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The rise and fall of philosophy of education: An institutional analysis

Andrew D. Colgan
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Derek J. Allison
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in Education

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Abstract:

Philosophy of education’s academic literature portrays the field as being in decline over the past half century, especially in the once preeminent citadel of initial teacher preparation programs. This decline prompts the broad problem of the proper place of philosophy in teacher preparation. I therefore set out to explain why (in part) this decline has occurred in the English language field by connecting, from the 19th century to the present, primarily in the United States and Britain, but also Canada, two histories: (1) the origins and development of the field of philosophy of education itself, and (2) the institutional history of teacher preparation programs, tracing each from their origins in normal schools and summer seminars, to modern faculties of education. The comparative historical analysis is supplemented by a case study of a particular faculty of education, the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education, London, Ontario, Canada, using data obtained from interviews with retired faculty members, especially philosophers of education, and examinations of founding documents and course calendars. The theoretical framework selected to analyze the case study and histories was institutional organizational theory, which pays attention to how institutions develop and change in response to environmental conditions. This theory uses a tripartite model of institutions, identifying a “technical core,” where its products are made, administered by a “managerial level,” which coordinates action and diplomatically softens demands made by the wider environment, the “institutional level.” A case is made that philosophy of education, once securely established in the technical core of teacher preparation, has declined as teacher education programs became more institutionalized within the contexts of the rise of the scientific research university and an increasingly bureaucratic public education system, both, in part, favoring graduate programs as the new dominant technical core of teacher education institutions. The consequences of this decline are discussed, identifying implications and a solution for teacher education, its institutions, and teacher professionalism. I conclude that the loss of philosophy in teacher education institutions is one indicator of a trend toward an increasingly institutionalized, illiberal and technical teacher training.

Keywords: philosophy of education, teacher education, institutional organizational theory, organizational theory, teacher education curriculum, teacher professionalism, history of teacher education, Althouse College of Education.
Epigraph

[Those] who are not interested in philosophy need it most urgently: they are most helplessly in its power . . . [They] absorb its principles from the cultural atmosphere around them—from schools, colleges, books, magazines, newspapers, movies, television, etc. Who sets the tone of a culture? A small handful of men: the philosophers. Others follow their lead, either by conviction or by default.

Acknowledgements:

I must begin with my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Derek Allison who agreed to take on this supervisory role even with his retirement in present view! He has tirelessly reviewed my drafts, sometimes second drafts, and has played such a positive role in this whole process. It was very evident to me early on that Dr. Allison was a great mentor and a person who supported my ideas yet could suggest alternatives which guided me to areas that broadened my horizon and the depth of my research. I appreciate the time he set aside for me to meet on many occasions, and his expertise on many fronts introduced me to new thinkers and works, fueling our discussions not only on the dissertation but also on wider issues in public schooling. I will carry his intellectual guidance with me for years to come. Many thanks!

Thank you to the reviewers of the manuscript of this work: Dr. Margaret McNay, Dr. Michael Murphy, and Dr. Jerry Paquette. Thank you also to Patsy Allison for comments on the first draft of the case study. All of the comments and insights were extremely helpful in getting the manuscript polished and prepared.

Thank you to the participants of the research—the many retired faculty members and others who supported my work with their statements which fill this dissertation. It was a joy to hear the stories from just over a half century of history of what was then known as the Althouse College of Education. Due to these contributions, part of the history of this institution may now be found in print.

There are a number of people who have helped me develop my skills as an instructor while a doctoral student that I wish to acknowledge and thank.

When teaching Social Foundations, Pat Moore guided my instruction of teacher education students. Our conversations in preparation for class about professionalism, the duty to students above all else—treating policy as a guide, never an absolute—and the courage needed to dissent from policy when it fails students, was invaluable.

Thank you to Dr. Chris Viger of the philosophy department at Western University who agreed to provide private seminars in philosophy of education when no such coursework existed
at the university. These meetings were essential to the design of a philosophy of education elective course I offered to B.Ed. students at the Faculty in 2014 and 2015.

This course, Developing Your Philosophy of Education, could not have been possible without the support of Dr. Margaret McNay, associate dean of the Faculty of Education. It brought an explicit philosophy course back to the students, at least for a time, and gave me invaluable experience with students and teaching philosophy of education. Thank you, Dr. McNay.

Thank you to those who helped me with the resources for building this dissertation. This included the education library staff at the Faculty, who quickly learned my name by my peculiarly frequent requests for philosophy of education books, most of which came from Library Storage due to their disuse, or had to be sent for from abroad. My thanks are also due to Irene Birrell of the University Secretariat who located and scanned many University Senate Minutes pertaining to the founding and institutional changes of the Faculty.

Special thanks are due to my family and friends who supported my efforts. The intellectual discussions, satiating food, and emotional support fuelled the endurance needed to complete this book-length work.

All of you have aided my development as an academic, an instructor, and a researcher, I thank you for your time, patience and advice over the years of this project.
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List of Abbreviations, Citation Style, and Pronouns

Abbreviations

A number of recurring publishers have been abbreviated as follows:

TCP = Teachers College Press

UCP = University of Chicago Press

OUP = Oxford University Press

UTP = University of Toronto Press

A number of recurring journals have been abbreviated as follows:

TCR = Teachers College Record

HER = Harvard Educational Review

EP&T = Educational Philosophy and Theory

JOPE = Journal of Philosophy of Education

CJE = Canadian Journal of Education

Citation Style

This document uses footnotes, at the preference of the author, in the Harvard Reference citation style. Footnote numbering is reset for each chapter. All citations are cited once in full in the footnote, and any further reference is written as “author-date, op. cit.” or ibid. A full listing of all references can be found in the bibliography section.

English Pronouns

Regarding singular third-person pronouns, for convenience I follow the (Charles A.) Murray Principle: unless there is a good reason not to, use the gender pronoun of the first author.
Chapter 1
Problem and Theoretical Framework

Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions . . . they undermine the will to power, they level mountain and valley, and call that morality; they make men small, cowardly and hedonistic . . . [they foster] herd animalization. These same institutions produce quite different effects while they are still being fought for; then they really promote freedom in a powerful way. ~ Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

In the spring of 2012, I was alerted by a colleague to a panel discussion at the annual Canadian Society for the Study of Education (CSSE) conference entitled “The Fate of the Philosophy of Education.” The doomsday title piqued my interest. I had assumed philosophy had remained a healthy pillar of initial teacher preparation programs (ITPPs) but was surprised to learn it had been experiencing a long decline. A subsequent literature search found references to this decline from as early as the 1950s, with no shortage of ongoing discussion. The CSSE 2012 panel also led me to find that my own Faculty of Education at Western University—as well as others across Canada—now teach a sliver of philosophy as a part of a larger “Social Foundations” course (0.75 course equivalent at Western) within which philosophy bunks with sociology, law, history, and administration. In Western’s case, the time allotted for direct instruction in philosophy had been rationed to a fifth of three quarters (about a seventh) of the time I received in my own ITPP at D’Youville College, Buffalo, in the United States in 2007. This fact particularly hit home as I had assumed teachers in Ontario received a program similar to my own, with an explicit philosophy component as a framework for practising the profession of teaching. This finding led me to question what pre-service teachers could reasonably expect to

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2 The panel, chaired by David Waddington, included Sandra Bruneau, who presented a paper on “A retrospective look at a recent generation of philosophers of education in Canada” and Bruce Maxwell, who presented a paper on “How teacher training could save the life of educational philosophy.” The conference was held in Waterloo, Canada.
4 It may be of interest to note that my teacher education resulted in both a New York State and Ontario teaching certificate. When the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT) received my request for certification, they must have been satisfied that the half-course in philosophy of education was an adequate substitute for the widespread “Social Foundations” courses in Ontario.
receive from their ITPP: what kinds of experiences, both academic and in practicum, are necessary? And, more specifically, what is the place of philosophy in ITPPs and how and why does this appear to have changed over time?

The philosophy of education course I had experienced as part of my ITPP included many discussions of philosophical issues in education, with students often being asked to adopt and argue for different perspectives. The perspectives presented in the course were framed in the typical “isms” approach of philosophy of education: realism, idealism, pragmatism, existentialism, as well as non-traditional positions such as Eastern mysticism (Buddhism). The encompassing idea was that these various approaches toward or assumptions about educational thinking framed or at least narrowed one’s educational conclusions; coherent practice demanded this philosophical awareness. For example, if one accepted that children learn best by experience, by doing and working out answers for themselves (pragmatism), then a teacher was obligated to refrain from lectures and rely on projects and demonstrations with hands-on components. Or, if one accepted that the aim of education was to set children on a path of salvation leading to a good and just religious life, a teacher was obligated to indoctrinate appropriate canons, instruct in moral education, reprimand deviance, and so forth.

The two main aims of this kind of philosophy of education course are usually understood as being to (1) develop a foundational worldview and philosophical position on metaphysics (e.g., what is man and his purpose) and epistemology (e.g., what is knowledge? Are we born with knowledge?); and (2) from these metaphysical and epistemological positions, derive ethical positions from which to justify our method of education, particularly in light of values and aims.5 The time spent on this material was believed to encourage contemplation and reflection of the act and aims of teaching, one’s personal stance on issues in education and how they permeate one’s practice, and encourage the beginning of an integration of the daily routines of teaching into a larger vision of the educational process. Another intention of learning about these perspectives is to provide awareness of the multiplicity of education philosophies operating in education, as represented, for example, in diverse views of parents, teachers, principals, schools, and Ministry policies. To understand the inherent philosophy of an idea is to understand its root: its source, assumptions, and structure, and if this root can be disputed, the idea itself can be disputed. Fear

5 The grounding of philosophy of education into traditional branches of philosophy is disputed by some philosophers. For an example, see Hook, S. 1956. The scope of philosophy of education. HER, 26(2), 145–148.
of the absence of this awakening and individually empowering content is, as John Dewey remarked, a “conservatism of practice” where practice and already established operations of practice capture the autonomy and stultify the growth of beginning teachers.\(^6\)

My initial exploration of the literature led me to suspect that the value of this kind of reflection and “pause”\(^7\) in the study of education for beginning teachers seemed to have been discontinued, in Canada at least. A question that began to emerge was whether this discontinuance of explicit philosophy for teacher candidates was a result of the longstanding “practical” bias typical of professional programs such as teaching, or whether the underlying cause of the decline of philosophy was more ominous, insidious, and systematic, sourced in the very institutions in which philosophy of education was supposed to flourish. Table 1 below will serve to forecast the bleak journey on which I was about to embark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Selected Philosophy of Education publications discussing decline(^8)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adler</td>
<td>1942 In defense of philosophy of education(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broudy</td>
<td>1955 How philosophical can philosophy of education be?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodring</td>
<td>1958 The decline of educational philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucas</td>
<td>1971 The demise of educational philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene</td>
<td>1976 Challenging mystification: Educational foundations in dark times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>1980 Philosophy and education: Retrospect and prospect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlyn</td>
<td>1985 Need philosophy of education be so dreary?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1987 The medical condition of philosophy of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>1988 What philosophy can do for education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirotnik</td>
<td>1990 On the eroding foundations of teacher education</td>
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</table>

\(^6\) This occupational condition alone may result in whether teachers operate as blue-collar workers or white-collar professionals—solidarity or autonomous growth-seeking. For example, Buchmann and Floden argue that teacher unions are “organized according to a blue-collar model.” Buchmann, M. & Floden, R. E. 1990. On doing philosophy of teacher education. *Oxford Review of Education, 16*(3), 343–366. Quote from p. 352.


\(^8\) All of the publications listed here are referenced in this dissertation and full citations can be found in the bibliography.

\(^9\) This article was defending a monolithic approach to philosophy of education, meaning there are common, agreed-upon truths which all philosophers ought to accept in order to form a field, rather than a pluralistic approach which Adler thought would discount philosophy of education. This approach would later be the strategy of analytical philosophy of education which dominated for a time in the UK.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McCann &amp; Yaxley</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Retaining the philosophy of education in teacher education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muir</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The evolution of philosophy of education within educational studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arcilla</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Why aren’t philosophers and educators speaking to each other?</td>
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<td>Burbules</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The dilemma of philosophy of education: “Relevance” or critique?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The rise and fall of ED200F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bai et al</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>OISE’s History and Philosophy of Education program may be axed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinchloe and Hewitt</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Regenerating the philosophy of education (Anthology)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theobald &amp; Tanabe</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>“It’s just the way things are:” The lamentable erosion of philosophy in teacher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffiths</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Re-thinking the relevance of philosophy of education for educational policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kline</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Toward a post-institutional philosophy of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolantonio</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The uselessness of philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smeyers et al</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Publish yet perish: On the pitfalls of philosophy of education in an age of impact factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Problem**

As Counts pointed out, education is reflective of a particular group at a particular time in history; it is contextual.\(^\text{12}\) For Plato, “man belonged to the state, and education was to mould him to its service and survival.”\(^\text{13}\) Likewise, “Aristotle . . . glorif[ied] the Spartans for making education ‘the business of the state.’ ‘The citizen,’ he said, ‘should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives . . . if the laws are democratic, democratically, or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical.”\(^\text{14}\) The appropriate proportion (and purpose) of

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\(^{10}\) ED200F was the Education Foundations course at Teachers College at Columbia, where it was first created.

\(^{11}\) This book contains 18 chapters and 2 appendices on the decline of philosophy of education and suggestions for its revival.


\(^{14}\) Ibid, p. 15.
philosophy in any education enterprise is also contextual and can be reasonably expected to depend on the conditions of society and the nature of its people. A totalitarian state, to maintain its hegemony, would be required to control to the utmost the inculcation of a single and total philosophy within and across its entire ITPP. This is because the aim of education in such a context would be to indoctrinate the young to support the regime, with the teachers as overt and compliant agents of the state. Note the mono-philosophy permeating such a program might be espoused—and even formally, if emptily, criticized—in a specialized “philosophy of education” course, or might be simply assumed and promoted as an implicit framework throughout all courses in the design and delivery of the program.

In our present situation, as conscious, tragic, fallible, mortal human beings living in more or less open and democratic states, we arrive at a different case. Given democracies grant political power to all citizens—both in the form of electing local representatives, and in the potential for the public to create sufficient public interest and scrutiny to unseat an elected government official or promote interest in a new issue or idea—its sustainability depending on the education of the individual citizen, led Rorty to conclude that philosophy is nowhere more important. Without educated voters, democracy can only be an illusion, with elections devolving to contests of popularity and charisma. For a populace to be willing to maintain democracy requires preparing new voters in an awareness of what it means to wield political power. This would ideally take the form of open discussions about political philosophy, sustaining conversation and debate regarding relationships between man and the state, encouraging participants to actively engage political proposals and their advocates such that every time a politician speaks, a debate in the mind emerges, deconstructing premises in the arguments espoused, and the like. If we accept that democracy hinges on a philosophically-minded populace, resting on ample education of the young, what may this suggest for teachers and thus, teacher preparation?

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Statement of Problem

The fundamental problem is the appropriate place and contribution of philosophy in the teaching of teachers. While this very important problem clamours for and deserves treatment, it was considered to be beyond the realistic scope of a dissertation. On reflection, the essential issue is the assumption or the arrogation of implicit neutrality toward philosophy of education in teacher preparation institutions. What seemed most pressing as I began this work was to seek an understanding of the decline of philosophy of education by way of:

How philosophy of education as part of teacher preparation has changed over time, why it changed, and the consequences going forward.

The problem seeks to understand a possible mechanism behind the changing nature of teacher preparation and its institutions in the wider political, economic and social forces of their eras, and how this changing “survival environment” impacted philosophy of education in its attempts to adapt. Central to the problem is to explain the relationship between philosophy, teacher preparation and its institutions.

Treating philosophy of education as an academic subject was necessary to apply focus, specificity and adequate disclosure of the boundaries of this inquiry. There are a variety of physical and conceptual entities one could enlist as providing evidence of—or at least accounts of—the state of philosophy of education, including: (1) living people who label themselves philosophers of education; (2) the explicitness of ideas and thoughts typically labelled philosophical that are applied to education, past and present, including their use by teachers and others in their educational practice; (3) conferences, academic journals, and books which store and display work; (4) the work itself, including the content of activities such as teaching, writing, and speaking engagements; (5) university and college courses in, about, or which contain philosophy of education; (6) faculty positions in universities or other educational institutions; (7) professional organizations; (8) the belief (or perception) that the field exists; (9) other documents which reference philosophy of education but are not considered work of the field, including accreditation standards of ITTPs, or university standards for appointments and promotion. Each of these foci promises insights into philosophy of education’s existence, including its nature, identity, function, origin, organization, and development, each thread creating different but not unrelated time lines of prominence (and despair) for the field. The analysis I have undertaken
focusses the inquiry through the historical and current threads of the most concrete of the above list—philosophy of education’s institutional assets—namely (3), (5), (6), and (7), including (1) in the case study of the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education in Ontario, Canada.

Thus the study became about philosophy of education’s institutional existence, that is, its reified existence in documents, faculty positions, etc., as the main target, but I could not alienate, still less ignore, other sources of insight and understandings of the nature and state of philosophy of education, especially in describing the conditions from which philosophy of education emerged before entering the teacher education enterprise with an explicit existence in the form of dedicated faculty and coursework, giving birth to the field as such.

Even the idea of “decline” regularly described in the philosophy of education literature is an open question, for what exactly is in decline? As is usually argued by philosophers, teacher education cannot be alienated from philosophical discussions because values and ethics are unavoidable topics. Thus, philosophy in ITPPs cannot be destroyed, it must be hidden, or implicit (in all coursework, likely without an expert interpreter). But to be hidden, it once must have been explicit (or institutionalized). Tracking the process is an important part of this study as an institutional existence means those who construct coursework or standards see it as important, that it is worthy of mention, of academic merit, and of being separately treated in ITPPs by an expert.

Likewise, the demand for experts creates programs to produce them, and the growing population collects to solidify a field, fortifying their institutional existence. Examining the establishment of philosophy of education as a university subject—its rise—would help explain its eventual fall or “decline,” which may be attributed to its modern implicit institutional “existence” in most ITPPs. In this state philosophy becomes hidden in unquestioned prejudices, disorganized slogans, and competing ideas the students receive from diverse instructors and courses, “straightened” by ethical prescriptions delivered in professional courses advised by external organizations which accredit the ITPPs, namely the teacher associations and state authorities. Education research is also theoretically impacted when philosophers of education are no longer available to education colleagues in a faculty of education, thus providing an explanation for what happened to philosophy of education in ITPPs may have wider

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16 As state accreditation began setting standards for teacher education, what the standards named and did not name began constituting teacher education programs. Furthermore, once the broad term “foundations” began being named, its constitutive subjects would suffer in expert faculty, replaced by an expert in one constitutive subject to cover it all. In this contest, philosophy suffered again being less scientific and research savvy than other education fields.
consequences for graduate programs and education research, but these latter areas are not the focus of this study.

Methodology

This section will stake out the plan to tackle the research problem. This includes declaring the material to be researched, the time periods and geography appropriate to tackle the problem, and the theoretical frame which will analyze the data. A case study is also planned of my own Faculty of Education to test the wider account and examine a detailed case of how philosophy fared in one institution, and how that institution changed over time.

Each subsequent chapter covers an era of time unearthed through academic literature in the history of education, describing the status of teacher preparation institutions as the “survival environment” of philosophy of education as found in teacher preparation. This is informed by such things as state accreditation requirements of teacher preparation, the status of the study of education as a research field, and other conditions. Referring to literature in the history of philosophy of education reveals the conditions of philosophy in each of these eras, including the sources of teacher preparation curriculum, examining the accounts of literature published in each era for their view of the purpose of the incorporation of philosophy in ITPPs of that era, and the like. Of particular interest are the conditions of which philosophy fared most positively, and what conditions changed to threaten its survival and trigger its adaptation. Overall, primary and secondary sources in the history of teacher education literature and of philosophy of education will provide most of the context and data that will later be analyzed through the theoretical frame, which will be described shortly.

The time period chosen for the study must begin in the 19th century to observe the role of philosophy in schools and teacher preparation prior to their institutionalization. A hundred years of time was believed to be a sufficient slice of historical data of both teacher preparation and its institutions, and philosophy of education, for the study. Thus, the main body text ends approximately in the 1970s, but continuing the analysis from this point into the present era is found in Appendix 2. For example, Chapter 2 describes the conditions of 19th century teacher preparation, while the rest of this dissertation is directed to the 20th century, describing the introduction, stabilization and subsequent decline of philosophy of education as a university subject.
In order to shed light on the decline, I decided it was paramount to consider the English language field in North America and Britain, with some reference to Australasia as appeared appropriate, complementing this general case with a specific and local case in Canada—that being the case of philosophy of education’s rise and fall in my own Faculty of Education. I believed choosing this large geographical area and surveying the conditions of philosophy of education in these areas—a broad study with the drawbacks of generalization—was necessary and required to be able to grasp the problem of the decline of philosophy of education as a whole and to be reasonably armed with the context of knowledge required to provide insights and a solution to the problem.

For example, more detail could have been obtained in choosing a narrow study of the philosophy of education in ITPPs only in Canada, or even in Ontario, but this approach would not have lent insight into the conditions of philosophy of education in the diverse and more research intense areas of Britain or the United States, especially since these nations impact Canada to a much greater extent than Canada impacts them. In addition, since the decline appeared to be similar across these nations, a wider net was deemed advantageous at the cost of specificity. I also considered having the case study of my own Faculty as the focus of the dissertation, how philosophy of education fared in one institution, but again it is possible that the peculiar reasons for decline of philosophy in one institution could become the focus, and while interesting, would be less useful toward understanding the wider problem of decline of philosophy of education across institutions and across nations. Due to this reasoning, the general case of the decline of the field became the focus, complemented by a detailed case study, in order to differentiate and identify the causes of decline shared by both the wider world and the single case, and those peculiar to the case. Therefore, and somewhat uncommon to research in the 21st century, for this research project I chose to side with the general over the narrow due to the needs of the research problem chosen.

Choosing my own Faculty of Education made acquiring data highly convenient (although there were difficulties obtaining it, and some important data was unavailable), but the main reason for choosing this institution—in fact, it was part of the reason for embarking on this project—was due to the institution’s history being an excellent “case” in the decline of philosophy. Offering its first secondary teacher training programs in 1965 and requiring a course in philosophy put on by a department of philosophers, and through multiple transitions, by the
turn of the 21st century philosophy courses and faculty had almost vanished completely. Due to this rapid decline, it seemed my Faculty was an excellent case since it followed the general trend of decline, and the events that led to the loss of philosophy’s institutional assets at my Faculty in under a half century would be extremely interesting to the wider field, especially if it was found to be not an atypical story. Putting together data for the case would include interviews with retired philosophy faculty and others, as well as browsing university calendars for course and faculty lists. Combining these two data sets enabled me to describe the conditions at my Faculty for philosophy and its ITPP, from its establishment, through its transitions, and into the present day, and put it into the context of the wider evolution of teaching and thus teacher preparation. More details on the design of this case study can be found in Chapter 5.

Overall, to contribute to an understanding of the decline and provide solutions to the problem, the host of philosophy of education is an important target for study, but to understand this host, the institutions of teacher preparation, it was necessary to explore how these institutions also change due to world and national events. In other words, it was judged necessary to maintain the same scale for the study as appeared the scale of the problem.

In selecting an appropriate theory that examines the changing nature of institutions, I decided to frame the inquiry within the institutional school of organizational theory within which I view philosophy of education as an institutional progeny dependent on its host organizations—Faculties of Education—for its existence in ITPPs. This relationship is what I hypothesize to be a considerable force explaining the changing institutional status of philosophy of education during the 20th century. The apparent rise of philosophy of education in the first half of the 20th century and its subsequent fall in the last half offers an intriguing correlation with the changing organizational structure of ITPPs in North America. These changing structures have altered the various power and interest groups that influence ITPPs, including philosophy of education itself which, in its changing forms, has always resided therein. I investigated parallels within these two inseparable histories—that is philosophy of education and teacher education—starting with their roots in pedagogy, which was the form of teacher education in the 19th century. I continued into the 20th century, treating philosophy of education as an academic

subject, drawing on its literature to track its primordial phase as academic philosophy (including apparent reasons for its insertion into ITPPs), its adoption into the academic subject area known as philosophy of education, and its subsequent decline.

Approach to Inquiry – Institutional Organizational Analysis

I chose to investigate the dynamic status of the academic subject area of philosophy of education within the evolving context of ITPPs through the theoretical framework offered by institutional organizational theory (IOT). This has been characterized by Scott18 as a “natural systems” theory of formal organizations founded by the work of Selznick19 and complemented by that of Perrow.20 An integral component of IOT is the use of case studies of empirical instances21 not only to anchor theoretical claims in real-world events and generate and treat data for analysis, but also to explore how individual cases manifest unique aspects and accommodations within broader theoretical claims. Perrow has characterized aspects of this approach as providing an “exposé” aspect that searches the “myriad subterranean processes of informal groups, conflicts between groups, . . . dependencies on outside groups and constituencies, . . . local community power structure, and legal institutions”22 that influence and direct organizational behaviour.

A classic example of this phenomenon is the Tennessee Valley Authority.23 Originally chartered in 1933 for both local and national purposes, the TVA was intended to modernize farming in the area, preserve forestation, help with local recreation development, institute flood control, improve navigation and, secondarily, promote power generation at the national level.24 In many ways the TVA was a contemporary masterpiece of rational planning and design, yet Selznick described and documented how local interests infiltrated the organization, subverting local goals via a process of “co-optation,” and how this and national pressures eventually made its national goals the primary focus. As a result, power generation became an increasingly

22 Perrow, 1986, op. cit., p. 159.
preeminent task of the TVA, eventually instigating U.S. Supreme Court hearings. Viewed through IOT, this co-optation process ensured “institutional survival” through goal displacement, protecting local employment and other interests which, in essence, constituted the technical core of the organization.

The case study used institutional analysis of the TVA. This analysis pays particular attention to the effects of “normative pressures”25 as well as regulative (coercive) and cognitive effects26 found either internally or externally to the organization—or type of organization—under study. These pressures are viewed as encouraging responses from organizational decision-makers and other actors who seek to maintain the organization’s internal stability through the adoption and perpetuation of standards, practices and policies that are justified through various claims to legitimation. In a common case, new or modified externally imposed rules arise which require changes in the “technical core” of an established organization or type of organization, or even the formation of new organizations or sub-organizations. Decisions are taken in the organizations in question to comply with the new requirements, but internal adaptations typically occur which serve to perpetuate previously established practices, especially those embedded in the technical core which is viewed by participants as defining and legitimating the organization’s—and to a variable degree, their own—purpose and identity.27 Particularly in Perrow and Selznick’s brand of institutional theory, state control is linked to the apparently inevitable—but unintended—institutionalization of dysfunctional processes in organizations. From the perspectives of external regulators, publics and clients, these processes are typically seen as impeding an organization’s pursuit of its intended task performance as it conforms and adapts to newly imposed external rules and circumstances (as it must), limiting the organization’s decision-makers’ boundaries of discretion. As task performance (action) is undermined by external pressures on structure, one theoretical consequence is a process of “decoupling” in which prescribed (rule-bound) actions of members of the organization begin to correlate less and less directly with the intended results of their actions.28 As these effects build, the continued existence of an organization becomes threatened because of lower task

performance, initiating “survival” measures. This can lead to a process of isomorphism in which decision makers seek more rapid ways of “matching” environmental demands, resulting in further declines in task performance as greater priority is accorded to responding to external demands and pressures. In a sense, governance begins to shift from being internally constituted to being externally driven—the internal demoted to carrying out the orders of the external.

Returning to the thesis subject, the initiation of teacher training into colleges and universities represented a major shift in external control and an expansion of the interests involved in ITPPs. Clark and Marker writing in the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) 74th Yearbook pointed to the “reluctan[ce]” of universities to accept the task of teacher education, especially as a public “service.” This move from semi-independent colleges to Faculties made changes to the governance of ITPPs through new external rules and changes to teacher qualifications (especially the requirement of a Bachelor’s degree recognized by the host university), more academic university staffing, course development (approved by host university senates), and creation and control of budgets by university authorities. Each one of these carried the threat of extensive challenge and change to established activities, including challenges to beliefs and values that had constituted the established technical core of ITPPs, both in their classrooms and practicum placements where candidate teachers interacted directly with school teachers and their students. Viewed through the lens of IOT, these challenges can be seen as triggering cycles of adaptation and institutionalized responses such as goal displacement, decoupling and associated reductions in task performance as discussed in the literature.

Talcott Parsons’ typology of organizations provides a structural framework for the dynamic processes considered by IOT. His three level typology of organization structure is described as follows: the technical level constitutes the core and most inner level; the

29 Scott, 2008, op. cit.
31 This idea is related to concerns over our own Ontario College of Teachers that prompted the subsequent LeSage Report in 2012. The Report recommended new governance over the discipline of teachers away from the teachers’ unions and into the hands of the OCT. In part, the failure to successfully alter this governance, especially in usurping power from the unions to the ministry level, led to the collapse of the British Columbia College of Teachers in 2011. See Glegg, A. 2013. The British Columbia College of Teachers: An obituary. Historical Studies in Education, 25(2), 45-64.
institutional level resides furthest from the core and is most vulnerable to external influence; and mediating between the institutional level and the core is the managerial level which attempts to satisfy influences from the institutional level with minimal disturbance to the technical level. The technical core (or level or system) is considered to give an organization its identity and reason for existing and surviving.\(^{35}\) All members of an organization have an interest in protecting the core from disturbances, although the managerial level has the “greatest stake.”\(^{36}\)

As an example, a typical Faculty of Education in Ontario contains the following “forces” in its institutional level: accreditation standards as currently imposed and administered by the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT),\(^{37}\) “internal” university program standards established and applied through Senate and administration policies and decisions, Ministry of Education funding, and policy demands of various public interest groups. Each generates pressures for change within and in how a Faculty of Education performs its activities, all these forces interacting to “determine its domain, establish its boundaries, and secure its legitimacy.”\(^{38}\) As applied to an individual Faculty of Education, Parsonsian organization theory sees these influences (or dictates) as being primarily handled by managerial staff such as deans, department heads, and program coordinators, but also engaging other faculty members, especially committee chairs and senior faculty, as well as various non-academic administrative staff. Pressures for change emerging from the institutional level will inevitably require modifications or more substantial upheavals to the technical core of the Faculty in the form of modifications to one or more of admission standards, programs of studies, staffing, evaluation or—always of central interest in professional Faculties—the balance between classroom and professional induction. It is at this core level where the very identity and soul of the organization is forged and protected by those who both perform the defining activities of teaching and—in the case of university units such as Faculties of Education—contribute to developing and modifying the policies and procedures through which the technical core is managed. Here in the core, according to IOT, is where philosophy of education has its institutional being—where it appears to have taken root, flourished, mutated and withered.

\(^{35}\) Thompson, 1967, op. cit.; Parsons, 1960, op. cit., p. 17.
\(^{37}\) For details pertaining to the founding of the OCT, see van Nuland, S. 1998. *The development of the Ontario College of Teachers*. Doctoral Dissertation. OISE, University of Toronto.
\(^{38}\) Ibid.
It is safe to assume that the subject area of philosophy of education should (and can only) reside in the technical core—if and only if—it is seen by policy-makers as part of the technical core, that is, an integral and indispensable part of ITPPs. I argue that changes in ITPPs over time, such as in curriculum and program organization, and faculty expertise and department structure, have resulted in changes to the technical core of Faculties of Education, explicitly affecting philosophy of education. For example, Tozer and Miretzky\(^{39}\) discuss two ways of formulating ITPP curriculum, namely: (1) “curriculum requirements,” specifying what teachers should know; and (2) “outcome assessments,” through courses selected via their link to later achievement, also called “evidence-based” practice. This can be viewed as a change in the technical core of ITPPs, the move to the latter form causing a “loss of protection of social foundation courses.”\(^{40}\)

I previously delineated philosophy of education as an academic subject in order to treat it as an institutional artifact, as it were. In other words, the very existence of philosophy of education, its lifeline, are the ITPPs provided by host organizations such as normal schools, teachers’ colleges, and faculties of education (with only minor interest from philosophy departments elsewhere in the university). John Dewey’s famous remark that philosophy of education is the “general theory of education” could perhaps be likened to saying that philosophy of education is and constructs the entire technical core of ITPP institutions, whether past, present, or future. Upon the reorganization of ITPP institutions from separate, semi-autonomous or government-run colleges into Faculties of Education in larger university settings, the subsequent expansion of the institutional level, including stronger and more dictatorial forces, could be seen as a shifting of power from the managerial to the institutional level, beginning a process of subverting the traditional governance of the technical core of ITPPs. This preliminary finding of IOT analysis appears consistent with contemporary characterizations of philosophy of education’s decline by philosophers of education\(^{41}\) by way of describing how it continues to be alienated from the technical core of ITPPs, damaging philosophy of education’s institutional existence, manufacturing its decline. Still, much work is needed to be done to tease out accounts


\(^{41}\) For example, see Kincheloe & Hewitt, 2011, op. cit.
and data to substantiate, modify, extend, or displace this tentative initial view in my search for a well-grounded and informed account.

Institutional analysis can shed informative light on past and present conditions in Faculties of Education, and the environment in which each and any subject area within their technical core (such as philosophy of education) “survives.” As Perrow writes, “The organization is tangled in a web of relationships that prevent it from fulfilling its real goals, and we can see how it deviates by examining this web.”42 This is what is meant by organizations as “recalcitrant tools,”43 meaning they resist intended organizational targets and inadvertently shift their purposes and goals. One can consider Faculties of Education enduring the external pressures of the larger government and College of Teachers compliance spheres and, also, philosophy of education enduring the larger external pressures of Faculties of Education at the managerial level. This theoretical framework aids in answering the research questions by providing an initial working hypothesis, namely that both the rise and decline of philosophy of education have been connected to institutional conditions of ITPPs.

The logical starting place to qualify and substantiate these claims made about the connection between the fate of philosophy of education as an academic field, and the changing nature of ITPPs, is to survey the history of the field of philosophy of education. The next three chapters attempt this with a view to providing the necessary context to understand how ITPPs have changed, including notable cultural and higher education restructuring events, all illustrating the conditions with which the growth and decline of philosophy of education had to contend.

In particular, the next chapter surveys the 19th century of North America where teacher education was mostly in a decentralized form, and teaching certificates were locally administered. Philosophy enjoyed by teachers was part of pedagogy and the implicit framework of the Great Educators, their philosophies often the basis of numerous voluntary teacher associations formed at this time. The purpose of this chapter is to set a starting place, this being the pre-institutionalized forms of teacher preparation and philosophy as it was available to teachers, and a look at how teacher education and philosophy transformed in the first normal school programs. In Chapter 3 I survey their early institutional forms, normal schools and

42 Perrow, 1986, op. cit., p. 16.
teachers’ colleges, and their use of academic philosophy in teacher preparation, up to the end of the Second World War. Chapter 4 continues the survey into the 1970s as the early institutional forms mature into university research-intensive faculties of education, with academic philosophy tending to transform into philosophy of education courses and instructors. Appendix 2 completes the survey by finishing the account of the fate of philosophy of education to the present day. Chapter 5 narrows the survey to the province of Ontario, Canada, in order to provide context for a case study of a single institution to complement the broader survey of the field. I track its internal developments from its origin as primarily a secondary teacher training institution into a modern faculty of education, and how philosophy began as a strong, required component of its teacher education program and subsequently lost its courses and faculty. Chapter 6, the final chapter, concludes the study and provides implications and insights going forward.
Chapter 2
Schoolkeeping: Pedagogy and Teacher Education in the Nineteenth Century

So sleeps the pride of former days. ~ Thomas Moore

Philosophy in pedagogy is a pivotal concept in this dissertation that seeks to capture both the philosophy animating the pedagogy of an era and its practical manifestations. The philosophy in the pedagogy of any era is rooted in practitioners—the Great Educators, and those they inspired, the veteran teachers and headmasters, who staffed the schools and instructed in the forms of teacher education available. Pedagogy is often used as an omnibus term for most of what goes on in teaching, but the term throughout this dissertation is used to describe a particular era’s type of teaching philosophy and practice. This was not yet scientific in the laboratory and statistical, perhaps positivistic sense often used today. Rather in the 19th century, pedagogy was informed mostly by personal experience embedded in the philosophies of the Great Educators\(^1\) who were often European, and provided a general yet synthetic view of the education process.

In this chapter, I sketch an account of philosophy in pedagogy as it existed prior to institutional ITPPs, that is, in the relatively de-centralized or locally administered teacher education found in 19th century North America and Britain in the form of summer or evening courses, and the first regulated normal schools. I characterize the form of teacher education and practice in this period to be “schoolkeeping”\(^2\) grounded in a pedagogy in which philosophy remained an intrinsic framework or meta-theory. This was delivered by headmasters and other veteran teacher educators, inspired by German pedagogues and emerging American thinkers. In this era, along with the two following eras as discussed in the next two chapters, I argue that the form of philosophy in teacher education is connected to the organization of ITPPs. Each stage of teacher education forms and is formed by an institutionalization process which drives the generation and allocation of organizational resources to fulfill its “technical level” as identified

\(^{1}\) These were the figures, often philosophers, who wrote on education as an application of their own philosophical system. Later the systems would be studied by educators for their premises, called the “ism” approach, but for now educators were inspired by the practical methods of these educators. A short-list would include Plato, Rousseau, and (later) Dewey. A more comprehensive though not exhaustive list would add Socrates, Aristotle, Confucius, Aquinas, Locke, Comenius, Emerson, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, and (later) Montessori, and Freire.

\(^{2}\) This characterization is part of the title of Samuel R Hall’s 1829 Lectures on School-Keeping. Good and Teller note that this work, compared to a list of typical textbooks in 19th century American normal schools, was the “first of these books to have any great influence.” They also point out Hall’s methods came from Bacon and Pestalozzi. See: Good, H. G. & Teller, J. D. 1973. A history of American education (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan, p. 182.
in Parsonsian sociology or, as amended by J. D. Thomson, the “technical core” of the organization as discussed by the institutional theories earlier introduced.

**Status of Teacher Education**

The most pertinent place to start is with the first institutes of teacher training. These arose in the 19th century in Britain, the United States, and Canada, and a century prior in Europe. The influence of European thought in the United States during this period is profound, most Americans seeking higher education still traveling to Europe, especially Germany, for their A.B. degrees. Before detailing the rationale and composition of the early normal schools, I wish to briefly outline their predecessor: teacher seminars. These lectures and workshops, provided in teacher institutes or model schools for in-service and pre-service common school teachers, can be likened to the bare form of the “technical core” of the times which, like the evolution of mitochondria captured by the cell, would soon come to be hosted within the normal schools.

Hosted temporarily in the summer or for several weeks at various times during the year, these seminars were composed of lectures provided by notable educators in the state or local area, each lecture detailing the teaching of various subjects such as reading, geography and arithmetic, but with attention also given to lectures on school governance, hygiene, and strategies for teacher professionalization. These often occurred at “teacher institutes” modelled on those originally founded by Henry Barnard, superintendent of Common Schools and Secretary of Education in Connecticut. He published in 1851 an overview of early teacher education institutions in several eastern states of the United States, including the British colonies of Upper and Lower Canada.

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3 Many of the organizers of early teacher education, such as Horace Mann and Henry Barnard in the United States, and Egerton Ryerson in Canada, traveled to Europe in order to study the approaches to education adopted by various countries, particularly France and Prussia, before returning home to publish what they found to be the best aspects of what they observed.

4 These degrees, Latin for *artium baccalaureus* or Bachelor of Arts, were the first teaching degrees for university instructors and grammar schools. The significance of the degree will be described later in the next chapter.

5 In 1839, Barnard initiated a convention for male teachers, and for “lady teachers” a year later. Not until 1843 did the first state, New York, recognize these conventions held in various counties, renaming them to “teacher institutes.” Several other states would follow this practice over the next several years. See Hinsdale, B. A. 1900. *Horace Mann and the common school revival in the United States*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 136.

6 Barnard, H. 1851. *Normal schools, and other institutions, agencies, and means designed for the professional education of teachers*, Hartford, CT: Case, Tiffany and Co.
According to Barnard’s survey, the initial rationale for seminars, as given in an 1839 report, was to improve all aspects of the common schools by enhancing the preparation and selection of teachers. The “supply would create the demand,” it was explained in the report, driving public support for the common schools through improvement of education via better qualified and dedicated educators. Not only would new standards bar the inept and the transient, the experience would be common, providing both modern methods and an initial peer association which would grow into professional associations for the purposes of forwarding the status of teachers in the eyes of the public.

It is important to stress that the goals and intentions of teacher training, at this first stage (and for all time), were to improve the common schools. Whatever the schools are deemed to need, as demanded by the “institutional level,” teacher training would conform, via its “managerial level,” to meet this need and maintain its role in the improvement of schools. Therefore, while the rationale for the work done in the technical core of teacher training is the improvement of state schools, as the schools changed—especially in role—driven by wider social change, whether economic, religious, cultural, etc., so would the teacher, and thus so would teacher training. This is what Swoboda describes as the sociological dimension of the audience—changing recipients drive the evolution of knowledge. In other words, and as I will describe later, the pedagogy of this time was predicated on a kind of teacher, and if one changed, so would the other. In the 19th century, the most pertinent strategy to deliver improvement of state schools was believed to be the improvement of their teachers, both in their craft and their professionalization, the latter by way of better selection of teacher candidates to combat transients, and improving the legitimacy of teachers by elevating their status in society.

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7 The report quoted in Barnard, 1851, is the First Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners of Common Schools, submitted in May, 1839.
8 From the Report, 1839, as cited in Barnard, 1851, p. 11.
10 For example, in 1843 Robert Murray of Canada West urged: “to impress upon teachers the great responsibility of their station in society, and the necessity for the strictness propriety in their walk and conversation both in and out of school. This resolution was adopted, because the impression on the public mind for many years past respecting Common School Teachers appears to have been, that these men are in general as low in their prudence and morality as they are in their pecuniary resources.” See Murray, R. 1844. *Annual Report: Of the Deputy Superintendent of Education on Common Schools throughout Canada West, laid before the Legislative Assembly, 14th November, 1843*, Toronto, para. 16.
At this time and into the 20th century, many common schools were one-room school houses, especially in rural areas, providing education up to age 12-14. They were irregularly attended, with truancy laws in effect yet typically not enforced especially in rural areas. Many teachers expected to be sole proprietors of education for their town or local area, and with the irregular attendance of students, could only hope to transfer to them a basic standard of literacy and numeracy. These poor and uncertain working conditions necessarily required teachers to work independently with a personal rather than professional approach to educating. This entrepreneurial approach was documented in Barnard:

Every good teacher will himself become a pioneer, and a missionary in the cause of educational improvement. The necessity of giving such a teacher every facility of a well-located, well-ventilated, and well-seated schoolhouse, of giving the teacher a timely supply of the best text books and apparatus, and of keeping him employed through the year, and from year to year, with just such pupils and students as he can teach to the best advantage—these things will be seen and felt by parents, and by districts.

Teachers would also be called the “chosen priesthood of education,” emphasizing the hope of newly trained teachers to be leaders in a new common school movement of universal education. An equally important somewhat older contemporary of Barnard, Horace Mann, also suggested, in 1840, that the normal schools must train teachers with the “power to manage and govern a school successfully.” To manage a school required training in schoolkeeping—these teachers were the sole organizers of an ungraded elementary education process. This fact manifested both in the teacher being the sole member in the schoolhouse, as well as the teacher overseeing the entire educational process, including registration of students. As I will discuss in more detail later, this solitary business of running a school, the whole building and the whole educational process, was to underlie the emergence of pedagogy for teacher training.

In addition, the new teachers of this time were expected to have a role in the moral development of their pupils. This anticipation of the common school framers was understandably

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11 The first compulsory attendance laws in the United States were passed in Massachusetts in 1852, and in Upper Canada in 1871. In Canada, these regulations required four months of attendance for children between the ages of 7 and 12. In 1891, the range was altered to 8 and 14, and in 1921, extended to 16 for urban students.
13 This quotation from testimony delivered in the US House of Representatives, cited in Barnard, 1851, p. 12.
14 Ibid.
hostile to most teachers at the time being transients; these teachers needed to be filtered out or rehabilitated, and the new supply to the schools highly scrutinized. Horace Mann, speaking to those who provided letters of recommendation and certificates of character to block the entry of transients, said the following:

In the contemplation of the law, the school committee are sentinels stationed at the door of every schoolhouse in the State, to see that no teacher ever crosses its threshold, who is not clothed, from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot, in garments of virtue; and they are the enemies of the human race—not of contemporaries only, but of posterity.¹⁶

The evolution of the common schools, the centralization of education delivery, and thus adjustments to teacher training, would reduce this solitary status, and also reduce the appropriateness of the pedagogy. Over time, teacher training has narrowed in scope from schoolkeeping to classroom teaching, the latter consolidating fellow teachers and administrators as team members. This modern method has not only multiplied the teachers involved in a student’s education, it also has fragmented the educational process, and leaves to yearly documents and report cards the previous role of a teacher having a view of a student’s total progress.¹⁷ Certainly the need for schoolkeeping was a practical solution, the work of school teachers in the 19th century being far more autonomous and precarious than it is today. As Horace Mann points out regarding the conditions of teaching in 1840,

It is utterly impractical for any committee to prepare a code of regulations coextensive with all the details, which belong to the management of a school, it must be left with the teacher; and hence the necessity of skill in this item of the long list of his qualifications.¹⁸

The conditions of teaching were more precarious given the equipment, building (not always dedicated), living conditions,¹⁹ and students with which teachers worked, making protocols of practice and standard operating procedures impractical.²⁰ Tenuous student numbers and

¹⁶ Mann, 1957, op. cit., p. 52. This was the sentiment of Ryerson in Canada as well; the common school act of 1846 banned transient American (“alien”) teachers who may have been fleeing the American system! See Love, J. 1978. The professionalization of teachers in the mid-nineteenth century Upper Canada. In N. McDonald & A. Chaiton (Eds.), Egerton Ryerson and his times: Essays on the history of education (pp. 109-128). Toronto: Macmillan, p. 115.

¹⁷ The normal arrangement in the past of having the same teacher over several years is now uncommon and called “looping” in education.

¹⁸ Mann, 1957, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁹ In 1843, Canada West, for example: “Teachers had no alternative. They had not the means to enable them to choose either their place or their company. Their income neither enabled them to live in respectable lodgings, nor to associate with respectable society.” Murray, 1843, op. cit., para16.

²⁰ Sowell makes this economic point: When local conditions are precarious, adaptation demands flexibility. As conditions become more predictable, centralization via protocols becomes possible. In terms of teachers,
attendance made the rural schools small and the urban schools unstable. Teachers as “pioneers” was an apt descriptor from Henry Barnard—much like the colonists of the New World. Provided with some knowledge and tools, teachers were expected to venture out and make their own life and subsistence, despite the adversity surrounding their work and position.

**Normal Schools**

If the conditions of teaching were made regular and isomorphic across all schools, it would allow teacher training to be standardized and effectively institutionalized. While seminars continued to dominate teacher training, normal schools were founded in the 19th century to consolidate these seminars in one central location.21 Much of their efforts at this time were remedial, teachers in the common schools often being poor in “basic skills.”22 Inspectors would increasingly oversee entry standards to balance the uncertain preferences and thriftiness of local trustees in urban areas. These usually took the form of examinations, for instance the 1844 common school act in Canada West established “numerous examinations” to be passed by prospective teachers in order to obtain “certificates of qualification” to teach in the common schools.23 The “examinations” of prospective teachers held by county inspectors were often informal oral tests. As Allison and Wells put it, “these early superintendents sometimes discharged their duties in a somewhat casual manner, as witnessed by William Hutton’s examination of a teacher as they strolled across a field, the centrepiece of the examination being the task of parsing a sentence containing nine “that’s.”24 Initially the normal schools were experimental—many were unstable and liable to fail (due to attendance, lack of stable funds, and other reasons), only finding stability in the last half of the century. In (Upper) Canada, the first normal school opened in Toronto in 1847, though it was required to relocate several times.

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21 A transitional (and temporary) practice, identified by Murray, were called “annual lessons” where in-service teachers would meet yearly at a local school. Inspectors were also given the opportunity to judge their quality. Murray, 1843, op. cit., para17. Eventually these were formalized in the first normal school in Toronto.


23 See Macnab, A. 1845. *Annual Report: of the Assistant Superintendent of Education on the state of Common Schools throughout Canada West, for the year 1844*, Toronto, para. 27. The report also advocates as “indispensable” the “establishment and endowment of a provincial normal school” (para. 68).

The introduction of normal schools in North America and the adoption of their name, “normal,” is tied to their use in Europe, probably because the founders of normal schools in Canada and the United States all traveled to Europe to learn of the various institutions already established. In France, the école normale meant “norm” or rule school: an educational institution where students learned standardized principles or rules of teaching. While the name had a French origin, the structure and curriculum of American normal schools (as well as the common schools) had a decisively Prussian character, many North American school reformers seeing Prussia as having the most advanced common schools in the world at the time. They would serve to promote the regimented, normalized schooling system that would feed socialized workers into the burgeoning factories, social services and military forces of the era, as well as the stability needed to regularize the practice of teaching, fostering the institutionalization of teacher education over the next century. While this process was in its infancy, teacher training for now would need to be heavily invested in each teacher’s independent, personal practice, most expecting to work alone and distant from central authority, making attendance in the unstable urban teacher associations difficult. This need would be met by a pedagogy largely imported from Europe and spread through influential educators such as Col. Francis W. Parker, the “father of progressive education.”

Horace Mann, important in the organization of the first normal schools in the United States, selected the first principals of the normal schools of Massachusetts. For Lexington, he selected Rev. Cyrus Peirce, and Mann’s description offers a glimpse of a kind of teacher education at this time.

Mann himself said of Peirce’s power . . . that it surpassed what he had before seen in any school. “The exercises were conducted,” he said, “in the most thorough manner: the principles being stated and then applied to various combinations of facts, so that the pupils were not only led to a clearer apprehension of the principle itself, but taught to look through combinations of facts, however different, to find the principle which underlies them all; and they were taught, too, that it is not the form of the fact which determines the principle, but the principle which gives character to the fact.”

27 Henry Barnard would also decorate Peirce: “had it not been for Cyrus Peirce, the cause of Normal schools would have failed or have been postponed for an indefinite period.” from Hinsdale, 1900, op. cit., p. 154.
The teaching of principles to teachers would be the common theme of early teacher education, explicit in the course titles, such as Principles of Education and Principles of Teaching, used in the normal schools and the successor teachers’ colleges which became dominant in the first half of the 20th century. The principles were often derived from and clearly evident in the educational literature at the time, but were also presented as fact. These facts were then induced into principles, and deduced again into facts. This cycle of learning ideas was the demonstration of their truth, including encouragement of teachers to perform this cycle in self-study of the pedagogy contained in educational literature of this time. Diversity of pedagogy was based on a difference of fact—demonstrations—which were induced to different principles.

It is also important to point out that teachers at this time were not likely to be given a critical assessment of these ideas, and while the philosophy behind the pedagogy may have been revealed in terms of its principles, and several pedagogies may have been introduced, the teacher was unlikely to be, at least as a pre-service teacher, engaging in the construction of pedagogy. Rather, teachers were led to adopt a particular pedagogy (aligned with parochial beliefs) and, having studied its underlying philosophy, were then posted to their schoolhouses to begin the empirical work of realizing it with support from colleagues at the institutes and the educational literature available to them.

