May 2018

Ideology of Multiculturalism as a Double-Edged Sword: Second-Generation of Black Jamaicans and Dark-White Portuguese

Esra Ari
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Allahar, Anton L.
The University of Western Ontario

Co-Supervisor
Nunes, Fernando
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in Sociology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

© Esra Ari 2018

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5353

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact tadam@uwo.ca.
Abstract

This research examines the interlocking effects of race and class on the integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canadian society. Comparing a “visible minority group” (black Jamaicans) with a “non-visible minority group” (Portuguese) controls for the effects of “race,” assisting in the assessment of these two second-generation groups’ degrees of integration. This study uses an historical and critical approach to provide a background for the discussion of this study topic. The main research questions concern the role of multicultural ideology in both cementing social control and in the integration of working-class second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canada. To address these lines of inquiry, forty-three in-depth interviews were conducted with second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). There are two arguments this study develops that may be considered significant contributions to the literature. First, the ideology of multiculturalism is not merely a distraction from structural inequalities nor is it without value, for it can bear both negative and positive meanings when understood in the context of integration of second-generations. Second, this study argues that multiculturalism is a stepping stone to assimilation for immigrant groups, especially those that are racialized. The integration of second-generation Portuguese and Jamaicans into Canada’s mainstream social, economic, and political institutions is greatly limited in spite of the fact that its policy of multiculturalism promises equal access to institutions, regardless of national origin. Both Jamaican and Portuguese immigrants have been used as cheap labor since their arrival to Canada, which has contributed to the racialization of these two groups. Another factor that has racialized these groups is their culture, which diverges from the mainstream.

Accordingly, for the Portuguese their culture and low socio-economic positions give shade to their whiteness. In other words, this study argues that, the “social color” of the Portuguese has served to render them “dark-whites”. However, on the part of the Jamaicans, in addition to these two factors, the politics of race and color as well as the meanings assigned to their phenotype have blackened them. They are thus seen as “blacks” in a society, where skin color matters.
Keywords

multiculturalism, ideology, social class, racialization, assimilation, white privilege, dark-whites, identity construction, globalization, development, immigration, diaspora, integration, second-generations, Portuguese, Jamaican, Canada
Co-Authorship Statement

Chapter 1 is sole-authored.

Chapter 2 is sole-authored.

Chapter 3 is sole-authored.

Chapter 4 is Ari, Esra (principle author) and, Allahar, Anton L. (secondary author).

Chapter 5 is sole-authored.

Chapter 6 is sole-authored.
Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Anton Allahar. My intellectual journey would never have been complete without him. He has always been generous in sharing his wealth of knowledge and his time with me. Our hours-long conversations about my dissertation and “sociology” shaped my research and sharpened both my arguments and theoretical background of my research. Those critical exchanges are treasure to me, which is not easy to find. Without your patience, support, guidance, encouragement and belief in me, this project would not have been possible. I always feel lucky having you as my supervisor, although I don’t believe in luck in life.

I am also deeply indebted to my co-supervisor, Dr. Fernando Nunes. When I first contacted him about reaching the Portuguese community, we did not know each other. He never hesitated to help me, and since then, he has always been supportive to me for my dissertation research and within academia.

I would like to thank Dr. Erica Lawson, with whom I had a chance to discuss about my research time to time. I would also want to thank my other committee members, Dr. Carl James, Dr. Teresa Abada, and Dr. Laura Huey, who took the time to read my dissertation. I also appreciate Dr. Tracey Adams’ assistance for preparing my ethics application. Dr. Lorraine Davies and Dr. Kim Shuey, your help is highly appreciated as graduate program directors.

My love, Gokhan Erol, we have overcome many hurdles in this country. During my Ph.D. process, you were the only one who was there for me seven days a week and twenty-four hours a day. Not only your emotional support, but also our provocative discussions, have always kept me motivated.

Dear Secil, Erden, Arda and Kaan, thank you for making me feel at home during my fieldwork in Toronto. My friends, Annaliese Pope, Cliff Davidson and Allison Cordoba, thank you for being around during these challenging years of my Ph.D. program. Dear Randa, Lorraine, Ray, Anton Allahar and Anne Allahar, our dinner meetings were wonderful
breaks in my hectic life. And dearest Fatos, thank you for staying in our tiny apartment for three months, helping us and cooking delicious meals.

Lastly, my parents, Halil and Servet Ari, they have never hesitated to support me throughout my education. My father is the most unusual dad I have ever seen. When I was desperate to graduate from my programme, contrarily, he always encouraged me to take more time during my Ph.D. to work on a project that I am passionate about and to take slow but sure steps. My mom, in spite of the Atlantic Ocean between us and the time difference, I was always able to hear your voice whenever I needed. Thank you.
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. i
Co-Authorship Statement .................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ....................................................................................................................... ix
List of Appendices ............................................................................................................. x
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................ 1
  1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
    1.1 Purpose of the Study and Research Question ......................................................... 1
    1.2 Theoretical Framework and Contextualizing the Problem ...................................... 3
    1.3 Dissertation Outline ............................................................................................... 16
    1.4 Research Methodology .......................................................................................... 19
    1.5 References ............................................................................................................. 28
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................ 41
  2 A Comparative Immigration History: Situating Portuguese and Jamaican Immigration
    in the Global Political Economy ..................................................................................... 41
    2.1 The Point of Departure ........................................................................................... 41
    2.2 An Historical-Structural Approach and Global Labor Migration ......................... 42
      2.2.1 Primitive accumulation of capital .................................................................... 45
      2.2.2 Expansion of immigration routes ................................................................. 47
    2.3 A Brief Theoretical Introduction to Globalization, Neoliberalism, and
        Immigration .............................................................................................................. 48
    2.4 A Brief History of Jamaica ...................................................................................... 50
    2.5 A Brief History of Portugal .................................................................................... 55
    2.6 How Portuguese Became Dark-Whites ................................................................. 59
2.7 A “Free” and Unified World Economy: Reflections on Jamaica and Portugal.... 62
2.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 65
2.9 References ......................................................................................................... 67

Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................... 75
3 Class, Race and Labor Market Integration of the Portuguese and Jamaican Diaspora in the Context of Canadian Immigration History ........................................................................... 75
  3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 75
  3.2 Immigration, “Race,” and the Nation-Building Process in Canada ............... 77
  3.3 Labor Market Dynamics and Situating Jamaican and Portuguese Immigration in Canada’s Immigration History .................................................................................................................. 82
    3.3.1 Labor market incorporation of immigrants ............................................... 82
    3.3.2 Jamaicans and labor market integration ................................................... 86
    3.3.3 Portuguese and labor market integration .................................................. 89
  3.4 Post-1962 Canadian Immigration, Globalization and Nationalism ............ 92
  3.5 Multiculturalism and the Nation-Building Process in Canada ..................... 95
  3.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 101
  3.7 References ......................................................................................................... 103

Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................... 111
4 Ideology of Multiculturalism as a Double-Edged Sword: Second-generation of Black Jamaicans and Dark-White Portuguese ................................................................................................. 111
  4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 111
  4.2 Ideology and Its Functions .................................................................................. 115
  4.3 Multiculturalism as an Ideology and Multiculturalism as a Policy .............. 118
  4.4 Broken Promises of Official Multiculturalism .............................................. 120
    4.4.1 The Portuguese community in Canada .................................................... 121
    4.4.2 The Jamaican community in Canada ....................................................... 126
  4.5 Limited Integration of Second-Generation Portuguese and Jamaicans ......... 129
List of Tables

Table 1: Occupation of Women, Age 18-64 by Ethno-Racial Group, Toronto CMA, 2001, by percentage .......................................................... 122

Table 2: Occupation of Men, Age 18-64 by Ethno-Racial Group, Toronto CMA, 2001, by percentage .......................................................... 123
List of Appendices

Appendix A: Ethics Approval ......................................................................................................................... 221
Appendix B: Email Script for Recruitment ...................................................................................................... 222
Appendix C: Letter of Information .................................................................................................................. 223
Appendix D: Jamaican-Canadians Flyer .......................................................................................................... 227
Appendix E: Portuguese-Canadians Flyer ....................................................................................................... 228
Appendix F: Interview Guide .......................................................................................................................... 229
Appendix G: Characteristics of Participants (Second-generation Jamaicans) .............................................. 232
Appendix H: Characteristics of Participants (Second-generation Portuguese) .............................................. 233
Chapter 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Study and Research Question

In 2016, second-generation immigrants, i.e., those born in Canada and who had at least one foreign-born parent, constituted 17.7 percent of the total Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2017a). The number of racialized second-generation or new second-generation (Portes and Zhou, 1993) in Canada has been growing due to the increasing number of immigrants of color after the drop of white-only immigration policies in 1962 (Green & Green, 1999, p. 431). By 2016, South Asians were the largest “visible minority” group (25.1 percent of the “visible minority” population), followed by Chinese (20.5 percent of the “visible minority” population) and blacks (15.6 percent of the “visible minority” population) (Statistics Canada, 2017b).

This research focuses on the racialized second-generation because this group works well for an assessment of the long-term impact of the integration of racial minorities into Canadian society. Not only are they a sizeable component of society, but racialized immigrants will obviously influence the course of Canadian society (Arthur, Chaves, Este, & Frideres, 2008; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007; Reitz & Somerville, 2004). Furthermore, since they are more likely to face discrimination compared European second-generations, it is imperative to examine the effect of discrimination on the process of their integration. According to Reitz and Banerjee’s (2007) analysis of the Ethnic Diversity Survey, second-generation blacks reported the highest level of perceived discrimination with 60.9 percent at the beginning of the 21st century followed by second-generation South-Asians with 43.4 percent and second-generation Chinese with 34.5 percent (pp. 8-10) where the policy of multiculturalism is celebrated almost among all European and racialized groups. Some statistical data clearly show that among various
racialized and European originated second-generation groups, blacks, and specifically Jamaicans, are the most marginalized in the educational institutions and labor market (Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 10-13, 2014, p. 83; Aydemir, Chen, & Corak, 2005, pp. 37-38; James, 2012, pp.472-473). Furthermore, compared to white and other racialized groups, blacks, especially young men, are more likely to be stopped and questioned by the police (Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011, p. 398; Wortley & Tanner, 2005, p. 596). The skin color of blacks, hence, informs their everyday life.

However, one of the European groups, the Portuguese evidences similar statistics in the area of education (Abada et al., 2008, p. 27; Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 10–13; Anisef, Brown, Sweet, & Walters, 2010, p. 18). Indeed, in Ontario, second-generation Portuguese had the lower level of university completion rate with 17 percent, while it was 24 percent for second-generation Jamaicans (Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 10–13). In the labor market, they, especially males, are more likely to assume the manual low-status jobs they inherit from their fathers, as compared to other European groups. Nunes (2003, 2008, 2014) emphasized that since Portuguese are categorized under the European groups, their integration problems are overlooked.

Departing from this point, this study aims to examine the interlocking effects of race and class on the economic and social integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canadian society. Comparing a “visible minority group” (black Jamaicans) with “non-visible minority group” (Portuguese) will control for the effects of race and assist in the assessment of these two second-generation groups’ degrees of integration. The main research question of this study is “What role does multicultural ideology play in integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into multiethnic Canada?” Although there is some research on the integration of second-generation immigrants in Canada, most studies lack a political-economic analysis, which results in an oversimplified understanding of the issue. This dissertation, in contrast, addresses the issue of integration from a historical and political-economy perspective and
calls for an examination of racialization and racism in relation to capitalist development and social class.

The immigration history of Jamaicans and Portuguese to Canada goes back to the 1950s. Immigration from Portugal began with men working in manual labor to fill the positions that were mainly in construction and often unionized (Bloemraad, 2009, p. 164; Marques & Medeiros, 1980, p. 37). On the other hand, Jamaican immigration to Canada started mainly with women who worked as caregivers (Satzewich, 1990, pp. 335–336). In terms of population ratios, as of 2016, 1.4 percent of the Canadian population claim Portuguese origin, and 0.9 percent of the Canadian population claim Jamaican origin (Statistics Canada, 2017c).

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Contextualizing the Problem

When we speak of a global economic system, there is no single place on Earth that is untouched by capitalism (Frank, 1967, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974). In response to the constant economic crisis of overproduction and underconsumption across the advanced capitalist countries, Western Europe colonized the rest of the world in order to find new markets and accumulate capital, which led to “newly expansionist form of capitalism” (Bonacich, 1980, p. 13; Ross & Trachte, 1990, pp. 21). The imperial ambitions of European powers created a geographical shift in the investment of capital and extraction of surplus (Allahar, 1995, p. 142). New regions were incorporated into the global production and trade chains. Capitalist production relations penetrated even the remotest precapitalist areas and this expansionist form of capitalism integrated these areas into the dominant economic world system (Frank, 1973, p. 11).

Meanwhile, the infiltration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral areas, i.e., underdeveloped areas, has undermined local economies and accelerated urban and rural change in those regions. Uneven capitalist development and economic restructuring on a
global scale have led to the displacement of peasants, rapid urbanization, growth of informal economies, and poverty in periphery regions (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, pp. 112-113; Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004, p. 20; Massey et al., 1993, p. 446). These economic changes have generated a reserve army of labor that is vulnerable to capitalist exploitation.

Crushing poverty among working class people in the periphery drove them to migrate to core regions and to sell their labor cheaper for survival (Bonacich, 1972, p. 549). This study accentuates the forced nature of this kind of migration because harsh economic consequences of the unequal capitalist development in the periphery have impelled people to immigrate to developed or core countries in search of a means to support themselves and their families. As stated by Hochschild (2003), “coercion is not occurring by physical force or through the barrel of a gun but through sheer economic conditions” (pp. 26-27).

Canada is among the developed countries with the highest number of immigrant flows from all national and ethno-cultural backgrounds; this began in 1962 because it was in dire need of labor (Arat-Koc, 1999; Green & Green, 1999; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). In this context, this dissertation is mainly concerned with the diaspora whose members were forced to leave their countries for better lives in the “land of opportunities.” Poverty has inspired many to immigrate to the core countries from various periphery and semi-periphery countries. This study will look at the children of immigrants coming from Jamaica (the periphery) and Portugal (the semi-periphery of the world economy and the periphery of Europe) to Canada to improve their economic living standards.

Being first and foremost a capitalist country, the desire to meet the shifting demands of the labor market has created an ethnically and a racially diverse immigrant society in Canada. The fact that immigrants of color will work cheaply at arduous tasks has created forms of racism among higher paid white workers towards migrant groups (Abele &
Stasiulis, 1989, p. 241) because white workers have had a fear of being replaced by the less expensive labor. For instance, in the early and mid-twentieth century, white union members collaborated to keep black labor away from better-paying jobs on railways, even though some of them were highly-educated (Calliste, 1987, pp. 3-4). Although eastern and southern European immigrants were treated with suspicion, the strongest forms of racism were reserved for non-white minorities such as blacks and Indians (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 111). With a view to minimizing ethnic conflict due to labor competition, the Canadian government officially declared and implemented multicultural policies. In 1971, Canada was the first country to declare multiculturalism as an official policy (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007, p. 35).

In response to social and political changes the focus of multicultural policies has evolved over the years since their implementation. In the 1970s official multiculturalism was premised on the idea that cultural diversity, or pluralism, is an integral part of the nation building process in Canada. The government promised to preserve each ethnic community and to recognize all cultures as being equal in value (Fleras, 2009, pp. 63-65). Accordingly, government resources were allocated to different ethnic groups to preserve their language and certain aspects of their popular cultures such as dance and music (Berry, 2013, p. 665)

By the 1980s, however, the government ceased providing resources to preserve ethnic cultures (Jedwab, 2008, p. 26) and equity related concerns were brought to the fore. Proactive, anti-racist policies were developed to alleviate the economic disparities among ethnic groups (Fleras, 2009, p.65; Satzewich and Liokadis, 2017, p.163). This is the period when the Employment Equity Act of 1986 was created acknowledging that there was in fact systemic discrimination in the labor market, and said act sought to alleviate institutional racism in the workplace (Henry and Tator, 2010, pp.84-85).
Starting with the 1990s, multiculturalism policies have again changed as they shifted to more of a civic multiculturalism with an aim to break down the “ghettoization” of ethnic groups (Fleras, 2009, p. 68). This was an attempt to minimize the use of the hyphen, e.g., Jamaican-Canadian or Portuguese-Canadian, to foster a common sense of national identity and to develop a shared citizenship. Later in the 2000s, immigrants of color themselves were assigned the responsibility and duty to better integrate into Canadian society (Satzewich and Liokadis, 2013, p. 164) as it is defined by the mainstream culture. Therefore, contrary to what was initially promised, the preservation of each cultural group, immigrants themselves are now asked to make the effort to become similar to the mainstream. Moreover, that mainstream, it must be noted, is not static as new immigrants too will have an impact, albeit slower, on its shape and direction. Although the public in general think that multicultural policies aim at preserving different cultural groups, government funds have been allocated to ensure that minority groups become more Canadian, which indeed results in assimilation rather than the multiculturalism that enshrines cultural diversity.

Within a multiethnic society, the capitalist class uses racism or racialization as a tool to divide the working class for different reasons: to cheapen the labor, to create a flexible and easily replaceable workforce to do the dirty work in the secondary labor market, and to keep the working class disorganized (Bonacich, 1980, pp. 13-14). Acknowledging the fact that any particular ethnic/racial immigrant group is not homogenous because of the divisions along class and gender lines, still, racialized immigrant groups are collectively less privileged than other immigrant groups (Abele & Stasiulis, 1989, p. 241; Block & Galabuzi, 2011, p. 12). At the end of the twentieth century, a report breaking down the economic performance of racialized groups by nationality based on 1996 census data showed that the highest level of low income and unemployment were among some African and the Caribbean groups, Latin American groups, East and South Asian groups, and Arab and Middle Eastern groups. In Toronto, which is the biggest and most
prosperous metropolis in Canada, the rates of low income and unemployment among these groups was almost three times higher than European groups (Galabuzi, 2001, p. 57). This report emphasizes the fact that poverty is “racialized” in Canada.

According to my interviews and literature, both Portuguese and Jamaican diasporas have made their way to Canada due to the scarce economic resources in their home countries (Anderson & Higgs, 1976; Jones, 2008). However, a few of the second-generation Portuguese research participants indicated that their parents left their country because of Salazar’s (the prime minister of Portugal between 1932 and 1968) authoritarian regime.

Although both flows of immigrants from Portugal and Jamaica began because of poverty during the 1950s (Higgs, 1982; Nunes, 1998; Satzewich, 1990; Teixeira & Da Rosa, 2000; Walker, 2012), there are some important differences between the two communities in terms of their integration into Canadian society. For instance, according to the National Household Survey, although the Portuguese diaspora has a lower level of education than the Jamaican diaspora, they have a higher level of employment income (Statistics Canada, 2011b). Besides economic integration, my interviews with second-generation Portuguese and Jamaican immigrants illustrated that by the second-generation, the Portuguese seem strongly connected to Canada and proud of being a Canadian. A significant number of second-generation Jamaican-Canadians, on the other hand, feel Canadian just because they were born in Canada and feel privileged in some ways, e.g., having free health care and easy travel across borders because of their Canadian passports. However, they are not seen as Canadian by the majority and are stereotyped as being “violent, lazy, loud, not intelligent, criminal and hopeless” (Allahar, 2010, p. 74; James, 2012, p. 467).

Second-generation Jamaicans encounter prejudice, which has resulted in discrimination towards them. My Jamaican participants feel they are under constant surveillance. They are suspected of theft at stores; some are carded by police; and others catch people’s eyes
on the bus and subway or outside of their neighborhood. Hence, for a significant number of them, Canada is not a real home, but it is Africa although they don’t plan to go back and build a life in one of the African countries. Furthermore, differently from second-generation Portuguese, second-generation black Jamaicans in Canada were “rediasporazied.” First, their ancestors were forcibly transported from Africa to the colonial periphery, for example, the Caribbean region, as slave labor. From there, blacks made their ways to Europe and America in search of better economic opportunities (Farred, 1996, p. 29).

Nonetheless, there are also some similarities between the two groups which render this study sociologically compelling. Similar to Jamaican-Canadians, when compared to other non-visible groups in Canada, Portuguese immigrants, although categorized as “white,” share less economic prosperity and have been underrepresented in political and cultural domains compared to most of the European groups in Canada (Nunes 1998, 2003). Not recognized as visible minorities, their educational levels are lower; they are highly concentrated in manual labor such as construction and cleaning; and they have lower income from employment than most of the European-originated immigrants (Higgs, 1982; Januário & Marujo, 2000; Kenedy & Nunes, 2012; Marques & Medeiros, 1980; Nunes, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2014). The Portuguese in Canada are an overwhelmingly working-class community and second-generation Portuguese take on similar working-class positions (Nunes, 2003, p. 140). Second-generation Portuguese, similar to second-generation Jamaicans, experience underachievement and have an over 30 percent school dropout rate, which is around 40 percent for the English-speaking Caribbean (Anisef et al., 2010, p. 18; Davis, 2012, p. 339). University completion rates of second-generation Portuguese are lower than those of European and some racialized groups (Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 13-14). Second-generation Portuguese as a non-visible minority are therefore a significant population to be studied.
Facing economic, social and cultural marginalization as a non-visible immigrant group, this study argues that Portuguese are a racialized community, and hence that group is treated as “dark-whites” which is a term proposed by Harney (1990, p. 113). This term does not refer to the skin color of Portuguese but to their social color, their poor socio-economic position in Canada, and their culture, such as their belief in Catholicism, which deviates from the Anglo-Saxon Protestant norm. However, since Portuguese immigrants have been amalgamated under the white European category, their problems have remained less researched compared to visible minorities in Canada (Nunes, 2008, 2014). By including this group into this research in comparison to the second-generation blacks, the aim is to include this forgotten immigrant group in the research and policy documents.

The light or white skin color of second-generation Portuguese makes their issue of integration a different case than second-generation Jamaicans. The skin color of Portuguese does not take on a negative meaning. For instance, they are not suspected of criminal activity and they don’t have frequent interactions with the police in their everyday lives. Some literature and the interviews conducted for this study also show that they don’t feel discriminated against in Canada (Oliveira & Teixeria, 2004, p. 15; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007, p. 5). However, race does inform everyday lives of second-generation Jamaicans in that one’s skin color has significant consequences such as police carding in 21st century “multicultural” Canada.

This study contends that holding a visible marker of being racially different is still an obstacle to the integration process of immigrants of color in “multicultural” Canada. Furthermore, it posits that racial identity is less flexible for immigrants of color than for whites. This trend for immigrants of color continues even into future generations, which is different from non-visible minorities. Although some second-generation Jamaican participants had acquired “proper” English, are imbued with Canadian values such as “democracy” and “tolerance” and are in line with dominant dress codes, they are still
more likely to be perceived as black by the rest of the Canadian society and do not easily integrate.

Racial and ethnic identities are socially constructed and they are reconstructed throughout the historical process as a response to social, economic and political changes (Allahar, 2001, 2006; Bonacich, 1980; Hall, 1990, 1996; James, 2003; Nagel, 1994; Waters, 1994). However, the literature and participant interviews clearly accentuate that the history of slavery, colonization and the needs of the labor market have made blackness less flexible. Slavery was abolished in the 19th century, but this does not change the fact that ideological justifications of slavery — racism in this context of research as well as religious ideologies — are still very strong and have real consequences.

However, even while saying that, caution must be taken to avoid overgeneralization. The interviews clearly reveal that social class makes a significant difference in the integration process of second-generation immigrants. Middle-class second-generation Jamaicans see Canada as their home and have smoother experiences than their working-class counterparts in the dominant white Anglo-Saxon culture because they are economically, socially, and culturally better equipped to deal with racism when they face it (Allahar, 2010, p. 81). Supporting this argument, the interviews reveal that second-generation Portuguese with economic difficulties have more concerns with race relations than their middle-class counterparts in Canada. For instance, they see various affirmative actions directed towards visible minorities as an unfair treatment towards whites such as themselves. This study therefore reveals the fact that race matters, but so does social class, and often in a way that supersedes the effects of race.

As mentioned, the main research question of this study is the role of multicultural ideology in the integration of second-generation immigrants into multiethnic Canada. Multicultural ideology is embraced by second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese who are making Canada their home, even if not by all of second-generation Jamaicans. The
majority truly believe that multiculturalism is part of their identity and think that multiculturalism is an inclusive and anti-racist model which enables immigrants to make a smooth transition into Canadian society.

Critical literature on multicultural ideology (Ali, 2008; Chazan, Helps, Stanley, & Thakkar, 2011; Fleras, 2014; Srivastava, 2007) has argued that the majority of immigrants buy into multicultural ideology without having a critical understanding of that concept. Indeed, multicultural ideology is used to maintain social control over various ethnic groups by the state. In this sense, they are in a state of false consciousness because they are not able to perceive structural and institutional discrimination in so-called multicultural Canada and they think the policy of multiculturalism offers equal rights to everyone, regardless of one’s race, ethnicity, and origin country. Symbolic manifestations such as food and festivals are shown as proof of multiculturalism by immigrants of color. Srivastava (2007) named this tendency the “3D approach — one celebrates dance, dress, and dining but fails to take into account the multiple dimensions of racial and social inequality” (p. 291). The multicultural ideology, by distorting reality, deceives immigrants of Canada and makes them believe that a multicultural policy improves the chances of fair treatment of minorities and tolerance towards different cultures.

Multicultural ideology carries a negative connotation as a distortion of reality within this context. This situation has been described by the term of false consciousness, which refers to an ideology distorting human beings’ understanding of social reality (Larrain, 1979, p. 14). The negative meaning of ideology derives from Marx and Engels (1847). Marx and Engels (1847) contended that ideology obscured the real nature of relations of production, exploitative in reality, which do not appear on the surface (as cited in Hall, 1996b, p. 34). Bourgeois notions of freedom and equality conceal the exploitation of waged labor, ownership, property and expropriation of surplus value under the alleged equal market exchange of labor and wages. According to Marx and Engels (1847), “the
ideas of ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (p. 21).

Therefore, there is one ideology, which is bourgeois ideology and distorts the reality of exploitative relationships between the working class and the bourgeoisie, hence perpetuating the domination of the ruling class. Accordingly, multicultural ideology is a tool in the hands of the ruling class of Canada and second-generation immigrants, who support the idea of multiculturalism, are deceived and are not able to perceive how they are exploited for the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Before jumping to a conclusion that embracing multicultural ideology is simply a false consciousness, and with an eye towards maintaining a critical approach, this study calls for elaborating the term ideology further from the Marxist perspective and trying to understand why second-generation immigrants embrace multicultural ideology to integrate into white Canadian society. The argument is that not all second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese are simply in a state of false consciousness. Ideologies provide explanations about the political reality around us, give meaning to the ambiguities of the world, and order to our lives. They perform a variety of significant functions for individuals and groups and not just for governments or the ruling classes [emphasis added] (Rejai, 1991, p. 19). From this perspective, multicultural ideology is manipulated by the second-generation of immigrants to provide rationales to themselves for integrating into Canadian society. They interpret their material realities though the lenses of multicultural ideology and use it in a rational way to develop strategies for their material, cultural and social needs. In this process, second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese take part in remolding multicultural ideology in Canada.

The evolution of ideology from a negative to positive meaning, in the Marxist tradition, was first institutionalized by Lenin (Larrain, 1979, p. 15; McLellan, 1995, p. 22). For Lenin (1963, p. 71), there was not only bourgeois ideology but also proletarian ideology. There are two class ideologies instead of just bourgeoisie ideology as false
consciousness. Ideology for Lenin was a set of ideas and theories which expressed the interests of a class (as cited in Larrain, 1979, p. 76). Hence, as opposed to Marx and Engels, ideology in itself does not have to be negative; what rendered ideology negative for Lenin were the class interests that an ideology may serve (cited in McLellan, 1995, p. 22). The concept now encompasses a true form of consciousness as well as a distorted form of it and hence, when speaking about ideology, it may imply negative or positive meanings (Larrain, 1979, p. 76). Furthermore, whether true or false, those meanings are useful because they can be used in class struggle (Cristea, 2013, p. 169). From this perspective, the adoption of multicultural ideology by Portuguese and Jamaicans can be read connotatively as positive. Working-class second-generation immigrants adopt multicultural ideology to defend and promote their interests as a social and economic class. The concept, therefore, embraces rational forms of consciousness as well because an ideology can be used by oppressed groups to empower themselves. Still, some of the second-generation Jamaican participants see multicultural ideology as false consciousness because they believe that it serves the interests of the white ruling class.

Now comes the uniqueness of this research. As mentioned, almost all of the critical literature about multiculturalism in Canada perceives multicultural ideology as false consciousness or useless. However, this study, while maintaining an awareness of the negative understanding of ideology, reminds us of the useful functions of multicultural ideology. To most of the second-generation Portuguese and Jamaicans, consciously or unconsciously, adopting multicultural ideology is a rational choice and necessary as a response to structural constraints to create strategies for their social and economic integration into a white Anglo-Saxon, capitalist society. Hence, this study argues that it is more complicated than simply contending that multicultural ideology is without value and foolish because it distorts reality. It is not simply imposed upon second-generation immigrants; multicultural ideology is also utilized by an exploited class in a specific
context to defend their own interests. Accordingly, not only is it a tool of the ruling class but also a tool of the racialized working class, that also has agency.

This approach brings us closer to the Gramscian analysis of ideology. Gramsci was opposed to the statement of ideology as a false consciousness and embraced a positive meaning of ideology (Hall, 1996, p. 433; Larrain, 1979, p. 80; McLellan, 1995, p. 25). To him, ideologies were not simply inversions of reality or an illusionary expression of reality. On the contrary, ideologies are shaped and sustained within real material conditions of a society. They are constructed upon specific circumstances of people’s lives as responses to their structural realities (Gramsci, 1971, p. 164). The practical concerns and needs of everyday life and lived experiences lead people to interpret the ideologies. Hence, ideologies are born out of everyday situations of people and are dependent on a particular context (Hall, 1996, p. 434).

Ideology as a world view may act to unify and cement people as a counter-movement to dominant groups. Historically, organic ideologies — which have a real effect on the world — sometimes organize masses and create a terrain on which people acquire consciousness and create strategies to struggle (Gramsci, 1971, p. 377), although not all of them are equally successful. They can provide frameworks which organize the ways of resistance against the dominant social order. For instance, the ideology of Marxism and its humanistic content mobilized the student/youth movement in the 1960s. This movement created a broad social awareness about nuclear wars, poverty, racism, women’s rights, natives, and the imperialist control of the South (Allahar, 1986, pp. 625-627). In this sense, ideologies can be employed by various groups, either for domination or for creating alternative ways to resist oppression. Similarly, some of the second-generation Jamaicans, in this research, transform the official multicultural ideology in a way that allows them to attain their economic and political goals as a response to structural inequalities, e.g., in education and labor market institutions.
Gramsci argued that consciousness of the oppressed people is a complex amalgam of ideas absorbed from the ruling class and notions which spring from these people’s practical experiences (cited in Eagleton, 1991, p. 36). Accordingly, the ruling ideology does not simply seize us. The philosophical categories and concepts of ideologies interact with the lived experiences of people. Individuals interpret these concepts, give meanings to their lived experiences, reformulate these categories, and act accordingly (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 164-165). Therefore, ideologies have a dialectical nature; they both shape our ideas and they are also shaped within a specific context (Bailey & Gayle, 2003, p. 27). Contrary to Marx’s idea of ideology, to Gramsci, ideology diffused in complex ways. Therefore, there is not only one dominant ideology which pervades everything but rather there are multiple ideologies (Hall, 1996, p. 434).

In this research, multicultural ideology serves in various ways to integrate second-generation immigrants of color and non-visible immigrants. There are three patterns of adaptation among the participants. First, some second-generation blacks deploy multiculturalism to achieve a better resource distribution and to struggle against discrimination in areas of the labor market, education, and in their everyday lives. In this sense, multicultural ideology, in a positive way, functions as a tool for creating strategies to manipulate the system. For instance, for jobs, they leverage their racial identity by applying as “visible minorities” when claiming to be Jamaican and African and checking the boxes labelled “visible minorities” to receive special consideration in competitive job market (Allahar, 2001, p.205). Being rational, they use their agency to create some opportunities for themselves in the labor market where they are discriminated against. Second, some second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese embrace multiculturalism because they believe that it is an antidote to racism and gives them an opportunity to be exposed to different experiences such as ethnic food and festivals. This leads to an understanding of the 3D approach, and hence multicultural ideology functions to distort reality and they fail to recognize multiple dimensions of...
inequality even though some do experience racism in their everyday lives. Third, some other second-generation Jamaicans cannot even situate themselves in Canada because, for them, multiculturalism is a lie in the hands of the ruling class used to control and obtain social order.

The term of “ideology,” specifically, multicultural ideology, is a significant sociological concept in this research. The argument is that both negative and positive interpretations of ideology have a strong conceptual power to allow us to grasp the role of multicultural ideology in the integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canadian society. Furthermore, the interpretation and use of multicultural ideology depend heavily on social class and racial and ethnic background.

1.3 Dissertation Outline

This section outlines the structure of this dissertation. Each chapter is designed as a separate manuscript with a specific purpose and argument. Nevertheless, each is interconnected and builds upon the others.

Chapter 2 (Manuscript 1) begins with a historical political and the economic analysis of immigration from the periphery, Jamaica and the semi-periphery, Portugal to the core, Canada. In this manuscript, it is argued labor migration cannot be studied independently of the development of capitalism, the history of slavery, colonization and the invasion of Native peoples’ lands. The term “dark-white” (Harney, 1990) is introduced to refer to the Portuguese community in Canada and the historical and sociological reasoning behind this term, and will be used in the articles that follow. In this article, there is a greater focus on the historical roots of the term. This chapter draws from literature on globalization (Cox, 1996; Eitzen & Zinn, 2006; Steger, 2002), labor migration (Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004; Massey et al., 1993; Sassen, 1988; Wallerstein, 1984), capitalism and development (Frank, 1967, 1972, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974, 2000), neoliberalism (Harvey,
2005; Wiegersma, 1997), and the Marxist concept of “primitive accumulation” (Allahar, 1990; Marx, 1887).

Chapter 3 (Manuscript 2) aims to situate Jamaican and Portuguese immigrants in the historical context of Canada’s attempt at nation building until today and their integration in the labor market. Canada as a settler colony was no exception to the tendency to rely on the ideology of nationalism to unify the nation. This article argues that the need for cheap labor supplies was the decisive factor behind the shift from ethnic nationalism — Anglo-conformity — to civic nationalism in the nation-building process of Canada. The whites-only immigration policy was dropped due to the economic needs of Canada, and immigrants of color were allowed in. Ethnicity and race, after this point, have served to support capitalist exploitation instead of a direct exclusion from Canada. This chapter draws from literature on nationalism (Allahar, 2004; Smith, 2001), immigration to Canada (Arat-Koc, 1999; Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003; Hawkins, 1991; Malarek, 1987; Satzewich, 1990; Sharma, 2006; Simmons, 2010), split labor market theory (Bonacich, 1972, 1980), and dual labor market theory (Piore, 1979).

