic identities to wax and wane as social circumstances change. Although pastors may have temporarily stopped publicly identifying as Germans during the war, travelling to Germany after the war’s conclusion allowed them to reclaim that identity with pride. As first and second-generation pastors sought to rebuild Germany from the ruins of war, so too did they start to rebuild their German ethnicities by connecting with the “land of Luther.”

**Ethnicity, Nationality, and Denazification at the Bad Boll Conferences**

The Missouri and Canada Synod programs coincided with Allied attempts to dismantle the Nazi state and eliminate Nazis from all levels of German government. This process, commonly referred to as “denazification,” began in early 1947 as a result of increasing tensions in the Cold War. American politicians initially favoured punishing Germany for its crimes and subscribed to the idea of “collective guilt” that blamed all Germans for willfully participating in another world war. By 1947, however, American elites worried that severely punishing Germany would turn its citizens towards radical political philosophies like communism instead of embracing democracy. They realized

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that West Germany could become a powerful propaganda tool in which to demonstrate to
the world the benefits of democracy in contrast to the Soviet Union’s communism. Lucius
Clay, the general responsible for overseeing civil affairs during the American occupation
of West Germany, gradually became convinced that Germany could become a
democracy. Americans, however, could not simply declare West Germany a democracy
overnight. They needed to teach democratic values and encourage Germans to study and
practice democratic beliefs. This philosophy made Clay an early proponent of German
elections and trying to rehabilitate German political culture to mirror America’s.\footnote{506}
The introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1948 signified that the United States was more
interested in turning West Germany into an economically stable democracy than
punishing its citizens for the war. A recovered German economy, American politicians
hoped, would help stave off the influence of Soviet communism.\footnote{507}

The Missouri and Canada Synods naturally favoured this more paternalistic and
benevolent attitude towards West German recovery. Formal denazification, as opposed to
collective punishment, resonated with North American Lutherans that believed the
Second World War represented the wishes of a Nazi minority rather than the majority of
the German people. Missionaries eagerly embraced denazification as it resonated with
their roles as cultural brokers. As ethnic elites, Missouri and Canada Synod pastors
believed they had a unique role to play in fostering a better understanding between the
United States, Canada, and West Germany. Several Lutheran initiatives in late 1940s

\footnote{506} Barbara Fait, “Supervised Democratization: American Occupation and German Politics,” in \textit{The United
University Press, 2004), 57; Cornelia Rauh-Kuhne, “Life Rewarded the Latecomers: Denazification During
the Cold War,” in \textit{The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990}, ed. Detlef Junker
\footnote{507} Carol C. Hodge and Cathal J. Nolan, “‘As Powerful As We Are’: From the Morgenthau Plan to Marshall
Aid,” in \textit{Shepherd of Democracy?: America and Germany in the Twentieth Century}, ed. Carl C. Hodge and
attempted to “reeducate” West German pastors after living under Nazi rule. Meyer, for example, suggested that the synod establish a series of scholarships to Valparaiso University specifically intended for German pastors. “The quicker we institute an exchange of students,” Meyer reasoned, “the quicker Germany will be taught how the rest of the world lives and what it thinks.”

The program, formally implemented in 1947, involved German pastors enrolling in courses at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. They took several courses in conservative theology “in order to condition them to come back to Germany and introduce these subjects in the theological departments at the universities.”

Meyer also sought to bring prominent Free Church advocates to St. Louis in order for them to gain “first hand insight into our system of separation of Church and State.” This, he hoped, would show more forcefully the benefits of conservative Lutheranism and would give them greater confidence in preaching such doctrines back home in Germany.

The Canada Synod initiated a similar program under Reble’s leadership. Reble arranged for West German pastors to visit prominent Canada Synod congregations in Montreal, Kitchener, and Winnipeg so these pastors could “renew old friendships and establish new contacts” in Canada. In these instances denazification and the Missouri and Canada Synods’ goals worked in tandem. Anglo-Americans wanted to educate West Germans about American democracy, and ethnic elites hoped to reconnect St. Louis and Waterloo County with their German homelands.

The Missouri Synod in particular successfully combined the American process of denazification with efforts to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in West Germany. In

508 CHI, Edwin Berenthal Papers (hereafter EBP), EBP, Box 1, Meyer Folder, Meyer to E.T. Berenthal, 2 July 1945.
509 CHI, EBP, Box 1, Meyer Folder, Report of L. Meyer, October 1947.
510 CHI, EBP, Box 1, Governmental Folder, Meyer to Berenthal, 5 March 1947.
511 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Clifford Monk, n.d.
order to increase their influence over Free Church congregations, Missouri’s missionaries started to host interdenominational theological conferences in 1947. These conferences, colloquially known as “Bad Boll” conferences as they took place in a municipality of the same name, brought together Missouri, Free, and State Church pastors in order to discuss the theological problems confronting Lutheranism in postwar Europe. In practice, the conferences functioned as a way for Missouri Synod missionaries to demonstrate the strength of the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology. Meyer explained the motivations for these conferences by emphasizing the threat EKiD posed to conservative Lutheranism. He believed that “there is great danger of Barth’s becoming the religious dictator of Lutheranism in Germany. While there are many staunch Lutherans…the great bulk of Lutheran clergy are not well enough founded to immediately recognize the pitfalls of Barth’s” liberal theology.  

512 Members of the Missouri Synod hoped the Bad Boll conferences would convert German pastors to conservative Lutheranism. “This is by far the most important and the largest project undertaken by any American Church body in Germany,” Meyer noted.  

513 Meyer and other missionaries justified expending resources to host Bad Boll conferences in the language of denazification. They drew upon their ethnic identities as Germans to argue why they could “educate” Germans more effectively than their Anglo-American counterparts that occupied West Germany through military and political force. After several years of American occupation, pastors believed that West Germans would benefit from being around those “who would treat Germans as fellow humans and not as second class” citizens or ex-Nazis. Unlike other Americans that

512 CHI, EBP, Box 1, Governmental Folder, Report of L. Meyer, October-November 1947.  
513 CHI, EBP, Box 1, Governmental Folder, Report of L. Meyer, November 1947.
Germans encountered, pastors promised not to “act like the troops of occupation.” As both Germans and Americans, Missouri Synod pastors believed they could connect with West Germans in ways their Anglo-American peers could not.

In fact, the culture surrounding the Bad Boll conferences in the late 1940s often functioned as yet another way for missionaries to connect with their ethnic identities. Missouri Synod attendees used their free evenings to celebrate the German portion of their identity by engaging in “German traditions.” At one conference, Meyer packed a Volkswagen full of barrels of German beer for the nightly festivities where Missouri and German pastors alike indulged in a healthy dose of the provisions. Perhaps as a result, the Missouri pastors began to sing “traditional” German songs in hopes their German brethren would participate as well. Behnken reportedly spent the night giving improvised speeches on the similarities he noticed between the German-American communities and Bavaria.

German pastors, did not see their German-American colleagues as distant ethnic cousins.

Although missionaries performed their German identities while abroad, West Germans saw them through a national lens and always reminded their guests that they were Americans, not Germans. In particular, the Missouri Synod’s tendency to discuss relief alongside theological issues caused the Free and State Churches to doubt their sincerity. Pastors in both the State and Free Churches often expressed their unease over the tendency to blur these two issues. Mayer knew this and frequently responded to the criticism that the Missouri Synod only provided relief for congregations that aligned with

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514 CHI, LMC, Box, 4, Folder 17, Missouri and World Lutheranism at Bad Boll 1949, 1949.
515 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 85, Mayer to BHME, 1 July 1946.
its theological positions. He stressed that theology and relief were unrelated during his many meetings with German pastors. For instance, several German pastors expressed disdain towards the Free Churches that allied themselves with the Missouri Synod during Behnken’s 1945 visit. They noted that these congregations consequently received substantial relief packages as a result of their union with Missouri. Mayer responded to this charge by claiming this was merely coincidence. He described that certain Free Churches and the Missouri Synod united on the basis of theological unity, rather than any meddling on Behnken’s behalf or attempts to gain aid.\footnote{516 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 85, Mayer to BHME, 22 June 1946.}

Behnken’s subsequent directions to the missionaries, however, lent credibility to the Free and State Churches’ accusations. Behnken warned Missouri Synod representatives that they “must not commit [themselves] as though there were actual fellowship” when meeting with the State Churches. Instead, they must “support every effort toward” promoting “sounder Lutheranism” among their congregations. Behnken instructed missionaries to give the State Churches “our moral as well as financial support. The latter is true especially if they show actual interest for the cause of Lutheranism.”\footnote{517 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 83, Behnken to August Bobzin, 17 July 1946.}

Of course, Behnken’s Lutheran “cause” meant doctrinal alignment with the Missouri Synod and a rejection of EKiD. Essentially, they would grant relief “especially unto Them Who are of the Household of Faith.”\footnote{518 Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-30 June 1944, p. 393.} Although Behnken and the Missouri Synod officially lent aid and relief to all German Lutherans, the level and volume of this relief depended on theological alignment.
Certain Lutheran congregations in Germany knew that accepting the Missouri Synod’s aid would place pressure on them to accept conservative doctrine. While some of the Free Churches were willing to make this deal, the majority of State Churches outright rejected Missouri’s offers. In a meeting with several State Church leaders, Mayer saw that there was “considerable opposition to Missouri Synod’s help” among these men. They stated that they did “not want American help” and tended to agree with Barth’s position on uniting the Protestant churches of Europe.\(^{519}\) Attempts to sway their position with the possibility of aid did not work.

State and Free Churches rejected Missouri’s aid because of their staunch anti-American attitudes. Although Daib and Mayer expected to be greeted as ethnic cousins and fellow coreligionists in the “land of Luther,” Germans viewed them through a national, not ethnic, lens. As the official representatives of the Missouri Synod in Germany, Mayer and Daib confronted the anti-American attitudes of German pastors most frequently. In the summer of 1946, Mayer hosted a conference with the intent to unite the Missouri Synod with some of the Free Churches that remained independent of any synod. A Free Church pastor gave a strong speech that attacked the Missouri Synod and its American attitudes. This pastor rejected union with other Free Churches since to do so was “tantamount to a union with Missouri” and its “American ideals.” The pastor continued to warn others not to trust the Missouri Synod’s promises. “The failure to carry out Wilson’s 14 points” and America’s “record in two wars” showed that Americans could not be counted as allies to the German people. He worried that any association with the Missouri Synod “will estrange their people” from “German” Lutheranism.\(^{520}\)

\(^{519}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 85, Mayer to BHME, July 1946.
\(^{520}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 85, Mayer to BHME, July 1946.
argued with the indignant pastor that such national distinctions were irrelevant when theological unity could be achieved. In Mayer’s opinion, “there is no such thing as a German or Indian Christian,” they were all simply Lutherans. When the Free Church pastor again criticized the Missouri Synod for not being truly “German,” Mayer explained that their Lutheranism was German “in the sense that it uses German language, methods, etc.”

Mayer’s argument drew on Behnken’s original appeal to German Americans to help refugees on the basis of their ethnicity first, and their nationality second. In an attempt to bring the Free Churches into fellowship with the Missouri Synod, Mayer similarly downplayed nationality in favor of a common religious identity based on German culture, not citizenship. True to the synod’s hybrid identity, Mayer believed that being Lutheran meant you were inherently German and vice-versa. Yet, the German pastor remained unconvinced. The Missouri Synod was simply too American to be accepted among West German congregants.

American nationality hampered Daib’s ability to convince Free and State Church pastors to join the Missouri Synod as well. During a July 1946 conference, a Free Church pastor unaffiliated with the Missouri Synod spoke of the dangers they faced in uniting with the Missouri Synod. He argued that Lutheranism in Germany “must be built within the framework of the German people and their ideas” and not the “American importation” that would dilute their religion. He believed that “Missouri has the intention of impressing its own particular type of theology upon the other Free Churches” that was inherently “foreign” to the conditions that Germany faced. Daib emphasized Mayer’s earlier point

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521 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 85, Mayer to BHME, July 1946.
that the Free Church should not believe “that there was a specific type of Christianity for Germans, another type for Americans, etc.”

The antagonistic meetings between the Missouri Synod and German churches considerably weakened Mayer and Daib’s morale. By the late summer of 1946, the two men started to express doubt in their mission. Thus, when they met with the same group of German pastors in late August, Mayer asked the Germans frankly “whether our help was welcome.” The German pastors gave a diplomatic reply. They once again expressed their fears that “all Missouri’s activity in its world-wide tasks has but one aim; to create Missourian replicas of itself all over the world.” They made it clear that if the Missouri Synod came to Germany “to Americanize…then [their] help was not welcome.” However, one pastor acknowledged that if the Missouri Synod was “here to help in the right way, then [Missouri’s] help will be gladly and gratefully received.” Of course, the “right way” to help included using the Missouri Synod for its material power to gain relief and aid to German civilians and refugees. In the interest of maintaining a relationship with the Free Churches, Mayer was forced to concede and ask “whether…there was something we could do from America that would be helpful” to the Free Churches. The Free Church pastors responded with a list of material demands, which ranged from providing food for their congregations to obtaining cars for themselves.

Daib and Mayer’s interactions with the Free Churches demonstrate that German pastors entered these meetings with objectives that differed and conflicted with those of the Missouri Synod. Daib and Mayer assumed that their German ancestry and Lutheranism would grant them authority among the Free Churches, because Germany

522 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 84, Walter Daib to BHME, 27 July, 1946.
523 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 84, Report #12 to BHME, 28 August 1946.
524 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 84, Report #12 to BHME, 28 August 1946.
was the homeland of both their relatives and religion. In their minds, these transnational ties overrode their nationality and identities as Americans. The lukewarm reception Germans gave Daib and Mayer, however, indicates that Germans viewed these interactions in the reverse. Daib and Mayer were not Germans, but rather yet another example of Americans intervening in German affairs. Speaking German and sharing the same religion did not convince German critics that the Missouri Synod had their best interests at heart. The very real local concerns of providing food and clothing to a starving population influenced the Free Churches pastors far more than the theological concerns of the Missouri Synod. The local and national experiences of Free Church Germans colored their interactions far more than any imagined ethnic and transnational ties.

**Gendering Missionary Work**

Behnken and Reble expected all members of their synods to participate in relief work for Germany. They did not, however, expect them to participate in the same manner. Gender dictated how German-Canadian and German-American men and women participated in renewing their ties with Germany. Male pastors could serve as missionaries abroad, whereas women had to carry out the synod’s relief program in their homes and churches. Synod leaders expected both groups to conform to established gender norms in the church. Missionaries, for instance, needed to embody a respectable Lutheran masculinity. Behnken and Reble conceptualized a good Lutheran pastor as a man who inspired, but did not succumb to, strong displays of emotion. This belief informed how pastors moderated their relationship with their congregations and leadership style. Theodore Graebner, a former professor at Concordia Seminary and
Lutheran Witness editor, believed “a professor of philosophy should not admit any such weakness” by showing emotion to his audience. Pastors saw humility, a strong understanding of theological issues, and an awareness of their German heritage as essential markers of Lutheran masculinity.

In contrast, male synod leaders enforced patriarchal gender norms that conceptualized women’s role in the church as confined primarily to charity work. While pastors could participate in rebuilding Germany by traveling abroad, they expected women to carry out the fundraising, packaging, and shipping work necessary to send relief packages to Germany. Meyer stated that the “vast program” of providing relief was the task of “the Lutheran women of America.” This work easily conformed to Lutheran gender norms, as women typically carried out the majority of charity work within Lutheran churches. It embodied the values of servitude and dedication that Lutheran men expected women to exhibit. Behnken, Reble, and other pastors saw themselves as the leaders of the efforts to rebuild Germany, with women playing secondary roles.

These gender norms informed how Lutheran men and women conducted their missionary work in West Germany. Male missionaries in Germany, for example, faced frequent surveillance from synod leaders and their fellow pastors. Pastors routinely commented on the psychological and physical health of their peers in order to make sure they conformed to the synod’s rigid masculinity. According to Behnken and his colleagues, such scrutiny seemed warranted and contained practical purpose. In order to encourage the Free Church to remain independent of EKiD, missionaries needed a strong

526 CHI, EBP, Box 1, Meyer Folder, Meyer to Bernthal, 2 July 1945.
527 Carol K. Coburn, Life At Four Corners: Religion, Gender, and Education in a German Lutheran Community, 1868-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 49-55.
command of the German language to express their theological convictions. These convictions needed to be clearly and confidently explained. If missionaries did a poor job explaining Missouri’s theology, they risked losing Free Church congregations to the more persuasive EKiD campaign to unite European Lutheranism under one banner. Thus, missionaries deemed it necessary to ensure that they all upheld masculine norms lest it endanger their mission to rebuild conservative Lutheranism.

Synod leadership believed a strong understanding of German helped them communicate effectively with Free Church Germans at both a theological and personal level. Karl Arndt, the synod’s representative with the American Military Government in Germany, noted that the Missouri’ Synod’s “delegation in general, is making itself felt more because of the fact that it handles the German language better” than other American groups.528 As Meyer and Behnken selected candidates to work in Germany, they highlighted their ability to speak German. One man, Meyer noted, “understands German very well” while another candidate was selected for being “well versed in the German language, both in speaking and writing.” Meyer also noted that this pastor “boldly expressed a sympathetic attitude for Germany.”529 Arndt recommended the synod sponsor Alfred Rehwinkel to attend the 1949 Bad Boll because his “knowledge of history and German literature” gave him “a very good background for this program.” His “unusual ability to reply to discussions without special preparation” made him a particularly viable candidate to debate other German theologians.530 As such, Rehwinkel embodied the pro-German and theologically conservative traits Arndt deemed respectable. Behnken and other missionaries ridiculed their colleagues who had a poor grasp of the German

528 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, Arndt to Meyer, 17 June 1949.
529 CHI, LMC, Box 87, Folder 716, Suggested Nominees, n.d.
530 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 21, Arndt to Behnken, 16 October 1948.
language. Graebner noted that Daib’s “German is very awkward indeed” and that “he certainly would be at a serious disadvantage” if called upon to meet with German theologians. However, Daib’s organizational efficiency and leadership remained unparalleled, and therefore his poor language skills were not enough to recall him back to St. Louis.  

Missionaries fluent in the German language, however, still faced criticism from the synod’s leadership. Missionaries had to have the correct “physical, spiritual, and mental make-up” to debate “German thinkers without suffering a breakdown.” Behnken and Meyer frequently evaluated the mental and physical health of their peers during their visits to West Germany. During a 1946 visit, Behnken and Meyer found one of their missionaries, Fritz Mueller, in a “pathetic condition.” His “nervousness” when discussing theology with Free Church pastors seemed evident to the two men and “had a very depressing effect upon” Behnken. Mueller was hardly alone in feeling anxious debating German theologians. The Bad Boll conferences in particular proved trying for Missouri Synod missionaries who not only engaged in theological debates with Free and State pastors, but also had their performances evaluated by their German-American peers. Arndt reported that “two of the representatives of Missouri Synod upon their return to the United States suffered serious heart attacks” after the 1948 Bad Boll. “The physical toll which Bad Boll has taken of the entire Missouri Synod delegation,” Arndt believed, “reflects the intense seriousness with which theologians in Germany” debated theological

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531 CHI, LMC, Box 87, Theo, Graebner Folder, Graebner to Meyer, 28 August 1949.
532 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 21, Arndt to Behnken, 16 October 1948.
533 CHI, European Affairs Collection (hereafter EUA), Supplement 1, Box 3, Behnken J.W. Folder, Behnken to Bobzin, 27 March 1946.
Mueller’s anxiety and the subsequent heart attacks cast doubt on whether or not these pastors were strong and manly enough to withstand debating German pastors. Behnken wanted men who could confidently demonstrate the validity of conservative Lutheranism, and not succumb to the anxiety and pressures of debate.

The 1949 Bad Boll proved even more strenuous for Missouri’s missionaries. Meyer and Behnken did not attend the conference that year and instead told Arndt and Harms to organize the proceedings. Arndt confessed to Meyer that his main burden in organizing that year’s conference was the poor quality of men the synod sent to Germany. “Frankly,” he reported, “Harms is not capable of handling this situation…Graebner is so disinterested in the conferences that he leaves meetings to take his wife out on drives through the country-side, and Praeses Harms does not have the stamina to hold his men together.” Missionaries at the 1949 Bad Boll simply did not conform to the masculine standards set by Behnken in the previous years. Arndt commented that the “Bad Boll this year lacks that spirit which made it such a remarkable success last year. The Behnken-Meyer team has not been replaced” in adequate form. Furthermore, the conferences attendees that year lacked the humility that Lutheran pastors were supposed to embody. Arndt frequently complained about Concordia Seminary professor J.T. Mueller and his arrogance. “I need not stress the obvious fact that J.T. [Mueller] is an ass,” Arndt told Meyer. His arrogance proved unpopular with the Free Church pastors who resented being condescended to at the conference. Arndt worried that if the Free Church pastors

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534 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 21, Arndt to Graebner, 22 October 1948.
536 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, Arndt to Meyer, 17 June 1949.
discovered that Mueller edited the synod’s theological texts they would likely throw them away.537

German-American and German-Canadian women faced social barriers that prevented them from participating in relief work overseas alongside their male counterparts. Reble and Behnken conceptualized missionary work abroad as a theological, and therefore male, activity. Lutheran women faced greater scrutiny than male pastors. Although both Missouri’s fight for conservative Lutheranism and Reble’s chaplaincy program privileged male pastors, women also wanted to renew ties with Germany or reconnect with their German roots. The Missouri and Canada Synod’s male-dominated programs, however, meant that German-American and German-Canadian Lutheran women had to travel to Germany through different means. Pastors deemed charity and educational work as acceptable for Lutheran women as both jobs emphasized female servitude and motherhood. Working with children or serving the needy fit both roles.538 Thus, some women found that volunteering with the Red Cross was one of the few ways they could travel overseas to Germany on their own. Aside from charity work, the wives of Missouri and Canada Synod pastors occasionally accompanied their husbands as they worked in Germany. Regardless, most women found their visits to Germany disappointing. Unlike their male counterparts, women often found their experiences in Germany limited by male pastors or soldiers who continued to regulate their behaviour overseas.

Ruth Renick was one of the first German-American women from St. Louis to visit postwar Germany due to her work with the Red Cross. Renick spent most of 1945

537 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, Arndt to Meyer, 9 June 1949.
538 Todd, 112-114.
working in France in the hopes that the Red Cross would later transfer her to Germany. Much like German-American men, Renick volunteered to serve overseas in part because it would allow her to travel Germany and connect with her German heritage. She noted that she “would like very much to take the trip down around Salzburg, Munich, Bremen Pass and over into Austria and Czechoslovakia” if the Red Cross approved her vacation time. In late 1945 Renick received her wish and the Red Cross transferred her to work north of Frankfurt.

Renick’s time in West Germany proved to be a disappointing experience. She noted that American soldiers enjoyed “seeing the American girls and eating the donuts and drinking the coffee, but we aren’t receiving the satisfaction we need to keep us going.” This was in part because of the frequent derogatory remarks American soldiers made about her. She told her family that American soldiers often referred to her as *fräulein, which she considered to be a disparaging comment referring to her marital status and ancestry.* She also shared the Missouri Synod’s criticism of American attempts to govern Germany. She discussed the “general mess of confusion” that occurred whenever she had to deal with American or Red Cross officials. After several months of unfulfilling service, Renick told relatives that her “morale is about as low as the men’s” and she often longed to return to St. Louis. “There is only one way I could return to the states now,” she told her family, “and that is to have my boyfriend (one I don’t have) write a letter to me asking me to return to the states to be married. That letter would be my ticket home. But I don’t have a boyfriend to marry and I don’t think I want

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539 Missouri Historical Society Archives (hereafter MHSA), Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Ruth Renick to Mr. and Mrs. C.R. Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
540 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
541 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
542 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
to marry right now so unless you can give me some good advice, I’ll be over here another year.” She even joked that perhaps her cousin could write a letter pretending to be her boyfriend in order to secure her passage back to St. Louis: “If worse come to worse he can write that proposal letter to me, and when I get back I won’t hold him to it! How about that!” Renick tried to forget her dissatisfaction by reminding herself of the reasons she initially signed up for the Red Cross. She noted optimistically that “I could come home now if I really wanted to, but there’s a bit of the country I want to see first and I think by next July I will be able to see every thing I want to see.”

Elite German Lutheran women had greater success conforming to Lutheran gender norms than younger women such as Renick. The wives of prominent synod officials, including Meyer and Graebner’s wives, accompanied their husbands overseas. Both women spoke “German fluently” and were allowed to accompany their husbands because they exercised “great influence in the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod, and have done a great deal for the cause of relief in Germany.” Both women planned on meeting with other groups of German Lutheran women to discuss relief and aid. Reble’s wife, Gertrud, also accompanied him overseas and participated in distributing aid and relief in West Germany. However, she was only allowed to do so among other women. She held classes where she lectured to German women on Lutheranism in Canada and the differences between church life in Germany and Canada. By speaking solely to women, Gertrud ensured that she did not violate Lutheran doctrine of holding authority over a man. She also never spoke directly on theological issues, but instead

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543 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
544 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945.
545 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 21 October 1945.
546 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, Arndt to Mrs. Antonie Nopitsch, 11 March 1949.
focused her lectures on charity work and social activities. These topics, deemed safe by the synod leadership, therefore never threatened the authority of the male pastor.

Lutheran men continued to devalue Lutheran women’s labour even when they did conform to acceptable feminine standards. Reble, for example, did not value his wife’s work as equally important to his own contributions in the field of theology and relief in Germany. The *Canada Lutheran* frequently published Reble’s reports from Germany, but never published articles on Gertrud’s work. Reble was equally dismissive of his wife’s work. He paid brief attention to Gertrud’s work in his columns and reports. He listed her work among German women at the end of his columns under the miscellaneous heading of “Here and There.” His wife’s work took a secondary role compared to his own efforts to help rebuild Germany.

Although men devalued their work, Lutheran women managed to push for their own agendas, even in their limited spheres of authority. Eddie Arndt accompanied her husband Karl overseas to West Germany and spent her time raising money and aid for several German orphanages. Karl approved of her work, because it focused on charity and children. However, Eddie’s work still faced scrutiny by the synod’s male leaders. In a 1947 meeting, Meyer expressed shock that her budget for an orphanage included six towels per child. He rejected her budget on the basis that “in my home in St. Louis we did not have 6 towels per person.” Eddie refused to budge on the issue. She told Meyer that six towels per person was the norm in Germany prior to the war. She pointed out that the synod’s goal was to help Germany recovery from the war’s losses, and that her budget seemed justified in this light. Her act of disobedience prompted Meyer to “explode.”

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the rest of the meeting he refused to listen to what Eddie had to say. Instead, he called upon his authority as a pastor and “simply told them” what he believed should be done.\textsuperscript{548} Meyer received the final say, and he changed Eddie’s budget to reflect his own priorities. Meyer’s reaction reveals that even women who conformed to synod-sanctioned definitions of feminine respectability were under surveillance. Regardless of where they worked, the synod’s male leadership still had the final authority.

Anna Brauer was one of the few young women the Missouri Synod sponsored to travel to West Germany in 1949. Young and educated with a Masters degree, Brauer represented the synod’s future as a middle-class and educated institution instead of its rural and working class roots. Brauer was part of a broader movement in North American Lutheranism that increasingly saw young professional women appointed to oversee the synod’s bureaucratic and social work.\textsuperscript{549} Synod leaders tasked Brauer with developing parochial schools among Free Churches so as to better train Lutheran youth in conservative Lutheranism. As the program inevitably involved knowledge of and working with children, the synod had little issue delegating this task to a woman in the synod.

As one of the few educated Lutheran women stationed in West Germany, the synod relied on Brauer to oversee humanitarian aid involving German children. Shortly after her arrival, the Society of Girls Homes in Stuttgart wrote to the synod asking for clothes and food to help assist their orphan girls. Meyer originally rejected their plea for aid. He explained to the organization that it was synod policy to only distribute aid through the German organization Hilfswerk, an organization in Germany that worked closely with the Free Churches and Missouri Synod. Since the orphanage was not a

\textsuperscript{548} CHI, EBP, Box 1, Governmental Folder, Report of L. Meyer, October-November 1947.
religious institution, it did not qualify for aid. However, Meyer recognized that the orphanage was still in need. He contacted Brauer and asked her to try and assist the orphanage herself in a personal capacity. Unlike other German-Canadian and German-American women overseas, the synod placed considerable trust in Brauer’s work due to her professional and educational background. As long as Brauer continued to work in the fields of charity and children, the synod had no problem with her putting her training into practice.

However, Brauer did not always abide by the restrictions the synod placed upon her. She pushed the boundaries of her job and the limitations the synod’s male leadership placed on her. When Brauer arrived in Germany, she met with Eugene Gerstenmaier, the leader of the *Hilfswerk*. Gerstenmaier was also a Lutheran pastor and worked closely with Behnken and Meyer to ensure that the Missouri Synod’s aid reached conservative Free Church Lutherans. Although the *Hilfswerk* theoretically distributed charity among all West German Lutherans, Gerstenmaier and his employees often tried to influence Lutheran politics and participated in the battle between Free Church pastors and EKiD. Like their Missouri Synod counterparts, the *Hilfswerk* promoted conservative Lutheranism by responding quickly to aid requests from churches unaffiliated with EKiD. Gerstenmaier’s work with the *Hilfswerk* was therefore inherently political and theological, and could not involve Lutheran women without violating the Missouri Synod’s strict gender norms. Brauer excused her meetings with Gerstenmaier as accidental and by chance. Meyer was not convinced, and told her that her meeting with Gerstenmaier was rather “fishy.” Meyer investigated the matter more deeply and received word from Arndt that Brauer had in fact deliberately met with Gerstenmaier. Arndt,

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550 CHI, LMC, Box 85, Folder 682, Meyer to Margaret Blewett, 14 July 1949.
continuing to spread gossip throughout the synod as usual, reported that Brauer likely arranged the meeting in order to secure more money for herself. Meyer disapproved of Brauer’s attempt to gain financial independence outside of the synod, particularly when it meant Brauer became involved in theological aspects of the Hilfswerk’s work. Meyer warned her to “watch her step” and told her that working with the Hilfswerk “will definitely reflect on you and your job unfavorably.”

Meyer continued to discourage Brauer’s ambitions throughout her stay in Germany. When she wished to attend and volunteer her help at the 1952 Bad Boll conference, Meyer told her that she was surely capable, but would offer nothing substantial to the conference. The Ball Boll would remain a male-dominated space due to the theological nature of the conference. Despite her best efforts, Meyer’s intervention ensured that Brauer’s work remained confined to the church’s traditional emphasis on women’s work involving charity and children. Attempts to push the boundaries of acceptable Lutheran femininity resulted in condemnation of her behaviour.

A New Strategy

By the early 1950s, any sentiment of ethnic and religious solidarity between German and Missouri’s pastors started to fade. The numerous reports that missionaries sent to St. Louis convinced synod leaders that their current approach towards German recovery prompted the local population to view them as “Americans,” and not as fellow Lutherans and Germans. They realized that they needed to recognize the Free Churches as

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551 CHI, LMC, Box 85, Folder 682, Meyer to Anna Brauer, 30 April 1949.
552 CHI, LMC, Box 86, Folder 697, Meyer to Brauer, 20 March, 1952.
equals if they wanted to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Germany. Synod leadership understood that they had to alter their missionary efforts to adjust “to European conditions and under the leadership of a locally trained national ministry” if they hoped to succeed.\textsuperscript{553} These sentiments became official at the 1950 Missouri Synod convention. The synod passed a resolution solidifying that “long-distance direction of the work in Europe is unsatisfactory.” Instead of trying to enforce Missouri’s conservative Lutheranism abroad, they recognized that synod policy needed to make its “objective to build an indigenous Church also in Europe which will be self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating.”\textsuperscript{554} The resolution offered the first indication that calls on the basis of a shared ethnicity and religion were not sufficient in convincing Free State churches to work harmoniously with St. Louis.

The 1950s witnessed a departure in Missouri Synod policy concerning Germany. The first step in completing the synod’s goal of creating an “indigenous Church” in Germany consisted of providing the necessary infrastructure. A theological seminary where Germans could attend and learn conservative Lutheran theology seemed an obvious first step to help the Free Churches cultivate their own leaders rather than relying on the Missouri Synod. The synod sponsored the creation of a seminary located just outside of Frankfurt. After just three years of operation, synod representatives noticed that the seminary created a strong change of attitude within the Free Churches. Newly graduated pastors from the Frankfurt seminary took an interest in promoting the

\textsuperscript{553} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 83, Report on the Meeting of a Committee of the Board of Directors with the Board for European Missions, 16 July 1948.

\textsuperscript{554} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 7, Folder 77, Proceedings of Synodical Convention 1950.
conservative Lutheran cause.\textsuperscript{555} In a departure from their previous attitude, the Missouri Synod did not use its status as benefactor to exert authority over the Free Church pastors who worked at the seminary. When the 1954 budget proved inadequate to pay the entire seminary staff, the synod dismissed a Missouri Synod pastor rather than a member of the Free Church. Although contradictory to his original plans for a strong Missouri presence in Germany, Behnken did not override or interfere with this decision.\textsuperscript{556}

The Missouri Synod’s shift in policy resonated with the Free Church pastors who felt their autonomy and local concerns were, for once, clearly recognized. Yet not all members of the Missouri Synod unanimously supported the synod’s new direction. In 1955, the Board for European Affairs submitted a report to the Missouri Synod that outlined its dissatisfaction with its relationship with Lutherans in Germany. With the Missouri Synod’s new hands-off approach, the Board explained it now lacked a sense of direction. Daib subsequently recommended that the Board be dissolved.\textsuperscript{557} Behnken rejected the idea that the Board for European Affairs no longer had a purpose. He explained that “co-ordination between various agencies of Synod is not assured and no machinery exists to make it possible.” The Board therefore still had a purpose in acting as an intermediary between the German Free Churches and the Missouri Synod. Daib and the other Board members remained unconvincing. They dissolved the board in 1955 after Behnken conceded that “it was not my purpose to persuade them to continue as a Board. If they serve with feelings as they expressed it will not be good.”\textsuperscript{558} The dissolution of the Board for European Affairs marked the end of the Missouri Synod’s attempts to exert its

\textsuperscript{555} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 7, Folder 77, Behnken’s Report to the Board of European Affairs, 17 December 1953.
\textsuperscript{556} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 7, Folder 77, Report on Germany, 5 November 1954.
\textsuperscript{557} CHI, Behnken Administration, The Board for European Affairs Report, 10 June 1955.
\textsuperscript{558} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 7, Folder 77, Behnken to Mayer, 2 July 1955.
authority over the German Free Churches and initiated a new relationship that placed each group on an equal footing.

Reble’s chaplaincy program faced a similar fate as Behnken’s campaign for conservative Lutheranism. Rather than facing challenge from Free Church pastors, however, Reble encountered internal disputes between himself and a younger generation of German-Canadian pastors in the National Lutheran Council (NLC). In particular, members of the NLC from Western Canada objected to Reble’s commanding position overseas. Western Canadian pastors like Clifford Monk and Traugott Herzer interpreted Reble’s program as yet another example of the Canada Synod dominating Lutheran affairs at the expense of their own authority. Monk and Herzer, in particular, objected to what they perceived as Reble “meddling” in immigration affairs overseas. The issue became a regional power struggle, and they particularly disliked Reble’s preference for recruiting chaplains from Waterloo County to serve the immigrants. Albert Jacobi, Reble’s successor as the Canada Synod’s president, confronted Reble about striving for greater regional balance in order to quiet the Western Canadian pastors. Reble quietly admitted that he “might favor the East” and promised to work towards greater regional representation.

However, Reble also tried to use this compromise as a way to gain more privileges for German pastors in Canada. In return for participating in the chaplaincy program, Reble wanted Western Canadian congregations to invite visiting German pastors to tour their congregations and cities on the Prairies. In order to implement this plan, Reble submitted a request to the NLC for the necessary funds to facilitate travel to

559 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Baetz to Monk, 6 September 1955.
560 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Albert Jacobi, 11 August 1955.
561 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Jacobi, 11 August 1955.
and from Western Canada for both Canadian and German pastors. This proved particularly problematic given that it was largely Western Canadian leadership, such as Monk and Herzer, who controlled the NLC and its budget. Their lack of faith in Reble’s program made it easy to reject his request for financial assistance.\textsuperscript{562}

Reble continued his chaplaincy efforts despite not gaining approval from the NLC’s Western pastors. His insistence of allowing Canadian chaplains to travel to Germany and vice-versa eventually poisoned his relationship with the pastors in the West. In the summer of 1956, the NLC’s Earl Treusch confronted Reble about his maintenance of the program. He expressed concern that despite passing a resolution to offer no funding to the chaplaincy program, German pastors continued to send receipts for reimbursement to the synod. Treusch, emboldened by Monk and Herzer’s outrage, disapproved of how the German pastors behaved in Canada. Treusch resented the German pastors for using their opportunity to visit the country as little more than a way to ask the congregations they visited for greater relief. Monk expressed indignation that one pastor visiting Winnipeg had the confidence to even tell members of the congregation to not send food and clothing to the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR), but directly to his congregation in Germany.\textsuperscript{563} Unsurprisingly, the action of these German pastors largely conforms to their interactions with the Missouri Synod. German pastors used their meetings with Canadians as a way to lobby for more aid for their congregations. They had little use for Behnken and Reble’s idealistic aim of promoting connections between North American and West German Lutherans. Reble remained unapologetic and confident that the chaplaincy program still had value for the German and Canadian Lutherans. He

\textsuperscript{562} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Brethren (NLC), 23 September 1955; LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Hjordis Overgaard to Reble, 15 December 1955.