In the modern period, facts would become the monopoly of science, altering the very basis for pedagogy as demonstrations of “fact” moved from personal, philosophical, theological grounds to scientific. But for Cyrus Peirce and his contemporary educators, professional knowledge was rooted in far broader grounds, as illustrated by this statement by Peirce:

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29 As I will discuss, “principles” is consistent with the traditional (Platonic) definition of philosophy, the knowledge of “ultimate causes.” See Butler, N. M. 1915. The meaning of education: Contributions to a philosophy of education (rev. ed). New York: Scribner, p. 3.

30 What was considered a “fact” is, of course, quite different from our modern conception of “fact.” Fact at this time was based in what was believed to be true, and the method of arriving at truth also invited approaches from philosophy, theology, human nature, and early science, such as the speculations of mind in psychology. The dismissal of metaphysics in the early 20th century by positivists and pragmatists would severely limit the legitimacy of non-scientific approaches to truth, including their use in fashioning education policy. This would be later exploited by postmodernists.

31 For example, Ryerson founded the Journal of Education of Upper Canada to proliferate ideas and support to teachers. Love remarked that the Journal “encouraged a particular attitude on the part of teachers . . . [to stand] with the clergyman in counteracting the sordid influences of the age, promoting morality and social cohesion.” Love, 1978, op. cit., p. 122.
The book to which, after the Bible, I owe most... is that incomparable work of George Combe, *On the Constitution of Man*. It was to me a most suggestive book, and I regard it as the best treatise on education and the philosophy of man which I ever met with.32

The study of “man” or the philosophy of man is a consistent theme in many of the texts studied at the time by teachers in order to inform two crucial issues: (1) the purposes of education, the teacher’s contribution to the destiny of his students; and (2) the methods of educating, based on how we acquire knowledge, his reception to influence, and the ethics of this influence. These ideas were core to pedagogy and left for teachers to process in the thought and action of their work, for once these explicitly philosophical questions were posed, their answers were the resulting work of the teacher, honed through experience, and often set within a religious (or metaphysical) framework. The purpose of education would soon be decided outside classrooms, to be less in the control of the contemplative thought and action of teachers. As education systems rose, it became possible to align the aims of education in classrooms to a more explicitly political goal, as one magnetizes a piece of iron by aligning the polarity of its atoms. As schools became more secular, the previous religious alignments of schools which set a parochial agenda began to be re-aligned by the early progressives who had high hopes that “free, public schools” would promote their social agendas, especially the opportunity to socialize the largely immigrant population, especially on the east coast of the United States, into a national identity. This theme will be visited again through the dissertation—if schools could be tools for central policy, teachers would obtain a new role as instrumental in deploying this policy, and teacher preparation would change to provide it.

Not only was it important that students in the United States and Canada, especially those coming from a variety of different countries, receive a “common experience” in the common schools, a further important task at this time was to make teachers across the nation share in their own common experience, especially to form associations to further the process of professional identity. One approach, funded from both state and private sources, was the circulation of educational literature, not only from the early educational journals such as the *Common School Journal*,33 but also important pedagogical texts often adopted in the normal schools. This literature would comprise what was known as the “teacher libraries.” The contents of a sample of

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32 Ibid.
33 Fifteen teacher journals were created in the early to mid-19th century in the United States, however few survived a decade after their birth. For a list, see: Good & Teller, 1973, op. cit., p. 166.
these texts as shown in Table 2 below will serve as a source for what was recognized as pedagogy, with philosophy evident as its guiding framework.

**Teacher Education as Pedagogy**

The most important aspect of teacher education at this time was the explicit development of the person, the teacher, as an educator and moral person. Recall the technical core of teacher education was devised to target the teacher as most needing improvement toward the purpose of establishing the common school. More specifically this improvement was to be found in the careful selection of teacher candidates, at the heart of which was a teacher credentialing program. In addition, the conditions of teaching required a dedicated and moral person, thus the humanity of the teacher was emphasized, while teaching was still considered an art and a rudimentary “science” at best. This perspective is also consistent with the requirement of a letter of character signed by a minister of one’s religion to attend the normal schools. This focus on the person would also align with the child-centered movement born of Rousseau and more recently, Herbart, which focused on the child and the teacher’s attitude toward what the child brings into his education.

As an example, this focus on the person can be seen in this definition translated from Schmidt’s *Geschichte der Erziehung* published in 1860.

*Pedagogics* is the science and art of so developing, by means of *conscious influence* on the physical, intellectual, and moral powers of man, the ideas of truth, freedom, and love that lie at the foundation of his god-driven nature, that he can meet independently, and spontaneously, his human responsibilities.

Note how this German definition of pedagogy is constituted by the basic branches of philosophy: (1) it identifies the powers of man—ontology; (2) our most abstract concepts man must attempt to reach—epistemology; and (3) man’s duties to live on earth—ethics. It also defines pedagogy by its roots as a science and an art. As a science, Schmidt further defines “philosophy” as the “science of principles” or the “study of universal and necessary principles.” As one can see,

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34 The teacher referred to at this time is the common school teacher, not the grammar school teachers who would not be institutionalized until the 20th century. In some ways, grammar school teachers or headmasters were never institutionalized, since at the same time the grammar schools were being out-competed by the new public high schools, and the new secondary teachers staffing these schools were trained as were the common school teachers.

35 The introduction of Herbart was “extraordinary.” Subsequently, Pestalozzi had a poor showing in the United States, but Herbart, an “interpreter of Pestalozzi,” was cited by Parker as having more influence than any other philosopher on education before him. See Good & Teller, 1973, op. cit., p. 338f.

philosophy is meant to find the patterns, the principles of the principles, or the universals: what is true of all things. A knowledge of this, of philosophy, means knowledge of the patterns which lie behind all things, as well as the connections between things, their correct application leading to the “good” and the moral.

Philosophy was the first “science” of all fields of inquiry, including education. For example, James Gall, writing in Scotland in 1840, advocated an approach for teachers to “imitate Nature,” discovering how things work. This was especially promoted through the naturalism of Herbert Spencer, who wrote several works on education in the 19th century urging us, in 1861, to “systematize the natural process.” Nature was a source of principles, and the “improvement of the art of teaching” would come by “fair experiment or long experience” from which can be ascertained the “principles upon which its success depends.” This was at odds with the dominant idealism of American philosophy at the time, perhaps led by Hermann Horne, which denounced human nature as something to be transcended to seek the good, rather than embraced and aligned with the natural, as the good. The principles of education were what was taught in the normal schools, and if knowledge of the principles could not be found by “fair experiments,” there being seldom any scientists in the modern sense engaged in education at the time, then the instructors in the normal schools would depend on their empirical “long experience.” As modern science became available, this balance would change in the instructors of the normal schools.

For now, teaching would remain an art, described by Gall as the “system of means, in accordance with these principles, for attaining some special end.” This is similar to sociologist Emile Durkheim, who also proposed viewing art as a system of means (“système de manières de faire”) though he adds it is adjusted for special purposes (“ajustées à des fins spéciales”). The means would be derived mostly from the experience of the instructors of the normal schools, who would also reveal the principles these means depended on, as written in the texts of this time. The principles are also linked to the outcomes desired of the education these means were to

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37 Gall, J. 1840. *A practical enquiry into the philosophy of education*. Edinburgh, Scotland: Gall & Son, p. 21. Gall defines teaching as an art as meaning trial and error by experience, and science was needed to discover its principles.


39 Gall, 1840, op. cit., p. 30.

40 Ibid, p. 25.

secure, and skills in making “adjustments” based on the uncertain environment of teaching at this time.

Many of the texts collected in the teacher libraries were selected to massage the humanity in the teacher, to show him that he would be part of a profession which would increasingly alter the next generation in a positive way. Pedagogy was also fundamentally a unifying discipline\(^\text{42}\)—its content was a series of demonstrations, each leading to the next, providing a synthesis of various facts and arguments deemed valuable. The consistency bred a worldview meant to affect not just the teacher’s thoughts and actions in the classroom, but through his very life—no exceptions were made for different places with different rules; the classroom was part of the world which pedagogy equally advised. The idea was that, if the natural world was a synthesis of its laws, so must our understanding of it retain this synthesis in order to be successfully practiced in the world. As in the case of the most notable professions at this time—the clergy, lawyers, and physicians—it was desirable for teachers to be the glowing exemplars of their philosophy at all times, their heroes being Plato, Aquinas, Jesus Christ, Rousseau, Herbart, and the like. This expectation is also shown by the fact that many responsible for the local parish operated the local schoolroom, especially the prestigious grammar schools offering a second level of education to a relative few, which required highly educated (Latin) instructors who mostly came from Europe.

**Pedagogy as a Discipline**

**What is pedagogy?**

It is necessary to embark briefly on the question of the disciplinary status of pedagogy at this time in order to inform how philosophy of education would emerge later. The framework of Hirst\(^\text{43}\) differentiates three kinds of enquiry: forms of knowledge, fields of knowledge, and practical theories. A form of knowledge has a unique method of acquiring its facts, and regularly engages in enquiry to expand this activity, even for its own sake, without a practical end. Examples include the traditional subjects of philosophy, history, science, theology, art, literature,

\(^{42}\) This need for unity and synthesis likely comes from its German roots, especially the philosophers Fichte and Hegel, both of whom wrote at length about metaphysical wholeness and the integration of seemingly contradictory ideas. See also Muir who mentions pedagogy has always been a more respected area of inquiry in Germany than in the English-speaking world. He also notes from R. H. Quick, writing in 1880, that while John Locke’s famous educational work was losing interest in England, it was revived for German readers before falling out of print. See Muir, J. R. 1996. The evolution of philosophy of education within educational studies. *EP&T*, 28(2), 1–26.

and mathematics. A field brings together various forms of knowledge in order to inform a subject, including research for its own sake to broaden the field. Education would be such a field, having no unique method of enquiry, as would the various physical sciences, and hybrid fields such as the social sciences. Hirst describes a practical theory as a field which focuses on “understanding.” Pedagogy, then, is a practical theory—Durkheim also made this assessment, further suggesting pedagogy to be between an art (“practique pure sans théorie”) and a science. His reasoning is as follows:

Mais les idées qui sont ainsi combinées ont pour objet, non d’exprimer la nature de choses données, mais de diriger l’action . . . La pédagogie est une théorie pratique de ce genre. Elle n’étudie pas scientifiquement les systèmes d’éducation, mais elle y réfléchit en vue de fournir à l’activité de l’éducateur des idées qui le dirigent.

[But the ideas which are being combined are intended, not to express the nature of things given, but to direct the action . . . Pedagogy is a practical theory of this kind. The teacher studies not the science of education systems, but rather reflects with the aim of providing the activity of the educator based on their fundamental ideas.]44

Pedagogy uses the knowledge that would be found in “education” (the study of which would not begin until the 20th century) but its purpose is never to enrich the field itself. Rather it aids its practical ends. The name itself, “pedagogy,” from the Greek (and “education,”45 from the Latin), explicitly refers to leading forth (of youth). This is akin to seeking a “research outcome,” which would not be deemed the dominant part of a field’s normal knowledge building, whereas resolving unanswered questions, conflicting results, or controversy would be. Pedagogy, as all practical theories, aims to formulate all facts or ideas into workable practice. The 20th century’s cleavage of theory and practice displaced this idea, eventually replacing it with the “study of education” in the universities. Overall, the relative balance of the forms of knowledge contributing to academic fields would shift in the next century, as well as treatment of the perennial question of the aims of education from philosophy to science.46

We can also make connections between disciplines and their accompanying institutions, or what Swoboda called “software” and “hardware”47 respectively. Forms of knowledge are the

44 Durkheim, 1911, op. cit. Translation mine.
45 Education comes from the Latin roots of educare and educere, meaning to train, and to lead out (perhaps to make independent). Debates in education often invoke these two aims. For a review, see Bass, R. V. & Good, J. W. 2004. Educare and educere: Is a balance possible in the educational system? The Educational Forum, 68(2), 161-168.
46 For an article reviewing this transition, see Watras, J. 2006. From philosophy of education to philosophizing about education. Philosophical Studies in Education, 37, 87-96.
47 Swoboda, 1979, op. cit., p. 74.
various ways we categorize our grasp of reality. These forms are institutionalized into fields, represented by faculties and departments in the university, and taught and advanced by the academic masses, whether philosophers, historians, scientists, etc., as well as other public researchers and writers. Practical theories reside in the training colleges, and increasingly the poly-technical universities. The former tend to be staffed with its practitioners, while the universities attempt to balance research and practice with hybrid researcher-practitioners, who synthesize their prior experience on the job with the research of the fields. As the disciplinary status of teacher education changed over the next century, so would its institutional home. For now, it is pedagogy appropriately hosted in the training colleges of the normal schools and the many occasional seminars, but it was destined to become the “study of education,” a field, accompanied by other fields, and residing in (or more often near) a university.

The texts found in teacher libraries provide insights into pedagogy as a practical theory, examples that are especially pertinent as these were typically selected as textbooks in the normal schools and as materials for the teacher institutes. Note that while their selection established explicit standards for the time, the selection process was ideologically narrowed by educational authorities. The texts selected were diverse in their philosophy, as well as their topics, representing both contemporary thought in education—sourced mostly from European pedagogies and some of the lecture series of early chairs and professors of education in Britain and the United States—as well as texts deemed readable by teachers and effective in their continued learning. It also further supports the idea of teachers themselves, with support from their local institutes, being responsible for their development.

The case of a Canadian institute’s teacher library\(^\text{48}\) will serve to illustrate this. A reading course was designed by the North Hastings Teacher Institute in 1885, containing material on “pedagogy, science, and literature.” Initially these readings were “cultural only,” but by 1900, individual certificates were issued for readings completed and a diploma issued for completion of a three-year course of readings. Note that teacher participation in the libraries and works was low given that most teachers at the time were transients—professional development would have had no benefit to the temporary worker. A remedy for this perhaps can be inferred by the remarks of the Institute’s president to members to form reading circles and meet monthly. Even so, the funding, organization, and selection of texts by the institutes and their approval by

education authorities is evidence of what was deemed appropriate for teachers at this time, and what was seen as contributions to their practice and professionalization. A report of the titles has been provided in Table 2, with discussion of the titles in the following section.

Table 2
Summary of Teacher Library Texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Author Description</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Published Date</th>
<th>Description of Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. James Sulley</td>
<td>British, Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic</td>
<td><em>Teachers’ Handbook of Psychology</em></td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>-Early work in psychology modified for teachers based on author’s larger work: <em>Outlines of Psychology</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Dr. Mark Hopkins</td>
<td>American, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric, Theologian, President of Williams College</td>
<td><em>Outline Study of Man</em></td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>-Ontological work -Used as a college textbook in senior classes⁴⁹ -Part of Applewood’s <em>American Philosophy and Religion Series</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joseph Payne</td>
<td>British, First Professor of Education in the College of Preceptors and First English Professor of the Art and Science of Education in 1872, co-</td>
<td><em>Lectures on the Science and Art of Education</em></td>
<td>1872 lectures.</td>
<td>-Separate chapters on Theory and Practice of Education, Methods, Principles -Contains several lectures on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>First collected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁹ Praise for this work, including the reference to its use in senior classes, can be found at the back of: McCosh, J. 1890. *Realistic philosophy defended in philosophic series*, Vol 2. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
The founder of Froebel Society, Col. Francis W. Parker, American Colonel, studied in Germany, known for Quincy Method, held various normal school principalships and superintendent posts. He published "Notes of "Talks on Teaching" by L. E. Patridge, compiler, at Martha’s Vineyard Institute—Provided new methods in contrast to the old. Adopted by almost all American reading circles, and most popular American teacher handbook. The Fairy-Land of Science lectures to children in 1878, published a year later.

**Pedagogy Examples Within Teacher Libraries.**

Texts were purchased and read by teachers participating in the institutes, and were also used to devise tests to grant certificates. Sampling their first few pages, one notices a very "exploratory" philosophic caliber which contrasts to present day materials. First mentioned on the list from the North Hastings Institute of 1886 is an early psychology text by James Sulley, who was the Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, London for eleven years. Published in 1886, Sulley’s “Teacher’s Handbook of Psychology,” was designed to

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50 These points are made in a publisher’s advertisement for the title found at the back of Joseph Payne’s Lectures, 1890.
51 All of the works discussed below can be found archived online via a simple Google search, mostly hosted by Google servers but some are archived by Harvard University and available to download in PDF and other formats.
be a practical guide based on his previous more comprehensive work “Outlines of Psychology.” As declared in the preface of the Handbook,

> By considerably reducing and simplifying the statement of scientific principles there presented [in “Outlines”], and expanding the practical applications to the art of Education, [Sulley] hopes he may have succeeded in satisfying an increasingly felt want among teachers, *viz.*, of an exposition of the elements of Mental Science in their bearing on the work of training and developing the minds of the young.

It is interesting that the need was felt to “considerably reduc[e] and simplify” early science to aid the teacher, while, as we shall see, the philosophy was not reduced. This balance would soon reverse in the next century, perhaps because teachers previously held more value in the contemplative, the long-term, whereas modern teachers are concerned more with the more myopic “but what do I do tomorrow!”

The work by Sulley spans the necessary topics of mind: the connection and limits of psychology to education, mind and body, mental faculties and development, epistemology of the senses and forming conceptions, memory, reasoning, emotions, the will, and moral action. These concepts were believed at this time to be important in the curriculum of teacher preparation—they were thought to be important in what teachers should know. It may be surprising that such topics as epistemology and moral action were once seen as important reading material for beginning and in-service teachers given the somewhat esoteric view generally taken of these concepts today. While in the next century science would begin distributing its facts, the “facts” provided in this period were demonstrated by the instructor. These demonstrations would be heard or read by teachers and considered for later use in the classroom. The provisional status of knowledge at the time required the teacher’s participation. This contrasts with later scientific facts and professional standards which were expected to be accepted based on the authority of the instructor or a textbook as “the latest findings,” often not demonstrated.

The second item on the list is Hopkins’ “Outline Study of Man,” published in 1873, and part of Applewood’s *American Philosophy and Religion Series*. It is a book on ontology, the study of man’s being and his purposive existence. In this case, the author attempts to devise a

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52 This practice of distilling the findings of science for teachers occurs today: teachers do not learn “psychology,” but “educational psychology” (previously known as “school psychology”), as Sulley’s Handbook illustrates.

53 Nelson, D. 2008. A new glass bead game: Redesigning the Academy. *Paideusis*, 17(2), 39-49. The author notes that the diversity of answers provided by philosophy, combined with the short-term time horizon of teachers, the “common concern of many practicing educators,” leads to a “dismissal of the values of courses in educational philosophy” (p. 43).
“unity” between many aspects of man, such as his body, reasoning, consciousness and will, and the ethics of choice and moral decisions. This work is meant for contemplation, containing no specific procedures, perhaps used as raw material or principles for generating practice by a process of thought. For teachers, this text illustrates how each aspect of our selves that influences our thoughts and behavior can be unified toward good ends. Moral decisions also presuppose what is believed to be right action, dependent on the religious framework of teachers at this time. This work’s inclusion was expected to exercise the teacher’s ability to apply a philosophy of education in practice, and be able to defend this application once appearing at the institute to earn a certificate for reading this work. This work represents the culture of (dedicated) teaching at this time and the realm of discussion occurring at the institutes.

The third work was written by Joseph Payne, the first professor of the art and science of education in England, who held his post in the College of Preceptors of London. Published posthumously, his “Lectures on the Arts and Science of Education” include separate lectures on theory, practice, methods, and principles of a science of education. A rationale for the work in the preface states the following:

The Art of Teaching had been learned by imitation; the teacher sought no principles, because he never heard they existed. But great men from time to time became teachers. Rabelais, Montaigne, Locke, the Jesuits[], Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and many others, rolled up a rich mass of teaching-facts, and partially arranged them in order. It needed next a philosophic mind to deal with these discoveries, to state their value and explain them. Joseph Payne seemed raised up for this purpose; his cast of mind, education and experience, fitted him to investigate this field of thought.

This introduction illustrates conditions of thought at this time and a need for study and synthesis of its diverse empirical roots. It reveals principles via study of the pedagogy of the Great Educators. Payne was also co-founder of the Frobel Society in London in 1874, and lectured on the ideas of both Froebel and Pestalozzi. The text also includes several lectures on teacher education and the importance of standards to raise the quality of those entering teaching. One

54 To add a personal note, I had the opportunity to design and teach a new philosophy of education course at my Faculty of Education. Such a course had not been available to pre-service students since the 1990s. It was run twice in the 2014-5 school year. Students wrote their philosophy of education statements and defended them from peers and myself.


56 The College is the oldest surviving teacher association in the world, founded in 1846 by private teachers. This contrasts with most other countries which established associations by state authorities. It is now the College of Teachers.

57 Ibid, p. 3.
lecture in particular—given to the National Union for the Women of All Classes—describes a profession as implying “learned,” and requiring accredited training as in medicine, law, and theology. Payne further remarks that because there were no standards for becoming a teacher, anyone could compete for a teaching position, from the ignorant to the learned; frugal trustees favoured the former. Several of these lectures fulfill a professionalizing role by stimulating teachers to organize to become aware of the issues in their profession, especially the dominance of transients, and the ease of access to the occupation.

A fourth title “Talks on Teaching” by Francis W. Parker is very much a curricular work, outlining the teaching of reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and history, together with other educational topics such as assessment and punishment, but he also addresses the more philosophical topics of the aims and purposes of education, the will, and moral and character aspects, mentioning the ideas of Comenius, Pestalozzi, and Frobel. Even the first chapter on reading begins with a basic epistemological position on the nature of concepts or ideas.

What is reading? . . . Reading is getting thought by means of written or printed words arranged in sentences. Thought may be defined as ideas in relation. Ideas are either sense products, or derivations from sense products.\(^{58}\)

The final title listed in the teacher library was Arabella B. Buckley’s “The Fairy-Land of Science,” a student reader in science. The inclusion of a work specific to teaching science may have been due to the lack of background knowledge among teachers at the time, so that a written work from which the teacher could teach (or the pupils could follow) was deemed necessary. This science-specific work contrasts with other subjects expected to be known by the teacher, especially literacy and arithmetic, each of which was believed to be broadly known well enough to instruct via the blackboard.

One further text I wish to include here which is not included in the New Hastings Teacher Library is an English version of an originally German text:\(^{59}\) *Grube’s Method of Teaching Arithmetic* translated and revised by Levi Seeley in 1888.\(^{60}\) This may seem like a curricular,

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\(^{59}\) The first German edition was originally published in 1842 as (translated) *Guidebook for Counting in Elementary Schools, Based on the Heuristic Method* by August W. Grube. His method was based on Pestalozzi’s idea of the importance of visualization. This information from: Ivashova, O. 2011. The history and the present state of elementary mathematical education in Russia. In A. Karp & B. R. Vogeli (Eds.), *Russian mathematics education: Programs and practices* (pp. 37-80). London: World Scientific, p. 43.

\(^{60}\) F. Louis Soldan in 1878, at the time principal of the St. Louis Normal School, suggests “Grube’s Method of teaching arithmetic does not lack friends and supporters: it has been tried and adopted, not in one city alone, but has become
methods work, however the advertisement by the American publisher encouraging teachers to purchase this work is quite interesting. These are the first two reasons, copied below in similar typographical form:

1. IT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL WORK.—This book has a sound philosophical basis. The child does not (as most teachers seem to think) learn addition, then subtraction, then multiplication, then division; he learns these processes together. Grube saw this, and founded his system on this fact.

2. IT FOLLOWS NATURE’S PLAN.—Grube proceeds to develop (so to speak) the method by which the child actually becomes (if he ever does) acquainted with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. This is not done, as some suppose, by writing them on a slate. Nature has her method; she begins with THINGS;\(^{61}\)

Not only does the second reason show evidence of the influence of Spencer’s naturalism across the Atlantic, the first reason cites philosophy as the text’s style, yet goes on to describe the practice of teaching mathematics. This illustrates that philosophy was a known part of the common vocabulary of the aspiring and self-improving teacher, and likewise a “sound philosophical basis” was of importance and contributed to the confidence of the method.

In summary, this Canadian teacher library drew from both British and American sources, disseminating practical ideas intended to ground the teacher in careful thought about his craft. For example, Parker’s work specifically asks teachers to resist mimicry of both the “stupefying” nature of tradition and the ideas he espouses in his lectures, asking the teacher to consider them and let the best methods win in practice. In other words, the teachers were expected to produce their methods—what worked for them in their contexts—under the guise or direction of an approach to, or philosophy of, teaching. This might be contrasted with the approach of “best practices” in the modern period, a trend toward teaching as a technology to be implemented produced by research, and away from teaching as an art or a personal craft honed by experience.

A second conclusion that can be drawn is that the texts at the institutes were not sourced exclusively from a specialized or technical teacher education literature, but rather sampled new works in education, such as from Payne and Parker, emerging scientific findings of early psychology from Sulley, but also included a more general or liberally educating text such as that recognized throughout the [United States].” See: Soldan, F. L. 1878. Grube’s method of teaching arithmetic explained: With a large number of practical hints and illustrations. Chicago: Interstate Publishing Co., p. 24.

\(^{61}\) The advertisement can be found at the back of Payne, 1890, p. 354 (page numbering stops at 343, but was counted past the text). Also advertised by the publisher is Parker’s Notes on “Talks on Teaching.”
by Hopkins. We should also keep in mind that these texts would have presumed a normal school education, including European pedagogy, and because of this did not include texts of this kind in the teacher libraries.

A final point which I have deferred until now is a peculiar advisement of the New Hastings Institute. The order of the list of the texts is important—the Institute instructed its members holding a First or Second class certificate to begin with the Sulley text and read the rest in order. If the teacher had a Third-class certificate, they should skip the Sulley text and instead begin with Hopkins. What may have been the rationale for this instruction was likely to encourage further study of psychology for those who were normal school trained rather than for the transient “thirds” who were unlikely to participate in professional development anyway. However, having Third-class teachers read Hopkins is just as interesting, implying such a philosophical text, while perhaps not seen as important or “revolutionizing” as the early psychology text, was still seen as providing the basic ingredients of teacher education literature. If Sulley and early psychology was enriching, Hopkins and philosophy was bread and butter.

**Philosophy in Pedagogy: Precursors to the Philosophy of Education**

Other than the more well-known pedagogues already mentioned, several texts often based on these pedagogues and previous philosophers were published in the 19th century which provided both material and sometimes textbooks for the normal schools. The production of these texts would accelerate by the turn of the century with the accelerating growth of normal schools. Along with constant consolidations of teacher journals, they provided soil for “study of education” leading to creation of educational theory and later, a narrower philosophy of education that was to become established. The beginnings of pedagogy itself can be related to classic literature or quality fiction in the sense of stories based on the actions of characters within philosophic themes. These themes represent the worldviews of the educator, and would later be carved up into research questions to be handled by separate university fields. The content or

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62 Good and Teller provide a list of books typical of a 19th century American normal school. The oldest text they list is *Schulordnung* by Christopher Dock, published in 1770. The German title translates as ‘school rules’ or ‘school order.’ Also on the list is two works by Neef, *Lectures on School-Keeping* by Samuel R. Hall, *The Teacher* by Jacob Abbott, *The School and the Schoolmaster* by Alonzo Potter and George B. Emerson, and *Theory and Practice of Teaching* by David P. Page, the latter published in 1847. See: Good & Teller, 1973, op. cit., p. 182.

63 Keeping the details brief, in Canada West, First- and Second-class certificates denote the length of time completed at a normal school. A Third-class certificate meant completion only of an exam and yearly satisfactory teaching reviews. More discussion of these teaching certificates can be found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
ideas on which philosophy of education would be based can be found in these early texts, while increasing institutionalization of the discipline would guide development of the changing technical core.

Early Works

Philosophy in 19th century pedagogy was based on the inspiration of the “Great Educators,” mostly Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Locke, Rousseau, the naturalism of Spencer, and the European Romantics: Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel. Notice that none of these figures were affiliated with universities, and cannot be considered part of later “academic” philosophy. It might be more accurate to say it was their worldviews or demonstrations that led to their personal vision of education. “Academic” philosophy, philosophy from the early universities, came almost exclusively from Germany, such as the work of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche (although Nietzsche was hired as a philologist). Locke, Spencer and Mill were not university professors. Adam Smith and Hume were, but are rarely studied for their educational views, and ironically, like Nietzsche, are more well-known and studied today not for their primary university work—Smith was a moral philosopher yet known today for his economics, and Hume a historian, yet studied as a philosopher. The point is that pedagogy was never rooted in the universities, but would be transplanted there by the turn of the century, especially through the works of the initial occupants of the first Chairs of the science and art of education, and the rise of John Dewey.

While most early works in pedagogy came from Germany, in terms of early English works J. J. Chambliss in his The Origins of American Philosophy of Education writes,

The earliest work on education which may fairly be considered to have a place among the origins of the philosophy of education as a distinct discipline is Joseph Neef’s Sketch of a Plan and Method of Education in 1808.64

Neef, a Scot, was a student of Pestalozzi and has been cited as bringing Pestalozzian education to the United States and aiding its implementation in schools.65 Pestalozzi wrote in German, which few Americans could read, and the resulting school set up in Philadelphia under Neef produced an education far different from that in the Gradgrind-like schools typical of the times. Another Scot, George Jardine, published his Outlines of Philosophical Education in 1818. This text also

resembles a pedagogical work with a focus on curriculum and the practice of teaching. Note the consistent use of “philosophy” in the titles of pedagogical works, still a practical theory, in contrast to how philosophy is considered abstract and “ivory-tower” today. At this time in pedagogy, philosophy lived in the practical. A further Scottish text shows this: James Gall's 1840 *A Practical Enquiry into the Philosophy of Education*. However, mid-20th century texts with similar titles were transformed after philosophy of education became a field institutionalized in faculties of education in the university.

Similar works were produced in Germany via the Romantics: Herbart’s collection in the early 19th century, Froebel's *The Education of Man* in 1826, and several works of Johann K. F. Rosenkranz, a Hegelian idealist. For example, Rosenkranz’s *Paedagogik als System*, originally published in German, was later translated for the United States in 1872. The translator provides this reason for interest in the text:

> too much of our teaching is simply empirical, and as Germany has, more than any other country, endeavored to found it upon universal truths, it is to that country that we must at present look for a remedy for this empiricism. Based as this is upon the profoundest system of German Philosophy, no more suggestive treatise on Education can perhaps be found.\(^{66}\)

The empirical was what was learned by experience in the field, which pedagogy was based upon, but many interested in teacher education at this time were inspiring in teachers a view of the principles behind their craft, sometimes referred to as “universal truths.” Educational literature as teacher preparation textbooks or for later professional development were also a source of these principles. As already mentioned, John Locke was rediscovered in Germany and used toward this goal. This influence can be found in Rosenkranz who, in a Lockean fashion, defined education as the “conscious working of one will on another so as to produce itself in it according to a determinate aim.”\(^{67}\)

In 1886, Rosenkranz’s *Paedagogik* was published with the English title *The Philosophy of Education*, suggesting “systematic pedagogy” was the general area of inquiry for the later field of philosophy of education. This work, and Frobel's *The Education of Man*, were part of Appleton’s *International Education Series* (editor W. T. Harris) compiled in the 1880s for the proliferation of European pedagogy (especially psychology, philosophy, curriculum, and

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\(^{67}\) Ibid, p. 6.
administration of schools) in the United States. Harris, in the editor's preface of Rosenkranz's work, illustrates the entrepreneurial conditions of teachers in this time:

> It is believed that the teacher does not need authority so much as insight in matters of education. When he understands the theory of education and the history of its growth, and has matured his own point of view by careful study of the critical literature of education, then he is competent to select or invent such practical devices as are best adapted to his own wants.\(^{68}\)

Perhaps the first English text with “philosophy of education” in the main title was Thomas Tate's *Philosophy of Education; or, The Principles and Practice of Teaching* published in England in 1857, republished and introduced to American teachers in 1885.\(^{69}\) Somewhat earlier in the United States was Mark Hopkins's *Outline Study of Man, or The Body and Mind in One System* published in 1873 and available in teacher libraries such as in North Hastings listed earlier. The subtitles of both these works reminds us of the German value of synthesis also found in the sample teacher library described earlier, illustrating philosophy's expected synoptic or systematic character and role in teaching, and of philosophy as the glue of theory and practice, always kept together. The first related text in French occurred somewhat later; according to philosopher Jacques Maritain, the first French text with “the subject of education in its relation to philosophy” was de Hovre's *Philosophy and education*, translated from Flemish in 1924.\(^{70}\) This particular work was used as a textbook in the *école normale* as the subtitle stipulates.

The late Victorian era was also important to early pedagogy for the “recovery of the history of educational ideas and philosophy”\(^{71}\) as exemplified in works undertaken to revive the ideas of Plato by Nettleship in 1880, Aristotle by Davidson in 1904, and the Renaissance by Laurie in 1903.\(^{72}\) Perhaps best known at the time in terms of published lectures serving as normal school texts was, in England (and, as we have seen, institute libraries in Canada at least), Joseph Payne's *Lectures on the Arts and Science of Education* (published posthumously in 1880). A


\(^{70}\) de Hovre, F. 1931. *Philosophy and education, the modern educational theories of naturalism, socialism and nationalism: A textbook for normal schools and teachers’ colleges* (E. B. Jordan, trans). New York: Benziger Brothers. The quote from Maritain can be found in the introduction to this English translation.

\(^{71}\) Muir, 1996, op. cit., p. 4.

\(^{72}\) Ibid, p. 5.
similar text in the United States was the previously noted Francis W. Parker's *Talks on Teaching*, based on lectures given in 1882 and published shortly after. Lectures on education by educators and philosophers, transcribed and published as educational materials, would be common in this century and into the next, as shown by the works of Herman Horne.

**Institutionalization of Pedagogy**

These lectures, sometimes first provided at teacher seminars and later published as educational literature, would be often used as textbooks in the early normal schools. As the institutionalization process began in the normal schools, and later in the state regulation of their programs, it is to be expected that these schools move away from the pedagogical-based approach to teacher education. This is predicted by institutional theory. As described by Zucker, organizations are influenced by normative pressures, sometimes arising from external sources such as the state, other times arising from within the organization itself. Under some conditions, these pressures lead the organization to be guided by legitimated elements, from standard operating procedures to professional certification and state requirement, which often have the effect of directing attention away from task performance. Adoption of these legitimated elements, leading to isomorphism with the institutional environment, increases the probability of survival.

This process is exemplified in the initial purposes of teacher education. Consistent with the dominant goal of the “improvement of the common schools,” the first stage and most effective concern was undoubtedly improved selection of the teachers, and only to a small extent changes to the normal school curricula, initially founded on the summer seminars, especially since they shared instructors. Gatekeeping would begin at the local level and later, become magnified through decisions by authorities such as superintendents, trustees and legislators who appropriated the gatekeeping function by admitting or denying passage to prospective teachers on the basis of more exclusive criteria as specified in local and state regulations. Normal schools and their later institutional formats would primarily follow these changing regulations, the “legitimated elements.” While improving teacher education always remained a value, it was never the criterion used to judge or assess a teacher education institution—rather, into the 20th century.

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century, institutional theory predicts the criterion would become the adoption of accrediting standards that dictated the continued survival of a teacher education institution.

To foreshadow the next chapter, this key point, the aim of teacher education being derived from and legitimated by the changing technical core of the organizations pursuing that end, is further illustrated in Sarason, Davidson and Blatt's 1962 *The Preparation of Teachers: An unstudied problem in education*.

The traditional ways in which teachers have been trained barely come to grips with the question of how one maximizes the possibility that a teacher’s practice harmonizes with principles of learning and development. A symptom of this neglect is that educational psychology (as the psychology of learning) is viewed as something which has to do with how children learn and not with how teachers learn. The student in the process of becoming a teacher is not made acutely aware of how he is learning, that is, to utilize himself as a source of understanding of the nature of the learning process. As a result, the teacher does tend to function as a technician who applies rules.76

The craft of teaching was to become a treatment administered to students—the teacher the manager, the students the workers. For example, in the conclusion of a study of teacher communication, the researchers reported the following,

Our data indicate that it is the everyday demands of the institution rather than the long-term goal of socialization that receives emphasis in teacher communication...Generally, children rated conforming to procedure as equal in importance to doing well...The data on teacher communication about the student role and student perceptions of the role paint a picture of the classroom as a workplace, rather than a place designed to enhance the intrinsically motivated pursuit of knowledge.77

These roles for student and teacher would define the technical core in later 20th century teacher education. Student learning outcomes, the student’s work, was the maintenance, the means, to the improvement of the common schools, and the functioning of these schools by the compliance of students and teachers was a means to the ends of creating and supporting public school systems.

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77 The study also found of classroom roles “indicated that the managerial imperatives of classroom life direct teacher communication and are reflected in student thought.” See: Blumenfeld, P. C. & Meece, J. L. 1985. Life in classrooms revisited. *Theory into Practice*, 24(1), 50-56. A further example is a 1980’s study that found teachers rarely revealed to their students the use of the lesson or why it might be interesting, and instead teacher communication tended to focus on student effort and performance, as if on a factory floor. See: Brophy, J., Rohrkeper, M., Rashid, J., & Goldberger, M. 1983. Relationships between teachers’ presentations of classroom tasks and students’ engagement in those tasks. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 75, 544-552.
This technical orientation contrasts with the point made earlier of pedagogy’s focus on the teacher, and his development toward a personal approach to schoolkeeping. The glue of philosophy within pedagogy was meant for a kind of teacher who would be expected to devise his methods for his situation. In addition, the forward of the text just discussed includes a remark indicative of the widening gap between the technical cores of the 19th century and the mid-20th century: “contents and procedures of teacher education frequently have no demonstrable relevance to the actual teaching task” and that criticism of teachers’ college programs from outside the “temple walls” are kept at bay by a “cordon sanitaire.” This is not surprising if survival of teachers’ colleges hangs on satisfying the institutional level by maintaining their state accreditation, as reviewed in the next chapter. The theory requires that isomorphism would set in as all normal schools and their successor teachers’ colleges, increasingly (and supinely) conform to these standards, even if they participate (and they often do) by sending a representative to accreditation policy review meetings. Other considerations beyond the metrics or policies within the accreditation standards become optional as they do not directly confer organizational survival, although metrics such as student satisfaction or later employment success may factor into the school's reputation, positively affecting recruitment. Reputation is a desirable metric to observe, but it is not as crucial as following the accreditation standards, the loss of which would literally discredit the institution, and the students’ goal of receiving a certificate to teach would be disrupted. As normal schools expanded into teachers’ colleges, their regulatory governance (as part of the institutional level) would rapidly increase in scope and number, and continue to increase as they would eventually grow into faculties and departments of education in the universities as the twentieth century matured.

Summary

As remarked by sociologist Peter Berger, ideas “do not succeed in history by virtue of their truth but by virtue of their relationship to specific social processes.” While this is an ominous idea—we would like to think that the truth always wins in the end despite any adversity

79 More interest groups would be created over the next half century which teacher education institutions must observe, including teacher unions, various state agencies, and private sector interest groups, such as parent groups. Very few groups would have the power to revoke a college’s accreditation, however all groups have their own ability to disrupt.
or clinging to tradition—it suggests that certain ideas become widespread or legitimated because of their endorsement by various social and institutional structures. As these structures change, so would the relationship to the ideas which operate the structures. Pedagogy in 19th century North America and Britain which I characterized as schoolkeeping, is the historical lineage of modern teacher education: it survived as the method of teacher training only while teachers remained fairly decentralized in their practice and employment. The precarious conditions of teaching at the time required a great deal of flexibility and judgement in their practice. In terms of their employment, the schools would multiply and enlarge, and so would those who governed them: from local trustees, to county inspectors and district superintendents, and later corporate school boards governing complex, integrated K-12 systems. The teacher institutes of the 19th century would themselves transform into associations and unions, and educational literature would be formalized by central authorities. As the grammar schools disappeared, methods courses would appear in the universities designed for secondary teachers destined for the new high schools, and while transitioning from the initial entry requirement of a university degree with a few methods courses to specialized subject-based preservice programs, they, too, would be institutionalized into teachers’ colleges alongside their elementary counterparts. All these changes to the governance and associations of teachers restructured the terms and means of their entry into teaching with an increasingly narrow, collaborative, and sometimes specialist role in the education of the young.

While teachers in the 20th century became responsible for the whole process of school teaching, guided by philosophies devised to meet this synthetic and inspirational need, there were few such official policies for nineteenth century teachers to look to or conform to. Rather they sought out the “Great Educators,” either through their professional literature, their meetings with colleagues at the institutes, or instructors in the seminars or normal schools inspired by them. Education was always part of a moral endeavor— teachers believed that with the right early child experiences, either parochial or based on the philosophy held, they would be contributing to a better (or less sinful) world.

During this time, governments created new educational arrangements. Normal schools were established with the explicit purpose of supporting the still young common schools. To this end, their first task was to guard entry to foster a more competent and moral future teaching profession. The rising public perception of good teachers would both increase public support and
combat truancy in the common schools. These embryonic teachers’ colleges embraced the diversity of pedagogy promoted through the teacher seminars, institutes and libraries that had become bases of professional learning across the land, providing teachers with ideas and principles from which they forged their practice. This is where philosophy of education existed in an implicit, banal state, and as part of teaching culture it held an inescapably important place in the preparation of teachers at this time. The later field of philosophy of education became institutionalized as a delineated subject as the components of the culture and early education of teachers was broken up into courses provided in the university setting. The loss of the “glue” that is philosophy in pedagogy would have to be replaced by the rail spikes of government policy.

The next chapter will continue the story of philosophy in pedagogy and teacher education from the turn of the century through to the end of World War II. The study of education would be born here, and various “educational” fields constructed, some of them grouped as “foundations” to retain the idea of écoles normale providing “principles.” The teachers’ colleges, often now affiliated with, but not yet part of, universities, would split and academize the subjects within pedagogy for study. The philosophy that was the glue of pedagogy would be transformed and replaced, for a short time, with academic philosophy and, likewise, the textbooks would show a clear transition\(^81\) from philosophy in pedagogy to philosophy of education. John Dewey played an essential part in this process, as well as helping to narrow philosophy in the teachers’ colleges to a new philosophy of pragmatism which resonated well with what would become the “new teacher.”

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\(^{81}\) The very large two volume textbook entitled *Readings in the foundations of education* produced by Teachers College, Columbia, perhaps the most influential teachers’ college in the world, shows a clear borrowing of both pedagogy and academic philosophy. It will be reviewed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

University-affiliated Teachers’ Colleges and Academic Philosophy

*For by Art is created that great Leviathan . . . which is but an Artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which, the Sovereignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.*

~ Hobbes

By the turn of the 20th century, the stabilized normal schools had spread throughout the Commonwealth and the United States. The quest for a professional teaching body seemed to be on the right track, initially due to gatekeeping: changing who teachers were. Entry standards would continue to rise to eventually mimic the nearby university, implicating secondary (grammar) school teachers as well. The more scrupulously selected candidates were increasingly prepared to manage a wider net of associations within larger schools, and encouraged to aspire to professional expectations somewhat in line with the successful outcomes of the Flexner Report,¹ which had redesigned the medical profession, the rising legitimacy of teachers generating claims to higher social status and living standards. It was expected that superior remuneration would make this process come full circle by displacing the transients and attracting a dedicated, higher class of people into teaching, sealing the profession.

This chapter will continue the history of the institutionalization process of teacher education, from, as previously described, seminars to normal schools and now, to university-affiliated teachers’ colleges. This institutionalization process paralleled the rise of the study of education, as a field, to replace the practical theory of pedagogy. It would begin to fragment conceptions of teaching by infusing the new psychology and established academic subjects into ITPPs, a process that required the introduction and socialization of new groups of academics to replace the veteran teachers who had formed the instructional corps of normal schools. As a result, a re-balancing of the forms of knowledge constituting this new “study of education” would create a new science of education,² in which philosophy would never again be dominant.

² One of the early proponents of a “science” of education was James Gall, writing in 1840: “the first object of the philosopher would be to take a comprehensive view of his whole subject, and endeavour to separate the substances in Nature according to their great leading characteristics.” This description reveals a transition to the approach of inquiry, keeping both the aspects of synthesis, the whole, and analysis, the parts. See Gall, J. 1840, op. cit., p. 33.
and pedagogy was relegated to its practitioners. The rise of John Dewey’s influence and legacy in American education is unmistakable and profound: he would bridge the conversion of pedagogy into the universities as the study of education, narrow the pluralism of philosophy in pedagogy into (American) pragmatic philosophy which would dominate the new ITPP instructors, and expand the use of psychology in teacher education curricula. Dewey’s influence, combined with the new science of education, would antiquate (German) pedagogy which had filled the curriculum of normal schools. Whether this era saw the emergence of the field of philosophy of education is contentious, but more confidently, its precursors, professors of philosophy (and early psychology) recruited to lecture in teachers’ colleges and supervise doctoral pedagogy students would secure philosophy of education’s clear existence in the next institutional step, university departments, schools, and faculties of education, the subject of the following chapter.

**From Normal Schools to Teachers’ Colleges**

By the end of the nineteenth century, normal schools had become a standard part of American, British and Canadian education for elementary teacher training. North America (especially the eastern coast of America) was urbanizing and spreading west beyond the frontier, and so were its schools: schoolhouses expanded to larger schools with multiple teachers as truancy declined, which supported a strengthened hierarchy of administration in the form of principals and local superintendents who would replace county inspectors. Fee-based private schools lost dominance, and their buildings and students transferred to the common schools. Expansion required greater numbers of staff at every level of education, especially to administer the burgeoning urban public education systems, including the instructors of these teachers and administrators for each level. Those working at all of these levels needed to be trained, designated, professionalized, and managed, constituting an expanded task set for the technical core of the new teachers’ colleges which were expected to handle the new needs of the education

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3 In case the reader is unfamiliar with Canadian history, Upper Canada, named in 1791, refers to the very southern part of the modern province of Ontario in Canada. It was renamed to Canada West from 1841 until “confederation” in 1867 which formed the Dominion of Canada, and the area of “Canada West” was enlarged and renamed to the province of Ontario. All reference to this region will use the historically accurate name, yet refer to the same basic region.
system which now supported the “public” schools, and soon, the high schools, which developed from the common and grammar schools.

Those few who did seek out further education in the normal schools in place of the disappearing teacher seminars\(^4\) were part of the first steps toward this higher educational attainment. It was believed that better teachers, trained in the normal schools, would foster better students who would supply better future teachers.\(^5\) Further education received by way of new university degree requirements for common school teachers (soon renamed to public school teachers) would also implicate the grammar school teachers (soon replaced by high school teachers).\(^6\) These grammar school teachers would be asked to join their lower school counterparts to create a new public school teaching profession. It is important to therefore take a slight diversion to describe and introduce secondary school teachers, the other half of what would comprise a future public teaching profession. More will be said on the topic of secondary school teachers, in the context of Ontario, in Chapter five.

**Secondary School Teachers**

As might be said of any product or service, grammar schools and their teachers varied in quality, reflected in part in the wide range of fees that were asked per pupil.\(^7\) Many grammar schools were glorified common schools, and catered to parents who would not send their children to the charity “public” schools but would patronize a cheap grammar school with the hope of raising the class and quality of their child’s education. But those who commanded the highest fees were the most acclaimed grammar school teachers—they were found in urban areas and were highly educated from Europe; in a sense, their craft originated from the sophists, tutors, and philosophers of Ancient Greece. Because of their role in early knowledge, we now call their operative territory the “classics,” and to this day while it is still studied in the university,

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4 Note that the teacher seminars which were discontinued to become part of the program of a new normal school had been provided by state educational authorities, such as a traveling headmaster or normal school instructor. Various associations of teachers who met voluntarily continued.

5 Perhaps the best indicator of the performance of public education is the capabilities of prospective teacher candidates.

6 In Ontario as authorized by the common school act of 1871.

7 Gidney and Millar estimate the cost in the 1840s in Upper Canada to be between 10 shillings to 3 pounds per quarter per pupil in the grammar schools. The cost of (grant-aided) common school attendance at this time ranged between free and just under 4 shillings. See Gidney, R. D. & Millar, W. P. J. 1990. *Inventing secondary education: The rise of the high school in nineteenth-century Ontario*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p. 61. By the common school act of 1871 introduced by Ryerson, all common schools became “free and compulsory,” and were renamed as public schools, and state-aided grammar schools became high schools.
instruction in Latin or Green in lower school programs has become quite rare. This tradition throughout since ancient times was the craft of 19th century grammar school teachers, some fluent in such languages, by default held university degrees largely from the old world, and operated the fee-based grammar schools. These schools were largely unregulated until the mid-19th century when some struggling grammar schools agreed to be inspected in order to receive state grants to subsidize their operations. Many fee-based schools, both common and grammar, accepted this arrangement and came under the jurisdiction of Public Boards, acquiring steadier income in exchange for conforming to inspection and regulation. As an example, in the United States by the 1920s, most independent American grammar schools had closed and converted to state high schools, but a few successful fee-based schools, often due to a notable headmaster, remained.

Successful grammar school teachers also held much prestige in their cities, deriving patronage from the upper classes. They were often priests who also ran the local parish, or were scholars, holding the regard of college professors, with whom some partnered in their scholarship. Part of their role was to inculcate morals, as can be shown from an 1856 manual,

> Each Head Master and Teacher of a Grammar School shall…daily exert his best endeavors, by example and precept, to impress upon the minds of the pupils the principles and morals of the Christian Religion, especially those virtues of piety, truth, patriotism, and humanity, which are the basis of law and freedom, and the cement and ornament of society.  

They were relatively unregulated for almost all of their existence, and instead were self-governing and judged by their prospective clientele who sought an “elite” European-style education similar to their own for their sons. This general goal also applied to the grant-aided grammar schools. As Day recounts,

> As for the qualifications of Grammar School teachers, it was generally assumed that their academic standing was such as to put their ability beyond question . . . [Thus they] did

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8 *Educational manual for Upper Canada: Appendix A.* (n. a.). 1856. Toronto: Thompson & Co., p. 103. While these societal values may have been inculcated into university-bound students in the 19th century, in our (post-)modern diversely religious and non-religious multicultural society, such an assumption—that these ideas are held universally as values, and students are familiar with their origins in classic texts—is unlikely to be well preserved. This is compounded by implicit normative claims in teacher “professional standards” manuals. While it may have been sufficient in this 1856 manual to state their values openly as supported by a Judeo-Christian society, in today’s more diverse circumstances, the same expectation of a universal moral ethic in which to support professional standards may be a mistake.
not have to be examined and certified by an intermediate authority as did common school teachers.⁹

Surely an “intermediate authority,” such as local trustees or boards, would not be appropriate judges of Latin or Greek proficiency, but often those patronizing this superior education could judge, having had the same education in their youth. Such client judgement was less available to the average Canadian or American settler who likely could read but were less likely to write, so that judging the basic literacy of common school teachers fell to trustees and school inspectors who were more likely to be literate than the commoner. As noted, however, by the mid-19th century many grammar schools accepted grants from the government, and henceforth were inspected for adequate buildings, student complement, and certificated instructors.

As most grammar schools became dependent on grants by the early 20th century, their transition to public high schools began. Grammar schools were not “public” in the sense of equal access—they were neither “free” nor “compulsory”—and state authorities planned to replace them with common high schools which would eventually be “free and compulsory.” The adoption of public high schools also coincided with raising the mandatory schooling age to fill them. It is perhaps obvious to note that “teacher preparation” of grammar school teachers did not include pedagogy or education-type courses, and were exclusively academic-orientated, a general liberal education without consideration to practice or application. And so even into the 20th century, the ITPPs for secondary teachers destined for the new public high schools retained this model, siding with university liberal arts training,¹⁰ with perhaps a course or two in education methods, while most elementary ITPPs were teaching-orientated (including remedial) sourced from the normal schools which later became teachers’ colleges. Eventually, both approaches would be merged: the modern period requires both elementary and high school teachers to have a university degree and attend a combined program in university settings, with some programs being consecutive and some concurrent, the latter often provided by liberal arts colleges which offer teacher education programs. Overall, for most of their history, elementary teachers were trained outside the university using a pedagogical model, akin to the education and

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¹⁰ This point was argued by Adler for all teachers. He writes: “Teaching is an art and a teacher must be trained, but since the technique is one of communicating knowledge and inculcating discipline, it is not educational psychology and courses in method and pedagogy which train a teacher, but the liberal arts. A good teacher must be a liberal artist.” From Adler, M. J. 1939. Tradition and progress in education. *The Social Frontier*, 5(42), 140-145.
status of early childhood educators today, whereas the preparation of grammar and then high school teachers had begun in the university. As a result, the former was changed substantially while the latter’s programs, creating the high school teachers, were only modified as the programs became merged in a single institution.