Chapter 4 (Manuscript 3) investigates the main question of this research: the role of multicultural ideology in the integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into multiethnic Canada within capitalist economic relations. It is argued that the role of multicultural ideology is more complex than simply labelling second-generation of immigrants as being in a state of false consciousness. This research reveals that the ideology of multiculturalism can be used both in a negative sense in terms of leaving the exploitative economic relations and systematic racism intact by distracting both second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese from the inequalities beneath the surface, and in a positive sense in terms of empowering second-generations to struggle with racism and economic disenfranchisement. The theoretical framework of this chapter derives from the sociological concepts of ideology (Allahar, 1986; Baldus, 1977; Eagleton, 1991; Gramsci, 1971; Larraín, 1979; McLellan, 1995), multiculturalism (Bissoondath, 1993;

Chapter 5 (Manuscript 4) examines identity construction among second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese in Toronto. In this chapter, there is a discussion of identity construction as a dialectical process that occurs between the self-perception of racialized populations and the other’s perception, arguing that Portuguese are dark-whites because of their social color. Jamaicans, on the other hand, are blacks due to the history of slavery, their phenotypical characteristics, racism, power relationships, and color symbolism. The theories and concepts which guide this paper are diaspora (Allahar, 2010; Clifford, 1994; Cohen, 1994; Safran, 1991), identity construction (Allahar, 1996, 2001, 2006; Hall, 1990, 1991, 1996; James, 2003, 2005; Nagel, 1994; Waters, 2010), segmented assimilation theory (Gans, 1992b; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997), hybrid cultures and identities (Cohen, 1994; Plaza, 2006; Vertovec, 2001; Yon, 2000), transnationalism (Vertovec, 2009), and whiteness (Barrett & Roediger, 2012; Frankenberg, 1993; James, 2003; McIntosh, 2004; Murguia & Forman, 2003; Roediger, 2002; Satzewich 2000, 2007; Wildman & Davis, 2012).

The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) summarizes the major findings, unifies the themes of each chapter and provides a discussion on the limitations, contributions and policy implications of this research. In this concluding chapter, the current state of multiculturalism will be briefly analysed with specific emphasis on increasing anti-
Muslim discourse such as the Syrian refugee crisis and the role of multiculturalism in mediating this discourse.

1.4 Research Methodology

This study utilizes qualitative research methodology in order to answer the research question: “What is the role of multicultural ideology in the integration of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canadian society?” Qualitative methodology is crucial because it has a power to produce sociological explanations by answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions rather than simply giving descriptive information or exploring what is happening (Mason, 1996, p. 6). It enables researchers to uncover complex social issues, which requires a critical inquiry and an in-depth analysis because the meanings attached to social actions are rarely visible on the surface (Miller & Crabtree, 2004, p. 188; Neuman, 2011, pp. 100-101). By using qualitative data analysis, this research aims to produce social explanations on the basis of rich, contextual and detailed data.

Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted as a qualitative data collection technique because they are designed with the goal of understanding the lived experiences of others and determine the meanings they attached to their experiences (Seidman, 2006, p. 9-10). They are an inclusive form of data collection as they allow for interaction with people, to talk to them, to listen to them and to gain access to their accounts (Mason, 1996, p. 40). Indeed, as mentioned by Miller and Crabtree (2004, p. 188), interviews can be seen as a “partnership” or “communicative journey” in which there are two active participants, both the interviewee and the interviewer. Accordingly, I respected and recognized the knowledge and experiences of the participants of this research, and during the interviews, asked some further questions to expand on their experiences and knowledge. As Gill Valentine (1997) argued, interviews are “sensitive and people oriented, allowing interviewees to construct their own accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words” (p. 111).
This dissertation is aimed at understanding migration and the perception of multiculturalism by these two groups in Canada. There are two complementary approaches that maybe found in my thesis to situate my work theoretically. First, I use a macro perspective or a grand theory, historical materialism, to speak about colonization, migration, underdevelopment and cheap labor that serves the interests of capital.

Historical materialism enables this present research to draw a more comprehensive picture, and to situate the argument of this study in a larger structural-institutional perspective (Cameron, 1985, 24-25). This does not mean that individuals, their choices and stories are not important. Rather, they are meaningful as long as they are linked to the wider institutional contexts in which they are situated. The critical materialist approach of this study encompasses the historical, economic, cultural and political processes that shaped the empirical context of this research. Moreover, according to the historical materialist approach, although there is a dialectical interaction among all these processes the economic influence is the greatest. Engels (1978) said it best when he underlined the central part played by economics in a materialist conception of history, but at the same time he cautioned us against a determinist reliance on economics to the exclusion of history, politics, culture and other forces.

According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase (760).
Second, when it comes to an understanding of multiculturalism and how it is perceived by members of my two groups, I resorted more to mid-range theory to deal with the more micro concerns of feeling and belonging. The second theoretical approach that complements the first thus is mid-range theories. They, on the simplest level, link macro and micro level of analysis (Hedström & Udehn, 2011). Mid-range theories lie in between grand theories such as historical materialism which claim to develop complete and unified theories and micro theories such as an interpretative approach/ interactionist perspective which are based on interpretation of particular situations. Mid-range theories don’t totally refuse the explanations of macro and micro theories but agree with them to a certain extent and encompass some features of both (Clark, 1990) and speak to how individuals internalize or interpret the messages and the promises of multicultural ideology within the boundaries of certain structures.

There are two mid-range theories, Merton’s theory of opportunity structure and his theory of unintended consequences, I used in this dissertation. Merton (1995) defined opportunity structure as “differential access to opportunities among those variously located in the social structure” (p. 6). According to Merton, individuals have some degree of agency within certain limitations. They are not merely victims of social structures because they are able to make choices according to their interpretations of their experiences within borders determined by structural constrains (Clark, 1990; Hedström & Udehn, 2011). Hence, as this study also aimed at understanding my participants’ feelings and perceptions about multiculturalism, I benefit from the interactionist approach as mid-range theories suggest.

The interactionist approach that guided the analysis of this study borrows from Max Weber’s notion of verstehen, or the interpretive understanding of social phenomena. In some approaches this is known as the interactionist perspective in which “all organizations, cultures, and groups consist of actors who are involved in a constant
process of interpreting the world around them.” (Taylor; Bogden, Devault, 2016, p. 23). People attach social meanings to their worlds and act according to these meanings. These meanings attached to participants’ experiences are an important aspect of the analysis of this research.

I developed a hypothesis which claims that when subordinate groups perceive and accept multiculturalism as fair and inclusive, social order is secured or preserved. However, if multiculturalism is perceived as an ideological distraction, the subordinate groups in question may be expected to react negatively and disrupt the social order. This all depends on the ‘perception’ of multiculturalism. Hence, the role of multicultural ideology is more complex than operating only as a mechanism of social control. In the interviews, I found confirmations for this assumption. My research thus also embraces mid-range theoretical insights that speak to a more limited set of assumptions about how my two target groups are expected to behave within certain structural boundaries.

The second midrange theory I used is Merton’s theory of unintended consequences which refers to “unanticipated consequences of purposive actions” (Merton, 1936, p. 894). Some of the consequences of social actions are unpredictable because of insufficient information, ignorance, short term interests, or/and the complex nature of social processes (Merton, 1936, pp. 888-904). However, first, unintended consequences don’t have to be negative, they can be beneficial for society. Second, since consequences are not planned, it does not mean that it is not worth examining because these have a real impact on people and they are meaningful for analysing social processes. For instance, the formulators of multiculturalism may have had an image of a harmonious and orderly Canadian society in mind. The unintended consequence, however, speaks to the ideologies of individualism and liberalism contained in the ideology of multiculturalism and which gave individuals to believe that they were living in a free, fair, open and equal society. Those racialized people who internalized the individualist ethos, and who were
not mobile, would blame themselves, while those who were more skeptical and thought structurally, are the ones who potentially could or would disrupt the social order by claiming structural racism and disadvantage.

As a Turkish woman coming from an overwhelming Muslim country just seven years ago, it was challenging to reach out to both ethnic organizations and participants as an outsider, although this was more evident with the Jamaicans compared to the Portuguese. Identity politics sometimes posed challenges in recruiting Jamaican participants, both women and men, because of my lighter skin color and the automatic advantages it brought into my life. Some of the organizations never replied to my follow-up emails after our initial meeting, or I was not given an opportunity to meet with the staff of those organizations. However, once I managed to build relationships of trust through networking, negotiations, and gatekeepers, I realized that my outsider status allowed to obtain very detailed explanations and examples because I was seen as being unfamiliar with the experiences of research participants.

Indeed, as mentioned by Dowling (2010), I was never “simply either an insider or an outsider” (p. 36). I also have some similarities with my participants because of my own minority status in Canada. Similar characteristics such as my being a member of a racialized group and my working-class status, and sometimes my age and gender helped me to develop rapport with my participants.

Among the black population, Jamaicans were interviewed because they are the largest black population in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007; The Environics Institute, 2017, p. 31). On the other hand, the Portuguese were included as being representative of non-visible minorities for two reasons. First, in spite of their integration problems compared to other European groups (Nunes, 2008, p. 122), the situation of Portuguese in Canada remains largely unknown to mainstream Canadian scholars and policy makers. Second, comparing immigrants of color with non-visible minorities, both of which are
overwhelmingly working-class communities, provided a significant insight into the impact of race on the integration of second-generation immigrants of color and how the factor of race shapes their interpretation of multiculturalism.

This study employed a purposive sampling model which allowed to find groups, settings and individuals where the processes being studied are most likely to occur (Creswell, 2014, p. 188; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 202). I reached out to participants via Portuguese and Jamaican and Caribbean organizations and other NGOs and some private individuals who are related to these two groups. These organizations and individuals were important for this research since they were the gatekeepers that could ensure my access to the site and interviewees (Creswell, 2014, p. 188; Mason, 1996, pp. 104-105). After my initial contact through organizations, participants were identified and included through snowball sampling by which I asked people to put me in touch with other participants with a similar background (Mason, 1996, p. 103).

As a limitation, since this study used snowball sampling, I had little control over the sampling method because I had to depend on the previous interviewees to reach more participants. That is why I had some difficulty finding male participants. At that point, my supervisor and my co-supervisor put me in touch with individuals who have close relationships with the Jamaican and Portuguese communities. This enabled me to connect with more male participants.

Although snowball sampling has limitations regarding representation and there are other obvious techniques of sampling, I opted for snowball sampling because my samples - second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese-were difficult to find. More importantly this method of sampling did not take away from the quality of this research because my dissertation does not stand solely on this particular method. My interviews with my participants on the contrary confirmed my initial assumptions and also served to enrich
my insights and to point me to future avenues of research concerning ethnicity, identity, multiculturalism, agency and structure.

During the fieldwork, I conducted interviews with forty-three Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians between February 2015 and February 2016 (See Appendix G & Appendix H for more detailed information on participants). Twenty-three of the interviews were with second-generation Jamaicans representing blacks and twenty of them with second-generation Portuguese representing non-visible minorities. Twenty-eight of these interviewees were women; fifteen were men. The higher number of female participants was not related to the purpose of this research; that occurred spontaneously during the fieldwork because my gender limited my access to male participants. Since only one of the aspects of this research is gender and interviews with males were sufficient to determine the main differences between the experiences of men and women, the overrepresentation of women ought not to be an obstacle to this research. The age span of my participants was between twenty- and forty-four-years old. My specific goal was to interview people older than eighteen years of age because this enabled me to hear about their experiences in a variety of areas, including education, labor market, and their social interaction outside of their neighborhoods.

Study participants were mostly from the working class, although I also had interviews with participants with a middle-class background. This social class diversity enabled me to compare and analyze the impact of social class on integration in addition to the issues of race and ethnicity. Some of my participants were university or college students; some were nurses, social workers, teachers and researchers. Two had family businesses; three others held prestigious government positions and one was a financial analyst at a bank. The rest were either looking for jobs or working in part-time positions such as in the retail sector.
I conducted my interviews in Toronto because a substantial majority of Jamaicans (Statistics Canada, 2007) and Portuguese (Teixeira, 2007) live in that city. Jamaicans are mostly in Etobicoke North, Jane-Finch Corridor, Englinton-Lawrence, Scarborough Rouge and Scarborough East in Toronto (Hinrichs, 2013, p. 3). The Portuguese population mostly lives in Little Portugal (downtown west end of Toronto). However, two new major settlement areas of Portuguese immigrants have emerged, which are northwest of Little Portugal and western suburbs including Mississauga and Brampton (Teixeira, 2007, p. 1). Based on this information, I distributed my participant recruitment flyers to some organizations and random coffee shops and bakeries in Jane-Finch, Englinton West, and in little Portugal.

The interviews were conducted at a time and place in Greater Toronto Area that is most convenient for my participants. Before each interview, I introduced myself, gave a brief description of my research, explained the purpose of it, answered their questions if they had any, and assured the anonymity of their identities. I obtained their consent through a letter of consent and recorded our interviews with their permission. Only two of my participants rejected recording, so during our interviews, I took extensive notes. For the rest of my participants, I made a selective transcription addressing the main research questions of this study because of the limited time and financial resources.

This qualitative research was analyzed by organizing interview data into categories and creating themes or concepts developed from the data (Neuman 2011, p. 510; Charmaz, 2004, p. 497). After the transcription of interviews, research questions and emerging patterns guided the organization of codes and the selection of key words such as multiculturalism, integration, identity construction, and racism. Later each concept or theme that was derived from the lived experiences of the research participants was incorporated in the overall analysis that is presented.
This research was approved by the Western University Health Science Research Ethics Board in February 2015 and was partially funded by the Faculty of Social Science ($750) and the department of sociology ($600) at the Western University.
1.5 References


McIntosh, P. (2004). White privilege and male privilege. In L. Heldke & P. O’Connor (Eds.), *Oppression, privilege, and resistance: Theoretical perspectives on racism*,


Chapter 2

2 A Comparative Immigration History: Situating Portuguese and Jamaican Immigration in the Global Political Economy

2.1 The Point of Departure

Migration is not a new phenomenon. Human beings have always migrated to escape poverty, conflict, famine or environmental disaster and to satisfy their curiosity (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 2; Eitzen & Zinn, 2006, pp. 1-2). However, the volume, diversity, and the geographical scope of international migration have expanded significantly since the beginning of European colonization when Columbus reached the Americas in 1492 (Gray, 1998, p. 215; Richardson, 1992, p. 1).

There are several theories explaining various causes of global migration. While micro theories focus on the decisions of individuals to seek income maximization, macro theories are concerned with the structural factors behind migration flows (Massey et al., 1993, p. 432; Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 25). From a political economy perspective, this study argues that the structural requirements of the capitalist economic system and uneven development of capitalism are the core reasons behind global migration, along with political crises and military interventions leading to waves of refugees (Allahar, 1990, 1995; Bonacich, 1972; Calliste, 1993,1994; Frank, 1972, 1973; Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004; Portes & Walton, 1981; Sassen, 1988; Wallerstein, 1984, 2000).

Whether in the developed core, or in the semi-periphery and underdeveloped periphery, the working class pays the biggest part of the bill, thus enabling the rich to get richer. However, the working class in developed countries is more organized than the working class in the periphery and, to a certain extent, have benefited from the plunder of wealth from those areas with, for example, affordable food prices, access to better education and
health care, and more personal security, all while the working-class in the periphery face the threat of hunger. Spurred by the worsening living conditions in the periphery and the semi-periphery, immigration has become a survival strategy for the working-class immigrants in those areas to find a job and make a living.

This paper aims to explore the factors behind the movement of working-class immigrants from countries such as Jamaica (the periphery) and Portugal (the semi-periphery of the world economy and the periphery of Europe) to Canada after the 1950s. Viewing this history from a political-economic perspective, the argument is made that labor immigration cannot be studied independently of the development of capitalism, which includes the history of slavery, colonization and the dispossession of the Native peoples. With respect to both immigrant groups, there is also a contention that history provides a useful perspective to understand current social patterns.

This paper will start with the historical-structural explanations of global labor migration. Next, a brief historical synopsis of Jamaica and Portugal will be provided, as well as a discussion of their relation to migration flows to Canada. The theories of underdevelopment, globalization and neo-liberalism will frame this discussion on immigration to Canada.

2.2 An Historical-Structural Approach and Global Labor Migration

The present study attempts to utilize macro-scale structural economic factors to explain immigration flows from the periphery and the semi-periphery to the core. Within this context, international labor migration emerged as a significant labor supply system with the expansion of the capitalist world economy (Sassen, 1988, p. 31). Modern capitalism spanning the globe thereby creates a global oversupply of labor (Bottomore, 1991, p. 474).
Frank (1967) argued that the development of the core and subsequent underdevelopment of the periphery is a relational and dialectical process. The poorer and more underdeveloped the periphery, the richer and more developed the core becomes as a result of imperialist expansion into the periphery and the exploitative relationship between them. Wealth extraction and surplus transmission from the periphery to the core have brought the underdevelopment of the periphery and its continuous dependence on core economies (Frank, 1967, pp. 6-14; Wallerstein, 1974, p. 401). Later on, Frank (1972) added the role of the lumpen-bourgeoisie in the periphery for its part in halting local development (pp. 15-16). He used the label of “lumpen,” which means scum, as a term to define the feckless local bourgeoisie in the countries of the periphery (cited in Allahar, 1990, p. 23). This export-oriented bourgeoisie has consciously and willingly exacerbated the dependence and subordination of the periphery by allying with foreign capital, thereby supporting policies such as free trade for its own economic interests.

Marxist scholars have argued that uneven capitalist development has created a global supply of cheap labor that is more prone to emigrate to make a living (Allahar, 1995; Amin, 1976; Frank, 1967, 1972, 1973; Sassen, 1988; Wallerstein, 1984, 2000). According to Frank’s (1967, 1972, 1973) dependency theory, the legacy of colonialism, worldwide exploitative capitalist relations between the core and the periphery, unequal trade relations, and the dissolution of the precapitalistic modes of subsistence are the factors behind growing labor reserves in underdeveloped regions. This reserve army of labor has used emigration as a survival strategy if they are able to finance immigration to the economically developed core.

Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems theory acknowledged the core-periphery model of the dependency school (cited in Frank, 1967, 1972, 1973). However, Wallerstein moved one step further and proposed a core, semi-periphery and periphery model for the analysis of the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1974a, pp. 8-9, 1974b, p. 401). According to this model, as is maintained by the dependency theory, the economies of the core are
technologically advanced, highly capital-intensive and are located in the centers of finance such as England. In contrast, the peripheral societies are technologically underdeveloped, labor-intensive, and economically specialized in the export of plantation and mining products (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 86) such as sugar, bananas, and bauxite in Jamaica. Semi-peripheral status is a middle stratum position, or in-between structural position, in the world-wide capitalist system and can be attributed to both the exploiter and the exploited, i.e., the Portuguese exploit weaker economies but, in turn, are themselves exploited by richer economies (Wallerstein, 1974b, p. 405). This in-between position therefore still implies a dependent development marked by a dependence on foreign capital and technology (Góis & Marques, 2009, p. 27; Santos, 2016, p. 11) but also receives more benefits from the world surplus than does the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974b, p. 414) and its development occurs at the expense of the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974a, p. 129). The semi-periphery economy specializes in industrial production (Wallerstein, 2000, p. 86) of machinery and equipment, as well as textiles, such as those produced in Portugal.

There are few places that have not been penetrated by capital in a single global capitalist economic system (Frank, 1967, p. 9, 1973, p. 1; Wallerstein, 1974a, p. 8, 1974b, p. 391, 2000, p. 87). Driven by a desire for higher profits, multinational firms and neo-colonial states enter the periphery and the semi-periphery in search of land, cheap labor, raw materials, and new markets (Massey et al., 1993, pp. 444-445). The penetration of capitalist techniques of production into the remotest areas of traditional agriculture in the periphery, the semi-periphery or non-capitalist societies and the monetization and reorganization of the peripheral economies have undermined local economies and have created easily exploitable populations (Allahar, 1995, p. 111; Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004, pp. 19-20; Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 30). Displaced from their lands and facing the threat of hunger, populations were forced to migrate en masse from rural to urban areas, and even to foreign countries to make a livelihood. Indeed, rural-urban migration is a
major reason for the “overabundance of migratory sources of labor” in underdeveloped countries (Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 113) because the inadequate level of industrial development in urban settlements have not been able to absorb displaced labor. Increasing mechanization, technologization, rural-urban migration and retarded development in the periphery and the semi-periphery have created a reserve army of labor that is completely at the mercy of capital (Dreher, 2007, p. 8; Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004, p. 20). This oversupply of labor has been beneficial to the capitalist economic system as it creates a cheap and yet disciplined labor force, either in their countries or in foreign lands (Sassen, 1988, pp. 31, 36). Migrants who are trapped by poverty therefore became more vulnerable vis-à-vis urban employers and owners of multinational firms. In this regard, Canada is a net beneficiary of underdevelopment of the periphery.

2.2.1 Primitive accumulation of capital

Marx saw primitive accumulation of capital as the precondition of capitalism (cited in Allahar, 1990, p. 16). Primitive accumulation refers to a process found in a capitalist system which transforms direct producers in the feudal system into wage laborers by separating direct producers from their means of production. Marx (1887) explained the process of primitive accumulation in England as follows:

As soon as capitalist production stands on its feet, it not only maintains this separation between the worker and the means of production but reproduces it on a constantly extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system can be none other than the process which takes away from the laborer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage laborers. The so-called primitive accumulation is,
therefore, nothing more else than the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of production. (pp. 507-508) [emphasis added]

With the primitive accumulation of capital, this surplus population “possesses nothing but its capacity to labor” as waged-labor (Marx, 1978, p. 208). They are periodically hired and fired, and this creates a pliable workforce who are easily replaceable with the abundant surplus labor force. Labor is free by law under capitalism, but only in comparison to feudalism, in which labor was tied to the feudal estate. This freedom stemmed from the dissolution of feudalism where the “authoritarian allocation of work was the norm” (Allahar & Côté., 1998, p. 9). These “free” workers under capitalism are desperate enough to work for low wages, thus maximizing the returns on capital. As indicated by Weber (1968), workers “in the formal sense voluntarily, but actually under the compulsion of the whip of hunger, offer themselves” (p. 42).

In the periphery, however, the transition from a subsistence to a capitalist economy was different in its form from that seen in England or in the core (Allahar, 1990, p. 191; Amin, 1976, p. 204; Petras, 1981, p. 60). The colonial conquest in search of raw materials, new markets, and cheap labor, and the consequent incorporation of new areas to capitalist expansion were accompanied by particular labor requirements (Petras, 1981, p. 60). In colonies, coerced and unfree forms of labor instead of wage labor became the rule of new labor power (Allahar, 1990, p. 191). Indigenous peoples forcibly made to work on the land were unable to survive under the brutal European colonial regimes and the newly implanted economic system. Therefore, for approximately around 350 years, European capital, in dire need of labor in the new world, resorted to the mass importation of slave labor from Africa for labor-intensive agricultural cultivation and resource extraction. After being stolen from their lands, the purchase and sale of African slaves was the greatest forced labor migration in the history of capitalist world economy (Petras, 1981, p. 60; Sassen, 1988, pp. 32-33).
As a colonial power, Portugal had the resources it had appropriated from its colonies to transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy. However, it remained an agrarian society longer than other European colonial powers (da Silva, 2011, p. 61; Santos, 2016, pp. 21-22). Colonial wealth was invested in an ongoing colonial expansion and a corrupt regime of government and church instead of an effective attempt at industrialization (Leeds, 1984, p. 61; Santos, 2016, p. 10). Hunger and stagnant economic conditions in Portugal pushed rural populations to other countries, including Brazil, Guyana and Trinidad, where they were relegated to the positions of indentured laborers, servants or gardeners in low-status jobs in search of better living conditions (Barbosa-Nunes, 2004, pp. 61-62; Ferreira, 2006, pp. 70-72). Only later did the Portuguese peasants who were separated from their means of production in Portugal convert to being wage workers in the Caribbean or South America.

2.2.2 Expansion of immigration routes

In the wake of the expanding capitalist economic system, labor movements have evolved on a global scale. Instead of a movement from one colonial area to another such as from Africa to the Caribbean, as was the case in the earlier phase of capitalist penetration, labor started to move from less-developed areas to economically advanced countries (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp. 96-97, 101-103). During their rapid industrialization after the Second World War, Western powers’ quest for cheap labor corresponded to the needs of a huge pool of poor and unemployed people in the “South” (Sassen, 1988, pp. 43-44) and the latter used migration as an escape route to making a living (Bonacich, 1972, p. 549).

The European metropolis and North America absorbed some of the pools of labor from the Caribbean, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia (Castles & Miller, 2009, pp. 96-99). Along with the immigration flows from non-Western countries, source countries of immigration extended to the European periphery and the semi-periphery. Some eastern
and southern European countries such as Portugal became major sources of labor export (Massey, 1999, p. 34). Immigrants from non-Western countries and eastern and southern Europe made the economic recovery of the Western countries possible because, together, they created an abundant, cheap, disciplined, and a highly flexible labor supply (Petras, 1981, p. 62).

2.3 A Brief Theoretical Introduction to Globalization, Neoliberalism, and Immigration

The colonies of the British, the French and other European countries began to agitate for and win their independence after the Second World War. However, this process did not automatically bring political autonomy and economic independence to the newly independent countries. Globalization and its recent accompanying ideology — neoliberalism — have kept these countries and the rest of the developing countries economically and politically dependent on the Western powers (Allahar, 1995; Gupta, 1997; Harvey, 2005; Steger, 2002).

Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, its contemporary phase is different from its previous phase, starting from the second half of the 20th century. From the political economy approach, the latter phase of globalization has been shaped and motivated by a neo-liberal ideology. This has created a new form of economic and political dependency instead of direct military intervention, although the military was not excluded from power wars when Western states needed to protect their interests.

More frequently, Western states manifested their control over economic and political resources through the multilateral frameworks of international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Economic Community (EEC), which was later absorbed by the European Union (EU) (Dollars and Sense Collective (DSC), 2006, p. 83; Harvey, 2005, p. 3; Steger, 2002, p. 63; Wiegersma, 1997, p. 258). The common goal of
these international organizations has been expanding and implementing the neo-liberal economic policies at global and regional level.

The neo-liberal framework, marked by unregulated global finance and open markets, has harmed the national economies of the periphery and semi-periphery countries. Taking advantage of the vulnerable economies of underdeveloped countries and also of the semi-periphery, international organizations such as IMF, WB and EU deliver loans to these countries on the condition of implementing neo-liberal economic policies with structural adjustments programs (SAPs) (Bina, 1997, p. 42; Harvey, 2005, p. 3; Nayyar, 1997, p. 27; Wiegersma, 1997, p. 258). This includes the removal of tariff barriers and free trade, privatization, cutbacks in welfare spending, withdrawal of price controls or subsidies, devaluation of currency, liberation of agricultural trade, elimination of labor regulations like minimum wage, and wage cuts (Dei, 1992, p. 46; Dollars and Sense Collective (DSC), 2006, p. 84; Steger, 2002, p. 12).

Economically weaker states therefore have no or limited say in their own economic policies and even if their leaders were interested in becoming involved, they are unable to respond to the needs of their citizens. The working class and poor have emerged as the net losers in this process because wages have been kept under pressure, welfare programs have shrunk, and capital’s drive for higher profits has decreased workers’ job security on a global scale (Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004, pp. 18-19).

On the other hand, the transnational capitalist class has benefited from free trade policies and has expanded its investment all around the world (Allahar, 1995, pp. 103-104, 186-187). Neoliberal agreements and regulations have paved the way for transnational companies to move to the areas where the cost of labor is lower. They have furthered their profits by obtaining strictly disciplined labor, tax evasions, rebates, certain monopolistic privileges, and by avoiding environmental and pollution regulations (Cox, 1996, p. 300; Nayyar, 1997, p. 25; Nisonoff, 1997, p. 179). The dependent lumpen-
bourgeoisie that heads up the states in the periphery and semi-periphery, partnered with
the transnational capitalist class, embraced this agenda and got a share of the profit at the

The widespread acceptance and sometimes involuntary adoption of the neoliberal agenda
have maintained both economic and political dependency of the periphery and the semi-
periphery countries. The negative effects of neo-liberal policies and SAPs have worked
as push factors for the immigration of some segments of the working-class people in
these countries.

2.4 A Brief History of Jamaica

Jamaica is one of the island countries in the Caribbean. Geographically speaking, the
Caribbean mainly comprises an archipelago of islands extending from the Florida Straits
in the north to Venezuela in the south. The region is bordered by Central America to the
west and the North Atlantic sea to the east. The islands themselves are referred to as the
“West Indies” or roughly “Antilles” consisting of Greater Antilles in the north and Lesser
Antilles in the south and in the east (Mintz, 1971, p. 21; Richardson, 1992, p. 6). Jamaica
is the third largest island of the Greater Antilles and the largest island of the
Commonwealth Caribbean-English-speaking islands under the British rule in the

The Caribbean region, the oldest colonial area of western European overseas expansion
(Mintz, 1971, p. 18), has been externally controlled by the Spanish, English, French, and
Dutch. The Caribbean islands host diverse peoples who arrived as African slaves, as
European, Indian, or Chinese indentured labor, or as European conquerors. European
colonial powers have transformed the landscape, inhabitants, and economic and political
structures of the Caribbean islands to create and accumulate wealth and to transfer this
wealth to their motherlands (Richardson, 1992, pp. 24-37).
Hence, it is imperative to look into some two hundred years of Spanish colonization and some three hundred years of British rule to understand the current economic and political dilemmas of Jamaica (Beckford & Witter, 1982; Manley, 1982). When Christopher Columbus set foot on Jamaica in 1492, he claimed the island for Spain. When the Arawak population, the local aboriginal peoples of Jamaica, were rapidly eliminated because of the forced labor under Spanish colonization and the diseases brought by Europeans, peoples from Africa and Europe were brought to the island to replace that lost labor (Beckford & Witter, 1982, pp. 13-14; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 10). After the colonization of Jamaica by the British in 1670 (Mensah, 2002, p. 97), a new era started as the British established an institutionalized slave plantation system (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 14).

A plantation system is an agricultural entity designed to produce export corps for foreign markets in colonies (Mintz, 1971, pp. 24, 26). This commercial production system, however, suffered a scarcity of labor from the beginning. Solving that problem involved bringing African and white slaves and indentured Indian, Chinese, and Portuguese laborers into the region, all of which led to the racialization of labor (Allahar, 1993; Beckford & Witter, 1982; Beckles, 1997; Mintz, 1971; Richardson, 1992). Despite the various forms of forced labor, African slave labor was always the major force supporting plantation society (Mintz, 1971, p. 25).

The development of plantation agriculture introduced capitalism to the Caribbean region. This region was integrated into the expanding European economy through the triangular trade between Europe, the Caribbean, and Africa. Ships departed Europe loaded with manufactured goods for African markets. These items were traded for the kidnapped slaves, who were transported to the Caribbean and exchanged for raw materials which were then shipped to the European countries for manufacturing (Williams, 1961, pp. 51-52). Jamaica has always been integrated into the world economy since its colonization and like other colonies, has provided raw materials for European industrialization and
acted as a market for the manufactured exports of colonial powers in a global capitalist economic system (Manley, 1982, p. 253).

Although European powers had introduced diverse cash crops, such as sugar, tobacco, coffee, and cotton, sugar took over the islands’ economies and lands during the 17th and 18th centuries (Allahar, 1990; Beckford & Witter, 1982; Beckles, 1997; Mintz, 1971). Once sugar cane was introduced to Jamaica, small farms were transformed into large sugar plantations. The mass labor force requirement was first and foremost fulfilled by the African slave trade. By the late 17th century, the English began to import large numbers of slaves (Beckford & Witter, 1982, pp. 15, 21). Approximately 250,000 African slaves were brought to Jamaica between 1781 and 1810 (Richardson, 1992, p. 65). More than the half of the African slaves in the entire British West Indies colonies were in Jamaica (Williams, 1961, p. 206) and it had become the sugar center of the growing British industry (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 16; Mensah, 2002, p. 97; Richardson, 1992, pp. 42-43).

However, the sugar plantation economy in Jamaica began to lose ground with the end of the mercantilist era. Growing support for free trade or a laissez faire economy signalled the end of state protection over the sugar trade. Starting in 1846, this resulted in dramatic fluctuations in sugar prices (Allahar, 1990, pp. 30, 34; Richardson, 1992, pp. 60-62). British sugar colonies were now in competition with other sugar plantations and producers worldwide. Meanwhile, most European governments gave subsidies to their own local beet-sugar industries. These local industries, using high technology and family labor, were producing with lower costs but in a greater scale compared to cane sugar producers utilizing labor-intensive production with huge slave labor populations (Allahar, 1990, p. 101).

London was flooded with German beet sugar during the 1880s and sugar prices lowered significantly (Richardson, 1992, pp. 60-62). Decreasing prices made the sugar plantation
economy less profitable, while sugar production by slave labor became more inefficient and more expensive (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 21; Williams, 1961, pp. 256-258).

Furthermore, during the same time period, slaves became very rebellious and offered all kinds of resistance to their enslavement. They were running away, harming the field animals, burning the plantations, and poisoning planters and their families, all of which added to the high price of sugar production. Hence, decreasing profits of running the slavery institution led to the abolishment of slavery.

As Allahar (1990) argued, the institution of slavery postponed the emergence of wage labor in the New World (p. 17), and in Jamaica, because slaves were used as an unpaid labor. Later, the abolition of slavery in 1838 ushered in the regime of wage labor. Jamaica therefore did not follow the same path of the development of capitalism as in Europe. The capitalist economic system was imposed upon Jamaica whereas, in Europe, it developed out of the internal contradictions of feudal society.

When the British Emancipation Act called for slave emancipation in 1838, the fertile land was under the control of planters and environmental marginality such as drought and erosion made it difficult for newly freed people to engage in subsistence agriculture. Some of them retreated to the hills or settled on small plots of lands. Others became the wage laborers of their previous masters or moved to urban centres and did odd jobs (Beckford & Witter, 1982, pp. 40-42; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, pp. 10-11).

Following the abolition of slavery, the “culture of immigration” became a survival strategy for Jamaicans (Jones, 2008, p. 1). Men and women began to immigrate to neighboring countries because of the poor economic conditions at home. Jamaicans left for Panama to work on railroad construction in 1853, and later on to be employed at Panama Canal construction in significant numbers in the beginning of the 1880s (Eisner, 1961, p. 147; Roberts, 1957, p. 133). Other areas to which Jamaican labor migrated were

By the beginning of the 20th century, living conditions in the Caribbean colonies were so poor that the British Colonial Secretary described British sugar-plantation colonies as the “Empire’s darkest slum” (Richardson, 1992, p. 62). In Jamaica, official government policy encouraged foreign investments and American, Canadian and British capital took control of bauxite mines and the banana, tourism, and banking industries. They also transferred some low technology and established the branch plant manufacturing industry (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 66). The Jamaican lumpen-bourgeoisie, in partnership with foreign capitalists, made profitable investments for themselves that were dependent on foreign technology, capital, and markets. The working class was growing in numbers whose members were largely recruited from displaced peasants from rural areas. During the 1950s, deteriorating economic conditions led to rapid rural-urban migration and massive waves of external migration (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 69; Jones, 2008, p. 3; Roberts, 1957, p. 161).