\textsuperscript{563} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Earl Treusch to Reble, 12 June 1956.
believed that, while unfortunate, the behaviour of these German pastors could be corrected “with the proper amount of coaching” before they travelled to Canada.

Speaking on Reble’s behalf, one Waterloo County pastor insisted they were “convinced in the continuing need for ships chaplains, both German and Canadian.”

Reble’s position with the CLWR expired in the fall of 1956 and he returned to Canada. Free from Reble’s influence, Treusch saw this as an opportunity to place the chaplaincy program under review. Unsurprisingly, Treusch condemned the program as expensive, unrealistic, and a bureaucratic headache. Most significantly, Treusch believed that Reble gave the German pastors the impression that they were “guests” of the Canadian Lutherans when this was certainly not the case. Treusch recounted several instances where Canadian congregations were unaware that they had to host a visiting German pastor and were unsure of the purpose of the visit. Other members of the NLC agreed with Treusch’s assessment. They believed that if German or Canadian pastors wished to visit either of the two countries, that they had best carry it out individually and at their own expense. They suggested that if the chaplaincy program continued, administering to the spiritual needs of the immigrants should be their primary concern. Thus, they would return immediately to Canada upon arriving in Germany rather than the previous tradition of traveling Germany afterwards. However, Treusch realized the limitations to this plan. He understood that such a plan significantly diminished the

564 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Baetz to Treusch, 4 July 1956.
565 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Treusch to Eugene Ries, 22 April 1957.
566 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Treusch to J. Schnell, 14 December 1956; LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Schnell to Treusch, 25 February 1957.
Canadian appeal of serving as a chaplain. If they could not travel throughout Germany, Treusch admitted “it will be practically impossible for me to find men to serve.”

The chaplaincy program continued in this diluted form for the next three years before being formally discontinued in 1960. Reble responded to this decision with a resigned attitude and inquired as to why the program was cancelled. Treusch responded that “this program had almost passed out of existence by itself” and that it was not worth the “problems” associated with the program to continue to offer it in such a limited form. Of course, Treusch and the other synod leaders made very little effort to keeping the program alive. The same NLC pastors that shifted they synod’s power away from Waterloo County after the war similarly contested and ultimately ended Reble’s attempt to promote greater interaction between Germany and Waterloo County. Without Reble’s vision, the program faltered and died.

**Conclusion**

Lawrence Meyer’s experiences in June 1948 highlight the conflict between ethnicity and nationality that missionaries and chaplains encountered in Germany. After frequent meetings with American military officials, Meyer decided that he did not believe the “American personnel here in Germany can really render a service. Most Americans are merely here to fill a job and to put in time.” He believed that “the great majority of them have no conception” of what rebuilding postwar Germany entailed, and that he

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567 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Treusch to Schnell, 8 March 1957.
568 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Treusch to Bengt Hoffman, 23 June 1960.
569 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Reble to Treusch, 15 August 1960; LA, ESF, 30 CLC, 30.4.2.21.2, Treusch to Reble, 1 September 1960.
“almost despairs to think” that Germans formed their opinion of American democracy based on their interactions with the military. Meyer drew on his own self-identification as a German in order to critique how the American military interacted with German civilians. He criticized Americans for having “little understanding of the language, culture, and background of Germany,” in contrast to his own authority as a German American. Yet Meyer’s interactions with German civilians that same month proved that although he thought of himself as German, the German people perceived him as an American. He remarked that most “Germans look upon us as conquerors, and it is the exceptional American who enjoys the confidence of the Germans.” Meyer’s interactions highlight the ambiguous hyphenated identities that he and other missionaries encountered in Germany. They felt German when interacting with Anglo-Americans, but felt American when they interacted with German civilians. While this gave them opportunities to engage with both communities, it also meant that they were not fully accepted as insiders in either group.570

The experiences of Behnken, Reble, and their colleagues continues to complicate the traditional narrative of identity loss present in the scholarship on German immigrants. These pastors self-identified as Germans and articulated an ethnic identity while renewing their ties with Germany. They displayed their ethnicity through trips to places of familial importance, sympathies with their “fellow” Germans over the war, and through their efforts to help rebuild Germany. Yet, the fact that these men never felt embraced by Germans civilians offers more evidence that a hybrid identity emerged during the Second World War and continued into the postwar period. German Americans and Canadians did not abandon their ethnic identity. Instead, they adopted a hyphenated “German-

570 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 8, Folder 86, Meyer’s ‘Day By Day’, 9-15 June 1948.
American” or “German-Canadian” identity that placed them simultaneously in both
“German” and “American/Canadian” worlds, yet firmly in neither.

Their experiences in Germany provide a compelling argument that, while a
shared ethnic heritage and transnational ties linked Germany with the Missouri and
Canada Synods, local conditions in Germany and their nationality prevented these bonds
from taking root. In the decades since Reble and others left Germany for North America,
the country fought two large wars that pitted them against North American “conquerors.”
Germans developed their own theological stances on Lutheranism and rejected what they
saw as yet another attempt of American takeover. These local conditions in Germany
were stronger than the transnational ties Behnken and Reble believed existed between the
two peoples, and Germans could not help but see the Americans as members of a
different nation, instead of ethnic cousins. Behnken and Reble’s attempts to renew ties
with Germany demonstrates a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and
Waterloo County, even if their attempts to solidify connections with a German
“homeland” failed.
Chapter 5: German Space as White Space: Race and Ethnicity during the “Ethnic Reverie” of the 1950s and 1960s

German displaced persons and refugees started to arrive in St. Louis and Waterloo County by the late 1940s. Their arrival dramatically increased the size of the Missouri and Canada Synods, as well as their local congregations. Germans constituted the largest group of refugees to settle in Missouri in the postwar decades. By 1960, over 360,000 German refugees arrived in Missouri with over 80,000 of them choosing to live in St. Louis. From 1950 to 1960, the Canada Synod’s population grew from approximately 38,000 to 64,000 due to increased immigration. These numbers continued to increase until the mid-1960s when immigration from Germany began to decline.571

The influx of refugees and DPs in the postwar decades prompted national conversations on how “foreigners” would adapt to their new North American homes. The transformation from “DP” to “citizen” was by no means a passive experience. Historian Franca Iacovetta’s scholarship describes the number of middle class Anglo-Canadians and institutions that monitored immigrant behaviour in Canada’s urban centers. Iacovetta labels such individuals and institutions as “gatekeepers.” Although the term “gatekeeper” typically refers to immigration officials and “those who determine admission requirements and regulations for a country or institution,” Iacovetta broadens this term as a useful shorthand to include the “wide array of reception, citizenship, and regulatory activities” that immigrants faced after they arrived in Canada. She argues that Anglo-Canadian social workers, educators, journalists, and health professionals all worked to

assimilate newcomers into a hegemonic Canadian culture based on British and “respectable” middle class values. Gatekeepers monitored immigrant behavior, ranging from their language, parenting style, clothing, food, and mental and physical health, in an effort to coerce them to conform to Canadian cultural norms. These preoccupations reflected Cold War-era concerns. They stressed the need for immigrant newcomers to embrace North America’s liberal democracy in contrast to the totalitarian and communist governments that the DPs left behind in Europe. Gatekeepers realized many DPs originated from communist nations or formerly fascist countries and thus needed to be “de-programmed” from their former totalitarian governments and embrace Western democratic values. Essentially, gatekeepers believed DPs needed to be “taught” how to become good Canadian and American citizens. This chapter examines similar gatekeeping institutions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. Local charitable organizations such as the International Institute of St. Louis (IISTL) and the Kitchener-Waterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) managed by Anglo-Americans and Anglo-Canadians tried to assimilate newcomers and encouraged them to abandon their ethnic ties. These organizations tried to integrate newcomers through English-language classes, citizenship tests, and generally monitored immigrant behaviour.

This chapter argues that the effective and widespread need to “integrate” newcomers Iacovetta identifies was not as pronounced in St. Louis and Waterloo County as other North American cities. While gatekeeper institutions such as the IISTL and KWCF tried to integrate newcomers, local German Lutherans challenged their efforts.

This occurred for two reasons. First, pastors performed their duties as ethnic elites and welcomed DPs into the pre-existing ethnic traditions of their congregations rather than trying to assimilate them. Pastors had a vested interest in German DPs maintaining their ethnic traditions and, most importantly, speaking the German language. By encouraging DPs to retain their German ethnicity, pastors hoped their Lutheran churches would grow in size and power, thereby allowing them to maintain their position as ethnic elites.

Rather than encouraging DPs to adopt new North American norms as Anglo gatekeepers did, pastors created an inclusive ethnic boundary zone in their churches by increasing the number of German-language services and nurturing an interest in German culture. Creating a harmonious relationship between themselves, their congregants, and new DPs allowed pastors to remain in integral leadership roles that bolstered their authority, and had the added side effect of limiting the power of Anglo gatekeepers in their communities.

Second, while German immigrants may have been minorities in other North American communities, the reputations of St. Louis and Waterloo County as German communities helped discursively define the character of these cities. Historian Kathleen Neils Conzen refers to this phenomenon as the “localization of immigrant cultures.” She defines localization as

> the tendency of an immigrant-constructed culture to embed and reproduce itself...in the educational institutions, political and governmental organizations, businesses, media, and popular culture of the broader local community. Consequently, what are initially ethnic group values come to play a strong role in determining the local ‘rules of the game,’ in molding ‘the way we do things here,’ in shaping non-group as well as group life on the local level.\(^573\)

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The density of German immigrants in both St. Louis and Waterloo County helped “localize” German-American and German-Canadian culture in both communities. Local legends such as the pioneer myth along with the number of German immigrants in both communities complicated gatekeeper attempts to educate German DPs on how to “fit-in.” Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, gatekeepers realized they could not convince DPs to fully abandon their language or culture when their German Canadian and American neighbours had yet to do so either.

Whiteness, alongside the localization of German culture, helped Lutheran churches remain ethnic boundary zones in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Just as in the previous decade, German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans continued to articulate white racial identities that inadvertently allowed their congregations to function as both German spaces and white spaces. The Missouri Synod, in particular, grappled with the issue of segregation and “white flight” in the 1950s. While they easily incorporated German DPs into their congregations, this chapter describes how synod leaders laboured to keep black Lutherans in separate and segregated congregations. In Waterloo County, the popularity of the pioneer myth ensured that German-Canadian Lutherans continued to cultivate a white ethnic culture inaccessible to racialized members of their community. Lutheran churches remained ethnic boundary zones in the postwar period, but only because German Lutherans actively worked to keep their racialized neighbours out of their congregations.

By investigating the ways German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County confronted ethnic and racial diversity in the postwar period, this chapter questions the notion of an “ethnic reverie” in the 1950s and 1960s. This term, used notably by historian Matthew Frye Jacobson, argues that European
immigrants and their descendants practiced an “American” or “white” identity during these decades at the expense of their ethnic identities. European immigrants and their descendants ignored their ethnic heritage and culture in favour of an all-American identity that stressed inclusion in the nation. Jacobson suggests that this approach started to change in the mid-1960s with the “white ethnic revival.” This revival witnessed white Americans reclaim and re-identify with the ethnic identities of their grandparents or forebears as a response to the successes of the African-American Civil Rights Movement. As black Americans successfully demonstrated the links between Jim Crow segregation and racial inequality with white supremacy in the United States, it was no longer politically expedient for white Americans to identify as “whites.” Articulating an Italian or Polish identity, for example, allowed white Americans to ignore their complicity in perpetuating racial inequalities by identifying with their ethnic rather than racial identity.574 American intellectuals ranging from Will Herberg and Eric Goldman, for instance, support Jacobson’s notion of an ethnic reverie. Goldman stated that postwar affluence caused white ethnics to be “more anxious to achieve further respectability of unhyphenated Americanism.”575

This chapter joins other historians, such as Joshua Zeitz, in arguing that the ethnic reverie was more complicated than the typical “view of postwar American history as a swift trajectory from city to suburb, from working class to middle class, and, hence, from pluralism to white homogeneity.”576 German Lutherans practiced an ethnic identity within their congregations and resisted mainstream attempts to assimilate DPs while also

articulating white supremacist views. Indeed, these were not unrelated events. The ethnic elites that supported keeping their congregations segregated allowed for their churches to remain ethnic boundary zones wherein they practiced their German culture without the influence of other racial groups. As gatekeepers begrudgingly acknowledged St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German heritage and culture, they also reaffirmed this culture and their communities as white. While the “pluralism to white homogeneity” narrative of the ethnic reverie may describe the experiences of other white ethnic groups, the Lutheran church continued to act as an ethnic boundary zone throughout the postwar decades wherein German Lutherans practiced their ethnic identities alongside their racial status as white.

The Lutheran Church as an Ethnic Boundary Zone

Congregations in both St. Louis and Waterloo County increased the number of their German-language services in the late 1940s. With the war over, Lutheran churches once again started to reflect the hybrid identities of their inhabitants by featuring both English and German services. Pastors and laypeople saw no contradiction in attending or offering services in both languages. Bilingual services did not make them any less American or Canadian, and attending services in English did not make them less German. Holy Cross Lutheran Church in St. Louis, for example, continued to offer German-language services following the Second World War. By 1949, German remained the dominant language of the church. The Reverend Paul Koenig preached close to two hundred German sermons compared to one hundred and thirty English language sermons in 1949. Attendance at both services, however, remained roughly the same.
Approximately 66,000 congregants attended the German services as opposed to the 62,000 that attended the English services.\footnote{Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Messenger Box, \textit{The Holy Cross Messenger}, April 1950.} St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener functioned in much the same manner. Although St. Peter’s church council staunchly opposed speaking German during the war, it fully endorsed the Reverend Albert Lotz’s motion to reintroduce German services in 1948.\footnote{The church council solidified this choice and agreed to offer more German services if Lotz deemed necessary in Laurier Archives (LA), Eastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada fonds (hereafter ESF), LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 17, Church Council Minutes, 12 December 1949.} As German immigration to Waterloo County increased in the 1950s, many German immigrants chose to join St. Peter’s due to its frequent German language services and downtown location. In 1951 Lotz suggested that he offer German language sermons more frequently at the church, and the church council agreed to purchase more German-language prayer books to meet the linguistic needs of the church’s newcomers.\footnote{LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 17, Church Council Minutes, 9 July 1951; LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 18, Church Council Minutes, 10 February 1952; LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 13, Annual Congregation Meeting, 12 February 1956.}

Congregational life at St. Peter’s and Holy Cross did not show signs of the “ethnic reverie” present in other ethnic communities during the 1940s and 1950s. Language and an interest in their German “homeland” prevented Lutheran congregations from completely conforming to mainstream Canadian and American culture. Koenig and Lotz demonstrated a dedication to their German ethnicities, rather than accepting the monoculture and monolingualistic norms supported by mainstream North America. Both pastors took steps to guarantee that English and German received equal attention and importance among their followers. They ensured that one language group would not feel secondary or beneath the other. Holy Cross, for example, held separate clubs for its congregants who wished to participate in church life in English or German. The
congregation had both a “Ladies Aid Society” and a Frauenverein to support bilingual and unilingual women. Regardless of their language of choice, the congregation remained actively involved in German affairs. When Koenig and his wife went to Germany in 1949, the entire congregation followed their time spent abroad in Germany with great interest. When Koenig returned in the fall, representatives from both language groups asked him to attend their meetings and show his photos from Germany and recount his experiences. No matter their language of choice, they still wished to see glimpses of their “homeland.” Likewise, St. Peter’s guaranteed that both its English and German-speaking members felt welcome at the church. St. Peter’s customarily stationed several members of their church council outside the church’s doorstep each Sunday to greet members of the congregation as they entered the building. In 1952, Lotz realized that this custom excluded German DPs from this weekly tradition. The church council contained no DP representatives and instead consisted of older, prominent, Canadian-born families. Lotz rectified the situation by asking several DP volunteers to work as greeters alongside the church council. In doing so, Lotz demonstrated that recent German arrivals were just as important as the elite members of the church council. Lotz’s effort to include German immigrants in the “welcoming party” suggests that he wanted a “unified congregation” that was not overtly divided along class or linguistic lines. Congregational cohesion, however, did not mean forcing German DPs to recognize English as the superior language. Lotz achieved internal unity in a way that empowered St. Peter’s German DPs rather than identifying them as second-class citizens. Lotz and Koenig,

580 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Messenger Box, The Holy Cross Messenger, November 1949.
581 LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 17, Church Council Minutes, 11 February 1952.
along with their congregations, performed a careful balancing act that resulted in churches unified by a shared respect for their German-English frameworks.

Smaller congregations also offered German-language services, and actually did so in order to attract new DP members. By increasing German services, pastors at smaller congregations could grow their churches by increasing their membership amongst recently arrived DPs. Bethlehem Lutheran Church, located near downtown St. Louis, increased the frequency of their German services with the hopes that DPs would become members of their church. Their efforts paid off. By 1952, the number of congregants wishing to speak German at church showed signs of increasing, thereby helping the congregation grow as well. Small congregations in Waterloo County adopted a similar strategy. At St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Waterloo, the Reverend C.S. Roberts visited the homes of recently arrived German DPs in order to encourage them to attend the church. Although St. John’s operated primarily in the English language, Roberts still conducted monthly, and later weekly, German services that he hoped to grow as a result of DP attendance. “Though not accustomed to attending services regularly in their home land,” Roberts acknowledged, “many who are negligent might become regular attendants at our German service.” Regardless of its popularity, speaking German remained an important aspect of church life at these congregations. Their pastors invested time and resources in maintaining the German language, even if English was the dominant language of that particular congregation. Ethnic culture co-existed alongside their status as Canadians and Americans, and actually worked to

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582 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Box, Bulletins Folder, Bethlehem Bulletin, 24 August 1947; CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Box, Annual Report Folder, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Annual Report 1952.
583 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.1.176, St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church Annual Report for 1964.
increase the authority and importance of local pastors who could successfully balance the German and English languages.

An ability to speak German remained important for leadership roles within St. Louis and Waterloo County congregations during the so-called “ethnic reverie.” In 1947, the Reverend Paul Streufert at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church in St. Louis found he did not have enough time to meet the demands of his congregation. Streufert volunteered his services at several other St. Louis churches, and therefore did not always have the attention or time necessary to preach at St. Matthew’s each Sunday. The synod responded by allowing its students at Concordia Seminary to take turns preaching as guests at St. Matthew’s when Streufert could not attend. Concordia Seminary still trained their students in both the German and English languages, and the students performed bilingual services at St. Matthew’s.\(^{584}\) Similarly, St. Peter’s in Kitchener placed importance on the ability to speak German when they sought to hire another secretary to help meet the demands of the growing congregation. The church council emphasized that the first requirement of the new job would be proficiency in both English and German. The church council hired Mrs. Michael Gondosch, because she was “particularly suited for the position because of her facility with both languages.”\(^{585}\) It was important to the church council that those they hired to represent the congregation also embodied its hybrid identity.

The German language remained an important part of Lutheran churches when German DPs arrived in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Efforts on behalf of pastors such

\(^{584}\) CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Matthew’s Board of Elders Box, Board of Elders Folder, Paul Streufert to Edwin Fritze, 16 January 1948.

\(^{585}\) LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, reel 13, Church Council Minutes, 16 November 1959; LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, reel 13, Church Council Minutes, 14 December 1959.
as Koenig and Lotz helped cultivate an atmosphere in which the German ethnicities of newcomers did not come into conflict with their congregations or fellow German Lutherans. Just as in decades past, German Lutherans continued to balance their ethnic, religious, and national identities in their churches. They did not slip into an ethnic reverie following the war, but maintained their German-English framework and solidified the model throughout the upper echelons of their congregations.

**Gatekeeping in German Lutheran Communities**

Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County provided spaces for German DPs to continue to speak and worship in German. Outside of the closed confines of the church, however, German DPs encountered secular institutions that sought to integrate them into North American life. Just like other urban cities in North America, St. Louis and Waterloo County had charitable organizations that aimed to provide DPs with services such as English-language classes and advice on finding jobs and permanent housing. The Kitchener-Waterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) and the International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis (IIISTL) interacted with German DPs alongside the Missouri and Canada Synods. Unlike the two synods, which provided a space for German DPs to preserve their ethnicity and language, the KWCF and IIISTL aimed to eliminate the German language and integrate German DPs into mainstream North American culture.

Both institutions had similar origins to other gatekeeping organizations in North America. The IIISTL started as one of the YWCA’s many “international institutes” in 1919 to promote charitable work among American immigrants. The IIISTL helped newcomers with medical issues, unemployment, and language training, while also
assisting immigrants with naturalization papers, deportation, and other legal matters. Harriette F. Ryan, the IISTL’s director during the mid-twentieth century, was a second-generation Irish immigrant and devoted much of her life to ensuring that immigrants and their children had an advocate in the IISTL. The KWCF started in a very similar fashion. Muriel Clement, a member of Waterloo County’s English community and the wife of former Kitchener mayor William Clement, founded the KWCF at the local YWCA in 1937 as an “international club” for other middle-class women in Waterloo County. The club originally functioned as a way for elite women to discuss culture “relating to the new and old world – music, travelogues, films and stunts.” In the postwar period, the organization broadened its scope to include philanthropic work among “newcomers with problems of employment, housing, obtaining furniture, giving advice, [and finding] their new way of life in Canada.” The KWCF and IISTL conducted similar events typical of other gatekeeping institutions in North America. They hosted English-language classes, offered cooking lessons, and sponsored different “folk” or “multicultural” events where newcomers could showcase dancing, music, and food from Europe. At their core, both institutions and its employees had the ultimate goal of assimilating DPs into mainstream Canadian and American culture. Although assimilation is rarely linear and more often reflects a process of adaptation and integration, the gatekeepers in charge of both

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586 State Historical Society of Missouri Archives (hereafter SHSMA), International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis Papers (hereafter IISTLP), Roll 1, Folder 1, “What is the International Institute?”, October 1938.
588 University of Waterloo Special Collections & Archives (hereafter UW), Kitchener-Waterloo Council of Friendship Papers (hereafter KWCFP), History File, K.W. Council of Friendship, 16 March 1969.
589 Iacovetta, chapter 6.
institutions did not see assimilation in such a nuanced manner.\textsuperscript{590} Clement made her mandate clear to all DPs that participated in KWCF events: “We are a melting pot, and privileged to be part of it.” The KWCF wished to “assimilate not merely integrate.”\textsuperscript{591} Ryan similarly acknowledged that the IISTL “is primarily an assimilation, integration or Americanization agency.”\textsuperscript{592} Both institutions sought to undermine the German ethnicities of newcomers in favour of a common American or Canadian identity.

The KWCF and IISTL initially did not provide a tolerant atmosphere for German DPs. The strict immigration quotas in place following the Second World War ensured that most immigrants arriving to St. Louis were the wives of returning American soldiers. These “war brides” consisted mainly of women from the United Kingdom. Providing the war brides legal aid and helping them find employment occupied the majority of the IISTL’s time in the years following the war. The IISTL started a War Brides Club shortly after the war in an effort to help provide a social space for newcomers to overcome the isolation and loneliness that moving to a new country inevitably entailed. The club succeeded in bringing together British war brides to socialize, but proved alienating for the newcomers who did not fit their American and British culture. Although the majority of war brides were British, American servicemen also married women from a variety of different countries. These marriages were less common, but war brides from Italy, Germany, and Japan also accompanied their husbands to St. Louis after the war. At the second meeting of the War Brides Club, the brides discussed whether they should allow Germans into the group. The decision was a unanimous “no.” The IISTL employee who

\textsuperscript{590} For a recent study on how assimilation is defined and its nuances, see Mary C. Waters and Tomas R. Jimenez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” \textit{Annual Review of Sociology} 31 (2005): 105-125.
\textsuperscript{591} UW, KWCFP, History File, K.W. Council of Friendship, 16 March 1969.
\textsuperscript{592} SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 91, “Talk Given by Miss Harriette F. Ryan over KXOK,” 9 March 1939; SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 1, Folder 1, “What is the International Institute?”, October 1938.
supervised the club meeting later wrote that she was not surprised over this decision “since the majority of the war brides are English.” Negative associations with Germans as “the enemy” dictated the exclusionary attitudes of the war brides. Even though the IISTL sought to provide a space for all immigrants, German women faced rejection as a result of wartime wounds not yet healed. The British background of the war brides allowed them to adapt easily to American cultural norms, which just so happened to include the discriminatory attitudes of other middle-class Americans. As members of former “enemy nations,” German war brides did not yet have a place at the IISTL.

English-language and citizenship classes sponsored by the KWCF and IISTL made it clear that each group expected German DPs to adopt English as their primary language, thereby facilitating their integration into Canadian and American culture. Although both gatekeeper institutions employed a mix of men and women, men taught English and citizenship classes more often than women. Male teachers tended to push a narrower definition of what constituted an American or Canadian, and they explicitly pursued the gatekeeper agenda of assimilation. Cold War anxieties intrinsically shaped the “gatekeeper-newcomer” relationship, because gatekeepers saw their role as not only creating productive Canadian/American citizens, but also “de-programming” DPs from their former communist backgrounds. Stuart Moore frequently taught English-language classes at the IISTL throughout the 1950s and imbedded his lessons with patriotic messages that stressed “American values” in opposition to what he perceived as the communist backgrounds of his DP students. Moore’s curriculum focused on providing immigrants with the vocabulary they would need to interact with other Americans on a

593 SHSMA, IISTLP, Reel 7, Folder 143, War Brides Club Minutes, 8 May 1947; SHSMA, IISTLP, Reel 7, Folder 143, Notes on War Brides’ Group at I.I., 1952.
594 Iacovetta, Gatekeepers, 14-15.
daily basis. He divided his lessons into several different categories, including vocabulary relating to transportation, work, home, and recreation. These lessons, however, contained clear political messages. Once DPs became familiar with a basic vocabulary, Moore used their newfound language skills to promote mainstream American values. For example, after learning English words relating to “the church,” Moore launched into a discussion of division between church and state in the United States compared to the “godless” regimes of communistic countries in Europe. W.H. Mertens at the KWCF likewise pushed immigrants to use their English-language skills to also increase their fluency in civic affairs. In 1957, Mertens encouraged Clement to support a social hour called the “Canadian Affairs Discussion Group.” He envisioned the group as a place to discuss current and global events to help turn newcomers into informed citizens. Mertens decided that the group should play host not only to immigrants, but also to native-born Canadians. In this sense, immigrants would improve their English and also learn the duties of citizenship from already established Canadians, rather than only socializing with their own ethnic group. “Cold Warriors” like Mertens and Moore ensured that the KWCF and IISTL were not politically neutral spaces. Learning English functioned as more than just a utilitarian necessity. English represented an opportunity for German DPs to not only learn the language of North America, but also its values. Unlike the Lutheran congregations these DPs attended on the weekend, the IISTL and KWCF placed no importance on retaining German. English, they believed, was both a practical necessity as well as the path to good citizenship. Unlike their Lutheran churches, German DPs found

595 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 5, Folder 102, Curriculum Committee to Teaching Staff, 20 January 1949; SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 5, Folder 102, Summer Classes: Procedure, and General Conclusions, n.d. 1949.
596 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 5, Folder 102, Curriculum Committee to Teaching Staff, 20 January 1949.
that gatekeeper organizations sought to dismantle their German language and culture in favour of a single conformist culture based around the English language.

Gatekeepers, however, found their efforts to regulate German DPs complicated compared to other North American communities. The high concentration of German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside the pre-existing population of German Lutherans hindered assimilative strategies that worked well elsewhere. Gatekeepers tried to enforce an Anglo-American and Canadian culture that did not have hegemonic status in either St. Louis or Waterloo County. Although the KWCF and IISTL wished to assimilate German DPs, they found their heavy-handed attempts to do so unconvincing. The density and history of German immigration in both communities furthermore allowed German DPs and German Canadian and German Americans alike to subvert their gatekeeper aims. They turned the KWCF and IISTL events into spaces that represented their own German heritage rather than the integrationist goals of the gatekeepers.

The high concentration of German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County complicated gatekeeper efforts to encourage the use of the English language. Gatekeepers believed that language “is the great stumbling block to integration,” and the large number of German-speaking people in both communities made the transition to English very difficult.598 The English-language teachers at the IISTL adopted a “one approach suits all” model of teaching English to newcomers. Regardless of what language their DP students spoke, the methods for learning English did not change. German DPs, for instance, commonly learned English in the same classes as DPs that spoke Polish or Italian as their first language. The IISTL’s technique, which favoured a uniform teaching method over addressing specific individual or group needs, proved more ineffective than

the instructors at the IISTL anticipated. Increased German immigration to St. Louis altered the composition of the IISTL’s English-language classes. Rather than their ethnically diverse student body, classes consisted solely of German DPs. The instructors discovered that homogenous classes composed of German DPs allowed them to learn English much more effectively. Learning alongside their fellow Germans allowed teachers “to indicate the similarities and differences in emphasis in English words” with their German origins, one instructor noted.599 “The overall homogeneity of the group,” teachers noted, “has turned out to be favorable. Most of the students are from the same language group (German)…so that demonstration through other languages is simplified.”600 This realization surprised Moore and the other gatekeepers at the IISTL. Gatekeepers generally worried that DPs would simply use the IISTL as a type of ethnic club or gathering place to meet, socialize, and preserve their ethnic identity. Such practices obviously went against the institution’s goal of assimilating newcomers.601 Gatekeepers therefore worked hard to ensure DPs did not compose a homogenous ethnic group at the IISTL, but rather blended in with other DPs and native-born Americans as well.602 The density of German DPs in St. Louis undermined this core desire, because they could not prevent their English classes from consisting exclusively of German DPs. Ultimately, the IISTL did not alter their philosophical preference of teaching multiple ethnic groups at once. It did, however, provoke a moment of reflection wherein they realized their general approach to DP work may was not as successful as a model designed to meet the needs of specific ethnic communities.

599 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 5, Folder 103, Evaluation of Techniques and Results in Advanced English Class, 19 April 1954.
600 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 5, Folder 103, Evaluation of Techniques and Results in Advanced English Class, 19 April 1954.
601 Iacovetta, 90-91.
602 Iacovetta, 90-91.
Gatekeepers found it even more difficult to discourage speaking German outside of the IISTL and KWCF. Because DPs could speak German at their churches, clubs, and occasionally at work, German DPs had few reasons to obtain anything other than a basic knowledge of the English language. In the mid-1950s, the Ontario Chamber of Commerce contacted its Kitchener branch to seek their advice on integrating DPs into Canadian society. Kitchener, with its historic and contemporary relationship with immigration, seemed well suited to answer the Ontario Chamber of Commerce’s questions on immigration. The organization hoped that its Kitchener branch could help “prepare a master plan or pilot plan on integration of newcomers to this country” that could be tested in Ontario communities and perhaps, if successful, used across Canada. The chamber’s plan proved ill-advised from the start, particularly given the KWCF’s trouble successfully assimilating German DPs. Regardless, the chamber appointed Joseph Connell, a member of Kitchener’s Anglo-Canadian community, as the director of the plan. In 1957, however, Connell publicly dissolved the committee looking into DP integration as he “could not present any plan since the city was failing in turning newcomers into Canadians.”

Connell expressed dismay over his discovery that DPs could “barely speak English” even “after being in Kitchener four or five years.” “A serious situation exists in Kitchener,” he remarked. “I was amazed at how little is being done.”

Connell’s public resignation triggered a small controversy in Waterloo County, as members of the committee freely shared their thoughts on Kitchener’s “failure” to assimilate DPs with the local press. Their inability to force German DPs to stop speaking

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German sat at the crux of the committee’s frustrations and failures. The committee found that “many of the newcomers are not too anxious to speak English except under dire necessity, and we find a distinct trend on the part of many of them to retreat to the comfort and security of using their own language.” Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian population, as well as the density of German DPs, essentially allowed DPs to continue speaking their language that would otherwise be eroded in communities with a larger Anglo-Canadian population. While investigating the degree to which DPs assimilated, Connell found evidence that the German language actually thrived among DPs. He resentfully noted that he received a request from a German ethnic club asking to use the local YMCA to host their meetings. “We had offered them the free use of our building, our pool, our sports facilities…but I couldn’t go for that,” Connell replied. Gatekeepers in Waterloo County were supposed to integrate DPs into their organizations, and yet this request showed signs of the exact opposite. German-language groups, it appeared, were trying to “take over” Anglo-Canadian institutions like the YMCA. Contrary to Connell’s gatekeeping goals, the German language seemed to be growing stronger rather than weaker.

In their condemnation of Kitchener’s German DPs, Connell and the rest of the committee often drew direct links between the difficulties in integrating German DPs and Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian population. G.E. Eastman, one of the committee’s members, believed that Waterloo County’s ethnic associations needed to “explain what their objectives were” in light of the region’s failure to “Canadianize” its newcomers. Connell proved equally skeptical about the role of current German ethnic

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606 “Survey 200 Groups For Integration Data,” The Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 21 February 1957.
clubs in Waterloo County. Throughout his investigation, one ethnic association approached Connell and asked him to join their association and offered to teach him German. Connell admitted that their offer was “half in fun, half in fellowship, but is it a trend?” The gatekeepers worried that Waterloo County was actually becoming more German as a result of the DPs. The committee generally hoped that the Canadian education system would solve the question of DP assimilation, even if they could not. By speaking English at school, the committee hoped the children of DPs would become fluent in English and stop speaking German. However, one committee member noted pessimistically that Waterloo County’s current German-Canadian population proved that this was not true. He described how “older people, born in this country, who live in rural areas and still talk with a strong accent” proved that the community had more generally failed at assimilating current and previous generations of immigrants.

The Canada Synod was partially to blame for this trend. Connell divided Waterloo County’s DPs into two categories. The first group consisted “of people who chose to come to this country,” like the Hungarian refugees of 1956. This group, he believed, showed positive signs of adopting Anglo-Canadian cultural norms. The second group, however, consisted of DPs “who came because of war, because they were induced to come, because of relatives. They seem to feel as long as they have a roof over their heads and eat that is their only concern.” This latter category of course referenced the programs sponsored by the Canada Synod, such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme or Close Relative Scheme. These DPs arrived through schemes that Waterloo County’s Lutherans

used to bring their fellow Germans overseas and, in Connell’s mind, served to strengthen German culture in the area. The resiliency of the German language led Connell to believe that “it may be best to follow the English idea of handling immigrants.” He suggested that when “large groups” of immigrants arrived, the government “put them into camps and teach them English for three or four months. Then when they’ve learned the language, and been clothed and fed well, let them out.”

Connell’s vision represented a coercive Canadian nationalism that went contrary to Waterloo County’s German-Canadian values of ethnic diversity. Connell wanted to forcibly stamp out the German language through imprisonment, whereas the Canada Synod worked to maintain a healthy balance of German and English in their congregations. Connell’s views represented those of an Anglo-Canadian outsider who ignored the localization of German culture in Waterloo County.

German Canadians responded to Connell’s report and public airing of grievances with equal passion. The German Canadians who shared their views with the press refuted Connell’s assertion that Waterloo County somehow failed at assimilating their DPs. One letter to The Kitchener-Waterloo Record questioned Connell’s conclusion. “Has the plan really failed or has it failed only in the opinion of those who presented it to the Kitchener Chamber of Commerce directors?”

One letter drew, much to Connell’s chagrin, on Waterloo County’s localized German culture to contest the committee’s findings. “New Canadians of years ago who chose Kitchener for their place of residence helped make our community the envy of many other cities. I am sure those who have arrived in the past

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five or six years will do likewise.”\textsuperscript{613} Clement also rejected the committee’s conclusions. As the KWCF’s leader, she took personal offense to his assertion that they failed to assimilate immigrants. She therefore defended herself and the KWCF by drawing on the discourses of postwar democratic values that gatekeepers elsewhere commonly expressed.

“Our government presents Canada to Europeans as a land of opportunities where they will be welcomed, be free and enjoy the benefits of free enterprise among people who want them and are anxious to integrate them. We cannot think that Canadians would expect them to live in camps and be ‘let out’ when they have learned the language. This is absolutely incompatible with our idea of democracy and individual freedom to think and speak as we please within the bounds of law and morals.”\textsuperscript{614}

Despite her personal goal of assimilating German DPs, Waterloo County’s localized German culture made it difficult for gatekeepers like Clement to uniformly reject the desire on behalf of DPs to continue speaking German. Clement wrote that trying to eliminate German “presents a real challenge to us,” particularly without disrespecting “the Pennsylvania Dutch immigrants who helped make this the admirable community it has become, and whose descendants’ German, to which we do not object.”\textsuperscript{615} While she and Connell agreed in principal that integration was desirable, the pluralistic discourses in Waterloo County prevented her from embracing Connell’s hardline approach.