In summary, the grammar school teachers could be seen as representing an ideal for a future merged profession of teachers. They were more likely to be academically-oriented, more connected to and filtered by the clergy and higher society, beyond minimum literacy skills due to a college A.B. degree, recipients of higher pay and usually resident in urban settings, making them more reliable and less migratory, with intrinsic prestige and access to higher society. In short, many of the qualities sought after in fashioning a profession of teachers were already a part, by nature, of the occupation of grammar school teachers. The challenge was whether these qualities could be produced from the institutions and central authorities now being developed to govern the creation of the new public schools, and whether these qualities could be retained in the new high schools. At the same time, the high school teacher was trained to be far more specialized than the grammar school teacher who was historically a generalist. While this concern for maintaining these “grammar school” qualities and strengths would, for now, be relegated to their separate ITPPs, by the mid-20th century, many programs were merged, offering one ITPP with both common and separate courses for elementary and high schools governed by the requirements needed to obtain each certificate. This particular merger also necessitated a merged institution, raising the question of what form it should take, which will now be discussed.

The Form of the Teachers’ Colleges

Separate institutions for elementary and high school ITPPs would persist to the mid-20th century, and in Ontario until the 1970s. Early high school ITPPs followed a traditional liberal arts program, the host university or college tolerating only a handful of pedagogy courses as a compromise both to the liberal arts faculty and the various state authorities which required them.

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11 As Gidney and Millar note, “compared to their colleagues in the elementary schools, or indeed, to society at large, high school teachers were a highly educated group of men and women. In 1890, almost all headmasters and 64 per cent of all [secondary] teachers held university degrees.” See: Gidney & Millar, 1990, p. 300.
12 For example, the phenomena of “transients” did not afflict the grammar schools as it did the common schools.
14 Ibid, p. 17. Woodring argues this merger of the “two philosophies” of public and high school teacher training was an “unsuccessful marriage,” since the former, at the time, emphasized the whole child, and the latter the intellect.
Overall, the vast majority of course hours were spent in the standard liberal arts.\textsuperscript{15} The low status of pedagogy common among American university faculty at this time, especially its presidents, was illustrated by a remark of Charles W. Eliot, president at Harvard: “Most teachers in England and the United States feel but slight interest or confidence in what is ordinarily called pedagogy.”\textsuperscript{16} Much of pedagogy at the time was imported from Herbart’s works—German pedagogy (as outlined in the previous chapter) for a time was the key research center of education, John Dewey also contributing several papers to the National Herbart Society.

Introducing ITPPs into the universities meant offering pedagogical courses, but their inclusion was met with fierce opposition and a compromise was needed.

This issue came to a head at the 1889 meeting of the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools in the form of a debate between a renowned psychologist and several university presidents.\textsuperscript{17} The result was not inclusion but affiliated segregation—the development of a “higher normal school,” which later became the prototypical state teachers’ colleges in the United States. These were initially only authorized to grant degrees in pedagogy, but soon would be expanded to offer four year programs and grant bachelor of arts degrees against the protests of liberal arts colleges.\textsuperscript{18} But crucially and definitively they were initially restricted to offering high school teacher training only. These institutions attracted new kinds of academics, initially traditionally trained, but later trained by these teacher education institutions themselves to fill an expanding system of higher education in the post-World War II period.

The fact that history and philosophy were already established as departments in universities (with early psychology still part of philosophy at this time) became the arts portion of the study of pedagogy, and tightly coupled to the resources controlled by these departments,

\textsuperscript{15} An historical irony must be pointed out. In the 19th century, the prestigious grammar school teachers were already required to have an A.B. degree. These degrees (now called B.A.) were historically teaching degrees, granting privileges to teach at universities. For the university to now condemn “teaching degrees” would seem ironic, being their prior business, however universities would also begin favoring their research orientation over their historical teaching orientation during the century. On this issue see Swift, F. H. 1920. The teachers’ baccalaureate. TCR, 21(1), 25–50.

\textsuperscript{16} Eliot, C. W. Report of the US Commissioner of Education, 1890-1891, II, p. 1076. Eliot would become part of the 1892 “Committee of Ten” (formed by the NEA) which sought to forge a consensus of the aims and philosophy of the American high school in order to standardize its curriculum.

\textsuperscript{17} In the affirmative was G. Stanley Hall and against the proposition of inclusion were university presidents Timothy Dwight (Yale) and Charles W. Eliot (Harvard).

\textsuperscript{18} This phenomenon has often been referred to as “academic drift.” See Harwood, J. 2010. Understanding academic drift: On the institutional dynamics of higher technical and professional education. Minerva, 48(4), 413-427.
while the practical business of school teaching\textsuperscript{19} remained mainly outside the universities until the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century. Overall, the development of programs to award doctorates of pedagogy was a first institutional step for education as a field entering the university, but Chairs with the title of philosophy of education would not arise until the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{20} The universities would salvage what they could from pedagogy, but ultimately pull apart its various scientific and artistic aspects for study via pre-existing resources vested in departments of history, philosophy, and later psychology, which was most prominent in the United States, and sociology in Britain.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, Dewey would predict this transition from pedagogy to educational theory.

The stream of European philosophical thought arose as a theory of educational procedure. This fact is eloquent witness to the intimate connection of philosophy and education . . . [I]n the course of two or three generations [philosophy was] cut loose from [its] original educational setting . . . [and] became an independent branch of inquiry into matters of theory apart from practice.\textsuperscript{22}

The fact of the origins of philosophy of education aside, the splitting of pedagogy into the separate topics of educational theory and educational practice was also part of the transition from the “schoolkeeping” curricula of the normal schools to the “teaching” curricula of the universities. It is important to keep in mind, nonetheless, that pedagogy was widely discussed in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century among teachers and within the normal schools in the form of teacher institutes, associations, magazines, and through professional development activities offered by principals or headmasters of normal or grammar schools. The universities and state education departments would attempt to institutionalize this collaboration into university-led fields which would impose rigor and methodology on research into (public) education. As an example, several state teacher journals would merge to form the (New England) \textit{Journal of Education} in 1875, the oldest surviving journal of education. The form teacher education would take was in one part its legacy

\textsuperscript{19} While most teacher education institutions offered “practice teaching” in the form of peer teaching (small group or lectures to adults in the institution), it would be some time before teachers would be sent out to teach children in schools alongside an associate teacher as part of their “practice teaching” or “practicum” as it is known today. The exceptions were the model schools, and Dewey’s experiments with an attached “laboratory” school for practice teaching and pioneering new techniques.


\textsuperscript{21} R. S. Peters would characterize this early form of the study of education as the “undifferentiated mush of educational theory,” the first phase of making education into an academic discipline. The next phase in the 1960s would study education as if it were interdisciplinary, identifying “problems” of education to be answered by the various fields native to the university. See Peters, R. S. 1973. Education as an academic discipline. \textit{British Journal of Educational Studies}, 21(2), 202–211.

as pedagogy, and one part what is appropriate for a university setting. A research institute can devote itself to a single philosophy’s ideas, as was the case for many teacher associations whether for Pestalozzi or Herbart. In contrast, university faculty are less likely to conform to the view of a single thinker, especially as a group, approaching a topic such as education from different fields. They are furthermore expected to provide research conducted under agreed-upon methods to reach conclusions which can be retested or analyzed to cohere to similar work.

While the founding of university Chairs of pedagogy began the proliferation of education and philosophy of education content in the universities, by far the most significant step for the future development of the higher study of education was the founding of “Teachers College” at Columbia University in 1892 . . . [I]t took leadership at [the graduate] level in creating a research literature in the history, philosophy, and science of education which had been so greatly lacking in the nineteenth century.²³

Teachers College at Columbia led the way in terms of education research, teacher education, and later education policy, including providing off-campus facilities and study groups in the United States and abroad.²⁴ Its journal, Teachers College Record, established in 1900, remains a top education research journal. John Dewey would join the College in 1904 from Chicago until his retirement in 1930. During this time, a revised course syllabus at Teachers College used John A. MacVannel’s Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of Education, published in 1912 as a “pioneer” textbook for nearly a decade.²⁵

The College later produced a hefty two volume textbook for teacher education programs across the country, entitled Readings in the Foundations of Education edited by Harold Rugg. Volume two contains a self-contained teacher education syllabus, likened to a course in pedagogy, with constant reference to and introduction of academic philosophical readings. The sections of the book have been listed in Table 3 below, and further details of Part I, entitled


²⁵Chambless, 1968, op. cit., p. 106 would also confirm this, stating that by 1913 philosophy of education as a “discipline was firmly established in the minds of serious students of education.”
“World roots of the American democratic outlook,” which is most concerned with philosophy, have been provided in the next two columns.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Table 3}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Sections (Parts I-V) & Selected Headings / Topics in Part I* only & Selected Authors (corresponding to headings/topics in previous column) \\
\hline
Part I)* World Roots of the American Democratic Outlook: Building a Philosophy of Life and Education & 1) Worldview of Christendom & 1) Santayana \\
American Democratic Philosophy: Building a & 2-5) Greek philosophy and Christianity & 2-5) Plato, Aquinas \\
Education & 6) Humanism & Tawney \\
Part III)* Art: Developing the Creative and Appreciative Process in America & 8) Evolution Worldview & 8) Reisner \\
Education & 9) Materialism & 9) G. W. Gray \\
Control of Schools (including teacher organizations) & 11) American Philosophy, Pragmatism & 11) G. H. Mead, James, Peirce, Dewey \\
Part V)* Administration and Control of Schools (including teacher organizations) & 12) Criticisms of Pragmatism & 12) Rugg \\
& 13) Current Issues in Religion & 13) F. E. Johnson \\
& 14) Democracy and Crisis & 14) none listed \\
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\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{26} It should be noted that all parts of volume two contain philosophical readings and topics, but providing a full listing was considered too onerous; the interested reader should look further for himself.
The two-volume work contains key readings from Dewey and others in philosophy of education, other fields such as sociology, psychology, school administration, as well as a statement from the American Federation of Teachers. There is no doubt that Teachers College made considerable efforts to monopolize and lead the direction of education research, and provide a model for effective programs.

The progressive and democratic outlook of Teachers College at Columbia, including the founding of *The New School for Social Research* in New York by Dewey and others at Columbia, emphasized a particular kind of philosophy of education grounded in a clear vision for social progress. This would combat other influences in American education, such as idealism from A. N. Whitehead and H. H. Horne, and Herbert Spencer’s naturalism from across the Atlantic, all for the purpose of influencing social reform through America’s growing system of national education rooted, in large part, in Horace Mann’s early efforts.\(^{27}\) As a result, the still young field of education developing close to the universities had its infancy closely associated with the status of mass public schooling, a consequence which illustrates how the field’s aims and purposes were devoted not to education writ large, but to education as an emerging public institution. Muir accurately captures this when he points out, “Dewey’s conception of philosophy of education was limited to the study of contemporary schooling.”\(^{28}\) This would be an anti-Victorian movement in the sense of turning away from the study of the history of educational ideas often found in pedagogy in order to focus on the future via “progressivism,” making the United States’ origins of philosophy of education quite different from that of Britain, and wholly alien to the German tradition. Also, the influential role of religion in many of the educational views of the time cannot be ignored, and yet it would recede from this role at the turn of the 20th century, recoiling from both the rise of science and the secularization of public institutions.\(^{29}\) Philosophy would only fill in for religion\(^{30}\) for a short while, having considerable status in secular universities. It slowly displaced religion as the implicit normative framework of education as the secularization of society continued apace through the twentieth century.

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\(^{29}\) It is possible that secularization also led to a decline of philosophy at the level of teachers’ work, part of the guidance of teachers. More traditional philosophical readings are commonly found in parochial teacher training to this day, but have been lost from modern teacher training, including John Dewey being less known and studied.

\(^{30}\) Religious schools (sometimes called separate schools) still exist, and (private) religious teachers’ colleges as well, where religion is the intrinsic framework, and its teachers study philosophy and religion in a more traditional way than those in secular institutions.
In institutions, other than the lone teachers’ colleges, Chairs of pedagogy were eventually enlarged and converted to departments of education, or became subdivisions in psychology or philosophy departments in the host university,\(^\text{31}\) especially as universities began to assume a greater responsibility in teacher training. However, while most state university faculties sneered at anything related to pedagogy (despite the most renowned philosophers of Plato, Aristotle and Kant engaging with the topic), the “oldest private universities” in the United States became some of the first to establish departments of education, including Harvard (1901) and Columbia (1892), with only the public institutions at Michigan (1879) and Iowa (1890) preceding these.\(^\text{32}\)

Overall, it was “early in the twentieth century educational philosophy began to find a comfortable and conventional place in a college curriculum that was designed to prepare teachers.”\(^\text{33}\)

These institutions and future ones that began to proliferate across the country were surrounded in a web of associations, most of which were teacher associations based on various pedagogies. Over time and especially by the first quarter of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century, many of these associations would consolidate to form larger more powerful groups, and while never holding exclusive power, these state and national associations began to influence basic standards for the improvement of public schooling.

**The Effects of National Accreditation and Professional Agencies**

Besides the starting place offered by normal school curricula for teacher education, another part of the reason for the borrowing from normal schools to inform the teachers’ colleges was sourced in rising accreditation and professional agencies. The rationale for securing national standards was part of the new “scientific management”\(^\text{34}\) sweeping many aspects of the expanding management of school and teacher activities, including outcome measurements. The gathering of data important to the monitoring of education systems for schoolboards as well as for any existing state or national oversight or planning needs was first the responsibility of

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\(^\text{31}\) Brubacher, 1966, op. cit.
\(^\text{34}\) Callahan, R. 1962. *Education and the cult of efficiency*. Chicago: UCP. This is also the time when the “school survey movement began.” See Good & Teller, 1970, op. cit.
appointed inspectors. However, by 1917\textsuperscript{35} in the United States programs were designed in teacher education institutions to train and educate superintendents beyond their predecessor, the inspector, to forge new administrative roles.

The most influential American professional association was the National Education Association (NEA). Born in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century it steadily gained influence by consolidating smaller local teacher associations of the time and taking on the professional affairs of the nation. It had little influence until after the Second World War period, having only ten thousand members before World War I.\textsuperscript{36} Still, as early as 1908 the NEA “encourage[d] the transformation of normal schools into teachers colleges,” as well as advocating for the training of elementary and secondary teachers to be combined.\textsuperscript{37} Overall, its main function other than holding yearly conferences, was in disseminating a great deal of literature widely read by classroom teachers, and providing data and reports to administrators on national trends and “best practices.”\textsuperscript{38}

Another agency was the American Association of Teachers Colleges (AATC) founded in 1926 by merging a department of normal schools in the NEA and the National Council of Normal School Presidents. The AATC developed and released standards for teachers’ colleges, including entrance requirements, program content, proper libraries, training schools, building standards, and recommended financial support. These agencies, and other state groups provided benchmarks for the new teachers’ colleges.\textsuperscript{39} These standards would also have the side-effect of generalizing the programs across the country through a process of coercive isomorphism,\textsuperscript{40} since programs will start to become more similar across institutions as they comply with increasing regulations and standards enforced by a state or provincial educational body. Failure to observe these requirements, even if divergence would improve task performance, would cause a program to suffer “institutionally,” in that it would risk acquiring a “pariah status” by losing legitimacy

\textsuperscript{35} Pierce, P. R. 1935. \textit{The origins and development of the public school principalship}. Chicago: UCP. Also see Reller, T. L. 1935. \textit{The development of the city superintendency of schools in the United States}. Philadelphia: Author. For the Canadian context, see Allison & Wells, 1989, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{37} Brubacher, 1966, op. cit., p. 486.

\textsuperscript{38} Cremin, 1961, op. cit., p. 275.

\textsuperscript{39} A few institutions would champion their own methods, such as Teachers College at Columbia—to lead so as to resist being led—also notably the Catholic colleges offering teacher education would also remain independent. Their success at remaining independent was due to having separate denominational schools which catered to Catholic college graduates.

and even a loss of its accreditation with larger state or national educational agencies.\(^{41}\)

Furthermore, prospective students are likely most interested in gaining a recognized teaching certificate in order to seek employment with a school board. Therefore, the ITPP’s selling point becomes less their reputation as an institution or their university affiliation, but rather their accredited status with the state or province issuing licenses to teach. As pointed out by Max Weber,

> every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally.\(^{42}\)

This is what is meant by the kind of legitimacy: teacher education institutions’ most effective legitimacy is their accreditation and, according to Weber, this basic fact establishes the institutions “type of obedience” and the managerial level tasked to secure it. At the same time, while the United States has never had mandatory national teacher education standards, institutional compliance is secured via funding tied to meeting state or national standards, effectively making adherence mandatory for most institutions dependent on public funding via per-student subsidies. This framework secures the institution, maintained through funding and recognition of their certificates, within the larger education system, which places teacher education institutions into the role of supplying approved teachers. The links in this system also illustrate how the original technical core of teacher education, that of support of public schools, is secured.

Returning to the concept of isomorphism, institutional level pressure weaves sameness across institutions because, in a way, it is part of the technical core of the institution. Typically, identity is fashioned within the technical core, this identity being the support of the public schools by way of providing authorized, legitimate certificates recognized by the local school boards that employ teachers. Since the institutional level contains an accreditation force which can strip identity, it effectively pressures the institution to a far greater extent than any other

\(^{41}\) A variant of classic institutional theory is neoinstitutional theory which proposes that institutions are not victims of their institutional level, rather there is a relationship between the two and both can change the other. While this is possible and has occurred as higher education developed teacher education programs, it does not suggest teacher education institutions are on equal footing to negotiate their programs, especially when one can effectively close the other.

institutional level force can, whether a parental group or teachers’ union. In other words, save for an elite institution such as Teachers College at Columbia, which stands on its own by going above established standards in order to claim even further legitimacy than the standard, the identity of nearly all teacher education institutions is completely dependent on maintaining their accredited status. However, the managerial level is not helpless, and can suppress or adjust these forces somewhat by *decoupling*, which will be explored further in the latter parts of this chapter. Accreditng agencies regulate teacher education curricula, and their withdrawal of support for explicit philosophical coursework in teacher education must, inevitably, lead to attrition of philosophy in ITPPs. Loss of philosophy coursework lessens the need for philosophers of education—in name—in the faculty, even if work using philosophy in teachers’ college is inalienable. Before addressing these standards, it is necessary to review how prototype courses in philosophy of education looked in the first university-affiliated ITPPs which came into being before coercive standards existed.

The Curriculum of University-affiliated Teacher Education Programs

Several examples of teacher education curriculum from the United States will be offered in an attempt to provide a general picture of how philosophy-of-education-type content was delivered in these new institutions. Recall in the normal schools discussed in the previous chapter, besides the remedial work, philosophy was the guiding, animating framework of schoolkeeping, especially as evidenced in the German pedagogy which inspired its instructors.

The general expectation of teaching throughout the 19th century was operating a rural

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43 At best, a parental group can pressure their representatives, who only have arms-length influence into state accreditation policy. A teachers’ union can dissuade its members from accepting practicum placements in their classrooms. While these are inconveniences and amount to public relations concerns, they are far from as devastating as would be a loss of accreditation status, which at worst would close the teachers’ college, or more likely, cause trustees to restructure or discipline vigilante faculty to secure adherence to state standards.

44 This point is made by Oliver, 1997, who argues that the ability of managers to negotiate and adapt to their institution’s institutional level can be considered part of an institution’s competitive advantage. See Oliver, C. 1997. Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and resource-based views. *Strategic Management Journal, 13*, 163-187.

45 The case in Ontario is somewhat different, and its history will be outlined in Chapter 5 as the context for the Althouse College case.

46 Pedagogy associations (meetings often gender segregated, as was common in teacher education, and elementary (female) and secondary (male) school staffs until the mid-20th century) were very much the culture of educators at the time. For instance, in 1892, a celebration was held in various parts of Europe and the United States for the 300th anniversary of the birth of Czech educator Comenius, stimulating formation of the Comenius Society which in a variety of forms, still exists today. In fact, Harvard University, back in 1654, had offered Comenius the position of president. See *The Harvard Crimson* (no author), 1892, February 25. The Comenius Celebrations.
schoolhouse with meager resources; teachers were trained to be independent missionaries of literacy and numeracy. Now, into the 20th century, teachers could often expect to teach in a classroom in a school supported by colleagues and administrators, and tasked with an expanded curricular and social mandate beyond literacy and numeracy: this was especially so for the new high school teachers. This kind of teacher needed a different kind of teacher education, and this is what was to be designed and forged in the new university-affiliated teachers’ colleges.

The University of Chicago provides an important exemplar for the purposes of presenting what this new kind of teacher education looked like in a new institution, rather than examining grafted institutions of “higher” normal schools or re-purposed colleges. The university was founded in 1890 and began its first programs in 1892, which included a department of pedagogy. Its first president, William R. Harper, held the common opinion among academics of being “not very impressed with the utility of courses in pedagogy,” yet established a department to attract students to the new university and appeal to donors who at the time were highly concerned with improving the public schools of Chicago.

John Dewey joined the university in 1894, and was to head both the department of pedagogy and the combined department of philosophy and psychology. For the pedagogy department’s first two years, teaching staff were borrowed from the department of philosophy. In addition, Harper’s views of educational reform had developed, and by Dewey’s arrival in July Harper had already assumed a “highly prominent role in the major campaign then underway by leading citizens and powerful civic groups to radically change public education in Chicago.”

This thrust of activism seemed to have triggered Dewey’s own interest, particularly given that he had few publications on education at this time. Harper would also direct university funds to

47 An important historical fact separates the USA and Canada here. The USA in the late 19th and early 20th centuries accepted countless immigrants which tended to cluster on the east coast, leading to greater urbanization and thus school systems, whereas immigrants to Canada were more often given land and sent out to rural areas, supporting schoolhouses. This would accelerate the need for new teachers in the United States, and sustain the “schoolkeeper” in Canada well into the 20th century. This also followed the differences in mass government expansion of the high schools in the United States in the 1930s, in Britain after World War II, and in Canada in the 1950s and 1960s.


49 Ibid, p. 15. According to Benson et al., Dewey was not Harper’s first choice, but with recommendation from an already hired member of the department who was a previous colleague of Dewey’s, he was hired to head the philosophy department. Appointment to the head of the pedagogy department, as discouraging as it is, was likely a result of justifying Dewey’s requested salary to transfer to Chicago. However, Dewey’s prestigious status as a professor of philosophy, in Harper’s mind, would boost Harper’s goals for the department and Chicago’s public schools.

50 Ibid.
create an academic journal focused on research in pedagogy for the public schools. When opposition mounted from trustees, Harper radically argued that “as a university we are interested above all else in pedagogy.”\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, in line with what Dewey would later champion, Harper argued as follows: (1) “Education is the basis of all democratic progress. The problems of education are, therefore, the problems of democracy;”\textsuperscript{52} and (2) “Through the school system, the character of which, in spite of itself, the university determines and in a large measure controls . . . [F]or from [universities] proceeds the teachers or the teachers’ teachers.”\textsuperscript{53} The leadership of Harper would set the stage for Dewey’s own work in education, and certainly initiated many of the reforms in Chicago. With Dewey’s mounting influence in the area of education, Harper provided needed advocacy for moving the conditions of teaching into the territory of the university, if not yet in scholarship, certainly in the university’s expanded role contributing to social progress within the American university-affiliated teachers’ colleges and university departments of pedagogy.

**John Dewey and Retooling Pedagogy**

John Dewey’s early works are an important historical note for this thesis because of the timing of his work, his prominence as an American philosopher,\textsuperscript{54} and his influence in progressive education reform. The kind of new ITPP that was being designed at the turn of the century is in part due to Dewey’s influence. Just before the turn of the century, Dewey participated in the American discussion of what was to be done with pedagogy: could it be usefully studied in the universities on equal grounds to traditional disciplines, was pedagogy compatible with science, and could pedagogy be adapted to the increasingly institutionalized setting of teachers and the prominence of education policy in the 20th century?\textsuperscript{55} Toward the purpose of illustrating Dewey’s influence on new ITPPs, included below is a discussion of two of his early pertinent essays written a few years after he began at the University of Chicago.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{54} A prominent compendium of great academics writing on key topics published in 1928 included chapters such as Bertrand Russel on “Science,” John Dewey on “Philosophy,” and Everett Dean Martin on “Education.”

\textsuperscript{55} Note, toward the thesis, pedagogy at this time remains the vehicle and explicit advocate of philosophy for teachers.

\textsuperscript{56} While Dewey’s tenure of both Chairs of philosophy and psychology and of pedagogy may have been a partial consequence of his substantial salary, his active responsibility for both affirmed Dewey’s position as an ambassador.
Both essays discussed below were directed toward advising and supporting the department of pedagogy being constructed at the University of Chicago and the new role universities were expected to have, from an exclusive education for the elite, to a part in the social progress of the masses.

In the first essay Dewey writes on “Pedagogy as a University Discipline,” aptly entitled for an introductory essay to the present question. It is split into two parts. In the first, Dewey suggests that education must be operated, either by voluntary agents or by government, with the “authority of science,” and because of this, “the universities are the natural centres of educational organization.” He refers to the wider academic community as being “skeptical as to claims of pedagogy [acquiring] a position in the sisterhood of university studies.” Not confident of convincing his contemporaries, he argued that universities had much scientific work on public education to be “collected and organized,” and a “working synthesis of this great range of scientific data” was an appropriate task for the university. As I have discussed earlier, universities resisted being involved in the “lower schools” as they did not see the university as the educational “third tier,” the next step after high school for those so inclined and able, but rather an exclusive place for the elite, their prestige and scholarship depending on their distance from “public” matters.

A further caveat lay in the prospect of university research on education in terms of how a university subject could be created out of the practical realm of pedagogy. Generalizable research might conflict with the work of teachers—the tradition of pedagogy has always been vocational, practical, and has provided a complete view of the teacher in his schoolroom. Dewey’s remedy, aligned with his pragmatic philosophy, was to restrict teacher education content to education research which had been vetted by practice, sorting out the ideas of academia by testing them in “a laboratory of a school of practice, experiment and

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of education and philosophy. Dewey also served as president of both the American Psychological Association in 1899 and the American Philosophical Association in 1905.


58 Ibid., p. 282.

59 In Britain in 1912, a Masters of Arts program in education was introduced with the intention of making the study of education of “equal rank with any other branch of speculative philosophy.” Also of interest to note is the program was purely academic, without a practice component. See Adams, J. 1912. The evolution of educational theory. London: Macmillan, p. 3.

demonstration.” This approach required training new teacher education instructors who were informed less by their classroom experience, and more from the knowledge their colleagues in educational science had verified. The important task of institutionalizing pedagogy lay in converting it from its empirical base to a scientific base, from personal to generalizable, and to begin shifting what can be gained in teacher education from purely preparatory to concrete scientifically verified practices, or what later would be termed “best practices” or “evidence-based practices.”

In the second part of the first essay, Dewey interestingly criticizes European pedagogy as “lacking . . . complete organization.” What he meant was that pedagogy lacked the internal structure to be studied and used for “university purposes.” He proposed splitting pedagogy into two parts, administrative and scholastic, each of which could be studied separately in the university research environment. The administrative part would be tasked with how schools function as social and political institutions. This not only includes historically in the sense of “how every people that has made a contribution to civilization has administered its educational forces” but also studying the merits of these past and current systems and how schools relate to other institutions, such as government, church, family, and the like. The scholastic part concerns the ideas of education, and how various pedagogies developed alongside philosophy and religion. Dewey compares these two parts of pedagogy as the “record of the intellectual development of humanity, as the other is of its institutional development”—the theory and the reality, or using Dewey’s metaphor, the plant, past and present, and how to better design the plant to maximize its fruit for human betterment.

This division of theory and practice, a new formulation for studying education away from the natural synthetic nature of pedagogy, also aligned with Dewey’s suggestion of teachers’ colleges being connected to a model school (which Dewey termed a laboratory), creating a cycle of criticism where theory from the research of teachers’ colleges is placed in a natural selection environment of practice, the results of which inform future theory. Overall for the long term,

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61 Ibid., p. 285.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 286.
65 For an early work discussing theory and practice as separate entities for study, see: Adams, 1912, op. cit.
universities would be challenged to have a role in leading the public school system, while becoming part of it as a “tertiary” step.

This rough framework is what was to become the university “study of education,” and would eventually seed the fields, as Dewey names them in the essay, of educational psychology, educational sociology, and educational history to begin the scholarship needed to fill in the order as outlined above with instructors who would teach the teacher education curriculum. Certainly all educational-typed fields began from their respective content distilled from pedagogy, while borrowing the current university methods used to study the respective fields: while historians began cataloging pedagogies and connecting historical factors leading to their creation, the more scientific fields of psychology and sociology were required to upgrade their pedagogical predecessors with dedicated researchers in the universities by extracting and filtering the empirical claims of pedagogy and producing verified scientific accounts. The fate of philosophy in pedagogy would be the field of “educational philosophy,” limited in scope from its lost territory ceded to the other fields mentioned, each field having its boundaries explicitly defined. Even so, Dewey believed philosophy had an inalienable role in education, famously calling it the “general theory” of education, which in my interpretation, is the glue of pedagogy I have referenced previously, and still could be the necessary glue (if less explicit) of the study of education. This point is developed in Dewey’s second article.

John Dewey’s Example Teacher Curriculum

This next document was in fact an 1897 letter to President W. R. Harper of the University of Chicago who consulted with Dewey regarding course composition for the department of pedagogy. Dewey included the following “main heads:” educational physiology (school operation and student health), educational sociology (the school as a social institution), educational psychology (adaptation of curriculum to the child), general pedagogy (theory of educational aims, organization of curriculum, and methods to obtain ends), educational history (education in other countries and historically, and the development of education theory).

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66 The balkanization of pedagogy into “educational” fields will be discussed in the next chapter. In brief it is the result of limiting the scope of education research to schools. The very nature of research into education which must filter through a variety of interest groups attached to public schooling prohibits the universal applicability expected of knowledge creation in the university.

Philosophy of education might seem oddly absent, but is included in the ideas explored in educational history and, more importantly, philosophy makes up most of “general pedagogy.” As Dewey explains:

[General pedagogy] is the head which receives most attention, and in some cases, exclusive attention, in the existing status of Pedagogy in colleges. It deals with the philosophy of education as such and the question of educational aims and means.\(^{68}\)

Dewey termed this part the “general work” which, once completed, would allow the student to move on to “more special and detailed study of the school curriculum.” Dewey certainly provided philosophy a central place in the new teacher education, surrounding a core of pedagogy with the science of education as composed by the new educational fields mentioned. This central place is consistent with the view of institutional theory in which a technical core, in this case the successful operation of the public schools, originally the subject of pedagogy, is maintained yet modified to make room for new university subjects in the new teacher education institutions. The core of philosophy remains, at least for now, in devising the new study of education.

Delving further, several of Dewey’s “lecture-study” course syllabuses used at the University of Chicago further illustrate the concentration of philosophy still to be found in early teacher education during its transition into the university. Reprinted in The Early Works, Volume 5\(^{69}\) are courses in Educational Ethics, Educational Psychology, and “Pedagogy 1B – Philosophy of Education.” Each syllabus is quite comprehensive and contains a synthesis of practical pedagogical topics with academic philosophy. Below in Table 4 is a summary of the first course, along with its lecture topics and several sample questions given to the students. The details of the Educational Psychology course has been omitted here. Table 5 summarizes the third course, which includes extensive reference lists of academic philosophical sources for each topic. The numbering in each table connects the lectures, topics, and questions or readings.

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\(^{68}\) Ibid, p. 445.

Table 4
John Dewey’s “Educational Ethics” Course, 1895

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lecture topics</th>
<th>Select sample questions for students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ethical Problem of the School</td>
<td>1. What is the theoretical justification of the remark attributed to Leibnitz, that if he could order the schools of Europe for a generation he could revolutionize the civilization of Europe?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Ethics of Method</td>
<td>2. What ethical philosophy is involved in the plea of a child to be excused because he “didn’t mean to” do it? Discuss the philosophy of the proper treatment of him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Ethics of the Curriculum</td>
<td>4. Is it true that Herbart’s practical pedagogy is not affected in its value by his metaphysics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Herbartian Theory of Unification</td>
<td>5. Discuss doctrine: “First form faculty, then furnish it.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Epochs of Child Development</td>
<td>6. How does the school deal with the problem of freedom and authority?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The School and Moral Progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70 A few interesting points which would be realized later for educational research included in this lecture: “psychology gives means, sociology [gives] aim” and under the title the “ethic of the school,” “ideal is development of social consciousness.”
Table 5
John Dewey’s “Pedagogy 1B – Philosophy of Education” Course, 1898

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lecture title</th>
<th>Sample topic per lecture</th>
<th>Sample readings per topic^71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Content and Form of School Life</td>
<td>2. Aristotle, Politics, Bk I; Dewey, My Pedagogical Creed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conclusion and Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. No references listed, discusses Herbart, which is criticized in the final lecture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this outline of a department of pedagogy as designed by Dewey it is clear that philosophy remained the undifferentiated starting place (or general work) for teacher education, and the

^71 Works by Sulley and Payne were included in normal school curricula; see Chapter two.
organizing framework from which the various new sciences (psychology, sociology) would be positioned. Curriculum is also wedded to philosophy and the two likewise studied together.

**John Dewey and the New Science of Teacher Education**

Around the same time of John Dewey’s move to the University of Chicago, science or scientia, “correct knowledge,” began to be enthroned as the new authority, creating a demand for a unified body of (professional) teachers to implement this new doctrine. This also required the university to become more closely part of public education, including bringing teacher education into a more institutionalized setting, with prescribed delivery and outcomes for each prospective student to further a single educational aim, in this case Dewey’s democratic pedagogy.

This change would attempt to standardize pedagogy, which previously had no prescribed outcomes, instructors forging their practice in their diverse classrooms. Philosophy in pedagogy provided many inspiring avenues, but the role of philosophy in teacher education would change to its method and away from the diversity of its conclusions. Dewey advocated this transition in an 1893 essay entitled “The relation of philosophy to theology,” writing “the value of philosophy lies in its method, not in what it arrives at.” Rather than borrowing from the diversity of demonstrations inhering in normal school style pedagogy, the method of demonstration was to be retained as “inquiry,” very much akin to the method of science, which was to fuel the new work being done under the narrower science of education beginning to colonize teacher education.

Anticipation of the rich fruits of science at the turn of the century cannot be overemphasized; Dewey in the same essay identified that philosophy is the “standpoint of science extended to all life.” This point contributes to the idea of philosophy having a role as a frontier or parent field, periodically giving up territory as areas of inquiry mature into a science. Certainly new sciences were a kind of progress, and psychology at this time was an emerging scientific field extracted from its home in philosophy and into the hands of a new brand of specialized researchers. This expanded delegation of “science-informed” education studies would occur again for educational policy and curriculum, outsourcing the content of these areas away from teachers’ own creations via philosophy coincident with the move of teachers from secluded schoolhouses to large schools which were part of complex, articulated education systems. Given this arrangement, did teachers still need to learn what philosophy could provide in their teacher education? Were principles of

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education-type courses still necessary, or was the new division of labour one in which the goals and direction of public education was the domain of administrators with the means of carrying them out simply delegated to teachers as technicians? ⁷³

This problem directly relates to the creation of the teaching profession, a conscious issue of educational authorities at this time. Professions are often acknowledged for the consistency of their outcomes—no matter who you enlist, you can expect a good quality product from a professional. Yet given equal outcomes, this expectation does not necessarily suggest the methods employed are equally consistent across professionals, save for desisting from unethical methods. Professionals who agree only on outcomes, of course can diverge in method through traditional pedagogy. However, such divergence would not contribute to an education system seeking legitimacy through equal, predictable, outcomes via unified practitioners, requiring standardization of both method and aim through science of education and education policy. And yet, Dewey’s remark that philosophy was the “general theory of education” presumably implies philosophy ought to have a stake in the education and the profession of educators. And while philosophy has a stake, such as in providing teachers with the “general theory,” i.e., abstract themes, ideas, and exploring questions pertinent to their practice, education and its practitioners are incompatible with being institutionalized. Instead, over the 20th century, the diversity and heroes of pedagogy would be replaced by a profession of teachers inducted into official state education policies where philosophy was already done, and teachers needed only to receive conclusions from such state-sanctioned philosophy and put them into practice. This state of affairs was described by Adler:

The study of social phenomena became scientific when research divorced itself entirely from normative considerations, when economists and students of politics no longer asked about the justice of social arrangements, but only who gets what, when, and how.” ⁷⁴

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⁷³ This point is related to sociologist Max Weber’s concept of the “iron cage,” where “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” deliver social and economic policy from scientific findings. This was part of his theory of bureaucracy which delegated tasks to roles, where workers follow a technical chain of action based on rules. Teachers and administrators would be trapped in the bureaucratic system as if in an iron cage. Combining this idea with institutional theory would not only affirm the trap but suggest task performance becomes less important over time than the maintenance of the rules for institutional survival, since the outcomes were managed by the institutional level, and the managerial level became only concerned with conforming to their demands. An example of this can be seen in the conforming of policy via “teaching machines” to later psychologist B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism which I will discuss in the next chapter. For the quote see Weber, M. 1905/1958. The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (T. Parsons, trans). New York: Scribner’s Sons, p. 183.

Indeed, the use of the *scientific method* left a gap in these starting points previously derived from the *a priori* or the presumptions dictated in the worldviews of religion or philosophy. Mortimer J. Adler, a philosopher who taught graduate education students, wrote a considerable number of publications defending traditional philosophy and reform in education in his time. He recalls that science in 1940 was taught in the colleges as “the way” and philosophy was no longer convincing, perhaps because science was anticipated to be a superior method. He continues,

The general achievement of the modern era is not simply the accumulation of scientific knowledge, but, more radically, the recognition of the scientific method (of research and experimentation) as the *only* dependable way to solve problems . . . Hence philosophy, at its best, can be nothing more than a sort of commentary on the findings of science.  

Traditional discussion using the age-old problems of philosophy and particularly their normative aspects, became less interesting and less needed by the new teacher. Topics often found in pedagogy such as (1) inferences concerning the capacities or destiny of man (ontology), (2) what knowledge is, and what knowledge is most important (epistemology), and (3) character and moral education (ethics), would recede from the common texts of teacher education. In modern texts many such questions are no longer treated as issues but accepted as conclusions enshrined in official policies or given in professional codes of conduct.

Still, as strong as the wave of science was, it could not dominate fully the inquiry of the universities. Famously at the University of Chicago, long after Dewey had left and retired from Columbia, President Hutchins during a convocation speech at Chicago in 1933 clearly reacted to the previous influences over the university: “We have confused science with information . . . ideas with facts, and knowledge with miscellaneous data . . . we are [now] rich in facts and poor in principles.” The new methods of science awaited these principles, goals or aims of education before it could begin its work. Philosophy would necessarily be pushed out, since after these goals were decided, science could then take over and discover the best methods to reach these goals, delivering a certain result rather than the tentativeness of “demonstrations” based on perspectives. No longer would the art of teaching be solely subject to how it ought to be done, for the moral imperative changed from the careful treatment of intentions of the teacher through

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76 As quoted in Adler, M. J. 1941, September. The Chicago School, *Harper’s Magazine*, 377-388. Adler in this article also called the University of Chicago the “mecca” of pragmatism.
his application of philosophy—his purity—to the consequences of means and results, and the
demand that those results take precedence over any good intention.

Science was expected to rid knowledge and action of perspectives and provide a reliable
method of discovering true answers. While certain schools of philosophy, especially positivism,
pragmatism, and linguistic analysis, already aligned quite well with these desires, many reacted
negatively, declaring “the doctrine of scientism is certainly the dominant dogma of American
philosophy today.”\textsuperscript{77} American pragmatism and the British philosophy of positivism would each
emerge as allies and receive prominence in the wake of the ascendancy of science, each arguing
in common that knowledge was solely provided by the methods of science, and public policy
determined by the metrics which track the implementation of scientific conclusions.\textsuperscript{78}

Even though it seems that traditional philosophy’s role would be deported to criticism
and commentary on the findings of science, education could never be rid of its normative aspect
since it depended on action. Reaction ensued: writing in the \textit{National Society for the Study of
Education} (NSSE) yearbook,\textsuperscript{79} one of the longest surviving journals of education, in an issue of
the journal devoted to philosophy of education, this distinction was made again by Adler. He
pointed out that all scientific knowledge was theoretical, and education was a practical matter
since it dealt with (moral) action.\textsuperscript{80} Greenfield also made this point,

\begin{quote}
\textit{is} and \textit{ought} are intimately joined in human action. At least in explorations of social
reality, one can look exclusively at \textit{is} in action only by holding the \textit{ought} constant.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

Thus, whoever was to convert theoretical to practical knowledge\textsuperscript{82} would seem to require an
unending need for philosophy, and where teachers and their associations had accomplished this
with pluralistic pedagogy in the past, the trend over the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was to delegate this task to

\textsuperscript{77} Adler, 1940, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{78} As Langemann famously put it, “one cannot understand the history of education in the United States during the
twentieth century unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey lost.” From Lagemann, E. C.
\textsuperscript{79} The yearbook was founded in 1901 by the University of Chicago and seceded from the National Herbart Society, in
both of which Dewey was involved. The yearbook began its two volume annual publications a year later. It is
currently published by Columbia University under the guise of their journal, Teachers College Record.
\textsuperscript{80} Note the yearbook issue is entitled “philosophies.” Adler, M. J. 1942. In defense of the philosophy of education. In N.
Henry (Ed.), \textit{The forty-first yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I: Philosophies of
education} (pp. 197-249). Chicago: UCP.
\textsuperscript{81} Greenfield, T. 1980. The man who comes back through the door in the wall: Discovering truth, discovering self,
\textsuperscript{82} Aristotle also pointed out that “practical knowledge” or phronesis must be differentiated from scientific knowledge
because, while the latter has invariable first principles, thus certain predictive power, phronesis has variable first
principles, which is consistent with pedagogy previously described as a practical theory, requiring deliberation.
the new researchers and policy makers involved in public education, which philosophers of education would join for a time. In a sense, philosophy was being extracted from the technical core of ITPPs and delegated to groups in its institutional level to then transfer their conclusions as prepackaged normative claims and practices (fixing the *ought* to study the *is*, narrowed to *state* education in the early 20th century) to be used in their future classrooms. The new institutions of ITPPs were fixing these environmental factors (such as the rise of science) into their programs, teachers, and future policy-makers.

Meanwhile, the trend to a reduced role for philosophy in teacher education is further evident in the gradual change of philosophy of education coursework in teacher education programs, starting in pedagogy, moving to principles of education-type coursework (which I review next), and discussed in the next chapter, before the move to omnibus “social foundations of education”-type coursework in which philosophy has been presently marginalized.

**The Principles of Education Course**

In the United States of 1920, 46 teachers’ colleges were operational, and nearly all “liberal arts colleges and universities had divisions of education complete with full professional chairs.” Many of the courses found in the normal schools would find a temporary home in the university-affiliated teachers’ colleges, including a “principles of education” course. In this section I will review exemplars to better gauge the contents of these courses, and other courses that formed the technical core of the new teachers’ colleges.

Table 6 is based on a survey conducted by Rowley of 152 college of education-type institutions in the southern United States in the late 1940s. In “Table 23 Part A” Rowley reports data on terms used in course descriptions most frequently denoting a “philosophy of education” type course, according to the respondent at the various institutions. I have consolidated these data in the table below, combining entries which were very similar. This inventory can speak to what universities at the time believed the role of philosophy to be in teacher education.

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85 The survey was found in Rowley, J. 1950. *An examination of the status and nature of philosophy of education programs in southern institutions of teacher education* (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Kentucky.
Table 6
Common Terms Used in Philosophy of Education Course Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competing philosophies of education (PoE) / Contrasting PoE / Working PoE</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational (Ed): aims / objectives / problems / ideals / meaning</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of education / Historical process / Ed leaders / Ed institutions</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed practices / Ed methods</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern education / Democratic society</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of education</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social life / Social order</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entry #2, “aims of education,” should not be a surprise. It is a routine philosophical question which sets the direction and destination of the educational process, such as may be captured in the question, “what is education for?” This question always requires an answer from whoever is the source of the educational process, whether a teacher, or those designing an education system. More surprising may be entry #1, which expects philosophy of education-type courses to be the vetting grounds for controversy and difference of outlook on educational issues. No other courses in education are likely to advertise any kind of disputation—psychology, curriculum, and administration of schools tending to be more monolithic in their prescriptions for teachers and less likely to invite debate. Over time, as policy would set answers to the aims of education and other controversies, the value of these debates diminish, or at the very least, are less valuable than other courses which offer content believed to be either: (1) “cutting-edge” and thus scientific; (2) immediately practical—this content particularly desired by students; or (3) content that must be taught, such as new laws, policies, and professional standards enforced either through accreditation of teacher education programs, or mandatory professional bodies. If philosophy-type coursework had no “of necessity” about it, eventually it would recede its place in teacher education programs, crowded out especially by new findings of science, the practical

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86 Note I have abbreviated some of the common words, such as “PoE” for philosophy of education, and “Ed” for Educational. For example, in the 2nd row, the separate terms were, educational aims, educational objectives, etc.
application of that science, or new laws, policies, and standards created to govern the profession. This process is part of the institutional survival of teacher education institutions.

This “competing” or comparable aspect expected of philosophy of education is due to its history in pedagogy which was, by nature, pluralistic, beginning from diverse principles, attitudes, and goals, and through demonstration, ending with diverse practices and outcomes. As I have described, there is a sense in which controversy in education would aid individuals who were expected to make a life for themselves operating a schoolhouse, but would not aid a profession, fashioned to operate an education system according to centralized policy, consolidation being a necessity when establishing a unified education system and teaching profession.

Furthermore, the entry for history of education also provides for differences of educational purpose but may or may not reveal the philosophy which would generate these purposes. History and philosophy of education throughout the 20th century would suffer similar fates of marginalization and were commonly grouped together in order to save both, often labeled as “History and Philosophy of Education” coursework and programs. The entry for curriculum is also surprisingly low on the list, meaning the respondents rarely associated curriculum with a philosophy of education course. This may simply be asserting a separation of coursework in philosophy and curriculum, and would not suggest curriculum, at least at this point, lacks philosophical content.

Rowley also provides an outline of the teacher education curriculum at the University of Kentucky in 1907. The following courses, grouped by type, are listed: (1) psychology-type courses such as elementary, adolescence, and/or advanced psychology; (2) philosophy-type courses of “educational theory,” and “history of philosophy;” (3) history-type courses such as history of education, and “educational classics;” (4) other courses such as “principles of education,” “method in education,” English literature, “seminary in education,” school systems, and aesthetics. Note that “educational classics” provided a dual role for both the history of

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87 Consider also the virtue of “self-governance,” which is sought by professions—“we are a self-governing profession.” This would be quite anathema if intended to be exercised by its individual members, or members that followed different philosophies.

88 The resources and staff previously working within history of education likely moved to “comparative education,” which is seen as more scientific and present-orientated and thus more prepared to aid public policy. A dissertation on the decline of history of education would likely show more evidence of favoring research needs of education policy over teacher education.

89 Rowley, 1950, op. cit.
educational ideas and the philosophy of those ideas, its course description stating that it explored a variety of thinkers from Plato to Rousseau. The “History of Philosophy” course dealt with the relation between philosophic movements and education and, while peculiar, it is this course that later became a Philosophy of Education course in 1911 at the University of Kentucky. It should not be so surprising, however, since in many institutions the history and philosophy faculty were combined into one department.

Also of note is the development of psychology courses to provide relevant psychological content for different grade levels, as well as the academic philosophy likely found in a history of philosophy course. These early educational psychology courses were likely far more inviting and seemingly applicable to the students than the history of philosophy-type coursework which was likely more imposing and demanding. From one perspective, academic philosophy and, to a lesser extent, history of education was “sent in” as a mercenary to impose academic standards on teacher education programs, whereas psychology was likely viewed as more naturally relevant to teachers, and “their professional subject,” as medicine to a physician, or law to a lawyer. However, universities were working with the tools they had at the time, and in cross-appointing faculty to the teachers’ college, willing candidates readily came from philosophy departments who taught what they knew best with the intentions of liberally-educating the students in the tradition of grammar school teachers of the previous era.

It may come as a surprise to see how quickly this would change. After several decades of philosophy-type courses in teacher education, by the 1930s “no special course in philosophy of education is offered to undergraduates in most teacher-training institutions;” most philosophical content now being packaged within “conglomeration” courses, most popularly a “principles of education” course. Rowley’s surveys of southern American teacher education institutions also confirmed this trend of decline, reporting in 1950 that a third of responding institutions no longer offered philosophy or related courses. This was contributing to the “weakness of philosophy” because the philosophical content was presented in a dilute form to

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90 This course was also taught for a few years after the founding of Althouse College of Education, London, Ontario, which will be the case study presented in Chapter five.


92 Rowley, 1950, op. cit., p. 171. He also calculates that the “average number of units carried by the foundations courses is approximately two and one-half semester hours; the average percentage of philosophy of education is 36; therefore, the average number of semester units in philosophy of education would be slightly less than one.” (p. 179).
preservice students. This trend was seen in Rugg’s “Foundations of education” textbook produced from the central hub of Teachers College, Columbia, and would return in the late 20th century where philosophy of education would again bunk with more undesirables in “social foundation”-type coursework.

**Early Teacher Education and Institutional Theory**

The final section of the chapter analyzes the above history using several key concepts that serve to explain the form and behavior of organizations and that intentionally and inadvertently affect their operations as they respond to political and social forces. The historical development of teacher education is linked to its host institutions, and these institutions are a product of a variety of factors that guide the grafting of future changes onto its past. As prominent teacher education researcher Linda Darling-Hammond remarked, “of all programs in higher education, teacher education is among the most heavily affected by outside agents and policies . . . [and] feels the greatest impact of government regulation.” These agents are the various stakeholders in education which rose in influence and number throughout the 20th century, including the emerging state and provincial regulatory bodies, *ad hoc* government commissions and inquires, the host universities, teacher associations (which eventually formed teacher labor unions), an educational research industry that often (ironically) points to teacher education as most needing reform, and various other (somewhat reactionary and often temporary) public interest groups.

These stakeholders attempt to influence how teacher education operates both in its methods and its goals, comprising what has previously been labeled the “institutional level.” Suggestions or commands from this level are received by the “managerial level,” which tries to compromise with these demands to disrupt as little as possible the “technical core,” where the institution’s function resides, where its product is manifested, its employees engage in their

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93 Bruce, 1931, op. cit., p. 222.
95 The university is a complicated force having less than normal control over the field and programs in education departments. This is aggravated by the historical negative judgement of academics on the work of education scholars, including examples of universities rejecting integration of education departments. See Ford, B. 1964. The school of education and social work. In D. Daiches (Ed.), *The idea of a new university: An experiment in Sussex* (pp. 135–152). London: Andre Deutsch. Note also that some teachers’ colleges in the United States were built without a host university and, after the GI Bill, later expanded into state universities.
work, and its identity is sustained.\textsuperscript{96} Thus each of these three levels are in a kind of relation, although the best metaphor might be the concept of pressure sourced from the institutional level, softened by the insulating managerial level, which attempts to protect the vulnerable technical core. The core provides the life of the institution without whose continued functioning the managerial level would not exist. Change in the core does happen, and indeed must happen, but it is minimized where possible to maintain the stability of the institution.