Sparked by the great depression of the 1930s, the agro-proletariat, urban proletariat and peasants united and revolted to attain their economic survival in 1938 (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 61, 73; Stephens & Stephens., 1986, p. 12). The rebellion of 1938 triggered severe social instability during the 1940s. Jamaica first became a member of the Federation of the British West Indies in 1958 and, in 1962, gained its political independence (Jones, 2008, p. 3).

Political independence did not create a major change in the economic structure of the country. Immigration thus has continued to be a survival strategy for Jamaicans. However, in the 1950s, new migration destinations — Britain, the U.S. and Canada — emerged. As a British colony, Jamaica was the biggest exporter of cheap labor to those three countries (Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 95). Immigration to Britain decreased
with the independence of Jamaica because Britain shut the door to its previous subjects (Martin, 1994, p. 166). Thereafter, in the 1970s, the majority of Jamaicans went to the U.S. or Canada. A recognizable number of Jamaicans first arrived Canada in 1955 under the Domestic Scheme as domestic laborers when English nannies lost interest in living and working in Canada (Satzewich, 1990, p. 337; Walker, 2012, p. 31).

### 2.5 A Brief History of Portugal

Located in the southwestern part of Europe, Portugal consists of a mainland and two autonomous archipelagos, Azores and Madeira (Higgs, 1982, p. 3; Teixeira & Da Rosa, 2000, pp. 4-5). In the 15\(^{th}\) century, 300 years after its establishment, the Portuguese expansion began in an effort to control the trading routes and to exploit the natural resources of other regions (Higgs, 1990, p. 9). The military domination and trade network of Portugal extended from Brazil to the north and west coasts of Africa, from India to Malaysia and from some regions in China to Japan (Rocha-Trindade, 2000, p. 19). Its colonial expansion began with the conquest of the Moroccan coast in 1415 and ended with the independence of African colonies, Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao-Tome and Principe in 1975 (Engerman & das Neves, 1996, p. 24).

In the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries, Portuguese overseas expansion built a trade network that included trading stations on the coasts of Africa, India and China (Higgs, 1990, pp. 8-9; Rocha-Trindade, 2000, pp. 19-29). Portuguese traders immigrated to these coasts, did business between these stations and dominated the commerce in this area, trading precious materials like gold, ivory, spices, and slaves from Africa. By the first half of the 16\(^{th}\) century, production of staples overtook trade when Portuguese conquered Brazil. Brazil was a source of sugar, cotton, coffee, and large deposits of precious metals. Sugar and then Brazilian gold became the main sources of the prosperity of the Portuguese empire (Barbosa-Nunes, 2004, p. 59; Engerman & das Neves, 1996, p. 5; Higgs, 1990,
pp. 11, 14). Portugal rose up as a hegemonic power during this time in 1640 (Wallerstein, 1974a, p. 184).

In the second half of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, the major emigration destination shifted to Brazil (Barbosa-Nunes, 2004, pp. 61-62; Engerman & das Neves, 1996, p. 19; Rocha-Trindade, 2000, pp. 20-21). In particular, literate Portuguese men immigrated to Brazil, took control of commerce in most Brazilian cities and acquired a significant amount of wealth. The Portuguese bourgeoisie made investments in Brazil but, in the interest of gaining higher profits, did not promote the development of local industry in the mainland during this time as Portugal had a restricted domestic market with a small population (Lockard, 2010, p. 464). Mercantile policies were also blocking Portugal from expanding into non-Portuguese colonies as new markets. Hence, the impoverished living conditions in Portugal pushed poor people to immigrate to Brazil for better living conditions. Some arrived as indentured workers; others engaged in commerce and started small businesses such as food stores (Barbosa-Nunes, 2004, pp. 61-62).

By the second part of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese Empire lost influence with the rise of the Dutch and British empires. The independence of Brazil in 1822 was the biggest blow to Portugal and put an end to its colonial dominance in the region. This was a significant period which witnessed reverse emigration to Portugal (Engerman & das Neves, 1996, p. 6-7). By the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Portugal had limited control over trade routes and its possessions. Portugal as an empire came to an end after the liberation wars in Africa and the expulsion of Portuguese from India in 1961. Subsequently, African countries gained their independence in 1974 and 1975, Timor in 1976 and Macao, China in 1999 (Rocha-Trindade, 2000, p. 20).

As Wallerstein (1974a, p. 179, 1974b, p. 407) suggested, there can be a shift in the world-wide economic hierarchical structure. States, regions, or some localities can lose or gain economic strength as a sort of “upward and downward mobility” as a result of world-
wide economic changes mostly occurring during stagnation and contraction periods, and the economic roles of those areas may change (Wallerstein, 1974a, p. 179). In the 17th century, while some core areas declined into the semi-periphery positions such as Portugal and Spain, others had established themselves as the core, e.g., northwest Europe and British America.

During its days as a hegemonic power, the basis of Portugal’s wealth was mainly slaves, the exploitation of precious metals, missionary expansion and commerce (Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 113). As Santos (2016) mentioned, Portugal was always “more colonial than capitalist” (p. 10). In contrast to Britain and France, the Portuguese bourgeoisie was not successful in investing this wealth in the development of productive forces and accumulating capital (Leeds, 1984, p. 61). Portugal therefore could not transform the wealth that it appropriated from its colonies into direct production and manufacturing and instead, squandered it. As pointed out by Marx (1971), “a country which seeks to preserve the existence of pure mercantilist capitalist activities when other countries are effecting the transition to manufacturing production, condemns itself to economic backwardness” (pp. 323-337, as cited in Allahar, 1990, p. 6).

Also, instead of financing its local industry, Portugal put a large amount of its wealth into religious activities (De Barros, 1994, pp. 85-87; Lockard, 2010, p. 464). The people of Portugal were governed by a corrupt tyranny of the state and church (Santos, 2016, p. 23). Hence, even during its heyday, it couldn’t establish a strong economy for its citizens. North European travelers were describing Portugal as an undeveloped country with precarious life conditions such as lack of hygiene and a place dominated by irrationality and ignorance. A report of three visitors to Portugal in the 18th century between 1720 and 1730 explained the situation as:

The general picture one gathers of the country is that of a fertile, rich land, yet squandered, and living off Brazil's gold almost exclusively. Most of
the clothing, most timber for urban and naval construction, most of the
necessaries life, all came from abroad, from England and Holland, and
purchased Brazilian gold. The Portuguese are lazy, do not take advantage
of their riches, nor do they know how to sell their colonies' riches well.

Even before the colonial empire collapsed, during the first half of the 18th century, the
whiteness of Portuguese began to be questioned. The Portuguese bourgeois failed to start
the process of industrialization in their country. Mainland Portugal and the Azores and
Madeira islands were still heavily agrarian and economically undeveloped. Portugal
therefore was the dark side of Europe.

By the beginning of 1930s, after two hundred years of failed attempts at industrialization
and capital accumulation, Portugal was showing all signs of dependent development
(Leeds, 1984, pp. 3, 61; Sklair, 2002, p. 41). The level of industry was rudimentary, and
the economy was largely reliant on the foreign capital. Under the control of British
capital and commercial dominance, Portugal took the role of commercial intermediary for
the rest of the world as a semi-periphery country, and it has reproduced itself as a semi-
periphery until now (Santos, 2016, pp. 9, 11). Portugal has remained less developed
compared to its neighbours in Europe, especially after the Second World War when, for
most, the postwar era ushered in a free trade economy, increasing foreign investment, and
high labor absorption. This process has been furthered by the development of a large
agricultural capitalist sector with technological transformation, which divorced small
farmers from their lands and turned them into wage-laborers looking jobs in the cities
(Baptista, 1995, pp. 317-319). Post-1950s emigration was largely a consequence of these
structural economic changes in Portugal. Indeed, emigration has always been a survival
strategy for Portuguese both in the mainland and in the Azores and Madeira because,
even when Portugal was an empire, it did not provide economic security to Portuguese on
the mainland and the islands (Higgs, 1990, p. 18; Rocha-Trindade, 2000, pp. 19-22).
After the Second World War, northern European countries were short of unskilled labor to aid in the recovery of their industrial and service sectors because local workforces had moved to the better paid, more highly skilled jobs. In addition to other immigrants, European countries such as Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland opened their borders to Portuguese workers to reconstruct their devastated war economies. In the Americas, especially in the first half of the 20th century, while Brazil remained an important destination because of the cultural and language similarities, the United States, Venezuela and Canada were the new destinations of immigration for Portuguese immigrants who were striving for a better life (Higgs, 1982, p. 3; Rocha-Trindade, 2000, pp. 22-27).

In 1953, Portuguese immigration to Canada officially started with the coordinated attempts of Canadian and Portuguese governments. Five hundred and fifty Portuguese men were recruited from the mainland and the islands as manual laborers in response to Canada’s demand for physical labor (Marques & Medeiros, 1980, p. 37). The Portuguese who entered Canada were predominantly poor, little-educated rural peasants, or similarly little-educated people working in unskilled manufacturing in the cities. Most Portuguese had the equivalent of a grade 4 education, or less, which is the lowest of any entering immigrant group, at the time (Nunes, 2008), and even lower than that of the Jamaicans.

While it might be tempting to view the movement of Portuguese as simply another immigration flow of another white European group to Canada, in practice this was not the case. While the Portuguese were technically considered European, at the time of their arrival in Canada, they were not seen as fully white (Harney, 1990, p. 113). This requires an historical and political-economic explanation.

### 2.6 How Portuguese Became Dark-Whites

As mentioned, the abolishment of slavery in the colonies resulted in a dire need for cheap and docile labor to replace the slave labor on the plantations. The labor demand was a

Colonial powers and plantation owners desired to export European labor to whiten the population of colonies. However, European populations largely refused to work on plantations because of the negativity associated with plantation work and slave labor (Northrup, 1995, pp. 22-23). The Portuguese were an exceptional group immigrating to various colonies, inclusive of Trinidad, Guiana, Antigua, St. Vincent, New England, Hawaii, and Brazil, under indentureship contracts as unfree labor (Barbosa-Nunes, 2004; Ferreira, 2006; Harney, 1990). In the 19th century, indentured labor was the main form of unfree labor and was mainly comprised of people from Asia and Africa, with the exception of a large number of Portuguese from Europe (Northrup, 1995, p. 42).

The entry status of the Portuguese into colonies became a social marker of their color. The jobs Portuguese took were associated with “black” slaves and non-European laborers; hence, at first, their darkness was based on their socio-economic status rather than their ethnic heritage or their European origin (Ferreira, 2006, p. 73). In a colony where “white” elites were the ruling class and black and non-European were largely the face of poverty, Portuguese were not recognized as socio-economically white. Portuguese “came to replace slaves, not simply as whites but simply another variety of coolie men like Chinese and East Indians” (Harney, 1990, p. 115). Poverty and the jobs associated with slave labor darkened the color of Portuguese in color-coded class societies.

Most Portuguese left field work after their contracts expired. They engaged in less demanding jobs or became small-scale entrepreneurs or self-employed such as shopkeepers, mechanics, gardeners, and drivers or they bought a small plot of agricultural
land (Brereton, 1981, p. 99; Ferreira, 2006, p. 73). In addition, some advanced to clerical work, which was not possible for non-European plantation workers and ex-slaves. However, there were some limits to their economic mobility. They were not able to obtain prestigious jobs or acquire political representation, and they were not allowed in social clubs of whites (Ferreira, 2006, pp. 72, 77, 80).

Harney (1990) used the term “dark-whites” to explain the socio-economic status of Portuguese who occupied an intermediate economic position between “colored” and “white” people and extended his argument of Portuguese being “dark-whites” through non-economic factors (pp. 119-123). So-called “scientific racism” and the cultural differentiation of Portuguese from the English have also “otherized” them. The proponents of scientific racism argued that Portuguese were not white but generally “dark” or “semi-negroid” because of the high rates of interracial mixing with blacks, especially when slaves were transported to the mainland Portugal, which was not the issue with other colonial powers (Harney, 1990, p. 122; Santos, 2016, p. 22; Taft, 1967, p. 18). Another factor darkening Portuguese was their culture, which was based on Catholic beliefs and the Portuguese language, while “whiteness” was associated with Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking Protestant groups (Harney, 1990, pp. 119-121).

After the second half of the 18th century in England, the idea of black Portuguese became widespread. They were ascribed racist stereotypes such as: “extremely ugly, certainly not white, and rather the result of some clearly disgusting ethnic mixture, the Portuguese are said to combine the worst defects of blacks, Jews, Moors, and . . .” (Santos, 2016, p. 22). The stereotypes of being lazy, ignorant, and ugly that were used for Portuguese people were the typical depictions of African slaves used by European powers, including in Portugal itself. Today, it can still be argued that, socio-economically and culturally, they are not white but “dark-whites.”
2.7 A “Free” and Unified World Economy: Reflections on Jamaica and Portugal

Liberal policies combined with foreign investments in Portugal and Jamaica have created challenging conditions for their working-class citizens. Contrary to the colonized peripheral Jamaica, a colonizer empire fighting for its life, in the 1940’s, Salazar’s dictatorship promoted a corporatist economic system (Baer & Leite, 1992, pp. 2-3; Story, 1986, p. 119). Hostile to free market and liberal policies, Salazar’s isolated economy used African colonies as suppliers of raw material and markets for their manufactured goods. However, in spite of high growth rates and low unemployment rates, Portugal was still the most backward economy in Western Europe. The wages of the working class were depressed, and income inequality between the small number of conglomerates and landless agricultural workers and working class was staggering (Stallings, 1981, pp. 106-107). Furthermore, by the end of the 1950s, Salazar decided to increase the development rate of Portugal despite the increase in military expenses spent to end the independence movements (Baklanoff, 1990, p. 39; Higgs, 1982, p. 6). He was therefore forced to step back and allow the progressive opening of Portugal to the global economy to gain access to loans from international organizations. Portugal became the charter member of European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 1959 and joined IMF, WB and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), all of which, in turn, started a huge wave of trade liberalization and foreign investments in Portugal (Stallings, 1981, pp. 106-107), just as had occurred in Jamaica.

Meanwhile, in Jamaica, by the beginning of 1960s, the economy was showing all the signs of a dependent capitalism (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 73-74; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 30). Carrying on the legacy of the colonial period, Jamaica was still serving as a mono-product economy, producing and exporting principal crops or mineral commodities, as well as a market for “previous” European colonizers who were importing luxury items and necessities, fulfilling even basic nutritional needs (Manley,

The 1973 oil crisis hit Jamaica hard. The price of imports skyrocketed, exports decreased, and Jamaica fell into a debt crisis. In spite of the policies against the new global economic order developed by Norman Manley and his son, Michael Manley, Jamaica’s first loan agreement with the IMF was signed in 1977 and structural adjustment policies were put in place (Weis, 2006, p. 67). The unemployment rate went up again, reaching a high of 31.1% in 1979 following the IMF agreement (Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 391). Structural adjustment loans devastated the agricultural and animal husbandry sectors because of the tariff reduction and withdrawn government subsidies. Local products and the food industry were replaced with imports from Canada and United States (Black, 2001; Weis, 2006, pp. 61-62). Food dependency in Jamaica grew throughout the implementation of SAPs. These structural changes pushed rural populations to urban areas and displaced peasants became wage laborers that constituted an industrial reserve army. Urban poor were employed in sweatshops owned by multinational corporations such as Tommy Hilfiger and Hanes. According to a confidential World Bank report, the structural adjustment loans achieved neither poverty reduction nor development in Jamaica (Black, 2001). Development loans dragged Jamaica into greater debt and dependency because the loans were not designed to build a self-sustaining economy [emphasis added] (Manley, as cited in Black, 2001).

In Portugal, with integration into the global economy, the period between 1960 and 1973 led to similar economic policies (Baer & Leite, 1992; Baklanoff, 1978, 1990; Story, 1986). First, the primitive agricultural production shrank considerably. In 1970, Portugal became dependent on food imports for the first time in its history (Stallings, 1981, p. 108). By 1973-74, economic problems were made apparent by the combination of the oil crisis, loss of African colonies and a huge deficit (Story, 1986, p. 120). After the short
socialist revolutionary period between 1974 and 1975, economic liberalization continued in full force.

Portugal turned its face completely to Europe and United States to obtain the European Economic Community (EEC) and IMF funds (Baer & Leite, 1992; Story, 1986). In 1976, renegotiations of the initial 1972 agreement with the EEC progressively removed tariff barriers. The retarded manufacturing sector burgeoned and integrated into the international trade. The cheap labor of Portuguese attracted various multinational companies such as Goodyear, Firestone, and Timex. Foreign direct investment, which accounted for less than 1 percent in 1959, had risen to 27 percent by 1970 (Baklanoff, 1978, p. 137). Sixty-one percent of Portuguese firms were under the control of a foreign majority, specifically from England, France and Germany (Baklanoff, 1978, pp. 136-138; Cravinho, 1984, pp. 196-197; Deubner, 1984, pp. 167-170). Segments of the manufacturing industry such as textile and footwear, machinery and equipment, and pulp and paper steadily became export-oriented. Trade with Europe gradually replaced trade with the African colonies.

In 1977 and 1978, two stabilization programs with IMF brought austerity measures and further structural changes in the economy, including cuts in government spending, devaluation of the escudo (Portuguese currency), curtailed workers’ rights, decreased real wages, and increased privatizations (Stallings, 1981, pp. 113-117). An unemployment rate of 1.7 percent in 1970 rose to 5.3 percent in 1974, and to 12.6 percent in 1977 (Baer & Leite, 1992, p. 18). The expanding secondary and tertiary sector was not large enough to occupy displaced agricultural workers. Nearly “two out of every three Portuguese workers leaving the agricultural sector found employment outside the country” (Baklanoff, 1978, p. 127). Later in the 1970s, emigration trends expanded to factory workers as well because of low wages in the industrial sector (Baer & Leite, 1992; Baklanoff, 1978).
In the 1950s, Portugal, once a colonial empire, and Jamaica, colonized by the European powers, were both showing the signs of dependent capitalism. This era marked large-scale immigration for these countries. Poverty, high levels of unemployment, low wages, inadequate access to education, and lack of mobility were the push factors behind the emigration waves. On the other hand, the need of labor for the industrialization process of economically developed countries worked as a pull factor. The waves of labor migration from Portugal and Jamaica to Canada started in the 1950s but grew in numbers in the 1970s. Underdevelopment of Jamaica and the dependent capitalism of both countries have created a constant supply of cheap labor for Canada, an industrially developed country.

2.8 Conclusion

This study argues that the history of colonialism, the development of the global economic system, and uneven capitalist development are vital to gaining insight into the current global labor migration. The colonization of Jamaica and its uneven integration into the capitalist world economy have created weak economic conditions in the periphery. Furthermore, neo-colonial policies and local government corruption devastate the Jamaican economy.

In contrast, the Portuguese bourgeoisie condemned itself to economic backwardness because it could not manage the transition from mercantile capitalism to industrial capitalism, despite the wealth it appropriated from the periphery. The demise of the Portuguese Empire hence has left a crumbling economy behind. Neo-liberal policies after the 1950s have targeted, not only non-European societies, but Europeans as well, including Portuguese. Portugal has been playing the role of the semi-periphery in the world economy, but it is a periphery of Europe.

The net losers of the economic turmoil in both Portugal and Jamaica are the working class. Portuguese and Jamaican immigration to Canada began with the incorporation of
the working-class people, who were among the global reserve army of labor. Indeed, these immigration waves have served the same interest, i.e., the demand for a constant supply of cheap labor to meet the changing economic needs of Canada. Once again, it is clear that “capital has no national origin, religion, race, and ethnicity” (Allahar & Côté, 1998, p. 151); it goes to whoever it can use.

Capital always seeks profits with the goal of remaining in the market competition. It never avoids using race, ethnicity, gender, and skin color to cheapen the cost of labor and to increase its profits. Jamaicans hence have been more readily racialized and have experienced the harshest forms of racism because of their country’s history of slavery and the colonial aspirations of the European powers. Although the Portuguese have also been racialized, it is more about the empire’s unsuccessful economy policies. Furthermore, their culture’s deviations from the Anglo-Saxon norm also gives shades to their whiteness. Although originating in Europe, following the gradual decline of their economic power, they have never been white enough.
2.9 References


in association with Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society.


Chapter 3

3 Class, Race and Labor Market Integration of the Portuguese and Jamaican Diaspora in the Context of Canadian Immigration History

3.1 Introduction

The expansion of capitalism, the process of massive accumulation of capital and concentration of productive resources in economically advanced countries, occurred with the underdevelopment and dependence of some other countries in the periphery and the semi-periphery (Frank, 1967, pp. 6-14, 1973, p. 19; Wallerstein, 1974, p. 401). The periphery capitalism and technological displacement in the periphery/semi-periphery draw more individuals who are unemployed or semi-employed in marginal jobs into the labor reserve (Marx, 1887, pp. 444–447). Uneven development, neo-liberal restructuring policies after the 1970s, and increasing poverty levels have forced those in the periphery to sell their labor cheaper in more developed northern countries, with the former using migration as an escape route to a means of making a living (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, pp. 112-113; Bonacich, 1972, p. 549; Magdoff & Magdoff, 2004, p. 40). In Canada, these immigrants are among the exploited sections of the working class (Allahar, 2010, p. 55; Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 118).

Migration of labor from Jamaica and Portugal to Canada began in 1950s but accelerated in the 1980s (Marques & Medeiros, 1980, p. 37; Simmons, 2010, p. 126; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 95). In both the 1950s and the 1980s, those countries showed signs of dependent capitalism (Leeds, 1984, p. 3; Manley, 1982, p. 253). In Portugal, the agricultural sector was still based on outdated techniques, and labor-intensive and low-wage production activities were the focus in the manufacturing sector. There was a huge inflow of foreign direct investments, specifically from England, France and Germany, and the economy was narrowly specialized in a few exports, including a limited number
of agricultural products, textiles, forest-based products and simple electronic gadgets. The country was dependent on food imports such as grain and meat and chemicals for manufacturing (Baklanoff, 1978, pp. 136-138; Cravinho, 1984, pp. 196-197; Deubner, 1984). In Jamaica, foreign ownership dominated major services and industries such as sugar, bauxite, tourism, finance, manufacturing and public utilities. The economy was extremely dependent on imports, even for basic necessities such as food. Exports were heavily concentrated on a few products, e.g., sugar and bananas, and Jamaican trade was overly reliant on American, Canadian and British partnerships (Beckford & Witter, 1982, pp. 73-74; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, pp. 25-30, 33).

Both the Jamaican and the Portuguese working-class immigrants have utilized immigration as a way of escaping poverty, and both groups have integrated into the Canadian labor market as a cheap labor. However, because of the history of slavery and colonization, and because racism has historically been used to cheapen the cost of labor, Jamaicans are more readily racialized and exploited than other vulnerable populations that are not or are less racialized.

This study argues that the need for cheap labor is the decisive factor behind the shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism in the nation-building process of Canada. After the proclamation of the Canadian Confederation in 1867, the nation-building process was based on a white society and an Anglo-Saxon British culture (Raymond, 1988, p. 88), with ethnic nationalism shaping immigration policies until 1962. Canada’s immigration policy listed Northern and Western Europe as places of “preferred immigration.” The entrance of non-whites such as Jamaicans to Canada was highly restricted and the immigration of Southern Europeans such as Portuguese was not preferred until that time. However, the political requirement for social order on the part of the state pitted it against capital’s economic drive to extract more surplus value. As a consequence, the capitalist has always pushed the state to open its borders to non-white populations because they served as a cheap and exploitable labor force. Thus, in cooperation with the national
bourgeoisie, and with the goal of competing in a global economy, the Canadian state had to admit immigrants of color. This brought about the abolishment of white-only immigration policies and the transition from ethnic to civic nationalism.

The broad aim, then, is to situate Jamaican and Portuguese immigration in the historical context of Canada’s attempt at nation building, which includes multiculturalism. The analysis will be done against a backdrop of Canada’s position in the global capitalist system, and its corresponding neo-liberal policies from the mid-1970s to the present. This paper will start with the nation-building process with reference to immigrants from the periphery (Jamaica) and the semi-periphery (Portugal) in the world economy, and will continue with the theories of labor market incorporation of immigrants, inclusive of split and dual labor market theories. That will be followed by a discussion covering the incorporation of Portuguese and Jamaican immigrants into the Canadian labor market, and then by an explanation of the shift in immigration policies with the introduction of neoliberal policies and its impact on those immigrants.

The next section includes an analysis of the centrality of the wage relation to capitalism and the reasons why capital will always pursue the means to cheapen labor costs. As is well-known, racism, like sexism, has historically been used by capital to that end. Although this speaks to the story of migrant labor and the racialization of Jamaicans, it is also relevant to the Portuguese, who, though viewed as “white” or “dark-white,” remain immigrants from a semi-peripheral country rather than from western and northern European countries.

3.2 Immigration, “Race,” and the Nation-Building Process in Canada

In global terms, Canada was part of the New World in terms of its economic resources and the racial origins of its conquering population. European overseas expansion during the late 15th century led to contact between Canada and Europe, starting with trade, and
then becoming a colonization as Canada came under British and French rule, with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples denied their basic rights (Bannerji, 1996, pp. 106-107; Lawrence, 2002, pp. 23-28; Razack, 2002, pp. 1-2; Simmons, 2010, pp. 50-53; Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, pp. 101-104). Contact did not immediately require conquest because the initial aim was to explore North America, searching for alternative routes to the Orient. This led to the exploitation of Canada’s natural resources, with fishing and fur trades being developed by European colonial powers to meet a ready demand for products in the European market.

In the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, Europeans, including the Portuguese, Spanish, English and French, began fishing off the shores of Newfoundland. European fishery was soon expanded by the Portuguese, who established a colony on Cape Breton Island around Nova Scotia between 1520 and 1524 (Simmons, 2010, p. 50; Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, pp. 101-109). Later, in the late 1500s and in the early 1600s, the two competing powers, Britain and France, set their sights on colonizing Canada. That competition ended with an overwhelming triumph of British armies around the mid-18\textsuperscript{th} century (Abele & Stasiulis, 1989, p. 241; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007, p. 30).

The indigenous people did not disappear upon the arrival of colonial powers but instead assumed a major role in the survival of newcomers, in the fur trade, and in shaping the history of some regions. At the beginning, the relations between the colonizing powers and the indigenous people were based on mutual benefit and cooperation. However, after the white conquest, indigenous rights were denied and they were forced to assimilate (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 98), although, to this day, the Aboriginal people have continued to resist those policies.

In contrast to areas in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean that were colonies subject to conquest, direct military occupation, and impoverishment, as a colony, Canada always maintained its privileged economic, social, and cultural contact as a part of the British
Empire (Abele & Stasiulis, 1989, p. 244; Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 97). Its “whiteness” was never in doubt. In settler colonies, such as Canada, after colonizers had suppressed the indigenous peoples, they appropriated the land needed to accommodate massive migration flows from the home countries (Allahar, 1995, p. 132; Beckford, 1972, p. 35). British colonial administrators were intent on building an overseas extension of British society, one that would differ from its colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean in terms of conquest or exploitation. In those cases, colonizers were mainly interested in the extraction of precious metals and raw materials through military and administrative organization, rather than developing permanent settlements that would include their families; that would not occur until much later (Allahar, 1995, p. 132). However, although these lands were conquered to meet European demands, in addition to military and administrative organization, the colonizing power also “had to develop an institutional framework for bringing together of land, labor, capital, management, and technology” in the colonies (Beckford, 1972, p. 31).

Permanent settlement of the British demanded the social and political control of people (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, pp. 109-116). In Canada, dominant socio-cultural and economic institutions took the ‘mother’ country’s institutions as a model to develop their own because, along with their families, colonizers also “carried with them patterns of social organization and definite ideas about the kind of the society they wished to create” (Beckford, 1972, p. 35). These patterns were maintained by perpetual immigration from Britain and the constant transfer of British ideas, goods and values. Even after Canada became a self-governing dominion in 1867, its ties to the British were retained, as were the dominant institutions, which in turn reproduced a British model in which race and color played a key role (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 97).

The British Empire’s goal was to populate Canada with “white” British people; indeed, race and ethnicity were the conditioning features of the nation-building process throughout the history of Canada (Abele & Stasiulis, 1989, p. 241; Razack, 1999, pp.
The authorities striving to preserve the British character of Canada encouraged “whites,” considered to be both superior as a “biological race” and more assimilable than non-whites (Jakubowski, 1999, p.11), to settle there, while “non-whites” were excluded from entry.

Race emerged as a restrictive criterion of immigration in section 38(c) of the Immigration Act of 1910 (Hawkins, 1989, pp. 16-17). This act was amended in 1919 to include “nationality” as a restrictive category, with immigrants classified as “undesirable”:

Belonging to any “nationality” or “race” . . . Deemed unsuitable having regard to the climatic, industrial, social, educational, labor or other conditions . . . because such immigrants are deemed undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits modes of life and methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry [emphasis added]. (as cited in Hawkins, 1991, p. 17)

That immigration policy was racist in that it was apparently ruling out Asians, Orientals, South Americans, Africans, and the Caribbeans as being undesirable. The ruling classes preferred Europeans, specifically western and northern Europeans, as a source of immigrants (Malarek, 1987, p. 11). The imagined community of Canada “otherized” all who were not “white” and who did not belong to the “white culture.” Categories of “others” are deemed to be uncultured and unable to adapt to British, Anglo-Saxon culture, which was based on a biological race category, i.e., non-white immigrants were seen as unsuitable due to their immoral, irrational and uncivilized character attributed to their so-called “biological” race and color (Plaza, 2001, p. 55; Razack, 1999, pp. 159-162). As explained by Bannerji (2000), “an element of whiteness . . . enters into cultural
definitions, marking the difference between a core cultural group and other groups who are represented as cultural fragments” (p. 10).

However, Canada still needed people of color, albeit in the subordinate status of cheap labor (Jakubowski, 1999, p. 101). Once they were admitted, British, white Americans and northern and western Europeans were at the top of the “racialized hierarchy of desirability” (Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007, p. 46). Previously non-preferred Eastern and southeastern Europeans such as Italians, Portuguese, and Ukrainians allowed in due to failures at recruiting preferred immigrants in adequate numbers (Jakubowski, 1999, p. 100) fell into the in-between preferred and non-preferred categories. Blacks and other people of color occupied the lowest rungs.

The 1920’s’ exclusionary immigration policy was still in place in the 1950s (Hawkins, 1991, pp. 26-27). The 1952 Immigration Act blocked immigrants on the grounds of nationality, ethnic group, citizenship, customs, habits, lifestyle, geographical area of origin and climatic unsuitability (Malarek, 1987, p. 16-17). From the late 19th century to the early 1960s, ethnic nationalism was the framework for the nation-building process in Canada (Raymond, 1988, p. 88).

The ideology of ethnic nationalism amalgamates society around the idea of a nation which claims to have a common history, common ancestry, and cultural distinctiveness (Smith, 1988, p.9). In this form ethnic (genealogical) nationalism refers to identification with, and loyalty to, an ethnic group (Williams 1994: 53). Accordingly, Canada was constructed upon the ideal and “imagined” category of a white European nation (Bannerji, 2000, p. 64).

Racist immigration policies and nationalism racialized “non-white” immigrants or immigrants from outside northern and western Europe. Ultimately, their ethnicity and race would be seen as being decisive in determining their economic opportunities, social status, political actions and even their cultural legitimacy (Allahar, 2003, p. 29).
Nevertheless, immigration and settlement in Canada have been ethnically and racially more diverse than British settlers planned (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 98). There has always been a strong relationship between the Canadian economy and its immigration policies. Hence, the vision of Canada as an all-white nation was never fully realized since Canada, first and foremost, is a capitalist country and the capitalist class is in constant need of cheap labor, regardless of race or ethnicity (Allahar, 2010, p. 57; Plaza, 2001, p. 40; Satzewich, 1990, pp. 330, 335; Trumper & Wong, 2007, p. 152). By the 1950s, an unprecedented wave of industrial and agricultural expansion brought a shortage of labor, with Canada being unable to attract workers from the desired European nations to work in agriculture, factories, construction, and other jobs linked to its industrial development due to the simultaneous post-war economic boom in those countries (Arat-Koc, 1999, p. 35). Canada was forced to turn to immigrants of color to fill the labor shortage, meaning that the development of the capitalist economy therefore frustrated the whites-only national project.

3.3 Labor Market Dynamics and Situating Jamaican and Portuguese Immigration in Canada’s Immigration History

3.3.1 Labor market incorporation of immigrants

Migrant labor has been vital to the development of northern economies; its low cost enables those economies to maintain the labor market flexibility that promotes investment and economic growth. As a core capitalist economy, both the government and various economic institutions of Canada alike are eager to secure a cheap and disciplined workforce as a key part of a well-functioning competitive capitalist economy (Allahar, 2010, p. 55), and immigrants fit that bill. From time to time, Canada has adjusted its border policies dependent on the demand for cheap labor. As of 1962, skills, training, and education regardless of national background were introduced as criteria of eligibility to apply for immigration, criteria that have remained in place ever since (Arat-
Koc, 1999). Concurrently, Canada has created new forms of unfree labor such as Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP) (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003; Sharma, 2006).

However, immigration from non-preferred countries has created labor unrest and ethnic conflict because local white workers have concerns about being replaced or being paid less due to the cheaper and more disciplined labor offered by immigrants (Bonacich, 1972). For instance, unionized white workers were opposed to less expensive black workers, which resulted in restrictions on the latter’s entry to better-paying jobs on railways prior to the early 1950s, this despite the latter’s higher level of education compared to the earlier group (Calliste, 1987, pp. 3-4). Although, more than race or ethnicity, the main issue was competition over limited economic resources such as job opportunities (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 112), the attempts by white workers to exclude black workers, which was racism from below, eventually led to the racialization of blacks.

An analysis of labor market incorporation requires an understanding of labor immigration from a political economy framework to interpret how racially and ethnically different labor forces were situated inside capitalist labor markets. When capital imports foreign labor, its aim is not simply filling the labor gaps, but also finding the cheapest and most exploitable labor to fulfil its main motivation, i.e., profit. As Allahar (1995) observed:

> It is not that individual capitalists exploit workers purely and simply because they are evil or greedy; rather, as an economic system based on market competition, survival is intimately tied to ever increasing accumulation, to expansion, and to economic efficiency, with all of these conditions premised upon the *exploitation of labor power by capital* [emphasis added]. (p. 50)

Lower-wage immigrant workers increase the profits of the capitalist, which results in the intensification of the exploitation of immigrant labor. This has a simultaneous function
of putting downward pressure on working-class wages while jeopardising the jobs of domestic workers (Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 281; Sassen, 1988, p. 40). Employers demand racially and ethnically different immigrant labor to lower labor costs, and hence race and ethnicity become tools for securing cheap and disciplined labor (Allahar, 2010, p. 55). This speaks to Bonacich’s (1972, 1980) split labor market theory and Piore’s (1979) dual labor market theory. In Canada, immigrant labor from Jamaica can be seen as a test case for the split and dual labor market theories, while the case for the Portuguese is well-integrated into the dual labor market theory.

Bonacich (1972, 1980) placed labor competition at the center of her analysis of immigrant labor market incorporation. According to split labor market theory, in a single labor market, there are at least two or more distinct ethnic or racial groups whose price for the same work differs (Bonacich, 1972, p. 549). Competition arises from price differences along with ethnic/racial divisions for an identical job in a single labor market.