Gatekeeping organizations like the ISSTL and KWCF moreover diverged from their sister organizations by eventually including local German Canadians and Americans into leadership roles at their clubs. As Conzen argues, communities with a strong localized immigrant culture often feature immigrants in leadership positions amongst the community’s charitable and educational institutions.\textsuperscript{616} Prominent German-Canadian families started volunteering at the KWCF in the early 1960s as a result of the

\textsuperscript{613} Canuck, “Letter to the Editor – Is It a Failure?” \textit{The Kitchener-Waterloo Record}, 22 February 1957.
\textsuperscript{614} “More Activity by Canadian-Born People Urged Toward Immigrants,” \textit{The Kitchener-Waterloo Record}, 23 February, 1957.
\textsuperscript{615} “More Activity by Canadian-Born People Urged Toward Immigrants,” \textit{The Kitchener-Waterloo Record}, 23 February, 1957.
\textsuperscript{616} Conezen, “Mainstreams and Side Channels,” 7.
organization’s university scholarship program. In an effort to promote assimilation among younger DPs, the KWCF created a series of university scholarships for DP students currently in high school. University-level education, the KWCF believed, promoted assimilation as it reinforced the English language and promoted economic mobility. DP students could qualify for the award if they attended a Waterloo County high school and promised to attend university in Ontario. They deliberately distributed the awards to students who had a strong knowledge of the English language, which conveyed to the KWCF their desire to assimilate. The scholarship requirements stipulated that the DP student submit several essays in English to the scholarship committee if they lived in Canada for less than five years. If they expressed a fluent knowledge of English, they remained in the applicant pool and had an opportunity to win a KWCF scholarship.\(^6\)

The KWCF intended their scholarships to reward young DP students for their willingness to adopt Canadian social norms. Ironically, the awards simultaneously created bonds between Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian community and German DP newcomers. The KWCF scholarships required extensive fundraising campaigns in order to raise enough money to offer a variety of scholarships to numerous DP students each year. Thus, KWCF members contacted some of Waterloo County’s elite families and businesses in an attempt to secure finances for their scholarships. These community leaders, however, often happened to be members of successful German-Canadian families. For instance, the prominent Kaufman family donated enough money to create a new scholarship titled the “Mrs. A.R. Kaufman Scholarship.” This money sponsored Ute Lischke, a German DP, to study modern languages at the University of Waterloo.

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\(^6\) UW, KWCFP, Scholarship Fund File, Kitchener-Waterloo Council of Friendship Scholarship Fund, 22 March 1962.
Similarly, the Schwaben Sick Benefit Society sponsored Waltraut Schork to study modern languages at the University of Toronto. Although the KWCF intended these scholarships to promote assimilation, they generated contact between Waterloo County’s German-Canadian population and recent German DPs. The KWCF, and gatekeeper organizations more generally, feared that immigrants would use their institutions to promote ethnic culture. By asking prominent German-Canadians for funds to help German DP students, the KWCF inadvertently caused their scholarship program to facilitate bonds between two generations of Germans.

Because the KWCF and IISTL operated on a largely volunteer basis, some of their volunteers happened to overlap with members of the local German Lutheran community. In an effort to increase attendance at their English classes, the KWCF began to advertise its classes on German radio stations and at Lutheran churches with large German DP populations. The advertisement campaigned worked. Not only did enrollment in the KWCF’s English classes increase, but it also generated interest in the program among the community’s German-Canadian population. As enrollment in English classes grew, so did the number of children the KWCF had to watch while their mothers took English classes. In 1962, “ladies from the different Lutheran parishes” started to assist the KWCF’s daycare program. Most notably, Gertrud Reble, John Reble’s wife, started to volunteer and look after the children. Reble’s involvement with the KWCF increased in the following years after her introduction to the organization in early 1962. Her role in the organization soon expanded outside of looking after children and she became involved in the KWCF’s English classes more generally. She joined the organization’s network of

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women who helped prepare food for the organization’s celebrations, such as Christmas parties and graduation ceremonies for the English classes. By 1965, Reble personally registered German DPs for KWCF English classes at the different Lutheran congregations in Waterloo County.\(^{620}\)

By participating in the KWCF, Reble and the other Lutheran volunteers managed to make the organization an extension of life at the church. They functioned as important intermediaries between DPs and their new host society, whether it was through attending German-language services together at St. Peter’s or by helping DPs learn basic English. Such actions served to undermine the essential goal of most gatekeepers: the explicit assimilation of a single homogenous ethnic group into mainstream society. With a large number of DPs and extensive interaction with established German-Canadian and American communities, gatekeepers found it difficult to break the ethnic bonds that existed between established Germans and DP newcomers.

**Upholding White Privilege and Supremacy**

Gatekeepers found it difficult to completely assimilate DPs not only at practical levels like English classes, but also at an ideological level. As a group of DPs who arrived in North America with very poor English skills, little money, and possible Nazi or “enemy” ties, DPs did not “belong” in a North American society that stressed Anglo and American conformity. They were clearly “outsiders.” However the localization of German culture in both St. Louis and Waterloo County created a unique situation that allowed German DPs to eschew this outsider status. As the DPs were both German and white, they could access popular myths in St. Louis and Waterloo County that helped

\(^{620}\) UW, KWCFP, Notebook File, Agenda, 13 January 1965.
include them in the community. Local legends such as Waterloo County’s “pioneer myth” allowed German DPs to situate themselves in the long German histories of these communities that privileged their German ethnicities and mimicked the racialized discourses on pioneering and nation-building recognized by Canadians and Americans as acceptable historical narratives. Although appealing to these local myths took on a more ephemeral process than disrupting English language classes, the German DP ability to conform to St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized culture at an ideological level also helped complicate gatekeeper efforts to assimilate them. As literary critic Daniel Coleman notes, myths and stories in settler societies often took on a sense of urgency found less commonly in other nations. As settlers established nations later than those in Europe, they often relied upon constructed myths and legends to claim authority and “indigeneity” with greater speed and intensity. They used these myths of pioneering and colonization to claim a sense of legitimacy to their new homes. DPs could also access these myths, since they essentially allowed settlers to quickly legitimize their presence in a foreign land. As whites, German DPs could share in local myths that inadvertently argued for belonging in North America while still acknowledging their German identities. Localized German culture in St. Louis and Waterloo County complicated gatekeeper efforts to fully assimilate German DPs as gatekeepers repeated local mythologies that directly allowed the white German DPs to benefit from the sense of belonging these myths provided. Local narratives that celebrated German culture gave DPs an opportunity to acknowledge both their German past and Canadian/American present and offered an alternative to the conformity emphasized by the gatekeepers.

The pioneer myth in Waterloo County provided a cultural understanding for gatekeepers to “place” recent DPs. Through their different language, culture, and desire to remain in ethnic communities, DPs threatened the gatekeeper goals of encouraging Anglo-Canadian conformity. The pioneer myth provided an important reminder that Germans historically contributed to Canadian national life after the initial period of settlement. The myth remained so pronounced that even the community’s Anglo-Canadian population referenced it throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1957, Andrew E. Thompson, a member of the Department of Citizenship, tried to combat the anti-immigrant sentiment in Ontario by drawing on the province’s Loyalist history. He encouraged Ontarians to stop associating all European immigrants with “displaced persons” that could pose a threat to their job security. Instead, Thompson advocated that Ontarians view DPs as “the same as the United Empire Loyalists. They came here under political pressure,” just like the DPs that fled communism from Europe. He furthermore noted the irony that Ontarians felt some discomfort over the number of European immigrants, but that “we feel secure about the British, Irish or Scottish newcomer…yet they are all newcomers aren’t they?”

Clement capitalized on Thompson’s remarks and modified them for her local Waterloo County audience. The Loyalists or the “Irish” meant very little to Waterloo County’s predominantly English, Scottish, and German population. Clement therefore repeated Thompson’s remarks but broadened them to reference Waterloo County’s German and “Pennsylvania Dutch” history. She noted, for instance, that “these new citizens have had enough faith in Canada to decide to make their homes here – as did our ancestors from Germany, England, Scotland, Switzerland, etc.

These are the people who will help fulfill our destiny as a nation.”623 While Thompson addressed a general Ontario audience, Clement’s remarks could not ignore Waterloo County’s German past. As a resident of Waterloo County, she had to acknowledge the reality of the community’s German past. Accordingly, Clement had to grant Waterloo County’s German forebears the same status bestowed on other white settlers in Ontario.

Clement’s remarks not only recognized the ethnic component of Waterloo County’s history, but also its racialized one. Like many other Canadians, Clement spoke of immigration in nation-building terms. Politicians and Canadians more generally discussed immigration as a nation-building process, wherein immigrants would “build” the nation economically as well as through their contribution to its “character” through changing, or solidifying, the nation’s demographics. While other Anglo-Canadians spoke of racialized immigrants, such as the Chinese, as undesirable and contrary to Canada’s “character,” Clement spoke of German DPs as contributing positively to Canada’s nationhood.624 German DPs could access these positive attributes due to common perceptions of the white race as natural “nation-builders.” Cultural theorist Richard Dyer argues that white people often associated their whiteness with particular ephemeral qualities that other races did not possess. Whiteness, Dyer suggests, contained the promise of “enterprise” that allowed white civilization to thrive in the areas of science, discovery, leadership, and governance. Decades of imperial and colonial rule convinced whites that they had a special inclination towards building and ruling nations.625 As

whites, German DPs found themselves the beneficiaries of this racial thinking. Clement could easily describe German DPs as “nation builders” since this was a perceived trait of the white race. German Loyalists once contributed to building the Canadian nation and German DPs, as a result of their whiteness, could do the same. Although men like Thompson generally applied this racialized logic to the British and English-speaking world, Waterloo County’s tradition of broadening Anglo-Canadian myths to its German inhabitants forced Clement to recognize German DPs as racially acceptable “nation builders.”

Although German-American Lutherans in St. Louis did not have a popular pioneer myth comparable to their coreligionists in Waterloo County, they too profited from St. Louis’s localized immigrant culture. As director of the IISTL for most of the 1940s and 1950s, St. Louis’s immigrant population benefitted from Harriette Ryan’s progressive views of ethnicity and tolerance. Ryan, a second-generation Irish immigrant, achieved middle class respectability while still gaining particular insight into the experiences of immigrants and their children. Ryan contested the American emphasis on the “melting pot” theory as an inadequate metaphor to explain immigration to the United States since the early 1930s. Ryan believed that Americans wrongly conflated the melting pot theory with democratic values. Americans spoke too often of vague notions of liberty and too little of the inequalities American immigrants faced. While an emphasis on “liberty” offered a noble goal, Ryan argued it is was much harder to “put into practical operation those democratic principles and methods about which so much is said and all too little accomplished.”

626 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 91, “Talk Given by Miss Harriette F. Ryan over KXOK,” 9 March 1939; SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 1, Folder 1, “What is the International Institute?”, October 1938.
factory that boiled up iron and other materials. She asked her audiences to imagine this process and to visualize putting people in a factory where “their individuality [would be] obliterated.” She wanted nothing to do with the “awful concept” that erased immigrant individuality.  

Instead, Ryan vouched for her own model of American diversity that she titled “the shuttle.” Rather than relying on the melting pot metaphor, Ryan preferred to think of American diversity as a shuttle “going into a tapestry or a beautiful design” that Ryan and the IISTL would help “weave.” This design had many different threads composed of many different ethnicities into one singular unit. Ryan did not pressure immigrants to lose their ethnic identity “as quickly as possible as [others] would have it.” She hoped immigrants would instead adjust to American life “constructively and with as little loss of values as possible.” Acculturation to the United States was a dialogue between American and ethnic cultures, a “two-way” process, and not a linear pattern of assimilation. Accordingly, Ryan believed that Americanization was a project that immigrants and Americans alike could shape.

Ryan conceived the shuttle model in part due to her belief that the “melting pot theory has not been successful with the Second Generation” of immigrants, like herself. Ryan proposed that the melting pot theory “encouraged [them] to cut loose from their own ancestral history and culture” which went on to create “an attitude of antagonism toward their own culture and their parents.” Yet, Ryan remarked that these immigrants lacked the same history and context as native-born Americans and therefore did not

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629 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 1, Folder 1, “What is the International Institute?”, October 1938.
belong in the “normal” American world either.\textsuperscript{630} She recognized the process of hybridity many Americans experienced. Her shuttle model, therefore, emphasized providing immigrants with a bit of “their own history and culture” and combined it with how it has “contributed to American life.” She hoped that recognizing second generation immigrants as the beneficiaries of both “ethnic” and “American” worlds would therefore mitigate any sense of inferiority and distrust, be it on the part of American society or within ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{631}

As fellow first or second-generation immigrants, members of St. Louis’s German Lutheran community embraced a model of diversity that aligned more closely with Ryan’s shuttle metaphor than the standard melting pot theory. Louis Sieck, a Concordia Seminary professor and St. Louis pastor, drew a direct connection between the DPs and former immigrants seeking refuge in the United States. “The immigrants to be admitted…have this in common with earlier immigrants to this country: their potential contribution to our national life and economy has been considered of sufficient value,” he wrote. “Always in the past immigrants have shared in local community resources along with other residents, just as they have contributed to community life.”\textsuperscript{632} Sieck understood that German DPs had the potential to participate in “nation building.” Their whiteness conferred a certain understanding that German DPs would be economically and morally “of sufficient value.” Other St. Louis Lutherans went further in their comparison and directly related the incoming Lutheran DPs to their own nineteenth and early twentieth century ancestors. Publicity material distributed by the synod made it clear that DPs

\textsuperscript{630} SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 90, “Radio Program Speech,” 20 January, 1940.
\textsuperscript{631} SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 90, “Radio Program Speech,” 20 January, 1940.
\textsuperscript{632} CHI, Emergency Planning Council Collection (hereafter EPCC), Box 4, Folder 49, Excerpts of Report of Committee on Financing Social Welfare and Health Services to Displaced Persons Resettled in St. Louis and St. Louis County, 1948.
would gradually adjust to life in the United States. One synod-produced pamphlet described how “Lutheran people from Europe found American governmental and cultural patterns quite unfamiliar, but they felt an identification with the Lutheran churches already established here. This continuity of their religious ties sustained and enriched the lives of many of them as they sought new homes in America.”

Ryan’s emphasis on balancing old and new world cultures found an ideological companion with the Missouri Synod’s desire to maintain a hybrid German-American identity in their churches. “No one can be expected to strip himself of his past or the behavior developed by this past just because he is in another environment,” one St. Louis pastor wrote. “Nor, for that matter, would it be wise for the newcomer to try to forget all old patterns and attitudes. Some of them will become valuable contributions to our American culture.”

German-American Lutherans saw their congregations playing an important role in facilitating this process. “Formerly and now, whenever local congregations and pastors have reached out to welcome them, many of these newcomers have found their places in American church life….The Church has contributed much to make possible the integration of the old and the new.” Lutheran churches consciously took on the role of helping to facilitate this process for DPs as an extension of their ability to balance ethnic and national identities. Ryan’s shuttle philosophy and the Missouri Synod’s construction of ethnicity stressed hybridity over American conformity.

The shuttle philosophy and St. Louis’s localized German culture, however, reinforced a racial hierarchy that placed white citizens at the top. Their celebrations of

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633 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, A Song in a Strange Land (A Handbook for Those Interested in Assisting Immigrants to Become Integrated Into American Life – prepared by The Lutheran Refugee Service of the National Lutheran Council and the LCMS), January 1956.
634 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, A Song in a Strange Land, January 1956, p. 6-7.
635 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, A Song in a Strange Land, January 1956.
ethnic diversity did not necessarily lead to declarations of racial equality. The inherent
whiteness of both models became strikingly evident at IISTL events that implemented
these philosophies at a practical level. Although the IISTL’s immigrants embraced Ryan’s
shuttle philosophy, they did not intend on applying it to all St. Louis residents. Ryan tried
to desegregate the IISTL’s social clubs by inviting more black and Japanese residents to
the IISTL, but found her efforts met with ambiguous or outright hostile responses. Ryan
suggested in early 1946 that the IISTL’s Women’s Discussion Group invite “a small
group of Negro women” to their subsequent meetings. Several immigrant women
objected on the grounds that there “was no use entertaining for one meeting people whom
they would not care to have more often.”636 The IISTL also tried to desegregate some of
its social clubs in the early 1950s. They noted in particular that the Japanese war brides
associated with the IISTL seemed isolated compared to the rest of their white members.
They invited Japanese war brides to some of the organization’s social events, but its
immigrant and DP members expressed reservations about their attendance. They told
IISTL employees that their lack of English and unfamiliarity with American cooking
acted as barriers to group cohesion.637 Ryan felt as though her efforts to desegregate St.
Louis were limited by the “climate of opinion” in the city. She admitted that she was
prepared to “go much further than perhaps Board members or St. Louisians generally”
were prepared to go.638 Immigrants at the IISTL embraced Ryan’s notion of ethnic
diversity while still maintaining racial exclusion. Tolerance, it seemed, was a quality only

636 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 7, Folder 154, Women’s Discussion Group Meeting, 2 January 1946; SHSMA,
IISTLP, Roll 7, Folder 154, Women’s Discussion Group Meeting, 6 March 1946.
637 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 97, Summary of Staff Discussion, 30 December 1952; SHSMA,
IISTLP, Roll 7, Folder 145, Japanese War Brides New Years Celebration, 15 January 1953; SHSMA,
IISTLP, Roll 7, Folder 144, Young Women’s Group Meeting, 22 January 1953.
638 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 1, Folder 17, Interpretive Statement of the International Institute Prepared by
Harriette F. Ryan, 7 October 1946.
extended towards their fellow white ethnics. While the IISTL’s racism excluded racialized members of St. Louis, it inevitably included German DPs thanks to their whiteness.

The KWCF did not voice explicit racial prejudice as frequently as the IISTL. Without the large presence of a racialized other, the KWCF did not have to confront racial inequalities or their own racism as directly as the IISTL’s employees. Even so, the KWCF also faced intermittent difficulties including racialized immigrants in their organization. Although nonwhite students did receive the KWCF’s scholarships, they generally tended to go to students of European backgrounds. Race did, occasionally, factor into who received these scholarships. Although initially nominated for a scholarship, the organization later decided not to award a scholarship to one “Dutch East Indies student” when her principal suggested that the scholarship go to a white student instead. Such instances contradict and demonstrate the limits of the KWCF’s declarations of tolerance. While the organization proudly boasted that its membership included “people from all national groups, community groups, service clubs and women’s organizations,” Clement simultaneously stated that “newcomers from Europe are especially welcome” within the KWCF. Such sentiments capture the way whiteness functioned in postwar Waterloo County. The lack of a strong nonwhite presence ensured that explicit racist sentiments did not need to be expressed by the KWCF’s Anglo-Canadian leaders, as the European and British character of Waterloo County was never in jeopardy in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, racist sentiment was expressed more subtly by

639 UW, KWCFP, Notebook File, Minutes of Meeting, 16 September 1963.
favouring Waterloo County’s German traditions and an explicit presence granted to white, European immigrants.

**White Flight and Segregation in the Missouri Synod**

White flight and Jim Crow segregation in St. Louis also contributed to Lutheran churches functioning as ethnic boundary zones. St. Louis, like other American cities, participated in the process of “white flight” in the postwar decades. The term “white flight” refers to the exodus of white middle-class Americans from urban areas to newly constructed suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s. In response to American attempts to dismantle segregation, white Americans fled to suburban homes in order to live among other affluent whites rather than confront racial integration. Through direct and indirect actions by real estate agents, bankers, and construction companies, American cities managed to uphold *de facto* segregation with white Americans living predominantly in the suburbs and Black Americans confined to urban or impoverished areas.\(^{641}\) This process occurred in St. Louis shortly after the end of the Second World War. The manufacturing boom the city experienced as a result of the war quickly vanished, leaving many workers jobless or underemployed as deindustrialization shaped the downtown core. By August 1945, over 100,000 St. Louis workers had lost their jobs.\(^{642}\) Provisions in the G.I Bill, a piece of legislation designed to provide benefits to returning American veterans, however, provided white veterans with the financial means to secure education and housing at low costs. Without a job in the quickly deindustrializing downtown core,


many white families used economic support from the G.I. Bill to move to recently constructed suburbs in St. Louis County. Promotional material for the newly constructed suburbs openly advertised its large neighbourhoods free from the presence of black Americans. By controlling rental and housing prices, local real estate agents helped wealthy whites flee downtown St. Louis to all-white suburbs. This process of white flight created an unspoken rule that housed the white residents of St. Louis south of Delmar Boulevard while Black Americans lived downtown and north of the “Delmar Divide.”

White flight in St. Louis proved particularly problematic for the Missouri Synod’s congregations located in downtown St. Louis. Prior to the 1920s, St. Louis’s downtown area housed the city’s working-class German immigrant population. Accordingly, the Missouri Synod had many of its oldest congregations founded in the nineteenth century located in the downtown core. Local pastors realized that their congregations suffered from decreased attendance as a result of their white congregants fleeing downtown St. Louis to live in affluent suburban neighbourhoods. Questions surrounding race therefore posed greater problems than ethnicity and language in these congregations. Originally established in 1849, Bethlehem Lutheran Church continued to offer German and English services in the postwar period. Bethlehem’s pastor, the Reverend L.E. Eifert, continued to preach bilingual sermons throughout the 1950s and easily maintained the congregation’s hybrid traditions. Eifert’s main concern throughout the decade proved to be the church’s

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643 Burnett, *St. Louis at War*, 162. Ira Katznelson describes how the G.I. Bill discriminated against black veterans in order to benefit white veterans during the era of Jim Crow segregation in *When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), chapter 5.


646 Gordon, 92.
“scattered membership” and “the problem of a changing neighborhood.” White flight posed a real challenge for the church, as Eifert noticed that “the movement of members out of the area and into the county” adversely affected attendance. He encouraged the congregation “to do our best to maintain and preserve” the members that the congregation currently had.647 This proved easier said than done. Eifert collaborated with other St. Louis pastors in an effort to try and solve the problems white flight posed, but to little avail. In a desperate attempt to keep his congregation together, Eifert even proposed that he move the entire congregation from downtown to a suburb in the county. The cost of this venture, however, ultimately dissuaded the church council from adopting Eifert’s proposal.648

Eifert and Bethlehem more generally showed no desire to desegregate their church, even if it would solve the problem of decreased church attendance. They were hardly alone in this regard, as desegregation rarely emerged as a solution to the problem of church membership. Pastors often saw the solution to white flight as merely attracting new white members, rather than desegregating their downtown churches. In 1956, a conference of St. Louis pastors met and essentially confirmed their commitment to segregation through their inaction. They concluded that the solution to dwindling church attendance was to increase their “evangelical” preaching techniques that appealed to all Christians, rather than just their Lutheran base. They hoped energetic preaching would draw in new white members to replace those who fled to the suburbs.649 This solution showed no attempt to integrate the synod’s German-English congregations with the few

647 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Box, Annual Report Folder, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Annual Report 1954.
648 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Box, Annual Report Folder, Bethlehem Lutheran Church Annual Report 1954.
649 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Vestry Minutes Box, St. Louis Lutheran Bible Institute flyer, 1956.
black congregations in St. Louis. Effectively, pastors prioritized keeping their churches white, and therefore German, spaces instead of creating new multiracial congregations.

White flight and the problem of ministering to black congregations in St. Louis took place within the broader context of debates over desegregation within the Missouri Synod. Racial tensions within the synod became fully apparent in 1955 as a result of the controversy surrounding the annual Lutheran Women’s Missionary League (LWML) convention. Lillian Preisinger, the president of the LWML, decided to hold the LWML’s biennial convention at the Hotel Roosevelt in New Orleans. The convention’s location in the south aptly suited the LWML’s mandate as a group dedicated to mission outreach. Traditionally, the LWML hosted their conventions in Midwestern cities due to the high concentration of Lutherans in the Midwest. In the 1950s, however, they decided to shift hosting their conventions in cities that promised greater Lutheran growth outside of their Midwestern core. Missouri Synod Lutheranism was at its weakest in the western and southern United States, and therefore it seemed appropriate to hold LWML conventions in regions that would receive a strong institutional boost due to the convention’s presence. New Orleans seemed a fitting southern city in which to accomplish this goal.

Preisinger, however, later discovered that the Hotel Roosevelt still enforced segregation. This posed obvious problems for the growing number of black Lutherans that the LWML assisted through its missionary efforts. Preisinger contacted John Behnkken and H.A. Mayer, the synod’s secretary of missions, for assistance on how to approach the problem. Both men took no issue with holding a convention in a city that still enforced segregation. In fact, the anti-black racism of both men guaranteed that the LWML found ready allies in the synod leadership. “I can readily understand that the Roosevelt Hotel would not want to house any Colored people,” Mayer privately told the
LWML convention organizers. Behnken also offered his moral support. Although Behnken moved to St. Louis as a teenager, his childhood in Texas and subsequent work as a pastor there in the 1920s continued to shape his views on race. Behnken identified as a “proud Southerner” during his youth and expressed an admiration and boyhood fascination with Confederate general Robert E. Lee. In early February of 1955, Behnken wrote to the LWML leadership in order to let them know that “as one who was born in the South and also as one who served in the ministry in Houston, Texas, for about 28 years, I am inclined to believe that I can understand your problem and your difficulty.” The strong support for segregation among the synod’s St. Louis leadership ensured that they stood firmly behind the LWML’s decision to host their convention in New Orleans. As a synod composed largely of white German-Americans, its leadership upheld current power relations by complying with segregation laws. By confirming New Orleans as the location of choice, Missouri Synod leaders privileged their white German-American laity over black members of their church.

The synod’s leadership, however, knew that their implicit support for segregation could create a public relations controversy for the church should civil rights groups discover their decision. Behnken worried that if “Negro delegates” attended the convention they “might create a scene which would give our church very unfavorable publicity. We know how eager some news agencies would exploit and exaggerate such an occurrence.” Mayer agreed, and expressed concern over the negative attention that the

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650 CHI, Office of the President Records, John W. Behnken Administration (hereafter Behnken Administration), Box 22, Folder 282, H.A. Mayer to Counselors of LWML, 5 January 1955.
652 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, John Behnken to LWML, 3 February 1955.
653 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Behnken to LWML, 3 February 1955.
conference could bring the Missouri Synod. “It would be most unfortunate if newspapers would pick up an innocent incident and plaster it across their front pages,” he confided.\(^{654}\)

Behnken and Mayer knew their support for segregation was controversial, but did little to challenge it. They felt little need to modify their behaviour and gladly participated in Jim Crow segregation. The politics of black exclusion did not trouble either man, but the possibility of negative media attention certainly did. In order to avoid a possible controversy, Behnken and Preisinger agreed that the LWML organizers should notify the various LWML branches that only white delegates should attend the convention. They sent out a notice to each LWML branch that the convention would not be “permitted to entertain delegates of the Negro race in the same manner as the others, or even allow them to attend Convention sessions” as a result of segregation policies throughout the city.

“We are sure this would prove a humiliating and heartbreaking experience to the fine Christian women who would represent our LWML. We, therefore, urge that all Negro leagues and those leagues having Negro membership be advised of this situation, and that they be urged for their own sakes not to make plans to attend the Convention in New Orleans.”\(^ {655}\)

Unsurprisingly, Behnken and the LWML opted to keep their convention a purely white affair when faced with the opposition to desegregate. They privileged protecting their own image rather than confronting racial inequalities within their church.

The LWML played on Lutheran gender roles in an effort to ensure that others respected their decision. Conservative Americans often couched their anti-black politics in the language of “respectability” in order to avoid alienating moderate or sympathetic whites from their discriminatory views. In contrast to the outlandish costumes of the Ku Klux Klan, conservatives cultivated a “respectable” tone of concerned citizens to express

\(^{654}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Mayer to Counselors of LWML, 5 January 1955.

\(^{655}\) CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 281, Mrs. William Borcherding to Mrs. C.B. Drake, 18 February 1955.
their support of segregation. They encouraged other whites to “protect” their community and its “integrity” from encroaching black Americans. This discourse successfully permeated the language of middle class whites who did not want others to see their segregationist politics as divisive or contentious.\textsuperscript{656} For members of the Missouri Synod, respectability often meant conforming to the synod’s gender norms, of humble male pastors exerting their authority over docile and submissive Lutheran women. The LWML organizers therefore took care to demonstrate that their decision to hold the convention in New Orleans was made in cooperation with the synod’s male leadership. “This entire problem has been discussed with the national officers, pastoral advisors, and Dr. J.W. Behnken,” they made clear. “This letter is an outgrowth of these deliberations and our committee meetings.”\textsuperscript{657} In appealing to the patriarchal nature of the Missouri Synod, the LWML hoped to avoid critique. After all, they merely followed the orders of Behnken and other male leaders. Male members of the Missouri Synod supported Behnken’s paternalistic oversight of the LWML. One man agreed that Behnken “should be in a position to exert an influence” over the LWML since any “stigma would certainly rest upon the Church rather than upon the organization of women.”\textsuperscript{658} The LWML organizing committee hoped that including Behnken’s involvement as an important caveat would help preempt any gender-based criticisms of their choice.

The LMWL’s gamble failed. Their decision to host only white delegates at the New Orleans convention ignited a series of protests that engulfed the entire synod. The issue exposed clear regional tensions within the Missouri Synod. Districts and congregations in the northern states generally criticized the LWML for their support of

\textsuperscript{656} Kruse, \textit{White Flight}, 55-56, 77, 104.
\textsuperscript{657} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 281, Borcherding to Drake, 18 February 1955.
\textsuperscript{658} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Arthur Weber to Behnken, 1 May 1955.
segregation, while the southern and Midwestern states remained quietly supportive.\textsuperscript{659} Pastors in Philadelphia issued a collective statement calling the LWML’s decision to host the convention in New Orleans an “un-Christian, discriminatory act, contrary to the law of love. The Conference deplores the fact that this procedure will be tolerated.”\textsuperscript{660} They subsequently requested that the convention be cancelled entirely, for “it is our firm conviction that, under existing plans, no blessing of God could be forthcoming upon a group dedicated to the service of Christ in the cause of Missions.”\textsuperscript{661} Meanwhile, Lutherans in the Midwest and South continued to support the decision to host the convention in a city that supported segregation. R.T. Eissfeldt, a pastor based in the Midwest, tried to confront his critics by noting “we personally have worked with our colored sisters at retreats, rallies, etc. in our northern states...However, the situation down south is entirely different.”\textsuperscript{662} Eissfeldt argued that they would support desegregation in the north, but allow racial inequality in the south to persist. Segregation was a “southern problem” that the church could do little to change. Moreover, proponents of the convention continually reminded their critics of the importance of holding the convention in New Orleans to help encourage the growth of Lutheranism in the southern states. Behnken believed that cancelling the convention would be “very unfair to the people of New Orleans” and did not seriously consider this suggestion from the northern critics.\textsuperscript{663} Eissfeldt agreed. “This will be the first convention in the south and would be quite a

\textsuperscript{659} See for example, CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, F.G. Brasch to Behnken and Lillian Preisinger, 9 March 1955; CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Mrs. Gerhard A. Molden to Preisinger and Behnken, 22 March 1955.

\textsuperscript{660} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, The Philadelphia Pastoral Conference to Preisinger, 15 April 1955.

\textsuperscript{661} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Philadelphia Regional Pastoral Conference Resolution, 27 April 1955.

\textsuperscript{662} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, R.T. Eissfeldt to James Brasch, 17 March 1955.

\textsuperscript{663} CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Behnken to LWML, 3 February 1955.
spiritual ‘shot in the arm’ for our Lutheran People and the cause of Christ in that section of the country.” Unlike their brethren in the northern states, the synod’s Midwestern leadership privileged the growth of Lutheranism among white Americans over racial equality.

Critics and proponents of the convention in New Orleans both drew on theology to bolster their position. One critic wrote to Mayer to prompt him to “wonder what St. Paul would have said about such procedure… I know what St. James said too about the disadvantaged brother how he should not be treated, no matter what social pressures of the time may have been.” Proponents of desegregation within the synod frequently referenced St. Paul’s assertion that God did not see anyone as a stranger or foreigner. One Lutheran woman wrote to Behnken to tell that “we can, as Christians, point out the injustice of such laws, as God does not discriminate as to color or race.” In contrast, supporters of the convention portrayed their opponents as either secularists or as violating Lutheran theology. Sadie Fulk Roehrs, a former resident of St. Louis and president of the LWML, wrote that “if the minority group of whites (clergy and laymen) had spent one tenth of the time they spent sending telegrams and letters and adding fuel to the flame had spent time on their knees” addressing God they would have realized how wrong they were to oppose the convention. According to Fulk Roehrs, God placed a greater importance on expanding Lutheranism in New Orleans than achieving racial equality.

Behnken took a more formal approach by couching his theological objections in the language of Romans 13. He stated that in “the deep South… there are the laws and

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664 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Eissfeldt to Brasch, 17 March 1955.
665 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Oswald C.J. Hoffmann to Mayer, 27 April 1955.
666 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Molden to Preisinger and Behnken, 22 March 1955.
667 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Sadie Fulk Roehrs to Behnken, 9 May 1955.
regulations of the state and of the city to be taken into consideration.” In a reversal from his more liberal interpretation of Romans 13 during the Second World War, Behnken now used the doctrine in order to excuse the church from contesting state politics. Behnken’s use of Romans 13 held little weight, among critics and proponents of the convention alike. James D. Brasch, a New York pastor, mocked Behnken’s strict position on adhering to local laws. He refuted the implicit argument in Behnken’s interpretation that “the laws of a few men may take precedence over the precepts of God.” Even some of Behnken’s conservative supporters in the synod acknowledged that the synod may need to recognize desegregation legislation in the United States. “I share your concern for the preservation of sound doctrine,” one pastor told Behnken. “Yet I wonder whether we are not straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel when we…ignore the basic law of Christian love in our dealings with fellow human beings.”

As usual, pastors drew on their own theological inclinations to support their pre-existing social views. Although each side tried to portray themselves as adopting the correct Christian or theological approach, segregation was a social issue that divided the synod along regional lines.

The LWML seemed to move ahead with their plan until a last minute effort by James Brasch stopped the convention from taking place. One week before the convention, Brasch told Behnken that he planned on reporting the synod’s support for segregation to the media if the LWML decided to go through with the convention. “I think that I am duty-bound to notify the large metropolitan press associations,” Brasch warned.

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668 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Behnken to F.G. Brasch, 17 March 1955.
669 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, James Brasch to Behnken, 6 April 1955.
670 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Weber to Behnken, 1 May 1955.
671 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, James Brasch to Behnken, 5 May 1955.
Behnken subsequently met with the LWML leadership and pastors in New Orleans about cancelling the convention. Eventually, he and the LWML leadership agreed that rescinding the invitation to New Orleans was the most diplomatic way to no longer hold the LWML meeting.

Behnken’s so-called “compromise” did not stop the flurry of letters expressing outrage over the convention’s cancellation. Their outrage highlights just how entitled Behnken and his supporters felt to maintain their convention as an all white affair. They resented having to cancel the convention and believed that Missouri Synod Lutherans had somehow violated their rights in the process of forcing their hand. Historian Kevin M. Kruse notes how Southern whites often thought of public spaces such as parks, buses, and other sites as “theirs” due to legalized segregation. Thus, they often viewed attempts to desegregate these spaces as a “loss” that violated their rights.672 Accustomed to feeling entitled to public space due to their whiteness, Behnken and Fulk Roehrs saw the convention’s cancellation as a minority part of the synod exerting “mob rule” over the rest of the synod. “The minority groups…think nothing of offending thousands – our fellow Lutheran Christians in the South,” Fulk Roehrs angrily wrote to Behnken. “I am shocked and disillusioned at the action taken.” Behnken agreed, and continued to voice his support for segregation. “I, too, am shocked and disillusioned that there was so much agitation, and this instigated by whites who thought to make an issue of the matter,” Behnken replied to her. “I certainly do not like the idea of pressure which some exerted. I did not think that it was possible that any minority group could act like that.”674 Behnken genuinely perceived the LWML as the persecuted group, and not the black Lutherans

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672 Kruse, chapter 2.
673 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Fulk Roehrs to Behnken, 9 May 1955.
674 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Behnken to Roehrs, 11 May 1955.
more significantly impacted by New Orleans’s segregation laws. By forcing Behnken and his supporters to confront their complicity in a manner that made them uncomfortable, Behnken portrayed himself as the real victim of the entire affair. “I cannot understand why some of our fellow-Lutherans insist on tolerance in the race question can themselves become so terribly intolerant. They surely permit their emotions to run away with better judgment,” he wrote to a group of pastors in New Orleans.675 Accustomed to enjoying the privileges their whiteness granted them, Behnken and other Missouri Synod supporters of segregation interpreted any movement towards racial equality as a loss for them.