The loose or tight-\textit{coupling} of elements and actions within institutions provides the “mechanisms for controlling the behavior of participants”\textsuperscript{97} in the organization, most being usually directed at those working within the technical core. Heavily routinized and divided labor organized to produce products or services tends to operate with tight coupling between management and workers, whereas work which requires more flexibility, or which requires special skills or knowledge not possessed by those in the managerial level will tend to favor a loosely-coupled arrangement. For example, general labor tends to be tightly coupled such as in a factory with multiple product lines where workers can be shifted to various roles and supervisors remain in close proximity, often working alongside them. In the same factory might be scientists engaged in research and development, who will meet with administrators regarding product design goals, but who will be left to their scientific work in the implementation of these goals, including using their expertise to determine feasibility, costs, and methods. This is an example of a more loosely-coupled arrangement necessitated by the nature of the work, and also fits more closely to the situation for teacher education and in school systems.

Assessing the coupling of teacher education institutions (and, related, the workplace of teachers) is a matter of setting a reference point. If the organization of work within a routinized factory is considered a typical tightly-coupled organization, and the peacetime military typically a tightly-coupled public institution, teaching organizations and teacher education both lean to being more loosely-coupled institutions—both are not strictly managed and routinized down to the day-by-day lessons in their respective courses, at least by the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century. Variations in coupling exist between various state systems, and certainly one can point to the tight coupling found in historic examples of Prussian and Napoleonian-era state schools. I have shown that the

\textsuperscript{96} This product and the institution’s identity have changed over time precisely based on the operating philosophy. This point will be discussed in the coming pages.

\textsuperscript{97} Scott, 1998, op. cit., p. 278.
early pedagogy and education departments designed their own programs largely autonomously, as was the case at the University of Chicago. This would change with the empowering of state regulatory bodies such as the AATC and later with the far more influential National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)\(^98\) founded in 1954. The AATC and later the NCATE began establishing voluntary national standards for teacher education programs in the United States, the essence of which leaked across the northern border into Canadian provinces. These requirements lead to *isomorphism*, the normalization of institutional behavior as adoption of external standards and compliance with official regulations becomes their single (or most important) metric of survival via legitimacy, as was previously discussed.

An interesting parallel to the building of an education system along with the professionalization of its members is found in the similar process undertaken in the medical profession via the Flexner Report. The Report was also nearly a model for American teacher professionalization, and provides further insight into the competing forces involved in establishing governance institutions.

**The Flexner Report and Professionalizing Teachers**

An important and historically relevant development which parallels many of the changes to teacher education, especially the culling of diverse pedagogy and indeed was considered but eventually rejected as a model for professionalizing teachers, was the professionalization of medicine through the adoption of a report entitled “Medical Education in the United States and Canada,” better known as the Flexner Report. This Report\(^99\) and its recommendations provide an excellent comparison to what could have been requisite for teachers: both sought university settings, professionalization, and centralization of standards under the authority of a national accrediting board.

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\(^98\) Only several years ago, in 2013, the NCATE merged with a related agency, the Teacher Education Accreditation Council to form the Council for the Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAEP). The now active CAEP collaborates with the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE) who provides conferences for educators.

\(^99\) The full report can be found at the Carnegie Foundation website, www.carnegiefoundation.org. It was written by a team in 1910 led by Abraham Flexner. Flexner was a high school teacher and principal for 19 years before studying at Harvard and joining the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. This background is particularly interesting since Flexner would later not recommend the Report be used as a framework for professionalizing teachers. This will be discussed shortly.
The Report\textsuperscript{100} institutionalized modern medical education in both Canada and the United States. Flexner recommended a variety of changes to institutionalize training, the most important of which were creation of national accreditation standards for medical schools, licensing of physicians, and adoption of scientific standards in medicine. I will discuss some of the changes relevant to teacher education, notably the move to scientific methods, and the need for appropriate standards in the university.

Already discussed in several areas was the rise of science and its new mandate to filter diversity and “upgrade” the empirical nature of pedagogy. These mandates would also curb medical science: many medical schools were closed and programs which offered what Flexner called “medical sects” were discontinued. The operative change was to build a medical system by instituting what was to count as “conventional” medicine, and to bar and de-list nonconforming practices, effectively banishing them to survive or fail outside of the profession, as shown in this excerpt from the Report:

Scientific medicine therefore brushes aside all historical dogma. It gets down to details immediately. No man is asked [in] whose name he comes—whether that of Hahnemann, Rush, or of some more recent prophet . . . There is no need . . . for the segregation from the larger body of established truth of any particular set of truths . . . The tendency to build a system out of a few partially apprehended facts, deductive inference filling in the rest, has not indeed been limited to medicine, but it has nowhere had more calamitous consequences.\textsuperscript{101}

Many educators at this time adhered to names such as Herbart, Pestalozzi, and soon Dewey, yet the need for a system to establish singular methods and goals requires its members to pledge allegiance to only one master—not a person, but a system; not a set of ideas, but “established” truth authorized by a profession within a gated institution. The legitimacy of the system was eventually to come most strongly not from the use of science, the application of which was not well understood by the public, but from the perception of a confident, stable, unified body of members fueled with “professional patriotism.”\textsuperscript{102} This perception of the unification of professional knowledge and practice was secured by adopting one method of inquiry, that of modern science, dedicated to results-orientated ends, and prescribing policies that detailed the

\textsuperscript{100} One way of identifying an institutionalized field or occupation is by the shift of governance and reform to “reports,” “commissions,” and “panels,” instituted centrally and broadly, and away from local, diverse programs led by remarkable individuals. Pedagogy certainly illustrates the latter, with a variety of associations formed around the influential person, whether alive or deceased.

\textsuperscript{101} Flexner, 1910, op. cit., p. 157.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, p. xiii. From the Introduction written by H. S. Pritchett.
expected behavior of all its members to gain support from a public who could be confident in the wise and sensible use of their tax dollars. This unification contributes precisely to explaining the decline of philosophy, by fixing a particular philosophy, and packaging it in professional standards over the 20th century in the form of prescriptions now dispensed in ITPPs.103

A similar criticism was launched by Raymond Callahan in his 1962 work Education and the Cult of Efficiency which details the use of the “scientific management” in schools in the 1930s and 1940s. School administrators took for granted established institutions and devoted most of their work to their maintenance and operation, the means and their costs, and largely ignored the product, the experience and quality of education for the students. Meanwhile, teacher education was much slower to professionalize, and this “scientism,” perhaps most pronounced during B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism,104 certainly initiated its own reaction as articulated by the so-called education “radicals”105 and the later de-schooling movement.

Raising the standards of medical schools came with closing many schools and limiting the oversupply of physicians. This particular change was not possible in teacher education, for at the time teachers were under-supplied and schools were expanding to meet the needs of a lengthened compulsory attendance age, reduced truancy and mass immigration. In a further parallel to problems in teacher education, Flexner found some medical schools admitted applicants who “could barely read and write” and, in some cases, were “open to casual strollers from the highway,”106 all of which can be likened to the transients of teaching.

After the Report, an “educational Flexner Report”107 was advocated and considered by the Fund for the Advancement of Education. This ultimately failed with consolation from Abraham Flexner. The decision cites infeasibility, especially a level of resistance from teachers and educational organizations not encountered by Flexner from medical licensing boards and the

103 The consequence of “scientism” in medicine was to ignore cultural and social aspects of medical care and its institutions. See Bates, D. 2000. Why not call modern medicine “alternative?” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 43(4), 502-518.
104 Much reaction to Skinner and his influence on education came from philosophers of education, which likely contributed to educational psychology’s turn away from behaviourism to embrace cognitivism. This will be explored in brief in the next chapter. For instance, see Machan, T. R. 1974. The pseudo-science of Skinner. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House.
105 See works by John Holt, Jonathan Kozol, Herbert Kohl, and Paul Goodman. This influence during the 1960s was rebuffed later by the report A Nation At Risk. For the de-schooling movement, see works by Ivan Illich.
106 Flexner, 1910, op. cit., p. 22.
107 Some comments on this can be found in Lieberman, M. 1960. The future of public education. Chicago: UCP, p. 254.
profession—another manifestation of institutional organization theory in action. A unified power structure governed by teachers (or doctors) provides a way of clarifying and managing sources of influence at the institutional level. The Flexner Report essentially led to tighter “coupling” of institutional forces to link together the various levels of an organization. This concept will now be discussed in terms of ITPPs.

**Coupling and Teacher Education**

Some discussion of coupling has already taken place, but little has been discussed regarding the concept of **decoupling**. Recall tightened coupling, in the worst case forming Weber’s iron cage, often reduces task performance which leads to decoupling, described as occurring when the “organization conforms closely to the ritually defined meanings and categories supplied by the environment but does not attempt seriously to implement them at the operational level.” This is often the organizational response to dysfunctional tightening, where the organization bargains with and appears to fulfill the requirements of regulation in order to maintain a functioning technical core. Those in the core may dissent from institutional requirements, and the managerial level tries to negotiate between the other two levels to meet the needs of both—a kind of undisclosed compromise. In other words, these kind of changes are driven by responses to the changing metrics of institutional survival—in the case of teacher education, the quest for survival was and is driven by aggressive changes in education policy created at the institutional level and implemented both in the organizational structure of teacher education and a redefined curriculum, which substantially modifies the technical core of the enterprise.

The history so far reviewed in the current and preceding chapter shows a trend toward tightening relationships within teacher education organizations and their curricula with the

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109 For a particularly interesting article on the institutionalization of medicine, especially as science began “crowding out” its original humanistic mission toward a scientific research mission, see: Bloom, S. W. 1989. The medical school as a social organization: The sources of resistance to change. *Medical Education, 23*(3), 228-241.

emergence and expansion of dedicated institutional and managerial levels. Where philosophy survived as the explicit framework guiding teachers and teacher education, one possible question is whether the tightening of relationships within the institution was connected to, or merely coincidental with, the decline of philosophy as the guiding framework for teacher education, i.e., philosophy as an integral part of the technical core. Institutional theory would predict that a further evolution of university-affiliated teachers’ colleges to faculties of education must also increase this coupling, which must also further erode explicit philosophy in the technical core unless, of course, philosophy was somehow protected in the new order.

The counter force expected to defend philosophy was the university.111 As noted earlier, several subjects were added to teacher education imported from the normal schools to improve the academic rigor of the programs, and to make use of already established academic faculty. The universities, as the governors of degree programs, were expected to enforce academic standards for teacher education equivalent to those in liberal arts programs by holding the line on these newly introduced subjects. However, some teachers’ colleges preferred to offer their own kind of degrees, such as bachelors of pedagogy, or bachelors of education, to elide the requirements of a nearby university.112 This was not viewed as a problem to the public school teachers, as the specific degree was all that was necessary to receive a certificate granting them access to the public and high schools, and the new degree would not interfere with or was expected to be equivalent to a bachelor of arts or science.

A similar effect can be seen in the curriculum of teacher education itself. Liberal arts program curricula are typically created in-house to serve as a general education. In teacher

111 There exists a strong argument over the 20th century, often sourced in postmodernist writers, of the “corporatization of the university” by way of “neoliberal policies” which favors outcomes-based research, cost-tightening, and removal of unprofitable programs. The decline or even elimination of philosophy would likely fall into this category, and certainly, if philosophy is not named on an accreditation list or otherwise specifically required, its excess, under this corporatization, would provide little incentive to keep it in teacher education programs. Côté and Allahar discuss many effects of this “corporatization,” all of which seem to make philosophy of education less financial profitable. For example, the tendency would be to promote lectures over seminars, TAs as teaching staff over faculty, more efficient assessments, such as multi-choice tests for exams, over essays and papers, especially as the latter often require written feedback which adds to the assessment workload. See: Côté, J. E. & Allahar, A. L. 2011. Lowering higher education: The rise of corporate universities and the fall of liberal education. Toronto, UTP.

112 This point is contentious. While bachelors of pedagogy at the time were “universally scorned,” it was also expected that a “distinctive degree will tend to increase or, at least, emphasize the autonomy of the department or college of education.” The point depends on the source of the recognition, and certainly teacher education institutions also believed that the advancement of their students in the field wearing their credentials would improve their own reputation and legitimacy. Quotes are from Swift, 1920, op. cit.
education curricula, the minimum requirements are set by state or provincial accreditation standards, and courses beyond this serve graduate programs. As recounted by Woodring,

During the first half of the [20th] century, while many liberal arts colleges turned their backs on the problems of teacher education, legal requirements for certification were established in nearly all states. In general, the trend was away from certification on the basis of examination and toward completion of course requirements in colleges and universities . . . Many states specify certain courses which must be taken in professional fields so that the responsibility for curriculum making has, in part, been taken away from the colleges.113

This is the dominant process of what was proposed before as a way of manipulating the technical core of institutions through accreditation rather than by way of external examinations intended to secure quality output standards, which is more likely to be part of a tightly-coupled institution than a loosely-coupled one. Establishing course requirements influences courses not named in accreditation standards which, as Woodring reports, effectively sets the curriculum of conforming institutions.

This grounding of certification in course requirements elicits the question of why the focus is placed on courses in accreditation standards and, furthermore, why certain courses are named over others? Viewed within institutional organizational theory, a large part of the answer is that such grounding focuses attention on the technical core of the organization and, as a result, the organizational components and dynamics located in the core which fashion the intended product. In essence, the “task performance” required to maintain the organization’s survival is not the product, but the components and dynamics that compose the technical core. This was a part of Flexner’s reforms through the emphasis placed on ensuring the assignment of properly qualified instructors and demanding more mundane but crucial standards for laboratories and modern medical equipment in the process of medical education. In the case of institutionalized teacher education, whatever has been deemed important to secure the improvement of publicly funded and governed schools as the times have changed, from graded schools through written lesson plans to the use of white boards and so forth, will become a candidate for authoritative inclusion in the technical core through changing regulatory or accreditation standards emanating from the institutional level. While over time the number of the sources for change has increased, these and other demands for changes in the preparation of teachers are mediated by the

113 Woodring, 1957, op. cit., p. 23.
managerial level resulting in modifications to the components and processes within the technical core. A dominant consequence as approaches to teacher preparation have evolved over the past two centuries has been a decline in the variety of inspiring philosophical pedagogies informing work undertaken in the technical core.

**Summary and Interlude to Chapter 4**

In the 19th century teacher education institutions were forming, their identity and work grafted onto previous forms of teacher education. Their main task was to assist in the proliferation of “free, common schools” by gatekeeping the teachers and sealing off transients through a vetting process by an approved governor, whether a headmaster or an inspector. The existence of the institution and the new teachers processed and produced by the institution was enough to meet these early goals, and thus little was done to change the work undertaken in their technical core. Pedagogy was largely left alone, for it was viewed as the educational conversation at the time, the very culture of teaching. The most important institutional step at this stage was the concentration of teacher education in designated, organized and specialized places behind a guarded door.

By the beginning of the 20th century, with the dam largely intact and holding relatively well, specific recommendations for the curriculum of teacher education began. Pedagogy was modified by the displacement of its “popular” education literature by “academic” education literature produced by the early academics holding Chairs of pedagogy in the universities. The dissemination of this new knowledge was hampered by a lack of appropriate preparation among teacher candidates and practicing teachers, necessitating much remedial work and the establishment of new credentials. Relatively speaking, this was not hugely disruptive to the technical core, since the same faculty who taught pedagogy were also, somewhat by definition, capable of judging basic literacy. Secondary teachers were far less of a problem given the established traditions reinforcing many of the qualities desired of a profession. Mediocre grammar schools were closed and new high schools demanded further specialization of teachers into specific subjects. The transition of teacher education into the universities was less of a challenge for these teachers, given an established tradition of being liberally-educated with B. A. degrees. Even so, the emerging coursework in university-affiliated teacher education colleges
prefigured a splitting of pedagogy into differentiated fields for study, which would come to define the new study of education.

By the Second World War the story becomes more complex. The philosophers of education would continue to grow, being seeded by the PhDs graduating from Teachers College, Columbia and other prominent teacher education institutions, less so due to control over teacher education exercised by growing regulatory bodies, and more due to the explosion of higher education in the post-war period. Just before the Second World War, philosophy of education emerges as a distinct discipline, which would later flower and stabilize through, in part, the creation of the American Philosophy of Education Society in 1941 and, a decade later, the still prominent journal Educational Theory, with more to come in the late 1960s as the legacy of Dewey faded and Britain emerges on the scene with Richard S. Peters. The competing force to this benevolent history was the new research university, in which,

by the early twentieth century, liberal education all but succumbed to the scholarly intellectualism of the new research-orientated academic disciplines, especially of the sciences flowing in from the German universities, or to the narrow specialization increasingly required for professional or graduate study.

These trends would become problems for philosophy of education to navigate as they developed over the 20th century. And while philosophy of education was losing ground in the teacher education curriculum, many philosophers of education expected to reclaim its lost territory in the technical core and reclaim its connection and function as nutrition for a new generation of teachers. These philosophers, such as John Goodlad, joined the timely area of

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116 In the preface of Goodlad’s *A Place Called School*, he notes that criticism over schools during the writing of the book had shifted to the criticism of the system itself. He also seems to evoke a theme of this dissertation, that of the problem of decline of local control of schools, whether in philosophy for the teacher in the classroom, or for principals in their schools. For instance, in referencing this shift in criticism to school systems, he writes: “Perhaps this is just part of the general decline of faith in our institutions and especially the bureaucratic insensitivity they are perceived to represent. The local school principal and teachers are more easily reached than are board members, the superintendent, other administrators, and supervisors in the central office …. If we are to improve schooling, we must improve individual schools …. [for] the evidence suggests that schools vary widely in almost all of their characteristics. It follows, then, that no single set of recommendations applies to all schools. Yet, commissions on school reform frequently put forward recommendations as though they were equally relevant to the schools of the entire nation.” This point reveals the tactics of institutional survival via coupling—over time, attempts to reduce variability of schools is a way of reducing dysfunction of school system survival maintenance. In other words, isomorphism permits more effective use of “coupling” as a tool of school reform, and keeps the conversation of reform at the “systems”-level where it is most fortified as opposed to permitting the criticism of a single school which has long conceded its management or local control to larger governing organizations such as teachers’ unions,
educational administration, and interacted and wrote for wider policy-makers in the institutional level; they tried to match the academic respectability sourced from scientific methods in new analytical methods; and they tried to claim philosophy was a requirement for education policy to be effective. The predictable effect of these new strategies during a further entrenching of technical and vocational education and the pressure of immediacy upon teacher education was the assignment of philosophy of education faculty to graduate programs, where they existed for several more decades before losing even this ground. As is shown in the case of medical education and the Flexner Report, if philosophy of education is ever to recover its strength, it would need to depend on the university.
Chapter 4
Philosophy of Education in the Post-War Period to the 1970s

The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth. ~ Niels Bohr

Recall that the purpose of early teacher education formed in loose associations and seminars, and later centralized into normal schools, was focused on the teacher to provide him with the skills and inspiration of a pedagogy to operate, initially at least, a rural schoolhouse. Teachers, in a context of relatively few regulations or rules, were thought to need some grasp of the (philosophic) principles which would guide them in sorting out their unpredictable work environment.

Initially university-affiliated teachers’ colleges trained only secondary school teachers, and made few changes to their education: they were still mostly educated in a traditional university arts program with the addition of one or two teaching methods courses. As specialized ITPPs were devised in later schools and faculties of education, the trend would be to alter their purpose and therefore their organizational structure away from initial focus on the teacher as a settler or entrepreneur, toward a program informed by an university standard of research that would support an expanding public school system.

Studies in institutional theory have tracked changes to and co-optation of the goals of various organizations, such as Selznick’s classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, as outlined in the first chapter. A parallel account for teacher education, and resulting adjustments to philosophy of education, will continue in this chapter with some specific attention to developments in Britain.

The first section of this chapter will close the American story for the time being with the cooling of the progressive movement, the consequences of pragmatism for philosophy of education, and the swiftness of the rise of alternative philosophies of education as science was accused of failing in its task. This will be followed by consideration of what became the “London Line,” a new analytical philosophy of education movement led by Richard S. Peters, a psychologist-philosopher who promoted both educational psychology and philosophy of education, whose credentials and leadership were quite similar to Dewey’s. The final section will
discuss this new rise of philosophy of education around the institutions in Britain, and show the compatibility of analytical philosophy of education with education policy.

**The Close of Dewey’s Golden Age**

By the close of the Second World War, ITPPs were widespread in rural normal schools along the American frontier and, particularly on the east coast, in urban liberal arts colleges, teachers’ colleges, and universities. According to a significant study\(^1\) of these institutions in 1933, while philosophy remained strong among the faculty within these institutions, students were split between a desire for philosophy on the one hand, and for the new sciences on the other in their coursework.\(^2\) This split in the demands placed on aspirant teachers may mark a transitionary period. One group desired traditional teacher education for a role in a traditional schoolhouse, comparable to a quasi-religious calling often characterized by the normal school. Another group was seeking a place in the larger schools on the east coast, not as a calling but as part of a new professionalism.\(^3\) Further interesting results from Peterson’s surveys are, in the words of responding faculty, as follows:

- Students “lack a unified point of view. That is, they have not formulated a well-ordered, thought-out philosophic outlook in terms of which to judge problems and issues.”\(^4\)
- Students “tend too much to see each issue singly; . . . they do not sufficiently recognize how very intimately one problem is related inevitably to many other problems.”\(^5\)
- “That teachers are not generally aware of what lies behind the issues on which they [were surveyed] is probably the most significant single conclusion from the study.”\(^6\)

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\(^1\) This study surveyed both faculty and students at 25 teacher education institutions in the United States. See: Peterson, F. E. 1933. *Philosophies of education current in the preparation of teachers in the United States: A study of four state teachers’ colleges, twelve normal schools, and nine liberal arts colleges*. New York: TCP.

\(^2\) As I have discussed in the previous chapter, this result is unsurprising as theory and practice became split to study education in university settings.

\(^3\) This may also be connected to the differing values of authority in urban or rural settings, the former desiring science to provide authority to the masses, and the latter desiring old knowledge or wisdom to provide authority to rural folk. Or in a phrase from Frank Herbert’s *Dune*, “polish from the cities, wisdom from the desert.”

\(^4\) Ibid, p. 122.

\(^5\) Ibid, p. 125.

\(^6\) Ibid.
These results are troubling as one would have thought the rise of Dewey which maintained (pragmatic) philosophy within teacher education, especially his promotion of democratic pedagogy, would have sustained teachers with (at least) a monolithic “philosophic outlook” on issues in education, if not a pluralistic outlook, and provide a banner of a sound philosophy for their practice. Likewise, the culture of college education at the time infused a particular moral outlook, many college programs requiring an ethics or moral philosophy course in their final year, sometimes taught by the president of the college. Instead, philosophy was not taking hold, not even at the school board level. A 1965 study found school board philosophy of education statements were “haphazard, cliché-ridden mythology that passes for philosophy.”

These results can only mean that even in these somewhat early stages, philosophy was losing the attention of students who sought not to be Herbartians, Pestalozzians, or other educational heroes of old knowledge, but rather expected much from new speculations of science, especially (experimental) psychology, which the new teacher education institutions were gearing-up to provide. This was also accomplished with new credentials which sealed off previous pedagogical influences on education in their recognition of the new methods and thinking promoted by the new institutions of university teacher education. The delivery and authority of teaching methods supporting an increasingly bureaucratic education system gained legitimacy by normalizing the noise of pedagogy and forming “official sources” of expertise, themselves legitimized by credentials such as degrees and certificates. Development of a burgeoning public school system acquired public support by substantiating the authority of its components with teachers, newly credentialed and university-affiliated, steeped in the fruits of research from new sciences. And it

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7 Titus discusses the importance of this course in the 1940s. Something of a crown for a college education, these moral philosophy courses were traditional taught by the college president as a “sending off” for its students to go forth and lead good, moral, lives. See: Titus, H. H. 1943. What is a mature morality? New York: Macmillan.

8 The charge of “cliché-ridden” is perhaps still current today, but more interesting is that the muddle apparently “passes for philosophy,” implying observers are satisfied and do not detect its poor quality. This might be contrasted with the previously cited advertisement found at the back of Payne, 1890, op. cit., p. 354, which promised a “sound philosophical basis” as a selling point. For the study see: Orlich, D. C. & Shermis, S. S. 1965. Educational philosophy as mythology: A critical analysis of school philosophies. Administrator’s Notebook, 14(4), 1–4.

9 The separation of psychology from philosophy shrank the academic field of philosophy. New empirical methods and ideas, such as from the behaviorists of B. F. Skinner, Pavlov, Watson, and Thorndike, would relieve somewhat the classical problems of research into the mind. For philosophy and philosophy of education, it meant a loss of institutional territory by forfeiting institutional posts and research dollars to newly labeled “psychologists” and “educational psychologists.”

10 Or as Brubacher adds, “having its teachers certified is considerably older than its interest in taking responsibility for having them trained.” From Brubacher, 1966, op. cit., p. 492.
was not simply the “academic” gifts of the university, but also its social status. As Clifford and Guthrie point out, it is a myth that, colleges, and even universities, were once—in some golden age—purely academic places. This fiction ignores the historic function of formal education in maintaining or enhancing the social status of individuals or groups.\(^\text{11}\)

A cogent example of this credentialism and the manner in which it sealed off pedagogy was the treatment of Maria Montessori\(^\text{12}\) by the growing educational establishment. Her approach represented a resurgence of interest in “pedagogy,” though she more accurately labeled her work “scientific pedagogy,” fostering a significant following within the early kindergarten movement and among teachers of the early grades. A contemporary of John Dewey, Montessori founded a unique philosophy of education.\(^\text{13}\) Nevertheless, while Montessori toured the world and gave speeches mostly to parents and teachers regarding her famous *Montessori Method*, Dewey and his disciple William H. Kilpatrick, also from Teachers College, Columbia, thought her ideas important and influential enough to voice opposition and disapproval.\(^\text{14}\) In 1914 Kilpatrick published a pamphlet entitled *The Montessori system examined*, the tone of which is suspicious and clearly treats her ideas as a “rival.” In the introduction, he uses tactics of peer pressure and ostracism by declaring his account dedicated to “the relatively large group of public-school teachers and superintendents” while he characterizes those following Montessori to be a “smaller class of heroic enthusiasts” who are “more or less partisan leaders and followers of a new propaganda.” He suggests that while the newness of the ideas may be enough for her followers, Not so with the leaders and teachers of the rank and file! To them the detail is the thing! Upon the soundness of special theories and the effectiveness of particular practices, the strength of an institutional scheme depends. They want to know how far the theory of Madam Montessori departs from the best philosophy of education that the American

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\(^\text{11}\) Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op cit., p. 85.

\(^\text{12}\) A recent study of private schools in Canada by the Frasier Institute found 1/3 of independent schools were “specialty schools,” with Montessori schools constituting the largest identifiable type in the category. See Allison, D. J., Hasan, S., & van Pelt, D. 2016. A diverse landscape: Independent schools in Canada. Frasier Institute.

\(^\text{13}\) Montessori is rarely discussed in philosophy of education journals, as a database search will reveal—however she can sometimes be found in early childhood education research. For my article, which attempted to reintroduce her ideas into educational philosophy literature by showing her philosophy is a unique summation worthy of study, see Colgan, A. D. 2016. The epistemology behind the educational philosophy of Montessori: Senses, concepts, and choice. *Philosophical Inquiry in Education*, 23(2), 125-140.

\(^\text{14}\) The competing factor to American educational authorities of Montessori, an Italian, was likely viewed as was Herbert Spencer a half century earlier. Coincidentally they share in the naturalism initiated by Spencer.
profession knows . . . [and whether her methods] may be reproduced under the conditions of American life.¹⁵

Temporarily abated in the United States, the Montessori movement spread in Europe. Allegations of being “outdated” made by Kilpatrick were, in fairness, tempered by praise of her scientific approach which was “too seldom found in the teaching world.”¹⁶ Still, although she shared many views with Dewey, being outside the universities her decidedly realist epistemology was viewed as a setback which offended the prevailing dominant pragmatic views of American philosophers of education, as did her intrusion onto the education stage. Her individualist approach to learning was also at odds with the more socially situated approaches to learning of the progressives. Rather than being welcomed as an enriching source of new pedagogical ideas for education, Dewey and to a greater extent Kilpatrick, wrote and provided speeches to discredit her Method. In some ways she was viewed as a living artifact, a pedagogue from the past who could not find a place within modern institutions of education research which had left pedagogy behind to educational historians. Today, Montessori is still a widely popular choice among private schools for the early grades, viewed as providing a traditional, smaller-scale and thus perhaps more authentic education than the mass produced “free” public schools, avoiding the zoo of interest groups, failed reforms, and shifting policies that plague public education.

Having no room for Montessori is unsurprising given how the modern education institutions were modeled after the leadership of the more prestigious among them, creating a “monolithic status system.”¹⁷ This factor of isomorphism, discussed in previous chapters, reinforces institutional survival by reducing institutional diversity and increasing the tightness of internal coupling—a seemingly necessary policy for organizations or professional bodies in their infancy, lacking the strength to benefit from pluralism. As human service organizations¹⁸ they are routinely interested in legitimacy-building with the public by way of the perception of a united and standardized front, yielding a profession. This strategy was similar to the account

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¹⁶ Ibid, p. 5. Montessori’s approach of observing children in free play and with her “didactic materials” would later be used by Jean Piaget to study his own children. While Piaget would later contribute to the founding of development psychology, this cognitivism would have to wait until behaviourism ran its course in educational psychology circles in the mid-20th century.

¹⁷ Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op. cit., p. 48.

given by the Flexner Report to create a medical profession, stamping out various competing medical theories and their associated practices.

Montessori’s ostracism can also be seen as an example of an institutional response to an emergent threat to the legitimacy of a unified school system of like-minded professional teachers. As such, the goals of the institution of teacher education would not permit this intrusion which would require adding new, implicitly challenging, credentials to those on whom the legitimacy of the institution was being built. Teacher education was beginning a process of domesticating the values and philosophies of education with which their candidates arrived, as well as domesticating the “wild” pedagogical landscape to prepare the ground for programs of education research. While American pragmatism was favoured, as Labaree notes, Dewey’s inroads into school systems were in difficulty, making it necessary to distinguish between the “pedagogical progressives” and the “administrative progressives.” The former characterized the new intellectual movements in education, such as Dewey and, although not sanctified, Montessori, both of whom advocated child-centered views, self-directed learning, and related curricular reform. The latter, in contrast, eventually dominating the former, were more concerned with utility, efficiency and vocationalism, a trilogy that received a significant boost during the post-World War II Red Scare and was fully enthroned with Sputnik.

Nevertheless, outside of the central urban cores American public schools have remained to this day quite decentralized and, in many instances, resistant to federalization, allowing varied amounts of state and local control which permit, even foster, relatively “wild” diversities of education philosophy among parents, schools, and teachers. While sustaining rotating summer seminars and pedagogical plurality, this diversity has not managed to sustain philosophy of education as a field in teacher education institutions; its survival has been tied to its ability to

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19 Montessori schools can be defined as “wild” and would not blend into a system of “domesticated” public schools. See Allison, D. J. 2015. School choice in Canada: Diversity along the wild–domesticated continuum. *Journal of School Choice: International Research and Reform, 9*(2), 282-309.


21 From Dewey: “The formulation of the business of the philosophy of education does not mean that the latter should attempt to bring about a compromise between opposed schools of thought…It means the necessity of the introduction of a new order of conceptions leading to new modes of practice. It is for this reason that it is so difficult to develop a philosophy of education, the moment tradition and custom are departed from. It is for this reason that the conduct of schools, based upon a new order of conceptions, is so much more difficult than is the management of schools which walk in beaten paths.” From: Dewey, J. 1938/1997. *Experience and education*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 5.
support not groups of schools which follow a certain philosophy, but the larger education system and its state mandated policies which, among so many other effects, reify the credentials needed to participate in the system, and thus the courses and textbooks which support them. This expectation is the “rent” paid by all boarders in the technical core of teacher education institutions, the details of which shift as the declared needs of the public schools change and the specifications for teachers are recalibrated to better meet expectations, just as production lines are reconfigured to create other new products.

Some things, however, do not change, and Dewey’s pragmatism and influence, immortalized with the creation of the John Dewey Society in 1933, reinforced the practical mindset of teachers required to follow new rules in the larger schools. The pragmatic philosophical stance on questions such as the validation of knowledge lying in its successful implementation—no certainty or prediction, always experiment—and that the future “working” of a procedure could not be induced but must be tested again with its success being its truth, contributed to this anti-intellectualism. Also contributing to this was the rejection of perennial philosophical problems of metaphysics with acceptance of attempts to “answer” them by being “pragmatic,” meaning to give up on the question, reconcile what we can, and believe and do what seems “practical.” Since pragmatists and later neopragmatist Richard Rorty rejected any foundations in philosophy (such as rejecting “essentialism”), in attempts to settle questions of value in policy, the “pragmatic” solution was to find guiding, foundational, values in the aggregate desires of the masses as manifest in the democratic preferences of the people, or in the informed views of experts, such as in professional organizations or governments.

There is no surprise, then, in how pragmatism, initially, was favored by policy makers and was eagerly invited into building an education system where Montessori was absent.

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22 This can be sourced in early criticisms of teachers being “anti-intellectual,” and intellectualism was needed to upgrade teaching from a craft to a profession. See Griffiths, D. E. 1976. Intellectualism and professionalism. In C. J. Lucas (Ed.), *Challenge and choice in contemporary education: Six major ideological perspectives* (pp. 148–156). New York: Macmillan. However, the cause is a curious one because it seems university methods courses had lost their intellectual component found in pedagogy. As Brubacher confirms, “methods or how-to-do-it courses so greatly preoccupied with narrow practical recommendations that they involved no “mystery” at all; that is, they had no theoretical or intellectual content.” See Brubacher, 1966, op. cit., p. 490.


24 For example, as explained by Burks in the case of an early proponent of pragmatism: “For Peirce truth is public: the truth is that on which the community of investigators will ultimately approach agreement. Hence, for Peirce, there are no private practical consequences.” See Burks, A. W. 1996. Charles Sanders Peirce: Introduction. In M. H. Fisch (Ed.), *Classic American philosophers* (pp. 41-53). New York: Fordham University Press, p. 44.
Pragmatism supported their efforts to organize national groups from which to derive policy and practices. At the same time, it is intuitive that philosophically-novice teachers learning a “pragmatic” mindset can stifle thinking on important philosophical problems, moving largely unnoticed from “what ought or can be done?” to the results-orientated “what is practical?” Further evidence lies in the survey referenced earlier which found teachers lacking a wider view on educational problems, tending to each problem in an isolated manner. Education researchers who were more used to theoretical and philosophical work were also feeling the need to satisfy the immediacy demanded of practice and policy. According to Kerlinger, “practicality” became a “social norm, a rule of proper educational research behavior.” This desire began tying down flights into high-minded theory, and encouraging preferred bottom-up thinking in education.

It is also intuitive how pragmatism would soon lead to interest in the French deconstructionists in the mid-20th century, as even the tentative threadbare state of truth in pragmatism was problematized, leading to a philosophy seemingly designed as undefinable, except to say its main use has been criticism of any assertions of truth founded in metaphysics or democratic aggregates, careful to not provide any solutions of its own! Some suggested that postmodernism argues the impossibility of “justification, both in and of education,” that it dispenses with learning to promote Nietzschean “ways of knowing that escape normativity” and “some educators have therefore concluded that postmodernism is the proclaimed end of education.” The schism in philosophy circles, the divide between the orthodox (idealists, realists), and the Heraclitean new pragmatists and postmodernists was adequately summed up by Blanshard as follows:

One party believes that intellect has an end of its own, which is theoretical understanding, and that this understanding can be achieved only by following the lines of an independent

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25 Peterson, 1933, op. cit.
27 Marx’s materialism also could be evoked as emphasizing the practical and the immediate. See Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1959. Excerpts from The German ideology. In L. S. Feuer (Ed.), Marx & Engels: Basic Writing on politics and philosophy (pp. 246-261). New York: Anchor.
28 For a discussion of the eventual move from pragmatism to deconstruction, see Biesta, G., 2010. “This is my truth, tell me yours.” Deconstructive pragmatism as a philosophy for education. E&P&T, 42(7), 710–727.
30 Lather, P. 2004. This IS your father's paradigm: Government intrusion and the case of qualitative research in education. Qualitative Inquiry, 10(1), 15-34. Quote from p. 27.
order of nature. The other believes that intellect has no end, and truth no meaning, apart from the process of human growth and adjustment.\textsuperscript{32}

The democratic ends of the new tide in philosophy within the John Dewey Society became a new point of leadership for philosophers of education. However, academics within the Society became increasingly worried about the Society’s explicit political agenda. As Kaminsky notes, the new discipline’s modern institutional form [required it to] abandon its social reform stance and adopt a standard of professional practice that was thoroughly academic and socially disinterested.\textsuperscript{33}

While the John Dewey Society was the first professional group of philosophers of education,\textsuperscript{34} soon a branch of the Society would break to form the (American) Philosophy of Education Society in 1941 as the proper institutional body of the field, distancing potentially hazardous political goals of those meeting in the John Dewey Society. A decade later, the creation of the journal \textit{Educational Theory} would be the “last element needed to realize a thoroughly professional version of philosophy of education.”\textsuperscript{35}

Under these conditions, and without the post-war higher education boom, philosophy of education may have declined much earlier.\textsuperscript{36} The field needed to adapt to the needs of a much altered set of occupational duties assigned to then current teachers if they were to continue to be seen as relevant. The response was a philosophy as flexible as possible, a philosophy of pragmatism and, soon, deconstruction, which doubled-down on philosophy of education’s forced exodus from any serious role in policy development and formation in faculties of education.

These developments in the United States would have little similarity to the very different philosophical current that flowed through education in England. American pragmatic philosophy of education gave up on metaphysics and declared all things provisional, and it would target the practical needs of the teacher and further solidarity among teaching associations, creating not a bottom-up system but just a bottom. Meanwhile, in Britain, neither pluralism nor decentralism were nearly as pronounced, the country being of much smaller size and the nation being more unified culturally than the American melting pot and its historical revolution against centralism.

\textsuperscript{33} Kaminsky, 1990, op. cit., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{34} This remark made by Schrag, 1994, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{35} Kaminsky, 1990, op. cit., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{36} Note that the post-war boom and the later Red Scare all funded and promoted STEM subjects to a much greater degree than humanities. Teacher education benefited because of its suspected impact on the nation’s schools.
especially in the aftermath of the solidarity required to defeat Nazism. These reasons contributed to Britain having a different educational history from that of the USA and, in turn, a different environment for the rise of British philosophy of education within its teacher education institutions. English Canada, particularly delayed in the formation of its institutions, would receive a mix of philosophic and educational influence: its heritage from Britain, and in the 20th century, some copying of model ITPPs in the US due to its proximity and renown. Though English Canada37 would lean more to Britain’s traditional essentialist philosophy, and pragmatism was clearly an American-style of philosophy, the recovery of British institutions after the Second World War would eventually yield its own flavour, analytical philosophy of education, which was decidedly British: being more traditional, top-down, paternalistic over teachers, yet as I will explain, still an ally to the needs of education policy.

**Rule, Britannia**

**The College of Preceptors**

The beginnings of education as a field of study, including establishing Chairs of education in universities, have a similar origin in Britain and the United States—the first Chairs in the “Art and Science of Education” being established in 1873 and 1879 respectively.38 The first holder of such a chair in Britain, Joseph Payne, was part of the newly established College of Preceptors39 which, while chartered, was independent, and launched a professional teaching and educational standards movement in Britain. It began by serving only secondary education and competed for most of its history with British educational authorities.40 Its voluntary exams, diplomas and certificates began as an alternative to state certificates and for teachers “was to provide for anyone who had no professional training a coordinated course in the principles of education and the methods of teaching.”41 The College began as a unifying force directed to the needs of the teacher and has remained so for its history. Its inclusion here is an illustration of

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39 In 1998 it was renamed to the College of Teachers. To reduce ambiguity, it will be referred to as “the College.” Its name was modeled after the previously formed (Royal) College of Surgeons and the College of Physicians.


41 Ibid, p. 134.
what a long-standing organization committed to teachers, governed by no state education system, and serving teachers all over the world looks like.

The College (1) set its own examinations, not only for prospective secondary teachers but also younger pupils, including exams in subjects such as Latin, bookkeeping, natural sciences, and many others, (2) provided professional development to teachers, including the Joseph Payne Memorial lectures, and (3) recognized successful students via qualifications which competed with university teaching certificates such as the University of London External Diploma in Education and the Cambridge Teachers’ Certificate, and the later Bachelor of Education degree first offered in the 1960s. For example, one of its early “induction” programs from 1968 provided the following curriculum:

Section A—Aims and organization of education;
Section B—Principles and methods of teaching (part 1, general; part 2, special);
Section C—Teaching Practice;  

Philosophy of education was part of the initial exams of the College. One particular judge noted that some of the “successful scripts in the principles of education, in history of education and educational method by graduates [of departments of education] would have been failed by the College.” One particular qualification, the Licentiate of the College of Preceptors (LCP), required “test[ing] knowledge over a relatively wide field, including applied philosophy, institutional studies, experimental psychology, and the problems of educational method” and the assessor “was very impressed by the standards of those candidates who had sat for the LCP.”

The LCP at this time (now called the LCoT) was designed for “non-graduate teachers in state-aided schools who wished to obtain some qualification beyond the bare minimum which enabled

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42 Willis notes that it was an “ongoing policy of the Board of Education to persuade schools not to present candidates for the College's examinations.” See Willis, 2012, op. cit., p. 150.
43 The College offered ACP (associate), LCP (licentiate), and FCP (fellowship) qualifications, in order of prestige. The LCP was degree level and the FCP required an original research dissertation. These qualifications were sought after internationally as well. Willis, 2012, op. cit., p. 141 finds in the archives from the 1950s a member of the College had formed a group in Egypt requesting examinations from the College. Centres were also created across the British empire in Africa, Australia, Hong Kong, India, and other places.
45 For example, an article discusses the lack of knowledge of the philosophy of science, and refers to questions on a “general studies exam” regarding the history of science and its influence on thinking in other disciplines. See Oliver, B. A. C. 1966. History and philosophy of science in the joint matriculation board general studies examination. Education Today, 16(2), 31-33. There are also sporadic book reviews on philosophic texts in the 1960s publication of Education Today: in 1969, Issue 3, there are separate reviews of Comenius, Jacques Maritain, and Dewey.
them to be recognized as qualified teachers.”

The papers were quite difficult, and “would be a challenge to any seasoned teacher.”

It consisted of three parts: (1) “compulsory subjects” in “philosophical, sociological and psychological bases of education” and “educational systems” selected from the countries in the United Kingdom. The “optional” subjects were “educational psychology,” and “history of education.” The second part tested teaching methods, and the final part tested subject proficiency, whether science, English literature, or the like.

**The Educational Research Context of Britain**

Returning to the situation of state schools in Britain, just as in the United States the study of education was no less influenced by science beginning, in Britain, with the founding of “arts and sciences” Chairs in education at universities across the country. Just as in the United States, science was believed to hold unlimited potential. In fact, Karl Marx, influential in Britain, rejected philosophy and believed its “speculations” would be replaced by positive science, or positivism, despite his own use of Hegelian metaphysical descriptions in his own “science” of history. Positivism was shared by logic and mathematic foundations in the thought of Bertrand Russell. In step with this, a distinctly British philosophy of education “followed philosophy’s obsessive positivist concern for logic, epistemology, clarity, and precision.”

Although the first Chairs of education resided among the Arts faculty, the title of “arts and sciences” nevertheless acknowledged the anticipation and authority that science might provide, and was the correct institutional response to build legitimacy, allowing early education research to “breach the academic walls” of the university. Academic dignity was promised by the use of science (namely early psychology), history and philosophy to make pedagogy more academic than the

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48 Ibid, p. 140f.
50 For the LCP requirements, see no author. 1969. The qualification of Licentiate of the College of Preceptors. Education Today, 19(3), 4-10. Exams like these are common in the United States. My own B.Ed. program from D’Youville College in Buffalo which met the requirements to issue New York State Teaching Certification required completion of three exams. The first was a general competency exam, the Liberal Arts and Sciences Test (LAST), the second a combined teaching profession and methods exam, and the third, a subject proficiency exam. Even though the program offered a course in philosophy of education, I do not recall questions testing knowledge of philosophy on the second exam.
anecdotal nature of the “scholarship” coming out of the normal schools in Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{53} For,

the twentieth century has seen considerable progress in education. It has also witnessed the birth of research in education, and has watched the delicate infant grow into a fair-sized, rather noisy and undisciplined child . . . [R]esearch in education has achieved very little up to the present, and it is fairly true to say it is taken seriously mainly by those who are engaged in it.\textsuperscript{54}

These remarks, written in 1965, spell the slow respect rendered to (and difficulty of conducting) education research as compared with traditional university subjects, especially in Britain. This is because education is usually viewed not as a discipline but as subordinate to the disciplines and thus “must draw on such well-established disciplines as psychology, history, philosophy, and sociology . . . [having] no unique content or method of its own.”\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, scholars toiling in established academic fields tend to look on education not as a field, but as a subject for study—a separate department or other institutional body with a set of specialist researchers is thus unnecessary. Even more difficult, for philosophy of education to become an academic field in Britain required the impossible task of marrying a new frontier of education research, starting almost from nothing, to a highly regarded history of British philosophical thought. The resulting progeny, philosophy of education, would necessarily have a difficult relationship with its parent disciplines, as do all “educational” variants of traditional university fields. Where they publish is also a factor, since

philosophers of education have the goal (reinforced by their institutional affiliation with Schools of Education and their involvement in the initial training of teachers) of contributing not to philosophy but to educational policy and practice. This shapes not only their selection of topics, but also the manner in which the discussion is pursued; and this orientation also explains why philosophers of education—to a far greater degree, it is to be suspected, than their “pure” cousins—publish not primarily in philosophy journals but in a wide range of professionally-oriented journals.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} The perception of low quality scholarship produced by education researchers, from the Normal Schools to modern Faculties of Education, would never transcend criticism sourced from the rest of the university, especially from university presidents in the early to mid-20th century. Around the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century they would inherit the name “Ed School.” See Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{55} Brubacher, 1966, op. cit., p. 491.
\textsuperscript{56} From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry Philosophy of Education, available here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/education-philosophy/
These journals include, for example in the United States, *Teachers College Record* or *Harvard Educational Review*, and in Britain, the *Cambridge Journal of Education* and the *British Journal of Educational Studies*. Institutionalizing philosophy of education as a field would force an unsteady relationship between its parent discipline, philosophy, and its environment, education, with professional and career incentives offered for publishing in the latter group.

The history of pedagogy has been introduced previously in Chapter two. One important point regarding the British context and pedagogy was education’s much lower standing as compared to nearby Germany; John Locke’s own educational writing had gone out of print in his native land but was discovered and revitalized in Germany. Early 20th century principles of education courses reigned in early British teacher education institutions. One prominent philosopher of education characterized its instructors as generalists, visionaries, even “oracles,” evidence of their synthetic function, perhaps, but emblems which would not be welcomed in the 20th century research university. These comments could also refer to the fairly wild state of teacher education in Britain, frequently referred to in the literature as a “swinging pendulum,” describing the “dominance at different times of a school-based/apprenticeship or a college- or university-based model of training.” The 19th century was particularly school-based, but by the mid-20th century, the university model began taking hold.

For most of the 19th century, teacher training took on an apprenticeship model, or a “pupil-teacher system.” The 1888 Cross Commission was the first explicit step toward planning the hosting of teacher training in the universities and encouraging faculties to begin education research. Several years later, the 1902 Education Act formalized the authority regulating these institutions to Local Educational Authorities (LEAs), effectively signaling the intentions of a transition to a university-training model. In this year, what would become an important central institution was also created, the London Day Training College. By 1909 it would be formally incorporated into the University of London, and henceforth known as the London Institute of Education which, as I will describe later, would be a central force in

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providing education research and a model for teacher training for the country, akin to Teachers
College at Columbia in the United States.

The study of education as a field entering the British university was far more onerous
than in the less entrenched and expansionist universities in the United States and Canada.
Hosting consistent giants in philosophy such as John Locke, David Hume in Scotland, Herbert
Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and now Bertrand Russell, made academic philosophy in Britain
important and institutionally entrenched. For instance, in 1912, some colleges in Britain created
Masters of Arts programs in education to attempt to make education of “equal rank with any
other branch of speculative philosophy.”60 This pride in the English philosophical tradition was
less so in the younger, more practical, United States, her institutions less developed and still
importing most of her degrees from abroad. The 1960s and 1970s also was the time of the British
Black Papers,61 a reactionary series of criticisms of British higher and lower education resisting
American progressive influences, arguing against importing political or social goals into
education policy, and arguing for maintaining “meritocracy” and liberal education in the
universities.

The distinctly British nationalism in high education standards argued in the Black Papers,
as well as the British tradition in philosophy boosted the philosophical grounding received by
Britain’s teachers as teacher education moved into universities and colleges, which caused early
British ITPPs to struggle with an overemphasis on the theory of education apart from its practice.
This led to the Board of Education delegating its examination of teachers to these institutions.62
The intention of this move was to tighten the coupling of the preparation of teachers, or technical
core, to their students’ later official accrediting via the exams, or what was previously an
institutional level force now incorporated. As also might be expected, the universities initially
tended to host only secondary teacher training, their established B. A. degrees requiring little
modification,63 and elementary training was provided in the training colleges operated by the
LEAs, or long established chartered institutions, such as the Church of England. In the

60 Adams, 1912, op. cit.
61 Cox, C. B. & Dyson, A. E. 1971. The black papers on education (rev. ed.). London: Davis-Poynter. This event can
also be linked to the rise of President Hutchins at the University of Chicago several decades earlier. Overall, this was
a pedagogical battle between British tradition and the influences of American progressivism.
63 The assumption of a Bachelor’s as indicative of a “general education” as preparation for teacher training is disputed
by; Edmundson, P. J. 1990. A normative look at the curriculum in teacher education. Phi Delta Kappan, 71(9), 717–
722.
universities, the institutionalization\(^{64}\) of educational fields, in effect, created teacher education institutions as mini-universities, each of which, if of sufficient size, would create internal departments to house the immigrating university disciplines of psychology, philosophy, history and the like.

Unsurprisingly these programs lacked a practice component, for in Britain secondary teachers still did not require such until after the Robbins Report of 1963. While the earlier McNair report of 1944 established schools of education and expected universities to accept the responsibility of educating teachers, some universities formed only “institutes,” such as at Cambridge, which were inferior departments “down the road” from the main campus (in the case of Cambridge, remaining so until 2005).\(^{65}\) Acceptance of the tradition of university degrees constituting a sufficient qualification for secondary (subject) teaching was prolonged in Britain. While many university students directly entered teaching with only an undergraduate degree and no specialized teacher training into the 1970s, this practice would soon end as the James Report of 1972 was implemented, recommending teaching to be an all-graduate occupation. While the earlier Robbins Report sought to reassert the intentions of the previous McNair Report by upgrading all “LEA colleges of education”\(^{66}\) and university departments and institutes of education into “schools of education” offering four year B.Ed. degrees, the James Report would formalize the use of these institutions as Britain’s ITPPs.