Bonacich (1972) argued that the split labor market produces a three-way conflict between the capitalist and two groups of ethnically and racially different workers (p. 549). The capitalists deliberately use ethnic and racial preferences in work assignments to fragment the working class and to secure social control by having one group of workers policing the other, hence cheapening labor costs. Indeed, the bourgeoisie has no advantage in hiring a specific ethnic group (Bonacich, 1972, pp. 553-554) because “capital has no race, sex, religion or national allegiance” (Allahar & Côté, 1998, p. 151). However, racist ideologies are incited by capital, which is racism from above, to control labor and to replace higher paid local labor with cheaper foreign labor. In an era of large scale immigration, capitalists are able to manipulate ethnic and racial consciousness to enhance the rates of exploitation.

Pitting workers against each other by utilizing racist ideologies puts the native or local working class athwart foreign labor and lessens the power of a united working class.
(Portes & Walton, 1981, p. 281). The domestic working class that fears replacement by cheaper immigrant labor becomes hostile towards immigrants; then, domestic workers organize to prevent the capitalists from importing cheaper labor, while simultaneously blaming foreign labor for their own deteriorating conditions (Bonacich, 1972, pp. 554-555). In this sense, native workers are caught in a false consciousness because they have a racialized/ethnicized understanding of their daily economic difficulties, even though the problem emerged due to the capitalist’s search for the cheapest labor. This weakens the overall working-class movement by dividing white from non-white workers, which racializes the latter.

Another theory that looks into the questions of race and ethnicity in immigrant labor market incorporation is Piore’s (1979) dual labor market theory. This theory deals with the bifurcation of the labor market into primary/core and secondary/periphery along ethnic and racial lines (Allahar, 2005, p. 2). Piore (1979, pp. 35-37) argued that, in economically advanced and highly industrialized countries, the labor market is segregated into primary and secondary labor markets. Jobs falling under the primary labor market are characterized by capital-intensive methods of production and are high-skilled and high-wage work under decent working conditions. In contrast, jobs in the secondary labor market are based on labor-intensive methods of production. They are low-skilled and low-waged jobs with minimum security and high turnover rates. While jobs in the secondary market are mostly filled by ethnic and racial minorities and women, jobs in the primary market are mostly occupied by native white male workers.

According to Piore (1979, pp. 16-17), international labor mobility is a result of the constant demand for cheap labor by industrialized countries. Immigrant workers are hired even when there is a domestic supply. However, as those workers are cheaper and more disciplined, they are preferred over native workers. In fact, immigrant workers are primarily hired based on their race and ethnicity. Powerful groups make biased evaluations based on their color or ethnicity believing that they are innately more capable
of doing inferior jobs and are hence they are more exploitable. Then, employers consciously manipulate racial and ethnic antagonisms which permits the capitalist to expose lower wages and poorer working conditions which are unacceptable for native workers (Portes, 1981, pp. 284-285; Reich, Gordon, & Edwards, 1973, p. 362).

3.3.2 Jamaicans and labor market integration

State practices have been decisive in assigning legal and illegal categories of membership in the Canadian nation (Sharma, 2006, p. 58). In the beginning of the 20th century, the entry of black immigrants was highly restricted except when there was an urgent demand for their labor because the mainstream culture categorized blacks as “undesirable” immigrants. The Canadian state actively discouraged the immigration of blacks because they were stigmatized as being socially, physically, economically, and morally inferior and incapable of developing capabilities to govern themselves (Calliste, 1993/1994, p. 133; Jakubowski, 1999, p. 123; Plaza, 2001, p. 50; Satzewich, 1990, p. 335). As stated by Scott, Superintendent of Immigration in 1914:

The government does not encourage the immigration of colored people. There are certain countries from which immigration is encouraged and certain races of people considered as suited to this country and its conditions, but Africans, no matter where they come from, are not among the races sought, and, hence, Africans no matter from what country they are in common with the uninvited races, not admitted to Canada. (as cited in Calliste, 1993/1994, pp.135-136)

The employers’ demand for cheap labor was at first in conflict with the state’s ideological view of Canada so blacks were excluded as permanent residents. However, the demands of the capitalist economy outweighed the race restriction on immigration. Although slowly and in limited numbers, in accordance with dual labor market theory, in 1910-1911, a limited number of blacks were admitted to Canada from the Caribbean region to
work in the mines and steel plants in Sydney, Nova Scotia, where there was a labor shortage (Plaza, 2001, p. 43). As a disciplined workforce, they were working under undesirable conditions in isolated areas and in physically demanding jobs for low wages. Their cheap labor created an advantage that allowed businesses to compete with American iron and steel producers. Whenever there was a recession, as *split labor market theory* suggests, the Caribbean blacks were accused of stealing whites’ jobs (Calliste, 1993/1994, pp. 132-139). When ethnic nationalism was the norm in Canada, they were the first workers to be fired. Similarly, when Canadian soldiers returned from the war, they went back to their jobs and blacks were discharged (Plaza, 2001, p. 43).

The arrival of black Jamaicans in Canada, in particular, can be explained through the dual labor market theory. High levels of unemployment and limited opportunities in Jamaica as an underdeveloped country, coupled with employers’ demand for cheap domestics in an economically advanced nation, all favored Jamaican immigration. Prior to the 1940s, white, British immigrant women dominated the domestics program in Canada (Hick & Allahar, 2011, p. 28). However, after the 1940s, there was a steady decrease in the number of British women working as domestics in spite of the continuing demand for this type of work in Canada.

Very few Canadians were attracted to this job, which fell under the *secondary labor market* because of long working hours, low pay, physically demanding labor, lack of respect for this kind of work, isolation, lack of independence, and potential abuse of domestic workers (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, p. 122; Calliste, 1993/1994, p. 140; Plaza, 2001, p. 42). Hence, the Canadian government had to fill the demand for cheap domestic labor from other source countries and, as mentioned by Piore (1979) and Bonacich (1972, 1980), race was a factor which rendered women of color cheaper and more easily exploitable. This explains the 1955 arrival of seventy-five Jamaican women under the West Indian Domestic Worker Scheme (currently called the Live-in Caregivers Programme), years before multiculturalism became an official Canadian policy and its
associated argument was introduced, i.e., ethnic and racial diversity was essential for a stronger economy and national unity (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, p. 12; Fleras & Elliott, 1996, p. 326; Walker, 2012, p. 31).

Jamaican domestics were incorporated into the Canadian labor market as “unfree labor” (Satzewich, 1990, p. 337) or “indentured labor” (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, p. 123). They had to remain in domestic work as proscribed by a one-year contract. They lacked mobility in the labor market to look for alternative jobs over the course of that single year. If they left their jobs before the one-year contract ended, they were subject to repatriation. Based on this condition, Jamaican women received conditional landed immigrant status upon their arrival in Canada.

Jamaican women arrived in Canada as maids and nannies in spite of the racist and restricted immigration policy at the time, but with some policy modifications (Johnson, 2012, p. 37; Plaza, 2001, p. 51; Satzewich, 1990, p. 337; Walker, 2012, p. 31). To be eligible for this program, a woman had to pass a medical examination, be single and have at least an eighth-grade education and some training in domestic service (Plaza, 2001, p. 51-52). Indeed, many of the applicants were not domestics in the Caribbean; they were instead teachers, clerks, secretaries, and so on. However, they used this program as a legal way to enter Canada. After their arrival, and as their numbers grew throughout the years, they took on domestic roles which were formerly the responsibilities of white women. Their entrance in Canada as domestics thus spoke to both questions of production and re-production of capital as it has enabled white women to participate more fully in the labor market. Some of these white women thus managed to take part in male dominant public life owing to Caribbean and other racialized women such as Filipinos.

Jamaican women were allowed in Canada as non-citizens, and hence were unable to benefit from citizenship rights. However, British women were granted full citizenship
rights as landed immigrants because they were seen as the prospective wives and mothers necessary to Canada’s nation-building process as a white nation (Callise, 1993/1994, p. 133; Hick & Allahar, 2011, p. 28). The right to apply for Canadian citizenship was conferred on the Caribbean women after they had lived in Canada for more than four years and if they had fulfilled the conditions of their one-year contract (Satzewich, 1990, p. 337).

After the mid-1970s, foreign labor for domestics shifted from the Caribbean to the Philippines. Anti-black racism was one of the reasons led to this shift. Moreover, Filipino women had been promoted as being submissive workers whereas the Caribbean women were outspoken (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, pp. 122, 126). Still, the domestic labor force is mostly occupied by women of color from underdeveloped countries, as dual labor market theory suggests.

The recruitment of Jamaican women started in a period when “whites only” immigration laws were still regulating the immigrant flows. This can be seen as a signal for the need of the official declaration of multicultural policies in 1971 because Canadian government came to realize that white Canada was not adequate to meet the demands of its economy. To build a stronger national economy, they therefore had to allow non-preferred immigrants in, which created an ethnically and racially diverse, multiethnic society.

### 3.3.3 Portuguese and labor market integration

Similar to the case of Jamaicans, push factors such as poverty and limited mobility opportunities in Portugal corresponded to the Canadian employers’ search for cheap labor. As dual labor market theory suggests (Piore 1979), the Canadian government imported five hundred and fifty Portuguese men to meet the labor demand in agricultural and construction sectors in 1953 (Marques & Medeiros, 1980, pp. 17-18). Later, thousands of workers took these low wage jobs to escape from poverty in the rural Azores, Madeira Island and various areas of mainland Portugal. Portuguese immigrants
originated mainly from rural areas, and usually did not have more than a primary school education equivalent of a grade 4 education (Higgs, 1982, pp. 4-6; Nunes, 1998, p. 60; 2008, p.122). This contributed to the darkening of Portuguese in Canada.

The Portuguese in Canada have been overwhelmingly employed in less skilled and manual jobs such as construction and agriculture, which fall into the secondary sector (Higgs, 1982, p. 7; Rocha-Trindade, 2009, p. 25). Those jobs were generally not preferred by white Canadians; as one employer indicated in an interview:

> We prefer immigrant labor . . . We have found through experience that the immigrants are the only people really willing to work. I’ve tried in the past to get the Canadians, but I have given up long ago…there are just none around who wish to do this kind of job. (as cited in Marques and Medeiros, 1980, p. 22)

Why did capital not just import black labor rather than in-between European groups if it is more exploitable and cheaper? When the official immigration from Portugal to Canada started in 1953, Canada was a dominantly North European “white” society, which begs the question of ethnic nationalism. Although capital was putting pressure on recruiting cheaper labor, the state had two concerns during the 1950s. First, the founding ideology of Canada was that of a white nation; hence, the state initially resisted and tried to create some alternative ways to avoid moving far from this ideal. They turned their attention to less-preferred European countries or regulated immigration from non-preferred under strict conditions, such as black domestics who got into Canada as “unfree” labor. Second, the state was not able to turn a blind eye to racism from below. That being the case, and with the aim of maintaining social order and securing the white vote, the government tried to regulate immigration by paying attention to both the demands of capital and the nationalists.
In the 1950s, southern European groups were discouraged from immigrating to Canada because of the “biological eugenics” which was governing the immigration policies. Based on the concept of “ethnics’ natural abilities,” Portuguese immigrants were assigned to the non-skilled, undesirable, and most dangerous jobs in the secondary labor market (Aguiar, 2006, p. 205). Hence, they were not considered to be the members of the superior “biological race”, i.e., the British and the northern European people who were associated with intelligence and skills and who were the cultured and civilized citizens of Canada.

Second, coming from the southern rural periphery of Europe with a low level of education, upon their arrival, Portuguese immigrants took on occupations that, being physical, unskilled, and low status, were associated with colored people (Northrup, 1995, pp. 22-23). Portuguese therefore became “dark” by association with both the blacks and the menial jobs they did. Whites, on the other hand, were associated with non-manual, skilled and high-status jobs. Although the skin color of Portuguese was white or olive, their social standing — social color — was not white. Hence, their poor entry status into the labor market and their ethnicity pushed them down the racially hierarchical ladder in the 1950s, where they were derided as “pork-chops” and “greasers” (Aguiar, 2006, p. 203).

This paper presents the argument that Portuguese have been a racialized group since their arrival in Canada. They were otherized by the majority on the basis of their social standing and biological eugenics, in addition to perceptions of their backward Catholic and Portuguese-speaking culture (Aguiar, 2006, p. 205; Harney, 1990, pp. 119-123). Portuguese are still socially and culturally otherized because of their culture, which deviates from the Protestant and English-speaking Anglo-Saxon norm, and their ongoing poor social standing in Canada (Nunes, 2003). For instance, at the beginning of the 21st century, Ornstein’s (2006) research of each ethnic group revealed that Portuguese had the lowest level of university completion, with 3.2 percent among all European groups and
lower than the each region’s average inclusive of the Caribbean, Arab and West Asian, South Asian, and African groups, and Jamaicans with 5.5 percent for persons aged 35-54 in Toronto (pp. 131-132). In the labor market, Portuguese mostly hold manual and unskilled jobs similar those of other racialized groups (Ornstein, 2006, pp. 142-146). However, although they have been socially, economically, and culturally categorized as being dark, they have lighter skin pigmentation and are, to a degree, still white, as can be seen in their free entrance status or their immigrant status, which has lacked any conditions from the very beginning of Portuguese immigration to Canada. This is why using Harney’s (1990, p. 119-123) concept of “dark-whites” to explain their position in the Canadian society is preferable for this research.

Social class has a vital role in understanding social forces prompting labor migration and immigrant labor market integration. Both Jamaicans, seen as blacks, and Portuguese, as dark-whites, came principally as members of the working class and both groups were exploited and used as cheap labor, which has implications for their take on multiculturalism. However, this does not mean that Jamaican immigrants and Portuguese immigrants have the same labor market experiences in Canada. Because of the history of slavery and colonialism, blacks have always been one of the most despised groups and have consequently been among the most exploited members of the working class in Canada. Although southern European immigrants were excluded because of the imagined “white Canada model” based on Anglo-Saxon British culture, blacks have endured the harshest forms of racism and exploitation.

3.4 Post-1962 Canadian Immigration, Globalization and Nationalism

In the early 1960s when Canada faced severe labor shortages, the traditional white immigrant policy was dropped. In other words, for the sake of economic advancement, the Canadian government had to officially abandon its long-standing immigration
selection criteria based on race, color, and ethnic origin (Arat-Koc, 1999, p. 35). In February of 1962, Section 31 of the Immigration Act made *education, training and skills* into the main criteria to be considered for admission, irrespective of race, color, or national origin (Green & Green, 1999, p. 431).

This was a definite shift to favoring non-European sources of immigrants to Canada (Reitz & Banerjee 2007, p. 1). However, this legal shift towards non-traditional countries did not automatically eliminate racism and nationalist explosions. In 1964, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) explained his concern about black domestics as:

One single Caribbean female domestic servant may take a year or two to become established but she may begin to sponsor brothers, sisters, fiancées, parents at a fairly rapid rate. The one unsponsored worker may meet someone’s need for a domestic servant for a year or two, but the result may be ten or twenty sponsored immigrants of dubious value to Canada and who may well cause insoluble social problems. . . I am greatly concerned that we may be facing a West Indian sponsorship explosion. (as cited in Satzewich, 1990, p. 338)

Despite nationalist outcries, there has been a steady increase in the number of immigrants of color since 1962. In 1967, this process was furthered by the introduction of the point system assigning specific values to categories such as education, language, and work experience for those who applied as “independent” immigrants (Arat-Koc, 1999, pp. 35-36; Green & Green, 1999, p. 431). While European-born immigrants represented 90 percent of the immigrants who arrived before 1961, they accounted for 61.6 percent of newcomers in 1971 (Stasiulus & Jhappan, 1995, p. 118). According to the 2016 National Household Survey (NHS), 21.9% of Canada’s population belonged to non-European groups, so-called “visible minority” groups by the Canadian officials. This means that, in
Canada, more than 1 in 5 people are from a “visible minority” group (Statistics Canada, 2017a). Canada has been an increasingly “multiethnic” society comprising various ethnic/racial groups; in fact, in 2016, 250 different ethnic origins were reported as living in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2017b)

With the change in the immigration policy, the number of Portuguese increased, but increases in the number of Jamaicans were especially high. The abolition of the racist immigration policy in 1962, together with the introduction of the point system in 1967, contributed to the growing volume of Caribbean immigrants. Jamaican immigrants have always been the most populous group coming from the Caribbean (Simmons, 2010, p. 126). Immigration from the Caribbean increased drastically until 1985 (Plaza, 2001, pp. 54-59). The family class, i.e., immigration out of concern for family unification, has been the main category used by Jamaican immigrants to get in Canada. In the 1980s, out of 210 countries, Jamaica was the ninth origin country sending immigrants to Canada, and in the 1990s, it was the fourteenth in 211 countries. Between 2000 and 2005, Jamaica was no longer among the top 20 origin countries (Simmons, 2010, p. 126) because of the increasing demand for highly skilled middle-class and wealthy upper-class immigrants. The focus on skills disadvantaged potential Jamaican immigrants because proportionately, there are fewer opportunities to access a high-qualified education in economically underdeveloped or less developed countries (Aguiar, 2006, p. 206; Plaza, 2001, p. 70). As of 2016, almost 0.9 percent of the Canadian population claimed Jamaican origin (Statistics Canada 2017c).

The number of immigrants coming from Portugal peaked during the 1980s. Out of 211 countries, Portugal was the eleventh origin country sending immigrants to Canada during the 1980s (Simmons, 2010, p. 126). Although immigration from Portugal continued into the 1990s, by the 2000s, Portugal was no longer a major origin country. In that case, the “social eugenics” of the point system prioritizing upper- and middle-class immigrants with high educational levels precluded significant numbers of Portuguese (Aguiar, 2006,
As of 2016, 1.4% of the total Canadian population claimed Portuguese origin (Statistics Canada, 2017c).

Canada’s changing immigration policies show that the immigration and nation-building process is a flexible rather than a fixed process, and hence it continues to change according to the needs of a powerful economy (Sharma, 2006, p. 73). Between 1962 and 1989, the hegemonic white Canada discourse shifted to a multicultural industrial nation (Trumper & Wong, 2007, p. 154). Besides the long-standing Quebec question and unsuccessful attempts to assimilate indigenous peoples, the Canadian government, recognizing the fact of ethnic/racial diversity, developed and implemented multicultural policies with a view to minimizing potential ethnic conflicts.

### 3.5 Multiculturalism and the Nation-Building Process in Canada

In 1971, Canada was the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007, p. 35). The 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act promised to develop tolerance to difference, eliminate discriminatory barriers, and reduce prejudice and discrimination towards minority groups (Government of Canada, 1988, pp. 3-4). The assumption underlying multicultural ideology as an official policy is that cultural differences are not incompatible with national goals, but rather are integral components of national unity, and hence socioeconomic progress (Fleras & Elliott, 1996, p. 326). Multicultural ideology has been a prerequisite for a strong competitive Canadian economy to manage diverse groups, which is in compliance with capitalism because it silences racism and promotes social control in a well-functioning economy.

These changing economic and demographic components of the nation-building process led to a transformation from an ethnic British-Canadian nationalism to civic nationalism and multiculturalism in Canada (Raymond, 1988, pp. 91-93). Civic (territorial) nationalism describes a nation as a rational union of individuals that is legally defined
and bounded by a common economy with a class structure in a demarcated territory (Smith 2001: 39-40, Allahar 2004: 105). In this view, nationalism refers to the loyalty to, and identification with, a state’s jurisdiction within a demarcated territory (Williams 1994: 53).

However, the shift from ethnic to civic nationalism does not mean that this transition wiped out ethnic nationalism. Any comprehensive study should consider both types of nationalism as they are not mutually exclusive. Immigration of ethnically and racially different populations still raises fear, suspicion, and hostility in Canada, as has been seen with the recent Muslim refugees and immigrants.

Under the wave of neo-liberal economic policies and the changing structure of the economy in developed societies with high-tech sectors, the imagined Canadian society changed again. After 1989, a new imagined Canadian economy began to seek highly skilled immigrants, and this has remained relatively intact until today (Simmons, 2010, p. 59). Still, this policy does not necessarily have an impact on temporary migrant workers.

In 1973, the Canadian state formulated the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), which subsequently became the Temporary Foreign Worker program (TFWP) in the 1990s (Trumper & Wong, 2007, p. 154). Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (2015) explained the purpose of TFWP as “filling genuine labor needs as a last and limited resort when qualified Canadians or permanent residents are not available” (p. 2). Under the TFWP, programs are mainly categorized into four streams as follows: the Live-in Caregivers Program (LCP), the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), and two other programs for high-skilled and low-skilled workers (CIC, 2015b, p. 9). Hence, in contrast to what is commonly believed, TFWP imports high-skilled labor such as engineers and computer programmers together with less skilled workers as a cheap source of labor (Bolaria, 1992, pp. 211-214; Trumper & Wong, 2007, pp. 157, 164). TFWP recruits migrants as unfree labor for a specific period of time. Workers
coming under temporary work programs are tied to their employers, and thereby are unable to circulate in the labor market as well as not being allowed to overstay the length of time indicated on their temporary employment authorization visa because of legal constrains (Bakan & Stasiulis, 2003, p. 123; Sharma, 2006, pp. 20, 105; Trumper & Wong, 2007, p. 154).

During the years of implementation of neoliberal policies, the state has continued its focus on multiculturalism and has tried to convince its citizens that cultural diversity is not a threat to national unity and a well-functioning economy. However, this premise has not been very convincing to the wider society, in which resources are limited and neoliberal economic policies have gradually cut into the social rights of citizens such as education and health care. Under challenging economic conditions, immigrants of color are otherized and racialized as the ones who steal the jobs and abuse the welfare system of Canada. Although this claim does not reflect reality, this perception has kept ethnic nationalism alive among native-born populations. The idea of temporary foreign workers or migrant workers hence has served to mitigate the racialized economic anxieties of the wider population, allowing the ultimate “multicultural” political ideal to survive. In fact, Sharma (2006) argued that the shift in the state’s immigration policy from permanent immigration settlement to “temporary migrant workers” fulfilling the need for a flexible labor force is indicative of a neoliberal turn in state policies. In 2005, the number of unfree temporary workers entries was almost double that of free immigrant workers (Trumper & Wong, 2007, p.155). This shift has therefore worked well with both the legacy of ethnic nationalism and the multiculturalism as a state policy (Sharma, 2006, p. 20).

Under the TFWP of Canada, Jamaica is the third largest source country after Philippines and Mexico (CIC, 2015b, p. 24). The temporary nature of these jobs tells us that racialized Jamaican workers are not part of Canada but can be used for dirty jobs as a flexible and cheap labor force. As mentioned by Piore (1979), even if there is sometimes
a supply of native-workers for precarious jobs, migrant workers are preferred because they are more exploitable than the non-or-less racialized groups. Jamaicans have been an integral part of the temporary workforce since the beginning of the SAWP in 1966. Before TFWP was expanded to include other programs under its umbrella, SAWP was the first program to recruit temporary migrant workers as unfree labor. In 1966, 246 Jamaican males were temporarily admitted to work on farms because of labor shortages in that area following the end of the Second World War (Basok, 2003, p. 7; Satzewich, 1990, p. 332). Originally developed with Jamaica on a trial basis and for the Caribbean countries, in 1974, this program was expanded to include Mexicans (Basok, 2003, p. 7; Robinson, 2006, p. 2). As to specifics, the number of Caribbean workers recruited through SAWP was 11,393 in 1995 (Plaza, 2001, p. 53) and in 2004, 8,110 in addition to 10,777 Mexicans (Robinson, 2006, p. 2). The total number of migrant workers under SAWP was 39,550 in 2014 (CIC, 2015b, p. 22) and 18,887 in 2004. Overall, the number of Jamaican foreign workers has been increasing on a constant basis in Canada. While the number of Jamaican foreign workers was 6,243 in 2005, it was 9,326 as of 2014 (CIC, 2015b, p. 22).

Temporary foreign workers from Portugal, on the other hand, do not constitute a major source of labor and their number is considerably lower than that of Jamaican foreign workers because, as a European population, they are not as racialized as Jamaicans. We can clearly see how race and skin color are manipulated to create the most exploitable workforce for most precarious jobs (Bonacich, 1972, 1980; Piore 1979). The number of Portuguese under TFWP was 128 in 2005, and 499 in 2014 (CIC, 2015b, p. 24).

Through state practices, employers in various sectors enjoy greater flexibility in labor management. Foreign workers from less developed countries are more likely to be employed in the lowest paying occupations compared to migrant workers recruited from economically more advanced countries or permanent residents and citizens (Islam, 2013, p. 96; Sharma, 2006, pp. 20, 104). For instance, the economy of Jamaica was completely
devastated by the European colonial powers, and this economic decay continues with the new institutions of European powers such as IMF and WB. Hence, Jamaicans are more open to being paid less because they are compelled by hunger, compared to temporary migrant workers coming from more economically developed countries. Furthermore, they work under unattractive conditions, and are highly disciplined, and hence heavily exploited.

The ideology of ethnic nationalism fits well with the ideology of neoliberalism because recent Canadian immigration policies are more inclined to import foreign migrant workers for a temporary period of time as a flexible labor force instead of bringing them as immigrants which gives them permanent residency status (Sharma, 2006, p. 149). Hence, the Canadian state, by legalizing unfree labor practices, is also able to soothe white Canadians’ fear of being invaded by non-white cultures. Accordingly, in 2014, the number of Jamaicans who came as permanent residents (3,054) was one third of those who came to Canada as foreign labor (9,326)(CIC, 2015a, p. 29, 2015b, p. 24). On the other hand, in the same year, the number of Portuguese who arrived in Canada as permanent residents (637) was higher than the number of Portuguese who came as foreign labor (499).

The commonsense perception of non-white migrant workers under TFWP by native workers is that “they” are given the opportunity to work legally in Canada by “us” (Sharma, 2006, p. 20). This is seen as an act of “charity” from Canadians to foreign others (Arat-Koc, 1992, p. 238). On the other side, the discourse of the Canadian state is that migrant workers are hired because of the labor shortage, and hence they do not take the jobs which belong to Canadians (Sharma, 2006, p. 107). Indeed, whites would not work for the low wages paid for the identical jobs. TFWP therefore serves more of the purpose of finding cheap labor rather than easing labor shortages.
The state apparatus utilizing nationalist feelings, i.e., racism from above, detracts attention from the global cheap labor strategies for higher profits. In this way, the Canadian state both secures global, neo-liberal production relations and reconstructs the white nationalist ideology. This study, in line with the neo-Marxist approach, argues that ethnic nationalism can be better understood if class interests and motives of its promoters are revealed because the prominence of ethnic nationalism in the modern political world sometimes obscures the explanatory power of social class, although nationalism is closely related to the distinct economic and political interests of ethnic entrepreneurs (Allahar, 2004, pp. 95, 97, 99).

In Canada, “otherizing” immigrants of color as “visible minorities” is based on the idea that immigrants of color do not fit into the imagined community with a common history and shared culture. However, first, this otherization process is beneficial for the bourgeoisie because these groups do the same work cheaper than the whites. Second, the state complies with businesses by making necessary laws and regulations to bring “others” in as cheap labor, and hence it consolidates its political support.

This does not mean that white Canadians are not exploited as members of the working class at a construction site or in a call center as a wage laborer. However, the myth of common history and shared culture obscures the exploitative relationship between workers and employers, and creates a false consciousness (Bonacich, 1980). Anderson (1991) noted that “the nation is always conceived as a deep and horizontal comradeship regardless of the actual exploitation and exploitation that may prevail in each” (p. 7). As stated by Allahar (2004, p. 120), the so-called common ethnic-racial interests of a nation can disguise class divisions within a community. So, the state as a promoter of nationalist ideology has a significant role in mobilizing people around a common ethnicity and “race,” thus masking class conflict, exploitation, and deep inequalities. The idea that the state serves the common interests of a nation serves to obscure the unequal, class-stratified nature of the wider society (Sharma, 2006, pp. 57-58).
3.6 Conclusion

Both Portuguese and Jamaican immigration to Canada started by incorporating working class people, who were among the global reserve army of labor. These immigration waves indeed served the same interests that demand a constant supply of cheap labor for the changing economic needs of Canada.

Ethnic nationalism was the political force behind the initial nation-building process of Canada, and hence the Canadian immigration system was racially and ethnically selective. Neither group was among the desirable immigrant groups during that process. There were three reasons that Jamaican immigration certainly faced an even greater challenge posed by the Canadian state and white Canadians. First, Canada was founded on the ideal of white British culture, and blacks — Jamaicans — have been seen to deviate from this norm more than the dark-whites. Second, anti-black racism carrying the legacy of colonialism and slavery hit blacks the hardest of any group. Third, cheaper immigrant labor of more racialized populations and the threat of being replaced spurred fear among white Canadians. However, the needs of the capitalist class and the requirements of the globalized Canadian economy replaced traditional immigration policy, and hence the white Canada project failed.

Hence, the shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism and multiculturalism was an economic “must” more than the result of emerging liberal ideas and a change in the state ideology. It was essential to allow the flow of cheap labor to meet the demands of a capitalist economy and keep the social order intact in Canada.

The state’s multicultural ideology attempts to convince people that Canada is stronger with its diversity. However, in opposition to the ideology of multiculturalism and its discourse, ethnic nationalism still creates hostility towards immigrants from the South. Furthermore, this time, ethnic nationalism works in accordance with the needs of neo-liberal economic policies, and hence Canadian immigration policies. In addition, the
Canadian state has explored new forms of unfree labor as a response to the flexible labor needs of businesses. Recruiting temporary “foreign” migrant workers not only alleviates the panic of being invaded by non-European cultures but also provides flexible and cheap labor to be a competitive economy.
3.7 References


Chapter 4

4 Ideology of Multiculturalism as a Double-Edged Sword: Second-generation of Black Jamaicans and Dark-White Portuguese

4.1 Introduction

This article deals with the concept of ideology and its role in maintaining social control in an ethnically diverse and competitive capitalist society. Because capitalism is based on exploitation, it runs the risk of producing conflict. Thus, the guardians of the system must find ways of institutionalizing exploitation while preventing the exploited from coming to a realization that they are being exploited. The ideologies of racism and sexism are key in this regard. In Canada, there are more than 250 different ethnic groups (Statistics Canada, 2017a), yet, compared to many other developed capitalist societies and economies, there is a great measure of social order and calm. To what extent might it be said that the social order in question is due to the operations of ideology?

Like any other capitalist economy, Canada requires constant supplies of labor and where the natural reproduction of the work force is insufficient, the government has had to turn to immigration to meet labor needs. After 1962, as European immigration became less popular, immigrants to Canada were recruited from the countries of the so-called developing world, namely Africa, India, the Middle East, South America and the Caribbean (Green & Green, 1999; Plaza, 2001; Satzewich & Liokadis, 2013; Simmons, 2010). This led to the shaping of the social and cultural fabric in the country as the new immigrants presented a sharp contrast to traditional Europeans, who had defined the earlier cultural, racial and ethnic composition of the country.

As an advanced, industrial capitalist country, where labor has been markedly deskillled, it stands to reason that Canada and Canadian industrialists and manufacturers would be
keen on securing any kind of workers just so long as they were cheap. The challenge, however, was to maintain social order in the face of the fast-changing social composition, especially given the competition among various immigrant groups for scarce resources, e.g., jobs, housing, education or health care. As is well known, the answer to the challenge was sought in the policy of multiculturalism that was introduced in 1971 and recognized in the constitution in 1982 (Reitz, 2012, p. 528; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007, p. 35). Later, in 1988, multiculturalism was passed into law (Government of Canada, 1988).

While competition is not in itself a bad thing, it can lead to conflict when the resources in question are scarce and when access to those resources is, or is perceived to be, unequal. In other words, if competition witnesses some groups being given preference over others, whether for reasons of race, ethnicity, culture or national origin, it could lead to a volatile situation and provoke outbursts of social unrest or ethnic conflict. The history of the colonization of Canada and the redistribution of economic resources started with the oppression of Aboriginal populations and the force and brutality that attended the killing and subduing of the latter. This is the backdrop against which recent immigrants from non-traditional countries have been empowered and have come to demand equal access and fair representation in the dominant economic, political, educational, social and religious institutions of the country.

However, in the current age and political climate, the Canadian government cannot rely on the same brutal tactics of physical control that were used against the Aboriginals. In the modern age of “democracy” and transparency, the question of human rights and respect for all peoples requires a different approach to the resolution of ethnic and cultural conflicts within society. The challenge, then, is to find a way to compel subordinate groups to accept their subordination without their becoming aware of being manipulated. This concerns the matter of social control and the engineering of compliance since it is not legal to secure consent by force. And this is where ideology is
brought into the equation because it is subtler and less interventive than the use of naked force (Allahar, 1986; Baldus, 1977; Gramsci, 1971); rather, it seeks to conquer people’s hearts and minds.

In the specific case of the ideology of multiculturalism, one can see the way in which the promise of equality, regardless of racial and ethnic differences, may serve to distract new immigrant groups from recognizing the real source of their subordination (Allahar, 2010, p. 57). It is almost the same as creating a sense of false consciousness, which acts as a distraction from the real causes of their oppression and removes any talk of exploitation from their vocabulary. When successful, the result is a lack of resistance, or even an endorsement of the status quo.

Based on these introductory remarks, the goal of this research is to treat multiculturalism in two ways. First, multiculturalism, as an ideological distraction, is aimed at second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese in Toronto, two populations that, for different reasons, find themselves occupying subordinate positions in Canada’s competitive market economy and polity. For when all is said and done, Canada is first and foremost a multiethnic, capitalist and monocultural country that promotes its multicultural policy ideologically as a distraction. Second, multiculturalism is treated as a tool and coping strategy that is used rationally by racialized populations to create a sense of belonging and to deal with the harsh reality of exclusion.

The aim is to untangle the complex web of race, ethnic and class subordination; to understand how the ideology of multiculturalism might play a crucial role in cementing social order in the economy and society at large; and to explain the role of multiculturalism in the integration of these two second-generation working-class groups into Canadian society. Speaking in broad strokes of the brush, one challenge will be to determine if it is a simple matter of charging the Jamaicans and Portuguese in question with being falsely conscious, or if there is a more compelling explanation for their
readiness to endorse what is an unjust social order. And how might the question of racial consciousness be assessed in the absence of class consciousness? And although second-generation Portuguese may think they are “white,” how do they interpret or process their own subordinate status in the society and economy, a status that places them socio-economically closer to the black Jamaicans than to white Europeans?

This article is based on two arguments that can be considered as significant contributions to the literature on multiculturalism, integration and assimilation. First, the ideology of multiculturalism is not simply without value, but can bear both negative and positive meanings concerning the integration of second-generation immigrants. Second, it can be argued that multiculturalism is a stepping stone to assimilation for various immigrant groups including racialized populations. A stepping stone, in this paper, refers to the experiences and circumstances which have been shaped by the principles and promises of official multiculturalism such as equality, full participation, and respect for diversity, through which the second-generation interacts with the dominant society. And when these promises of multiculturalism are embraced by the subordinate groups, they are accepted as paths or key steps toward eventual acceptance and incorporation.