Although the debate around the convention exposed clear regional tensions within the Missouri Synod, Behnken and the LWML’s eventual “compromise” bore distinct Midwestern qualities. In his analysis of race relations in St. Louis and broader Midwest, historian Clarence Lang found that the somewhat artificial binary distinguishing the North’s liberal position on race relations versus the racist South could not adequately characterize the struggle for black freedom in the Midwest. Lang proposed that race relations in St. Louis functioned as a type of border South,” wherein race relations functioned as a compromise between northern and southern approaches.676 Lang describes that white elites in St. Louis responded to race relations not through “massive resistance” to desegregation, but rather “massive redevelopment.” This strategy involved maintaining de facto segregation by continuing black subordination through “white paternal authority under the guise of cooperation.”677 Behnken and the LWML embodied St. Louis’s racial politics by attempting to portray the 1955 convention’s cancellation as a

675 CHI, Behnken Administration, Box 22, Folder 282, Behnken to G.M. Kramer, 17 May 1955.
677 Lang, “Locating the Civil Rights Movement,” 386-388.
compromise between Lutherans of different locations and race. Free of its respectable veneer, however, Behnken’s compromise proved nothing more than another way for the synod to continue its policy of segregation and exclusion of black Lutherans. The LWML and Behnken pursued policies that favoured their white German-American membership over respect for black Lutherans. Keeping their congregations German spaces, then, was not a passive act free of racial implications. In preserving the synod as a German space, they preserved it as a white institution through supporting segregation.

**German Ethnicity at the Core and on the Peripheries**

The localization of German culture remained pronounced in St. Louis and Waterloo County in the 1950s and 1960s. Race proved a provocative and divisive issue, but not their ethnic heritage. However, the German language generated greater controversy in Lutheran congregations throughout Ontario and Missouri than in the St. Louis and Waterloo County cores. Other Lutheran congregations also practiced German traditions, but they did not always go unchallenged. Pastors and congregations alike throughout Missouri and Ontario had different expectations of how their German ethnicity would function than their coreligionists in St. Louis and Waterloo County. These misunderstandings produced debates about the nature of ethnicity in the Lutheran church that did not occur in St. Louis and Waterloo County. This proved particularly true at congregations founded in the mid-twentieth century, such as those in Toronto or rural Missouri.

The German language generated significant controversy in the 1950s at Trinity Lutheran Church, a Missouri Synod congregation in Toronto. Originally founded as a German language congregation in 1935, the Missouri Synod created Trinity with the
intention that it would eventually switch to the English language as the congregation grew. Compared to other urban areas like St. Louis or Kitchener, Toronto did not have a large number of German Lutheran immigrants that could support Trinity as an exclusively German church for the foreseeable future. Synod leaders expected that Trinity, as a “mission church,” would inevitably grow to attract English-speaking Canadians regardless of their ethnic heritage. Trinity eventually switched to English during the Second World War when “English was forced upon” the congregation. However, “the original members always hoped to get back to the German again.”

Thankfully for Trinity’s founding members, the number of German DPs that settled in postwar Toronto proved sufficient that their German-language services grew in the late 1940s. Attendance to the English-language services dwindled, and it initially appeared as though Trinity would remain a German church.

The arrival of Trinity’s new pastor, the Reverend Albert Pollex, in 1949 upset the congregation’s functional German-English framework. When Pollex arrived, the number of congregants who wished to speak German far outnumbered those who wanted to their services in English, and the number German DPs outweighed Canadian-born members. Regardless, Pollex followed the Missouri Synod’s original intent of creating an English congregation to appeal to as many Canadians in Toronto as possible. Recruiting more Canadians to the church would help the church achieve financial stability and transition away from being a “mission church” that relied on the Missouri Synod for financial assistance. Pollex “feared that the English group would lose out” to the German congregants and thus started to discourage attendance to German-language services at

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678 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953.
Trinity. Pollex preached a German language service early Sunday morning and preached an English sermon during the more popular mid-morning time slot. His detractors accused Pollex of fudging the numbers and outright lying about the “poorly attended” German-language services.⁶⁷⁹ “This,” wrote one observer from Waterloo County, “offended many of the German people, not only the newcomers but especially the older members.”⁶⁸⁰ Initially, the aggrieved congregants complained to Leo Kostizen, the assistant pastor at Trinity and a recent DP. Kostizen tried to vouch for his fellow DPs, but Pollex refused to change his policy of trying to create an English-only congregation. After several disappointing confrontations, Kostizen left Trinity to preach at another congregation in Toronto where he offered German and Lithuanian services. Pollex therefore replaced him with another DP pastor, William Goegginger, to oversee Trinity’s German-language work.⁶⁸¹

Initially, Goegginger and Pollex worked harmoniously among Trinity’s German and English populations. However, the German segment quickly convinced Goegginger to push for greater representation within Trinity. They successfully argued that Pollex upset the congregation’s German-English framework and that they needed to return the congregation to its original roots. In order to accomplish this goal, they had to empower the congregation’s German DPs and weaken Pollex’s power and stature as Trinity’s pastor. Goegginger proposed increasing the number of eligible voters by confirming more German DPs as full members of the congregation. In July 1952, Goegginger put forward the names of several German DPs for voting membership. However, these men did not

⁶⁷⁹ CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953.
⁶⁸⁰ CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953.
⁶⁸¹ CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Walter Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.
attend the congregational meeting and therefore could not be received and confirmed as voting members. The German congregants blamed Pollex for deliberately not notifying the DPs that they needed to be present at the meeting in order to be recognized. Privately, Pollex expressed concern about nominating so many German DPs for voting rights. He believed he needed first to “ascertain whether their beliefs were truly Lutheran.”

Pollex feared that the frequency with which German DPs lobbied for language rights signified that they wished to use the Lutheran church solely as a means to maintain their ethnic traditions. He worried that the German newcomers attended church to socialize with their fellow DPs rather than for the purpose of worship. Enfranchising German DPs essentially gave DPs the ability to influence congregational practices. Thus, Pollex opposed their movement as it threatened his ability to lead Trinity towards an English-speaking future.

Goegginger and the German DPs did not make the same mistake at the next congregational meeting in October 1952. Goegginger attended the congregational meeting with over twenty new German DPs eligible to become voting members at Trinity. Their attendance represented nothing short of a coup. Trinity’s German-Canadian members recognized the voting rights of the German DPs, even though Pollex did not approve of them for membership prior to the meeting. Bolstered by the increase in German voters, a spokesman from Trinity’s German-Canadian group immediately presented a motion requesting that the German portion of Trinity unite and separate from Pollex. They wished to form a Dreieinigkeitsgemeinde of their own, with Goegginger as

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682 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953; CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.

683 Pollex’s concerns were the product of a broader concern about whether Lutheran DPs from Europe could truly adapt to and conform to North American Lutheran standards. Chapter 6 describes these concerns in greater detail.
their pastor and German-language services granted the authority and frequency that Pollex so often denied them. Pollex and the English-speaking members of the church council would be dismantled and replaced with a German-speaking administration. Pollex and the English members of Trinity rejected the proposal. Their rejection caused around thirty German-speaking congregants to immediately leave the meeting in protest, demonstrating that they would no longer be associated with Pollex’s vision of Trinity one way or another.684

Trinity’s German members followed their protest by sending a petition asking to form their congregation to the Missouri Synod’s Ontario District headquarters, located in Waterloo County. The debacle at Trinity confused the Waterloo County pastors, who in contrast managed to maintain a balance between the German and English languages. The Reverend C.T. Wetzstein could not see how Pollex, Goegginger, and Trinity’s English and German speakers could not worship peacefully together. Privately, Wetzstein blamed Pollex for creating trouble at Trinity. Unlike their own congregations, Pollex seemed to be creating controversy by meddling with the German-English traditions that produced harmonious congregations in Waterloo County. Wetzstein personally visited Trinity in an effort to promote reconciliation and decrease animosity between the two sides. In his address, he promoted the vision of linguistic tolerance practiced by his congregation in Waterloo County. He told Trinity’s English congregants “that a Christian should not be concerned too much about language but that we should be ready to serve people in every language and should make it possible that all people, no matter what their language is,

684 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953; CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.
might be able to hear the gospel.”

Wetzstein created a “compromise” wherein Trinity had to remain as a single congregation, but had to grant its German congregants greater rights. They agreed to give Trinity’s German population its own treasury and to move German language services from the early morning to the more popular 11:00 time slot. Henceforth, they agreed that Pollex would preach the English language service at 9:30, and Goegginger would preach a German language service at 11:00. This decision was ratified at a November congregational meeting and received the congregation’s overwhelming support. Thanks to Goegginger’s efforts in the previous meetings, the voting membership of Trinity now consisted primarily of German-speaking congregants. Although Pollex and other English congregants voted against the motion, they were overwhelmed by the German voters.

The compromise clearly favoured Trinity’s German congregants at the expense of Pollex’s authority. Pollex sought to overturn Wetzstein’s decision by appealing directly to the Missouri Synod’s leadership in St. Louis. He wrote to Frank Streufert, of the synod’s missionary board, in December 1952 sarcastically thanking him for the money the synod provided his congregation to work with German DPs. He rhetorically asked Streufert whether this money was “given to ‘take in’ the D.P’s or was it given to ‘have the D.P’s take over’?” The attitude of the synod, Pollex believed, showed that there were certain

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685 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953.
686 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953; CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.
687 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953; CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.
688 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Albert Pollex to Frank Streufert and Mayer, 29 December 1952.
“strings attached” to this money that suggested he had to obey the directions of the synod, even if they undermined his authority.

The debate over language at Trinity encompassed the entire congregation. As the dispute intensified, laypeople became embroiled in the controversy as well. After Pollex failed to accomplish his goal through the church’s traditional channels of voting and congregation meetings, he conspired with his wife to try to gain a favourable policy through other means. In December 1952, Gertrude Pollex travelled to St. Louis to utilize her kinship ties in an effort to gain St. Louis’s support to challenge the Erdman-Wetzstein decision. Officially, Gertrude visited St. Louis under the guise of visiting her ailing mother.  

However, her actions in St. Louis prove she visited with the intent of helping her husband and Trinity’s English-speaking congregants. Gertrude stayed with her brother, Walter Buszin, who worked as a professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. Once in St. Louis, Gertrude began pushing her brother to convince his peers and colleagues among the Missouri Synod’s leadership to take greater action in the Trinity case. Her presence convinced Buszin to write to Frank Streufert and Mayer, two of the synod’s leaders in missionary work, and offer his opinion on the “embarrassing” issue currently occurring at Trinity. He echoed Gertrude’s stance which lamented the fact that Trinity’s English congregants now have “practically no jurisdiction over its own property” and congregation.  

Once in St. Louis, Gertrude arranged a meeting with Streufert and Mayer. She told the two men Pollex’s correspondence with them did not do enough to underscore the tensions at Trinity. She articulated the viewpoints of Trinity’s

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689 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Pollex to Streufert and Mayer, 29 December 1952.
690 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.
English members and the importance of speaking English if the congregation had any hopes of growing once the influx of postwar immigrants ceased. She worried that speaking German would simply serve to alienate the congregation from the rest of the community. “We are going twenty years or more back in time if this situation continues,” she argued.\textsuperscript{691}

Gertrude remained in St. Louis throughout January and continued to lobby for Pollex and Trinity. While her brother entered the discussion on Trinity as an interested third party, by mid-January he emerged fully on Pollex’s side due to Gertrude’s advocacy. Buszin’s correspondence with the synod’s leadership suggest that she knew precisely how to prompt him to advocate for Trinity’s English congregants. While in St. Louis, she told Buszin how Goegginger “turns up his nose at our theologians, our Seminary, etc.” As a theologian and professor at Concordia Seminary, such statements naturally provoked Buszin. He told Mayer that he wondered whether Goegginger “and his people have any interest in us outside of our money and subsidies.”\textsuperscript{692}

Laymen also became increasingly involved in the debate and petitioned St. Louis for assistance when Pollex and Ontario District seemed to fail them. In December 1952, Adam Ulrich, a laymen associated with Trinity, wrote to Mayer and Streufert about his experiences attending a Christmas service among the DPs. On Christmas, Ulrich attended a service offered by Leo Kostizen at his new congregation in Toronto. Upon his arrival, Kostizen reportedly “stopped me and told me that I was spying on them.” He accused Ulrich of attending the service simply to “count how many people attend church and

\textsuperscript{691} CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Gertrude Pollex to Mayer, 11 January 1953.

\textsuperscript{692} CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 18 January 1953.
control there (sic) money” and relay this information back to the synod. The interaction convinced Ulrich that, despite only wanting “peace and unity” between Kostizen and Pollex, Trinity’s problem began because of Kostizen’s poor attitude. He decried the DPs for their implicit belief that “the government supports them like it did in the Old Country.” In contrast, he praised the Canadian-born members of Trinity like himself for sacrificing their own finances to better the church.693 Mayer responded to Ulrich’s letter, albeit dismissively. He told Ulrich “difficulties are bound to occur” when so many ethnicities live in close proximity. However, he told Ulrich “among Christian people all difficulties should always be ironed out in a God pleasing manner” and mentioned he should take the issue up with Wetzstein.694 Mayer expected a “God pleasing” solution to Toronto’s DP problem, though evidently he did not feel obliged to find one. In this sense, Mayer displayed the same attitude that Wetzstein did. Both men lived and preached in St. Louis or Waterloo County where the German-English framework functioned smoothly and without controversy. Leadership in the St. Louis and Waterloo County cores both seemed to expect that the congregations on the periphery needed to handle their own disputes internally until they could balance their ethnic and national congregations just as well as those in the Lutheran core.

Language debates also occurred more frequently in Missouri due to the Missouri Synod’s stance on segregation. White flight in St. Louis led to the creation of several new congregations in St. Louis County’s suburbs and less urban areas of Missouri. This exodus brought German-American Lutherans into contact with other white Americans

693 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Adam Ulrich to “Gentlemen,” 29 December 1952.
694 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Mayer to Ulrich, 5 January 1953.
who participated in white flight from St. Louis. Anglo-Americans occasionally joined their German-American Lutheran neighbors at newly established Lutheran churches and created more heterogeneous congregations than most German-American Lutherans and their pastors were accustomed to in St. Louis. Occasionally, Americans joined Lutheran churches because it was the only church in their new suburb. These Americans joined Lutheran churches to enjoy the social benefits of organized religion, rather than out of a strict loyalty to Lutheran theology or their German heritage.  

Regardless of their motivation, synod leaders saw their expansion to the suburbs as an opportunity to grow their church. They hoped that their new suburban congregations might thrive and grow, thereby recouping the losses their downtown congregations experienced due to white flight.

However, recent Anglo-American converts quickly came to challenge the German traditions and conservative theological beliefs of Missouri Synod pastors. Christ Memorial Lutheran Church, established in the late 1940s in southern St. Louis County, was one of the first of several Missouri congregations to witness a debate between its liberal American members and conservative German-American pastors. The congregation started as a church primarily composed of St. Louis residents that fled the city to the suburbs. The church was built “where there are thousands of new homes and...it is reasonable to expect that in due time there will be many more homes.”

The synod’s decision paid off. By the early 1950s, the congregation consisted of more Anglo-American members than its original German-American membership from St. Louis.

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696 CHI, Western District Collection (hereafter WDC), Box 8, Folder 1, Martin Schaeffer to W.T. Rossnagel, 15 September 1953.
697 CHI, WDC, Box 8, Folder 1, Schaeffer to Edgar Mundinger, 14 August 1953.
The rise in American membership at Christ Memorial also increased tensions within the congregation between its “modern” congregants and “traditional” pastor. Members of Christ Memorial started to complain about their pastor, the Reverend Karl Schweder, in the early 1950s. Americans congregants, unaccustomed to the Missouri Synod’s strong emphasis on a literal interpretation of scripture, found Schweder extremely conservative. Schweder’s sermons privileged theological lessons instead of the more moral and socially oriented nature of other Protestant denominations. This emphasis provided the exact opposite of what Christ Memorial’s American congregants wanted from a religious service. These congregants wanted a broader discussion of Christianity and how it applied to their day-to-day lives with an emphasis on charity and cooperation. This trend was by no means isolated to Christ Memorial, as American Protestants more generally placed a greater emphasis on interdenominational cooperation during the 1950s and 1960s. The general American public started to see theological differences between different Protestant faiths as insignificant. Theological disputes, they believed, should not prevent unity and brotherhood among Christians. Essentially, Protestants saw religion as a “spiritual marketplace” in which they could “shop” for a church to suit their social, as well as religious, values. American Protestants started to see “personal happiness” and instruction on how to live virtuous lives as the primary reason for attending church, and placed less of an emphasis on theological instruction. Schweder, with his emphasis on conservative Lutheran doctrine, proved ill-equipped to meet these modern “American” standards.

Martin Schaeffer, the pastor in charge of overseeing mission work in Missouri, soon started hearing complaints from these congregants as a result of Schweder’s preaching. Schaeffer noted that the Americans “haven’t liked his ways. They think he has been a little legalistic.” In Missouri Synod parlance, “legalistic” often referred to a pastor who stuck exceedingly close to a literal interpretation of the Bible, with very little room for creative or practical license. Although some pastors prided themselves on their legalistic emphasis, most Lutherans generally used this as a slur. The congregation’s critique contained more than just a theological criticism. They attributed Schweder’s conservative Lutheranism as a product of his German heritage. Schaeffer noted that the congregation felt uncomfortable with the degree to which Schweder maintained “the traditions of our fathers.” Schaeffer tried to intervene on Schweder’s behalf, but proved unsuccessful. Schaeffer subsequently reassigned Schweder to a different congregation and began the process of looking for his replacement. Schweder was simply “too German” or “old fashioned” for Christ Memorial’s new American membership.

Unlike Schweder’s traditional theology, Christ Memorial’s congregants wanted a pastor that reflected their forward-thinking point of view. The congregation listed some of its most important qualities in their new pastor and, in doing so, reflected their background as a mission congregation that sought to engage in American life. They stressed that their replacement pastor must be “devoted to caring for and shepherding the souls of the congregation” and demonstrate a “consecrated and zealous” attitude “in the work of the Lord, capable of drawing the unchurched to God’s soul-saving grace.” They

699 CHI, WDC, Box 8, Folder 1, Schaeffer to T.A. Weinhold, 11 November 1952.
700 CHI, WDC, Box 8, Folder 1, Schaeffer to W. Boestcher, 15 February 1951.
wanted “a man who will be on excellent terms with the Community.” W.T. Rossnagel eventually accepted the call to minister to Christ Memorial. He did so with the knowledge that part of his job as pastor would be “the welding together of people with various church backgrounds” alongside making “people from various large St. Louis churches into a working team.” These mission churches could not function like their counterparts in St. Louis. They did not have a localized German culture, thereby granting recently converted American Lutherans more power over determining church affairs.

This division between pastors and their congregations occurred at other mission churches in areas where the population consisted primarily of Anglo-Americans. The synod selected Warrensburg, a smaller city in western Missouri, as another opportunity to build a congregation and grow the Lutheran presence in that region. They described Warrensburg as “a good ‘American’ town, with less people of German extraction than many other towns of that size.” While this presented the possibility for growth among Americans, it also inevitably brought Missouri Synod pastors into conflict with these Americans. The Reverend J.V. Kimpel confessed that “several members have been dropping derogatory remarks about the ‘old School’ among the clergy ever since” he arrived in Warrenburg. Kimpel worked hard the next month to convince his congregation that he could fulfill their evangelistic desires and recruit more Anglo-American members. The following month he proudly reported recruiting three new families to the congregation, which did a great deal to quell the congregation’s critiques. “Let’s be glad for the Word of God taught purely in our midst, and for the mission work

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701 CHI, WDC, Box 8, Folder 1, Christ Memorial Lutheran Church Call Committee to Members of Christ Memorial Lutheran Church, 17 June 1953.
702 CHI, WDC, Box 8, Folder 1, Rossnagel to Schaefer, 24 September 1953.
703 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Schaefer to Carl Schinnerer, 28 February 1949.
704 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, J.V. Kimpel to Schaefer, 20 September 1951.
being done by our pastor," one congregant reported.\textsuperscript{705} The postwar emphasis on expansion and recruiting Americans undermined Kimpel’s education. Kimpel’s training in St. Louis emphasized that preaching German and English sermons centered on the Bible would be enough to satisfy his congregation. His training, however, did not account for preaching to a general American audience that did not value his German heritage or conservative Lutheranism.

The congregation continued to criticize Kimpel, despite some limited success attracting new members. Kimpel reported that he and “the elders who stick with me” continued to be plagued by the feeling that nothing they did pleased the American contingent in the congregation. “I can not satisfy some of the members here…I have heard too much deprecating of things ‘Missouri Synod’ and things which are good old Lutheran customs as mere ‘old-fashioned Germanisms’.\textsuperscript{706}” Kimpel’s fears proved well founded. In the following months the American contingent continued to make “disparaging remarks, sometimes downright wild against Mo. Syn. Clergy and practice.”\textsuperscript{707} These divides, along with several personality conflicts, forced Kimpel to leave the congregation shortly thereafter. Schaefer recognized that Warrensburg needed a “good, faithful pastor who is willing to work, who has tact and good judgment, who is cordial and sympathetic, who is willing to go out and win the unchurched for Christ and the congregation.” Such a pastor “ought not only find his work in Warrensburg pleasant, but also ought to meet with constant success.”\textsuperscript{708} Essentially, Americans in Warrensburg wanted a pastor who was not German. They wanted a pastor that reflected their

\textsuperscript{705} CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 8 October 1951.
\textsuperscript{706} CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 8 October 1951.
\textsuperscript{707} CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 26 November 1951.
\textsuperscript{708} CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 2, Schaefer to Paul Czamanske, 3 September 1952.
“American” background, and not someone steeped in a German and Lutheran tradition that seemed out of step with modern evangelical practices. Much like the infighting at Christ Memorial, balancing a hybrid German-American identity proved an insufficient model to implement in Warrensburg.

As the pastor in charge of expansion in Missouri, Schaeffer continually tried to solve congregational disputes by appeasing the synod’s new American members over their German pastors. This often involved hiring younger and more mission minded pastors at these congregations who shared their congregation’s desire to recruit Americans to their church. This, however, proved harder than either Schaeffer or his pastors realized. The Missouri Synod’s reputation as a German church acted as a barrier in many cases that dissuaded Americans from joining their congregations. One pastor wrote in frustration that his efforts to reach Americans in Missouri often failed. “We were on the wrong side of the tracks, known as the ‘little Dutch church’; few in numbers,” he believed. At other times the German-American members of these congregations challenged the time and focus their pastors placed on recruiting Americans who did not share their Lutheran faith or German ethnicity. The Reverend Robert Harms at Trinity Lutheran Church in Lebanon, Missouri, found that German-American members of his church council looked down on his efforts to appeal to potential American recruits. Harms lamented the “lack of cooperation” from the “founding fathers” of the church. He noticed that unchurched newcomers were practically excluded from the church unless they were directly related to prominent German-American families from St. Louis. “This point however, is gradually losing weight as new blood comes in, and when the ‘old

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709 CHI, WDC, Box 11, Folder 6, Victor Grimm to Schaeffer, 30 December 1950.
timers’ no longer can swing the votes negatively,’” he continued. “Obviously the ‘old
timers’ resent that, and have mentioned it in just about so many words.”

This generation of “old timers” and their disciples guarded their authority within
their communities and continued to prize their German ethnicity. Despite criticisms from
new American congregants throughout Missouri, synod president John Behnken
continued to prioritize a theologically conservative ministry steeped in their German
culture. Behnken encouraged Missouri pastors at a 1951 gathering to increase their
“Christ centered, Christ motivated, and winning preaching.” Behnken criticized the
emerging generation of younger pastors so desired by American congregations for their
more liberally minded theology in contrast to his generation’s strict emphasis on
conservative Lutheranism. He blamed their liberal emphasis primarily on the growing
tendency to prioritize English-speaking services within their congregations. He
encouraged Missouri pastors to again consult classic German-language texts like Gesetz
und Evangelium written by the synod’s founder in the nineteenth century to better
acquaint themselves with both the German language and conservative Lutheran
principals. Although new American members stressed conformity and evangelism,
Behnken continued to prioritize the synod’s German and conservative Lutheranism within
the St. Louis core.

Canada Synod pastors like John Reble and Otto Stockmann also saw themselves
as continuing their own German and Lutheran principals for a new generation. In the late
1950s, the German National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation offered

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710 CHI, WDC, Box 11, Folder 6, Robert Harms to Schaeffer, 30 October, 1950.
711 CHI, WDC, Box 14, WDC Minutes Folder, Minutes of the Pastoral Conference of the Western District,
20 June 1951.
“assistance to the Canadian churches in the ministry to the immigrants.”

The Canada Synod graciously declined their offer. After all, they did not need help from Germany to preach to German DPs when pastors like Reble and Stockmann could accomplish this task easily on their own. By 1957, Stockmann, a “veteran of the cross,” retired from his position as Trinity’s pastor and started to travel throughout Northern Ontario to preach to small groups of German DPs. Retirement similarly could not stop Reble from continuing to work among German-language congregations in Waterloo County. Although he retired from his position as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, he started to offer his services as a guest preacher at St. Peter’s.

In contrast to the contentious relationship between Pollex and German DPs at Trinity, or the debates between American congregations and Missouri Synod pastors, minor debates did not lead to extensive congregational breakdown in Waterloo County. Lotz and his German-Canadian church council prevented any dissenters from mobilizing too much support at St. Peter’s because of their support for bilingual services. At St. Peter’s annual congregation meeting in 1957, one congregant voiced his concern that “a greater effort should be made to encourage more of the German members to make use of the English Services.” Lotz rejected the layman’s position and stated that the German immigrants had ample opportunity to partake in English life at the church if they so chose. He replied that “the two groups get along harmoniously and that every effort should be made to appraise the situation objectively.”

A few congregants occasionally expressed their uncertainty over St. Peter’s willingness to continue its German-English

712 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.3., Minutes of the Meeting of the Division of Canadian Missions, 27 November 1957.
713 Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” The Canada Lutheran, February 1958, p. 7.
714 LA, ESF, 6 Evangelical Lutheran Church of Canada, Folder 6.1.6.3., Executive Committee of the Ev. Lutheran Synod of Canada Minutes (Waterloo), 26 June 1957.
715 LA, ESF, LM10 St. Peter’s, reel 13, Annual Congregation Meeting, 3 February 1957.
model. Peeter Vanker, a young seminary student, voiced his concern about German DPs at a 1967 congregation meeting. Vanker was a member of what one pastor once referred to as Waterloo Lutheran Seminary’s “rebellious generation” of seminary students. Vanker and his fellow students in the late 1960s developed a reputation for questioning the synod’s ethnic traditions in favour of their more “modern” and evangelical approaches to preaching. They particularly criticized the insistence of pastors like Lotz and Reble who encouraged German-language services, and instead favoured English-language services so that their churches would appeal to “all” Canadians. After listening to various members of St. Peter’s praise its work among German DPs, Vanker requested that the church council authorize a special committee in order to discern whether the church’s leadership “should contribute more towards the English segment of the congregation.” He believed that the church should place a greater emphasis on integration so that the Germans “might proceed unitedly (sic) in the total congregation.” Vanker was clearly an outlier at the meeting, as his motion did not receive endorsement from the congregation. Unlike Trinity in Toronto, Lotz’s refusal to indulge any of the congregation’s critiques of its German congregants cultivated an atmosphere of tolerance rather than doubt. By the late 1960s, the German-English framework of the congregation could not be seriously criticized, even by younger members of the congregation like Vanker.

St. Peter’s German-Canadian and DP members continued to balance their German and Canadian identities even without Lotz’s insistence. When Lotz retired from St.


717 LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s, reel 18, Annual Congregational Meeting Minutes, 29 January 1967.
Peter’s to assume leadership of the Canada Synod in 1961, the church council had to find a replacement pastor. They created a list of desirable traits that they wanted their new pastor to embody. At the top of the list, they stated their new pastor had to speak fluent German. They disqualified several promising candidates with important family lineages in the Canada Synod. The church council rejected Fred Little, the son of seminarian and St. Peter’s congregant C.H. Little, from the position even though he had completed intern work at St. Peter’s during his time as a seminary student. The church council cited his weak understanding of the German language as the primary reason they rejected him. Instead, the majority of the church council voted to offer the job of pastor to Otto Reble, John Reble’s son, who was bilingual and even completed graduate work in Germany.\textsuperscript{718} Otto declined the position and the congregation subsequently offered the job to Henry Opperman in 1961.\textsuperscript{719} Because Opperman was born in Waterloo County and spoke fluent German, he seemed the perfect fit for St. Peter’s. Opperman accepted the call and looked forward to return to “the city of my birth and early life.”\textsuperscript{720} In selecting Opperman, the congregation ensured that they had a pastor that would continue both German and English traditions.

Opperman’s arrival at St. Peter’s coincided with an internal debate about the congregation’s future. St. Peter’s grew considerably in size after the end of the Second World War due to the arrival of so many German DPs to Kitchener’s downtown core. The church council frequently commented on the church’s cramped quarters as a result of the congregation’s steady growth. Shortly after Opperman’s arrival, the church council

\textsuperscript{718} LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s, reel 18, Church Council Minutes, 13 June 1961; LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s, reel 18, Special Meeting of Church Council Minutes, 28 June 1961.
\textsuperscript{719} LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s, reel 18, Special Meeting of Church Council Minutes, 29 October 1961.
\textsuperscript{720} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.1.55, Albert W. Lotz to Henry Opperman, 31 October 1961; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.1.55, Opperman to St. Peter’s Congregation, 6 November 1961.
started to consult with the congregation about whether it should construct a new larger church building, or perhaps split into two separate English and German-language congregations. In 1963, the congregation decided to remain as one single congregation that would keep its German heritage and customs an essential part of the church. Opperman ensured the congregation continued its hybrid traditions while the new church building moved towards completion. In June 1963 the church council unanimously voiced their dedication to “work harmoniously toward the ultimate objective, set out by the church Council, of a total congregational life and attitude” based on its shared German and English traditions.\footnote{721 LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s, reel 18, Special Congregational Meeting Minutes, 23 June 1963.}

Congregational cohesion at St. Peter’s represented a model for other Canada Synod congregations to follow. By the early 1960s, the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) continued to remind its congregations that they “must continue to be the backbone of all our efforts to make our migrants feel at home.” Reble agreed and proudly told his audience at St. Peter’s that their “policy and method…in this respect is well known throughout the Church. It is with St. Peter’s an act concerned love and not by law,” that they welcomed German newcomers into their church. He maintained that the German-English model at St. Peter’s continued to be a shining example throughout the synod.\footnote{722 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.1.55, The Pastor’s Report, 1962.}

The new St. Peter’s church building was completed by 1967-1968 and allowed the congregation to continue its German-English framework in less cramped quarters. Reble continued to conduct German-language services for the congregation into the late 1960s, and even reported that attendance to his services increased now that the congregation was
in the new church. “We can justly and humbly be proud of our new building in the heart of the city,” he told the congregation in 1968.\footnote{LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, reel 18, Annual Congregational Meeting Minutes, 28 January 1968.}

### Conclusion

The two decades following the Second World War did not constitute an “ethnic reverie” for the German Lutheran communities of St. Louis and Waterloo County. Gatekeepers certainly tried to eliminate the German language from each community and unsuccessfully attempted to break the ethnic bonds that existed between German DPs and local German Canadians and Americans. The localization of German culture provided a strong discursive tool for ethnic elites to combat pressures to integrate while pastors also worked to ensure that a harmonious relationship existed at the congregational level. Pastors continued to support and work towards maintaining hybrid congregations that balanced both languages through sermons, clubs, and respect for both DPs and native-born congregants. Although congregations in rural Missouri and urban Ontario had a more difficult time reconciling the English and German portions of their congregations, ethnicity nevertheless continued to determine church life during decades previously thought to be a period of conformity. The importance of the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone ensured that German Canadians and Americans earnestly welcomed German DPs into their congregations.

Cultivating a respect for their German heritage did not, however, make German Lutherans immune from also maintaining strong racial views. German Lutherans participated in both direct and indirect acts of white supremacy throughout the 1950s and
1960s. While the localization of German culture provided a welcome atmosphere for German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County, so did the inherent whiteness embodied in cultural myths in both communities. German DPs found themselves welcomed at local congregations because they were not only German spaces, but also white spaces. Gatekeepers and Lutheran leaders alike drew on histories of St. Louis and Waterloo County that valorized their white settler ancestors and continued to see white ethnic culture as compatible with Canadian and American life. The Canada Synod and KWCF kept their community white largely through ideological practices, whereas the Missouri Synod directly confronted race through policies of segregation and white flight. In St. Louis, keeping their churches German also meant keeping their churches white. Lutheran churches in the 1950s and 1960s therefore not only remained ethnic boundary zones, but they also remained white spaces due to the historic and contemporary cultures that upheld traditions of white supremacy in both communities.

The ethnic-racial binary so frequently used in historical examinations of whiteness does not match these two communities of German Lutherans. They practiced ethnic identities at their churches, and also maintained strong views on race that kept their churches simultaneously German and white spaces. German Lutherans easily maintained their hybrid identities while conforming to North America’s white supremacist standards. The ethnic reverie narrative does not fully capture the complexities of the multiple identities German Lutherans juggled throughout the postwar decades. While it is tempting to reduce them to simply one category of “German” or “American/Canadian” or “white,” German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County actually practiced all of these identities simultaneously. There was no ethnic reverie during the 1950s and 1960s in
these communities. Instead, ethnic diversity worked acceptably within the confines of white supremacy in St. Louis and Waterloo County.

Lutheran efforts to assist refugees and displaced persons included campaigns to admit Latvian, Estonian, and other eastern European Lutherans following the Second World War. Although the Missouri and Canada Synods were primarily interested in helping German Lutheran DPs, programs such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme also assisted DPs of other ethnic and national backgrounds. While the previous chapter examined how St. Louis and Waterloo County’s pre-existing German communities responded to German DPs, this chapter addresses how they engaged with Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish newcomers throughout the late 1940s to the mid-1960s.

Unlike the harmonious relationship between local Lutherans and German DPs, the influx of Latvians, Estonians, and Finns in Canada and Missouri Synod congregations directly challenged the authority of ethnic elites in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Initially, ethnic leaders like John Reble and John Behnken showed an interest in maintaining harmonious relations with the various DP groups that populated their congregations. Incorporating Latvian, Estonian, and other DPs into their congregations would help ethnic elites grow their churches and increase their influence in the Lutheran community. However, newly arrived DP pastors did not passively accept their role as subordinates within the synod. Rather, they sought to exert their influence and become ethnic elites within their own DP communities. Latvian DPs, and their self-proclaimed leader Alfred Skrodelis in particular, frequently challenged synod leaders by organizing Latvian congregations and synods independent of the Missouri and Canada Synods. Latvians wished to speak their own language at church and tried to maintain a political connection to the Latvian state. Finnish DPs similarly tried to form their own
congregations where they would not have to attend German or English services. They tried to obtain pastors from Finland to preach to their congregants rather than relying on those provided by the Missouri and Canada Synods. German-Canadian and German-American pastors responded by limiting the influence of DP pastors and undermining their efforts to form independent congregations. They saw little need for DPs to form their own congregations when they could attend German or English services at established congregations.

This chapter argues that competing notions of ethnicity led local ethnic elites and DPs to disagree over how to best incorporate DPs into the church. DPs articulated an ethnicity firmly rooted in citizenship or nationality, alongside allegiance to their former European homelands. DPs did not consider themselves “Americans” or “Canadians” like their German Lutheran neighbours, but rather conceptualized themselves as communities “in exile.” As a result, DPs tried to form their own congregations, speak their own language, and retain a direct political connection with their homeland in the hopes that they would one day return. Their desire to establish congregations rooted in their specific Latvian or Estonian identities represented a political decision, rather than a theological choice. In contrast, German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County practiced hybrid identities that sought to balance their ethnic, religious, and national identities. German Lutherans justified the ethnic tradition of speaking German at church by citing theological and spiritual tenants that argued for the links between language and faith. Speaking German in church did not represent a political connection to Germany, nor did it suggest that they did not belong as Americans or Canadians. Despite their status as first or second-generation immigrants, they recognized St. Louis and Waterloo County as their homes. These fundamental different definitions of
ethnicity pitted German-Canadian and German-American pastors against recently arrived DPs and help explain the tensions that resulted from trying to incorporate DPs into North American synods.

The subsequent clash between German-Canadian and German-Americans and Lutheran DPs demonstrates the saliency and importance of ethnicity in St. Louis and Waterloo County following the Second World War. While American historians have emphasized that the 1940s and 1950s constituted an “ethnic reverie,” the efforts of Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants to maintain their own ethnic identities in opposition to synod policies demonstrates the centrality of ethnicity in North American Lutheranism during these decades.\textsuperscript{724} The Missouri and Canada Synods consciously maintained their churches as German spaces and rejected attempts to make them “Latvian” or “Estonian” spaces as well. Although tolerant towards their fellow Germans, the Missouri and Canada Synods proved more hostile hosts to those who advocated different ethnic identities than their own. Ethnicity continued to play an important role in Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County prior to the “ethnic revival” of the 1960s.