The borrowing of faculty and material from traditional university subjects would last until new PhDs produced from faculty in the traditional branches of the university started producing their own materials and courses.\(^{67}\) For example, one of the first professors of philosophy writing on education in Canada was Rupert C. Lodge. Born and educated in Britain, he wrote one of the earliest textbooks in philosophy of education in 1937, with a revised edition published a decade later.\(^{68}\) He noted various pressures on philosophy for teachers in the early 1950s,


\(^{65}\) Ford, 1964, op. cit., p. 135.

\(^{66}\) LEAs are municipal organizations across Britain which administer elementary and secondary level education.

\(^{67}\) As I will discuss in the next chapter, academic philosophy would also be initially used in Canadian teacher education programs, likely due to its long standing congenial affiliation with Britain.

\(^{68}\) Lodge, R. C. 1937/1947. *Philosophy of education*. New York: Harper. Lodge’s textbook follows the basic “ism” approach (idealism, realism, pragmatism), and believed a balance was the wisest course, only leaning to one “ism” checked by the other two. This evaluation was given by Skinner, 1963, op. cit.
Administrators do not want young teachers inoculated with academic philosophy: tormented (and perhaps unsettled in their minds) by being made to face difficult and fundamental questions to which there do not appear to be any agreed-upon answer.⁶⁹

This was one of the first notices from philosophers of the impracticality of teaching academic philosophy to teachers. Institutional organizational theory, however, holds that this was inevitable as organizations “are constituted by elements drawn from their institutional environments” and “great efforts are made to ensure their visibility to outsiders.”⁷⁰ Feedback mechanisms were not in place to detect and signal concern about the applicability of the teacher education curriculum, except for what was imposed by the regulatory forces of official education policy. For example, the Robbins Report notes under item 315, that the “Minister of Education is responsible for securing an adequate supply of teachers; in this he is assisted by the National Advisory Council on the Training and Supply of Teachers.” This is an example of a regulatory check on the number of teacher graduates from the nation’s colleges, which could intervene in the setting (or disregarding) of enrolment standards of the colleges. But such a policy item leaves the content of ITPPs wide open, and universities were left to devise programs based on their own institutional resources and structure.

Lodge further comments that this led to the “Philosophy of Education Society’s perennial concern with suitable content for a course on Philosophy of Education.” The new education fields, such as philosophy of education, were expected to somehow span the gap between nascent education research, balancing theory and practice which provide for teaching as a craft, and maintaining respect to their academic parent. The new academics developing these fields could not simply plunge into education research and abandon philosophy entirely. Rather, a more gradual process unfolded as the new philosophers of education sought to secure their own legitimacy by extracting what was found to be serviceable from philosophy, which is rich in educational writings, and fashioning this material into thought-provoking, inspiring, and actionable theories to arm teachers in their craft. This seemed to be the value of synthesis from pedagogy. The only thing that was needed was to insert “upgraded” content from modern educational research—both philosophy and science were legitimacy-building assets to the new

⁷⁰ Scott, 1998, op. cit., p. 211.
study of education, however the pluralist systems provided by pedagogy and academic philosophy would not fit into the modern university study of education, as has been discussed.

British philosophy, having a substantial history, would affect philosophy of education strongly. Pragmatism, while strongly within the American academic tradition, especially in the work of William James and John Dewey, was considered “soft” and “something to be transcended”\(^{71}\) in British academic circles and would not make strong inroads in Britain. While both had similar beginnings in terms of pedagogy in early teacher education, and both sought to transcend it, the two countries would take two different philosophic paths to accomplish this. America’s path was decidedly social and pragmatic in approach (inductive), while Britain’s was founded on a metaphysical view of analysis via logic and ontology (deductive). While Dewey would work backwards from a democratic ideal, anticipating what kind of society and thus what kind of education would be needed to secure this end, Britain would take a bottom-up approach that formulates the best foundations of thought, carefully honing their concepts and other metaphysical premonitions, before applying them to everyday experience.

Or, on Power’s account,

as idealism, realism . . . and pragmatism declined in significance and the influence of systematic philosophy waned, analytical philosophy . . . began to assert itself as a method of inquiry for unraveling difficult educational riddles rather than a code of answers to questions that might be asked about education.\(^{72}\)

Borrowing the system building of philosophy would not work well for philosophers of education gripped by education practice by its students and policies by education policy-makers seeking to fill the operational needs of a growing public education system. There needed to be philosophy of education which was academically respectable to the university, yet institutionally supportive of the changing needs of an already complex yet still developing education system.

**British Philosophy of Education**

The first members of the field of philosophy of education for Britain, aside from the rare writings of a few academic philosophers such as Alfred N. Whitehead, might begin, institutionally-speaking, with Lawrence A. Reid’s appointment to the first Chair of philosophy of education in Britain, established at the London Institute of Education in 1947. Reid was tasked

\(^{71}\) Kaminsky, 1993, op. cit., p. 156.

with starting the discipline for Britain. He was specifically selected because of his interest in education, having published several works on the topic, and for being a philosopher; these attributes were seen as an appropriate academic guide for education departments focused on pedagogy and practice—education, at this point, still undifferentiated into disciplines for study. As an illustration, the launching of the new *British Journal of Educational Studies* in 1952 would include Reid in the first issue, as well as (somewhat ominously) an obituary of John Dewey. The close of Dewey’s American empire of philosophy of education left a vacuum which was filled by British analytical philosophy of education during the next two decades.

Recall this strategy to bring in academic philosophers into education departments was similar to that adopted in the United States. Reid’s main legacy from an institutional point of view was the establishment of an Easter conference of philosophy for teachers at the London Institute.\textsuperscript{73} The very existence of a routine conference for teachers would have added institutional strength and provided a recurrent platform for Reid and his colleagues to sell and repackage as necessary their intellectual product, even if at the time philosophy was still considered an “intrusion.”\textsuperscript{74} This was because education researchers at the time thought their best path to academic respectability and legitimacy was by becoming more scientific and *au courant*. It therefore resisted influence from established university fields such as philosophy and, in doing so, likely contributed to the formation of modern (scientific) psychology.\textsuperscript{75} During the rebuilding after the Second World War, newness was the thing, and the trend for philosophy was slow withdrawal from “giving directive assistance in education.”\textsuperscript{76}

At the same time, philosophy of education in Britain began to emerge as a consistent theme emphasizing a paternal role of philosophy over education. The discipline of philosophy was recognized as having conclusions, methods, and ideas which education research must consider or incorporate to upgrade its then meager status. Other emergent fields of education, having little philosophical training to translate the work of philosophers, found this approach

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\textsuperscript{73} Kaminsky, 1993, op. cit., p. 158. This has expanded greatly and the London Institute at University College, London, England now has a research center called “Philosophy at the London Institute” headed by Paul Standish. Research centers seem to protect their contents from the institutional forces operating on philosophy in teacher education. I discuss this point further in Chapter 5 and the final chapter.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, p. 157f.

\textsuperscript{75} This field began as mental philosophy, and during the rise of science in the early 20th century, changed to experimental psychology, and soon after split into philosophy of mind, (scientific) psychology, and the in-house “educational psychology” of schools of education.

\textsuperscript{76} Skinner, 1963, op. cit., p. 256.
fairly useless, allowing the work of philosophy of education to build a distinctive, if rancorous, identity. Reid complained about this in his first major work, *Philosophy and Education* in 1962, the “and” distinctly written and perhaps the first prominent work entitled as such to regret the opportunities for partnership the new field was missing. Drawing on an earlier observation in the 1955 (American) NSSE issue, he pointed to how “modern philosophies of education” were acquiring an “artificial air” as a result of philosophers of education choosing to remain “spectators from the outside” rather than building from “the experience of education and teaching.”

Reid went on to point out that the very “raison d’être, its justification” lies in how philosophers of education engage with questions of education practice. That this should be the case should not surprise us, as most educational philosophers had been trained as philosophers and, having taken a post in the new and expanding schools of education, and likely having little to no teaching experience, their skill set prepared them to lecture and write on philosophy. A 1956 survey of philosophy of education courses in 26 departments of education in the United Kingdom found a diversity of methods and purposes for teaching the subject. The study noted “in some cases the immediate aim is thought to be of value in itself, as part of the general education of a graduate who intends to teach.” Although most of the time it was taught as a “principles of education” course, the survey also noted diversity in the delivery of the philosophy content. This varied from an exclusive study of Plato to education seen through philosophical schools, and this suggests philosophy of education had a liberal role to foster a “philosophic outlook” and was yet to be institutionalized. At the time, this was likely seen as a virtue; academic university subjects with long histories of prestige constituted the education of grammar school teachers, and this model teacher, as in the United States, was, at least initially, the expected standard for anyone expecting an occupation in the civil service. This was even more the case for Britain, and instructors in the early schools of education were even more

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79 Ibid.
81 Ibid, p. 268.
82 As I will discuss in Chapter 5, a 1969 study by Burke and Howard of philosophy of education courses in Canada and abroad found a lack of diversity and “virtually the same introductory course” offered in ITPPs. For the study see: Burke, D. R. & Howard, V. A. 1969. On turning the philosophy of education outside-in. *British Journal of Educational Studies, 17*(1), 5-15.
encouraged to come bearing high university standards of excellence, rather than experience in the lower schools.

A similar point was later made by Clifford and Guthrie, who noted that American education faculties seldom hired superintendents or renowned headmasters, as the normal schools had done. The faculty complement was thus alien to the previous cycle of expertise and experience evident in the rural and small-town schoolhouses and the normal schools, including the culture of educational heroes such as Parker in the United States, where no such heroes came out of the universities. Making oneself distinctive also no longer required great and recognized efforts but, in its place, an association with an exclusive professional group. This would cut off the previous generation of educators, and attempt to create a new breed of teacher, armed with new methods and branded with new certificates from universities and colleges.

Hostility to the growing numbers of philosophers within British schools of education was likely deflected by the philosophers themselves through their very preoccupation with mining the philosophic literature for educational ideas. This can be seen in the bibliographies of the first generation of philosophers working in education departments in the early to mid 20th century. For example, many concentrated on separating and translating the long tradition of educational ideas from luminaries such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Comenius, Rousseau, Locke, Dewey, and others. Therefore, and as also reported by Reid, the initial field of philosophers working on education resulted in “no universally agreed field, or subject matter or method, in philosophy.”

This state of affairs would soon change, and new philosophers of education would organize and seek their own philosophic distinction and “newness” in the analytical school.

While a few early works in analytical philosophy of education did appear before the first Chair, the field would not accelerate in Britain until a more institutional catalyst emerged. This came with the 1962 succession of Richard S. Peters. His recruiter, Lionel Elvin, was the writer of the teacher education portion of the Robbins Report, and part of the reason to maintain the

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83 Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op. cit., p. 77. They note that only 1/6 of education faculty in 1933 in the United States had public school administration experience.
84 Ibid., p. 3.
85 For example, Hardie’s 1941 *Truth, fallacy and educational theory* which references the Cambridge analytical school as a possible new method for philosophers of education. The Second World War made this work obscure; it was thus reissued in 1962. Furthermore, D. J. O’Connor’s *An introduction to philosophy of education* in 1957 was meant as a textbook in analytical philosophy methods. It also complemented Israel Scheffler’s work in the United States. Scheffler would be the key analytical philosopher of education in the United States, as was R. S. Peters in Britain.
philosophy of education Chair at the London Institute was because he believed “philosophy was
the keystone of a liberal education and it was the keystone of teacher education.”

Peters, at that time, had the only Chair in philosophy of education in all of England. Trained in philosophical psychology, he had a vision different from that of Reid, and was far more successful in promoting the field. Combining the Oxford school of philosophy and the Wittgensteinean analytical approach,

it was Peters, the second professor of educational philosophy at the London Institute of
Education, who spoke to Britain’s academic establishment, the profession, and the public.
It was Peters who maintained the image of a unified and scholarly community.

His claim to leadership also came at an opportune time, with the influential Robbins
Report being published and implemented a year after Peters’ appointment. Peters’ legacy can be compared with Dewey’s in the United States: both were incredibly successful because of their ability to satisfy a variety of groups interested in education becoming a respectable field of study in the universities. Peters was an “academic politician” and the conditions of education which Dewey improved were similar to those in which Peters worked. Overall, his influence can be summarized as follows:

Richard took his duties very seriously: building up the department; creating a world-leading set of masters and doctoral programmes in his subject; taking a leading part in committees of the Institute and more widely of the University (at one stage he was a member of some 35 of them); extending the reach and complexity of the subject’s standing and advancement overseas; and all the while assiduously working away at a personal publishing programme, resulting in a string of books and articles, that would have been the envy of many colleagues with only half the weight of administration, representation and consultancy that he was carrying.

His landmark text, *Ethics in Education*, would set the agenda for research and courses in philosophy of education for decades to come. He trained and spread the London Institute’s brand of doing philosophy of education across the country, adding further Chairs in several institutions.

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86 Ibid, p. 160. This remark illustrates a common view of teachers being liberally educated, or generalists. Philosophy as the “keystone” can also be likened to the technical core of teacher education, the framer of its contents.
88 Kaminsky, 1993, op. cit., p. 169. Kaminsky believed Peters’ hegemony over Britain was actually greater than Dewey’s over the United States largely because Dewey at Columbia had competition from Harvard, Ohio State, Stanford, and UC Berkeley. Britain’s devastation and loss of empire status after the Second World War may have also prepared the academic ground for new movements to restore British pride.
89 Ibid.
Peters would begin to professionalize the field in Britain similarly to the way in which the field of education was distanced from pedagogy by: (1) setting boundaries and methods for the field and (2) gatekeeping entry. He would curb the cottage industries of education and the scholasticism perpetuated in academic circles through study of the Great Educators and other pedagogical remnants and aphorisms of the normal school era. Interest in these became historical, not current, including pontification on education typical from “autodidacts, philosophical tourists [and] quasi-professionals of previous generations.”91 None of these characters would be henceforth permitted to contribute to the emergent field of philosophy of education, for a new regime at the London Institute was taking over, and much new work was needed analyzing the concepts of education to clear up the language used to devise policy.

Crucial to these initiatives was for Peters to “dominate” both educational philosophy’s “intellectual initiatives [and] its institutional initiatives.” Contributing only to one, either the intellectual or the institutional, would not be enough to provide for an academic field. Both the ideas, the soil, were combined with lobbying for more Chairs of philosophy of education,92 including training those to fill them, in order to create a stable field. In order to do this, over the 1960s, Peters and his colleagues, especially P. H. Hirst at King’s College and later the University of Cambridge, “monopolized the discipline’s literary technology . . . [effectively making] Peters . . . the major editor of educational philosophy in Great Britain.”93 The word “editor” is operative here: Peters would not only change the discourse concerning philosophy of education and what counted as contributions to the field, he would also begin recruiting and training new academics who would emigrate to other areas of the Anglosphere and spread the “London School.”

As it spread, the London School began to challenge the status of the field of education as a plurality of ideologies. The dominance of the Great Educator approach perpetuated diverse “systems” or “ideologies” of teaching and educational aims, each self-contained and each seen as necessary and fundamental to educating prospective educators. In contrast, analytical philosophy

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92 Peters would be “instrumental in decisions regarding who would be appointed to Chairs and lectureships” over the next 10 years. This included Paul Hirst at King’s, Leslie Perry at Warwick and King’s, Ray Elliot and Robert Dearden at Birmingham, Hugh Sockett at Ulster and later East Anglia, and Richard Pring at Exeter and then Oxford. From Kaminsky, 1993, op. cit., p. 170.

93 Ibid, p. 169.
was geared towards providing its own kind of ideology, with a common set of tools in commonsense linguistic analysis from which any philosopher of education could develop a shared answer to any educational question. This answer did not depend on the axioms and slogans derived from the pluralist Great Educators; it was produced by using a common analytical workbench akin to a standard method for achieving results similar to the sciences. This powerful transition would make philosophy of education the most respected it ever would be in the university, as shown, in part, by the publication of a variety of book series in philosophy, as well as the creation of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain in 1964.

The Fall of the Analytical Philosophy School

The analytical approach disrupted the previously all-pervasive slogans in education by focussing on the problems of philosophy as problems of conveying the truth by taking the virtues of mathematics and logic and strictness in definitions of concepts and applying them to other academic areas. The belief at the time was that no more fields could be plowed and we can only carefully prune what was to grow; that problems of philosophy and the existence of the “isms” of philosophy were the result of philosophers accepting the presumptions of metaphysics, and using different tools (especially, according to Wittgenstein, the meanings of words) to create their own gardens, rather than using the same tools in order to contribute to a common field to make communal progress. The slogan might be “common methods, common concepts, common suggestions” which, in practice, was meant to safeguard philosophy’s role in education policy.

Still, philosophy of education would have mixed success, and failed to retain influence in education policy. A typical analytical strategy for policy development in 1969 was outlined by Taylor in *Towards a Policy for the Education of Teachers*:

If the education and training of teachers is something in relation to which government, the universities, local authorities, teachers and the training institutions themselves all have a legitimate interest and concern . . . then the first steps towards the evolution of a workable policy must be to expose the differences and misunderstandings, and to explore the possibilities that exist for agreement . . . there might one day hopefully emerge some strategy for action which enjoys a substantial measure of consensus.

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94 One book series was the Routledge and Kegan Paul International Library of the Philosophy of Education.
95 Descartes’ method also began with firm foundations. He wrote: “Those who seek the direct road to truth should not bother with any object of which they cannot have a certainty equal to the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry.” From his classic *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*.
96 Taylor, 1969, as cited in Wilson, 1975, op. cit., p. 98.
Philosophy among non-philosophers has a difficult time finding a “consensus” that does not simply degrade the conversation to an unphilosophical level as illustrated in a subsequent quotation from Wilson offered below. Where the other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, and history, offer points of fact that must be considered, philosophy is wholly different, and while it can contribute to the analysis of ideas and conclusions it cannot, by itself, possibly synthesize actionable conclusions. Analytical philosophy of education was a test to take on this role of contributor by judging the consistent use of concepts in education policy. But its preference for clarifying concepts neutrally while refusing to engage in moral questions contributed to its exclusion from primary policy writing.

As Wilson put it in respect to the work of Taylor quoted earlier,

there is a bland assumption that research into teacher-training must necessarily follow the orthodox empirical lines; in a 40-page section on research no serious philosophical studies are quoted and discussed, and questions about basic aims are treated in a strictly sociological manner.97

The absence of explicit philosophy from education policy is clearly a signal of a lack of engagement and importance of philosophy in the technical core of teacher education. If philosophy is not writing policy, using its expertise in philosophically framing concepts and problems and drawing on the relevant empirical disciplines,98 then it can only criticize the policy work of others. Even so, by choosing a life of criticism, philosophy would have a difficult time warring with its institutional level.99 Success in this latter position would come from finding effective philosophies of criticism, and re-engaging with the moral content that was lost in the analytical school. By the late 1970s such philosophic critique also led to the later burst of pluralism in British philosophy of education after the end of Peters’ reign. In a way, this decline may have returned the organization of teacher education to a former state, and the loss of the temporary informal organizational policing of those in the “London Line” may have “let in” others from different schools of thought. Whereas the organization would prefer roles filled and

97 Wilson, 1975, op. cit., p. 98.
tasks delegated, individuals fill those roles and tend to assert distinctiveness whether it serves the organization or not.\textsuperscript{100}

The 1970s was a period of transition, the analytical movement losing steam and eventually falling prey to a new generation of philosophers of education, some having written their dissertation criticizing current habituated techniques of conceptual analysis as their rite of passage into the field.\textsuperscript{101} Also by this time, many philosophers of education seriously doubted the life of the field and were upset with the failed project of the “London Line.”\textsuperscript{102} Lucas claiming in 1971 “educational philosophy as a discipline has not simply declined in influence; it has died.”\textsuperscript{103} Not only does he report that the boundaries and purpose of the field had not held together, he argues courses in philosophy of education have suffered from a bad reputation of being poorly taught.

These problems could have been predicted by the structure of teacher education and its accrediting agencies. The first sign of decline for the field of philosophy of education came from American educational psychologist Paul Woodring. First writing in 1957 to warn of problems in teacher education,\textsuperscript{104} in the following year he was the first\textsuperscript{105} to note decline in the field.\textsuperscript{106} He identified the institutional problem as follows:

During the first half of the present century, while many liberal arts colleges turned their backs on the problems of teacher education, legal requirements for certification were established in nearly all states. In general the trend was away from certification on the basis of examination and toward . . . completion of course requirements in colleges and universities . . . Many states specify certain courses which must be taken in professional fields so that the responsibility for curriculum making has, in part, been taken away from the colleges.\textsuperscript{107}

Note that this problem was insulated from the College of Preceptors in Britain, which maintains examinations as its test for awards rather than course titles. These policies can dictate the

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\textsuperscript{102} Ironically, Reid, the first chair in Britain, was also the first to criticize the dominance of the London Line. He writes, “the demand for clarity at every point has indeed been one of the paralysing obsessions of contemporary philosophy” and rather, philosophers should be “questioners.” Reid, 1964, op. cit., p. 11.


\textsuperscript{104} Woodring, 1957, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{105} This is confirmed in Lucas, 1971, op. cit., as well Sirotnik, K. A. 1990. On the eroding foundations of teacher education. \textit{Phi Delta Kappan, 71}(9), 710–716.

\textsuperscript{106} Woodring, 1958, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{107} Woodring, 1957, op. cit., p. 23.
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technical core of teacher education, providing clear requirements that must be offered. The needs of teacher education become part of state policy with an eye to the functioning of the education system, with accreditation a method of “delegation”\(^{108}\) of organizational resources and faculty.

**Summary**

The trend of empirical research governing education remained consistent over the 20\(^{th}\) century in both Britain and the United States, most recently under the label of “evidence-based.” Science has retained a substantial role in legitimizing both teacher education institutions and the teaching profession. Philosophy’s initial presence in these institutions is best seen only as an envoy of traditional university disciplines. It was an initial expedition, and another was never sent. These initial settlers survived as they could but eventually died out not before producing progeny which to a greater extent lived with the educational natives. These progeny, the fields of educational psychology, educational sociology, educational history, educational administration, and educational philosophy co-existed together to make up what is known as the study of educational theory. Unsurprisingly, the parent discipline of philosophy recoiled at the “work” being done in educational philosophy.\(^{109}\) However, the climate of expectations for scientific work still reigned, and those fields which provided it survived and prospered better than those in the humanities.\(^{110}\)

Philosophy of education needed to retool once more. Rather than starting from abstract “schools” or “isms” of philosophy and determining educational aims and practices that students were expected to implement, philosophers of education began starting from classroom issues and concerns over grading, indoctrination, and the like. This was an important and effective change, for while it required only a slight shift of method from “pure” analytical philosophy of education, it both met students where they were and maintained their interest in criticism of education policy. The method born from this approach was the “issues” model of teaching and doing philosophy of education. It was increasingly favoured by students, but also institutionally, as the issues to be raised could be sourced in problems of the day. The change was necessary; as

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\(^{108}\) Selznick, 1948, op. cit., p. 27.


\(^{110}\) One of the best essays addressing the widespread rift between arts and sciences, especially due to state policies favouring sciences in the universities and the public schools to contribute to the war efforts, is British C. P. Snow’s *Two Cultures* in 1959. For the American equivalent, see Harvard president James B. Conant’s *Two modes of thought: My encounters with science and education* published in 1964.
Christian Weber remarked in 1960, reality is too complex to be captured by a single “ism,” and where pedagogy and the simplicity of the schoolhouse had been superseded by ever more complex state educational policy, school classroom policy, and evolving professional standards, teachers would lack the autonomy to design classrooms to fit a preconceived “ism” in the first place.

The control of teacher education programs, in part, led to the decline of the most vulnerable programs in the scientific wave. This hostile environment, along with the needs of education policy, may have led to an isomorphic process within education research. These institutions, formalizing ITPPs and their faculty, all had a similar purpose, and “once disparate organizations in the same line of business are structured into an actual field . . . powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one another.” This would also explain the later creation of “policy departments” and, most recently in the late 20th century, “educational leadership departments,” which seems to have followed coursework consolidation changes, such as “social foundations”-type courses. These groupings were created to improve the task performance of teacher education institutions in responding to their institutional level, and the faculty hired prior to these groupings were blended as well as possible, even though they were experts in disparate (more traditional) university fields. As philosophy of education researchers failed in the competition to have an inalienable role in directing policy, their move from a single approach of analytical philosophy to criticism from a plurality of perspectives may, itself, have been a formalism. As DiMaggio and Powell explain, “as an innovation spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves performance.” This suggests a practice may continue to occur despite having no effect on performance, yet still is viewed as “doing something” or contributing to informal or personal goals (such as publishing in non-professional education journals). The more loosely-coupled the organization, the more this practice would seem to be inevitable.

Furthermore, formal organizations under the restraints of coercive institutional environments tend to adopt expedient responses, adopting the minimum changes needed to (or to appear to) meet a new policy directive. In this fashion, state policy dictating course offerings to

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113 Ibid.
qualify a program to award sanctioned teaching certificates or degrees will expediently be
complied with by teacher education institutions. This compliance often results in the
isomorphism of sharing a course syllabus with a nearby institution, and the assignment of the
course to an instructor only vaguely familiar with the content so as to avoid hiring a new, more
qualified faculty member. Since this instructor would also “examine” or “test” his own students,
no routine method of detecting poor instruction or course delivery exists, besides student, or
perhaps peer, complaints. Nevertheless, such complaints would not change the institutional
procedure for expediently replacing the instructor in a similar fashion. External exams help
prevent this process, providing tighter coupling between programs and expected results. Perhaps
the most welcome change would be a field’s Society setting national exams for its courses. This
process would immediately standardize course material for those institutions adopting these
exams.

In the next chapter, I will review some of the details of Canada’s own struggle with
forming teacher education institutions. The flavour of philosophy of education among these
institutions also depended on philosophy inspired by its traditional lineage to Britain and its
proximity to the United States. The main section is a case study of one particular teachers’
college, built in 1961, within which my own PhD studies reside. This institution, somewhat
coincidently, has followed the path just outlined of philosophy of education’s rise and decline in
its faculty complement over the span of its just over half century existence.
Chapter 5
The Case of the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education

If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development. ~ Aristotle

A general history of teacher education in the institutions of the United States and Britain has been covered, and likewise of philosophy of education as it was transformed in those institutions. We now turn to an individual case of these complex relations. The case study of the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education, Western University, and known just after its founding as the Althouse College of Education (ACE) in London, Ontario, Canada, will serve as a particularly apt exhibit of how philosophy of education began in a new institution with faculty and courses and, over time, declined to zero faculty and a bare presence in an educational foundations course in its teacher education program. Before exploring this case, a brief history of Ontario will build the context leading up to and situating the 1962 founding of ACE affiliated with the nearby University of Western Ontario.¹ This historical summary will be followed by a brief discussion of the role of case studies in institutional organizational theory, and how this case serves to illustrate the general theory. The latter portion of the chapter, while continuing the Ontario history as a background, will provide an in-depth look at the developments within ACE. Of central interest is the fate of philosophy of education in this ITPP, and how its courses and faculty were affected by institutional and managerial level developments. The case provides an exemplar of particular (micro) manifestations of the (macro) forces operative on the field of philosophy of education as discussed in previous chapters.

Ontario – Delayed Developments of a Mix of Visions

In its early colonial days Canada was made up of mostly British and French subjects, and native peoples. As in the history of education in every country, education was valued in accordance with the little advantage it afforded for the poor and rural majority. These services were provided in the common schools, and common school teacher training mostly resided in rural model schools and urban normal schools, providing First, Second, and Third-class certificates. The selection of candidates was poor and most non-grammar school teachers, up to

¹ In 2012 this university shortened its public (but not legal) name to Western University.
the turn of the 20th century, and with the exception of some highly qualified teachers in urban areas,2 were “transients” holding Third-class certificates.3 This was encouraged by rural school boards which were unwilling to pay a premium for normal-trained teachers, and were content to entrust temporary “Thirds” to staff common schools. Families, often during seasons when less work was required, sent their children to local common schools to comply with any truancy laws operating at the time.4

The creation of a mass “free and compulsory” school system, as envisioned by Ryerson for Canada in the mid-19th century and as was already operating in the United States due to the initial efforts of Horace Mann, followed a slower process in Canada. Eventually the schools of the 19th century,

gradually ceased to be subordinate to churches and families and were now the creatures of local and provincial governments. The grammar school, with its distinctive purpose and its all-male student body, had become a multi-purpose secondary school serving teenage boys and girls alike, while the common school had been reduced to an elementary school. Together, these various changes, accomplished between the 1840s and the 1880s, established the fundamental shape and character of Ontario’s modern system of public education.5

Various tactics were used to encourage “Thirds” to upgrade to higher certificates. A hierarchy of institutions was created: First class certificates were provided solely in The Provincial School of Pedagogy which opened in 1890, Second class by the normal schools, and Thirds by the model schools. At the turn of the 20th century, while the model schools still trained most teachers, not everyone assessed this fact as causing a negative impact on the teaching profession. Ross, writing in 1896 and quoted at length by me below, comprehensively sums up the teacher training provisions for most (rural) Ontario teachers:

After eighteen years’ experience of the working of county model schools, it is the universal opinion of the profession in Ontario that the training, even elementary and limited as it is, is invaluable to the young teacher. His knowledge of the philosophy of education may not be very extensive; he may not even have acquired sufficient knowledge of school organization to classify properly a large ungraded school; but he has, however, learned the necessity of teaching according to some preconceived design or lesson plan, of guarding against all unprofessional peculiarities which might mar his usefulness, of practicing self-control and personal dignity before a class, of cultivating the

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4 Canada’s first truancy law was enacted in 1871 for children ages 6-12 to attend school for 6 months of the year.
attentive interest of his pupils, and of presenting his own thoughts with clearness, fluency, and animation. When he takes charge of a school for the first time, he knows what to do, and within certain limitations how to do it, and consequently avoids the mistake of a teacher wholly inexperienced. He has also become acquainted with a wider field of professional literature, and is impressed with the necessity of higher educational attainment.6

This account, while perhaps a rosy picture,7 nevertheless describes the early, perhaps limited expectations in teacher preparation. Eventually Thirds issuance was terminated by making them temporary certificates which would expire unless upgraded.

At the secondary level, in contrast to the American system, Ontario would delay the high school’s role in mass education, sustaining its British8 roots with the grammar schools maintaining high standards and exclusive entry by examinations. Its certificate, even into the early 20th century, would provide access to many skilled vocations, including law, engineering, and others, as well as elementary teacher training. In this case, the new high schools which evolved from the 19th century grammar schools and their teachers had a particular role as a competitive terminal education which offered particular career paths, in contrast to the new elementary schools whose role became the first and lower part in mass education—compulsory and thus, expected and neither distinctive nor valued by employers.

Pedagogical texts, as reviewed from an exemplar Canadian teacher library in Chapter 2, illustrate the philosophic culture of ITPPs of the time; philosophy was the synthetic inspiration and framework of its teacher instructors, further formalized and spread in teacher associations and literature. Pedagogy had far more room to reign in elementary teacher training since the instructors providing the training were closer to the practice and culture of teaching, that of schoolkeeping. The training of secondary teachers began much later and only amended the grammar school teaching route, adding but a few education courses (and thus, limited contact between students and instructors) alongside the more dominant traditional bachelor of arts in the universities. Thus, while elementary teachers early on were offered year-long programs for training, secondary teachers were offered one or two courses. Even so, philosophy existed in

7 This assessment was later heavily criticized by J. G. Althouse, Director of Education from 1944 to 1956, who bemoaned the “devastating effect of the model schools on the status of the profession and declared that they succeeded only in handing over the vast majority of the schools to the half-trained and immature.” Paraphrased from Fleming, 1971, op. cit., p. 3.
8 This comparison of the three approaches made by Gidney & Millar, 1990, op. cit., p. 316.
both groups but in different ways. Pedagogy was the vehicle for philosophy in the former group: it constituted teaching culture (often child-centered and religious), while the traditional university program was the vehicle for the latter group, academic culture, such as in studying philosophy explicitly, or in classics and ecclesiastical studies, instilling a kind of (religious) pedagogy. Science in the early 20th century would also take hold. Elementary training added coursework in psychology, particularly psychology of the child, which was consistent with the aims of already acculturated child-centered educational philosophy. As secondary schools became part of mass schooling, they expanded their aims of education beyond traditional knowledge-centered aims from the grammar schools to include national social and political aims already active in the elementary schools.

Progressivism in Ontario would be delayed nearly a half century from its American formulations via Francis Parker and John Dewey. However, American influences were to accelerate over the early 20th century both in progressive philosophy of social aims, and in the promise of a professionalizing subject for teachers, psychology. In fact, both influences were sourced in nearby Teachers College of Columbia, the latter from Thorndike. For example, this remark of transition was made in 1926 by Peter Sandiford, Professor of Education, University of Toronto:

Dear old Pestalozzi! Dear old Spencer! Yet though we smile patronizingly upon them today, they in their time played their parts and played them well. If it were not for the scientific scepticism of a Thorndike we should still be dictating their laws as the last words in educational wisdom. . .[W]e cannot but believe that we are on more solid ground than were our forebears.11

Nevertheless, these influences took considerable time to mature within teaching. As Gidney and Millar find, any student who passed through the system before the 1960s will testify to the fact that progressivism had not yet run rampant in Ontario’s secondary schools. Indeed, in many

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9 It should be noted that religion was a far more dominant force in the culture of Canadians and their schools at this time. While the public schools were expected to be secular, religion provided the moral instruction to the young and the aims of education. This pervasive religious influence is why regular criticism was made of teachers being “immoral;” today we would call them “unprofessional” which is an interesting shift since the criticism of “immoral” cites a failure to observe religious practices, while “unprofessional” is a failure to observe standards set by the profession—a shift from external governance of the public to institutionalized insulated self-governance sometimes at odds with the public.


11 Sandiford, P. 1926. Contributions to the laws of learning. TCR, 27(6), 523-531.
respects the schools of the 1880s would not have seemed alien to the student of the 1950s.\footnote{12}

At this time, Ontario had but one secondary teacher training institution, the Ontario College of Education located in Toronto, and founded in 1920. With so little changing philosophically-speaking in Ontario’s schools until the 1960s, Ontario would remain decidedly British, especially as the Great War and Second World War would call its subjects to defend the homeland. John G. Althouse was directing education in Ontario during the 1940s and 1950s and was particularly active in writing and safeguarding the history of education and teacher training in Ontario. In a 1947 address to the Toronto Normal School entitled “100 years of Teacher Training,” he asks the audience how the “normal-school type” has survived a century in Ontario. He answers, it “endured because it was able to adapt itself to changing conditions and expanding concepts of public education.”\footnote{13} This connection between the education system and teacher training has been consistently re-affirmed through this thesis, and it continued as teacher training moved into the universities.

The post-war boom, followed by the tensions of the Cold War and Korean War in some ways accelerated the development of Canada’s institutions. The single month of December, 1920 saw publication of a number of committee reports that targeted needed improvements to elementary teacher training. The Bowers Report,\footnote{14} produced by the Ontario Normal Schools, recommended a two-year program for those entering ITPPs with grade 13 only; the program’s second year was to be particularly designed to instil new educational science, with the intention that “a large proportion of the student’s time...[would be] spent on educational psychology, including child study and mental hygiene.”\footnote{15} The Report also recommended reducing traditional subject courses in curriculum which dominated elementary ITPPs to make room for new general

\footnote{12} Gidney & Millar, 1990, op. cit., p. 318. Stamp accounts for the delay of change over this same time period by arguing that “Ontario educators were convinced of the superiority of their school system. They sincerely believed they had little to learn from the rest of the world. Consequently, they paid amazingly little attention to changes and innovations elsewhere. Only in the post-1960 years did this attitude begin to change.” Note in contrast that Ryerson and others in the 19th century sought out European models to help improve Canadian education institutions. See: Stamp, R. M. 1982. \textit{The schools of Ontario, 1876-1976}. Toronto: UTP, p. xiv.


\footnote{14} Or the Report of the Ontario Normal School Teachers’ Association chaired by H. Bowers.

\footnote{15} This is an interesting substitution. If the student’s academic education was not sourced in a university degree, it was acceptably sourced from a year of training in educational psychology. Quotation from Fleming, 1990., op. cit., p. 23.
teaching methods, and psychology.\textsuperscript{16} Another report completed in the same month by the Hope Royal Commission\textsuperscript{17} provided interim reports over the five years of its investigation to deal with “emergency” measures to staff schools during post-war influxes of elementary students. Consequently, the Commission did what they could to temper the influx of a new kind of “Third” into the still undeveloped teaching profession in Ontario, such as by instituting panels to interview and select candidates in grade 13 who were interested in elementary teaching. Mandatory emergency summer courses were offered in the 1950s, and delayed further the raising of standards for elementary teachers. However, while the Report bemoaned this taxing situation on the profession, it called for future, calmer times to produce teachers, prepared for his profession by a broad education which gives him the resources of educational philosophy and psychology and of much general knowledge and experience, and so enables him to understand the newer methods and to devise procedures suitable for particular purposes and circumstances.\textsuperscript{18}

A further issue raised in the reports of this time was the central authority of the Minister. While the Bowers Report criticized the lack of flexibility possible in normal school programs, the Department of Education asserted it must hold central authority, especially with regards to entrance requirements and certification, as they were the link to the people of the province. Not until the early 1970s would university-governed elementary teacher education be realized, and the university’s own protectiveness of their autonomy revive this issue of control.

During this turbulent time in the 1950s, a number of changes were made and formalized in new nomenclature: (1) the normal schools were hereafter renamed to teachers’ colleges in 1953; and (2) the First, Second, and Third-class certificates were replaced by a single Elementary School Teachers’ Certificate in 1956. Also of note is the dispute initiated in 1950 by the Ontario Public School Men’s Teachers’ Federation.\textsuperscript{19} In brief, as a result of the profession suffering from the influx of lower standard teachers because of emergency measures, they proposed a leveling of the power the Department of Education had over admission to ITPPs. They advocated teacher

\textsuperscript{16} In the past, traditional subjects, such as English, geography, arithmetic, etc., were included as separate courses for the purposes of remedial work, and to instruct in subject-specific teaching methods. With the onset of university degree requirements and longer programs, these subject courses would slowly consolidate to broader courses in elementary ITPPs. Philosophy-type courses would likewise consolidate into policy-type courses.

\textsuperscript{17} The Royal Commission on Education, chaired by Justice John A. Hope, commissioned by the province in 1945.

\textsuperscript{18} Report of the Royal Commission on Education in Ontario (The Hope Report), 1950, Toronto: Johnston, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{19} This report, proposed in 1949, was presented to the Department in December, 1950.
education be moved\textsuperscript{20} into the universities and henceforth governed by a number of groups: the Department, the host university, the Federation, and other related groups such as the Public School Inspectors Association. Academic training was to be delivered by a faculty of education in a host university, and professional training provided by a panel of the other groups, including the Department. This change would take time, but by 1971 admission to an elementary ITPP required a university degree, and subsequent merging of elementary and high school training would require drafting of agreements to detail the proposed proportional governance structure.

The 1960s\textsuperscript{21} was another period of substantial change for Ontario schools. As an illustration of the prevailing philosophic conversation in the culture of teaching which would ramp up and support changes in the schools, the Philosophy of Education Committee of the Ontario Teachers’ Federation published a pamphlet in 1960 which endorsed long-standing traditions.

The development of a philosophy of education has become a matter of increasing concern to a great number of Ontario teachers. . .[While science of education is important], [h]owever, in the contemporary situation there is still greater need for an understanding and interpretation of man and reality. . .[A]n adequate philosophy of education demands a clear conception of the nature of the teaching function, a comprehensive understanding of the essentials required to be a well-qualified, successful teacher, and a guiding realization of the rights and responsibilities of teachers. . .[in] constant search for the ultimate.\textsuperscript{22}

Changes would soon come to further open up the high schools to assist with demographic changes. Where previously a common school assimilation of pupils of mostly English-descent was possible, the post-war baby boom and now increased immigration from mainland Europe and East Asia required a system, with a system-wide increase in the duration of compulsory education and a smooth transition from its elementary to its secondary schools. For this purpose, in 1949, high school entrance examinations were discontinued, and in 1954, an amendment to the School Administration Act raised the compulsory attendance age to 16 for all children in Ontario. The high schools had now become part of mass public education, following the vision of Ryerson a century ago, and shared more in the tendencies of the American system, abandoning the old British model. As a consequence of losing the selectivity provided by

\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of the problem of location as a “serious obstacle to the integration” of ITPPs with their host university, see Fleming, 1971, op. cit., p. 19.


entrance exams, high school certificates lost value in the marketplace; careers in law, engineering, etc., including elementary teaching, were placed on a higher shelf to be reached through preparation in the colleges and universities. With the opening up of the high schools and the expected longer stay of more diverse students, a greater supply of modified secondary teachers was needed. This transformation led to the establishment of two new high school teacher training institutions beyond the sole Ontario College of Education in Toronto. The second secondary training institution built in Ontario was located in London, soon renamed as the Althouse College of Education and affiliated with the University of Western Ontario. It began its first full year of operations in 1965.

In 1966 the Macleod Report investigation of the status of elementary teacher training reasserted some of the recommendations of the reports from 1950. The objective of ITPP policy was to merge them into the universities, and so the Report recommended again making a university degree a necessary requirement for entry into an elementary ITPP. Asserted again were the main reasons for raising the reputation and legitimacy of elementary teachers—the university requirement would not only raise their academic standing, select from a wealthier class and filter out less capable candidates, it would also raise the age at which students became teachers. No longer would teachers be in some cases only one year older than their students, both in age and in competency.23

With this background in mind, highlighting the changes made to teachers and schools in Ontario, the trend, as was the case in the United States and Britain, was to fashion a free and compulsory education system, and secure the training of staff with the skills and legitimacy to sustain it. The older professions of medicine, law, and theology were a model for the teaching profession; each of these had a professionalizing subject, and teaching, during the wave of the new sciences, looked to psychology to fill this role. As the lower schools crystalized into the mass education system, the universities were narrowed in role with new research mandates. The soon-to-emerge faculties of education were expected to take advantage of university-level research while maintaining professional practice, institutionalizing “educational” varieties of

23 From the Report, “inadequate academic education and insufficient maturity on the part of the student teacher” were the main cited conditions needing change. See the Committee on the Training of Elementary School Teachers (chaired by C. R. MacLeod), Toronto, p. 12. The Report also recommend merging elementary and secondary ITPPs.
relevant fields such as philosophy of education, educational psychology, educational history, and later, educational administration and policy studies.

This transition will be illustrated in one ITPP, but before moving to the case study of ACE, some further preparatory discussion is needed to provide the rationale and benefits of reviewing changes at a particular teachers’ college to illustrate (and in some sense “test”) the general account of the fate of philosophy of education developed in previous chapters.

Case Study and Institutional Organizational Theory (IOT)

Chapter one has already discussed some aspects of general case study within IOT. This short section will particularize these earlier remarks toward the actual case study soon to be presented.

A particularly good model for IOT case study work is Selznick’s 1949 study of the Tennessee Valley Authority,24 recently cited as “set[ting] the standard for case study research in organizational theory.”25 This impact is twofold: Selznick demonstrated the “need for comprehensive data collection and the importance of rich and detailed attention to context” and “second, the TVA stands as an exemplar for how a researcher can move fluidly between a single case study and general theory.”26 In this thesis, substantial attention has been paid to context, the first four chapters and the earlier part of this chapter providing an account of this. While philosophy of education grew and transformed, various other relevant groups also went through transitions: teacher education institutions, the growing school system and its administration, the rise of science and the research university, and the teacher, especially with regard to the conditions of the occupation, the attributes of the membership, and the professionalization process. These complex and inter-related changes make the causal relations impossible to sort out, but must nevertheless be identified as a “core tenet of institutional theory, which holds that organizations are influenced, if not fully determined, by the social conditions in which they are embedded.”27

Another important point in preparation for the case is that not all aspects of the general trend will be part of each particular case—other factors not shared by faculties of education in

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 465.
general might sustain philosophy of education in specific cases. All that needs to be shown is, under common or predictable circumstances, the trend holds. In other words, a case must share in the environment or general forces as described in the macro-level theory, and differences of outcome between cases must be explained by mitigating factors, otherwise there must be missing pieces to the general theory.

All of these factors, while more easily viewed from afar, can be found in decisions made in faculties of education and relevant groups. However, the perspectives from inside the institution in which the retired philosophers of education interviewed for this study once worked might not align with an outside and institutional view of the events. This point was made by Clark in a similar case study of a junior college:

[it must] be assumed at the outset of an institutional study that some of the major internal changes and external adaptations of an organization may be beyond the awareness of all participants, that latent tendencies and functions may be identified by the outsider who comes at the organization with a particular analytical point of view. The hope of saying something new and useful rests on such an assumption.

This would explain why philosophers of education may find, from their point of view, that philosophy in teacher education institutions is adapting, as they have adapted as faculty members, while the view from IOT is that philosophy as an explicit subject is declining and returning to an implicit state in conformity with an inescapable marginalizing process in teacher education institutions. This point by Clark also notes that a study of this kind goes beyond a simple retelling of the history of ACE—as a series of autobiographies might—by linking together these biographies in the form of interviews, considering founding documents, and using an analytical theory, all of which produce a very different account of the institutional life of ACE, an account greater than the sum of its parts, as it were.

We also must keep in mind what the following study cannot and has not done. Epistemologically, a case must always be a slice of reality—we cannot have total knowledge in any matter; instead we build and improve upon previous knowledge. However, the researcher also intentionally must do the slicing because of practical limitations of time, and writing space—we necessarily stake out and limit the area under study, in this case, to the fate of

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28 Burbules notes that philosophers of education have survived based on their individual remarkability; faculties of education have provided no concerted effort to keep them. Burbules, N. C. 2002. The dilemma of philosophy of education: “Relevance” or critique? Part two. Educational Theory, 52(3), 349–357.

philosophy of education at ACE. Researchers minimize outside forces which might impact the
designated inquiry, and strive to produce a well-documented account of the case by way of its
sources of influence and its effects. In a case study, this occurs through paying attention to
official documentation, and verifying, where possible, interview data with documentation.
Defining the “case” and setting the boundaries, as Yin points out, continues to “plague”30
researchers.

One last point considering the importance of case studies in IOT is that “crisis” periods in
the operation of institutions are very important “revealing” events. This is because,
institutional processes tend to be invisible, masked by habit and ritualistic reproduction.
The micro-processes that underpin institutions are often observable only in instances of
extreme change when the institutional fabric is torn and the inner activities used to
maintain and reproduce institutions are exposed; thus, case studies are often the best way
to capture such natural experiments.31

Several of these crisis periods did occur at ACE, and each represented turning points in the
departmental structure of the institution, which had wide-ranging consequences for courses and
future faculty hiring. These institutional restructurings were adjustments to the technical core, the
“fabric” of the institution.

**Data Collection.** Building on the discussion of method from Chapter 1, I made use of
two types of sources to unearth the history of philosophy of education at ACE, (1) official
documentation, such as university senate minutes and university calendars, provided by Western
University Archives, and (2) retired faculty members and visiting professors of ACE. Data from
(1) primarily took the form of digitally scanned senate minutes which pertained to the founding
of ACE and other institutional changes, as well as notes based on Western University course
calendars which included ACE data. Data from (2) included interviews of faculty and syllabi
from courses they taught at ACE. Access to these data was authorized through a research ethics
proposal approved by the university; the approval record is included in Appendix 4. Most
participants chose to identify themselves by name in the study, rather than remain anonymous. I
also promised the participants that any attribution of statements to them would be subject to their
explicit approval of the proposed quotation and the context in which it would appear. Each
participant was interviewed once. Interviews were planned for one hour, though all exceeded this

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somewhat; most conversations lasted an hour and a half, and the longest was three hours. The names of participants were already known to me, nearly all having served in faculty positions at ACE, and were initially contacted in March of 2014 with recruitment letters via email or mail. Interested participants received Letters of Information which detailed the purpose of the study. Signed return of these Letters signaled agreement to participate. Most recruitment was narrowed to retired philosophers of education of ACE, though several others were also contacted who were either visiting professors of ACE, retired faculty at ACE in another field (psychology and history), or previously a dean of the Faculty. Most who were contacted agreed to participate. Six interviews were conducted, four at ACE, one over the phone, and another at the participant’s home in London. Interviews were recorded, and notes were made both during the interview and afterward when listening again to the tape. An interview protocol was used which contained questions on the history of ACE, such as changes in courses, faculty, and departments, as well as changes to the field of philosophy of education over the course of the participant’s career, although sessions were semi-structured to allow for interesting leads to be pursued when they arose.

Having covered preliminary remarks regarding the context of Ontario, the use of case studies in IOT, and how data was collected, I can now turn to the case of philosophy of education at ACE, beginning with the institution’s founding documents, where agreements were made regarding its governance between the Minister of Education, the host university, and other related groups. Faculties of education are a unique kind of faculty in the university setting since their governance and creation do not flow from the university alone, but from shared governance with the Ministry of Education. Compared to the faculties created at Toronto and Queen’s, a previous dean of ACE observed, “Western’s agreement was the worst of the three from the point of view of the University.”32 These consequences will serve as the opening of the case of Althouse College.

**Philosophy at the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education – A Case Study**

This case of the fate of philosophy of education at the Althouse College of Education draws on a variety of information sources. Senate documents established the legal agreement

between Western University and the Department of Education over the governance of ACE. Interviews\textsuperscript{33} with retired philosophers of education and other faculty members also provided an internal view of the changes.

I urge the reader, before continuing, to browse through Table 8, found in Appendix 1, and refer to it as the need arises. It is an advanced organizer, summarizes the fine details of the case presented in detail below, especially tracking changes in faculty, by name, and philosophy of education-type courses at ACE.

**Founding, Structure and Early Years, 1965-1969**

On April 16, 1963, the university board of governors in conjunction with Minister of Education William G. Davis, completed the establishment agreement for the second Ontario College of Education to operate in affiliation with The University of Western Ontario, London, later named the Althouse\textsuperscript{34} College of Education when it opened officially with full-year programs in 1965. There are two important points made in this initial “establishment agreement” which would colour the institutional position of ACE and institutions with similar agreements to the present day.

First, the Minister delegated to ACE the authority to offer “courses leading to” the various certificates current for teaching in the high schools; therefore, the university and ACE would provide the program and upon its successful completion, a student would be recommended to the Minister. Issuance of applicable certificates—the goal of any student in an ITPP—was held exclusively by the Minister and the Ministry would be in the superior position to set the requirements to achieve it. Graduate programs, however, were solely under the discretion of the university, and hence the faculty of ACE. This is perhaps why later on philosophy of education, when marginalized from teacher education, escaped to the graduate level for a short time before being eliminated.

\textsuperscript{33} Any reference to a faculty member without citation indicates the statement was made during an interview conducted as part of the research for this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{34} John G. Althouse (1889-1956) born at Ailsa Craig, Ontario and completing a Doctor of Pedagogy at the University of Toronto, was a classical master, principal, and headmaster. He was dean of the (Toronto) Ontario College of Education from 1934-1944, when he was appointed Chief Director of Education until his death. Upon the appointment, the premier of Ontario, George A. Drew, said of Althouse that he “enjoys the confidence of Ontario educationists; he is well and favorably known throughout the whole Dominion and his excellent articles on Canadian education command respect abroad.” See *The Ottawa Journal* (n. a). 1944, February 10. Ontario educational setup. p. 3; Stamp, R. M. 2007. John George Althouse. *Canadian Encyclopedia* (available online).
Second, as per the earlier proposal by the Ontario Public School Men’s Teachers’ Federation for a balanced power structure, an “advisory council” was established. Of 12 total seats, 1/3 were to be appointed by the Minister, 1/3 by the university and, of the remaining third, one seat was appointed by the inspector’s association, and the remainder by the Ontario Teachers’ Federation. The duties of this council were to “make recommendations in matters concerning admission requirements, curriculum, examinations and other matters affecting the College.” While those involved in deciding these issues were broadened, notice that the real power, the requirements to receive teaching certificates, remained in the hands of the Minister. The Minister also held the power to “approve” faculty and the dean of ACE from those recommended by the university.