Developing this argument requires the unpacking of the sociological concepts of ideology, multiculturalism, integration and assimilation. The research questions pertaining to the role of multicultural ideology in cementing social control and its role in the integration of second-generation working-class Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canada will be analyzed in light of empirical data. These data came from semi-structured and in-depth interviews with twenty-three second-generation Jamaicans and twenty second-generation Portuguese, which were conducted in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Nicknames were given to the participants to protect their identity.
4.2 Ideology and Its Functions

Ideology is a thorny concept in the social science literature, carrying a variety of meanings, both pejorative and positive (Bailey & Gayle, 2003, pp. 22-23; McLellan, 1995, pp. 1-5). The focus in the study of ideology can vary, depending on whether it is analyzed through Marxist or non-Marxist perspectives (Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979; McLellan, 1995; Rejai, 1991). This study utilizes Marxist and neo-Marxist lenses because these places an emphasis on power relations, historical and dialectical understanding, the lived experiences of peoples, agency within certain structures, and the role of individuals in interpreting ideologies and creating meanings accordingly.

At the simplest level, ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs and ideas that govern the thinking process and actions of peoples (Allahar, 1986, p. 613; Bailey & Gayle, 2003, p. 6; Eagleton, 1991, p.1-2). An ideology provides a mental framework through which human beings make sense of their lived experiences and their world. Ideology, rather than being a systematic set of thoughts, equips people with practical reasoning to figure out their society (Hall, 1996, p. 26) and to create tools to develop rationalizations for their lived experiences (Rejai, 1991, p. 17). It is how they attempt to make sense of their worlds and to soften contradictions that can otherwise be harsh.

To Marx, ideology carried a derogatory meaning because he viewed it as a set of beliefs and ideas which are used to distort the reality of unequal relations and uneven distribution of economic resources, and to justify the rule of the few over many (Allahar, 1986, p. 610). As a historical materialist thinker, Marx argued that the economic substructure of society conditions the superstructure of culture, politics, laws, and norms. In a similar vein, the class which controls the means of production also has control over the ideas and beliefs of peoples. This was indicated by Marx and Engels (1932) as “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (p. 21). Clearly, in this formulation, the ideologies of capitalism, e.g., equality, freedom and individualism, are used to
camouflage exploitation and inequality by giving the appearance of free choice and exchange in the market (McLellan, 1995, p. 14). The dominant ideology providing distorted and mystified forms of ideas creates a false consciousness which limits the understanding of unequal class relations (Bailey & Gayle, 2003, p. 34).

When used to promote false consciousness, therefore, ideology is seen as a tool for social control because it is easier to get the consent of people who are not aware of the source of their disadvantage. According to Baldus (1977), in complex capitalist societies composed of increasingly diverse yet interdependent individuals, engineering social control by ideological tools has been more common than resorting to coercion, which is a costly and a cumbersome process (pp. 251-257). For instance, the ideologies of racism or sexism aim to detract attention from class consciousness and to convince blacks and women that their inferior statuses are normal and understandable. This new and creative way of social control thus helps the capitalist class cement social order in a highly diverse society rife with inequality and injustice. This also means that the working class is not conscious of being subject to hegemonic control and gives unwitting support to the objectives of the ruling class in their everyday lives (Baldus, 1977, p. 250).

Although direct force is utilized when necessary by the state in capitalist societies, this can risk the loss of ideological legitimacy; once power shows itself in coercive ways, it can bring about political resistance (Eagleton, 1991, p. 116). Hence, the invisible tools for consolidating power are more effective for gaining the consent of the ruled. Once the ruled perceive that they do have the authority to make decisions of their own, social control is less threatened and longer-lasting. A social order must be constructed “in which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society — but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 268). For instance, by the use of the ideology of religion, a majority of people do not fight against daily inequalities because of their belief that their subordination is God’s will. Their religious beliefs also hold that bad
people will be punished in the after-life, thus keeping the status quo intact. During harsh times in their lives, the meanings they attribute to “God” or praying work to create a sense of comfort and protection; adversity is interpreted as God’s way of testing their worthiness of His grace.

Although the idea of ideology as false consciousness helps in understanding the social forces beneath the surface, this is not by itself an adequate conceptual tool to explain the role of ideologies. This view sees every human being simply as lacking any moderate level of agency and any degree of control over his/her lives (Eagleton, 1991, p. 12) and underestimates the power of ideas and ideologies in everyday life (McLellan, 1995, p. 17).

Gramsci (1971) rejected ideology as a purely negative phenomenon and also suggested a positive understanding of their functions (pp. 376-377). To him, first of all, there was not just one dominant ideology, but there were ideologies which could be developed by various groups of people independently of their rulers. Ideologies are necessary and they have validity to the extent that they “organize human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 366). Therefore, they are not simply useless because they serve to unite people. They are not just imposed upon people because human beings take part in the construction of ideologies as a response to their lived realities and the specific needs in their everyday lives (Gramsci, 1971, p. 164).

Instead being restricted to only one understanding of ideology, it is preferable to adapt the contributions of both Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives to provide a more adequate and powerful explanation of the research issue at hand. In this paper, the ideology of multiculturalism serves to elucidate this point; specifically, here, the treatment of ideology recognizes the centrality of power structures for the benefit of the ruling class. However, an additional argument will be made that human beings are not
always merely passive recipients of the ideas of the ruling class. They also create and assign meanings in response to their material realities or their structural positioning, and these assigned meanings have the potential to either create or impede change. For instance, the working-class movement in the 1960s was a response to workers’ difficult living and working conditions and was one of the factors behind the rise of Keynesian state policies. Those policies, in turn, expanded the rights and benefits of the working class, e.g., access to public housing and decreased working hours.

### 4.3 Multiculturalism as an Ideology and Multiculturalism as a Policy

Canada became an ethnically and racially diverse society after the abolishment of immigration policies that restricted the entrance of non-European people. With the introduction of the ‘point system’ in 1967, immigrants were selected on the basis of their job skills, education and official language abilities, regardless of their racial and ethnic backgrounds (Simmons, 2010, p. 73). Today, using the data on race, ethnicity, and language, and out of more than 180 countries, the only Western nation appearing on the list of the top twenty most diverse countries is Canada (Morin, 2013).

In a descriptive sense, multiculturalism refers to a demographic reality in which there are ethnically diverse groups of people who speak different languages, have different religions or values and beliefs (Fleras, 2017, pp. 299-300, Fleras & Elliott, 1992, pp. 27-28, 1996, p. 27). In this sense, Canada is a “multiethnic” society which hosts Aboriginal peoples, different ethnic groups from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Americas and many other non-European countries with a variety of cultures. According to Statistics Canada (2017a), Canadian society comprised more than 250 ethnic groups in 2016. Thus, as an empirical fact, Canada is a multiethnic society.

Multiculturalism as an ideology refers to an ideal situation concerning how society should be organized. The assumption underlying the multicultural ideology is that
cultural differences are not incompatible with national goals, but instead are integral components of national unity and socioeconomic progress (Fleras & Elliott, 1996, p. 326). Regarding the notion of multi-cultural, culture can be defined as a set of values and beliefs of a group and their way of life (Allahar, 1993b, p. 71). However, it should be noted that culture goes beyond the popular culture which deals with superficial and visible elements such as food, dance, dress, and music. Central tenets of a culture, on the other hand, refer to its political elements, including values, beliefs, customs, habits, religion, language, and specific economic and political practices. Canada is indeed “monocultural” in practice and multicultural in ideology, i.e., the values, beliefs, and customs of Canada are still mono-European as an English-speaking, Christian, and capitalist society.

As an official ideology, the intention is for multiculturalism to be based on the principles of freedom, respect, and tolerance for cultural differences, while promising equal status to every group, each of which has a different cultural background (Government of Canada, 1988, p. 3). With the adoption of multiculturalism, Canada promised to pursue policies to alleviate unequal treatment among different ethno-cultural and racial groups. Hence, multicultural policy refers to a set of government initiatives aimed at turning the multicultural ideals into practice (Fleras & Elliott, 1996, p. 328). These government policies are said to guarantee equal access to Canadian institutions, to promote full and equal workplace participation, to grant equal cultural rights and to celebrate cultural differences. Unfortunately, it is not easy to legislate culture.

In Canada, with respect to official multiculturalism, what we ought to have is an equal access to the dominant institutions and equal distribution of wealth regardless of ethnic and racial background. However, based on this ideal, what we have or how Canadian society is currently organized is different from what was promised by official multiculturalism. The main problem is that multiculturalism promises equality but does
not specify how “cultural equality” in a competitive capitalist society can be accommodated alongside economic and political inequality.

Accordingly, the paper will first offer an explanation of the ways in which the current situation is different than the ideal, followed by a discussion that will focus on the integration of second-generation of Portuguese and Jamaicans within the context of unequal power relationships. Brief snapshots of Portuguese and Jamaican communities are provided because family background is a significant contributing factor to the limited integration of these two second-generation groups. Last, there will be an examination of what these two groups of second-generation want multiculturalism to do for them.

4.4 Broken Promises of Official Multiculturalism

Before multiculturalism was introduced in 1971, Porter (1965) presented his ground-breaking work, *The Vertical Mosaic*, describing how Canadian society was organized. He argued that, contrary to the common belief that Canada is a classless and an egalitarian society, it is in actuality a classed society. He further claimed that Canada is a mosaic in terms of hosting diverse ethnic groups, but that there is a vertical relationship among the various ethno-cultural groups because each had disproportionate power in this hierarchal order (Porter, 1965, pp. xii-xiii). Hence, not all cultures were equally valued and accepted, just as wealth was not equally distributed among various ethnic groups. First the British and then the French were the ones who benefited most from the economic, social and political resources. Ethnic affiliation and immigration were significant determinants of the formation of social classes (Porter, 1965, p. 73), so each ethno-cultural group had different access to educational and occupational opportunities in the ethnically and economically stratified society.

Following the question of how Canadian society is currently organized, it is crucial to remind the reader that Canada’s demographic structure is racially and ethnically much more diverse than it was during the period when Porter provided his unsettling analysis of
the Canadian mosaic. With the elimination of overt racial preference from the immigration policy in 1962 and the introduction of point system in 1967 (Reitz & Somerville, 2004, p. 392; Satzewich & Liokadis, 2013; Simmons, 2010, p. 73), racial and ethnic diversity increased. According to Statistics Canada (2017a), in 1981, while 4.7 percent of the total Canadian population belonged to “visible minority” groups, this number increased to 22.3 percent in 2016, the same year that the number of immigrants born in Europe decreased from 61.6 percent in 1971 to 11.6 percent.

4.4.1 The Portuguese community in Canada

Today, ethno-cultural background is no longer seen as a barrier to economic mobility or incorporation, which differs from class mobility that is defined by the ownership or the lack of ownership of the major means of production, e.g., capital, knowledge, factory, land, or machines — among European groups in Canada (Breton, 2005, p. 290; Lian & Matthews, 2008, p. 462). While Porter defined the southern and eastern European groups as lying at the bottom of the hierarchical system due to the ethically defined barriers, in time, most had become an indistinguishable part of the dominant groups with, however, some exceptions, including the Portuguese (Jedwab & Satzewich, 2015, p. xxiii; Kenedy and Nunes, 2012, p. 105; Nunes, 2008, p. 124).

As part of the European community, the Portuguese have been economically, politically and socially marginalized since their arrival to Canada in the 1950s (Kenedy & Nunes, 2012, p. 109; Nunes, 2003, p. 123). Their economic mobility lags behind other European populations mainly due to their stubbornly low level of educational attainment and, until recently, their segregation into low-status occupations. The Portuguese, who mostly originated from rural areas of the Azores and the mainland, arrived in Canada with limited education (Higgs, 1982; Kenedy & Nunes, 2012; Marques & Medeiros, 1980; Nunes, 1998, 2008, 2014). As of the 2000s, the level of university completion among Luso-Canadians over the age of 15 was still around 6 percent, similar to that of
Canada’s most vulnerable Aboriginal peoples (Nunes, 2014, p. 4; Persley & Brown, 2011, p. 2).

In broad, descriptive terms, the Canadian-Portuguese are largely working class. Because of their low educational levels, the men have been mainly employed in lower status manual occupations, particularly in construction. For their part, the women have been concentrated in factory jobs — although this is declining because of the country’s transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy — and low-status service occupations, particularly in the cleaning sector (Clifton, 2010, p. 3; Januário & Marujo, 2000, pp. 103-108; Nunes, 1998, p. 11, 2003, p. 125, 2008, p. 122). Accordingly, at the beginning of the 21st century, the research conducted by Ornstein (2006) in the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) where a substantial majority of Portuguese live (Teixeira, 2007), the Portuguese in Canada had a low representation in professional and high-status jobs (Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1: Occupation of Women, Age 18-64 by Ethno-Racial Group, Toronto CMA, 2001, by percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada overall</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Total</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ornstein, 2006, pp.142-143
Table 2: Occupation of Men, Age 18-64 by Ethno-Racial Group, Toronto CMA, 2001, by percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada overall</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Total</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ornstein, 2006, pp.144-145

Some Portuguese immigrants still do not have a full comprehension of English, mainly because they have their own formal organizations providing some of the necessary services to their ethnic communities, which refers to a high level of institutional completeness (Breton, 1964, p. 194). They are an essentially self-sufficient community, having ethnic organizations and businesses such as bakeries, grocery stores, real estate agencies, travel agencies, churches, and banks serving in the Portuguese language (Nunes, 2008, p. 121; Teixeira & Da Rosa, 2000, pp. 7-9; Teixeira & Murdie, 2009, p. 196). Utilizing ethnic networks, ethnic economies help to recruit co-ethnic workers (Boyd, 1989, p. 653). For instance, Portuguese in construction and cleaning services have a high chance of having Portuguese co-workers so they don’t have to learn English to communicate in the workplace (Januário & Marujo, 2000, p. 107). The institutional completeness of Portuguese community has indeed retarded their assimilation process. Ethel, whose parents arrived Canada in 1987, reported her parents’ occupation and knowledge of English as:
My dad is doing labor. It is always sort of construction. Mum is always in cleaning… My dad still does not speak English. His job is always working with Portuguese people in construction; so he has never needed to learn English.

Although Portuguese-Canadians earn less than the Canadian average (Nunes, 1998, p. 8, 2003, p. 128; Ornstein, 2006, p. 146; Statistics Canada, 2011), unemployment and poverty are not major problems for the community. They also have high rates of homeownership (Kenedy & Nunes, 2012; Noivo, 1997; Nunes, 1998, 2003; Ornstein, 2006; Persley & Brown, 2011; Teixeira & Murdie, 2009), as well as a strong network of contacts — social capital — within their ethnic community (Teixeira & Murdie, 2009, pp. 196-197) that helps them find employment and other forms of social assistance. That being the case, they do not necessarily rely on mainstream institutions, which limits their integration into the so-called multicultural Canadian society.

The Portuguese are lumped into the “white” category in Canada (Canada, 1995; Nunes, 2008, p. 214, 2014, p. 4; Pacheco, 2004, pp. 1-2; Sardinha, 2011, p. 380; Teixeira & Da Rosa, 2000), but the term “white” has to be qualified. The marginalization of the Portuguese community raises the question of the extent to which Portuguese are “white,” acknowledging the fact that whiteness is more than skin color and is more related to power relations and unearned and systemic advantages (Frankenberg, 1993, pp. 53-54; Harris, 1993, p. 1715; Howard, 2013, p. 836; Levine-Rasky, 2013, p. 4; McIntosh, 2004, p. 319; Wildman & Davis, 2012, p. 111). In this paper, due to the weak socio-economic and political positioning of the Portuguese in Canadian society, Portuguese are treated as “dark-whites,” which is a term that was used by Harney (1990, p. 113).

The argument presented here is that “whites” can be racialized in a manner similar to people of color such as black Jamaicans because racialization refers to a process of social construction through which oppressed groups are othered by those who are in power.
Historically, powerful groups — male, “white,” educated, European, Christian — have used biological color to assign meaning to the oppressed groups as a marker of their social standing. For instance, black people are associated with being less capable of social achievement, criminal, violent, immoral, sexually overactive and less intelligent. So, in a transformative way of thinking, the “white race” is socially constructed as well, although white people see themselves as raceless or just as human beings (Dyer, 2012, p. 11) and they are associated with intelligence, high level of morality, civilization, wealth and being more capable of social achievement (Allahar, 1993, pp. 43-44, Miles, 1989, pp. 29-32).

Accordingly, if racialization is tied to power relations along with skin color, the biological color of the Portuguese or their lighter skin pigmentation do not match their *social color*, i.e., social standing, such as their low educational level and their occupational ghettoization in low-status jobs. At this point, it can be contended that both the *social darkness* — being an overwhelmingly working-class community — and the biological whiteness of Portuguese have real consequences in their lives — or one can even trump the other. In a racist system of social allocation of resources, Portuguese can be sociologically defined as dark-whites, with their social color giving shades to their whiteness. Additionally, as indicated by Nunes (2003, p. 130), they are not culturally and physically similar enough to Anglo-Saxons to be considered familiar, yet not so different as to be considered as exotic.

This was illustrated in an article that was written by Duckworth (a young Anglo-Canadian woman) in a Luso-Canadian student magazine:

I am going to give a description of the Portuguese in the eyes of the typical Canadian: “The Portuguese are dark and short. They speak a strange language that only they understand. They live in a neighbourhood in the City of Toronto - between Dundas and Bloor, Spadina and Dufferin.
The Portuguese have a Portuguese market where [only] fish is sold, nothing more. The Portuguese talk a lot and talk loudly, especially on the streetcars where they are very often seen. The Portuguese man is a labourer. He works in construction [...] The Portuguese woman works as a cleaning lady. The Portuguese is not very sophisticated. [He] doesn’t like to learn English. [He] doesn’t like to live outside the Portuguese neighbourhood in Toronto. [He] doesn’t like to adapt to Canadian habits. [He] doesn’t like to study. [He] prefers to work and to earn a lot of money.” I think that this is an exact description of the Portuguese in the eyes of the typical Canadian. It’s sad, but it’s true. The Portuguese is an enigma. He lives in a closed world and he is little understood by Canadians. One can say that [his] image is one of the least exotic of all of the immigrant groups that live in Canada. Maybe the image of the Portuguese in public opinion will change in the next generation when they will have time to better establish themselves. I hope so. At least the image which they now have could not be any worse (1986 as cited in Nunes, 2003, p. 130) (Author’s translation).

Overall, since, on average, Portuguese as a European group lack the same level of socio-economic power as other white European groups and their culture is not similar enough to the mainstream, their whiteness is limited (Satzewich 2000).

4.4.2 The Jamaican community in Canada

Concerning the Jamaican community in Canada, some argue that, with the increasing diversity of immigrants and Canadian immigration policies, an ethnic hierarchy has been replaced with a racial hierarchy (Block & Galabuzi, 2011; Galabuzi, 2001, 2006; Lian & Matthews, 2008; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2011; Ramos, 2013). According to this argument, as people of color are overrepresented in precarious jobs and low-income
occupations, poverty and unemployment have been increasingly racialized (Block & Galabuzi, 2011, pp. 3-5; Galabuzi, 2001, pp. 3-7). For instance, using 2006 Census data, racialized Canadians earned 81.4 cents for every dollar paid to non-racialized Canadians (Block & Galabuzi, 2011, p. 3). Pendakur and Pendakur (2010) found that, in particular, South Asians and blacks have been hit hardest by earning disparities since the 1990s (p. 305-306). Moreover, controlling for age and education, these differences have persisted for the second-generation Canadians (Block & Galabuzi, 2011, p. 5; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2011, pp. 305-306).

This perspective therefore argues that Porter’s ethnic hierarchy — social stratification of groups based on their cultural characteristics — was replaced with racial hierarchy — social stratification of groups based on their phenotypical characteristics. In support of this view, the first formal acknowledgement of bias and discrimination towards the members of “visible minorities” appeared in the Report of the Commission on Equality in Employment (1984) along with Aboriginal peoples, women and persons with disabilities. This report led to the development of the Employment Equity Act in 1986, which, in 1995, was strengthened to increase the representation of “visible minority” members, along with other groups (Henry & Tator, 2010, pp. 84-85, 327).

The racial hierarchy thesis is supported by evidence of labor market discrimination and increasing poverty rates among people of color. However, it is not empirically safe to homogenize all racialized groups. First, there are class differences within and between groups (Allahar, 2010, p. 67; Satzewich & Liokadis, 2013, p. 152). Second, the economic well-being of racialized groups may differ depending on the ethnic/ racial community, years spent in Canada and the generation under discussion. For instance, the Portuguese in Canada are socio-economically not significantly better off than some “visible minority groups” (Satzewich & Liokadis, 2013, p. 150). Hum and Simpson (2007) also found that Chinese do not earn less than non-visible minorities (p. 95). Skuterud (2010), regarding the generational aspect, found increasing earnings over
generations for “visible minorities” although earning gaps seem to be more permanent for blacks (p. 878). Canadian-born blacks were doing only slightly better than a black immigrant in 2002 although, previously, they were earning significantly more than black immigrants (Hum & Simpson, 2007, p. 104).

Still, this does not refute the argument of racialized hierarchy because the majority of European groups are statistically overrepresented in decent and high-paying occupations. On the other hand, racialized groups are more likely to be occupied in temporary, precarious, low-paying and low-status jobs and more likely to be unemployed based on 2006 Census data (Block & Galabuzi, 2011). This should serve as a warning against making sweeping generalizations.

Although there are some differences with regard to the results of various investigations of racialization and its economic impacts, one of their findings is identical. All research has shown that blacks in Canada consistently lag behind various racial groups in terms of earnings and occupational status, regardless of being Canadian-born or an immigrant, and this disadvantage is more stubborn over generations (Block & Galabuzi, 2011; Galabuzi, 2001; Hum & Simpson, 2007; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2002, 2011; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007; Reitz, Banerjee, Phan, & Thompson, 2009; Skuterud, 2010).

In Canada, the principle ethnic black group is Jamaicans (Statistics Canada, 2017b; The Environics Institute, 2017, p. 31), which is the reason they are one focus of this study. Like the Portuguese, the Jamaicans are predominantly a working-class community who are economically and socially very marginalized. In 2001, the university completion rate for Jamaican-Canadians aged 15 and over was 10 percent while the Canadian average was 15 percent (Statistics Canada, 2007). Hence, not surprisingly, similar to the Portuguese, they are less likely to be occupied in professional jobs (see Table 1 and Table 2) and their employment income is lower than the Canadian average (Ornstein, 2006; Statistics Canada, 2007). Twenty-six percent of Jamaican-Canadians had incomes falling
below Canada’s Low-Income Cut-Offs, compared with 16 percent of the total population in 2000 (Statistics Canada, 2007).

Unlike Portuguese-Canadians, the unemployment rate and poverty are huge concerns for the Jamaican community, although their post-secondary education level is higher than that of the Portuguese community (Ornstein, 2006, pp. 130-131; Statistics Canada, 2011), which is a clear indication of racism. For instance, in 2001, while the average unemployment rate was 6.3 percent, it was 8.2 percent for the Jamaicans and 4.1 percent for the Portuguese in Toronto (Ornstein, 2006, p. 139). Poverty was consequently as high as 27 percent, compared to the average of 15 percent (Ornstein, 2006, p. 155). In addition to an overrepresentation in precarious jobs and unemployment, the high number of the female lone parent family type among Jamaicans (Ornstein, 2006, p. 124-127), while considering that women have lower incomes and, in this case, are the sole breadwinners, is another factor behind the high level of poverty.

4.5 Limited Integration of Second-Generation Portuguese and Jamaicans

One of this paper’s research questions, the role of multicultural ideology in the integration of two second-generation groups, and one of its arguments, which holds that multiculturalism is a stepping stone to assimilation, require that the concepts of assimilation and integration should be defined prior to delving into the limited integration patterns of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese and the discussion of assimilation of these two groups.

Assimilation refers to becoming culturally similar to the mainstream and being accepted formally or informally by the host society (Allahar, 2010, p. 57; Fleras & Elliott, 1996, p. 9; Gans, 2007, p. 153). Therefore, one must accept the culture of the new society, and the host society has to accept immigrants as well. It is a dynamic process, and hence second and especially third and later generations become culturally more like the
mainstream, for instance, when mainstream language is acquired or when later generations lose their accents (Allahar, 2010, p. 72).

Integration, on the other hand, is defined broadly in the literature. It refers to a process through which one becomes incorporated into various domains of the society involving formal institutions such as educational and labor market institutions and informal relations such as friendships and marriages with the members of mainstream society, through which one acculturates into the mainstream culture in addition to constructing a new identity (Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach, & Reitz, 1990, p. 7; Isajiw, 1999, p. 109).

Similar to assimilation, integration is an ongoing process (Allahar, 2010, p. 55). Hence, one might expect to see a stronger integration in time and from one generation to the next. Integration is also a matter of degree (Breton et al., 1990, p. 6). One individual may integrate into the host society more or less completely, in contrast to another, based on social class, gender, ethnic and racial affiliations. Considering that integration is a two-way street (Allahar, 2010, p.73), it depends on both the cultural and economic background of the immigrants and the actions, behaviours and culture of the majority group.

In this paper, the term “integration” is narrowed down to socio-economic phenomena. (Unless otherwise specified, “integration” will refer to socio-economic integration). This refers to participation in the dominant institutions of the host society such as the labor market, educational and political institutions, and, more importantly, equal access to these institutions and similar interactions within these institutions (Allahar, 2010, p. 72; Breton et al., 1990, p. 7; Isajiw, 1999, p. 109).

4.5.1 Limited integration of second-generation Portuguese.

The greatest concern for the integration of second-generation Portuguese is in the area of education (Nunes, 1999, 2003, 2008, 2014; Ornstein, 2000). In 2006, although second-
generation Portuguese had a higher level of education than the first generation (Abada, Hou, & Ram, 2008, p. 15; Aydemir, Chen, & Corak, 2005, pp. 37-38, 2008, pp. 33-34), their university completion rate was still the lowest among various second-generation groups from Western and non-Western source regions (Abada et al., 2008, p. 27).

In the Toronto District School Board (TDSB), the majority of the Portuguese-speaking students are second and third generations (Persley & Brown, 2011, p. 2). These Portuguese youth have a serious problem of underachievement and are more likely to drop out of high school and to be overrepresented in the special education, remedial reading programs, and in non-university streams of courses (Anisef, Brown, Phythian, Sweet, & Walters, 2008, p. 8; Anisef, Brown, Sweet, & Walters, 2010, pp. 18-19; Nunes, 2003, pp. 131-135, 2008, p.123; Persley & Brown, 2011, pp. 2-5). According to a 2010 TDSB report, the dropout rate among both non-English-speaking student groups and English-speaking groups is particularly high for Portuguese, as well as two other non-English-speaking groups, Spanish and Somali students, which was over 30 percent (Anisef et al., 2010, p. 18). Along with some “visible minority” communities, Ornstein (2000) described new generations of Portuguese as one of the most worrisome groups due to their underrepresentation in higher education (pp. 50-51). These problems can be explained by systemic discriminatory educational practices and policies such as culturally biased assessments, teachers’ lowered expectations and the Anglo-Saxon focus in the curriculum. Portuguese students’ language difficulties also result in underachievement and disengagement at school, although some teachers tend to confuse this language difficulty with a lack of intelligence and learning disabilities (Nunes, 2003, pp.136-138).

The educational barriers faced by Portuguese-Canadian males are of particular concern (Nunes, 2014, p. 5). Adam, who works as a welder, spoke of the reason that he disliked his school:
I wasn’t learning anything from teachers. Maybe that was just me being stubborn … I think it is teacher's work to push me into what I like…
Instead ‘here is a chalk bar’, ‘you do this’, ‘this is your exam’, or you fail.
That’s it. It seems like teachers don’t care about the education they are giving; they also aren’t pushing students a lot.

Despite the economic stability of Portuguese immigrants, their marginalized educational positions and occupational segregation have been inherited by second and third generations. The economic standing of Canadian-born Portuguese has not improved in spite of their higher educational level. According to the report of Aydemir, Chen, and Corak (2005), the wages of second-generation Portuguese between the ages of 25 and 37, including men and women, is lower than their fathers (p. 34). Hence, Portuguese youth in general are experiencing a lack of economic mobility that differs from that of their European counterparts (Kenedy & Nunes, 2012; Nunes, 2008). Furthermore, the community is concerned with the segregation of Canadian-born Portuguese into low-waged and low-status occupations and, consequently, the social reproduction of the new generations in their similar working-class positions (Nunes, 2003, p.140), which signals the continuation of the integration problems of the subsequent Portuguese generations.

The negative experiences of second-generation Portuguese in educational institutions and labor market can be analyzed through Giroux’s (2005) critical pedagogy. His approach rests upon the argument that neoliberal corporate interests have control over educational institutions, e.g. production of knowledge and values through which schools are governed. Giroux (2005) hence argued that schools are not neutral. They are political sites, classist and racist. They are designed to produce culturally uniformed agents and to train workers who are functional for the capitalist economic system (Kincheloe, 1990). In this regard, Portuguese are racialized because they are not yet assimilated into dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. This can be one of the explanations why second-generation Portuguese have challenging experiences in schools. They don’t fit into mainstream
culture and teachers and administration evaluate them through the lens of Anglo-Saxon culture. According to critical pedagogy, schooling functions to train them for jobs which basically require simple reading and writing abilities in Canadian capitalist economy.

4.5.2 Limited integration of second-generation Jamaicans

Regarding second-generation Jamaicans, some research data are provided under the categories of Caribbean or black. As Jamaicans are the largest group among the Caribbean and black population in Canada, that research is relevant here as well. On the part of Canadian-born Jamaicans, data and anecdotal evidence show that, integration being a two-way street, racism and exclusionary practices of the host society have significantly slowed their process of integration. Hence, it will take longer to assimilate for second-generation Jamaicans holding a visible marker of racial difference and the challenges of integration are greater for them (Plaza, 2006, p. 225).

Children of Jamaican origin are at high risk of living in a low-income household compared with all children in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2007). In terms of educational attainment, second-generation Caribbeans aged from 25 to 34, along with Latin-Americans, had the lowest level of educational attainment among non-Western source regions using the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (Abada et al., 2008, p. 13). According to the 2006 Census data, in Ontario, the university completion rate was 24 percent for the second-generation Jamaicans and 17 percent for the second-generation Portuguese among twenty-six European and non-European countries, while the average was 30 percent for all second-generation groups (Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 10-13). Other education-related problems of black, specifically, Jamaican students are high dropout rates, underachievement, streaming, alienation credited to the Eurocentric curriculum, lowered expectations on the part of educators, disciplinary actions, financial problems, limited number of black teachers or principals, and racial profiling or stereotyping such as their being “lazy, slow learners, underachievers, troublemakers, and loud” (Anisef et al., 2005,
According to the 2006 TDSB report, the dropout rate was high among blacks, much higher for males than females, and, at 40 percent, the highest among English-speaking youth of Caribbean descent (Davis, 2012, p. 339). Sarah, a social worker, explained the racial profiling at schools as:

It was my first time being exposed to those stereotypes [...] You walk in there and teachers already have that idea of ‘oh my God, a Jamaican…’ you are almost expected to fail. [...] while I was there, I was always expected that I would be a delayed kid. [...] So, it was always the thing of trying to keep up, because they think you are less than what you really are.

Kevin, a university student, said that schools are racist and claimed:

… But it was not until I came to the university I learnt about the Haitian revolution. I was kind of shocked. I could not understand why they did teach American revolution, French revolution, ideals of egalitarianism and fraternity…. Here you have Haiti that is slave people under colonial rule, only successful slave rebellion revolution in all of the Transnational Slave Trade. And inconveniently you skip that when there are direct implications for the themes to talk about fraternity, liberty and egalitarianism…. [emphasis added]

Labor market statistics are no better than the education statistics. For instance, using the 2006 census data, second-generation Jamaicans aged 25-34 had the highest level unemployment in Ontario among various second-generation groups from the Caribbean, Latin American, Asian, African, and European countries (Abada & Lin, 2014, p. 83). While Canadian-born Jamaican men had the highest level of unemployment, Canadian-born Jamaican women had the second highest unemployment rate among the children of
immigrants from Western and non-Western source countries (Abada & Lin, 2011, p. 11-12). Sociologically, this means that second-generation Jamaicans in Canada are at high risk of being a member of the *reserve army of labor*, which refers to people who are unemployed or employed but in precarious jobs who can be easily replaced or fired (Marx, 1887, p. 447). Research also showed that using the 2001 Census (Aydemir et al., 2005, pp. 34, 37-38) and the 2006 Census (Abada & Lin, 2014, pp. 84-85), second-generation Jamaicans, including men and women, made less income from employment than their fathers; it was the lowest annual income among second-generation groups despite the fact that they have higher levels of education compared to their fathers. In a capitalist society where race and ethnicity work as tools to cheapen the labor (Allahar, 2010; Bonacich, 1972, 1980; Piore, 1979), the statistics support the argument that the skin color or phenotype of second-generation Jamaicans is used to secure a cheap, exploitable and flexible labor force in Canada’s split and segmented labor markets. Hence, second-generation Jamaicans are seen to lack economic mobility.

Interviews also reveal other challenges that Canadian-born Jamaicans face in the labor market, including discrimination, which sees the promotion of coworkers with lower educational credentials and less work experience. Additionally, the competence of black Jamaicans is questioned by their coworkers and clients in the workplace. Agnes, an elementary school teacher in a well-off, white neighborhood said that: “Everything I said is questioned. Where I went to school, how I teach, where I am from; there is also ageism as well. So I am young, black, and female.”

Limited integration of second-generation Jamaicans goes beyond the educational and labor market institutions; racism is part of their everyday life. Reitz and Banerjee (2007), in their analysis of Statistics Canada’s Ethnic Diversity Survey, found that second-generation blacks reported the highest level of perceived discrimination with 60.9 percent, which is the highest among all “visible minority” groups. Further, what is more alarming is that it is higher than the first-generation blacks, with 49.6 percent (pp. 8-10).
The first-generation blacks from the West Indies were seen as “good” blacks — obedient, hard-working, respectful, and non-violent. The second and third generations, on the other hand, were seen as criminals, violent, troublemakers, underachievers, hopeless, and lazy (Allahar, 2010, p. 74; James, 2012, p. 467). This can be explained sociologically by Portes and Zhou’s (1993) segmented assimilation theory which points to diverse assimilation patterns for various second-generation groups. The downward mobility pattern of the black second-generation from the West Indies can be explained by the permanent nature of racial discrimination and poverty (Gans, 1992, p. 78; Zhou, 1997, p. 979).

Race informs second-generation Jamaicans’ everyday life, where the color of their skin has serious social consequences, especially for males subject to racial profiling (James, 2006, p. 44, 2012, p. 481). For example, in Canada, statistical analysis shows that, compared to all other “visible minority groups” and whites, they are more likely to be stopped, searched and questioned by the police (Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011, p. 398; Wortley & Tanner, 2003, p. 372, 2005, p. 596). Furthermore, social class and good behaviour do not shelter them from police suspicion compared to whites (Wortley & Tanner, 2003, p. 372, 2005, p. 596) because the phenotype of the black second-generation is seen as a threat to social order. Racist forms of actions such as police carding are used to control and subordinate black youth and their potential anger over discrimination. Mike said that:

I feel like I am harassed by police officers only because of my skin color. Or because of the way I dressed… I live in Etobicoke-Rexdale… I feel like I am discriminated against even if I am not doing anything or not causing trouble because I am a black man. An example of that is me being pulled over for like why are you walking?... granting my identity, being pulled over while riding my bike... Police stops me and asks questions like where you are going? Can I see ID? What did I do? Just walking on the street?
The statistical and anecdotal evidence show that multiculturalism as a policy still has not delivered on its promise of equal rights for all. While the challenges for second-generation Portuguese are more related to their class position, for second-generation Jamaicans, a system of multiple and interlocking axes of race and class oppression comes into play. Second-generation Portuguese benefit from unearned skin privilege to a certain extent (McIntosh, 2004; Wildman and Davis, 2012). For instance, none of the Portuguese males mentioned that they were stopped and asked for an ID by police for no reason, or none of the Portuguese females indicated that they were singled out during shopping trips as potential shoplifters.

Given the gap between the policy and ideology of multiculturalism as something Canadians have or ought to have, there is still a great deal of social order in what is otherwise a society with deep race and class divisions. This relates to the last section of this research — the use of multicultural ideology in cementing social control and integration of these two second-generation groups into Canada.

4.6 Multicultural Ideology as a Double-Edged Sword

The ideology of multiculturalism works not in one way, but in multiple ways amongst second-generation Portuguese and Jamaicans. Marxist analysis of ideology as both false consciousness and as bearing a positive meaning are useful sociological tools for understanding the role of multicultural ideology in cementing social control, given the limited integration of these two groups.

Alaina is a second-generation Jamaican, 20-years-old and a student of nursing. Her parents are unemployed and on social assistance to meet their daily needs. She expressed her thoughts about multiculturalism as:

I feel like it is an idea of what if I wasn't living in a multicultural society. What would be my mindset? What if I hated a certain type of person just
because they believed in something or they ate this type of food for certain amount of days. I feel like I wouldn't be as open-minded, I wouldn't have the capacity to understand why they do certain things, why they celebrate certain days, or why they aren't like me.

The perception of multiculturalism varies by race, gender, ethnicity, and class. As my participants are not a homogenous group, they have different understandings of multiculturalism. However, the ideology of multiculturalism, just as Alaina suggests, distracts the majority of my participants from the questions of structured power and class relations despite the empty promises of a fair and just society. Being in a state of *false consciousness*, and hence not being aware of their exploitation by the ruling class, they give tacit *consent* to the current power structure because, to their minds, theirs is a fair society and they are more individual than structural in their thinking. The idea that they live in a multicultural society may give them a sense of comfort and belonging. A belief in inclusion and acceptance within diversity may soothe their insecurities. This makes it easier for the authorities to cement social order. Tom, a second-generation Portuguese working in construction, said:

I feel grateful of being a Canadian citizen. We live in the best country in the world. We have the rights we want. We have every opportunity to do what we want to do. Freedoms, health care, education. You can become what you want to be in this country. If you work really hard, you can get what you want.

By individualizing social problems and blaming the individuals but not the system itself, the existing power structure remains unthreatened. For example, the Portuguese community usually tend to blame themselves for their failure to achieve higher education, as well as the blame that they place on the community’s parents, for having what they perceive as poor attitudes towards the education of their children (Nunes, 2014). In
essence, most Portuguese can’t see or perceive the structural and systemic barriers to their children’s education. This refers to the hegemonic model of multiculturalism which asserts that multiculturalism is a ‘managerial’ strategy to preserve Anglo hegemony over the economy and culture (Fleras, 2014, pp. 249-253).

At the same time, immigrants from European countries are more likely to blame their own lack of mobility on the members of minority groups and seek to justify their situations as resulting from faulty multicultural policies. Some think that these policies deliver undeserved benefits to racialized people. Jacob, a second-generation Portuguese working as a part-time student supervisor, expressed his view about multiculturalism as:

… Even government jobs too, they are not hiring as much as "white people" as opposed to people who have an ethnic-cultural background …
Who gets what job or not shouldn’t be based on their ethnic backgrounds as opposed to their merits.

Most of the participants are unfamiliar with the multicultural policies and have a superficial understanding of multiculturalism. Ethel, a second-generation Portuguese, whose father works in construction and whose mother works in a cleaning company, explained her ideas about multiculturalism as:

I love it. I love to eat different cuisines, there is a variety of things you can eat, I enjoy learning.... There are so many things in terms of activities that you can make in the city. A lot of entertainment… All the different colors on the wheel so you looked in one direction and one other and it is never the same…. different languages, different culture, different faces, different color. For me that is multicultural. [emphasis added]

Accordingly, the ideology of official multiculturalism has depoliticized diversity, simplified culture without an in-depth understanding and reduced it to symbolic areas
rather than promoting political forms of cultural diversity (Bissoondath, 1993, p. 374; Mackey, 2002, p. 67). Srivastava (2007) called this tendency the “3D approach — one celebrates dance, dress, and dining but fails to take into account the multiple dimensions of racial and social inequality” (p. 291). Hence, culture as values and beliefs is different from popular culture, which is more to do with its visible and superficial aspects. This depoliticized understanding of multiculturalism has left Canada’s dominant Anglo-Saxon culture — capitalism, patriarchy, Christianity and the English language — intact.

However, as Gramsci (1971) reminded us, ideologies are not simply imposed upon us. Human beings are not mere prisoners of social structures as Weber argued (as cited in Allahar, 1986, p. 611) and, as mentioned by Eagleton (1991), they have some level of agency with which to make sense of their lives (p. 12). Therefore, depending on their individual self-interests, second-generations of Jamaicans and Portuguese assume an active role in the construction of multicultural ideology. They interpret the messages within the context of their limited integration and create meanings to better their life chances. In particular, the ideology of multiculturalism gives hope to the Jamaican participants due to their positive interpretation of it, motivating them to develop coping strategies to move up within the hierarchical system. In this sense, multicultural ideology works in a positive way at the level of the individual. Some Jamaican participants, on the other hand, see multiculturalism as a tool to fight back racism and manipulate it to suit their own self-interest. Harol, a working-class second-generation Jamaican and a student at the University of Toronto, expressed his thoughts about living in “multicultural” Canada as:

    Canada has many opportunities... Canada has a lot of programs that people could take advantage of if they really want to… But it is hidden and you have to find it. This is a possibility. [emphasis added]
The ideology of multiculturalism has also led to some unintended consequences, i.e., unplanned and unconscious outcomes of purposive actions (Merton, 1936, p. 116). Regarding Portuguese, it has led to the promotion of the false belief amongst the Portuguese that they are more white than non-white, and also that they have the same chance to succeed economically in Canadian society as Anglo-Canadians. By focusing on visible minorities only, multiculturalism and its related policies, have led the Portuguese to identify with other white Europeans, rather than to the newer visible-minority groups.

The unintended consequences of multicultural policies, first planned to maintain social control and decrease ethnic conflict, also “encouraged groups to organize in order to influence institutional decisions” (Breton, 2005, p. 312). For instance, as a response to the campaigns and protests against the police carding by mostly racialized activists, such as Black Lives Matter, which is mainly rooted in a long history of protesting anti-black racism, Toronto police approved new carding rules in 2016 (Draaisma, 2017; Miller, 2016). Therefore, if ideologies inspire the masses to struggle, those struggles are not without value. Rosa, a working-class second-generation Jamaican, explained this situation as:

I am treated like a second-class citizen. I have to work twice as hard to get to where someone could come. I think it is not quite fair. I am not going to let it hold me back and stop. Because I can't stop. This is not only for myself, it is for my community and other communities and people around me [emphasis added].

4.7 Conclusion and Discussion: Multiculturalism as a Stepping Stone to Assimilation

Both second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese have integrated into Canadian society in a limited way, although the former is less integrated because of their skin color, racism, negative stereotypes about blacks or black Jamaican-Canadians as violent and
criminal, and its social consequences such as racial profiling (Allahar, 1993, 2010; James, 2010, 2012; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011; Wortley & Tanner, 2003, 2005). In the process of integration, thus, the ideology of multiculturalism works to both calm their insecurities and to create strategies for them to integrate into Anglo-Saxon Canada. Jamaicans are more likely to favor multiculturalism as a stepping stone because of their fragile position resulting from the interlocking categories of race, ethnicity, and class, and the ideology of multiculturalism makes them feel more legally accepted and respected by the mainstream.

This paper presents the argument that both of these groups will assimilate into Canadian society because, for that to occur, one does not require “material” possessions but has to adopt the core values and beliefs of the dominant culture. Therefore, an individual can partially integrate or not integrate but can assimilate, once the core values of the dominant culture are internalized. This brings the differentiation between integration and assimilation into this paper. While integration refers to a socio-economic incorporation, assimilation occurs when mainstream values and beliefs such as liberalism, individualism, and consumerism in Canada, become hegemonic and deep-rooted in the minds of immigrant groups and come to be taken as second nature (Allahar, 2010, p. 83).

However, assimilation will take longer for the Jamaicans because they are phenotypically different from the “imagined” society, which remains constructed on the ideal of the white European nation (Bannerji, 2000, p. 64). Blacks have been seen as other when they have been socially cast as immoral, lazy, underachievers, oversexed, and troublemakers. As assimilation is a two-way street, racism slows down the acknowledgement or the acceptance of the Jamaicans as a part of Canadian society. Later generations of Portuguese, on the other hand, are expected to assimilate earlier because once one “looks” physically similar to the mainstream, it takes less time to be accepted.
During the process of integration by the use of multicultural ideology, both second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese adopt, consciously or unconsciously, the core values and beliefs of the dominant culture to make a living or to be economically more mobile as a part of their rationality and beliefs. Hence “multiculturalism” is a stepping stone to eventual assimilation.

However, ‘race’ will affect how successful second-generations are in adopting the core values. Although, for both people of color and whites, multiculturalism creates circumstances more likely to promote assimilation; for the Portuguese, the hurdles are fewer due to their skin privilege. Thus, they embrace assimilation in a much smoother manner, while it is a bumpier road for the black Jamaicans. Regardless of the fact that some of the second-generation Jamaican participants do not see Canada as an emotional home because of racism, Canada is home to them in practice because each of them wants to build a life in Canada rather than in Jamaica.

The conclusion is that exploitation is intrinsic to capitalism and, in the Canadian context, the exploitation of immigrants plays a key role in the development and expansion of capital accumulation. In other words, although racism and sexism can and have been used by capital to increase or intensify the rate of exploitation and capital accumulation, neither racism nor sexism is necessary for capitalism to exist, but that requires class exploitation. This is evident in the cases of both the second-generation, working-class Jamaicans and Portuguese. And where ‘race’ is clearly used to intensify the exploitation of the working-class Jamaicans, it is also very much in evidence, albeit somewhat more subtly, in the way that the working-class Portuguese are ‘socially darkened’ as part of their own exploitation as immigrants to Canada.
4.8 References


Association.


Chapter 5

5 Centering the White Gaze: Dark-White Portuguese and Black Jamaicans

5.1 Introduction

I feel more Jamaican because I am always reminded that Jamaican is tied to being black. In my everyday interactions, …, I am never reminded that I am Canadian. I am reminded of my subordinate status in the society daily (Matthew, a second-generation Jamiacan, interview, February 2016).

In Canada, some have confused multiethnic societies with multicultural societies. Born and raised in Toronto, Carl is not allowed to feel Canadian in the sense that “Canadian” refers to being “white,” Anglo-Saxon, Christian and Western. (Breton, 2005, pp. 309-310; James, 2006, pp. 44-45, 2012, p. 472; Kalbach & Kalbach, 1999, p. 3; Razack, 1999, p. 166; Satzewich, 2007, p. 70; Shadd, 2001, p. 12)

In our increasingly interconnected and transnational world, theorists from different ideological perspectives have agreed that modern living would eradicate the need for any communalistic affiliation. It was assumed that the effects of capitalist industrialization, urbanization, and mass communications would replace traditional and fixed identities of rootedness and belonging, e.g., race, clan, tribe, village and even national origin, with more mobile and comprehensive identities, such as class and occupation (Allahar, 2006, pp. 37-38; Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 1-5). However, globalization and immigration have kept ethnic and racial identities alive in modern societies. Members of ethnic minority groups feel vulnerable in new lands and have sought to stay together for economic and cultural security on the basis of assumed primordial identities (Howard-Hassmann, 2006, p. 222). In foreign lands, as discussed by James (2003), “ethnicity gives individuals a sense of identity and belonging based, not only on their perception of
being different, but also on the knowledge that they are recognized by others as being different” (p. 51).

This article will examine the identity construction process in the diaspora, in particular, second-generation black Jamaicans and dark-white Portuguese in Toronto, Canada. There are two reasons that these two groups were chosen. First, since the members of both the Jamaican and the Portuguese communities are largely working-class immigrants, it will be easier to lay bare the impact of race on identity construction. Second, this research involves an assessment of how social class, race and culture shape the process of identity construction among second-generation immigrants who have mostly “white” skin color, Portuguese, and who are black, Jamaicans.

The research question that guides this study is whether, in a “multicultural” Canadian setting, there are differences between the ways in which second-generation diasporic Jamaicans and Portuguese define themselves ethnically and racially and how others see them. The discussion will cover identity construction as a dialectical process between the self-perception of racialized populations and the other’s perception on the part of the majority. While identity construction is partially psychological, as it depends on the subjective interpretation of one’s position in a specific social context, it also requires a sociological analysis because politics and the distribution of power lie behind the relationship between “self ” and “others” (Allahar, 2001, p. 197; Hall, 1991a, pp. 47-51; Miles, 1989, p. 11).

This paper will begin by unpacking the term, diaspora, followed by a brief discussion of Portuguese and Jamaican diasporas in Toronto. Next, the theoretical framework of this research, i.e., identity construction and assimilation in the context of multiculturalism, will be addressed, as well as an introduction of the notions of creolization and hybrid identities with which an expanded appreciation of segmented assimilation theory is developed. Finally, how others see Portuguese and Jamaicans will be compared to how
these two groups define themselves by drawing upon forty-three interviews with second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese that were conducted in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).

Nicknames will be used in the interview data to protect the anonymity of the participants. Regarding second-generation Jamaicans, references will be made to past research about the Caribbeans or blacks in Canada to situate the experiences of Jamaican-Canadians because they are the largest group within the black population in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2017; The Environics Institute, 2017, p. 31). Hence, the information about the previous two groups is fairly valid in the case of the Jamaicans.

5.2 Diaspora

Diaspora refers to a group of people who have scattered from their ancestral homes and settled outside of their origin country for various reasons, such as natural disaster, economic desperation, political repression, hunger and other traumatic events (Cohen, 1994, pp. 26-29). Those who comprise a diaspora build a new home “away from home” (Clifford, 1994, p. 302). Owing to cultural differences between the host society and the origin country, diaspora’s relative subordination and powerlessness, and lack of positive reception lead to the development of a diaspora consciousness (Safran, 1991, pp. 94-95). In response to alienation, to being otherized and marginalized, diaspora members build a separate community (Clifford, 1994, pp. 307-308) where they can live gregariously and have a sense of security and belonging among others who are like them. They come together to pray and also to celebrate and enjoy their familiar foods, music, and dance, as well as their customs, values and beliefs (Allahar, 2010, pp. 68-69). Adapting to a new country, the diaspora selectively preserves some traditions and values of their origin culture, mixes them with other cultures, becomes culturally hybrid, and reengineers new cultural homes (Clifford, 1994, p. 317; Nagel, 1994, p. 162).
However, sharing the same origin country does not automatically lead to a united or cohesive diaspora. An immigrant group from the same country is not homogenous as it is complicated by gender, religion, social class, and other differences. In the literature and with some exceptions, the class dimension of a diaspora is often downplayed (Allahar, 2010; Liodakis, 2002; Satzewich, 2007; Satzewich & Liokadis, 2013). Accordingly, following Allahar (2010), diaspora is treated here as more of a working-class phenomenon. Upper and middle-class immigrants have more cultural capital, are likely to be considerably more assimilated into the mainstream culture and have more equal access to the dominant institutions within the host society. Hence, most of the time, although upper and the middle-class immigrants share concerns with regard to the issues of racial profiling, discrimination in the labor market, good quality schools or neighborhoods, these problems are not as pressing as they are for the diaspora. Given their limited contact with the diaspora and their occasional participation in social activities, the upper- and middle-class members of the immigrant group in question are at best “event-specific” diasporic members (Allahar, 2010, p. 67).

Diasporas in the new age of globalization are no longer completely separated from their origin countries owing to mass communications and fast travel between distant locations (Vertovec, 2009). There is a dense mix of economic, political, and cultural interconnections across nations and peoples, and almost all diasporas are transnational communities embedded in multiple locations and leading dual lives (Bailey, 2001, p. 416).

5.2.1 The Jamaican diaspora

Tracing the history of Jamaicans stolen from ancestral homes and shipped across the Atlantic to the Americas by European colonial powers as slave labor, the Jamaican diaspora can be first defined as a victim diaspora (Cohen, 1994, pp. 25-27), factors of which are trauma, cruelty, suddenness, and the involuntary aspect of their movement.
After the abolition of slavery, in response to economic hardship, a “culture of migration” became a survival strategy to find work around the neighboring islands such as Cuba or countries such as Costa Rica and Panama (Eisner, 1961, p. 147; Graham, 2013, p. 1; Jones, 2008, p. 1; Roberts, 1957, p. 134; Simmons & Plaza, 2006, p. 134). The continuing pressure of economic survival after the independence of Jamaica in 1962 scattered its citizens to various destinations, including Canada (Beckford & Witter, 1982, p. 73; Stephens & Stephens, 1986, p. 95) in search of wage labor (Cohen, 1994, p. 57).

Immigration from Jamaica to Canada accelerated with formal elimination of overtly racist barriers in 1962 (Green & Green, 1999, p.431). However, the change in the racist immigration policies has not altered hostility towards blacks because anti-black racism has been long settled in the minds of Europeans and their descendants in the Americas. Black has represented a negative cultural, historical, and political “other” as opposed to a positive “self” (Hall, 1991a, pp. 53-54; Miles, 1989, p. 11). Interviews conducted for this research also revealed that second-generation Jamaicans argue that they are seen as “criminals, violent, lazy, deficient” by society at large.

Jamaican-Canadians comprise an overwhelmingly working-class community (Liodakis, 2002, p. 107) and have a disproportionate challenge with socio-economic problems. They have weak access to the labor market and earn less than the average (Statistics Canada, 2007), some of which can be explained by institutional racism. For instance, whether native-born or immigrant, black men experience a significant wage gap compared to non-racialized groups, even when educational backgrounds are similar (Block & Galabuzi, 2011, p. 13; Hum & Simpson, 2007, p. 97; Skuterud, 2010, pp. 876-78).

Jamaicans are concentrated in Etobicoke North, Scarborough Rouge, Jane-Finch corridor, Scarborough East and Eglinton-Lawrence in Toronto (Plaza, 2007, pp. 221-22). In some of these residential areas, such as Jane and Finch and Etobicoke, there is a high
demand for subsidized housing, with a substantial number of people on welfare or single parents (Furlan, 2014, p. 79; Henry, 1994, pp.229-30; Plaza, 2007, p.221). These neighborhoods are also known for crime, violence, and drugs. For instance, the media announced the year 2005 as the “Year of the Gun” because of the record levels of homicides in these neighborhoods (Davis, 2012, p. 330).

As noted above, middle- and upper-class Jamaicans, on the other hand, tend not to belong to the diaspora and are more easily assimilated into mainstream values. They live in safe and mixed suburban areas such as Brampton, Oakville, Picketing, and Mississauga, have a higher educational level, work at professional jobs and enjoy comparatively decent incomes (Henry, 1994; Simmons & Plaza, 2006; Stennett, 2008; Williams, 2014).

5.2.2 The Portuguese diaspora

As a response to the heavy labor demand (Higgs, 1982, pp.4-7), Portuguese immigrated to Canada as a labor diaspora in search of work around the 1950s (Cohen, 1994). Initially settled in the downtown west end of Toronto (Little Portugal), Portuguese neighborhoods later extended to northwest of Little Portugal and the western suburbs, particularly Mississauga and Brampton (Teixeira, 2007, p. 1).

In the years following their arrival, the Portuguese were perceived as “unassimilable” and not “quite-white” because of the unskilled or low-skilled jobs they held and their Catholic, family-oriented, and Portuguese-speaking culture, which deviated from the Protestant and English-speaking norm (Harney, 1990, p. 123; Higgs, 1982, pp. 4-6; Noivo, 1997, pp. 4-12; 2002, p. 261; Nunes, 2003, p. 145). Yet, in recent decades, the Portuguese have come a bit closer to the white norm, possibly in contrast to the increasing number of immigrants of color. Over time, they have come to be viewed as a hardworking and disciplined addition to the Canadian labor force (Costa, 2012; Nunes, 2003, p. 130). But it should be kept in mind that the physically demanding jobs at which they labor, which are frequently associated with blacks, have degraded some European
groups (Bashi Treitler, 2013, p. 88), and served to racialize the Portuguese-Canadians and darken them socially. As a case in point, one member of the Portuguese community, Pacheco (2004) remembered hearing her parents describe their day as including working “like a negro” (p. 18).

Similar to the immigrants of color, the Portuguese are overrepresented in working-class groups (Liodakis, 2002, p. 17). The Portuguese men’s unskilled or semi-skilled jobs were not always necessarily low-paying because of high levels of union participation and their role in the Laborers’ International Union of North America (Costa, 2012; Reitz, 1998, pp. 166-168). However, the Portuguese work more at precarious jobs compared to earlier decades with the economic restructuring and the introduction of neo-liberal policies (Aguiar, 2006, p. 208).

It should be noted that the lighter skin pigmentation and more organized labor of the Portuguese have always set them apart from the black Jamaicans. They are not therefore racialized in the same way as the Jamaicans in Canada, where color is still currency.

### 5.3 New Aspects of Assimilation in the Age of Globalization and Transnationalism

Traditional assimilation theory refers to a process by which immigrants become *culturally* similar to the mainstream (Gans, 2007, p. 154). With the passage of time, immigrants and their descendants are assumed to lose their cultural uniqueness and become an indistinguishable part of the receiving society through socio-economic incorporation into the host country, occupational mobility and residential integration (Allahar, 2010, p. 72; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008, p. 80; Zhou, 1997, p. 976).

In 21st century North America, however, the assimilation process has significantly changed because of the new age of globalization, transnationalism, ethnically and racially
diversified societies, changing economic structures of late capitalism, and emphasis on identity politics (Glazer, 2004, pp. 62-65; Isajiw, 1990, p. 35; Jedwab, 2003, pp. 12-13; Vertovec, 2001, p. 574). Portes and Zhou (1993) developed the segmented assimilation theory to address the issues of the increasing number of immigrants from non-European countries and rapid transition from industrial to post-industrial capitalism. This theory, with a specific emphasis on the new second-generation — children of immigrants of color — argues that, instead of traditional one-way assimilation into the mainstream, the second-generation acculturates into the system in divergent ways through three different assimilation paths.

With regards to changing immigration patterns and the neo-liberal turn in economic policies (Green & Green, 1999; Sharma, 2006), segmented assimilation theory provides an explanatory framework to analyze assimilation and identity construction among second-generations in Canada as well (Abada & Lin, 2011; Allahar, 2010; Aydemir, Chen, & Corak, 2005; Block & Galabuzi, 2011; Galabuzi, 2006). However, the argument presented in this paper is that 21st century globalization, transnational linkages and lifestyles and living in a country which holds multiculturalism as an “official” policy require an expanded version of segmented assimilation theory to attain a more robust understanding of identity construction, especially when dealing with large multiethnic cities such as Toronto.

According to the segmented assimilation theory, the first path refers to the traditional linear assimilation into the mainstream (Portes, 2004, p. 157; Zhou, 1997, p. 977) such as was exhibited by Northern and Western European second-generations in Canada. These groups can easily identify themselves as “Canadian” without any challenge. The second pattern of assimilation refers to the acculturation of the new second-generation into a reactive subculture defined by poverty and, in some cases, crime, such as dealing drugs and gangs and where education is devalued (Portes, 2004, pp. 158-162; Portes & Zhou, 1993, p. 83; Zhou, 1997, pp. 979-980). This was described as “second-generation
decline” by Gans (1992, p.181-182) or “downward assimilation” by Portes and Zhou (1993, p. 83). In Canada, where poverty has been racialized and anti-black racism is rooted in the leading social institutions, the literature (Davis, 2012, p. 330; Furlan, 2014, pp. 69-70; James, 2012, p. 473; Plaza, 2006, p. 226; Simmons & Plaza, 2006, p. 143; Yon, 1994, pp. 124-126, 142-144; Yon, 2000, p. 145) and the interviews conducted for this research revealed that some black youth assimilate into street culture identified with an opposition to the education and authority figures and associated with drug dealing and hip-hop. This culture is made-in North America and different than the origin culture of their parents; first-generation West-Indies immigrants were seen as a model minority group; they value education and are hard-working, law-obedient, and respectful (Allahar, 2010, p.74). The third model, selective acculturation, refers to retaining origin culture while learning mainstream values to achieve economic mobility in the host society (Portes, 2004, p. 163). Utilizing their social capital and community forces and focusing on education, in this model, the second-generation may improve their opportunities for successful careers, as is evident among, for example, second-generation Chinese from lower-income families (Ooka, 2002).

In a context where diaspora meets the host culture following the migration to a new country (Hutnyk, 2005, pp. 79-80), in addition to three paths of assimilation, creole cultures and new hybrid identities have emerged via the interpenetration and blending of different value systems (Cohen, 1994, p. 130; Vertovec, 2009, p. 7). The majority of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese identify themselves by a creative mixture where different ideas, cultures, politics, movies, and songs meet (Cohen, 1994, p. 130) and where their transnational lives shape their identities (Oliveira & Teixeria, 2004; Plaza, 2006; Sardinha, 2011; Yon, 2000). Given the fact of globalization, the racially and ethnically diverse structure of Canadian society, and transnational lives, ethnic retention and assimilation are no longer mutually exclusive. An individual can both keep her/his
heritage culture and assimilate into the contemporary Canadian society. Hence, the future lies in hybridization.

5.4 Identity Construction

Far from their home, as a response to xenophobia, racial or ethnic discrimination coupled with alienation, loss of community, and an unfamiliar, individualistic and materialistic culture, diasporas have reinvented their ancestral identities as a coping mechanism to overcome isolation and marginalization in a foreign place (Allahar, 2001, pp. 204-205; Breton, Isajiw, Kalbach, & Reitz, 1990, p. 5; Howard-Hassmann, 2006, p. 222; James, 2003, p. 51). Uniting around shared cultural practices, celebrating the feeling of “oneness” soothes their insecurity of being “other” in the host society.

Marginalized by the rest of the society because of the physical and cultural differences from the mainstream, e.g., phenotype, religion, language, ethnic identities are constructed in relation to “others” and setting boundaries between “us” and “them” wherein power is unequally distributed among these ethnic groups (Bashi Treitler, 2013, p. 68; Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 84; Hall, 1991b, p. 21; Johnson, 2006, pp. 78-79). These socially constructed boundaries shift constantly depending on external dynamics such as changing economic conditions or resurrection of nationalism. Members of ethnic groups continuously reconstruct their identities in a strategic attempt to survive and fit in. Identities are thus dynamic, fluid and situational, and never complete (Allahar, 2001; Hall, 1990, 1996; Nagel, 1994; Plaza, 2006; Waters, 1994)

Ethnic identity construction is not simply a personal choice (Waters, 2010) because histories and social context also shape identities (Hall, 1990, p. 225; Kitossa, 2012, p. 54; Nagel, 1994, pp. 153-154). Identity construction is a dialectical process and built by an interaction between how one sees oneself (asserted identity) and how others see him/her (assigned identity) (Bailey & Gayle, 2003, p. 56; Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, pp. 75-76; James, 2003, p. 50; 2006, p. 44; Nagel, 1994, p. 154; Vertovec, 2001, p. 577, 2009). The
Portuguese participants think that others see them as white. However, does it match how others see them in Canada? For instance, in his dissertation, Da Silva (2011) reported that he himself saw the words “white niggers of Europe” on the backdoors of a church in Toronto’s Little Portugal in 2008 (p. 73). So, do Canadians see them as white as they think? Is their ethnicity “hidden” under the white category (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007, p. 88) associated with intelligence, wealth, and success (Allahar, 1993, pp. 43-44; Miles, 1989, pp. 29-32)? These questions will be explored under the subsection in which identity construction among second-generation Portuguese will be discussed.

Individuals do not construct their identities within national borders, but in a space transcending those borders (Cohen, 1994, p. 169; Vertovec, 2001, pp. 573-575). In our global and transnational world, the flow of values, beliefs, images, aesthetics, and practices across different places shape our identities. Furthermore, in Canada, official multicultural discourse encourages immigrants to keep their heritage culture. There is therefore no contradiction between keeping one’s ethnic origin and becoming Canadian according to that “official discourse” (Bailey & Gayle, 2003, p. 56; Jedwab, 2008, p. 25). In Canada, the intermingling of various cultures, the hybrid culture, establishes the structure upon which ethnic identities are constructed.

Second-generation immigrants construct their hybrid identities by drawing from their heritage culture, blending with the mainstream and all other cultures that are present (Yon, 2000). Based on Nagel’s (1994) “shopping cart” metaphor (p. 162), the participants in this study pick some aspects of the different cultures to which they are exposed and leave others on the shelf, depending on their emotional and material interests. Jacob, a second-generation Portuguese, sees himself as a Canadian-Portuguese because:

I went to a school where instruction was in English and everything was based on Canadian culture like history classes… So, at the end of the day I
can identify with Canadian culture…. But I am very involved in Portuguese culture in terms of the foods, language, soccer, supporting Portuguese team, etc.

The various characteristics with which Jacob identifies himself are a mix of Canadian and Portuguese culture. However, the elements that define his identity are not fixed; the items in the shopping cart can always change as ethnic identities are reshaped regarding a specific context and a time period.

Identity construction among second-generation Portuguese and Jamaicans delineates the complex nature of this process. There are multiple and intersected levels by which the participants identify themselves in a random mix of race, ethnicity, nationality and gender. They construct their identities based on how they look, the languages they speak, their religious beliefs, and their social class. Although the majority of the Portuguese and Jamaicans are located in the same social class, Jamaicans are more likely to be assumed not to be authentic Canadians and thus are commonly asked “where are you really from?” This reflects the lingering assumption that being Canadian means being “white,” Christian, English-speaking, Anglo-descended, Western and pro-capitalist. Conversely, it means not being black, Muslim, or of African, Indian, Chinese, Middle Eastern descent.

5.4.1 Second-generation Jamaicans as blacks

Born and raised in Canada and socialized in Canadian institutions, second-generation black Jamaicans are not easily accepted as a part of Canadian society (Hill, 2001, p. 49; James, 2012, pp. 471-474). Native-born blacks in the US, on the other hand, although, by some, associated with negative characteristics such as crime, drugs, and gangs, are more likely to be seen as American than blacks are seen as Canadian, and hence assimilated (Portes, 2004; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Waters, 1994). In other words, blacks can be said to have a legitimacy crisis when claiming to be Canadian in Canada. As stated by James
the concept of a “‘Black foreigner’ — simply based on skin color — persists” (p. 472).

Most second-generation blacks have acculturated into the mainstream values and beliefs such as liberalism and individualism. However, they are torn as their Canadian identity is constantly challenged by others in their everyday lives with such reactions as “oh, you don’t sound Canadian”? Chariandy (2007) defined this as living in an “adopted state” (p. 819). The society at large construct them as “racialized other” which deviates from the white norm.

Although race is a biologically empty concept and not real, “it is significant as long as groups are determined by their physical traits, and attributes are assigned as a result of these traits” (James, 2006, p. 44). As a “symbolic marker,” color differentiates second-generation black Jamaicans from the mainstream where ethno-racial differences are politicized. Black skin is more than a question of skin pigmentation in a color stratification system (Miles, 1989, p. 16). It is accompanied by a social evaluation that takes into account such things as lip size, nose shape, bone type, and hair type (Omi & Winant, 2015, pp.110-111). Black represents a cultural, historical, and political “other” (Hall, 1991a, p. 53). Sarah tells her experience as:

…you walk in there, and teachers already have that idea of Oh my God a Jamaican…. you are almost expected to fail…you know when it comes time for scholarships and that sort of things you are overpassed or you are not smart enough… I was always expected that I would be the delayed kid.

Interviews also revealed that being Jamaican is seen as a synonym of black as if blacks are a monolithic group with no ethnic differences (James, 2012, pp. 471-472). All of the participants agreed that people see them through their skin color and they are more
marginalized specifically if they are young black males. Kevin explains how he is seen by the society at large as:

People see me as black because of my skin color. I think black has particular meanings. One of the issues is with cops. …. there is a tremendous amount of fear. I don't know why the fear is there necessarily, is it the TV or the training? But there is a tremendous amount of fear people have for black people. That is why how people have a particular type of look on the bus. I am black and sometimes specifically man as well.

The context in which second-generation Jamaicans build their identities has a significant impact on how they see themselves (James, 2012, p. 473). Black youth are more likely to be racially profiled and, as a result, they have frequent interactions with the police (Wortley & Tanner, 2003, p. 372, 2005, p. 596). In this specific case, Jamaicans are more criminalized than any other black groups in Canada (Benjamin, 2003; Connelly et al., 2014, pp. 18-19; Hogarth, 2007). The education system also has failed some black youth because of the alienating school environment; the Euro-centric curriculum, low student expectations, negative stereotypes such as underachievers and troublemakers and culturally inappropriate assessments, all contribute to their marginalization (Davis, 2012, pp. 336-339; James, 2012, pp. 480-486; Stennett, 2008, pp. 16-33; Yon, 1994, pp. 120-47). 60.9% of second-generation blacks perceive discrimination more than any group, according to Reitz and Banerjee’s (2007) analysis of 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (p. 10).

Second-generation Jamaicans thus have limited options for choosing their social avenues. Their ethnic identities are devalued, and assigned racial meanings (James, 2006, p. 44; Waters, 1994, p. 796, 2010, p. 203). Because being Jamaican has real social costs in their
everyday lives, they have a thick assigned identity, which, according to Cornell and Hartman (2007) is:

A comprehensive or “thick” ethnic and racial tie is one that organizes a great deal of social life and both individual and collective action. A less comprehensive or “thin” ethnic or racial tie is one that organizes relatively little of social life and action… In short, racial identity is extraordinarily “thick”: It dominates layer after layer of social organization with a comprehensiveness and power unmatched by any other dimensions of individual or collective identity (pp. 77-78).

However, assigned racial identities are not simply imposed upon Jamaicans (James, 2012, p. 473); some resist being black, defining themselves through ethnic lenses and refusing the perception that they are not Canadians. Second-generation Jamaicans are therefore not simply passive recipients of mainstream ideas and beliefs but possess agency and are active participants in constructing their identities. They give meaning to their everyday life experiences and construct their identities accordingly. Barbara tells that:

I don't like just being rephrased by my skin color. I like to call myself Afro-Canadian where I descent from…. In Canada, I assume I am a non-Canadian, I am a Jamaican. Or I am a Jamaican-Canadian… I feel Canadian, but I most definitely like identifying with the Jamaican culture.

The conflict between their asserted and assigned identities, the hostility of the host society, cultural alienation, and the feeling of “otherness” have given rise to the diaspora consciousness among second-generation Jamaicans. They have reinvented their identities around their perceived similarities to develop a “we-consciousness” and to build a sense of belonging (Allahar, 2001, pp. 200-201; Breton et al., 1990, p. 5). Jamaicans who have not been accepted by host society organize around community, youth groups, political institutions and, most significantly, churches (Connely et al., 2014, p. 26; Hall, 2012, p.
164). Still, and not wanting to homogenize all of them, some second-generation blacks think that solidarity is weak amongst themselves and that blacks do not like helping other blacks (Furlan, 2014, p. 157). Two participants define this situation as “crabs in the bucket.”

On the other hand, some other participants eagerly assert a black identity because of their common history of colonization and similar experiences of anti-black racism with other blacks (Hall, 1990, p. 52-53; Solomos, 2014, p. 1671; The Environics Institute, 2017, p. 9). Black here is a historical, political, and a cultural category which goes beyond skin color. They have chosen politically delineated racial boundaries to act on their common interests as a positive reinforcement (James, 2003, p. 58). When Rosa was asked how she sees herself, she replied:

Race is not biological, but at the same time, it is there. We are treated differently based on it. So, I need to acknowledge it. So, I see myself as a black woman.

Second-generation Jamaicans have embraced Jamaican culture or some African cultures, looking for authenticity as a means of coping with marginalization. Not feeling or not being seen as Canadian, they can be understood as individuals searching for a spiritual home (Hall, 1991b, pp. 52-53; Simmons & Plaza, 2006, p. 138). This journey enables them to reinvent their lost histories and reconnects them emotionally with Jamaica and Africa (Farred, 1996, pp. 34-35). In today’s globalized world, the participants have developed and maintained their transnational ties with Jamaica and Africa through short visits and information exchange (Henry, 1994, pp. 254-256; Jones, 2008, pp. 136-147). In the process, Jamaica and Africa are imagined as their real home and Canada as their practical home, thus, all worlds are part of their new identities and culture (James, 2005, p. 235).
Living simultaneously in Canada, Jamaica, and Africa, they selectively pick some cultural themes from each and fuse them in a unique way. Discriminated against and marginalized in their practical home, each culture provides them with tools to negotiate anti-black racism. Some of the Jamaican participants express their feelings by singing, painting, and making music. These expressive forms of diaspora culture work to resist racism, poverty, and inequality (Clifford, 1994, p. 315; Hall, 1996, p. 443).

Some of them use patois — Jamaican language — as a tool of power and resistance against the mainstream. Patois, a creole blend of English and West African languages, was created by Afro-slaves to communicate secretly among themselves (Henry, 2012, pp. 100, 103; Hutnyk, 2005, p. 85). Clearly, it continues to be a tool of resistance for second-generation Jamaicans. They speak patois when they don’t want authority figures to understand them, and then revert to standard English to communicate with dominant institutions, a practice known as code-switching (Simmons & Plaza, 2006, p. 143).

Sandra tells that:

If someone's annoying us, we talk in patois with other Jamaicans… in that way, I feel like more Jamaican.

Their patois is different from the patois in Jamaica because it has been reconstructed in a different context, Toronto. Speaking in their languages makes them feel more Jamaican in the moments of resistance because of the similar meanings they attached to discrimination and inequality.

Ethnic identities being situational and fluid, second-generation Jamaicans identify themselves in multiple ways, depending on the context. They are Canadian in Jamaica; they are Jamaican or African or Jamaican-Canadian in Canada. Sometimes, even if they do not feel they are black (given the negativity associated with the term), they leverage their racial identity rationally if it is to their advantage. Robert feels more African than anything else and explains this as:
I identify being an African before Jamaican…. If I talk with white people who I feel like they don’t know any historical context, I am African (I see Jamaica as a part of Africa). They continue asking what part of Africa. I say Jamaica, so that is how I get the chance to educate them .... but if it is a certain type of person who has an understanding of context I am just black. Black is a term that Europeans created…it has nothing to do with your actual identity…If there is a grant … I don’t argue. In a way manipulating the system, I click black or visible minority.

Canadian citizenship is obviously not an indicator of feeling Canadian or of being seen as a Canadian (Howard-Hassmann, 2006, p. 229). While their Canadian citizenship entitles them to some legal rights such as Canadian passports, some participants consider themselves to be second-class citizens, and, in fact, although second-generation Jamaicans have acculturated into the mainstream, they are seen to deviate from the “white” Canadian norm (Kalbach & Kalbach, 1999, p. 3; Razack, 1999, p. 161). Furthermore, despite exogamy, their skin color will remain as a marker even after two to three generations (Cohen, 1994, p. 144). Hence, compared to whites and dark-whites, the two-way street of assimilation will be a longer and more painful process for black Jamaicans.

### 5.4.2 Second-generation Portuguese as dark-whites

Portuguese-Canadians are categorized as a European group, and hence second-generation Portuguese fall under the “white” category in formal documentation (Statistics Canada, 2016). This categorization is simplistic because it determines the ethnic/racial background of groups through an immigrant’s origin country, which, although objective, does not take into account the subjective assessment of their standing.

This study adopts a sociological and a critical understanding of whiteness. Whiteness is beyond skin color and one’s European country of origin; it is about social, economic and
political power. In short, it is about various forms of power, along with light skin color (Bailey, 2004; Frankenberg, 1993; McIntosh, 2004; Satzewich, 2007; Wildman & Davis, 2012). Whiteness is thus a complex category; one should avoid essentializing whiteness just as, similarly, blacks should not be seen in an essentialist way. The groups categorized as “white” are not homogenous and whiteness is not a monolithic category (Doane, 2003, p. 331; Satzewich, 2007, p. 75). A European group can stand as “not-yet-white” (Barrett & Roediger, 2012, p. 41; Roediger, 2002, p. 331) or socially darker on a scale from being white to black as whiteness and blackness are matters of degree (Murguia & Forman, 2003, p. 65). There are, therefore, various degrees of whiteness and blackness.

This is the basis on which this research argues that Portuguese are dark-whites, for even if the wider society does not discuss them in terms of color, they are nevertheless a racialized community in Canada and their labour force participation puts them closer to blacks than to whites. As McIntosh (2004) pointed out, being white brings unearned privileges that are conferred systematically. However, the lighter skin pigmentation of Portuguese does not automatically confer structural privileges on second-generation Portuguese. This was illustrated by McLaren (1986) as:

During one meeting, a staff member exhorted those present not to expect too much from this year's crop of students, claiming that teachers couldn't be expected to fill sixty-ounce bottles with ninety ounces of wine. By this he meant that Portuguese students - presumably because of their language and cultural differences - couldn't be expected to learn as much as middle-class Anglo- Saxon students. Staff meetings thus became occasions during which the tacit categories that located Portuguese students as academically inferior were credentialized and made legitimate. The paradigmatic status of cultural deprivation theory was therefore enhanced through the imputed consensus that Portuguese students were 'inferior' to middle-class students.
in manifold ways -the most pronounced deficit consisting of academic achievement. Through informal gossip on the part of teachers, the Portuguese student was made into a type of subcultural underdog - a member of an underclass or *Untermensch* (p. 119, as cited in Nunes, 1999, p. 84). (Italics in original)

Accordingly, this study prefers to use Harney’s (1990) term, “dark-white,” to address Portuguese in the diaspora instead of “white” for the latter is not sufficiently nuanced. The claim here is that social class can confer social color, which can, in turn, determine social standing. For example, a rich black man is not perceived to be as black as a poor black man.

The Portuguese participants are overwhelmingly “working-class,” similar to second-generation Jamaicans. Furthermore, the second-third-generation Portuguese are reproduced as a working-class community, and specifically, males drop out of school to get a job in construction or in some other non-skilled or semi-skilled area (Nunes, 2003, p. 140). Compared to both European and non-European groups, second-generation Portuguese are less likely to acquire a university diploma (Abada & Lin, 2011, pp. 10-13). High representation of Portuguese in low-status occupations, along with their poor education levels, serve to color their whiteness (Murguia & Forman, 2003).

At school, Portuguese and Caribbean English-speaking youth share similar statistics in dropout rates, somewhere around 30-40 percent (Anisef, Brown, Sweet, & Walters, 2010, p. 18; Davis, 2012, p. 339; Stennett, 2008, p. 47). Their intellectual abilities are questioned by teachers (Nunes, 1999, p. 54-55, 2003, p. 138), and, similar to black students, they are overrepresented in remedial courses (Persley & Brown, 2011, pp. 2-5). As the male participants mentioned, they are labeled as “troublemakers” at school. The marginalization of second-generation Portuguese "darkens" their color and social standing. Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon curriculum alienates them in school, which does
not mean that the history of Portugal is less bloody than that of the United Kingdom, Spain, France, or Holland, but that the history of the Portuguese is not fairly covered in the Canadian schools. The discrimination against them is less overt because their skin color obscures their racialization; hence, theirs is what could be called an “invisible oppression” as was mentioned in a recent conference. That being said, it is a mistake to equate the marginalization of second-generation Portuguese Canadians with that of the second-generation Jamaican Canadians.

Based on Murguia and Forman’s (2003) criteria of whiteness, which includes the command of English, accent, phenotype, religion, social-class standing, ethnic and racial identity (p. 67), second-generation Portuguese can at best be seen as dark-whites. Hegemonic whiteness, on the other hand, refers to “white,” Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and English speakers.

This does not mean that second-generation Portuguese see themselves as dark-whites. The Portuguese participants usually do not feel they are discriminated against, as reported in other research (Oliveira & Teixeria, 2004, p. 15; Reitz & Banerjee, 2007, p. 5), which has a significant impact on how they construct their identity. However, this does not change the fact that they are being discriminated against in the educational system and in the labor market, as discussed previously. Since feeling they are not discriminated against is different from being discriminated against, almost all of the participants think that others see them as white or as Canadian.

An argument can be made that the whiteness of Portuguese can be, at best, related to their skin color. In terms of their social standing, power and prestige, they are not seen as whites by the wider society. The media, where they and their problems are depicted as those of a working-class community, has a significant impact on how Canadians see the Portuguese community (Clifton, 2010, p. 411; da Silva, 2011, p. 292). In contrast to the construction of whiteness, in which whites are understood as being intelligent and
oriented towards success, Portuguese students are characterized as underachievers. The general view of Canadian society towards Portuguese communities is one that presumes low-skilled manual laborers and undocumented construction workers facing deportation; both views are typically held towards colored people, but not towards whites. Furthermore, the understanding of Portuguese as non-white is a historically ingrained construction. By the end of the eighteenth century, the English were describing Portuguese as “not white” and stereotyped them as “primitive, barbaric, lazy, violent, superstitious, silly, and imbecile” (de Sousa Santos, 2016, pp. 21-23), terms that were mostly used to describe blacks. Today, although some of those characteristics have changed, they are still seen as not being that bright and intelligent, not very sophisticated, not educated, not willing to learn English, and as talking loudly and being devoutly religious (da Silva, 2011, p. 292; Nunes, 1999, pp. 54-55, 2003).

Portuguese are also underrepresented in the political domain (Bloemrad, 2009, p. 163; Nunes, 1998, pp. 40-42). For instance, the proportion of elected Portuguese officers to the total number of Portuguese living in Toronto was 0.28, which means weak political representation when this proportion is under 1 and it was 0.92 for Jamaicans in 2001. However, it was 1.83 for Anglo-Saxons and 2.52 for Italians, which is strong for both groups because the proportion is higher than 1. In this sense, the political representation of Portuguese is closer to Jamaicans and racialized communities than to whites (Siemiatycki, 2008, p. 32-33). Another example of political underrepresentation is the election of the first Portuguese-born member of federal parliament in 2004 (Bloemrad, 2009). Overall, the Canadian educational system, labor market, political institutions, and wider social system do not see Portuguese as whites in Canada as they are either excluded or casted down in the hierarchical system.

However, when they are asked whether they claim to be white, some deny it because of the cultural differences between them and the mainstream. So, not every Portuguese wants to be white, or to claim Anglo-Saxon “whiteness.” Many prefer instead to simply
identify themselves with Portuguese culture. Siobhan declares herself olive-colored but not white because of:

- Family values and religion… Being close to family... all my friends at work moved out from their parents’ house when they were 19. They found weird that at the age of 24, I was still living with my parents. Portuguese move out when they are married... I feel like being Catholic is being Portuguese and being Portuguese is being Catholic because it is so ingrained in Portuguese culture.

While defining whiteness, Frankenberg (1993) set two other criteria, in addition to structural advantages. Whiteness is also defined by cultural practices such as language, and religion and it is “a standpoint or a place from which to look at oneself, others and society” (p. 54). Therefore, in addition to socio-economic indicators, Portuguese are not white with regards to their culture. Mary, on the other hand, feels white:

- In every kind of way… Economically, politically, you know kind of your living standards. If you are white, you are white, right? It is not even only about your nationality it is about the color which you get in. If you are visibly white, I think that is all. … if you are white you have kind of statistically better lifestyle …people who are colored or different races … have a lower standard of life versus if they are visibly white.

However, as mentioned, whiteness is beyond one’s skin color. Mary’s asserted identity does not match how the majority sees Portuguese in Canada. Although they are not otherized because of their skin color, they are otherized because of their social color or socio-economic status and culture. For some of the participants, their ethnic identity, being Portuguese, has negative connotations. As Ethel says:
If I don't say my background; they see me as anybody else. If they know that I am Portuguese, then they see me different. They start judging me, just making false assumptions about me and Portuguese…. uneducated, in construction and cleaning, just assuming that I am just the typical dropout. We are not that bright… but hardworking… they have a preconception of who I am. And that is not who I am…. Sometimes I avoid telling people that I am Portuguese…

The second-generation Portuguese participants define themselves in a combination of multiple identities such as Portuguese, Canadian, and Latino (given the Brazilian link), depending on the social context (Gomes, 2008, p. 39; Noivo, 2002, pp. 266-267; Sardinha, 2011, p. 20; Stennett, 2008, pp. 62-63). They are Portuguese-Canadians or Canadian-Portuguese in Canada and Canadians in Portugal. They have developed hybrid identities through negotiating with different cultures. One participant, a working-class man, defined himself as only Canadian. They keep some of their Portuguese values and blend them with the mainstream, and sometimes add some Latino flavor, which is constantly fed by the transnational linkages and multiethnic Canadian society. Jim, who has a business and economics diploma and works in the finance sector and is not a member of the diaspora, identifies himself as:

Personally, I consider myself Canadian. To an extent Latino because Portuguese people are considered Latino…. Have a nice Portuguese barbecue, watch soccer, or listen to Latin music, Brazilian, Portuguese, or Spanish. I like it…

Considering the shades of color among Latinos, it is important to make a differentiation between dark-skinned Latinos and “European-looking” Latinos. Jim is a white-skinned, blue-eyed middle-class man, who sometimes identifies himself as "Latino” because of his leisure activities but not because of how he looks or because of his occupation. His skin
color and social class privilege him over darker-skinned Latinos in the diaspora, although they may share a similar culture or are attracted to Latino music and soccer. For Jim, feeling Latino is an enjoyable and voluntary aspect of his identity and is individual without any social costs (Waters, 2010, p. 202).

In contrast to second-generation Jamaicans, second-generation Portuguese have a “partial white privilege” and thus lack a strong “racial awareness”. They do not face instances of discrimination, such as police carding, due to their racial phenotype. Furthermore, for example, second-generation Portuguese earn higher incomes than Jamaicans, even though they may have a lower level of education than the latter (Abada & Lin, 2014, pp. 84-85).

Second-generation Portuguese-Canadians have developed a diaspora consciousness which rests on their pride in their “magnificent” history and their culture but also bitter memories of their parents back home — poverty, deprivation and Salazar’s oppressive regime (Gomes, 2008, pp. 36-37; Edite Noivo, 2002, pp. 258-261; Oliveira & Teixeira, 2004, pp. 12, 19, 21; Pacheco, 2004, p. 34; Sardinha, 2011, p. 382). These participants have a strong emotional attachment to their “imagined” home; they are proud of being Portuguese and keen on retaining their culture. Being an institutionally complete community, this is not challenging for them. They go to the schools such as St. Helen Catholic school in Toronto where most of the students are Portuguese, live in Portuguese neighborhoods, and some are hired by Portuguese businesses such as real estate agencies (Gomes, 2008, pp. 4-6; Oliveira & Teixeira, 2004, p. 15; Sardinha, 2011, p. 380; Stennett, 2008, pp. 61-64). Some still attend ethnic events such as Feast Day of Saint John celebrations and rancho (Portuguese folk dance) (Sardinha, 2011, p. 380). They speak Portuguese with their parents and grandparents, either by choice or due to their parents’ lack of English proficiency.
This doesn’t mean that they are in any way reactionary to the mainstream. They appreciate Canada for the opportunities provided to their families. Second-generation Portuguese carry the traits of both cultures and celebrate this as a new definition of Canadian under multicultural policies (Sardinha, 2011, p. 374-375). Most of the participants associate traditional values such as the centrality of the church and family in their life with Portuguese culture. However, to them, their work ethic is Canadian because they live in a fast-paced world whereas they think that Portugal is much more laid back. Sam spoke of the difference between Canada and Portugal as:

I look at the ways that they run certain things in Portugal… give me a break, you guys are way behind… They still don’t have a work ethic …. You know what people who came here worked really hard. And they sacrificed lots of things. I have uncles who didn’t take any vacations even for one day for 20 years. Then they say you guys have everything in Canada. But you go there in August and everybody is on vacation.

Hence, although second-generation Portuguese acculturate into the dominant culture as an adaptive strategy, some of their beliefs and values, such as Catholicism, family ties, strong community involvement, and ethnic language somewhat separate them from the mainstream (Noivo, 1997, pp. 13-14; Stennett, 2008, p. 63).

5.5 Conclusion

Second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese are both more or less acculturated to the mainstream values. However, while the black second-generation is devalued by the dominant group, Portuguese are more accepted as decent, hardworking manual workers. Acceptance, therefore, does not always have to come from the heart. It can be based on rationality and functionality, such as Portuguese being a disciplined and hardworking community beneficial to Canada. But acceptance does not mean that one is accorded equality.
What does it mean for Jamaicans to have a black skin in a white country? The blacker they are, the more likely they are to be seen as deviating physically and culturally from the white European norm. That being said, second-generation Jamaicans build their identity around the feeling of rejection. To them, Jamaica and/or Africa is/are their real home but, as stated by Farred (1996), “You can go home again, you just can’t stay” (p. 29). Although there is a physical home to go back for them, it would be disruptive to stay somewhere to which they cannot ideologically and socially relate (Safran, 1991, p. 91).

While some Portuguese may feel “white” in their minds and hearts, their social class and culture serve to shade or darken their whiteness. Their skin color hence is not a guarantee of being white because feeling and being white have different meanings since identities are constructed in a dialectical way and in a specific power context.
5.6 References


Chapter 6

6 Conclusion

The manuscripts that comprise this dissertation are united by the question of the role of multicultural ideology in dealing with the otherization of the black Jamaican second-generation and of the dark-white Portuguese second-generation. Its central argument is that while the ideology of multiculturalism has usually distracted the second-generations of Jamaicans and Portuguese from an understanding of the structural issues such as systemic class and racial inequalities, it will also work to assimilate those future generations by the manipulation of multicultural policies and the promises of multiculturalism made by the state.

Canadian society, where racism is institutional, is systematically racist. Initially, Canada operated as a racist society that utilized white-only immigration policies that prevented the immigration of non-European people on the basis of a white nation-building project (Bannerji, 2000; Hawkins, 1991). Later, although immigrants of color were allowed in, they were and continue to be discriminated against by the dominant institutions of Canada, despite the official multicultural discourse which guarantees equal access to those institutions, as well as cultural pluralism (Government of Canada, 1988). For instance, in the labor market, blacks are underrepresented in high-status and good-paying positions (Block & Galabuzi, 2011; Galabuzi, 2001; Pendakur & Pendakur, 2002, 2011) and non-Northern/Western European students are alienated by schools constructed on a white Anglo-Saxon culture (James, 2012; Nunes, 2003).

This does not mean that second-generation Jamaicans or other racialized members of the working class are solely victims. They can exercise agency and have used the ideology of multiculturalism as a means of resisting the racism from above and from below (white working-class racism). Since multiculturalism is an official policy, they use their agency
and embrace it to fight attempts at exclusion. Assimilation (blending or becoming invisible) is also a way of resisting exclusion. However, it is not as easy for blacks and visible minorities to do so, so they actively hold on to the promise of equal acceptance embodied in multiculturalism, and challenge those individuals, policies and institutions who seek to exclude them. Even if some of them think that multiculturalism is a farce or myth, they may use it to defend against racist exclusion based on the promises of official multiculturalism. As revealed in a series of interviews, some of the second-generation Jamaican participants believe that multiculturalism is real and are happy to embrace it, while others see it as a farce but, when necessary, still deploy it strategically by exercising their agency. This speaks to Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of the agency of the oppressed. The ideology of multiculturalism, therefore, is not simply imposed upon blacks. Whether they accept the promises of multiculturalism or see it as a farce, they can still use it to gain access to jobs, education and so on. In that way, while structural changes may not occur, individual advantages can be attained.

As to the Portuguese second-generation, they use the ideology of multiculturalism to construct a physical and an emotional home in Canada. If multiculturalism promotes cultural diversity, and confers on everyone a right to preserve their culture, being Portuguese-Canadian is already being Canadian to them (Sardinha, 2011). Sam, a second-generation Portuguese, identifies himself as:

I’m Canadian and then I will say my heritage is Portuguese. I can’t trade this country for any country. I love to visit Portugal. But I’m always happy to come back home. [emphasis added]

In a society where skin color is a currency, the white or lighter skin color of Portuguese will render their assimilation process smoother and possibly quicker than visible minorities. Furthermore, if they assimilate into the Anglo-Saxon culture, they may derive the benefits of whiteness, but this option or flexibility is not open to blacks (second-
generation Jamaicans). Even though some blacks can be well-integrated economically, politically, and socially, and individuals may indeed acquire some measure of power and enjoy a degree of mobility, that is more individual than structural. Thus, in a system where money whitens individual blacks who have a higher social class standing can at best be “white-by-association” (Allahar, 2003, p. 12) because of their visible marker of color. Furthermore, even after they may assimilate into the Anglo-Saxon culture (speaking the English language, being Christian and embracing capitalist, liberal ideology), their skin color will remain as a marker in a world where ‘black’ has clear political meanings.

There are some themes, friendship, gender, and agency, came out of my interviews. My second-generation female participants indicated that the most important factor for building a friendship is being able to relate to another person. For instance, my Portuguese participants indicate that their friends are mostly Portuguese because they have similar upbringing and do not need to explain cultural practices and expectations. To them, unlike Anglo-Saxons, they have curfews and family is central in their lives. It is practically easier to be friends with Portuguese because then they don’t have to apologize for why they have to be at home at a certain time or why they stay with their families until they get married. My Jamaican female participants reported that they are usually attracted to blacks as friends because they have similar experiences. When they spend time with their black friends, they don’t have to explain how fixing their hair takes time and why their food smells different.

Regarding my male participants, Jamaicans are particularly concerned with the way they are perceived as dangerous and criminal by authority figures and their interaction with police. A significant number of my Portuguese participants, on the other hand, believe that visible minorities are provided jobs not because of their merit but their color, thus taking the jobs away from them. They are not adequately knowledgeable about how Employment Equity Act works.
Portuguese in general blame themselves when they fail. However, Jamaicans are more likely to perceive the structural barriers in institutions. This may be related to the fact that Jamaicans are continuously warned about racism by their parents and communities owing to their history of colonization and slavery, whereas Portugal was a colonial empire. This awareness triggers their agency and they create alternative ways to navigate the system and devise new options for mobility.

That being said, this dissertation is written in a manuscript/article form and explores various related issues. These include global immigration patterns with a specific emphasis on Portugal and Jamaica, the labor market integration of first-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese, the integration of second-generation black Jamaicans and dark-white Portuguese into the Canadian society, and the process of identity construction within these two groups. Each manuscript has a specific research question and argument; however, though separate, all the chapters are interrelated.

6.1 Contributions

Overall, there is no dearth of research on second-generations and multiculturalism in Canada. However, this dissertation is unique because of its approach to the multicultural ideology and its use in the integration of second-generation immigrants. The literature is characterized by two key opposing arguments. The first group argues that multicultural ideology is not effective in integrating every second-generation group, e.g., Jamaicans and Portuguese (Abada, Hou, & Ram, 2008; Abada & Lin, 2011, 2014); it merely serves to distract those populations from structural inequalities such as racial and class discrimination while maintaining the dominant power structure in areas such as a Eurocentric curriculum (Ali, 2008; James, 2012). Those in the second school of thought contend that a multicultural ideology is a very effective tool with which the second-generations can integrate into Canadian society, credited with, for example, the increasing educational levels of second-generations compared to their parents (Boyd,
The argument presented in this study is that the multicultural ideology functions in a dual fashion as both inducing false consciousness and as an integrative tool for the second-generation Jamaicans and second-generation Portuguese. Using their agency, marginalized second-generations are sometimes able to turn the conditions to their advantage via the various meanings they attach to multiculturalism.

Among the participants of this research, one-third of the second-generation Jamaicans \((n=23)\) find multiculturalism to be a great equalizer that guarantees equal access to institutions, regardless of ethnic and racial background. Although they are not aware of the systemic problems, they use their belief as a motivation to move up economically as an individual solution. Furthermore, the promises of multiculturalism make them feel more respected and soothe their feeling of insecurity. Second, another third of the second-generation Jamaicans think that multicultural policies are progressive; while having some positive consequences, these policies are not yet fully effective. To the rest of the second-generation Jamaicans, the goal of multiculturalism is not to create cultural diversity and social equality; rather, it is a tool of the state used to stave off a major social disturbance among various ethnic and racial groups. Still, as they have agency, they utilize multiculturalism and emphasize their racial identities as a rational act to manipulate the system and increase their life chances. To all second-generation Portuguese \((n=20)\), on the other hand, multiculturalism is an ideal policy because it enables them both to assert their Canadian and Portuguese identities and to enjoy the elements of great popular cultural diversity, such as ethnic foods, festivals and parades. Overall, the Portuguese respondents as a group appeared to associate multiculturalism more with popular culture. Recalling the point that culture is political, the Jamaicans as a group appeared to think of multiculturalism in more political terms.

Still, some of my male Portuguese participants think that some multicultural policies lead to discrimination because those prioritize visible minorities for job opportunities. Here
they are confused about the difference between advantages and privileges. Not all advantages are privileges because not all advantages are institutional, and privileges stem from years of oppression. The prioritization of some visible minorities in some rare cases only refers to individual advantages, so they do not create a basis for institutional discrimination, and these kinds of acts are tools to alleviate the effect of years of oppression. However, since these are only at the individual level, systemic oppressions still remain intact. Most members of the lay public may not make the sociological distinction between individual and structural oppression.

This dissertation uses a comparative approach to understand the integration of second-generations. This is helpful when analyzing the impact of race and social class on two overwhelmingly working-class second-generations from two, quite different, racialized groups. Those between-group differences offer a robust understanding of how race and social class matter.

Accordingly, this study argues that all second-generation immigrants do not share the same characteristics because it is a highly heterogeneous group which is divided by social class, race, ethnicity, education, age and gender. Therefore, it cannot be simply claimed that the integration of second-generation immigrants is a success story for all or that, conversely, the system fails all of them (Ray, 2018). This study hence takes multiple levels of oppressions (Andersen & Hill Collins, 2010), class, race, ethnicity, and gender into account to determine the ways in which race, ethnicity and social class work simultaneously and how they are interlocked in the process of integration and identity construction of second-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese.

Although intersectional analysis or matrix of domination as an analytical tool has a significant place in the literature, many researchers forgo an examination of the impact of social class, as was mentioned by Allahar and Côté (1998) and Satzewich and Liokadis (2013). Indeed, studies about race and gender oppressions or the interactions between the
two take up a significant space in the literature. Hence, this study brings social class back in the analysis. But to be clear, while racism and sexism are real, they are not essential to the functioning of capitalism. Class exploitation, on the other hand, is essential. Throughout history capital has demonstrated that it has no race, color, nationality, or religion. Whites and blacks have exploited other whites and blacks, women have exploited other women, the powerful have exploited the powerless of their own nation and so on. Of course, there is no denying that racism and sexism can intensify exploitation, but in theory they are not integral to the functioning of capitalism.

In returning social class to the analysis, then, this study takes Harney’s (1990) term, dark-white off the dusty shelves as an analytical tool. As Nunes (2003, 2014) has argued, members of the Portuguese community are usually categorized as being white due to their European background and light skin color. However, in Canada, Portuguese overall do not have a strong social, economic and political standing compared to other European groups, which is evidenced by their low representation in high-status professional or managerial jobs, weak educational attainment and low political representation (Liodakis, 2002; Nunes, 1998; Ornstein, 2006; Siemiatycki, 2008). Thus, in a systemically racist society, the term dark-white has a strong explanatory power, allowing one to see the intersections of class, race and ethnicity and to support the argument that whiteness is not just skin color, hair texture, nose shape and lip size, but also refers to unearned advantages systematically conferred on white people (Frankenberg, 1993; McIntosh, 2004). Portuguese in Canada, however, do not automatically benefit from institutional privileges, as seen in education, the labor market and political institutions. Therefore, this research argues that whiteness is a matter of degree and the social status of Portuguese gives shades to their whiteness. This does not mean that they have no chance of being considered white in the future, as racial and ethnic identities are fluid and flexible, but currently, this study treats them as an overwhelmingly dark-white group, a status given them by their weak socio-economic position in Canada.
Furthermore, unlike the Italians or the Irish, although there is research on Portuguese in Canada, the relationship between their social standing and their whiteness has not been adequately investigated. Even when it was, the discussion was largely limited to their cultural differences as compared to the Anglo-Saxon mainstream. However, in addition to the ways in which their culture differs from that mainstream, this research looks at the positioning of Portuguese in an economic hierarchical structure, i.e., the relationship between their economic status and racialization compared to those of systemically racialized people of color, black Jamaicans, in Canada.

The second chapter, first manuscript, titled *A Comparative Immigration History: Situating Portuguese and Jamaican Immigration in the Global Political Economy*, contextualizes the immigration history of first-generation Jamaicans and Portuguese in a global economic system. Just as this study uses history as a tool to understand the root causes of current issues, this specific article argues that the immigration of Portuguese and Jamaicans cannot be analyzed without considering the history of colonization, slavery, the penetration of capitalist economic relations into the non-capitalist areas of the world and unequal development patterns that resulted, all of which served to displace various groups of people from their homelands. The working-class immigrants had to leave their countries because of poverty and deprivation as a result of the expansion of a capitalist economic system. In this sense, their immigration could be analyzed as a form of forced migration under the “whip of hunger” (Weber, 1968, p. 42). The participants confirmed this, saying that their parents immigrated to Canada because of poverty and lack of opportunities. Allie, a second-generation Portuguese, explains the reasons of immigration as “financial reasons and for the idea of better futures for their children that they did not have in Portugal.” Abigail, a second-generation Jamaican, describes the reasons behind her parents’ immigration as:

For a better life. They grew up really poor, so they wanted to come here, go to school and live a better quality of life… My grandmother was the
first person who came here, she came here as a maid, as a house help following the early 60s. That was the only way to come here back then. You could only come here as a house help but you could not come here say to go to school. That was the only job you could get, and you had to stay with that family. I think it was for four years before you could go on your own and got your Canadian citizenship.

The third chapter, second manuscript titled, *Class, Race and Labor Market Integration of Portuguese and Jamaican Diaspora in the context of Canadian Immigration History*, explores the labor market integration of the two groups in relation to Canada’s nation-building process and the demands of its labor market before and during the multiculturalist era. Portuguese and Jamaican immigrants in Canada have significantly contributed to the economic development of Canada as an available pool of cheap labor. Hence, both groups have been racialized, but Jamaicans have faced worst forms of racialization because of the legacy of slavery and centuries-old anti-black racism. The Canadian bourgeoisie, i.e., racism from above, favored black Jamaicans and less-preferred dark-white Portuguese as workers because, as a cheap and disciplined labor force, the bourgeoisie strengthened their position in a competitive global economy by decreasing the cost of production. As mentioned by Allahar and Côté (1998), “capital has no race, sex, religion or national allegiance” (p. 151).

Before the adoption of multiculturalism policy in 1971, the driving force of the nation-building process was ethnic nationalism. Canada was constructed on the imagined idea of a white-only nation (Bannerji, 2000, p. 64). Immigrants of color and non-Anglo-Saxon cultural groups therefore raised suspicion and panic among whites, racism from below. They were seen as unassimilable groups and a threat to the Anglo-Saxon white culture. The Portuguese as a Catholic, family-oriented and Portuguese-speaking community, were seen as culturally “backward” (Aguiar, 2006, p. 205), in contrast to the modernity associated with white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) English-speaking
groups. In addition to their culture, their skin color was “not quite white,” which could also create a basis for discrimination (Frye, 1998, as cited in Aguiar, 2006; Nunes, 2003, pp. 130-145). For black Caribbeans or Africans, their phenotype was their destiny. Not only their skin color but also their hair texture, eye shape, nose and lips have all been used as symbols of their characteristics and behaviors (Omi & Winant, 2015), which were thought to include a lack of intelligence and sexual control, laziness, and moral decay. This negative stereotyping was used as a justification to the claim that they could not be assimilated into Canadian society (Calliste, 1993/1994, p. 133; Jakubowski, 1999, p. 123; Plaza, 2001, pp. 50, 55) and were not preferred citizens of Canada.

The state, on the other hand, both to keep the high profit rates of the bourgeoisie and maintain social order, declared multiculturalism an official policy in 1971 with the goal of preventing potential conflict among diverse ethnic and racial groups (Fleras & Elliott, 1996). According to the multicultural ideology, cultural diversity was no longer a threat but was instead good for national wealth and the country’s unity. This manuscript therefore argues that the cheap labor demand of the Canadian economy led to the transition from ethnic nationalism to the civic nationalism in Canada’s nation-building attempts.

The fourth chapter, *Ideology of Multiculturalism as a Double-Edged Sword: Second-generation of Black Jamaicans and Dark-White Portuguese*, answers the main research question of this dissertation: the role of multicultural ideology in cementing social control and in the integration of second-generation working-class Jamaicans and Portuguese into Canada. This article, in addition to its unique approach to multiculturalism as mentioned above, argues that multicultural integration is a stepping stone to the assimilation.

Multiculturalism is thus seen, not as the final destination of eventual assimilation, but rather as a necessary step along the way. Official multiculturalism promises cultural pluralism and full participation in the dominant institutions of Canada, promises that shape the expectations and experiences of second-generations in their interactions with
the dominant institutions. It therefore creates an opportunity for rights-based claims and sometimes, a sense of belonging, depending on the promises of the official policy. Multiculturalism is thus seen as a stepping stone, a process which prepares the conditions of assimilation. Groups with greater vulnerability more readily embrace this idea because of their experiences with racism but this does not mean that assimilation is an easy process for them. On the way to eventual assimilation, some groups, e.g., blacks, must first clear a number of hurdles. For white immigrants, however, especially if they quite closely resemble the mainstream, multiculturalism may not be a necessary step.

On the other hand, second-generations’ attempts to make a living expose them to dominant institutions, such as when they attend school. They sometimes consciously or unconsciously internalize some elements of mainstream standards such as capitalism, English, individualism, and liberal values. Similar to the segmented assimilation theory (Portes & Zhou, 1993) this paper argues that one does not have to be economically successful to assimilate into the mainstream. Both Portuguese and Jamaican groups, even if not immediately second-generations, will assimilate into the Canadian society although their integration remains limited. Owing to phenotypical differences, the latter will take more time because assimilation also requires the acceptance of the host society and anti-black prejudices and discrimination lengthen the time required for their assimilation.

The fifth chapter, last manuscript titled, Centering the White Gaze: Dark-White Portuguese and Black Jamaicans, develops an extended version of the segmented assimilation theory by introducing the assimilation into creole cultures and embodiment of hybrid identities in addition to the three diverse patterns of identity construction — identification with the mainstream, the development of “reactive” identities, and the retention of the origin identities. Accordingly, most participants identify themselves through a mix of components. Second-generation Jamaicans define themselves via elements from Canada, Jamaica, and Africa. To Portuguese second-generations, identification involves a combination of Canadian and Portuguese cultures. Still, among
the participants, there is a minority group of participants who see themselves as just being black or Portuguese or Canadian. Summer, a second-generation Portuguese, explains in this way: “I see myself as Portuguese because I was always exposed to the culture.... I was born in here, but I consider myself Portuguese.”

Adam, another second-generation Portuguese, defines himself as:

More than Canadian anything else. I grew up here. My major language is English. It is not Portuguese. I love hockey. And I love this country…. this is the only country that I can call home… I love listening rock and roll, I don't like listening to Portuguese folk music... All I am watching Canadian and American TV because I understand what they are saying. I don't like watching Portuguese TV it is mostly soap operas and I don't care about that stuff and I have a hard time understanding... I don't listen to Portuguese news, I listen to Canadian news…Anything that deals with the Portuguese community and the Portuguese, entertainment, it does not interest me because I grew up here…

For Adam, claiming to be Canadian is easier because of his skin privilege (James, 2006; Waters, 2010). For racialized visible minorities, because of their visible markers, claiming a Canadian identity is not possible so they usually define themselves with hybrid identities (Plaza, 2006, p. 226). On the other hand, Rosa, a second-generation Jamaican, says: “I just see myself as a black woman” because blackness is a political tool with which she can claim equal rights for blacks and women. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the majority define themselves with hybrid identities, such as Portuguese-Canadian, Canadian-Portuguese, Jamaican-Canadian or African-Jamaican-Canadian. However, identity construction is a dialectical process (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Nagel, 1994). Even if second-generation Jamaicans see themselves as at least somewhat
Canadian, society at large continues to see them as black instead as Canadian, a view which is rooted in the history of slavery, power relationships, and color symbolism.

In contrast, Portuguese are seen as white when categorized by skin color, but they are not seen as white by their social color. They are known to be underachievers at schools (Nunes, 2003) and mainly construction workers and cleaners in the labor market (Trindade, 2007, p. 52), rather than the intelligent and success-oriented white social construction. Additionally, Portuguese culture deviates from the white Anglo-Saxon norm. Hence, this paper argues that they can be at best white with regard to their phenotypical characteristics. Still, the skin color of some Portuguese is “not quite white” (Frye, 1998, as cited in Aguiar, 2006), and they do not resemble standard, blue-eyed whites because of the high level of interracial mixing during the colonization period. They are dark-whites when one associates whiteness with economic and social power such as in political and educational institutions and the labor market, in addition to their light skin pigmentation. Of course, ‘black,’ ‘white,’ and ‘dark-white’ all deal with matters of perception. But those perceptions lead to real consequences for the persons concerned. Police profiling, for example, can and has resulted in arrest, detention and even shooting merely based on the officer’s perception and interpretation of what ‘black’ or ‘white’ means.

6.2 Limitations and Future Research

All dissertations are works in progress. There are always a number of issues which are omitted from any research because of delimited scope, time or budgetary constraints. This section focuses on some areas in which this study can be enriched by future research.

This research initially attempted to look into the effects of race and social class on the integration process of the second-generation Portuguese and Jamaicans. However, acknowledging the basic tenets of an intersectional approach, the relationship between
gender and integration can be studied more in-depth in the future. To explore and expose the differences and similarities with regard to the aspect of gender would be very illuminating. For instance, how are the experiences of second-generation Jamaican females and males similar to, or different from each other? Findings of this research clearly revealed that, while interaction with law enforcement is a significant issue for Jamaican males, it is less so for females. Furthermore, black women are not seen as a physical or sexual threat to the white (man) in the ways that black men are. On the other hand, both Jamaican males and females have similar experiences of discrimination in the labor market, including a high concentration in low-paying jobs and discrimination in educational institutions, e.g., teachers’ prejudices about black students. The other important question to answer would be the differences and similarities between second-generation Portuguese and Jamaican females. According to the initial findings, Portuguese woman are stereotyped as cleaners and maids, whereas Jamaican women are labelled as angry and aggressive, and as shoplifters, so they are frequently treated with suspicion in the public areas such as malls. Second-generation Jamaican females are also stereotyped as being unintelligent as well as aggressive and loud; they are expected to fail in the educational institutions, or their competence is constantly questioned at their workplace, which, while not an issue for second-generation Portuguese females. However, these issues can be elaborated further in future research through the use of more specific literature reviews, in-depth interviews or statistical data sets.

The second area of future research with the potential to make a significant contribution to the literature is conducting interviews with various second-generation European groups such as second-generation Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern Europeans to learn how these second-generation groups see each other, based on the argument that European groups are not homogenous. This study revealed that most of my second-generation Portuguese participants do not automatically consider themselves as white because of the cultural differences between themselves and Anglo-Saxon whites. Ethel, a second-
A first-generation Portuguese, says that she loves the Portuguese culture and sees the biggest difference as being:

in the home. …customs in the home are very different. A majority of the Canadians for instance, for my experience, they don't eat dinner together. They have all separate meals whereas in my home we all share meal together and we talk about our day. …Those are the things that I valued. I valued family a lot. Their communities are more independent as soon as the kids come of age they encourage them to move out whereas in our family we will support you as long as we can…

However, along with how Portuguese see white Anglo-Saxons, the perceptions of other European groups about Portuguese could encourage more stimulating discussions about the degrees of whiteness of Portuguese. Also, because, like Europeans, the Caribbean people are not homogenous, Jamaicans can be compared with other Caribbean groups and similarities and differences among these different ethnic groups can be identified.

Last, because of the snowball sampling strategy of this research, a significant number of the participants were college and university students. As such, the study sample did not speak for many who had been excluded from the education system. In the sampling, there were three Portuguese male participants who did not continue on to post-secondary education. If this study had also reached out to some second-generation Jamaicans who were cut off from education after high school, one could have anticipated more critical evaluations of the Canadian institutions. The other issue with the sampling strategy is the overrepresentation of women in this research. However, as mentioned previously, the interviews were sufficient to see the initial differences between male and female participants.
6.3 Policy Implications

Policy makers could use the findings of this research. Regarding second-generation Jamaicans, and blacks in general, policy makers could make an investment in schools in certain neighborhoods to increase the quality of education. Families who can afford to move do so may choose to allow their children to attend higher quality schools, where teachers may be less likely to associate phenotype with academic ability. However, there are many who do not have the financial resources to move. Hence, for the ones who are left behind, some schools should be prioritized, and more resources should be allocated to these schools to ensure fair educational opportunities for all. Needless to say, this also has implications for key concerns of crime and policing.

In terms of the ethnic and racial backgrounds of the students, policy makers should collaborate with community leaders to develop a more inclusive curriculum which speaks to most of the students rather than only those with a northwestern European background. This will enable Jamaican and Portuguese students to relate to course materials. There is also an urgent need for more black teachers and administrators to act as role models for black students; policy makers can enact new regulations that prioritize the hiring of black teachers. Overall, these policies have the potential to render educational institutions less alienating for marginalized students.

Sensitivity training for police officers is also a policy matter. Police carding has been a significant problem for black males in their everyday lives. As a response to negative reactions from the black community, the Toronto Police Department approved new carding rules in 2016. Officers are no longer able to randomly stop people; they can only do so under some circumstances, such as in the course of traffic stops and the investigation of a specific crime (Draaisma, 2017; Miller, 2016). However, the implementation of these new rules should be followed to determine if they are or are not effective.
Regarding second-generation Jamaicans, policies should address the economic situation of Jamaicans overall, with specific policies developed to alleviate poverty. Since wealth and economic, social and cultural advantages and disadvantages are transmitted throughout the generations, once black parents have better living conditions, they will automatically be more able to invest in their children’s education.

It is also very important for policy makers to recognize that European groups are not homogenous but are instead divided by ethnicity, social class, and gender. Southern Europeans, in this case, Portuguese, do not share the same educational and labor market advantages as northern and western European groups. For instance, unlike most of the European communities, the dropout rates and the concentration in remedial courses are high for Portuguese students. Policies should therefore target the specific needs of some southern European populations instead of lumping them together as an undifferentiated group.

The immigration policy of Canada could be also more inclusive. Currently, Canadian immigration policy favors immigrants with higher levels of education and skills that meet the labor demand of a post-industrial economy. This is elusive racism because many people from the global South are excluded. Following years of colonization, the economies of these regions became and continue to be very weak and their governments are not able to invest in education to develop a skilled labor-force. Moreover, this pattern has become even more dramatic with the rise of neo-liberal policies and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). These countries, locked in a vicious cycle of debt, are only offered loans through SAPs on the condition of a shrinking welfare state, which means a poorer educational infrastructure for their working-class citizens. There is also the matter of the ‘brain drain’ whereby Canada’s immigration policy is tailored to take the best skilled and educated persons from developing countries thus leaving those countries poorer.
6.4 Concluding Remarks

Immigration of ethnically and racially different populations still raises fear, suspicion, and hostility in the global and transnational world of the 21st century, and, despite Canada being “officially multicultural,” this has been seen with the recent Muslim refugees and immigrants after 9/11. There has always been an “other” with which to construct “self,” although these groups vary regarding time period and social context. As mentioned by Razack (2008), “The imagined nation must be fortified against racialized and cultural others” (p. 16). Before white immigration policies were dropped in Canada, the others were overtly First Nations, Indians, Chinese, and blacks. What must be remembered is that prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory practices were not automatically eliminated following the introduction of multiculturalism as an official policy; they still remain.

In the years since the 9/11 attacks, the racialized “other” has clearly shifted to Muslim groups in the North America and Europe (Arat-Koc, 2006; Razack, 2008). Arabs were no longer just exotic; they were also the new enemies of the West (Arat-Koc, 2006, p. 219). In this sense, the Western world constructs itself through the creation of the Islamic “other.” While the Western world represents civilization and modernity, the East is considered to be uncivilized, barbaric, and dangerous. These negative stereotypes have racialized Muslims in the Western world, and in Canada. The critical question then is whether Canada, which is said to be a multicultural society, is better able to absorb Muslim communities while most of the European countries, such as the UK, are withdrawing their “multicultural policies” (Satzewich & Liodakis, 2017, p. 152).

Not surprisingly, under the influence of media manipulation, some of the second-generation Portuguese study participants indicated that one of the major problems in Canada is the threat of Islam. Adam expressed his concerns as:

Adam: There are some things that I see from other races which I don't approve of. They shouldn't bring it over here.
Ari: Can you give me some examples?

Adam: Shariah Law.

Ari: What is that?

Adam: It is something Muslims do ... this is when a Muslim father has a Muslim daughter, she does something that is totally against their tradition and he kills her. It is legal in your country, but it is not legal over here.

Ari: Do they do the same thing in Canada?

Adam: It has been done. And those people go to jail.

There has been a growing anti-Muslim racism among some groups, along with increasing fear about the so-called consequences of Muslim beliefs that can potentially harm Canadian values, such as freedom of speech, respect for women as equals, and tolerance of religious difference. This claim brings in the argument that multicultural policies are “too soft” on immigrants (Razack, 2008, p. 145). For instance, the promotion of cultural relativism has indirectly supported fundamentalist Islam and homegrown terrorists (Satzewich & Liodakis, 2013, pp. 174-175), such as Canadian citizens who fought for ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). Hence, since the 1990s but especially after the events on 9/11, there has been a retreat from multiculturalism in Canada (Arat-Koc, 2006, p. 216). The dominant discourse has been that it is immigrants’ responsibility to acculturate into Canadian values.

Whether the fear about Islam is or is not real, it has real consequences. There has clearly been a growing institutional racism against Muslims in “officially multicultural” Canada. Examples include detentions after the 9/11, surveillance of Muslims in the name of security, and interrogation and imprisonment because of “suspicion” of any act of terrorism. There have also been incidents of violence against mosques, such as the arson
attack in Peterborough, ON, on November 17, 2015 (CBC News, 2015) and the mass killing of those attending prayer services in a Quebec City mosque on January 29, 2017 (National Post), both of which are in complete opposition to the salient guarantee of multiculturalism, respect for different cultures.

Muslims and their integration into “multicultural” Canada became an even a bigger issue during the 2015 federal election. There has been an increasing refugee flow of Syrians after the civil war erupted in Syria in 2011. When three-year old Alan Kurdi’s, a Syrian-Kurdish boy, body was found on the shores of Turkey following his family’s attempt to reach Europe, the image of this child made the global news. Since Kurdi’s family initially made a refugee application to Canada where they had some relatives and their application was turned down, it became a hot topic in the 2015 Federal election.

While Prime Minister Harper’s administration was highly restrictive about hosting refugees and keener on strengthening military existence in Middle East as a way to deal with ISIS, Prime Minister Trudeau pointed to the humanitarian aspect of the Syrian refugee crisis. During the election campaign, Trudeau pledged to resettle 25,000 Syrians by the end of February 2016. The latest federal elections of Canada, held on October 19, 2015, replaced Harper with Trudeau as the prime minister of Canada. This was a critical point in Canadian immigration policy because Trudeau and his government have had a different approach to Syrian refugee crisis. After Trudeau assumed office, the number of Syrian refugees admitted in Canada increased sharply. Between November 4, 2016 and January 29, 2017, 40,081 Syrian refugees arrived in Canada (Government of Canada, 2017). During that time, Trudeau’s welcoming approach to immigrants and refugees revived multiculturalism. However, despite the focus on positives of multiculturalism, refugees who fled from violence and could make their way to Canada have met with different reactions.
There are many Canadians who empathize with the refugees and are involved in sponsoring them. However, there is also an increasing backlash against Muslim immigrants. Muslims are seen as a threat to the physical security of Canadians and the cultural differences between the West and the East are seen as being inherent, and hence insurmountable by some groups (Arat-Koc, 2006; Razack, 2008).

According to research done in 2016 by the Angus Reid Institute in collaboration with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 68 percent of Canadians indicated that minorities should do more to fit in with Canadian mainstream. In line with the results of this research, until now, multiculturalism has not been effective in alleviating the growing anti-Muslim discourse. Multiculturalism and its role in the integration of Muslims became an even more pressing question after Syrian refugees arrived in Canada. The cultural conflict between two groups and their perception as a threat to Canadians’ security have highly racialized Muslims. Today, Muslims in general and Syrians in particular are constructed as “other” and seen as not belonging to Canada, even as some Muslims feel that they do. However, this does not change the fact that they are not yet a part of the Canadian society because assimilation is a two-way street. That being said, in the long run, multiculturalism has the potential to be a stepping stone to assimilation of Muslims into Canadian society, albeit if not as equals. This is because they, like other racialized groups in Canada, are able to use multiculturalism as a reason to stay in Canada, a country that promises cultural relativism, and ask for equal participation in Canadian institutions, which is promised by the Multiculturalism Act (Government of Canada, 1988). However, even if assimilation is a possibility, it is going to be a long and challenging process for them as they deviate significantly from the Christian norm of Canada. First, it is essential to remember that it is possible for some groups to keep certain elements of their origin culture and still assimilate into the dominant culture in the 21st century globalized and transnational world. Therefore, ethnic retention and assimilation are no longer mutually exclusive (Glazer, 2004). Second, for assimilation to
occur, the host society does not have to like it but must acknowledge the fact that other groups will nevertheless remain within the same borders.

What this detour into the Muslim question suggests is that otherization and racialization are exceedingly complex questions. For example, Muslims are predominantly ‘white’ or ‘brown’ and yet their exclusion is based upon religious ideology rather than their skin color. As Muslims, they are still perceived as less white than they really are. This situation raises exceptionally intriguing questions regarding the situation of Muslims as dark-whites (albeit qualitatively different from dark-white Portuguese individuals), as well as concerns in relation to the limits of Canadian multiculturalism.
6.5 References


Plaza, D. (2006). The construction of a segmented hybrid identity among one-and-a-half-


Weber, M. (1968). Charisma and the structure of social relations. In S. M. Eisenstadt (Ed.), *Max Weber on charisma and institution building: Selected papers* (pp. 3-
45). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Appendix A: Ethics Approval

Western University Health Science Research Ethics Board
NMREB Delegated Initial Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. Anton Allush
Department & Institution: Social Science/Sociology, Western University

NMREB File Number: 100594
Study Title: The Civic Engagement of Canadian-born Jamaican and Canadian-born Portuguese
Sponsor:

NMREB Initial Approval Date: February 05, 2015
NMREB Expiry Date: February 05, 2016

Documents Approved and/or Received for Information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Version Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>Interview Questions</td>
<td>2014/12/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Business Cards</td>
<td>2014/12/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western University Protocol</td>
<td>class copy, etc.</td>
<td>2015/01/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Items</td>
<td>class copy, etc.</td>
<td>2015/01/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Letter of Information &amp; Consent</td>
<td>class copy, etc.</td>
<td>2015/01/29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) has reviewed and approved the above named study, as of the NMREB Initial Approval Date noted above.

NMREB approval for this study remains valid until the NMREB Expiry Date noted above, conditional to timely submission and acceptance of NMREB Continuing Ethics Review.

The Western University NMREB operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2), the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA, 2004), and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario.

Members of the NMREB who are named as Investigators in research studies do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on such studies when they are presented to the REB.

The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

[Signature]

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.
Appendix B: Email Script for Recruitment

Subject Line: Invitation to participate in research

You are being invited to participate in a study that we, Professor Anton Allahar and Esra Ari are conducting. Briefly, the study involves individual interviews with second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. The purpose of this study is to examine the economic, social and civic integration of the second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. Specifically, this study explores two immigrant groups to Canada with a view to assessing the degree of civic engagement exhibited by each group.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to provide answers to a series of open-ended questions. These questions will be related to your experiences in school, labor market, neighborhood, society at large; formation of your identity; and organizations, association and community services you are engaged.

It is anticipated that the entire interview will take approximately 90-120 minutes. The interview will be conducted at a time and place that is most convenient for you. I am open to meeting anywhere that best accommodates your personal schedule.

If you would like more information on this study or would like to receive a letter of information about this study please contact the researcher at the contact information given below.

Thank you,

Professor Anton Allahar  
Western University,  
Department of Sociology

Esra Ari  
Ph.D. Candidate  
Western University,  
Department of Sociology
Appendix C: Letter of Information

Project Title: The Civic Engagement of Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese

Principal Investigator: Anton Allahar, Professor, Department of Sociology, Western University

Co-investigator: Esra Ari, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, Western University

Letter of Information

1. Invitation to Participate
You are being invited to participate in this research study exploring the civic integration of the Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese because you are a second and third generation Jamaican or Portuguese who has fit the inclusion criteria (see below)

2. Purpose of the Letter
This letter is yours to keep and its purpose is to provide you with information required for you to make an informed decision regarding participation in this research.

3. Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the economic, social and civic integration of the Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese. Specifically, this study explores two second and third generation immigrant groups to Canada with a view to assessing the degree of civic engagement exhibited by each group.

4. Inclusion Criteria
You are eligible in this study if you are: 1) Male or Female 2) English speaking 3) Born in Canada to parents who are Jamaican or Portuguese and/or immigrated from Jamaica or Portugal 4) Resident in Toronto 5) Older than the age of 18.

5. Exclusion Criteria
First generation immigrants or foreign-born immigrants, those outside the two ethnic groups selected, and those younger than 18 are not eligible for participation. Neither are those who do not reside in GTA.
6. **Study Procedures**

If you agree to participate, you will be interviewed about your experiences in school, labor market, neighborhood, society at large; formation of your identity; and any organization, association and community service that you are engaged in. It is anticipated that the entire task will take 90-120 minutes in one session. Interviews will take place at a time and location convenient to you. An individual interview can take place at your home. If you prefer, we can also meet somewhere else of your choice. The interview will be audio-taped and will also be transcribed. If you choose not to be audio-recorded, then the interviewer will take notes. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcript interview, as well as the reports and publications generated from this data. There will be a total of 60 participants in this study.

7. **Possible Risks and Harms**

There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts associated with participating in this study.

8. **Possible Benefits**

You may not directly benefit from participating in this research study. However, this study will make your voice heard about your experiences in school, labour market, society at large and your community involvement. By this way, this research study will enhance public awareness about your experiences in many dimensions. This study has the potential to improve the policies about integration of immigrants, and hence the integration process of future generation immigrants.

9. **Compensation**

You will not be compensated for your participation in this research.

10. **Voluntary Participation**

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on your future.

11. **Confidentiality**

All data collected will remain confidential and accessible only to the investigators of this study. If the results are published, your name will not be used. All information will be either stored in a password protected computer or kept locked/secured in my office at Western University. Your confidentiality will be respected. I will be using pseudonyms in the transcript of the interview, as well as in all reports and other publications generated from the data. Furthermore, the audio tapes will be destroyed upon the completion of the project, and the transcripts will be destroyed after five years. If the results of the study are
published, your name will not be used and no information that discloses your identity and/or helps you be identified will be released or published. If you choose to withdraw from this study, your data will be removed and destroyed from our database.

12. Contacts for Further Information
If you require any further information regarding this research project or your participation in the study you may contact me, Esra Ari (co-investigator), or the Principle Investigator in the Department of Sociology, Professor Anton Allahar. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics.

13. Publication
If the results of the study are published, your name will not be used. If you would like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please contact Esra Ari (co-investigator) or Professor Anton Allahar (principal investigator).

14. Consent
If you agree to participate in this research project and accept the conditions outlined above, please sign the attached consent form and return it back directly to me before the interview.

Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely,
Esra Ari (co-investigator)

This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
Consent Form

Project Title: The Civic Engagement of Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese
Principal Investigator: Anton L. Allahar
Co-investigator: Esra Ari

I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.

Participant’s Name (please print): ___________________________________________
Participant’s Signature: _________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________________________

I agree to have the interview audio-recorded (please initial):
YES _____________________________
NO _____________________________

Person Obtaining Informed Consent (please print): ___________________________
Signature: _____________________________________________________________
Date: _________________________________________________________________
Appendix D: Jamaican-Canadians Flyer

The Civic Engagement of Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese

- Were you born in Canada to parents who are Jamaican and/or immigrated from Jamaica?
- Have you been a resident in Toronto?
- Are you older than the age of 18?

If your answer to the questions above is YES, you may be eligible to take part in a study about the economic, social and civic integration of the second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians living in Toronto.

This study involves individual interviews with second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. The purpose of this study is to examine the economic, social and civic integration of the second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. Specifically, this study explores two immigrant groups to Canada with a view to assessing the degree of civic engagement exhibited by each group.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to provide answers to a series of open-ended questions. These questions will be related to your experiences in school, labor market, neighborhood, society at large; formation of your identity; and any organization, association and community services you are engaged.

It is anticipated that the entire interview will take approximately 90-120 minutes. The interview will be conducted at a time and place that is most convenient for you. I am open to meeting anywhere that best accommodates your personal schedule.

Esra Ari, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, Western University, London, ON N6A 5C2
Appendix E: Portuguese-Canadians Flyer

The Civic Engagement of Canadian-born Jamaicans and Canadian-born Portuguese

- Were you born in Canada to parents who are Portuguese and/or immigrated from Portugal?
- Have you been a resident in Toronto?
- Are you older than the age of 18?

If your answer to the questions above is YES, you may be eligible to take part in a study about the economic, social and civic integration of the second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians living in Toronto.

This study involves individual interviews with second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. The purpose of this study is to examine the economic, social and civic integration of the second and third generation Jamaican-Canadians and Portuguese-Canadians. Specifically, this study explores two second and third generation immigrant groups to Canada with a view to assessing the degree of civic engagement exhibited by each group.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to provide answers to a series of open-ended questions. These questions will be related to your experiences in school, labor market, neighborhood, society at large; formation of your identity; and organizations, association and community services you are engaged.

It is anticipated that the entire interview will take approximately 90-120 minutes. The interview will be conducted at a time and place that is most convenient for you. I am open to meeting anywhere that best accommodates your personal schedule.

Esra Ari, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, Western University, London, ON N6A 5C2
Appendix F: Interview Guide

Demographic Information:
1. How old are you?
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Are you married?
   - Do you have children?

Migration Process and skills and resources of parents
1. Can you tell me why did your parents decide to migrate to Canada?
2. When did your parents arrive to Canada?
3. Did they know English when they came to Canada? Do they know English now?
4. What is the educational background of your parents?
5. What was the occupation of your family in their previous place of residence?
6. What type of work did your parents do when they came to Canada?

Experience of School
1. Can you tell me about your education? What is/was it like?
2. How do/did you like school/university?
   a. What do/did you most like school/university?
   b. What do/did you least like school/university?
3. Were /Are you involved in any of the school/university activities, organizations or clubs? What kind of? And why?
4. How are/were your relations with your teachers?
5. How are/were your relations with other students?
6. Can you tell me a little bit about your school’s social environment?
   a. Where are/were students mostly from? (Immigrant families, recent immigrant families, non-visible minorities, visible minorities, etc.)
   b. Do/Did you have friends from diverse backgrounds? Why, why not?
i. If a person spent time with students from same or similar cultural/national background: What factors make you spent more time with those students?

**Labor Market**

1. Are you currently employed? / Have you ever been employed?
2. Can you tell me about your job searching experiences?
   - Do you think that your ethnic/racial background have an impact on your job search?
3. What kind of work do/did you do?
   - Is your current job in any way different then your previous jobs?
4. How do/did you like it?
   - Can you tell me about your workplace: diversity, how many people, etc.?
5. How is/was your relationships with your boss and people in your workplace?

**Neighborhood and Peer Group**

1. Can you tell me about your neighborhood?
   - Can you describe where you live and what your neighbors are like?
   - Is your current neighbourhood different than where you were grown up in Toronto? If yes, why did you decide to move into this neighbourhood?
2. How do you like your neighborhood?
3. How do you feel when you go to other neighborhoods and downtown in Toronto?
4. Where are your friends mostly from? (School, neighborhood, organizations, etc.)
   - What is your group of friends based on?
   - How do you spend your time with your friends?
**Multiculturalism**

1. How do you feel about living in a multicultural society?
   - How do you define multiculturalism?
2. How do you like the multicultural policies in Canada?
3. How do you feel about being a citizen of Canada? How do you think you are treated as a Canadian citizen in Canada?

**Civic Engagement**

1. Can you tell me about any major problems you face in day-to-day life? What do you do to overcome/negotiate with these problems?
2. What matters most to you?
3. Are you engaged in any organization, association, community services or any kind of group?
   - What are your expectations from engagement in any of these organizations?
   - Can you tell me about your experiences in these places?
4. Have you ever signed a petition? Have you ever participated in a protest or demonstration? Have you ever engaged in letter writing, in boycotts, community organizing, and disseminating information about an issue which disturbs you?
   - What are your expectations from these activities?
   - Can you tell me your experiences about these activities?
Appendix G: Characteristics of Participants (Second-generation Jamaicans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nickname</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>*Education (Highest Level of Education)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sarah</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33 Social worker</td>
<td>College (Early Childhood Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Barbara</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20 Student</td>
<td>College (Nursing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Alaina</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20 Student</td>
<td>College (Nursing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rosa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20 Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Women Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Agnes</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32 Teacher</td>
<td>Masters (Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lily</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20 Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Women Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Liam</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31 Nurse</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Nursing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Alexa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>31 Consultant (Service Canada)</td>
<td>Bachelor's (International Business)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Riley</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>34 Personal Support Worker</td>
<td>College (Personal Support Worker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Allison</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 Finance Analyst (Government of Canada)</td>
<td>Bachelor's (International Communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Emma</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23 Student</td>
<td>College (Nursing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>41 Social worker</td>
<td>College (Child and Youth Program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Abigail</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22 Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Sociology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mia</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>- Court Worker (Part-time)</td>
<td>College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jen</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>39 Consultant (Government of Canada)</td>
<td>Master's (Business and Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Brianna</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40 Teacher</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sandra</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18 Student</td>
<td>College (Music)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kevin</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25 Student</td>
<td>Master's (Urban Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Isaac</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31 Social worker</td>
<td>Master's (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25 Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Liberal Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25 Student</td>
<td>Ontario College of Art and Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Matthew</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>34 Social worker</td>
<td>Master's (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Harol</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>24 Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Law)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If research participant is a student, education applies; if research participant has an occupation, highest level of education applies.
Appendix H: Characteristics of Participants (Second-generation Portuguese)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nickname</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>*Education (Highest Level of Education)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Zoey</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>College (Early Childhood Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Liam</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (French Language and Literature and Diaspora and Transnational Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Siobhan</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Student Life Coordinator</td>
<td>Master's (Higher Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nancy</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Master's (Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Summer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Legal Assistant</td>
<td>College (Legal Assistant Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ethel</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Nursing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mia</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Linguistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Charlotte</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Linguistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mary</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Liberal Arts and Professional Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Ava</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Telemarketer (Part-time)</td>
<td>College (Real Estate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Donna</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Secretary (Part-time)</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Social Work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Natalie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Art)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Tom</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Construction Worker</td>
<td>High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Piper</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Master's (Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Adam</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Welder</td>
<td>Some college (Hotel and Restaurant Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jacob</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Part-time student supervisor</td>
<td>College (Early Childhood Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jim</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Financial Analyst</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Business and Economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Luke</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Bachelor's (Civil Engineering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sam</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Self-employed (Small business)</td>
<td>High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aaron</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Teacher's College Bachelor's (History and Geography)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If research participant is a student, education applies; if research participant has an occupation, highest level of education applies.
Curriculum Vitae

ESRA ARI

EDUCATION

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology & Migration and Ethnic Relations September 2011-
Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

- Specialization: racialization, multiculturalism, immigration, development, second-
generations, integration, assimilation, identity construction
- Comprehensive Examinations: Social Inequality and Migration and Ethnic Relations.

Master of Science (M.S.) in Sociology September 2007-August 2010
Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

- Thesis: Educational Perception of the Internally Displaced Families’ Children: Evidence from Izmir and Diyarbakir
- Specialization: ethnic relations, internally displaced people, internal migration, education, child labor

Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in International Relations September 2001-June 2005
Department of International Relations, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Introductory Sociology, Racialization, Minorities and Diversity, Migration, Globalization,
Development, Social Inequality, Sociology of Work.

MANUSCRIPTS


BOOK CHAPTERS

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Minority Groups (SOC 2143)</th>
<th>Fall 2017-Winter 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Sociology of Work (SOC 2145)</th>
<th>Fall 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Minority Groups (SOC 2143)</th>
<th>Fall 2016-Winter 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Sociology of Work (SOC 2145)</th>
<th>Fall 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Social Inequality (SOC 2239)</th>
<th>Fall 2015-Winter 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Instructor for Current Issues in Stratification (SOC 3347F)</th>
<th>Fall 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guest Lecturer for Research Methods (SOC 2206)</th>
<th>Winter 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guest Lecturer for Society and You (SOC 1025)</th>
<th>April 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guest Lecturer for Social Inequality (SOC 2239)</th>
<th>February 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching Assistant</th>
<th>Fall 2011-Winter 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Introduction to Sociology (SOC 1021e), Sociology of Law (SOC 2260B), Life is not Always Fair (SOC 1027), Society and You (SOC 1025), Social Inequality (SOC 2239), Work and Policy in an Aging Society (SOC 3315)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching Assistant</th>
<th>Fall 2012- Winter 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology, King’s University College, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Introduction to Sociology (SOC 1020), Survey of Sociological Theory (SOC 2240)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching Assistant for Indigenous Services</th>
<th>Fall 2011-Winter 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS


PANELS

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Researcher
January 2015-present
Doctoral Field Research, Toronto, ON.
Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Research Apprenticeship
2013-August 2013
Regulating Professions in Canada, London, ON
Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Researcher
February 2009-June 2010
MA Field Research, Izmir and Diyarbakir, Turkey
Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

Social Science Researcher
February 2009-June 2010
Project Title: Child Poverty in Turkey: Cases of Izmir and Diyarbakir, Izmir and Diyarbakir, Turkey
Development Workshop, Ankara, Turkey

Field Staff
April 2009
Project Title: Crime Repression Cots in Turkey, Ankara, Turkey
Sixth Framework Program of the European Union and Department of Sociology, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey

Field Staff
May 2008
Project Title: Forests and the Protection of its Scarce Plants and their Sustainable Usage, Kars and Ardahan, Turkey
Field Staff
Project Title: The Attitudes towards Marriage, Istanbul and Samsun, Turkey
General Directorate of Family and Social Research, Ankara, Turkey and Department of Sociology, Balikesir University, Balikesir, Turkey

Field Staff
Project Title: Socio-economic and Cultural Positions of Fishing Communities in Turkey and Scenarios towards Future within the context of European Union Adaptation Policies, Trabzon, Turkey
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

HONORS and AWARDS
International Doctoral Scholarship ($27,000 per year) 2011-2015
The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Out of Province Bursary ($500) March 2014
Society of Graduate Students, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Out of Province Bursary ($500) December 2013
Society of Graduate Students, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Research Awards
Graduate Thesis Research Award ($750) April 2015
Faculty of Social Science, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Program Funding for Thesis Research ($600) February 2015
Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Research Award ($5000) February 2009
Middle East Technical University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Center, Ankara, Turkey

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
- Canadian Ethnic Studies January 2018-present
- International Sociological Association October 2017-present
- Society for the Study of Social Problems January 2015-present
- American Sociological Association January 2015 -present
- Lusophone Studies Association June 2015 -present
• Canadian Sociological Association  
  November 2012–present
• International Studies Association  
  October 2013–January 2014

CERTIFICATES/ SEMINARS/ ORGANIZATION
Certificate in University Teaching and Learning  
  May 2017
  Teaching Support Center, The University of Western Ontario, London, ON.

Writing Workshops  
  January 2016–March 2016
  Writing Support Center, The University of Western Ontario, London, ON

MEMBERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
Member, Employment Equity Committee  
  January 2018
  King’s University College, London, Canada

Executive Member, Public Sociology @ Western  
  September 2013–2017
  Department of Sociology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

Co-Partner, Development Workshop  
  2008–present
  Development Workshop Science, Culture, Training, Research, Implementation, Production and Enterprise Cooperative, Ankara, Turkey

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE
Community Champion  
  January 2017–March 2017
  City of London, London, ON, Canada

Researcher, Client Support Services  
  September 2014–June 2015
  Cross Cultural Learner Center (CCLC), London, ON Canada

Volunteer, Career Services  
  July 2014–May 2015
  Youth Opportunities Unlimited (YOU), London, Canada

Member, Education Sub-Council  
  December 2012–February 2015
  London & Middlesex Local Immigration (LMLIP) Council, London, Canada

LANGUAGE SKILLS
• Turkish - native level of competence
• English - advanced level of competence