\textbf{The “New Canadian” and “DP” Problems}

The Missouri and Canada Synods’ attitude towards DPs was shaped by several trends in postwar North American society. Demographic data suggests that Lutherans, like other North Americans, contributed to the “baby boom” of the 1950s and 1960s. Lutherans also followed the national trend of moving from rural and urban communities

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to newly created suburbs following the end of the war.\textsuperscript{725} These broad developments in postwar society caused synod leaders to place a greater emphasis on what they called “home missions.” Although mission work typically referred to attempts to convert non-Lutherans overseas, “home missions” placed an emphasis on converting North Americans to Lutheranism in their local communities and retaining existing members. Some of the most prominent pastors in each synod served on boards organized explicitly to deal with home missions. John Reble and Albert Lotz both sat on the Canada Synod’s Home Missions Committee (HMC). Likewise, Frank Streufert and H.A. Mayer both sat on the Missouri Synod’s Home Missions Board (HMB). Both the HMC and HMB became increasingly occupied with addressing the issue of home missions in the postwar era.

The population boom of the 1950s and 1960s helped prompt the interest in home missions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. With the increased size of Lutheran families, one Canada Synod commenter noted that the synod could not afford to “overlook the fact that our babies constitute a mission challenge.”\textsuperscript{726} If the synods hoped to retain its members for the future, they needed to pay close attention to ensure that these children attended church. This proved difficult, however, due to the population shift from rural and urban areas to the suburbs where no Lutheran churches often existed. Norman Berner, assistant to the Canada Synod’s president, commented on this “new condition in our national life.” “Once upon a time Canadians stayed where they were. Families lived in the same house for generation after generation. Those days are gone forever,” he


\textsuperscript{726} Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Eastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada fonds (hereafter ESF), 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.1.2., “Preserve and Extend…Through Home Missions” An Address by the Appeal Director, the Rev. Norman Berner, n.d. 1955.
argued. “Today, practically everybody moves two or three times in his life.” As a result, the two synods needed to ensure that these people continued to attend a Lutheran church after they moved. In situations where no Lutheran churches existed in the suburbs, the HMC and HMB attempted to conduct synod-wide fundraisers in which to build new churches in these areas. Finances and a congregation’s ability to be economically “self-sufficient” became increasingly important to synod leaders and their home missions organizations.

The new emphasis on home missions in the postwar period represented a break with the past for the Missouri and Canada Synods. Previously, their mission work within North America focused on reaching out to newly arrived German immigrants. However, their attention to the suburbs led synod leaders to focus equal attention on recruiting “unchurched” Canadians and Americans who had no religious affiliation. Berner, for instance, believed that the synod should not “confine our home mission work to the ‘Lutherans.’ The Gospel is for all and we must minister to all that we can reach.” Many new neighborhoods in North America’s urban communities did not yet have established churches, thereby opening up the possibility of recruiting “unchurched” Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans into their Lutheran churches. Synod leaders turned their attention to the growth and future of their church, and realized that their ability to continue to grow depended on meeting the challenges of urban and suburban life.

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The arrival of Lutheran DPs heightened the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ability to achieve their goal of postwar growth while simultaneously placing it in jeopardy. On one hand, the influx of DPs would theoretically increase church attendance and provide the two synods with more laypeople in which to help their fundraising efforts. “Each newcomer,” Berner commented, “is a challenge to us to preserve the Gospel in him, and him in the Gospel.” However, synod leaders had several financial and cultural concerns about the DPs that also challenged their ultimate goal of postwar expansion. Although nominally Lutheran, DPs arrived in North America with religious and cultural customs that differed from the Missouri and Canada Synods. These prescribed traits and qualities subsequently became known as the “new Canadian” or “DP problem” among synod leaders in Waterloo and St. Louis and placed their goal of postwar growth in jeopardy.

Synod leaders believed that Lutheran DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries had a poor record of church attendance that would ultimately hinder their plans for postwar growth. They believed that Finnish Lutherans, for instance, more commonly met in “meeting-houses” and other “homelike gatherings” to practice their religion. This tradition stood in contrast to their own North American emphasis of practicing their religion overwhelmingly in the church. Lutheran DPs, it seemed, did not really know how to “behave” as proper North American Lutherans and did not understand the responsibilities that went along with joining a congregation. Horace Erdman, a Missouri Synod pastor from Waterloo County, believed that pastors needed to explain that “church membership does not consist primarily in having their names recorded on the membership roll of a congregation.” They needed to understand that church membership meant


733 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Mauri Tiilikainen to Albert Jacobi, 31 December 1955.
participating in “congregational activity, especially attendance at divine services.”\(^{734}\)

Other synod leaders took an even more pessimistic view. “The DP’s, as a rule, never learned to go to church regularly,” argued Frank Streufert, of the Missouri Synod’s HMB. “To many the church is on the same level with the social organization.”\(^{735}\) The casual attitude that DPs exhibited towards church attendance placed synod goals of congregational expansion in jeopardy and constituted a chief concern of the “new Canadian” or “DP” problem.

Increased immigration further complicated the push for postwar growth due to the perception that DPs did not contribute to the church financially. Synod leaders noted that Lutheran churches in Europe received state support in order to continue to function. This negated the need for European congregations to rely upon their congregants for fundraisers and acts of charity to fund their churches. DPs arrived from a context in which their local church made very few economic demands on them. The North American emphasis on charitable donations therefore surprised newcomers, and their North American pastors resented DPs for not giving as greatly as their native-born congregants.\(^{736}\) The reluctance of DPs to contribute to the church financially was in opposition to the goals of the synod leadership, which placed a great deal of importance on laypeople to contribute to the synod’s growth. In essence, synod leaders accused newly arrived DPs of bringing a “lazy Lutheranism” to North America.\(^{737}\) Synod leaders worried that they would not attend church and would not contribute to the synod.

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\(^{734}\) Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, The Displaced Persons’ Problem by Horace Erdman, 1949.

\(^{735}\) CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP Work (Canada) Folder, F.C. Streufert to W.C. Eifert, 11 December 1950.

\(^{736}\) LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Tiilikainen to Jacobi, 31 December 1955; CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP Work (Canada) Folder, Streufert to Eifert, 11 December 1950.

\(^{737}\) LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Niilo Tuomenoksa to Jacobi, 6 April 1957.
financially. Both qualities stood in opposition to the synod’s goals of postwar growth of retaining church membership and remaining financially self-sufficient. While new members could theoretically help fill new congregations and donate their money to the synod, the European background of the DPs caused synod leaders to question whether the arrival of so many DPs would help or hinder their goals.

**The Arrival of DP Pastors, 1947-1950**

Although discourses surrounding the “new Canadian” or “DP” problem shaped the general fears and anxieties of synod leaders, they also had to confront the more practical challenge of ministering to such an ethnically diverse group of immigrants. The 1947-1950 period witnessed synod leaders actively debating how best to meet their obligations to the DPs. Synod leaders and pastors alike had few ways to communicate to DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries. While pastors could speak German and English, the Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages were unknown to them. If they wished to interact with recent arrivals, they needed to find European-born pastors who could speak these other languages until the DPs learned German or English, and integrated into their congregations. Synods depended upon these “DP Pastors” during the late 1940s to help them address newly arrived DPs and recruit them to their congregations.

The two synods relied upon several DPs to work as pastors preaching to the small communities of immigrants that started to form throughout Ontario, Quebec, and large American cities in 1947. These initial pastors often had theological training from when they lived in Europe, but simultaneously worked secular jobs in North America as the
Missouri and Canada Synods did not yet recognize them as properly ordained pastors. Adolf Gaudins, for instance, arrived in Canada in 1948 as a Latvian DP and worked fulltime in an Ontario hydro plant. On weekends, Gaudins travelled throughout Ontario and Quebec preaching to other Latvian DPs. Karl Raudsepp and Rudolf Kiviranna, two Lutheran pastors from Estonia, did much the same for Estonian DPs in Ontario, Quebec, and New York. These men initially worked for the Missouri and Canada Synods in the hopes that they would be incorporated into the synods as officially recognized ordained pastors.

Working as itinerant pastors was not a financially viable long-term situation for these men. As a result of their meager wages, the first wave of immigrant pastors became some of the early advocates for ministering to DPs within the synods. They wrote to synod leaders extolling their own personal virtues and how their services as full-time ordained ministers might benefit the two synods. Members of the Canada Synod’s HMC and the Missouri Synod’s HMB needed to be convinced that the DP pastors could become full members of their synods. Fears about the “DP problem” ensured synod officials did not necessarily trust them to share the same goals, and saw little use for the Estonian or Latvian languages in their German-English church. DP pastors therefore specifically emphasized their European heritage and fluency in several different languages as positive attributes. Kiviranna told synod leaders that “the Estonian language is closely akin to the Finnish, and many [Estonian] pastors could be used to do missionary work among

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739 These pastors managed to receive some minor compensation from the synods as well as charitable donations from congregations and DP communities that they visited. However, these wages paled in comparison to what fulltime pastors in the Missouri and Canada Synods made each year. See John Reble, “From the President’s Office,” Canada Lutheran, December 1948, p. 8
unchurched Finns” as well as Estonian DPs. Oskar Puhm, another Estonian DP pastor, petitioned the HMB to hire Estonian pastors on the basis that “the same pastor could preach to the Finns as well…and there are many Estonian pastors who would be able to serve in different languages.” They encouraged synod leaders to conduct missionary work among the DPs in an effort to elevate their own status as fully recognized and ordained pastors within the Missouri and Canada Synods. In doing so, they tried to demonstrate how their unique skills could help the church meet its postwar goal of expanding home missions.

Synod leaders, however, had a difficult time imagining DP pastors as equal members of their communities. They did not conform to their linguistic traditions, nor were DPs easily integrated into St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized German culture. The issue of language sat at the crux of synod leaders’ concerns. Latvian and Estonian immigrants had varying degrees of competency in conversational German or English, but they rarely had the fluency in these languages to preach to a German or English congregation. While their Estonian or Latvian language skills might be useful in “DP work,” synod leaders could not envision these pastors preaching to their English and German congregations. This, after all, was the synod’s “real” daily work and an ability to speak English remained instrumental to their plans to reach unchurched North Americans. While Kiviranna and Puhm envisioned conducting a broad range of missionary activity among Baltic and Scandinavian Lutherans, the synod officials struggled to see a place for DP work in their German-English synods. In fact, pastors conceptualized work in the

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740 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Rudolf Kiviranna to Streufert, 20 July 1948.
741 CHI, European Affairs Collection (hereafter EUA), Box 8, DP Work Pastor Appl. Reports Folder, Oskar Puhm to Streufert, 14 December 1950.
Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages to be European, not North American, work. Streufert believed their poor English-language skills made them unsuitable for work in the United States. He believed that they should instead focus their efforts on helping impoverished Lutherans in Europe recover from the war’s devastation. DP pastors, he stated, should “be advised not to forsake their homeland at a time when their own country and their own people are so desperately in need of faithful pastors” instead of trying to find work in North America. They did not see a future for these pastors in their synods until they learned enough German or English to preach services regularly. Synod leaders found it difficult to advocate for permanent employment for pastors that did not speak fluent English and German. New arrivals needed to demonstrate that they could become a part of the synod, as well as performing DP work.

Synod leaders instead believed that Estonian and Latvian pastors should have minor roles within the synod that rarely included missionary work. When a Latvian pastor wrote to the Missouri Synod looking for work, Lawrence Meyer replied that the only job he could possibly secure for him was to work at the synod’s radio station in St. Louis translating English scripts into European languages for broadcast overseas. Meyer hoped that he could find “some niche” for the DP pastor to work in. DP pastors tried to dissuade men like Streufert and Meyer from thinking along the synod’s German-English model, albeit unsuccessfully. Kiviranna, for instance, reminded synod leaders that he preached to Estonians “in many places on this continent” and that the synod conducted mission work among “American Estonians” for the last fifty years. “It is natural,”

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742 CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Streufert to B.J. Rogstad, 1 September 1950.
743 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Lawrence Meyer to David, 31 August 1948.
Kiviranna concluded, “that we look at this problem as a problem of our Synod.”\textsuperscript{744} As they did not participate in the English or German life of the synod, the leadership relegated them to “niche” work rather an authoritative place within the synod.

DP Pastors did, however, employ several effective strategies in order to gain some limited financial and moral support for their work. Most notably, they gained support when they exploited the HMC and HMB’s anxieties about postwar growth and competition with other religious bodies. Specifically, both synods resented the frequent attempts made by other Protestant religions to recruit Lutheran DPs to their churches instead of directing them to Lutheran churches. One Missouri Synod pastor expressed disdain for the tactics of the “the United and Anglican church(es)” for using “teas, dances, folk festivals” to lure Lutheran DPs into their congregations. “We must continue to be concerned about the soul and the salvation of these people,” he believed.\textsuperscript{745} Albert Jacobi, a pastor from Kitchener, noted that these DPs should be members of the Canada Synod, because they were fellow Lutherans. “But when [DPs] come to Toronto,” Jacobi observed, they “find ULCA Lutheranism playing second fiddle to another Church.”\textsuperscript{746} DP pastors used knowledge of religious competition between the Protestant churches to their advantage. Kiviranna told Streufert that if he granted “the funds for calling [Estonian] pastors” he could guarantee that “the Estonian Lutherans will not be split among various Lutheran bodies in this country, but become members in our Synod.”\textsuperscript{747} Puhm also played on the HMB’s same fears for financial gain. He requested five hundred dollars from

\textsuperscript{744} CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Kiviranna to Streufert, 20 July 1948.

\textsuperscript{745} CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, Expansion 1957 Folder, George Bornemann to Horace Erdman, 18 March 1952.

\textsuperscript{746} Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” \textit{Canada Lutheran}, February 1956, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{747} CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Kiviranna to Streufert, 20 July 1948.
Streufert in order to help sponsor more Estonian DPs to North America, noting that it would be “very good propaganda and would draw thousands to our Synod.” In 1949, Gaudins and Raudsepp successfully used this fear to become recognized as fulltime pastors in the Canada Synod. The two men sent the Canada Synod HMC field reports that emphasized the Missouri Synod’s activity among Toronto’s Latvian population. They described how the Missouri Synod recently hired a Latvian DP pastor as a fulltime pastor to preach to the city’s Latvians. The HMC worried that they were falling behind the Missouri Synod in reaching DPs in Toronto and hired Gaudins and Raudsepp as a result.

Hiring Gaudins and Raudsepp marked an important first step in the Canada Synod’s attempt to solve the DP problem. Gaudins and Raudsepp benefited from the HMC’s concern that the Missouri Synod had greater success in reaching DPs than the Canada Synod. In an effort to make their synod seem more attractive than Missouri, the HMC drafted a resolution to allow DPs to form their own congregations and allow DP pastors such as Gaudins and Raudsepp to preach services in Latvian and Estonian. In February 1949, the HMC met with the Board of American Missions (BAM), the committee responsible for overseeing mission work in the United Lutheran Church of America, of which the Canada Synod was a member. Reble and Lotz attempted to convince Karl Henry, the BAM representative, that their model of DP autonomy should

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748 CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP Work (Canada) Folder, Puhn to Streufert, 10 September 1950.
749 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 22 February 1949. These tactics further illustrate that competition over the hearts and souls of DPs even existed between different Lutheran bodies. Competition between the Missouri and Canada Synod in Ontario proved particularly volatile. Tensions escalated to such an extent that the Missouri Synod’s Ontario District pastors issued an official resolution requesting that “the pastors of both groups...desist from derogatory remarks concerning the other.” See CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, The D.P. Situation in Canada, N.D.
750 John Reble, “From the President’s Office,” Canada Lutheran, December 1948, p. 8.
receive BAM support. If they adopted a more restrictive approach, they believed, the Canada Synod risked losing DPs to other churches. While sympathetic to the religious competition over DPs, Henry disagreed with the Canada Synod’s approach. Henry and BAM believed that successfully integrating DPs into the traditions of North American Lutheranism would be the best way to ensure that they retained DP membership. Allowing DPs to form their own congregations, Henry believed, would only foster their less desirable traits such as not attending church or donating to the church financially. Thus, Henry vetoed the HMC’s desire to let the DPs form their own congregations. While he agreed that DPs could initially receive religious services in their own language, he did so with the understanding that the DPs would be “absorbed into local congregations” that would eventually facilitate their assimilation into North American society.

Nevertheless, the HMC did manage to gain BAM financing to hire Gaudins and Raudsepp as fulltime pastors. The conditions of their employment, however, reflected BAM’s emphasis on integration into the synod’s existing German and English practices. Henry approved funding for the DP pastors only on the condition that they complete a six-month internship with Canada Synod pastors to learn North American Lutheran customs. These pastors had very little say in the matter. Raudsepp consented to the six-month “apprenticeship,” but requested he get to spend it in Montreal where he currently lived, rather than relocating to Toronto. Henry ignored Raudsepp’s subsequent protests to remain in Montreal and informed him that he needed to live in Toronto if he wished to

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751 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 22 February 1949.
752 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 22 February 1949.
753 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 22 February 1949.
754 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 22 February 1949.
continue to work for BAM.\(^{755}\) Raudsepp had little choice but to agree. Henry later assigned all incoming DP pastors to German-Canadian pastors living in Toronto, Montreal, Kitchener, or Hamilton. These cities in Ontario and Quebec absorbed the bulk of central Canada’s DPs and therefore acted as appropriate training grounds for the incoming DP pastors.

The Missouri Synod’s leadership remained equally skeptical that the incoming pastors could acclimatize to their North American Lutheran traditions. The Missouri Synod’s adherence to conservative Lutheranism ensured that they shared even less common ground with these pastors than BAM and the Canada Synod. Consequently, the HMB decided that all Estonian and Latvian pastors needed proper mentorship and training before they could assume the full responsibilities and respect of preaching in the Missouri Synod. Generally, HMB members suggested that recent immigrants enhance their theological training at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis before preaching in the Missouri Synod. Yet even this did not guarantee full acceptance into the synod. In 1950, for example, Streufert received notice from a Latvian DP pastor who wished to join the synod. After other pastors pushed him to clarify his doctrinal position, it became clear that he actually did not hold the same theological positions as the Missouri Synod. Streufert was unsurprised. “We cannot be too careful with many of the D.P.’s that came to the shores of our country,” he concluded.\(^{756}\)

\(^{755}\) LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 6 April 1949. 
\(^{756}\) See this episode recounted in CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Walter Nitschke to Streufert, 22 November 1950; CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Louis Sieck to Streufert, 4 December 1950; CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Streufert to Nitschke, 4 December 1950. DP pastors developed something of a reputation for changing synodical allegiances once they arrived in North America. See also CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Emil Jaech to Streufert, 15 March 1951.
Although synod officials monitored their theological convictions, language remained the most difficult barrier for the DP pastors to overcome. Pastors could therefore gain “a great advantage” with men like Streufert if they had some knowledge of English or German.\(^{757}\) In 1950, an Estonian pastor, Mihkel Soovik, neared graduation from the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, prompting Streufert to begin to consider a placement for him within the synod. One of Soovik’s mentors vouched for his employment in the synod by telling Streufert that he “speaks English quite well and German very well.”\(^{758}\) These qualifications ensured that Streufert and the HMB took his candidacy and future within the synod seriously. Yet Soovik still faced suspicion over his qualifications due to his status as an Estonian DP. One pastor commented that Soovik needed to be discouraged from serving “his own people” now that he graduated. He believed that Soovik should serve as an assistant pastor in a congregation that consisted mainly of German Americans with a small Estonian population. Soovik could use his German language skills while ensuring the Estonians could “be assimilated into said congregation.”\(^{759}\) Streufert agreed with this assessment. He stated that “the sooner the foreign language groups are assimilated into our American way of life…the better it will be for them and their children.”\(^{760}\) Although Soovik’s willingness to preach in German and English helped guarantee his employment in the synod, it did not exempt him from becoming the target of the HMB’s fears about the DP problem.

Such instances highlight the ways synod leaders privileged their German ethnicity over the other European ethnicities practiced by the DPs. The localized German culture


\(^{758}\) CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Herbert C. Meyer to Streufert, 1 February 1950.

\(^{759}\) CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Herbert C. Meyer to Streufert, 1 February 1950.

\(^{760}\) CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Streufert to Herbert C. Meyer, 3 February 1950.
embedded into most congregations did not include welcoming other ethnic identities into their congregations. Soovik’s mentor, for instance, noted that immigrants should be encouraged to adjust to their new congregations “despite their nostalgic longing for things Estonian and Latvian.” The irony of this statement escaped Streufert and the other synod leaders. While the Missouri Synod’s German-American leadership portrayed DPs wishing to speak their native tongue as “nostalgic,” they saw their own tradition of speaking German as continually relevant. Since the synod maintained its German language services since its inception in the nineteenth century, they viewed the continued relevance and utilitarian use of the German language in ways that they did not understand the European languages of the DPs. Synod leaders spoke German because it was an integral part of their Lutheranism. Speaking Latvian or Estonian, on the other hand, did not have the same spiritual necessity. As a result, it appeared that DP pastors encouraged speaking their own languages for nationalistic reasons rather than spiritual ones. While the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone benefitted German DPs and their German-Canadian and German-American membership, it inevitably led to the marginalization of the Baltic DPs.

Synod leaders pursued a policy of assimilation when confronted with large numbers of Lutheran DPs. In November 1948, approximately ninety Latvian DPs arrived in Tate County, Mississippi, to work in the area’s cotton farms. The large number of Latvians in a single concentrated area meant that the Missouri Synod could, theoretically, undertake efforts to organize a congregation in the area. Yet the Latvian background of these DPs caused considerable hesitancy among synod officials. Aside from expressing concern for their material wellbeing, synod leaders believed that “the foremost problem”

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in missionary work “seems to be how these foreigners can be served with the Word of God.” Streufert noted sadly that the synod had “no pastors able to speak the Latvian language.” As a result, he believed “we cannot do anything about this situation.” He encouraged nearby German-English congregations “to get in touch with [the Latvians] and do the best they can,” but noted that they would have no official help from the Missouri Synod. As the HMB did not believe the Latvians spoke English or German, they did not see a place for them within the Missouri Synod.

The Missouri Synod revised their initial stance on what became colloquially known as the “Mississippi Latvians” in the summer of 1949. By June, the Missouri Synod’s leadership realized that none of their pastors made any efforts to address the needs of the Mississippi Latvians. Yet Latvian DPs continued to arrive to Tate County in great numbers. In fact, the number of Latvian DPs living in northern Mississippi swelled from ninety to nearly nine hundred in the span of several months. Mayer visited northern Mississippi throughout the summer of 1949 in order to assess the situation. Synod members noted two things throughout these visits that made them advocate for greater mission work among the Mississippi Latvians. First, contact with the Mississippi Latvians made synod officials aware that members of other religious bodies had visited the area in the previous months. Mayer discovered that a pastor from a rival Lutheran synod made several visits to the Latvians, as did Baptist and Presbyterian officials. Mayer learned that “two of the Latvian families in that area are Baptists and told us that there was no need for our Church to come in. The Presbyterian pastor in Senatobia is planning to visit all of the homes and offer his service.” He concluded that “some definite action should be taken

762 CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Wm. Wedig to Streufert, 29 January 1949; CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Streufert to Wedig, 7 February 1949.
regarding serving these people lest they become a prey of the various sectarians about them...Unless all of these people are to be lost to the Lutheran Church, something must be done for them now.”

Second, these visits made the Missouri Synod realize that the language barrier between the synod and Latvian DPs was not as wide as previously assumed. Synod officials were surprised to discover that nearly all of the Mississippi Latvians spoke German. This significantly increased the feasibility of providing them with a pastor. One visitor commented that any of the synod’s “German speaking pastors can go into that field and start to serve these neglected people” now that the two groups shared a common knowledge of German.

Only through appealing to the synod’s ethnic culture could DPs hope to receive attention from the Missouri Synod.

The Skrodelis Controversy, 1949-1950

The growing number of DP pastors in the late summer and early fall of 1949 shifted discussion of the DP problem from abstract to reality. Waterloo County pastors such as Reble and Lotz maintained their belief that the spiritual care of DPs needed to be understood as the most important issue when discussing immigration. They believed certain linguistic and cultural concessions should be made to the DPs in order to prevent them from joining the Missouri Synod or other Protestant bodies. While not an ideal situation, these concessions would allow ethnic elites like Reble to maintain their control over the DPs and increase the size of the Lutheran church. The DP pastors shared many of these same goals, and therefore maintained a pragmatic alliance with Reble and Lotz in

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763 CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, Investigations of Latvians in Mississippi, 28 June 1949.

764 CHI, EUA, Box 17, Latvian Mississippi Folder, G.H. Biar to H.A. Mayer, 10 August 1949.
these early years. However, BAM officials and pastors outside of Waterloo County did not always hold the same sympathetic approaches as Reble and Lotz. Local disputes in cities such Hamilton and Toronto inevitably involved the Canada Synod’s leadership in Waterloo County as Lutherans looked to them to help mediate their disagreements.

Congregational arguments typically focused on clashes between DPs intent on maintaining their ethnic identities and the German-Canadian pastors who hoped they would adopt the German-English culture of their church. These disputes forced Reble and Lotz to realize that the DP pastors they previously championed conceptualized their ethnicity as a secular and nationalistic identity that contradicted their own ethnicity. By the end of 1950, early advocates for DP pastors came to favour BAM’s more hardline integrationist approach. The “Skrodelis controversy” of 1949-1950 represents both a concrete example of the DP problem as well as demonstrating the ways in which German-Canadian Lutherans in Waterloo County conceptualized ethnicity differently than the recently arrived DPs.

Alfred Skrodelis, a Latvian DP pastor, arrived in Canada in September 1949. Prior to his arrival, Skrodelis ministered to a Lutheran congregation in Latvia before fleeing the country from Soviet persecution in 1944. He and his family fled to Marbug, Germany, where he spent the next several years acting as a pastor for other Latvian refugees who fled to Germany. Skrodelis was one of the first DP pastors to be accepted into the Canada Synod under the condition that he complete BAM’s mandated six-month internship program at a Canada Synod congregation. In the fall of 1949, BAM assigned Skrodelis to St. Paul’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hamilton, Ontario, because of the

765 For biographical information on Skrodelis see LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, St. Paul’s Newsletter, September 1949.
congregation’s growing Latvian population. The German language played a less important role at St. Paul’s than it did in congregations in Waterloo County. The congregation mostly spoke English by the 1940s and its membership roll shows a greater heterogeneity of German, Scottish, and English members than the predominantly German membership of Waterloo County congregations. The Reverend Fred Mueller, the pastor at St. Paul’s, similarly had greater involvement with secular and Anglo-Canadian groups and charities in Hamilton than his contemporaries in Waterloo County. Influenced by these secular connections, Mueller initially embraced the idea that he should help Skrodelis and his Latvian followers integrate with greater fervor than Reble, Lotz, and the other Waterloo County pastors. Prior to Skrodelis’s arrival, BAM officials made it clear to Mueller that the goal of his mentorship was to “absorb” Skrodelis and the Latvian DPs into the North American church structure and society. “We want [Skrodelis] to be impressed, however, with the importance of looking forward not to the establishment of a Latvian church,” they told Mueller, “but to their integration into a non-national church like yours. His chief purpose should be to minister the Gospel to the people in the way they best can be reached with the idea of fitting them for the church life of their new land.” They stressed that Skrodelis should communicate in English whenever possible and learn “our principles and methods of exercising stewardship so that he will see how churches attain and maintain self support.” BAM wanted the DPs to realize that they

766 LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.21, St. Paul’s Church Council Minutes, 4 April 1946; LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.21, St. Paul’s Church Council Minutes, 6 April 1949. LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.21, St. Paul’s Church Council Minutes, 1 September 1949
767 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Fred Mueller to H.R. Gerberding, 8 July 1949.
768 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Gerberding to Mueller, 2 September 1949.
could not rely on financial support from the state as they did in Europe. If DPs and their pastors wanted to practice their religion, they needed to do so by financing themselves.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Gerberding to Mueller, 2 September 1949.}

Skrodelis, however, did not quietly conform to Mueller and BAM’s expectations. Rather than encouraging the assimilation of Latvian DPs in Hamilton, Skrodelis actively worked towards creating an infrastructure that would allow their Latvian ethnicities to thrive. Skrodelis made very little effort to encourage St. Paul’s Latvian DPs to integrate into the congregation. Instead, Skrodelis began to canvass throughout Hamilton to encourage Latvian DPs to attend St. Paul’s. He visited other churches in Hamilton and told their Latvian DPs that they should start to attend St. Paul’s where he would preach to them in Latvian.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Mueller to Reble, 29 August 1949; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Alfred Skrodelis to Reble, 8 December 1949.} Skrodelis regularly preached in Latvian and even requested that the congregation offer a Latvian-language Sunday School in which to educate the congregation’s youth. Mueller interpreted Skrodelis’s actions as an attempt to operate within BAM’s restrictive framework by \textit{de facto} organizing a Latvian congregation within St. Paul’s. Skrodelis stated as much in December 1949. He believed that the Latvian DPs should continue to worship at St. Paul’s, but only if they received greater rights within the congregation.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 8 December 1949.} Skrodelis’s insistence on implementing Latvian-language services at St. Paul’s challenged BAM and Mueller’s authority. He essentially sought to replicate Latvian and European traditions and languages when BAM stressed complete integration into the German-English framework at St. Paul’s. In doing so, Skrodelis made a bid at becoming an ethnic elite in the Latvian DP community at the expense of Mueller’s leadership.
While Reble sympathetically tried to moderate Skrodelis’s behaviour in Hamilton, Mueller and BAM saw Skrodelis as the embodiment of their fears about DP pastors. Mueller “stated that the work was not progressing as it should…Skrodelis insists on a Latvian Sunday School, which we are against.” Mueller believed that Skrodelis was an “extreme nationalist” who continued to remind the Latvian DPs about their homeland rather than encouraging their integration into Canadian life. Skrodelis rejected Mueller’s attempt to “re-educate” him and viewed his assimilationist policies as an “insult” to both himself and St. Paul’s Latvian DP congregants. According to Skrodelis and his congregants, Mueller and BAM members acted as though they wanted him “to give up everything Latvian.” Mueller’s hostility prompted Skrodelis to inquire skeptically as to whether the Canada Synod’s goal was actually to serve the religious needs of the Latvian DPs, or whether the synod wanted to simply recruit enough DPs to “pay the church tax.” Skrodelis warned Reble that this attitude showed the Canada Synod worked “against them” and that “the Canadian church will remain strange to many of them” if the synod did not “take more into consideration the wants of the Latvian souls.” Mueller worried that Skrodelis’s passionate “nationalism” for the Latvian cause would slowly weaken his grip on the congregation. He confided to Reble that “soon, if not already, we have more Latvian members belonging to the congregation” than St. Paul’s Canadian-born populace. Accustomed to maintaining complete control of his

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772 LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.21, St. Paul’s Church Council Minutes, 17 November 1949.
773 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 18 April 1950.
774 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 18 April 1950.
775 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to A. Conrad, 9 February 1950.
776 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 13 October 1949.
777 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 13 October 1949.
778 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Mueller to Reble, 29 August 1949.
congregation, Mueller recognized that Skrodelis jeopardized his status as a pastor and ethnic elite.

The tensions between Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s congregants became so contentious that Mueller called an emergency meeting to discuss how to solve their “Latvian problem” in April 1950. Mueller proposed that the congregation vote on whether the Latvians should form a “separate and independent Latvian congregation in Hamilton” or “stay in St. Paul’s congregation,” and continue as a single congregation. Mueller intended the vote to be somewhat rhetorical. By putting this question to a democratic vote, Mueller hoped to gain the authority to stop Skrodelis’s constant lobbying for a separate congregation. In order to ensure the congregation overwhelmingly voted to “remain,” Mueller placed strict regulations on which Latvian members of the congregation could vote. He decided that only the Latvians who attended services regularly and made financial donations to the congregation could vote at the meeting.779 Skrodelis rejected such an obvious ploy to disenfranchise the majority of St. Paul’s Latvian members. Skrodelis pointed out that Mueller knew many of the Latvian DPs had sporadic church attendance and did not make financial contributions due to their refugee status.780 The strict regulations Mueller placed on voting convinced Skrodelis that the only way to ensure the Canada Synod would respect Latvian DPs was to “found real Latvian congregations” where Latvians could receive services in their mother tongue. “Nobody here asks for our opinion,” Skrodelis stated.781 He told both the HMC and his Latvian followers alike that he “shall not be neutral any more” and that he planned on

779 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 18 April 1950.
780 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 18 April 1950.
781 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Hoyer, 15 May 1950.
uniting the Latvians in Hamilton into a single congregation. This, he hoped, would help them “defend against the undeserved offenses” that Mueller and his policies created.782

Mueller subsequently mailed out voting cards to just over three hundred Latvian DPs associated with St. Paul’s. Skrodelis urged the Latvians not to fill out these voting cards in an effort to arrange a larger meeting where they could debate the issue of congregational autonomy. Regardless, out of the three hundred Latvians who received voting cards, approximately half replied. Out of those that replied, one hundred and twenty voted to stay with St. Paul’s. Mueller interpreted the results as a clear indication the Latvian DPs wished to remain with St. Paul’s, while Skrodelis was quick to point out that those who abstained from voting did so out of his own urging. Skrodelis also believed that the vote did not fully represent Latvian feeling in Hamilton. He argued that the voting cards should also have been mailed to Latvian members of the Missouri Synod, for they would likely join an independent Latvian congregation associated with the Canada Synod if one were to form. Thus, Skrodelis viewed Mueller’s victory as illegitimate.783 Skrodelis accused Mueller of trying to “swallow” the Latvian DPs into St. Paul’s rather than letting them form their own congregation. At the height of the controversy, Skrodelis went so far as to criticize the Canada Synod for acting “intolerant against the national groups” of Europe.784 Skrodelis’s decision to protest the vote ensured ethnicity and language remained a contentious issue at St. Paul’s, despite Mueller’s best efforts.

On 30 June 1950, Reble and Lotz travelled from Waterloo County to Hamilton to meet with the Latvians associated with St. Paul’s. Prior to attending the meeting, BAM

782 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 18 April 1950.
783 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 2 June 1950.
784 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 2 June 1950.
officials told the HMC that they should continue to discourage DPs from forming their own congregations. After all, “the D.P.’s are not in exile, but are resettled from exile” and therefore should not maintain their own national churches.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Hoyer to Reble, 23 May 1950.} Approximately fifty Latvians attended the meeting and listened to Reble explain to them why “the best plan for St. Paul’s, Hamilton under present conditions, is, for the new Canadians holding membership in St. Paul’s to remain members there.”\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Mueller to Reble, 15 June 1950; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Reble to Gerberding, 3 July 1950} Reble explained to the Latvian DPs “the full importance and financial responsibility” of establishing their own congregation in order to persuade them to remain at St. Paul’s.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Reble to Skrodelis, 13 June 1950.} Skrodelis attended the meeting and continued to threaten to form a separate congregation, despite Reble’s advice. He claimed that he controlled a “Latvian Association” that was prepared to form a separate Latvian congregation in Hamilton. This proved false, however, as the so-called “Latvian Association” consisted of Latvian DPs of various religious backgrounds that had no interest getting involved in a strictly Lutheran matter. After Skrodelis’s outburst, Mueller and St. Paul’s church council declared that they wanted “no further dealings” with him and informed him that he had “no status whatsoever as far as the affairs of St. Paul’s Lutheran Church are concerned.”\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Mueller to Reble, 15 June 1950.} The HMC responded by transferring Skrodelis to Montreal to work among the city’s Latvians, and called a young Latvian DP pastor from Kitchener to work among the Latvians in Hamilton.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to W.A. Mehlenbacher, 27 November 1950.}

The June meeting further soured relations between the Skrodelis-Latvian and Mueller-Canada Synod factions. Previously, Skrodelis believed that only Mueller and St. Paul’s church council wished to assimilate the Latvians. After Reble’s intervention,
however, he started to see Reble and the HMC as agents of assimilation as well. In a letter following the meeting, he accused Reble of trying “to take away at once everything latvian (sic), to deny it… I get the impression that you and the HMC would by any means achieve” Latvian assimilation at St. Paul’s. Reble left the meeting disillusioned with the whole “Latvian problem” as well. He confided to BAM officials that he believed “sooner or later separate congregations in Hamilton, Toronto and Montreal will be the best solution. They simply refuse to lose their identity. And we cannot force a group of 400, 500 and even 800 into assimilation.” Reble’s exasperated response marked a decided shift from his earlier accommodating attitudes towards the DPs. The controversy over Skrodelis demonstrated to Reble that the Latvians at St. Paul’s continued to privilege their Latvian identity over their shared identity as Lutherans. By continuing to advocate for services based in the Latvian language, Skrodelis proved to the Canada Synod that his primary interest was preserving a Latvian identity at the expense of Lutheran unity.