Thus, one can see, even in this initial agreement, a lending of power to various groups associated with teaching, and a sharing of decision-making powers between the Ministry of Education and the university. The university would manage academic faculty members who would provide a university standard to education research and teaching, but unlike other university faculties, the Minister would remain a joint partner in the governance of ACE. The key feature of this arrangement, the issuance of certificates, was kept in the hands of the Minister in order to keep control of the technical core of ACE by way of securing the ultimate product expected by their students—entry to the occupation of teaching in Ontario. In order to maintain its identity and legitimacy, ACE’s programs were to be acceptable to the Minister, and further confidence in this is shown by requiring equal representation from the Ministry and the university on the advisory council. A further result of maintaining a single source of certificates was safeguarding of a single profession, the programs of which could be moulded as needs arose to support the public high schools. This single source arrangement would promote isomorphism across the new secondary teacher training institutions, as their programs more or less adapted to the program already operating in Toronto for nearly a half century, and would prevent “Toronto

35 A Faculty Council was also created. It was to contain, along with all full-time faculty at ACE, one representative from each faculty across the university, and one from each affiliated college. This Council would attempt to bolster university-wide oversight for ACE. See Constitution of Faculty Council in University of Western Ontario Senate Minutes February 28, 1969.

36 Item 10 of the establishment agreement dated April 16, 1963.

37 Kymlicka remarks that the political skills of the first dean, W. Turner, may have calmed the university's fears of a lack of autonomy at ACE. Some of these fears were remedied when the agreement was re-drawn during the merger of the London Teachers’ College to form a combined “faculty of education,” retaining its legal name as ACE. See also: Fleming, 1971, op. cit., p. 87.
teachers,” “Althouse teachers,” and “MacArthur teachers” from competing, let alone graduates of any private facility.39

ACE began its first full year program for prospective secondary teachers in 1965, the same year the Ontario Institute of Education (OISE)40 was authorized by legislation. The program consisted of 20 weeks of lectures and seminars, 9 weeks of practice teaching, and 1 final week of exams. At this time, the departmental structure of ACE was close to a typical American liberal arts college providing teacher training. Departmental structure is important as departments can serve as decision-making units—mini institutions surviving in the environment of the larger college. Existence of departments also embodies and empowers the makeup of the technical core of the institution in terms of the working parts required in order to sustain the work of the organization. These parts could not be internally tinkered with, for any changes required authorization through a resolution of the university Senate, revealing their importance.

The changing size and names of departments at ACE have been graphed for its first three decades, from 1965 to 1995. These will be shown in three different data displays placed in the ACE case corresponding to the year being discussed. Figure 1A below displays the first 11 years. Many departments were initially created to handle the variety of courses offered, including approximately 20 departments devoted to methods. This group subsumed the many subjects in the secondary school curriculum (maths, Latin, geography, etc.), as well as practice teaching, teaching aids, and librarianship. There were also four “educational foundations” departments: history of education,41 philosophy, professional practice and administration (PPA), and

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38 The third Ontario College of Education was located in Kingston, as it had been in the early 20th century for a time, associated with Queen’s University. It was called the MacArthur College of Education and opened in 1968.

39 Note that this form of branding is somewhat the case in the United States which continues to have no central compulsory regulations on teacher accreditation programs. For instance, many Catholic liberal arts colleges offer their own teacher training, and are preferred over public faculties of education by some school districts. Ontario has many publicly-funded religious schools, but all Ontario-trained teachers attend centrally accredited faculties of education.

40 This is a graduate program and education research institution located in Toronto. It took much longer to affiliate with the nearby University of Toronto—not until the mid 1990s. Its purpose was to provide research leadership in education for the province, and to train those who would be teaching in the new faculties of education that were to come in the early 1970s. However, there were significant drawbacks in fulfilling this mandate since the institution had little contact with schools or teacher training. See Gidney, R. D. 1999. From Hope to Harris: The reshaping of Ontario’s schools. Toronto: UTP, p. 55. In some respects, OISE was modeled after the success and desired reach of Teachers College at Columbia University, except that, in lacking a university-setting, its research agendas were set externally by the Ministry. This would mean different equipment in its technical core than the new faculties of education, even if both shared in the same broad goal of providing support to the public school system.

41 According to a McGill Journal of Education editorial note, in 1968 the chairman of the history department was Robert M. Stamp. See http://mje.mcgill.ca/article/view/6662/4608
psychology and sociology.\footnote{Notice the “educational sciences” were put together and represent the American leaning toward psychology and the British leaning toward sociology. At this time, psychology of education, called school psychology, was having trouble gaining institutional respect, facing similar issues to philosophy of education, such as little respect from its parent discipline and it, too, was laced with jargon and robotic data sets which lacked insight and had made little progress toward professionalization and distinguishing itself from education, clinical psychology, and the like. For a review of these issues, see: McMurray, J. G. 1967. Two decades of school psychology: Past and future. \textit{Canadian Psychologist}, 8a(3), 207–217.} PPA was a single course with initially a single faculty member who taught lesson planning, questioning, discipline and classroom management, professional obligations, and the organization and administration of secondary schools in Ontario. Guest lectures are also noted. Looking back, it is surprising how all these topics, today much more central in teacher education, were packed into a single course with a single instructor. Certainly, this initial arrangement of the foundations departments reveals the proportions that went into making a secondary school teacher at this time. In other words, it seems plain that the founders of ACE’s teacher education curriculum created a \textit{balance} of liberal arts subjects important for the educational foundations of the teacher: 1-part history, 1-part philosophy, and 1-part science.

**Figure 1A – ACE Faculty by Department, 1965-1976\footnote{Note that three years are missing (1965-1966, 1968-1969, and 1969-1970 from the figure. Faculty numbers were not reported in the university calendar for those particular school years. Each year corresponds to the faculty on staff during the school year ending. For example, the data for “1967” means the faculty count from September 1966 to April 1967 (school year).}**

According to the 1967-1968 ACE Calendar, each foundations department had four faculty members, except PPA which had one. The “methods” faculty, dominating ACE perhaps by 3/4, had a particular role, and the foundations departments had another role. The former
delivered professional courses, mostly in teaching methods and, while the faculty had lower-school experience, they were also less likely to be educated beyond a Bachelor’s degree. The latter delivered liberal arts-type courses to foster a general education (history, philosophy, and science), and were more likely to have PhDs but usually lacked school teaching experience. Jim Sanders, a psychologist hired at ACE in 1967, recounts the characteristics of the initial faculty at ACE,

Most of the people [at Althouse when I arrived] were ex-school teachers . . . I thought it was a small liberal arts college I was coming to . . . So the people I tended to relate to were the philosophers . . . together, we were [a younger] age-cohort . . . The faculty [in methods] tended to be advanced in their careers, [they were] department heads, ex-principals, [and the like]. They constituted an older age demographic [than the philosophers]. In some ways, they focused more on schoolmanship than their various subject specialties . . . My own department [of educational psychology] was made up of older types as well, but they all had PhDs [often from] Toronto . . . And in certain ways, they were connected to the psychology department on main campus. For example, as a courtesy, all the people [we] hired were to be approved by the [main] campus department. And I think they were also perceived by the rest of the faculty as being especially qualified academically. As a consequence, they wielded considerable political power in [ACE]. For example, some were often nominated as acting deans.

As this institution developed, a key question was whether the different roles of the methods and foundations departments could function and cooperate, or would one eventually dominate the other. This question would have to be answered by the time of the merging of elementary and secondary teacher training, but I will return to this in the coming pages.

It is important to point out that the philosophy department was not named “philosophy of education,” nor did it offer philosophy of education courses. ACE’s first philosophy instructors were nearly all American. The department’s first chairman was Vernon Howard, hired from

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44 In fact, the only faculty with PhDs at ACE, according to the 1967-1968 Calendar, were three of the four in psychology, two of the four in philosophy (Howard and Burke) and one of the two in classics. Professorial rank is also interesting: according to the same Calendar, psychology had one full professor, two associates, and 1 assistant; philosophy had two assistants and 2 lecturers, and history of education had three assistants and one sessional. Around the time of the merge with Elborn in 1973 and the transformation to a Faculty of Education, professors at ACE were encouraged, if not demanded, to obtain PhDs to remain in the faculty. The initial difference in PhDs was also indicative of the research demands of the various fields, the psychologists expecting to fuel research in the buzzing science of education, whereas the historians and philosophers had a liberal-education role, where research was less demanded. The onset of a Faculty of Education would disrupt this role, and by 1980, merge the foundations group into “policy,” save for psychology which sustained its independence, but more on this later.

45 Howard would not stay long at the faculty and would travel to Harvard and the London Institute of Education to teach. He eventually returned to Harvard, joining a research team with Howard Gardner.
Indiana University. The other initial members were Paul T. O’Leary, Barbara E. Houston, David R. Burke, with John McPeck joining a year later. At this time, ACE students were required to take one course in philosophy, one in history, and one in psychology from among the foundations subjects (along with the sole PPA course), in addition to curriculum courses and others. Each department designed and delivered its own courses, and students enrolled in and completed at least one course from each foundations department to satisfy requirements. These courses offered from history, philosophy, and psychology were “leveled” and depending on the number of courses a student had taken in these three areas in their undergraduate degree, a level one, two, or three course (introductory, intermediate, and advanced) from that foundation area was selected. For example, a student who had not previously completed a course in Canadian history would select a level 1 course offered by the history of education department. The same student having already taken a course in philosophy, could select “Logic and Philosophy of Science” or “Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy” or others at level two.

Academic philosophy, even though promised to the initial faculty as the content to be taught and not philosophy of education, quickly became reviled by the students. As one philosophy faculty member recounts,

I think we did some Plato, the early dialogues, the Republic . . . We were doing straight philosophy, and that was a problem. We actually didn’t know what to do the first year . . . It was more academic because we didn’t know anything about the philosophy of

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47 Houston was a graduate student in the philosophy department at Western without a PhD at this time, but completed it later at Western University in 1978 with the title: “The Paradox of Moral Education.”

48 John Edward McPeck did not have a PhD at this time, and was working in social work in Boston when he was contacted by Howard to take a post at the new ACE. He later completed his PhD at Western University in 1973 in philosophy of science with the title: “A Logic of Discovery: Lessons from History and Current Prospects.”

49 Jim Sanders, a psychologist joining the faculty in 1967, notes the philosophers hired were mostly young and from the USA, whereas the psychologists were mostly older, from Toronto, with PhDs, and therefore had more local, political affinity. This may help explain why several psychologists became (acting) deans of the faculty, and the only philosopher to be appointed dean was brought in externally. This would include psychologist F. B. W. Harper who was an original member of the faculty and served as Acting dean from 1986-1988.

50 The level one course was called Introduction to Philosophy (notice, not philosophy of education). Additional level two courses not yet named in the main text were “Philosophy of the Social Sciences” and “Esthetics.” The level three course offered was “Advanced Seminar in Philosophy.” In addition to these, the 1967-1968 Calendar lists “philosophy of religion,” “social philosophy” and “ethics.” Level two and three course offerings changed each year.

51 O’Leary remarks that department head Howard, facing “mounting pressure to appeal to the students,” gave a talk at ACE on the necessity of (academic) philosophy in the education of teachers.
education. It was a slow introduction to it, and the most productive at it was the Brits: Hirst, Peters. We found them slowly and we started buying their books and using them more in our courses . . . We just did what we knew how to do [at the start].

Plato and other academic philosophy content would not have been a problem for previous generations of grammar school teachers, who wrote entrance exams to enroll in the grammar and early high schools, and learned Latin and Greek. But the tables would turn: while these grammar school teachers dodged education courses, as I will describe, a half century later at ACE and similar institutions, it was philosophy courses that were “dodged.” This earlier population was assumed to be attending ACE, and thus a liberal arts teacher preparation was devised of which philosophy courses would be an appropriate part. The philosophy instructors hired at ACE also expected it: as O’Leary recounted in his memoir: “while those teaching history and psychology were more than willing to teach the history and psychology of education, the four of us teaching philosophy had no inclination to engage in the philosophy of education.” This was a contentious issue in designing ITPPs:

Professional educational programs have got themselves into trouble in universities by offering their own versions of traditional disciplines such as history of education and philosophy of education. While there is little argument that these disciplines have important implications for teachers, serious scholars have been irritated at the assumption that they can be adequately taught by instructors with a superficial background of formal study in the discipline, or even none at all.

The design of courses was torn between traditional academics and teaching methods courses, with the middle-ground impressing neither side—philosophy and psychology of education courses were condemned for being “survey courses” and committing to poor intellectual culture. To complicate matters further, around the time elementary and secondary training merged into one institution, ITPP administrators would desire most, if not every,

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52 Fleming notes this was a common view of students at the time. See: Fleming, 1971, op. cit., p. 131.
53 For example, the 1961 Ontario Conference on Ontario, in discussing the requirement of a university degree for elementary teachers, suggested a year of professional courses should come after a “liberal arts” program rather than an education program. This was to ensure “intellectual and cultural maturity” of students from the university. See Ontario Association for Curriculum Development. 1961, November. Education of elementary teachers. Report of the Ontario Conference on Education (Windsor, Ont., Canada), p. 59.
54 From O’Leary, 2010, op. cit., p. 100. The visit from R. S. Peters would change this. McPeck recalls around this time starting to collect British philosophy of education books authored by Peters and Paul H. Hirst for teaching material. Peters helped to “get us off philosophy,” according to McPeck, and the move to offering more philosophy of “X” (curriculum) courses was a “baby step” since these courses were still very abstract.
instructor to have some lower-school experience, which made finding qualified and experienced foundations faculty much more difficult. However, secondary teachers had historically been educated by university faculty who lacked experience in the lower-schools and this was the case among the initial (and subsequent) faculty of the philosophy department at ACE. As part of the foundations of education, they were not expected to have this experience; rather their role at this time was academic (as was the other foundation departments). Fleming notes one of the purposes of academics in ITPPs was “that teachers should have a sound cultural and intellectual background in order to be suitable bearers of the traditions, knowledge, and attitudes of Western civilization.” 57 Similar to the MacLeod report, the 1962 Patten Report on secondary teacher training in Ontario added that a liberal or “general course” would foster a “breadth of interest and flexibility which will contribute to the well-being of the teaching profession.” 58 Small class sizes was also part of the design at ACE (and not the other sites at Toronto or Queen’s) to permit seminars for better discussion in foundations courses and closer, mentoring relationships in methods courses. 59 As both elementary and secondary teachers required university degrees, this role would be transferred to their prior degree and assumed to have been fulfilled so that faculties of education could focus on “education studies” from lower-school experienced faculty and not on liberal studies.

For now, while philosophy was part of teaching culture, it was usually confined to conversations about the Great Educators, or religious beliefs from which derived a philosophy of education. This culture was illustrated in the previously noted OTF statement 60—as an additional local exemplar, the 1967 yearbook of the nearby London Teachers’ College (LTC) at Elborn College called the Spectrum, 61 noted a joint event organized by student committees of ACE, LTC, and the university. It was a “Teach-in Weekend,” entitled “Conflicting Philosophies of Education.” Not only was this topic typical of the issues in teaching attracting attention at the time, it was made more urgent by the substantial social and political turmoil to the south. As A.

57 Ibid, p. 54.
59 Ibid, p. 130. For foundations, lectures of 150 and seminars of 15 were recommended for class sizes, and for methods courses, 30 and 12-15 respectively.
60 Excerpted on page 116.
61 From the student yearbook of the London Normal School, which later became the London Teachers’ College and Elborn College.
F. Skinner noted, “in a time of rapid and manifold change, thinking and discussion about aims become ever more relevant and urgent.”

Ontario education was about to be thrown into turmoil over exactly this—its traditional British academic curriculum would be challenged by the most progressive educational philosophy document produced in Ontario: “Living and Learning,” more often referred to as the Hall-Dennis report of 1968. This document, written in the style of a pedagogical creed and containing colour pictures of children’s art, was substantially different from more typical lengthy, dry government reports. Its creation illustrates a sign of these times, where a document resembling a text from a teacher library, was believed to be an effective means of persuasion to begin changing Ontario teachers’ approach to education. Its first several pages contain a great deal of philosophical premises: in the report’s first line, education is declared to “further the search for truth.”

Overall, the “report fell almost exclusively on education for personal fulfillment . . . reflect[ing] the anti-technocratic, anti-traditionalist, romantic impulses of the 1960s.” The committee that devised the report had been tasked with “set[ting] forth the aims of education” for K through grade 6 to update the previous 1937 curriculum, but they quickly discovered it was difficult to set these aims without considering the higher grades and setting aims for the education system as a whole. The education system had been expanding in Ontario during the previous two decades, both in students and their teachers, bringing forth discussions of new directions for the province. The Hall-Dennis report also had recommendations for teacher education, re-asserting the need to merge elementary and secondary teacher training into the university environment.

63 Classics subjects such as Latin and Greek were no longer mandatory in Ontario’s high schools in 1968.
64 See Chapter 2.
68 Gidney, 1999, op. cit., p. 71. The MacLeod report actually suggests K through graduate school ought to be designed as a whole system. See MacLeod Report, 1966, op. cit., p. 15.
69 While the format of the Report dazzled the public, it became fodder for philosophers and academics who wrote critically against it. Published immediately a year later, perhaps the strongest reaction was from a history professor at McMaster. See Daly, J. 1969. Education or molasses? A critical look at the Hall-Dennis Report. Ancaster, ON,
Around the time of the Hall-Dennis report, R. S. Peters visited Ontario in the 1967-1968 school year, spending time at OISE and ACE. The ACE Lecture Series Committee, with Paul O’Leary as Chairman, hosted R. S. Peters who provided guest lectures and met with students. As Paul O’Leary recounts, Peters’ motivation for the visit was to,

“Spread the word” . . . He talked about philosophy of education in the big auditorium for a big crowd. He said to me later on, “My god I didn’t realize I would have that kind of crowd.” He thought he would talk to people already engaged in philosophy of education, but we weren’t!

The philosophers at ACE were still teaching academic philosophy, but after his visit and his consultations with faculty, he sent materials and syllabi from the London Institute of Education to share his new philosophy of education coursework with the Althouse faculty. Academic philosophy was not eliminated and still existed for more advanced philosophy students entering teaching, such as the Phenomenology and Seminar courses, but many new courses pertaining to the philosophy of teaching subjects (or “philosophy of X”) began to be offered, such as philosophy of social science, math, history, science, and religion. The purpose of these courses, as had been the initial intent with the previous courses they displaced, clung to the idea of philosophy as enlightening, as providing the underlying philosophic base of the subjects to help teachers understand them better, and to teach them with this superior knowledge in mind. I asked one philosophy faculty member about the students and the lack of relevance they saw in the philosophy courses:

Yes, it was a constant problem. And even if people found it fun and interesting, there was a big herd of people who said, “what relevance does this have for my teaching?” . . . [And yet] there is a snag but true remark you could make, but it wouldn’t satisfy. You could ask that question [of relevance] about your whole education. You as a person are going to be a teacher, and you will be a better teacher for having been educated. And so your education . . . is going to affect the way you approach teaching in general. A person uneducated would approach it entirely different . . . Even just the original philosophy we taught, in some sense that is enlightening and it makes them more educated . . . but that

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Canada: Cromlech. He writes, “the Committee exaggerated the vices in our educational system, misunderstood its necessities, and inflated the supposed benefits of changing it” (p. 75). At the same time, OISE produced a series of critical essays. See Crittenden, B. 1969. (Ed). Means and ends in education. Toronto: OISE. For a soberer analysis by a philosopher of education who visited ACE a decade later to, in part, produce the analysis, see Barrow, R. 1979. The Canadian curriculum: A personal view. London, ON, Canada: Faculty of Education, University of Western Ontario.

70 One would think holding knowledge of the nature of these various subjects would assist in understanding how students learn about the subject, including where difficulties in concepts might arise, whether it is about the nature of numbers, history as stories, science as inquiry into causation, or the metaphysics underlying religions.
isn’t good enough, and even we started to think it wasn’t good enough, and we could do better to make teachers see its relevance.

Offering these “philosophy of X” courses was also aligned with the idea of teachers knowing more than what they are required to teach, of being inducted into thinking about their subjects from a philosophical point of view to yield future insights while practising in the classroom. However, as one philosophy faculty member recounts, even these courses were still difficult for the students:

It took us a while to [begin offering “philosophy of X” courses]. And, after all, that literature was new to us too. See, what we found out later, to develop that, and to move more closely to [philosophy of education], it isn’t just that there’s a philosophy of maths you can teach to maths students. That at least grabs their interest. But it in itself is not a contribution to their understanding of teaching math. Because the philosophy of math is really abstract, even more abstract than math, and nothing could be further from the application in the classroom than that. So the philosophy of curriculum . . . was a step in the right direction . . . but to take that course and do a lot of reading [a student might still say] “So what? What does this have to do with going into a classroom on Monday morning?”

This result was also unsurprising since teachers’ colleges were dominated by “methods” and curriculum instructors, perhaps two-thirds of the staff, and the small number of “foundations” instructors, more likely to have PhDs, academically-educated, desired to instruct in their academic backgrounds, just as the methods instructors were teaching from their experiences in schools. In other words, there was a difference in the approach of the faculty areas, some taught to educate, providing “background” or foundations, and others taught to prepare students for the “day 1” or the immediate problems of the classroom. As this institution developed, a key question was whether different roles for the methods and foundations departments could function and cooperate, or would one end up dominating the other? Soon, however, ACE would be required to re-structure, complete a new agreement with the university, and merge with the less academically-orientated London Teachers’ College that prepared elementary level teachers.

**Designing and Creating the New Faculty of Education – 1969-1979**

In 1969, the University Senate established an ad-hoc committee to discuss merging ACE and LTC. Its purpose was to plan.

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71 O’Leary similarly found that, where possible, philosophy was “avoided” since it was “too hard, too difficult.”
[the] incorporation of London Teachers’ College into the University structure according to the guidelines suggested by the Deutsch Report approved by the Department of Education and University Affairs, and by the Committee of Presidents of Universities of Ontario.\footnote{Senate Minutes – Integration of London Teachers’ College into University Structure, October 30th, 1969.}

The Deutsch report\footnote{The full name of the Deutsch Report is “Memorandum of Understanding between the Deputy Minister of Education and representatives of the Committee of Presidents regarding the proposed integration of Teachers’ Colleges into Universities.”} provided a blueprint for the merger of local teachers’ colleges and Ontario Colleges of Education. For ACE, the ad-hoc committee was tasked to prepare the merger by reviewing the Deutsch report and taking care of any unique circumstances appropriate to this particular merger. The committee was chaired by the then dean of ACE, W. S. Turner.\footnote{During the transition, the dean of the LTC, Ernest Stabler, would transfer to dean of ACE in 1970. Turner continued as chair of the ad-hoc committee and as assistant to the Vice-President (Academic) of the university. Turner as Provost would see the transition through, and sign the merger document of 1973.}

Before getting into the details, it is worth summarizing a study funded by dean Turner before he left ACE.

This study, authored by Burke and Howard\footnote{Burke & Howard, 1969, op. cit.} and published in \textit{British Journal of Education Studies}, surveyed both the methods of teaching philosophy of education and the field’s general health in Canada and abroad.\footnote{When observing British institutions, they found this approach tended to “degenerate into what might be dubbed ‘educational casuistry’—creeds to live and teach by.” Ibid, p. 6. This outcome was heavily criticized by the new regime of analytic philosophers of education who attempted to rid education of conceptual fads and clichés of both traditional (teacher-centered) and progressive (child-centered) methodologies.} It is very likely the motivation for this study came from the resistance philosophers at ACE were finding from their students. Burke and Howard found that teaching philosophy of education in ITPPs had been relegated, for reasons of “pedagogical, educational and administrative components” of ITPPs, into what they called the “I-O package deal.” By this they meant instruction would start from educational issues “in” the classroom and be abstracted “out” to philosophy. The “package-deal” referred to the near isomorphic conditions of teaching philosophy found in the teacher education institutions they surveyed or visited for the study. They detail three findings: (1) “diluted coursework” as compared to philosophy courses found in the main university; (2) “narrow criteria” used to judge the competence of instructors, with preference often being accorded to educational rather than philosophic credentials; and (3) “remarkable lack of curricular diversity” of courses across
institutions, with only a few courses being offered by philosophy of education departments, and “virtually the same introductory course” given to both undergraduate and graduate students at many institutions. These conditions should not be surprising to a reader having surveyed the previous chapters of this dissertation; it reveals a field lacking the resources to generate a range of varied courses and produce new courses highlighting emergent thinkers and topics. Rather, the conditions are closer to scarcity or bare-bones, where minimal course content and scarcely suited instructors were all too common. Burke and Howard did not stay at ACE much longer, perhaps in part due to their analysis of the situation from the results of the study. The idea of ACE as a liberal arts college, subscribed to by many of the then faculty, was fading, and philosophy would have to adapt or decline. The “philosophy of X” courses birthed by R. S. Peters’ visit was the road to this adaptation, but it also meant concessions at odds with some faculty’s initial expectations of teaching philosophy at ACE.

Returning to the merger, ACE would undergo more changes as the details of the merger proposal unfolded. The main guidance was from a 1970 Senate Report, which was substantially a copy of the Deutsch Report with added comments by the ad-hoc committee under certain items of interest. In brief, many of the Deutsch Report’s recommendations proposed increased university representation on the council governing the soon-to-be faculty of education and included attempts to usurp the Ministry’s control over admissions and the granting of certificates. The Deutsch Report stated there was no need for the province to have a “uniform organizational structure” to their teacher education programs, and the type of program offered could be left up to the University and its Faculty of Education, in consultation with the Department of Education. The Ministry would continue to grant certificates and set the conditions for certification. The ad-hoc committee preferred this be changed to the “minimum conditions requisite for certification,”

77 The authors further comment that this outcome had arisen from inside the institutions, and a remedy which they believed was occurring lay in bringing philosophers trained in philosophy departments into faculties of education. In this way, their academic background would provide a kind of immunization to resist the infirmity of current philosophy of education caused by the internal practical mindset of students and most of the (methods) faculty.

78 From the Report of the Senate Ad Hoc Committee on the Integration of London Teachers’ College, created approximately on June 30th 1970 and circulated on approval of Senate, July 9th. Other recommendations included: the buildings of ACE and LTC (at this time, located nearby at Elborn College) would become the property of the university; education students would be charged fees (tuition) according to the university schedule to promote their “integration” among other university students. A further point on this transition, the Ministry of Education had been delayed in joining the discussions at ACE on the integration, but it was reported in Senate Minutes May 18, 1972 by dean Stabler that the Ministry was detailing a “master plan” which would provide a merger agreement for use province-wide to integrate all teachers’ colleges by 1973.
which would prevent the Ministry from having total, prescriptive control over the Faculty’s programs and, instead, set only a minimum bar. Lastly, during the merging years, starting in 1970, ACE would be authorized by Senate to award diplomas in education and, by the first completed school year of the merged institution, award bachelor of education degrees beginning in 1975.

By 1973, most of the proposed changes required by the merger were proceeding. In the June 22nd, 1973 minutes of the university Board of Governors, Appendix P recorded that in the “main” the integration procedure had been reached, save for several “problems” related to the LTC.79 Two important changes over governance of the institution occurred. A new “Teacher Education Advisory Committee” that shifted power toward the university was formed to replace ACE’s oversight committee. It contained 16 members, half of whom were appointed by the university Senate, and the other half by a mix of agencies involved with public schools and teacher education.80 Furthermore, Faculty Council was revised to include university administrators, one member from each university-level faculty (faculty of arts, faculty of science, etc.), all faculty members of the new Faculty of Education, several students, and the chairman of a committee from the Ontario Teachers’ Federation.81 It is clear from the compositions that Ministry oversight was reduced considerably, and much power was transferred to the university, especially across the university faculties. One would think this arrangement might insulate the Faculty of Education from the culture and politics of public education and encourage education faculty members to find greater affinity with the university rather than the Ministry and the lower schools. For instance, the advisory committee, half with senate appointments, in addition to the dean and the one faculty member, could easily compile votes in order to maintain university interests, such as high standards, in the ITPPs of the Faculty of Education. This preponderantly

79 One of the problems was the integration of LTC faculty who lacked graduate degrees. They were offered four years of employment in the new Faculty of Education, during which they were to upgrade their academic standing (i.e., acquire a Masters or PhD) if they wished to remain instructors. A few members of the philosophy department needed to upgrade, namely McPeck, Houston, and one incoming member from the LTC, Goldwin Emerson, who later completed a PhD on pragmatism and John Dewey.

80 The other 8 non-senate-appointed members of the Advisory Council were the dean of the Faculty of Education (as representing the President and Vice Chancellor), 1 other faculty member, 2 appointed by the Minister of Education, 3 Ontario teachers (1 elementary, 1 secondary, and 1 principal), and 1 member from the Ontario Association of Education Officials (i.e., a superintendent).

81 At the time, this last member was motioned to be stricken, those in favor questioned whether an “outsider” should have direct access to the functioning of the (now) university-governed Faculty of Education. dean Stabler replied that it was important that there was “direct representation of teachers on Council through the [OTF].” The motion was defeated, and OTF representation sustained.
university voice might have taken the form of defending traditional academic subjects and resisting “educational” varieties which have never had a place in the main university. As shown throughout this study and illustrated by the Burke and Howard travel-study, the university did not perform in this way. In the Western case, the host university has never, that I have discovered, had a strong academic influence over, nor even interest in, ITPPs.82

The other major change in transitioning to the combined Faculty of Education was the institution of a new departmental structure which eliminated many subject departments. A hint of the problem took place at a faculty conference, held in Stratford in October of 1973. Those attending discussed the “radical” changes to “departmental structure” proposed and concluded they would not be advisable.83 Department changes were detailed in the final proposal, released in January of 1974. As an introductory note, it states,

the Faculty of Education must evolve as individual and institutional needs change. In this respect our recommendations should be regarded as an initial institutional structure and program organization which will change over time.84

The position of “program coordinators” was invented to oversee the various ITPPs which would be offered, each reporting to the dean(s). In addition to the (head) dean, two associate deans were created, one administrative, and one academic. The departments were to be less formalized than those in other faculties, led but not operated by a “department coordinator.” This is how they were defined:

A department is not to be construed in the same sense as a Department in the Faculties of Arts, Science and Social Science, but is defined as a group of professors with common intellectual interests, training or experience.85

This amounts to an informal group or an association rather than a distinct administrative unit. Appointments were to be made by an Appointments Standing Committee, composed of at least

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82 This continued to be the case into the late 1980s as shown in a review of Ontario’s faculties of education. The review found that “for the most part . . . faculties of education are not programatically well linked with their parent universities” (p. 27). See Watson, N. & Allison, P. 1992. *Ontario faculties of education: Responding to change, a report prepared for the Ontario Association of Deans of Education* (OADE). Toronto: OADE. Another part of the reason for the lack of interest could have to do with faculties of education offering their own, specific, education degrees, such as the Bachelor of Education, Masters of Education, and Doctor of Education. If they desired to offer the Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of Arts, encroaching upon the degrees of other faculties in the university, the matter would be entirely different.


84 Ibid.

85 See Senate Minutes, April 25th, 1974, p. 1152.
the relevant department coordinator and program coordinator, the dean, and elected faculty members. A number of “one person” subject departments were to be closed, reducing the original 22 departments to 16, and none of the new departments were to have a chairman, anything more than a trivial budget or, more crucially, authority over appointments. The technical core of the organization was structured by its teacher preparation programs, which drew from the departments as required to staff and operate the courses leading to teaching qualifications. This ultimately meant that the departments or academic subjects which no longer had a place in programs would be deleted, and the faculty assigned to teach in other courses until their retirement. The new ITPPs of the new faculty of education would also combine elementary and high school training; their teaching subjects would remain somewhat distinct, but “foundations” courses would be combined. If the secondary students, with their history of university courses, had reviled philosophy, surely the elementary students would continue the distaste.86

Howard and Burke had left ACE just before the merger. Both their posts were promptly filled: Goldwin Emerson came over from the LTC merger in 1973, upgrading to a PhD soon after to secure his standing at the new faculty of education; and Maryann Ayim was hired externally a year later. At this point the philosophy faculty count still remained at the original five, yet with an enlarged student population of around 1200, more faculty should have been hired.

Emerson at the LTC taught a course most closely associated with philosophy in their elementary training program. He recounts the following,

It was called History of Educational Thought; it was history with a little touch of philosophy. We used a book87 by Margaret Gillett, from McGill, as a textbook, and she had a philosophical bent on things and she not only described what was going on in education but also was saying: “But why, why do we do this and why should we do that” which I thought was very good. They found it interesting, but not as important to them as practical subjects they were going to have to teach when they go out to the schools . . . When I came to Althouse, to be frank about it, the people who were in the philosophy department didn’t know very much about the regular classroom . . . I think that gave me an advantage with the students at Althouse . . . I don’t think what they were doing in

86 Goldwin Emerson recalls he taught “History of Educational Thought” at LTC, which he described as having had the right combination of history (the what) and philosophy (explaining the why). It was a required course, the “closest” course to anything philosophical in content at the LTC. The course continued a year or so after the merger. In addition, the department created a “philosophy of the elementary years course” to provide a “philosophy of X” course for elementary teachers.

87 The textbook was Gillett’s 1966 A History of Education: Thought and Practice.
philosophy was very practical, but it could be if the professor could relate it to actual classroom situations.  

The struggle for the philosophy coursework to become more practical was echoed by all the philosophy faculty that participated in this study. Soon the mix of “philosophy of X” courses would be consolidated into a new, single “philosophy of education” course for teachers. Part of the movement toward consolidations of courses, leaving the liberal arts structure of ACE, was consolidation of departments.

Implementing these changes to the internal structure of the new faculty of education, including the merger of elementary and secondary ITPPs, would be the task of the soon-to-be appointed dean, Bernard J. Shapiro (1976-1978). Figure 1B below provides the department structure and complement of ACE in 1978 and 1979. The context at this time was an oversupply of teachers and, as Shapiro declared in his first address to the faculty, “we have decided to allocate increasing resources to the development of our continuing education and graduate programs.” This change was intended to appeal to in-service teachers, especially those from the 1950s and 1960s, who had been trained only in emergency summer sessions. None of the various graduate and continuing education programs listed in the newsletter communicating Shapiro’s address were in philosophy of education (nor history), though it is likely a course or two would have been part of the variety of those programs in which teachers enrolled. Certainly because of the demands at this time for these in-service programs, pre-service programs (ITPPs) would be somewhat reduced in prominence as the faculty became more diversified to be able to react to the various maintenance demands required of the staff in the education system.

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Emerson gave a few examples of linking classroom issues to philosophy: “For example, bullying; students who came to schools sometimes poorly dressed, tired, or undernourished. Also the use of drugs was emerging within the school setting of the early sixties. [All] these are topics or issues that really have implications for justice, fairness, truth, and other epistemology and philosophic matters.”

Departmental changes from the merger were still underway, including for philosophy. After Shapiro, PPA and History of Education reorganized to form two new groups, History and Comparative Education, and Educational Administration. Psychology also became Educational Psychology. These occurred just after the merging of teacher training, since combining secondary and elementary training would better support the establishment of a continuous K-13 curriculum in the lower schools. In his brief stay, Shapiro enforced the departmental reorganization as a way of centralizing program decisions, a step that eventually culminated in the creation of three divisions (policy, curriculum, and psychology) by 1980 shortly after Shapiro’s time as dean.

These can be seen in Figure 1C below. In the meantime, as programs became the locus of control, the original foundations departments lost the control needed to contribute relatively

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90 Examining author briefs of publications of faculty at ACE shows some instability in department affiliation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For example, looking only at the CJE, Emerson in a 1977 article lists the department of philosophy, in 1979 lists the department of philosophy of education, and in 1980, does not list a department. Ayim, publishing two articles in 1980, in the earlier lists the department of philosophy of education but in the later, no affiliation. Other non-philosophy faculty at ACE in that year also list no affiliation. Stabler in a 1979 article lists the department of history and comparative education, showing a definite mark of change from the original history department, which seems to coincide with Emerson's and Ayim's department change. O'Leary in 1983 lists no affiliation, nor does McPeck in 1984. In 1985, the 4th edition of the textbook for ACE's philosophy of education course lists “Department of Educational Policy Studies.” Emerson, in a 1986 CJE article, lists the same, while Ayim in two articles from that year lists no affiliation. Certainly not indicating the department may be out of protest, or could be to prevent misleading readers that one is in policy.

91 According to the university calendar, psychology went through a series of changes. The Psychology Department began in 1965 as the “Psychology and Sociology” department. The 1975 university calendar listed Psychology and Sociology as department groups (with sociology having one faculty member). The 1976 university calendar listed a combined Psychology, Sociology and Special Education department. From its origins, it appears this department could have been more profitably renamed a “Science of Education” department. However, with its original and present dominance of psychology, the more specific label is warranted, being aware of the consequence that this may suggest psychology is the only discipline which can provide scientific research to the study of education.

independently to each program. No longer would requirements be “choose any one philosophy course,” but rather the program itself would suggest courses which various departments would be asked to supply. As a result, students had less choice in their program as the variety of courses declined and department offerings became more centrally planned.

A department of educational administration was formed by 1978 which began accumulating members, especially to staff programs for school administrators—for instance, in 1977 this department recommended Derek J. Allison to dean Shapiro to be hired, initially, on a three-year contract. Departments now became increasingly informal associations without the autonomy provided by a chairman, budgets, hiring or course control, decision-making powers having been effectively moved to a higher hierarchical level; this redistribution of power was formalized to create a new institution based on these new divisions. For example, psychology retained its identity by becoming a division, adapting to the new departmental structure.

For the fate of the other foundations subjects, an apt metaphor may be the fate of the Ancient Greek city-states. Traditionally the departments had relative independence, and contributed to “Hellas” in their own way to collaborate on “world projects,” as the departments had provided different courses year by year in which students were to enroll. By the 1970s and the imposition of a new hierarchical power structure can be likened to the Roman Empire’s conquest of these states, operating the region’s resources from the goals of a central authority. The policy empire was created as a way of consolidating the interests of the non-philosophy foundations faculty around the “school and society” course (composed of history of education developed by Gidney, and educational administration developed by Allison), which also built a base for expanded graduate involvement. The philosophers were reluctant to join policy, but it was the nearest thing to an organizational home and they were promised control of their own course. Overall, the main driving force was an administrative desire to rationalize the new division structure regime.

According to Jim Sanders, getting rid of departments “gave him [the dean] flexibility to hire,” with the informal associations within larger divisions allowing more selective hiring when

93 James T. Sanders was hired in 1967 as part of the psychology department at ACE. He thought he was coming to a liberal arts college, and felt he “fit in” better with the philosophers (though he lists the educational psychology department in a 1985 CJE article. See footnote 79). He pointed out to me important differences between the kind of people which filled the psychology vs. the philosophy department. The former was filled with older people, often with PhDs from Toronto, with local recognition, “revered,” and thus were candidates for the deanship. In contrast, the philosophers were almost all American, younger, and only half had PhDs initially. This difference in “clout,”
vacancies occurred. The divisions became the operative selection criteria; philosophy would become part of the policy division, and future hiring would be to fill divisional, not legacy departmental needs. This connection between departments and courses can be demonstrated in how “curriculum” faculty and courses are organized in teachers’ colleges. Elementary and secondary curricular and methods courses keep their subject faculty distinct by way of their contribution to specific “teachables” (for example, secondary English, secondary technical education, elementary music, etc.) demanded by elementary and secondary teaching certificates. Subject and methods courses are also differentiated by growing specialties sought by teachers, whether writing specialists, special education and, much later, by Ed.D. programs. This advantage was not available to “foundations” groups, such as at ACE, and thus their courses lost specificity (philosophy of X), and were required to cater to all. However, the larger point is that philosophy of X could have been a part of subject teachables, or specialists, if treated as dispensing “advanced” understanding, but they were not.94

These changes were important for establishing a Faculty of Education. Departmental changes contributed to a change in the delivery of the instructional program—the loss of small seminars and the use of lectures to larger groups. Faculty were also far more likely to have PhDs, research being now favoured and expected. The previous structure of ACE as a liberal-arts college required reformation, institutionalizing each traditional subject to meet the demands of the new research-based faculty of education. Education policy would be the new centre in which the traditional foundation subjects were framed, except for psychology which remained mostly emancipated as the “science of education,” this being the mark of a faculty of education. This new survival environment curbed philosophy, as it harkened back to the anarchic and personal teacher education days of Great Educators—education as a craft formed by the individual teacher, not a science formed by the needs of a system. Graduate programs were also a pillar of faculties of education, which were, as was happening to teacher education, framed completely by the faculty of education research environment. One attempt was made to cope95—the brand and

94 Around this time, the graduate program offered Masters of Teaching degrees (MAT), another opportunity for philosophy of education as “advanced knowledge,” but again it did not take root.

95 A related approach was to frame philosophy in teacher education as educational issues or problems, an approach that had been used in textbooks for a near half century—the latest Canadian foundations of education textbook uses this method. However, this approach does not match institutions designed for expediency (and peacemaking), which
method of analytical philosophy of education buzzing in Britain and the United States was meant to serve as the proper institutionalized form of philosophy conducive to the new goals of faculties of education—which would have kept philosophy in the technical core—but this battle was lost as science won its place as the proper branding for teachers: psychology became the professional subject aligning with the basic framing of teacher education within the (scientific) research institutions of the new faculties of education.

**Steady as She Goes - Philosophy of Education at the Faculty, 1979-90**

By the end of Shapiro’s appointment, undergraduate philosophy of education courses were to be consolidated into a single course taught mostly in large lectures, with somewhat larger seminars than the previous “philosophy of X” courses. The new division structure of the Faculty would reveal what fields would be targets for growth and whatever was inside them would become a means to this end. On this point, Robin Barrow makes a related remark in a book he wrote while a visiting professor at ACE from 1977-1978. Barrow reflected on the change philosophy was undertaking: “It has been said many times that we should hope for the day when there are no books on philosophy, but all books are philosophical.” This point seems to have been a further consequence of the consolidations of coursework, especially of those subjects which traditionally contributed to the liberal education of a teacher in earlier times; a preparation in general education useful for his later near solitary function as a schoolkeeper. Rather, the evolving role of the modern public school teacher required philosophical issues to be in as small

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97 This was the *Faculty of Education Tape Series: Conversations with Educators* produced for sale and distribution. Barrow was interviewed by McPeck, and the other contributors were Bruce Joyce (by G. Milburn) for teaching methods and Denis Lawton (by R. J. Clark) for history. An advertisement for the tape series can be found on the back end of Barrow, 1979, op. cit.

98 Barrow, 1979, op. cit., p. 105.
a dosage as possible for students and the largely non-philosophy-trained faculty. Fundamentally, the questions did not matter as much to teachers trained to function in an education system where fundamental questions were already answered and active in policy, and where a professional was one who observed policy, and thus philosophy! The institution forging this new kind of teacher would have preferred new instructors but, having to follow university rules of tenure, necessarily compromised and relegated its faculty into areas half providing value to its institutional goals and half making use of their academically trained areas. This pressure, diverting philosophy somewhat into the graduate level, would eventually rid the institution of its “inefficient” parts as faculty not fitting into its plans were not replaced.

A further factor which altered the technical core of faculties of education at this time lay in the lack of already established models for the newly consolidated elementary and secondary ITPPs to emulate. This lack of models to draw on directly affected the foundations fields of history and philosophy, the traditionally liberalizing subjects which had once helped filter out the Thirds, and had injected the humanities and encouraged contemplative aspects to better foster the professional quality desired for teachers. Other educational fields had the specificity of age (psychology) or subject (curriculum) and were less affected. In contrast, foundations subjects were required to appeal to and teach elementary and secondary teachers together who, historically, had been educated separately. This “merger” was especially difficult since historically elementary sided with practice, a trade, and secondary sided with academic, a degree-holding profession. The driving force behind this forced merger was the laws and regulations which only recently had been applied to both levels of the lower schools and, later, professional standards, in an attempt to foster a unified profession. Overall, the institutional goals were changing and programs struggled to adapt with the faculty they had. These changes, in part, can be seen in the new three-group model of ACE, as shown in Figure 1C below.

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99 Some of the “philosophy of X” courses withdrew to the graduate level, such as philosophy of language, philosophy of curriculum. The Masters of Education program began in 1975 (supplanting an experimental Masters of Teaching, MAT program), and the doctoral program did not emerge until the mid-1990s.

100 All the while Ontario’s teachers’ unions remain bifurcated into elementary (ETFO) and secondary (OSSTF).
Beginning in 1979, philosophy of education was taught as one official course with a standard textbook. Instructors lectured and produced chapters for the textbook on the topics with which they were most comfortable, and still had their own seminar sections to discuss the lectures with their students. The philosophy “department” also joined the policy division, which at this time also contained educational administration, history and comparative studies.

101 Note 1994 and odd-numbered years are omitted, except 1995. According to the university calendar, “Educational Policy Studies” was formed in 1980 and “Curriculum Studies” in 1984. Note also that “Curriculum Studies” contains two groups of faculty: non-academic methods instructors who tend to be veteran, often retired, teachers and academic (Ph.D.) faculty who undergo regular research in curriculum. The number of the latter group is approximately equal to each of the other two academic departments, yielding a ~1/3 share of the academic faculty.

102 This textbook, Philosophy of education: An introduction, compiled and contributed to by most of the philosophers at ACE, in the majority contained readings by prominent and classic philosophers of education, especially in the British variety a la Peters. The textbook took on the nickname of the “Marmalade Bible” from the students, the cover of the book having a distinctive yellow-orange colour. Its first edition was printed in 1979, following by a 2nd edition in 1980, and a 4th edition in 1985. A 3rd edition could not be located.

103 The consolidated philosophy course had some positive aspects. O’Leary remarks, “we could more or less do as we thought best,” meaning the instructors could emphasize what parts they thought they needed to in their seminars.

104 Around this time, history teaching methods professor Robert J. Clark at ACE would sound the alarm of the encroachment of a new group, “social studies,” which would blur geography, history, government, etc., together. This would blend history, institutionally, into its predicament in policy at this time. He bemoans a new breed of social scientists which wished to teach “skills” in social studies, rather than history. See: Clark, R. J. 1979, May. “Hot-housing tomatoes': History in Ontario schools. The History and Social Science Teacher, 233-239.
education (H&C). Philosophy was reluctant to join with the policy division but had nowhere else to go, having equally low affinity for the psychology division or the curriculum division. The closest division they could fathom which somewhat shared philosophy’s goal of revealing what was “behind the scenes,” was educational policy studies, which lumped them in with administration, school law, policy, and professional practice. As a result, by the beginning of 1980s, the policy division contributed two compulsory courses to the B.Ed. program, School and Society and Philosophy of Education.

The 4th edition of the philosophy of education textbook, in its preface, provides a note on the then current scene for philosophy:

Since philosophy is over 2000 years old, it sounds strange to say that 20th century philosophy is suffering from growing pains . . . The pains are brought about by its attempt to grow in two directions at once. One force is trying to understand discrete problems or pieces of knowledge, and the other is trying to capture a fleeting picture of the whole in some pattern . . . [T]here are philosophical analysts (or specialists) who struggle with one problem, or piece of knowledge, at a time; and there are also synthesizers (or systematizers) who attempt to organize knowledge into a coherent picture of the whole.106

Recall the goal of Peters’ revolution in philosophy of education was to establish experts in analytical philosophy of education, trained ideally at the London Institute or its progeny, in order to provide the “analysts” or “specialists” described in the above quotation. The understandable strategy of Peters was that this kind of professor of education, using the methods of analytical philosophy, would be an inalienable member of education studies and actively involved in the writing of education policy, anywhere. It was to be a kind of profession in itself—organized, well connected with others in the field, their inclusion in any faculty of education assumed and valued. However, the other side, which also lent to the idea of teachers’ colleges as liberal arts colleges, was this idea of philosophers as generalists, and teachers as generalists, as they were in the past. Unfortunately for philosophy of education, neither of these two anticipations would provide a sufficient institutional lifeline to survive, the strongest being the former approach, which the philosophy faculty at Althouse had attempted to emulate. And if

105 This course, covering Ontario education history, school organization, professional standards and regulations through lectures and case studies method, would become the essential model for the next consolidation of policy ITPP courses in 1999. Social Foundations of Education.
one could not be on the policy-writing group to devise sound educational concepts, one became a “barbarian at the gate,” and turned to criticism of policy as the last straw and an ultimatum.

During the 1960s and 1970s, school boards in Ontario had been consolidated, from thousands to a few hundred, centralizing administration of schools into larger administrative units requiring more office staff and teachers who could navigate the increasing complexity of larger school boards and the laws and regulations which bound them. This type of content ballooned in the curriculum of teacher education over the decades as “professional knowledge,” and became an important theme in the policy division, crowding out more academic subjects of the university less directly attached to public school teaching. For now, however, the “school and society” course would take care of this growing need, and provide the rear guard to allow philosophy of education to remain a philosophy course.

And under these conditions, philosophy at ACE was stable, especially when viewed in historical context. The decade following 1967 was recalled by O’Leary as a “halcyon period for philosophers in Western’s Faculty of Education”\(^{107}\) with secure provincial funding, and vacancies promptly filled. A blip occurred in 1971 when philosophy became a foundations option,\(^{108}\) students being allowed to choose either history or philosophy as a required course, yet at the time of the consolidated course in 1979, philosophy regained its required status and the philosophy faculty was still fully staffed with a full-time faculty complement of six.\(^{109}\)

This positive bill of health for philosophy was recognized in a national survey, in 1977 reporting philosophy of education to be “alive and well in Canada today.”\(^{110}\) The study found philosophy of education was a required course in 18 institutions across the country (as it was at ACE in 1979), part of a general foundations course in 9, a foundations option in 15 (as it used to

\(^{108}\) The 1971-1972 ACE Calendar, included in the full university calendar, lists as compulsory only PPA and two psychology courses (one of these psychology courses could be avoided with advanced standing). The student was required to choose 2.0 elective credits, mostly from the foundations departments, with a maximum of two half-credit courses. The purpose of this latter exclusion was to make at least one history or one philosophy course a requirement, since only half credit courses were offered by psychology and a few curriculum departments (for example, introduction to computers, audio visual instruction, and others) while history and philosophy only offered full year courses.
\(^{109}\) The 1971-1972 ACE Calendar lists as Assistant Professors: Howard (chairman), Burke, O’Leary, and A. P. Koutsouvilis (PhD, London; he taught and published in philosophy of religion). Lecturers listed are McPeck and Houston. As a comparison, psychology and history both list 7 faculty. PhDs have also changed, 3 for philosophy, 6 for psychology, and 4 for history.
\(^{110}\) McKenna, M. O. 1981. The status of philosophy of education in the curricula of preservice teacher education programs in Canada. CJE, 6(1), 42-54.
be at ACE), and a free elective in 2. Unsurprisingly, instructors reported it to be very important, and students reported it was irrelevant. In the final pages of the article commenting on the future of the field, one memorable respondent reported that philosophy of education should not be begging for relevance and acknowledgment from the other educational fields, but rather asked whether those other fields are relevant without philosophy. Unfortunately, this view was too far lost by the mid-20th century. The problem was that, to nearly all stakeholders in education, the inclusion of the study of philosophy of education was not at all obvious—not to parents, teachers, policy-makers and politicians in government, nor even fellow teacher education faculty. But at the same time, philosophy is always there, in policy, curriculum, professional ethics, etc.; however, it tends to be hidden, buried—perhaps even denied—and requires some philosophical training to be able to expose it for analysis and scrutiny. The need for this unveiling, and the changing teacher of Ontario, would seriously question, for ITPPs, whether philosophy was still part of the technical core of faculties of education. And when budgets become an issue, what remains essential and what is cut or consolidated would further reveal the current needs of institutional survival.