Reble’s concerns proved correct. Latvian DPs continued to advocate for their own congregation throughout 1950, even though the HMC relocated Skrodelis to a congregation in Montreal. One Latvian DP wrote to Reble in order to demonstrate that the controversy at St. Paul’s was “not a personal quarrel between two Lutheran Pastors in Hamilton.” Instead, it was a fundamental misunderstanding between the Latvian DPs and members of the Canada Synod. He explained that Latvians did not “belong to the category of ordinary emigrants” but needed to be thought of as DPs. “An emigrant,” he explained “has voluntarily left ones native country in order to go to some other land.” On the other hand, DPs “have either been expelled forcibly from their country or they

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790 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, 3 July 1950.
791 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Reble to Gerberding, 3 July 1950.
have been forced to leave it because of war or political terror in order to save themselves and their families from imminent death. They have not sought for better conditions of life but only for temporary refuge in an alien country.”

Thus, Mueller’s emphasis on integration made little sense to the Latvians who still conceptualized themselves as living in “exile” rather than living in Canada permanently. Such sentiments made even less sense to Reble. Although a first generation immigrant as well, Reble saw himself as a German Canadian, and not a German immigrant living in exile. His German ethnicity remained an important part of his Lutheranism, and did not have the same political or nationalistic connotations that the Latvians placed on their language. The DP appeals to their former Latvian citizenship as a reason for rights within the Canada Synod held little weight with Reble and the HMC.

By September 1950, nearly two hundred Latvian members at St. Paul’s petitioned the HMC to establish their own congregation in Hamilton. Their insistence slowly but surely drained St. Paul’s church council of any previous resolve about remaining as a single congregation. Reble visited St. Paul’s in October in an effort to boost their morale and reaffirm his position that the Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s remain in a single congregation. His speech had little impact, however, and the church council voted unanimously in favour of letting the Latvians form their own congregation without any financial support from St. Paul’s. The Latvian DPs also succeeded in forming the Canadian Latvian Federation (CLF) just a few months later. They elected Skrodelis “as leader of the spiritual care for all the Latvians in Canada” and hoped to work with the

792 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Peteris Kikauka to Reble, 19 December 1950.
793 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 14 September 1950.
794 LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.21, St. Paul’s Church Council Minutes, 22 October 1950.
Canadian Lutheran World Relief to provide advice on Latvian immigration to Canada. Upon hearing this news, Reble immediately wrote to BAM to describe how “uneasy about the whole Latvian situation in Canada” he had become. He worried about what powers Skrodelis believed he had, even though the Canada Synod had yet to recognize the CLF in any meaningful way. Reble believed the creation of the council, and Skrodelis’s election to a place of prominence, demonstrated the level of concern Latvian leaders had for the DPs, as well as their intent to control how the Canada Synod managed them. Despite their best efforts, Skrodelis managed to position himself as an ethnic elite who could challenge the Canada Synod’s authority. Reble stated that Skrodelis’s promotion “reveals that they do not, by far, understand and comprehend the position and situation in which they find themselves as new Canadians. Their attitude is rather assuming. They need to and must be advised and directed; but whether they will accept advice and direction remains to be seen.” Reble agreed to take Latvian advice on resettling DP families, but rejected their application to join the CLWR. He noted that only organized church bodies could participate in the CLWR, not ethnic associations.

While Reble’s initial stance in 1948 favoured creating DP congregations, he became increasingly disillusioned by the nationalistic attitudes of Skrodelis and the other Latvian DPs by the end of 1950. The “Skrodelis controversy” demonstrated to BAM and Canada Synod leaders alike that the Latvian DPs offered a conception of ethnicity that differed greatly from their own.

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795 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Reble, Clifford Monk, and Rex Schneider, 7 December 1950; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Reble to Paul Kirsch, 8 December 1950.

796 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Reble to Monk, 12 December 1950.
Jacobi’s Finnish Experiment

Lutheran DPs and immigrants continued to arrive in even greater numbers throughout the 1950s. Their numerical strength, along with precedents established by the Latvians at St. Paul’s, ensured that Missouri and Canada Synod leaders often conceded greater rights to DPs throughout the 1950s.\(^\text{797}\) Despite the growing rise of “DP congregations” during the 1950s, leaders in both synods still expressed concern over the challenges recent immigrants posed to their synods. They remained skeptical as to whether DPs truly practiced Lutheranism or whether they just used synod resources to help maintain their ethnic communities. Synod leaders accepted German DPs as they easily conformed to the German-English culture of their churches, but other European DPs proved harder to accept. Rather than try to directly force and constrain the DPs as they had done in cases like St. Paul’s, synod leaders considered a new solution to address immigrant integration. Instead of looking towards Europe or DP pastors to meet immigrant needs, synod leaders started to promote young Canadian and American-born pastors who advocated similarly hybrid conceptions of ethnicity. In doing so, they avoided relying too heavily on DP pastors who sought to maintain ethnic identities for nationalistic rather than religious reasons. Synod leaders looked to this new generation of pastors to help them solve the “new Canadian” and “DP problem” in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Latvian victory at St. Paul’s succeeded in creating a precedent for DPs to argue for their own congregations moving into the 1950s. In early 1951, the Canada

\(^{797}\) In 1954, Mueller recognized that the Skrodelis controversy indeed created a precedent that other congregations subsequently followed. See LA, ESF, Box 4, Folder 3.8.22, Mueller to W.A. Michel, 21 June 1954.
Synod and BAM created two distinct Latvian congregations. The Latvians of St. Paul’s succeeded in gaining their congregation, as did the Latvian DPs in Montreal, led by Gaudins.\textsuperscript{798} By the spring of 1951, the HMC started receiving petitions from Latvian and Estonian groups in other Ontario cities petitioning for their own congregations as well. Raudsepp, emboldened by the Latvian victories, told synod officials that they must continue to let Latvian and Estonian DPs form their own congregations. Nothing, Raudsepp argued, could guarantee DP church attendance “except a service in [their] mother tongue.”\textsuperscript{799} Regardless, the Missouri and Canada Synods still expressed uncertainty about the rise in DP congregations and preferred DPs to instead integrate into their English or German churches. “While we are eager to serve these people,” Mayer stated, “it is not our intention to establish foreign-tongue congregations but rather to serve them in their own tongue until they may be integrated into our existing congregations.”\textsuperscript{800}

Yet, DP congregations enjoyed greater rights in the 1950s, however reluctantly. The financial concerns surrounding the new Canadian or DP problem continued to shape how the Missouri and Canada Synods interacted with the new DP congregations. Rather than forming separate Latvian and Estonian congregations, the HMC and HMB tried to encourage these separate DP groups to worship together in newly purchased churches.\textsuperscript{801} In 1953, for instance, Mayer rejected funding for a DP congregation in Montreal in favour of making the various Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian DPs worship in a single church. In doing so, Mayer believed “your district will have a freer hand in the establishment of a congregation with real Canadians later on when you are ready to

\begin{itemize}
\item[798] John Reble, “From the President’s Office,” \textit{Canada Lutheran}, March 1951, p. 3.
\item[800] CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP & Refugees Folder, H.A. Mayer to District Presidents, 28 September 1950.
\item[801] LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 6 March 1951
\end{itemize}
launch upon that program.” 802 After all, Mayer believed strongly that “our greatest opportunities, however, do not lie with the foreign element but with the real Canadians. We are just now beginning to make our influence felt. This is the time to become aggressively active.” 803 Only by incorporating DPs into Canada’s English-speaking congregations, he argued, could the synod “build solidly for the future.” 804 The HMC closely monitored DP activity and permitted DPs “to organize into a separate and distinct parish” on the condition that they did not abuse their “aid from the Canada Synod, or the Board.” When approving a joint Latvian-Estonian congregation in Toronto, HMC and BAM members made it clear that they were not responsible for “uncontrollable problems” such as “national, economic depression, the return of the members of the congregations” to Europe or other movements. 805 In fact, economic uncertainty and mistrust was the very reason why the HMC recommended “that the two congregations be incorporated” into one joint Latvian-Estonian congregation. 806 Synod leadership also maintained the right to monitor languages in which these new congregations offered services. They reminded the Latvian and Estonian congregations that they needed to offer German-language services if German DPs subsequently joined their churches. 807 Thus, synod leaders tried to maintain some control over shaping the German-English culture of DP congregations, even as DPs increasingly gained more rights within each synod.

802 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, H.A. Mayer to Erdman, 15 January 1953.
803 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Assistance to the Ontario District in behalf of Baltic D.P.’s in Toronto, 15 June 1951.
804 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Assistance to the Ontario District in behalf of Baltic D.P.’s in Toronto, 15 June 1951.
805 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 9 October 1951.
806 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 14 February 1952.
807 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.3, Home Missions Committee of the Canada Synod Minutes, 26 January 1954.
The creation of new DP congregations provoked a strong backlash within each synod that largely lay dormant in the 1940s. Critics of DP congregations continued to condemn the alternative model of ethnicity that DPs practiced that seemed to place citizenship and nationalism above Lutheranism. Streufert, for instance wondered whether the DPs who requested funds from the Missouri Synod were actually concerned with “spiritual care” among their people. He confessed that “I fear after the ‘fish and loaves’ are distributed ‘the holy desire’ with the majority has vanished.” Skeptical pastors worried that DPs wanted to maintain their language for “nationalistic rather than spiritualistic” reasons. Thus, when DPs petitioned the Missouri and Canada Synods to form their own congregations, pastors often “tried to impress upon this delegation that we are not interested in their cultural aspirations nor would we be inclined to serve them merely as a language group, but if they were genuinely interested in establishing a congregation that are interested in receiving ministrations of the Word and Sacrament, then we would stand behind them.” While not directly opposed to the DPs maintaining ethnic identities outside of the church, these pastors worried that DPs were using the church to fulfill ethnic rather than spiritual aspirations. “By all means let them keep the national festivals of their homeland and preserve their traditions,” an editor of the Canada Lutheran wrote, “but let the cause of Christ come first, let the faith take precedence to nationalism.” DPs imbedded language with nationalistic meaning, and ignored the spiritual reasons that members of the Missouri and Canada Synods continued to speak German.

808 CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP Work (Canada) Folder, Streufert to Eifert, 11 December 1950.
809 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Anttila to Jacobi, 12 March 1957.
810 CHI, EUA, Box 8, DP Work (Canada) Folder, Eifert to H.A. Mayer, 6 December 1950.
811 “The Editor’s Corner,” Canada Lutheran, April 1956, p. 4.
The hostility in which some German-Canadian and German-American members of the synods treated DPs contributed to Latvian and Estonian pastors often feeling unwelcome in their new home. DP pastors that expressed interest in working within their ethnic group continued to face criticism from synod leaders throughout the 1950s. Upon graduating from Concordia Seminary, one Latvian pastor hoped that he would be sent to South America rather than remain in the United States. He believed “that there is little opportunity that he would be employed because it is our practice to integrate the other language groups into existing congregations.”

Missouri’s efforts to integrate DP pastors into German-English work forced particularly “nationalistic” pastors to look outside the United States for support. Even those who continued to work within the synods faced close scrutiny. Reble, for instance, insisted on “fact checking” every article that Skrodelis attempted to publish in order to ensure that he did not continue to advocate for an independent Latvian church in Canada. Skrodelis took offense at such attempts to “censor” him and subsequently refused to publish any more articles with the Canada Synod until “I am looked at as a christian (sic) brother and trusted by full confidence.”

DP pastors could only gain the confidence of synod leaders once they showed concern for Lutheranism outside of their own immediate ethnic group. Erdman, for instance, complimented the “very good development” among two DP pastors in Toronto because they showed signs “that they are thinking more and more along the line of Lutheranism as a whole in Toronto” rather than just showing concern for their particular ethnic group.

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812 CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Interview with Latvians in Indianapolis, 13 July 1950.
813 An Estonian DP pastor was also subjected to this vetting process after publishing articles that advocated for independent Estonian congregations. See LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Hoyer to Skrodelis, 2 May 1950; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Hoyer, 4 May 1950.
814 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Erdman to H.A. Mayer, 22 February 1952.
If Latvian and Estonian pastors could not be relied upon to advance the interests of the synod, synod leaders needed to find a new solution as to who would minister to recent immigrants. Instead of promoting the work of DP pastors who defined their ethnicity by attachments to their country of origin, synod leaders started to promote North American-born members of their synod who had other connections to Europe. Albert Jacobi, who succeeded Reble as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, first proposed the synod to undertake a new “experiment” in DP work by altering their approach to ministering to Finnish Lutheran immigrants. Rather than relying exclusively upon Finnish itinerant pastors, Jacobi proposed that the synod continue to supply a minimal number of itinerant Finnish pastors while increasing their number of Canadian-born pastors. Thus, Finns would be exposed to both the Finnish and English languages simultaneously. Few pastors in the Canada Synod, however, spoke enough Finnish for this experiment to be carried out with any success. The Canada Synod’s leadership therefore called upon young members of Finnish congregations to attend the Waterloo Lutheran Seminary to receive a proper Lutheran education that could allow them to return to these congregations as pastors. Canada Synod pastors rallied behind Jacobi’s approach and encouraged “our Finnish brethren to send some of their fine young men to our Seminary for training for full-time service in the Church. This is a must if the work is to survive.” “Bi-lingual men,” Jacobi argued, “are our only hope” if the Canada Synod wanted to retain the loyalty of Finnish immigrants without inspiring the same sort of DP revolt that

815 LA, ESF, Folder 50.10.1.6.1, Canada Synod Home Missions Committee Minutes, 3 February 1955; LA, ESF, Folder 50.10.1.6.1, Canada Synod Home Missions Committee Minutes, 23 February 1956.
816 Minutes of the 90th Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 1952, p.76.
817 Minutes of the 93rd Annual Convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Canada, 1955, p.131
Skrodelis started at St. Paul’s. Jacobi essentially hoped to apply the synod’s hybrid model of ethnic elites to solve the linguistic and ethnic difficulties of DP work. Promoting pastors with a similar conception of ethnicity, Jacobi hoped, would help DPs reconcile their ethnicity, nationality, and language in ways that no longer generated difficulties in the synod.

The Reverend Alex Koski’s brief career in the Canada Synod conveyed the hopes synod leaders placed on pastors who mimicked their own roles as ethnic elites. Koski conformed to the Canada Synod’s German-English model but with a Finnish, rather than German, perspective. Born in Michigan to Finnish parents, Koski spoke fluent English and Finnish. Throughout the early 1950s, Koski worked as a pastor in Timmins, Ontario, and fulfilled Jacobi’s “experiment” by preaching in both Finnish and English to the area’s Lutheran population. Unlike other DP pastors, Koski’s status as a second-generation immigrant ensured that he never attempted to organize a congregation outside of the Canada Synod’s jurisdiction. While Koski therefore seemed to successfully implement Jacobi’s vision for DP work, he left Timmins in 1956 to pursue work as pastor in Minnesota. Jacobi lamented the Canada Synod’s loss publicly. “Pastor Koski though always conscious of the need for a Finish (sic) ministry among the Finns of Ontario was not unmindful of the equally important need of an English ministry among the Canadian born Finns. He was a champion of the Gospel in Finnish for those whose language was Finnish…He believed every Church was for all Christians regardless of national background.”

Jacobi went on to praise Koski as he “deplored nationalism in all its petty

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818 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Jacobi to Anttila, 15 March 1957.
819 Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” Canada Lutheran, March 1956, p. 6
forms.\textsuperscript{820} Although never expressed outright, Jacobi hinted that some of Koski’s DP congregants resented his insistence that he conducted bilingual instead of exclusively Finnish sermons. “For this deep rooted conviction,” Jacobi concluded, “he was not always understood or accepted by the very people he was seeking to serve.”\textsuperscript{821} Unlike Skrodelis’s positive relationship with Latvian DPs at St. Paul’s, Koski’s adherence to the Canada Synod’s model of ethnicity inevitably alienated his DP congregants who wished to use the church for primarily national reasons.

Jacobi continued to favour pastors born in North America when he looked for Koski’s replacement. He subsequently hired John Wetzel, an American, to fill Koski’s vacancy. Wetzel was born and educated in the United States and could speak English, German, and Finnish as a result of his mixed German-Finnish heritage. Wetzel therefore grew-up speaking all three languages, and even discussed possibly doing graduate work in Helsinki, Finland, to become even more proficient in the Finnish language.\textsuperscript{822} “I believe you to be the kind of person we seek for the Finnish parishes,” Jacobi informed him. “So often we have to depend upon Finland for pastors for these fields with the result that little progress is realized in implementing the kind of ministry a Canadian Parish should have.”\textsuperscript{823} Wetzel’s fluency in both North American, German, and Finnish cultures made him an ideal candidate to enforce Jacobi’s model of ethnicity that emphasized the spiritual utility of other languages rather than the “nationalistic” reasons of the DPs. Jacobi firmly believed that hiring pastors who balanced their ethnicity, religion, and

\textsuperscript{820} Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” \textit{Canada Lutheran}, March 1956, p. 6
\textsuperscript{821} Albert Jacobi, “From the President’s Office,” \textit{Canada Lutheran}, March 1956, p. 6
\textsuperscript{822} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, John Wetzel to Jacobi, 13 January 1960.
\textsuperscript{823} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Jacobi to Wetzel, 19 January 1960.
nationality in the same manner German-Canadian pastors did would help solve the contentious DP problem.

Although Jacobi’s experiment seemed to offer a solution to the new Canadian and DP problem, language continued to challenge the synod’s German-English framework throughout the 1950s. In 1956, Irma Lehmann, the synod’s port worker in Halifax, realized the synod’s emphasis on speaking English and German alienated Lutheran DPs from other ethnic backgrounds. Upon their arrival in Halifax, Lehmann distributed various promotional literature to encourage Lutheran DPs to attend Canada Synod congregations. Part of the synod’s “welcome package” included what became colloquially known as the “little blue sheets.” These small leaflets, written in the German language, provided a list of Lutheran churches that DPs could attend. Other material included handbooks and welcome brochures that introduced the immigrants to Canada, also published exclusively in English and German. However, as immigration from Baltic and Scandinavian countries increased, Lehmann encountered more Lutheran DPs who did not speak either of these languages. Lehmann noted that some DPs “seem to object to the German print” on the synod’s promotional material which therefore proved useless to them.\textsuperscript{824} The fact that the “blue sheets” listing Lutheran congregations were printed in German demonstrates the synod leadership’s assumption that incoming DPs would fit easily into their German-English framework. Berner, now working as Jacobi’s assistant, skeptically agreed to print the blue sheets in English as well, but proved slightly more accommodating with the general promotional material. He suggested that the synod print the word “Welcome” in various European languages on the front, with the remainder of

\textsuperscript{824} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, Irma J. Lehmann to Norman Berner, 8 May 1956.
the material in English.\textsuperscript{825} Berner’s solution was not to include more European languages, therefore, but to increase the number of English-language materials. German and English would remain the languages of the church, and immigrants were expected to select one of the two beyond their token welcome.

Synod leaders continued to monitor the linguistic habits of DPs once they entered their congregations. In 1959, a newly formed Finnish-language congregation in Toronto printed its constitution in simple colloquial Finnish. The congregation’s pastor intended to rewrite the constitution in formal Finnish, but encountered resistance from the synod leadership. Jacobi prevented the pastor from writing the constitution in formal Finnish due to the “danger that the real meaning of the English version is not conveyed in a Finnish translation.” He therefore suggested keeping the constitution as is, lest it depart “from the real meaning of the English” copy.\textsuperscript{826} While Jacobi therefore supported letting the Finnish congregation have a copy in Finnish, the synod only recognized the English constitution as the “final authority.”\textsuperscript{827}

Jacobi’s model of hybridity continued to gain currency among Canada Synod pastors into the 1960s. In 1961, Berner noted that the numerous languages spoken by Canada Synod members constituted a “constant problem besetting the synod.” Yet the Canada Synod’s hybridity prevented critical members of the synod like Berner from fully condemning the DP’s insistence that they maintain their languages. Berner recognized that the DP desire to speak their language mirrored the Canada Synod’s “predecessors in

\textsuperscript{825} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.16.6, Berner to Earl Treusch, 11 May 1956.
\textsuperscript{826} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Hakkinen to Jacobi, 17 March 1959; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Jacobi to Hakkinen, 20 March 1959.
\textsuperscript{827} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Leslie Lurvey to Albert Lotz, 18 June 1964.
the earlier decades” as well.\textsuperscript{828} Herbert Hartig, another young pastor in Waterloo County, similarly recognized that many “Canadian-born” members of the synod “have come through situations of ethnic loneliness such as [the DPs] may be facing.”\textsuperscript{829} The importance synod leaders placed on speaking whatever language was necessary in order to promote Lutheranism ensured that even critical members of the synod like Berner recognized that “the synod nevertheless seeks to minister in the languages that will best ‘preserve and extend the Gospel’ for all.”\textsuperscript{830} While pastors could sympathize with the tensions that accompanied speaking several languages in Canada, they ultimately recognized that this desire could not come at the expense of their spirituality. DPs could maintain an ethnic identity if they so wished, but they needed to identify themselves as Lutherans first and foremost. “The new Canadian,” Hartig argued, must be “properly welcomed into the fold…an ethnic group shall not be regarded as a ‘foreign breed!’ We are one by faith even when heritage and culture differ.”\textsuperscript{831} Such declarations offered an idealistic view of how the DPs conceptualized themselves.\textsuperscript{832} While DP congregations throughout the synod still fought to preserve their languages, pastors like Hartig hoped they would one day embrace their Lutheran faith over their ethnic culture.

The attachment certain DP congregations displayed towards their homelands continued to pose problems for the Canada Synod into the 1960s. Most notably, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland remained active in trying to maintain a relationship with Finnish congregations in North America. Unlike the Latvian or Estonian national churches, Finnish Lutherans had a strong organizational presence in North

\textsuperscript{832} On DP identity, see Pascal Maeder, \textit{Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada} (Gottigen: V&R unipress, 2011), 220-222, 232.
America starting in the mid-nineteenth century. Their churches and seminaries maintained financial, cultural, and theological connections to Finland throughout the resulting decades that tied their pastors and churches much more closely to Finland than other North American Lutheran bodies. While the Missouri Synod developed its own theological texts, for instance, Finnish Lutherans still looked to Finland for spiritual guidance. Consequently, Finnish DPs and church leaders from Finland alike were in a stronger position to protest the Canada Synod’s dominance over Lutheran affairs in Ontario than their Latvian or Estonian counterparts. Although the Canada Synod preferred to work with pastors like Wetzel who conceptualized ethnicity the same way they did, the Church of Finland continued to place pressure on the Canada Synod to accept more itinerant pastors from Finland. Finnish representatives also hoped that their work in Canada would result in more Finnish DP congregations affiliating with the Church of Finland rather than a North American Lutheran body.

In 1965, the leaders of the Canada Synod and the Church of Finland reached a tentative agreement that they hoped would clarify any ambiguities about whether Finnish congregations fell under the jurisdiction of the Canada Synod or the Church of Finland. The final agreement stated that the Church of Finland would allow Finnish congregations to join the Canada Synod and grant the “ecclesiastical and shepherding functions” of the church firmly to the Canada Synod. In return, however, the Canada Synod conceded that the Church of Finland could sponsor guest speakers and festivals, send pastors to work in Canada, and publish Finnish language Bibles and newsletters. Finnish pastors, while welcome to periodically perform Finnish-language services in Canada, could only

834 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Raymond W. Wargelin to Reuben A. Lundeen, 23 July 1965.
do so on the condition that pastors spend “at least two semesters of study” in North America and spoke English proficiently.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Record of the Consultation between Bishop Eero Lehtimen, Presidents of the Synods, and the Executive Committee Members of the Suomi Conference, LCA, 25 June 1965.} Although the agreement awarded more power to the Finns and DPs than the Canada Synod leaders wished, it did grant them control over Finnish congregations in Canada Synod territory. More importantly, it allowed the synod’s German-English structure to continue relatively unchallenged. The stipulations of the 1965 agreement confined Finnish-language activities to the strictly theological, thereby solidifying the connection between ethnicity and religion Canada Synod leaders felt most comfortable with.

The 1965 agreement received its first real test in late 1966 at the behest of the Reverend Leslie Lurvey. Lurvey worked at Toronto’s Agricola Lutheran Church, a Finnish-language congregation composed primarily of Finnish immigrants. As Lurvey was born in the United States to Finnish parents, he spoke Finnish fluently and received training at the Finnish-language Suomi Seminary in Michigan. He practiced the Canada Synod’s model of ethnicity, albeit with emphasis on preserving Lutheranism’s Finnish instead of German traditions. In December of 1966, Lurvey informed the various synod leaders in Canada that he planned on sponsoring Urpo Vainio, a longtime Finnish itinerant pastor, to do several weeks of mission work among Finns that did not have a regular pastor.\footnote{LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Lurvey to Lotz, Otto Olson, John Zimmerman, 15 December 1966.} Lurvey’s proposal provoked a backlash from the Canadian Lutheran leadership that highlighted the tenuous nature of the 1965 agreement. Otto Olson Jr., the president of the Central Canada Synod, replied that he appreciated Lurvey’s “Christian concern” for the Finnish DPs, but believed sending an itinerant pastor would be “unrealistic, and that it is poor stewardship of God’s money to try to reach them with the
Gospel in this manner.”\textsuperscript{837} His past experience work with Finnish DPs suggested that itinerant pastors had very little success in organizing dispersed populations into stable congregations which, in his mind, should continue to be the goal of the Canada Synod’s work. Olson furthermore believed that many Finns in Western Canada had a strong knowledge of the English language, negating any need for a Finnish-speaking itinerant pastor. Sponsoring Vainio, he believed, would only give “the impression…that they are still a part of the Lutheran Church in Finland.”\textsuperscript{838} John Zimmerman, the President of the Western Canada Synod, concurred. He confessed that he “was somewhat perturbed and uncertain” about Lurvey’s proposal. Zimmerman believed that the plan seemed “slightly presumptuous, rather like a neighbouring pastor announcing that he is going to start calling in your parish.” If Vainio actually did conduct a missionary tour, Zimmerman promised that he would examine his report “with a critical eye and no request will go to the Church of Finland from our Synod for an itinerant pastor unless there is ample evidence of the need” for one.\textsuperscript{839} Regardless of the 1965 agreement, Canadian-born pastors continued to see itinerant or DP pastors as a threat to their jurisdiction and authority. They represented a continued link with a European homeland rather than an effort to identify as Lutherans alongside their Canadian brethren.

Lurvey responded to his colleagues’ criticism by advocating for Vainio’s work in the language of ethnicity that members of the Canada Synod were comfortable with. Lurvey readily admitted that “these people could very well be served in English.” However, he urged his peers to understand the situation of first generation Finnish DPs. “Imagine if you will the feeling of the immigrant hearing an English sermon when all his

\textsuperscript{837} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Olsen to Lurvey, 23 December 1966.
\textsuperscript{838} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Olsen to Lurvey, 23 December 1966.
\textsuperscript{839} LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Zimmerman to Lurvey, 29 December 1966.
life he has heard the Gospel preached in Finnish. There is a certain theological vocabulary that must first be learned before the message breaks through….We who have ‘the gift of tongues’ feel that we have something to offer these people not only basically for their spiritual well-being but also for their mental well-being. To speak another language is a gift of the Spirit, not to be regarded lightly. Its use, too, is a stewardship." Like other Canada Synod pastors who supported German-language services as a part of their ethnic traditions, Lurvey reminded his peers that “our Lutheran church has made its beginnings in the New World in the many languages of immigrants.” “Seminaries and colleges that now serve millions with great blessings were begun in these languages,” he continued. “I cannot forget the fact that I found my Savior in a college founded by Finns. Our request to help the Western Finns comes in the same spirit, although in a much later setting.”

Just as his German-Canadian colleagues drew on their own immigrant pasts to advocate assisting German DPs, Lurvey drew on his own Finnish roots to help recently arrived Finns. A Finnish representative also attempted to calm the Canadian Lutherans’ fears. He reminded all the parties involved that financing future mission work among the Finns would be decided by “sociological data gathered in a reliable manner” by Vainio. National sentiment, he promised, would not guide the relationship between Lutherans in Canada and Finland. Although the 1965 agreement gave the appearance of religious cooperation, ethnic animosities still strongly governed the feelings of both Canadian and Finnish Lutherans.

840 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Lurvey to Olson, 29 December 1966.
841 LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.1, Lurvey to Olson, 29 December 1966.
Conclusion

The influx of Lutheran DPs in the postwar period made it easy for Jacobi to recognize the Canada Synod as a “Church of Many Nations” by 1960. Jacobi’s celebratory tone, however, masked the controversies that accompanied confronting the DP problem. Synod leaders and pastors expected Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants to conform to the hybrid German-English traditions of their churches and adopt an approach towards their ethnic identities that mirrored their own. Yet, DPs and their pastors defied these expectations and staunchly advocated for greater linguistic and congregational rights within the Missouri and Canada Synods despite their minority status. They did not do so out of a desire to maintain their faith, but rather out of a political desire to remain associated with their European homes and an unwillingness to recognize their American and Canadian circumstances. The secular and nationalistic nature of their ethnic identities as well as their dismissive attitudes towards their new North American community ensured that their German-American and German-Canadian coreligionists opposed their desire to maintain this form of ethnicity.

In articulating their opposition to DP pastors like Skrodelis, members of the Missouri and Canada Synods simultaneously gave voice to their own conceptions of ethnicity. Unlike DP advocates, they saw their German ethnicity as an identity that did not conflict with their Canadian and American nationalities. They continued to speak German as a religious calling that helped them remain true to their Lutheran teachings and reach their synods’ German membership. Their German ethnicities did not fade

843 LA, ESF, 11 Lutheran Church in America, Folder 11.6.6.4, Minutes of the Home Missions Committee, 13 January 1960.
during the war or the postwar period, but rather continued to find expression in opposition to the “nationalistic” ethnic traditions of a new generation of Baltic and Scandinavian DPs. The contentious relationship between German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans and Baltic and Scandinavian DPs illustrates the enduring role ethnicity played in shaping the Missouri and Canada Synods in the decades following the Second World War. For German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, the 1940s and 1950s did not represent a deterioration of their ethnic identities. Rather, ethnicity and language remained dominant factors in who did and did not belong in the Missouri and Canada Synods.
Chapter 7: Pioneers and Prophets: German Lutheran Participation in Cultural and Commemorative Events in the Postwar Era

Postwar immigration and relief work in Germany created avenues for the German Lutheran communities St. Louis and Waterloo County to mend the wounds from the Second World War. Cultural and commemorative events were yet another opportunity for German Lutheran communities to find common ground after wartime controversies. As historian Frances Swyripa argues, commemorative acts allowed immigrants to “explain and justify who they were but also to argue for their uniqueness and importance.” This chapter studies several cultural acts as yet another opportunity to examine how German Lutherans constructed and articulated their ethnic identities. It details several war memorials constructed by German Lutherans following the war, as well as the Missouri Synod’s centennial anniversary in 1947. Throughout these and other events, German Lutherans valorized their nineteenth century ancestors as symbols of their German ethnicity. They commemorated their ethnic past by recounting North American moments in history, rather than events associated with their German homeland. They did not commemorate nineteenth century German military victories or politicians as previous generations of German immigrants did, but rather engaged in commemorative activities that paid homage to their immigrant ancestors in North America. As a result, this chapter argues that German Lutheran commemorative acts were based on their hybrid German-Canadian and German-American identities. Their commemorative events

followed North American histories by placing an emphasis on “loyal pioneers” and their participation in the Second World War. Unlike their Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American neighbours, however, they did not participate in these events as an expression of mainstream Canadian and American nationalism. Their commemorative acts focused on specifically German and Lutheran figures in order to address wartime tensions in their communities and as a way to reinforce their ethnic and religious identities. Thus, German Lutherans engaged in commemorative activities that highlighted their hybrid identities by balancing distinctly ethnic and religious events within a narrative of pioneering familiar to most Anglo-Canadians and Anglo-Americans.

Whiteness informed how German Lutherans celebrated their past. As whites, German Lutherans could participate in broader settler colonial narratives advanced by Anglo-Canadians and Americans that commemorated European explorers, nineteenth century pioneers, and the modern nation state. German Canadians, for instance, participated in Expo 67, a national celebration that commemorated Canadian Confederation. Throughout the 1960s Canada Synod members capitalized on funding from Expo 67 to commemorate European explorers Jens Munk and Rasmus Jensen as the first Lutherans to touch North American soil. Members of the Missouri Synod meanwhile began to commemorate German Americans in Missouri that fought for the Union during the Civil War. These broad stories were completely inaccessible to racialized people.

Japanese Americans and Canadians, for instance, could not claim the title of “pioneer” or trace their community’s origin back to a seventeenth century European explorer. Thus, German Lutherans did not celebrate an ethnic culture that was anti-racist, nor did their cultural acts seek to address the inequalities other racial groups encountered. Their ethnic culture worked comfortably within the exclusionary Canadian and American nationalism of the postwar era due to their whiteness.

**Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Anti-War Sentiment**

Although the immediate threats of internment and nativist discrimination ended with the war’s conclusion in 1945, negative perceptions of Germans as disloyal or unpatriotic remained. Synod leaders in particular resented the public perception that German Lutherans shirked their wartime duties and did not enlist in the armed forces as frequently as other ethnic groups. The wartime project of emphasizing loyalty to Canada and the United States did not simply fade away overnight. Missouri Synod president John Behnken devised one of the synod’s first postwar commemorative events in the summer of 1945, shortly after the United States made peace with Germany. Behnken devised what he called a “Peace Thankoffering” drive to fundraise money to celebrate the war’s end and fund the synod’s future projects. Tensions between pastors and congregants continued to linger after the war concluded, and Behnken hoped a large fundraising endeavor through the Peace Thankoffering would help heal these wounds. He expected that this fundraising drive would resonate with the synod’s laity, as it celebrated peace instead of war. Paul Koenig, president of the Western District that oversaw

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847 See for example LA, ESF, CWS Executive Council Minutes, 17 February 1944.
Lutheran affairs in the state of Missouri, embraced Behnken’s plan. “We shall need much money for postwar work in the mission fields and for building up our educational institutions,” Koenig believed. He had confidence “that all congregations and members will leave nothing undone to complete the task” to help the synod meet its fundraising goals. In the following months, Behnken and Koenig continued to use national and patriotic events as a way to inspire their followers. They hoped to capitalize on the postwar optimism that greeted the war’s conclusion. Peace with Germany and Japan became yet another excuse for synod leaders to try and collect money from their laypeople, as well as more somber occasions like President Roosevelt’s 1945 funeral. They hoped these national events would inspire Lutherans across the country to demonstrate their cooperative spirit and raise money for the synod’s future.

The Peace Thankoffering campaign failed to resonate among the synod’s laypeople. After four years of war, congregants had little to desire to continue giving the synod money for patriotic reasons. The majority of pastors in St. Louis also rejected another fundraising drive occupying their time and resources. Without the same fear of internment or discrimination so pervasive during the war, pastors no longer needed to voice pro-government opinions and they rejected the Peace Thankoffering campaign. Reversing their wartime stance on Romans 13, pastors now joined their congregations in rebuffing the synod’s patriotic V-Day celebrations and their participation in Roosevelt’s funeral. Rudolph Meyer, Old Trinity’s pastor, questioned “whether such participation was justifiable and if so, on what grounds. Is this not a departure from Synodical tradition and

848 CHI, Western District Collection (hereafter WDC), Proceedings of the Sixty-Fifth Convention of the Western District, 23-25 July 1945, 11.
sound Lutheran practice?" Now that they had no need to stress their patriotism, Meyer had no qualms about protesting a Lutheran presence at what was clearly a state function. The Peace Thankoffering therefore failed to even meet Behnken’s modest fundraising goals.

Community leaders in the Canada Synod had greater success healing wartime divisions as they, unlike Behnken, addressed the ethnic identities of their congregants in their commemorative acts. While the majority of Lutheran churches in Waterloo County chose not to commemorate or reflect upon the war, congregations that felt particularly discriminated against during the war did erect war memorials as a way to overcome negative memories of ethnic discrimination. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, for example, faced more than the typical wartime debates over German-language services. The congregation faced further strife over the death of Francis Weitzel, a member of their congregation, during the Battle of Normandy in July 1944. Allegedly Weitzel died single handedly eliminating two Nazi machine-gun posts that stalled his company from completing their objective. His regiment posthumously nominated him for the Victoria Cross, the highest award that a Commonwealth soldier could receive for bravery on the battlefield. This news brought a great deal of pride to Trinity, even if it was short-lived. Weitzel did not receive the award, and was rejected on the grounds that there were not...
sufficient witnesses to confirm that he had in fact completed his task alone. Trinity, as well as Weitzel’s regiment, rejected the “official record” pronounced by the British and Canadian military. They could not help but feel Weitzel was denied the Victoria Cross as a result of his German heritage, rather than any legal stipulations. They labeled Weitzel’s rejection a “political” decision and that “due to politics alone” Weitzel did not receive the Victoria Cross. The decision seemed to imply that the Victoria Cross, an important British symbol, could not be awarded to a German.

Trinity’s resentment and grief over Weitzel’s death prompted its pastor, the Reverend Otto Stockmann, to take action to try and heal the perceived slight against the congregation’s ethnicity. In an unprecedented display of congregational unity, an overwhelming majority of the congregation attended Stockmann’s funeral service for Weitzel. The church quickly filled and those who did not arrive early had to listen to Stockmann’s eulogy outside in the church parking lot. The service did not put the rumor to rest, however. In March 1945, Stockman collaborated with the church council to pass a resolution to erect a small memorial for Weitzel and the other two members of Trinity who died fighting overseas. They decided to plant three maple trees in the churchyard, one for each of Trinity’s soldiers killed in action, and erect a small plaque at their base. This small act, Stockmann and the church council hoped, would assuage some of the grief and anger the congregation felt over Weitzel’s loss.

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851 Snowie, Bloody Buron, 92.
853 “Memorial Service For Cpl. Weitzel,” Tavistock Gazette, 9 August 1944.
854 LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 19 March 1945; LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 31 May 1948.
This small commemorative act helped Stockmann accomplish two contradictory goals. First, the memorial gave Trinity’s Anglo-Canadian neighbours no reason to suspect the congregation of harboring resentment towards the military or prompt suspicions of disloyalty. At first glance, the memorial conformed to other Anglo-Canadian commemorative acts through its use of Canadian maple trees and a simple marker listing the names of Trinity’s war dead. Furthermore, Stockmann and the church council decided to erect the memorial in the so-called “old cemetery” where the pioneers and founding members of the church were buried. Like other churches, Trinity grouped its headstones and burial plots by different decades, and it therefore made most sense to place the memorial in the 1940s section of the cemetery behind the church. By placing it in the “old cemetery,” however, Stockmann met his goal of appearing loyal to the Anglo-Canadian public. Trinity’s old cemetery was located at the front of the churchyard, directly beside the entrance of the church, and was viewable from the road running south into the town core. Viewable to all who passed, the war memorial acted as a testament to the dedication of Trinity’s congregation during the Second World War. Trinity’s loyalty could not be questioned with a clear marker demonstrating men from the congregation served and died overseas. Any Anglo-Canadians passing by the memorial would not associate the memorial with ethnic grievances.

Second, the memorial’s placement met Stockmann’s goal of addressing his congregation’s ethnic grievances. Placed in the old cemetery alongside the congregation’s founders, Stockmann conveyed the impression that Weitzel deserved to be remembered along the same lines as the “pioneers” who established Trinity. Evoking similar themes to


856 LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 19 March 1945.
the pioneer myth, Stockmann’s placement suggests he wished to address members of the congregation who needed to see a fellow German Lutheran acknowledged as “loyal” or as a “nation-builder,” after being rejected for the Victoria Cross. If the military refused to recognize his heroism, then Stockmann’s small act helped elevate Weitzel’s life and memory to a place of prestige within Trinity’s community. Just as Trinity’s “pioneering” founders helped establish the community, so did Weitzel through his act of loyalty by dying overseas. Stockmann succeeded in crafting a landscape of loyalty that therefore met the demands of both his congregation and the surrounding Anglo-Canadian community. It successfully embodied the hybrid German-Canadian framework familiar to Trinity by presenting a vision of their ethnicity that did not overtly challenge or oppose mainstream Canadian nationalism.

The pioneer myth continued to function as an effective way to counter Anglo-Canadian hostility towards German Canadians that masqueraded as patriotism. Although the war had ended, certain Anglo-Canadians still had a negative perception of German Canadians due to their associations with “the enemy.” In 1956, University of Western Ontario professor Hartley Munro Thomas published a history of the university’s wartime activities. As Waterloo Lutheran Seminary and Waterloo College were both then affiliated with Western, Thomas inevitably included them in his history. In contrast to the favourable presentation of Western and its other colleges, like the Anglican Huron College, Thomas critiqued Waterloo College’s patriotism on the basis of their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith. Like Western’s other affiliates, Waterloo College participated in Western’s Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) program that allowed students to enroll in a military training program alongside their other academic classes during the war. Successful applicants also took military courses that would assist
them in obtaining officer positions within the armed forces. Thomas included a single chapter on the Waterloo branch of the COTC, focusing largely on its few non-Lutheran members. Instead of following the general accounts of heroic deeds as per the book’s other chapters, Thomas continually reminded readers that Waterloo College’s soldiers were outsiders, both at Western and in the army more broadly. He stated that “Waterloo officers never felt quite at home” likely due to the fact that their unit was “never commanded by a Lutheran.”

Anglo-Canadians serving with Waterloo College felt equally out of place, he argued. According to Thomas, Anglo-Canadians soldiers reported being much happier once they transferred to a different unit with less Lutherans. Thomas did include heroic details, but only about these Anglo-Canadian officers. He concluded that Waterloo College was privileged to have an “effective leader…of the most influential popular and scholarly of the staff: an English Anglican to represent and develop before the world the German Canadian patriotism of Waterloo.”

Thomas’s comments made him an enemy of Waterloo College officials such as Carl Klinck, a professor and former director of the COTC program during the war. His history not only disrespected members of their community, but also demonstrated that their efforts to appear loyal during the war were not enough to convince skeptics like Thomas. Following the war, Western’s COTC officers dissolved the program and sent its remaining money to the various colleges to erect war memorials honouring those who participated in the program. Klinck used this opportunity to refute Thomas’s negative portrayal of Waterloo College by emphasizing German Lutheran loyalty. Klinck felt that

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858 Thomas, *UWO Contingent COTC*, 392-394.
859 Thomas, 392-294, 397. For Klinck’s thoughts on the Thomas’s book see LA, Carl Klinck fonds (hereafter CKF), Correspondence, Carl Klinck to Ruth Vogt, 12 March 1956.
Thomas had “not done justice to the Waterloo College unit” and sought to rectify this through the proposed COTC memorial. In order to highlight Waterloo College’s loyalty and success, Klinck composed a long list of those he believed should be included on the COTC plaque. Many of Klinck’s suggestions had little to no relationship with the actual COTC program. Klinck included Waterloo College students who did not enlist with the COTC, as well as the names of several of the Canada Synod’s pastors who served in the armed forced as chaplains. By including a wide range of community members, Klinck simultaneously was able to give recognition to the many German Lutherans who served in the war while also “padding” the list of names to make Waterloo College’s achievements in the COTC program appeared greater than they actually were.

Western professors that formerly served in the COTC took notice of Klinck’s creative liberties. Western’s faculty intended the COTC memorial to pay respect to members of a Western organization, funded by the program’s directors, and expressed shock that Klinck seemed determined to use their resources to build a community memorial. Several faculty members inquired about these additional names to Ross Dunford, a member Waterloo College’s Board of Governors, who just so happened to be one of the suspicious names that appeared on the proposed memorial. Dunford rather ambiguously defended his name on the plaque by stating he believed he “signed up for a course or two” in the COTC and that he suspected several other Waterloo College Lutherans “joined up” under similar terms. Klinck subsequently admitted that he allowed some of the “outside people” to be included on the COTC Memorial. Through

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860 LA, CKF, Correspondence, Klinck to Vogt, 12 March 1956.
861 See for example LA, CKF Correspondence, R.N. Shervill to Joseph Gerald Hagey, 2 December 1954; LA, CKF Correspondence, Klassen to Hagey, n.d.
862 LA, CKF Correspondence, Vogt to Klinck, Raymond, J. Ross Dunford, 6 March 1956; LA, CKF Correspondence, J. Ross Dunford to Vogt, n.d.
including “outsiders” on the monument, Klinck tried to give voice to the “extra-ordinary record for efficiently and gallantry” of Waterloo College during the war effort. Clark, a member of Western’s English Department, felt little need to hide his disappointment. The COTC memorial, complete with small Lutheran symbols and a dubious list of names, proved so contrary to the original committee’s hopes that he wondered whether the memorial was “worth the effort of so much preparation.” He questioned whether he and other Western professors should even attend the unveiling ceremony of the now perhaps incorrectly titled COTC Memorial. Those who did attend the unveiling ceremony certainly did feel out of place. Klinck made the ceremony a public affair that involved many diverse members of Waterloo County’s German Lutheran community. While he invited local political officials and former COTC members, Klinck also made sure to invite several prominent local families whose names could be traced back to Waterloo County’s nineteenth-century founding. Klinck invited the Eby and Shantz families, two family lines that had strong associations with the pioneer myth because of their ancestors. Although not necessarily Lutheran, Klinck invited these families to further enhance the image of loyalty that Stockmann also relied upon at Trinity. Though the COTC Memorial began as a monument meant to honour Western’s wartime achievement, Klinck’s skillful maneuvering shifted the focus on the monument to become a Lutheran monument that paid respects to his German-Canadian Lutheran community.

Stockmann and Klinck’s commemorative events helped unify their communities because they directly addressed the ethnic needs of their followers. Behnken and his

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863 LA, CKF Correspondence, Klinck to Vogt, 12 March 1956.
864 LA, CKF Correspondence, Clark to Hagey, n.d.
865 LA, CKF Correspondence, Clark to Hagey, n.d.
Peace Thankoffering failed to realize that restoring unity needed to address the German portion of the Missouri Synod’s German-American identity. Stockmann recognized the necessity of relating directly to Trinity’s German ethnicity. His congregation did not interpret Weitzel’s rejection as a colonial Canadian slighted by the British, but rather because he was a “German.” It was the German portion of their hyphenated identity that Weitzel’s rejection disrespected and therefore any commemorative events needed to address the congregation’s German ethnicity. Likewise, Klinck crafted a memorial to provide a patriotic counter narrative to Thomas’s condescending history. Behnken’s fundraising plan only accounted for the Missouri Synod’s American identity, and completely ignored how they interpreted wartime related patriotism through an ethnic lens. Stockmann succeeded by recognizing, albeit through a carefully curated public image, his congregation’s ethnic identity whereas Behnken failed because he did not. In this sense, cultural and commemorative events following the war did not diminish the German-Canadian and German-American identity, but actually served to showcase it.

**Theology and Rewriting the Past**

Theology inevitably shaped how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County commemorated their ethnic past in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1947, the Missouri Synod celebrated its centennial anniversary of its founding in 1847 by the “Saxon Lutheran” immigrant C.F.W. Walther. The centennial provided Behnken and other St. Louis Lutheran elites with a platform to revisit their synod’s history and offer new directions on its future. They used the anniversary as a way to address the recent theological divisions that the war created over issues such as Romans 13 and the divisions
between liberal and conservative Lutherans within the synod. As Behnken and other synod leaders supported a conservative Lutheran doctrine, they used the centennial as a way to highlight how the Missouri Synod traditionally acted as a beacon of “true” conservative Lutheranism and discredit their liberal competitors. In contrast, the more liberal Canada Synod also found its previous emphasis on the pioneer myth waning as a result of ecumenical cooperative ventures like the Canadian Lutheran World Relief and various synodical mergers. As Waterloo County Lutherans engaged with their coreligionists throughout the country, they increasingly found that other Lutherans had their own foundational myths that stressed a Canadian, rather than ethnic German, past.

Behnken learned his lesson from the failed attempt to mobilize the Missouri Synod with American patriotism during the Peace Thankoffering. The Missouri Synod’s centennial anniversary in 1947 provided Behnken with another opportunity to unite the synod and begin to heal some of the wounds that emerged during the war. Unlike the Peace Thankoffering, the synod’s centennial offered laypeople a chance to celebrate their German and Lutheran identities. Behnken needed to address both of these identities, as ethnic and theological tensions born from the war still plagued his administration. Most notably, Behnken’s vision of a conservative Lutheranism faced criticism late in the war from a group of professors from Concordia Seminary and district presidents that referred to themselves as the “Forty-Four.” In 1945, the Forty-Four released A Statement, a collection of resolutions that condemned Behnken’s leadership for his wartime stance on unionism. They felt that the Missouri Synod needed to cooperate with other Lutherans during the war and that Behnken’s policies were “unevangelical techniques…unsympathetic legalistic practices, a self-complacent and separatistic
narrowness, and an utter disregard for the fundamental law of Christian love.” The synod’s insistence that there could be no union without theological unity, they argued, was antiquated, overly strict, and prevented the growth and power of Lutherans in North America. The Forty-Four mailed a copy of A Statement to every pastor in the Missouri Synod and published it in an edition of The Lutheran Witness. The active attempts of the “Forty-four” to spread A Statement demonstrated that this was not a theological debate limited to a few intellectuals, but a movement to drastically alter the Missouri Synod’s conservative policy on unionism. Conservative leaders of the synod went so far as to label the Forty-four “revolutionaries” with A Statement acting as their official “manifesto.” Behnken organized a series of conferences between the Forty-Four and conservative leaders of the synod. After several meetings throughout 1946 and 1947, the Forty-four still refused to recant A Statement, but agreed to stop actively promoting its message. This compromise pleased few people. Both sides recognized the need to move forward, but bitter tensions remained. The conservative faction felt that Behnken should have punished the Forty-Four, while the Forty-Four felt bitter that their critiques essentially went unheard.

The 1947 centennial therefore provided Behnken with an opportunity to shift popular discussion within the synod away from theological controversy. The theological challenges posed by A Statement prompted Behnken and his colleagues to craft a singular narrative of the synod’s history that stressed the validity of conservative Lutheranism over liberal interpretations of God’s word. The 1947 centennial focused largely on C.F.W

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867 Todd, Authority Vested, 134; John W. Behnken, This I Recall, 2nd ed. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2014), 166.
868 Todd, 136-138.
Walther, the synod’s original founder, and the critical role he played in bringing conservative Lutheranism to North America. In his public retelling of the synod’s history, Behnken emphasized the many “trials and bitter experiences” Walther and the original Saxon Lutherans endured at the hands of liberal Protestants in Europe. “Their experiences made them very cautious about safeguarding Biblical doctrine and Scriptural practice,” he told readers in the Lutheran Witness. Walther’s careful meditations on the Bible, Behnken argued, demonstrated that the Bible must be understood as the “Word of God” in order to practice as a true Lutheran.\(^{869}\) By focusing disproportionately on Walther, Behnken helped cultivate the notion that the synod’s history was the story of brave figures preserving conservative Lutheranism in the face of liberal Lutheran foes. Behnken ended his centennial history of the synod by calling on laypeople to “study the Word of God and the Lutheran Confessions.” As a synod, they must “become all the more deeply convinced that our fathers laid the only correct scriptural foundation.”\(^{870}\) Behnken used the 1947 centennial not only as a way to convey Walther’s importance in Lutheran history, but also as a way to refute the liberal Lutherans that sought to undermine his administration.

Behnken’s emphasis on Walther as a heroic prophet prompted several St. Louis congregations to associate their church with Walther and the synod’s early history. Bethlehem Lutheran Church, celebrating its centennial anniversary in 1949, proudly noted that Walther preached the first sermon at their church, while Immanuel Lutheran Church similarly emphasized Walther’s role in creating their church in 1847.\(^{871}\) The

\(^{871}\) CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethany Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, Seventy-five Years in God’s House, 2-3; CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection,
emphasis Behnken placed on Walther and the Saxon Lutherans during the 1947 centennial continued to echo in local commemorative events into the 1950s. In 1954, Old Trinity celebrated its one-hundredth and fifteenth anniversary and recounted their history in terms similar to Behnken’s 1947 outline. Walther, the “champion of sound and conservative Lutheranism,” turned Trinity “into a model congregation and became a blessing to thousands and thousands of Lutherans of our city and our whole country to this day.”

The anniversary booklet went even further, however, by arguing for Old Trinity’s near-mythical importance in the history of Missouri Synod Lutheranism. The booklet concluded with a discussion to preserve the church’s slowly deteriorating building as “the mother church of true Lutheranism in St. Louis, as a shrine, that is, a sacred place of historical value.” Local Lutherans also gave importance to historic objects Walther used during his lifetime. Old Trinity still contained Walther’s pulpit that he, and subsequent pastors from Trinity, preached from: “To us this pulpit is a memorial and a symbol – a memorial since from it have spoken all the pastors who have served Trinity Congregation since the time of Dr. C.F.W. Walther…What an unbroken stream of doctrine, admonition, comfort…and pastoral guidance has proceeded from this pulpit!”

Walther’s newfound prominence in the synod following the 1947 centennial helped St. Louis Lutherans identify with their nineteenth century German heritage. While congregations consisted of German immigrants from different generations, many of the churches in the city could trace their origins back to Walther and the Saxon Lutheran

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872 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Box 1, Anniversaries folder, Old Trinity, 7.
873 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Box 1, Anniversaries folder, Old Trinity, 13.
874 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Box 1, Anniversaries folder, Old Trinity, 13.
immigrants. Bethany Lutheran Church, celebrating its seventy-fifth anniversary in 1949, wrote in their anniversary booklet that their “branch of Lutheranism was established in St. Louis with the advent of the Saxon Immigrants.” Numerous commemorative histories from the late 1940s endeavored to apply Behnken’s emphasis on a long unbroken history of conservative Lutheranism to their congregation and its founders. Bethany’s anniversary booklet concluded with a eulogy for the Saxon Lutherans who created their congregation. “Of those who were instrumental in the founding of our Congregation, not one remains. All such has passed on into eternity. But their descendants may readily be traced in our present membership,” they noted proudly. Immanuel went even further in their deification of their Saxon Lutheran founders. Their 1947 pamphlet featured a photo of an infant, Paul Weinhold, and described him as a “sixth generation of Saxon descent on his mother’s side and the descendant of Saxons who organized the Perry County Lutheran Churches in 1839 on his father’s side.”

The theological controversies in the Missouri Synod led Behnken and other St. Louis Lutherans to associate their conservative Lutheranism with their German founders. Theological debates in the mid-twentieth century therefore had the unintended impact of popularizing the synod’s identity as both German and conservative. Walther, as a figure of conservative Lutheranism, continued to find resonance in a synod where conservative Lutheranism was starting to lose its firm grasp. By elevating Walther and his Saxon Lutheran peers, Behnken and others also simultaneously reaffirmed their synod as a German organization. Theology, in this instance, served to reify a certain degree of

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875 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethany Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, Seventy-five Years in God’s House, 2-3.
876 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Bethany Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, Seventy-five Years in God’s House, 2-3.
belonging for the synod’s German membership by conflating the issues of conservative doctrine with their German immigrant origins. As long as synod and congregational leaders identified as conservative Lutherans, they would also identify as German.

The Canada Synod also found its ethnic traditions shaped by liberal Lutheranism. As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod members had few qualms about interfaith cooperation and paid little attention to concerns over “unionism.” Cooperative ventures like CLWR brought Waterloo County Lutherans into greater contact with Lutherans across Canada. Annual meetings and conferences, typically held in Kitchener-Waterloo, now occurred in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and other Lutheran centers in Western Canada. The joint organizations saw pastors from the Canada Synod and their prairie counterparts struggle and compete for various leadership positions, typically with the pastors from Western Canada emerging victorious. Furthermore, the Canada Synod collaborated with Lutheran churches in the Quebec and the Maritime provinces to form the Eastern Canada Synod in 1962. These changes essentially served to undermine the once central and authoritative center of Waterloo County in Lutheran affairs. While the pioneer myth once functioned as essentially the stand-in story for all of Canadian Lutherans, increased interactions with Lutherans elsewhere saw the rise of new origin myths that weakened the significance of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth.

As Waterloo County encountered Western Canadian Lutherans at meetings and conferences across the country, they realized that other synods had foundational stories of their own. Western Canadian Lutherans did not trace their origins back to Loyalists, but rather to the Danish-Norwegian Lutheran explorer Jens Munk. He navigated the Hudson’s Bay in 1619-1620 and his Lutheran pastor, Rasmus Jensen, received credit as preaching the first Lutheran sermon in North America. Western Canada Lutherans therefore claimed
that Munk and Jensen demonstrated that Lutherans had a North American presence “at a surprisingly early date.” Lutheranism in Canada did not begin with the arrival of the Lutheran Loyalists, but rather “back to 1619 at Hudson Bay.” Similarly, the cooperation with Lutherans in Nova Scotia exposed Waterloo County Lutherans to yet another foundational myth. Lutherans in the Maritimes traced their lineage back to the Nova Scotian community of Lunenburg, founded in the mid-eighteenth century by German Lutherans. Speeches, commemorative materials, and Canada Lutheran articles all started to mention these connections more frequently in the 1950s. Waterloo County and its “pioneers” now had to share the spotlight with other Lutheran histories due to the many synod mergers and organizations in the 1950s.

The rise of Western Canadian Lutherans in prominent positions challenged the hybrid German-Canadian identity that the Canada Synod prioritized. Western Canadian Lutherans saw the ethnic identities of their ancestors differently than the reverence often granted their pioneer ancestors in Waterloo County. While members of the Canada Synod continued to maintain their hybridity wherein their German, Lutheran, and Canadian identities coexisted, Western Canadian Lutheran leaders saw their ethnic past in less positive terms. Unlike the largely homogenous population of Lutherans in Ontario where “Lutheran” and “German” were essentially synonymous, Lutheranism in Western Canada had large Norwegian, Finnish, and Danish roots. When they examined their history, they largely attributed the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Western Canadian Lutheranism as the primary reason that prevented Lutherans from merging into one single synod or

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878 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.23.2., Kings in the Ladder, 1954.
church. They often blamed the fact that Lutherans did not have a single authoritative body until the Second World War as the reason why Lutherans had such a weak political and national presence in Canada. Lutherans in the West saw ethnicity and language as divisive traits that separated, rather than unified, Canadian Lutherans. Sidney Nelson, an Albertan pastor of Norwegian heritage, commented on how during the last fifty years, “the people and the situation” of Canadian Lutheranism “have drastically changed.” By the late 1950s, he wrote, “English is the main language (at last!). Cooperation is now possible, for we can understand one another!”

Speaking English allowed Canadian Lutherans to share their “resources, our manpower and our money into a more common effort to reach Mr. Average Canuck.” Ethnicity was a relic of the past, while speaking English offered possibilities for the future. Pastors like Nelson envisioned a centralized body of Lutherans that attracted unchurched Canadians in the English language. In contrast, to the Canada Synod’s German-English framework, he offered a vision of the future that did not recognize their immigrant pasts.

The respect typically afforded to Lutheran pioneers and ancestors in Waterloo County weakened as a result of the new emphasis on “forward thinking” Western Canadian Lutherans. Mars Dale, from Saskatoon, described their “early pioneers” as a hindrance to Lutheranism’s growth. Unlike the pastors in Waterloo County that drew links between their own immigrant origins and the new waves of DPs to promote empathy and respect, Dale believed the DPs threatened Lutheranism’s newfound Canadian and English emphasis. “We still lack a policy of integrating Lutheran immigrants into an emerging core of Lutheranism,” he noted with some bitterness. “Even

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880 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.3.2., Sidney Nelson, “Can Canada’s Lutherans Unite?” 1958.
881 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.3.2., Sidney Nelson, “Can Canada’s Lutherans Unite?” 1958.
to mention the problem in certain circles arouses defense mechanisms which turn otherwise sweet personalities sour,” he said with obvious reference to the Canada Synod. While congregations in Waterloo County promoted their German-English framework, Dale saw any language retention as contrary to their goal of recruiting unchurched Canadians. “We must recognize the barrier or insulation that language differences raise between people,” he concluded.882

This vision, however, could not receive support from members from the Canada Synod. Whereas Western Canadian Lutherans interpreted synod mergers through a teleological lens of a destiny fulfilled, Canada Synod president Albert Jacobi subtly worked against this notion. Speaking of their Lutheran ancestors, Jacobi believed that more “likely than not they were practical men who sought a home where they could live like free men and worship God according to the dictates of their conscience. So they lived and died unmindful perhaps of the possibility of a Lutheran Church extending from sea to sea and from the rivers to the end of the earth.”883 Contrary to the claims of Western Canadian Lutherans, there was nothing inherently natural or virtuous about forming a single organization. Ethnicity and language did not appear as stumbling blocks or challenges to overcome in Jacobi’s personal interpretations of Lutheran history. Canada’s original Lutherans “could hardly envisage the establishment of a synod of their own, much less the creation of other groups of Lutherans of varying national backgrounds and with diverse loyalties and doctrinal persuasions.”884 Jacobi dispelled Western Canadian

882 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.23.2., Kings in the Ladder, 1954.
883 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Minutes, 17 November 1960.
884 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Minutes, 17 November 1960.
romanticism of their Lutheran ancestors by stating skeptically that there would be no way for them to “see visions and dream dreams of one Lutheran Church in Canada.”

The widening and reframing of Canadian Lutheran history changed the once prominent position of Waterloo County and the pioneer myth. Whereas the community had once been central to the history of Canadian Lutheranism, by the mid-1960s Waterloo County was referred to as “the heartland of Lutheranism in Eastern Canada.” The Canada Synod headquarters and seminary ensured it remained the “heartland,” but not the birthplace or national scope it once was. As threats to the Missouri Synod’s leadership came from within the synod, Behnken and St. Louis Lutherans in contrast saw a renewed emphasis on their generation of pioneers. Regardless, the theological changes in the postwar period helped dictate and shape the importance German Lutheran communities placed on their ethnic ancestors.

The Limits of the White Imagination

Race, alongside theology, shaped how German Lutherans commemorated their pasts and discussed their ethnic identities. As members of the white community, German Lutherans did not feel alienated by national mythologies in Canada and the United States that stressed national stories of pioneering, settlement, and creating new nations from the wilderness. Stories of explorers and pioneers resonated with German Lutherans, who did not grasp that these mythologies were about colonization and the displacement of North America’s original indigenous inhabitants. German Lutherans disagreed with portions of

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885 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.1., CLC Minutes, 17 November 1960.
these narratives, but not their inherent racial implications. Their whiteness allowed them to modify national mythologies to include immigrants, rather than upset them by pointing out the historic injustices the state committed against its racialized people. German Lutherans did not mean to challenge Canadian and American nationalism, but merely sought to find ways to incorporate themselves within its patriotic folds.

Nils Willison, the first graduate of Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote several newspaper articles throughout the 1950s that argued Canadians needed an inclusive national anthem. In a 1952 article, Willison suggested that Canadians needed their own national songs independent of Great Britain. “In so far as we in Canada are concerned I think we may be well content with the music of ‘o Canada!’” he wrote. However, his own immigrant background prevented him from embracing the future anthem wholeheartedly: “Multitudes of people in Canada cannot sing of their country as their ‘native land’.” Willison clarified his views in a subsequent letter to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. “It is the word ‘Native’ in the first line. As immigrants they were not born in Canada and therefore, without any fault of theirs, Canada is not their ‘native’ land.” In its place, Willison suggested including the phrase “Our home by birth or choice” or “Our home and honored land.”

The ironies embedded in Willison’s statement are hard to miss. While contesting that he and his German Lutherans peers could not sing “O Canada!” because its emphasis on native-born Canadians, he completely missed that Canada’s Indigenous peoples may also take umbrage with the national anthem for erasing their presence. Willison’s message did not seek to change or even challenge Anglo-Canadian dominance and

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887 LA, Nils Willison fonds (hereafter NWF), Diary folder, newspaper clipping, 27 April 1952.
888 LA, NWF, Correspondence folder, Nils Willison to John Diefenbaker, 20 January 1960.
mainstream Canadian patriotism. His request fell very much in line with literary critic Lily Cho’s criticisms of Canadian multiculturalism and its adherents. Rather than viewing Canada’s multicultural status as truly representing and respecting the voices of marginalized Canadians, Cho argues that Canada’s liberal multiculturalism includes the “presence of otherness” that “enhances rather than disturbs the liberal state…[it] enhances dominant culture’s sense of its own inclusive superiority.”889 Willison’s idea never gained traction, but it also proved unlikely to generate a great deal of opposition. His changes would have worked in tandem with the liberal state’s goals of making some of its white immigrant communities feel accepted and embraced. However, such sentiments cultivated an image of the state as benevolent and welcoming, despite the many limitations the federal government placed on racialized immigrants.890 Whiteness allowed Willison to ignore the state’s role in displacing indigenous people and excluding racialized immigrants, thereby prompting him to advocate for a vision of Canada that seemed welcoming.

Willison’s comments did not intentionally erase Canada’s racist past, although other German Lutheran commemorative events deliberately sought to do so. By the 1960s, St. Louis congregations could no longer ignore their decreasing membership as a result of white flight. Several anniversary booklets commemorating St. Louis churches commented on how empty their churches seemed compared to previous decades. Holy Cross’s booklet mentioned that they, “like other inner-city churches, [have] transferred

many members to sister churches in the county and elsewhere.” Mount Calvary hinted at white flight in much the same manner. Their 1957 booklet described confronting the “heavy loss of the many members who were transferring their membership to sister congregations.” Despite these acknowledgements, St. Louis churches rarely explicitly articulated or made reference to the increased Black membership in their churches at the expense of white members. Nor did they give voice to the many tensions desegregation caused within their churches. Instead, anniversary booklets continued to reify the importance of their German pioneer forebears and tied their history to C.F.W. Walther. Zion Lutheran Church, for instance, staged a pageant in order to honour their centennial anniversary in 1960. Although unorthodox, the pageant followed the familiar script of most congregational histories. The first act was devoted to the congregation’s German or “Saxon” origins. It showcased C.F.W. Walther and the Saxon Lutherans leaving Europe for St. Louis. The second act detailed the life of Zion’s early pastors while the last two acts emphasized the growing church and its current emphasis on evangelical recruitment. While this last portion of the play theoretically offered an opportunity to include black voices and perspectives, the play instead focused on its white “missionary” workers and did not include any black actors. St. Paul’s 1963 anniversary acknowledged that its demographics changed from its original 1863 founding, but did little to incorporate Black perspectives or histories into the booklet. Instead, the booklet continued to reify the place of its German congregants. They included the list of their

891 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Holy Cross Lutheran Church Anniversaries Box, 1958 folder, 1858-1958, n.p.
892 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Mt. Calvary Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, Forward With Christ in the Community, n.p.
893 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Zion Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, Zion, Rise!, 4-5.
founding members, and placed italics around the names of “persons whose descendants still hold membership in the congregation.”

Other histories deliberately tried to excuse the synod’s longstanding and ongoing debates about segregation by emphasizing common myths about nineteenth century German-Americans. In 1964, Old Trinity in St. Louis celebrated its one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary with a commemorative booklet by Walter Umbach, a descendant of one of the original Saxon Lutheran immigrants. Umbach situated Old Trinity’s history in the broader context of American history and included discussion of the congregation’s involvement in national events like the Civil War. In doing so, Umbach repeated the popular refrain in German-American circles that “to the predominantly high German population…slavery was repugnant.” When Lincoln called upon Missouri for volunteers, “many companies of volunteers were formed in St. Louis, especially among the numerous German populace….Trinity, Immanuel, Holy Cross, and Zion contributed manpower.” During a period where St. Louis congregations struggled to accept Black congregants, Umbach’s history tried to emphasize the congregation’s anti-racist German roots. Umbach’s interpretation differed from the historical reality wherein the Missouri Synod by no means held an anti-slavery position throughout the nineteenth century. The famed Walther, for instance, cited several instances where the Bible supported slavery and did not explicitly condemn slave-owners. Despite this inconvenient truth,

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894 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, St. Paul’s Lutheran Church Box, Anniversaries folder, *St. Paul’s Lutheran Church: A Historical Review*, iii, 5.
895 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Box 1, Anniversaries folder, “To God Alone All Glory”: A Historical Sketch, 2.
896 CHI, Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity Lutheran Church Box 1, Anniversaries folder, “To God Alone All Glory”: A Historical Sketch, 17.
897 Walther recorded his impressions on slavery and its relationship to the Bible throughout several editions of *Lehre und Wehre* throughout the Civil War.
Umbach’s history attempted to minimize the synod’s racism by fabling an allegedly anti-racist past with its racist present.

In these instances, anniversaries and commemorations served to enhance the image of these congregations as both white and German. While Willison’s stance on the Canadian anthem operated as a covert nod to his own whiteness, the St. Louis anniversary booklets deliberately politicized their German ancestors in an effort to exclude their congregation’s black members. Such commemorative anniversaries conveyed a clear message that only white Americans of German heritage belonged in their congregations. Umbach’s attempts to address racial issues in the synod says more about his own whiteness than it does about the reality of race relations in St. Louis. He addressed racial tensions not by acknowledging Old Trinity’s black congregants, but rather by claiming Walther and their ancestors fought on the correct side of racial justice. His example of Walther’s supposed anti-racism intended to alleviate the guilt or racial tension current white congregants felt in the midst of civil rights protests, and did little to comfort black Lutherans facing modern racism within the synod. Although these commemorative efforts in the 1950s and 1960s were ethnic histories written for a distinct ethnic group, so too were they white histories meant for a white audience.

**Expo 67 and Engagement with Mainstream Nationalisms**

Umbach’s history of Old Trinity was the first of many projects in the 1960s and early 1970s that involved German Lutherans trying to integrate their histories into the broader American and Canadian publics. Lutherans started to pitch their histories and commemorative events outside of strictly religious circles in part because of the changing
demographics in both synods. Appeals to unchurched Americans and Canadians led to an increase in members who had interests in their community’s history outside the strict confines of the church. Moreover, the increased emphasis on the ecumenical movement within the Canada Synod brought Lutherans into greater contact with their Anglican, Baptist, and United Church neighbors, who proved more interested in engaging with national histories. Moments of national celebration functioned as important opportunities for German Lutherans to showcase their “Canadian” and “American” qualities, and be recognized as such. Despite this newfound drive to celebrate a Lutheran and German history alongside Anglo-Canadians and Americans, Lutherans failed to convince outsiders that their history deserved equal celebration. The inherent ethnic and religious focus of stories surrounding their Lutheran ancestors made them of little interest to the Canadian and American mainstream public. However, their whiteness ensured that their histories had a minor place amidst national celebrations in the 1960s and 1970s.

Canadian nationalism in the 1960s represented something of a paradox. On one hand, Anglo-Canadians became increasingly nationalistic as they sought to craft an identity separate from Great Britain. Under the Liberal governments of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau, Anglo-Canadians sang a new national anthem, waved a distinctly Canadian flag, and participated in national moments of celebration. The centennial of Canadian Confederation in 1967, commonly referred to as Expo ’67, embodied this newfound civic nationalism as state actors put forward a vision of Canada as a mature, independent, country. Simultaneously, however, many Anglo-Canadians retained a close personal connection to Britain and Canada’s British past. Public celebrations of

Canada’s history, for example, continued to venerate symbols of Canada’s colonial past, such as nominally English explorer John Cabot, or its connection to the British Empire during the two world wars.\textsuperscript{899} Canadian nationalists in the 1960s articulated a new sense of Canadian nationhood while also venerating a British colonial past.

German-Canadian Lutherans participated in the newfound spirit of Canadian nationalism during popular events like Expo ’67 in ways that differed from their previous emphasis on the pioneer myth.\textsuperscript{900} Expo 67’s national scope prompted Canadian Lutherans to frame their history through this national lens. The Loyalist pioneers of Waterloo County had very little importance amidst the national breadth of Canada’s past. Commemorative events needed to somehow relate to Canada’s broad mythology that placed an emphasis on “exploration,” national development, and historic “firsts.” Thus, the story of the Munk expedition and the Lunenburg settlement shifted from marginal stories to the central story of Canadian Lutheranism during the 1967 events.\textsuperscript{901} Unlike other Anglo-Canadian groups that showcased their history, however, these commemorative events provided Canadian Lutherans with an opportunity to integrate their unique stories of faith and migration into the Canadian narrative. While other Canadians celebrated broad ideas of their nation, German Lutherans once again used these commemorative events to make the case to mainstream society that they too belonged in Canada.


\textsuperscript{900} On Expo ’67, see John Lownsbrough, \textit{The Best Place To Be: Expo 67 and Its Time} (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012).

\textsuperscript{901} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.1., Daniel Baker to Schultz, 21 February 1964.
One of the most important centennial events Canadian Lutherans participated in was the celebration surrounding the first Lutheran church in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. Affectionately referred to as the “Old Dutch” or “Little Dutch” church, synod leaders discovered that the building was still in use by an Anglican congregation. Initially, the Canadian Lutheran Council (CLC), spearheaded by Earl Treusch, tried to purchase the church but the Anglicans refused. They therefore reached a compromise where “the denominations might work together to preserve the church.”

The CLC decided to erect a plaque on the church’s exterior making note that it was “the first Lutheran Church in Canada.” Treusch unveiled the plaque alongside the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia in a public ceremony in March 1967. Marking the church, even with a small plaque, represented an important point for Treusch and other members of the CLC that wanted Lutherans recognized in the annals of Canadian history. In an announcement to the press, Treusch stated that his interest in the Old Church “arises primarily for the fact that this is the first church building erected in Canada by Lutherans and that it was constructed during a very interesting phase of Canada’s early history.”