Over the course of the 1980s with dean Paul Park (1979-1987) at the helm and then several acting deans in the latter part of the decade, philosophy of education would remain a stable and compulsory part of the B.Ed. program at the Faculty. A 1991 study similar to McKenna found that “despite the general cutbacks which occurred in the 1980s, philosophy of education [in Canada] is holding its own.” In 1987 Paul O’Leary became the first editor of the philosophy of education academic journal *Paideusis*, which was to be the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society (CPES) journal. As O’Leary recounts, “when I was editor, I wrote to a series of [Canadian] universities for seed money, and it came. People were willing to give us a

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111 If teacher education faculty were asked “when would you consult with a philosopher of education to assist you in your work, whether in teaching or research,” I believe the responses would be unsurprising. If I could sum up this changing relationship in a word, in the 19th century, it was intrinsic, up to the mid-20th century, it was extrinsic, and by the modern period, inspired by Barrow’s previously quoted remark, it was presumptuous.

112 There is an interesting parallel here between the 1950s emergency summer sessions, where teachers were given a minimalist “training,” leading some to worry about the return of unprofessional “Thirds,” and the modern period with a surplus of unemployed teachers in Ontario, and yet still a frugal intensity to include only immediately practical lessons, eliminating much luxury of time to provide content for the teacher’s long-term prospects.

113 Hare, 1991, op. cit., p. 75.

114 This journal was renamed to *Philosophical Inquiry in Education* in 2015. O’Leary also notes that the CPES had its first meetings at ACE in 1966; at that time, the philosophers at ACE were still skeptical of philosophy of education. See O’Leary, 2010, op. cit., p. 101.
good deal of money.” Around this time, another (part-time) faculty member was added, Andy Bjerring who stayed until the middle of the decade; Emerson retired at this time. Both faculty members were not replaced; Fred Ellett joined the faculty in 1988 and, while having a philosophy background, was not selected for this reason but for joint responsibilities in the policy division. This action would reflect the future, as the policy division did not have any institutional need to fill itself with specialists in its constituent fields, but rather anyone who could broadly fit under policy, allowing flexibility in appointments to pursue other institutional goals, such as graduate programs or, more specifically, faculty with research dollars, or political recognition, areas in which philosophers of education were at a disadvantage.

A New Crisis—A New Normal, 1990-2016

Leading up to the end of the 1980s and a series of acting deans, ACE had become a hotbed of internal conflict due to “warring departments” as one interview participant put it. This time also saw a provincial review of education (the Radwanski Report), consolidation of teaching certificates, and introduction of Additional Qualification (AQ) courses, which began in 1979. Many of these changes were in play, and the curriculum, policy, and psychology divisions were in dispute over control, direction, and hiring in the Faculty, with particular tension between the curriculum division led by Robert J. Clark and the policy division led by R. D. Gidney. Even

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115 Derek J. Allison, who was part of the policy department at this time, notes that Fred Ellett was not hired primarily as a philosopher, but rather for his experience and as a “bridge” to assist policy department members in “understanding, researching, and teaching education policy.” His background and interests were seen as providing a promising resource for fostering an effective policy department, perhaps the first in a Canadian Faculty of Education, and in building toward a PhD program.

116 Note this is a particularly strong reason why the methods and curriculum division has remained relatively internally fragmented, for no particular subject can gain politically over the others as long as each is represented in the education system (unlike Latin, Greek, etc.). Likewise, the members of the policy division tended to want to fill new appointments with more of their own specialty, which was, of course, opposed by the other members not sharing that specialty.

117 At the (USA) 1968 Philosophy of Education Society meeting, Report of the Committee on Professional Affairs, “very few researchers in philosophy of education have been funded by the U.S. Office of Education.”

118 This would lead to faculty who were au courant regarding the needs of the Ontario education system, such as the recent mental health and bullying movements. The former created the Canadian Research Centre on Inclusive Education later founded at ACE which attracted research dollars for the educational psychologists working therein. Philosophers of education would, instead, treat “inclusive education” as more likely to be another fad or cliché in education research meant to support an active political directive in the Ministry of Education.

119 Its full name is the “Ontario Study of the Relevance of Education” released in 1988. The report concluded a shifting economy needed to be met with changes to the education system. Provincial testing returned to Ontario under the auspices the Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO) not long after this report. De-streaming in the high schools was also considered and enacted for a brief time for grade 9 only. Some discussion of these changes for philosophy of education can be found here in Raphael, D. 1993. Accountability and educational philosophy: Paradigms and conflict in Ontario education. CJE, 18(1), 29–45.
worse, and perhaps as a result, the selection committee would not agree on a new dean of the Faculty. The Provost at the time sent in Harry K. Fisher\textsuperscript{120} to serve as dean in 1989, who ended up resigning after not quite a year. Another issue was the supervision of practice teaching. Traditionally the curriculum division was responsible for visiting and observing students’ teaching on practicum; however, they wanted to be awarded career credit for this responsibility, since non-curriculum faculty used practicum time when the students were away to write and research. If career credit was not possible, curriculum faculty wanted the practicum to be a shared responsibility to make equitable the competition for faculty promotion. Involvement with practicum was especially disagreeable to those members of the policy division who lacked teaching experience in the lower schools, mostly the philosophers. Due to this intolerable situation—a kind of institutional crisis—in 1990 the university appointed Bohuslav B. Kymlicka,\textsuperscript{121} a previous dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, to put out the fires and return the institution and its divisions to the alliance crucially needed to fulfill its programs and objectives, including preparing the Faculty to launch a PhD program.\textsuperscript{122}

Forgoing many desperate details, this crisis in the institution finds a clear parallel in Selznick’s previously noted analysis of the TVA. He writes,

> The breakdown of real unity will be reflected in administrative coordination becoming no longer a mechanism for the resolution of technical and transitory maladjustments but rather a vehicle and an instrument in the unacknowledged struggle over a primary prize: the evolving character of the organization as a whole.\textsuperscript{123}

The various crisis periods at the Faculty, according to institutional organizational theory, are periods of conflict which reveal threats to the technical core of the institution. The faculty involved fight with one another in various ways, often over territory\textsuperscript{124} for their own survival, but the institution’s survival always takes precedence over maintaining functionality. Ellett recounts an apt example of faculty covetousness,

\textsuperscript{120} Fisher was a career educator. He had his start as a teacher in Perth County in a one-room rural school. He later became an inspector and superintendent, and Deputy Minister of Education.

\textsuperscript{121} Kymlicka’s experiences at the Faculty likely led to his writing of a manuscript on this institution and the unique situation of faculties of education in the university. See Kymlicka, 1992, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{122} The next dean, Allen Pearson, started the PhD program at the Faculty, which had its first graduate in 1999.


\textsuperscript{124} As Watson and Allison, 1992, op. cit., also find, “both faculties of education and school boards have been criticized as ‘guarding their territory.’” And what is relevant to both external and internal groups of the Faculty: “the idea of collaboration may be deceptively attractive, obscuring the hard work and conflict that lie below the surface appeal” (p. 29).
To actually hire a lawyer—to have someone to come in and do law and education was thought to be a really amazing idea. [John] Goodlad was in favor of it and just got it through [at the UCLA Graduate School of Education] but most faculty would have thought: “What has education have to do with law?” . . . Here [at ACE] we had Greg Dickinson really early on [but] they are not replacing him, he’s the top 3 in Canada, and has the law journal here . . . But you see what’s happened . . . They never allowed Greg to teach a course aimed at educational psychology or special education. [Psychology] always did those courses, but they have no one over there in law . . . That’s the territorial thing.

While these disputes over territory can breed crisis periods, sometimes the host university will send in interim deans in order to resolve problems, while at the same time enforcing changes which ensured the institution continued to meet its primary purpose, support of the public schools. However, as institutions are “recalcitrant tools,” they resist our desires, and the diverse, sometimes contradictory demands from a crowded institutional level makes crisis periods inevitable. Indeed, Scott and others call these periods “organized anarchies”125 and some researchers believe these are not crises or transitional periods at all, but rather the result of a chaos of “problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities” all part of the “decision arena” or what Cohen, March, and Olsen called the “garbage can model” of organizations.126 This state of affairs seems to be caused by the unsolvable polarities that make up faculties of education—to name only two, the combined program of elementary and secondary; the academic university vs. the practical profession and teachers’ federations; each of these, and other polarities, provide endless fuel waiting for the spark of an external institutional level demand, the conflagration creating not a phoenix but a new house of cards.127

127 An important review of faculties of education across Ontario was published in 1992 (Watson & Allison, 1992, op. cit.). It lists several problems faculties of education were having in fitting into the university. Also, more relevant to philosophers of education, new research mandates were putting them at a disadvantage when competing in policy departments. Several points are summarized from the review, with my comments: (1) “importance of critical mass and research programs, rather than small isolated studies” (p. 40). Philosophers tend not to need large research teams to do their work. (2) Most research is funded externally with little internal funds. Philosophers tend not to need funding to perform research, just time. (3) Notes Western in particular emphasizes research, “expects 40% of the workload” (p. 19). For an article which finds the publishing practices of philosophers of education are at a disadvantage when compared to other education researchers, especially the productive yet multi-authored team research of educational psychologists, see Smeyers, P. et al., 2014. Publish yet perish: On the pitfalls of philosophy of education in an age of impact factors. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 33, 647–666.
The decade of the 1990s would be the last decade for the philosophy of education course in the ITPP at the Faculty. All the philosophers hired to teach philosophy retired in this decade. O’Leary, retiring in 1996 having been part of the original faculty and having served 31 years at the Faculty, remarks that no one was replaced due to “money and indifference.” He went on to say that “there’s been a drift toward commercial interests, and technocratic interests, and philosophy doesn’t fit into there.” During this decade, declining student enrolments had been costly to faculties. Another consolidation was expected, this time for the “school and society” course and philosophy of education, creating the omnibus “Social Foundations of Education course” in 1999. This new course became the sole compulsory course in the ITPP provided by the policy division. As we saw before with previous consolidations in which Howard and Burke left as academic philosophy courses were to be discontinued, in the 1990s all but one of the philosophy of education faculty left or retired as philosophy of education was discontinued.

Allen Pearson, a philosopher of education from the University of Alberta, was dean of the Faculty from 1995-2007. This was approximately the beginning of the “equity and social justice” movement, and eventually the policy division would be replaced shortly after Pearson’s appointment: all three divisions were dissolved and the faculty restructured into the pre-service and graduate units which prevailed until recently. At this time, much of the policy faculty were mobilized to supply the graduate programs. After the current appointment of dean Schwean in 2011, the faculty were re-organized into “academic research clusters,” placing policy faculty into the “Critical Policy, Equity, and Leadership Studies” cluster, which continued to largely provide graduate programs. Teacher education is managed by the Teacher Education Office, headed by an associate dean, wherein Social Foundations of Education resides. This organization has changed over the decades, the first several decades of the B.Ed. program constituted by many independent parts, from the outside in, to one of centralized delegation, or inside out.

128 According to the 1994-1995 ACE course calendar, philosophy of education provided 1.5 units of the 21-unit program. Each unit was equivalent to 20 hours of class time. Both an introductory and an advanced course in philosophy of education were offered. As a comparison, the foundations group comprised 8 units, curriculum, 7-8, other professional courses, 4, and the practicum, 4. Within foundations, psychology was allotted two units, school and society was 2.5 units, along with philosophy at 1.5.

129 McPeck and Ellett created an interim philosophy of education course, put on in the 1998-1999 year, called Philosophical Perspectives on Education (with an accompanying textbook with this name). It was similar to the previous philosophy of education course, the text an anthology of important philosophers of education. After this course, McPeck retired with 33 years of service, the longest serving philosopher at ACE.
The modern equity movement and social foundations had been connected before—the course’s founding at Teachers College of Columbia began in 1929 in the United States where “reconstruction” influenced the course’s first purpose toward fostering a more “just social order” to temper the effects of the Great Depression.\(^{130}\) Along with this vision for the schools and its teachers, several faculty members were hired into the policy area. As Ellett recounts,

During that period the equity movement was going on, we got very top heavy with equity people. I think [Pearson] felt comfortable with that, he may have even thought it was philosophy . . . And he hired a lot of these people during that period . . . [But] we hadn’t hired philosophers, we hired people who . . . look like they can do social foundations, and they are really different.

These faculty did not come from a philosophy background, and more likely were engaging with current educational issues as “equity” advocates or ideologues rather than philosophers of education who are predisposed to be suspicious of fads.\(^{131}\) This is especially true as “methodology and politics are closely intertwined in fields like education.”\(^{132}\) Some of the new hires were to teach in the new Social Foundations of Education course which began in 1999; without new faculty, the end of philosophy of education in the B.Ed. program was signalled at the end of the decade with Ellett and McPeck saddled to teach the last philosophy of education course to around 600 students. The situation became impossible, but inevitable; philosophers were not being hired at the Faculty—not even for graduate programs—as other interests had displaced them. Ellett sums up the transition into Social Foundations in this way,

Part of it was that people were retiring, and as [departments] were fighting for positions, the arguments were not being made for [keeping a philosophy of education course] . . . [It ended] around the time McPeck retired, because I couldn’t [teach] it myself. Around that time I got absorbed into Social Foundations. It wasn’t an unhappy place to be because I do value the legal stuff, [which] at that point in time this Faculty of Education was pretty unique in doing.

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130 For a review of the “rise and fall” of foundations at Teachers College, see, McCarthy, M. R. 2006. The rise and fall of ED200F. *Educational Studies, 39*(2), 134–145.

131 A philosopher at the Faculty argued that philosophy of education, to remain current and relevant, must engage with what she called “eurocentrism,” “race,” etc. See: Ayim, M. 1999. Research questions in philosophy of education in the 1990s: The state of the “ought.” In *A challenge met: The definition and recognition of the field of education* (pp. 173-180). Ottawa: CSSE. Other philosophers of education, such as John Wilson, wrote explicitly against ideology in education, where “the villain is commonly Society” and “involvement with these topics may often take the form of an ideological crusade . . . by ideological leaders who wish to further a certain cause or programme.” See: Wilson, J. 1993. *Reflection and practice: Teacher education and the teaching profession*. London, Ont., Canada: Althouse Press, p. 46, 68.

Nevertheless, in offering social foundations the new policy group tried to maintain the discussion format which was so important to teaching philosophy. Returning to Ellett,

[Philosophy of Education was] meant to be [taught in] discussion groups, and that’s a big thing that changed over time too . . . As the [problem] with funding gets going, Derek [Allison] recognized early on that . . . the structure of social foundations was really very economical for the department because it allowed a lot of people [to be served] with the lectures . . . The way philosophy went, you’d have these sections, but no lectures . . . and small, 20-25. That was a big deal, that these sections should be small for discussion. That was thought to be essential for philosophy. Social Foundations had a similar thing, the case study approach, so they made the same argument [for small class sizes for discussion] . . . And we were fighting; Pearson protected us, he tried to hold that line [of keeping class size of Social Foundations 20-25], while very early on educational psychology went to big sections.

This change was emboldened at the Ministry level as well. Regulations on teacher qualifications under the 1996 Ontario College of Teachers Act listed the following requirements for an ITPP: (1) “studies in education, including learning and [child] development” specific to age-group (2) teaching methods; (3) “acts and regulations;” (4) curriculum; and (5) 40 days of practicum. The new Social Foundations of Education course, a modified version of the “school and society” course which had come out of the original history, professional practices and “teachers and the law” courses, was designed primarily to satisfy (3) above, as was required for all Ontario ITPPs. Social Foundations was instructed by some policy faculty, including Fred Ellett who lectured and led seminars in it until 2013, though he retired in 2011 along with Pearson. The course covered all aspects of what policy was responsible for, including philosophy, which held explicit content in two or three of the weeks. These weeks Ellett lectured, delivering for example in the first year of the course, a lecture on democracy and education, and another on morality and teaching as represented by Kohlberg. Students also attended seminars, each group of students led in discussion by one of the various instructors who were part of the course (not all of whom provided lectures). While the lectures were delivered by an expert, such as Greg Dickinson, a renowned Canadian education law professor, the seminars were led, in most cases, by a non-expert, since the topics changed week by week and only by chance would a particular seminar be led by the expert in that area.

After just over a decade of the course, further change was to occur which in part led to many policy faculty retiring. Starting in 2010, the provincial government cut the education

133 These can be found in Section 1, subsection 3, paragraph 2 of: https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/970184
student subsidy received by faculties over the next three years. In 2013, lectures were discontinued, the social foundations course became seminars only, and while their length increased to 90 minutes from 60, so did their size.\textsuperscript{134} At the time of this change was the last year Ellett and Pearson were seminar leaders with the course. One policy faculty member noted to me, “I am no longer a philosopher [of education]. Philosophy doesn’t sell” in faculties of education.

For the 2014-2015 school year, as an eager graduate student who had taught in Social Foundations, I put this idea to the test. I taught two sections of an elective ITPP course I designed entitled “Developing your Philosophy of Education.”\textsuperscript{135} With only a nine week, two-hours-per-week seminar-style class, it was impossible to “bring philosophy back” to the Faculty. I knew the course must have a practical end, and so the writing of one’s philosophy of teaching statement\textsuperscript{136} became the goal, and the content in the class was the raw material the students would consider and integrate into a statement of their attitudes and approaches to education and teaching. I had thought such an assignment should be a kind of ultimate examination for an ITPP, somewhat like a written “oral” of past university examinations. Devising a (good) statement requires deep consideration of and reflection on the entire curriculum of a teacher education program in order to fashion together both educational philosophy and one’s own life philosophy; when taken seriously, the process and the end product I believed was a very practical project. While the course received good comments and reviews by students, it was not offered again, even while ITPPs across Ontario expanded to two years during the 2015-2016 school year.

\textsuperscript{134} For class sizes, during the “philosophy of X” period, courses were numerous and particular to the students, making seminars very small, less than 20; consolidated philosophy of education seminars rose to approximately 25; early social foundations course seminars enrolled close to 30, as it was when I taught in this course in 2013-2014. As of the 2016-2017 year, typical class sizes range from 40-50. The fact that such sizes are tolerable to administration, let alone pedagogically sound for seminars to be effective, speaks volumes of the times teacher education is in.

\textsuperscript{135} I recall one of the selling points I used was the plea that John Dewey had become unrecognizable amongst education students and teachers.

\textsuperscript{136} Social Foundations at ACE in 2016 began requiring students, as part of their final project, to write a teaching philosophy. There may have been some influence from the course I taught in the 2014-2015 schoolyear to “bring back philosophy” where the final project was a teaching philosophy statement, but for the last several years, the Social Foundations course has not included an instructor with primary expertise in philosophy of education, nor one who routinely researches and publishes in the field. And so, philosophy continues to decline in the same way Orlich & Shermis, 1965, op. cit., found school boards required to disclose a philosophy of education produced muddled statements that “passed” for philosophy. Without expertise in philosophy of education, the same fate is likely for Social Foundations, inflicting harms which has historically plagued philosophy of education: espousal of the value of philosophy and selling it to students without employing experts in the field to sufficiently supervise the product.
Summary

This chapter has primarily explored the fate of philosophy of education in the initial teacher preparation program at a single institution, the J. G. Althouse Faculty of Education, previously called the Althouse College of Education. The chapter took the form of a case study reviewing the general history of philosophy in ITPPs in the broad sense. ACE went through a series of organizational crises, each one, as viewed from the perspectives of IOT, resulting in a reorganization of the purposes of the institution, and a refashioning its technical core as it sought to forge new teachers ready for the changing world. The technical core was organized and reorganized into successive groupings, their official names marking a fortified place in which its inhabitants were sustained, some subgroups being better protected than others.

The institutional and managerial environments proved less than supportive to philosophy, with new policy directions and research mandates encouraging the formation of research teams and emphases in the technical core, attracting research grants to match. This would change hiring policy, from a policy of providing a well-rounded faculty of a liberal arts college in the beginning, filling gaps when retirements occurred, to a policy of specialization, which amasses faculty in similar pockets of interest in order to create small research centres better able to compete in winning research funding and scholarly recognition. The former suggests a concern for students and teaching, the latter for research and careerism. The final chapter will provide a more contemporary view of philosophy of education, as well as some final remarks and my suggestions for the future.

To complement the above descriptions, two data displays have been constructed. As noted at the beginning of the case account, a large table summarizing the history of the philosophy of education faculty at ACE, from 1965 to 2016, including changing organizational structures and delivery of philosophy of education courses appears in Appendix 1. The reader is urged to review this tabulated history of philosophy at ACE. The final small chart in Figure 2 below compares variations in four different indicators over the course of ACE’s history. By tracking the various courses offered by philosophy of education including the component in the Social Foundations course, the chart compares the number of philosophy of education faculty, class sizes, and estimated hours of philosophy instruction to offer a quantitative summary of the trends described and discussed in this chapter.
The case study shows that the internal organizational structures in which the philosophy of education faculty had their institutional home had considerable impact on the other variables considered, including course-type offered, class sizes, etc. Also, looking at the faculty as a whole, my analysis suggests the internal organizational component of ACE, especially the three divisions which dominated life and work in the institution in and around the 1980s (policy, curriculum, and psychology) were often working as if they are in a different kind of institution—the curriculum and methods faculty were working as if they were in a teachers’ college, the philosophers and historians in a liberal arts college, and the psychologists and modern policy faculty, a faculty of education. The environment and certain deans triggered crisis periods which morphed the overall institution’s climate, causing survival conditions to change, allowing certain plants to flourish and others to wither.
In dying as philosophy[,] the ideas come to live as a part of the common and unconscious intellectual life of men in general. They become the presupposed background, the unexpressed premises, the working (and therefore controlling) tools of thought and action . . . Unless we are to be mastered by them, we must master them. And this involves a continual dragging of them out of their unconscious hiding places; a deliberate and reflective overhauling of them—that is to say, the study of philosophy. . . [For] the best of reasons for studying philosophy—necessity. ~ John Dewey, Why study philosophy?\(^1\)

In this final chapter, I will conclude this work by way of reviewing the journey thus far taken, drawing conclusions, considering implications, and reflecting on meanings. I will restate and reflect on the initial raison d’être of the study, the research questions, and review the approach and strategy taken to shed light on the inquiry. Collecting the findings detailed throughout the work, I will next attempt to answer the questions, discuss the efficacy of the theory used, and the difficulties encountered in the research. Finally, implications from these findings will be given directed to the theory used, directions for future research, and thoughts on the practical consequences going forward.

**Research Question and Approach**

The present study was undertaken to examine what I had initially assumed to be a healthy philosophical component in initial teacher preparation programs (ITPPs) as I had experienced in my own teacher education in the United States. In my B.Ed. program, this component was expected to provide the basis on which educational theory and practice is formulated, this being the tradition of philosophical thinking on matters of the aims of education, and other such topics. Instead, I discovered the existence of philosophy of education across institutions is unreliable—precarious even—for it assumes no condition of required status in courses comprising teacher education programs, nor in the expertise of faculty comprising these institutions. An extensive literature search discovered that over a half century of consistent remarks in articles and books

describing this state of affairs, most authors viewed philosophy of education as being in decline in various ways and degrees, including up to the present day.²

To explain this situation, the guiding research question formulated was,

*How has philosophy of education, as a field, changed over time, why has it changed, and the consequences for teacher preparation.*

Note that this question, while selecting the general territory and direction of the study, needed to be sharpened to be appropriately practical for a dissertation. This was done in the following ways:

*Time period:* A wide net was cast for the study, from the 19th century to the present—I believed it was necessary to review the very first teacher education programs and observe how philosophy fared therein. I had suspected the changing nature of ITPPs affected the fate of philosophy, and thus seeing them both in their infancy was the correct starting place for this inquiry.

*Geography:* The study surveys the major English-speaking countries where universities and academic fields are most developed. The United States was the focus, with an important part of Britain also covered. These motherlands which developed their own kinds of teacher education and philosophy of education influenced in a somewhat cosmopolitan way the academic institutions of the satellite nation of Canada.

*Construct:* Philosophy of education as a field of study was the target, but it needed to be narrowed further to its manifestations in publications, professional organizations, and its coursework and faculty in teacher education institutions. These manifestations were studied alongside teacher education institutions, but the particular focus was teacher education programs, not other programs such as graduate and continuing education programs. Of particular interest were the origins of the field, its form in early teacher education, and how this component changed as teacher education and the role of the teacher changed, especially as mass education systems developed.

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² For example, in the latest Canadian foundations of education textbook, the state of the field is described as “pushed to the periphery of teacher education programs. This is perhaps reflective of a global trend—increasingly evident in Canada—which promotes a negative view of education that undervalues the contributions of broader philosophical perspectives to our understanding of education.” See Gereluk, et al., 2016, op. cit., p. x.
Within these delimitations, the question of the relationship between philosophy of education and the establishment and development of teacher education institutions proceeded as the broad, historical task of the study. Chapters were designed to cover time periods, each of which contained a particular form of philosophy of education which survived within a particular form of teacher education. In particular, the fifth chapter presented a case study of how philosophy of education fared at one teacher education institution, involving specific data in terms of course calendars, and interviewing mostly retired philosophers of education who served in the institution. Further details of the chapters, and the theory used to interpret the data, will be covered next.

**Approach to the Study**

The basic task of the study was the presentation of two seemingly separate developments, namely teacher education and philosophy of education, and, using a theory, show how they are connected. During the last 150 years, while it is plain to observe that teacher education institutions have risen and become numerous and complex, from summer sessions and normal schools, to teachers’ colleges, and in the modern period, faculties of education, over the same time-period, philosophy of education as a field has risen in these institutions, but appears to suffer a variable and uncertain status in varying degrees in modern faculties of education, as reported in the last 50 years of relevant academic literature. Key to understanding the decline of philosophy of education is in its changing “survival environments,” mostly teacher education institutions, and how philosophy attempted to survive as these institutions changed to survive in their own environments.

Attempting to understand these “survival environments” requires a theoretical frame, the success of which depends on its overlay of both histories. The particular frame chosen was institutional organizational theory (IOT). This theory pays attention to how institutions change, and how those things dependent on these institutions—in the case of educational institutions, faculty and fields—alter to better survive during institutional change. The source of change is often from the outside environment when particular forces, such as Ministries of Education, coerce teacher education institutions through various acts and regulations. At the same time, institutions naturally form a barrier to better resist and soften change, over time becoming considerably recalcitrant and periodically resistant as viewed by agents in the outside
environment who seek to control it. A particularly important reason for these barriers is to keep its contents, its purpose and identity, stable, and to resist and minimize alterations to the “technical core,” the center of the institution. The core is the institution’s “factory floor,” where the work of the institution is undertaken, and all its tools used in the process are laid out.

Administering these processes, serving as a middleman between the core and the outside world, is the managerial level, which buffers change and provides not only a time delay for change, but softens change by way of diplomacy. As teacher education institutions are public entities, “change” actions are necessarily initiated by democratic government and other forces, such as to alter or add new functions that might come from election of new political forces.

At the same time, it seems to be a tacit assumption that public institutions can be controlled so as to always serve public interests, and never private interests. As F. A. Hayek famously pointed out in 1977,

> [what has] govern[ed] thinking since the 18th century, is the idea that we can make everything to our pleasure, that we can design social institutions in their working. Now that is basically mistaken. Social institutions have never been designed, and they do much more than we know.  

This point is consistent with the idea from IOT evoked throughout this dissertation of institutions being “recalcitrant.” As I will review from the chapters, an example of this recalcitrance is the transformation of the technical core of teacher education institutions into favoring the more institutionally rewarding graduate education programs. Along the way, dysfunction is inevitable, and various crisis periods, as shown in the ACE case, are periods where dysfunctions are “corrected” or, perhaps better put, are part of a “tripartite compromise” between the current demands of the different institutional levels, the technical core’s flexibility for change, and the managerial levels efforts at diplomacy among institutional forces, such as the government, and interests from within the core.

The efficacy of this theoretical frame will be considered by reviewing the focus and main finding of each chapter of this dissertation, beginning with chapter two where the research

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3 This term, referred to as “technical level” by Talcott Parsons, was renamed to “technical core” by J. D. Thompson and was adopted in this study. This is because a “core” vs. a “level” better represents it as the center of the institution, which is surrounded by the other levels.

4 From an interview on the *Firing Line*, hosted by William F. Buckley jr.
begins. Each chapter also provides an answer to the research question, revealing how philosophy of education has been changed over time due to its institutional environment.

**Chapter 2.** This chapter presented an account of the status of education in the 19th century. Common schools dotted the landscape, most of which were one-room schoolhouses, especially in rural areas, which dominated. Teacher preparation, as undeveloped as the public-school systems it was meant to serve, was known as “pedagogy,” a quite basic though synthetic, personal, and philosophic approach in the craft of schoolkeeping. In some cases, these programs were quite short, sometimes a month or two in length in the summer, and instructors tended to be headmasters from prominent grammar schools or local school inspectors. They were tasked with fostering a professional responsible for the complete education process, who could work alone, and under precarious conditions for the rural or frontier settings in which they were likely to work. The glue of pedagogy was philosophy, and while the university provided traditional philosophy for those destined to teach in and operate grammar schools, the few but growing normal schools in urban areas provided the “Great Educators” in courses and texts for common school teachers. Evidence of their importance can be seen in inclusion of these courses and texts as philosophic sources in “teacher libraries.” These texts were meant to pass down pedagogy, the wisdom of the teaching craft, termed a philosophy, a synthetic account not yet differentiated into theory and practice as it is in the modern period. These texts were selected as appropriate material for many purposes, such as for teacher education by headmasters in the normal schools, professional development by teacher institutes and associations, and as part of certificate requirements by local or state governments. Secondary teachers were educated in the university in traditional Arts programs and took posts as assistants and headmasters of “elite” and selective grammar schools.

Overall Chapter two uncovered the origins of both teacher education and philosophy in their original non-institutional forms, save for grammar school teacher preparation in the university which followed traditional Arts programs containing components of philosophy, history, and other humanities. While both common and grammar school teachers had different preparation, the shared element was the importance of the person’s moral character, and in part, his training was meant to encourage a desire for future learning and development. The next chapter continued the story up until the Second World War.
Chapter 3. This chapter, covering the turn of the 20th century and ending after the Second World War, reviews a great deal of change which altered the situation substantially for the study of education and its delivery. Public education systems are forming, institutionalizing common schools into standardized, state-funded elementary schools, while the process for the establishment of public secondary schools was still underway. The rise of science was mobilized in every area of society, including education, and profoundly in the universities, which boomed in the post-war period, tending to become research institutions. Both the growth of the education system and the rise of science provided impetus for centralizing decision-making in now larger, centrally administered systems of schools, altering the occupation of teaching and thus ITPPs. Increasingly teachers were expected to work in the growing urban settings in multi- and differentiated-staff schools, and because of this, were trained in more institutional and stable normal schools.

It was not elementary teacher training but the growth of secondary, already receiving one or two courses from university Chairs in pedagogy, which seeded larger departments of education as secondary teacher training programs were added to the responsibilities of universities. These departments needed to “upgrade” the low academic standing attributed to pedagogy by the rest of the university; they had to be institutionalized and split into smaller pieces and divided into theory and practice. Likewise, courses and faculty were no longer likely to be generalist, but specifically expert in a piece of the education process; the result was a compartmentalization of subjects, each subordinated to a role in the makeup of education and teacher training. In normal schools, philosophers of education often claimed a place in generalist “introduction to education” or “principles of education” courses, and sometimes formed specific philosophy of education courses when in larger teachers’ colleges near universities. At the same time, with science as the new way, early psychology was given a new lifeline, injected in digest-form into ITPPs, and eventually crowding out humanities-type coursework by the late 20th century. As the old grammar schools were replaced by the new high schools, their teachers began being certificated to work in public high schools, yet their educational backgrounds were relatively unchanged, resting on possession of a university Arts degree with the addition of one or two required education “methods” courses.

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5 Brubacher, 1966, op. cit., p. 488.
Overall the time-period covered in this chapter notes considerable institutional building in the education system, and the beginnings of new teacher methods and subject matter entering the ITPP curriculum. Pedagogy still hung on in smaller normal schools as compulsory introductory material in “principles of education”-type courses, and philosophy of education, for a time, rode the tide of the post-war boom, expanding in faculty and courses, generating textbooks, and building the field with the various “isms” it could muster from its parent discipline, philosophy. Teacher professionalism and remuneration was a high concern, and much hope was invested in the university study of education, and a university-branded lower school teaching staff. The impact of the new wave of science, especially as fueled by the war efforts, cannot be overemphasized. New institutions, the teachers’ colleges, would clean the slate to allow new “science-based” programs to take hold and attempt to recreate the technical core of teacher education institutions, without objection from hangers on like philosophy. This, in part, was due to the fragmentation of education for study purposes, which forced philosophy into a role of a contributor, rather than its previous role as a framer. These new institutions, which John Dewey supported, proposed to “upgrade” pedagogy to a science of education as closer ties to universities were encouraged.\(^6\) This science-driven upgrade process meant the Great Educators and teaching as a craft could not be seen as compatible with scientific methods of behaviorist psychological techniques which were now the “light and the way” of education. This new survival environment which favored scientific findings and “answers” would require philosophy to adapt or decline. At the same time, greater institutionalization meant a more complex institutional environment, with more forces at play attempting to gain control of these institutions. Likewise, as the education system expanded the occupation of teachers, their preparation was redesigned to match, and new specialties were certified with new credentials.

**Chapter 4.** This chapter picked up the story after the Second World War and ended in the 1970s. The most important part of this era for philosophy of education was the rise of the analytical school of philosophy of education in Britain by R. S. Peters and Israel Scheffler in the United States. At the same time, teacher training of both elementary and high school teachers was largely merged into new faculties of education, research arms of the provincial and state ministries or departments of education, and programs jointly staffed and managed by local

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\(^6\) Recall that John Dewey advocated for the universities to undertake the study of education as a public service. While many universities have faculties of education, universities as a whole would not undertake to study education.
universities. The perspectives of science would continue to be demanded from education programs, and “evidence-based” research and practice would be encouraged from all education faculty members. Educational policy studies also rose at this time, based in the need to study large and complex education systems and train those who were to manage them. It is here where some philosophers of education, led by Peters in Britain and Scheffler in the United States, tried for a coup to recover the lost ground of philosophy, but re-situate its soil and life into graduate programs. As research became the purpose of modern universities, and faculties of education their foster child, graduate programs became the center. As a result, ITPPs were somewhat displaced at the technical core of faculties of education, a natural development as academic prestige and dollars became more abundant in the former than the latter. This turning of the technical core to graduate programs occurred at the same time that accreditation organizations became more strict in their requirements over ITPPs, and more or less began arms-length governance over these programs, faculties complacently yielding and happily providing the isomorphic minimum while they were developing the more rewarding graduate program frontier. This transformation, in part, led to the bunking of philosophy and other humanities subjects into omnibus “foundations of education” courses, by this time a widely-practiced consolidation, the specific topics contained within it destined to decline as instructors could not be an expert in all foundations areas.

Unfortunately for the analytical philosophers of education, while the tactic seemed to have been the right one—policy at the graduate level and educational issues at the ITPP level—analytical methods failed to become a dominant and defining mode in either, and while the first batch of newly minted philosophers of education coming out of the London Institute was received by surrounding institutions in Britain, the tradition never gained any entrenched status in faculties of education. Contemporaneous with the rise of the analytical school was the rise of philosophers of education bemoaning the decline of the field, a view apparently shared by authors in both the earlier population of philosophers and by the newer analytical philosophers, spanning the 1950s and intensified into the modern and “postmodern” period. A review of the last several decades of this literature, which continues up to the present, can be found in Appendix 2. Despite various efforts, something else was causing philosophy of education to decline inevitably.
Chapter 5. In this chapter, the story-method of revealing the trials and tribulations of philosophy of education as shown in the academic literature is halted in order to observe its rise and fate in a single institution. This was the Althouse College of Education (ACE), located in London, Ontario, Canada, which was to become the Faculty of Education of the University of Western Ontario. Research for this case study included reviews of official and university course calendars. Retired philosophers of education and other faculty were also interviewed to provide insight to the just over half century life of the institution. Overall the fate of philosophy of education went through the steps seen in the larger field, except that it was perhaps more severe at ACE as the last philosophy faculty had retired in 2011.

ACE was founded as a secondary teacher training institution in 1965. At this time, there were separate “foundations” departments for philosophy, history of education, psychology and sociology, and professional practice and administration, each of which had some autonomy in their course offerings. This initial setup was akin to a liberal arts college, providing founding disciplines which operated as independent partitions, their courses informing teaching as a tradition and a profession. Academic philosophy was the initial subject matter, not philosophy of education, but by the 1970s, and with aid from R. S. Peters who visited the Faculty, philosophy coursework added “philosophy of X” courses, the “X” being various subjects taught by secondary teachers. This new coursework remained consistent with the original liberal purpose of philosophy, providing a deeper understanding of subject matter, including some insight into how students might correctly or incorrectly come to understandings of various subjects.

Other factors, but primarily changes in departmental structures in the late 1970s, led to a consolidation of philosophy courses into a single, compulsory philosophy of education course and accompanying textbook. All instructors, rather than teaching their strengths, taught all the areas of this course. In 1980, the foundations departments were consolidated into “education policy studies.” This new formulation remained relatively stable until the late 1990s when another institutional crisis led to further changes. Philosophy of education was ended as a separate course, and a “social foundations of education” course began. A consolidated course and a consolidated department provided no justification for specific subject or disciplinary expertise among its faculty. After 1988, no philosophers of education were hired at the faculty,
and even this last hire in 1988 was not primarily intended for the teacher education program, but the graduate program.

Overall, the story of philosophy at ACE remains fairly consistent with the story given in the last three chapters. A combination of factors led to a decline of philosophy of education, especially due to the structure of its home institution, and its changing technical core. The various “institutional forces” which are cited in the “decline literature,” as well as the general history of teacher education’s institutionalization, seem to be a fairly robust predictor of the fall of philosophy of education. These transformations and decline do not appear in university philosophy departments; they have tended to have a much more stable institutional history than philosophy in teacher education institutions, and relatively more stable health, even while suffering from periodic decline in the humanities. While it would be strange for a university, as a higher education institution, not to have a philosophy department, no such expectation exists for modern teacher education institutions. Though both institutions tend to be established with one, only one of them tends to keep it.

An Answer to the Inquiry – The Proper Place of Philosophy

The narrowed research question sought an understanding of how and why philosophy of education in ITPPs has changed. How philosophy of education has transformed during different time periods due to its institutional habitat have been broadly summarized in the preceding review of the chapters. I will now turn to implications and attempt a solution or perhaps a treatment to the institutionalism that preys upon philosophy and teacher education. The fate of the field of philosophy of education, everything else being equal, is vested in three important parts of teacher education: (1) its institutions; (2) its programs; and (3) the teaching profession. Teacher education is affected by external, often coercive measures to regulate its programming, and this mechanism has, in part, led to the decline of philosophy of education. Therefore, a possible remedy would be to counter this “coupling” or outside-in influence by an internal normative influence, empowering a source of institutional organization from the inside, the technical core, that radiates out. In theory, the result would be slower dysfunction, and a resistance to institutional level “co-optation.”

Place in Teacher Education Institutions. Philosophy of education began as part of the liberal arts method of teacher education, and has struggled to survive in later scientific research-
focused faculties of education,™ smothered by systematic, institutional forces. A reorganization of
the technical core of teacher preparation institutions is needed, and we must rediscover
philosophy’s unique role in the technical core. This will locate the proper place for philosophy in
institutions of teacher preparation, not as a component, but as its soul.© Philosophy is the starting
place, the foundation, of all educational institutions, for their justification depends on defending
the idea of education, that it is possible, and that it is worthwhile. Toward this end, universities
and professors often have written statements declaring their philosophy of education, and the
mark of the Ph.D. designates a reminder that “philosophy,” not science, is the explicit
institutional signet of our intellectual and scientific work.

Over time, this soul has been forgotten as the technical core was tunneled by outside,
institutional forces into teacher preparation. Philosophy has created all our fields of inquiry. Each
new field goes through a maturing process, which distances it from its parent, but in the modern
era with the prospect of survival in modern universities, the pressure to be “cutting edge” tends
not to include value in a “sound philosophical basis” as it once did; indeed, emancipation from
philosophy mistakenly seems to be part of a field’s maturity. Once “education” entered the
university, this process began and philosophy was brought in temporarily to support the maturing
of the “study of education.”œ Over the time of this maturing and the explosion of research
produced from educational fields, philosophy was less able to hold its curricular ground.

However, since philosophy is inalienable and thus it is impossible to “mature” out of
philosophy, it was moved, or hidden. As it was institutionalized, it slowly receded in explicit
courses, often placed within larger social foundations courses, and became part of the

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7 A particularly apt observation is to witness the health of philosophy in the main university: it pays no considerable rent
in research dollars, nor reputation to the university in terms of publicized scientific research. Rather, it would seem
to remain for reasons of tradition and cross-faculty partnerships, for all subjects eventually reach philosophy.
However, a further important factor is it is protected behind an autonomous department of philosophy. I would
predict that if the Faculty of Arts at a typical university were to dis-empower all its internal departments, as did
many faculties of education, to form a consolidated “Faculty of Humanities,” and its courses were also consolidated
to humanities I, humanities II, etc., many core fields would be lost, and faculty expertise replaced by hybrid faculty.
8 This characterization was the central theme of the later anthology on the decline of philosophy of education. It is
9 This idea was beyond the scope of the dissertation to pursue, but the relative success of educational psychology in
maintaining its foothold in the study of education may be due to its faster maturing as a (social) science field than
education was able, and thus, while education struggled to mature and achieve academic respectability, it leaned on
and welcomed the influence of its older brother who was having more success socializing on the academic
playground.
unquestioned intrinsic framework for both education research and teacher education. Pragmatism was this default philosophy for educators, being an expedient\textsuperscript{10} philosophy that supported ongoing school system construction and maintenance. And yet, Dewey declared philosophy the “general theory” of education, as having a unique role in the intellectual structure in whatever form the “study of education” might take. I suggest the form of knowledge of the field of education must be found in the structure of the institutions designed to partake in revealing its secrets and inducing its teachings to its prospective practitioners. Therefore, putting philosophy back into its proper place requires all other educational fields being put into their proper places. While the first teacher preparation institutions seemed promising, institutions break down and need to be periodically renewed, re-established, and re-constituted.

Institutional organizational theory predicts eventual institutional dysfunction, such as the displacement of institutional goals as institutions react to their environment, become recalcitrant, and begin taking on a life of their own to sustain their survival and resist alteration. However, institutions, especially public institutions, have no right to this maturation—they are not founded to be an end in themselves—they are chartered to serve a specific public good, and once enough dysfunction has altered the course of institutions beyond their purpose, they must be renewed. A reconstruction process could return philosophy to its unique, central place in teacher education institutions, released from being stowed away, becoming “post-institutional.”\textsuperscript{11} With this re-organization of the technical core, not only could these institutions combat being “vulnerable to fads and frills”\textsuperscript{12} that come from the wider political landscape, and return a “curriculum conscience”\textsuperscript{13} to educators, renewed faculties of education could abort the gradual narrowing of their research focus on (public) schools and serve the public better by providing research in

\textsuperscript{10} This expediency to render aid to the public schools may be an indicator of the privileging of research with immediate practical aims, which appears to dominate the output of faculties of education. While this might be more appropriate for a “faculty of public schooling,” akin to an industry-linked training college, a university faculty of education should surely study education as an academic subject, and not confine research to public schools. This would return more worldly academic subjects, such as philosophy and history, to the study of education. This would also better decide the question of teacher preparation as training or as an education, impacting the teaching profession.


education as it occurs outside schools in the wider world, including the university itself. If philosophy is the soul of the institution, its heart is its life and it must “survive” by radiating its life, from inside-out, rather than the current model of institutional survival, from outside-in. Therefore, what was long buried must be revealed again; to honour this soul braves the perennial question of “what is it to be educated?” A possible solution to de-institutionalize faculties of education would be supporting the creation of a philosophy of education for teacher education institutions, an animating document to be widely circulated, thought upon, compared with other institutions, and cherished as the institution’s academic charter. The construction and renewal of this charter would begin a post-institutional life for philosophy of education and in some ways a new lifeline for faculties of education. The charter provides a normative, internal source of institutional life and development apart from long-standing, competing, and often coercive, environmental sources.

Place in Teacher Education. This charter could reasonably be the starting place for teacher education. Defending the charter would require the faculty of the institution, especially its philosophers of education, to construct a program of study to explain every point and define every important word of the charter. The tactics of this defense would unearth the entire business of educating, and provide a curricular map to guide the analysis of specific concepts in education, and thus deploying educational fields to inform concepts such as the learning process,

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14 This question is often paired with whether teacher preparation ought to be education or training. A very good place to start would be Peters’s analysis of the concept of education. He argues “to be educated requires...some understanding of principles, of the ‘reason why’ of things...An educated man suggests a more all-round type of development...Certainly ‘training’ always suggests confinement. People are trained for jobs, as mechanics, and in science. No one can be trained in a general sort of way.” See: Peters, R. S. 1966. What is an educational process? In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The concept of education (pp. 1-23). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 6-7.

15 I am somewhat reluctant to call it this, as ironically it seems, currently philosophy of education statements are somewhat of an embarrassment to the field of philosophy of education as the statements tend not to be rigorous, interesting, nor original. However, in lieu of a better term, perhaps or vision or mission statement, this document composed from an institution’s education faculty ought to be something respectable, defendable, and original, and around the length of a 15-20 minute speech. Having constructed such a statement is also evidence of a “program”-approach to teacher education rather than offering unconnected courses because they are required by accrediting standards.

16 For instance, “inclusive education,” if included in the charter, would be presented as an idea to be considered, its assumptions unearthed, and its values criticized, both from a theoretical and a practical standpoint. Students would also be encouraged to take any stand they can effectively defend, writing final papers that either praise or condemn full or partial inclusion; some may even brave to question the idea of special education. I point this out as courses such as these may tend to assume all its enrolled students wish to be “inclusive” educators, and desire the practical training to do so. And while it may be true most students enrolling in the course do desire the training, I believe the role of the university, and thus of a faculty of education, must always emphasize the academic and the theoretical, rather than (often) hire external staff to teach practical courses that appear more appropriate for a technical college.
informed by psychology, or school as a social institution, informed by sociology and history. As these paths are explored, philosophy performs its proper role, as it did in pedagogy, in synthesizing these isolated curricular paths back into a philosophy of education, where the “is” and “ought” are together again, the synthetic form providing the coherence required so the knowledge gathered from a teacher education program may be practiced in the classroom.

Having experienced this kind of deductive-inductive teacher education, students will mimic this method of education and craft their own philosophy of education statement, guided by an expert who will avoid clichés and truisms, combining the framework of the program with their own philosophy of life, their values, and other aspects that contribute to a creative view of the education and teaching process.

Note how this approach to teacher preparation de-emphasizes fitting teachers into the roles required of school systems, constructing its programs on the basis of the requirements of a credential sought by teachers, all of which seem to narrow the meaning of a professional. In the same way, the more philosophical term “moral” can be rescued from being replaced by “social” or just “good” when discussing ethical issues in teaching.\footnote{Ethics is often narrowed to our actions towards others, and further narrowed to social goods as the only ethical aim (or obedience to professional standards). The broader term “moral” subsumes ethics by centering questions on the individual as an agent with his own approach toward his own life. The “moral” tended to be used in the past, focussing on the character of the schoolroom teacher, often including a religious component. The “moral,” thus, is an expanded term where philosophy should have a proper stake, as well as the individual teacher who must devise a moral or self-reflective approach to being a teacher. This is in contrast to the ethical approach of driving human behavior, by which a focus on external actions fixes those actions to conforming to externally-derived professional standards, ignoring (or compromising) inner motives and values. Hayek also discussed this replacement of “moral” for “social” for similar reasons as I have explained—to aim professional behavior to the external results of “social goods” devised in a rationalistic sense. He suggests these “plans” to be faulty and instead advises individuals to stick to long-standing socially-evolved moral codes to judge controversial situations, rather than depend on rationalistic, immature, policies or standards. Or more succinctly: “only the judge and not the administrator may order coercion.” See: Hayek, F. A. 1960/2011. Freedom, reason, and tradition. In R. Hamowy (Ed.), The collected works of F. A. Hayek, Volume XVII, The constitution of liberty: The definitive edition (pp. 107-132). Chicago: UCP, p. 129.} The overall problem has been the co-optation of external, coercive standards over teacher education, creating a piecemeal program of vocational components, each of which seeks to satisfy these institutional level demands. Instead, for teacher preparation to find internal order, it must start from the beginning, primarily providing a foundation in education, and secondarily unraveling and scrutinizing how education is practiced by teachers, schools, and school systems in the present. The most difficult questions facing philosophers of education must be faced by teachers; their professional understanding of education depends on it. This place of philosophy of education depends on this approach to
teacher education. That which would save ITPPs and enliven them again into a proper education also saves philosophy of education. In other words, philosophy of education will return to life in a different kind of ITPP with a more hospitable “survival environment,” but this is contingent on teacher education institutions also achieving a more cooperative relationship with its institutional environment.

**Place in Teacher Professionalism.** The most important aspect of a profession is ownership of its intellectual tradition; its history and literature that sustains a culture of conversation in education, past and present. Maintaining this tradition is contingent on the preparation of teachers previously described, and institutions with a stake in this tradition. The current situation is quite different, with professional development almost solely delivered by administration, and the occupation of teaching battles blue-collar (unionization) and white-collar (association) influences. It has been a Sisyphean task, for self-governance has in most cases been imposed via institutionalism and rule formalism, rather than from a natural process of a mature teaching culture of pedagogy, with self-governance formed democratically. The needs of the education system have taken precedence, which is why ITPPs have transformed in the way they have, at the expense of philosophy, modern ITPPs fostering technicians over teacher professionalism. Technicians lack a personal philosophy of education, and are fixed by training to the tasks of a rule- and policy-bound occupation. They are also less concerned with the moral dimensions of the tasks, assuming those are officially sanctioned by their employer. On the other hand, a professional ought to be educated in such a way as to gain the judgement and knowledge needed to operate independently, without the administrative oversight needed by technicians to

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18 An even bolder reorganization of higher education that might support teacher education’s fostering of teachers’ philosophy of education might have prior “college education . . . primarily . . . task[ed] [with] assisting every student to develop an independent philosophy of life.” From Bode, B. H. 1933. The confusion in present-day education. In W. H. Kilpatrick (Ed.), *The educational frontier* (pp. 3-31). New York: Century Co.


20 This latter path to professionalism is particularly hampered by unionization which by its actions sustains a kind of “Third” in the occupation. While this problem may be more rampant in the United States, one pertinent example is the Ontario LeSage Report of 2012 which sought to amend problems with disciplining offending teachers, a problem characteristic of mass public schooling. The main point, though, is the LeSage solution was delivered externally rather than by a self-governance motion by teachers anxious to regulate their profession for the goods of themselves, their clients and society.
function. They are concerned about the moral results of their practice, and willing to dissent from malignant standards when the professional deems them in conflict with their ethical principles.