The fact that German Lutherans founded Lunenburg shortly after the Seven Years War proved important to the broader Lutheran goal of demonstrating that they too belonged in Canada. As Daniel Coleman suggests, settlers often emphasized what they perceived as their long lineages and histories in the land they now occupy in an effort to appear “indigenous” to the land itself. Although then occupied by Anglicans, the small plaque on the old church conveyed the impression that the church historically belonged to Lutherans. By

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902 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.6., Division of Public Relations, Report of the Executive Secretary to the Division Committee Meeting, 9 April 1964.
903 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.6., Divisions of Public Relations, Report of the Executive Secretary to the Division Committee Meeting, 2 November 1965.
904 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.1., Earl Treusch to Cal Holloway, 19 August 1965.
905 Coleman, 16.
emphasizing the impact of their ancestors on the past, Treusch and the CLC made an argument for their belonging in the present.

The CLC embarked on several commemorative efforts to honour the Munk expedition and convince Anglo-Canadians of its importance. Many of these projects, however, failed. The CLC unsuccessfully tried to convince the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) to invest in “a good TV drama” about the Munk expedition, and also failed to convince Canada Post to issue a commemorative stamp in his honour.\textsuperscript{906} These setbacks did not deter the CLC from pursuing their campaign to see Munk and Jensen recognized as two of Canada’s important explorers alongside John Cabot, Jacques Cartier, and Samuel de Champlain.\textsuperscript{907} In 1965, the CLC decided to pursue “the erection of a suitable memorial to Pastor Rasmus Jensen” near Churchill, Manitoba.\textsuperscript{908} Very few others shared their passion, however. They contacted Canada’s Historic Sites and Monuments Board with a proposal to erect a plaque honouring Jensen for his role in preaching the first Christian Christmas service on Canadian soil. Government officials replied that they could not help with the effort to commemorate Jensen, as they focused on people and places of national historic significance. Jensen, it seemed, did not quite make the cut. A government representative suggested that they “contact the Department of Northern Affairs as well as the Manitoba Historic Sites Board as I am sure they will be of service to you.”\textsuperscript{909} Yet, the Department of Northern Affairs proved equally uninterested in commemorating Lutheran history. They responded to the CLC that

\textsuperscript{906} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.6., Division of Public Relations, Report of the Executive Secretary to the Division Committee Meeting, 9 April 1964; LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.6., Division of Public Relations, Report of the Executive Secretary to the Division Committee Meeting, 7 March 1966.


\textsuperscript{908} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.2.6., Minutes, Division of Public Relations, 2 November 1965.

\textsuperscript{909} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.5., Claude Gauthier to Schultz, 17 June 1966.
commemorating Jensen “would create a new problem for us.” They described how many different groups petitioned them for such markers and they could not possibly meet all these various demands. “Once our rule was broken, we would be hard put to deny the privilege to others,” they replied.\textsuperscript{910} Government agencies simply did not see Jensen and Munk as national figures worth celebrating alongside Canada’s roster of national heroes. The two individuals were of importance only to Lutherans, and had little significance for other Canadians.

Internally, the CLC sponsored several commemorative projects intended just for Lutherans rather than a broad Canadian audience. These projects demonstrated a greater comfort with celebrating their ethnic and religious heritage than the bland efforts to create Jensen and Munk in the same image as other Canadian explorers. In 1966, the CLC sponsored a hymn-writing contest. The winner would be their official hymn for Canada’s centennial. Ulrich Leupold, a professor at Waterloo Lutheran University, judged the contest and received sixty-one entries from pastors and laypeople. Although written in part for Canada’s “birthday” celebration, Leupold rejected entries that praised the so-called Fathers of Confederation. He dismissed hymns that parroted the Canadian nationalism exhibited elsewhere in Expo 67 celebrations. One rejected hymn described John A. Macdonald and his peers as respected leaders blessed by God: “Our leaders in Thee trusted/And never were dismayed/Thy statutes they respected/Thy righteous laws obeyed/Thy goodness came upon them/Thou was their strength and stay.”\textsuperscript{911} Leupold had no problem rejecting the entry. The hymn made “the founding fathers look like a bunch of narrow Puritans,” he complained. “The tone is that of Victorian moralism. It sounds

\textsuperscript{910} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.5., P.H. Schonenbach to Shultz, 23 June 1966.
\textsuperscript{911} LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.2., A Hymn for Canada’s Centennial 1967, n.d.
terribly straight-laced and self-righteous.”912 Leupold’s first choice was written by a pastor from Zurich, Ontario, which clearly emphasized Lutheranism’s immigrant roots. The hymn stated that Canada consisted of “men from lands both far and near” who “did lay a firm foundation/By Thy providence.”913 The hymn matched the synod’s general understanding of Canada as a settler colonial nation composed of white immigrants that helped gradually turn an empty wilderness into a thriving modern nation. Leupold and his peers rejected entries that honoured Anglo and French-Canadian statesmen in favour of an entry that paid respects to the anonymous migrant settlers to whom they claimed their own.

Although this entry touched on the desired themes, its clumsy wording prevented Leupold from accepting it. The committee decided not to select a winner, as they felt no hymn was of adequate quality. Their decision angered several of the participants, who let the committee know they felt their decision was particularly “unchristian.”914 Yet there was more at stake in the contest than mere prizes and prestige. C.N. Weber, a prominent Waterloo County layman, sat on the committee and felt that the hymn needed to give voice to the importance of Lutheranism in Canada. Promoting a poor hymn would be “an unfavorable reflection on our Lutheran Church.” Lutherans, he argued, could not handle any more bad publicity than they had already endured in the past decades. “I have felt many times that as Lutherans we were satisfied to accept second and third grade positions, whereas with our heritage, we should be in the first bracket.”915 Episodes such as the failure to secure a commemorative event for the Munk expedition and the failed

912 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.2., Ulrich Leupold to Schultz, 5 October 1966
913 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.2., Andrew Blackwell to Schultz, 9 May 1966.
914 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.2., Edward Brohart to Sirs, 9 December 1966
915 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.5.3.3.2., C.N. Weber to Schultz, 26 October 1966
hymn contest proved to Lutherans like Weber their acceptance in Canada was far from secure. They could not risk further condescension from Anglo-Canadians by releasing a substandard hymn, even if it meant angering the contestants.

The Missouri Synod’s celebration of its 125th anniversary in 1972 also diverged from past histories by aiming for a broader American readership. That said, it continued to follow the typical narrative of the synod that Behnken solidified during the 1947 centennial. Like other histories sponsored by the Concordia Publishing House, it directly acknowledged the synod’s German heritage and ongoing German ethnicity, while deifying Walther as the synod’s moral, spiritual, and personal founder. The anniversary book recognized that the synod’s German character would never truly leave the synod. The book chronicled the religious conditions in Europe that drove Walther to seek refuge in North America and portrayed the decades following the synod’s founding as an exclusively German time period. The author recognized that the First World War caused the synod to eliminate some visible signs of its German ethnicity because Lutherans “were looked upon as disloyal citizens,” but recognized that the war did not eliminate their German ethnicity. In one of the more humorous references to the synod’s hybrid German-American character, the author reported that many Missouri Synod Lutherans responded to the First World War with the declaration that “Ich bin ein Amerikaner.” Such sentiments easily captured the ironic and contradictory German-American character within the synod.

Yet this commemorative book, The Zeal of His House, diverged from previous histories in several important ways that recognized the changing face of Lutheranism in

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the 1970s. The Concordia Publishing House tended to commission the synod’s previous anniversary texts from established pastors and professors based in St. Louis.

Unsurprisingly, the stories of St. Louis congregations, Walther, and the Concordia Seminary featured prominently in what were supposed to be synod-wide histories. The book’s author, Eldon Weisheit, was not a St. Louis pastor like his predecessors. Weisheit was born in the Midwest but spent most of his career as a popular religious writer and pastor in Alabama, with a brief stint as an editor for the Lutheran Witness in the 1970s. Unlike previous authors, Weisheit wrote his anniversary retrospective in an accessible tone rife with popular slang and informalities that would have shocked his predecessors.

While previous histories conformed to contemporary scholarly standards, Weisheit intended his text to be read by all members of the Missouri Synod. The Zeal of His House was not meant just for educated laymen and pastors. Weisheit wrote the text to appeal to Lutheran men and women, and many of the synod’s recent displaced person, Anglo-American, and black converts, not just its primary German-American readership. The first section of the book, subtitled “Let Me Talk You into Reading the Whole Thing,” explained Weisheit’s motivations for writing the text. He described the many “new members” of the church who “may have little identity with denominational history” because of their DP or American backgrounds. The booklet, for instance, is dedicated to “those who have joined the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as adults in appreciation of your contributions to the heritage of the synod.”

Weisheit acknowledged that American, DP, and black Lutherans may feel left out of the synod’s history due to its focus on German pioneers and prophets. “The first part of Missouri Synod history is heavy with the German influence. If you are German but not a Saxon or Franconian (I’m

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neither), you might feel that you are on the edge of the stage. If you’re not German at all, you might feel you missed the whole scene. But it’s not so,” he tried to reassure his readers. In order to make his readers more comfortable with an alien German past, Weisheit included lists of prominent German figures in the synod’s early history with a simple addition of how to pronounce their names phonetically. He also focused a great deal on the synod’s work among unchurched Americans, DPs, and black Lutherans in contrast to his predecessors fascination with Walther and the Saxon Lutherans. As a pastor who worked primarily in Alabama, Weisheit closely detailed the synod’s mission work among black Lutherans in the south. He spent seven of the booklet’s one-hundred and twenty pages describing the story of Rosa Young, a black Lutheran schoolteacher from Alabama. In contrast, Walter Baepler’s 1947 centennial anniversary publication devoted a single sentence to “Negro missions.” Weisheit’s history offered a new history for a synod that had changed considerably in the previous twenty years.

Lutheran commemorative activities in the 1960s and 1970s offered a sometimes contradictory look at their own communities. On one hand, they continued to stress the German roots of their communities and valorize the pioneers and pastors who established their churches in the previous centuries. They did so in a way that aligned with how Anglo-Canadians and Americans discussed their own storied historical figures, even if mainstream society did not always see their importance. Yet these commemorative events highlighted the possible future directions of their communities as well. The Canada Synod took on a secondary role in contrast the CLC and Western Canadian pastors who increasingly dictated that their history needed to appeal to broader Canadians and placed

918 Weisheit, 10.
919 Weisheit, 17.
920 Weisheit, 163.
less importance on local immigrant communities. While St. Louis histories begrudgingly acknowledged the changing racial make-up of their congregations, Weisheit’s history offered a clear indication that synod-wide histories outside of St. Louis could not simply tell the same story of Walther and his conservative Lutheran German pioneers any longer. Broad commemorative events, be they for national and synodical audiences, now included the voices and perspectives of Lutherans outside of the St. Louis and Waterloo County cores. As such, they paid attention to the different Lutheran histories throughout North America and included information about the recently converted and newly arrived Lutherans. Although none of the events broke firmly away from their emphasis on their German heritage, they created the conditions for a future generation of Lutherans to see themselves within the histories of North American Lutheranism whether or not they could personally connect with a German past.

**Conclusion**

Cultural and commemorative events in postwar St. Louis and Waterloo County demonstrate a continued engagement with their German ethnic identities. Commemorative events continued to pay respect to their nineteenth century immigrant forebears as a meaningful symbol of both their German heritage and as a way to address modern challenges. The Saxon Lutherans that migrated to St. Louis continued to provide a potent origin story for synod leaders and congregations alike. The present challenges from liberal Lutherans within the synod heightened the respect St. Louis Lutherans paid to their Saxon Lutheran ancestors as they practiced a “true” conservative Lutheranism. The memory of German Lutheran pioneers in Waterloo County provided them with a way
to combat Anglo-Canadian nationalism following the war, ensuring that their German ethnicity continued to resonate in the community. While Lutherans elsewhere in Canada started to revise the singular importance previously placed on the pioneer myth, Waterloo County Lutherans continued to argue for its importance, particularly in relation to DP work. Their German ethnicity remained an important part of postwar commemorative activities, regardless of external and internal challenges.

Whiteness played an important role in shaping commemorative events surrounding their immigrant ancestors. At one level, it allowed German Lutherans to situate their histories in broader American and Canadian commemorative events and histories. As members of the white community, they could locate their own explorers, pioneers, and settlers, alongside other white Americans and Canadians. Their whiteness prevented them from challenging these narratives outright. Instead, they sought to incorporate themselves into these pre-existing narratives and argue that their own German Lutheran ancestors could be just as important as other white British and American historical figures. Their ethnic culture co-existed comfortably within American and Canadian narratives of white supremacy. Furthermore, cultural events in St. Louis in the late 1950s and 1960s deliberately marginalized their new black congregants by ignoring their presence and valorizing their German ancestors. The message in these commemorative booklets was quite clear: German immigrants built the church and their white descendants continued to allow the church to thrive. In these instances, celebrations of ethnic diversity not only benefitted from North America’s white supremacist culture, but actively enforced it.

Postwar commemorative events continued the German Lutheran project of finding ways to balance their ethnic, religious, and national identities. Their attempts to situate
their ethnicity and religion in popular American and Canadian narratives should not be seen as a loss of ethnic identity. A 1967 speech by Karl Holfeld at Waterloo Lutheran Seminary captures how German Lutherans sought to integrate their immigrant pasts into national mythologies. He noted that “most of the members of our churches are of other national origins than British or French, the founding nations, but we do claim equality with them in Canadian citizenship, concern and loyalty.” Their German heritage and language did not somehow mean that they were not equally Canadian. German and Lutheran “names may sound like a roster of Europeans but they think, speak and act Canadian.” Such sentiments convey the hybrid German-Canadian and German-American identities that Lutherans continued to practice well into the 1960s.

921 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.2.1., Address to the Executive Committee of the Lutheran World Federation meeting at Waterloo, 14 June 1967.
Conclusion: Welcoming Strangers

Ethnicity remained a powerful identity in the Canada Synod by the 1970s, even as the “old guard” of ethnic elites started to retire from public life. John Reble, “a fine old soldier of the Lord who just does not fade away,” finally retired from preaching German-language services at St. Peter’s in 1969. He passed away just three years later, but lived long enough to see his son Otto Reble assume leadership of the Canada Synod. As synod president, Otto continued the work that his father started and listened to the chorus of German, Canadian, Latvian, and other voices in the synod. By 1974, Otto undisputedly labeled the Canada Synod as “a synod of linguistic ministries.” Although the “new Canadian” problem had certainly passed, mission outreach to unchurched German immigrants and their children remained a concern for Otto and other Canada Synod pastors. In the 1970s, Otto worked with numerous Toronto pastors in a group called the “German Cluster” to help ensure they provided German-language services to Lutherans in Toronto’s growing cityscape. Unlike his father, Otto sought the assistance of EKiD in West Germany to meet these linguistic demands. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary students of the 1960s did not always have the fluency in German to help Otto and the German Cluster reach German immigrants. With his father’s generation retired or deceased, and new Canadian-born generation preferring the English language, Otto

922 LA, ESF, LM10 Kitchener St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, reel 18, Annual Congregational Meeting Minutes, 28 January 1968.
923 See for example, LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.8, Hartmut Horsch to Otto Reble, 21 October 1974; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.8, Horsch to Reble, 12 November 1974; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.8, Meeting of the Toronto German Cluster, 27 May 1975.
initiated the process of reorienting the Canada Synod’s ethnic identity towards West Germany.

Theology and ethnicity remained intertwined in St. Louis in the 1970s as well. Under John Behnken’s presidency, Missouri Synod pastors strongly associated the German language with preserving their theology. Behnken’s retirement in 1962, however, created a power vacuum within the synod’s leadership that had repercussions for the synod’s ethnic character. Staunchly conservative pastors replaced Behnken’s more “moderate” faction with the election of Jacob Preus in 1969. Preus’s conservatism on theological issues, as well as cultural issues such as feminism and the Civil Rights Movement, alienated a number of moderate members of the Missouri Synod. These tensions climaxed in 1973-1974, when over two-hundred members of the Concordia Seminary left to form their own seminary in protest. Preus and his conservative supporters derogatorily referred to their moderate opponents as “old Germans” out of touch with the modern American political landscape that favoured evangelism and Republican politics instead of respect for their ethnic past. Future historians will no doubt have to contend with how Preus’s rule shaped the synod’s German ethnicity.

Unlike previous studies of German immigrants that routinely end eulogizing or hypothesizing the “end” of a German ethnicity, this study ends in the late 1960s on a different note. It does not conclude that Germans lost, or started to lose, their German ethnicity. Rather, it suggests that a new sense of hybridity may have started to emerge in

926 Burkee, Power, Politics, and the Missouri Synod, 57-58.
the 1970s, largely after the generation identified in this study retired or passed away. Future historians may wish to follow Otto Reble’s work among German-speaking immigrants in Toronto to examine what role ethnicity played in Canadian Lutheranism beyond the 1960s. More locally, the rise of a secular German ethnicity based on “food and folk” customs in Waterloo County began to develop in the 1960s. Multicultural initiatives sponsored by the federal government, for example, created popular secular events like Oktoberfest that may have shifted the community’s localized German culture out of the church and into the public sphere.928 Subsequent studies of the Missouri Synod and German-Americans in St. Louis must examine their ethnicities in the context of the rise of political and religious conservatism in the Missouri Synod. Scholars will need to examine how Preus’s leadership altered the synod’s relationship with Lutheranism in Germany, and how race and ethnicity became another battleground over which conservative and moderate Lutherans fought.929 These potential research areas show that the story of German immigrants and their ethnic identities did not end during the world wars or even in the postwar period. It remains a field open for further inquiry.

The first objective of this dissertation was to provide an alternative to the emphasis on assimilation found elsewhere in the literature on German immigrants. In his work on German Canadians in Winnipeg, Hans Werner found that “the concept of assimilation still offers explanatory power for first-generation immigrant behaviour.”930 The majority of the ethnic elites examined in this study were first or second generation.

928 Ross Fair untangles how certain celebrations of a “folk” ethnicity in the 1970s shaped historical writing about Waterloo County in Ross Fair, “‘Theirs was a deeper purpose’: The Pennsylvania Germans of Ontario and the Craft of the Homemaking Myth,” Canadian Historical Review 87, no. 4 (December 2006): 680.
929 James Burkee, for instance, mentions frequent bouts of anti-Semitism amongst the new generation of conservatives within the synod. See Burkee, 57-58.
immigrants that actively grappled with the question of assimilation, but did not succumb to it. Ethnic elites flirted with promoting integration and assimilation during the Second World War, but largely moved beyond such pressures once the war ended. They maintained their positions as ethnic elites into the postwar period by building positive relations with a new generation of first generation German refugees, while ensuring other European ethnic groups did not challenge the hegemonic status of the German-language in their congregations. Pressures to assimilate certainly informed the experiences of first and second generation ethnic elites, but it not define them.

Furthermore, Russell Kazal’s writing on German Americans in Philadelphia, and on immigrant history more broadly, places great emphasis on assimilation as “processes that result in greater homogeneity within a society.” 931 St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutherans shared fundamental differences with mainstream Canadian and American culture that prevented a high level of homogeneity from occurring. In fact, German Lutherans continually articulated difference in the face of exclusionary American and Canadian nationalism. Their churches did not reinforce Canadian and American values like other evangelical congregations, but rather functioned as ethnic boundary zones that allowed their German laity to connect with their ethnic identities. 932 They greeted the Second World War with trepidation and fear over ethnic discrimination, not with expressions of solidarity with the Allied armies. They became advocates for ex-Nazi German refugees when American and Canadians largely believed these former “enemy aliens” should be left in Europe. Rather than participating in the middle-class attempts to

assimilate postwar newcomers, ethnic elites responded by solidifying the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone. They purchased German-language prayer books, elevated the status of DPs, and continued to educate their followers at church and Sunday schools in the German language. Their efforts to protect their German ethnicity within the church ran counter to the national emphasis on homogeneity in Canadian and American society, during both the war and the Cold War consensus that emerged afterwards.

Rather than emphasizing the ways in which German immigrants assimilated, this dissertation examined how they maintained their ethnic identity despite pressures to assimilate. German Lutherans constructed an ethnicity rooted in hybridity as a result of their attempt to reconcile their immigrant heritage with their new homes in North America. They constructed this unique ethnic identity in several ways. Language, however, was one of the most important ways German Lutherans identified with their ethnic heritage. By the mid-twentieth century, the German language did not have a practical or conversational purpose. As Barbara Lorenzkowski’s earlier work on the late nineteenth century demonstrates, most German immigrants spoke a hybrid dialect that combined English and German words and syntax. While true, the German language still remained important as a powerful symbol of ethnicity and faith. As chapter one illustrated, German Lutherans fought to speak German on days of religious importance. In order to properly worship and understand the word of God, German Lutherans believed they needed to preach, speak, and pray in the language of C.F.W. Walther and Martin Luther. This belief remained dominant in the Missouri and Canada Synods until at least the 1960s, with synod leaders like John Behnken continually reminding their pupils that they needed to master religious texts in the German tongue. Chapter six demonstrated this

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belief most obviously, as ethnic elites opposed speaking Latvian, Estonian, and other European languages in their churches as they felt it did not have a spiritual necessity. For German Lutherans, speaking German in church did not represent a connection to a European homeland, but rather a commitment to their faith. For ethnic elites in St. Louis and Waterloo County, strengthening the German language had personal and political motivations as well. Chapter five demonstrated that encouraging German refugees to speak German instead of English at church allowed pastors to grow their congregations and, as a result, their authority within the community. Instead of losing their new German refugee followers to English clubs and social circles, pastors kept their authority as ethnic elites by allowing refugees a place to speak German within the ethnic boundary zone of the church.

Yet this was not the “pure German” heard in the streets of nineteenth century St. Louis and Waterloo County. German Lutherans heard English spoken at church just as frequently as German, most notably during the Second World War. This does not, however, signify their assimilation into Canadian and American society. Rather, it highlights the careful balancing act German Lutherans performed to ensure that they maintained both their old ethnic and new national identities. Speaking German emboldened their ethnic and religious identities, whereas speaking English recognized their North American circumstances. As Lorenzkowski wrote of an earlier generation of German immigrations, “the duality of their worlds resonated in the hybrid tongue they spoke. Their speech acts told of lives that were shaped in a series of exchanges.”

The exchange of English and German language heard in Lutheran congregations across St. Louis and Waterloo County embodied their German-American and German-Canadian

934 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 10.
Lutheran hyphenated identities during a period in which these ideas seemed incompatible. Lutherans justified speaking German on the grounds that it embodied their faith and thus found a way to continue their ethnic traditions within the ethnic boundary zone of the church while still participating in the English-speaking world of North American life.

German Lutherans moreover expressed an ethnic identity throughout the 1940s and early 1950s when they expressed sympathies and solidarity with their brethren living overseas in Germany. Chapters one and two detailed how German Lutherans opposed another world war with Germany, albeit to different extents. German Lutheran women in St. Louis worried the war bonds they purchased would be used to bomb other German women working in the war effort, while the women in Waterloo County organized events at their churches to advocate for peace and neutrality instead of war. Pastors like Behnken and C.H. Little largely had to downplay their qualms with the war in favour of a patriotic image, whereas others eventually lost faith that appeasing Anglo-Canadian and Americans was worth ethnic and theological compromises. Certain pastors resented the anti-German caricatures in the *People Come First* pamphlet that stereotyped members of their ethnicity, while others conducted private German-language services to ensure that they did not break decades of tradition. As chapters three and four explored, German Lutherans maintained a vested interest in helping Germany recover from the war. While international organizations like the United Nations largely felt German refugees were Germany’s obligation, German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County mobilized to alter immigration laws that would facilitate refugee passage from Europe to North America. These were not “enemy aliens” or “Nazis,” but rather members of their ethnic and religious community that desperately needed assistance. German Lutherans refused
to abandon their brethren, even during a time in which most Canadians and Americans had little interest in becoming further involved in German affairs.

Although German Lutherans sympathized with Germans abroad, they did not construct an ethnicity rooted in diasporic sentiments or a German homeland. As chapter four highlighted, ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods were motivated by their German sympathies to perform missionary work in West Germany throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. While they eagerly expected to be greeted as distant cousins and fellow Germans, West Germans saw them strictly as “Amerikaners.” First-generation immigrants like John Reble felt a renewed connection to their German roots when visiting Germany, but most West Germans used their new Canadian and American friends exclusively as a way to better their material circumstances. They were not interested in forming a diasporic connection between their West German home and St. Louis and Waterloo County, but instead used these connections to secure financial aid for themselves and their followers. Missionary trips to Germany seemed to confirm the hybrid identities of the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ethnic elites. Americans and Canadians labeled them “Germans” while they were in North America, while Germans told them they were “American” while in Germany.

Ethnic elites had little choice but to focus on creating an ethnicity rooted in their St. Louis and Waterloo County homes as a result. Nineteenth century German immigrants participated in commemorative and festive events that linked them closely with political events in German states. They celebrated German unification, the Franco-Prussian War, and erected humble monuments to political leaders such as Kaiser Wilhelm II.935

935 See for example Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Ethnicity as Festive Culture: German-America on Parade,” in The Invention of Ethnicity, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Barbara...
Although German Lutherans in the mid-twentieth century did place some importance on Martin Luther and the Reformation, their ethnic celebrations largely valorized the immigrant experience in North America instead of myths and figures rooted in their German homeland. Their celebrations placed their hybridity at the forefront. The pioneer myth in Waterloo County and commemorative events surrounding C.F.W. Walther in St. Louis emphasized their German and Lutheran identities while also acknowledging the fact that these were Canadian and American stories. As several chapters made clear, the pioneer myth took pre-existing Anglo-Canadian myths surrounding the British Loyalists but modified them to include people of German heritage. In doing so, German Lutherans could articulate an ethnicity without offending or challenging Anglo-Canadian conceptions of nationhood and history. Similarly the Missouri Synod’s preoccupation with Walther and the synod’s creation provided an important symbol for preserving their German traditions, theology, and language, while still conforming to popular narratives of nineteenth century settlers and pioneers. Their stories confirmed their North American realities while still allowing room to express their ethnicity. These were not the Anglo-Canadian and American national mythologies that valorized British politicians and founding fathers, nor were the events that connected German Lutherans to an imagined German homeland. Instead, they were stories of hybridity that situated German Lutherans firmly as an ethnic and religious community in St. Louis and Waterloo County.

German Lutheran expressions of ethnicity demonstrate a community that grappled with demands to assimilate and integrate, but ultimately found a way to preserve portions of their ethnicity in the face of such challenges. Although they adopted some Anglo-

Canadian and American norms, such as speaking English in public and using national frameworks for commemorative acts, German Lutherans simultaneously maintained their own ethnic and religious traditions. Although this generation of German Lutherans in the mid-twentieth century may have appeared assimilated compared to their nineteenth century forerunners, this dissertation has tried to portray a more holistic definition of ethnicity that sought to define a community of immigrants on their own terms. While German Lutherans may have embraced their Canadian and American citizenship, these national identities did not eclipse their established ethnic or religious traditions. War, postwar immigration, theological disputes, and the changing demographics of the church all provided opportunities for German Lutherans to shed their immigrant identities and embrace their national communities. However, they chose not to do so. Ethnic elites and laypeople fought to preserve their churches as ethnic boundary zones wherein they could continue to articulate ethnic and religious identities that differed from mainstream society. German Lutherans did not articulate an identity that placed them firmly in either “German” or “Canadian/American” camps. Hybridity, and not assimilation, defined their experiences in the mid-twentieth century.

Broadly speaking, the second goal of this dissertation was to apply developments in whiteness studies to the experiences of German Lutherans. This dissertation argued that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for understanding how German Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. German Lutherans articulated a white racial identity that served to bolster their ethnic identity in several ways. First, their whiteness allowed them to form bonds with political leaders that helped ensure their safety during periods of anti-German sentiment. Chapters two and three examined how ethnic elites established working relationships with high ranking politicians like Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Office of War Information in order to advocate for their loyalty to the Canadian and American states. Although their German ethnicity prompted some suspicion, ethnic elites successfully courted these politicians and largely convinced them that their immigrant communities posed little threat to national security during and after the war. Unlike the widespread incarceration of Japanese Canadians and Americans and the hostility expressed towards black protestors, Germans escaped acts of systemic violence. Their whiteness allowed them to be treated as individuals rather than a monolithic group. While government officials may have believed some “bad apples” existed within German communities, they by and large accepted Germans as decent citizens because of their whiteness. While racialized North Americans experienced state-sanctioned discrimination on account of their race, German Lutherans could maintain controversial ethnic allegiances due to the privileges whiteness afforded them.

Moreover, German Lutherans celebrated their ethnic past through myths, commemorative acts, and foundational stories as a result of their white privilege. As several chapters made clear, German Lutherans mimicked other settler colonial narratives that normalized the presence of whites in North America. These narrative frameworks proved particularly useful for German immigrants as they allowed white settlers to appear “indigenous” or “entitled” to the land in which they lived. These narratives bolstered settler regimes in North America by erasing the presence of indigenous peoples and normalizing their marginalization while propping up German immigrants as members of the newly-native settler class, or as the “natural” owners of the land. Racialized North Americans simply could not access these narratives. Asian immigrants, for example, were “temporary sojourners” or, worse still, represented a hostile attempt by China and
Japanese to “take over” white countries. Celebrations of ethnic culture like the pioneer myth persisted because the ethnic elites advancing such myths were white. Moreover, ethnic elites occasionally advanced these narratives to directly ignore or minimize their complicity in racial discrimination and white supremacy. Popular myths about nineteenth-century German immigrants fighting to abolish slavery helped ethnic elites in St. Louis ignore the Missouri Synod’s pro-slavery past. During the decades in which debates about segregation engulfed the synod, these myths helped ethnic elites portray the synod as a benevolent and progressive institution. It masked their contemporary racism by valorizing a historically inaccurate past. In St. Louis and Waterloo County, celebrations of ethnic culture and white culture overlapped.

Lutheran churches moreover remained ethnic boundary zones because they were segregated spaces. The Missouri Synod in particular actively kept their congregations white, and therefore German, by barring black Lutherans from worshipping alongside them. Chapter five demonstrated that Lutheran congregations impacted by white flight made few efforts to rebuild their churches with new black members. Instead, they kept their churches white by either relocating or replacing old members with white Anglo-American laypeople instead. In doing so, the Missouri Synod maintained its English and German-language traditions without including other minority groups in the church. Although the Canada Synod never directly enforced a policy of segregation, chapter six showcased that Ontario congregations remained German spaces only because of their hostility towards Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants. Ethnic elites hoped to eliminate Latvian, Estonian, and other “foreign” language services and effectively integrate DPs

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into their German-English churches. In doing so, ethnic elites acted as the gatekeepers they otherwise resisted. The Missouri and Canada Synods kept their churches as ethnic boundary zones by excluding their racialized neighbors and other marginalized immigrants from their German churches.

In drawing connections between whiteness and ethnicity this dissertation engaged with previous American historians who critiqued whiteness studies and pushed the field in new directions. Most notably, it has provided nuance to the established narratives of an “ethnic reverie” in postwar United States. This narrative purports that immigrants largely adopted racial identities as whites and as Americans during the Second World War and its resulting decades. Immigrants only reverted back to their ethnic identities in the late 1960s and early 1970s as part of the “white ethnic revival.” As this narrative remains dominant in the field, historian Ronald Bayor asked future scholars to answer the following question: “After World War II, did a white identity dominate or did the prevalence of national identities persist and, if so, for how long?” This study has addressed Bayor’s question by suggesting the ethnic reverie narrative does not adequately capture the experiences of German Lutherans. Ethnicity continued to inform community debates and decisions throughout the 1940s and onwards. Simply put, there was no ethnic reverie that witnessed German Lutherans ignoring their ethnic heritage. A white identity did not dominate among Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Rather, whiteness provided a vehicle for German Lutherans to continue their ethnic identities. Race and ethnicity did not function as binary identities in German Lutheran communities, but rather

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worked in tandem to reinforce the other. Whiteness created the cultural and social conditions necessary for Germans to continue an ethnic identity during the decades with a strong anti-German bias.

This dissertation also addressed the critiques of Peter Kolchin, among others, that have criticized the field’s forerunners for producing national histories of whiteness that span over centuries. Due to their lack of temporal and geographic constraints, Kolchin suggested that whiteness often appears as ahistorical, always present but never changing, and is not properly grounded in specific communities during precise time periods. By using a case study approach, this dissertation found that German Lutherans simultaneously maintained ethnic and racial identities within their churches. Future historians hoping to address Kolchin’s critiques and Bayor’s questions would do well to examine how immigrants expressed their identities via religious institutions. As Kolchin notes, many previous whiteness studies focus on immigrants in the public sphere. Yet, within their ethnic boundary zones, this dissertation has argued that immigrants articulated white and ethnic identities in the midst of the “ethnic reverie.”

More significantly, this dissertation is one of the first studies in Canadian history to effectively racialize white European immigrants in the twentieth century. Many Canadian historians of ethnicity evaluate immigrants using the “new social history” approach of examining their subjects along the lines of class, gender, ethnicity, as well as region and sexuality. Race, however, appears notably absent among discussions of white immigrants. While other scholars have started to address whiteness and white supremacy in the nineteenth century, Canadian historians of the twentieth century typically use

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“white” as an adjective to describe their immigrant subjects rather than an analytical framework employed to understand how race shaped immigrant lives. Too often Canadian historians examine white supremacy through a legal or political lens that points out the ways in which the Canadian desire for a white settler nation shaped anti-Asian immigration policy, cultural genocide in residential schools, and enacted settlement policies that favoured white migrants at the expense of indigenous peoples.940 Yet this dissertation has demonstrated that whiteness existed outside of nativist calls for exclusionary immigration policies or a preference towards other Commonwealth countries.941 It also operated at cultural and ideological levels in immigrant communities like Waterloo County’s German Lutheran population. While this community never directly called for subjugation or exclusion of racialized peoples, they advanced a white ethnic culture that was inherently based around their racial status as whites. In doing so, this dissertation has addressed historian Constance Backhouse’s remark that Canadian historians believe race “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to marginalized groups.”942 German Lutherans did articulate a white racial identity, even if it remained couched in the language of ethnicity.

The German Lutheran experience demonstrates how important it is that future historians racialize white immigrants. Recent studies on ethnic diversity, largely centered

941 Laura Madokoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren eds., Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017).
in Western Canada, have adopted a rather celebratory tone that takes pride in Canada’s multiculturalism. In their overview of prairie immigrant history, Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen suggest that immigrants “shaped a distinct variation on the Canadian model of cultural diversity” in the prairies as a result of their “hybrid cultures [and] the vibrant ethnic networks developed by the immigrant communities.”\(^{943}\) In a similar vein, historian Frances Swyripa commends the various European immigrants that settled in Western Canada and made the prairies “a place of remarkable ethno-religious diversity, making it unique in the history of Canada.” After surveying how immigrants came to populate the prairie landscape with various commemorative acts including cemeteries, churches, parades, and memorials, she concludes that prairie immigrants “bred visibility and confidence” through their commemorative works.\(^{944}\) While I do not dispute the findings of previous scholars that have unearthed examples of immigrants successfully creating cultures of diversity, this dissertation has raised the question as to whether such celebrations of ethnic diversity were predicated on their whiteness. Indeed, German Lutherans helped “set the tone” in St. Louis and Waterloo County through a localized German culture in each of these communities, but only because of the privileges whiteness conferred upon them. The German Lutheran experience provides an important reminder that celebrations of ethnic and religious diversity can work comfortably within a culture that celebrates whiteness and reinforces the marginalization of racialized others. While proponents of a German Lutheran identity in North America provided a counterpoint to the exclusionary Anglo-Canadian and “100% American” identities


popular in the early and mid-twentieth centuries, their identities did seek to overhaul the inherently exclusionary basis of these nationalisms. Multiculturalism and ethnic diversity are not necessarily anti-racist philosophies, nor can they be relied upon to challenge the white supremacist identity that hides behind notions of nationality. These foundational myths were vitally important to white ethnic groups. German Lutherans successfully mobilized them to advocate for their loyalty, convince government officials to change their refugee legislation, and helped them feel more comfortable in their communities. It does not detract from this importance, however, to understand that this only occurred because of their white privilege. I hope future Canadian historians are more conscientious of whiteness as a category of historical analysis and can use it to shed light on the country’s racial disparities, both past and present.

I titled this work “Welcoming Strangers” as it conveys how race and ethnicity functioned in St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities in the mid-twentieth century. Their ethnicity often made them “strangers” in communities they had long called home. The Second World War and attempts to regulate aspects of immigrant life in the postwar period often put German Lutherans at odds with their Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American neighbours. Yet, their whiteness simultaneously ensured that these “strangers” were ultimately welcomed in their communities in ways that other racialized peoples were not. Whiteness helped cultivate bonds with political leaders that ensured they avoided large-scale internment during the war, and moreover allowed them to create ethnic foundational myths that parroted Anglo-Canadian and American narratives of pioneering and settlement. Whiteness helped German Lutherans justify their at-times controversial ethnic identities and heritage. Only by looking at the ways in which race and ethnicity interacted does it become fully clear how German
Lutherans were able to maintain a hybrid ethnic identity and successfully negotiate the pressures to assimilate.
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