With this contrast, one can see how educational psychology, as a practical science with useful knowledge of how to accomplish certain ends, was overemphasised and relatively stable in ITPPs that sided with training; educational psychology has been healthy and has not suffered through the institutional changes other fields have in education. Furthermore, psychology was pushed as the professionalizing subject of teachers—can psychology properly arrange the “study of education,” putting other fields in their proper place? —as medicine is for physicians, and has discounted practical wisdom and a synthetic outlook as traditionally provided by pedagogy and the Great Educators. If the practice of education is itself a synthetic practice, and while it is valuable to analyze the aspects and parts of education, the delivery of education must be returned to its original synthetic form to be put into practice. This is a further place for philosophy of education, as the glue of pedagogy, of practice. If we are to avoid creating technicians, as might be produced in a devolved faculty of education which fosters teachers as state actors who are “professional” in their efficient carrying-out of the orders of state authorities, philosophy must return to its proper place in any profession and a balanced teacher education must be created. To be clear, separate professional ethics courses are not enough and themselves an institutionalized form of philosophy of education. Philosophy cannot and should not be confined to one course; it has a greater role than the actions of teachers, or the conflicts of policy as might be covered in a professional ethics course. Philosophy has a part in every field, for it governs them all, and governs the approach teachers take in the classroom via their approach, understanding, and values in and of education. This sort of teacher education also fuels the

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21 As Marrou describes of education in Ancient Greece, “their distrust of over-specialization was one of the noblest and most lasting characteristics of the Greek genius: its sense of reasonable limits, of human nature—in a word, its humanism. The child and adolescent should study, ‘not to become experts but to educate themselves.’ [Plato’s Protagoras, 312b]...[F]or there is a fundamental antinomy between scientific research and education. If a young mind is made a slave to science and treated merely as an instrument in furthering scientific progress, its education suffers, becomes narrow and short-sighted. But if on the other hand too much emphasis is laid on the open mind, on a purely humanistic culture, there is a danger of superficiality and unreality. This problem has still not been settled.” From: Marrou, H. I. 1956. A history of education in antiquity (G. Lamb, trans). Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 57.

intellectual tradition of a profession, for it is often the philosophical aspects of various subjects, policies, and practices that are most debated and discussed.

Further implications are provided below on the use of IOT, remarks toward what future research could be conducted based on the findings of this study, and for the practice of education going forward.

**Implications: Theory**

Institutional organizational theory treats formal organizations as environments that are both influenced from the outside, and have internal motives. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the situation and fate of philosophy of education in normal schools, teachers’ colleges, and faculties of education, examined through IOT, would depend substantially on environmental conditions. As I have described, structural changes to teacher education institutions, especially those that affect departments and coursework, unavoidably alter the status of philosophy of education, and other subject areas.

IOT predicts that in a relatively undeveloped state, the institution will be designed in its natural, non-institutionalized form. This was the case in normal schools for the common school teachers wherein philosophy was found in education—philosophy as education’s intrinsic framework, enlivening and inspiring teaching culture.

In the next stage of university-affiliated teachers’ colleges, philosophy in education becomes institutionalized into philosophy of education. This is necessary to foster a “study of education” which breaks apart this research area into parts for study, dividing theory from practice, for example. This results in specialization of departments, faculty, and courses, each of which survives only while holding a secure place in programs, as primarily guaranteed by being designated a compulsory part of a certificating program. At this stage also, faculty are encouraged to “upgrade” academically to Ph.D.’s, and graduate programs begin to be planned as Ph.D. faculty concentrate.

In the final stage, university-integrated faculties of education further intensify the research orientation of the institution, the members of which ultimately crave the greatest rewards in research dollars and scholarship, that of scientific work and graduate programs. To begin this process, the institution is re-organized via changes to departments and coursework. As
ITPPs become subordinate in the technical core or the changing institution, the managerial level retools the technical core to better meet graduate program demands. The institutional level, exemplified by Ministries or Departments of Education and teacher organizations, having little influence over graduate programs, increases its influence over ITPP standards, which increasingly come to favor practical, vocational, components. These isomorphic conditions tend to hamper task performance of the fragmented ITPP, which further entrenches institutional level command through tightened coupling as the institution re-tools to provide expanded graduate and in-service programs. Inside the institution, attrition sets in for faculty and fields which do not supply the new technical core, for modern faculties of education are no longer built primarily on their ITPP, and some exist without it. The rise of “educational policy” departments can be seen as evidence of institutional level influence (especially as Ministries offer research projects to faculty), and further doom the traditional though now less institutionally-rewarding areas, such as history and philosophy. These areas, while useful for schoolkeeping, are relegated to providing impotent, valueless, obsolete criticism in the face of a fully operational juggernaut of a school system which needs only maintenance from its policy-fasteners.

Despite these grim developments, IOT would also predict an institutional solution that seems to have worked for some pockets of philosophy of education in faculties of education. Save for a return to teachers’ colleges unattached to universities, which some have advocated, if separate funding lines can be secured, research institutes set up inside faculties of education provide the shielding that previous departments of philosophy have done in teachers’ colleges. Put another way, research institutes or research centers provide a kind of managerial level,

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21 For example, in the case of ACE, both its founding documents and its merger agreement both permit graduate programs which the Faculty may create to be governed by the Faculty and the university, not the Ministry. This fact may be precisely the reason for a kind of “institutional drift” toward its graduate programs; it may be “growth” more easily realized since it avoids regulation from the Ministry (and the OCT) governing the ITPP, and while this regulation ought to be made up by university governance over all graduate programs, I have seen surprisingly little evidence that Western University plays a significant role in any programs offered by faculties of education.

22 As Wilson points out, “institutional marginalization of these experts has been accompanied by a marginalization of their expertise.” See: Wilson, 1993, op. cit., p. 44.

fulfilling what faculties of education demand: research dollars and institutional reputation, which explains why lone teachers’ college philosophers writing their books became “dinosaurs.”

In using IOT to examine the predicament of philosophy of education, I was surprised to find how absent institutional explanations were in the decline literature. Most contributors to the decline literature blamed themselves for their own decline, especially pointing to the lack of purity of their Ph.D. progeny or, if from analytical philosophers of education, the lack of training and rigor in analytical methods, rather than looking to the changing nature of the institutions they were attempting to inhabit. I also learned that department structures matter a great deal to the inner-workings of institutions, especially when those components are meant to concentrate and have a particular role in a communal product. Put another way, walls matter, and when they are broken down, the contents mix, becoming diffuse and ineffective.

**Implications for Future Research**

There are many other avenues which could be taken to research the topic of how the field of philosophy of education has fared. This particular research focused on the history of the increasing institutionalization of teacher education institutions, especially teacher education programs.

1. A parallel study could have examined only the field itself, providing an inventory of the topics of the field over its existence, searching for paradigms that could be related to broader themes in the environment (social, economical, etc.).
2. Graduate programs, rather than ITPPs, could have been the focus. It appears to be an important factor in faculties of education; why (analytical) philosophy of education could not find a niche here, but other forms of philosophy of education could in early programs in teacher preparation. The impact of graduate programs could be studied.\(^\text{26}\)
3. Another study could test the hypothesis often found in the decline literature of the problem of poorly trained faculty. This would track faculty members, graduate students in philosophy of education and their academic backgrounds and research interests, and statistically cross-examine their futures in publishing and posts secured.

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\(^{26}\) To whom might engage in this study, at the graduate level, philosophy would appear to be “on the horns” for these primary and connected reasons: (1) the lack of use of philosophy of education research in education policy; and somewhat due to this, (2) education research grant panels do not tend to value philosophy of education.
4. History of Education has suffered a similar fate to philosophy of education, and it would be of interest as a complement to the current study to trace and test the fate of this sister field and look for similar and different reasons which explain their common fate.

5. Further case studies of other teacher education institutions, such as a positive case where philosophy of education still holds on in its ITPP, would be of interest. Perhaps the case of ACE was a worst case scenario, but given the decline literature, some of which is reviewed up to the present day in Appendix 2, it would seem to be indisputable that increasing institutionalization is indeed taxing on philosophy of education. For it to survive, its peculiar health must be explained by a kind of oasis, whether due to a celebrity faculty member, or a sheltering research center.²⁷

**Implications for Practice**

This final section discusses implications from the study for the field of philosophy of education going forward, and for teacher education.

Faculties of education are currently ruled by their graduate programs, in addition to Ministry or continuing education courses. Whether the Masters of Teaching programs, AQ courses in Ontario (in-service training which expand teachers’ certificates, whether in subjects they may teach or special training), or the more recent Ed.D. programs, these programs are more or less vocational, tending to focus on the “political economy” of the school system, to use an old term. While these graduate programs might “accidentally,” as it were, describe the history of education, question the nature and purpose of the schools, the aims of education, or the philosophies of education operating currently or possibly in some future time, these topics are rarely the purpose of these programs, and likewise the instructors’ ability to discuss these areas effectively from a thorough philosophic background would probably not be the reason they were hired.²⁸ Instead, these programs tend to hire non-academic instructors for their experience in the

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²⁷ My own ITPP at a liberal arts college, D’Youville College, Buffalo, New York State in 2008 had a single, compulsory course in the “social and philosophical foundations of education” but as the instructor was trained in philosophy of education, she had the freedom to devise the course to favor it.

²⁸ For example, a recent survey of ITPPs and Masters of Teaching (MAT) programs in Australia, Canada, and the United States discovered variable and low percentages of programs requiring students to complete a professional ethics course. The lowest numbers were reported for the MAT programs. In Australia, three of thirty MAT programs surveyed required the course, in Canada, two of seven, and in the United States, one of forty-one. See: Maxwell, B.,
field—their (often uncritical) practical knowledge—which institutionally hemorrhages philosophy of education and cycles teachers and their education through the merry-go-round of what Dewey called the “routine empirical affair.”29 The overall problem of faculties of education today, shared by other university-invested professions, is the institutionalization of knowledge production, by way of governance over faculty and fields, and knowledge implementation, via programs and a selected student body.30

This state of affairs is not perfectly accomplished, for institutions primarily safeguard their survival while providing services of knowledge production and delivery. The tendency to favor the expedient and the status-quo serves to protect the institution from attacks from its environment, by reducing pariahs, such as by pushing research into centers with multiple faculty to sanitize the work, and insulating change when it unavoidably occurs. The typically solitary work of philosophers of education is disfavored by this condition, as well as by the need to acquire external, preferably large grants conducive to research centers. Furthermore, the deleterious effects of practical specialization are evident in liberalizing subjects such as philosophy, but a further nail in the coffin was the lost opportunity for analytical philosophy to flourish as the unavoidable research arm of every faculty, a development which theoretically could have provided the cutting-edge of education policy31 construction. It seems evident that a purely academic form of such a center would be impossible, and even intolerable while education in a society dominated by Ministries of Education looms large, as the legislated kingmaker of a complex, bureaucratic system. In other words, “academic” work in education would tend not to be financially supported unless it is practical, appealing to the needs of the present school system, and to education research committees which tend to value practically orientated projects—this is consistent with the non-existence of “theoretical” or speculative education departments in faculties of education, while they do exist elsewhere in the university, including philosophy departments! And this situation also seems to explain the difficulty of


30 Essentially the problem is unshielded centralism, causing isomorphism, which culls diversity of thought.

31 See Griffiths, M. 2012. Re-thinking the relevance of philosophy of education for educational policy making. *EP&T,* 46(5), 546–559. It may be the case that while analytical philosophy of education is a creature of centralism, it would not be encouraged to operate outside the educational power structure. Unsupported by policy-makers, it wilted.
education reform: save for the size of the system and the many players at the table, the difficulty is also due to the overbearing effect of state expediency in the face of shifting fads and policy fantasies over and above academic sources of critique. This situation does not permit faculties of education to naturally create organized policy-making centers with a critical mass focused in a particular approach, such as analytical philosophy. Instead, this situation promotes anarchic critique from countless perspectives, and while thorough *en masse*, such critiques are divided, and thus harmless to a massive education system and the ensconced hordes of administrators who maintain it. Table 7 below summarizes the prior discussion into two conceptions of teacher education institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inquiry into Education</th>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>Philosophic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Teacher Education</td>
<td>Compartamentalized</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Teacher Education</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>General education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim of Institution</td>
<td>• Teacher education and research for efficiency of present school system</td>
<td>• Teacher education as preparation to act independently as a professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Research quantity over quality (quickness of response to conflict)</td>
<td>• Research in leisure only, quality over quantity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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33 An important Canadian historical source of the expected contribution of the university in the form of a general “arts” education for teachers can be found in Dyde writing in 1904. He writes: “Whenever a profession is thoroughly organized, the professional training is carried on side by side with the liberal training of ‘Arts.’ Teachers are the only exception. The university pays no attention to the teacher further than to draw up several courses, approved by the Department of Education, from which the candidate for specialist must make a selection, but the prospective teacher leaves the university in order to undergo his professional training.” (p. 176). This state of affairs seems oddly similar a century later, for teachers still “leave” university “arts” to undergo separate training. See: Dyde, S. W. 1904. Should there be a faculty of education in the university? *Queen's Quarterly*, 12, 165–177.
Institutional Action | Expediency to promote conflict-free system | Entrepreneurial / anti-institutional

Alternatively, one could look at the changing approach of teacher education from an ethical theory point of view. In the 19th century, teacher education was more concerned with the person compared to modern times; this is the focus of virtue (aretaic) ethics, which argues that fostering a good person would create a professional able to deal with contingencies. With the hopeful expectations of the rise of science in the first half of the 20th century came more utilitarian ethics (actions, results), using education to fulfill national goals, serving institution building on success (and failure, which just needs more resources, or so it goes). What seems to be settling in the modern period is deontological ethics (rules, duty), having some grasp of educational results from the prior experiments, and serves bureaucratic and technical establishment.

While government properly sets the boundaries of social activities that may endanger others, to dictate and institutionalize what manifests within those boundaries is—or should be—intolerable in a free Western society. Likewise in teaching, while a gatekeeping entity empowered by the legislature may set certain boundaries in the practice of teaching, what manifests within is a matter of the philosophies of education of the teachers. Today, as the decline literature continues, teachers are becoming institutionalized, or as Walker bluntly states, teachers are being subject to a “narrow deprofessionalising training agenda [in] teacher education.”

Teacher education needs to aspire once again to construct a philosophy of education for its programs which will empower teachers to engage in the professionalizing conversation of this design, and the design they would make their own. As this freedom of delivery of education has been narrowed through policy, so has declined philosophy.

**Envoi**

Our civilization has long believed that wise laws and policies makes our society better, but modern times have seen an explosion of legislation and accompanying regulations that

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34 Gereluk, et al., 2016, op. cit.
36 See Appendix 3 which provides an excellent structure of the philosophical study of education.
compound to tighten the ropes of the rack placed on human freedom and ingenuity. Hayek’s indictment of the “fatal conceit” of our central planning builds on the tightening institutional grip of Weber’s iron cage in seemingly all walks of life but, as shown in the preceding pages, certain in the occupation and education of teachers. Among several tragic consequences, this “conceit” has reduced the dream of teacher professionalism to sets of bureaucratic prescriptions which add more bars to the iron cage rather than inducting teachers into an enlightened awareness of their obligations to their pupils and themselves within the sacred traditions of their craft. Then again, when would we know we have gone too far? What does an overbearing institutionalism mean, what would it look like? Perhaps the health of philosophy is that indicator. Perhaps without it, there is nothing to stop the iron cage from turning into an iron maiden. Instead, we could resolve to admit not everything can be designed, and that in education, our institutions should provide philosophy a space where timeless issues are accorded the gravity they deserve, and not elided or replaced with forests of rules.

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Appendix 1 – Summary Table of ACE Case

Table 8
Philosophy Courses at Althouse College of Education, 1965-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period and Important Events</th>
<th>Type of Courses</th>
<th>Course Examples</th>
<th>Class Format, Length, and Class Size</th>
<th>Department Name and Faculty List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-1967</td>
<td>Academic or General Philosophy</td>
<td>Epistemology, Logic, History of Modern Philosophy, Aesthetics (and others)</td>
<td>Seminars, 10 weeks @ 3h/w = 30h, ~20 students per class.</td>
<td>Department of Philosophy: Vernon A. Howard (dept. head), Paul T. O’Leary, David R. Burke, Barbara E. Houston, John E. McPeck (h. 1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ontario College of Education built 1963, added “Althouse” to name in 1965 as first full year program began 1965-1966)¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1978</td>
<td>Academic Philosophy + Philosophy of Teaching Subjects</td>
<td>Introduction to Philosophy², Philosophy of History / Religion</td>
<td>Seminars, 10 weeks @ 3h/w = 30h, Class size vary as very specific courses ~5-30</td>
<td>Department of Philosophy of Education: Howard (l. 1972)³, Burke (l. 1973)⁴ O’Leary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R. S. Peters visit, 1967-1968)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Merged with nearby Elborn)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ While the first run of the secondary ITPP began in 1965, the ACE building was still being prepared and other buildings around Western, including the London Teachers’ College (Elborn College) were used to hold classes. By the next year, ACE was ready.

² This list of courses appears in the 1971-1972 ACE Calendar.


⁴ According to the PA-APA, Burke lists his affiliation in 1972-73 as the Philosophy Department at ACE, but in 1973-74 he lists a psychiatry department in a medical centre in New Mexico.
| --- | --- | --- |

5 Ayim presented a paper to the Peirce Society in the 1972 APA, Eastern division conference where she lists York University as her affiliation. According to the PA-APA, Ayim listed a Burlington, Ontario address in 1973-74, and thereafter a London address until 1990. Ayim first appears in the 1977 ACE Calendar and is listed as Emeritus from 1999 through 2002, having been involved in graduate courses, but she did not teach in Social Foundations.

6 Apostolos P. Koutsouvilis published in philosophy of religion (especially in *Heythrop Journal*) and held a PhD from the University of London.

7 Michael Henry McCarthy received his PhD from Toronto in 1973. In 1982 and 1985 he lists a Brockville, Ontario affiliation in articles on Kant published in *Kant-Studien*.

8 As Bjerring finished his PhD at Western’s philosophy department in 1978 (along with Houston), he was hired to teach part-time for ACE in philosophy. He also did work for previous dean Shapiro starting in 1978 when Shapiro became Vice President (Academic) at Western University. By 1986 when Shapiro became Deputy Minister of Education for Ontario, Bjerring had left both ACE and Shapiro to work in the university’s administration. Bjerring is not listed among the authors of the 4th edition of the 1985 Philosophy of Education textbook.

9 Significant changes to departmental structure happen in this time period, near Shapiro’s deanship and during Kymlicka’s deanship. However, the time period has been labeled to designate the type of philosophy course offered.
According to an author brief in the *Atlantis*, a publication of Acadia University, Barbara E. Houston was teaching in both ACE and the University of New Hampshire by at least 1987 and, according to the latter's website, she made the move exclusive in 1991. See https://cola.unh.edu/education/emeriti. This is collaborated with the ACE Calendar, which no longer lists Houston in the 1992-1993 calendar.

Garth Lambert taught methods courses in classics (Latin). In 1968, after classics subjects were no longer mandatory in the high schools, he was listed under social studies in the early 1970s. In 1978, he joined the History and Comparative Education Department, moved into Policy in 1980, and is listed as an author in the 4th edition of the philosophy of education textbook in 1985. He became Emeritus in 1992.

Beginning in the 2015-2016 school year, all teacher education programs in Ontario lengthened to two years.

This elective course was designed and taught twice by myself as a PhD student to B.Ed. students. It was funded by my graduate studies program (final year), but when this ran out, it was not funded by the B.Ed. program.

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<th>1999-2016</th>
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14 This refers to the number of weeks which presented an explicit topic in philosophy, such as moral education, or “what is knowledge?” Social Foundations covered topics in law, history, sociology, philosophy, as well as case studies of educational problems.
Appendix 2 – Philosophy of Education, 1980 to 2015

Background of Political Changes to Education, 1980-2000

Before reviewing the state of philosophy of education in the last quarter of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, I will provide the general background up to now of the context of education. The need to bring in discussion of professionalism, the education system, ITPPs, and higher education is because all are implicated in bringing about a loss of philosophy in teaching culture and teacher education.

Overall, as elsewhere, the history of public education is written by the victors. It is a story of the colonization of a relatively decentralized cottage industry of schools, industrialized into a public school system used as a means to achieve various economic, social, political, and later, global ends. Much of the emphasis over the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in education was allotted to those initiatives, “reforms,” and effects which supported this industrialization.

The first quarter of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was infused with the promises of the sciences in the organization of human capital, and culminated in the “scientific management” movement, later documented by Callahan.\textsuperscript{1} The third quarter featured consistent war, Sputnik and the space race, and the civil rights movements active in the 1960s. These events, in part, led governments to make stronger connections in school operations and curriculum to improve the economy, national security, and social order, efforts later studied in the Coleman Report.\textsuperscript{2} Standardized testing, first used in the army, was now being administered in schools to place students in optimum programming. As economic concerns and war-measures accelerated the sciences—C. P. Snow warned of the creation of “Two Cultures” in 1959—those in the humanities were viewed with suspicion, as made explicit in the McCarthy period in the United States. War and foreign competition were driving the agenda at the federal level of many nations, and this agenda led to a view, prevalent since Mann in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, of education not as a human service of individual growth and enlightenment, but as a dial used by central planners to work toward

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} Callahan, 1962, op. cit. See also Rice, J. M. 1913. \textit{Scientific management in education}. New York: Hinds, Noble & Eldredge.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2} The 1966 report entitled “Equality of Educational Opportunity,” or better known as the Coleman Report, studied “school effects” and found school spending made little difference to student achievement relative to the much larger factors of socio-economic status and family background.}
economic or social goals to serve “interests in the nation-state,”³ later expanding these same targets in the 21st century to globalism.

Ontario’s education context echoes this broader story. As reviewed in the previous chapter, a series of reports came after the Second World War to remobilize schools to deal with changing demographics and fill much-needed teaching positions. The later 1960s saw the apex of the child-centered movement with the Hall-Dennis report (Living and Learning) in 1968, later countered by the 1987 Radwanski report,⁴ which was followed by the creation of an arms-length college of teachers and a provincial testing organization, as well as goal and curricular tightening, with a move away from Hall-Dennis focus on process to outcomes-based goals.

Similarly, in the final quarter of the 20th century in the United States, A Nation at Risk⁵ continued the emphasis on literacy, maths, and sciences, as would No Child Left Behind continue the trend in 2001, mandating “evidence-based” practices for participating states as the scientific standard of the instructional methods of teachers. As Clifford and Guthrie report, the 1980s “turned much of the then-young science of education into a crusade for efficiency that promoted the bureaucratic, top-down controls that have limited teacher professionalism.”⁶ Likewise in Ontario, efficiency was pursued by tighter coupling within the education system, such as through consolidating school boards, eliminating grade 13, making more credits compulsory, which limited curricular electives, and other such changes. The standards set by board exams for students wishing to enter the high schools ended in the 1950s but were revived as psychometrics for the purposes of collecting information. This data, such as test scores, was monitored to serve “accountability” regulations and resulted in a standardizing influence of schools.⁷ Not long after, although teacher federations had acquired bargaining power in 1975, government stepped in to somewhat check unionization by establishing an “arms-length” professional body via the Ontario

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⁶ Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op. cit., p. 9.
⁷ This testing was formalized in the Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO) in 1996, and its first round of testing began a year later on grade 3 students, testing literacy and maths skills. While this was a far cry from the target and purpose of high-stakes testing a half century earlier, their shared intentions of attempting to raise standards is indicative of the governance approach in a decentralized vs a centralized school system.
College of Teachers Act of 1996, the OCT beginning operations a year later. Overall, the Ministry, host universities, the several teacher federations, and the OCT were set as the main players in the institutional environment for Ontario's teacher education institutions for some time.

While these larger moves were taking place at the political and institutional level, philosophers of education at the faculty level during these decades were still figuring out what their role ought to be. While there have been lots of good arguments for philosophy of education to have an important role in a good teacher education program, nevertheless the results of a decline of philosophy of education coursework and faculty, including “educational foundations” consolidation, suggests these arguments have not been enough, and that other (institutional) forces were constraining the curriculum of ITPPs at the expense of philosophy of education, and other humanities subjects, such as history.  

The State of Philosophy of Education in the 1980s to the Present

I have previously mentioned the study by McKenna in 1981 suggesting Canadian philosophy of education was “alive and well” up to the end of the 1970s. Another comprehensive study of Canada was produced by Hare in 1991 suggesting a similar status, which also noted a “strengthening” of connection between philosophers and philosophers of education. I also must mention that, in the same year, Beck published a review of the historical roots and mixtures of “North American, British and Australian Philosophy of Education,” sadly lumping Canada in with the United States. In particular, Beck notes that analytical philosophy was well underway prior to Peters via Scheffler, and Hare, in criticism, notes that Canada was influenced by the United States and Britain, as was Australasia, where a journal and a society were in place by

8 A study of the decline of history of education is urgently needed, as its history and its causes of decline are similar to that of philosophy of education. I would be happy to send anyone who might consider this project article links I have uncovered while researching for this project. See also: Kerr, D., Mandzuk, D., & Raptis, H. 2011. The role of the social foundations of education in programs of teacher preparation in Canada. CJE, 34(4), 118–134.

9 Hare, 1991, op. cit. Hare mentions all the philosophers at Althouse College, including Barrow’s particularly noted for his analytical swashbuckling in Canadian curriculum theory literature, producing several books. Hare notes Barrow’s remark that “teaching is given back to teachers when it is recognized that “the judgement of the individual teacher. . .must be paramount in deciding how to proceed, rather than the generalized demands of some curriculum design or otherwise imposed rules of educational experts.” Quote from Barrow, R. 1984. Giving teaching back to teachers. London, ON: Althouse Press, p. 264.

1969 and 1970 respectively, whereas in Canada these institutional landmarks were not attained until 1987 and 1976, respectively.

The lateness of these institutional assets for philosophy of education on the Canadian scene is precisely why this rosy picture is given by McKenna and Hare, for most of Canada's faculties of education at this point were only several decades old. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australasia, philosophers of education consistently suggest decline earlier, but differ to a great extent on the cause. My own particular explanation has focused on the view from institutional organizational theory, which looks at institutions not only as (1) primarily interested in their own survival in dealing with a coercive environment of often competing and demanding interest groups, but also, (2) while we may have expected institutions to set up a firm outer wall to resist this barrage, instead, over time institutional boundaries were sapped and their technical cores raided, conceding rather than tempering demands to produce different kinds of teachers. In Parson’s schema, faculties of education as early as a few decades ago may have, as members of the university, lost the power at their managerial level\textsuperscript{11} to check external political and union interests seeking to produce teachers aware and supportive of new education policy and changes to the professional status of teachers. The balance of power has shifted; Clifford and Guthrie similarly find an alliance with certain parts of the institutional level, noting that “deans are today attempting to exert the dominant influence over the restructuring of teaching, in ways that continue to celebrate researchers over teachers, educational science over eclectic craft knowledge.”\textsuperscript{12} It seems an unholy alliance has been created with the universities and the government against the more independent teachers unions, resulting in the technical core of ITPP being hollowed-out and changed from its roots as a center of liberal education to a manufactory of technical teachers, and leading a considerable faction of postmodern philosophers of education to declare defeat to corporate interests.

Few philosophers of education have examined their own institutions as a culprit, and many still believed the fault was due to an academic reason, such as a failure to define their

\textsuperscript{12} Clifford & Guthrie, 1988, op. cit., p. 4. Burkhardt and Schoenfeld find education research not influential, useful, or well-funded, and argue it should be more practical to practitioners and policy-makers and not speculative. See Burkhardt, H. & Schoenfeld, A. H. 2003. Improving educational research: Toward a more useful, more influential, and better-funded enterprise. \textit{Educational Researcher}, 32(9), 3–14.
discipline. Yet some, since the 1980s, identify “institutional forces” similar to what I have discussed throughout this document. In particular, two independent educational researchers in the UK, Hamlyn and Wilson, both point to the setting in which philosophers of education are expected to work. Hamlyn references this twice, first in what he called “institutional factors” and second in this description, pointing out that the “concerns of philosophers were to some extent influenced, or even dictated, by the institutional settings in which they had come to work.” He also finds that philosophy of education has been pinched in a “university system,” between their parent philosophy which is largely disengaged and unwilling to descend to practical questions, and the practice-orientation and presentism of their supposed homes. In other words, philosophers of education have had difficulty either cohabiting with the educational natives, or being appreciated for their career choices by their purist parents.

Wilson, while complaining of the quality of philosophers of education and seeing “little hope” for improvement without a revival of interest in the “rational and intellectual discussion of educational issues,” points to the debilitating effects of “institutional pressures” and various educational bodies that “force philosophy into various straight-jackets.” Since “so much of philosophy is necessarily informal. . .[it is] likely to disappear under the influence of over-organization, external assessment, and cost-benefit analysis.” And, perhaps most powerfully, he finds that as “education is a natural stage for the dance of fashion and fantasy,” since philosophers of education have a “missionary instinct,” meaning they want to see their ideas come to light, the decline of the discipline is “the price to be paid for refusing to turn philosophy into something else.” Finally, Wilson points out that faculties of education “earn their bread and butter by preparing teachers rather than by studying education,” which surely harkens back to teachers’ colleges, but more importantly reveals what counts as institutional survival.

From both Hamlyn and Wilson can be seen a struggle which philosophers of education are having to endure while failing to take root in the institutional soil of faculties of education. And, perhaps more egregious, by this time in the 1980s to the 2000s, an increasing number of

16 Ibid, p. 47. And previous long quotations.
17 Ibid, p. 48. And previous two long quotations.
philosophers of education would have received their doctorate from another philosopher of education, which should have increased the habituation of this new breed of faculty to their environments. Something else must be wrong—yet, philosophy as training is not necessarily anathema, philosophy can offer “truths” and critical thinking about educational issues. Nevertheless, philosophers of education continue to report consistently on poor times ahead.

Nearing the end of the decade, Wilson's assessment of the situation has changed little, finding philosophy of education being “squeezed out” of practical decision making in education, encouraging philosophers of education, as if waiting for relief or rescue, to adapt and be prepared to “function . . . where they can.” Wilson bemoans the loss of transcendental senses of “philosophy,” its absence Scheffler called the problem of “provincialism” of practice in education faculties which he recalls in the mid-1980s creating a “post-doctoral research centre” as a shelter for philosophy of education that it might survive the coming winter.

Another philosopher of education from the UK, White, brings a particularly interesting explanation of the situation. He notes that philosophy of education was more or less the basis of policy-making in education up to the mid-1980s in the UK, but had fallen away since then. The key reason, he argues, was “pre-1988 governments were not responsible for the content of the school curriculum. Decision-making about aims and curricula was left to schools themselves. Each had its own policy on this.” Under such a condition, it is unsurprising philosophy of education was in good standing in ITPPs as teachers were analogous to modern schoolkeepers. Wilson continues, after 1988, a national curriculum “began to move policy-making upwards

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18 M. J. Adler would certainly agree that philosophy has truths to offer, something similar to facts. Also, I have discussed in earlier chapters that arming teachers with critical thinking is not necessarily a value to top-down policy implementation, nor unions, if they operate more oligarchically than democratically. It would seem critical thinking most benefits decentralized arrangements where decisions rarely deal in ordinary, predictable situations which precludes policy or rules and rather requires professionals entrusted to exercise good judgement. The most rule bound occupations require no judgement and thus no professionals. Consider whether teachers over a century of time have required more or less professionalism and more or less skills? For further arguments along these lines, see: McPeck, J. E. & Sanders, J. T. 1974. Some reflections on education as a profession. Journal of Educational Thought, 8(2), 55–66.

19 A reply article by White disagrees with Hamlyn that the field currently is in a problem state, but rather that it has failed to adapt and create new lively issues to continue at the pace of change in education research, and that “so few younger philosophers can get posts.” See White, J. 1987. The medical condition of philosophy of education. JOPE, 21(2), 155-162.


from school to [the] central government level, with teachers increasingly becoming implementers of decisions made elsewhere rather than policy-makers in their own right."\textsuperscript{23} This certainly reveals an indisputable factor in the role of philosophy of education and whose interests it serves, then as a guide, now outsourced.

Even after the fallout in the universities from Bloom's \textit{The Closing of the American Mind}, philosophers of education continued to report decline as if unaffected by the closer public scrutiny to higher education. In Australasia, McCann and Yaxley, writing in 1992, find a "growing rejection of the value of the philosophy of education within pre-service programs" and note it provides the crucial benefit of "disciplined discourse which recognizes the problematic, ambiguous, tentative and uncertain nature of human action."\textsuperscript{24} In the United States, similar arguments were made, if not for philosophy, at least for educational foundations courses, yet one survey found these courses dissatisfying to both faculty and students.\textsuperscript{25} In their defense, Kneller stated openly,

\begin{quote}
What use are Foundations courses? . . . To the teacher as teacher, very little. To the person and the scholar, very much. They introduce the student to the study of Education as a discipline on a par with other disciplines.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

This certainly reflects a bygone era, where preparation was for the person to become a teacher, rather than the modern conception of teacher education fostering skill development and law navigation.\textsuperscript{27} This is consistent with Wilson’s judgement on the situation in the United Kingdom, finding “(to put it bluntly) that we have now a generation of educators who are themselves largely uneducated in the educational disciplines.”\textsuperscript{28} Certainly the role of teachers has changed, but it seems that the “decline” literature has largely ignored the powerful impact of the contexts in which modern teachers teach and their teacher education institutions—the particular perspective on the decline provided by IOT as explored in this work is rarely invoked. Instead it is almost universally assumed that the latest institutionalization of teacher education, the

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, p. 506. He states the situation now, in 2012, is that “policy-involvement is a minority activity among us” (p. 507).


\textsuperscript{25} Sirotnik, 1990, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{27} Or the transition from aretaic ethics (virtue, moral person), to utilitarian (results via science), and to today’s deontological tendencies (formalize results into rules). I discuss this idea briefly in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{28} Wilson, 1993, op. cit., p. 41.
university embedded faculty of education, remains devoted to and protective of a liberal form of teacher education, and in failing to appreciate this do not see how the “questioning” or perspective-taking of philosophers does not serve the new interests found in wider policy and education system goals. The outcome of this most recent institutionalization has nonetheless been clear: the attrition of philosophy faculty and the compaction of their contribution to teacher education into “foundations” to make room for new initiatives, inevitably trivializing if not eliminating educational disciplines such as philosophy of education from the education of modern teachers.

**Philosophy of Education in the New Millennium**

As ITPPs shifted to offering foundations courses, and the smaller allotment given to a variety of subjects now compacted into “foundations” increased alarm for philosophers of education, there were considerably fewer posts for new faculty in the field. Nevertheless, philosophers of education hired under different circumstances kept their posts but, perhaps saddened that their posts would disappear when they retired, came together to argue for a continued place in these new omnibus courses.²⁹

Meanwhile, somewhat akin to relief efforts, not yet at the stage of refugee camps, academic journals responded by devoting full issues to the fate of the discipline, as well as countless conference themes, all for the purposes of philosophers of education to pause and undergo some maintenance of their field.³⁰ To name a few, journals included *Educational Philosophy and Theory* in 1996, *Educational Theory* in 2002, and in 2009, the *European Educational Research Journal* published a symposium from a conference in Switzerland, and *Educational Philosophy and Theory* on the topic of the fate of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA).³¹ More recently, the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* in 2012

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³⁰ For example, the Canadian Society for the Study of Education’s Philosophy of Education division held a panel on the fate of philosophy of education in 2012 at the University of Waterloo, from which two years later I presented my proposal for this research to this same crowd at Brock University.
³¹ Clark notes when the founding members of PESA (in 1970) were not replaced by institutions in Australasia, the society suffered. See Clark, J. 2009. Leaning tower of PESA. *EP&T*, 41(7), 808–810. This appears to be around the early 2000s when attendance dropped considerably, and James Marshall was considering a motion to disband the society. See: Haynes, B. 2009. Philosophy of education society of Australasia: The official record. *EP&T*, 41(7), 738–741.
had a special issue devoted to recovering the place of educational philosophy in education policy, and *Theory and Research in Education* in 2014 published a symposium devoted to the purpose of philosophy of education.

Skipping to *Educational Theory*, a controversial article by Arcilla\textsuperscript{32} bluntly declared that “by and large, the philosophical community expresses no interest in thinking about education. The educational community does not seem to care about philosophy.”\textsuperscript{33} It was suggested that disdain from both of these communities was marooning philosophers of education into their own “increasingly marginal and shrinking community.”\textsuperscript{34} This perspective triggered a series of response articles which comprised Issue 3 of that year, including one authored by Ellet of Althouse College of Education who provided a more hopeful account, despite “fragmented, limited, and restricted”\textsuperscript{35} lines of communication between the two groups. Another rejoinder, Bredo, suggested that philosophy of education should exhibit “lowered ambitions” and, in grabbing the “two horns” which philosophers of education faced, the apathy of both philosophy and education, seek to meet both “set of constraints, if at a lesser level.”\textsuperscript{36} Another respondent, Fenstermacher, identifies “scripted[ness]” in the work of teachers which has reduced the advantage of philosophy for the teacher.\textsuperscript{37}

Far more derisive was Burbules. In the same special issue, he identifies “institutional factors” that have led to the field’s decline, stating that other than the odd scholar who was valued personally, “there was never a deeply held commitment by most faculty or administrators in schools and departments of education to the value of philosophy of education” and that philosophers of education can no longer hide behind “teacher certification requirements [to] mandate a course in “philosophical foundations of education,” or [even expect] the course will


\textsuperscript{33} This disdain from philosophers continues to persist: an anthology edited by Rorty in 1998 entitled *Philosophers on Education* precluded philosophers of education and rather provided a historical account of the philosophies of over 25 Great Educators by specialists on each thinker’s philosophy. A tribute to Scheffler is included by the editor, whose recent retirement may have in part encouraged the book’s creation. For a long review of this work by a philosopher of education, see: White, J. 1999. Philosophers on education. *JOPE*, 33(3), 485–500.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p. 1.


be taught by someone with a doctorate in this area.”\(^{38}\) In a further remark, he confirms my fears that “the self-concept and intellectual vitality of the field of philosophy of education and its institutional viability do not necessarily run on the same tracks.”\(^{39}\) This statement from Burbules appears to be devastating, suggesting the field could still perish by the poisoning of its soil, sourced in a kind of anti-academic movement opposite to the hopes and ideals used to justify the initial incorporation of ITPPs into universities. It seems this justification has been re-purposed, legitimating the marginalization or elimination of academic fields from the technical core that have not fitted comfortably into the recent broader agenda of education or, perhaps more simply, philosophy of education (and history of education) is no longer institutionally required.

Continuing with the literature, little has changed over the last decade and philosophers of education continue to blame themselves for the decline, while pointing out the little help afforded from philosophers or educators. Guzenhauser argues that high-stakes testing has infected lower and higher education and has set a “default philosophy of education,” limiting thinking and reform in education.\(^{40}\) Carr in the UK declares an “inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder”\(^{41}\) within the field because of the intellectual split of education from philosophy in the past as the former entered the universities for study. Van Goor, Heyting, and Vreeke provide a somewhat more unique suggestion that a coup d’état of “anti-foundationalist” philosophers of education has, in a sense, sabotaged the field and presumptuously made demands of educators to adjust to their postmodern philosophy!\(^{42}\) J. Clark in New Zealand discusses how philosophy of education can “fit” in today’s world, but remarks that the topic is considered a “luxury” and of no interest to teachers focused on “enhanc[ing] their employment opportunities.”\(^{43}\) This is in considerable contrast to Tozer and Miretzky who


\(^{39}\) Ibid, p. 351.

\(^{40}\) Gunzenhauser, M. G. 2003. High-stakes testing and the default philosophy of education. Theory Into Practice, 42(1), 51–58. Alfie Kohn’s work is also of interest here in terms of testing regimes as institutional coupling, setting assessment and outcomes as a monitor on task performance which seems to limit a teacher’s control of curriculum delivery.


argue that the “dedicated study in Foundations elevates the knowledge of the teacher to a distinctive professional level,” echoing my consistent remarks that it is foundation subjects, like philosophy, which are the essential ingredient in making a profession, as opposed to the creation and imposition of a rule-bound workforce.

The continued absence of philosophy from teacher education programs can also be shown in texts produced by notable teacher education researchers such as Linda Darling-Hammond and Lee Shulman. Even with a title of “preparing teachers for a changing world,” a chapter specifically devoted to teacher education programs does not notice philosophy of education! Similarly, Darling-Hammond, in a 2006 article on “21st century teacher education,” makes no mention of philosophy, and “foundations of education” ominously appears only in the keywords. Perhaps not surprising to some, a survey of the philosophy of education of 2600 student-teachers in Ontario from 2002 to 2007 found 90% agreed with progressivism. Perhaps more interesting would be comparing a pre- and post-test, for it is likely that most students enter with these views, find they are not substantively challenged, and exit with them reinforced. I have yet to discover any university administrator citing this as a problem of either education or the value of diversity of thought.

Continuing with samples from the literature, Nelson in Canada finds philosophy of education becoming unrecognized by both philosophers and educationists and left “on the sidelines” and Hare in 2007 finds “philosophy has all but disappeared from such programs as teacher education.” Barrow, writing in a special issue devoted to R. S. Peters in 2009, attempts

44 Tozer & Miretzky, 2005, op. cit., p. 22.
45 The chapter notes a requirement of programs is a “shared vision,” suggesting if philosophy exists at all, its not to be presented openly to students, but rather should be a single, pre-determined vision of the program. See: Hammerness, K., Darling-Hammond, L., Grossman, P., Rust, F., & Shulman, L. 2005. The design of teacher education programs. In L. Darling-Hammond & J. Bransford (Eds.), Preparing teachers for a changing world: What teachers should learn and be able to do (pp. 390–441). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. The main title of this text does not hide the authors’ view of professionalism, reinforcing the idea of teachers as technicians, their prescriptive training providing what they “should learn” and what they should “be able to do.” Such a title might appear on a dog handler’s manual.

to correct a slow misunderstanding of the London Line in a new generation of philosophers of education, who he notes have replaced their lack of expertise in analysis with writing from a particular ideology.\(^{50}\) Interestingly, it was Waks in 1988\(^{51}\) who claimed analytical philosophy of education had been the cause of this alienation now being experienced by philosophers of education from philosophers and educators. It may, indeed, have been an institutional power strategy when analytical philosophers attempted to infiltrate policy-making, but ultimately it was short-lived and not sustained. Perhaps in part due to lack of outside support, Siegel in 2009 confirms as editor of the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Education* that philosophers, since the 1990s, continue to “not recognize” philosophy of education as part of philosophy. While Siegel notes the work he edited was created to remedy this rift, in part, the irony is he later also notes this handbook contains only authors who have made contributions to academic philosophy, perhaps to insinuate a debt that philosophers of education must pay.\(^{52}\) Finally, Duemer and Simpson find philosophy of education “intentionally eliminated” in many institutions, naming the culprit as the “evolution of educator preparation” which has been “a major factor in the perceived death of philosophy of education.”\(^{53}\)

This body of academic literature eventually culminated in two important anthologies: Waks’s 2008 *Leaders in Philosophy of Education* and Kincheloe and Hewitt’s 2011 *Regenerating the Philosophy of Education*. Both are important texts which seem to have been coincidentally designed with one another in mind; the former capturing the past and present, and the latter the present and future of the field. To highlight a few unique points, Robin Barrow, writing in


\(^{51}\) Waks, L. J. 1988. Three contexts of philosophy of education: Intellectual, institutional, and ideological. *Educational Theory, 38*(2), 167–174. Waks suggests the problem is that philosophers of education cannot fit nicely into separate disciplines, but rather must be “nosy,” in the sense that their work is always on other people’s work—philosophy’s raw material is issues and problems of practice and life itself. A further problem is that while it doesn’t function well when separated as the university system is structured, it also demands an expert and the idea of training or liberally educating every professor on the use of philosophy in their work which may be impractical, even if the practitioners concerned are decorated with PhDs. Perhaps the university “straight-jacket,” as has been mentioned before, is inappropriate in faculties of education, and education as a field requires more blending of experts to be productive, bringing back synthesis to education.


Leaders\textsuperscript{54} and as a highly published philosopher of education,\textsuperscript{55} is well suited to find the publishing situation\textsuperscript{56} has drastically changed. He also suggests it may be time to close the experiment on faculties of education—that the tactics of institutional survival of faculties of education qua university faculties has been detrimental as compared with a humbler and less complicated existence as separate teachers’ colleges or teacher education provided in liberal arts colleges.\textsuperscript{57}

The anthology, *Regenerating the philosophy of education, What happened to soul?* contains particularly blunt accounts of the death of philosophy of education, the consequences to teachers, and calls for everything from triage to revival methods.\textsuperscript{58} A consistent theme, as written in the subtitle, is philosophy as the “soul of educator preparation programs,”\textsuperscript{59} the “soul of foundations,”\textsuperscript{60} and the “soul of colleges of education” which has been “purge[d].”\textsuperscript{61} I cannot think of a better reference to what I have been describing throughout this document as an

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\textsuperscript{55}In 2014, an anthology devoted to Barrow was published as part of the Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy of Education. In his chapter, he spends a few pages describing in great detail the problems in today’s universities and how philosophy of education has fared. It is impossible to sum up his remarks, except to say that he finds overall the situation akin to a circus: financial interests have clearly run the agenda for some time, philosophers of education rarely have backgrounds in philosophy and deal in issues tangentially and in piecemeal form, and where there are pockets of light, it is soon devoured by academic masses and other educational interest groups who go on with their slogans and emotional appeals and perhaps abuse the vices of democracy. He even suggests, given we are in a “commercially orientated, anti-humanistic, and even anti-intellectual culture” philosophers of education ought to turn their attention to higher education itself! See Barrow, 2014, op. cit., p. 144. John Wilson, also a highly productive philosopher of education, also provides his assessment of philosophy and the decline of educational disciplines in faculties of education in the United Kingdom. See: Wilson, 1993, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{57}Barrow suggested to me, and also published these views in Barrow, 2014, op. cit., that teachers’ colleges would gain a great deal if they exited the university scene. I can foresee a great deal of political opposition, and a loss of the illusion of a “university” standard to research. Wilson, 1993, op. cit., similarly argued the university should step in to create “departments of education” which study education via traditional disciplines (psychology, philosophy, etc.), making the study of education intellectual respectable, and leave “practice” to an apprenticeship model in the schools.

\textsuperscript{58}One of the editors relates in the introduction, “I never thought I would ever have to justify the moral importance of social foundations courses—particularly philosophy of education courses.” He was discussing his experiences in front of a committee considering cutting the course from a Doctor of Philosophy program. Perhaps this title appears in its abbreviated form too often in the university that we have forgotten what the degree was meant to afford.


\textsuperscript{60}Steinberg, S. R. 2011. The philosophical soul: Where did it come from? Where did it go? In J. L. Kincheloe & R. Hewitt (Eds.), *Regenerating the philosophy of education* (pp. 3–10). New York: Peter Lang, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{61}Simpson & Duemer, 2011, op. cit., p. 199.
alteration of the technical core or soul of these institutions, where at one time philosophy was the natural framework upon which teacher education functioned, and for the same reason, philosophy was the professional mark of a teacher, from Ancient Greece to the early university A.B., and perhaps fading away in the 20th century. And continuing with the metaphor, a soulless person is basically a zombie, one who lacks higher functions yet carries on doing its more basic tasks. This is aligned with many contributors who suggest foundations or philosophy provide “dimensionality to schooling” versus a “flattening out” of education practice, risking the creation of “pancake” teachers. Finally, Carlson provides a common postmodern view, critiquing the invasion of financial interests into the universities which has corrupted education. In particular, faculties are “losing control over [their] curriculum” due to “performance-based certification standards,” and faculty are expected to “compete for funding dollars,” which will eventually “seal” the fate of foundations. Overall, he finds a “dumbing down” of teacher education through a narrow emphasis upon technical pedagogical knowledge.”

Swain finds this process, the “slow and steady elimination” of the concession course that is foundations, to be already occurring in 2013. While some philosophers of education have tried to appeal to the more practical interests of modern faculties of education, others have suggested they must return to theory, and perhaps for their criticisms to cut more deeply in order to goad attention.

A further note of a more local phenomenon which seemed to have had a ripple effect for philosophers of education concerns a series of departmental amalgamations at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) at the University of Toronto. At one point in time, separate departments existed for Sociology and Equity Studies in Education (SESE) and History

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65 Swain, A. 2013. The problem with “nuts and bolts:” How the emphasis on “highly qualified professionals” is undermining education. Educational Studies, 49(2), 119–133.


and Philosophy (H&P). Today, both of those departments now reside under one (long) banner: Humanities, Social Sciences, & Social Justice Education (HSSSJE). In addition, presently all admissions to graduate studies in philosophy or history of education have “ceased” and students are now asked to apply to the department of sociology. In 2011, an online petition helped save OISE’s history and philosophy doctoral program which was to be cut. According to their website, the Ontario Council of Graduate Studies (OCGS) cited low staffing levels and imminent retirements as sufficient reason to declare the program as lacking a sufficient “intellectual climate for a doctoral program.” Faculty members associated with this petition came not only from OISE but also Simon Frasier, UBC, and the United States, including professors emeriti.

As a final addition to this appendix, I wish to offer a personal experience in teaching Social Foundations at my own institution which relates much to what has been described. At our instructors meeting prior to beginning the 2014 school year, administration handed out a four-page list of 75 curricular expectations required of all courses in our ITPP. The document was entitled “Learning OUTCOMES required for OCT ACCREDITATION” (capitalization retained). Each of the three divisions at my faculty (curriculum, psychology, and policy) were required to rate their current contribution to each curricular point, though divisions were not expected to meet every point, such as the “Ontario context” for psychology. Unsurprisingly, philosophy was not listed anywhere, and the curricular points related to policy were mostly referencing law and a teacher’s duty to be aware of and support current mandates from the Ministry, whether aboriginal education, social justice, special education, safe schools, and the like. As an example of a curricular point, teachers are expected to understand “equity, diversity, inclusion and social justice and the key role of teachers in identifying and eliminating barriers and creating social change.” This is quite a task, and much is smuggled into this package deal of ideas. It would do a teacher—not to mention the politicians and bureaucrats who create and enforced these and related mandates—much good to unearth the political, ideological and, dare I say, philosophical nature of these concepts before attempting to wear them in the classroom.

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68 The HSSSJE website can be found here: http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/hsssj/index.html
70 One further brief remark, one particular policy faculty member related to me that “I am no longer a philosopher . . . philosophy doesn’t sell.”
Appendix 3 – Possible Framework for the Philosophical Study of Education

Figure 3. The Relationship of Philosophy to Educational Practice
Appendix 4 – Ethics Approval for the Study

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB’s periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB00000941.

Signature

Ethics Officer is Contact for Further Information

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grace Kelly</td>
<td><a href="mailto:grace.kelly@uwo.ca">grace.kelly@uwo.ca</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vikki Turn</td>
<td><a href="mailto:vikki.turn@uwo.ca">vikki.turn@uwo.ca</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emoo Mekhaled</td>
<td><a href="mailto:emoo.mekhaled@uwo.ca">emoo.mekhaled@uwo.ca</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erika Basta</td>
<td><a href="mailto:erika.basta@uwo.ca">erika.basta@uwo.ca</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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VITA

Name: Andrew D. Colgan

Post-secondary Degrees: The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2002-2006 H.B.Sc. in Chemistry

D'Youville College
Buffalo, New York, U.S.A.
2007-2008 I/S Teaching Certificate (Chemistry/Physics)

University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
2010-2011 M.Ed. (Creativity)

The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2011-2017 Ph.D. in Education

Relevant Work Experience: Researcher in Human Ingenuity Research Group
Director: Dr. Ron Hansen
The University of Western Ontario, 2011

Research Assistant & Assistant Journal Editor
The University of Western Ontario, 2011-2013

TA, Instructor & Curriculum Design
The University of Western Ontario, 2013-2015

Selected Publications:


