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Romantic Metasubjectivity: Rethinking the Romantic Subject Through Schelling and Jung

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Abstract

This thesis takes up Friedrich Schelling’s philosophy and Carl Jung’s analytical psychology to develop Romantic metasubjectivity, a model of the subject absorbing more of the vast compass of Romantic thinking on subjectivity than what prevails in Romantic criticism. Romantic criticism tends to be dominated by psychoanalysis as well as deconstruction and poststructuralist theory, which see the subject as either a linguistic phenomenon or simply a locus of difference without a unified “I.” In response to this critical tradition, Romantic metasubjectivity discerns a notion of Self which is neither a linguistic fantasy nor a transcendental essence which is or becomes fully present to itself. The Introduction supplies historical and theoretical parameters for what follows, explaining why Schelling and Jung are crucial to the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity. The first chapter establishes analytical psychology as a Schellingian Naturphilosophie après la lettre, with the latter illuminating analytical psychology’s differences from psychoanalysis (particularly Jung’s rethinking of libido). The second chapter focuses on analytical psychology and Naturphilosophie to develop the topography of the Romantic metasubjective unconscious as a dissociative economy of energy. I establish Schelling’s actant and Jung’s archetype as isomorphic dynamisms which create this economy in Nature and the psyche, to articulate the uniquely Romantic historicity and materiality which resists coagulation into history and materialist notions of the subject. Chapter Three articulates the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity as a limit-experience of this dissociative historicity via Schelling’s idea of intellectual intuition (later ecstasy) and Jung’s development of synchronicity as an acausal connecting principle. Chapter Four focuses on the individuation of Romantic metasubjectivity as a radically ateleological, purposively driven force of self-organisation which informs the person’s experience in the world. Paradoxically, it is Romantic metasubjectivity’s traumatic experience of historicity which both makes this individuation possible and guarantees its interminability. Chapter Five turns to Romantic literature, examining William Wordsworth’s The Prelude and Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as “case studies” of the Romantic metasubjective psyche. The Conclusion touches on John Caputo’s Against Ethics and the contemporary hit TV series Breaking Bad to question the possibility of a Romantic metasubjective ethics.
Keywords

Romanticism; Metasubjectivity; German Romanticism; German Idealism; Theory; Friedrich Schelling; Carl Jung; Analytical Psychology; Psychoanalysis; Subjectivity; Individuation; Personality; Ethics; Potencies; Dissociation; Libido; Synchronicity; Archetype; Actant; Alchemy; Sublation; *Ungrund; Aufhebungsdualektik; Erzeugeungsdualektik*; Copular Logic; Freedom; Necessity; The Unconscious; Thanatopoiesis; Grammatology; *Naturphilosophie*; Rhythm and Caesura; Desire; Tragedy; Trauma; Evil; Historicity; Positive Philosophy; Philosophy of Mythology; Teleology; Purposiveness; Dialectic; *Trieb*; G.W.F. Hegel; Sigmund Freud; Gilles Deleuze; Deconstruction; William Wordsworth; Percy Shelley; Friedrich Hölderlin; *Breaking Bad*
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Was man nicht erfliegen kann, muss man erhinken.
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List of Abbreviations

Full bibliographical information for abbreviated works can be found in the *Works Cited*.

**AF**  Schlegel, *Athenaeum Fragments* (in *Philosophical Fragments* [1798-1800])

**Ages**  Schelling, *Ages of the World* (1815)

**Beyond**  Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920)

**CF**  Schlegel, *Critical Fragments* (in *Philosophical Fragments* [1798-1800])

**DR**  Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968)

**FO**  Schelling, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799)

**Freedom**  Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Freedom* (1809)

**GPP**  Schelling, *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures* (1841)

**HCI**  Schelling, *Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology* (1842)

**Ideas**  Schlegel, *Ideas* (in *Philosophical Fragments* [1798-1800])

**Notes**  Novalis, *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia* (1798-1799)

**“NPS”**  Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821)

**STI**  Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800)

**Symbols**  Jung, *Symbols of Transformation* (1911-1912/1952)
Preface: Romantic Metasubjectivity

There is a kind of poetry whose essence lies in the relation between ideal and real, and which therefore, by analogy to philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental poetry. It begins as satire in the absolute difference of ideal and real, hovers in between as elegy, and ends as idyll with the absolute identity of the two. [...] In all its descriptions, this poetry should describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry. (Schlegel, Athenaeum Fragment #238)

The highest task of education is – to seize the mastery of one’s transcendental Self – to be at the same time the Self of one’s Self. (Novalis, Miscellaneous Remarks #28)

This thesis has several related goals. First and foremost, it develops what I call Romantic metasubjectivity as a model of identity more faithful to the full compass of Romantic thinking about the nature of the human being than what prevails in Romantic criticism. This criticism tends to be dominated on the one hand by psychoanalysis, from which it cherry-picks some concepts and ignores others. On the other hand, it often takes up both deconstruction and poststructuralist theory to articulate the Romantic subject as either a linguistic phenomenon or simply a locus of difference without a unified “I.” As we will see, Romantic metasubjectivity conceives of human identity as neither an after-effect of discourse or the movements of difference, nor as an essentialised “I” that is or can be made fully present to itself. Put differently, Romantic metasubjectivity points directly to the logical impossibility of the discursive construction of selfhood, while offering a more sophisticated alternative to this model.

Second, developing Romantic metasubjectivity necessarily establishes and explores what has hitherto remained a silent intellectual partnership between the philosophy of Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) and the analytical psychology of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961).¹ It remains an irony of intellectual history that both Schelling, who was often seen as

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¹ For our purposes here, psychology can be defined as a concern, beginning in the Enlightenment, with the study of the mind and its (cognitive) functioning. As Fernando Vidal (98ff) explains, it was Kant who advocated the study of “empirical psychology” in its own right alongside anthropology and metaphysics (indeed as independent from the latter). But Kant also thought a “science of psychology” impossible, because “the
little more than a footnote in a history of German Idealism venerating Fichte and Hegel, and Jung, who for many years remained in the shadow of Freud, ultimately have more to tell us about Romanticism’s thinking on the human being than their counterparts. Ironic, too, that both Schelling and Jung suffered from the slings and arrows of political (mis)fortune which favoured their intellectual foils. Hegel’s 1818 appointment to the University of Berlin sidelined Schelling’s thought, cementing Hegelian philosophy in Prussia until at least 1841 (Beiser, Hegel 307ff) when Schelling was finally called in to fill in the chair left vacant by Hegel’s death in 1831, although Schelling’s lectures made far less of an impact than his predecessor’s. Jung arguably fared worse: smeared by Freud’s inner circle and variously accused of mysticism, anti-Semitism and Nazism, after Jung’s “defection” from psychoanalysis circa 1912 a tradition of intellectual ostracism began which would also see his works shunned (if not slandered) by Derrida, Roudinesco, and others in the Tel Quel years after World War Two. Ironically, those claiming to be sensitive to the nuances of language and close reading of theoretical works were caught up in politics that prevented them from applying the same balanced scrutiny to Jung, whose thought has been denied the sensitive, intelligent engagement which psychoanalysis has enjoyed for decades.2

empirical concept of mind does not allow enough purchase for mathematics,” which for Kant was “a necessary condition for natural science” (Guyer 182). This overarching Enlightenment concern with psychology as a science of man in his social, historical, and political dimensions to unite a multiplicity of fields under “an ideal of unity and interdependence” (Vidal 102) set the stage for the emergence of depth psychology as its uncanny other. “Depth psychology” [Tiefenpsychologie] was coined by Eugen Bleuler to refer to psychologies that hypothesise the unconscious, which include psychoanalysis (which I associate with Freud unless indicated otherwise) and Jungian analytical psychology as its main exponents. Psychoanalysis and analytical psychology troubled the premises of this positivist science of man with the idea of an unconscious outside the purview of the human sciences, and which destabilised the unitary principle operating within and between them. I will articulate analytical psychology in more theoretical detail below (see note 15), but for now we may simply note that Jung first used the term “analytical psychology” in 1913 to differentiate his approach from that of Freudian psychoanalysis (”On the Doctrine” para. 1355 & n). Presumably, the proximity of the two terms reflects Freud’s and Jung’s mutual desire to maintain the scientific aspect of their disciplines.

2 Thomas Kirsch relates the following: “Élisabeth Roudinesco, a prominent French psychoanalytic historian, was friends with Deirdre [Bair; Jung biographer] and could not abide the fact that she was writing a biography of Jung. Roudinesco was a Jewish holocaust survivor who had been born in Romania near the end of the war, and in her view Jung was a Nazi and an anti-Semite, and she could find nothing redeeming to say about him. Deirdre uncovered material indicating that Jung had been contacted by the Allies in 1944 and had, at their request, submitted psychological profiles of major Nazi figures, including Hitler, prior to the Allied invasion. However, this evidence of Jung’s cooperation with the Allied cause did not change Roudinesco’s opinion or, sadly, the opinion of many other psychoanalysts who had concluded that Jung was a Nazi and an anti-Semite” (152). Kirsch is referring to Jung’s enlistment as “Agent 488” by Allan Dulles, Swiss director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS; later the American CIA), to provide psychological profiles of Hitler. Jung’s insights, according to Bair, “were considered fact” by both Dulles and then Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower “and figured importantly in the agency’s operational policies” (492, 494). After the war, Dulles
When we consider the historical connections between Jung and Schelling, it is reasonable to assume that Jung likely understood Schelling mostly second-hand from Eduard von Hartmann’s *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1869), which profoundly influenced many psychologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Jung, *Memories* 101). However, Jung’s *Bibliothek-Katalog*, a list of his library contents at the time of his death in 1961, indicates that Jung owned two later volumes of Schelling’s *Sämtliche Werke* (1856-1857) and the *Treatise on the Deities of Samothrace* (1815), pointing to an interest in Schelling’s later philosophy of mythology (whose specific connections with analytical psychology merit an independent study). Irrespective of Jung’s scant first-hand knowledge of Schelling, the degree to which the latter’s thinking resonates throughout analytical psychology is striking. In the truly remarkable (and hitherto unexplored) detail with which Schellingian philosophy and analytical psychology articulate the same dynamics, their affinities are far more significant than the oft-repeated connections to Kant, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer (often with no more evidence than mutual concerns with the problem of opposites and their interaction) which comprise orthodox Jungian intellectual history. Indeed, that Jung did not see Schelling as influential lends weight to what Jung might have called a shared archetypal constellation of thought. Thus, I conceive this silent partnership as an intellectual countertransference between metaphysics and metapsychology wherein one often answers (to) the blindness of the other. To use a Schellingian phrase I will explore below, Schelling and Jung are questioning and answering beings to each other.

Finally, in articulating Romantic metasubjectivity I hope to suggest its connections with contemporary theory, even if these connections can only be hinted at within the scope of this study. One notable example is the degree to which the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze serves as a theoretical co-pilot of sorts for my study. In the midst of prevailing intellectual

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was heard to remark that “nobody will probably ever know how much Professor Jung contributed to the Allied Cause during the war” (493), contributions that to this day remain classified.

3 Thanks are due to Jung’s grandson Andreas Jung, who graciously lent me his personal copy of the *Katalog* for my research. The *Katalog* offers no evidence that Jung “relied on elements of Schelling’s early *Naturphilosophie*” in the development of his thought, as Andrew Bowie suggests (*Aesthetics and Subjectivity* 65). Indeed, the idea may have seemed repellent to a thinker who had already distanced himself from Romanticism and who was at pains to establish himself as an “empirical scientist.” Nevertheless, we will see that Jung ends up recapitulating the fundamental dynamics of *Naturphilosophie* in both his conception of analytical psychology as a science and his mature formulations of the archetype.
disdain for Jung’s thought in the twentieth century, Deleuze and other significant thinkers (e.g., Gaston Bachelard and Gilbert Simondon) were largely sympathetic to Jung’s thought, and the spirit of Jungian thought can be seen in Deleuze even when his name is absent. Romantic metasubjectivity, then, is also a conduit for interjecting Schelling’s and Jung’s thought into the wider discussions of contemporary theory insofar as it articulates a subject which is neither beholden to essence nor dispersed into endless difference. Given the Jungian lacuna in contemporary theory, it is necessary to introduce and contextualise Jung’s thought in relation to psychoanalysis (which is far more familiar to scholars) and in ways that will be amplified in the following chapters. Here (and elsewhere) I also refer the reader to Appendix A, “Disentangling Romantic Metasubjectivity,” which provides some provisional definitions of terms used by this thesis to reference human identity (“metasubject,” “Self,” “subject,” “person,” “personality”).

Romantic scholarship has not been particularly kind to the “subject.” The canonical genealogy linking Romanticism to psychoanalysis is cleanly stated by David Simpson, who writes that “the psychoanalytic model is both a symptom of and a solution to the dramas of subjectivity and self-consciousness that figure so prominently in Romantic writing” (19). Recent studies have added sophistication to the idea of psychoanalysis via its intersections with Kristeva, Freud and Jung (Faflak). Nevertheless, psychoanalytic dimensions of discussions of the Romantic self have often taken the form of the binding of the sublime under the Oedipus complex (Weiskel) or the uncanny (Bloom), or the hegemony of primal childhood scenes in the articulation of Romantic personality as an Oedipal self (Douglas Wilson, Onorato, Edmundson). But I argue that to stage critical projections of the infantile past and the family scene throughout Romantic poetry forecloses on the much broader scope of Romantic literature and thought concerning human identity. While childhood relations are no doubt important, this tendency obscures the more profound dimensions of Romantic personality. This critical deployment of psychoanalysis leads to a Romantic subject that is left hopelessly fragmented, presumed to know, but in an infinite regress of knowledge leading interminably to an infantile past, an objet petit a constituted as its own desire and thus unattainable, because it is never where it is. Closely related to this approach is a radical refusal of the thetic transcendental ego of M.H. Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism (1971), which was at one time the canonical critical narrative of Romanticism’s “I” embarking on its
Hegelian-dialectical journey onwards and upwards to inevitable “union” with a desacralised logos.\textsuperscript{4} This disavowal takes the form of post-structuralist\textsuperscript{5} critiques of subjectivity heavily influenced by Foucault, which tend to treat the self as subject, as a product of contending discourses. To this end Andrea Henderson’s \textit{Romantic Identities} (1996) deploys a Ricoeurian “hermeneutics of suspicion,” treating the so-called “depth model” of subjectivity as one among many contending ideological paradigms of the Romantic period.\textsuperscript{6}

One could say, then, that the Romantic subject is caught in a critical psychodrama that defines the major poles of scholarship on the subject. That is, critical history reflects an enantiodromal\textsuperscript{7} shift from the fantasy of the unified “I” to an equally fantastic self dispersed through the matrices of historical discourse. As a response to this psychodrama, Thomas Pfau’s \textit{Romantic Moods} (2005) negotiates this critical Scylla and Charybdis by shifting away from discursivity to focus on “the (re-)construction of emotion as an aesthetic form, a ‘voice,’ [as] a more reliable mode of access to history than the garden-variety methods of associative and or contextual rumination” (24), thereby resisting the appropriation of affect as a screen for discursivity. Pfau does not abrogate personality or collapse the transcendent “back into a historical matrix against which […] it had sought to establish itself” (24) but instead focuses on the traumatic historicity \textit{underneath} history, so to speak. In other words,

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{4} In Abrams’ Romantic narrative of “progressive self-education” “the mind of man [is] disciplined by the suffering which it experiences as it develops through successive stages of division, conflict, and reconciliation, toward the culminating stage at which, all oppositions having been overcome, it will achieve a full and triumphant awareness of its accomplished destiny” (188). Although Abrams concedes that this goal “can never be completely attained” (215), this does not affect the intrinsic optimism of his narrative.
\item \textsuperscript{5} I follow Tilottama Rajan’s distinction between deconstruction, which preserves a concern with consciousness, perception and being, and poststructuralism, which nominally emphasises structural and linguistic models in various forms (\textit{e.g.}, Foucauldian discourse, deManian rhetoric). Deconstruction’s retention of a certain kind of depth against poststructuralism’s dispersion of signifiers across a flat discursive surface is, I will argue, important to understanding Romantic metasubjectivity. See Rajan, \textit{Deconstruction xi-xiv}.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Although Henderson states that there are models of Romantic identity which dissolve the opposition between “self-determination” or “entrapment in ideology” (4), her analysis remains on the level of the discursive.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Jung’s concept of \textit{enantiodromia} is based on Heraclitus’ principle of opposites, defining it psychologically as “the emergence of the unconscious opposite in the course of time [which] always occurs when an extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in time an equally powerful counterposition is built up” (“Definitions” para. 709). With the rare exception I cite Jung’s work by paragraph number, as there are several collections of Jung’s essays that focus on specific themes (\textit{Jung on Evil, Jung on Alchemy} etc) and retain the paragraph numbers of the \textit{Collected Works}. Thus, readers with these volumes can still look up primary sources.
\end{enumerate}
historicity is an open economy of productive forces from which the discipline and narratives of history emerge. In this sense, Romantic literature strives to connect with this historicity by orienting itself “toward an as yet unknown, perhaps unrepresentable ‘openness’” (25). But neither does Pfau return to the fantasy of a unified “I”; he describes the sublime experience, for example, as “upheaval,” an emotional “event” which “alerts the subject to its having been implicated all along in a seemingly uncontainable network of antagonistic historical forces” (31).8 If the sublime is apocalyptic revelation, it is the revelation of something closer to Foucault’s “historical a priori,” a “condition of reality for [discursive] statements [which must] take account of statements in their dispersion, in all the flaws opened up by their non-coherence, in their overlapping and mutual replacement, in their simultaneity” (Archaeology 127). What Pfau describes, without naming, is a rethinking of the sublime as an encounter with historicity as such – a traumatic historicity which describes, without circumscribing, a dangerous fluidity on which the flat surface of discourse composes and decomposes. This fluidity does not decompose its witness – otherwise, one could not speak of a sublime event after the fact. The subject encounters not the transcendental signifier of God or the moral law, but a “transcendent” historical empiricism from which the human psyche emerges. Pfau alludes to a non-psychoanalytic psyche which, moving through traditionally psychoanalytic economies of trauma and melancholy, approaches the psyche I explore in this thesis, one which emerges from such an uncontainable network of historical forces.

What is needed, then, is a model of personhood more faithful to the full compass of Romantic thought – the full range of the “I” in its specifically Romantic freedom – which defines the person as something more than mere “subject.” The Freudian hermeneutic seems to me inadequate to the task of answering a crucial question which preoccupies Romantic thought: how does the unique personality come to be in the first place?9 The problem is

8 We can provisionally define the Romantic sublime as an overwhelming experience of powerful poetic rhetoric, or of abject terror in the face of Nature’s vastness (waterfalls, mountains, cliffs). Thinkers in the Romantic period overwhelmingly saw the sublime experience as an ultimately optimistic reassertion of the mind’s power. Although it is beyond the scope of my study here, I nevertheless want to suggest that that the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity articulated in Chapter Three strongly contests this optimism.

9 Romantic metasubjectivity’s invocation of “personality” is not the same as the subject traditionally defined as an aftereffect of either discourse or early social relations. For a more detailed discussion of the term see Appendix A, “Disentangling Romantic Metasubjectivity.”
clarified, but not resolved, via Lacan’s well-known articulation of the mirror stage, wherein
the human child “self-alienates,” identifying with an image of itself “seemingly predestined”
to “primordially” inaugurate its membership in the Symbolic order (“The Mirror Stage” 76).
But this does not account for how the child recognises the image as its own so as to self-
alienate. How does one not know oneself unless one “has oneself” on some level as a basis?
One cannot self-alienate without a prior acquaintance with something as “self” before the
event of alienation, even if only this event can make us aware of the hinge of desire and lack
which marks lived existence.10 To frame this problem in a somewhat different register: while
materialist and poststructuralist accounts of the subject shed light on the effects of the split
subject and its contentious knowledge(s) in linguistics and culture, they cannot account for
the origins of the subject which makes this knowledge possible – the purposive force which
centripetally gathers discourses and experiences together in a form and flux unique to the
individual person.

I address this epistemological aporia by articulating Romantic metasubjectivity
through a silent partnership, an unspoken intellectual countertransference between
Schellingian philosophy and Jungian analytical psychology in their specifically Romantic
dimensions. As a counterpoint to the psychoanalytic, poststructuralist and cultural
materialist conceptions I have outlined here,11 the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity
corroborates Henri Ellenberger’s unproven but compelling position that “Romantic
philosophy and the Philosophy of Nature” are among Jung’s most important intellectual
sources, as well as Werner Leibbrand’s provocative but hitherto unexplored argument that
“Jung’s system cannot be conceived without Schelling’s philosophy” (qtd. in Ellenberger
728). In this vein, Sean McGrath writes that in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie “a coherent
psychology of the unconscious comes into view, a speculative psychology of the

10 For Derrida, “The hinge [brisure] marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a signified,
be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. That is why there is no full speech. [. . .]
Before thinking to reduce it or to restore the meaning of the full speech which claims to be truth, one must ask
the question of meaning and its origin in difference” (Of Grammatology 69-70). I read the hinge away from its
psychoanalytic inflection and toward a differential play of desire and lack which mobilises the genesis of the
individual.

11 For a contextualisation of the theoretical debate in which I intervene, see Appendix B, “Situating Romantic
Metasubjectivity.”
unconscious, i.e., one which begins in metaphysics and finds confirmation in the empirical (by distinction from a metapsychology, which forms hypotheses on the basis of the empirical)” (“Is Schelling’s” 10; my italics). Romantic metasubjectivity is the model of personhood which emerges from this analytic encounter between speculative psychology and Jungian metapsychology – between Schelling’s metaphysics as the spectre of philosophy in Jung’s therapeutics, and analytical psychology as the Romantic afterlife of Schelling’s desire for an empirical psychology.

Joel Faflak writes that the psychoanalytic unconscious “marks the Romantic subject’s alienation from himself” but also “a sublime imaginative jouissance” in which this subject “reimagines his psychic determinism within the interminable psychic process of finding his identity” (24). Similar to the Romantic subject traumatically (re)constituted through a metonymy of “pathological” substitute-formations (34), the Romantic metasubject exists under the burden of an impossible history, a genesis that can only be known through its traumatic effects – a genesis Schelling calls “unprethinkable” and which Jung narrates as emerging from the mists of human prehistory. Faflak points to a self-alienation that is not synonymous with Freud’s answer to this metonymic trauma, which is to bind even Nachträglichkeit’s developmental impetus to a notion of primal phantasy that reinstates the past.12 Faflak reads a future into this pathology via James Hillman and others as an interminable reimagining; similarly, the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity allows us to theorise this pathology forward, into a future to come for which psychoanalysis cannot fully account. This pathology is “perverse” and “monstrous” insofar as it is determined by the late eighteenth-century vitalist shift to epigenetic (self-generating) accounts of life in the Romantic sciences – a shift which unworks the hierarchical structures of preformation (the idea that all organisms had been predetermined by God) that had hitherto dominated the life

12 Nachträglichkeit is Freud’s term for the analysand’s revision of past events at a later date in the service of forward development. But in his analysis of the Wolf Man – ostensibly a response to Jung’s critique of the primal scene as retroactively constructed – Freud binds Nachträglichkeit to the primal phantasy as the claim to origins, the demarcation of a single event which “dramatis[es] into the primal moment or original point of departure for a history. In the ‘primal scene’, it is the origin of the subject that is represented” (see Laplanche and Pontalis 113-14, 332).
Put simply, then, Romantic metasubjectivity describes a purposive, *epigenetic* psyche in contrast to the teleology of a preformed goal inscribed in the organism. The decentred nature of this epigenetic psyche also inscribes Romantic metasubjectivity in the dissociationist tradition of psychology, which holds that different clusters of images and affects in the psyche had their own autonomy and “personality.” As I will discuss below, the dissociationist lineage can be traced back through Jung (as its most important contemporary thinker) to Schelling as one of its key metaphysical precursors. Dissociationism provides the psychic terrain upon which we may begin to think the “uncontainable network” of Pfau’s Romantic historicity, and indeed, in the register of the psyche Romantic metasubjectivity asserts *materiality*, as a heterogeneous disturbance of all absolutes, against cultural *materialism* as “an absolutism of the empirical” (Rajan, “Introduction” 2). In other words, the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity acknowledges a purposively organised phenomenological matrix of human experience that is irreducible to its organisation by and through cultural discourse.

In developing the Romantic *metasubject*, however, I do not imply that its personifications are hiding in every Romantic work as a dramatic character (which is simply not the case for, say, Wordsworth’s Lucy poems). Rather more broadly, Romantic *metasubjectivity* gestures toward a wider Romantic universe whose impetus to self-organisation and purposiveness exists in both human and non-human forms of organisation, as Romantic scientists often observed. Romantic *metasubjectivity* thus marks a certain set of epistemological, psychological and ontological perspectives within which the Romantic *metasubject* operates. Put briefly, and in terms I will articulate below: the Romantic metasubject is equivalent to what Novalis calls the “Self of one’s self,” what Jung calls the *Self*, and what Schelling calls the *absolute subject*. As “counterpoint” in a musical sense,

13 “Vitalism helped effect a shift away from preformation and toward epigenesis, [which] became widely accepted over preformation because it defined each new birth as a new formation, a theory that accounted for variability but implied the existence of an invisible vital force that could organise living matter into complex forms. [...] [N]ature was increasingly understood to be self-generating, [and] preformation had a hard time accounting for variation and monstrosity. [Epigenesis] gave the Romantics a way of thinking about the purposiveness of life without a predetermined form or purpose. In short, life itself was perverse” (Sha 19).

14 In contrast to “teleology,” which largely presupposes an endpoint or final goal of development, I use “purposiveness” here, and throughout, to signify a “directionedness,” an unfolding whose inscrutable goal is encrypted within the very process of unfolding itself.
Romantic metasubjectivity does not simply annul Freud’s thought. But because it is singularly attuned to the individual’s purposive self-organisation, Romantic metasubjectivity necessarily reads the personalism of psychoanalysis against its Freudian grain.\textsuperscript{15}

The Novalis epigraph beginning this thesis frames this purposive force as meta-subjectivity, the “Self of one’s self,” the organisational force unique to the individual person which plots a course moving through the discourses which inform the “self,” drawing them into its wake while remaining irreducible to this discursive play. This perpetual self-description is also the basis of Schlegel’s description of “transcendental poetry” in my other epigraph, which is a \textit{poiesis} traversing the genres of satire, elegy and idyll as it navigates between ideal and real, mind and Nature. Indeed this “transcendence,” far from being an Idealism confined to thought, also gestures toward the rethinking of transcendence in contemporary theory, perhaps the most important example being Deleuze’s thinking (through Hume and Kant) of transcendental empiricism. For Deleuze, transcendental empiricism is a “science of the sensible,” an aesthetics predicated on the sensing of difference, of what Schlegel might have called the lived repetition and experience of the difference between real and ideal. Put differently, it acknowledges the elusive proximity of mind and nature, the disruption of the (Kantian) faculties by sense:

\begin{quote}
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental […] only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. [Transcendental empiricism’s object is] the intense world of differences, in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Even after the schism with Freud, Jung never dismissed psychoanalysis (although at times he criticised it harshly). Thus, I occasionally deploy psychoanalytic concepts (the uncanny, the pleasure principle) to articulate aspects of Romantic metasubjectivity in the oeuvres of Schelling and Jung. While there has been much work on the fundamental differences between Freud and Jung, the similarities and disciplinary transferences between, say, psychoanalysis (including Lacan) and analytical psychology are underexplored and merit serious study. To point here to a crucial distinction which I will amplify in the following pages, Jung writes: “‘[Analytical psychology] is a special trend in psychology which is mainly concerned with complex psychic phenomena [\textit{i.e.,} the psychology of complexes], in contrast to physiological or experimental psychology, which strives to reduce complex phenomena as far as possible to their elements. The term ‘analytical’ derives from the fact that this branch of psychology developed out of the original Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud identified psychoanalysis with his theory of sex and repression, and thereby riveted it to a doctrinaire framework. For this reason I avoid the expression ‘psychoanalysis’ when I am discussing other than merely technical matters” (“Analytical Psychology” para. 701). Mario Trevi argues that Freudian and Jungian “hermeneutic modes” “do not exclude, but \textit{complete} each other […] when one of them reaches its limit, then at that time it calls for the other” (139). But this folding of two complex disciplines into a Yin-Yang wholeness dismisses their constitutive tension and assumes a “communication” (a “calling for” the other) for which there is little historical evidence.
which we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible [. . .] precisely the object of a superior empiricism. This empiricism teaches us a strange ‘reason’, that of the multiple, chaos and difference (nomadic distributions, crowned anarchies).

(Deleuze 56-57)

Deleuze’s strange “reason” resists the dialectical ordering of being along the lines of a logical endpoint of absolute knowledge; it marks the emergence of ideas from experience and not from Kant’s categories. To this end, Deleuze develops the idea of the dark precursor as the “in-itself of difference,” an enigmatic force impelling the differential communication between disparate series, a paradoxical connective differentiation that makes all difference possible (117). We will see that this dark precursor has an analogue in Jungian metapsychology, lending force to Deleuze’s explicit invocation of Jung (and, to some degree, Schelling) against Freud’s model of the mind.

Romantic metasubjectivity’s general economy of metonymic desire for objects resists desire figured as lack (of the phallus, of the mother, etc.) in a representative unconscious that binds all productive forces under the “despotic signifier” of Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 54). Instead, as “a process of production without reference to any exterior agency” (A Thousand Plateaus 154), desire articulates a productive unconscious that works in terms of “the logic of partial objects.” These partial objects are not static and self-present, but points of intensity measuring a fragmentation and flow in service to a “schizophrenic” ontology of production organised by something irreducible to metanarrative or hierarchy, “a universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary production as ‘the essential reality of man and nature’” (Anti-Oedipus 5). The unfolding purposive drive

16 Whereas in psychoanalysis a partial object is an object of desire which Freud represented as the phallus (or lack thereof), Deleuze and Guattari write that “a partial object is not representative, even though it admittedly serves as a basis of relations and as a means of assigning agents a place and a function; but these agents are not persons but relations of production as such” (Anti-Oedipus 47). And in a statement which in effect summarises the economy of the Jungian unconscious, they write that “partial objects are the molecular functions of the unconscious” (324; my first italics). This molecular subject is not “present” (molar, representative), but instead a nonmolar relation of forces irreducible to their empirical manifestations. Thus, “desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being” (27). In the non-Freudian psyche of Anti-Oedipus, desire exists in a general economy of production as opposed to that of (Freudian) representation. To this end, Deleuze and Guattari write that the project of schizoanalysis is “that of tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing the flows they would be capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity; and assembling the desiring machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others. For everyone is a little group [. . .] and must live as such” (362). Indeed, the notion of the person as a
[Trieb] of Romantic metasubjectivity can thus be mapped onto Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of desire, which postulates another world of fictive objects removed from the material world:

If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. [...] The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. (26)

In other words, desire unfolds in the transcendental-empirical world of the real; the autoproducive unconscious generates products which are themselves matrices and flows of nonmolar forces, relations of production. And this intangibility extends to the subject itself, which for Deleuze remains a dissociative nexus of “selves” (eyes are selves, the liver is a self) which he calls “larval subjects,” and “even the philosopher is a larval subject in his own system” (DR 119).

The concept of Romantic metasubjectivity emerges from the Romantic lineage of this non-fixed subject of unconscious (auto)production and desire in Schelling’s philosophy and Jungian thought. Where the spectre of the past blocks even the most radical, decentring aspects of Freud’s thought from thinking this purposive Trieb in its authentic futurity, Jung opens up a space for considering the embryonic therapeutics in Schelling’s philosophy. Similarly, Schelling allows us to think the metaphysics repressed in Jungian psychology’s

“little group” is derived directly from the dissociationist tradition of psychology, in which Schelling and Jung are key thinkers.

17 I will have more to say about Trieb. Differentiating Trieb (drive) from instinct [Instinkt] is tricky business, but Laplanche and Pontalis offer a useful gloss which illuminates my use of Trieb here: “Trieb ’accentuates not so much a precise goal as general orientation, and draws attention to the irresistible nature of the pressure rather than to the stability of its aim and object” (214). Schelling uses several words for “drive” (Drang, Trieb), often interchangeably. For example, in the First Outline he uses Bildungstrieb (“formative drive”) and Trieb (“drive”), and although Bildungstrieb has often been read as a force of acculturation, Frederick Beiser points out that Bildung is a multivalent term which resists a single interpretation (see note 83, below). For the sake of consistency I refer to Trieb throughout, as it preserves the purposive valency in Schelling’s thought.

18 Another way of expressing the hinged nature of desire and lack is to say that, instead of repressing desire under the fixed subject of psychoanalytic lack, productive desire is instead exteriorised, or inhibited (to use a term from Schellingian Naturphilosophie) by a non-fixed subject into a metonymy of partial objects. See A Thousand Plateaus 154. This position rejects any connection between Schellingian inhibition and Freudian repression.
drive to be an “empirical science” in order to excavate Jung’s repressed Romanticism.\(^{19}\) Indeed, analytical psychology moves “forward,” “beyond” psychoanalysis to provisional unity and the horizon of this “centre.” But it also moves “backward,” “behind” psychoanalytic infantile trauma to the collective unconscious as a receding origin of human experience tied to the sheer materiality of the natural world – Deleuze’s “autoproduc
tive unconscious.” And while \textit{Anti-Oedipus} takes up an overtly quasi-Jungian position in its critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, Deleuze’s individual work was also explicitly influenced by Jung through the 1950s and 60s,\(^{20}\) even though \textit{Difference and Repetition} (1969) reflects the growing absence of Jung’s proper name in his work (Kerslake, \textit{Deleuze} 69-70). Romantic metasubjectivity’s emphasis on personhood as a product of the non-molar play of forces thus aligns Schelling, Jung, and Deleuze in their thinking on the person.

The structure of this thesis consciously proceeds via a rhythm of progression-regression, circling back at times to amplify the concepts and dynamics I have suggested to the reader here. The Introduction establishes the historical and theoretical parameters for what follows. It constellates the paradigm of Romanticism with the oeuvres of Schelling and Jung, outlining key concepts and illuminating some of the salient differences in thinking between Schelling and Jung and their contemporaries. This contextualisation will explain why Schelling, Jung, and Romanticism are crucial for the articulation of Romantic metasubjectivity. The first chapter, “A First Outline of Romantic Metasubjectivity,” reads the \textit{Naturphilosophie} of Schelling’s \textit{First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature} (1799) as a theoretical site on which the project of analytical psychology emerges as distinct from psychoanalysis, indeed as a \textit{Naturphilosophie après la lettre}. I argue that in this quasi-subjective space (one which lacks subjects but possesses a nascent absolute subject), the fundamental ambivalence of Schelling’s Nature towards its products anticipates what Jung psychologises as the fundamental movements of libido. This movement serves as the basis for a Jungian (re)figuration of the death drive, what I call \textit{Thanatopoiesis} as not simply the

\(^{19}\) For Jung’s ambivalence toward his “Romanticism,” see “Foreword to Mehlich” pars. 1732ff. and “Foreword to von Koenig-Fachsenfeld” pars. 1739-40.

\(^{20}\) In “From Sacher-Masoch to Masochism” (1961) Deleuze credits Jung with recognising that “there are very different levels of the unconscious, of unequal origin and value, arousing regressions which differ in nature, which have relations of opposition, compensation and reorganization going on between them” (128).
psychoanalytic drive for inorganicity, but a movement marked by both regression and progression, systole and diastole. Like Schelling’s Nature, Thanatopoiesis is both a regression to origins and a crucial drive forward which catalyses creativity and productivity in a futurity for which psychoanalysis cannot account.

Chapter Two, “The Romantic Metasubjective Unconscious,” tracks the theoretical transferences between Naturphilosophie and analytical psychology in more detail. It examines the unconscious of Romantic metasubjectivity, which is coextensive with the specifically Romantic sense of traumatic historicity which Pfau identifies at the cusp of modernity. To elucidate this in detail, I turn to Schelling’s exposition of the actant [Aktion] as non-molar (de)composing force in Schelling’s First Outline, exploring its remarkable affinities to the Jungian archetype; indeed, the former prefigures a materiality in the latter which Jung at times represses in his oeuvre. This analogy between Jungian archetypes and Schellingian actants articulates the radically historical psyche of Romantic metasubjectivity, underwritten by a rhizomatic unconscious which makes possible (without being reducible to) the materialist subject prevailing in Romantic criticism. And indeed, it is an underwriting: for the dynamism of Schelling’s actants and Jung’s archetype articulates a grammatology of Being, an open economy of signification and symbolisation constellated around the “Self of one’s self” (Schelling’s absolute subject, Jung’s Self), which proceeds through this difference without simply being it.

Just as Jung could not escape from the Romantic aspects of analytical psychology, Schelling never managed (nor perhaps did he want) to escape from the Nature and the Naturphilosophie which haunts his thinking. In this spirit, Chapter Three, “Romantic Metasubjectivity: Experience,” turns to Schelling’s Erlangen lecture “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821) [“NPS”] to argue that what emerges in this text is a philosophical psychology bound by the materiality of Nature unfolded in the First Outline (a dynamism which also informs Chapter Four). Chapter Three explores how the phenomenological experience of the metasubject might be formulated within a Romantic register by approaching Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) as a text on the cusp of both Idealism and Romanticism, and a text which both courts and resists the Naturphilosophie of the First Outline in a dynamic of which Schelling was acutely aware. On the one hand, the System claims to have evolved past Naturphilosophie to reach a
transcendental system of self-consciousness akin to Fichte’s subjectivism. On the other hand, it remains eternally bound to Nature in a dynamic in which two systems, to use a profound Jungian refrain to which I will return, “touch and do not touch” (Jung, “On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 418). From this anxiety of influence comes Schelling’s formulation of intellectual intuition, which he defines as an apprehension of the union of real and ideal (two decades later he will recast this as ecstasy, which marks the encounter with the absolute subject). I explore intellectual intuition’s continuity with Jung’s formulation of synchronicity as an acausal connecting principle developed through his collaboration with Nobel Laureate quantum theorist Wolfgang Pauli. As Jung’s concept for the limit-experience of the archetypal energies of the collective unconscious, synchronicity provides a therapeutic, developmental context for what Schelling would express as the “ecstatic” contact with the absolute subject.

Tracking what Schelling in 1821 calls the movements of the absolute subject, Chapter Four turns to Schelling’s Freedom essay and the 1815 Ages to articulate individuation – a term implied yet unspoken in Schelling, but central to Jung – as the radically ateleological unfolding of personality which marks Romantic metasubjectivity. Paradoxically, it is precisely the traumatic experience of Romantic metasubjectivity that unworks any possibility of fully comprehending individuation (i.e., as teleology), even as this experience makes individuation possible in the first place. At the same time, the person is confronted with the purposive force of self-organisation which constellates knowledge and experience, one with no guaranteed end. I first examine Schelling’s Freedom essay, which Schelling refers to as his theory of personality (Freedom 73), and which enacts Thanatopoiesis’ systolic-diastolic rhythm in a moral theatre. In terms I will amplify below, the Freedom essay explains the reality of evil as the energy of a rhythmic relation between the individual and the centrum, the (un)ground of all Being as it exists in the individual. Cultivating this relationship is necessary for what Schelling calls “salvation,” but evil consists in the individual breaking away from this relationship and being for-itself. This rhythmic attraction and repulsion is the index of personality and individuation, a uniquely Romantic ontology whose energies Schelling nevertheless tries unsuccessfully to contain in an Idealist narrative promising salvation through love.
I then turn to Schelling’s *Ages of the World* (1811-1815), whose textual history seems to reflect the darkening of his thought on a broader scale. The first (1811) version is written in a largely theological register, where “completed time” has an interiority which contains its outside in a guaranteed Christian salvation (Rajan, “Abyss” para. 8). The second (1813) version, like the first, attempts to construct a teleological individuation promising a complete future where “history develops unproblematically through nature” (para. 8). But the third (1815) version, which interests us here, is far more aleatory. Here, psychoanalysis (in its broadest sense) emerges traumatically to rupture teleology with the movement of the potencies [*Potenzenlehre*]: contraction, expansion, and their synthesis exist as one “moment” through which time and history come into being. Recapitulating the rhythmic ontology of the *Freedom* essay, spirit and nature remain bound to each other in a rhythm of evolution and involution that puts its own beginnings under erasure. The 1815 *Ages*’ deployment of mesmerism and magnetic sleep as dramatizations of the *Potenzenlehre* also uniquely position it as a proto-Jungian text. With this in mind, I then turn to analytical psychology to illustrate the striking degree to which these two texts of Schelling’s are imbricated with Jung’s conceptualisation of individuation and other key concepts of analytical psychology. Jung’s concepts of inflation (where the ego is taken over by an archetype) and the transcendent function (the creation of new knowledge in individuation) carry forward the undeveloped psychological tendencies of the *Freedom* essay and *Ages* to articulate a dissociative therapeutics based on a purposive model of individuation which resists linearity. In this way, Schelling’s two texts supply Jung with the metaphysics he often represses in analytical psychology.

Chapter Five, as “applied Romantic metasubjectivity,” turns to mythology as the crucial expression of Romantic metasubjectivity’s libidinal potentiation. Both Schelling and Jung theorise mythology not in terms of stable pantheonic forms (Zeus, Christ etc.), but rather as nonmolar intensities, “theogonic processes” (in Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology) or Jung’s archetypal mythologems. For Schelling, the philosophy of mythology was a crucial bridge to his later positive philosophy (which he opposed to Hegel’s “negative
philosophy” of conceptual thought); mythology assumes a similarly existential role in analytical psychology, whose goal, stated simply, is to cultivate the individual’s ability to “live their own myth” as the essence of individuation. With this in mind, this chapter reads William Wordsworth’s *The Prelude* (1799-1850) and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) as two distinct yet related instances of what I call Romantic “Prometheanisms.”

As a narrative of the growth of a poet’s mind, the 1799 *Prelude* is also a case study of the Romantic metasubjective psyche. It is a primal site for the Promethean coming-to-be of poetic consciousness, unfolding episodes of Promethean theft whose dissociative energies do not conform to the strictly personalist readings or Freudian accounts of guilt and transgression that often prevail in Romantic criticism. But the poem’s textual history also reflects the gradual (Schellingian) inhibition of these energies: 1799’s22 primal sites are gradually bound in subsequent revisions, and we will see how 1805 interpellates them into forms privileging a lyricised consciousness (by 1850 they are thoroughly Christianised). By contrast, Shelley’s later *Prometheus Unbound* unfolds a dissociationist topography of the Romantic metasubjective psyche which paradoxically predates the poetic consciousness of *The Prelude*. Shelley’s poem narrates this psyche’s emergence from the primordial trauma of what Schelling, in *Ages*, calls the cisionary moment at which God enters the history and time occupied by Wordsworth’s Poet. While many studies read *Prometheus Unbound* as

21 Schelling’s positive philosophy is a “philosophy of existence,” conceived circa 1810 as a move to supplement “negative” (merely conceptual/Hegelian) philosophy with “a historical philosophy that [...] integrates the orders of necessity that structure our existence” (Matthews, “Translator’s Introduction” 30; see also 22). Edward Beach also offers a succinct discussion of negative and positive philosophies and their interrelation (107-8). Joseph Lawrence describes Schelling’s positive philosophy as a philosophical religion which “seeks to renew the transformative power of traditional religion [...] by creatively unleashing the forces that gave birth to it in the first place. [It is Schelling’s] as yet unachieved religion of the future” (16-17), carried forward in the later lectures on the philosophy of mythology. Schelling’s project of philosophical religion is supplemented by analytical psychology, in which therapeutic healing consists significantly in the development of a “religious attitude” in its broadest (non-dogmatic) sense. See Shamdasani’s important remarks to this end, although Romantic metasubjectivity contests his assertion that the closest analogies to individuation are in “spiritual traditions, such as Kundalini yoga, the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola and medieval alchemy” (“Is Analytical Psychology a Religion?” 543-44). Instead, speaking more broadly Jung writes that “analytical psychology helps us to recognize our religious potentialities. [It] teaches us that attitude which meets a transcendent reality halfway” (letter to Hélène Keiner, 15 June 1955, 265).

22 Throughout this thesis, I will refer to different versions of *The Prelude* by italicising their dates, i.e., 1799 for the 1799 Two-Part Prelude and 1805 for the Thirteen-Book Prelude of 1805.
transpiring within the mind of Prometheus (who is strangely absent for much of the poem), I emphasise Shelley’s prefatory statement that his lyrical drama is meant as an exploration of the operations of the human mind – in essence, a dramatic metapsychology of the Romantic metasubjective psyche. Nevertheless, Shelley attempts to bind this poetic metapsychology’s energies to a politically Idealist narrative that reads this psyche into a quasi-Hegelian teleology of emancipation from political tyranny.

The Conclusion revisits the post-Romantic aspect of Romantic metasubjectivity to explore the contemporary ethical implications of this model of personhood. Is there an ethics of Romantic metasubjectivity? If so, is this ethics identical with what we call morality? I begin by looking at Jung’s late work Answer to Job (1952), which makes a case very similar to Schelling’s for evil’s importance as energy in the creation of the world. Indeed, Jung makes the crucial argument that even God must undergo Schelling’s crisis of consciousness; even God must individuate. This nonhuman aspect of individuation aligns the human person with Nature in a way that makes a Romantic metasubjective ethics impossible. But this does not obviate the need for meaningful relation and obligation, a morality that resists the phantasy of overarching anthropocentric ethical paradigms in favour of the individual encounter. To this end I take up John Caputo’s Against Ethics (1993), which offers a model of obligation and responsibility without recourse to ethical paradigms as a contemporary example of how Romantic metasubjectivity might operate in twenty-first century culture. The nonhuman, hence nonethical potency of individuation is a self-evident concern of the Naturphilosophie, taken up in both Schelling’s engagement with nineteenth-century natural sciences and chemistry. But analytical psychology’s radical nonhumanism, virtually unexplored in scholarship, also leads Jung to look at Nature for examples of individuative self-organisation, particularly the crystal, which aligns Jung’s thinking on individuation with Romantic crystallogeny as the nineteenth-century concern with self-forming forces in Nature. In turn, this individuative crystallogeny resonates profoundly with one of the twenty-first century’s most infamous pop-cultural protagonists; thus, to crystallise this idea further I end with a brief analysis of Walter White, protagonist of the hit TV series Breaking Bad (2008-2013), who offers a particularly striking and timely representation of this nonhuman, non-ethical individuation. Walter White suggests a different, more contemporary Prometheanism than those of Wordsworth and Shelley, but one no less resonant with Romantic
metasubjectivity, and with this brief, somewhat freehand analysis I hope to suggest ways in which Romantic metasubjectivity can contribute to contemporary criticism.
Introduction: A Word to the “Why”s

Why Romanticism?

Tilottama Rajan has pointed out the ways in which German Romantic thought puts English Romantic thinking and poetry under theoretical analysis to “[reveal] a far greater uneasiness about the limits of poetic Idealism than might appear from the theoretical statements of the [English] poets themselves” (Dark Interpreter 28-29). In this spirit, recent and current Romantic scholarship has rethought Schelling’s Romanticism (Bowie, Krell, Rajan, Snow) while also interrogating (albeit more obliquely) the family romance of Romanticism and psychoanalysis. Just as Jung is progressively moving out from under Freud’s fatherly shadow, so too is Schelling being rethought outside the confines of Fichtean discipleship. Reading the breadth of Schelling’s oeuvre reveals a liminality between “Idealism” and “Romanticism” that makes his thought irreducible to either. Indeed, the German Romantics themselves used the terms loosely and questioned their distinction vigorously. To put the distinction simply, Idealism understands Being within the parameters of a closed metaphysical system (or a system of “self-consciousness” for Fichte and Hegel); Romanticism emphasises the remainders which fall outside of systemic understanding, or a notion of existence which cannot be made transparent by a theoretical system. As Rajan puts it, Idealism “denotes a specifically philosophical movement committed to dialectical totalisation, identity, and system” where Romanticism is “the larger literary-cum-philosophical context within which Idealism emerges as no more than an ‘idea’ continually

23 Andrew Bowie elaborates on this crucial distinction: “The division that can be made between Idealist and Romantic thinking depends upon the extent to which each thinks it possible to restore unity to what the modern world increasingly separates. In the main the Idealist response to the divisions in modernity is to seek new philosophical foundations on the basis of the Cartesian and Kantian conception of the founding role of self-consciousness. For Idealism, what philosophy can analyse in the activity of consciousness is a higher form of the intelligibility present in nature, so that the task of philosophy is to show how our thinking is the key to the inherent intelligibility of things. The essence of the Romantic response, on the other hand, is a realization that, while it must play a vital role in a modern conception of philosophy, the activity of consciousness is never fully transparent to itself. It can therefore never be finally incorporated into a philosophical system, because what we can consciously know of ourselves does not exhaust what we are” (Aesthetics 63). Thus I argue that it is more useful to read Schelling and Jung not as simply “Idealist” or “Romantic,” but as multivalent thinkers in which exist different Idealist or Romantic intensities at different moments. Romanticism and Idealism are not in place but in play (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 122). This said, my focus gravitates toward the specifically Romantic dimensions of Schelling and Jung’s oeuvres as forces which unwork, often decisively, the Idealist drive to systemic completion undoubtedly present in both.
put under erasure by the exposure of Spirit to its body” (“Introduction” 14 n. 9). This distinction opens up the space for considering Schelling as a “Romantic” philosopher. This section will detail some of the uniquely Romantic dimensions of Schelling’s thought, amplifying their relationship to Romantic epistemological concerns about the nature of knowledge which inform Romantic metasubjectivity. More specifically, I argue that Schelling’s infamously protean philosophical nature centres around a “darkening,” a shift of intensity in his thought from an early Idealist focus on the metaphysics of self-consciousness to a later, more Romantic concern with how we can gain knowledge of an unprethinkable Being and how the world of time and history comes to be (which some call the work of the “middle Schelling”).

This shift in emphasis underpins Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s system of absolute knowledge. For Hegel, reflexive thought is ultimately capable of recognising and incorporating that which is other to it; the difference between thought and Being – in theory at least – is ultimately overcome in the revelation of absolute Spirit, and this Spirit is something that can be known. Being is always already determined by the dialectical movement of the Concept. This is the core of what Schelling calls Hegel’s “negative philosophy” of abstraction, which “makes the truth of being a necessary consequence of thinking” (Bowie, Schelling 143). In contrast to this, Schelling’s positive philosophy attempts to suggest a different path for philosophy, in the face of the impossibility of reason knowing what is absolutely other than it as ultimately itself. [..] [Its positivity] lies in the demand for an explanation [..] even in the case of geometry, or logic, of the fact that there can be self-contained a priori systems of necessity. Such systems cannot, and this is the fundamental point, explain their own possibility: whilst geometry maps the structure of space, it cannot explain the existence of space. Schelling does not deny the internal necessity in geometry or logic, but demands to

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24 Dividing Schelling’s career into “phases” is tricky business. Some see three more or less distinct phases: an “early Schelling” which includes work from roughly 1795-1809 (which problematically includes the divergent strands of Naturphilosophie and the Identity Philosophy), a “middle Schelling” whose work begins with the 1809 Freedom essay and stretches to “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821), and a “late Schelling” whose work comprises the positive philosophy (which is intertwined with the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation). The later Schelling is also sometimes categorised by a conservative turn to Christianity. Others see these phases as overlapping, arguing that the positive philosophy begins in 1809. Others see no phases at all, preferring to note the intensity of the Naturphilosophie throughout Schelling’s oeuvre (Grant). And so on. There are certainly important moments in Schelling’s career (e.g., the break from Fichte and introduction of the Naturphilosophie), but no schema is universally accepted. For my purposes here, “middle Schelling” refers to Schelling’s work from 1809’s Freedom essay to On the Nature of Philosophy as Science (1821).
understand why it is necessary. The only possible answer to this is the fact that it is necessary, which does not allow of a further logical explanation. (142, 144; my first italics)

That is, for Schelling reflexive thought and knowledge rest on something irreducible to itself, a facticity, or plenitude of Being which recedes before attempts at knowledge just as it makes knowledge possible. As Bowie succinctly puts it, “the point is that the potential of thinking itself must first be in a way that it cannot itself explain” (166). We will see that as Schelling’s oeuvre develops, he will turn to art as a means of accessing this plenitude.²⁵

This Romantic concern with the indeterminacy of Being is nascent in the Naturphilosophie of Schelling’s First Outline (1799), and the transcendental philosophy of the 1800 System, but gains intensity with the Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom (1809) and the third version of his Ages of the World (1815) to his Philosophy of Mythology (1842) and Philosophy of Revelation (1858).²⁶ Indeed, these texts foreground Schelling’s unique conceptualisation of human freedom as a condition of possibility for all knowledge, unbinarised by oppositions between, for example, “fate” and “free will.” That is, a consummately Romantic freedom does not vie for dominance against an opposed “fate” or “destiny” but rather becomes “a freedom without which neither determinism nor free will [nor ideology] could be supposed” (Ferris pars. 2, 3). But simply to label Schelling a “philosopher of freedom” is to miss the problematic yet constitutive tension between freedom and system present throughout his oeuvre. In the Naturphilosophie, radical productivity is paradoxically circumscribed in a circle of possible forms; in the 1800 System, self-consciousness is supposed to contain the Nature in which it exists. The Freedom essay attempts to implicate an unruly freedom in an Idealist narrative ending in love’s ultimate resolution of all conflict, and the 1815 Ages develops a cosmological doctrine of potencies [Potenzenlehre] to explain the beginning of time and history while channelling this

²⁵ While Schelling’s specific focus on art dwindles after the Philosophy of Art (1803-1804), the aesthetic gains a certain epistemological, existential charge in works such as the Freedom essay (in which the unfolding of personality is existential artistry) and Ages, which sees an “artistic wisdom” in the universal soul binding together Nature and artist (Ages 56).

²⁶ While Schelling did not use the term “positive philosophy” until much later, elements of it were already nascent in the early Naturphilosophie. I follow Grant, McGrath, and others in reading these works as extending the project of the Naturphilosophie, to which Schelling compulsively returns throughout his career.
infinite productivity toward an ultimate unification of science and myth. In contrast to Hegel’s insistence on dialectical Being and an endpoint of absolute knowledge, Schelling turns to *potentiation* as an attempt to describe a non-logical Being in non-logical terms, articulating the interaction of nonmolar forces oscillating in a rhythm that cannot be contained or understood within any reflective framework. This interplay forms systems of knowledge, but as we will see they resist the transparency that Hegel attributes to them through dialectic’s promise of completion (even if it is only a promise).

This tension between system and freedom informs the Romantic genre of the fragment and the idea of the Romantic encyclopedia as figurations of the mutual interpenetration and (in)completion of disciplines and bodies of knowledge. Christophe Bode sees this (in)completion as a significant link between Romanticism and deconstruction, arguing for “distant relations” and “elective affinities” between them which focus on language as the medium of thought with all the epistemological consequences it entails, including the Romantic fragment as trope of knowledge, as *poiesis*. These “elective affinities” converge as disciplinary (counter)transferences around what Rajan has pointed to as “[a Romantic-]encyclopedic thinking which discovers that thought cannot be exhausted in a single discipline or form of thought [. . .] a perception about the disseminative interconnectedness and incompleteness of knowledge” (Rajan, “Philosophy” 6, “Encyclopedia” 336). In this sense, Schlegel’s *Philosophical Fragments* (1798-1800) is a text underscoring its own spectrality as a manifestation of what Rodolphe Gasché calls “the radical atotality of writing,” a collection of “erratic pieces” “structurally linked with the

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27 See Beach 116ff. Indeed, from his earliest work Schelling is a thinker of potencies: magnetism, light and electricity are conceived as potencies in the *First Outline* well before the *Potenzenlehre* of Ages.

28 In recognising the “indissoluble relation between part and whole of a text,” the “coupling of language and thought,” and the synecdochic relation of poetry to Being, Bode nevertheless insists upon a somewhat stark consequence – this “pan-lingualism”’s “[collapse] into linguistic and epistemological skepticism” (149). Romantic metasubjectivity responds to this skepticism not by dismissing it, but rather by thinking it away from its entanglement in linguistic matrices and toward the purposive productivity of forces from which these matrices emerge. Moreover, if we accept Bode’s reading of Derrida’s “unmistakable suffering and a quarrel with that nothing that cannot be named [the lost transcendental signifier]” as a proximity to negative theology and mysticism (150), we need not read this return of the repressed with the upturned noses of hard-boiled theorists; it is too often forgotten that the mutual (in)completion of systems characterising the Romantic also admits religious scribblings in the margins of philosophy. Philosophy ultimately ends where the religious begins, but this convergence is only one degree in the circumference of that impossible circle of knowledge which remains irreducible to any one discipline.
whole or totality of which it would have been, or of which it has been, a part[, receiving their] very meaning from that ensemble that it thus posits and presupposes rather than challenges” (“Foreword” vii). This freedom also underwrites Novalis’ *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia* as a paradoxical project of a “book of books” meant to unite the irreducibly fragmented (in)completion of the sciences.29 Similarly his *Fichte Studies* (1795-1796), Novalis’ prolonged engagement with Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, is structured as a system of fragments wherein “no individual pronouncement may be considered as conclusive [. . .] [C]ontradictions abound, self-corrective statements occur, [and] variations on the same themes are frequent” (von Molnár 27). This emphasis on atotality allows for the ambitious and audacious project of an “Idealism without absolutes,”30 a total system of knowledge constituted by, and from within, its radical incompletion. And indeed, in a well-known Athenaeum Fragment Schlegel describes how “progressive universal poetry,” as “a mirror of the whole circumambient world” unfolding a poetic will, a poiesis hovering between real and ideal, is the most potent philosophical concept for the purposive organisation of disparate and mutually (in)completing forces along a line of becoming without a teleological endpoint (*AF* #116). We will see that Schelling puts the opacity of this ungrounding atotality of thought at the heart of his positive philosophy, and Jungian metapsychology also makes it crucial to the development of personality.

Closely connected to this emphasis on the productive nature of decentred knowledge is the reconception of language’s proximity to thought in an epistemic shift away both from what Foucault calls the “raw, primitive being” of Renaissance language on the one hand, and the denominatory, taxonomical emphasis of the Classical episteme on the other. This shift pushes language toward its modern conception as a counter-science, an intransitive (un)working of other disciplines as it takes itself for its own object in a self-reflexive elusiveness. For Foucault, in what is almost a harkening back to the linguistic pantheism of the Renaissance, the “enigmatic density” of the modern episteme’s language becomes an

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29 Novalis writes that “One science can only truly be represented by another science” (*Notes* #49).

“enigmatic multiplicity.” This state of “precarious being” must be “mastered” through projects of “universal formalization of all discourse,” general theories of signs and other keys to the mystery of language (Order of Things 42, 116-17, 298, 305). Hence the Romantic fascination with ur-languages and the search for language’s ultimate origins, which to varying degrees also concerned Schelling and Jung, specifically in their formulation of mythology as primordial poiesis and their view of mythologies as its spontaneous manifestations.[^31] Yet unlike Foucault, whose ambivalent relationship to psychoanalysis leads him to disconnect this epistemic shift from the psyche, the Romantics often figured language as drive [Trieb] in a bid to synthesise the plenitude and density of Foucault’s Renaissance language with the problem of discursive self-reflexivity posed by the modern episteme of the nineteenth century.

But Romanticism is, of course, far more than the quest for the “original power” of an ur-language. The freedom opened up by this “fall” from an original commensurability between word and world (and the desire to return to it) is crucial to a certain sort of existential play which reveals the very impossibility of this return. Maurice Blanchot aligns Romanticism with this freedom in a “being of literature” that reads and writes not only the human sciences (for Foucault), but the ontological structures of reality itself:

Romanticism, as the advent of poetic consciousness, is not simply a literary school, nor even an important moment in the history of art; it opens an epoch; furthermore, it is the epoch in which all epochs are revealed, for, through it, the absolute subject of all revelation comes into play, the ‘I’ in its freedom, which adheres to no condition, recognizes itself in no particularity, and is only in its element—its ether—in the totality in which it is free. (168).

[^31]: The entanglement of language and mythology in both Schelling and Jung will be taken up in Chapter Five. For now, let us remark in passing that for Herder “the origin of language was [. . .] an inner urge, like the push of the foetus towards birth at the moment of maturity,” and that for A.W. Schlegel language and poiesis were part of “a kind of original poetry of humanity, an original creativity of the human mind which underlies all specific, developed languages. [. . .] Language is, therefore, not the product of reason alone, but of a deeper, more comprehensive power of which reason is merely a part and in which the imagination also participates. [. . .] The language of science conveys hardly any impression of this original language, and appears to be a collection of signs established through agreement. And yet, even in this language, the infinite language of humanity lies hidden, and is proven by the continuous recurrence of poetry in the most abstract stages of language” (Behler 268-69).
There is a grand synecdoche at work in Blanchot’s prose. As the epoch of epochs, Romanticism’s self-dramatization is nothing less than the unfolding of the world in both its “pastness” and its future possibilities – the prophetic and prophesying nature of the “absolute subject of all revelation.” The horizon of this unfolding futurity, the play of this Romantic “absolute subject” (Blanchot’s glimpse of Romantic metasubjectivity) unbound by particularity, discourse, or paradigm, cannot be bound to metanarrative, Oedipal, infantile or otherwise. Romantic thinking about language, on the one hand, is a complicated engagement with the Babelic multiplicity of discourse. On the other hand, it is a drive to regain an ur-language lost in the development of reason and self-consciousness – the pursuit of a lack which both unworks and constitutes the proliferation of discourses as alibis for a liminality between words and Being. But this “original language” – part of us, and familiar to us through this spectral absence – must come from some different psychic economy.

Where Behler sees language as something “between” reason and this “deeper, more comprehensive power,” Blanchot ontologises it as “the being of literature” and gives it a phenomenological texture. But with Romanticism’s “absolute subject” the psyche becomes the point of convergence for both the play of language and discourse and their projected (impossible) resolution. As the source of both the multitude of these systems of knowledge and their complicated interconnections, “psyche” becomes an analogue of the fragmentary Romantic conception of system. As a result, the “hermeneutics of suspicion” Henderson adopts toward notions of “depth” or the “deep subject” must itself be suspected. This suspicion of suspicion does not mean reinstating a sovereign idea of depth, but instead it necessitates rethinking its metaphors and operations in Romantic literature.32 Pfau’s conception of Romantic historicity reflects a concern beyond the mere play of discourses,

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32 The “deep subject”’s cynical overdetermination at the hands of contemporary theory is perhaps due ironically to its ties with psychoanalysis’ own notion of latent depth. Adriana Craciun sees the “deep subject” as an avatar of the “quintessential modern dream of subjectivity (especially female subjectivity) as latent depth,” invoking the psychoanalytic manifest-latent distinction in order to disavow it (225). But just as Jerome McGann chastises what he sees as Romanticism’s 1980s critical clerisy for “an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representations” (1), one wonders whether or not psychoanalysis has suffered a similar fate with respect to its own critical interpellations. Psychoanalytic “depth” is figured in a vertical, “transcendental” model (where latent, “real” truth is hidden under “manifest”) in order to be critiqued and dispatched as old hat, flotsam of a bygone critical age – perhaps along with the anti-democratic political overtones some have attributed to this “transcendence.”
and it’s worth remembering that even the arch-associationist Hume admitted his inability to
discern the laws governing the mind’s organisation of external stimuli. And for Foucault,
naming “the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with others,
the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive,
become transformed, and disappear” does not bring him any closer to explaining these laws
of discourse away from the “alien development” he wants to disavow (Archaeology 127).

This thesis draws these crucial Romantic concerns into the orbit of Romantic
metasubjectivity, as a model of personhood whose drives and forces are constellated around a
purposive principle which organises energy and experience according to inscrutable laws
unique to its individual existence. This “Self,”33 as the play of force and form, endlessly
unfolds according to its own inscrutable self-organisation. It is by no means exclusively
personified, nor is it hypostasised as an imminent experience or endpoint of unfolding
historical processes, or made “deep” through a transcendent altitude. Its unfolding traverses
the living and non-living domains, recapitulating the difference between the two even as it
exhibits their shared symmetries and patterns. Let us now turn to Schelling to see how this
“Self” is figured in his thought.

Why Schelling? – The Absolute Subject, or, the Logic of the
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It was not without reason that Hegel dubbed Schelling the “Proteus of philosophy.”
Perhaps more than others, Schelling’s thought demands a conceptualisation of “Idealism”
and “Romanticism” as moments of intensity in an evolving body of thought. The tension
between an Idealist drive toward systemic completion and the Romantic focus on what
system cannot assimilate is perhaps most apparent in the Naturphilosophie, which is crucial
to understanding Schelling’s thought. The Naturphilosophie Schelling develops from 1797
onwards permutates throughout his oeuvre, which leads Iain Hamilton Grant to argue that
“Schellingianism is naturephilosophy throughout” (Philosophies 5). As we will see in
Chapter One, the productive yet problematic indeterminacy of Nature in Schelling’s First

33 See Appendix A, “Disentangling Romantic Metasubjectivity” for more detail on the “Self.”
Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799) consists in Nature’s ambivalence toward its own products. On the one hand, it “hates” the proliferation of products which disturbs its equilibrium and rest. On the other hand, it depends on the progressive unfolding of these products to reach what Schelling will call the “absolute organism” as, paradoxically, both Nature’s end goal and the interminable process required to reach it. Schelling calls the motile forces of this ambivalence *actants*, dynamic atoms of production. Even here, Schelling is thinking Being in terms of nonmolar forces, and to this end, Grant argues that in response to a post-Kantian “antiphysics” denuding Nature of its dynamism, Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* presents us with the groundwork of a *genetic* philosophy not of things but of *forces*, a project of “unconditioning the metaphysics of nature” (*Philosophies* 6). And as if anticipating the transferences between Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* and analytical psychology, Grant points out that *Naturphilosophie* puts metaphysics under analysis, confronting it with its molecular unconscious. That is, *Naturphilosophie* does not merely sit episodically amongst other systems and artifacts of the antiquarian intellect, but *challenges systems to reveal what they eliminate*. Insofar as philosophy still leaves nature to the sciences, it [fails this test] and becomes a conditioned, that is, a compromised antiphysics, an Idealism so ‘powerful’ [. . .] as to eliminate nature. (*Philosophies* 21)

For Schelling, it is precisely Nature’s materiality that puts the Idealism of “antiphysics” under analysis, indeed opening up a space for an Idealism without absolutes as “a symbiosis between ideality and materiality” (Rajan, “Introduction” 1). This symbiosis, which makes Schelling so crucial for the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity, consists first and foremost in the idea of the *absolute subject* which is not only implicit in his work from the *First Outline* onwards, but is also a trope for the individuative thrust of his oeuvre as a whole. Blanchot’s “absolute subject of all revelation” is prefigured in Schelling’s oeuvre, which can be read as a philosophical individuation, a circumambulatory approach to understanding the absolute subject both as it exists in *and recedes from* time and history.³⁴ Where the “subject” is the human being interpellated by discourse, the absolute subject is Schelling’s name for the organisational force that makes this subject possible. Because many

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³⁴ Of course, what Blanchot describes in more literary terms as the “advent of poetic consciousness” is anything but mere “consciousness,” considered psychologically.
of Schelling’s important ideas constellate around the absolute subject, I want to provide here a shorthand of its presence in Schelling’s work, which will be amplified in the chapters that follow.

As Keith Peterson (“Translator’s Introduction” xxviii) writes, the absolute subject is already implicit in the Naturphilosophie in Nature’s desire for full self-realisation as what Schelling, in the 1799 First Outline, variously calls Nature’s “absolute product” or “absolute organism” (FO 28). As the next chapter will demonstrate, this drive towards an “absolute subject” is far from a simple teleology, instead unfolding a rhythm that becomes the fundamental basis for the purposive movement at the heart of Romantic metasubjectivity. While the absolute subject is also not named as such in the 1809 Freedom essay, it functions as a silent placeholder in the idea of copular logic with which the essay begins. According to copular logic, the statement “the ball is blue” is logically indefensible because a thing cannot be two things (a ball and blue) at the same time. In other words, ball does not contain and own blue as part of its essence (or vice versa). Instead, there is something that is both a ball and blue, but this “something” cannot be an object since an object cannot be two things at once to consciousness. It is the copula (the is, or = in “the ball is blue”) that gestures toward this something as an unconditioned “object = X” which cannot ultimately be conditioned by any of its predicates. It is “unprethinkable” because we cannot define it with any concepts based on our experience. But this unconditioned, absolute object = X is also an absolute subject – that is, an unconditioned subject to which everything in Being is a predicate. This absolute subject is what makes it possible for us to conceive of subject-predicate statements in the first place. Schelling’s absolute subject is nearly synonymous with Romantic metasubjectivity’s “Self of one’s self,” but as we will see, Romantic metasubjectivity evolves the un(der)developed psychology in Schelling’s work and, through its symmetries with analytical psychology, opens up the absolute subject’s affinities with a more specifically Romantic, and human, dimension of thought.

And in turning to this psychological tendency in Schelling’s thought, we see that this unknowable quantum of the absolute subject becomes the essence of personality in the Freedom essay’s discussion of the nature of evil. Here, personality is the link between man
as selfish, particular being and man as spirit (33).\textsuperscript{35} Put differently, in the Freedom essay’s Romantic ontology, personality watermarks the unique dynamism between the individual and the centrum, or ground of Being as it exists in the person. This personality-dynamism through which human life unfolds recapitulates the creation of the world itself, which emerges through the dynamic between ground (or Ungrund, the ground-which-is-a-non-ground, or the grounding of Being before time and history) and existence (Being; the natural world of flux and process) in an unprethinkable moment which cannot be reduced to a logical concept or described in terms of Hegelian dialectic. Indeed, this dynamic encrypts the answer to the question haunting Schelling’s oeuvre: “Why is there something rather than nothing?”

In the 1815 Ages, a subject per se is absent (but liminally implied in the proto-psychology invoked with magnetic sleep and Mesmerism).\textsuperscript{36} However, the absolute subject is once again implied as reason’s confrontation with its Other in the form of God as freedom, which is “the negating force of the future,” a future which can only be “intimated” (Ages xxxv) in an inscrutable beginning to time and history unfolded in the movement of the potencies [Potenzenlehre]. Here, the absolute subject is the Godhead as something beyond being and non-being. Put simply: for Schelling, the unapprehendable ground of existence is contractive; it seeks to shrink away from the tumult of Being into itself and refuse coming into being. This is the ground’s death drive – its “No” to existence. But this “No” is ineluctably linked with the “Yes” of existence itself, the expansive principle, God’s (or Nature’s) drive to enter Being and participate in the play of natural products and forms that comprises the world. Thus, this systolic-diastolic rhythm of Being unfolds Nature’s antipathy and “unnaturalness” toward its own organic creations (Naturphilosophie), the tension between egoity and centrum as the nonground of personality (the Freedom essay), and the potentiated, incomprehensible moment of creation, God’s decision to enter Being (Ages). All these iterations of Schelling’s Romantic ontology orbit the Romantic

\textsuperscript{35} Here and throughout I use “man” strictly for the sake of expediency, as it was how both Schelling and Jung designated humanity in general. It should not be taken to exclude the non-masculine.

\textsuperscript{36} The first book of Ages also opens with Schelling’s insistence that “the person is the world writ small, [thus] the events of human life, from the deepest to their highest consummation, must accord with the events of life in general” (3), implying a continuity between the individual personality and the absolute subject.
metasubject’s perennial suspension between the desire for system and the melancholic responsibility of freedom.

The *Freedom* essay and the 1815 *Ages* point forward to the 1821 “NPS,” which paves the way for Schelling’s positive philosophy and philosophy of mythology. In this essay, Schelling explicitly describes the absolute subject as that which engenders systems of knowledge while remaining irreducible to them – in other words, an organisational force “proceeding through everything and not being anything” (“NPS” 215). In the essay’s philosophical psychology, the absolute subject moves within and through *asystasy*, Schelling’s term for the fundamental disunity and “inner conflict” from which all systems of knowledge come (210). Here Schelling offers a crucial experiential component of the absolute subject in the form of *ecstasy*, a dissociative experience where the ego is “placed outside itself” (228) closely resembling experiences of the Romantic sublime, but without the idealist optimism often attached to the latter. This dissociative experience of the absolute subject, which is in a sense the culmination of the nascent psychology in the *Freedom* essay and *Ages*, makes Schelling an important precursor to core concepts of analytical psychology.

Schelling’s more specific relevance to depth psychology has been explored in two recent, notable studies of Romantic psychology which build a critical history of what I have called Romantic metasubjectivity. Matt ffytche’s *Foundation of the Unconscious* (2012) and Sean McGrath’s *The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious* (2012) can be counterposed, the former being a broadly constructivist approach, the latter being a more adventurous and philosophical exploration of Schelling’s esoteric heritage.37 ffytche equates the unconscious with its dispersal across the disciplinary structures of the nineteenth century, which ultimately represses the conditions of its existence (12). McGrath, however, is more

37 ffytche examines the historical inception(s) of Schelling’s “new ontology of the self” relative to contending metaphysical models of personal identity in the early nineteenth century, but also as a response to socio-political shifts writing the idea of the unconscious into the heterogeneity of post-Enlightenment social discourses anticipating modern liberal thought (11, 22ff). Interestingly, despite his psychoanalytic focus, ffytche sets the stage for thinking Romantic metasubjectivity as a response to the historical milieu of the early nineteenth century. As a fallout from the Enlightenment separation of the individual from an “organic body of society,” “versions of the unconscious start to reconceive that greater organic body in such a way that moral and political anxieties concerning fragmentation are allayed, though without wholly compromising the experience of self-directedness within the individual” (27). Thus, ffytche tracks the way in which “self-directedness” is maintained against its occlusion by Enlightenment reason.

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philosophically serious about the unconscious, arguing that while “clearly the unconscious is a constructed concept [. . .] we are not so sure that its constructed nature means that it does not in fact reference a real phenomenon” (Dark Ground 20). Thus, McGrath more directly engages with the ontological inscrutability of the unconscious which, for fftyche, is more illocutionary position than epistemological knot. Arguing that “Schelling is widely recognised for having been the first to posit a single ground of matter and mind, which cannot itself be conscious,” McGrath places this “ground” (a notional term for the Ungrund) in a tradition extending through Jakob Böhme and Franz von Baader (74 n. 1, 44ff). Reading the history of Schelling’s oeuvre from within the cisionary grain of his own thought, McGrath sees a contrast between an early “Eckhartian reditus,” “a return into the non-dual, unmediated point of origin of being,” and a later “Boehmian exitus,” “[a move] away from the non-dual toward differentiation, personalisation, history and mediation” (60). My concept of Romantic metasubjectivity is clearly more sympathetic to what McGrath calls a Schellingian “co-inherentism” between psyche and history, mind and nature (37). But where McGrath stops short of entering its undiscovered theoretical country, this thesis theorises the psyche that remains unspoken in both of these accounts.

Describing it as “crypto-metaphysics,” McGrath points to Schelling’s anticipation of depth-psychology in his desire to conceive a medicine based not in clinical but speculative concepts such as his Naturphilosophie, so as to “fuse the a priori and the a posteriori element in psychology and approach the empirical through the metaphysical” (20). We must then consider the disciplinary transferences between psychology and philosophy as crucial to Romantic metasubjectivity. Despite Freud’s well-known ambivalence toward philosophy and his narration of psychoanalysis as a surpassing of the “primitive philosophy of nature,” he can nevertheless appreciate this philosophy’s remainders in contemporary culture. And while Jung often shares this ambivalence toward metaphysics in insisting on his status as an

38 Robert Brown’s The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme on the Works of 1809-1815 (1977) is a valuable study of Schelling’s engagement with Böhme in the beginning phases of his positive philosophy. Jung, too, was aware of von Baader’s works, and particularly with those of Böhme, who is cited extensively throughout the Collected Works. For more on Jung’s engagement with Böhme see Dourley 124ff.

39 See, for example, Totem and Taboo 76. Freud’s text reads “philosophy of nature” (Naturphilosophie in the original German). While the passage in the original Werke makes no specific mention of Schelling, the English editors assume it refers to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (erroneously described as “pantheist”).
“empirical scientist,” his thought nevertheless encrypts a multidisciplinarity in ways similar to that of psychoanalysis. Indeed, the more overt presence of the *religious* in Jung’s middle and later writing, as well as his later research on alchemy, reflect a unique awareness of the interpenetration of religion, philosophy, and psychology. In short, as a mirror image of Schelling’s speculative thought, analytical psychology often seems to approach metaphysics from its empirical standpoint of clinical observation and interpretation. Thus, to think Romantic metasubjectivity’s general psychic economy – that is, to figure its “original depth” (*Ungrund*) as space itself beyond the reach of hypostatising metaphors of vertical height and depth, we must turn to Jung and analytical psychology, in whose work Schellingian metaphysics is provocatively encrypted.

**Why Jung? – Anatomy of a Difference**

The cryptonomy of Schelling’s oeuvre is a case study of depth psychology’s self-analysis: in Schelling’s work there are aspects of both psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, and as such it sets in relief the theoretical break between Freud and Jung. In the history of depth-psychology, psychoanalysis emerges as a discipline plagued by the unsolvable problem of its own genesis. Confronted with the irresolvable, boundless problem of the unconscious and contracting this problem, as it were, into the irretrievable (mythical) image of the past, its provisional solution to its constitutive problems is interminable analysis – a constant (re)finding of the primal scenes suggested by the complexes this analysis finds. Of course, analytical psychology in its current form would not exist had the momentous

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40 Jung’s prolonged engagement with alchemy is reflected in vols. 12-14 of the *Collected Works* devoted exclusively to the subject. Jung’s alchemical studies are a prolonged effort to establish a linear analogy between the different stages of the alchemical process and the individuation process, but this teleology is unworked by Jungian metapsychology’s insistence on the purposive play of radically nonmolar (archetypal) forces.

41 Despite his insistence on “empirical” science, by 1931 Jung writes that “philosophy and psychology are linked by indissoluble bonds which are kept in being by the interrelation of their subject-matters [. . .] Neither discipline can do without the other, and the one invariably furnishes the unspoken—and generally unconscious—assumptions of the other” (“Basic Postulates” para. 659). Strangely, in 1954 Jung will prophesy the swallowing-up of philosophy by *phenomenological* psychology as a universal(ised) discipline. By “phenomenology” Jung means the empiricism of the “psychological statement” apart from, say, a Hegelian understanding of phenomenology as the progressive revelation of an absolute standpoint (*Transformation Symbolism* para. 375). An apt reminder that just as there are “many Freuds,” so there are also “many Jungs.”
meeting between Freud and Jung in 1907 never taken place. Indeed, Jung’s early work The Psychology of Dementia Praecox opens with an indebtedness to “the brilliant discoveries of Freud” (3) which would later allow Jung to define analytical psychology as an independent entity. Analytical psychology emerges from Jung’s relationship with Freud and psychoanalysis as an expansion into a general economy of fluidity in which this freedom can pursue its own line(s) of flight toward the plenitude of a potentiated unity which nevertheless remains unattainable, the receding terminus of a purposive unfolding. The complexes (re)found in psychoanalysis, which Freud at different times wants to bind to the myth of Oedipus or infantile trauma, is eclipsed by mythology as a decentred nexus of nonmolar forces, a view shared by both Schelling and Jung (this will be the focus of Chapter Five). Articulating Romantic metasubjectivity specifically against the backdrop of analytical psychology excavates Jung’s crucial place in depth psychology’s unexplored historical and theoretical continuities with Romanticism – domains which have been often overdetermined by psychoanalysis. Manfred Frank lays the foundations for individuality’s resistance to mere subjectivity on a normative level (see Appendix B, “Situating Romantic Metasubjectivity”), but we cannot conceive what this individuality is, and how it operates in more than its formal, socio-political sense, without the insights of analytical psychology.

Jung’s often religious or mythopoetic language is at times suggestive of what I call a therapeutics of presence which consolidates analyst and analysand, and the archetypal forces investing their mutual encounter, into relatively transparent, self-present forms (Shadow, Anima-Animus, Wise Old Man/Woman) in the interests of therapy and healing.42 But we will see that Jung’s metapsychology troubles this therapeutics of presence with a depth that psychologically (un)grounds Deleuze’s notion of depth as multidimensional, “pure implex [. . .] the (ultimate and original) heterogeneous dimension [. . .] the matrix of all extensity [. . .] pure spatium” (DR 229-30). And it is no surprise that here Deleuze invokes Schelling’s understanding of the Ungrund when he writes that “depth is not added from without to length

42 In the orthodox pantheon of Jungian archetypes, the Shadow is the traditional Doppelgänger, the “dark side” of the conscious personality. The Anima/Animus is the figure of the woman in man or man in woman, respectively; the Wise Old Woman/Man is the figure of wisdom in the man or woman respectively. The therapeutics of presence hypostatises these figures into personifications which, while quite possibly useful in a therapeutic setting, elide the potentiated nature of Jung’s metapsychology.
and breadth, but remains buried, like the sublime principle of the differend which creates them” (DR 230). Irrespective of Jung’s occasional use of metaphors of depth and height to figure personality, Jung’s metapsychology prefigures the differential depth Deleuze sees in the surface play of “length” and “breadth,” where verticality is a mobile metaphor casting a small beam of light on a libidinal economy that exceeds the purview of any one metaphor (e.g., latent-manifest, height-depth).

This theoretical affinity with Deleuze is in stark contrast to the fact that Jung’s contributions to Romantic criticism, not to mention twentieth-century theory, have been significantly hampered by a longstanding critical narrative which Sonu Shamdasani has aptly called the Freudocentric legend. This narrative, perpetuated by both Freudians and Jungians for different reasons, eclipses analytical psychology behind psychoanalysis, depicting Jung as little more than Freud’s errant Satan, a rebellious angel who left the psychoanalytic fold for a misguided career in starry-eyed “Romantic” mysticism (Shamdasani, Jung Stripped Bare 31). In this deracinating psychoanalytic creation myth, Jung is the ungrateful son in an uncanny Oedipal repetition of the primal scene, abjected from psychoanalysis to preserve its illusory, ergonal purity. And in this spirit, the Romantic-philosophical bedrock of analytical psychology is marginalised by scholars who would never dream of reading Freud with the same critical inattention. This said, some have seen recent decades as marking

43 Dean Rapp points out that British Edwardian intellectual circles overwhelmingly preferred Jungian thought to psychoanalysis: “Jung’s broadening of the libido to a general mental energy made it more attractive [than Freudian libido] to those already fascinated with Bergson’s élan vital. Thus reviewers outside the Jungian circle similarly stated their preference for Jung’s ‘broader’ outlook to the ‘narrow’ and ‘restricting’ views of Freud, meaning by this not only his ‘relentless pursuit of a sexual motive’, but also that Jung drew heavily on myths, sympathised with religious experience, and ascribed a philosophical and religious significance to the unconscious. Ironically, Jung was thus praised by various British expositors for being both more philosophical and more scientific than Freud, primarily because of the simultaneous British publication of his early and later works” (233).

44 For an illuminating discussion of the degree to which opposition to psychoanalysis (and Jung in particular) was pathologised, see Leitner 465, 481.

45 To take a few examples: Jacques Lacan describes the archetypal symbol as “the blossoming of the soul, and that is that” (“Situation” 392). Slavoj Žižek similarly trivialises Jungian thought as a “New Age […] resexualization of the universe (‘men are from Mars, women are from Venus’)” sanctioning “an underlying, deeply anchored sense of archetypal identity which provides a kind of safe haven in the flurry of contemporary confusion over roles and identities” (Ticklish Subject 443-44). Elsewhere, Žižek seems to want to reabsorb Jungian thought into psychoanalysis with a purportedly “Jungian” reading of Wagner in terms of superego(!) symbolism, unabashedly superimposing psychoanalytic terminology over what he would have us believe is the Jungian paradigm (“Foreword” viii). And discussing the ways in which alchemical language and ideas have
“the collapse of classical psychoanalytic theory,” to the point where Mario Jacoby can state offhand, in a back cover blurb to his *Individuation and Narcissism* (1991), that “recent developments in Freudian psychoanalysis, particularly the work of Kohut and Winnicott, have led to a convergence with the Jungian position.” And if Foucault is correct that one day the twenty-first century will be known as “Deleuzian” (“Theatrum Philosophicum” 165), Jung’s muted influence on key contemporary thinkers make it not implausible that psychologically it may be known as Jungian.

Romantic metasubjectivity should be understood as a contribution to this reconsideration of Jungian thought; it remedies the compulsive misreadings of Jung by suggesting, alongside a “darkening” in Schelling’s thought, a “darker” Jung whose metapsychology often unworks the optimistic teleology of a therapeutics of presence in which archetypes sometimes appear as (invoking Leibniz) windowless monads, self-contained and self-sufficient entities that refer to nothing outside themselves. It is this “darker,” more indeterminate Jung who is crucial to contemporary thought and whose ideas will be amplified in the following chapters. If Deleuze and other contemporary thinkers so valorised Jung over Freud, one may well ask why Jung has been so consistently marginalised in contemporary academia. Despite several factors (Freud’s highly successful smear campaign against Jung, Jung’s notoriously unscientific language, the theoretical diffused into psychology, Christine Battersby paraphrases twelve years of Jung’s alchemical researches as “a eulogy of the ‘feminine’ with a lethal bias against the merely female” (110), assuming that the masculine bias she perceives in ancient alchemists was simply transferred to analytical psychology. Significantly, in none of these passages are Jung’s works cited. You can lead scholars to Jung, but you can’t make them think…sympathetically.

46 See Shamdasani, “Introduction” xxi. Shamdasani refers specifically to the clinical situation of Freudian psychoanalysis, but there is something to be said for the increasing momentum of a call to re-evaluate psychoanalysis’ purchase in theory and philosophy. Beside philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari, some Romantic critics (e.g., Hogle) explicitly search for a new (non-psychoanalytic) theoretical language with which to articulate the sophisticated dynamics in Romantic literature, as we will see below.

47 All translations perform a certain violence, but the English translation of Jung’s *Collected Works* suffered in particular from the translator’s prejudices and errors. R.F.C. Hull, described by some as an “ardent rationalist,” had difficulty understanding several of Jung’s concepts and did not always follow Jung’s directions, which led to the “silent correction” of Jung’s texts (without Jung’s consent) with far-reaching consequences for the reception of some of his ideas. Moreover, the English *Collected Works* were released before the German, and with material that was not added to the German edition (Shamdasani, *Jung Stripped Bare*, chap. 2). Moreover, volume 18 of the *Collected Works*, entitled *The Symbolic Life*, was “informally referred to as the ‘junk volume’” during the *Collected Works’* compilation (Shamdasani, *Jung Stripped Bare* 53), containing waste products, abjected detritus that often troubles Jung’s more orthodox statements on individuation and its moral
shallowness of much “Jungian” writing), Jung’s important influence on contemporary twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers such as Bachelard, Deleuze, and throughout “psychoanalysis” (whose modern definition is now quite broad), is palpable, even where the proper name of Jung is absent.48 Nevertheless, Jung is indispensable to the intellectual genealogy of Romantic metasubjectivity, and this Jungian lacuna in intellectual history necessitates a brief account of analytical psychology and its key differences from psychoanalysis.

As a first outline of psychoanalysis (and one to which I shall refer later), Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) describes psychoanalysis as a “natural science.” Its objects of inquiry are “psychical processes” as “quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles” whose laws of interaction could be codified and ultimately made accessible to consciousness (295).49 At the Project’s scientific core is the developing conviction that the unconscious, which is almost exclusively a repository of repressed psychic contents,50 is capable of being made subservient to consciousness. In this sense, implications. The relation of this errant volume to its orthodox body remains unexplored. Where appropriate, I modify translations based on C.G. Jung’s Gesammelte Werke, 24 Bänden, heraus. Lena Hurwitz-Eisner, Lilly Jung-Merker, Marianne Niehus-Jung, Franz Riklin, Elisabeth Rüf, and Leonie Zander (Ostfildern: Patmos Verlag, 2011). For Freud, I use the Gesammelte Werke, 17 Bänden (Frankfurt am Main and London: S. Fischer Verlag/Imago Publishing, 1940-1950).

48 Despite Deleuze’s attribution of a differential unconscious to Jung and not Freud (DR 317), a journal volume devoted entirely to the Deleuzian idea of the “transcendental unconscious” (Deleuze & the Transcendental Unconscious, PLI 4.1-2 [1992]), replete with references to Freud, fails to take any note of Jung. Krell notes the possible proximity between Schelling and Jung, only to fold it back into their relevance as troublemakers for Freud’s “exquisite dualism.” Ironically, Krell’s central notion of “lifedeath,” taken up from Derrida as an expression of the “fatal imbrication” of “life-giving and death-dealing” forces of nature in Novalis, Schelling and Hegel, is tied to the Freudian concepts of Éros and Thanatos where Romantic metasubjectivity reveals lifedeath as a product of dual Jungian tendencies of Jungian libido as force, thereby revealing what Grant might call a genetic aspect absent in Krell’s Freudian account (Contagion 2, 190 n. 1).

49 Positioning Freud contra Schelling, ffytche summarises the ramifications of Freud’s burgeoning scientific psychology for notions of personhood: “Freud does not identify the individual with a secret or emergent freedom or an intangible ‘spirit’ of individuality, or assume any overarching unifying principle within the world, other than general physical laws governing the concentration and displacement of energy. [. . .] What stood out in Schelling’s work as a displacement of divine or absolute organisation in the world behind the screen of the unconscious, transmutes in Freud to a more technical concern with the structure and dynamics of thought association, libidinal energy, censorship and resistance as empirical phenomena for the scientific investigation of mental life” (276).

50 In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud will write that even though the repressed is “the paradigm of the unconscious,” at least part of the ego is “undoubtedly” unconscious, thereby troubling scientific distinctions between ego, id, and superego. Significantly Freud immediately adds, with some ambivalence, that the idea of a “non-repressed” unconscious (such as Jung’s) would only demur the idea of the unconscious into a
psychoanalysis became a colonial project whereby repressed unconscious contents were explored and excavated until the underlying primal scenes causing repression were (ideally) discovered and lifted, often through the method of free association, which traces units of organisation in memory in order to uncover a primal cause or scene. That the existence of such a primal cause was haunted by the spectre of interminable analysis – the inexorable problem of where one finds the primal cause, and how one identifies it – complicates but does not annul the psychoanalytic emphasis on origins. But this conflict model determined by the ubiquitous struggle between consciousness and the unconscious inaugurates what Lacan would later famously call the “split subject,” a subject always already alienated from itself with no prospect of synthesis.

In contradistinction to Freud’s emphasis on the past, Jung emphasises the Schellingian “spirit of individuality” that ffytche sees as excised from psychoanalysis (276). And against the psychoanalytic conflict model, analytical psychology emphasises a more compensatory relationship between consciousness and the unconscious serving the human organism’s current developmental needs: a person wholly devoted to rational thinking in daily life will likely have an emotional, affect-driven unconscious that manifests itself in dreams and waking fantasies. Jung explains: “the role of the unconscious is to act compensatorily to the conscious contents of the moment. By this I do not mean that it sets up an opposition, for there are times when the tendency of the unconscious coincides with that of consciousness, namely, when the conscious attitude is approaching the optimum” (“Role” para. 21). It follows from this that the unconscious need not smuggle dream contents past a censor into consciousness, as both consciousness and the unconscious are interested in the organism’s well-being and preservation. Rather, the dream’s symbolic language reflects its status as “a part of nature, which harbors no intention to deceive, but expresses something as best it can, just as a plant grows or an animal seeks its food as best it can” (Memories 161-62). Jung will elsewhere write with emphasis that “the unconscious is nature, which never deceives” (Symbols 62) – an alignment of the unconscious with Nature that pervades his oeuvre. Hence Jung’s formulation of the collective unconscious as a stratum of the psyche

“multivalent quality that allows no scope for the far-reaching and definitive conclusions we would have liked to draw from it” (107, 109).
common to all human beings and contiguous with Nature itself: “[t]he unconscious, as the totality of all archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience right back to its remotest beginnings. Not, indeed, a dead deposit, a sort of abandoned rubbish-heap, but a living system of reactions and aptitudes that determine the individual’s life in invisible ways” (“Structure” para. 339).

The mythopoeic register in which Jung expresses the living system of symbolic Nature situates him in the literary-philosophical style Charles Schwab identifies with Manfred Frank’s “antirationalist”/“neostructuralist” tradition inaugurated by Nietzsche. Neostructuralism underscores the ontologically productive nature of “metaphorically ‘released’” language which “yields a thought all its own, or, more radically [. . .] only metaphorical procedures [that] are adequate to exhibit the dynamic, indeterminable, and multiple character of all semiosis or, if it is different, of reality at large” (Frank, What is Neostructuralism? xix). And we must not be snobbish about our metaphors. When Jung describes the unconscious as a “treasure-house [of] accumulated life-experiences” or as “[hiding] living water, spirit that has become nature” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 352; “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious” para. 50); when he describes regression as a dike damming up a mountain watercourse (“On Psychic Energy” para. 72); or when he warns those who would plunder “psychic riches” that “more than one sorcerer’s apprentice has been drowned in the waters called up by himself” (“Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious” para. 31), he is not subscribing to nature-mysticism or diving headfirst into a metaphysics of presence. Rather, Jung’s mythopoeic register establishes the nature of these psychic dynamisms as anterior to logical thought and profoundly fabular.51 Schlegel writes that “one cannot really speak of poetry except in the language of poetry” (Dialogue on Poetry 54), and similarly Jung’s ubiquitous references to fairy tales, myths and literature in describing the phenomenology of the psyche reflect the quintessential Romantic emphasis on the aesthetic as the only means of authentically expressing absolute knowledge. We need

51 “The language I speak must be equivocal, that is ambiguous, to do justice to psychic nature with its double aspect. I strive consciously and deliberately for ambiguous expressions, because it is superior to unequivocalness and corresponds to the nature of being” (letter to Zwi Werblowsky, 17 June 1952, qtd. in Shamdasani, Jung Stripped Bare 48).
only read the opening pages of Schelling’s *Ages* to see his emphasis on the narrated nature of knowledge, an emphasis which persists across all three revisions.

This compensatory dynamic between consciousness and the unconscious informs Jung’s fundamental divergence from Freud concerning the nature of libido.52 Jung’s *energetic* conception of libido asserts libido’s “generalised” quantitative aspect against Freudian libido, which is qualitatively defined by sexuality (Jung calls this the *mechanistic* approach).53 That is, Jungian libido is “psychic energy” in general, irreducible to any one instinct but measurable in principle through its *quantitative* potency and investment in objects or fantasies (which include, but are not limited to the sexual):

[Libido] denotes a desire or impulse which is unchecked by any kind of authority, moral or otherwise. Libido is appetite in its natural state. From the genetic point of view it is bodily needs like hunger, thirst, sleep, and sex, and emotional states or affects, which constitute the essence of libido. All these factors have their differentiations and subtle ramifications in the highly complicated human psyche. (Symbols 135-36)

The fluid dynamics of Jungian libido and the productive unconscious are conceptualised by the archetype, which is perhaps the best-known (and most contentious) concept of analytical psychology, and one which has been subjected to at times wildly variant interpretations. Jung’s orthodox anthropocentric conception of the archetype – that is, the archetype as it appears in Jung’s therapeutics of presence – is that of a fundamental organisational force of

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52 In 1912 Jung published *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (*Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*; extensively revised as *Symbols of Transformation* [1952], vol. 5 of the *Collected Works*), which presented Jung’s view of libido as a direct critique of Freud’s sexual theory. Incest was the point of division: Jung’s argument was that “[the incest taboo] has a much greater—and different—significance than the prevention of incest [. . .] [the taboo] is the symbol or vehicle of a far wider and special meaning which has as little to do with real incest as hysteria with the actual trauma, the animal cult with the bestial tendency and the temple with the stone” (letter to Freud, 17 May 1912; *Freud/Jung Letters* 506). Jung wrote this work knowing it would cost him his relationship with Freud (*Symbols* xxvi), who ultimately could not tolerate the dissent of the heir-apparent to psychoanalysis. The Freud-Jung correspondence for the last half of 1912 is compelling reading.

53 Jung does not dismiss the mechanistic approach to libido as irrelevant or flawed, stating in the following paragraph that both views of libido “are indispensable for understanding physical events.” And, gesturing toward the “third term” that characterises so many aspects of Schelling’s philosophy, Jung further writes that “their continued existence side by side has given rise to a third conception which is mechanistic as well as energetic—although, logically speaking, [. . .] it is not possible to conceive that one and the same combination of events could be simultaneously both causal and final” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 4). Read with emphasis on Jung’s qualifier “logically speaking,” it seems as if analytical psychology peers into the metaphysics Jung elsewhere seeks to repress to retain psychology’s disciplinary purity.
human experience and knowledge shared by all members of the human race. Represented by images, objects and affects while remaining unknowable in themselves, archetypes express the differentiations and varying intensities of libido performed in different forms at different times according to a culture’s historical particularities. Archetypes can be dream figures or projections on to people in everyday life (mother, father, partner), or situations (birth, death, rites of passage). Jung’s first reference to the archetype in 1919 is to “a priori, inborn forms of ‘intuition’” in the collective unconscious, “the archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes” (“Instinct” para. 270).

As human beings, we exist in a rhythm of archetypal projection and recollection. We project archetypal patterns on to the objective world in order to organise and articulate our experience. However, healthy adaptation also requires us to withdraw, or “recollect” archetypal material – to understand our own investment in projections and come to realise our psychic participation in what we see (Jung, “Psychological Aspects” para. 160). But while Jung’s therapeutics of presence may present this rhythm as an unbroken harmony of interaction with symbols and natural phenomena, Jung’s darker metapsychology resists this Abramsian imposition. In Chapter Four we will see, via Hölderlin, that this rhythm harbours a latent indeterminacy, a vulnerability to trauma which can break this rhythm and send its line of flight into unpredictable or catastrophic directions.

Jung’s early conflation of “archetype” with vague terms such as “primordial image” (“Definitions” para. 747), as well as his at times rather rigid interpretations of myth and literature (verging at times on a “spot-the-archetype” Easter Egg hunt), has contributed to the

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54 Jung uses “primordial image” (Urbild) and “archetype” (Archetypus) synonymously, which has caused much confusion over Jung’s specific formulation. See Jung, “Instinct” para. 270 n. 7. The German Bild is notoriously difficult to translate (it can mean “representation,” “image,” and “likeness” to name but a few examples). To make matters more confusing: in “Definitions” Jung’s original German reads das urtümliche Bild. Hull translates this as “primordial image,” but more accurately it means “natural” or “primeval” image, which does not have the same claim to absolute origins as “primordial.” Urtümlich is closest to ursprünglich (“original”), and both carry the very specific sense of “from the beginning” or “from the origin.” What makes it “natural” is that it remains true to its origin, as in a river whose course has not been artificially changed. It is thus “ancient” or “primordial,” but in a strictly autochthonous sense. This does not make it static or unchanging: an urtümlich river continually flows, but it is ancient and originary, hence “natural” in this sense. For Schelling, natura naturans is Urnatür (“originary”) and urtümlich, “natural.” With this in mind, read through the lens of transcendental empiricism, this “natural image” may be more amenable to a specifically Deleuzian notion of depth as extensive matrix and “pure spatium” (DR 229-30). Jung’s German term for the archetype’s purposive nature (zweckmäßig), however, is identical to Schelling’s in the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) and elsewhere. I am indebted to Jason Wirth for this observation regarding urtümliche.
misunderstanding of the Jungian archetype as a fixed structural unit in a totalising literary-mythological encyclopedia of human experience. Moreover Jung’s early Kantian explanation of the archetypes, which deployed a distinction between the *noumenal* “archetype in itself” and the archetype’s *phenomenal* representation\(^{55}\) has also cast the archetype as a static form strangely alienated from its manifestation. But the darker, more indeterminate aspects of Jungian metapsychology – those aspects which articulate Romantic metasubjectivity – radically unwork this orthodox conception. 1947 marks a turn in Jung’s thinking on the archetype, a “further degree of differentiation” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 419). Now, Jung conceives of the archetype as *psychoid* in nature, which is to say that its intensity ranges from the human psyche into the inscrutable darkness of biological processes. It is simultaneously *both producer and product of human experience*, implicating the concept of the archetype in a materiality which oversteps the boundaries of Jung’s Kantianism. With the psychoid archetype, Jung’s metapsychology moves decisively toward a general economy of dynamic creation which, as we will see, has compelling affinities with Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*. Indeed, straddling both mind and nature, ideal and real, the archetypes become unruly almost beyond definition: “you will never be able to disentangle an archetype. It is always interwoven in a carpet of related ideas, which lead ever further toward other archetypal formations, which constantly overlap and together knit the wondrous carpet of life” (Jung, *Dream Interpretation* 237). The Jungian archetype can best be defined as a centripetal force, attracting psychic and material contents to itself while remaining irreducible to any one of its representations. Always already imbricated in an infinite metonymy of representations, the archetype nevertheless *happens* through unique constellations of ideas, images and natural objects.\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\) This also calls attention to Kant’s own problematic designation of the noumenal realm; for what can we say about something as unknowable as the “thing in itself”?

\(^{56}\) Indeed, one can almost speak of the archetype (although Jung does not) as a constellation of multiple energetic centres, much like the way Schelling describes comets as recapitulations of the “fiery electrical dissolution” of original matter. Comets, whose “individual center[s] of gravity [are] not reconciled with the universal center of gravity,” embody the primordial systolic-diastolic rhythms of the cosmos without conforming to the set movement of “settled planets” (*Ages* 96-97). And following Jung’s observation that archetypes are mutually entangled, it follows that archetypal *situations* constellate other archetypal symbols, affects and forces as multiple energetic centres. The question, then, would be: what makes this archetypal constellation “choose” particular manifestations in therapy and/or lived experience? This issue is broached in the discussion of individuation in Chapter Four.
This centripetalism accounts for the Jungian archetype’s autonomous nature. In both dreams and waking life, archetypes can function as dramatis personae, individual personalities whose wishes do not always coincide with those of consciousness. Where Freud’s well-known second topography of the psyche features ego, id, and superego as driven yet impersonal constructs, the autonomy of the archetypes reflects Jung’s indebtedness less to Freud than to Pierre Janet\textsuperscript{57} and the dissociationist tradition of depth psychology. As John Haule writes,

Dissociationism accepted the notion that ideas and images tend to combine into complexes, but conceptualized the process very differently. Rejecting (forever) the concept of mental Newtonian forces, they held that every aggregation of ideas and images possessed, in some measure or other, its own personality. [Dissociationism] replaced the impersonal, atomic level mechanisms more appropriate to psychics and astrology with a kind of holistic personalism, which appears more adequate for understanding the experience and behavior of human individuals. [A] compelling adjunct to this was the fact that there exist lower life forms, well-known in biology, in which larger individuals are comprised of colonies of simpler individuals. (243-44, 245)\textsuperscript{58}

In contrast to Freud, who “imposed a causal schema upon dissociationism’s essentially teleological image of complex formation” (251),\textsuperscript{59} Jung did not see libido as organised around one instinct or one type of primary cause. Nevertheless, for Jung individual development organises experience and knowledge according to an unfolding plan; the “voices” of the archetypes, if understood, suggest an epigenetic trajectory one’s life should take. Jung’s term for the process of discovering and attempting to follow this “plan” is individuation, which is the therapeutic goal of analytical psychology.

\textsuperscript{57} Pierre Janet (1859-1947), founding figure in psychology whose work (particularly Psychological Automatism [1889]) helped develop the dissociationist approach to the psyche. See Ellenberger 358ff. and Shamdasani, Jung and the Making 122ff.

\textsuperscript{58} Despite dissociationism’s checkered acceptance in the psychological community (Haule 245), Deleuzian-Guattarian schizoanalysis shares its fundamental understanding of the psyche. Schizoanalysis is the project of “tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions” and “liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress” (\textit{Anti-Oedipus} 362).

\textsuperscript{59} Although Jung’s energetic approach to libido is not teleological (insofar as there is no telos, or final goal to its unfolding) but rather purposive, it is clear that Haule uses “teleological” in the latter sense here.
In simple terms (and terms which we shall complicate in Chapter Four), Jungian individuation is the person’s becoming who s/he is by negotiating both collective norms and particularities “already ingrained in the psychic constitution” (Jung, “Definitions” para. 761). In other words, individuation is the process of achieving the “optimum” compensatory relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. But as with the archetype, Jung’s development of the concept of individuation emerges as a Deleuzian line of flight, cutting across traditions and disciplines while remaining unbound to any. Jung’s earliest mention of the concept of individuation seems to have been in his *Septem Sermones ad Mortuos* (“Seven Sermons to the Dead”) published anonymously in 1916, a Gnostic fragment from *The Red Book*, Jung’s self-authored and illustrated folio manuscript which reflects his imaginative engagement with his own unconscious following the traumatic break with Freud circa 1912. In this text Jung refers to the “Principium Individuationis” (the principle of individuation) intrinsic to all creatures as a drive to resist the “primeval, perilous sameness” of the pleroma, Jung’s Gnostic term for the “nothingness or fullness” from which “creatura” emerge (Jung, *Memories* 379-80).

But crucially, Jung elsewhere equates individuation with the *non-human*, which unworks any pretence to a teleological, linear understanding of individuation as proceeding tidily from one stage to another. Indeed, the following description of individuation illustrates the opposing tendencies of preformation and epigenesis which often inform Jung’s articulation of individuation:

[I]ndividuation is not an intensification of consciousness, it is very much more. For you must have the consciousness of something before it can be intensified, and that means experience, life lived. You can only be really conscious of things which you have experienced, so individuation must be understood as life. Only life integrates, only life and what we do in life makes the individual appear. [. . .] Individuation is the accomplishment through life. For instance, say a cell begins to divide itself and to differentiate and develop into a certain plant or a certain animal; that is the process of individuation. It is that one becomes what one is, that one accomplishes one’s destiny, all the determinations that are given in the form of the germ; it is the unfolding of the germ and becoming the primitive pattern that one was born with. [. . .] Individuation is both the beginning and the end of life, it is the process of life itself. (Jung, *Visions* 2:757-58)

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60 See also “Adaptation, Individuation, Collectivity,” papers dated October 1916 but not discovered until 1964.
On the one hand, individuation seems preformationist in nature (a matter of “accomplishing one’s destiny” and the “determinations of the germ”). But on the other hand it is precisely in the connection with “life” and the phenomena of cell division that individuation is opened up to the possibility of mutation, monstrosity, deviation from categorical norms. Moreover, Jung’s further complication of individuation with the open economy of psychic “experience” moves individuation into more indeterminate territory – indeed, it is psyche, and its consanguinity with Nature,\textsuperscript{61} which ultimately undetermines teleology in Jungian individuation. And Jung will extend individuation even further into inorganic processes, and the implications of this will prove crucial to the ethical dimensions of Romantic metasubjectivity I explore in the Conclusion. But for now, let us observe that individuation’s indeterminate, ateleological dimensions are also central to Schelling’s thought beginning with the First Outline, which concerns itself with the question of how natural products individuate from a primordial, undifferentiated fluidity. “The highest problem of the philosophy of nature,” Schelling writes, is to explain how “Nature in general evolves with finite velocity, and so shows determinate products (of determinate synthesis) everywhere” (FO 77).

Analytical psychology’s Thanatopoietic rhythm of progression and regression, and its entanglement with psyche and Nature, allow us to conceive analytical psychology as a supplement to psychoanalysis in the Derridean sense.\textsuperscript{62} Just as the Derridean supplement “adds only to replace [. . .] intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 145), analytical psychology, emerging from psychoanalysis, “adds” a prospective, future-oriented element to depth-psychological theorising of the self, and seeks to “replace” Freud’s emphasis on the personalised subject by also reaching further back to the primordial origins of humanity as the collective unconscious.\textsuperscript{63} The grammatology of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} “The psyche is a phenomenon not subject to our will; it is nature, and [. . .] cannot be changed into something artificial without profound injury to our humanity” (“A Psychological View” para. 831; my italics).
  \item \textsuperscript{62} See Barentsen for a more detailed consideration of this supplementarity.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Taking up Derrida’s reading of Freud’s agon with Jung in The Post Card (1980), Todd Dufresne contextualises Jung’s parergonal presence in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “Freud’s attempt to ostracize Jung’s generalized libido theory—to annul it in the eyes of psychoanalysis—with a “generalized” death drive, only mirrored in reverse that very theory. As such, Jung’s monistic vision of libido remains the essential supplement, the counterpart, to Freud’s death drive and, consequently, the true structural partner to Freud’s
\end{itemize}
Being, as the ontological écriture within which Romantic metasubjectivity unfolds, points to a missed encounter between Jung and Derrida, but this missed encounter is also symptomatic of a broader resistance to theory marking Jungian criticism. In the final section of this Introduction, I want to touch on the embattled engagements with theory on the part of Jungians as a means to suggest ways in which Romantic metasubjectivity opens a space for more productive engagements between Jungian thought and contemporary theory.

Jung and the Resistance to Theory

The 2009 publication of Jung’s Red Book64 precipitated numerous discussions about its broader relevance to analytical psychology. The Red Book, and much of its reception, gestures toward a persistent Idealism in Jungian scholarship which often writes the general economy of analytical metapsychology into an ontotheology of presence that elides Jung’s more radical thinking. One such example deals with Schelling: Paul Bishop uses The Red Book to argue that “Schelling – and the intellectual debate of the period of German classicism and Romanticism […] offers a framework within which we can better understand Jung’s project in analytical psychology as a whole and in The Red Book in particular” (“Jung’s Red Book” 337). But in designating The Red Book as Jung’s “long-withheld masterpiece,” Bishop repeats an auratic transference onto this “sacred text” symptomatic of a religious reading of Jung. Moreover, by categorising Schelling as Idealist (337) Bishop obfuscates Naturphilosophie’s centrality to Schelling’s thought by treating it as merely a preamble to the philosophy of art and the 1800 System which, following an orthodox reading, uneasy dualism of 1920” (Tales 23; my italics). See also Derrida, The Post Card 366-67. Of course, beyond the critique of Freud which informs my study, it should be noted that depth psychology itself is constituted in no small part from the relationship of mutual supplementarity between Jung and Freud. Indeed, Jung’s naming of his psychology as “analytical psychology,” and its proximity to psychoanalysis, invite such a relationship. A more in-depth consideration of the Freud-Jung relationship on this theoretical level is a topic quite worthy of study, yet beyond my scope here.

64 While an in-depth discussion of this seminal yet enigmatic Jungian text is beyond my scope here, its importance to analytical psychology merits some mention. Begun in 1914 soon after the break with Freud and based in a series of traumatic (and arguably precognitive) fantasies preceding the First World War, the Red Book is a narrative of Jung’s confrontation with the unconscious, written and illustrated in his own hand, depicting parables and dialogues with mythical figures after the style of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Red Book 30, 88). Put simply, the Red Book can be read as a poetic case study of Jungian individuation and active imagination, about which I shall have more to say in Chapter Four.
he regards as Schelling’s overarching system (347). In doing so, Bishop effectively closes analytical psychology off to the broader potential of a theoretical encounter between Schelling and Jung. In other words, there is a drive to idealise Jung in much Jungian work (perhaps especially post-Red Book) which elides potential engagements between Jung and other theories which interrogate this Idealism, or which work to excavate the more radical dimensions of Jung’s thought aligned with theories critical of Idealism (such as deconstruction).

The drive to idealise analytical psychology is particularly reflected in the work of Wolfgang Giegerich. In direct contrast to my reading of Jung vis-à-vis Romantic metasubjectivity, Giegerich’s Hegelian reading of Jung empties analytical psychology of “irrational” factors such as the archetypes and the collective unconscious in favour of the alchemical-dialectical movement of “Soul” toward absolute knowledge. For Giegerich, analytical psychology “is rooted in the Notion soul [. . .] explicitly set up [to give] (relatively) free play to the unfolding of the complexities of the Notion and harbors within itself, in implicit, germinal form [. . .] a higher logical status of consciousness, one that could be hoped to be able to match the logical status our reality has long reached” (Soul’s 53; my italics). Thus individuation, for Giegerich, is nothing more than a “Jungian power word,” a subjective need eclipsing what he sees as the real (read: logical) substance of “the Jungian heritage” (85). For Giegerich, the labour of the Concept erases individuation as the core process of true psychology. Moreover, according to Giegerich, Jung “hypostatized (substantiated) the unconscious” as a positive entity and “reified the archetypes” as “timeless factors” to the point where they are “positivized and logically removed from within the real psychic process and set up as external ‘dominants’ of this process.” Jung’s view of psychic illness as something potentially transformative is seen as a theoretical flaw (“Love” 259). Indeed, assuming a Hegelian Archimedean point with which to survey history in its entirety,

65 That this reading implies only a certain “Idealist” Hegel – and perhaps not the most interesting one – has been shown in two excellent essays by Arkady Plotnitsky and Tilottama Rajan. See Plotnitsky, “Curvatures” 113-14, and Rajan, “Phenomenology” 159, 163. Frederick Beiser’s Hegel (2005) is also a comprehensive and nuanced reading of Hegel in both his Idealist and Romantic intensities.

66 As Krell argues, Novalis’ shares precisely this view of illness in his “poetics of the baneful” in which one must voluptuously love the monstrous for its own sake, as part of an authentic health which includes within itself a “whole illness” as impetus to philosophical reflection and action (Contagion 50-53).
Giegerich negates the unconscious itself as something which “cannot be demonstrated and [. . .] could not possibly have been discovered” – as only “an idea or construct in the minds of certain people. [. . .] Today, being able to see the crazes of the twentieth century from a historical distance, we no longer have to believe in the unconscious” (“Love” 260).

Giegerich’s dismissal of Jung’s Romantic-dissociationist heritage centres on his notion of interiority – the idea that the soul’s movement is an absolutely “logical movement” with no Foucauldian “thought of the outside.” He writes: “There is nothing outside the psyche, no other, nothing new. The notion or logic of the soul precludes a beyond, an ‘abroad.’ [There is no] demarcation line separating what is inside the soul from what is out there. We are hopelessly stuck in the soul[’s] absolute interiority” (“Is the Soul ‘Deep’?” 136-37). The “conquest” of this absolute interiority’s infinity is “the alchemical, logically negative process of an internal putrefaction, corruption, fermentation, sublimation of ‘whatever is there’ [in this infinity] deeper into itself” (139). History, which acquires for the Romantics a traumatic affinity with Being, is here the aftereffect of dialectic (“The Unassimilable Remnant” 445); all things “unconscious” are the excreta of a “twentieth century craze,” waste products of the soul’s Hegelian teleological movement. As the following chapters will explore in more detail, Romantic metasubjectivity directly contests Giegerich’s imposition of alchemical teleology on Jungian thought in order to recuperate the nonrational aspects of Jung’s psychology (the collective unconscious, the archetypes, the Self) which Giegerich abjects.67 Indeed, the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity involves reading Jung through the full compass of theoretical transferences informing his thought – away from the strictures of teleology and analytical psychology’s therapeutics of presence,

67 In fact, Giegerich sees Schelling as an “ontotheological” thinker (“Jungian Psychology” 243) and rather polemically takes issue with McGrath’s view that Schellingian metaphysics is a “natural ally” for analytical psychology (McGrath, “The Question” 23). For Giegerich, “Schelling’s project had always aimed, from beginning to end, for a grand system, an overall closed system” (“Jungian Psychology” 242). Rather more problematically, Giegerich’s references to Schelling are overwhelmingly to the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism and the 1801/1802 “Presentations” of Schelling’s philosophy, none of which can be reasonably said to represent Schelling’s oeuvre as a whole. Indeed, Giegerich dismisses a Schelling-Jung link altogether as an “emotional need” which leads people to establish links between Naturphilosophie and Jung, who for Giegerich can only be a thinker of alchemical teleology (244). As I will argue in Chapter Four, while there are teleological moments in Jung’s alchemical studies and his desire to link stages of alchemy with stages of the individuation process, he ultimately unworks this teleology to make linear-alchemical progressions more corpuscular as part of a more fluid purposiveness.
and toward a specifically Romantic discipline of theory as “a field that lies midway between philosophy and criticism,” between phenomenology (the study of the structures of consciousness and their expression in culture) and deconstruction (as the interrogation of ontotheological “presence”), and thus partaking of both (Rajan, “Phenomenology” 158, 160). With this, I turn in this final section to Jung’s relevance to deconstruction.

We have glimpsed how theory resists Jung; it remains an unfortunate fact that many Jungians also resist theory. Nevertheless, when Shamdasani refers to the collective unconscious as a Borgesian “library within” (C.G. Jung 7, 49), he is touching on a fundamentally rhizomatic drive within analytical psychology which situates it in close proximity to deconstruction. Rajan defines deconstruction as “a transposition of phenomenological into linguistic models that retains the ontological concerns of the former” (Deconstruction 7), whose notion of écriture does not isolate the literary from a broader philosophical discourse of ideas. This theoretical sensitivity is lacking in the vast majority of Jungian criticism, which often prefers an interiority through which theory is (mis)translated into a Jungian rubric. In this way, analytical psychology’s deconstructive potential is often elided.

For example, Polly Young-Eisendrath positions Jung against Derridean deconstruction, which to her is a “branch of postmodern theory” and “a political critique of human ideals and virtues [. . .] a skeptical philosophy of doubt and dismantling, based on a negative assumption that human lives are governed mostly by power arrangements” (33, 79-80). Against this she sees a “constructivist” Jung affirming everything as interpretation. She denies the archetypes any part in this interpretive process because “even our very perceptions are interpretations, and so nothing is absolutely fixed and eternal in our phenomenal world.”

68 Apart from obvious exceptions, here and throughout I use “phenomenology” not as Hegel deploys it in service of teleology (a “phenomenology of spirit”), but in its more unbound sense of potentiated (or libidinally charged) natural objects, which is also how Jung uses the term.

69 Even the concept of a “Jungian metapsychology” is resisted by some Jungians. In 2006 Christian Galliard, then president of the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP), insists that Jung developed his theories “only in response to his discoveries and encounters, and at the pace and rhythm of the debates that they incite. [. . .] unlike Freud, [Jung] does not construct a psychology, and certainly not a metapsychology, but produces animated concepts to deconstruct the rigidities of the conscious and accompany the diverse moments and aspects of a live relationship with the unconscious” (“The Arts” 336, 368).
But in the next passage she recapitulates a Kantian dichotomy between this phenomenal world and “universal aspects of our subjectivity” through which “we are all human beings who are universally constrained and endowed in certain predispositions to perceive ourselves and the world” (33). Susan Rowland makes some interesting observations regarding the tension in Jung between a logocentric, image-based Christian individuation process and an “Eros-based” narrative purportedly deconstructing a Logos-Eros inside/outside distinction. But she uses this to read Derrida (rather incomprehensibly!) as “that other architect of mythical re-individuation” (106) who “emphasis[es] the goddess” (111), thus missing deconstruction’s theoretical point and laying Derrida to rest on a Procrustean bed of mythical drama, constructing a romance of unity that deconstruction fundamentally suspects. The mythical understanding of deconstruction here (as “son-lover” in the “Sky-Father / Earth-Mother” dyad) relapses into ontotheology at the expense of deconstruction’s interrogation of presence. Indeed, just as prejudiced theorists often do not bother citing Jung, Rowland’s substitution of other authors for Derrida’s primary texts reflects this evasion of deconstruction’s radical core instead of an earnest engagement with it.

Pellegrino D’Acierno and Karin Barnaby approach Jung more judiciously, rightly suggesting that Jung can “elucidate the psychological dynamics” suggested by “deconstructivist discoveries” (xxiii). Edward Casey takes up Jung’s suspicion of the superstitious belief in “nebulous power-words” (Jung, *Alchemical Studies* 49) as a point of connection with Derrida’s deconstruction of the language of metaphysics as part of a larger “recourse to the polyformity of phenomenology in flight from the monism of metaphysics” (Casey 320). And Ross Woodman’s more sophisticated thematic alignment of Jung and Derrida regarding the significance of madness in symbolic orders preserves a phenomenological approach to Romanticism which, Rajan argues, has been exorcised from American deconstruction: “Jung struggled less to imprison madness in an archetypal system than phenomenologically to transform it into an ever evolving consciousness evident in [Romantic] poetry” (Woodman 17; Rajan, *Deconstruction* xii-xiii). On the deconstruction

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70 But as we will see in Chapter Five, instead of personalising theoretical movements as mythical figures, Romantic metasubjectivity focuses on the nonmolar matrix of forces that do generate what Schelling and Jung both rightly recognise as “mythology” in its broadest sense, the mythology that resists Giegerich’s claim that we have entered a “stage of alchemy” without looking back.
side of the divide, few seem to have specifically engaged with Jung, and he seems to have been (predictably) used as a term of insult. In an apparently scathing attack circa 1970 (which arguably sets the tone for Jung’s reception for most of the twentieth century), Élisabeth Roudinesco compared Derrida’s work with Jung’s, which “flabbergasted” Derrida and led to a protracted falling-out between the two (Peeters 215, 365).71

It is important to do justice to the phenomenology of the psyche which Jung puts at the heart of analytical psychology (Jung, “Foreword to Jung” para. 742). But as “crypto-metaphysics,” Jung’s thought need not lead one to oversimplifying distinctions. “Metaphysics” and “monistic” closure are not synonyms. Although both Jung and Schelling are in many ways “post-metaphysical” thinkers insofar as their oeuvres challenge the closure of system, their use of metaphysical concepts (often screened by psychology in Jung’s case) points up the problem of demarcating metaphysics from its “post.”72 Romantic metasubjectivity’s ontological terrain theorises what is missing in these more thematic accounts of Jung’s affinity with deconstruction: a missed encounter between Jung and Derrida, a theoretical rapprochement that was elided by the *fort/da* with psychoanalysis which marked Derrida’s intellectual milieu. Indeed, the idea of Romantic metasubjectivity articulates the subject Derrida *might* have found in this missed encounter. And to this end, Derrida’s later thought suggests a need to move beyond psychoanalysis’ own pleasure principles, the “large Freudian machines” which inhibit the productive psyche to the point of a closure he identifies with metaphysics.73

71 But Derrida’s 1980 reading of Freud’s agon with Jung in *The Post Card* perhaps signals a more leavened consideration of Jung. And it is possible that by the time he writes “The Transcendental ‘Stupidity’” (2007), Derrida has acknowledged Jung’s significance via Deleuze: “Deleuze’s absolute originality: in France, admiring Jung more than Freud” (37).

72 For a critique of the equation of metaphysics with “closure” see Bowie, *Schelling* 67ff.

73 In 2004 Derrida writes: “the id, the ego, the superego, the ideal ego, the ego ideal, the secondary process and the primary process of repression, etc. – in a word, the large Freudian machines (including the concept and the word ‘unconscious’!) – are [only provisional weapons] against a philosophy of consciousness, of transparent and fully responsible intentionality. I have little faith in their future. I do not think that a metapsychology can hold up for long under scrutiny [. . .] The grand entities (ego, id, superego, etc.), but also the grand conceptual ‘oppositions’ – which are too solid, and therefore very precarious – that followed those of Freud, such as the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, etc. or ‘introspection’ and ‘incorporation’ – these seem to me to be carried away [. . .] by the ineluctable necessity of some ‘difference’ that erases or displaces their borders. [. . .] I am therefore never ready to follow Freud and his followers in the functioning of the grand theoretical machines, in their functionalisation (“In Praise of Psychoanalysis” 172-74).
In contrast to (perhaps supplementation of) these conceptual edifices, and to gesture toward a more productive conception of the Jung-Derrida missed encounter, let us return to what I call the grammatology of Being (which I discuss further in Chapter Two). Jung’s emphasis on the play of archetypal forces that are both producer and product of experience provides a general economy of symbolic écéditure that preserves the fundamental movements of différence which interrogate presence.74 For this reason, the grammatology of Being is synonymous with an archetypal grammatology which, unlike the “machines” of psychoanalysis, allow for the play of différence among its constituent (archetypal) forces. And Derrida was not concerned with eradicating the idea of the “subject” altogether; Manfred Frank suggests that even if subsequent Derrideans saw subjectivity as an epiphenomenon of différence, “Derrida does not repudiate the phenomenon of self-consciousness that is evident in itself; to do this would indeed mean falling into absurdity. What Derrida has in mind [is] a different, more illuminating explanation of that same phenomenon that is taken into consideration only within the framework of transcendental philosophy at the price of indissoluble aporias” (What is Neostructuralism? 257). The presence of the “self,” as “proper word and unique name” (“Différance” 160) is deferred—not deleted. Indeed, to see this nonknowledge (Bataille)75 not for its own sake but as the condition of possibility for knowledge itself against the closure of “organic totality,” as Arkady Plotnitsky has compellingly argued (“Conclusion” 243, 248), is both quintessentially Romantic and a core tenet of analytical psychology. Archetypal grammatology articulates the Trieb of the absent subject in Derridean deconstruction because the Jungian Self is not (and never has been) a transcendental self-present “I,” but rather a centripetal force of selfhood writing itself, as ontological écriture, through the symbolic unfolding of what Derrida calls différence. It is precisely these provisional constellations of knowledge from a nonmolar intensity that makes différence possible. Thus, the Romantic metasubject is the “subject” Derrida, who remained stranded before the Law and doorkeeper of psychoanalysis,

74 “Différance” is Derrida’s term for “the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other” (Positions 27).

75 Bataille sees “nonknowledge” as the anxiogenic non-ground of rational thought and knowledge from which emerge, according to inscrutable forces, organisations of knowledge and experience. I will say more about Bataille’s nonknowledge in Chapter Three.
would perhaps have wished he had. But now, let us turn to the Naturphilosophie of Schelling’s First Outline to explore the beginnings of this grammatology of Being, his early expression of this idea as the tensive dynamism in Nature.
Chapter 1

1 A First Outline of Romantic Metasubjectivity

Contemporary scholarship (Grant, McGrath, ffytche) has recognised not only the sophistication and multivalency of Schelling’s oeuvre as a whole, but also the centrality of his early Naturphilosophie. Throughout his philosophical career, Schelling keeps returning to the core dynamics of the Naturphilosophie developed in the late eighteenth century, remaining productively entangled in it to the extent that Iain Hamilton Grant writes, “Schellingianism is naturephilosophy throughout” (Philosophies 5). Ellenberger suggests that Naturphilosophie is an important basis for twentieth-century depth psychology: he writes that “there is hardly a single concept of Freud or Jung that had not been anticipated by the philosophy of nature” (205), but leaves this avenue unexplored. The “quasi-mythological nature” of metabiology in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) leads Paul Ricoeur to argue for a defining relationship between Goethe’s Naturphilosophie and Freud’s libido theory as a whole (312f). But this is where Freud’s relationship to Naturphilosophie ends. For the nature of Naturphilosophie as a speculative physics positing fundamentally nonmolar, (de)composable forces behind the construction of matter itself is a concern far beyond Freud, who is at pains to distinguish his scientific project from the “mysticism” of nature philosophy (“Introductory Lectures” 20 & n. 1).

In contrast to this, Romantic metasubjectivity emerges from affinities between Naturphilosophie and Jungian metapsychology which extend far beyond the personalist

76 Ricoeur is talking specifically about Goethe’s Naturphilosophie which, Robert Richards argues, emerges at least in part from a reciprocal influence between Goethe and Schelling (464f). Reading Freud against his own grain, Ricoeur suggests that “the whole libido theory was already under the control of Naturphilosophie” to make psychoanalysis “a protest on the part of the nature-philosophy against the philosophy of consciousness,” because “the patient reading of desire in its symptoms, its fantasies, and in general its signs never equaled the hypothesis of the libido, of instincts, of desire” (313). Indeed, at the end of “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937) Freud – perhaps channelling Jung – presents Empedocles’ warring figures of love and strife as analogues to Eros and Thanatos, edging psychoanalysis closer to the general economy of forces of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie were it not for the sharp distinction Freud tries to make between matter and drive (200-1).
mechanism of psychoanalysis. To elucidate this connection, this chapter frames the 
Naturphilosophie of Schelling’s First Outline as a metaphysical site for the disciplinary 
agon between psychoanalysis and analytical psychology. From this basis, I turn to Freud 
and Jung to read key moments of their work as metapsychological engagements with the 
quasi-subjective space of Naturphilosophie and Schelling’s ambivalent Nature. Freud’s 
Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) and Jung’s contemporaneous Zofingia lectures 
(1896-1899)\(^{77}\) prefigure the Freud-Jung schism, and in the wake of these texts I touch on 
other works as post-schismatic theoretical articulations. Freud’s A Phylogenetic Fantasy 
(1915) is an early foray into the pre-human dimensions of libido which anticipates his 
extension of germ and cell theory into the speculative phylogenesis of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle [Beyond], which I read in part as a response to, and engagement with, 
the spectre of Jung.\(^{78}\) Similarly, Jung’s early critique of the hegemony of rational-
empirical science prefigures his counter-scientific formulation of analytical psychology, 
as he considers it in relation to the creation of world views [Weltanschauungen]. This 
conception of analytical psychology culminates in Jung’s Symbols of Transformation 
(1911-1912/1952) [Symbols] as the psychoanalytically heretical text which precipitated 
the break with Freud and which underwrites analytical psychology as a whole.\(^{79}\)

Against this backdrop of Naturphilosophie, I also want to revisit the key issue in 
the Freud-Jung schism – the theory of libido – as the site of emergence for what I have 
described as Thanatopoiesis, the regressive-progressive, systolic-diastolic movement 
powering Romantic metasubjectivity. That is, reading Thanatos away from the yearning 
for inorganicity, libido is driven back to past experiences and the interiority of memory.

\(^{77}\) Jung’s Zofingia Lectures are a series of talks given by Jung at the weekly club meetings of the 
Zofingia Verein, a Swiss student fraternity to which Jung belonged during his medical studies at Basel 
University.

\(^{78}\) This largely unexplored domain of Freudian scholarship is developed further by Dufresne (The Late 
Sigmund Freud 229ff).

\(^{79}\) Although the original Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido was published in 1912 before the other 
theoretical works I take up here, its substantial revision in 1952 also makes it a later Jungian text, a 
theoretical substructure of Jung’s oeuvre as a whole. The first English translation (Psychology of the 
Unconscious [1912], trans. Hinkle) is generally considered unreliable and fraught with errors.
But it is also impelled by present circumstances toward a horizon of self-development, a futurity that is always undecided. In the words of Schelling’s 1815 Ages, “all evolution presupposes involution” (83) – retrograde and forward movement entangled in a rhythm that can be intuited, but is never an object of knowledge. Indeed, the specifically Romantic quality of this bifurcated rhythm informs the ontopoetics of Schlegel’s progressive universal poetry, which unfolds in a similar rhythm as “capable of the highest and most variegated refinement, not only from within outwards, but also from without inwards” (AF #116). The speculative physics of the 1799 Naturphilosophie thus allows one to trace the Romantic genealogy of Thanatopoiesis through Schlegel’s progressive universal poetry to analytical psychology. In what follows, I will show that Thanatopoiesis establishes analytical psychology as a Naturphilosophie après la lettre, supplementing Freud’s death instinct with a futurity marking the fundamental Trieb of Romantic metasubjectivity.

Tilottama Rajan shrewdly reminds us that Schelling’s First Outline “is not yet part of a history [and thus] brackets or re-idealises its more deconstructive insights” (“First Outline” 312). In a similar vein, Sean McGrath writes:

The early Schellingian unconscious, developed in the nature-philosophy [. . .] is impersonal and immanent. It is not yet the dark side of God unveiled in the Freedom essay, not the underside of the personality of the Stuttgart Seminars [. . .] rather, it is the collective intelligence running through all of matter, and insofar as we too are material, running through us as well. [It is] the spirit of nature, nature spiritualized and given subjectivity, but of an impersonal quality. (Dark Ground 82)

This “collective intelligence” is, to use Lancelot Whyte’s phrase, “potential mind” (116) not yet experienced by a psyche. It is Naturphilosophie’s version of the absolute subject (Peterson, “Translator’s Introduction” xxviii), and its dynamics are not yet part of the uniquely human history of suffering. It attempts to become object to itself as an abstract

80 The “progressive” nature of Schlegel’s universal poetry should be read as less of a teleological progression towards a final endpoint and more as a perpetual unfolding akin to Schelling’s Nature. Indeed, for Schlegel this poetry “should forever be becoming and never be perfected” (AF #116).
(if provisional) goal set for Nature’s infinite productivity. But although Schelling’s unfolding “drama of a struggle between form and the formless” (FO 28) lacks dramatis personae, it is nevertheless linked to the forces of magnetism, gravity, and chemistry which occur in a temporal, historicised being (albeit one bracketing time and space as markers of human history). Thus, Naturphilosophie transpires and unfolds not in a pre- or non-history, but rather in a liminality between world and psyche, a quasi-subjective space where the latter is driven to emerge as part of what David Krell calls Nature’s tormented Idealism (Krell, Contagion 73ff). It is because of this emphasis on “thisness,” the sheer facticity of Being and the attempt to think its emergence in Naturphilosophie, that neither Freud’s personalist psyche nor his adherence to a Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics can adequately articulate the protopsychology of the First Outline.  

1.1 Schelling’s Naturphilosophie: Inhibition and “Unnatural Nature”

Freud defines psychoanalysis as a natural science against the prevailing understanding of “psychological modes of thought” as the domain of “laymen, poets, natural philosophers and mystics” (“Introductory Lectures” 20). In contrast,

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81 Freud defended Lamarck’s theory of inherited characteristics until the end of his life. In his last great cultural narrative, Moses the Man and Monotheistic Religion (1938), Freud writes: “for a long time we have acted as though the inheritance of memory-traces of ancestral experience, independently of direct participation and the influence of education by example, were beyond question. In speaking of the continuance of an ancient tradition in a people, of the formation of a national character, what we usually had in mind was this kind of inherited tradition rather than one passed on by communication. […] We confess in all modesty that we are unable, even so, to dispense with this factor in biological development” (262). George Hogenson argues compellingly that not only did Jung not endorse Lamarckism, but was more closely aligned with the evolutionary thought of Conway Lloyd Morgan and James Mark Baldwin, whose “Baldwin effect” argues, contrary to Lamarck, that “one result of evolution is the organism’s ability to alter the environment and thereby shape the circumstances of evolution by natural selection” (596). This crucial idea of “behavioural plasticity” (596) actuates, on the level of evolutionary science, what Foucault sees as the elusive “historical a priori” laws governing the heterogeneity of social discourse; it is also essential to understanding the genesis and development of the Jungian archetype.

82 James Strachey’s note identifies this natural philosophy specifically as Schellingian “pantheism” (20 n.1).
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, as a dynamic “science of nature,” is the bedrock of a metaphysics – what he calls a “speculative” physics meant to discover the dynamic forces and drives behind Nature’s infinite productivity. That is, Naturphilosophie “assumes that the sum of phenomena is not a mere world, but of necessity a Nature (that is, that this whole is not merely a product, but at the same time productive)” (FO 197). As such Naturphilosophie unfolds in a register not of stasis but of process, drive and compulsion: in the Introduction, Schelling writes that “Nature can produce nothing but what shows regularity and purpose, and Nature is compelled to produce it” (FO 194). This Nature is one of “absolute activity,” which is marked by “the drive [Trieb] to an infinite development” (18).83 Nature, as a fact of necessity, is also compelled, through this productive drive, to produce organic and inorganic natural products as part of a general economy of infinitely productive relations. Like Nature itself, the organism self-organises according to principles irreducible to a logical system. And this fact that each natural product performs within itself Nature’s infinite productivity anticipates a mind-

83 Schelling often uses Bildungstrieb (formative drive) instead of Trieb to describe Nature’s production in the First Outline. However, Frederick Beiser perceptively points out two somewhat contradictory meanings of Bildung (“building,” “forming,” “culturing,” “education”) in early German Romanticism. On the one hand, Bildung “must arise from the free choice of the individual [and] reflect his own decisions. The self realises itself only through specific decisions and choices, and not by complying with general cultural norms and tradition. Bildung cannot be the result, therefore, of some process of education or conditioning imposed by a culture or state” (Romantic Imperative 29). On the other hand, “the importance, and indeed urgency, of Bildung in the early Romantic agenda is comprehensible only in its social and political context” and that (contrary to the outcome of the French Revolution) Bildung’s apogee lies in a republic of “responsible, enlightened, and virtuous citizens” (88-89). Schlegel, too, seems to use Bildung in this latter sense (On the Study 24ff). The two are left unresolved (as perhaps they must be) to reflect this specifically Romantic problem of freedom. Perhaps Hölderlin is the one who cuts to the chase: in a letter to his brother he writes, “ich Dir das Paradoxon aufgestellt habe, daß der Kunst- und Bildungstrieb mit allen seinen Modifikationen und Abarten ein eigentlicher Dienst sei, den die Menschen der Natur, erweisen (“I give you the paradox that the artistic and formative drive, with all its modifications and varieties, is a true service rendered by men for Nature” (328-29; my trans). While Bildung tends to linearise development into a trajectory toward a perceived goal (e.g., an ideal republic or ideally enlightened individual/citizen), Schelling’s use of the term in the First Outline is troubled by the indeterminacy of the Nature it describes. Thus Bildungstrieb in the First Outline is problematic, ultimately neither teleological nor socio-politically subject-ed; for this reason I use Trieb throughout as the radicalised force which emerges from this tension. Romantic metasubjectivity, via analytical psychology, theorises the agency of this radical Trieb in the world. Schelling also uses Triebwerk at several points in his oeuvre, which has been variously translated as “power mechanism” (Ages 90), “mechanical motor” (HCI 153), and “inner workings” (STI 14), none of which do justice to its distinctly psychological potency. Read against its mechanical grain, Triebwerk can be seen as a precursor to Deleuze and Guattari’s “desiring machines,” non-Oedipal productive forces which constellate partial objects.
nature parallelism with prototherapeutic properties, as we will see in Jung’s model of the psyche. So even in the Naturphilosophie, this repetition of Nature’s infinite production in the individual opens it to the bidirectionality of Thanatopoiesis. As Robert Richards writes, “[Naturphilosophie] suggested that nature might furnish a path back to the self [. . .] the exploration of nature might even be regarded as a necessary propaedeutic to the development of the self” (134). Nature is a fold, entangling interiority and exteriority: one finds oneself through Nature, but in going back “through” Nature one can move “forward” in self-development through Nature’s “exploration.” In Kierkegaardian terms, if Schelling’s organism is defined by a desire to recollect and achieve a past state of sameness or inorganic indifference, it is no less driven by repetition as “actuality and the earnestness of existence” (Repetition 3-4). This force of the new is not antithetically opposed to recollection, but rather fills this movement out in earnest to define a bidirectional movement of self-development: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards” (3; my italics).84

Schelling’s particular formulation evolves from the broader field of German nature philosophy which encompasses Romantic biology and other disciplines. Writing that “all Romantic biologists were Naturphilosophen, but not all Naturphilosophen were Romantics,” Richards argues that Naturphilosophie not only shifts away from eighteenth-century mechanist philosophy, but also marks Schelling’s move away from Kant within Naturphilosophie itself (8ff). The early Naturphilosophen included Kant, who conceived the archetypes of species as transcendent entities of an ideal reality. Schelling’s

84 The irony of this is that while Kierkegaard was clearly disillusioned with Schelling’s thought by early 1842, a year before its publication (Kierkegaard, Letters and Documents 136), Repetition (1843), as “an essay in experimental psychology,” distinguishes between recollection and repetition in a way which subjectivises Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Recollection is the Socratic possibility of returning to the Same of the past; repetition is the irruption of the new in experience akin to the orgasm of forces in Ages responsible for time and history, an act of creation pointing toward the future. In Repetition, then, recollection is Nature’s nostalgia for indifference subjectivised in the figure of Constantin Constantinus, who does not understand authentic repetition as the mutation of the new; speaking about repetition, he really means recollection.
Naturphilosophie, however, begins with natural (real) existence instead of (ideal) consciousness: “the ideal must arise out of the real and admit of explanation from it” (FO 194). Schelling moves against Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal bifurcation of existence on the one hand, and on the other hand he also moves against Fichte’s “absolute I,” which makes nature an epiphenomenon of subjective consciousness. As we will see in the following chapter, this anticipates Jung’s emphasis on a phenomenological psychology and his ultimate turn away from Kantian conceptions of the archetype. In the architectonic elaborated in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the idea of the whole is subservient to the operations of its component parts; Kant’s organicism is a regulative idea that denies any genuinely aleatory force in Nature. In contrast, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, as “an a priori study of the ‘Idea’ of nature,” holds that nature “is not a mechanical system but a series of basic ‘forces’ or ‘impulses’ that mirror at the basic level the same kind of determinations that are operative in us at the level of freedom. [Thus Naturphilosophie] must construct an account of nature that is continuous with our freedom” (Pinkard 178, 181).85

Richards writes, perhaps with some irony, that “the fundamental idea of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie was simply that nature strove to achieve the absolute” (297) – hardly a simple idea, for although Schelling critiques Kantian formalism by conceiving nature as radical productivity, he does not jettison the a priori. Rather, anticipating Deleuze’s conception of transcendence and Jung’s mature formulation of the archetype, Schelling relocates the a priori in experience. In the “Introduction to the Outline” he writes:

> Not only do we know this or that through experience, but we originally know nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience, and in this sense the whole of our knowledge consists of the judgments of experience. These judgments become a priori principles when we become conscious of them as necessary, and thus every judgment, whatever its content may be, may be raised to that dignity, insofar as the distinction between a priori and a posteriori

85 In thinking about the “continuity” between an aleatory Nature and human freedom, however, one should keep in mind that this continuity is also a repetition of the difference between Nature and human freedom. That is, this “continuity” between Nature and freedom ultimately throws open their contingent natures.
judgments is [. . .] a distinction made solely with respect to our knowing [. . .] every judgment which is merely historical for me—i.e., a judgment of experience—becomes, notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon as I arrive, whether directly or indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity. [. . .] It is not, therefore, that WE KNOW Nature as a priori, but Nature IS a priori. (FO 198)

Written after the First Outline, and as an attempt to rein in Nature’s infinite productivity by synchronising Naturphilosophie with transcendental Idealism and its emphasis on the primacy of thought and self-consciousness (194), Schelling’s Introduction wants to give Nature’s productivity the sole task of “transporting” the real into the ideal world (193). But even here, in introducing psychology and appealing to experience as the criteria for a priori principles, Schelling does not rein in this indeterminacy so much as redouble it on the level of the psyche. And in stating that “Nature is a priori,” he folds the a priori back into contingency, which makes the Naturphilosophie forever resistant to encapsulation by self-consciousness (in Chapter Three, we will see that Schelling addresses this resistance again in the 1800 System).

So in the Naturphilosophie, the a priori is no longer separated from phenomena, but is now imbricated with thought’s (revisable) experience of natural objects as external stimuli. What Hegel will economise as dialectic becomes, with Schelling, dialects of dialectic as the absolute is now beholden to the intensity of interactions and events dictated by the individual’s inscrutable grammatology of Being, written by “judgments of experience.” These judgements are part of an anterior organisation, but this organisation is paradoxically, simultaneously constituted by its parts, in events where the individual realises a thought’s “internal necessity.” Indeed, this internal necessity offers a way through what would otherwise pose a logical problem for Schelling: how far one can move from the deductive principles of natural science to experiential Nature if “the ideal must arise out of the real and admit of explanation from it”? This movement is the sole means of discerning the a priori structures of Nature’s infinite unfolding. Deleuze and Guattari define this movement of concepts as syneidetic events, “fragmentary wholes” “jointed” together by “zones, thresholds or becoming” in relations of extensivity with other concepts: “every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections. Every concept has components that may, in turn, be grasped as concepts” (What is Philosophy? 16, 19, 20-21). Insofar as the First
Outline speaks of an experiencing subject, Schelling anticipates this Deleuzian subject as a nodal point for these syneidetic events.

Schelling conceives the “regularity” and purpose” of both Nature’s productivity and thought’s “internal necessity” (FO 194) as a graduated scale of development [Stufenfolge]. The Stufenfolge is a development of increasing complexity in Nature’s products, directed toward an “absolute product” that “lives in all products, that always becomes and never is, and in which the absolute activity [of Nature] exhausts itself” (16, 43n). This gradient is meant to culminate in man as its “greatest and most perfect form” (144), but the sexual generation of these beings both troubles and corroborates this Stufenfolge. In an enantiodromal movement remarkably similar to Jung’s later formulation of psychic development, Nature’s crisis-autobiography (decoupled from Abrams’ Hegelianism) emerges from within its own ontogenetic productivity. That is, sexuality becomes a pharmakon to Nature. Schelling writes of the separation of the sexes within the “infinite metamorphosis” of Nature that “each organism has a level of formation at which [this] separation is necessary. [But this] highest point of disturbed equilibrium is [also] the moment of the reestablishment of equilibrium” (36, 40-41). This describes the production of the genus against the individual in a systolic-diastolic movement of expansion and contraction foregrounded in Schelling’s later work. But sexual separation does not fold the organism back into a teleological hierarchy of developmental stages. Instead, it opens the organism up to the radical productivity of Nature: “from the moment of the diremption onward, the product no longer completely expresses the character of the stage of development at which it stood.” Schelling describes this as “derangement” [Störungheit], and this trope of illness marks the “most intense moment of natural activity” in the organism (FO 39). Nature blossoms through “abortive” experiments on itself, seizing on its own aberrations, “pursuing” its individuative derangement as far as possible in a given manifestation (FO 41n). Precisely this derangement, this illness, drives one toward absolute knowledge as “a following of the particular wherever it might lead, regardless of its consistency with a
larger whole” (Rajan, “First Outline” 315). Each organism is a tumescence in Nature, a derangement of the *Stufenfolge*. Put differently, organisms are symptoms of a radical auto-alterity in Nature which resists Schelling’s attempt, in the later Introduction to the *First Outline*, to contain it as an anterior organisation which “must have existed as a whole previous to its parts” (*FO* 198). We will see that Jung later conceives the collective unconscious along precisely these lines: as a universal stratum of the psyche, “transcendental” in that it cannot become an object of knowledge, but nevertheless constituted by the historicity of its evolving archetypal matrix. But just as Jung will face the question of how consciousness emerges from the depths of the unconscious, Schelling faces an analogous problem: how does Nature come to *be* from this fluidity, “the most primal fluid—the absolute noncomposite, and for that reason the absolute decomposite” (6)?

For the Nature of Schelling’s *First Outline* it is *inhibition* – a primordial self-limiting force intrinsic to Nature – that brings about the phenomena of the natural world. As a homogeneous “universal organism” Nature, as “absolute activity,” is “inhibited at sundry stages” which produce natural objects (*FO* 6, 16f). Inhibition is at the root of all conflict and difference as “an original diremption in Nature itself [. . .] that original antithesis in the heart of Nature, which does not [. . .] itself appear” but nevertheless constitutes Nature as object to itself (205; my first italics). As the agent of Nature’s auto-alterity and the paradoxical differential movement within an always already universal organism, inhibition infinitely counterbalances Nature’s infinite productivity: “If nature is absolute activity, then this activity must appear as inhibited ad infinitum. (The original

86 Freud states precisely this aim in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: “to dedicate oneself to a train of thought and follow it as far as it leads” out of scientific curiosity (59). But this narrative *provisio* comes strangely near the end of his text, and one wonders if or to what degree Freud’s *fort/da* with metaphors of biology, mythological and literary references (not to mention Jung) throughout *Beyond* reflect either the inhibition or consummation of this goal.

87 In the 1800 *System* Schelling writes that we get at this Absolute Other through *art*, if only through the fleeting awareness of intellectual intuition. Just as Nature cannot become aware of its genesis through inhibition, so the work of art derives from the mind’s prereflexive ground that is indelibly “etched” into it, yet irreducible to the metonymy of its possible representations. Andrew Bowie takes up Schelling’s pivotal insight here to critique (Derridean) deconstruction (*Schelling* 68ff). This ground will also become the *Ungrund* of Schelling’s later *Freedom* essay.
cause of this inhibition must only be sought in [Nature] itself, since Nature is absolutely active)” (16). Schelling is well aware of the “irresolvable difficulty” of this deadlock between infinite activity and infinite inhibition (17). Krell sums up the problem in terms of Freudian Eros and Thanatos:

Schelling [must] conceive of an original duplicity, a dyas, in which infinite activity and infinite inhibition work together to produce the natural world. [But sexuality and its relation to illness disturb this balance. Both] alike tend toward the universal and the infinite. It is as though infinite activity itself, the absolute as such, were both sexually active and subject to ultimate passivity and even an inevitable infection or malignancy. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for Schelling to locate the duplicitous source of life without colliding against the ultimate source of illness and demise. (“Three Ends” 65)

Here Krell emphasises sexuality and illness as markers of the organism’s highly ambivalent, indeed “unnatural” relationship with Nature. With sex, both the Erotic drive toward the absolute product and the Thanatotic drive back to universal indifference explode on to this primal site. Nature longs for its original state of indifference, a zero-point that can only be hypothesised behind the always already extant original diremption. In a quasi-subjective death drive, “Nature contests the Individual; it longs for the Absolute and continually endeavors to represent it. [. . .] Individual products, therefore, in which Nature’s activity is at a standstill, can only be seen as misbegotten attempts to achieve such a proportion” (FO 35). But just as the Stufenfolge is disrupted by the sexual proliferation of beings, each “misbegotten attempt” also recapitulates Nature’s intrinsic dynamism (25). As the propensity to reproduce such misbegotten attempts (and consequently Nature’s self-blockage), sexuality is a hostile, pestilent force to a Nature yearning for primordial, absolute indifference.

This originary “not-Nature” within Nature is transferred to the dynamic interplay of forces in the production of natural phenomena. Schelling describes the activity of life (as the effect of inhibition) in terms of actants [Aktionen] as combinatory forces/drives in the natural world. Themselves irrepresentable, actants collectively constitute an “infinite

88 Krell’s translation of this passage (“Three Ends” 63) is clearer about the source of inhibition in Nature itself.
homogeneity,” combining in various relations and ratios to form different natural products:

[Actants are] the most originary points of inhibition of Nature’s activity. [As] the most originary negative presentations of the unconditioned in Nature [they] are not themselves in space; they cannot be viewed as parts of matter. [They are, rather,] action in general. (FO 19-21)

We will see in the next chapter that, more than Kant’s a priori, Schelling’s actant will prove to be the most crucial metaphysical analogue to the Jungian archetype, which performs Schelling’s “drama of a struggle between form and the formless” (28) in the register of the Romantic metasubjective psyche. Particularly significant here, however, is that “these [combinatory] actions, presented collectively, strive toward one and the same product; for all natural activity aims toward an absolute product” (24; my last italics).

There is a compulsion in Nature that is recapitulated in its “misbegotten attempts” and their persistent strife with Nature. Perhaps nowhere is this made clearer in the First Outline than in Schelling’s admission, repressed into the margins of the “Introduction to the Outline” in a lengthy footnote, that

Nature hates sex, and where it does arise, it arises against the will of Nature. The separation into sexes is an inevitable fate, with which, after Nature is once organic [. . .] it can never overcome.—By this very hatred of separation it finds itself involved in a contradiction, inasmuch as what is odious to Nature it is compelled to develop in the most careful manner, and to lead to the summit of existence, as if it did so on purpose; whereas it is always striving only for a return into the identity of the genus, which, however, is enchained to the (never to be canceled) duplicity of the sexes, as to an inevitable condition. [. . .] Nature develops the individual only from compulsion. (231n)

Thinking Nature’s compulsive auto-derangement and productive self-division on the level of psyche, Jung writes that “together with ‘life’ itself, [the psyche is] the only ‘natural factor’ capable of converting statistical organizations which are subject to natural law into ‘higher’ or ‘unnatural’ states, in opposition to the rule of entropy that runs throughout the inorganic realm” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 375). The Jungian psyche is a generative “natural factor” which Nature’s auto-alterity both courts and resists.
Thus Nature is hostile to the organism as obstacle to its “backward” yearning for original indifference. But the organism is also necessary for the “forward” unfolding of an absolute product which already exists as potential in Nature. Indeed, faced with this pharmakon which cannot be limited to a Thanatotic drive for a previous state of indifference, Schelling’s task is now to “find the point in which this infinite multiplicity of diverse actants can be unified in Nature” (FO 24). But with Schelling’s desire to find a this zero-point of unity we return to the idea of the absolute subject as Schelling’s gesture, within the First Outline’s quasi-subjective space, toward the seeming paradox of the absolute organism as perfected nature within Nature (FO 28). Schelling’s search for Nature’s zero-point of indifference is where we locate Schelling’s relevance for depth psychology. In different ways, Freud and Jung attempt to theorise this subject’s unfolding; in different ways they attempt to write the drama between form and formless. For Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle’s drama of the germ-plasm moves boldly past the Project and into the speculative; it ultimately pits Eros against the death instinct’s nostalgic drive for inorganicity, a drive that is reminiscent of Schelling’s sex-hating Nature. In contrast, Jung’s Symbols of Transformation, and the energetic model of libido it proposes, supplements this drive with a bidirectionality that recapitulates the productive ambivalence of Schelling’s Nature in ways that surpass the biological, emphasis on the past, and personalism marking psychoanalysis. Absolute knowledge remains on a promissory horizon, but this Romantic metasubjective psyche can think this horizon in ways the psychoanalytic subject cannot. With this, let us turn to Freud’s early theoretical narrative.

1.2 Freud and Jung: Borders and Border Zones

Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) can be called a first outline of psychoanalysis, auguring in microcosm its history and dynamic. Posthumously published, it nevertheless haunts Freud’s writing on psychoanalysis until his death
and thus informs the subsequent unfolding of Freud’s theories through their own interminable self-analysis (284, 290). The Project opens with Freud’s desire to create psychoanalysis as a “natural science” which will “represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction” (295). This natural-scientific project becomes one of the more salient points of difference between Freudian and Jungian metapsychologies, a difference prefigured by Schelling’s critique in the Naturphilosophie of the “mere world” of mechanism as a quantitative aggregate of products (FO 202).90 Freud’s drive toward a natural science (an atomist science of “material particles”) is thus positioned against Schelling’s conception of Naturphilosophie as a science of nature which explores the dynamism and play of forces comprising Nature’s products. Schelling begins the Outline to the First Outline by writing that “to philosophize about nature means as much as to create it” (FO 5). This resounding statement ontologises thought to foreground the uncanny affinity between mind and Nature.91 Moreover, as we have seen, Naturphilosophie’s emphasis on Nature’s dynamic processes recapitulates this dynamism on the level of the individual object, which is subject to the same drive to infinite

89 The Project’s textual history shows Freud’s ambivalence toward it during its composition. At one point Freud writes to Wilhelm Fliess that while composition promised success, “nothing certain can be said as yet. To make an announcement on this now would be like sending the six-months’ foetus of a girl to a ball” (284). However, Freud would later reformulate the Project’s ideas into the core precepts of psychoanalysis.

90 In the Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) Freud describes psychoanalysis as the project of “transforming metaphysics into metapsychology,” but the original German (“die Metaphysik in Metapsychologie umzusetzen”) in fact points to a crucial interpretive knot. Umzusetzen (or umsetzen) can mean “transform,” “turn into,” “transpose” or “implement,” but it can also mean “translate.” While “transforming” metaphysics into metapsychology implies a change in nature without remainder, “translating” metaphysics into metapsychology suggests deriving metapsychology from a metaphysics which retains some foundational authority. Like Strachey, Anthea Bell translates this passage as “turning metaphysics into metapsychology” (245).

91 The uncanny as a critical concept needs little introduction, but a brief gloss is perhaps in order as my adjectival use of it departs from its strictly Freudian context. The Freudian uncanny, of course, is what is both familiar and unfamiliar (Heimlich/Unheimlich) to the experiencing subject, which causes a sense of ambivalence toward the uncanny object. Although Freud makes passing reference to instances where outer circumstances accord with psychological conditions which categorically fall outside the purview of individual complexes, the uncanny nevertheless ultimately leads to the castration complex. My use of uncanny consciously spins it away from the personalism of psychoanalysis into a broader theoretical field.
development as the Nature engendering it: “even if [infinite productivity] should result in
finite products, these can only be apparent products; i.e., the tendency to infinite
development must lie once again in every individual; every product must be capable of
being articulated into products” (5; my italics).

Of course, Freud does not remain strictly biological in his approach: the natural-
scientific principles of his Project are dispersed and transformed across the history of
psychoanalysis, a history including his second topography of ego/id/superego as well as
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. More specifically, Beyond attempts to map its more
speculative terrain with Victorian biologism in the form of the biodrama of the germ
plasm; indeed, this biodrama is Beyond’s textual centripetal force, pressing other
narratives (little Ernst’s fort/da game, the sexual theogony of Plato’s Symposium) into its
service. Biology reins in the plasticity of psychoanalytic discourse. This difference
between a natural science aiming toward a closed, measurable system of natural
“particles” and Naturphilosophie’s speculative physics is the first point of divergence
between Freudian and Jungian metapsychology. Indeed, the spectre of Jung is
manifested in Beyond as Eros, the mythological unifying principle which imperils
Freud’s theoretical economy with a speculative futurity it cannot digest. Jung’s earliest
metapsychological text, “On Psychic Energy” (1928), contrasts the “purely causal”
mechanistic view with an “energetic point of view [tracing events] from effect to cause on
the assumption that some kind of energy underlies the changes in phenomena [and]
founded not on the substances themselves but on their relations” (para. 3). And as I will
discuss later, Jung’s earliest conception of the archetype as a “complex,” and its
evolution into a transcendental-empiricist92 component of human knowledge, comes to
emphasise the infinite productivity of psychological processes in ways resisted by

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92 Transcendental empiricism should be understood in Deleuze’s sense as tied to “the very being of the
sensible”: “Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience.
On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard” (DR xx, 57). In a
similar vein, Schelling writes of Naturphilosophie that it is “empiricism extended to include unconditionedness” (FO 22).
psychoanalysis. This transcendental empiricism is foundational to the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity.

As the soil from which analytical psychology would germinate, “The Border Zones of Exact Science” (1896), which is roughly contemporaneous with Freud’s Project, is a counterposition to Freud’s biologism. As a critique of scientific rationalism, this early essay sets the stage for Jung’s later development of analytical psychology as the border zone in which psyche and Nature “touch and do not touch.” Full of youthful arrogance and confidence, roughly half the essay attacks materialists, “Mammonists,” and careerists as agents of “stupidity,” cultural manifestations of the “principle of inertia” (para. 13). And perhaps this inertia is what leads Jung to discuss not borders per se, but border zones as permeable boundaries resisting intellectual inertia. Important for Jung’s later metapsychology, however, is his emphasis contra mechanism on a “preexistent vital principle” necessary “to explain the world of organic phenomena” (para. 63). Here, Jung argues that rationalism’s attempt to track back the origins of organic life exhausts itself in an infinite regress, resulting in the observation that “the creation of the first cell must have come about through contact with preexistent life” (para. 57). This regress unworks the claims of causal logic to explain the organic, leading “the critical examination of rational scientific claims” into “an immaterial or metaphysical realm” (para. 57). Indeed, in “Thoughts on the Nature and Value of Speculative Inquiry” (1898), Jung writes, with words reminiscent of Schelling’s own emphasis on the a priori nature of experience in the First Outline, that “every a priori structure that converts our experience into an abstraction must inevitably lead us to erroneous conclusions” (para. 175; my italics).

Freud’s Project inaugurates the particular materialism that persists throughout psychoanalysis, but Jung’s dual polemic against philosophical abstraction and stark materialism anticipates his later development of synchronicity, Jung’s concept for the experience of the archetypal as “real-ideal,” a collapse of the boundary between nature and mind (which he recasts as “physical” and “spiritual”).93 One key milestone in this

93 Chapter Three explores how synchronicity gives Schelling’s key question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” an experiencing psyche, a psyche confronted with the facticity of Being in an event
development is Jung’s idea of “psychic reality” in “Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology” (1931), which does not resolve but rather expands Schelling’s question of why there is something and not nothing into the domain of a psyche which cannot escape imbrication with Nature. In other words, Jung’s attempt to develop psychic reality as a domain of mental “psychic images” brings him up against the conundrum of sheer facticity that underwrites Schelling’s guiding question. Recognising “the paradox of psychic life,” Jung’s essay tries to negotiate a path between the Scylla of spiritual monism and the Charybdis of a “modern [empirical, objective] brand of nature philosophy” that explains existence in purely physical terms. Jung begins with the assertion that we are “so wrapped about by psychic images that we cannot penetrate at all to the essence of things external to ourselves,” and that the indeterminate something = X of the psyche, “because it alone is immediate, is superlatively real” (para. 680). Yet he continues, dissecting psychic reality into content “derived from a ‘material’ environment to which our bodies belong” and those “in no way less real, [which] seem to come from a ‘spiritual’ source which appears to be very different from the physical environment” (para. 681). But Jung finds himself caught in the conundrum of speaking about a psyche which, in the end, is an “incomprehensible ‘something’,,” and to make any statements about it all we must “be willing to contradict ourselves” to do justice to something to which Jung gives the proper name “psyche,” but whose excess suspends his efforts to psychologise this psyche (para. 680).

While Jung invokes the sole validity of the psyche – still an indeterminate “something” – to end “the conflict between mind and matter, spirit and Nature, as contradictory explanatory principles” (para. 681), he nevertheless removes his qualifying quotes from the “‘material’ environment” when he admits that beyond the domain of psychic images there are “physical process[es] whose nature[s] [are] ultimately unknown” (para. 681; my italics).94 Jung wants to distinguish between psyche and

that cannot be rationalised, but which connects the person with the libidinal matrix of creative production underlying Romantic metasubjectivity.

94 Jung is not consistent in his anti-Cartesian view of psychic reality; in fact, it often troubles even as it constitutes his empiricist desire to define his object of inquiry. The tension between this desire to get out of
matter, to resolve all experience into an unknowable psychic reality which nevertheless inexplicably “still exists in its original oneness, and awaits man’s advance to a level of consciousness where he [...] recognizes both as constituent elements of one psyche” (“Basic Postulates” para. 682). But “psyche,” as something that resists all of Jung’s predications and boundaries, collapses into the plethora of its own facticity, its own Being, even as it encompasses all human experience (“All that I experience is psychic” [para. 680]). In this ontoaesthetics of intensity where psychic reality unfolds in being as unique symbolic forms and metaphors, “art” is not only the organ of philosophy but the primary organ for the individuation of the organism (which I will discuss in Chapter Four). Indeed, Schelling’s overarching task in the 1815 Ages will be to potentiate and dramatise this individuation cosmogonically.

But what does it mean to read the First Outline “aesthetically”? To “narrate” Nature in Schelling’s speculative physics is to make aesthetics a tacit ontoaesthetics in an “outline” meant for the organic form of the lecture (as rhizomatic genre of the line of flight – the pursuit of knowledge along any number of abstract paths) instead of a codified treatise (FO 3). Indeed, as a series of lecture notes, the text of the First Outline already has a plasticity to it; it consistently deranges itself into productive paths through copious footnotes and digressions. Nature’s hatred of Eros (as sex) and corresponding ambivalence toward its products establish one thread in The First Outline in part as an ur-text of what Peter Brooks calls “Freud’s Masterplot” (285). This narrative seeks to avoid deranging “short-circuits” in the service of, in Freud’s words, “restoration of an earlier state” (and in this sense the First Outline’s “ending” truly is the beginning in the form of

the psyche to talk about “things as they are” and the keen awareness of psychic reality is central to analytical psychology.

95 “Ontoaesthetics” merges ontology and aesthetics to express the importance of metaphoricity not only to literary poetry and art, but to articulating the unfolding of Being. This is precisely what makes Thanatopoiesis an ontoaesthetics – namely, that its progressive-regressive rhythm applies not only to art (as we will see in Chapter Five), but to lived experience. It also determines Schelling’s description of Nature as the “unconscious poetry of the spirit” in the 1800 System (STI 12).
the Introduction (Beyond 76)). But Nature exists here as an unruly organ, an appendix whose ontoaesthetics unwork the body of Freud’s masterplot. On the other hand, as an heuristic narrative of Romantic metasubjectivity the First Outline must be read against this teleological grain, as a site of ateleological displacement. In this light, Schelling’s graduated stages do not simply narrate the desire for an earlier, inorganic state but rather follow a progressive “stream of consciousness” unique to the organism – a line of development discernible only in its unfolding between the poles of regression and progression, recollection and repetition. Put differently, Romantic metasubjectivity is the articulation of an organic “plot” through its own excess, a surplus of Trieb whose general economy unfolds the organism by means of a narrative readable only in its wake. In other words, purposiveness breaks through narrative teleology. If this is “doomed” energy, as Brooks argues, then it is doom as “fate,” as a distinctly Nietzschean tragedy in terms of

[t]he metaphysical solace [. . .] we derive from every true tragedy, the solace that in the ground of things, and despite all changing appearances, life is indestructibly mighty [as] that core of being [which exists] despite the constant destruction of the phenomenal world. (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 39, 41)

For psychoanalysis, then, ontology becomes aetiology – a being which is a sickness unto death striving toward a primordial inorganicity which has been and must be again as a return of the Same. This return transpires in what Deleuze calls the theatre of representation, where repetition is explained by (and contained in) an overarching external concept (the past, Oedipus). Deleuze describes the differences between a

96 Indeed, in Peter Brooks’ sense that beginnings presuppose endings (283) the ending is before the beginning: the First Outline begins with an “Outline of the Whole” and ends not with an Introduction, but an “Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature,” a “beginning-again” that tries to contain the deranging short-circuits of Schelling’s Nature by tethering it to transcendental Idealism (FO 193).

97 Brooks gestures toward this possibility, if only through the lens of a bleak Freudianism: “It may finally be [. . .] that repetition speaks in the text of a return which ultimately subverts the very notion of beginning or end [. . .] that the interminable never can be finally bound in a plot. [. . .] Narrative, that is, wants at its end to refer us back to its middle, to the web of the text: to recapture it in its doomed energies” (297; my italics).
repetition of the Same and a repetition serving the auto-alterity of the Idea itself, or what he provocatively calls “the Self of repetition”:

[W]e must distinguish two forms of repetition. [. . .] in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an ‘a-presentation’. One is negative, occurring by default in the concept; the other affirmative, occurring by excess in the Idea. [. . .] One is material, the other spiritual, even in nature and in the earth. One is inanimate, the other carries the secret of our deaths and our lives, of our enchainments and our liberations, the demonic and the divine. [. . .] One concerns accuracy, the other has authenticity as its criterion. (DR 23-24)

For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s “indestructibly mighty core of being,” whose productivity cannot be pulled back by a nostalgia for origins, is figured as the excess of “a-presentation” intrinsic to an unfolding Idea unconfinable to an atomistic “materialism,” but readable only through a “spiritualism” encompassing the earth as a secret pulsation of dynamic polarities (death/life, enchainment/liberation, demonic/divine). Put differently, where the first repetition is really only the (Hegelian) play of the Concept with itself in which it always returns to itself through its own differences, the second repeats the difference of the (Deleuzian) Idea’s auto-alterity. That is, this second repetition of difference reflects the Idea’s indwelling desire to know itself, but this desire unfolds through fluctuations between polarities to generate knowledge that never (fully) returns to itself.

We can align Deleuze’s two fundamental movements of repetition with two fundamental ways to read the seething ontoaesthetic “narrative” of the First Outline and, mutatis mutandis, the movements of libido that distinguish psychoanalysis from analytical psychology. What for psychoanalysis is the mere aetiology of representation and the Same – the Thanatotic drive toward an impossible object – is, seen through the Thanatopoietic lens of Romantic metasubjectivity, always already supplemented by the difference within repetition’s emergence. “Spiritual” repetition can never reach the Same. Romantic metasubjectivity figures Brooks’ narrative return as an eternal return
which “ultimately subverts the very notion of beginning or end”; the “web of the text” at every purported end is a return to the indestructibility of narrative itself, whose “terrible power” Deleuze frames as the return of difference. Against the Hegelian theatre of representation, in the (Kierkegaardian/Nietzschean) theatre of repetition we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as ‘terrible power.’ (DR 10)

The tension between these two readings provides us with a history of Romantic metasubjectivity’s genesis from the dynamic between Freud and Jung, and Jung’s emergence from within the fluid early days of depth psychology. Thus, to amplify and detail the issues at stake here, we turn to Beyond and Symbols as key statements of Freudian and Jungian metapsychology, so as to articulate this emergence against the backdrop of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Antipodes of each other, these two texts are contrasting attempts to think the psyche toward the pre-subjective origins of Schelling’s First Outline, framed through the questions of the nature of libido and drive which determine both texts. Like psychoanalysis, analytical psychology constitutes a “poetics of the baneful” (Krell, Contagion 53) in its pathological relationship to knowledge. However, in turning to Jung to articulate Romantic metasubjectivity, it becomes apparent that this pathology is deployed in a different economy and to a different end.

1.3 Freud: The Pleasure Principle…and Beyond

In 1962, Lancelot Whyte was perhaps the first to discern in Schelling’s thought a “single unconscious formative energy” which organises both mind and nature while remaining irreducible to either (116-17). With this monistic principle, Schelling prefigures what Freud and Jung both develop in different directions as libido.98

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98 It was likely Jung himself who first saw the repressed monism within Freud’s insistently dualist framework: “An attentive and critical reader of Freud’s writings cannot fail to remark how wide and flexible his concept of sexuality is. In fact it covers so much that one often wonders why in certain places
However, it is not until *Beyond*’s phylogenetic speculations that Freud’s conception about the origins of life approaches the *Naturphilosophie* he previously disavows.99 *Beyond* is a nerve cluster in the body of Freud’s writing, a curious text that tacitly extends the biologism of germ and cell theory to the speculative terrain of Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*. It retraces its steps, even as in its depersonalisation of sexual libido as Eros it moves resistanently toward some of the Jungian ideas Freud disavows, thus performing the very detours and short-circuits it theorises in a bid to master its own drive. A text about the death instinct as the culmination of Freud’s final metapsychology, *Beyond* wants nothing more than to (impossibly) fulfil its own pleasure principle as a culmination and completion of psychoanalytic metapsychology that bridges Freud’s early biologism with his later psychology.100 And even where Ellenberger, for example, reads Freud’s nod to Fechner101 as a decisive influence (512ff), perhaps nowhere else in his writings is Freud struggling more with Jung. Dufresne’s suggestion that *Beyond* is an attempt to “exorcise” Jung (*Tales* 22) is more exact than one may think if one takes into

the author uses a sexual terminology at all. His concept of sexuality includes not only the physiological sexual processes but practically every stage, phase, and kind of feeling or desire” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 106).

99 Indeed, ffytc suggests that *Beyond* masks a turn to *Naturphilosophie* meant to fulfil the pleasure principle of psychoanalysis itself: “As central Europe headed into an even more calamitous undermining of the liberal ideal than had overshadowed *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud felt the need to slip the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis from its empirical mooring within the system of the individual, and to anchor the emergence of individuality itself in a wider, metaphysically conceived fabric of nature. As *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* attempts to drive the justifications for the psychic structure of the person deeper and deeper into a notional primordial bio-history, to triangulate the instabilities of identity through that absolute basis, so Freud’s account does seem finally to approach the grandiose mythologisations of *Schelling’s* *Naturphilosophie*” (287).

100 Dufresne suggests as much when he describes *Beyond* as “the Rosetta Stone of Freudian theory—the key that unlocks the psychological theories of the late works precisely because it provides a translation of the biological theories of the earliest” (“Introduction” 26). He elsewhere suggests that *Beyond* is a synecdoche for psychoanalysis and its reception: “what is deemed ‘Freud’s’ is always mediated through a complex and distorting process of interpretation and reinterpretation: a repetition, then, always beyond what Freud said, should have said, or didn’t bother to say. [Thus] any rigorous return to Freud’s view of death, in other words, is always already a return to the reception of this body of work at the hands of his followers, friends, foes, and critics” (*Tales* 13).

101 Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) developed the theory of psychophysical parallelism (which established a causal link between physical stimuli and psychological reactions, *e.g.*, sensations) and the theory of the “tendency to stability” by which psychic energy always seeks the lowest and most stable form or state. See Ellenberger 218.
account a suitably archaic definition of exorcism as “the action of calling up spirits” (
OE D 1b; my italics). The word’s uncanny multivalency as something that expels, but with a residual threat of “contamination” (the way out is the way in, so to speak), aptly describes the dynamic of Beyond’s Jungian agon. As “a traumatic rupture point in the history of psychoanalysis” (Dufresne, Tales 26), Beyond does not quite scuttle the good ship Psychoanalysis (even if it does make the crew wonder where magnetic North is), but it brings Freud dangerously close to the “black tide of mud of occultism” against which he enlisted Jung’s aid in the halcyon days of their collaboration (Memories 150), and which Freud would later hang around Jung’s neck after their break.

In 1911 (the terminal phase of the Freud-Jung partnership, whose aetiology probably began with the trip to the United States in 1909), Freud writes Jung a characteristically ambivalent letter, a précis of the dynamic between them that would lead to their professional break, but also to the fort/da game Freud would play with the ever-present figure of Jung, carried through the metapsychological papers of 1914-1915 and culminating, perhaps, in Beyond. In this letter, Freud writes to Jung while referring to him in the third person:

One of the nicest works I have read (again), is that of a well-known author on the “Transformations and Symbols of the Libido.” [. . .] it is the best thing this promising author has written, up to now, though he will do still better. [. . .] Not least, I am delighted by the many points of agreement with things I have already said or would like to say. [. . .] it is a torment to me to think, when I conceive an idea now and then, that I may be taking something away from you or appropriating something that might just as well have been acquired by you. When this happens, I feel at a loss. (letter to C.G. Jung, 12 Nov 1911, 459)

102 Dufresne elsewhere makes the poignant observation that, as the site where “metapsychology subverts psychoanalysis,” Beyond is “the name of the trauma Freud inflicted on psychoanalysis, playfully or otherwise, from a position within psychoanalysis” (“Introduction” 28). In “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Freud says as much when he writes that when confronted with difficult therapeutic issues one must summon “the witch of metapsychology” (181).

103 See, for example, Chapter Nine of Kerr.
In this magnificently understated (and overlooked) passage Freud admits that Jung says what he would like to say – but cannot. What exactly is it Freud would like to say? What makes him incapable of saying it? The answer to these questions is, of course, a sphinx-like silence.

Jung’s response is equally prescient: “You are a dangerous rival—if one has to speak of rivalry. Yet I think it has to be this way, for a natural development cannot be halted, nor should one try to halt it. [. . .] Because of the difference in our working methods we shall undoubtedly meet from time to time in unexpected places” (To Sigmund Freud, 14 Nov 1911, 460; my italics). The degree to which Freud was – susceptible to? tolerant of? struggling against? – Jung’s ideas will likely remain a matter of speculation and debate. But Jung’s insistence on the irrevocable unfolding of a natural development foreshadows his later theoretical emphasis on prospective, forward movement. And this prospective Trieb would encounter the final phase of Freudian metapsychology against the metaphysical backdrop of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie – a meeting place neither Freud nor Jung would have expected.

A few years after the fateful break, Freud’s strange bids on the phylogenetic and the pre-subjective begin with A Phylogenetic Fantasy (1915) – a metapsychological metanarrative contiguous with the work begun in Totem and Taboo (1913) on the primordial origins of the human race. A Phylogenetic Fantasy can be fruitfully read as a response to Jung’s Symbols, and the Thanatotic quality of its textual drive makes it a stepping stone to Freud’s later flirtations with phylogeny in Beyond. In A Phylogenetic Fantasy, Freud aims to forward the psychoanalytic project of “[representing] forcefully the interests of early infantile acquisitions” while constituting a “phylogenetic series” “which relates the development of each illness [dementia praecox, paranoia, melancholia-mania] in the individual (ontogeny) to specific events in the prehistory of mankind (phylogeny)” (Hoffer 518). And here Freud comes closest to extending this narrative beyond phylogenetic history toward something like the quasi-subjectivity of Schelling’s Nature: “The developmental history of the libido recapitulates a much older piece of the [phylogenetic] development than that of the ego; the former perhaps recapitulates conditions of the phylum of vertebrates, whereas the latter is dependent on the history of
the human race” (*Phylogenetic Fantasy* 11-12). If Schelling’s three versions of *Ages* never quite get beyond the past, and if this past’s ineluctable nature is part of *Ages’* “invention” of psychoanalysis (Rajan, “First Outline” 312), one can see an analogous quandary in the text of Freud’s phylogenetic fantasy. Here, Freud’s ages of the libidinal world remain tied to the “anxiousness of the beginning of the Ice Age” (*Phylogenetic Fantasy* 14), even as successive epochs of human development provide the psychic foundation for modern neuroses and psychoses. The text ends with a similar recapitulation, summarising the phylogenetic narrative as something that “may be no more than a playful comparison,” but whose promise, in an apt moment of deferred action, “should properly be left to further investigation, and illumination through new experiences” (19). Thus the *Fantasy’s* nachträglich coda, with the phylogenetic narrative as binding primal phantasy.

This phylogenetic fantasy frames Freud’s later theorising of both origins and the return to those origins in *Beyond’s* metapsychology. Yet *Beyond* reaches back beyond the phylogenetic fantasy to a space where there is no thinking subject or racial history, but instead the genetic drama of the germ-cells, which Freud invokes in a way that both corroborates and troubles *Beyond’s* metanarrative. The death instinct, as the urge to restore inertia, is “the expression of the conservative nature of living matter,” contrary to “factor[s] pressing toward change and development” (*Beyond* 75-76). Freud’s disavowal of prospective movement aligns with both the dying organism’s “greater and greater deviations from its original path of life and toward more and more complex detours” and his formulation of deferred action (*Nachträglichkeit*) in service to primal phantasy.  

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104 It should be noted that Rajan does not use “psychoanalysis” in the specific Freudian sense I do here; however, its specifically Freudian meaning is nevertheless appropriate here.

105 It is difficult to tell if Freud distinguishes between the “change and development” he mentions here and the “instinct towards perfection” he harshly critiques later as Eros (42). The difference between these ideas is crucial: Jungian individuation – and hence metasubjectivity – while driven by a purposiveness, does not link this purposive movement with an idealist ethos or a tangible notion of “perfection.”

106 Although Laplanche and Pontalis (122) defend *Nachträglichkeit* against criticisms that psychoanalysis reduces all human actions and desires to the infantile past, they do not differentiate *Nachträglichkeit* from the regressive movement of the death instinct. As a result, the “pathogenic force” with which the neurotic
The subject is constituted as Nature’s primary “misbegotten attempt,” driven backward to annihilation and primordial inorganicity. Indeed, as formulated by Freud the death instinct ultimately suggests a melancholic drive within Nature toward Nature as inorganicity not unlike what Geoffrey Hartman sees as the *pharmakon* element in Romantic self-consciousness. This “death-in-life” is its own antidote as a “middle-term, the strait through which everything must pass” in the circuitous journey of the detour (Hartman, “Romanticism” 50-51). Freud’s Thanatotic bionarrative begins in a similar vein:

> At some time, and through the influence of a completely inconceivable force, the characteristics of life were awakened in nonliving matter. Perhaps this was a process similar in type to that other process which later brought about the emergence of consciousness in a particular layer of the living matter. The tension then arising in the previously inanimate substance strove toward equilibrium. Thus arose the first drive: the drive to return to the nonliving. (*Beyond* 77)

Here Freud narrates the Romantic impetus toward “anti-self-consciousness,” but it is *Beyond’s* drama of the germ-cells which both corroborates and troubles this narrative of inorganicity, recapitulating the “wavering rhythms” of the organism it describes (79). This drama also performs Freud’s Jungian agon, a *fort/da* moving him both toward and away from Jung as Freud is driven to reduce Jung’s “libidinal” presence (the presence of Jung’s rhythmic libido) in this metapsychology to a zero-point of influence.

Then there is the telling *peripeteia* beginning Freud’s discussion of the germ-cells: “this cannot be so” (78). It is indeed a *turn* – not a turning-*away-from*, but perhaps a looking-askance-at the conservative formulation of the death instinct. It is also the point of departure for Freud’s germ-cells and their biological dramatisation of what, for Schelling’s speculative physics, is the ambivalent bidirectionality, the lifedeath of Nature.

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subject revises past events is not the same as Jung’s prospective hermeneutic. *Nachträglichkeit* is conceived as an iteration of the death instinct’s conservative “detours,” accentuated by its connection to primal phantasy.

107 While such a goal might be aligned with Oedipal return to the mother’s womb through literal incest, Freud does not tie the death instinct to Oedipal metanarrative. Adrian Johnston reminds us that Sophocles’ Oedipus hardly resembles a subject who has managed to achieve jouissance through incest (xxi-xxii).
Yet in precisely this ambivalence we can read what Freud would like to say, but ultimately cannot. As Freud’s markers for the “potential immortality” (79) of organic matter apart from “the developmental path all the way to natural death” (78), the germ-cells participate in both a “fall[ing] back on the beginning of development” and a “development to the end” (79). As the “wavering rhythm” (79) of the organism, Beyond deploys the trope of the uncanny to articulate both the germ-cell’s fundamental division against itself and its drive to “[merge] with another [cell] similar yet different from it” (79). In this rhythm, “one group of drives storms forward to reach the final goal of life as soon as possible, but the other group shoots back to a certain location on the path to retrace it from a given point, thus prolonging the journey” (79). Freud’s biological version of Thanatopoiesis.

This heimlich-unheimlich nature of the germ-cell – its desire for something simultaneously identical with and foreign to itself – constitutes an uncanny remainder intervening in Freud’s narrative, just as this desire makes this narrative possible. The labyrinthine paths of his metapsychology here lead Freud to remark that the sexual drive “came into operation at the very start,” which brings him very close to the Jungian monism he later derides, irrespective of the distinction between sexual and ego-instincts that is unworked in his later The Ego and The Id (1923) (Beyond 79, 89). Thus, while the death instinct and its phylogenetic narrative constitute the Romantic subject of diseased self-consciousness which “seeks to draw the antidote to consciousness from

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108 In The Ego and The Id, the tripartite ego/id/superego framework is destabilised by the ego’s nature as partially unconscious and repressed, “a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” constituted by a metonymy of these object choices. Indeed, Freud defines the ego as “a specially differentiated part of the id” (17, 29, 38). Freud attempts to situate the “moment” of ego/id differentiation in the phylogenetic history begun in Totem and Taboo, but ends up pushing it much further back into a pre-subjective era of “much simpler organisms” reacting to the external world. Interestingly, Freud’s account of this differentiation deploys a dynamic startlingly close to Jung’s formulation of the archetype as paradoxically a priori and product of repeated external experiences. Freud writes: “The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existences of countless egos” (38; my italics). Indeed, Freud seems very close to the dissociationist tradition here, but Jung is more attentive to the paradoxical nature of this dynamic than Freud.
consciousness itself” (Hartman, “Romanticism” 48), in detouring back to inorganicity it never reaches its origin. But even though the death instinct is forever frustrated by its uncanny remainders, it does not serve the “vital, dialectical movement of ‘soul-making’,” the infinite productivity Hartman sees as central to the Romantic project (“Romanticism” 49). What Freud “would like to say, but cannot” resides in the uncanny remainder unsettling the death drive.

This remainder is Eros, the drive “to combine the organic into larger and larger unities” (Beyond 81). At one point Freud seems to construct Eros as a Stufenfolge only to dismiss it as impossible, seeing it as a substitute for a human “drive toward perfection” which cannot be substantiated (80). But in a lengthy footnote at the end of Beyond, Freud notes that the “findings of psychoanalysis” lead him to decouple sex drives from reproduction, indeed to see the sex drive as “Eros, which seeks to push together and hold together the parts of living substance” (97 n. 1). And in admitting that death drives are always already entangled with life drives (93), Freud closes down his scientific investigation as “a darkness into which not one ray of hypothesis has penetrated,” turning to Plato’s Symposium and the Upanishads to corroborate his original hypothesis (93, 94 n. 2). This transition from Victorian biologism to “the Eros of the poets and philosophers” (87)109 is watermarked by Jung’s presence, first in Freud’s reference to “critical and far-seeing minds” which “had long ago objected to restricting the concept of libido to the energy of the sex drives directed toward an object.” But just as quickly as this speculative expansion of psychoanalysis appears it is closed down, as such minds have nothing to provide an orthodox psychoanalysis and are thus dismissed (88). Now as the promulgator of “monistic libido” (89) Jung is sidelined, along with the futurity of Eros as combinatory force. Beyond can only access this speculative potency through forays into mythology, religion and philosophy, which are ultimately abjected in Freud’s economy.

109 It should be recalled that this turn begins with Freud having unwittingly “sailed into the harbor of Schopenhauer’s philosophy” (87).
1.4 Inter-Section: Deleuze’s Perversion of Libido

It is Deleuze who, in his critique of the death drive, offers a useful framework through which to approach Jung’s energetic reconception of libido and reformulation of the death drive. In *Coldness and Cruelty* (1967), Deleuze attempts to get at what is “really” beyond the pleasure principle – the “second-order [transcendental] principle,”110 “the highest authority which subjects our psychic life to the dominance of this principle,” “the absolutely unconditioned, the ‘ground-less’ from which the ground itself emerged” (112, 114). For Deleuze, this (un)grounding principle is *perversion*, the “structural split” between “the functional interdependence of the ego and superego” (116f) marking *desexualised* libido (freely mobile energy) according to Freud’s own observations on libido’s desexualisation in the narcissistic ego (idealisation) or the superego (identification).111 In perversions such as sadism and masochism, the desexualisation of idealisation/identification is resexualised “in coldness” – in other words, the original desexualisation “has become in itself the object of sexualization” in a way that does not sublate the original desexualisation, which persists as an unassimilable remainder (*Coldness* 117).

Contrary to Freud’s assertion that this desexualised libido serves the pleasure principle (*Ego/Id* 135), the repetition “beyond the pleasure principle” becomes unbound. In perversion,

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repetition runs wild and becomes independent of all previous pleasure. It has itself become an idea or ideal. Pleasure is now a form of behavior related to repetition, accompanying and following repetition, which has itself become an awesome, independent force. Pleasure and repetition have thus exchanged roles, as a consequence of the instantaneous leap, that is to say the twofold process of desexualization and resexualization. (*Coldness* 120)
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110 "Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world" (Deleuze, *DR* 143).

111 Put differently, desexualised libido is an indifferent energy that can be either Eros or Thanatos, which enables love to become hate and vice versa – Freudian libido’s repressed third term, as it were.
The pain in sadism and masochism now “represents a desexualization which makes repetition autonomous” in a manner that does not annul the pleasure principle, but rather releases repetition into a wider economy in accordance with the “perverse” second-order principle governing the field of the pleasure principle (120). We can read this dynamic away from its personalised Sadean register: in appealing to perversion as the (un)ground of this wider economy of repetition, Deleuze reads in Freud a polymorphous perversity leading away from the sovereignty of past pleasures and toward autonomous repetition. And although Jung criticises Freud’s formulation of “polymorphous perversity” in children in its literal, sexual sense, the kernel of desexualisation Deleuze sees in Freud leads toward Jung’s definition of the archetype as a centripetal force of repetition, “impressions of ever-repeated typical experiences [which simultaneously] behave empirically like agents that tend towards the repetition of these same experiences” (On the Psychology para. 109). Indeed, the following chapter will show that what Jung therapeutically criticises in Freud recrudesces as the impersonal, cosmic polymorphous perversity of the archetypes in Jung’s metapsychology.

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze thinks Thanatos beyond the phylogenetic return to a previous state and toward death as an “empty form of time” separate from negation, uniting past, present and future in a sort of “death” drawing the ego narcissistically into itself through “the essentially lost character of virtual objects and the essentially disguised character of real objects” (110). This ego re-emerges as Deleuze’s larval subject, a narcissistic ego “related to the form of an I which operates upon it as an ‘Other’” constituted by displacements forming a house of mirrors through which the

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112 In the forewords to the second and third editions (1915/1938) of “Psychic Conflicts in a Child” (1946) Jung disputes the legitimacy of “polymorphous perversity,” thinking of it instead in energic terms as “polyvalency.” But the ideas are not so different when considering “perversion” as an indeterminacy apart from a explicitly sexual context.
larval subject is constituted (110). Put differently, Deleuze’s notion of “transcendental synthesis” releases Thanatos from nostalgia into a futurity that Freud represses:

From a transcendental viewpoint, past, present and future are constituted in time simultaneously, even though, from the natural standpoint, there is between them a qualitative difference, the past following upon the present and the present upon the future. [...] These two correlative structures [of past and present] cannot constitute the synthesis of time without immediately opening up to and making for the possibility of a future in time [...] that saves or fails to save, depending on the modes of combination of the other two. (Coldness 115)

Deleuze’s indication of “a monism, a qualitative dualism and a difference in rhythm” in Freud’s work on the death instinct gestures toward a futurity which reads Thanatos not only toward the spectre of Jung in Freud’s thought as Eros, but also toward that aspect of Trieb in Schelling’s Nature which does not hark back toward sex-hating indifference. Thus, Deleuze offers a way of mapping the temporal topography of Thanatopoiesis and Romantic metasubjectivity; his exposition on death in Difference and Repetition leads it away from a binary opposition with Eros and toward the “neutral, displaceable energy” that Freud repudiates in Jung. Invoking the dissociationist psyche (whose topography I will trace in the following chapter), Deleuze puts the subject under erasure as an amalgam of larval subjects in order to think the death drive, as desexualised, neutral libido unbound by the erotism of the pleasure principle, closer to the forces of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and Jung’s collective unconscious.

The “natural development” Jung refers to in his letter to Freud augurs the movement of supplementarity by which Jungian metapsychology releases the Thanatotic drive of the pleasure principle into a broader dynamic field. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie conceptualises this agon, but Romantic metasubjectivity marks Jung’s closer relationship to the bidirectionality of Schelling’s Nature. Where Beyond sublates the Romantic subject into the “urge inherent in living organic matter for the restoration of

113 As Constantin Boundas puts it, here “the subject is the tensive arrangement of many larval subjects. A self exists as long as a contracting machine, capable of drawing a difference from repetition, functions somewhere” (274).
an earlier state [as] the expression of inertia [. . .] to reach an old goal by ways old and new” (75-77), Romantic metasubjectivity emerges as an anamnesis of the Naturphilosophie’s rich ambiguity through its Jungian analysis. We have seen how in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, Nature’s developmental drive toward the absolute product stalemates Nature’s backward movement with a promissory horizon of unity, paradoxically substantiated by the same organic life which unworks it. This bidirectionality underwrites the Thanatopoiesis of Romantic metasubjectivity, which names the ontoaesthetic “ambitendency” of Jungian libido (Symbols 173). 114

Thanatopoiesis articulates the Romantic metasubjective psyche’s ontoaesthetic rhythms of projection and recollection, progression and regression as it recapitulates, stepwise through time, its uncanny affinity with a Nature likewise ambivalent toward its products. With this, we turn to Jung in order to examine how analytical psychology emerges as a very different kind of science and opens itself to the speculative terrain ultimately closed off to psychoanalysis. 115

1.5 Jung: Analytical Psychology, Weltanschauung, and the Fluidity of Being

The project of Schelling’s First Outline begins, in essence, from the standpoint of a philosophical unconscious figured as Nature’s preindividual fluidity. Within this “most primal fluid—the absolute noncomposite [and] absolute decomposite [. . .] receptive to every form [. . .] a mass wherein no part is distinguished from the other by figure” (FO

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115 For this reason, McGrath’s argument for an “intimate historical and systematic relationship between nature-philosophy and psychoanalysis,” even if Freud’s late metapsychology amounts to “a nature-philosophy without telos” (“Is Schelling’s” 20), seems overstated.
6), the actants, as combinatory forces, coalesce and resist. This “drama of a struggle between form and the formless” (FO 27-28), between individual force and “the chora, the (un)ground of new formations” (Rajan, “First Outline” 314), is doubled on the level of psyche as the “original, undifferentiated polyvalency” of regressed libido in Jung’s collective unconscious (Symbols 159). This constitutive fluidity is part of what leads Jung to think analytical psychology as an ur-science, or counter-science through its reconception of the death instinct as Thanatopoiesis. Thus, it also constitutes analytical psychology as a psychic afterlife of the Romantic Trieb toward unconditional knowledge represented in the First Outline, whose Nature is itself a force which unworks the positivity of the positive sciences. Indeed, this distinction informs Jung’s fundamentally Romantic conception of science versus Freud’s fundamentally Victorian-scientific influence. Beyond folds even the “potential immortality” of the germ-cells into the primal phantasy of inorganicity as “only a lengthening of the path toward death” (79). But analytical psychology seeks the very fluidity of a science “receptive to every form” insofar as it lacks an Archimedean point of reference in its drive to recapitulate Schelling’s “‘absolute activity’ of Nature as the ‘unconditioned’” (Rajan, “First Outline” 313-14). In other words, analytical psychology sounds the full depth of Nature’s lifedeath by measuring the fluidity of Schelling’s Nature through the regressive-progressive rhythm of libido.

We can begin to probe analytical psychology’s fluidity with Jung’s “Analytical Psychology and ‘Weltanschauung’” (1931). The “Weltanschauung” essay is Jung’s statement on analytical psychology’s status as “science” as opposed to both the “natural science” of psychoanalysis or a Weltanschauung (a philosophy of life or, as Jung defines

116 See also Rajan, “First Outline” 316.

117 Foucault defines a counter-science as a science which directs positivist sciences “back to their epistemological basis” to “unmake” that positivity. A counter-science “traverse[s], animate[s], and disturb[s] the whole constituted field of the human sciences [by] overflowing it both on the side of positivities and on that of finitude [to] form the most general contestation of that field. [It] make[s] visible, in a discursive mode, the frontier-forms of the human sciences, situating its experience in those enlightened and dangerous regions where the knowledge of man acts out, in the form of the unconscious and of historicity, its relation with what renders them possible” (Order 379, 381).
it, “an attitude that has been formulated into concepts” [para. 689]). But while Jung attempts to distinguish between such terms as “Weltanschauung,” “science,” and “picture of the world,” all of these terms are drawn together in a fluidity from which analytical psychology ultimately emerges as a science of life, a psychology of experience which prioritises the “internal necessity” of one’s judgments in Schelling’s a priori Nature (FO 198). In separating analytical psychology from Weltanschauung Jung ends up equating them as the force of difference between systems which creates systems; indeed, this counter-scientific fluidity constitutes the “Weltanschauung” essay in many ways as Jung’s own “First System Programme.”

The “Weltanschauung” essay is bookended with discussions of the relationship between analytical psychology and Weltanschauung, but the middle of the essay is weighted with an exposition of analytical psychology contra psychoanalysis. Here, Jung aligns the inherited nature of archetypes with the collective unconscious as “an inherited system identical with the ancestral constitution, which will unfailingly function in the same way as before. Consequently, the possibility that anything new and essentially different will be produced becomes increasingly small” (para. 717). Left here, the Jungian psyche reads like a restricted economy of “inherited possibilities,” a structuralist pantheon of archetypes whose limits are always already delineated. But Jung continues by describing the collective unconscious as the mighty deposit of ancestral experience accumulated over millions of years, the echo of prehistoric happenings to which each century adds an infinitesimally small amount of variation and differentiation. [It is] a deposit of world-processes embedded in the structure of the brain and the sympathetic nervous system,

118 In this sense, analytical psychology is also symmetrical with the project of Schelling’s positive philosophy as a philosophy of existence based in sheer facticity, “that which just exists” independently of every concept (GPP 200).

119 The “Oldest System Programme of German Idealism” (1796), attributed to several authors (including Schelling), was a reaction to the restrictions on human knowledge Kant articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Its heavy emphasis on organicism contra mechanism and its call for philosophy’s “sensualisation” for a future “mythology of reason” are crucial to the Romanticism which developed out of German Idealism. These dimensions of sense-experience and mythology are also crucial to both the middle (and later) Schelling as well as Jung.
[constituting] in its totality a sort of timeless and eternal world-image. (para. 729; my italics)

This is to say that the “inherited system” recapitulates, but encrypted within this “sameness,” is a kernel of difference, a quanta of variation. In other words, the “mighty deposit of ancestral experience” becomes an evolutionary remainder in the economy of the psyche.

This kernel of difference is carried over into the “Weltanschauung” essay’s attempt to articulate the relationship between analytical psychology and Weltanschauung. As a world-view or philosophy of life, Jung defines a Weltanschauung as

something which embraces all sorts of attitudes to the world, including the philosophical. [. . .] [It is a person’s] serious attempt to formulate his attitude in conceptual or concrete form [. . .] a widened or deepened consciousness [. . .] To have a Weltanschauung means to create a picture of the world and of oneself [with] the best possible knowledge—a knowledge that esteems wisdom and abhors unfounded assumptions, arbitrary assertions, and didactic opinions. Such knowledge seeks the well-founded hypothesis, without forgetting that all knowledge is limited and subject to error. (pars. 689, 694-96, 698)

But while a Weltanschauung is based in a conscious creation of one’s “picture of the world,” this picture is nevertheless predicated on one’s “unconscious attitude” (para. 697). As the conscious articulation and cultivation of one’s attitude, a Weltanschauung is nevertheless always already rooted in the unconscious, purposive aspects of personality—one’s attitude as the “particular arrangement of psychic contents oriented towards a goal or directed by some kind of ruling principle” (para. 690; my italics).

Jung sees psychoanalysis as a Weltanschauung of “rationalistic materialism [. . .] an essentially practical natural science” (para. 707; trans. mod.). In contrast, analytical psychology is “not a Weltanschauung but a science [. . .] an experiment in Weltanschauung” which provides the tools to construct Weltanschauungen (pars. 730-31; 120 Jung’s original German defines psychoanalysis as Naturwissenschaft and analytical psychology as Wissenschaft. Presumably Jung wants to separate analytical psychology from the materialist dimensions of Freud’s “natural science.”)
trans. mod),\textsuperscript{121} but as much as Jung wants to create analytical psychology as a science separate from Weltanschauung (making the former irreducible to the latter as “experiments” in it), it is precisely the experiment which fuses them together. For Jung’s exposition of analytical psychology’s concepts and hypotheses of the autonomous complex and the collective unconscious in the middle of the essay are fundamentally a case study in the formation of the “well-founded hypothesis” both analytical psychology and Weltanschauungen depend on. This said, there is nevertheless a desire in Jung’s essay to release analytical psychology from the conceptual economy it shares with Weltanschauungen: in the end, the generation of a Weltanschauung (which is necessary for life) requires that one “leave behind science,” because “now we need the creative resolve to entrust our life to this or that hypothesis” (para. 740). This creative resolve is precisely what casts analytical psychology as a psychology of experience. As what we might call an Urweltanschauung, a set of crafted hypotheses which folds back into Being, resistant to reifying concepts.

Roughly fifteen years later, Jung thinks analytical psychology closer to a counter-science of the unconditioned in “On the Nature of the Psyche” (1947). Here, Jung frames analytical psychology as nothing less than a disciplinary individuation process which recapitulates the dissociative potentiation of individual development. Just as the individual’s goal is the depotentiation of the ego in service to integrating “objective,” autonomous archetypal content, analytical psychology’s goal is ultimately, in a word, to dissociate – to become its own subject through becoming the very object of its knowledge:

\textsuperscript{121} While Jung denies that analytical psychology can become a Weltanschauung, analytical psychology is not free from the tension Derrida identifies in “Freud and the Scene of Writing” between an institutional “Psychoanalysis” and a radicalised (“traced”) “psychoanalysis.” Jung’s effort to systematise analytical psychology into a therapeutics of presence reifying and progressing through archetypes (one meets the Shadow first, then the Anima/Animus, then the Wise Old Man/Woman etc.) is troubled by the metapsychological theory of the archetypes, much like Freud’s efforts to establish stages of sexuality in the Three Essays is unworked by the idea of polymorphous perversity. Thus Jungian metapsychology inflicts a “trauma” on analytical psychology analogous to the trauma Dufresne identifies in Freud’s metapsychology. See note 103, above.
The psychology of complex phenomena finds itself in an uncomfortable situation compared with the other natural sciences because it lacks a base outside its object. It can only translate itself back into its own language, or fashion itself in its own image. The more it extends its field of research and the more complicated its objects become, the more it feels the lack of a point which is distinct from those objects. And once the complexity has reached that of the empirical man, his psychology inevitably merges with the psychic process itself. It can no longer be distinguished from the latter, and so turns into it. But the effect of this is that the process attains to consciousness. In this way, psychology actualizes the unconscious urge to consciousness. [Analytical psychology] is, in fact, the coming to consciousness of the psychic process [but not] an explanation of this process, for no explanation of the psychic can be anything other than the living process of the psyche itself. Psychology is doomed to cancel itself out as a science and therein precisely it reaches its scientific goal. (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 429; my italics)\textsuperscript{122}

Schelling’s World-Soul unfolds in “the tension of infinite individuation of matter and the un-conditioning of experience as it moves from recording to producing further individuation” in an infinite “feed[ing] back on itself” (Grant, “Philosophy” 133). Similarly, analytical psychology’s archetypal physics is a self-unfolding indistinguishable from its objectification in Nature, a “progressive universal poetry” which “writes” itself mythopoetically and phenomenologically in the world – Jung’s version of Schelling’s \textit{a priori} Nature and Schlegel’s ontopoetics.

This bold mission statement declares nothing less than analytical psychology’s counter-scientific desire not simply to be one \textit{Weltanschauung} contending among others, but the fluid economy from which \textit{Weltanschauungen} come. Jung’s vision of psychology as “the discipline to unite the circle of the sciences” (Shamdasani, \textit{Jung and the Making} 18) ends up as a psychic analogue of the Romantic encyclopedia, as analytical psychology’s intrinsic resistance to form both underwrites and dissolves this united circle of knowledge. Schelling puts in relief the possibility of this system as the opening of an intellectual infinity which is imbued with the forces and processes of the natural world.

\textsuperscript{122} Novalis makes similar claims for philosophy: “We cannot measure the content of reason by its form, or its form by its content – both are unending – and philosophy can never be \textit{primal history}, but rather must be, and remain, the law of unmediated existence. […] It may not pursue its ideas, but only represent them” (\textit{Fichte Studies} #472).
That is, the possibility of this unifying science is encrypted into its very unworking in a text as dynamic as the Nature it tries to explain:

The *empirically infinite* [of Nature] is only the external intuition of an *absolute (intellectual) infinity* whose intuition is originally in us, but which could never come to consciousness without external, empirical exhibition [. . .] through a *finitude* which is never complete, i.e., which is *itself infinite*. In other words, it can only be presented by *infinite becoming*, where the intuition of the infinite lies in no individual moment, but is only *to be produced* in an endless progression. (*FO* 15)

This idea of subject-object / mind-nature consubstantiality informs the idea of the *unconscious* as the crucial point of convergence for Schelling, Jung and Deleuze & Guattari; we will later see that its specifically human materiality emerges in Schelling’s 1800 *System*. Jung’s scepticism about attaining a unified circle of the sciences is encrypted in his reminder that “there is no conscious content which can with absolute certainty be said to be totally conscious, for that would necessitate an unimaginable totality of consciousness. [Thus] the paradoxical conclusion that there is no conscious content which is not in some other respect unconscious” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 385). Writing at the point of his crucial turn in thinking on the archetypes (which I discuss in the following chapter), this fluidity moves Jung decisively away from the perceived debts to Kant or Hegel,123 and aligns the *ateleological* project of analytical psychology closely with Schelling’s thought. Let us turn, now, to Jung’s specific formulation of libido which caused the break with Freud, and which powers the dynamics of Romantic metasubjectivity which will be articulated in the following chapters.

123 Jung’s ambivalence toward Hegel suggests a complicated (if confused) philosophical heritage. On the one hand Jung views Hegel as both a “schizophrenic” and “a psychologist in disguise who projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created,” and who supersedes Kant. On the other hand, Jung’s preference for Kant is clear: “the victory of Hegel over Kant dealt the gravest blow to reason and to the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind.” Jung further holds Hegel’s views responsible for “that hybris of reason which led to Nietzsche’s superman and hence to the catastrophe that bears the name of [post-WW2] Germany” for which Schelling, among others, offers a compensatory philosophy (“On the Nature of the Psyche” pars. 358-59). But Jung elsewhere writes that Hegel was a great Romantic psychologist “in philosopher’s garb” (“Foreword to Mehlich” para. 1734). Wolfgang Giegerich argues that the Hegelian “thinking form,” as it marks the proper “logical status of consciousness,” is “betrayed” in Jung by a “Kant-based empiricism” compromising the project of “true” psychology (“Jung’s Betrayal” 56).
“Sexuality is not mere instinctuality; it is an indisputably creative power [. . .] sexuality seems to us the strongest and most immediate instinct, standing out as the instinct above all others” (Jung, “On Psychic Energy” para. 108). This may sound quasi-Freudian, but here Jung is already thinking sexuality away from the margins of Freudian biologism. Indeed, for Jung, sexuality is in dialogue with spirit, both of them as what Schelling, in Ages, earlier called questioning and answering beings. Thus Jung writes:

the spirit senses [wittert] in sexuality a counterpart equal and indeed akin to itself. For just as the spirit would press sexuality, like every other instinct, into its service, so sexuality has an ancient claim upon the spirit, which it once—in procreation, pregnancy, birth, and childhood—contained within itself, and whose passion the spirit can never dispense with in its creations. (para. 107)

This is not, of course, the sublation (or Freud’s sublimation) of sexuality into spirit. Rather, sexuality becomes a catachresis for desire in general, but as a speculative Eros in a dialogue with spirit which psychoanalysis cannot decrypt. Indeed, sexuality becomes susceptible to blockage and crisis (to use a Schellingian term I discuss in Chapter Four), hence the involution which precedes evolution:

Whenever an instinct is checked or inhibited, it gets blocked and regresses. Or to be more precise: if there is an inhibition of sexuality, a regression will eventually occur in which the sexual energy flowing back from this sphere activates a function in some other sphere. In this way the energy changes its form. [. . .] The presexual, early infantile stage to which the libido reverts is characterized by numerous possibilities of application, because, once the libido has arrived there, it is restored to its original undifferentiated polyvalency. (Symbols 158-59)

This “original undifferentiated polyvalency,” as a fluid reservoir of intensity, allows Jung to depotentiate the specifically biological aspect of incest, the issue which so vexed the Freud-Jung relationship. Thus incest attains a metaphoricality which makes it less about sexual taboo and more about transformation: “The effect of the incest-taboo and of the attempts at canalization is to stimulate the creative imagination, which gradually opens up possible avenues for the self-realisation of libido. In this way the
libido becomes imperceptibly spiritualized” (224; my italics). Incest’s potential for “creative imagination” here punctuates its metaphoricity, its symbolic role as a meaningful event in the individuation process. Jung releases libido from the work of nostalgia into a wider energetic economy, articulated by the Thanatopoietic movement of regression (to the mother, symbolic or otherwise) and “progressive” creation of new libidinal avenues unconstrained by metanarrative or teleology.

The inscrutable determinations of this systolic-diastolic movement unfold quantitatively, in relations of intensity:

Instinctual processes of whatever kind are often intensified to an extraordinary degree by an afflux of energy, no matter where it comes from. [...] One instinct can temporarily be depotentiated in favour of another instinct, and this is true of psychic activities in general. [Thus] it is not the sexual instinct, but a kind of neutral energy, which is responsible for the formation of such symbols as light, fire, sun, and the like. (138-39)

Indeed, where Schelling writes in the Naturphilosophie that “beyond matter is pure intensity” (FO 21n), Jungian libido is nothing less than “subjective intensity” (Symbols 165). And in a strongly proto-Deleuzian passage Jung writes:

Libido [only] manifests itself [...] in the form of a ‘force,’ that is to say, in the form of something in a definite energetic state, be it moving bodies, chemical or electrical tension, etc. Libido is therefore tied to definite forms or states. It appears as the intensity of impulses, affects, activities, and so on. But these

124 “Canalization” is Jung’s term for libido’s desire to create new pathways (canals) to articulate itself when faced with blockage.

125 Again, one should read “progressive” here as a purposive unfolding in line with the Romantic idea of organic unity. It is useful to keep in mind Frederick Beiser’s distinction between an external teleology “which understood nature as if it were only an instrument created by God to serve man” and a Romantic internal teleology, developed from the Romantic re-reading of Spinoza, “which sees purpose as inherent in a thing, as the very idea or concept of the whole” (Romantic Imperative 142-43). For a more specific discussion of the progressive-regressive dynamics of libido see Jung, “On Psychic Energy” pars. 72ff. Mark Welman describes this dynamic as one in which “Thanatos is oriented on one hand towards a ‘return’ of the ego to its primal origins and on the other hand towards a transcendent union of opposites” (132), but one must qualify “transcendence” as a Deleuzian transcendental empiricism as opposed to its traditional philosophical meaning of spirit without body.
phenomena are never impersonal; they manifest themselves like parts of the personality. (165, 328)

Jung sometimes lapses into a psychological Kantianism in trying to distinguish between a noumenal archetype-in-itself and its phenomenal manifestation. But Deleuze takes up Jungian libido in its intensive dimension\textsuperscript{126} in his transcendental empiricism, in a move \textit{against} the Kantian subject as a locus of quantity, quality, relation and modality as the categories of pure reason defining all possible experience. Deleuze takes up the Jung who is concerned not with the qualities of \textit{possible} experience (the Jung who would stop at a “closed system of inherited possibilities”) but instead with articulating \textit{actual} experience in a phenomenological economy analogous to Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism. Indeed, Jung does not limit libido to progressive-regressive bidirectionality, but superadds the tension between introverted and extraverted experiences; Jungian libido thus “moves not only forwards and backwards, but also outwards and inwards” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 78).

Jung thus gives libido a multidimensionality Deleuze would later take up as the “pure \textit{implex}” of depth which resists metaphors of verticality. And it is perhaps not surprising that Deleuze specifically invokes Schelling with regard to this depth. Deleuze’s point is important: “[Schelling] said that depth is not added from without to length and breadth, but remains buried, like the sublime principle of the \textit{differend} which creates them. [. . .] Depth and intensity are the same at the level of being, but the same in so far as this is said of difference” (\textit{DR} 230-31). The “neutral energy” of Jungian libido is aligned with Deleuzian intensity as the precursor of empiricism itself. The passage is worth quoting at length:

[As opposed to an empirical energy,] energy in general or intensive quantity is the \textit{spatium}, the theatre of all metamorphosis or difference in itself which envelops all its degrees in the production of each. In this sense, energy or intensive quantity is a transcendental principle, not a scientific concept. [. . .] An empirical principle is

\textsuperscript{126} Given that at least some of \textit{Difference and Repetition}’s key concepts are “explicitly indebted to Jung” (Kerslake, “Desire” 78), it is plausible that Deleuze takes up intensity directly from Jung’s formulation of libido. See also Kerslake, “Rebirth Through Incest” 142.
the instance which governs a particular domain [as] a qualified and extended partial system, governed in such a manner that the difference of intensity which creates it tends to be cancelled within it (law of nature). [...] On the other hand, there is an intensive space with no other qualification, and within this space a pure energy. The transcendental principle does not govern any domain but gives the domain to be governed to a given empirical principle. [Thus] [t]he domain is created by difference of intensity, and given by this difference to an empirical principle according to which and in which the difference itself is cancelled. It is the transcendental principle which maintains itself in itself, beyond the reach of the empirical principle. (DR 240-41)

In Jungian terms, libido is the intensive field through which empirical concepts arrange and govern knowledge. And in the absence of these specifically human domains, intensity is the First Outline’s fluidity; it is “pure energy,” what Schelling will later call the asystasy (which I discuss in Chapter Three) which recedes with the creation of systems of knowledge. “Domains” emerge to occlude their intensive (un)grounding just as Weltanschauungen are constructed from within the matrix of analytical psychology as their “transcendental principle.” This principle is the counter-scientific concept which analytical psychology both strives towards and endlessly deconstructs through its own matrix of archetypal forces.

In the final pages of The Order of Things, Foucault speculates about the potential of a “third counter-science” between psychoanalysis and ethnology, lauding the possibilities of an ethnology whose object of inquiry was not “societies without history” but “the area of the unconscious processes that characterize the system of a given culture [so as to] bring the relation of historicity, which is constitutive of all ethnology in general, into play within the dimension in which psychoanalysis has always been deployed” (379-80). That is, Foucault wonders about a psychoanalysis “with the dimension of an ethnology” guided by “the discovery that the unconscious also possesses, or rather that it is in itself, a certain formal structure” (380). Foucault argues that this counter-science would “make visible, in a discursive form, the frontier-forms of the human sciences [and] situate its experience in those enlightened and dangerous regions where the knowledge of man acts out, in the form of the unconscious and of historicity” (381; my italics). Foucault’s speculative remarks are resonant with analytical psychology which, more than psychoanalysis, sought to “rework psychology radically on
the basis of ethnopsychology” (Shamdasani, *Jung and the Making* 297), and primarily through the very phenomenon of mythology which Foucault saw reflecting the “formal transformations” of this (to Foucault) hypothetical structure (380).

We may lament yet another missed encounter between Jung and twentieth-century theory. Yet Romantic metasubjectivity opens up a space for us to see how analytical psychology gives a name to this counter-scientific historicity. Moreover, while Foucault remained entrenched at the level of discourse and linguistics, Romantic metasubjectivity allows us to conceive and name the historical psyche to which Foucault gestures. The specific articulation of this psyche is the subject of the following chapter, which returns to the *First Outline* and the Jungian archetype in order to explore their continuity in more detail, and articulate the dissociative matrix in which Romantic metasubjectivity emerges.
Chapter 2

2 The Romantic Metasubjective Unconscious: Dissociation, Historicity, Trauma

“The psyche, like the body,” writes Jung with emphasis, “is an extremely historical organism” (“Foreword to Perry” para. 837; trans. mod). Jung goes further, suggesting a synthesis of individual contingency and the purposiveness of Being when he writes that “history is prepared in the collective unconscious of the individual” (Tavistock para. 371; trans. mod). It is now commonplace to conjugate Romanticism with the so-called “rise of history,” but narratives of a “Romantic” Jung rarely take this into account. Jung’s extended analysis of Hölderlin’s poetry as a literary case study of energetic libidinal dynamics in Symbols (398ff), and his focus on Schiller and Goethe in his theory of psychological types, are enough to make us suspect his disavowal of Romanticism. Moreover, in 1918, after the break with Freud, Jung insists that the productive-dissociative unconscious,127 which “[holds] that every aggregation of ideas and images possesse[s], in some measure or other, its own personality” (Haule 243-44), “can be traced back to the time of the French Revolution, [with] the first signs of it [to be found in] Mesmer” (Jung, “Role” pars. 21-22). Jung saw the French Revolution as more than just a historical marker. On the one hand, it was an irruption of the “unconscious destructive forces of the collective psyche” which deposed Christianity to make “a tremendous impression on the unconscious pagan in us.”128 But on the other hand it was

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127 Recall from the Introduction that dissociationism is based on the view of the psyche as fundamentally decentred, constituted by a nexus of autonomous nodal forces (“voices,” “personalities” etc). In my discussion I will use the terms “productive” and “dissociative” somewhat interchangeably, consciously invoking the distinction Deleuze and Guattari make in Anti-Oedipus between the Freudian representative unconscious and the more radically productive “schizoid” unconscious traceable back to Jung. Chapter Five will take up Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as a poetic unfolding of the dissociative psyche’s topography.

128 In this sense, Jung offers us a psychological analogue of the Deleuzian event. For Deleuze, an event is the unique expression of a nexus of “prehensions,” his term for coalescences which constellate objects and perceptions (e.g., the event of the living organism “prehends water, soil, carbon, and salts”) (The Fold 88). Furthermore, “the event is inseparably the objectification of one prehension and the subjectification of another; it is at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own becoming” (88). The Jungian analogue to this is the unique emergence
a key historical event which catalysed the rise of empiricism’s concern with materiality itself. Leaving to one side Jung’s highly impressionist rendering of this history,129 its trajectory leads humanity’s inquiry into “the roots of life itself” from alchemy to scientific materialism, social realism, and finally to contemporary inquiries into “the ‘dark’ side of matter itself” (Aion 232).130 The importance of this trajectory should not be understated, for it also maps on to the profound shift in intensity within Jung’s own thinking, particularly with respect to the archetypes. Where Jung’s early thought gives the archetype a Kantian noumenal-phenomenal architectonic (and thus a transcendental nature amenable to the goals of alchemical teleology, which seeks on some level to grasp the in-itself of the Self and individuation), his later formulation effectively disintegrates this boundary to entangle the archetype in both psyche and matter as a point of intensity in a dissociative matrix that becomes synonymous with the psyche’s nature as a “historical organism.” The “extremely historical organism,” then, is grounded in the “dark side of matter,” the materiality and historicity from which the discipline of history emerges.

This shift in Jung’s thought from alchemical teleology to the more indeterminate “‘dark’ side of matter” is mapped out in advance in one of depth psychology’s key historical texts – Eduard von Hartmann’s The Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869), which exerted a profound influence on European culture at the end of the nineteenth century, and which both Freud and Jung knew well. Steeped as it was in the German Idealism of the time, and as much as it may ultimately have corroborated the philosophical narrative which put Schelling under Hegel’s shadow, von Hartmann’s text privileges both Hegel and Schelling as forerunners of the unconscious; in so doing, it

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129 Jung poeticises this history as the transition from Gnosticism to alchemy, a repetition of the Gnostic Nous “who, beholding his reflection in the depths below, plunged down and was swallowed in the embrace of Physis” (Aion 232-33).

130 See also “Role” para. 22 and Aion 90.
preserves in the history of the unconscious a voice for the Romanticism emerging from Idealism. Von Hartmann’s Idealism emerges most clearly in his goal of “[elevating] Hegel’s unconscious Philosophy of the Unconscious into a conscious one” (1.28). And von Hartmann’s Hegelian analytic of the unconscious is inscribed in a strikingly proto-Freudian framework: his metaphysical unconscious is demonic and indeterminate but ultimately beholden to consciousness, offering up its first-fruits of “feeling for the beautiful and artistic production” to specifically further the “conscious process of thought,” “preserve” and “guide” the organism (2.39). To this end von Hartmann writes: “wherever consciousness is able to replace the Unconscious, it ought to replace it, just because it is to the individual the higher” (2.41). Strange then that von Hartmann – whose work watermarks Jung’s early Zofingia Lectures – writes in almost the same breath that only with Schelling does one find “the Unconscious in its full purity, clearness and depth” (1.24). Stranger still that Jung should miss this aspect of von Hartmann’s thesis, relegating Schelling to the status of a minor waypoint en route to Carus, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann himself (Transformation Symbolism para. 375). Indeed, significant lacunae in Jung’s account are von Hartmann’s specific focus on Schelling’s important critique of Fichtean subjectivism (1.24; trans. in Schelling, On the History 108ff), and von Hartmann’s identification of Schelling as the first to explore the question of “[w]hether, and how far, the obscure ideas without any consciousness are to be explained by the penetration of the original intellectual intuition of the primordial Being into the derived human understanding” (1.23). This latter point crucially anticipates Jung’s later thinking on the archetypes and the collective unconscious.

Von Hartmann’s identification of Schelling as the explorer of an original “intellectual intuition of primordial Being” gives, perhaps, the first hint of his importance to the development of the dissociationist approach to the mind, a line of thinking which

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131 One need not look far to find Freud’s appropriation: in a 1914 footnote to The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud invokes von Hartmann to make the analogous point that the unconscious must be “subordinated” to consciousness, here in terms of content “appropriate” to consciousness (528 n. 1).
extends from Schelling, through Reil,132 Bergson, Janet,133 and Jung to Deleuze (the latter two being closely aligned with the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s, which included R.D. Laing and Foucault among others). Indeed, McGrath views Schelling as an important metaphysical precursor to dissociationism’s view of the person as “constitively plural” (“Schelling and the History” 53 n. 2).134 And Christian Kerslake sees dissociationism as a crucial point of difference between Jung and Freud: for him, Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious consists in his being the first” to create a strictly ‘molar’ opposition between consciousness and the unconscious” which led to “the loss of demarcations between different kinds of states of consciousness,” and hence Freud’s “scotomization” of dissociative thought (Deleuze 58-59).135 It is against this backdrop of

132 Johann Christian Reil (1759-1813), who actively took up Schelling’s thinking, developed theories of insanity as self-fragmentation which were closely aligned with the “polypsychism” of nineteenth-century magnetists (Ellenberger 146ff; Richards 263). Generally, polypsychism is the belief that an individual is comprised of a multitude of different entities (“souls,” psychological forces, etc). It is thus a direct ancestor of dissociationism.

133 As Shamdasani notes, Jung attended Janet’s lectures in Paris in 1902 – five years before he met Freud – and counts Janet as one of his most important teachers, along with Bleuler and Flournoy (Jung and the Making 47, 93). For a more detailed study of Janet’s theoretical presence in Jung see Monahan, esp. 40ff.

134 McGrath elsewhere makes the important point that Schelling’s copular logic is by definition dissociative, something “which conjoins but also disjoins.” When one says “A is B” (or “the ball is blue”), one always points to the unnameable copula. In other words, “in all acts of self-consciousness or self-identification, some aspect of the self goes unnamed, an anonymous indifferent ground withdraws from the identification and is never denominated by either the subject (the I) or the predicate (whatever the I happens to identify itself with)” (Dark Ground 121). This supports McGrath’s rather stark distinction between the Oedipal Freud and dissociationist Jung. However, McGrath’s truncation of Jungian theory to a passing acknowledgement of introversion and extraversion as “constitutive elements” of a potentially “fully functional polypsychism” (“Schelling and the History” 65) does not do full justice to the more radical aspects of Jungian metapsychology I explore here. It is also worth remembering that Schelling himself called the concept of freedom developed in the Freedom essay only one of his system’s “ruling centrepoints” (Freedom 9). This anticipates “NPS”’s later ungrounding of systemic knowledge in what can be called Schelling’s systemic dissociationism.

135 Kerslake somewhat overstates the case for Freud’s “molar” distinction. While Freud certainly rejects the dissociationist approach, in his “Outline of Psycho-Analysis” (1938) Freud describes the ego as a sort of rogue “special organization” broken away from the primordial reservoir of id, charged with “gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction” (145-46). But associating administrative choice with the ego sits uneasily with the crucial formulations of Freud’s second topography; here, part of the ego “behaves exactly like the repressed” and in The Ego and The Id (1923) the ego is “a specially differentiated part of the id” (38). For these reasons Kerslake’s description of Freud’s rejection as “scotomization” is also debatable. Scotomization was René Laforgue’s term for a post-repression formation of a “blind spot” in consciousness that completely blocks out traumatic memories and stimuli. But the problematic between ego, id, and superego formations demonstrates that
dissociationist thinking that I develop the historicity of the Romantic metasubjective unconscious.

Jung was no historian. One quickly sees that his sense of history is overdetermined by his theory of the archetypes, and as a result historical events are read as tangential points in the unfolding of the collective substratum of the human psyche. But opposed to this, Jung’s concern with the “dark side” of matter alludes to what Pfau calls the transferential “affinities” on which contemporary Romantic scholarship predicates the rise of history:

Moments of rhetorical instability [in Romantic texts] ought to be grasped [.] as symptomatic condensations of a larger historical dilemma. Indeed, it is only on the basis of a deeper affinity between formal-aesthetic and historical processes that we can begin to grasp romanticism as a specific phase in the evolution of modernity. Above all, we find the period conceding interiority to its post-Enlightenment subjects only in supplemental form. Rather than collapsing inwardness into a purely imaginary order—a quasi-maternal and allegedly unimpeachable, affective origin—romanticism during the Napoleonic era and beyond stages the inwardness of its subjects as a progressive awakening to their traumatic history. (242; my italics)

What Pfau describes in a less explicitly psychological framework than Jung is Romanticism’s ever-shifting tectonics of language and history, whose “affinities” nevertheless serve to recapitulate their difference in a dynamic encrypting, “staging” the interiority of the subject (Pfau’s dramatic language here is surely not accidental). In other words, what Pfau calls traumatic history is history’s subjection to the indeterminacy of historicity – what Schelling will call, in terms we shall explore below, history’s derangement. And while critical history still tends to associate Jung with this “purely imaginary order,” we have seen that the Jungian collective unconscious is historicity itself, the recapitulation of an infinitesimal kernel of difference and variation in its “deposit of world-processes” resulting in a “sort of timeless or eternal world-image which

dissociationism, while abjected and repressed, is not completely blocked out in psychoanalysis, even if Freud is essentially uninterested in different states of consciousness as Kerslake suggests.
counterbalances our conscious, momentary picture of the world” (“Analytical Psychology and ‘Weltanschauung’” para. 729).

But what is a “sort of” timeless or eternal world-image? We can read Jung’s imprecise terminology as a colloquialism for the difference within repetition that marks the unconscious, a repetition that “appears as difference without a concept, repetition which escapes indefinitely continued conceptual difference. It expresses [. . .] a stubbornness of the existent in intuition, which resists every specification by concepts” (DR 13-14; my italics). Put differently, this “sort of” timelessness marks the imbrication of ideal and real, the repetition of what does not rest entirely in concepts of either singularity or difference – the paradoxically productive lack underwriting the enantiodromia between one and the other in a “moment” that is always happening. Jung’s collective unconscious is the paradox of “sheer objectivity” which takes the subject out of itself to make it the “object of every subject, in complete reversal of [. . .] ordinary consciousness, where [. . .] the subject [always] has an object” (“Archetypes” para. 46), but also making the self part of the world in a continuum consciousness cannot perceive. That is, as Jung’s version of Schelling’s a priori Nature, the collective unconscious names the nonmolar matrix of historicity from which history unfolds. It is that “in” the person as ego (figuratively speaking) which connects them with the intangible energies of the archetypes, which the category “collective unconscious,” like Schelling’s “universal hierarchy” (FO 34), attempts to circumscribe only to find its boundaries infinitely porous, defined by the very excess it tries to contain.

Within this dissociative seethe, each “coming to presence” of every organism shares what Wirth calls a terrible solitude at the heart of its coming into existence, its own “awful secret of the absolute as natura naturans” (Schelling’s Practice 4), its singular burden of Nature’s infinite productivity which is nevertheless, and paradoxically, shared by all organisms. Indeed, what Wirth writes of Schelling’s Nature can be said with equal justice of Jung’s collective unconscious: “The community that is nature, a terrible belonging together, is the strange one—in no way to be construed as one thing or
being—expressing itself as the irreducibly singular proliferation of the many” (5). 136 For Jung archetypes, and individuals as amalgamations of archetypal intensities, all manifest as irreducibly singular proliferations of an unprethinkable materiality. And to anticipate themes detailed in the following chapters, we can say for now that the dissociative matrix of Nature and historicity is what engenders the trauma of becoming for each of Nature’s organisms; left to individuate in and through time and history, and powered by forces which recede before the purview of consciousness (or which dwell and circulate through the non-human animals), each organism lives, consciously or not, this secret of the Absolute. And for our species, to experience this awe and terror is to experience that which cannot be named as such.

This chapter explores this dissociative framework as the Romantic metasubjective unconscious, which emerges from a remarkable symmetry between Schellingian actant and Jungian archetype – terms each use respectively to theorise the primordial units from which Nature and psyche emerge. Indeed, the isomorphism between Schelling’s Nature and Jung’s collective unconscious offers a way through Jung’s early embattled attempts to articulate “psychic reality” which, as we saw in the last chapter, come up against the psyche’s unassimilable fluidity and resistance to a binarism with Nature. Schelling’s actant is a hypothesis, a heuristic unit which does not exist but which must be postulated in order to think Nature. Nevertheless, Schelling’s only way to think the actant’s dynamism is in the protopsychological rubric of Trieb which, even in this prehuman space, invites an analogy with the collective unconscious. The archetype, on the other hand, is performed within an (onto)aesthetic space as images, affects, situations and experiences, even if their symbolic economy means that these phenomena can only gesture toward the archetype’s unknowable core. Thus, Jung’s archetype in effect translates 137 the dynamism of Schelling’s actant into the economy of the dissociationist

136 Thus Jung writes: “the unconscious can contain everything that is known to be a function of consciousness, then we are faced with the possibility that it too, like consciousness, possesses a subject, a sort of ego” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 369; my italics).

137 Indeed, the conundrum over “translation” – does one translate from an original, or transform the original into something different? – is no less present here than with Freud (see note 90, above). However,
psyche, but this should not be understood as a relapse into a Cartesian distinction between (Schellingian) Nature and (Jungian) psyche. For we will see that Jung’s earlier problems separating psyche and Nature ultimately dissipate in his mature formulation of the archetype, which is in line with Jung’s ultimate conception of analytical psychology as a science which should be paradoxically inseparable from its object. The actant articulates the coalescence of Nature’s infinite productivity into dynamic products; the archetype articulates knowledge and experience of this emergence as images, affects, experiences and situations which variously, infinitely recapitulate this emergence and its “terrible belonging together” in solitude. I want to end this chapter by projecting the historicity of both Jung and the idea of Romantic metasubjectivity into contemporary theory. To this end, I demonstrate how Jung’s ultimate grounding of the archetype in a notion of language approaching Foucault’s “enigmatic density”138 allows us to conceptualise a grammatology of Being, a symbolic écriture through which Romantic metasubjectivity’s “Self of one’s self” unfolds. Let us now turn to Schelling’s notion of the actant, which can be seen in terms of the interlocked concepts of derangement, drive, and disease, all of which inform Schelling’s Nature.

2.1 Schelling’s Actant: Derangement, Drive, Disease

The First Outline’s structure is rhizomatic, a body without organs consisting of intersecting and mutually determining systems and disciplines which are constellated in a text with “undeveloped tendencies” (Rajan, “First Outline” 329-30). Indeed, the

the point I make here is that the theoretical dialogue between Schelling’s actant and the Jungian archetype reveals the former’s psychological potency and the latter’s material potency beyond Jung’s sporadic attempts to make Cartesian distinctions between psyche and Nature.

138 Foucault attributes this “enigmatic density” to modern language in The Order of Things. Unlike the density given to language in the Renaissance, “now it is not a matter of rediscovering some primary word that has been buried in it, but of disturbing the words we speak, of denouncing the grammatical habits of our thinking, of dissipating the myths that animate our words, of rendering once more noisy and audible the element of silence that all discourse carries with it as it is spoken” (298). Importantly, Foucault makes the point that this language is marked by “the need to work one’s way back from opinions, philosophies, and perhaps even from sciences, to the words that made them possible, and, beyond that, to a thought whose essential life has not yet been caught in the network of any grammar” (297-98).
“rhetorical instability” Pfau sees as symptomatic of Romantic texts is reflected in the *First Outline*’s performativity, which (un)grounds Schelling’s oeuvre as its metaphysical unconscious, the “fluidity” from which the other strands of his philosophy emerge and in which they entwine (FO 29). Schelling never fully plumbs the depths of his Nature, but in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy of nature, “structured by an anthropomorphism that reads nature as pathologized spirit” (Rajan, “Philosophy as Encyclopedia” 9) Schelling will privilege Nature’s productive aporias in subsequent works and phases of his thought. Indeed, Wirth offers a compelling case for considering the Naturphilosophie, if not as psychology, nonetheless psychologically; “doing Naturphilosophie” is not “doing a science,” but rather “doing philosophy in accordance with nature,” as “a gateway into the originating experience of philosophizing” itself (Schelling’s Practice 17). To plumb the depths of Nature is to sound the depths of one’s own nature. In other words, and anticipating the key themes of the following chapters, Naturphilosophie’s Nature offers a dissociationist experience of the absolute subject as the goal of a philosophical individuation process. And while Schelling does not use the term “absolute subject” in the *First Outline*, it is nevertheless nascent in the text as the “Proteus” of a philosophical creation myth drawing all possible forms into a circle “determined for it in advance.” This gathering requires “infinitely many attempts” (FO 28), making the circle both determinate and immanent. This Protean appearance in the *First Outline*’s speculative physics is, in fact, a version of the constellating force of the Self as the goal

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139 McGrath argues that Naturphilosophie permeates Schelling’s oeuvre as a whole, extending to at least the positive philosophy (Dark Ground 141). We will see in the next chapter that “NPS” makes asystasy the constitutive aporia in human knowledge, the basis for a philosophical psychology of ecstasy articulating the ego’s confrontation with the absolute subject. This absolute subject moves purposively through all knowledge, even as Schelling tries to organise the relation of forces in the Naturphilosophie into an idealised framework (210, 213, 228ff). So too, does analytical psychology seek to (un)ground itself in a similar asystasy by becoming its own object of knowledge, dispersing itself into its object of inquiry to become a line of flight in the spirit of Schelling’s absolute knowledge, which follows its own path regardless of its effect on the whole.

140 Schelling *does*, however, explicitly equate Naturphilosophie with the absolute subject in his later lectures on the history of modern philosophy. Here he explains that Naturphilosophie moved away from Fichte in beginning not with the human “I,” but “the infinite subject […] the absolute subject, because it alone is immediately certain [and] the subject which can never stop being subject, can never be lost in the object, become mere object” (On the History 114).
of Nature’s individuation. But to articulate the dynamic of how this “gathering” comes about, we must turn to the actant as the constituent part of this dynamic productivity.

In the first of the *First Outline*’s three Divisions, Schelling develops the actant [*Aktion*] as the nonmolar, monadic force articulating Nature’s absolute productivity, which is the first principle of the *Naturphilosophie*’s “dynamic atomism” (*FO* 5). Although the actant briefly reappears in his retrospective Introduction to the *First Outline* and the second Division, Schelling does not revisit the concept elsewhere in his oeuvre. Nevertheless, the actant occupies an important role in the *First Outline* as the fundamental component of “the original multiplicity of individual principles in Nature [. . .] Each [actant] in Nature is a fixed point for it, a seed around which Nature can begin to form itself” (*FO* 21 n. 1). And just as Nature “forms itself” around the actant in the phenomenal world, so Schelling surrounds the actant with a proliferation of textual predicates in an attempt to define it. Actants are “dynamic atoms,” “*pure intensity*,” “originary qualities,” “simple productivities” of Nature – and yet their “simple” nature proves unruly as their *Trieb* drives them from text into subtext and back again in the form of lengthy footnotes complicating and unfolding this “simplicity” (*FO* 21n., 208). As if sedimenting the actants’ dynamism in the texture of language, Schelling’s text itself recapitulates the “infinite multiplicity of original actants” (28). Taking up atomism to define the actant as a factor of Nature’s dynamic productivity, Schelling concedes that the intangibility of the actants is precisely what makes them necessary:

141 Peterson (*FO* 244 n. 1) translates *Aktion* as “actant” instead of “action” (which for him is too general) or actor (which for him is too intentional). What goes unmentioned by Peterson, however, is the actant’s provenance both in narratology and the thought of French philosopher and sociologist of science Bruno Latour. In the narratological framework of Greimasian semiotics, actants “operate on the level of function rather than content. That is, an *actant* may embody itself in a particular character (termed an *acteur*) or it may reside in the function of more than one character in respect of their common role in the story’s underlying ‘oppositional’ structure. In short, the deep structure of the narrative generates and defines its *actants* at a level beyond that of the story’s surface content” (Hawkes 70-71). Here, actants are essentially patterns of behaviour (a phrase Jung also uses to describe the archetype; see *Symbols* 313 and “On the Nature of the Psyche” pars. 397ff). Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) borrows from narratology, conceiving the actant as either human or non-human. It should be noted that Schelling’s *Aktion* marks a nonmolar force, an intensity which is anterior to both the representative framework of narratology and the ANT’s sociological dimensions. But the actant’s affinity with the Jungian archetype and Jung’s conception of libido bring out the “deep structural” narrative that is encrypted within Schelling’s speculative physics as what I have called the Thanatopoietic movement of regression and progression in Nature.
Our opinion is [. . .] not that there are such simple actants in Nature, but only that they are the ideal grounds of the explanation of quality. These simple actants do not really allow of demonstration—they do not exist; they are what one must posit in Nature, what one must think in Nature, in order to explain the originary qualities. [. . .] We need only prove as much as we assert, namely, that such simple actions must be thought as ideal grounds of explanation of all quality. (FO 21n)

Not existing in space or as matter (but nevertheless “constituent factors of matter”), and “truly singular” like Leibnizian monads yet decomposable to an indeterminate degree (FO 21 & n.), the actant occupies a liminal space between the ideality of the unconditioned and the materiality of space. This dilemma is an iteration of the fundamental question of types which, as we will see, recrudesces in Jung’s attempt to formulate an archetypal system of knowledge.

Yet the First Division of the First Outline attempts to work through the trauma of its textual excess by turning from the metaphysical overgrowth of the first section on the actants (“The Original Qualities and Actants in Nature”) to something closer to a dramatic narrative in the following section (“Actants and Their Combinations”). Here, Schelling describes the creation of matter as “the drama [Schauspiel] of a struggle between form and the formless” (FO 28). For Schelling, Nature’s universal fluidity is always already inexplicably “solidified” by the actants in this drama without beginning, which transpires in “infinite multiplicity” between fluid and solid. That is, the actants, in their creation of natural products, are always already subject to a drama of (de)combination in their infinite multiplicity:

While the actants are decombined, left to itself each one will produce what it must produce according to its nature. To that extent, in every product there will be a

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142 To complicate matters further, after defining the actant as “action in general” Schelling goes on to define matter itself— in the footnoted margins to his own philosophy – in terms of “repulsive and attractive forces” (FO 21, 22-23n). Schelling’s aporia here is the undecidable relationship between actant and matter, analogous to Jung’s realisation that “the nonpsychic can behave like the psyche, and vice versa, without there being any causal connection between them. Our present knowledge does not allow us to do much more than compare the relation of the psychic to the material word with two cones, whose apices, meeting in a point without extension—a real zero-point—touch and do not touch” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 418). This zero-point is crucial to Jung’s later development of synchronicity as an acausal connecting principle.
constant drive toward free transformation. While the actants are continually combined anew, none of them will remain free with respect to its production. Thus, there will be compulsion and freedom in the product at once. Since actants are constantly set free and recaptured, and since infinitely various combinations of them are possible (and in every combination a slew of various proportions are possible), then continually new and singular materials will be originally produced in this product. It is indeed possible to find the elements of these materials through the art of chemistry, but not the combination itself; that is, the proportion of the combination. (FO 33)

This dynamic of (de)combination, of coalescence and dissolution, is ultimately figured by Schelling pathologically as the actants’ mutual derangement [Störung] of each other into universal fluidity, which is in turn resisted by the actant’s individuality (FO 26, 28). This derangement describes what we saw in Chapter One as Nature’s auto-alterity, the ambivalence of a Nature divided against itself yet compelled to form products (26, 28). In effect, the actants’ deranging tension creates generative fibrillations in Nature. The language Schelling uses to describe this deranging moment is significant: the actant’s “constant drive [Trieb] toward free transformation” is inhibited by the “compulsion” [Zwang] of its combination with other actants (33). In Jungian parlance, free drive enantiodromally turns into the compulsion to bind to other actants. But both of these “moments” are imperative to Nature’s dynamism. Jung, too, recapitulates this derangement’s productivity in the form of the dissociationist psyche and its bustling dramatis personae of personification, sense and image:

the unconscious depicts an extremely fluid state of affairs: everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness. (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 382)

Indeed, the fluid derangement of Schelling’s Nature provides Jung with an “answer” to the “question” of Nature; it gives analytical psychology the metaphysical foundation Jung thinks it lacks, while preserving the power of this “questioning” Nature as a force.
analogous to Jung’s idea of the unconscious.\footnote{143} Indeed, just as the “question” of Nature dogs Schelling’s metaphysics, its infinitely productive question is recapitulated in Jung’s collective unconscious as an uncanny mirroring of Schelling’s Nature:

[In medical psychology] the object puts the question and not the experimenter. The analyst is confronted with facts which are not of his choosing and which he probably never \textit{would} choose if he were a free agent. It is the sickness or the patient himself that puts the crucial questions—in other words, Nature experiments with the doctor in expecting an answer from him. (\textit{The Undiscovered Self} para. 532)\footnote{144}

But what kind of “questions” does a deranged Nature ask? That is, what does its facticity present to us? The natural products we see in the world are, after all, “nothing other than productive Nature itself determined in a certain way” (\textit{FO} 34), inhibited according to inscrutable, unknowable laws into the unique, terrible, solitary forms which surround us. Each one of them is part of Schelling’s \textit{Stufenfolge}, the graduated series of stages with which Nature hopes to achieve the “Absolute,” “the most universal proportion in which all actants, without prejudice to their individuality, can be unified” (\textit{FO} 35). Yet each one of them is also a “\textit{misbegotten attempt}” at this proportion (35): as we saw in the first chapter, each product is a wayward line of flight away from the absolute ideal for which Nature strives, but can never achieve, caught in an “infinite process of \textit{formation}” (35) which constitutes these lines of flight to begin with. Nature is caught within the dynamics of its actants – caught in the derangement of a free drive to create infinite products and the compulsion to combine them into a “universal proportion.” It is from this derangement that the materiality and historicity of Being emerges. It is to this historicity that Jung replies when he writes that, ultimately, Nature experiments with the doctor: “When all is said and done, our own existence is an

\footnote{143} Deleuze’s argument that “[p]roblems and questions [. . .] belong to the unconscious, but as a result the unconscious is differential and iterative by nature; it is serial, problematic and questioning” (\textit{DR} 108) strongly resonates with Jung’s conception of the unconscious.

\footnote{144} Here Jung is getting at the \textit{transferential} nature of the medical-psychological experiment (in the form of the object as “questioning analysand”), which necessitates relinquishing the \textit{a priori} assumptions of science as much as possible to approach the unconditioned “derangement” of forces which constellate to create the “crucial questions” of the analytic encounter.
experiment of nature, an attempt at a new synthesis” (“Analytical Psychology” para. 730). And for Jung, the products of this derangement coalesce around the individuation process. To be sure, Jung describes individuation in part as one’s “becom[ing] what one is [. . .] one[’s] accomplish[ment of] one’s destiny, all the determinations that are given in the form of the germ” (Visions 2.758) following a preformationist understanding. But in the same breath Jung also states that individuation is when “a cell begins to divide itself and to differentiate and develop into a certain plant or a certain animal” (Visions 2.758), which opens the organism to mutation and indeterminacy. Indeed, to this end Jung likens the processes of the unconscious to teratomata (Introduction 39) – rogue growths in the body caused by independent germ cells being for-themselves, cells embarking on their own lines of flight away from the organism’s “proportion.” Similarly, in the experience of Naturphilosophie, as “doing philosophy according to nature,” the philosopher experiments on Nature, but paradoxically as one of Nature’s own “abortive experiments” (FO 41n) confronting Nature’s derangement. These two views mirror each other in what both Schelling and Jung would aver is the “infinite task” of discovering the “intermediate links in the chain of Nature” or the psyche (FO 199).

This infinitely productive derangement of the actants is the basis of the aetiology of the ontoaesthetic, which Schelling locates in disease. Disease, for Schelling, is coterminous with life itself: because disease “is produced by the same causes through which the phenomenon of life is produced[, it] must have the same factors as life” (FO 160). Thus, although the term Aktion is not used in the First Outline’s Appendix on disease (FO 158ff), Schelling in effect transposes the actants’ deranging dynamism of activity and receptivity into physiology: here, the organism exists not as a static “being” but as “a perpetual being-produced,” an “activity mediated by receptivity” (FO 160) against a series of external stimuli which prevent the organism from “exhausting” its activity in a final (dead, inorganic) object.145 In this “being-produced,” the organism reproduces an “original duplicity” whereby it generates itself “objectively” in response to

145 See also FO 56f., where Schelling more specifically deduces the dynamism of activity and receptivity.
external conditions (its receptivity to the world) as well as “subjectively” – that is, as an object to itself (its activity). Disease is precisely the “othering” of the organism’s presence to itself as object, a “disproportion” within the economy of excitability (FO 169). And this force of disease is ultimately predicated on a “uniformly acting external force” which acts on the organism while at the same time it “seems to sustain the life of universal Nature just as much as it sustains the individual life of every organic being (as the life of Nature is exhibited in universal alterations)” (FO 171). Both life and disease, then, emerge from a constitutive tension between the world of external forces and the higher-order dynamical force which sustains the organism against the barrage of stimuli from without (FO 161). But as a Naturphilosophie après la lettre, analytical psychology takes up Schelling’s actantial dynamism as the libidinal matrix of the archetypes. In doing this, Jungian thought furnishes Schelling’s project with the (meta)subject upon which its predicates must ultimately hang. Where Schelling’s Naturphilosophie deals with Nature’s primordial derangement and its manifestation in the organism’s economy of excitability, analytical psychology conceives this derangement on the level of the psyche. And in so doing, we will see that Jung ultimately ascribes a materiality to the psyche which brings it into the domain of Nature as an “extremely historical organism.” With this, we turn to Jung’s formulation of the archetype as the formative force behind analytical psychology’s symbolic economy of psychic production.

2.2 Jung’s Archetype: Dissociation

Jung’s thinking on the archetype evolves from its origins in language via his early word-association experiments and their demarcation of dissociative complexes, through

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146 This is what Schelling calls the organism’s “excitability,” its capacity to define itself against Nature but also for itself with a self-organisational interiority that cannot be directly influenced by external factors (FO 106 & ff). Indeed, for Schelling excitability is the source of both life and disease (161).

147 In Chapter Four, we shall see how Schelling reads this physiological dynamic as into the discussion of evil in the Freedom essay. There, the tension between the contingent forces of the external world and “higher-order dynamical force” is cast psycho-theologically as the relationship between “self” (the individual in time and history) and centrum (the individual’s unique relationship with the Absolute, marked by personality).
problematic attempts to delineate noumenal and phenomenal dimensions of the archetype, and finally to Jung’s mature formulation of the psychoid archetype as a force which is at once psychic and material, ideal and real. And it is this mature formulation which opens up the psyche encrypted in the *First Outline*’s Nature, enabling us to conceive its dynamic as psyche. I argue that this intellectual continuity between actant and archetype establishes Schelling’s silent partnership with Jung as the most crucial and pervasive in Jung’s intellectual genealogy – far more important than well-worn references to Kant, Nietzsche or Schopenhauer. In this spirit, McGrath’s description of Schelling’s move away from Fichte (and Hegel) prefigures Jung’s shift away from Kant toward the fundamentally non-rational basis of his metapsychology, which finds expression in the archetypes and the collective unconscious:

Fichte had shown that if one takes away the ghost of a thing-in-itself which forever relativizes a priori judgements, the categories of reason become categories of being. [. . .] Schelling sees in [this] the undermining of every rationalism: no longer a secure possession of the self-reflecting subject, the a priori is the ground that always recedes from the reflective gaze; instead of serving as the transparent logical pre-structure of the Cartesian “I think,” the a priori coincides with the unconscious, or at least that part of it that can be indirectly deduced. *Material nature now tells us as much about the structure of the subject as the structure of the subject tells us about nature.* [Schelling’s method] underscores the role of psychological introspection in Schelling’s nature-philosophy, indeed the origin of the latter in the former. (“Is Schelling’s” 11-12; my italics)148

Working through the history of Jung’s thinking about the archetype reveals his precarious allegiance to Kant’s noumenal-phenomenal distinction, as well as his turn to a Schellingian account of production.149 And although Jung represses this materiality in

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148 Frederick Beiser articulates this subject-nature dynamic somewhat differently: “[Contra Fichte,] for Schelling nature is not only something found or given, something produced according to the laws of intelligence, but [. . .] consists in productive and intelligent activity itself. For Schelling, the objective side of the subject-object identity [required] that the philosopher postulate rationality inherent within nature itself, independent of the finite minds in which it realized itself” (*German Idealism* 496-97).

149 For an early critique of Jung’s relationship to Kant, see de Voogd. Following this critical tradition, Paul Bishop concludes that “whilst claiming to remain within Kantian boundaries, Jung shows his true Romanticism in constantly yearning to go beyond them” (*Synchronicity* 162ff, 185). Strangely, Bishop’s more recent work distances Jung from German Romanticism, turning instead to Goethe (particularly his theory of morphology and the literary impact of *Faust*) and Weimar Classicism as Jung’s primary intellectual influence. Bishop is also keen to distance Goethe from German Romanticism by criticising
the margins of his discourse, attempting to rein it in under a Cartesian mind-Nature
distinction, this materiality provides the psychic bedrock, the symbolic grammatology
with which the Romantic metasubject Thanatopoetically converses with the
“unconscious productivity [. . .] whose mere reflection we see in Nature” (FO 194).

Jung’s theory of the archetypes emerges from his earlier theory of complexes
which, as we have seen, is firmly rooted in the dissociative tradition in psychology.
Dissociationism’s specifically Romantic lineage can be traced to nineteenth-century
Romantic scientists including Schelling, but also Reil, whose Rhapsodien (1803)
advanced a theory of insanity as self-fragmentation foundational to Romantic psychiatry.
Dissociationism sees the psyche as decentred, comprised of various autonomous forces
with “egos” or “personalities” of their own. The ego, on some level, organises these
“sub-egos” into a coherent order (personality), but because we are not entirely conscious
beings the ego cannot be fully responsible for this organisation.¹⁵⁰ Put differently, this
“multëity in unity”¹⁵¹ is organised through an inscrutable dialectic of conscious and
unconscious aspects of the psyche. And akin to what Novalis saw so clearly in disease,
this dialectic is one of contagion, the interaction of things which “touch and do not
touch.” Jung’s full description of the complex, worth quoting at length, is a
contemporary rewriting of Romantic polypsychism¹⁵² which informs his theory of the
archetypes and the collective unconscious:

Ellenberger’s Romanticising of Goethe; for him “the differences between Goethe and the Romantics are
arguably even larger than those between Freud and Jung” (Analytical Psychology 2.1, 14).

¹⁵⁰ Indeed, although Freud resisted dissociationist thinking, for both Freud and Jung this “ego” is a unique
product of the very unconscious forces it organises. This moves the conception of the person away from
what is traditionally called “ego psychology” and points to a much more complicated approach to the
emergence of consciousness shared by both Schelling and Jung.

¹⁵¹ The term is originally Coleridge’s, coined in 1814: “The most general definition of Beauty [is] Multëity
in unity” (“Essays” 372).

¹⁵² Polypsychism is the belief that the individual is comprised of several different “entities” (“souls,”
psychic forces, etc). See note 133, above. Significantly, polypsychism (and by association,
dissociationism – pardon the pun) figures in Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO), which is
an important contribution to what later became broadly known as speculative realism. I shall risk gross
oversimplification to define OOO as a view that everything is an “object,” objects being entities that cannot
be reduced to either manifestations of a universal vitalist essence or substrate, or to their perception by the
A complex is an agglomeration of associations—a sort of picture of a more or less complicated psychological nature—sometimes of traumatic character, sometimes simply of a painful and highly toned character. [. . .] A complex with its given tension or energy has the tendency to form a little personality of itself [with a localized] body, a certain amount of its own physiology. It can upset the stomach. It upsets the breathing, it disturbs the heart—in short, it behaves like a partial personality. [. . .] Because complexes have a certain will-power, a sort of ego [. . .] [t]hey appear as visions, they speak in voices which are like the voices of definite people. This personification of complexes is not in itself necessarily a pathological condition. In dreams, for instance, our complexes often appear in a personified form. [. . .] All this is explained by the fact that the so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion. [. . .] We like to think that we are one; but we are not, most decidedly not. [. . .] Complexes are autonomous groups of associations that have a tendency to move by themselves, to live their own life apart from our intentions. [The collective unconscious] consists of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities. This idea explains [the poet’s] capacity to dramatize and personify his mental contents. When he creates a character on the stage, or in his poem or drama or novel [. . .] that character in a certain secret way has made itself. (Tavistock pars. 148-52; my italics)

“Feeling-toned complexes,” Jung writes, are part of what he calls the personal unconscious – that stratum of the unconscious reflecting the individual’s unique psychic life (“Archetypes” para. 4). As such, they constellate archetypal material: a father-complex can constellate the archetypal image of the father (as tyrant, saviour, etc) but also an innumerable amount of archetypal father-situations (including but not limited to literal or symbolic incest). And the detour into art, with characters that autonomously “make themselves,” establishes Jung’s complex theory as not only a therapeutic

human mind. There are many different thinkers with divergent views in speculative realism (of which OOO is one, Iain Hamilton Grant’s work on Schelling another), but they all share a pointed criticism of the correlation between thought and Being which, for them, has conditioned the vast majority of Western thought. To this end, Harman endorses a polypsychism “which must balloon beyond all previous [psychological] limits, but without quite extending to all entities” in service to a “speculative [Schelling would say “cosmic”] psychology, [which may one day lead] philosophy to the tectonic plates that separate atoms from gold, moss, mosquitoes, Neanderthals, and bears” (122). Exploring what Jung, or indeed Romantic metasubjectivity has to offer speculative realism is a fertile ground for future study.

153 In his Foreword to Jolande Jacobi’s Complex / Archetype / Symbol, Jung describes the complex as “a network of associations” clustered around an individually-acquired emotional core, and which rests on an instinctual basis (ix-x). See also Jung’s “A Review of the Complex Theory.” The problems distinguishing between instinct and archetype are not resolved by Jung, and are beyond the scope of my study.
organisation of dissociative material, but also a post-Romantic aesthetics which
ventiloquises the productive-dissociative unconscious through art.  

Jung’s complex theory grew out of his word-association experiments of 1900-
1905, in which patients had to respond to single (hence ambiguous) words with another
word. Longer reaction time was a signal that the test words were connected to a
complex, and using this method a list of associations was able to identify the complex
around which they constellated. We shall have cause to return to this importance of
language as an (un)ground for both the complex and the archetype; for now, let us note
that this was the intellectual-historical backdrop against which, as early as 1907, Jung
was reading Freud through a Janetian-dissociative lens (Haule 255). Haule writes that
Jung formulated the archetype as “the completion of the complex theory” (256), but
Jung’s theory of archetypes ends up deconstructing, and not completing, Jung’s
metapsychology. Jung eventually conceives the archetype as inextricably entangled with
psyche and material Nature, but it is also entangled within its own intellectual history.
Haule discerns no fewer than six “partly complementary, partly contradictory” meanings
of the archetype (256f), and in these examples terminology proliferates in a manner
harking back to Schelling’s effusive attempts to define the actant. Like Wordsworth’s
“hiding-places of Man’s power” which closes whenever the Poet tries to approach it
(1850 Prelude 12.279), the archetype recedes as Jung attempts to approach and define it
in an interminable ventriloquism.

Jung’s 1919 reference to the archetype as an “a priori, inborn [form] of
‘intuition’” embeds it firmly in the dissociative tradition. As the force which “[channels]
perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns,” the archetype is

Jung’s mythopoetic register is arguably inaugurated by the generic shift from scientific treatise to
literary art in Reil’s Rhapsodien, “perhaps the most influential work in [the] shaping of German psychiatry
before Freud” (Richards 263-64). Although criticised by many for its ostensible mysticism and lack of
objectivity, Jung’s mythogenesis is in fact an extension of this tradition as part of analytical psychology’s
counter-scientific drive to consummate itself as science by passing into its object of inquiry.

Significantly, Jung’s later work speculates that the archetypes and individuation are not reducible to
specifically human experience. In 1943 Jung writes that archetypes are likely to exist in animals as well as
humans (On the Psychology para. 109), but his late and controversial work Answer to Job (1952) insists
the *instinct’s perception* [*Anschauung*] *of itself*, or [. . .] the self-portrait of the instinct, in exactly the same way as consciousness is an inward perception of the objective life-process. Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct. ("Instinct" pars. 277, 270)

This passage inaugurates some of the central tensions in Jungian metapsychology: instinct is given self-awareness as consciousness is made into an epiphenomenon of Nature, even as Jung attempts to salvage a certain freedom of “conscious apprehension” alongside instinct’s own strange instinctive “consciousness.” We are “misbegotten attempts” of Schelling’s Nature and “attempts at a new synthesis” in the experiments of Jung’s Nature. Already we see the profound liminality between Nature’s “objective life-processes” and “inward perception” which unworks Jung’s attempts elsewhere to resolve the psyche into a Cartesian inside/outside polarity, for example when he writes that “it is the function of consciousness not only to recognize and assimilate the external world through the gateway of the senses, but to translate into visible reality the world within us” ("The Structure of the Psyche" para. 342). Yet how does consciousness, as “perception,” a passive aftereffect of natural processes, assimilate and “translate” into/for Nature? Consciousness clearly estranges the psyche from natural processes enough to allow a certain reflexive assertion of (in Lacan’s terms) the Symbolic over the Real; enough to create “‘higher’ or ‘unnatural’ states” in opposition to inorganic entropy (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 375). But this boundary is troubled by a fluidity which depotentiates the ego to make consciousness a marker of Nature’s autoerotism – man is an adjunct “aftereffect” needed by Nature in its self-differentiation. Just as Schelling sees reason as the epiphenomenon of natural processes (*FO* 195), Jung’s consciousness translates Nature back to itself but also keeps a portion of this Nature for itself in contagious exchange, assimilated and transformed into Nature’s uncanny self-perception, a mirror-state where consciousness mirrors Nature to itself in an image both identical and transposed. This contagion persists throughout Jung’s attempts to define the archetype, and perhaps this is where Schelling’s isomorphic account of the actant productively

that Job is necessary for the differentiation of *Yahweh’s* consciousness. In the Conclusion I will touch on the ethical implications this poses for Romantic metasubjectivity.
supplements Jung’s embattled psyche-Nature negotiation. Where Jung talks of psyche and archetype, the actant steps in to remind us that Nature, too, emerges from a dissociative matrix – something Jung will acknowledge in his mature formulation of the archetype, but also in his later (1958) statement that psyche is Nature (“A Psychological View” para. 831).

Consciously appropriating Kant, Jung defines the archetype in 1921 as “the noumenon of the image which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates” (Psychological Types 401). Anthony Stevens suggests that this Kantianism perseveres until 1947, when Jung resolves the archetype into “a clear distinction between the deeply unconscious and therefore unknowable and irrepresentable archetype-as-such (similar to Kant’s Ding-an-sich) and the archetypal images, ideas and behaviours that the archetype-as-such gives rise to” (“The Archetypes” 77). But in fact, Stevens’ account recapitulates a Kantian binarism that is not borne out by Jung’s post-1940 thinking, which effectuates a shift away from the Kantian thing-in-itself. Indeed, Jung’s fraught engagement with Kant ends up taking him “not only back to pre-Kantian thought but also beyond the critical philosophy into the post-Kantian realms of late German Idealism and Romantic philosophy” (Bishop, “The Use of Kant” 137).

In fact, Jung’s turn in thinking on the archetype begins with On the Psychology of the Unconscious (1943) and culminates in his 1947 supplementation of the archetype’s “merely psychic” operations with “a further degree of conceptual differentiation” – the archetype’s psychoid nature which, he emphatically writes, has “a nature which cannot with certainty be designated as psychic” (“On the Nature of the Psyche” pars. 419, 439). This shift in thinking releases analytical psychology from the Kantian architectonic and moves it closer to the quasi-subjective space of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Jung uses a natural-scientific analogy of light to describe the archetype and its relation to instinct:

Just as the “psychic infra-red,” the biological instinctual psyche, gradually passes over into the physiology of the organism and thus merges with its chemical and physical conditions, so the “psychic ultra-violet,” the archetype, describes a field which exhibits none of the peculiarities of the physiological [but] can no longer be regarded as psychic, although it manifests itself psychically. But physiological processes behave in the same way, without on that account being declared
psychic. Although there is no form of existence that is not mediated to us psychically and only psychically, it would hardly do to say that everything is merely psychic. (para. 420)

This passage reflects Jung’s difficulty in keeping the archetype within a “psychic light spectrum” as it slips into Nature, dragging psyche with it. Our experience comes to us only through the psyche, Jung writes, but what this psyche is has now radically altered. This difficulty is compounded by the connection the archetype now has with “the organic-material substrate” (para. 380). Jung explains this radical materiality “by assuming [archetypes] to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity. [. . .] subjective fantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process” (On the Psychology para. 109; my italics). In Schelling’s words, “Nature is a priori.” And in a crucial footnote, the metaphysics often consigned to the margins of analytical psychology come to the fore: “[The archetypes are] the effect and deposit of experiences that have already taken place, but equally they appear as the factors which cause such experiences” (para. 151 n. 3; my italics). The archetypes and the collective unconscious now open into an Ungrund, an uncontainable fluidity tied to the materiality of Being. Indeed, two years before his death in 1961 Jung writes, rather convolutedly, that the archetype is “an image of a probable sequence of events, an habitual current of psychic energy” (“To Herr N.,” 9 May 1959, 505; my italics); the mind’s eye is led from “image” to “probable sequence” to intangible “current.”

Jung figures this Ungrund of the unconscious in strikingly Schellingian terms. The stratum of drives, much like the primordial fluidity of Schelling’s Nature and its seethe of actants, is an unmanageable chaos in itself. Where Schelling sees the inscrutable agency of inhibition at the point of Nature’s genesis, for Jung it is the phenomenon of consciousness and will, which emerges inexplicably from the dark mists of the unconscious (but is nevertheless part of it):

The system of drives is not harmonious in composition, but is exposed to numerous internal collisions. One drive deranges and represses [stört und verdrängt] the others, and although the drives as a whole make individual life possible, their blind compulsive character [blinder Zwangscharakter] frequently causes mutual disturbance. The differentiation of function from the compulsion of the drives [der zwangsläufigen Triebhaftigkeit], and its voluntary application, is
vitally important with regard to the maintenance of life. But this differentiation increases the possibility of collision and creates disruptions – precisely those dissociations which time and again interrogate the unity of consciousness. (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 378; trans. mod.)

Here Jung takes up, on the level of psyche, Schelling’s demand in the First Outline that Naturphilosophie “accompany its a priori constructions with corresponding external intuitions.” In fact, Jung’s picture of the system of drives is the mirror-image of Schelling’s fluidity, its dark aspect. Schelling’s only way of describing the actants’ impetus to free transformation is as Trieb (FO 34), which already gives Nature’s bidirectional ambivalence a taint of temporality and purposiveness. And in the First Outline the actant’s Trieb is bound by compulsion (Zwang), making it receptive, bound to other actants according to a “universal hierarchy.” But in Jung’s version of this economy, the drive’s binding Zwang is one of discord and disruption. Psychological functions must separate from this compulsive derangement in the service of consciousness and life. Thus, Jung and Schelling describe two complementary aspects of the motile moment of Nature. And these mirror-images – Schelling’s “universal hierarchy” and Jung’s disturbed, repressed, and disruptive “system of drives” – punctuate the melancholic incommensurability between mind and Nature. Indeed, this psyche puts into relief the fundamental problems with this correspondence. Actantial drive perpetuates the unifying “prehension” binding them; conversely, Jung’s unifying “differentiated functions” of consciousness perpetuate the deranging “dissociations” they are meant to order and contain. And as a result both a priori constructions and external intuitions (Jung’s drives and functions) become barely distinguishable from each other in the transcendental empiricism (empiricism “extended to the unconditioned” [FO 22; my

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156 There are considerations of terminology here. Jung uses Trieb for “drive” here, but drive and archetype are profoundly entangled in Jung’s work. Here Jung also uses language identical to Schelling (stören), but adds verdrängt (“repress”) to the mix. Hull is by no means consistent in his translation of verdrängen in the Collected Works; here he translates it as “displace,” but “repression” retains the dynamism between drives which Schelling reads into the actants. Like Strachey’s translation of Freud’s Standard Edition, Hull also seems to equate “instinct” with “drive,” where Jung tends to distinguish the two. This said, disentangling instinct, drive, and archetype in Jung’s is a project worth serious study.

157 “The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas” (“On the Psychology” para. 109).
trans.]) which frames Nature and psyche in a relationship of repetition and difference. Consciousness may be able to defy natural law and entropy, but it is never completely free from the possibilities of disease intrinsic to the derangement of (actantial, archetypal) forces (un)grounding the psyche.

As “condensations of the living process” (“Definitions” para. 749) archetypes are centripetal forces, gathering and combining specific materialities, “natural products” to themselves while remaining irreducible to the metonymy of their possible representations. And we must emphasise the plural, for Jung also writes that the archetype is not merely one energic centre, but “bipolar” (*Psychology and Alchemy* 471) like the ambivalent nature of psychic energy itself and the actants’ dual tendencies of autonomy and receptivity. Because of this, Jungian taxonomy strains under the excess of “an indefinite number of archetypes representative of situations” (*On the Psychology* para. 185). Indeed, similar to Schelling’s problem of finding the laws whereby actants coalesce into their own lines of “free transformation” (*FO* 33), Jung’s problem is that of type itself – of how being coalesces into the archetypes, or how to conceive an archetypal taxonomy at all. We have seen how Schelling sees the actants as necessary constructs in order to think Nature. He also knows he cannot ultimately explain how actants, as “pure intensities,” coalesce into “simple qualities,” or the law(s) by which they are “completely dissolved” (208, 31). Jung clearly faces a similar dilemma:

An archetype, in its quiescent, unprojected state, has no exactly determinable form but is itself an indefinite structure which can assume definite forms only in projection. This seems to contradict the concept of a “type.” As soon as [one divests the archetypes] of the phenomenology presented in the case material, and [tries] to examine them in relation to other archetypal forms, they branch out into such far-reaching ramifications in the history of symbols that one comes to the conclusion that the basic psychic elements are infinitely varied and ever changing, so as utterly to defy our powers of imagination. The empiricist must therefore content himself with a theoretical “as if.” (“Concerning the Archetypes” pars. 142-43; my italics)

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158 See also “The Archetypes” para. 99, where Jung nevertheless attempts to privilege “those archetypes which stand for the goal of the developmental process.” But this does not resolve the archetype’s fundamentally ateleological purposiveness.
Thus both Schelling’s actant and Jung’s archetype are constituted by a rhizomatic indeterminacy, where specific forms become visible as fluctuations in relationality and intensity between an infinite proliferation of nodal points. Schelling’s “universal hierarchy” and Jung’s collective unconscious are always already provisional circumscriptions of the primordial fluidity of Being.

This fabric of indeterminacy is the canvas for Romantic poiesis. For in Romanticism “language and poetry [are] the material that Idealism can never fully assimilate or marginalize in its formation of an absolute” (Plug 17), and this materiality underwrites what David Clark gracefully calls, with Derridean (and Jungian) flavour, Romanticism’s paleonymic nature – “at once haunted by sedimented histories and beckoning towards undetermined futures” (166). Indeed, the nonmolarity which the archetype shares with the actant is poeticised in Novalis’ unfinished Novices of Sais (1798), which can be read as a condensation of analytical psychology. Its second division, “Nature,” narrates the emergence of consciousness and an Idealist impetus to unite man and Nature, but against a backdrop of “the infinite divisions of nature” poeticising the drama of the actants in Schelling’s First Outline:

Never can we find the smallest grain or the simplest fiber of a solid body, since all magnitude loses itself forwards and backwards in infinity, and the same applies to the varieties of bodies and forces; we encounter forever new species, new combinations, new phenomena, and so on to infinity. (39)

The rhizomatic yearning that Novalis describes here – the “mysterious force” in us “that tends in all directions, spreading from a center hidden in infinite depths” (29), marks Romantic metasubjectivity’s cryptic exotropism. This differential articulation is open to any direction pointed out by its own unfolding, but proceeds from a nucleus which persists under the erasure of its own becoming. This unfolding can only proceed in a psyche deeply implicated in the work of futurity, of Thanatopoiesis – a psyche that is

A living phenomenon [. . .] always indissolubly bound up with the continuity of the vital process [. . .] not only something evolved, but also continually evolving and creative. Anything psychic is Janus-faced: it looks both backwards and forwards. Because it is evolving it is also preparing the future. (Jung, “Definitions” pars. 717-18)
The systole-diastole of Jung’s “Janus-faced” psyche, its Thanatopoietic enantiodromia between past and future, is emphasised by the psyche’s archetypal grammatology which, like Schelling’s chemical elements (FO 33), figures the inscrutable combinations of natural materials and forces which unfold Being. We now examine how this grammatology is articulated in a psyche that is structured like a language, but whose dissociationist matrix resists structuralist impositions.

### 2.3 The Grammatology of Being

In *Of Grammatology* (1967), Derrida conceives grammatology as a “science of writing” which interrogates the privileging of speech over writing (“absolute privileging of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being” [12]) named as logocentrism, but also more generally the idea of being as presence, as onto-theological truth present to itself before all writing and signification (14). Contesting the idea of a transcendental signified that separates signifier and signified, grammatology makes a case for the motility of signification itself. In other words, grammatology’s essence is an “arche-writing,” a “movement of differance,” of traces159 which “cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field” (60), and this differential movement prevents elements in a linguistic system from congealing, as it were, into being as presence. A year earlier, in “Freud and the Scene of Writing” (1966), Derrida radicalises the idea of the (Freudian) trace outside of its logocentric articulation in institutionalised psychoanalysis. To this end, and anticipating grammatology, he calls for a “psychoanalytic graphology,” “a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of the originality of the literary signifier” versus the “analysis of literary signifieds” or “nonliterary signified meanings,” self-present meanings that purport to transcend the differential matrix of signification (230). Thus,

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159 For Derrida, the “originary trace or arche-trace” (61) is the primordial difference marking the constitution of objects. Because entities can be conceived only relative to what they are not, e.g., to other entities, any entity must retain a trace of its “others.” Indeed, this originary trace is synonymous with *différance* (62).
grammatology is the science of *écriture*, of a writing which makes historicity possible before “being the object of a history” or “of an historical science” (27). In short, grammatology raises the question of a science’s genesis in writing, which is repressed by sciences in their formation (28).

However, in privileging psychoanalysis as a discipline of the future which interrogates “being in its privilege” (21), Derrida grafts grammatology on to a positive science whose spectre of nostalgia haunts the undecidability on which grammatology’s general economy of the trace is predicated. In other words, a science which “runs the risk of [. . .] never being able to define the unity of its project or its object [or] describe the limits of its field” (4), as well as the “danger” of its undecidable future (5), is paired with a psychoanalysis whose radical traces bear a burden of origins which watermarks even its most nachträglich moments and movements. In contrast, I will argue here that the grammatology of Being which underwrites Romantic metasubjectivity reflects Derrida’s missed encounter with analytical psychology, which is precisely a science which can describe neither the limits of its field nor that of its object, but is in fact driven to *become* that object. The grammatology of Being gives Derrida’s formulation a materiality more commensurate with his interrogation of the signifier/signified binarism as part of “the play of signifying references that constitute language” (7), but also with his extending this question to the repressed “ontophenomenological question of essence” (28) within organisations of knowledge. This encounter is formulated in Romantic metasubjectivity, which articulates the subject that goes missing in Derrida’s account of *différance*. And this subject emerges from precisely the symmetry between Schelling’s actant and the Jungian archetype, which put the ideas of play and trace into a general economy more amenable to the futurity which marks both Derrida’s grammatology and the paleonymic nature of Romanticism. In this, analytical psychology offers a model of the psyche which provocatively resonates in contemporary theory.

To use a phrase Krell invokes so lucidly with reference to Novalis: in the Romantic view there is, between language and Being, a “touching at a distance” which defines the very desire for the object within language (*Contagion* 59). Language is infected with Being. In Jungian terms, this contagion is precisely divine hypochondria, a
symptom of the convergence of conscious and unconscious, of egoic existence and archetypal experience which “touch and do not touch” in the form of the symbolic, which gives all language a numinous texture. Thus, this derangement within language means that any signifier can become a symbol infused with libidinal intensity – indeed, it all but nullifies the signifier-signified distinction altogether. “Illness” here is the ineradicable proximity of life and death, language and Being – which yields spiritual knowledge (for better or worse) if we learn to see it as such, and of which individual illness (melancholy) is the representative. We will see in the next chapter that this experience is a limit-encounter of reason, a trauma which Pfau places at the core of Romantic historicity.

Thus the Romantic metasubjective unconscious is, to borrow Lacan’s famous phrase, “structured like a language,” but the historicity of the Romantic metasubjective psyche demands that we de-emphasise the idea of “structure” in favour of “language.” Indeed, Jung does more than simply mark the phylogenesis of the psyche through physiology. Appealing to the experience of meaning, Jung progresses through, only to deconstruct, the stages of the therapeutics of presence\textsuperscript{160} that elsewhere characterises the analytical process:

The anima and life itself are meaningless in so far as they offer no interpretation. Yet they have a nature that can be interpreted, for in all chaos there is a cosmos, in all disorder a secret order, in all caprice a fixed law, for everything that works is grounded on its opposite. […] Only when all props and crutches are broken, and no cover from the rear offers even the slightest hope of security, does it become possible for us to experience an archetype that up till then had lain hidden

\textsuperscript{160} In the Introduction, I coined the phrase “therapeutics of presence” to describe the congelation of archetypal dynamism into figures (Shadow/Doppelgänger figure, the Anima as “woman in man,” Animus as “man in woman” etc) for the sake of dream analysis and therapeutic dialogue, and against their unworking in Jung’s metapsychological economy. This tension between therapeutics and metapsychology can be represented in Lyotard’s figural terms as a tension between the figure-image as “that which I see in the hallucination or the dream […] an object placed at a distance, a theme [belonging] to the order of the visible,” and the figure-matrix, which is an “object of originary repression,” an astructural “violation of the discursive order” whose unconscious origins instantly recede before the “schema of intelligibility” imposed on it from without (268). Although Lyotard deploys these figures in a Freudian framework, they nevertheless map the tension between a therapeutics of presence which works within an economy of figure-images that inhibit difference into “quasi-oneiric” (268) outlines of personal narrative in the therapeutic setting, and the figure-matrix as the differential general economy of the collective unconscious, the mutual imbrication of archetypal forces that resists the “scheme of intelligibility” which reifies them into figure-images.
behind the meaningful nonsense played out by the anima. This is the archetype of meaning. (“Archetypes” pars. 61, 66)

But what does this meaning mean? Jung’s answer in the following paragraph breaks with the linearity of this therapeutics:

From what source, in the last analysis, do we derive meaning? The forms we use for assigning meaning are historical categories that reach back into the mists of time—a fact we do not take sufficiently into account. Interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images. From whatever side we approach this question, everywhere we find ourselves confronted with the history of language and motifs, which always leads back straight away into the primitive wonder-world. (“Archetypes” para. 67, trans. mod.; my italics)

In one fell swoop therapy’s teleology opens out on to radical atelos, the indeterminacy of language and image imbricated with the archetypes. Analytical psychology becomes an archetypal grammatology, and this grammatology marks Jung’s a prioritisation of historicity itself through the symmetry between language and the archetypes. Put differently, the archetypes and language are both imbued with a materiality that makes the collective unconscious an Ungrund operating beneath discourse, as it were. Indeed, its operations have a motility akin to the enigmatic density of modern language in The Order of Things. However, aligned with Schelling’s actants as the forces of a bidirectional Nature, the corresponding ambitendency of the archetypes unfolds with a purposive self-organisation that supplements Foucault’s narrative. Indeed, with Novalis, one might say that the transcendental empiricism of the archetypes and the collective unconscious approaches the “sympathy of the sign with the signified” (Notes #137). Novalis also puts this empiricism at the core of the “grammatical mysticism” which underlies Being: “Everywhere there is a grammatical mysticism [. . .] It is not only the human being that speaks—the universe also speaks—everything speaks—unending languages” (qtd. in Weeks 223).161 This speaking in tongues is what constitutes the “sick

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161 For Novalis, “mysticism” does not denote either Schwärmerei or the religious desire to transcend the material world of Nature. Rather, by mysticism he means the outcome of a “syncriticism” which unites the real and the ideal (Notes #457). To this end, he dismisses “the faith in fathoming the thing-in-itself” as “false mysticism,” the misled belief in spiritual knowledge which annuls Nature (Notes #906).
narrative of Novalis’ magical Idealism as a “poetics of the baneful,” infused with the melancholic illness of nature and history (Krell, *Contagion* 64, 66). But nevertheless, *something speaks* – the motile force behind the intensive unfolding of these archetypal-grammatological forces.

Thus, with the grammatology of Being, Romantic metasubjectivity gives an experiencing psyche to what Foucault sees as the “enigmatic and precarious being” of language itself. It symbolises the plenitude of a general economy that “[denounces] the grammatical habits of our thinking, [dissipates] the myths that animate our words, [renders] once more noisy and audible the element of silence that all discourse carries with it as it is spoken” (*Order of Things* 298). But these myths are not dissipated *into* words; the symbolic, no longer bound to the Providence of a divine Word, instead speaks a derangement of myths, motifs, and words. The myths, the gods are not dead; they have just become multiple, imbricated and implicated in the textures of sense and the event that constellate language and Being (I will explore precisely this sense of myth in Chapter Five).

The *Thanatopoiesis* of Romantic metasubjectivity puts under analysis the liminality between Being and language to make its historicity felt, as affective contagion, through the performativity of the poem as event. Indeed, for Novalis language is caught up in the Romantic potentiation of the world, and Schelling will devote the *Ages* to, among other things, a cosmological dramatisation of potencies in the creation/narration of knowledge. In a well-known passage Novalis writes:

> The world must be made Romantic. […] To make Romantic is nothing but a qualitative raising to a higher power [potentization]. In this operation the lower self will become one with a better self. Just as we ourselves are such a qualitative exponential series. This operation is as yet entirely unknown. By endowing the commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious respect, the known with the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am making it Romantic […] Romantic philosophy. *Lingua romana*. Raising and lowering by turns. (*Logological Fragments* 1, #66)

Chapter Four will investigate how this poetics of potentiation anticipates the movement of the potencies in Schelling’s *Ages* and Jung’s articulation of the individuation process.
But germane for us here is Novalis’ figuration of this “potentization” in the specifically linguistic terms of his “grammatical mysticism [which] lies at the basis of everything,” and it is precisely the mysterious which “incit[es] potencies” (Notes #138). This grammatical mysticism underlies the Romantic presumption that poetry is the supreme art among arts. But Novalis’ consideration, like Schelling’s, of his own idealist “Golden Age” reads language away from poetry and into the fabric of Being itself – “a Golden Age, when all words become—figurative words—myths—And all figures become—linguistic figures—hieroglyphs—When we learn to speak and write figures—and learn to perfectly sculpt and make music with words” (Notes 206).

What Novalis sees as the Romantic potentiation and figuration of words which imbricate them with Being, Deleuze conceives as the “linguistic precursor,” his understanding of the question of the psyche’s being structured as a language (DR 122). The linguistic precursor is an “event” analogous to the centripetal force of the dark precursor as motile differential force in Being, an “esoteric word” that marks the sense of language – the irruption of an affective texture in the word which troubles its place in the chain of signification in which it exists. Deleuze cites the (Joycean) portmanteau word162 as a contemporary example of such a word which expresses “both itself and its sense” (155).163 Thus, the linguistic precursor marks this limit-experience of sensibility before the being of the sensible:

the linguistic precursor belongs to a kind of metalanguage and can be incarnated only within a word devoid of sense from the point of view of the series of first-degree verbal representations. […] This double status of esoteric words, which state their own sense but do so only by representing it and themselves as nonsense, clearly expresses the perpetual displacement of sense and its disguise among the series. In consequence, esoteric words are properly linguistic cases of the object = x, while the object = x structures psychic experience like a language

162 Portmanteau words are combinations of two or more other words, but with a meaning and sense of their own. For example, in Finnegans Wake Joyce uses fadograph, which combines “faded” and “photograph” without being synonymous with either.

163 But need we limit this to the portmanteau words of modern literature? From a psychological standpoint, a schizophrenic – or one schizophrenically inclined – could potentially “feel” the “sense” of any word insofar as all words share the same stepwise temporality.
on condition that the perpetual, invisible and silent displacement of linguistic sense is taken into account. In a sense, everything speaks and has sense, on condition that speech is also that which does not speak – or rather, speech is the sense which does not speak in speech. (DR 123; my italics)

In other words, the linguistic precursor’s “metalanguage” is that which suspends and annuls “first-degree” conceptual representation. “Esoteric words” mark the irruption, in language, of the copula, the object = x which unites the word’s morphemes in non-sense, and as with the confrontation with an archetypal intensity, one must search out this experience for oneself in experience’s sense-data.

Thus, Deleuze’s understanding of sense through the linguistic precursor, as fundamental unity of difference within the series-unity of discourse, harks back to the Ungrund of sense and Being from which all discourses coalesce. Language at its most authentic is schizophrenic, open to and entwined with the potentiation of Being. Indeed Romantic poetry, which understood literature as a fundamentally embodied vocation, sought to engage with and experience this kind of Deleuzian sense – whether it is both courted and resisted (Coleridge) or more enthusiastically explored by the so-called “Younger Romantics” such as Keats and Shelley (Mitchell 44-45). Chapter Five will examine Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as a poetic metapsychology of Romantic metasubjectivity demonstrating this sense-power of language not only as it invokes the power of political discourse, but also as it more fundamentally represents actantial-archetypal dynamics in the emergence of the dissociative psyche. But we must first explore this “sense-power” as it is articulated by Schelling and Jung. This leads us to the question of experience, which is a crucial index of Schelling’s difference from Hegel but also the central concern of analytical psychology. What is the experience of this grammatological entanglement – in other words, what is the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity? This is the subject of the next chapter.

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164 The Yes and No of Schelling’s expanding and contractive forces are perhaps the first, best portmanteau words. Rebecca Comay puts it nicely: they are “shifters,” or “indexicals,” which “[draw their] entire energy from [their] site[s] of enunciation” (250).
Chapter 3

3 Romantic Metasubjectivity: Experience

“Everything about [analytical psychology] is, in the deepest sense, experience; the entire theory, even where it puts on the most abstract airs, is the direct outcome of something experienced” (Jung, On the Psychology para. 199; my italics). Jung’s words recall a similar statement of Schelling’s in the First Outline: “Not only do we know this or that through experience, but we originally know nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience” (198). We have seen how the intensity of experience becomes, for Schelling, the royal road of insight into Nature’s existence as a priori in the Naturphilosophie; indeed, reason itself is seen as a product of natural processes. The previous chapter read this emphasis on experience forward to Jung, whose conception of the archetype developed out of the theory of complexes and word-association experiments – the affective experience of language which Jung ultimately articulates as an archetypal grammatology of Being which unfolds through the experience of symbols and objects. Indeed, this turn in Jung’s thought is inevitable in analytical psychology, whose object of knowledge is “sheer experience” (“Foreword to von Koenig-Fachsenfeld” para. 1738) and whose goal is to “release an experience that grips us or falls upon us as from above” (Introduction 87). And Jung’s emphasis on the phenomenology of the psyche brings this grammatology that much closer to Schelling’s concern with the general economy of nonmolar forces from which natural products emerge.

The subject of this chapter is the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity, which bears an intimate and complex relation to the purposive individuation process on which the following chapter focuses. Indeed, the understanding of experience which I will discuss, which is crystallised in “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821) [“NPS”] as an onto-epistemological response to the First Outline, underscores an

165 We will see that Schelling’s Ages straddles the concepts both of experience and individuation: it maps individuation through the Potenzenlehre and opens a space for its experience through the discussion of magnetic sleep, as well as the broader cosmological framework from which humanity comes and to which it periodically returns.
aleatorism that troubles individuation’s teleological drive to organise experience according to the *Stufenfolge*. In this limit-experience of reason, the reflexive epistemology of consciousness encounters its own materiality as that which it cannot assimilate or contain in reflection – that which cannot produce knowledge in the Kantian sense of conceptual organisation according to knowable *a priori* categories. Reason encounters its genesis in Nature (for Schelling, the ideal’s “arising from the real” [*FO* 194]); knowledge is confronted with its genesis in paradoxical archetypal formations, which are both producers and products of the human organism’s experience of material nature – archetypes of “perception and apprehension” [*Wahrnehmung und Erfassung*] rooted in *sense* (Jung, “Instinct” para. 270). The experience of Romantic metasubjectivity, as the self’s encounter with the “Self,” is thus the ineffable point where ideal and real, mind and nature, touch and do not touch. It is an encounter with the third thing of Schelling’s copular logic, which grounds all subject-predicate and subject-object relationships. And anticipating the concept of individuation discussed in the following chapter, it is an intuition that one is “on the right path” while never allowing knowledge that one is on the right path. This is precisely the condition of Romantic metasubjectivity; what one knows about one’s path is always left behind the minute one walks, experiences, feels the path one is on after its happening. But this happening always leaves clues to lead knowledge forward and backward, beyond itself, beside itself.

In what follows, I will track the development of this limit-experience through Schelling and Jung. Schelling’s thinking of this limit-experience centres around intuition – specifically, the fundamental (and problematic) idea of *intellectual intuition* [*intellektuelle Anschauung*]¹⁶⁶ as developed in the in the 1800 *System*. There, intellectual intuition is, put simply, the experience of contact between real and ideal which grounds the *System’s* idea of self, and which undergoes a crucial transformation in Schelling’s later thinking. It is a free act of intuition (that is, one that does not require proofs) in

¹⁶⁶ While *Anschauung* is typically translated as “intuition,” Marcus Weigelt translates it as “perception,” which reads a physicality into this experience against Schelling’s (and perhaps his other translators’) desire to idealise this experience in the *System’s* cognitive sphere.
which the self recognises itself as it constructs itself as object. As such, it is essentially what we might call an indwelling *unconsciousness* within consciousness, which is precisely why it both constitutes and unworks the profound emphasis on consciousness and thought in the *System*’s transcendental philosophy. In the later “NPS” intellectual intuition becomes *ecstasy*, as the experience of the absolute subject moving through knowledge to organise it without being concretised in it. Thus, intellectual intuition’s “intellectuality” is deconstructed, returned to its basis in embodied nature – returned to its status as the *organ* of transcendental philosophy (*STI* 27), but with an unruliness previously repressed by the *System*’s Idealism. I shall argue that in the closing pages of the *System* Schelling attempts to harmonise the disruptive potential of intellectual intuition, and the productive unconscious it marks, by sublating their unruly energies into aesthetic intuition as the objectification of these energies in a work of art which resolves all contradiction. This aesthetic Idealism leads to a missed encounter with the productive force of intellectual intuition – a force whose potential is lost until its recovery in the cosmological imagination of the 1815 *Ages*. This drive to repress intellectual intuition’s aleatory materiality is the locus of the *System*’s neurosis, a neurosis which speaks to Schelling’s desire to close the circle of the *System*’s knowledge at all costs (and seemingly against his earlier resistances to the idea of a system).  

Jung’s early thinking about intuition as unconscious perception, the “purposive apprehension of a highly complicated situation” (“Instinct” para. 269), is drawn from the

167 “NPS” is a key text in Schelling’s oeuvre in several respects: it can be read as a retrospect on Schelling’s philosophical proteanism, as it contains the residual Idealism found throughout his work, but it also translates the *Ages*’ cosmogony into a philosophical psychology, thus providing a bridge between cosmogony and the later positive philosophy.

168 Things are more complicated with Schelling than simply labelling him as, like Hegel, a thinker of the system. Several years earlier in 1795, Schelling emphatically states that authentic philosophy *does not and cannot* result in an overarching system: “Nothing can rouse the indignation of the philosophical mind more than the declaration that henceforth all philosophy shall be detained in the fetters of a single system. The genuine philosopher has never felt himself to be greater than when he has beheld an infinity of knowledge. The whole sublimity of his science has consisted in just this, that it would never be complete. He would become unbearable to himself the moment he came to believe that he had completed his system. That very moment he would cease to be *creator* and would be degraded to an instrument of his own creature” (*Philosophical Letters* 172). The *System*’s apparent ambivalence about this sentiment should be read against Schelling’s oeuvre as a whole: certainly by 1809 he is unconcerned with creating a closed system.
same nonrational basis as intellectual intuition. He will later attempt to articulate this experience as *synchronicity*, an acausal connecting principle where circumstances in the external world and the archetypal constellations in the psyche converge in an event wherein cause and effect are suspended (indeed, the event reveals that psyche is Nature).

But this experience of connection with infinite dynamism and productivity is also a site of strange chiasmus in Schelling and Jung’s silent partnership. Schelling’s turn to the ecstatic admits a quasi-mystical element into his thinking as part of what would become his positive philosophy of existence. By contrast, Jung’s discussion of synchronicity is embedded in the genre of the twentieth-century scientific experiment.

That is, where Schelling positively affirms ecstasy as a nonrational basis for systems of knowledge, Jung expresses this nonrationality negatively, as an experiment which ultimately shows the limits of the statistical method in explaining “immediate creation [unmittelbaren Schöpfungsakt] which manifests itself as chance” (letter to Markus Fierz, 2 March 1950, para. 1198). Just as the System attempts to rein in the limit-experience of intellectual intuition through an aesthetic Idealism, Jung attempts to contain synchronicity’s aleatorism in an experiment, hallmarked with Western Cartesianism, which interrogates Nature. Yet this does not diminish synchronicity’s potency, which recrudesces in Jung’s ideas of the transcendent function and active imagination as core ideas of individuation (which I discuss in the next chapter). Indeed, in spite of Jung’s imposing questions on Nature, one wonders if, leading him into a labyrinth of statistics and numbers, Nature once more experiments with Jung in demanding an impossible

169 In his later (1827) lectures on the history of philosophy Schelling makes an important distinction between the authentic, “living” mysticism of those (such as Böhme) who have been “originally stirred” by the mystery of Being, and a “shorthand,” window shopping species of mysticism used by the intellectually corrupt to dismiss what is unknown and shut down scientific inquiry. This latter mysticism is “the hatred of clear knowledge [and] of science in general” (*On the History* 183, 185). Wirth frames the distinction eloquently with regard to intellectual intuition: “intellectual intuition does not strive simply to mystify things and thereby shroud them in chaotic obscurantism. It moves to say the unsayable, respecting as much the clarity that speaking demands as it does the mystery that its seeks to communicate” (*Conspiracy* 115). Clearly Schelling’s notion of ecstasy touches on mysticism in the former sense.

170 And yet the experiment is where Nature speaks – albeit its enigma is read differently in this chiasmus. For Schelling the experiment, as “invasion” of Nature “compelling” a response, nevertheless gets folded into the “prophecy” of a methodology creating its own object (*FO* 197). We have seen above that for Jung, in medical psychology “the object puts the question and not the experimenter.”
answer. Let us begin with “NPS,” which offers up a philosophical psychology that both harks back to the past of the System and gestures to the future of the positive philosophy.

3.1 On the “Nature” of “Philosophy” as “Science”

Schelling’s “NPS” is a lecture given in 1821 at Erlangen which takes up the question of philosophy’s status as a unified system of knowledge. As such, “NPS” is an implicit response to Hegel’s construction of philosophical knowledge as a unity composed of its different historical manifestations. In response to Hegel’s demand for systemic unity, Schelling develops the idea of freedom first articulated in the 1809 Freedom essay: freedom is neither absolute indetermination nor the teleological determination of absolute spirit, but rather the freedom to be determined in a unique unfolding which cannot be articulated by teleology, a radical indetermination behind and beneath systemic unity. Schelling’s lecture focuses on this freedom and its experience. But “NPS” is also a text which attempts to decrypt, remember, and work through the traumatic encounter between the 1800 System and the Naturphilosophie of the First Outline. Seen in this light, “NPS” is an afterword to the “system” Schelling envisioned, tantamount to the “growth of a philosopher’s mind” remaining unbound by Hegelian teleology or the rhetoric of self-making that marks Wordsworth’s “egotistical sublime.”

Indeed, looking back in Schelling’s oeuvre while looking forward to the following chapter on individuation, “NPS” takes up the absolute subject which is potentiated, but not articulated as such in Schelling’s 1815 Ages. Thus, one can see a Romantic encyclopedics emerging from “NPS”’s lectural architectonic, a theory of systems of knowledge coalescing from, and dynamised by, their unthought.172

171 The Prelude was subtitled “Growth of a Poet’s Mind.” The English Romantic poet John Keats, who never read The Prelude, used the term “egotistical sublime” to describe what he saw as Wordsworth’s overweening emphasis on his own mind, as opposed to the “Poetical Character” which “is not itself—it has no self—it is everything and nothing—it has no character—it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated” (194-95).

172 Indeed, Wirth (Conspiracy 120) indicates that “NPS” is an assemblage derived from several of Schelling’s Erlangen lectures (although it is uncertain whether it was culled by Schelling himself or his son). The very form of the lecture involves an extemporaneous element, which exemplifies the possibility within the spoken event of “[following] the particular wherever it might lead, regardless of its consistency with a larger whole” (Rajan, “First Outline” 315). It is possible to see “NPS” as a textual “ego” that
The core experience of Romantic metasubjectivity and its blueprint of individuation can be discerned from within the baroque folds (and unfoldings) of “NPS,” which Schelling wrote roughly twenty years after the hermeneutic trauma of two bodies of thought – the transcendental and natural philosophies – which touch and do not touch: a trauma revisited, revised, reworked, but still unsurmounted. The Schelling of “NPS” is a consummately Romantic philosopher of intensity, of potentiation, of the écriture (de)composing systems of knowledge according to the inscrutable rhythms of a grammatology of Being which Jung later supplies with an experiential therapeutics. Indeed, Bowie sees “NPS” not only as the inauguration of Schelling’s positive philosophy, but also as the foundation of his critique of Hegel (“Translator’s Introduction” 25). Michael Forster also recognises the specifically Romantic intensity in Schelling’s lecture, which carries over into the positive philosophy (43ff).173 If, as Schelling writes in Ages, evolution proceeds from involution (Ages 83), then “NPS” is evolution, the extensification of Ages’ involutive cosmology. Ages’ potentiation suggests a psychology taken up later by Jung (as the following chapter discusses), but “NPS” outlines an aetiology of systemic knowledge nascent in Schelling’s thought since the Freedom essay, presented here as a philosophical psychology of “ecstasy.” Indeed, this aetiology has its ultimate source in the derangement of natural production Schelling explores in the Naturphilosophie. Moreover, “NPS” explains the trajectory by which this aetiology creates a subject-ed knowledge – that is, knowledge produced in the wake of the absolute subject’s sublime happening, and left in the hands of the individuating person. This knowledge exists as the purposive unfolding of an individuative Trieb, which articulates the motility of Romantic metasubjectivity. We can express this in Deleuzian terms as the subject which emerges from the (un)folding of analytical psychology and Schellingian philosophy and their disciplinary “subjects” under the “law

emerged from a heterogeneity of speaking events and/or editorial “voices”; “NPS”’s textual history thus reflects Schelling’s argument that no one system (or lecture) can assume a final epistemological authority.

173 Contra the tradition of reading Schelling’s later philosophy of mythology and revelation as intrinsically conservative, I suggest that the philosophy of mythology exhibits a deconstructive tension between Christian teleology and its (actantial) “theogonic forces” – a tension shared by the works I discuss here. I shall touch on this in Chapter Five’s discussion of Romantic literature.
of curvilinearity,” the “law of folds or changes of direction” articulating a liquidity of inside and outside determined by the elusive force of an individuating unity (Deleuze, *The Fold* 14).

“NPS” lies on the cusp of Schelling’s later “positive philosophy.” This positive philosophy seeks to get beyond [Hegel’s] ‘negative philosophy’ [which] explicates the forms of pure thought that determine what things are, to a conception which comes to terms both with the fact that things are and with the real historical emergence and movement of consciousness. [...] The positivity of the positive philosophy lies in the demand for an explanation [...] of the fact that there can be self-contained a priori systems of necessity. Such systems cannot [...] explain their own possibility: [for example,] whilst geometry maps the structure of space, it does not account for the existence of space. (Bowie, *Schelling* 13-14, 144; my second italics)

History’s sheer facticity, which Jung represents as an “extremely historical organism” emerging from an inscrutable matrix of material and organic processes, has concerned Schelling since *Naturphilosophie*’s central (and unresolved) question of why nature ends up creating natural products in the first place. It is also at the core of Schlegel’s “progressive universal poetry,” whose progress lies precisely in its losing itself in this unfolding history as an uncanny othering in an endless approximation to the “circumambient world” (*AF* #116). “NPS” thinks this laterally unfolding historicity as a uniquely Romantic aetiology: knowledge unfolds through history as an illness of incommensurability, vitiated only through philosophy as a “free act of the spirit” (227). Thus, philosophy in “NPS” is a pharmakon hoping to “cure” freedom through freedom. And it is Novalis who specifically takes up this aetiological poetics of human freedom as a “poetics of affliction” that conducts a path to a “higher synthesis” in this illness of incommensurability. This path is a cultivated love of one’s melancholy which does not end in transcendental perfection, but rather unfolds according to a gradient of sadomasochistic harmony, which increases grades of “terrible pain” while “hidden in dwelling pleasure” (Novalis, *Notes* #653).

As a retrospective Schellingian analysis of *Naturphilosophie*’s tenuous alignment with the System’s transcendental philosophy, “NPS” is a consciously paradoxical attempt
to systematise this aetiology of difference that gives rise to system, the intellectual intuition meant to achieve its experience, and the absolute subject as organising principle of the systems emerging from the differentiation at the core of Being. For this reason, I read the “Nature” in the title contrary to its status as dead metaphor (“the nature of philosophy as science”), as an intensive marker alongside “philosophy” and “science.” That is, “Nature” harbours an unnamed vitality in “NPS” which serves as the backdrop for the disunity between systems giving rise to knowledge; it is the stage upon which the encounter with the absolute subject occurs.174 Thus, suspended between “Nature” and “science,” “philosophy” is possessed (in the possessive sense; the nature of philosophy) by a quasi-theosophical ecstasy that puts the System’s intellectual intuition under analysis. In this way, a philosophical psychology emerges in “NPS” from within the determinations of “philosophy as science.” Predicated on the epistemological suspension of Naturphilosophie and transcendental Idealism, this philosophical psychology prefigures and informs Romantic metasubjectivity’s central notions of experience and individuation.

Schelling begins “NPS” by asserting that human knowledge emerges from a primordial asystasy, his term for a differential economy of nonknowledge175 resembling the primal fluidity of the First Outline:

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174 In an extremely concentrated phrase Schelling imbricates Nature and freedom: “Freedom estranged from itself is nature, nature withdrawn back into itself is freedom” (“NPS” 240).

175 The term is from Bataille, who went beyond Schelling in exploring the relationship between ecstasy and knowledge (although Schelling can certainly be seen as a precursor). Bataille’s nonknowledge is “that which results from every proposition when we are looking to go to the fundamental depths of its content, and which makes us uneasy” (“The Consequences” 112). Bataille elaborates on nonknowledge in Inner Experience (1943/1954): “NONKNOWLEDGE LAYS BARE. [. . .] This proposition is the summit, but should be understood in this way: lays bare, therefore I see what knowledge was hiding up to there, but if I see I know. In effect, I know, but what I knew, nonknowledge again lays bare. If nonsense is sense, the sense that is nonsense loses itself, becomes nonsense once again (without possible end). [. . .] NONKNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATES ECSTASY. Nonknowledge is first of all ANGUISH. In anguish appears nudity, which leads to ecstasy. But ecstasy itself (nudity, communication) slips away if anguish slips away. Thus ecstasy only remains possible in the anguish of ecstasy, in the fact that it cannot be satisfaction, grasped knowledge” (57). Although Schelling might have seen Bataille’s ecstasy as Schwärmerei, religious (over)enthusiasm (one wonders if Schelling would have countenanced a nonknowledge “beyond absolute knowledge” [57]), Bataille nevertheless outlines an experience of nonknowledge (as “pure experience”) strikingly similar to Schelling’s understanding. The ipse (subject), wanting to be everything by appropriating the world to its projections, comes to anguish as “the nonsense
The idea or the endeavour of finding a system of human knowledge, or [...] of contemplating human knowledge within a system [...] presupposes, of course, that originally and of itself it does not exist in a system, hence that it is an [asystaton] [...] something that is in inner conflict. In order to recognize this asystasy, this non-existence, this disunity [...] in human knowledge (for this inner conflict must become apparent), the human spirit must already have searched in every possible direction. [...] The need for harmony arises first of all in disharmony. (210)

The quest for an absolute knowledge, whose erasure and lack must be brought to light through a rhizomatic “searching in every possible direction,” discloses the Ungrund of knowledge itself as a failure of disclosure, the inner conflict of asystasy as the disunity grounding all knowledge. Schelling attempts to articulate a “true system” of knowledge that fuses system with the indeterminacy that constitutes and paradoxically completes it in a “unity of unity and opposition” (210). Developing the 1815 Ages’ conception of knowledge as “a living, actual being” (xxxv), Schelling’s interdisciplinary organicism here implies a transference of knowledge between different “systems” of organs. But the threat of disease attending the organic – the risk that one organ “which has its freedom or life only so that it may remain in the whole strives to be for itself” (Freedom 35; my italics) – sickens this absolute subject with the incommensurability between system and freedom that holds them in sublime suspension relative to one another. Hence philosophy as a pharmakon “free act of the spirit.”

Such a system can only form around “a subject of movement and of progress,” a subject “proceeding through everything and not being anything” (“NPS” 215). This purposive force organises the system, constellating its aleatory energies while remaining of the will to knowledge arises, nonsense of every possible, making the ipse know that it is going to lose itself and knowledge along with it. Insofar as the ipse perseveres in its will to know and to be ipse anguish lasts, but if the ipse abandons itself [and] gives itself to nonknowledge in this abandonment, rapture begins. In rapture, my existence recovers a meaning, but the meaning immediately [becomes] a rapture that I ipse possess, giving satisfaction to my will to be everything. As soon as I return there, [...] the loss of my self ceases, I have ceased to abandon myself, I remain there, but with a new knowledge” (58; my last italics). Bataille’s ecstasy cannot be folded back into a science as its knowledge collapses in on itself with a joyful masochism absent in Schelling’s conception of philosophy, but Schelling’s philosophical subject also “wants to be everything” through “searching in every possible direction” (see below).
uninhibited by its particulars.\textsuperscript{176} This organising principle, implicit for Schelling since the \textit{Naturphilosophie},\textsuperscript{177} is the absolute subject. The absolute subject is a purposive current through the unconditioned, a liminal force which touches and does not touch existence. This subject is “not indefinable in such a way that it could not also become definable, not infinite in such a way that it could not also become finite, and not ungraspable in such a way that it could not also become graspable” (“NPS” 219).\textsuperscript{178} It is a sylleptic subject which traverses its contradictory aspects while remaining immune to final predication; in one and the same moment it both “adopts” and “divests” a given form (219). Such change underpins all thought: “[Thought cannot be an underlying principle,] since if knowledge is constantly changing it cannot finally know itself \textit{as} itself because the fact of its identity [. . .] depends on an other that it cannot encompass within itself: namely, the principle of \textit{change}, ‘eternal freedom’, the absolute subject” (Bowie, \textit{Schelling} 137). As a “principle of possibility” for a system of knowledge, the absolute subject is even above God (“NPS” 215, 217). Insofar as it is the motor force of the productive unconscious, the absolute subject, “inhabiting the subject position, overturns the workings and pretensions of the subject position” as its “immanent critique” (Wirth, \textit{Conspiracy} 37). Its anteriority to reflexive thought and its purposive Thanatopoietic movement through knowledge put it outside the personalist economy of psychoanalysis, just as it establishes a futurity which anticipates the positive philosophy’s revelatory nature.

\textsuperscript{176} While the absolute subject of Schelling’s earlier \textit{On University Studies} (1802) is aleatory and contingent, “NPS”’s philosophical psychology can be read as an attempt to psychologise the subject to which this aleatory drive is bound. In this sense, “NPS” supplements this earlier contingency with the necessity required to complete the freedom in which knowledge operates.

\textsuperscript{177} Peterson suggests that “Schelling’s dialectic is driven by the persistent attempt of the (absolute) subject to become an object for itself, making its way to higher powers of subjectivity or inwardness in the process” (xxviii). But while Peterson reminds us that this is not Hegelian dialectic, he leaves unexplained exactly how this “subject” manifests itself in Nature’s quasi-subjective space. Schelling does not use the term “absolute subject” in the \textit{First Outline}; “absolute organism” is the closest he comes (\textit{FO} 28).

\textsuperscript{178} Again, this movement is explicitly linked with the \textit{Naturphilosophie} in Schelling’s later lectures as the force of the absolute subject’s “self-gravitation” (\textit{On the History} 115).
Thus, Schelling’s move away from a negative philosophy of the Concept in “NPS” consists of a certain revocation of knowledge, a negative capability for the Socratic dictum of knowing only that one does not know, which brings the absolute subject into view as knowledge’s receding origin (“NPS” 228). But “NPS” also promises a return of knowledge to the “ignorant” knowing subject through a movement which is essentially countertransference *avant la lettre*, a movement in which absolute subject and “ignorant” subject move through each other, touching and not touching. In movements very similar to Bataille’s description of inner experience, this psychology’s tripartite movement (which amounts to a “moment,” or sublime *event* of knowledge) begins with absolute subject and consciousness (as “ignorant knowledge,” knowledge ignorant of its interiority in “absolute outwardness”) at opposite poles. The second stage is one of countertransference: the absolute subject “becomes object” just as “absolute ignorance makes the transition to knowledge,” and “the transition from subject to object is reflected in the transition from object to subject” (230). The third and final stage effects a “restoration” in which the absolute subject returns to its inwardness but leaves a trace of itself in consciousness as a *knowing* ignorance, an “internalization” of the absolute subject as a remembrance of the eternal freedom of which it is a part: “now [consciousness] knows this freedom, knows it indeed immediately, namely as that which itself is the interior of it, of ignorance” (231). And while this movement may seem rather Hegelian, it is precisely this ignorance and lack, as the object of cognition, which constitutes knowledge while making its terminus impossible. That is, this ignorance ensures that knowledge can never fully return to itself.

But what is the *experience* of this asystasy in “NPS”’s philosophical psychology? To articulate the encounter with this absolute subject Schelling returns to the *System*’s concept of intellectual intuition as the unity of real and ideal, but gives it a history and a nature resisted by his earlier work. Schelling subjects intellectual intuition to a scrutiny absent from his previous account, deconstructing its “intellectual” quality to imbue it with a materiality repressed in the *System*’s aesthetic economy. Here, Schelling tells us that the “intellectual” in “intellectual intuition” means that “the subject is not lost in sensory perception, i.e., in a real object, but that it is lost in, or gives itself up in, something that *cannot* be an *object*” (228). Thus he drops “intellectual,” because it
neglects the sense-aspect of such an encounter (228). Instead, Schelling opts to describe this encounter as *ecstasy*, an affective experience where

our ego, namely, is placed outside itself, i.e. outside its role. […] Confronted with the absolute subject, it cannot remain a subject, for the absolute subject cannot behave like an object. It must, then, give up its place, it must be placed outside itself, as something that no longer exists. Only in this state of having abandoned itself can the absolute subject appear to [the ego] in its state of self-abandonment, and so we also behold it in amazement. (228; my third italics)

The central question of “NPS” evokes the text’s deconstructive turn: the question of the “true” system of knowledge becomes the question of how man can “be brought to this ecstasy – a question that is synonymous with: how can man be brought to his senses?” (229; my italics). With Schelling’s notion of ecstasy, the sensory aspect of nature and materiality supplements an otherwise philosophical exercise of intellectual intuition. And with this return of the object(ive) in the movement of forces involved in the countertransference between the absolute subject and consciousness, we discover the territory in which Deleuze later maps out sense as the relation of forces constituting an object. Reading Nietzsche, Deleuze writes:

We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. […] All force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of reality. Even perception, in its divers aspects, is the expression of forces which appropriate nature. That is to say that nature itself has a history. The history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force which appropriates it. History is the variation of senses. […] Sense is therefore a complex notion; there is

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179 Schelling’s original German reads: “wie wird der Mensch zur Besinnung gebracht?” (Sämtliche Werke I.9.230). The root of Besinnung, Sinn, translates to “meaning,” “sense” or “signification,” but Schelling’s use of the term goes beyond this. Discussing Schelling on character [Gesinnung], Wirth writes that Sinn also means “to sense, [to become] ‘sensitized’ to the life of that which one cannot understand in advance.” More specifically to the point of intellectual intuition, Wirth aligns Sinn with sensation [Empfindung], “sensation or sensory experience” – in a word, “direct experience” (Conspiracy 28, 91). Thus, the transition here from intellectual intuition to ecstasy involves a return of the repressed object(ive), and Deleuze and Guattari take this further to describe the “being of sensation” as “not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings” (What is Philosophy? 183).
always a plurality of senses, a constellation, a complex of successions but also of coexistences. (*Nietzsche and Philosophy* 3-4; my italics)

Deleuze reads *history*, as the “variation of sense,” away from its disciplinary formations and toward Romantic *historicity* as the play of forces (actant, archetype) that constitute history and its temporal permutations. Moreover, because Deleuze is a thinker “interested primarily in experiences that defeat the conditions of representation and threaten to dissolve the subject in a becoming” (Welchman 247), the Deleuzian *event* is “paradoxically [what] both has already happened and is about to happen; a way of thinking the past and future within the present. In short, sense explains what is” (Young 278-79). Brought to our senses, we are brought to a confrontation with nature and materiality as egoity is “dislodged” in and by historicity (“NPS” 229).

Put differently, Schelling’s ecstasy opens consciousness up to the matrix of nonmolar forces that constitute historicity, the energies that congeal into history as its variations. We are brought forward to Deleuze’s thinking of sense but also to the distinctly Jungian conception of quantitative libido, which is not bound by a specific *quality* (or qualities) but is rather hypothesised through the *quantity*, or *intensity* of libido and the “relations of movement” governing its manifestation in natural objects (Jung, “On Psychic Energy” para. 3). In “NPS,” “being brought to one’s senses” is nothing less than the cultivation, in the properly “philosophical” subject, of the awareness of differential, asystemic (libidinal) transferences between systems of knowledge. And in observing that by unfolding the difference within similarity *analogy* functions as the master trope for the constitutive transferences between knowledge-systems (“On

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180 For more on this distinction see Kerslake, *Deleuze* 73ff. For Jung, *intensity* is a crucial metapsychological concept with which he measures libido charge. See, for example, “On Psychic Energy” pars. 19-20, 37 & ff. and “The Transcendent Function” para. 166. Apropos of Deleuzian intensity, Claire Colebrook writes: “Against the idea of representation—that there are persons or things that we come to know through qualities—we can say that there is a world of perceptions, intensities or varying qualities from which we produce extended things or an underlying human nature. This means that cultural or artistic works do not represent an already given human nature so much as produce general interests from intensities” (88). Bearing the mark of Jungian libido but moving further with its ontological implications, Deleuze’s intensity is the differential measure of a univocal being irreducible to analogy or hierarchy (lecture on *Anti-Oedipus* and *1000 Plateaus*). Indeed, Deleuze’s notion of intensity may have been taken up directly from Jung; see Kerslake, “Rebirth Through Incest” 142ff.
Psychological Understanding” para. 413), Jung minds the gap, so to speak, between knowledges that are marked by ecstasy as the limit-experience of sheer materiality – something already come into being but nevertheless carrying the weight of an event, a happening of absolute subjectivity. Precisely this sublime ecstasy marks the happening of the “Self of one’s self.”

But it is also intellectual intuition’s displacement as ecstasy which unworks the “consciousness of eternal freedom” at the core of “NPS”’s philosophical psychology. “NPS”’s epistemology insists on a double movement of restoration and restitution. As we saw in the transferential moment, the absolute subject is “restored from” the ignorance of consciousness just as consciousness regains, or “remembers,” its connection with eternal freedom. But “NPS” displaces intellectual intuition into an ecstasy which experiences, but cannot definitively know its knowledge: the ego of Schelling’s philosophical-psychological subject, as the focal point of systemic knowledge, is cancelled out in the very moment of apprehension, dissociated from itself as something that no longer exists. The hopeful idealist question at the introspective centre of Schelling’s text – “what if we ourselves were eternal freedom restored as subject after being the object?” (226) – is in fact hopeless, invoking a knowing subject that can never know the dissociative difference at its core. The materiality of sense that marks this dissociative difference articulates Romantic metasubjectivity’s fundamentally ambivalent experience of selfhood. Romantic metasubjectivity furnishes this limit-experience of absence with an experiencing psyche which allows it to be written into a futurity to come. With this in mind, let us turn to the 1800 System to examine intellectual intuition’s first ambivalent formulation in an equally ambivalent text. As a primal site for the philosophical psychology of “NPS,” the System straddles Idealism and Romanticism as a philosophical mutagen in Schelling’s oeuvre, and intellectual intuition emerges as a crucial free radical which would later develop into ecstasy.

181 Schelling’s admission that ecstasy is a fundamentally “ambivalent expression, to be taken for better or worse” (229) is not mitigated by his strange attempt to distinguish between “beneficial” and non-beneficial ecstasy, based on whether or not what is dissociated or dislodged from its place is supposed to be there according to a criteria Schelling does not provide.
3.2 The System of Transcendental Idealism: Self-Consciousness and Its Discontent

The 1800 System is, to use Schelling’s words in the First Outline, a “misbegotten attempt” (35) that is quickly set aside.\(^{182}\) As a neurotic text which represses what is nevertheless a radical productivity, the System is both a repetition and a surpassing of Fichtean subjectivism:\(^{183}\) against the hegemony of its own Idealism, the System lays the groundwork for a psychological dissociationism important to the middle Schelling, and which Jung would take up as analytical psychology. Indeed, the System emerges from the ambivalence toward Nature’s energies present in the Introduction to the First Outline. As an attempt to “make a nature out of intelligence,” the System attempts to bond with the Naturphilosophie, which was meant to discern the intelligence in nature (STI 7). In other words, the System’s transcendental philosophy “materializes the laws of mind into laws of nature, or annexes the material to the formal” (STI 14).

In the System’s nascent psychology, intellectual intuition defines an encounter between self-consciousness and a productive unconscious at the heart of natural production, an unconscious which is unavailable to philosophy. It is the problematic index of the System’s emergent self and the locus of the text’s neurosis, marking the persistence and resistance of material Nature against the System’s drive to fold intuition into an idealist economy of self-consciousness.\(^{184}\) As Snow puts it, in the System “the irrational becomes a source of movement and life within the system, yet does not become

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\(^{182}\) Bowie suggests that by the time of On the True Concept of Naturphilosophie (1801) Schelling, unencumbered by transcendental philosophy, once again foregrounds Naturphilosophie’s epistemological basis for the rest of his philosophical career (Schelling 57).

\(^{183}\) Schelling would later reflect on the System as a mere “exposition of Fichtean Idealism” which nevertheless contained a “new system” that “sooner or later had to break through” (On the History 111). Dalia Nassar sees the Fichte-Schelling break as “one of the most significant moments in the development of German Idealism” (159).

\(^{184}\) Already in the First Outline, Schelling refers to Naturphilosophie’s need to break out of the confines of the merely conceptual by finding “corresponding intuitions” to give its ideas materiality, and intuition is further described (in terms reminiscent of the Kantian sublime) as an “infinite becoming,” an endless progression of moments of apprehension which surpasses both reason and the powers of the imagination (FO 15 & n).
entirely subsumed into the rational” (123). But contrary to Snow’s somewhat optimistic assertion that this irrationality “[expands] the limits of the idealistic understanding of consciousness” (121), I argue that Romantic metasubjectivity marks this Idealism’s limit-experience with an unconscious materiality which determines it, yet which this Idealism cannot know. Put differently, the ontopoietic experience that marks Romantic metasubjectivity emerges from within the System’s aesthetic scene of “infinite contradiction” based in an “unconscious infinity,” but against the will of the aesthetic in Schelling’s text. This tension between “conscious and unconscious activities” (STI 225, 14) is represented in the aesthetic as the “organon” of philosophy (12) – an organ which Schelling’s Idealism cannot control, but instead attempts to sublate in a repressive drive to complete itself as a system. The text does this by using art to lead the System’s circle of knowledge “back to its starting point” in a process which fuses art and philosophy as objective and subjective (232).185

Bowie writes that in the System “the conceptual structures of the Naturphilosophie recur, but as descriptions of the I” (Schelling 46).186 Yet this in itself does not account for the dialogic tension between the First Outline and the System, nor the way in which the System’s aesthetics closes down these structures. Indeed, the System does not complete Schelling’s “system” of knowledge but rather recontextualises its aporiae. This is why the System is “more ambitious and comprehensive, but also more precarious, than any other work Schelling ever published” (White 55), and for all its confidence and presuppositions, the System seems to “obscure rather than illuminate”

185 Yet there is the faintest glimmer, within the System’s Idealism, of the indeterminacy which Schelling would tacitly give to art in later work. Schelling very briefly pushes art further into mythology as the medium for art’s “return to science,” and in ways which look back to pre-1800 work on mythology but also forward to Schelling’s philosophy of mythology. So although Schelling here expects the sciences, “nourished” by poetry and philosophy, “on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source,” mythology was the medium of this ocean “before the occurrence of a breach seemingly beyond repair” (STI 232-33). Schelling’s System hastily returns to Idealist teleology to place the aesthetic at the pinnacle of the Stufenfolge (233), but here we can see the core of his later philosophy of mythology, which radicalises this “breach” as a traumatic “crisis” which engenders tribes, peoples, and the “system of the gods” as theogonic forces (which I take up in Chapter Five).

186 See STI 90.
(one could read “repress” for “obscure”) the problems of Naturphilosophie (Krell, Contagion 23). In Schelling’s words, the transition from Naturphilosophie to transcendental Idealism is meant to form a “system” of knowledge, “a whole which is self-supporting and internally consistent with itself” (STI 15). But what kind of system is composed of two entities which “must forever be opposed to one another, and can never merge into one” (2)? Hence, the convergence of the First Outline and the System marks a countertransference that recognises, even as it seeks to repress, Nature’s materiality.

Schelling’s vision of philosophy in the System is “a progressive history of self-consciousness” with “an internal coherence which time cannot touch [in the form of a] graduated sequence [Stufenfolge] of intuitions whereby the self raises itself to the highest power of consciousness” (STI 2). But in a dilemma which Schelling has already encountered in the First Outline, this Stufenfolge is always already troubled by Nature’s incommensurability with its own products. Quite apart from Schelling’s later descriptions of art’s unification of real and ideal as “bliss” and “tranquillity” (STI 221), here we have mind and nature in sublime suspension, their contagious incommensurability seeping through the disciplinary boundaries of Schelling’s project. We shall begin by examining the System’s analytic determination of self-consciousness, its problematic propositional relationship between the “I think” of the represented, determined self and the “I am” of a syleptic self immune to predication, which opens up a space for considering intellectual intuition as a first outline of ecstasy as the experience of...

187 In this sense they are analogous to Schlegel’s poeticisation of Nature and mind in a “play of communication” at the heart of a “symphilosophy” which runs throughout the Athenaeum Fragments (Schlegel, Dialogue 54). Symphilosophy is Schlegel’s term for the collaboration, dialogue, and intersubjective play of individuals from which authentic philosophy comes. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it, symphilosophy “implies the active exchange and confrontation of individuals-philosophers. [. . .] [It is] the absolute, absolutely natural exchange—or change—of thoughts-individuals between individuals-thoughts, which is also [. . .] the production of this same genuine naturalness as a work of art (45). But this Schellingian conversation interrogates and thus de-idealises the sublime suspension between “absolute comprehension” and “absolute incomprehension” that characterises symphilosophical “friendship” (Blütenstaub #2).

188 By the time of the “Deduction of the Concept of History,” Schelling’s history of generative nature figures Jung’s historical psyche in a way that stalls this idealist progression in a directioned movement which cannot be determined a priori (STI 199-200).
of the absolute subject in “NPS.” The System seems to insist on the systemic drive later deconstructed in “NPS”; the compulsive repetition of the self’s grounding in thought, as the System’s pleasure principle, is a drive to annul the absolute subject nascent in Schelling’s thought since the First Outline. But despite this repetition of the self’s essence as thought, the System’s neurotic Idealism, driven to abject what falls outside the boundary of consciousness, cannot manage or economise the metonymy of natural objects constellated by the “I am.” Elaborating on Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition we will then turn to the System’s closing pages, in which the aesthetic is invoked as an attempt to harmonise its discordant energies in the work of art.

The genesis of self-consciousness in the System is described in terms analogous to the inhibition of Nature in the First Outline. The self is pure process, “infinite activity [. . .] originally a pure producing out towards infinity” which, through the act of self-consciousness, becomes inhibited as an object to itself amidst other objects (STI 36). Through an act as inexplicable as Nature’s inhibition in the First Outline, the being of the self in the System is always already displaced into its concept: “the concept of the self arises through the act of self-consciousness, and thus apart from this act the self is nothing; its whole reality depends solely on this act, and it is itself nothing other than this act. [The self] has no other predicate than that of self-consciousness” (25-26). It is “pure act, a pure doing” (27) which simply has to be nonobjective in knowledge, precisely because it is the “principle of all knowledge” (26). Schelling’s idealist self is paradoxically indistinct from its conceptual thinking and irreducible to this reflexive thinking as its anterior organising principle. But let us dwell for a moment on this paradox, which reflects the baroque curvature189 of his thinking on the self. Emphasising the System’s more overtly psychological implications, Alan White suggests that the System – a text implicitly about the unconscious – is infected with its subject, unaware of many of its own insights (71ff). White gets at the heart of the matter: for Schelling’s “I think”/“I am” distinction marks precisely the distinction between the self of intellect,

189 I take this eloquent phrase from the title of Arkady Plotnitsky’s “Curvatures: Hegel and the Baroque.”
which freely reconciles contradiction in an idealist aesthetic, and the self of Being, of intellectual intuition and connection with the productive unconscious. In Schelling’s words, the “I think” “accompanies all presentations and preserves the continuity of consciousness between” concepts and thoughts; the “I am” is a return to infinite productivity, an irrerepresentable “original self-awareness” (STI 26), a sylleptic self immune to final predication. Schelling asserts this syllepsis as “beyond doubt a higher proposition” (26), but self-consciousness, as a kind of knowing and not a kind of being (16), amplifies the gap between transcendental Idealism and the materiality of Schelling’s Nature. Despite this gap that separates knowing and being, the System’s founding principle of a science of knowledge – the “Principle of Transcendental Idealism” – is absolute identity (A=A), which needs to exist in being. For this reason, the principle of transcendental Idealism is split into identical and synthetic propositions. Identical propositions (A=A) are contentless; as a statement of the unconditioned as a purely logical proposition, A=A asserts the identity of A apart from contingency or materiality. A is A in essence; A is A and can only be A.

However, Schelling also writes that

In all knowledge an objective is thought of as coinciding with the subjective. In the proposition A = A, however, no such coincidence occurs. Thus all fundamental knowledge advances beyond the identity of thinking, and the proposition A = A must itself presuppose such knowledge. Having thought A, I admittedly think of it as A; but how, then, do I come to think A in the first place? If it is a concept freely engendered, it begets no knowledge; if it is one that arises with the feeling of necessity, it must have objective reality. (22)

190 “Absolute identity” is most closely associated with Schelling’s “identity-philosophy” period (1801-1804), with which the System conceptually overlaps. The “most extensive statement” of identity-philosophy, the 1804 “Würzburg System,” “makes it clear why there cannot be any cognitive foundation of knowledge. [It succeeds] in showing that without some inarticulable, grounding identity, of the kind that enables us to understand the connection of singular and general term in a judgement, even the idea of the dependence of the different signifiers on each other is unintelligible” (Bowie, Aesthetics 133, 135). This returns us to Frank’s very strong critique of orthodox deconstructive thinking about the self as epiphenomena of difference: “Derrida’s attack on the metaphysical thought of the present self-relation is so radical that minimal conditions of the phenomenon of our familiarity with ourselves can no longer be explained by it. […] Without a moment of relative self-identity differentiation (shift of meaning, metaphorical redescriptions of meaning, change of psychic states) could not be established at all, differentiation would lack a criterion and would be indistinguishable from complete inertia” (“Is Self-Consciousness” 231).
This “objective reality” comes with the synthetic proposition (A=B), which links all subject-predicate statements to “something alien to the thought, and distinct from it” (22; my italics).\footnote{This “alien” dimension is in fact the essence of the copular logic Schelling expresses later in the \textit{Freedom} essay, the unknown=X that marks the unknowable difference lurking behind all subject-predicate expressions of identity.} If A is, it is something. But in the following section entitled “Elucidations,” which disavows more than it elucidates, Schelling nevertheless attempts to fold this materiality into the principle of identity as “an act of thinking which \textit{immediately becomes its own object}” occurring only in self-consciousness as thought. The \textit{System} wants to establish an “identity between being-in-thought and coming-to-be” (25), between identical and synthetic propositions. And indeed it is selfhood, in the form of “the proposition \textit{self = self},” which “converts the proposition \textit{A = A} into a synthetic proposition” as “the point at which identical knowledge springs immediately from synthetic, and synthetic from identical” (30).

But what can be made of this new “alien” proposition, this schizophrenic objectivity in the \textit{thought}-project of the \textit{System}? In an oft-quoted passage, Schelling writes that “self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but it casts its light ahead only, not behind” (18). As a rejoinder to Schelling’s Idealism, White points out that “much later, the light of self-consciousness nevertheless does shine backward, at least in that it reveals that the pure ego is not the highest ground; that ground is absolute identity, which becomes ego by dividing itself in the primal act of self-consciousness” (71). But this absolute identity, A=A, is always already conditioned by the alien proposition of self=\textit{self} – indeed, the former is “only possible through the act expressed in the proposition \textit{self = self}. [. . .] Did not \textit{self = self}, then nor could \textit{A = A}” (30). Thus, the idealist economy of “thought” and “consciousness” in the \textit{System} becomes infected with a materiality it cannot contain within the “circle of knowledge” to which the \textit{System} belongs, a circle which \textit{excludes} the facticity of Being (18). In other words, the \textit{System} gestures to that which is “behind” knowledge as its precondition – the “autonomy” of knowledge apart from its reflexiveness (18-19). Schelling awkwardly
conjugates “pure consciousness” and “self-consciousness” into “pure self-consciousness” (as a timeless act constituting time), which he sets against an empirical consciousness “[arising] merely in time and the succession of presentations” (32). This conjugation suggests a consciousness which cannot work through the traumatic materiality that constitutes it. In McGrath’s words, “the ‘I think’ becomes a subject, distinct from the object and other subjects, at the price of the fullness of the intuition ‘I am’” (*Dark Ground* 98).

Thus, the *System*’s overarching trajectory is that of an introverted analytic scene, the unfolding of a depth-psychological encounter with the unconscious as thought is troubled by its outside. The self begins as “nothing distinct from its thinking” (*STI* 26), but in the final pages of the *System* the Schellingian unconscious manifests itself as the “intervention of a hidden necessity into human freedom” (204), a productivity tainting the operations of the intellect’s conceptual freedom. In the *System*’s “assumed relationship between freedom and a hidden necessity,” necessity is nothing else but the unconscious. [Through freedom] something I do not intend is brought about unconsciously, *i.e.*, without my consent; [consciousness] is to be confronted with an unconscious, whereby out of the most inhibited expression there arises unawares something wholly involuntary. (204)

This encounter with an unconscious that brings about involuntary (and often unwanted) thoughts or actions is Schelling’s way of expressing the paradox of freedom and necessity: to be free is necessarily to be open to the indeterminate, the “necessity” of that which lies outside the purview of consciousness. And although here Schelling displaces this unconscious into an “unconscious lawfulness” geared toward a “moral world-order” in the service of the human species (206), without this zero-point where ideal and real, identical and synthetic touch and do not touch, “one can will nothing aright; [. . .] the disposition to act quite regardless of consequences as duty enjoins us, could never inspire

192 Indeed, this is a return of the repressed compulsion we saw in the *First Outline*; where in the *Naturphilosophie* the compulsion bound the free development of the actants, here it binds and “intervenes” in what is ostensibly the freedom of thought.
a man’s mind” (204). It is also the System’s only path to a science of knowledge, as “a knowing that has its object outside itself” (22). This point is intellectual intuition: a hinge between ideal and real that ruptures the auto-affection of the System’s self-consciousness. For Schelling, the self is intellectual intuition, which is “the organ of all transcendental thinking” (27).

Describing intellectual intuition, Jason Wirth writes pithily:

What is intellectual intuition if not creativity, if not remarkable, unexpected births? [. . .] [It is] the overthrow of the tyranny of the ego [. . .] an intimation, an Ahnung, of the abyss of freedom. It is a percept of death as akin to the unfathomable depths of the past as they re-intimate themselves as the future. [. . .]

The intellectual intuition, quite simply, is the indispensable birth of philosophy. (Conspiracy 106, 108, 114, 115)

Intellectual intuition is the site of a paradoxical materiality. As “the instantiation within what is there of what is not there” (111), of what is immaterial in terms of a metaphysics of presence, it recalls the matrix of Nature’s radical productivity from which all material comes. It is, as Michael Vater puts it, an unconscious principle of consciousness,” a “knot of pure fact” (xxiii, xxx) which is not as beholden to “consciousness” as the System’s Fichtean pedigree would have it. Indeed, in Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1803) Schelling thinks the pre-text for intellectual intuition through Nature, writing that to pursue the soul-body/mind-matter antithesis means to ultimately confront a point “where mind and matter are one, [. . .] where the great leap we have so long sought to avoid becomes inevitable; and in this all theories are alike” (40). In this text, philosophy is now “a natural history of [the human] mind,” which anticipates Jung’s “extremely historical organism” in its proposal of Nature’s “absolute purposiveness” as a critique of theoretical dualism (41; my italics). Philosophy becomes a dissociative, genetic force which “allows the whole necessary series of our ideas to rise and take its course, as it were, before our eyes” in a manner which consciousness – here, contingency against Nature’s necessity – cannot control (30, 35).193 Indeed, in intellectual intuition Schelling

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193 In a well-known critique of the Cartesian cogito, Schelling writes: “The ‘I think’ is [. . .] in no way something immediate, it only emerges via the reflection which directs itself at the thinking in me. [. . .]
is working through the materiality of what Jung, via Janet, would take up as analytical psychology’s core dissociationist topography. Intellectual intuition, in other words, is knowledge always already imbricated with its object, and thus displaced into its own unthinkability. Its experience displaces thought into Foucault’s “modern cogito” in his discussion of the “cogito and the unthought” in The Order of Things: thought displaced into perception by its proximity to its own being, experiencing itself yet not grasping itself as scientific knowledge. That the self is intellectual intuition marks the System’s Romantic turn away from the text’s Idealism, even as the System retains the form of an analytic treatise.

As a transcendental philosophy based in the subjective as “the first and only ground of all reality” and “the sole principle of explanation for everything else,” the System’s knowledge begins as an analytic of epochs of consciousness and ends as a poetic “odyssey of the spirit” (STI 232), what Schelling would have us believe is an interminable aesthetic progress toward “that world of fantasy which gleams but imperfectly through the real” (232). Nature is now an “imperfect reflection” of consciousness’ inner world (232). For the System, the Idealism of aesthetic production begins with consciousness and the unconscious divided for the sake of the production of art – its “becoming-objective” (220). But for the work of art to be a “complete manifestation of [their] identity” (220), the work of art ends its production “unconsciously” – that is, in the domain of the objective, of being “out there” in the world. But in this objective domain “there must be a point at which the two [once again]

Indeed, true thinking must even be objectively independent of that subject that reflects upon it; in other words, it will think all the more truly the less the subject interferes with it. [Therefore,] because there is an objective thinking which is independent of me, it follows that that which reflects might deceive itself about that supposed unity, or, by attributing the original thinking to itself, it might be precisely this attribution about which it is deceived, and the ‘I think’ could have no more significance than expressions I also use, such as ‘I digest’, ‘I make juices’, ‘I walk’ or ‘I ride’; for it is not really the thinking being that walks or rides. It thinks in me, thinking goes on in me, is the pure fact, in the same way as I can say with equal justification: ‘I dreamed’, and ‘It dreamed in me’” (On the History 47-48; my italics). Compare Jung in 1937: “we have got accustomed to saying apotropaically, ‘I have such and such a desire or habit or feeling of resentment,’ instead of the more veracious ‘Such and such a desire or habit or feeling of resentment has me.’ [. . .] The truth is that [. . .] we are continually threatened by psychic factors which, in the guise of ‘natural phenomena,’ may take possession of us at any moment” (Psychology and Religion para. 143). See also Jung, Introduction 82ff.
merge into one” (220), and thus this artistic production is no longer “free,” no longer in the domain of the subjective. For this reason, Schelling insists on the reconciliation of conflicting conscious and unconscious activity in consciousness: “[t]he intelligence will therefore end with a complete recognition of the identity expressed in the product as an identity whose principle lies in the intelligence itself; it will end, that is, in a complete intuited activity” ending in “infinite tranquillity” (221). And while the conscious “intelligence” cannot claim this unity of conscious and unconscious as something entirely of its own making, in a passage evocative of reason’s privileging in the Kantian sublime Schelling ends by saying that the intelligence “will feel itself astonished and blessed by this union, will regard it, that is, in the light of a bounty freely granted by a higher nature” (221). Consciousness ultimately harmonises what was all along “the preestablished harmony between the conscious and the unconscious” (221).

Finally, in his closing “General Observation on the Whole System,” Schelling writes that his “system” is split between the two “extremes” of intellectual and aesthetic intuition (233). But where before the self was intellectual intuition, here it has no provenance in everyday consciousness; it only attends to “the fraction of a man,” where art “brings the whole man” to a “knowledge of the highest” (233). Aesthetic intuition is that faculty which works to resolve the conflict of the sublime experience “which threatens our whole intellectual existence,” whereby “a magnitude is admitted by the unconscious activity which it is impossible to accept into the conscious one” (226). Yet one must wonder how great this threat is, since aesthetic intuition is the inevitable result of this conflict which once again brings about, in another ventriloquism of Kant, an “unexpected harmony” (226) that establishes aesthetic intuition as the highest power of consciousness (233). Thus, Schelling’s previous desire to synonymise intellectual and aesthetic intuition (the aesthetic intuition is “simply the intellectual intuition become objective” [229]) masks the profound neurosis which separates them, driving the materiality of intellectual intuition and its sublime limit-experience into the background as aesthetic intuition becomes the alibi for a missed encounter with the energies of the productive unconscious. The System ends up eliciting an analysis of philosophy itself in the form of intellectual intuition as philosophy’s “indispensable birth,” but the aesthetic reinscribes this within the economy of consciousness as the neurosis of the System’s
thought-project. In other words, the System avers that “the self itself is an object that exists by knowing of itself” (28), but represses the facticity of this “knowing” as Nature itself, the “producing and reproducing” that has already claimed reason as early as the First Outline (FO 195). We will see in the following section that Jung is caught in an analogous dilemma as he conceives synchronicity, which articulates a psychic materiality that fuses psyche and Nature and which both constitutes the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity and imperils its experiencing subject.

3.3 Jung and Synchronicity

Germinating after some twenty years of thought, synchronicity is a late concept in Jung’s oeuvre and the culmination of an individuative gradient in his thinking, leading away from the restricted economy of a Kantian epistemology and toward the characteristically Schellingian question of Being as an excess to conceptual logic. Jung’s writing on synchronicity is concentrated in two essays: “On Synchronicity” (1951), a shorter and more popularised version of Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (1952). The latter is Jung’s main statement of the concept which emerged from his collaboration with Wolfgang Pauli, the Nobel-Prize winning quantum physicist who, like Jung, sought to articulate the relationship between the particular and the universal and the known and unknown, but from within physics as opposed to psychology. Indeed, if Schelling’s intellectual intuition is a uniquely human capacity, synchronicity is a universal phenomenon which Jung ultimately does not confine to the human mind. Yet as we will see, Jung’s attempt to articulate synchronicity within the rubric of the

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194 Synchronicity para. 816. See also Bishop, Synchronicity 28f. for a brief summary of this preoccupation. Jung’s first mention of “synchronism” occurs in 1928 seminar on dream analysis (Dream Analysis 44-45).

195 Pauli’s correspondence with Jung began circa 1933 and continued for over twenty years. They collaborated on a volume in which they each published complementary articles: Jung’s “On Synchronicity” and Pauli’s “The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler.” The volume is translated in English as The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche (1952). While Pauli never entered analysis directly with Jung, Jung analysed more than 400 of Pauli’s dreams in his alchemical studies. For a detailed narrative of their collaboration see Zabriskie.
scientific experiment (perhaps in an effort, following Pauli, to inscribe the concept in empirical science) at times obscures synchronicity’s specifically Romantic valencies. Indeed, just as the Idealism of the System’s thought-project elides intellectual intuition’s Romantic materiality, Jung’s ambivalence about thinking synchronicity outside the human psyche leads at times to a missed encounter with the full import of synchronicity as the experiential cornerstone of analytical psychology; the derangement of Nature is ranged, demarcated in a questioning where answers are suppressed.

In his correspondence with Pauli, Jung describes synchronicity as

an ordering system by means of which ‘similar’ things coincide, without there being any apparent ‘cause.’ [. . .] Insofar as for me synchronicity represents first and foremost a simple state of being, I am inclined to subsume any instance of causally nonconceivable states of being into the category of synchronicity. [Such states] represent a “so-ness” [“So-sein”] or a unique ordering factor or a ‘creative act.’” (letter to Wolfgang Pauli, 30 Nov 1950, 60)

Jung later elaborates on synchronicity as an acausal connecting principle that articulates “the simultaneous occurrence of two meaningfully but not causally connected events [. . .] of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state–and, in certain cases, vice versa” 

(Synchronicity pars. 849-50; my italics). 196 It is the experience of the archetypal. In

196 In the Collected Works synchronicity is translated as “meaningful coincidence” [sinnvolle Koinzidenz], a convergence of inner and outer events that creates meaning which might suggest an agency, or a plenitude of meaning emanating from a “creator.” But Giegerich makes the important observation that Jung’s original German almost exclusively describes synchronicity as sinngemäße Koinzidenz. Sinngemäße means “analogous to;” thus, sinngemäße Koinzidenz is the coincidence of things that mean roughly the same thing but are not identical (“A Serious Misunderstanding” 501-2). This crucially emphasises that meaning is not guaranteed. That is, in synchronicity one is confronted not with the fusion of two events in an experience always already replete with meaning, but with a magnetic pull of two events that gravitate towards each other but can never unify in a direct subject-object experience – two events that touch and do not touch. But Giegerich uses this to fallaciously argue that synchronicity has nothing to do with “Meaning with a capital M, with human experiences of meaning, with what is meaningful for us and makes existence meaningful.” This argument depends on Giegerich’s insistence on a stringent inside/outside distinction at all costs as well as the denigration of nonrational psychological states, which the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity contests tout court. Indeed, Jung acknowledges this dilemma, writing that “In view of the possibility that synchronicity is not only a psychophysical phenomenon but might also occur without the participation of the human psyche, [. . .] in this case we should have to speak not of meaning [Sinn] but of similarity [Gleichartigkeit] or conformity” (Synchronicity para. 942 n. 71; trans. mod.; my first italics). But where Giegerich’s Hegelian reading of Jung leads him to dismiss synchronicity’s Romantic ramifications (in fact synchronicity itself) out of hand (506), we will see that this
other words, synchronicity marks a fleeting encounter with the unconditioned plenitude of Being, the primitive metaphoricity, the “hot liquid stream” that Nietzsche sees flowing from both the human imagination and the “indestructibly mighty and pleasurable” “eternal life of that core of being [persisting] despite the constant destruction of the phenomenal world” (“On Truth and Lying” 148; The Birth of Tragedy 39, 41).

Synchronicity is a parabolic alignment of real and ideal whose outcome is undecided. If meaning comes, its origins are in the inscrutable third, that unknown=\(X\) to which real and ideal gesture without defining – the selfhood of Romantic metasubjectivity.

In this convergence of real and ideal, synchronicity thus marks the affectivity of the psychoid archetypal as Jung’s “object = x” – the zero-point of suspension between mind and Nature within which the Self operates. But as a “psychically conditioned relativity of space and time” (Synchronicity para. 840), this affectivity cannot be a direct experience of the atemporal and unconditioned in human consciousness. Rather, it is the limit-experience of that consciousness when confronted by “the necessary deformity belonging to the truth of an unprethinks existence” (Warnek, “Prolegomena” 53), the “incomprehensible base of reality” in “the indivisible remainder” which (un)grounds Being (Schelling, Freedom 29). In other words, synchronicity marks events where the psychoid archetypal touches and does not touch conscious experience beyond the normal threshold of awareness. It is

a factor [mediating] between the apparent incommensurability of body and psyche, giving matter a kind of ‘psychic’ faculty and the psyche a kind of ‘materiality,’ by means of which the one can work on the other. [This factor would ground all reality] in an as yet unknown substrate possessing material and at the same time psychic qualities. (Jung, Flying Saucers para. 780)\(^{197}\)

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metaphoricity corresponds with Schelling’s copular logic. That is, synchronicity’s metaphoricity points to the constellation of two factors by and through an “unknown=\(X\)” whose ultimate significance is inaccessible to rational thought. The possibility and potentiation of meaning which is suggested by Jung’s language, and not its relegation to either a strictly subjective or objective point of origin, is key for Romantic metasubjectivity.

\(^{197}\) To take one example form Jung’s recalled experience: an analysand relates a dream to Jung in which she was given a golden scarab. “While she was still telling me this dream, I heard something behind me gently tapping on the window. I turned round and saw that it was a fairly large flying insect that was knocking against the window-pane from outside in the obvious effort to get into the dark room. This seemed to me very strange. I opened the window immediately and caught the insect in the air as it flew in.
As contact with an “unknown substrate,” which Jung elsewhere calls the libidinal energy that “underlies changes in phenomena” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 3), synchronicity is precisely what punctures any linear, teleological pretense to individuation. As the tangential point of an inscrutable unfolding, synchronicity marks an awareness that both ungrounds and corroborates the individuation process, degenerating teleology into purposiveness as the subject connects with this meaningful acausality in defiance of the operations of reason.

But Jung’s attempt to contain synchronicity in the genre of the scientific experiment also foregrounds a strange tension which informs synchronicity’s centrality to analytical psychology. As the final phase of Jung’s long goodbye to Kantian epistemology, synchronicity forms a strange knot in Jung’s late thinking – and indeed, a strange chiasmus in relation to Schelling’s System-period thinking on intellectual intuition. Where in the System the aesthetic sublates intellectual intuition, Jung estranges synchronicity from the mythopoesis he often uses elsewhere to discuss the experience of the archetypes and the collective unconscious. Here there is no dragon guarding the “treasure hard to attain,” no contact with the “mists of time,” no mythopoetic descriptions of self-realisation. Instead, in Synchronicity Jung writes with a forensic voice reminiscent of his early writings on dementia praecox, which in part analyses the

It was a scarabaeid beetle, or common rose-chafer [. . .] whose gold-green colour most nearly resembles that of a golden scarab. I handed the beetle to my patient with the words, ‘Here is your scarab.’ This experience punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of her intellectual resistance” (Synchronicity para. 982). This narrative offers an example of a synchronistic occurrence in which an event in the natural world beyond conscious control (the appearance of the beetle) and the current condition of a human psyche (an analysand relating a dream of a scarab) converge in an event for which causality cannot be determined.

198 I use this term in the specific context of late eighteenth/early nineteenth century debates around the concept and function of degeneration in moral, political and natural-historical discourse. Joan Stiegerwald writes that while degeneration in the early eighteenth century meant “a decline from a noble birth or pure form” with all its political, moral and biological implications, by the end of the century “degeneration continued to mean a deviation from an ideal type and lineage, but it was no longer confined to negative notions of decline. The term marked the effects of the material world on organic forms, but also the capacities of living forms to respond variously to alterations in their physical living conditions” (1). The “degenerate” nature of Jung’s archetype is reflected in the influence of Baldwin over Lamarck (cf. Høgenson), irrespective of Jung’s disavowal of Romanticism. I am grateful to Joan Stiegerwald for generously providing me with a copy of her pre-publication work on degeneration.
presence of complexes in word-association charts with stimulus-words, reaction words and response times. At the argumentative core of the essay is an eclectic astrological experiment replete with statistics and charts meant to explore connections between individual character and marriage choice. Here as elsewhere, Jung marginalises the influence of philosophy and religion on what he wants to establish as “not a philosophical view but an empirical concept which postulates an intellectually necessary principle[, one which] cannot be called either materialism or metaphysics” (para. 960).

And just as Schelling responds to the insoluble dilemma of Nature by attempting to fold intellectual intuition back into a restricted economy of “self-consciousness,” in a strange peripeteia Jung attempts to reinscribe synchronistic events within a psyche distinct from Nature’s indeterminacy, an idealist self-consciousness akin to that of the System. The relativisation of space and time characteristic of synchronicity’s “timelessness” now becomes possible “when the psyche observes, not external bodies, but itself” (para. 840). And yet later in the essay Jung writes with decided emphasis that synchronicity is wholly within the realm of the psychic, being “the simultaneous occurrence of two different psychic states” (para. 855). A strange ambivalence, given that Jung had synonymised psyche and Nature as far back as the “Weltanschauung” essay (discussed in Chapter One). Indeed, in privileging the human psyche here Jung resists what he more radically asserts later in 1957, which was that in the experiment “the object puts the question and not the questioner” and “Nature experiments with the doctor in expecting an answer from him” (The Undiscovered Self para. 532). Here, in “Synchronicity,” the experiment is an interrogation of Nature: [experiment] consists in asking a definite question which excludes as far as possible anything disturbing and irrelevant [alles Störende und Nichtzugehörige]. It makes conditions, imposes them on Nature, and in this way forces her to give an answer to a question devised by man. She is prevented from answering out of the fullness of her possibilities since these possibilities are restricted as far as practicable. For this purpose there is created in the laboratory a situation which is artificially restricted to the question and which compels Nature to give an unequivocal answer. The workings of Nature in her unrestricted wholeness are completely excluded. (para. 864; my italics)
Indeed, one might wonder if, by “experimenting” in this way, Jung is asking (or responding) in the right language. For the experiment closes down precisely the derangement [Störung] of Nature in “the fullness of her possibilities” that Jung elsewhere articulates in the psychoid archetype, which is precisely from where the experiential charge of synchronicity comes. We shall see this derangement recrudesce in the following chapter on individuation and the Self.

Yet in an enantiodromal shift Synchronicity’s penultimate chapter, “Forerunners of the Idea of Synchronicity,” dramatically unworks this insistence on repressing Nature’s “unrestricted wholeness” in the experiment. Pushed toward the end of the essay as an appendix of sorts, it nevertheless infects the hermetically sealed laboratory scene Jung previously constructs: now, the Western civilisation that has developed the genre of the experiment he invokes is “not the only possible one and is not all-embracing, but is in many ways a prejudice and a bias that ought perhaps to be corrected” (para. 916). This “appendix” continues to inscribe synchronicity in a history including the Chinese concept of Tao, Italian Renaissance philosopher Pico della Mirandola, Hippocrates, Leibniz and others. But what is most remarkable for our purposes here is its turn from the forensicality of the previous chapters to the rubric of German Idealism and Romanticism. To be sure, Jung’s resistance to analytical psychology’s specifically Romantic intensity is troubled by his alignment of synchronicity with Romantic-era “magnetism” (Mesmer’s magnetic crisis and sleep) even as he dismisses it as a “causal” science (para. 850). And this turn to the philosophy Jung previously disavows ironically opens up a space for considering the aporiae in Jung’s conceptualisation of synchronicity. These aporiae mirror Schelling’s attempts to elucidate self-consciousness through Nature’s unruly materiality, and from which Romantic metasubjectivity emerges as a contestation of the Idealist thought-project.199 More significantly for Romantic metasubjectivity, the

199 Analytical psychology’s suspension between psychology and metaphysics returns with Jung’s invocation of Schopenhauer’s “On the Apparent Design of Fate in the Individual” as “godfather” to synchronicity. But Jung simultaneously distances himself from Schopenhauer by critiquing his “absolute determinism of the natural process and belief in a first cause.” Jung argues instead that such a “first cause” is not a unity but a multiplicity and that “natural law possesses a merely statistical validity [which] keeps the door open to indeterminism.” And in language reminiscent of Coleridge’s idea of the beautiful as
“appendix” links synchronicity directly to “absolute knowledge” in the form of a
“causeless order, or rather, of meaningful orderedness [. . .] a knowledge not mediated by
the sense organs” (para. 948). Here Jung completes his epistemological break with the
Kantianism he previously claimed as foundational to his thinking on the archetype, even
as he conceives of this absolute knowledge as disembodied, “not mediated by the sense
organs.” Jung again seems to resist the materiality his formulation of synchronicity
demands, even as, again contra Kant, Jung argues that synchronicity “postulates a
meaning which is a priori in relation to human consciousness and apparently exists
outside man” (Synchronicity para. 942).

And in another peripeteia Jung goes further. In a bold assertion resonating with
Schelling’s intellectual intuition: synchronicity reflects “some possibility of getting rid of
the incommensurability between the observed and the observer” (para. 960), which
effectively closes the epistemological gap between scientist and object that Jung attempts
to keep open in the experiment. Paul Bishop argues (with some hyperbole) that the
overarching structure of Jung’s psychology is marked by “a desire for the Absolute and a
yearning for ‘intellectual intuition’. [. . .] Even if Jung never used the term [. . .] the
concept of synchronicity only makes sense in terms of it” (Synchronicity 2). But what
this Absolute is emerges only through the analysis which the concept of synchronicity
seems to demand of Jung: the working-through of the psyche-Nature connection that is
part of Jung’s own individuation, a process which resonates throughout his oeuvre as
Schelling’s resonates throughout his.

“multiëity in unity” and Schelling’s unity of unity and difference, Jung asserts that such a first cause is
“[only] a [credible] philosophical mythologem [. . .] when it appears in the form of the old paradox [of]
unity and multiplicity at once” (Synchronicity para. 828).

200 Indeed, such disembodiment contrasts sharply with Jung’s examples of synchronistic occurrences,
which often exhibit a distinctly affective, sensate character (such as the case of the scarabeid beetle; see
note 197, above).

201 Kant insists that intellectual intuition, as an invalid “positive” intuition of a noumenon, “forms no part
whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge” because it goes beyond the objects of experience (Critique of
Pure Reason 270).

202 Jung in 1959: “[A]ll of the books that I have written are but by-products of an intimate process of
individuation, even when they are connected by hermetic links to the past and, in all probability, to the
As a twentieth-century differentiation of intellectual intuition, synchronicity opens up a space for considering the proximity of experience to knowledge in a way irreducible to the labour of the Concept. Jung makes a double claim for synchronicity (analogous to Schelling’s claims of intellectual intuition): 1) that real and ideal converge in a limit-experience of thought; and 2) that knowledge (“meaning”) can emerge from this experience. These claims show Jung’s “true Romanticism” in his desire to move beyond Kantian boundaries (Bishop, *Synchronicity* 185). To this end Jung states, again contra Kant, that “it is necessary for science to know how things are ‘in themselves’,” and thus synchronicity is a necessary postulate of scientific reasoning (*Synchronicity* para. 960). But “even science cannot escape the psychological conditions of knowledge,” and this is precisely what opens a space for “the symbolic interpretation of causes by means of the energic standpoint” (“On Psychic Energy” pars. 45-46) by which phenomena are interpreted purposively. When Schelling writes in the *System* that “Nature is purposive, without being purposively explicable” (*STI* 12), purposiveness remains ultimately bound by the teleology of the *Stufenfolge* – indeed, Schelling makes no distinction here. But the tension between the two is more acute in synchronicity, Jung’s modern differentiation of intellectual intuition where the predeterminations of teleology (in the form of Jung’s therapeutics of presence) are undermined by purposive unfolding in an encounter without guarantees.

It is in precisely this purposiveness that we must situate the experience of the Self both emerging and receding in this limit-experience of reason. The terminology

future” (“Talks with Miguel Serrano” 395). Indeed, this may account for Jung’s often paradoxical and seemingly contradictory statements as something more than an incapability to construct a system. Tina Keller, a member of Jung’s early circle, recalls: “I remember how I said: ‘But what you say today is just the contrary of what you said last week,’ and he answered: ‘That may be so, but this is true, and the other was also true; life is paradox’” (qtd. in Chodorow 3).

203 Bishop also sees synchronicity as Jung’s most consummately Romantic concept (*Synchronicity* 348).

204 Jung writes that “psychic finality [i.e., the energic view of libido] rests on a ‘pre-existent’ meaning which becomes problematical only when it is an unconscious arrangement. In that case we have to suppose a ‘knowledge’ prior to all consciousness” (*Synchronicity* para. 843 n. 38). Jung’s scare quotes emphasise his tentative encroachment on the philosophy he elsewhere seeks to hold at arm’s length.
describing this experience circles the phenomena, just like Jung’s attempts to define the archetype and Schelling’s attempts to define the actant. We can use “irruption,” “sublime,” “suspension,” “limit-experience” to conceptualise this affect-charged encounter with the unknowable, but the ineffability of this experience is precisely the receding silence of the self-organising principle. Synchronicity is Jung’s way of thinking this difference even if he at times represses its darker outcomes and ramifications for the sake of an individuative image of thought, an interiority through which the psyche, as self-consciousness, wants to observe itself. Nevertheless, this image of thought does not square with the more radical implications of Jungian metapsychology. If “Jung’s system drives relentlessly towards a psychic monism which proclaims a unity or Absolute” (Bishop, *Synchronicity* 182), then seen through the lens of Romantic metasubjectivity this “Jungian Absolute” is not teleological, nor is it a circumscription of psyche within the interiority of self-consciousness. Outside the tenuous boundaries of *Synchronicity*’s experiment, synchronicity remains a Romantic absolute without Idealism, a revelation of the asystemic space between knowledges which inherits the dark materiality of Schelling’s intellectual intuition. Indeed, here Jung withdraws before the darker, more indeterminate implications of synchronicity as “the hiding-places of Man’s power.”

The limit-experience of Romantic metasubjectivity is thus marked by a materiality, named by intellectual intuition and synchronicity, the derangement of Nature across which systems and organisations of knowledge range. This limit-experience has a crucial voice in contemporary theory in the form of Bataille’s non-knowledge. But its important place in contemporary philosophy is reflected in Deleuze’s philosophical conception of the “dark precursor” – his term for the strange self-identity of difference which makes difference possible. Jung’s metonymy of seemingly contradictory terms to define synchronicity – as “ordering system,” “so-ness,” “creative act” – describes its differential core as a psychological analogue of the dark precursor as an ontological knot, an abstract term for the excess of Being:

> When we speak of communication between heterogeneous systems [. . .] does this not imply a minimum of resemblance between the series, and an identity in the agent which brings about the communication? [. . .] *Are we not condemned to rediscover a privileged point at which difference can be understood only by virtue*
of a resemblance between the things which differ and the identity of a third party? [. . .] Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse [. . .] Likewise, every system contains its dark precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral series. [. . .] The question is to know in any given case how the precursor fulfils this role. [. . .] There is an identity belonging to the precursor, and a resemblance between the series which it causes to communicate. This ‘there is’, however, remains perfectly indeterminate. Are identity and resemblance here the preconditions of the functioning of this dark precursor, or are they, on the contrary, its effects? [Thus the dark precursor represents] the in-itself of difference [. . .] the self-different which relates different to different by itself. (DR 119; my first italics)

Deleuze’s language here is strikingly similar to Jung’s description of the archetypal. The dark precursor, as “object = x” (123), is Deleuze’s expression of the constellation of subject and predicate through the differential energy of Jungian libido, here as a magnetic force which allows “peripheral series” to communicate as their common un-ground. The dark precursor “does not relate two fields of individuation according to a resemblance between them, but rather because it finds expression in both simultaneously, while resembling neither” (Somers-Hall 82). Similarly, for James Williams the dark precursor “[works] away behind the scenes of a well-determined subject and self [to make] them individual [while undermining] any claims to full self-knowledge or to absolute freedom as a subject” (205).

Like the archetype’s paradoxical relationship to representation, Deleuze leaves as indeterminate whether the dark precursor is cause or effect of “identity and resemblance” (DR 119). In the absence of apparent cause, object-systems or sense-events are nevertheless constellation in a relation of difference and sameness in a spontaneous act of creation, a thunderbolt explosion with a poiesis which, as we will see, approaches the cosmological trauma inaugurating time and history in Schelling’s Ages. Put simply, the dark precursor, as the “self-different which relates different to different by itself,” is Deleuze’s attempt to reach the bottom of the abyss, to sound beyond the mere repetition of the Same and find “the real subject of repetition [. . .] the Self of repetition, the singularity within that which repeats” (DR 23). Jung, of course, conceives of “Self” as the goal of the development of personality; hypostatised at times within his therapeutics of presence, his metapsychology nevertheless casts this Self as a nonmolar force which
energises a purposive individuation process crucial to some of Schelling’s most important works. Indeed, the derangement which is all but stifled in Jung’s experiment in/on synchronicity recrudesces in his conception of individuation and the Self. This is the subject of the next chapter, which begins with Schelling’s *Freedom* essay and *Ages* as central texts to the concept of individuation in Romantic metasubjectivity.
Chapter 4

4 Romantic Metasubjectivity: Individuation

The problem of individuation – how individual entities come into being and how they exist and persist in the world – has concerned Schelling since the Naturphilosophie of the First Outline where, as we have seen, it takes the form of how natural products emerge from the endless deadlock between infinite productivity and infinite inhibition. This concern with individuation evolves through the Identity Philosophy of the early 1800s\(^{205}\) and becomes central to the Freedom essay, the 1815 Ages, and the positive philosophy. But what is the nature of this individuation? There is often in Schelling a persistent tension between a teleological drive to resolve contradiction and difference in an ultimate horizon of unity, and a purposive drive that resists the imposition of a final endpoint in the unfolding of its own internal logic. And indeed, the rhythms\(^{206}\) of purposive unfolding in texts like the Freedom essay and the 1815 Ages ultimately

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\(^{205}\) Arguing against a scholarly view of the Identity Philosophy of 1801-1802 as a wrong turn on Schelling’s part, Daniel Whistler argues that the Identity Philosophy allows Schelling to solve the problem of individuation in the First Outline. For Whistler, the Naturphilosophie is a “synecdochal metaphysics” in which “productivity both is its products and is more than them; nature both is and is not the entities of the natural world” (3). Inhibition is the negation of this productivity into form, which Whistler sees as the First Outline’s failure to explain individuality (hence individuation). Whistler argues that with the Identity Philosophy Schelling turns to “absolute immanence” (11) to explain individuation not as negation or inhibition, but as a quantitative difference in identity whereby identity “affirms itself […] into individual expressions of identity” in an intensive spectrum as opposed to negation (12). Whistler calls this an “infinite finitude” (11ff), meaning that the infinite effusion of identity is the finite world of form without remainder; different natural products simply exhibit intensive variations of one and the same domain of Being. Whistler does not see the Identity Philosophy as discontinuous with Naturphilosophie, but as operating within a different discourse (metaphysical as opposed to natural-scientific). Yet this shift can also be conceptualised as a turn to the same notion of intensity that Jung attributes to libido against the Freudian model.

\(^{206}\) As will become apparent in my discussion of Hölderlin, by using “rhythm” in this chapter I do not mean a compulsive repetition of the Same. Schelling does not use the idea of rhythm per se to describe the dynamism in the Freedom essay or Ages, but I use it to name the unfolding of a purposive order which has regularity without closure, a regularity which does not return to itself. Perhaps it is possible to use pi (\(\pi\)) to conceptualise this regularity (the perfect shape of a theoretical circle) which harbours a logical abyss (the interminable calculation of \(\pi\) as the ratio of the circle’s diameter to its circumference). \(\pi\) thus marks an indeterminacy on the cusp of system, but whose designation as system remains undecided. As we will see, while Hölderlin’s understanding of rhythm and caesura may at times suggest regularity, it rests upon a radically indeterminate tragic ontology, a “living sense which cannot be computed” (Hölderlin, “Notes on the Oedipus” 317).
destabilise the pretence to linearity in Schellingian individuation. In fact, these two texts can be read as responses to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*; they do not dismiss dialectic, but rather decouple it from the teleology of absolute spirit. In 1815 Schelling writes that “all knowledge must pass through the dialectic” (*Ages* xxxix), and Jung, too, conceives dialectic as central to the analyst-analysand encounter (*The Relations* para. 339). But where this dialectic leads is another matter entirely.

Not that Idealism is absent from these two texts. Key to the *Freedom* essay’s theodicy is a recasting of the *First Outline’s Stufenfolge* as God’s progression toward an ultimate apocatastasis, a “final, total separation” reminiscent of *The Book of Revelation* wherein “everything true and good” is “raised into bright consciousness” and the “eternally dark ground of selfhood” is locked away in a resolution where everything is “subordinate to spirit” and temporality and contingency are gathered up into an Idealist regime (*Freedom* 70). The Introduction which accompanies all three versions of the *Ages of the World* also looks to the horizon of a “golden age of truth and fable” where *logos* and *mythos* are united in a visionary refrain, a “great heroic poem” meant to manage the unruly abyss of the past. For the Schelling of the 1815 *Ages*, the way to this golden age is through the *Potenzenlehre*, a triad of endlessly circulating forces (contractive, expansive, and the force of their synthesis) evolving stepwise through time. But these forces can never be inhibited, and thus the coming of this golden age is that of a golden age always to come. It consists not in the recovery of either history or knowledge but in their interminable analysis, a mutual transparency between contractive and expansive forces as questioning and answering beings in a “future objective presentation of science” (*Ages* xl). And this futurity paradoxically (un)grounds knowledge in its own historicity and experience: the three potencies are forever in an “irresolvable concatenation” (*Ages* 12). Thus, authentic knowledge restlessly reverberates with the melancholic “indestructibly mighty core of being” Nietzsche later saw so clearly in (and as) *The Birth of Tragedy*. Likewise, the *Freedom* essay’s bright horizon of spirit is clouded by the dark indeterminacy of the Ground-Existence relation: the “anarchy” of the ground can always break through to existence (*Freedom* 29), and this is man’s “propensity” [*Hang*] for evil
as the energy of personality in time and history (47). What would later become the absolute subject which traverses and organises knowledge in “NPS” is given a history and a nature in Freedom as “absolute personality” (62) with the possibility of evil. Put differently, the absolute subject’s centripetal self-organisational force now runs the risk, as personality, of being sidetracked or mutated by one organisation being for-itself in a repetition of what Ages calls the first potency’s rotating movement, its “self-lacerating rage” (91), the energy driving individuation.

When we turn to the question of the experiencing and individuating psyche which marks Romantic metasubjectivity, the question becomes: what is the nature of an individuation that is both constituted and destabilised by its limit-experience? The same tension between teleology and purposiveness that dogs Schelling’s metaphysics can be found in analytical psychology – the tension between Jung’s therapeutics of presence and his metapsychology which often destabilises the linearity Jung at times imposes on the analytic encounter. This is to say that experience and individuation are mutually entangled: the anxiogenic experiences of connection with the grammatology of Being, with Jung’s collective unconscious, are precisely what bear the traumatic freight of purposiveness that marks an ateleological individuation. Anxious, because the experience of individuation can be intuited, but never made a full object of knowledge. Certainty recedes with the experience to leave the trace Schelling describes in “NPS” as “knowing ignorance” left in the wake of the absolute subject. The gap in consciousness

207 This is why Schelling writes that “mere Idealism does not reach far enough [to] show the specific difference [Diferenz], that is, precisely what is the distinctiveness, of human freedom. [. . .] Idealism, if it does not have as its basis a living realism, becomes [an] empty and abstract [system]. [. . .] Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can constitute a living whole” (Freedom 22, 26).

208 Discussing the productive madness intrinsic to both Nature and truly “living intellectuals,” Schelling writes that Nature becomes more “frenzied” the closer it approaches spirit (Ages 102). That is to say that “nothing great can be accomplished without a constant solicitation of madness, which should always be overcome, but should never be utterly lacking” (103).

209 To this end Jung writes: “Teleology says there is an aim toward which everything is tending, but such an aim could not exist without presupposing a mind that is leading us to a definite goal, an untenable viewpoint for us. However, processes can show purposive character without having to do with a preconceived goal, and all biological processes are purposive. (Introduction 93; my italics)
left by this limit-experience is suspensive, both courting and resisting interpretation. For Jung, this was the synchronistic experience of the individuation process as “the process of life itself” (*Visions* 2.758), and this tension likewise constitutes the individuation process of Romantic metasubjectivity.

This chapter, then, elaborates this Romantic metasubjective individuation. I begin with the *Freedom* essay, which I read as a case study of the purposive energetic rhythms of individuation which underwrite a uniquely Romantic ontology. This ontology informs the *Freedom* essay’s theodicy – the dramatisation of both the inscrutable beginnings of time and history, and the individual’s rhythmic move toward and away from what Schelling, taking up a term from Böhme, calls the *centrum* as the basis of personality. It also informs the (meta)physics of the work of the three potencies [*Potenzenlehre*] that forms the core of the 1815 *Ages*. Indeed, *Ages*’ cosmology develops a complementary (meta)physics of potentiation which narrates the same impenetrable abyss of the past, supplementing the drama of man’s relationship to the *Ungrund* of his existence with the anxiogenic “rotatory motion,” the unremitting movement without differentiation Schelling sees as intrinsic to Being. But *Ages*’ thinking of individuation also comes closer to making explicit the psychology nascent in the *Freedom* essay: the potencies’ intrinsic and necessary “madness,” harking back to the deranged Nature of the *First Outline*, reflects an etiology of Romantic illness which is carried forward to discussions of magnetic sleep and alchemy. And just as intellectual intuition prefigures synchronicity in Romantic metasubjectivity’s intellectual history, this chapter will establish the dramaturgy of the *Freedom* essay and the (meta)physics of the 1815 *Ages* as theoretical precursors of Jung’s concepts of inflation (where consciousness is overwhelmed by archetypal energy) and the transcendent function (the analytic moment where a new state of awareness and being emerges), which are crucial to articulating individuation in analytical psychology. But for Jung, individuation is not a teleological process: despite his efforts to align individuation with the sequence of linear alchemical stages, his
metapsychological concepts of inflation and the transcendent function serve a darker, more purposive unfolding of individuation than teleology can articulate.\textsuperscript{210}

We have seen that in “NPS”’s philosophical psychology, systems of knowledge emerge from that which is anterior to knowledge: the absolute subject travels through these spheres, organising them in its wake in a manner unique to its circumstance in time and history. But while “NPS” articulates the non-Hegelian dialectical experience of the absolute subject, it does not explain how this experience, or the knowledge systems to which it gives rise, is organised in lived experience; it is not about individuation proper. However, the question of how the person relates to the absolute subject is inextricably bound up with the questions of freedom, necessity, and evil which preoccupy the earlier \textit{Freedom} essay. As I will illustrate below, “NPS”’s guiding question of how systems of knowledge emerge from asystasy is cast in the \textit{Freedom} essay as the problem of God’s emergence into time and history. The \textit{Freedom} essay crucially argues that God is not a system, but a \textit{life} which must thus unfold in Nature (\textit{Freedom} 62). And with this we return to the \textit{Naturphilosophie}, whose ambivalent Nature watermarks God’s individuation in the \textit{Freedom} essay, which is in turn recapitulated in the individuation of the person.\textsuperscript{211} In the \textit{Freedom} essay’s more eschatological register, Schelling conceives individuation as a \textit{telos}, guided by the unifying power of love, leading to an apocatastasis marked by the “complete actualization of God” and a “final separation of good from evil” (67). But Schelling also conceives of evil as a positive, productive force which drives this \textit{telos} while making its achievement impossible. The nature and historicity which drive the individuation of both God and man also assure its interminable incompleteness.

\textsuperscript{210} Alchemy is important to both Schelling and Jung, but for different reasons. In \textit{Ages}, Schelling sees true alchemy as an “inner process, when beauty, truth, or the good are liberated from the attached darkness or impurity and appear in their purity,” an attempt to release matter from its “obscuring potency” so as to approach the “original being” of which all matter is an intensive marker (63). Schelling exemplifies this alchemy in natural processes such as the formation of the fetus and the organism’s production of waste, whereas Jung saw its stages as symmetrical with the individuation process – an alignment which is quite problematic.

\textsuperscript{211} Schelling explicitly states that \textit{Naturphilosophie} is the only project adequate to the task of freedom (\textit{Freedom} 26-27).
Indeed, such an infinite process can only be accompanied by an unbeginning, an un-grounding; and thus we turn to Schelling’s formulation of the Ungrund as the abyss from which all things inexplicably emerge.

4.1 Schelling’s Freedom Essay: The Ungrund and the Emergence of Personality

The Freedom essay moves past the absolute identity of the Identity Philosophy and returns to the graduated sequence of stages [Stufenfolge] of the First Outline’s Naturphilosophie, but casts it as the series of stages through which God himself must proceed. In other words, where the First Outline’s speculative physics theorised the emergence of products in Nature as part of Nature’s individuation toward the absolute product, the Freedom essay turns to God, who is “not a system, but rather a life” that must also individuate (Freedom 62). As Alan White explains:

In the system of identity, the subjective moment (the moment of understanding) is presented as the source of content: content develops as the subject incorporates its own reflective acts into what it has already objectified. In the Freedom essay, the ground as such is said to have all content within it and to resist being grasped or explained by the power of understanding, to resist revealing itself in actual existence; at every stage of dialectical development, the ground is forced to expose more of itself than the power of understanding has previously grasped. In the Freedom essay, the source of content is obscurity and darkness rather than clarity and light; this difference from the system of identity destroys the possibility of metaphysical construction. (119-20)

The “obscurity and darkness” which recedes from knowledge in the Freedom essay is what Schelling calls “the original ground or the non-ground” [Ungrund], “a being before all ground and before all that exists [and] before any duality,” indeed before God (Freedom 68). The Ungrund is a state of “absolute indifference” (Freedom 68) between opposites which does not nullify them (it is not what Hegel famously called “the night
where all cows are black”) but rather suspends them in relation to each other.\(^{212}\) Thus, Schelling writes that even though the *Ungrund* is before all opposites and duality, it is “neutral” towards them, which is precisely why opposites and polarities can “[break] forth immediately from the Neither-Nor” of its indifference (69). Thus it is no surprise that Schelling begins the *Freedom* essay, as he will begin *Ages*, with a discussion of copular logic. For following this logic, the *Ungrund* is the unknown=\(X\) without which subject-predicate relationships could not be conceived.

For Schelling, the *Ungrund* provides a resolution to the problem of conceiving becoming in a God that is “infinitely” different to the world of things (28). This resolution is also momentous for Romantic metasubjectivity, as it marks the materiality of Nature as the dark ground of spirit, the receding origin of Being and becoming analogous to Jung’s collective unconscious. The world of becoming must emerge from God; but how can things separate from a God which encompasses all things? Schelling’s answer is that things are ultimately grounded in “that which in God himself is not *He Himself*, that is, in that which is the ground of his existence” (28).\(^{213}\) In other words, the *Ungrund* marks the *not-God within God*, that within God which God cannot know, and which always already implicates God in the history of Nature. In this sense, the *Ungrund* is God’s unconscious; it harbours “the yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself” (28),\(^{214}\) the drive to individuation in and through Nature’s materiality. But we

\(^{212}\) As Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt put it, indifference “is not in fact an absence of difference [or] an overcoming of opposition in pure identity, [but instead] a point of indifference between oppositions where they are in balance, where they are indifferent the one to the other” (*Freedom* 168 n. 95).

\(^{213}\) Schelling goes on to describe yearning as God’s mirror-stage: as “the first stirring of divine existence,” yearning creates in God “an inner, reflexive representation” which is God’s “exact image of himself [. . .] the God who was begotten in God himself” (*Freedom* 30). But insofar as the mirror-stage of time and history – that of the infant seeing itself in a mirror – provides only a flipped image, this “exact image” is really Schelling’s God’s “pure” mirror stage.

\(^{214}\) Love and Schmidt in the *Freedom* essay, and Wirth in *Ages*, translate *Sehnsucht* as “yearning.” But as a pivotal concept to both of these texts, it is worth pointing out that *Sehnsucht* can also mean “craving,” which arguably does more justice to the agitation, restlessness, and forward desire in both the *Freedom* essay and *Ages*. Of course, as with so much related to translation there is no one correct answer; indeed, both of these translations bring out crucial aspects of Schelling’s work which ought to be considered in tandem.
have seen in the *Naturphilosophie* that this materiality is deranged, ambivalent toward its own existence. As life, then, God’s yearning is driven by unknown forces, and in this God is like man. Both God and man are confronted with their un-grounding Other, which becomes an existential *pharmakon*, both the cause and cure of melancholic desire and endless approximation to wholeness. Both God and man are destined to “the deep indestructible melancholy of all life” (63). This is the basis for the analogy Schelling draws between God’s relationship to the not-God of the *Ungrund* and the human being’s relationship with the *centrum*, which is “the undivided power of the initial ground” as it exists in the person (44). Through the freedom of the not-God within God, “a fundamentally unlimited power is asserted next to and outside of divine power” that is conceptually unthinkable, and which inaugurates a divine individuation marking Schelling’s radical turn from the notions of emanationism and theodicy prevailing in his time (11, 28). This not-God within God marks the (un)beginning of all things as a difference always already operating in Being, and this (un)beginning’s human equivalent is in Schelling’s formulation of personality.

In contrast to Hegel’s assertion that dialectical progression is always already attributed to Being, the *Freedom* essay emphasises the emergence of personality in an unprethinkable “moment” of creation. This moment is analogous to God’s entry into time and history, a non-egoic “free act” from the abyss of the unconditioned:

> Man is in the initial creation [. . .] an undecided being—[. . .] only man himself can decide. But this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all time and, hence, together with the first creation (though as a deed distinct from creation). [. . .] The act, whereby his life is determined in time [belongs] to eternity [and] goes through time (unhampered by it) as an act which is eternal by nature. (51)

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215 Melancholy [*Melancholie*] is only mentioned once in the *Freedom* essay, but it is pervasive within the broader individuative economy of the text. This tension between the essay’s sense of futurity (its desire for love that unites all) and melancholy (the acknowledgement that this desire must find and re-find itself) is central to the text’s complexity. After all, as Schelling writes: “the good *should* be raised out of the darkness [. . .] whereas evil *should* be separated from the good in order to be cast out eternally into non-Being” (*Freedom* 67; my italics). The optative tone here should not be overlooked. Thus, this melancholy is not one which throws up its hands in despair; rather, it marks the medium of personality, which ultimately fuels the *Freedom* essay’s futurity.
“Decision” [Entscheidung] cannot be an act of conscious volition, since it precedes ego. Rather, it is a primordial separation [scheidung], a scission which inaugurates becoming. This act, which is paradoxically free and necessary, means that freedom is the freedom to exist as one must, and this free necessity is the kernel of Schelling’s philosophy of freedom. For Schelling, this paradoxical free necessity as personality is “the connection between a self-determining being and a basis [zentrum] independent of him” (Freedom 59). And crucially for the Freedom essay’s protopsychological dimension, this act leaves in each individual a residual correspondent feeling of personality in time and history, as the mark of both what one has always been and what one must also be. This feeling is “a feeling in accord with [this act] as if he had been what he is already from all eternity and had by no means become so first in time. [Thus this act] cannot appear in consciousness to the degree the latter is self-awareness and only ideal, since it precedes consciousness just as it precedes essence, indeed, first produces it” (Freedom 51). Thus, the act of decision which marks personality is explicitly unconscious: “the fundamental force of all initial and original creating must be an unconscious and necessary force since no personality actually leaves its mark” (Ages 102).216 To be sure, this force conjugates the grammatology of Being – but it is always a “future tense,” endlessly deferred, wrought with anxiety over its eternal self-incommensurability, caught from the beginning in perpetual melancholy, the quest for a lost, impossible object. But while we have seen how Schelling conceives the Ungrund and its human analogue, we must now turn to how Schelling articulates this conjugation dynamically, as well as the crucial role evil plays in the Freedom essay’s theodicean drama.

4.2 Evil and the Dialectic of Production

While the Freedom essay’s Idealism wants to recast the Stufenfolge as the progressive individuation of both God and man, its disclosure of the Ungrund as God’s

216 For a more detailed explanation of the concept of personality developed in the Freedom essay, and which augments to some degree the present discussion, I refer the reader to the discussion of personality in Appendix A, “Disentangling Romantic Metasubjectivity.”
unconscious, and the *centrum* as its human iteration, necessarily harbours a dark kernel of indeterminacy which frustrates this *telos*. For both Schelling and Jung the rhythm of unfolding in Being is unpredictable. Individuation can go awry, and the power of the *centrum* can always be falsely appropriated in the ego’s being-for-itself, which Schelling will describe as the basis of evil. Freedom is the necessary introduction of chaos and the anarchy of the *Ungrund* into time and history, a fracturing of Idealism in the *Freedom* essay and the 1815 *Ages* that reflects Schelling’s turn away from a teleological explanation of Being (Bowie, *Schelling* 129). Evil is the energetic force of movement without which existence would founder and congeal, unable to move. But if this dynamic is in the end dialectical yet purposive, how do we conceive it?

Beach offers a useful distinction which highlights Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s labour of the Concept. Hegel’s *dialectic of sublation* [*Aufhebungsdialetik*], through a dialectic of “thought-experiment” testing the truth of concepts, implicates Being in an existing *telos*, however inchoately it may present itself in philosophy or (natural) history. Conversely, Schelling’s *dialectic of production* [*Erzeugungsdialetik*] reaches behind reason, so to speak, “so as to be capable of recovering the willing that allegedly precedes rational thought itself,” the unthought anterior to and constitutive of reason (85). As a recapitulation of the unprethinkable act by which the cosmos came into being, the

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217 Coleridge’s *Theory of Life* (1816) is a prolonged engagement with Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* unique in English Romanticism, and can be read as a retort to the darkening of Being that the *Naturphilosophie* transfers to the *Freedom* essay. It is his most systematic account of individuation as Idealist teleology, as “the power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by all its parts” (510). In terms recalling the *System’s Stufenfolge*, Coleridge conceives this drive to individuation as “an ascending series of intermediate classes, and of analogous gradations in its class” as part of “the great scale of ascent and expansion,” culminating in man as individuation “perfected in its corporeal sense [and beginning] a new series beyond the appropriate limits of physiology” (516). Individuation is “a tendency to the ultimate production of the highest and most comprehensive individuality [as] the one great end of Nature [. . .] which bears to a final cause the same relation that Nature herself bears to the Supreme Intelligence” (517-18). God ultimately dispels the strife of Nature in Coleridge’s theory of life. Indeed, theology is a dangerous supplement in the *Theory*, simultaneously adding to and (ultimately) repressing the darker, more inscrutable aspects of physiology and epigenesis. This leads Coleridge to write a year later that Schelling’s fatal mistake in the *Naturphilosophie* is putting “objective and unconscious nature” before “intelligence” (*Biographia* 1.255), and that “the highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualization of all the laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect” (1.256).

218 For Schelling’s critique of Hegel in his own words see *On the History* 142-43.
dialectic of production’s “procreative causality” demands both logical understanding and corroboration in “direct historical experience” (85), which implicates this dialectic in the uniquely Romantic historicity described by Pfau. To connect with this causality is to connect with the will, and for Beach the Freedom essay’s crucial importance lies in this emphasis on “volition” (his word for Schelling’s will) at the heart of ontology (84).

Schelling writes:

In the final and highest judgment, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal Being to which alone all predicates of Being apply: groundlessness, eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation. All of philosophy strives only to find this highest expression. (Freedom 21)

As the desire for “self-affirmation,” will designates philosophy itself as a protracted individuation process which, on account of its groundlessness, can never complete itself. This “willing” also correlates to Jung’s conception of an underlying energy to libidinal development, and suggests a broadly psychological component to this dialectic which resonates with the project of analytical psychology. Thus, Schelling’s dialectic of production allows for the irruption of new ideas that are not bound within a pre-existent economy of the labour of the Concept.

Schelling’s account of freedom both diagnoses creaturely existence as what the First Outline called a “misbegotten attempt” – here, a miscomprehension of the proper relation to “universal will” – and prognoses a transfiguration by which the person (as creature) unites with “the primal will” of understanding:

[The dark principle of] self-will of creatures[,] to the extent that it has not yet been raised to (does not grasp) complete unity with the light (as principle of understanding), is pure craving or desire, that is, blind will. The understanding as universal will stands against this self-will of creatures, using and subordinating the latter to itself as a mere instrument. But, if through advancing mutation and division of all forces, the deepest and most inner point of initial darkness in a being is finally transfigured wholly into the light, then the will of this same being is indeed, to the extent it is individual, also a truly particular will, yet, in itself or as the centrum of all other particular wills, one with the primal will or the

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219 See, for example, The Relations para. 339.
understanding, so that now from both a single whole comes into being. (Freedom 32)

Here, individuation is the dramatization of the blind individual will’s elevation into something more than itself, as part of the universal will. Personality is “selfhood raised to spirit” (38), both a cision in the individual and a connection with the ideal, as “a relatively independent principle” (32), “will that beholds itself in complete freedom [as] above and outside of all nature” (33). In Schelling’s drama of freedom, individuation is not driven by a process of identification or the unfolding of something preformed. Rather, the “mutation and division of all forces” drives self-will from its darkness into a transfiguration where it paradoxically becomes particular and universal as “selfhood,” just as for Jung individuation “does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself” to make one paradoxically both individual and collective (“On the Nature of the Psyche” para. 432). Yet this prognosis is nevertheless one of a completed individuation, of “final transfiguration.” If will is groundless Being, what does it mean to unify with the centrum, the primal will? Is it not to unite with the groundlessness of primal Being, just as to “gather the world to oneself” is to imperil oneself with exposure to Nature’s derangement, Nature’s dissociative matrix whose experience puts one outside oneself? In the Freedom essay, this imperilment is the evil nature of the world – that is, the inevitable failure and suspension of this transfiguration as the condition for time and history. This positive force of evil persists in spite of Schelling’s efforts to fold individuation’s Erzeugungsdialektik back into an Idealist economy through the Freedom essay’s scriptural traces of “darkness” and “light,” like Jung’s more optimistic moments in which he suggests that individuation can be “achieved.”

In the Freedom essay, Schelling draws a significant parallel between evil and disease. Evil results from the self’s estrangement, as the “dark principle of self-will,” from the centrum (44). In this perversion of the self’s relation to its centrum, the will “steps out from its being beyond nature” to “elevate the ground over the cause, to use the spirit that it obtained only for the sake of the centrum outside the centrum and against creatures; from this results collapse within the will itself and outside it” (34). In other words, self-will attempts to bend the centrum to its own designs (which is precisely what, in Jung’s words, inflates self-will beyond manageable boundaries, which I shall discuss
below). Outside the harmony of the *centrum’s* “divine measure and balance” self-will, as “a bond of living forces,” can no longer rule the rebellious dominion of forces as “cravings and appetites,” which leads to a “peculiar life [of] mendacity, a growth of restlessness and decay” (34). As a disruption of cosmic harmony which thereby shows this harmony’s constitutive self-difference, evil is the force whereby “things feverishly move away from their nonthingly center” (Wirth, *Conspiracy* 170).

But this evil is *productive*, and in precisely the same way as Nature’s ambivalence toward its products in the *First Outline*. *Erzeugungsdialektik’s* connection with historicity and materiality risks the individual’s annihilation or subsumption in “restlessness and decay” as the ego attempts to proclaim: “I am the *centrum*.” But it is also a connection with the purposive movement toward what the *Freedom* essay calls transfiguration, and is thus essential to the individual’s existence in the world. Jung takes up precisely this purposiveness in the energetic view of libido, which conceives the transformation of phenomena in terms of an underlying energy. Indeed, it is ironic that in a discussion of alchemy, Jung explicitly casts individuation as an ateleological process which destabilises the “logical” alignment of alchemical stages and individuation. Thus, individuation’s transfigurative processes cannot be simply “achieved”:

I have often seen patients simply outgrow a problem that had destroyed others. This “outgrowing,” as I formerly called it, proved on further investigation to be a new level of consciousness. Some higher or wider interest appeared on the patient’s horizon, and through this broadening of his outlook the insoluble problem lost its urgency. *It was not solved logically in its own terms*, but faded out when confronted with a new and stronger life urge. It was not repressed and made unconscious, but merely appeared in a different light, and so really did become different. (“Commentary” para. 17; my italics)²²⁰

²²⁰ We have seen how Giegerich’s “psychology of interiority” makes psychology into an alchemical work which always already proclaims its completion. This leads Giegerich to dismiss both the archetypes and the collective unconscious as twentieth-century “crazes” whose illogical nature we can now see from a “historical distance” (“Love” 260). But Jung insists that “what is real, what actually exists, cannot be alchemically sublated, and if anything is apparently sublimated it never was what a false interpretation took it to be (”The Practical Use” para. 328; my italics), which distances Jung from even his own inclination to equate individuation with the stages of alchemy. This does not prevent Jung from elsewhere re-idealising alchemical individuation into an apocatastatic vision similar to the one Schelling had previously incorporated into the *Freedom* essay as the discussion of love (Jung, *Aion* 169; *A Study* para. 550). But ultimately, Jung casts the teleological conception of individuation as a sublime moment in a larger
What Jung outlines here is a change in intensity governed by the underlying energy of libido – libido’s “will” as it were – and not this energy’s manifestation as teleological movement. Indeed, Jung ultimately casts Schelling’s philosophical “will” of *Erzeugungsdialektik* as the differential movement of a *libidinal gradient* [*Gefälle*].

It does not lie in our power to transfer [the] “disposable” energy [of the libido] at will to a rationally chosen object. [This energy] can at best be applied voluntarily for only a short time. But in most cases it refuses to seize hold, for any length of time, of the possibilities rationally presented to it. *Psychic energy is a very fastidious thing which insists on the fulfilment of its own conditions.* However much energy may be present, we cannot make it serviceable until we have succeeded in finding the right gradient. [When this libido] does seize hold of a rational object, we think we have brought about the transformation through conscious exertion of the will. [But] the most strenuous exertions would not have sufficed had there not been present at the same time a gradient in that direction. [. . .] *Life can flow forward only along the path of the gradient.* But there is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites; hence it is necessary to discover the opposite to the attitude of the conscious mind. *(On the Psychology* pars. 76-78; my italics)*

*purposive economy.* That is, teleological “moments” of system (where order manifests itself in epiphany) circulate in a fluid freedom according to inscrutable laws and indiscernible (but *intuitive*) connections. These moments are corpuscular, circulating in a larger current.

221 Thus, despite Jung’s insistence on a *Stufenfolge* of archetypal experience in his therapeutics of presence (Jung uses precisely this word; see *Aion* 53), Jungian metapsychology reveals Jung as a thinker of *intensity*, as Deleuze saw so clearly (Kerslake, “Rebirth Through Incest” 142).

222 *Gefälle* is a crucial Jungian concept here whose full import is somewhat obfuscated in the English translation. *Gefälle* typically means “gradient,” “incline,” “decline,” or slope,” but it also means “difference” as a difference in degree to which something rises or falls. In English, “gradient” can be defined more abstractly as “a continuous increase or decrease in the magnitude of any quantity or property along a line from one point to another” (*OED* 2a), or in embryology as “an increase or decrease, along an axis of an organism or a part, in the potential for developing into an organ or in a related bodily process” (*OED* 2b). “Gradient” as difference in magnitude or intensity is much closer to Jung’s formulation of libido, and the relatively straightforward German *Gefälle* should be read in this light. Hull translates *Gefälle* variously as “slope” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 91), “pull”/“flow” (*The Psychology* pars. 423, 467), “current” (*Psychological Types* 249), and “potential” (*Answer to Job* para. 665 and throughout *Psychological Types*). The latter two definitions come closest to Jung’s intent, but do not fully capture Jungian libido’s intensive differential. Significantly, Jung also equates *Gefälle* with *Drang*, “compulsion”: while the unconscious to a degree resists becoming conscious, “it must also be emphasized that it has a kind of gradient [*Gefälle*] towards consciousness, which is to say a compulsion [*Drang*] to become conscious” (*A Study* para. 545 n. 55; trans. mod). I am grateful to Jason Wirth for his insights regarding the translation of *Gefälle*.

223 As Peterson observes, the motility of the *First Outline*’s Naturphilosophie consists in a similar gradient wherein the dialectical energy of production is “situated in a graduated scale of development that indicates
Measured by the intensity invested in “rational objects,” the Thanatopoietic movement of the libidinal gradient in and through the “tension of opposites” pre-exists the metonymies of its possible objects. And like Schelling’s absolute subject, which moves through everything without being anything, the libidinal gradient is the constellating force of individuation: the “Self of one’s self.” This process cannot be based on the causal processes of consciousness insofar as conscious direction of this energy is either purely phantastic or ill-advised. In the Introduction, we saw that Jung articulates this as the energetic view of libido, a “final” concept of energy “abstracted from relations of movement” in terms of “some kind of energy [which] underlies the changes in phenomena [with] a definite direction (goal) in that it follows the gradient of potential in a way that cannot be reversed” (“On Psychic Energy” para. 3). In the previous chapter, we saw that the tragic-melancholic experiencing of this gradient is an encounter with the derangement of Nature’s materiality; as such, this encounter expresses the (im)possibility of individuation’s completion, 

And while the tragic element is certainly present in the Freedom essay as the melancholy of all finite life, the Freedom essay cannot be simply labelled a tragic work. It is in fact Hölderlin whose theory of tragedy is an early articulation of the tragic potential of the self-centrum relationship, the Ungrund’s potential to irrupt and disrupt the person’s relation to the centrum. Indeed, Hölderlin’s theory of rhythm and caesura in tragedy can be read as a crucial shift from the early Schelling’s aesthetic Idealism to the darkened powers of the Freedom essay. Let us turn briefly then to Hölderlin, who was more willing than the young Schelling to see the ontological implications of a tragic aesthetics.

224 Jung defines “final” as having a goal or end which cannot be anticipated (i.e., purposive) versus a “teleological” notion of a conceivable goal (para. 3 n. 4), as well as a middle term, “a third conception which is mechanistic as well as energetic” (para. 4). Although he leaves this “middle term” unexplored as something beyond the bounds of logical thought, the possibility he opens up here gestures towards what Schelling’s primordial moment before Being, where the Godhead exists as simultaneous Yes and No with respect to Being – or, in Jungian terms, a psychic energy simultaneously contained within telos and purposive beyond thought (Ages 73-74).
4.3 Excursus: Hölderlin and the Rhythm of Romantic Ontology

Krell argues compellingly that of all the German Idealist and Romantic thinkers, it is the German poet and philosopher Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) who took tragedy to its farthest reaching conclusions. Before Schelling, “Hölderlin is [. . .] already engaged in a life-long confrontation with tragedy; Schelling will come to such a confrontation later, and more traumatically” (The Tragic Absolute 41). Where the early Schelling’s repressive thinking about intellectual intuition darkened only much later into “NPS”’s ecstatic experience of absolute subjectivity, Hölderlin famously writes circa 1800 that the tragic “is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition” (“The Lyric” 302). As Krell writes, “intellectual intuition is in Hölderlin’s view tragic thinking” (The Tragic Absolute 302) because it marks an always already fractured absolute – an anticipation of the Freedom essay’s not-God within God. Intellectual intuition is the simultaneous, paradoxical experience of embodiment and separation, attraction and repulsion:

The unity present in the intellectual intuition embodies itself in the very same degree in which it departs from itself, in which the division of its parts takes place, which only separate themselves, because they feel themselves to be too unified, when in the whole they are closer to the centre, or because they do not

225 At the end of the eighteenth century Schelling, Hegel and Hölderlin were all students (and roommates) in the Tübingen Stift, a theological seminary which hosted only the most gifted and/or prestigious students. Franz Nauen notes that “their close intellectual fellowship throughout the nineties made each extremely responsive to the others ideas” (VII). This responsiveness, in fact, led to a collaboration between the three resulting in the “Oldest System Programme of German Idealism” in 1796. Adler and Louth write that all three shared a preoccupation with “the concern with classical tragedy, and Sophocles in particular; the dialectic structure which emerges in their definitions of the tragic; the central place the tragic assumes in their thinking; and the great, indeed religious, significance located in the tragic action. It is now clear that both in philosophical reach and poetic conviction Hölderlin’s thoughts go beyond anything in the work of his peers, and it is generally accepted that his thinking had a considerable influence on the others’, though of course their discussions will have been a three-way process” (xlv). Although Hölderlin’s mental decline was apparent by 1804, the year Schelling last saw him (Hölderlin was committed to an institution in late 1805), Schelling certainly knew of Hölderlin's translations of Sophocles; he met with Hölderlin the previous year to discuss the prospect of approaching a theatre in Weimar about staging Hölderlin's translations (Hölderlin, Essays and Letters 397), for which the Notes were meant as introductions. Bowie suggests that Hölderlin’s important critique of Fichtean subjectivism became the core of Schelling’s critique of Hegel (“Translator’s Introduction” 7). It is thus quite possible that it was none other than Hölderlin who helped effectuate Schelling’s transition from the strictly aesthetic thinking of tragedy in the Philosophical Letters (commonly understood as being addressed to Hölderlin) to the darker thinking of tragedy in the Freedom essay.
feel themselves to be united enough according to their completeness, if they are secondary parts, lying further from the centre, or, according to their liveliness, if they are neither secondary parts, in the given sense, nor essential parts, in the given sense, but because they are not yet actualized, because they are still only divisible parts. (Hölderlin, “The Lyric” 305)

In an eternally moving One, which “must not remain always in the same closer and further relation, so that all encounters all, and each [part] receives its entire right, its entire measure of life” (304), how can such an intuition not suspend, indeed shatter the ego’s frail categories, leaving a gap which cannot be assimilated but must be minded by the nobler souls Hölderlin addresses? A far cry, to be sure, from the self-consciousness of Schelling’s 1800 System. Hölderlin’s most significant statements on tragedy are his “Notes on the Oedipus” and “Notes on the Antigone” (1803), which offer a theory of rhythm and caesura that articulates, in the aesthetic register of tragedy, the systolic-diastolic dynamic which underpins Romantic metasubjective individuation, and a dynamic which Schelling later figures differently as the Freedom essay’s self-centrum rhythm.

In “Notes on the Antigone,” Hölderlin develops the “calculable law” of tragedy not as a structuralist formula applied to a work of art, but rather as a means of tracking the development of “idea and feeling and reflection” according to the logic of a poem or drama. What Hölderlin describes here is how Greek tragic plots unfold, but also what they point to beyond their textual margins: namely, a “calculus for holding on to the incalculable and dangerous totality of life, which manifests itself at its purest in tragedy” (Adler and Louth lii). And this “higher sense” of rhythm is not a philosophical exercise directed at the faculties themselves, but rather at the human faculties as divided forces – connections between their “independent parts” that by definition are for-themselves to

226 Hölderlin writes: “For just as philosophy always treats only one faculty of the soul, so that the representation of this one faculty makes a whole, and the mere connection between the parts of this faculty is called logic: so poetry treats the various faculties of a human being, so that the representation of these different faculties makes a whole, and the connection between the more independent parts of the different faculties can be called the rhythm, taken in a higher sense, or the calculable law” (“Notes on the Antigone” 325).
varying degrees in a denial of unity and indifference. To properly discern tragedy, one must observe

how the particular content relates to the general calculation within a continuum which, though endless, is yet determined throughout, and how the development and the intended statement, the living sense which cannot be computed, may be related to the calculable law. [. . .] Hence the rhythmic succession of ideas [. . .] wherein the transport [i.e., metaphor] manifests itself demands a counter-rhythmic interruption, a pure word, that which in metrics is called a caesura, in order to confront the speeding alternation of ideas at its climax, so that not the alternation of the idea, but the idea itself appears. (“Notes on the Oedipus” 317-18; my first italics)

This “continuum” ensures that such “rhythm” cannot be the mere repetition of the Same. It is the incalculable and dangerous derangement of Nature within which the tragic plot unfolds; as such, it is the tragic gradient of Jungian libido, whose purposive movement can only be fleetingly glimpsed as Hölderlin’s “idea” through the traumatic rupture of continuity. It is a substrate for the relation between tragedy’s calculable law and that “living sense” of tragedy which forever remains irreducible to it.

This calculus is written in the language of rhythm and caesurae, as counter-rhythmic breaks in this rhythm that cause the idea itself to manifest in the tragic metaphor (“transport”) of intellectual intuition (“Notes on the Oedipus” 318). The caesura is a suspension of rhythm, “a protracted instant or elongated point within which we can see how and why matters are tearing ahead so relentlessly and so perilously” (Krell, The Tragic Absolute 294). The tragic interplay of rhythm and the caesural transport of intellectual intuition depend on the wayward “independent parts” of the faculties in the tragic individual – the dissociationist paradigm of melancholy in which our faculties are no more themselves than we are when we say “I.”

The eternal possibility of caesura,

227 Krell further describes the caesura as “a simultaneous engagement in the entire sweep of the play and a reflection upon the play’s representations as representation [in which] our entire system of sensibility–from intuition through rational calculation–is caught up and exercised in the play,” and emphasises that “even though the term caesura is borrowed from versification, Hölderlin applies it to the faculties of human knowing and feeling as well as to the events of the tragic plot” (The Tragic Absolute 294).

228 Arkady Plotnitsky places intellectual intuition’s fusion of real and ideal specifically within Romantic ontology’s tragic-melancholic paradigm. He sees Hölderlinian rhythm as a confluence of “the inaccessible
of the *Ungrund*’s anarchy breaking into existence, is the basis of both personality and the traumatic historicity which Pfau sees as intrinsically Romantic. In psychoanalytical terms, “it is the subject’s experience of the ‘real’ that opens the caesura and illuminates the (contingent) subject’s glimpse into the elusiveness, the caesura, of Being” (Gosetti-Ferencei 132).

Jung both courts and resists this Romantic structuring of tragedy. His fourfold Aristotelian account of the dream-work is meant to gather up Romantic ontology’s discontinuity into a linear structure. But the energetic libido developed in his metapsychology ultimately assumes the characteristics of Hölderlinian rhythm, and thus unworks this teleological imperative. That is, in spite of Jung’s resistances, Jungian efficacity of all events, the incalculable emergence of individual events, [and] rhythmic effects and counter-rhythmic movement, giving rise to caesuras” (“The Calculable Law” 135). In this interplay of rhythm and caesura, “The rhythm of any life can radically alter at any point, revealing this underlying ‘caesured’ discontinuity, rarely completely random, even if not always manifesting a tragic fate, and hence making this caesura belong to the structure of [tragic] representation. [. . .] A caesura opens a possibility of another, different – “erratic” [. . .] “caesured” history, and [. . .] reveals a different, rhythmic temporality, which is the condition of all history” (132, 133). More specifically, Plotnitsky takes up Hölderlinian rhythm and caesura and contemporary quantum theory to describe Romantic ontology as an ontology of the unprethinkable, a “scepticism concerning the possibility of capturing the ultimate workings of matter or thought by thought [which makes] the ultimate workings of matter or thought inconceivable, unthinkable, ultimately unthinkable even as unthinkable” (125). Despite Kantian epistemological limits on knowing and thinking the unconditioned, there are nevertheless “collectivities” of events which manifest order and rhythm, but rhythm which is not closural: “The overall structure of such collectivities is not random, even though any two events still cannot be connected by any law” (130). This necessity without causality is what Jung develops in analytical psychology as synchronicity.

229 Jung’s four phases are: 1) statements of place, protagonist and temporality; 2) plot development; 3) a “culmination or peripetia” in which “something decisive happens or something changes”; and 4) the lysis, or “solution or result produced by the dream-work” (“On the Nature of Dreams” pars. 561ff). Jung wants to use this structure to formalise dream-works, as “separate acts of compensation,” into individuation’s “planned and orderly process of development” (para. 550). But rhythm and caesura mark the purposiveness in Jungian metapsychology which does not always fit Jung’s compensatory psychic economy; not all dreams are faithfully tied to the conscious attitude. Indeed, dreams without lysis mark the “fated” nature of the dissociationist psyche in which “we do not dream, but rather we are dreamt” (Schelling’s “it thinks in me”). Such dreams are “anticipated fate” and (at least in his seminars on children’s dreams) seen as catastrophic (*Children’s Dreams* 158-59).

230 Hölderlin is not a major figure in Jung’s *Collected Works*, but Jung nevertheless thinks tragedy toward Hölderlin’s metaphysics. Indeed, the climactic final chapter of *Symbols* relies heavily on Hölderlin’s poetry to illustrate the movement of libido. This said, Hölderlin thinks the tragic more rigorously than Jung, emphasising a melancholic difference that Jung sometimes disavows in favour of marking synchronicity as a unified, life-affirming and meaningful confluence of real and ideal. Before his two essays on synchronicity, Jung makes radical claims for synchronicity along precisely the lines Plotnitsky develops via Hölderlin – that coincidences between two events are acausal and that they can occur across organic and
libido – hence individuation itself – belongs to the existential melancholy of Romantic ontology, articulating the psychic substrate for Hölderlin’s tragic subject. Jung writes: “When the libido is forced back by an obstacle, it does not necessarily regress to earlier sexual modes of application, but rather to the rhythmic activities of infancy which serve as a model both for the act of nutrition and for the sexual act itself” (Symbols 154).

Encountering the existential caesura of an obstacle, libido regresses, switches tracks, canalises into a different rhythmic temporality. Indeed rhythm, taken somewhat more literally here as a “classic device for impressing certain ideas or activities on the mind” (154), is responsible for the materiality of the archetypes as both producers and products of repeated experiences and activities. “The rhythmic tendency [. . .] is a peculiarity of emotional processes in general. Any kind of excitement, no matter in what phase of life, displays a tendency to rhythmic expression, perseveration, and repetition” (155; my italics). But within this “rhythm” are encrypted evolutionary caesurae, the kernels of differentiation which permeate the development of world processes in Jung’s “extremely historical organism.” For Jung, it is affect and “emotional processes” that deconstruct the faculties into their “independent parts” under the melancholic regime of rhythm and caesura.

Hölderlin’s development of rhythm and caesura thus articulates a specifically Romantic ontology for the progressive-regressive movement of Jungian libido and the Freedom essay’s self-centrum drama. But from within this interplay between rhythm and caesura, Romantic ontology marks an emergent system – a sublime “is it happening?” of order always on the cusp of Being, within “the irreducible, rhizomatic multiplicity of temporal effects” which, by way of “structural isomorphism,” is iterated in tragedy, history, and their confluence in Jung’s historical psyche (Plotnitsky, “The Calculable Law” 136). The potential order within what Plotnitsky calls “collectivities” of events organises the “living realism” of Schelling’s Freedom essay (Freedom 26), which he intended as the antidote to an Idealism characterised by “the abhorrence of everything inorganic realms (letter to Pauli, 30 Nov 1950, 60). Jung’s essays on synchronicity seem to resist this fluidity, but we will see that this idea returns in Answer to Job.
real” (26). But in theorising what Schelling dramatises as the self-centrum relation, Hölderlinian tragedy puts this relation under analysis to reveal its incommensurability with the apocatastatic “love conquers all” narrative which ends Schelling’s text. In this sense, Hölderlin’s positing of rhythm and caesurae as nonmolar forces anticipates the dissociationist cosmogony of Schelling’s 1815 Ages. Indeed, one can read Ages as a sort of retroactive metapsychology for the Freedom essay: where the Freedom essay develops the self-centrum relationship within a theodicean framework, Ages disperses this drama across multiple energetic centres; psyches meeting in Mesmeric crisis, individual potencies, and even celestial bodies are now implicated in individuation’s cosmological work of yearning.

4.4 Schelling’s Ages of the World (1815): The Work of Yearning

For Ages, yearning [Sehnsucht] is the beginning of the end – and of the beginning again. For here, Schelling writes of first Nature that “Since it did not begin sometime but began since all eternity in order never (veritably) to end, and ended since all eternity, in order always to begin again, it is clear that that first nature was since all eternity and hence, equiprimordially a movement circulating within itself; and that this is its true, living concept” (Ages 20). In the Freedom essay, yearning is God’s desire for being and self-understanding – “the yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself” (28). In Ages, yearning and desire cause the “inner cision” in eternal nature, the unprethinkable moment which releases the endless movement of the potencies into time and history. Yearning begins with cision (56, 28). And it is the lack marked by yearning that distinguishes the Trieb of Romantic metasubjectivity from a merely mechanistic process. For in poeticising the sublime beginning of a moment of yearning – a moment over before (and as) it has begun – Schelling makes Trieb something more than endless mechanism or the perfect rhythm and symmetry of a divine Newton’s Cradle in perpetual
motion on God’s office desk. With yearning, *Trieb desires* itself. “Aware” of itself—rather, of that which it is *not*—*Trieb* “now” (to speak in time) wants to find itself, and can only do so by stepping into time and history, finding itself in time, but never finding itself in *time*. Yearning separates *Trieb* from the stasis of the unconditioned to give it the endlessly unfolding ground of its self-comprehension. Yearning is the personality of *Trieb*. As Jung says, personality is a “happening,” and this development of “personality” informs Jung’s earliest thinking about instinct and archetype. Instincts (as “typical modes of action”) and archetypes codetermine each other; indeed, the archetype is “the *instinct’s perception of itself* [. . .] the self-portrait of the instinct,” that which determines instinct’s “form and direction” as instinct strives to become aware of itself (“Instinct” para. 277). In other words, for Jung the instinct yearns for knowledge and self-apprehension through the archetype; *Trieb*’s purposive nature is endlessly recapitulated through psyche, archetype, instinct, and world. Schelling “disciplines” this yearning as the philosophical psychology of “NPS,” which articulates the movements of the absolute subject as it travels through disciplines and knowledges without arresting its motion in any one thing. But it is not until the *Freedom* essay and the 1815 *Ages* that Schelling puts *Trieb* under analysis to articulate the dynamics of its desire.

The 1815 *Ages*, which concerns us here, is the third of a series of attempts by Schelling to write the history of the past, but it also blueprints the futurity which marks Schelling’s later positive philosophy. Indeed, *Ages*’ textual history can be read as a microcosm of the trajectory of Schelling’s oeuvre as a whole, from transcendental Idealism to the dark, indeterminate forces of Being and their operations in time and history. The first (1811) version is a work of Idealism, suffused with Christian teleology

231 Newton’s Cradle is the proper name of the infamous “desk balls” or “Executive Ball Clicker” – five balls suspended alongside each other, set in motion (or remaining at rest) through the act of pulling one or two balls up on one side and letting them go to collide with the others. It demonstrates the conservation and momentum of energy.

232 The compulsive nature of Schelling’s attempts is made clearer by Horst Fuhrmans’ 1944 discovery of twelve variants of the first book of *Ages* in the University of Munch library cellar. Sadly, these drafts were lost when the Allies bombed Munich in World War Two, destroying the library (Wirth, “Translator’s Introduction” vii).
and promising a completed futurity underwritten by the Trinity. It is a work of
“ontotheology as anthropology, [a] complete work that Schelling later unworked” (Rajan,
“First Outline” 321). Less theological, the second version (1813) nevertheless retains the
visionary teleological horizon of completion, and has a tranquillity absent in 1815. Here,
the powers of generation are contained within spirit as its consummate creation, lacking
the potentiated rhythm of the third version but retaining a religious rhetoric of “joy” and
“bliss” (Schelling, *The Ages of the World [1813]* 144-45). In 1813, philosophy is the
alibi for 1815’s nascent psychology. Rajan points out that the interminable dynamism of
the third version is absent, and as a result individuation is more of a visionary ascension
to a completed future Coleridge would no doubt have appreciated (“Abyss” para. 8). To
reach this visionary futurity, the philosopher must dissociate (“separate”) from himself,
but in a “distancing from the present [and] an abandonment to the past” ultimately
serving a “great heroic poem” of true opinion “indubitable, rooted for all time” (*The Ages
of the World [1813]* 115-16, 119-20; my italics).

The 1815 *Ages* turns from an “anthropogenesis” in 1813 (shared with the 1800
*System*), which represses a primordial, traumatic rotatory motion, to a radical
“psychoanalysis” whose disciplinary countertransferences displace this philosophical
history into interminable analysis: “[*Ages*] returns to the theory of history (and its three
ages or periods) sketched at the end of the *System* to provide a psychoanalysis of this
history: to disclose that history cannot begin without a psychoanalysis that may well
make history impossible, in the Hegelian sense of a transition from nature to spirit and
from spirit to freedom” (Rajan, “Abyss” para. 2). But while *Ages* certainly serves as “a
laboratory for a psychoanalysis avant la lettre” (para. 1), to articulate this
“psychoanalysis” means understanding the term, with Rajan, as something broader than
Freudian thought, which cannot decode the visionary futurity of “that future objective

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233 1815’s later “psychoanalysis” ontologises Derrida’s “psychoanalytic graphology,” meant to “radicalize”
and “extract” the Freudian trace from psychoanalysis’ metaphysics of presence. This is opposed to what
might be called 1813’s “Psychoanalysis” which reflects Freud’s logocentric relegation of writing to the
status of supplement for the primary processes of memory (the philosopher’s abandonment to the past).
See Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing” 231, 229.
presentation of science” to come, a “great heroic poem” optimistically projected into a future without guarantees, meant to narrate what for Schelling’s age (and our own) could only be explored (Ages xl). If Ages is a “laboratory,” Schelling’s abortive experiments, his “misbegotten attempts” to write the past over more than three versions, try to answer (to) the impossible objects of Nature. And just as Nature blossoms through abortive experiments on itself in purposive pulsion toward the absolute product and backward to indifference, so this narrative experimentation leads Schelling forward to “NPS”’s philosophical psychology, the philosophical religion of the positive philosophy and the philosophy of mythology.234 Failing to write history, Ages enacts historicity through (meta)physics.

Schelling emphasises that Ages is a work of imagination, but it has little to do with the rhapsodic tenor which marks later moments in the 1800 System’s discussion of art. As a narrative which we must imagine “although this cannot be conceived as actually having happened in this way” (77), the text is closer to being a working-through of the “crisis of consciousness” that Schelling attributes to the first mythological poets (Homer, Hesiod) in the 1842 philosophy of mythology (HCI 18), which we will discuss in the following chapter. For now, let us observe that the unprethinkable cision that inaugurates time and history in Ages is what the mythological poets attempt to work through in the earliest poems.235 Ages carries forward the project of the Naturphilosophie by putting under analysis the account of the actants in the First Outline. Where the First Outline articulated Nature’s productivity in terms of the (de)composability of the actants relative

234 As we will see in Chapter Five, Schelling’s science of mythology can also be read as a philosophical psychology, but one which expands “NPS”’ asystemic aetiology of knowledge into a broader domain of human history (e.g., the function of mythology in human culture). This reflects the understanding, in current Schelling scholarship, that Ages marks a project which continued through the 1827 Weltalter lectures in Munich and into the positive philosophy and philosophy of mythology.

235 As what Wirth calls a “self-composing cosmic poem” (“Translator’s Introduction” x), Ages’ Introduction bears out the text’s epigenetic nature in this respect. The “highest science” of knowledge is “the development of a living, actual being which presents itself in it,” a primordial life that develops itself “freely, out of its own drive” as “a nature in the most complete understanding of the word” (xxxv). This epigenesis is reflected in a textual fluidity, an unbroken stream of writing to which Schelling’s son added an analytic synopsis, thereby inhibiting the text’s poetic energies into a manageable framework (Wirth, “Translator’s Introduction” xxxii).
to each other, *Ages’* cosmogony narrates the inauguration of Nature itself as the eternal “moment” of potentiation. Indeed, as McGrath puts it, the potencies are “a metaphysics of God which is indissolubly linked to a metaphysics of Nature” (*Dark Ground* 141). The *Potenzenlehre* deconstructs the actants themselves into what Jung would call their *complexio oppositorum*, a dynamic dyad of opposing contractive/expansive forces.

Although its beginning seeks a “golden age of truth and fable” that unites myth and science, *Ages* nevertheless breaks with the *Freedom* essay’s Idealist narrative wherein the work of yearning’s lysis into “bright consciousness” leads to the locking away of the “dark ground of selfhood” (*Freedom* 47, 70). In doing this, *Ages* moves closer to the evil of the *Freedom* essay in describing the first potency’s endless motion and restlessness, the drive to be for-itself which impels movement away from the *centrum*, and which in *Ages* is now fundamental to knowledge. The *Potenzenlehre* ultimately conceives this motion as a scene of mesmeric crisis, and thus a crypto-psychology emerges from a text which Snow aptly describes as “a guided tour of the limits of philosophy” (Snow 184). This derangement of the margins of philosophy drives *Ages* to “[reconstitute] history (and also ontology) around geology” (Rajan, “Abyss” para. 5) as part of the text’s interdisciplinary individuation, an uncanny repetition of its cosmogony whereby a “particular nature” separates from the whole to assume its own anxiogenic rotation about its own axis in “self-lacerating rage” (*Ages* 91). Yearning degenerates from history to the materiality of historicity as a generative physics of potentiation.236

Jung also thinks the psyche geologically, but as a sedimentation of individuals, families, clans, nations, anthropological groupings, and primates through to an underlying “central fire” at the earth’s core from which the previous strata derive, and which, like a dormant volcano, can erupt through these sedimentary layers to the surface (*Introduction*...
142-43). Some have read this Jungian geohistory of the psyche as a “mystical geological vision,” a turn to theosophical-emanationist “völkisch mysticism” casting analysis as a teleological journey toward the molten core of the personality (Noll 99ff). Yet the affinity between Jung’s geological map and the disciplinary unfoldings of its Schellingian territory unworks any pretense to telos or terminable analysis. In Jung’s geological model of the psyche the sedimentary rhythms of history are always vulnerable to eruption from, and disruption by, historicity’s molten core. Indeed, reading Jung’s geohistory through Schelling opens up a space for considering the historical psyche as the logical extension of a Romantic geohistory which, in Schelling’s time, “turned out to be as contingent, as unrepeated, and as unpredictable (even in retrospect) as human history itself” (Rudwick 6). This contingency begins in the Naturphilosophie as Nature’s ambivalence toward its own products – the Thanatopoietic drive of Romantic metasubjectivity, which Jung later recasts as the ambitendency of Jungian libido. The 1815 Ages’ cosmogony, through the dynamic of the three potencies, metaphysically dramatises Jungian individuation, which in turn retrofits Ages’ outer limits of metaphysics with a therapeutics and mode of being in the world. But in order to understand how Ages conceives this dynamic, we must examine Schelling’s Potenzenlehre in more detail.

4.5 The Movement of the Potencies

In writing the Ages drafts, Schelling both refers to a higher, “intimated” knowledge based on symbolic meaning and turns away from the symbolic per se to the theory of the three potencies [Potenzenlehre] that would figure in his later work on mythology (Beach 36). These three potencies, which articulate the yearning of Trieb in Ages, are nonmolar forces which, in a state of “irresolvable concatenation” with each other, define primordial being as contradiction (Ages 12), difference within unity always already bursting forth into Being as moment and yearning. As McGrath writes, they are predicated on a Böhmian distinction between a principle of dark, violent contraction and
a principle of loving, light expansion\textsuperscript{237} analogous to the \textit{Freedom} essay’s distinction between “Ground” and “Existence” (\textit{Dark Ground} 45). As such, “contingency (not necessity, reason, or ‘the notion’) grounds the Schellingian dialectic” (146).\textsuperscript{238} In a similar vein, Jung is the great psychologist of the \textit{complexio oppositorum}, which informs both his exposition of the archetypes (in their “light”/“dark” aspects) and his thinking of libido as “ambitendency.” But while Jung’s individuation process is predicated upon this ambidentent conception of the archetypes, Schelling’s \textit{Potenzenlehre} thinks the dynamism of the potencies through a (meta)physics which narrates a cosmology of the archetypes, but also articulates the laws of expansion and contraction through which the tension of opposites manifests and unfolds itself. We will see that this (meta)physics is also a prefiguration of what Jung later psychologises as the transcendent function, the interpersonal unfolding of libido following the same dynamic of potentiation.

Schelling begins \textit{Ages’} work of yearning with the first potency ($A^1$), which marks the negation from which all else comes:

That God negates itself, restricts its being, and withdraws into itself, is the eternal force and might of God. In this manner, the negating force is that which is singularly revealing of God. But the actual being of God is that which is concealed. The whole therefore stands as $A$ that from the outside is $B$ and hence, the whole = ($A = B$). (15)

God’s power is a self-withdrawal, a contraction. Harking back to the sex-hating Nature of the \textit{First Outline’s Naturphilosophie}, withdrawal is for-itself and antipathetic to prehension. But unlike the \textit{Naturphilosophie}, the potencies of \textit{Ages} now possess a

\textsuperscript{237} In his “A Fundamental Report” (1620), Jakob Böhme distinguishes between the contractive \textit{Ungrund}, as “an eternal beginning that amounts to a craving” which withdraws into itself since it lacks an object outside itself and the \textit{will}, which the \textit{Ungrund} creates out of its craving as “the craver in the craving” (797). This will desires an expansive existence in Being, to go out into Nature (801). Böhme conceives the will’s dominance over blind craving as analogous to God’s dominance over Nature (799), but both \textit{Ungrund} and will reciprocally cause each other, leading Böhme to write that “will’s spirit is an eternal knowledge of the abyss [\textit{Ungrund}], and the life of craving is an eternal being of the will” (799).

\textsuperscript{238} McGrath continues: “Although the movement from one potency to the other is logical, the whole sequence itself is not. God freely introduces lack into being and sets the sequence of potencies into self-actualization. The contingency, anarchy, and spontaneity of the actualization of first potency undergirds the logical necessity of each of the successive potencies” (146).
psychology, existing in “rotatory motions” of contradiction, “loathing and anxiety” (32). In this sense, time and history are inaugurated by a dissociative act whereby the first potency must “dislocate [sondern] itself from itself in order to be, so to speak, its own complete being” (9). Yearning is the paradoxical uplifting through a “pulling downward” by eternal nature reverberating through the chain of potencies. Thus the second potency ($A^2$), as “Being to the second power,” forms a “primordial antithesis” with $A^1$ which is not mutually exclusive, but rather “an opposed relationship” (18). $A^2$ is thus “the savior and liberator of nature [. . .] outside and above this nature and thereby comport[ing] to it as the spiritual comports to the corporeal; yet only as something spiritual to which nature is the next echelon and that is again capable of an immediate relationship to it” (34).

In his discussion of first nature ($A^1$), Schelling describes the primary decisionary movement whereby the break into the potencies is followed by new movement and “each subordinate potency attracts the potency immediately higher in it” (56). In this process each potency, realising its higher counterpart as that which it is capable of, attracts it through a “bewitching,” numinous force: as $A^2$ is pulled down (bewitched) to $A^1$, $A^3$, as the posited unity of $A^1$ and $A^2$, becomes visible to itself as counterprojection in $A^2$ (59). In other words, $A^1$’s involution, its being “inwardly posited” through its encounter with $A^2$ (35), leads to the evolution of $A^3$. $A^3$ is spirit in nature, an animating force which places the affirmative force of $A^2$ in a free relationship with the negating force of $A^1$ (36). $A^3$ is

that universal soul by which the cosmos is ensouled, the soul which through the immediate relationship to the Godhead is now levelheaded and in control of itself. It is the eternal link between nature and the spiritual world as well as between the world and God. It is the immediate tool through which alone God is active in nature and the spiritual world. (37)

But $A^3$ does not remain ascendant, for this movement, “having arrived at its peak [. . .] retreats back into its beginning” in an eternal return (Ages 19). Thus, Schelling’s Potenzenlehre articulates, on the level of cosmology, an interminable analysis where even God’s “levelheadedness” is but a “moment” within this universal unfolding. That is, momentarily equalised between Nature and spirit, even God is inevitably deranged once again in the next moment and movement of potentiation. “Evolution presupposes
involution” (83) as “from time to time, every physical and moral whole needs, for its preservation, the reduction to its innermost beginning” (xxxviii). Telos is supplanted by a rhythmic pulsation with no discernible beginning or end, but which nevertheless retains a promissory horizon of the new age to come, a purposive and potentiated way forward. Just as the highest comes into view only as potencies are pulled down towards eternal nature in the primordial antithesis, so the unconscious strives to express itself through both its lower (instinctual) and higher (spiritual) qualities in the “organic relationship” required between negating and affirming potencies (34). Where depth psychology limits Jung to speaking hypothetically from the standpoint of consciousness, Ages’ (meta)physics allows us to imagine the obverse standpoint of God entering Being as the Negative through the incomprehensible primordial act, engendering time and the figural through which God can become active in Being (37). And yet even this distinction is an illusion, an elision: for Jungian analytical psychology and Schelling’s Potenzenlehre can only hypothesise and narrate this abyss of the unconditional upon which the figural conscious rests.

Jung’s collective unconscious, as primordial fluidity (“beginning,” “end,” and neither), flows through and encompasses this complex of opposites while being articulated by it through the eternal movement of ascension and descent that Schelling outlines in Ages (19). In this way, the primordial interplay of affirming conscious and contracting unconscious of the Eternal No and Eternal Yes (A¹ and A²) is replicated, through the bridge of the symbol, in (counter)transference, within which is replicated the dual (light/dark) aspect of the archetypes in the analyst-analysand encounter. Schelling’s primordial antithesis and Jungian individuation thus converge as a self-organising pattern which repeats itself in different modalities in the eternal attempt to comprehend itself. As we shall see, the Self, as centripetal force of psychic self-organisation and paradoxical emblem of the “uncertainty relationship” between opposites in the necessary freedom of God (Aion 226), exists as the outer limit of the psychic archive. In the universe model we have seen, the archetypes, as ambidentent forces, constitute the outcome of the “self-lacerating rage” of spiritualised contradiction engendering matter as “individual and independent centres that, because they are also still held and driven by averse forces, likewise move about their own axes” (Ages 91). The 1815 Ages’ shift in emphasis to a
proto depth-psychological dynamic as an analogue for cosmic movements makes its
discussion of questioning and answering beings, and its specific focus on mesmerism and
magnetic sleep, a crucial facet of Ages’ crypto-psychology and its continuity with
analytical psychology.

Ages’ cosmogonic yearning begins in a drama of anamnesis and transference.
The text’s Introduction establishes the self-organisation of the universe as a “primordial
life” produced by and through the confluence of freedom and necessity – a life which is
“a nature in the most complete understanding of the word, just as the person is a nature
regardless of freedom, nay, precisely because of it” (Ages xxxv). Indeed, to answer the
question of how to bring about the “golden age” of truth and fable, Schelling turns to a
proto-Jungian analysis of the individual, who must catachrestically “climb up to the
beginning of the ages” toward realising a principle “outside and above the world”
contained within itself (xxxv-xxxvi). Here as in the Freedom essay, personality means
something more than ego. In personality, an “unknowing and dark” principle containing
the “archetype of things” as a rhizomatic “recollection of all things, of their original
relationships, of their becoming, of their meaning” is bound to the “supramundane
principle” of Being and the person (xxxvi). 239 Ages figures this lower principle’s
yearning as the “intimation and longing for knowledge” realised through questioning and
answering beings in an allegorical countertransference:

239 It should be noted that Schelling’s specific use of “archetype” at times differs radically from Jung’s. In
the Freedom essay Schelling deploys the term in a preformationist sense, referring to “the archetypical
[urbildlich] and divine man who was with God in the beginning and in whom all other things and man
himself are created” (44). And Schelling later argues that although the anarchy of the Ungrund suggests an
infinity of possible worlds, “by no means is this [infinity] to be thought as if there were no archetype
[Urtypus] in the ground containing the only possible world according to God’s essence. [. . .] In the divine
understanding itself, however, as in primeval [urantatlgen] wisdom in which God realizes himself ideally
or as archetype [urbildlich], there is only one possible world as there is only one God” (62). In Ages the
term is more ambivalent; in the present passage, the “archetype [Ur-Bild] of things” seems to cast
archetype once again in a preformationist role. But later, archetypes, as “ideas,” become something more
dynamic and aleatory: they are now “not to be thought of as physical substances or as empty genera, [nor]
as finished and available forms, existing without movement. [. . .] For they are precisely ideas in that they
are something eternally becoming and in incessant movement and generation” (66-67). In Ages, then, the
archetype is the domain of all knowledge, but as the following passage indicates, these ideas must also be
brought up by the higher principle; in short, they must be witnessed.
In the higher principle everything lies without differentiation and as one. But in
the Other it can differentiate, express, and set apart what in it is one. Hence there
is in the person that which must again be brought back to memory, and an Other
that brings it to memory; one in which the answer to every research question lies
and the Other which brings the answer out of it. This Other is free from
everything and is capable of thinking everything, but it is bound by this innermost
witness and cannot hold anything for true without the agreement of this witness.
On the other hand, the innermost is originally bound and cannot unfurl itself; but
through the Other it becomes free and reveals itself to the same. Therefore, both
yeam with equal intensity for the cision. [. . .] This cision, this doubling of
ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two beings, a questioning
being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks knowledge and an
unknowing being that does not know its knowledge, this silent dialogue, this inner
art of conversation, is the authentic mystery of the philosopher. (xxxvi)

The “unity of unity and difference” which constitutes the absolute in Schelling’s Ages is
thus unfolded through the countertransference between consciousness (as “witness”) and
its unconscious Other. Put in Jungian terms, the productive unconscious, “free from
everything and capable of thinking everything,” needs the witness of consciousness to
create truth in time and history as its eternal attempt at self-comprehension. In this
witnessing, consciousness and the unconscious assume aspects of each other. But
nevertheless, here the “silence” of this dialogue reflects its nature as a conversation in the
mind of the philosopher, an interiorised conversation which is opened to a dangerous
Outside in mesmerism.

Unique to the 1815 Ages and fatal to the pervasive Idealism of former drafts
(Rajan, “Abyss” para. 10 n. 10), mesmerism,240 and specifically the mesmeric crisis in
the psychodynamic between hypnotist and hypnotised, is deployed by Schelling as an
analogue for the primordial cision in Being leading to time and history, the very occasion
for the “entrance of yearning into the eternal nature” (Ages 28-29). For Mesmer, crisis is

240 Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) was a German physician who postulated an energetic transference between
organic and inorganic objects which came to be known as mesmerism. On mesmerism’s role in the
evolution of nineteenth-century dissociationist notions of the psyche leading forward to analytical
psychology, see Faflak 38, 53, Fulford 65, and Borch-Jacobsen, who shows how “by invoking
[mesmerism’s later incarnation as] hypnosis against the philosophy of consciousness, Freud calls up a
phenomenon that escapes his own theory of the unconscious” as a theory of representation, thereby
destabilising the presuppositions of psychoanalysis (79).
an “illness,” or division, an intermediate state of suspension “between wakefulness and perfect sleep” ("Dissertation by F.A. Mesmer” 124). It was the goal of every hypnotism session, as “beneficial crises” had healing power ("Dissertation on the Discovery" 48). In the state of crisis, those hypnotised can “foresee the future and bring the most remote past into the present. Their senses can extend to any distance and in all directions, without being checked by any obstacles. In short, it seems that all Nature is present to them. Will itself is communicated to them apart from conventional means” (112) in a state analogous to both the ecstatic contact with the absolute subject of “NPS” and Jungian synchronicity. In *Ages*, Schelling sees mesmeric crisis as intrapsychic *Potenzlehre*: it awakens the “seed” of “soul-like essence” in the lower potency, whose “irresistible magic” (*Ages* 57) attracts the higher potency to it. Crisis is what begins individuation in Being, and Schelling specifically connects Nature’s individuative crisis with the crisis seen in magnetic sleep (57), which is meant to remedy the “sick” condition of “interrupted guidance between the higher and lower principles” (69, 70).

But by extending the dynamic of magnetic sleep to sleep in general, Schelling goes further than Mesmer, and in ways which bring Schelling significantly closer to the dissociationist approach to the psyche. Schelling argues that while in waking life the human being is governed by an “externally binding unity” (68). But in sleep the copular link which unifies these forces is severed, and “each force retreats back into itself and each tool now seems to be active for itself and in its own world. [. . .] while the whole is outwardly as if dead and inactive, inwardly the freest play and circulation of forces seems to unfold” (68). This free circulation of forces marks psychological derangement; it is now coterminous with the primordial productivity of Nature, what in analytical psychology is the anarchy of the collective unconscious. It is the psyche’s experience of the intellectual intuition repressed in the 1800 *System*. But this “most fully voluptuous inner unfolding of all forces” (67) does not amount to a full dissolution of the copula – indeed, without the unknown=X to express the unity of subject and predicate/object, existence would dissolve into a plenitude of forces with no means of binding them into knowledge – in a word, psychosis. There is instead a “voluntary sympathy” governing this free circulation of forces (67), but Schelling leaves the nature of this voluntarism unexplored.
Significantly, Schelling also delineates three degrees of “inner life” which are possible in magnetic sleep. In the first stage\(^{241}\) the soul, liberated from the “material of human nature,” engages in “free circulation” with a salubrious, higher “spiritual being” (69). In the second stage (the highest stage of magnetic sleep) this spiritual aspect of the person puts soul under analysis, drawing soul to it “in order to show it, as if in a mirror, the things hidden in the soul’s interior and what lies still wrapped up in the soul itself (pertaining to what is future and eternal in the person)” (70). Rather cryptically, Schelling writes of the third and final stage, which lies “in the relationships that lie utterly outside customarily human relationships,” that “it is better to be silent about them than to speak of them” (70). While Jung recognises the importance of Mesmerism in the historical development of analytical psychology,\(^{242}\) his strictly historical concern leads him to see it as largely predicated on “suggestion” (“Fundamental Questions” para. 231).\(^{243}\) However, Schelling’s naturalisation and cosmologisation of magnetic sleep, through its relation to the actantial dynamic of Nature and the Potenzenlehre, bring it much closer to analytical psychology’s human and preterhuman dimensions. Seen in this

\(^{241}\) Schelling rather optimistically writes that in this first stage magnetic sleep always restores, “at least for awhile,” the previously “interrupted guidance between the higher and the lower principles” (Ages 69, 70). But elsewhere he aligns the dissolution of the copula and the being-for-themselves of forces in crisis with precisely what the Freedom essay develops as sickness and evil. So in the sick organism, “forces appear that previously lay concealed in it. Or if the copula of the unity dissolves altogether and if the life forces that were previously subjugated by something higher are deserted by the ruling spirit and can freely follow their own inclinations and manners of acting, then something terrible becomes manifest [previously] held down by the magic of life. And what was once an object of adoration or love becomes an object of fear and the most terrible abjection. For when the abysses of the human heart open up in evil and that terrible thought comes to the fore that should have been buried eternally in night and darkness, we first know what lies in the human in accordance with its possibility and how human nature, for itself or left to itself, is actually constituted” (Ages 48). What restores balance and guidance also imperils the organism, and this is also true of the “terrible thoughts” of the unconscious (Jung would say that dreams do not always “guide,” but can also traumatis the conscious attitude). In other words, Ages recapitulates the dissociationist topography of forces and the cisionary pharmakon that confronts the Nature of the First Outline, whose derangement of actantial forces ensures its purposive individuation while making its consummation impossible.

\(^{242}\) Indeed, we saw at the beginning of Chapter Two that Jung’s genealogy of analytical psychology begins with the French Revolution and Mesmer, whose animal magnetism was to Jung “a rediscovery of the primitive concept of soul-force or soul-stuff, awakened out of the unconscious by a reactivation of archaic forms of thought” (“The Role” para. 21).

\(^{243}\) See also “Review of Waldstein” para. 797.
light, the mesmeric principle forms the basis of the profoundly *transpersonal* aspect of Jungian countertransference, which Andrew Samuels describes as an “intensity of relational energy” greater than a merely intersubjective relationship – indeed, akin to a “simulacrum or reprise of a relation to the divine” (193). This countertransference psychologically articulates what Schelling calls those “unusual states” in which “the power is bestowed upon one person in relation to another such that the one has an unleashing and liberating effect on the other” (*Ages* 68), and yet it also gestures toward the third degree of mesmerism, the nonhuman dimension about which Schelling keeps silent. This preterhumanity takes the form of an excess which Deleuze later takes up in a Jungian tenor as the productive unconscious, where the question of Being has a persistent power which “always comes from somewhere else than the answers”:

Problems and questions thus belong to the unconscious, but as a result the unconscious is differential and iterative by nature; it is serial, problematic and questioning. [. . .] It concerns problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that are felt in consciousness. (*DR* 107-8)

As the embodied subject of immanence and transformation, the Romantic metasubject is dramatised by the interplay of the *Freedom* essay and *Ages* as questioning and answering beings in Schelling’s oeuvre, two texts which respond in different ways to the research question of the absolute subject which pervades Schelling’s oeuvre. Schelling’s concern with this selfhood inevitably turns to *affect* – anxiety as “the governing affect that corresponds to the conflict of directions in Being” (*Ages* 101) and the melancholy which suffuses Being in the *Freedom* essay. In turn analytical psychology, as a science of affect and experience, casts as therapeutic dynamic the dialectic between questioning and answering beings and the self-*centrum* rhythm which marks the individuation of Romantic metasubjectivity. But we will see that in translating these dynamisms into the analyst-analysand encounter, analytical psychology offers no

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244 Mitchell and Broglio understand Romanticism “in terms of immanence and transformation: that is, as an attempt to locate, within an overarching system or structure, those points from or axes along which the system or structure can be transformed” (para. 1).
more guarantees than Schelling’s philosophy that personality will remain free from the irruption of the *Ungrund* or the destructive misrelation to Nature’s derangement.

### 4.6 Jung, Individuation and the Self

As a text which never got past the past (so to speak) in its interdisciplinary account of the ages of the world, *Ages*’ protopsychology questions itself in a textual self-loathing, anxiety and disavowal, but without finding a voice to speak its future, which remains spectral and promissory. So as a text whose “reversion to the beginnings of the world also puts under erasure its own originary moment” of transcendental Idealism (Rajan, “Abyss” para. 1), *Ages* would seem to corroborate both the death drive and interminable nostalgia of what would become psychoanalysis. But within the “primordial antithesis” of the first two potencies, whose dynamic indeed comes about through a repression of sorts, there is also “the structure for a future, inner unity in which each potency comes out for itself” (*Ages* 18). Indeed, one can read *Ages* as a crucial part of an individuative *Erzeugungsdialektik* in Schelling’s oeuvre. As Rajan observes, by putting other disciplines under analysis and constellating them around geohistory as a new discipline, *Ages* already wants to move forward purposively, in a movement where previous forces (history, ontology, “the science of right”) are “not sublimated but abiding” (*Ages* 17). But *Ages*’ decentred unity in which “each potency comes out for itself” lacks a voice to answer (to) its own speculative methodology. The person is this “world writ small” (*Ages* 3), but while it gestures toward psychology with magnetic sleep, *Ages* does not have the psychological tenor of the later mythology lectures, where mythology emerges as a way of working through a primordial crisis of mythological consciousness. In *Ages*, the purposive individuation process of Romantic metasubjectivity is still largely cosmological. It remains for analytical psychology, in turn, to cast the cosmological forces of *Ages*, as well as the self-*centrum* drama of the

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245 Rajan writes that *Ages*’ reordering of systems of knowledge around geohistory leads to “a countertransference wherein the earth’s sedimented strata and the body’s pathological interior and secret heredity summon man to a knowledge of history’s unconscious” (“Abyss” para. 5).
Freedom essay, in terms of the distinctly human encounter which marks Romantic metasubjectivity. But this encounter is one in which the preterhuman, cosmological dimensions of Schelling’s thought are not sublimated, but abide in a psyche with the fluidity of the Nature it engages. This profoundly Romantic conception of the liminality between human and preterhuman will also carry us forward into the discussion of Romantic poetry in the final chapter. With this in mind, we shall first briefly revisit Jung’s formulation of individuation as the crucial pretext for what follows; we will then amplify this concept of individuation by turning to its core concepts of inflation and the transcendent function, which, I argue, translate the Freedom essay’s self-centrum drama and Ages’ Potenzenlehre respectively into a therapeutic context. I conclude with some detailed discussion of Jung’s concept of the Self, his version of Schelling’s absolute subject and the empty centre toward which individuative Trieb strives.

Writing in 1921 some twenty five years before his crucial turn in thinking about the archetypes, Jung describes individuation as “the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated; in particular, it is the development of the psychological individual as a being distinct from the general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality” in a dialectic of production between the individual and the collective (“Definitions” pars. 757ff). Jung describes individuation in terms of a paradox he elsewhere reserves for the archetype, as “the a priori existence of potential wholeness [. . .] as if something already existent were being put together” (“The Psychology of the Child Archetype” para. 278). In the Introduction, we saw Jung describe individuation as “a building up of the particular [. . .] already ingrained in the psychic constitution” (“Definitions” para. 761). But we have seen that Jung’s psyche is ultimately definable only in terms of a fluidity which un-defines it, dissociates it into nodal points of intensity. In other words, it is imbricated with the derangement of Schelling’s Nature, traumatic historicity in its specifically Romantic sense, the grammatology of Being which destabilises all attempts at history. In the terms of the Freedom essay, it is the dark ground of personality; in Ages, it is the “highest science” of the person as the living being within knowledge, a movement toward the confluence of truth and fable. Thus, the individual’s libidinal gradient can never be reduced to the Stufenfolge of Jung’s
therapeutics of presence; it is eventually blocked by involutive turns which reflect the primordial difference within Nature – the yearning always already within the Potenzenlehre, the very principle of energy and movement. While Jung at times talks of individuation in terms of wholeness, this blockage is always imperilling; the cuts and breaks of caesurae always risk infection and swelling. Indeed, this blockage is figured in the Freedom essay as evil’s “turgor, turgescence, tumescence, the swelling that comes from the isolation of the part from the general economy of forces” (Wirth, Conspiracy 170). And Jung figures this tumescence in remarkably similar terms as the inflation of the personality. In inflation, the ego is overwhelmed by archetypal forces in an “identification with the collective psyche” (The Relations para. 260) through its attempt to assume control over the entire personality, which typically leads to the destructive identification with a single archetypal force or symbol: “In such a state a man fills a space which normally he cannot fill. He can only fill it by appropriating to himself contents and qualities which properly exist for themselves alone and should therefore remain outside our bounds” (The Relations para. 227). Inflation is psychic cancer – archetypal life that grows out of control to push an always already precarious ego further away from a “point of equilibrium.”

In a word, inflation is psychosis: and in a statement strikingly similar to Schelling’s critique of the Cartesian cogito, Jung writes that in this state “it is no longer he that thinks and speaks, but it thinks and speaks within him: he hears voices” (The

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246 “The further the conscious situation moves away from a certain point of equilibrium, the more forceful and accordingly the more dangerous become the unconscious contents that are struggling to restore the balance. This leads ultimately to a dissociation: on the one hand, ego-consciousness makes convulsive efforts to shake off an invisible opponent [. . .] while on the other hand it increasingly falls victim to the tyrannical will [. . .] which displays all the characteristics of a daemonic subman and superman combined” (The Psychology of the Transference para. 394).

247 See also “A Study” para. 621. Jung’s classic example of inflation is Adolf Hitler who, as a prophetic “medicine man,” was inflated by the God archetype in the form of his “Voice.” “His Voice is nothing other than his own unconscious, into which the German people have projected their own selves; that is, the unconscious of seventy-eight million Germans.” “Hitler has sacrificed his individuality, or else does not possess one in any real sense, to this almost complete subordination to collective unconscious forces” (“Diagnosing the Dictators” 115-16, 119-120; “Jung Diagnoses the Dictators” 139).
It is worth remembering that inflation is, at bottom, consciousness’ foolhardy attempt to do precisely what individuation aims to do – to close the gap separating mind and Nature, to appropriate tout court for one’s ego the deranging powers of Nature made available to the individual in magnetic crisis. But just as in the Freedom essay man neither can nor should attain an impossible homology with God, so ego can never attain Self, can never reign like Jupiter over the infinite pantheon of archetypal energies. No drive can ever be fully realised. Yet even this is beside the point; thoughts have us, Jung writes, with some necessary inhibition from a healthy consciousness. We are in no small way lived by personality, but it is evil, as the power of the Ungrund in Nature (Freedom 44), which powers the inscrutable rhythms by which we move toward and away from the centrum. And just as evil is necessary for Schellingian individuation, Jung sees inflation and its risk as necessary for the individuation process, a byproduct of “simply continuing the analytic work” (The Relations para. 243). Inflation, then, is a caesura in the inscrutable rhythm of individuation; it is a tumescent blockage which can catalyse either compensation or destruction; the vantage point of Krell’s “protracted instant” which offers a fleeting glimpse of the whole can either enlighten or overwhelm. As such, we are all consigned to the melancholic incommensurability between ground and existence, the infinite, indiscernible rhythms of progression and regression, rhythm and caesura in “the sadness that clings to all finite life” (Freedom 62).

Thus freedom, necessity, and evil are inseparable in the pharmakon unfolding of Romantic metasubjectivity, in which individuation’s success is in its “failure.” But how

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248 See note 193, above. This dissociative state recalls David Fincher’s Fight Club (1999), a film which unfolds like a case study of the dissociationist psyche. Recall Jack’s discovery, in the derelict house on Paper Street, of the litany of articles written in the first-person from the perspective of organs aware enough to seriously consider “striving to be for themselves.” Attended by his imaginary Döppelganger Tyler Durden, Jack reads: “I am Jack’s medulla oblongata: without me, Jack could not regulate his heart rate, blood pressure or breathing.” “I am Jill’s nipples.” “I am Jack’s colon…I get cancer; I kill Jack.”

249 Thus in 1935 Jung critiques the standpoint of Western rationalism from the standpoint of the East, which is considerably closer to Jung’s dissociationist framework: “for the East [thoughts] are material beings [. . .] something that happens and can be felt. [. . .] But we [in the West] talk of manipulating them for we are convinced we make them. This is nonsense, but [. . .] the Westerner would be demoralised by the idea of being the toy of fate which tosses us about” (Modern Psychology 225).
is one to *treat* this “sadness”? How does one move individuation through this melancholy? In Schelling’s *Freedom* essay, the perennial “propensity of man to do evil” by appropriating the ground is powered by self-will, which in turn catalyses the “will of love” (47), a process which ultimately “consists in the reconstruction of the relation of the periphery to the *centrum*” (34-35), the projected restoration of Jung’s “point of equilibrium.” Jung more specifically develops an antidote as the transcendent function. The transcendent function harks back to Schelling’s suggestive remarks on magnetic sleep. However, where magnetic sleep explores the inner life of the individual in a somnambulistic state, the transcendent function is a potentiated analytic encounter between analyst and analysand as Jungian questioning and answering beings, but energised in ways which surpass Jung’s efforts to contain these energies in this dynamic.

For Jung, the transcendent function is a product of the countertransference dynamic of the analytic encounter; it addresses the question of the proper “mental and moral attitude” to take toward the manifestation of unconscious material and its communication to the analysand (“The Transcendent Function” para. 144). Generally speaking, the transcendent function marks the convergence of two positions in a third position or state of awareness:

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions creates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing – not a logical stillbirth [. . .] but a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. The transcendent function manifests itself as *a quality of conjoined opposites*. (para. 189; my italics)

This third thing, this “new level of being” created by questioning and answering beings of consciousness and unconscious, is birthed through a dialectic between analyst and analysand as conspirators in a rhythm of “approximation [*Angleichung*] and differentiation [*Unterscheidung*]” (Jung, “Foreword to Michael Fordham” para. 1172). The energetic tension in such a moment marks the convergence of conscious and
unconscious in conditions much like those of a synchronistic experience. Jung’s essay casts the analyst-anałyands relationship in terms similar to that of Schelling’s “higher principle” (as second potency or \(A^2\)) guiding the soul emerging from consciousness (Ages 59), or a waking equivalent of the “guidance” restored in the first stage of magnetic sleep outlined by Schelling. However, Jung is ultimately ambivalent about the dynamics which (un)ground the transcendent function. On the one hand, he wants to contain the transcendent function within the anałyands, so to speak. Thus the analyst “mediates the transcendent function for the patient [to] help bring conscious and unconscious together and so arrive at a new attitude” as part of managing the anałyands’ transference on to the analyst (“The Transcendent Function” para. 146). But elsewhere Jung writes of the productive and unpredictable aspects of countertransference: “For two personalities to meet is like mixing two different chemical substances: *if there is any combination at all, both are transformed*” (“Problems” para. 163; my italics). 

There is, then, a risk of *contagion* in the analytic scene of the transcendent function, where both analyst and anałyands are, as we have seen, dissociative matrices of archetypal forces and nodal intensities. Beyond Jung’s desire for an ethics of *Auseinandersetzung*, this scene is fundamentally the site of a rhizomatic convergence wherein, exchanging insights and ideas on the conscious level, each also affects the other’s unconscious and any number of connections and countertransferences between

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250 Of course, not every meaningful event (in analysis or otherwise) is accompanied by synchronistic occurrences like Jung’s account of the scarab beetle. Nor does it mean that every time an anałyand achieves a new level of awareness there is an experience of ecstasy. Rather, the transcendent function provides a theoretical blueprint for the intellectual apprehension of new attitudes merging conscious and unconscious energies, which can be of varying intensity. New intellectual attitudes may catalyse ecstatic or synchronistic experiences and vice versa.

251 In his “Toward an Ethics of *Auseinandersetzung*” (2000), Gâsché articulates *Auseinandersetzung* as the situation in which “the critic comes face to face in a direct confrontation with the thought of an Other” in which “real and concrete issues come to word, while the debate itself mobilizes energies that themselves testify to the urgency […] of the problems in question” (315).

252 Jung’s discussion of transference in the fourth *Tavistock Lecture* exhibits this ambivalence as well as his trademark philosophical laxity. Transference here is “a priori,” yet can and should be dissolved because it “is always a hindrance, never an advantage. You cure in spite of the transference, not because of it” (pars. 315, 349). But just as “we do not need transference just as we do not need projection,” in the same breath Jung asserts that archetypal images “have to be projected, otherwise they inundate consciousness” (pars.
forces can be made. Thus on one level, the analyst can “guide” the analysand to greater awareness, but beyond this rubric of “higher guidance,” the countertransference encounter activates a fluidity whose ripples cannot be discerned or measured. Analyst and analysand can both project onto each other in imperceptible ways; both can be transformed (for better or worse). Indeed, seen through the lens of Schelling’s copular logic, the transcendent function’s particular energetic charge consists in the awareness of both analyst and analysand as predicates before the absolute subject, which manifests itself here as knowledge of a new state or configuration of experience that travels through analyst and analysand without being either one of them. This is why Jung insists that this function’s “transcendence” is not the apprehension of a sublated ideality, but instead denotes “the [organic] transition from one attitude to another without loss of the unconscious” (“The Transcendent Function” para. 145; my italics). In other words, the transcendent function marks the copula of Being through a zero-sum libidinal economy where the unconscious is not depotentiated with new conscious awareness. Yet this persistent unconscious valency not only defeats the psychoanalytic project of depotentiating the unconscious in service to consciousness; it also constitutes a contagious excess which permeates and imperils the Jungian analytic encounter.

*Ages’ Potenzenlehre* is nothing less than a cosmological parable for the transcendent function, which reciprocates its dynamism on the level of the psyche. Let us recall the work of yearning in the movement of the potencies: in the eternal moment of creation the expansive potency ($A^2$) is “bewitched” and pulled down to the first, contractive principle ($A^1$) because $A^1$ sees its futurity in $A^2$, something it is capable of. This process makes $A^3$ visible as spirit in nature, the freedom underwriting $A^1$’s relationship with $A^2$. In the countertransference dynamic of the analytic scene, the analysand projects their unconscious content on to the analyst; the analyst becomes the

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351, 361). We may chide Jung for remaining caught in a somewhat stagnant complex of opposites (here a stark tension between the “aetiology” and the “therapy” of the transference [pars. 328, 357]), but Jung nevertheless points to the rhythm of archetypal projection and recollection – a dynamic rendered much more fluidly in Schelling. Jung’s later *On the Psychology of the Transference* (1946) offers a more mitigated account. Warren Steinberg offers a useful (if somewhat psychologising) account of Jung’s evolving thought on transference (29ff).
analysand’s A\(^1\), which confronts the analysand’s consciousness (A\(^2\)), “bewitching” it, pulling its projected archetypal material to itself. Schelling writes in *Ages* that the “self-lacerating madness” of the first potency, which is now “innermost in all things” as the eternal beginning of Being, must be “verified by the light of a higher intellect” (103). That is, the unconscious material needs consciousness to witness and express it in the exchange, and thus it is here that A\(^3\), the force of the Self as freedom, can manifest, can touch and not touch consciousness, opening up a new attitude and opportunities for new knowledge – a recapitulation of this eternal beginning of Being in Being. But the third thing created from this free flow is, like Schelling’s A\(^3\), re-implicated in eternal unfolding in an individuation process without guarantees. Because there is no loss of unconscious valency, the third thing’s “irrational nature” drives the process forward as an undecidable force.

Yet “The Transcendent Function” harbours an indeterminacy at its textual core which recapitulates Jung’s problematic attempts to contain countertransferralional contagion in the analyst-analysand encounter, and thus unworks the essay’s capacity as a manual for the analysand’s “guidance.” The middle of Jung’s essay (pars. 166-75) is occupied by a detailed discussion of *active imagination*: a therapeutic method of stimulating fantasy production in the analysand in order to articulate the affectivity of the present emotional state as “the beginning of the transcendent function” (para. 167). Jung would later write that active imagination is in fact the transcendent function’s theoretical core, “the indispensable second part of any analysis that is really meant to go to the roots” (letter to Mr. O., 2 May 1947, 459). In the state of active imagination, the analysand “must make himself as conscious as possible” of the current emotional state and record “fantasies” and “associations” which manifest: “Fantasy must be allowed the freest possible play, yet not in such a manner that it leaves the orbit of its object, namely the affect” (para. 167). From this comes “a more or less complete expression of the mood” or, more precisely, “a picture of the contents and tendencies of the unconscious that were massed together” in the crisis (para. 167). Jung positions active imagination contrary to Freudian free association, which for him “leads away from the object to all sorts of complexes, and one can never be sure that they relate to the affect” (para. 167).
Yet in detailing the procedure for the analysand’s practice of active imagination, Jung takes up a Cartesian boundary between mind and its object:

Contemplate [the object] and carefully observe how the picture begins to unfold or to change. Don’t try to make it into something, just do nothing but observe what its spontaneous changes are. Any mental picture you contemplate in this way will sooner or later change through a spontaneous association that causes a slight alteration of the picture. You must carefully avoid impatient jumping from one subject to another. Hold fast to the one image you have chosen and wait until it changes by itself. Note all these changes and eventually step into the picture yourself, and if it is a speaking figure at all then say what you have to say to that figure and listen to what he or she has to say. (letter to Mr. O., 2 May 1947, 460)

As the transcendent function’s core, active imagination in fact recapitulates the transcendent function’s analytic scene on the level of the individual psyche. Here the analysand assumes the role of “guide” to their unconscious material, observing and scrutinising changes which ostensibly occur in the object as it “changes by itself.” Indeed, the other appellation Jung gives to this process – “confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with the unconscious” (letter to Mr. O., 20 April 1947, 459) – depends on this distinction. The ability to decide when to “step into the picture yourself” presumes a conscious control which resonates with the interrogation of Nature in the synchronicity experiment, where the scientific observer demands answers from Nature. But the assumption that one can differentiate between object-changes and those which belong to the observer is profoundly troubled by the Jungian psyche’s intractable fluidity and affinity with Schelling’s deranged Nature. How does one know a train of associations leads away from the object unless one follows it – or, in Schellingian terms, unless one follows “the particular wherever it might lead, regardless of its consistency with a larger whole” (Rajan, “First Outline” 315) so as to intuit that “whole”? Indeed, in spite of the tacit attempt to sublate this dilemma into a revelation of the object or affect, Jung duly notes the dangers this fluidity poses to not only the self-analytic experiment but also the analysand in the form of psychosis (Mysterium 530-31).^{253} For active imagination after the break with Freud; see note 64, above. And we cannot miss the irony that Jung, as the first to insist that analysts themselves be analysed and who harshly criticised Freud’s idea of “self-
imagination is an encounter with archetypal forces, “images [which] have a life of their own and [. . .] symbolic events [which] develop according to their own logic” (Tavistock para. 397). Ultimately, the untameable fluidity and contagion of the Jungian psyche is precisely what imperils the dialogic aspect of both the transcendent function and active imagination – that is, their Auseinandersetzung as a structured debate or dispute in which each side is given its due. Auseinandersetzung transpires on the shaky ground of Hölderlin’s incalculable law, as that which can alter or dispel the arbitrary contract between conscious and unconscious at any time.

Here is where Jung perhaps draws closest to Deleuze’s transcendental-empirical “science of the sensible,” for the transcendent function apprehends the moment of system’s declension from the datum of sense, a remembering and repeating of the moment where infinite productivity is conjugated into form. The “living tension of the universe” (Wirth, “Translator’s Introduction” xxiii), inaugurated by Schelling’s primary cision and recapitulated in the dynamic between questioning and answering beings in magnetic sleep, takes human form in a metapsychology allowing for the creation of new inflections of this tension in what Deleuze calls a reason of “the multiple, chaos and difference” (DR 57). Indeed, the specific energy and event of “transcendence,” and its revelation of a sylleptic third, allows us to narrativise the ineffable self-creation of the archetypes themselves as magnetised particles of creation, conjugations of Schelling’s contractive (A¹) and expansive (A²) potencies. To use Schelling’s naturphilosophische analysis,” nevertheless writes that active imagination is something his analyses can perform on their own, “a dialectical procedure [one] carr[ies] through with [oneself]” (letter to Mr. O., 30 April 1947, 459). Via Heidegger, Gasché takes up Nietzsche’s understanding of the term as “true philosophy,” as “that which, in a thinker’s thought, [. . .] obeys the law of thinking, thinking’s own law” (316). Jung attempts this Auseinandersetzung as psychology. But while the intersubjectivity of the transcendent function may make it more manageable, the Schellingian derangement intrinsic to active imagination effectively deconstructs this Auseinandersetzung and the ethics generated by the binding distance required to hold each side in place relative to the other and do justice to their particularities (317). If Auseinandersetzung marks what in thought is intrinsic to “thinking’s own law” (316), what happens when these very “laws” collapse thinking into its Other (as we have seen with Schelling’s early equation of reason with the processes of Nature [FO 195])? When confrontation becomes conflagration? In this sense it is striking that Jung equated the teleology of alchemy with active imagination (Mysterium 526) when active imagination clearly harbours the potential to derange teleology.
language: the archetype’s “free transformation” drives it to repeat its own nature, its own pattern and potential, but at the same time it must expand in “universal prehension,” entangling itself with other archetypes to form the rhizomatic fabric of Being. But finally it remains for us to examine the horizon of futurity which inheres in this matrix; the goal toward which this movement is driven. In short, the Jungian Self.

It is not by accident that the copular bond returns in *Ages as character*, the emblem of personality which is not chosen but *happens* to one as the subject constellating all future predicates. Just as the X that is both “ball” and “blue” enables us to say “the ball is blue,” so character is that which can be both “good” and “evil” without being either (*Ages* 8-9). It thus assumes the role held by personality as the “nonthingly center” of the *centrum* in the *Freedom* essay (Wirth, *Conspiracy* 170), and in “NPS” this is, of course, the absolute subject. Analytical psychology conceives of this purposive organisational force as individuation’s drive of “endless approximation” toward the “empty centre” of the Self. Jung writes:

> The goal of this approximation seems to be anticipated by archetypal symbols which represent something like the circumambulation of a centre. With increasing approximation to the centre there is a corresponding depotentiation of the ego in favour of the influence of the “empty” centre, which is certainly not identical with the archetype but is the thing the archetype points to. […] We can describe the “emptiness” of the centre as “God.” Emptiness in this sense doesn’t mean “absence” or “vacancy,” but something unknowable which is endowed with the highest intensity. If I call this unknowable the “self,” [I have given] the effects of the unknowable [an] aggregate name, but its contents are not affected in any way. […] The self is therefore a *borderline concept*, not by any means filled out with the known psychic processes. (letter to Pastor Walter Bernet, 13 June 1955, 258)\(^{255}\)

Jung tends to associate the experience of the Self positively, with a process of centring, an affect-laden experience of “the timelessness of the unconscious which expresses itself in a feeling of eternity or immortality” (*Psychology of the Transference* para. 531). But we have seen that the “depotentiation of the ego” involved in the sublime experience of

\(^{255}\) For an important discussion on the status of the Self relative to the archetypes see Appendix C, “Self and Archetype.”
the Self is precisely the danger intrinsic to the dissociationist psyche as inflation or Schelling’s impossible homology between man and God; here, an identification with the Self as “God-image” (“A Psychological Approach” para. 231). And we have seen that Jung elsewhere acknowledges the profound ambivalence of archetypal experience, and particularly that of the Self, of which only “antinomial statements” are possible (Transformation Symbolism pars. 399n). The experience of Self thus points to a very real psychological peril that Jung occasionally (and perhaps grudgingly) accepts: sometimes individuation can “lead to a fatal outcome owing to the preponderance of destructive tendencies [. . .] preordained in the life-pattern of certain hereditarily tainted individuals” (“On the Nature of Dreams” para. 547). Jung insists that with psychological reality “a proposition can only lay claim to significance if the obverse of its meaning can also be accepted as true” (“Fundamental Questions” para. 236), and this problematises an implicitly moral telos which assumes that such experiences are always positive. The “Janus-faced” aspect of the unconscious and the possibility of inflation mean that wrong advice can be given; right advice can be ignored; a Self-experience can come to the “wrong” person at the “wrong” time and result in death or catastrophe. One cannot calculate the incalculable law by which caesurae irrupt within the indiscernible rhythm of an individuative line of flight.

For Jung the Self is a “virtual nucleus” (Introduction 129) reflecting personality’s inscrutable emergence from the always already divided Ungrund of the Schelling of the Freedom essay and Ages, the God-and-not-God of the primordial cision. Indeed, just as Trieb desires itself, the Jungian Self figures the absolute subject, the preexistent marker of personality, the badge of self-desire worn by Schelling’s God. Like the archetypes it

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256 To this end Lucy Huskinson sees the Self as “an overpowering and violent entity” which “violates the boundaries of ego-consciousness [to] interrupt and effectively destroy the self-containment of the ego in order to express its hitherto unconscious meaning and creative capacity” (442). Huskinson’s description suggests that the Self’s revelation of meaning and its creative charge are imminent to the limit-experience of Self. But through my articulation of Romantic metasubjectivity I argue against the existence of any such guarantee. One cannot simply impose revelatory meaning upon the unpredictable productivity of the Ungrund.
constellates, the Self’s yearning to articulate itself means that it unfolds in time and history, in the grammatology of Being:

The ego stands to the self as the moved to the mover, or as object to subject, because the determining factors which radiate out from the self surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it. The self, like the unconscious, is an *a priori* existent out of which the ego evolves. It is, so to speak, an unconscious prefiguration of the ego. [Nevertheless,] The existence of ego consciousness has meaning only if it is free and autonomous. (*Transformation Symbolism* para. 391)

The “prefiguration,” in freedom, of personality is the closest Jung gets to the paradox of system and freedom Schelling so painstakingly elaborates in the *Freedom* essay. And Jung’s strange, paradoxical imagery here punctuates the conflation of object and subject positions in the Self-ego relation – factors radiate *out* from the Self like the sun’s rays to *surround* a subordinate ego. This paradox is Jung’s poetic expression of how the Self simultaneously invokes and surpasses its antinomialism as “*a priori* existent” whose experience is quantified with libidinal charge. In other words, it is the intuition of the purposive libidinal current underlying changes in phenomena (“On Psychic Energy” para. 3). Indeed, Jung writes elsewhere of the Self that it “is felt empirically not as subject but as object, and this by reason of its unconscious component, which can only come to consciousness indirectly, by way of projection. Because of its unconscious component [the Self] can only be partially expressed by human figures; the other part of it has to be expressed by objective, abstract symbols” (“The Psychological Aspects” para. 315). The Self *is* not Jesus; it *is* not Buddha, nor *is* it Mohammed or the Lamb of God. It is nothing in particular, but can be anything.

Jung’s late thinking on the Self reflects a final break with teleology. He writes of the Self shortly before his death in 1961:

So far, I have found no stable or definite center in the unconscious and I don’t believe such a center exists. I believe that the thing which I call self is a hypothetical center, equidistant between the ego and the unconscious, and it is probably equivalent to the maximum natural expression of individuality, in a state of fulfillment or totality. As nature aspires to express itself, so does man, and *the*
self is that dream of totality. It is therefore an ideal center, something created” (“Talks with Miguel Serrano: 1959” 394, trans. mod.; my italics)\textsuperscript{257}

Put into Schellingian terms, the Self is the equivalent of Nature returned to primordial stasis by paradoxically having created and travelled through all of its possible derangements. It is derangement at rest, having reached its “maximum natural expression” – in a word, indifference. But even this indifference is but a hypothetical moment. For as an equidistant point between an unconscious without beginning and a consciousness which can never fully know itself, the Self remains polarised, subject to the fluctuation of its poles. Indeed, Jung’s late thinking on the ultimate goal of individuation radically potentiates it as a complexio oppositorum (Answer to Job para. 716), a magnetic constellation of energies evocative of the potencies’ work of yearning in Ages. And in 1958 Jung goes even further to define the Self’s “maximum natural expression” as in fact “the whole range of psychic phenomena in man” (“Definitions” para. 789), as a dissociative matrix of energetic centres reminiscent of Schelling’s description of celestial bodies in the construction of the cosmos (Ages 89ff). Archetypal energies now orbit a centripetal force which is itself imbricated and implicated in a matrix of nodal points. The Romantic metasubject, the “Self of one’s self,” is the plenitude, the excess of Being.

If the Self is “the whole range of psychic phenomena in man,” and psyche is coterminous with Nature in all its derangement, then the intellectual partnership between Schelling’s philosophy and Jung’s psychology which articulates the Trieb of Romantic metasubjectivity requires a move beyond the purview of the strictly human. And indeed, unlike Hegel, who would conceive individuation as the immanent unfolding of absolute spirit in human history, or Freud, who sees individual development as a project of mastering the unconscious, neither Schelling nor Jung ultimately conceived individuation as exclusively focused on the human individual. Schelling’s copular logic is once again

\textsuperscript{257} It should be emphasized that when Jung describes the Self as a “dream of totality,” an “ideal center” or something “created,” he by no means argues that the Self is either a product of consciousness or an oneiric epiphenomenon.
worth invoking here for its expression in the logic of the Jungian symbol. Jung’s conception of the archetypal symbol is the vehicle for an aesthetics which surpasses the idealist confines of Schelling’s 1800 *System*, which represented the aesthetic as a series of Idealist “odysseys of the spirit.” This copular dynamic is expressed in the therapeutic encounter through the archetype’s metaphoricity – its necessary embodiment in symbols and situations that gesture toward an excess dwelling within its own representation:

An archetypal content expresses itself, first and foremost, in metaphors. If such a content should speak of the sun and identify with it the lion, the king [or] the power that makes for the life and health of man, it is neither the one thing nor the other, but the unknown third that somehow finds more or less adequate expression in all these similes, yet – to the perpetual vexation of the intellect – remains unknown and not to be fitted into a formula. ("The Psychology of the Child Archetype" para. 267)

A living symbol, then, contains an intensity which is expressed through a metonymy of predicates which can never reach the archetype’s “unknown third,” the energetic continuum which flows through it. In the next and final chapter we will have occasion to examine the workings of this metaphoricity in the Romantic poetry of Wordsworth and Shelley. And although *The Prelude* and *Prometheus Unbound* ostensibly work within the domain of the human,**258** we shall see that they also gesture toward the same fluidity which marks the individuative *Trieb* of Romantic metasubjectivity and the preterhuman domain through which it unfolds.

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**258** *Prometheus Unbound* is, of course, more unbound to the strictly human than *The Prelude*; for while Shelley intends it as a topography of “the operations of the human mind” (*Prometheus Unbound*, “Preface” l. 45), its mythological *dramatis personae* clearly reflect its cosmological dimensions.
Chapter 5

5 “Romantic Myth-subjectivity”: Wordsworth and Shelley

This chapter examines how the experience of Romantic metasubjectivity and its purposive model of individuation operate within the libidinal matrix of Romantic thought and poetry. More specifically, I want to explore how Romantic metasubjectivity amplifies Romanticism’s focus on mythology through the existential imperative of both Schelling’s positive philosophy and analytical psychology’s focus on experience. For both Schelling and Jung, mythology allows for a conceptualisation of the potentiated, libidinal forces of Being; that is, mythology articulates the grammatology of Being in which Romantic metasubjectivity unfolds. This “mythology” is not simply a structuralist pantheon of, say, Christian or Greek origin; nor does it anticipate a Barthesian semiotics whereby cultural discourses attain the status of “myths.” Rather, Schelling and Jung ultimately consider mythology as a matrix of nonmolar forces and potentiations, motile forces unfolding the traumatic historicity at the heart of Romanticism.\(^\text{259}\) In this sense, mythology organises both Romantic literature and philosophy. As early as his *Philosophy of Art* (1803-1804) Schelling argues that *Naturphilosophie* should ground the mythology of the future, relocating its nascent absolute subject in a mythology that individuates itself as “a collectivity that is an individual as one person” (§42). Taking up this project, Schelling’s 1842 lectures on mythology (*HCI*) read the *Potenzenlehre* of the 1815 *Ages* into the origins of humanity, deconstructing the Christian myth of the Fall\(^\text{260}\) as a play of potencies to explain the origins of tribes, peoples, and mythological traditions as a cision from a primordial relationship to God. Arguing for a primal, poetical “crisis

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259 Jung’s collaboration with the Hungarian classicist Karl Kerényi resulted in a joint publication entitled *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (1941), which draws directly from Schelling’s philosophy of mythology (*Essays* 155). The text adopts Schelling’s conception of mythology as a matrix of theogonic forces: mythology is not simply narrative, but the movement of forces (“mythologems”), something “solid and yet mobile, substantial and yet not static, capable of transformation” (2). Mythology has no guiding question or ideology; it is, in fact, nothing less than the “spontaneous regression to the ‘ground’” (7).

260 The analogy between potentiation and the myth of the Fall is established in the 1800 *System* (*STI* 200, 232-33).
of mythological consciousness” from which mythologies emerge (HCI 18), Schelling deliberately conceptualises his Philosophy of Mythology as a *psychoanalysis* of mythology in the broadest (non-Freudian) sense: the scientific spirit does not colonise its object of inquiry, but instead “induces it to open the sources of knowledge that are hidden and still concealed in itself.” In this way, the spectator himself “take[s] active part in the continued formation of science” (HCI 7). Mythology becomes the disciplinary unconscious of the sciences and the location of the “absolute process” which is the goal of philosophy” (151).

This psychoanalytic “inducement” is an invitation to a countertransferenceential encounter with *historicity itself* as a “system of the gods” (HCI 9). This “system” is not a pantheon but a nexus of gods as potentiations unfolding through history, an economy of autochthonous “pure matter” (14) which is represented in specific historical representations as “historical beings” (10) without being reducible to any one species of representation. In this sense, mythology is the manifestation, in and through human consciousness and history, of the *Naturphilosophie*’s self-organising actants, here cast as “theogonic powers” (144). This distinctly psychological component of Schelling’s lectures anticipates analytical psychology’s emphasis on mythology as the indispensable organisational force of archetypal knowledge and experience for Jung’s “extremely historical organism.” Jung puts it simply: to individuate is to live one’s own myth.261

But as a result, Schelling’s mythological potentiation and its role in humanity’s (ultimately Christian) individuation is both corroborated and troubled in Jung, who radicalises this individuation on the level of the psyche and in so doing depotentiates Schelling’s Christian eschatology. In turn, Schelling’s deconstructive approach to mythology troubles Jung’s tendency to personify mythical figures as archetypes in analytical psychology’s therapeutics of presence.

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261 After the break with Freud and during Jung’s own confrontation with his unconscious, he asks himself: “what is your myth—the myth in which you do live?” (Memories 171). While this use of “myth” in the singular might suggest a monocular view of myth as one overarching narrative, it is clear from Jung’s metapsychology that Jung equates “myth” here with the purposive individuation of a life. Each myth, and the archetypal forces a myth constellates, are mutually entangled to the extent that it is the purposive *Trieb* of individuation that *decides* (in the Schellingian sense!) on their organisation.
Mythology’s energetic matrix, then, is the primal site in which Romantic metasubjectivity unfolds. I thus turn to two Romantic “myth-subjectivities” – William Wordsworth’s *The Prelude* (1799/1805)\(^{262}\) and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* (1820), two different Prometheanisms which articulate the Romantic metasubjective psyche. Both these instances of Romantic “mythmaking” at once inhibit and reinvoke Romantic metasubjectivity’s radical productivity as purposive *Trieb* against the idealist teleology of individuation both poems seek to preserve. In other words, both poems’ Promethean elements trouble the Hegelian promise of a final revelation of self-consciousness. In *The Excursion* (1814) Wordsworth writes of myths in general, and the myth of Prometheus in particular, that they are “Fictions in form, but in their substance truths, / Tremendous truths! familiar to the men / Of long-past times, nor obsolete in ours” (6.545-47). Prometheanism in *The Prelude* unfolds as personal experiences of the growth of a poet’s mind. However, the poem’s textual history from 1799-1850 reflects *Trieb’s* displacement into a philosophical *Bildungsroman* as mythology’s play of forces is gradually suppressed through interpellation into discourse. In other words, the philosophy of Wordsworth’s “philosophical poem” gradually becomes an interiority binding Nature’s phenomenology into its self-grounding. What begins in 1799 as “embryonic theogony” (Hartman, “Was it for this?” 137) is gradually overdetermined by poetic theology by the time of the poem’s final 1850 version. I will stage focused incursions into Wordsworth’s epic to discuss three scenes of Promethean thievery (the theft of woodcocks, raven’s eggs, and the Shepherd’s Boat) and their place in the rhythms and caesurae of 1799’s Romantic metasubjective economy. These scenes constitute a gradual amplification of Promethean intensity in 1799, a staging of the Poet’s libidinal

\(^{262}\) 1799 includes what Parrish calls the poem’s “final form,” from MSS that “Wordsworth appears to have been closer to” (41). Interestingly, the differences in punctuation separating this text from others (notably the Norton edition) present a two-part *Prelude* more unbound than its Norton counterpart, published only two years later. For 1805, I use the AB-Stage reading text from *The Thirteen-Book Prelude*. Although aside from the rare citation (as 1850 *Prelude*) I do not deal with the 1850 *Fourteen-Book Prelude* here, it should be mentioned that this final edition, published only a few months after Wordsworth’s death in 1850, inhibits much of 1805’s aleatory energy. Subject to several posthumous revisions, the ambivalent natural powers of 1799 and 1805 are thoroughly Christianised and harmonised into a paean to what at the poem’s close is “a mind sustained / By recognitions of transcendent power / In sense, conducting to ideal form” (1850 *Prelude* 14.74-76). All other references to Wordsworth’s poetry are from *The Poems*, 2 vols.
gradient whose productive energies are inhibited in 1805. I then turn to the 1805 version
to discuss the failed crossing of the Alps and the sublation of this traumatic failure in the
Poet’s experience on Mount Snowdon, where the Poet represses the more radically
productive forces of Nature and its unconscious analogue. By reframing 1799’s opening
encounter, 1805 makes Nature a stage where its darker “under-powers” are subordinated
to the mind and its reflection(s). Thus, I argue that The Prelude is mythmaking in the
personal sense\textsuperscript{263} – that is, the sense in which Wordsworth expresses the growth of his
poetic mind through a phenomenological economy of experience removed from
established literary or religious pantheons.

In contrast, Prometheus Unbound is a dramatisation of myth making, a psychic
scene of emergence for Schelling’s system of the gods. Here, metapsychology is
metamythology, the paradoxical deployment of Biblical motifs of flood and plague and
figures from Classical mythology (such as Jupiter, Mercury, and personifications of earth
and moon) to dramatise the nonmolar movement of potentiation. The Prometheanism of
Shelley’s lyrical drama unbinds the energy of Prometheus from his brief lyrical presence
in the poem, distributing it across planets, natural forces, and gods in what is ultimately a
dissociative topography of the Romantic metasubjective psyche. One might say that in
Prometheus Unbound Prometheus, hitherto considered as a megasubject unifying
disparate forces into a self-present One Mind, is unbound into metasubjectivity. Classical
mythology – presumably less personal and more universal than individual narrative – is
rethought in a topography of “operations of the human mind” (Prometheus Unbound,
“Preface” l. 45) at once more radically universal and personal than the individual poet’s
relationship to his/her personal memories. In this sense Shelley is closer to the
organisational force Schelling suggests in his mythology lectures, where the “Self of
one’s self,” and the purposive individuation attending it, is not merely a personal force
but is thought on the level of peoples, mythologies, and indeed humanity itself.

\textsuperscript{263} Harold Bloom sees Wordsworth’s poetry as starkly “antimythological” (23), but this is obviously
predicated on an understanding of mythology apposite to that of both Schelling and Jung.
In psychoanalytic terms, we can say that The Prelude largely represses Romantic metasubjectivity, whereas Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound negates it. For just as negation amounts to a lifting of repression but not intellectual acceptance of what was repressed (Freud, “Negation” 236), so Shelley’s text gives a voice to Romantic metasubjective Trieb while offering the text itself as a means to bind its own purposive energies intellectually. That is, the end of Prometheus Unbound superimposes political Idealism over its psychological insights, thereby suspending the full implications of Romantic metasubjectivity for the poem’s implicit ethos. Read in this way, The Prelude is a phenomenological case study of the dissociative topography traced by Prometheus Unbound, a deployment of its energies on the personal level of childhood experience and later reflection. Both Wordsworth and Shelley exemplify the evolution of Schelling’s mythological thinking from the early Idealism of the tenth Letter to Schelling’s later philosophy of mythology. The first wants to safely aestheticise the tragic element of Greek mythology; the second ontologically asserts these terrors as the postlapsarian Babelic confusion of languages and peoples, even as it moves to inscribe them in a Christian apocatastasis. The Prelude converts the titanogeny that the early Schelling disavows into a phenomenology, and Prometheus Unbound’s poetic metapsychology casts Schelling’s “terrors of an invisible world” as psychological forces. In so doing, The Prelude recovers the libidinal energies of Romantic metasubjectivity in a promissory horizon of poetic individuation, but these energies remain dispersed in Shelley, unbound to the end in a poem whose hero remains spectral in spite of Shelley’s apposite desire to portray Prometheus as a megalosubject who represents political freedom.

264 In his tenth Philosophical Letter on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795), Schelling discusses the “sublime thought” of Greek tragedy, which is “to suffer punishment willingly even for an inevitable crime,” to fight against “an objective power which threatens our freedom with annihilation” – the power of fate itself – and, in so doing, to be vanquished (192-93). Such a tragic narrative is not dissimilar to the narrative of Prometheus, who suffers for doing what is precisely according to his nature. But in the tenth Letter Schelling backs away from the phenomenological and psychological implications of this trauma: “Such a fight is thinkable only for the purpose of tragic art,” for tragedy as a human mode of action “would presuppose a human race of titans” raging against the terrors of impossible objects, teetering on the brink of schizophrenic rupture, “tormented by the terrors of an invisible world” (194). I argue that Wordsworth phenomenologises this tragic trauma in The Prelude’s personal Bildungsroman and that Shelley’s lyrical drama, meant as a portrayal of “the operations of the human mind,” unfolds the more distinctly metapsychological titanogeny both hinted at and feared by the early Schelling.
5.1 The 1799 Prelude: Potency, Amplification

A narrative of “the growth of a poet’s mind,” The Prelude is nevertheless, like Schelling’s Ages, a text wrapped up in its repeated attempts to narrate the past. In the 1814 “Preface to The Excursion” Wordsworth writes that he intended The Prelude as a “preparatory poem,” an “ante-chapel” to the “gothic church” of The Recluse, Wordsworth’s never-written great “philosophical poem” and magnum opus of reflections on the world by a retired poet (“Preface to The Excursion” 5). But this first outline of Wordsworth’s masterwork is itself plagued by a dilemma of origins. The Prelude begins – and remains – without a proper name. The title is posthumous – almost from its inception the project was understood by Wordsworth as “the poem to Coleridge,” who functions as an absent answering being throughout the poem and whose life events catalysed different revisions and versions of The Prelude. And where Ages’ Idealism is gradually unbound as it is revised from 1811 to 1815, the reverse is the case with Wordsworth’s epic: 1799 stages encounters with Romantic metasubjectivity’s radical, productive unconscious in the form of Nature, encounters that have an intensity sublated (and sublimated) in subsequent revisions.

265 In one of the few studies of Wordsworth and Schelling, Hirsch argues that they “developed independently [the] identical Weltanschauung” (4) of Enthusiasm, “a constant and sober way of confronting reality” somehow akin to being “possessed by a god,” yet different from the religious Schwärmeri Schelling criticises elsewhere (15). Beyond a certain reductive optimism, in limiting his study to periods where both writers’ “outlook remained stable and constant” (7), Hirsch misses the fluidity of their oeuvres.

266 Wordsworth writes in his earlier fragment on the sublime and the beautiful that the sublime requires “preparatory intercourse” (“The Sublime and the Beautiful” 359). “Preparatory” texts are a common Wordsworthian tactic to equip the reader for an experience of indeterminacy with which Wordsworth is not quite comfortable (see, for example, “The Thorn” and its preface).

267 The Five-Book Prelude Wordsworth created for Coleridge’s convalescence in Malta can be seen as a transitional text that begins to narrativise the aleatory energies of The Prelude as a whole.. Where in 1799 the Poet invokes Coleridge only at the end as somewhat of an afterthought (2.496ff), like 1805 the Five-Book Prelude begins with the Glad Preamble, in which Coleridge is very much present as poetic answering being, and continues with the Poet’s rumination on what subject matter to use in his poetic vocation, interpellating some 270 lines before the beginning of 1799 (“Was it for this?”) and the scenes of Promethean theft. While the Five-Book Prelude contains several of The Prelude’s potentiated episodes (the Discharged Soldier, the Drowned Man, the Boy of Winander), they are pushed forward to the final two books, deferred by Book Three as a prolonged narrative about the Poet’s studies at King’s College.
Nevertheless, *The Prelude*’s complicated textual history reflects a fluidity the text attempts to contain under the rubric of what Abrams’s *Natural Supernaturalism* has famously called its “crisis-autobiographical” movement. Abrams conceives crisis-autobiography as Hegelian *Aufhebungsdiälektik* whereby the Poet’s experience is structured by poetic crises, followed by recoveries and reaffirmations of a stronger, more determined poetic will as part of a teleology of poetic progress (77, 177, 225ff). This drive to read *The Prelude* as a Hegelian phenomenology of spirit emphasises the progress of “self-consciousness.” Yet there remains an aleatory quality to *The Prelude* making it less of an ante-chapel and more of a Borgesian infinite library, an unruly psychic economy which the 1805 Thirteen-Book and 1850 Fourteen-Book versions attempt to mitigate under the rubric of the poetic mind’s teleological progress. Despite Abrams’ (now perhaps dated) belief that a work must be judged as “a finished and free-standing product” (76), the 1799 *Two-Part Prelude* is a Wordsworthian “under-presence” that troubles any understanding of *The Prelude* as such. Viewed through the lens of Romantic metasubjectivity, *The Prelude*’s revisionary history from 1799 to 1805 recapitulates, on the level of *Bildungsroman*, a Schellingian inhibition or cision inaugurating time, history and Nature, and what Jung narrates as the emergence of (poetic) consciousness from the inscrutable primordial past of the collective unconscious.

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268 This progress often aligns with psychoanalytic interpretations of *The Prelude* inevitably predicated on the formative impact of childhood scenes on the maturation of the poet’s mind. See Wilson, *The Romantic Dream* 8-9 and Ellis.

269 Wordsworth uses “under-“ compound nouns at significant points in his poetry, often denoting an unconscious process or drive, or a force out of phenomenological view.

270 Abrams’ uses his somewhat totalising hermeneutic to argue, in Hegelian fashion, that *The Prelude*’s revisionary history from 1799 to 1805 was one of conscious revision, so that “the design inherent in [Wordsworth’s] life, which has become apparent only to his mature awareness, may stand revealed as a principle which was invisibly operative from the beginning” (76). But Abrams did not know of the *Two-Part Prelude*, which was published several years after *Natural Supernaturalism*. Parrish’s introduction to the Cornell Wordsworth edition of 1799 discusses the poem’s fluid textual history, which troubles Abrams’ hermeneutic. 1799 exists in two MSS.: MS. JJ (Part One) and RV (Part Two). JJ is an incomplete notebook, composed in a strange back-to-front manner, with fragments of the same episode (the Boy of Winander) scattered throughout and with disconnected passages written in different inks. Parrish describes the Cornell reading text as a “plausible” reconstruction (5). RV seems to have been assembled from lost working drafts (27), which makes definitive chronology impossible. The Cornell *Prelude* thus represents 1799 in its earliest stages, but as a reconstruction it is not absolutely authoritative.
What tries to emerge is a self-consciousness akin to that of Schelling’s 1800 System, but one pursued by the shadow of its materiality. So if the poem is a Bildungsroman, the text’s unfolding shows the (speculative) tension Beiser sees in the term Bildung (see note 83, above). As Hartman writes, “Wordsworth [does not] discover nature as such but rather the reality of the relation between nature and mind” (Wordsworth’s Poetry 170), and this relation is far more indeterminate than the Poet lets on. Put differently, The Prelude’s absent centre is a site of endless approximation; indeed, emanations from its body (such as “The Boy of Winander,” “Vaudracour and Julia”) were detached from it to become poetic centres of their own, yet always existing in tension with this ideal centre, this dream of totality underwriting The Prelude.

1799 begins with past and present suspended in a moment of poetic blockage: the Poet’s failure to write his great philosophical poem.271 This Two-Book primal site already reflects what in subsequent revisions becomes clearer as the Poet’s “unsettling psychic ontology, his inability to master ‘who he is’” (Faflak 99). Indeed, the Poet is not only a “split subject” but a subject to whom Nature synaesthetically speaks in a dissociative chorus (“strange utterances,” “low breathings,” “huge and mighty forms,” the River Derwent, the huge Cliff) as part of his tragic-melancholic line of flight. But here, this lack of mastery takes the form of an infinitely productive Deleuzian question: in the beginning refrain to the River Derwent (“Was it for this?” [1.1, 6, 17]) the Poet questions, with the river as witness, his relation to his younger years. Interrogating his history, the Poet’s indeterminate “this” places both past and present under erasure in a poetic suspension, a sublime blockage that recapitulates the “inhibitive sublimity” of Schelling’s naturphilosophische account of creation in the First Outline and Ages (Krell,

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271 Indeed, in seeing him as an “instinctive phenomenologist” Hartman connects Wordsworth’s stark phenomenology with the dissociative matrix of Romantic metasubjectivity. Whether he knows it or not, Hartman also gestures toward the sublime suspension of Schellingian de-cision accounting for the origins of mythology when he writes that “The Prelude’s account of the birth of a poet as ‘the subject in question’ is also a phenomenology of elemental feelings connecting that account with another story: the birth of the gods” (“Was it for this…?”” 133, 137).
Contagion 7). Romanticism, as a period that rethinks literary genres as philosophical modes of consciousness, is also marked by an eighteenth-century “absorption of the rhetorical concept of difficulty into the experiential notion of blockage” (Hertz 48; my italics) which makes the natural and rhetorical registers of the sublime “mutually cognate” (Weiskel 11).

Put differently, 1799 begins enmeshed in the very “crisis of consciousness” that inaugurates mythology as historicity for Schelling. Where the First Outline and Ages begin from the perspective of the pre-subjective unconditioned, Schelling explains in the mythology lectures that “it is history to which the Philosophy of Mythology first has a relation” (HCI 159), and this history is comprised of mythology’s very emergence through “the inner processes and movements of consciousness” which reach back to “pre-historical time” as “the time of the cision or crisis of the peoples” which gives rise to mythological systems (162). This crisis, and the individuation process it inaugurates, means that we are confronted with a psyche working through its dispossession by its own purposiveness. As Carolyn Culbertson writes of Schelling, in the crisis of ecstasy and suspension “we are permitted another beginning. For Schelling, however, this other beginning is not a ground separate from Nature but the potency of Nature itself” (235; my italics). And in 1799 the Poet connects with this potency in ways that are elided and inhibited in 1805. The poetic blockage that marks 1799’s beginning is tied to a questioning of the river as perennial symbol of the flow of libido and emblem for the Poet’s libidinal gradient. The Poet’s symbolic return to the river marks an involutive turn, what Jung calls the regression of libido as part of a larger Thanatopoietic movement of poetic energy. Indeed, 1799 insists on the Poet’s connection with the river as libidinal

\[272\text{ As a suspension or checking of the rational understanding, an encounter with indeterminacy in the face of something vast and uncontainable (a raging storm, a towering mountain, an endless landscape, or certain alterations of perception), the sublime is analogous to, but not identical with, Schelling’s idea of ecstasy in “NPS.” Mitchell has shown how Romantic poets, engaging with the science of their day, sought to create a sense of suspension or suspended animation in their own writing. While a full treatment of the sublime is beyond my scope here, I will argue in passing here that Romantic metasubjectivity requires an anamnesis of a darker, more indeterminate element in the sublime which is elided in most Romantic thinking on the subject, specifically Kant, who uses the sublime as an occasion for reasserting the dominance of reason. In fact, the sublime shares a dark, uncontainable quality with Jungian synchronicity.}\]
analogue, which “loved / To blend his murmurs with [the Poet’s] Nurse’s song, / And from his alder shades, and rocky falls, / And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice / That flowed along [the Poet’s] dreams” (1.2-6). But how is this involution, this suspension and blockage negotiated? The transition from the “Was it for this?” refrain to the following recollections take the form of a conjunctive “And afterwards,” which bridges to the memory of woodcock stealing (1.27), followed by “Nor less, in spring-time” (1.50) which begins the theft of the raven’s eggs. Neither of these episodes answer or dispel the question “Was it for this?” but instead work through this caesura in a Thanatopoietic shift to three crucial scenes sustaining the enantiodromal music and rhythm of the poem.

In 1799, then, the woodcocks theft, the theft of eggs from the raven’s nest (1.50-66), and the theft of the Shepherd’s Boat (often called the “Stolen Boat” episode; 1.81-129) evoke a crucial Prometheanism that is mitigated in 1805. Origins here take the form of recollected metaphors of Promethean cision and rebellion, an enacted difference which, as a *mise en abyme* within Wordsworth’s poem, personalises the poem’s reference back to itself as a *pharmakon* for its own blockage. Put differently, the overcoming of 1799’s caesura and blockage does not provide a safe grounding for a stable subject, but instead opens up into personalised scenes of ungrounding. But this ungrounding, this contact with Romantic metasubjectivity’s radical productivity, is precisely where the Poet’s “stolen” gift of poetic consciousness resides.

With the Poet’s recollection of the stolen woodcocks (1.27-49), 1799’s questioning refrain is redirected to “Gentle Powers” (35) in an apostrophe absent from 1805, giving the earlier version of the episode a mythic texture closer to the theogonic powers of Schelling’s system of the gods than the reified concepts of 1805. Indeed the Poet of 1799, driven to the theft by a desire which “overpowers” his whole person (42-43), is more susceptible to the dissociative fabric of the episode, closer and more intimately entwined within its implicit Promethean *Trieb*. In 1805, the poetic self of this episode is already “critiqued” in a quasi-Kantian sense. Here strong desire now overpowers “*better reason*” (1805 1.326; my italics), a reason now mandated as a ruling faculty in a manner that removes the entire subject from Promethean desire. Reason
emerges in 1805 as an organising principle subjugating desire, separated from the Poet’s libidinal gradient in what Freud would call the aftermath of a primal repression. But the rhythm and caesurae of Promethean enantiodromia at work in the opening of 1799 interrogates this model of psychoanalytic guilt. While there is furtiveness in the poet’s “anxious visitation” and excitement about the theft (1799 1.38ff), the “low breathings” do not create penitence in the Poet’s recollection; there is no primal scene of theft or transgression. Instead, these “sounds of indistinguishable motion” (47-48), which as indistinguishable mark aurality as an “organ of vision” for Wordsworth (Hartman, *The Unremarkable Wordsworth* 23), hark back to the “Gentle Powers” to which the episode is addressed (1799 1.35-36).

The following episode in which the Poet steals raven’s eggs (1799 1.50-66) fills out the broader rhythms and caesurae of the Poet’s Promethean enantiodromia begun by the woodcock episode. The woodcock and raven’s egg thefts are rhythmic, isocolonic, recapitulating subtle yet profound natural strife. On one level there is a Promethean theft which catalyses a reflection on the dissociative matrix of the Romantic metasubjective psyche, one focused on Wordsworth’s aural “organ of vision” (“low breathings” and “strange utterances”). But on another, more fundamental level the Poet’s actions unfold against the backdrop of Nature’s auto-alterity, its characteristically Schellingian ambivalence toward its own products. Here this auto-alterity is represented by flowers: the woodcock episode begins when “the frost and breath of frosty wind had snapped / The last autumnal crocus” (1799 1.29-30; my italics), and the theft of raven’s eggs

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273 Onorato calls this scene an Oedipal “sexual fantasy of the child’s separation from the mother” (185), which corroborates an “Oedipal configuration” (186) in which the “Low breathings” and “sounds / Of undistinguishable motion” the Poet hears “when the deed was done” (1799 1.45, 47-48) represent a punitive superego. In “Inhibition, Symptom and Fear” (1926), Freud explains primal repressions as taking place before the differentiation of the superego. These repressions do not occur under its influence but are more likely due to “quantitative factors, such as the excessive strength of an excitation and a sudden breaching of the protective barrier.” He reminds us of the earlier distinction in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* between breaches from external and internal forces, but without specifying which (if any) define primal repression (161). This uncertain shift to *quantitative* measurements of *intensity* away from *qualitative* (sexual) aspects of psychoanalytic libido marks one of Freud’s subtle gestures toward a conception of libido at odds with the orthodox psychoanalytic conception. The concept of primal repression is arguably the closest Freud gets to Schelling.
unfolds when “The shining sun had from his knot of caves / Decoyed the primrose-flower” (1799 1.51-52; my italics). “Snapped” and “decoyed” reflect Nature’s traumatisation of its own products through seasonal fluctuation; the crocus is broken by frost and the primrose is decoyed, lured into a process which should ostensibly be part of a harmonious natural cycle. Indeed, Nature’s auto-alterity persists in the “strange utterance” the Poet hears as the dissociative vocalisation of Nature’s generative powers: in a moment of sublime suspension where “the sky seemed not a sky / Of earth, and with what motion moved the clouds!” (1.65-66).

The “Stolen Boat” episode (1799 1.81-129) is the culmination of the Poet’s Promethean mythologem, amplifying it into the human social sphere: here the Poet steals not a “natural” object (woodcock, raven’s egg) but a human product, a “Boat” whose movements resemble “a man who walks with stately step / Though bent on speed” (89-90). For this reason, “low breathings” and “strange utterances” are replaced by “the voice / Of mountain echoes” (91-92), a clearer sense of aural agency metonymically related to the “huge Cliff” that will traumatise the Poet’s endeavours “as if with voluntary power instinct” (108-9). This shift to the human-social recapitulates Jung’s narrative of the emergence of consciousness from the mists of the unconscious. And with this the Poet begins to realise, within the phenomenology of his poetic reflection, the very essence of the tragic which the early Schelling of the tenth Letter wants to confine to art. And even here, the “voluntary power” with which the cliff seems to pursue the Poet unfolds in “measured motions” in line with the counted beats of the Poet’s oar-strokes (“twenty times / I dipped my oars into the silent lake”) and the growing stature of the cliff as the

274 Perhaps this is behind Wordsworth’s melancholic lament in the final lines of the “Immortality Ode” that “the meanest flower that blows can give / Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.”

275 Both “low breathings” and “strange utterances” reflect the Romantic resistance to systematic entrapment which Swingle reads discursively, but which for Romantic metasubjectivity is an emphasis on a more general economy of forces contrary to psychoanalytic representation (see Swingle).
Poet “struck, and struck again” with his oars (113, 103, 110). The Poet’s furtive progression is still contained in the music of “meaningful differentiation.”

The Poet turns back with “trembling hands” when the cliff “Rose up between [him] and the stars, and still / With measured motion, like a living thing, strode after [him]” (111-14). Often read as an expression of societal guilt, what begins as “an act of stealth / And troubled pleasure” (90-91) crucially does not end the Poet’s “stealing” once he turns around. This reversal is still part of the episode’s Promethean continuum; just as he stole across the lake in the Shepherd’s Boat, so he “stole [his] way / Back to the cavern of the willow-tree” (115-16; my italics). The differential rhythm sustaining the entire episode expresses the Poet’s libidinal gradient, which is amplified to a culminating limit-experience of ideal and real. This synchronicity is uncontained by parental imagos, released into the general economy of the collective unconscious, the theogonic forces from which Schelling’s mythology emerges. The rhythm and “cadence” of the Poet’s oar-strokes are matched exactly by the growing stature and “measured motions” of the predatory cliff which spontaneously, autochthonically assumes life. Ideal and real rhythms converge in a synchronistic moment where the Poet touches and does not touch the mythological forces animating Nature as they are reflected in the Poet’s address to “ye Beings of the hills” (130-32). Put in terms of Hölderlinian rhythm and caesura, this synchronistic moment emphasises a crucial dynamic: namely, that it is precisely the convergence of two symmetrical rhythms (Poet and cliff) which causes the caesura. This is to express, in Hölderlin’s terms, that there can be no consummate convergence of ideal and real; their identical polarity means that they can never touch each other, are destined to push away from each other at the same time as they are brought together in a moment.

276 David Ellis categorises the theft episodes under a “common pattern” as “some kind of assault on the environment which the environment (‘Nature’) resists” (41), as a transference of Freud’s conflict-model of the psyche on to The Prelude. But this does not do justice to the rhythms and caesurae that inform a Romantic-metasubjective reading of the poem. The Poet’s anxiety, as caesurae within the finer, broader rhythm of his libidinal gradient, is not at odds with Nature but rather one instant of a mythological Erzeugeungsdialektik.

277 Ellis describes this scene in Freudian terms as a “flight reaction” (71).
of magnetic attraction. And through precisely this contact with the mythological matrix of Romantic metasubjectivity, the Poet leaves not admonished, but gifted with a Promethean intuition of the “hiding-places of [his] power” (1805 11.336), the libidinal-mythological matrix of Romantic metasubjectivity as “a dim and undetermined sense / Of unknown modes of being” (121-22). The caesurae have allowed the Poet a fleeting glimpse of the whole. But this gift is less a “cure” for poetic indecision and more of a pharmakon. The Poet emphasises that the “solitude” and “blank desertion” in his mind after the episode has nothing to do with “familiar shapes / Of hourly objects, images of trees, / Of sea or sky, no colours of green fields” but instead with autochthonic, indeterminate potencies which hover on the edge of representation, “huge and mighty forms, that do not live / Like living men” (123-28).278

In the Stolen Boat episode, then, the Poet touches and does not touch the asystasy anterior to all systems of (poetic) knowledge. This is why the pharmakon of such synchronistic “absolute knowledge” can only be represented by indeterminacy, trauma and absence, the pervasive trauma of non-anthropomorphic forms “that moved slowly through [his] mind / By day, and were the trouble of [his] dreams” (128-29). If there is guilt in the beginning of the Stolen Boat episode, this guilt becomes something else by its end; just as for Jung patients often outgrow problems that cannot be solved logically, so the gradient of the Poet’s individuative Trieb leads from the question of societal transgression to a broader awareness of Romantic metasubjectivity’s preterhuman mythological economy. These forms reflect “the symptomal force of Wordsworth’s unconscious life” (Faflak 101), but are also the “terrors of an invisible world” of Schelling’s Tenth Letter, the pharmakon gift of living tragically for one who now sees with Promethean eyes. From “low breathings” to “strange utterances” to “voices,” the Poet’s troubled pleasures are trebled into Trieb. Thus, the theft episodes unfold a rhythmic alternation between scenes of theft and glimpses of Promethean insight.

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278 Joseph Sitterson sees this metaphoricity as the “primary metaphoric ability or power” repressed in both Freud and Lacan, an attribute of a “Wordsworthian subject” irreducible to entanglement in primal scenes or the psychoanalytic “incessant sliding of signifiers” (104).
furnished by a dissociationist mythological matrix of “Powers,” natural objects (cliffs, yew-trees, crags), “spirits,” and “huge and mighty forms.” These moments are instead rhythmic pulsations, alternations in the “strain of music” performed by the Poet in concord with “Gentle Powers,” “Beings of the hills” and “eternal things” (1.130, 136). This rhythm, in turn, is gathered up into a “re-experiencing” (Jung, *Alchemical Studies* 162-63) of the Promethean mythologem, its amplification through the phenomenology of the Poet’s memory and experience culminating in an intuition of the purposiveness of Romantic metasubjectivity.

### 5.2 The 1805 *Prelude*: The Burden of the Unnatural Self

Hartman suggests that Wordsworth does not want “to see nature purely under the aspect of the human. The ultimate figure remains a borderer, at once natural and human” (*Wordsworth’s Poetry* 202). But beginning with the “Glad Preamble,” the inhibitive progression from 1799 to 1805 suggests that the Poet would prefer to shut these borders rather than entertain an uncomfortable liminality with Nature. *The Prelude* in general retains the aleatory nature of a working-through of Schelling’s crisis of consciousness. Nevertheless, 1805 interpellates 1799’s primal energies, locating them in a topology of name and place (Schelling’s “tribes and peoples”) to furnish a typically Wordsworthian “preparatory intercourse,” an idealist economy of mind that binds (without dispelling) the energies of Romantic metasubjective *Trieb* unfolding through the Poet. The “rover” who steals raven’s eggs is now moralised as a “plunderer,” and the 1805 Poet retrospectively judges his 1799 “unnatural self” as “careless,” through “meditative” eyes that will continue to circumscribe ecstasy in the Snowdon episode, which I will discuss below (1799 1.53; 1805 1.337, 13.124, 126). Moreover, the libidinal territory of 1799 is mapped in 1805; the River Derwent which assumes so much importance as an emblem of the Poet’s libidinal gradient is now socialised as a “Playmate” tracked from “Mountains” to the “Towers of Cockermouth,” passing “Behind my Father’s House [. . .] Along the margin of our Terrace Walk” (1805 1.287-91). The Stolen Boat episode is now an event “by the Shores of Patterdale” involving a “Stranger [. . .] A School-boy traveller, at the Holidays.” And the “unexpected chance” by which the boy Poet discovers the boat
distances him from *1799*’s tragic fate of Promethean potency, accentuating the doubt lurking in the Poet’s self-assuring “surely I was led by her,” “her” now a gendered, personified “Nature” instead of *1799*’s “quiet Powers” whose guidance was unmistakable (1805 1.364-82; 1799 1.81).

Put mythologically, 1805 falls away from the ecstatic “new beginnings” to which 1799 was closer; potentiation has now “fallen” into a postlapsarian poetics of time, locale, and history. The encounters with the mythological potentiation of the Romantic metasubjective unconscious are now displaced from the Poet’s beginnings as “trances of thought” and “mountings of the mind” which must be “shaken off” as “that burthen of [his] own unnatural self” (1.20-23), a self once formed by “Powers of earth” and “Genii of the springs” that have now become “presences of Nature” (1799 1.186; 1805 1.491). Indeed, this division of natural and unnatural selves persists in a self-doubling that overdetermines the Erzeugungsdialektik of the Poet’s individuation with a profoundly Hegelian schematic of recognition. When the Poet reflects on “the calm existence that is mine when I / Am worthy of myself,” it is after an idealisation of the paean to the “mind of man.” Where 1799’s ambitendent, ambivalent “spirits” and “quiet Powers” visited the Poet “as at the touch of lightning” (1799 1.69ff), here the emphasis is once more on the Christianised “breath” and “harmony” of music which serves a “dark / Invisible workmanship that reconciles / Discordant elements, and makes them move / In one society” (1.352-56).279 With this, the music of differentiation that underscores the Poet’s

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279 In the famous “Lordship and Bondage” section of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, recognition is an intersubjective process, a discursive mirror-stage by which self-consciousness is constituted through mutual acknowledgement (§178ff). This mutual “self-worthiness” occurs not within the strains, rhythms and caesurae of differential music or the dissociative matrix of powers, but within a “workmanship” reconciling elements in language moving away from 1799’s mythic textures. Indeed, reading the struggle for recognition as that between the Poet’s two “selves” (the interchangeable “I” and “myself”), the Poet’s “calm existence,” as the pleasure principle of his balanced psychological intersubjectivity (being “worthy of himself”), makes him a lord disconnected from Nature’s “workmanship,” which must necessarily remain “dark” and “invisible.” The lord remains “a consciousness existing for itself, mediated with itself” through both a phenomenological “thing” and the bondsman/slave, as “the consciousness for which thinghood is the essential characteristic” (§190). Alexandre Kojève offers some useful insights on what is here the Master-Poet’s relationship with an inaccessible Nature through the workmanship of things: “The Master’s superiority over Nature […] is realized by the fact of the Slave’s Work. This Work is placed between the Master and Nature. The Slave transforms the given conditions of existence so as to make them conform to the Master’s demands” (42). “Nature” here is the mythological matrix inaccessible to the Poet, whose
individuation is not dispelled, but alters its symbolic tenor. Where in 1799 the Derwent’s music “blends” and “flows” with the Nurse’s song and the Poet’s dreams in “steady cadence,” 1805’s “gentle breeze,” a “Messenger” and intermediary interjecting between the Poet and a river which once “composed” his thoughts, now “beats against” the Poet’s cheek “And seems half conscious of the joy it brings” (3-4, my italics; 1799 1.11). This conflictual rhythm displaces the Poet from the “knowledge” and “dim earnest of the calm / Which Nature breathes among the fields and groves” (1799 1.14-15).

1805 begins not with the sublime blockage and libidinal symbolism of the “Was it for this?” refrain but the “Glad Preamble” (1805 1.1-54), where a gentle breeze provokes within the Poet a “corresponding mild creative breeze.” As a “blueprint of the mind’s visionary awakening” (Faflak 105; my italics), the Preamble reads 1799’s Nature as spirit, releasing it into a poetic world interpellated by history and time in a way 1799 is not. But this “corresponding breeze,” as a Christianised symbol removed from the mythological potentiation of 1799’s ambivalent “Powers,” nevertheless recapitulates, even as it represses, the “loathing and anxiety” of Schelling’s rotatory motion and Jung’s libidinal blockage as a “tempest, a redundant energy / Vexing its own creation,” which is only uneasily balanced with the promissory “vernal promises” of “The holy life of music and of verse” (43-54). As we have seen, Schelling’s first potency exists in “loathing and anxiety” because it “unites within it conflicting forces, of which one always craves the outside and of which the other is inwardly restrained [and] does [not] know whether to turn inward or outward and in this fashion falls prey to an arbitrary, revolving motion” (Ages 32). This vexation shapes the economy of doubt and conflict through which poetic knowledge circulates in 1805’s opening, and for which the Poet aims to compensate through re-idealising Nature into the life of the prophetic (visionary) mind. Doubting both his “consecrated joy” and the existence of the “corresponding mild creative breeze” (1.39, 41), the Poet of 1805 is left to unfold a musical individuation now in more

illusory “mastery” remains troubled by the dark invisible workmanship beyond his control. This entrance into a discursively-grounded type of self-recognition is an overdetermination further marking the repression of Romantic metasubjectivity’s radical, nonmolar productivity. In other words, the “Self of one’s self” is here the “self of one’s self.”
“measured strains” and encased in the language of prophecy (“poetic numbers” from a spirit “cloth’d in priestly robe”), an idealised space of immediacy in which “the very words which I have here / Recorded” (1.57-59) are supposedly identical with Nature in what amounts to a messianism that displaces the messianic.\textsuperscript{280} Indeed, the Poet regains confidence not through the phenomenology of Nature, but from the sound of his own voice, “and, far more, the mind’s / Internal echo of the imperfect sound” (64-65), an interiority which recalls the uneasy assertion of self-consciousness in Schelling’s 1800 System against the Naturphilosophie.

What follows is a prolonged internalised meditation on the Poet’s “unmanageable thoughts” (1.150), a projection of the Poet’s drama of self-consciousness on to a Nature which persists as an indeterminate remainder to this idealist economy. The Poet retires to sit beneath a tree, and his “being not unwilling now to give / A respite to [the] passion” of his autoerotic prophecy reflects Wordsworth’s characteristic use of litotes to mark ambivalence and blockage, or, as Michael Cooke puts it, an incorporation of “potential resistance and rejection in a controlled innocuous form” (1.68-69; Cooke 198). For the Poet does continue his tenuous prophetic soliloquy, couched within a pleasure principle of “perfect stillness” wherein he “[passes] through many thoughts, yet mainly such / As to [him]self pertained,” (1.79-81). Indeed, his priestly belief that his words conjure up reality persists as he imagines his new home “And saw, methought, the very house and fields / Present before my eyes” (1.83-84). Much as Nature both supports and unworks the thought-economy of Schelling’s 1800 System, so here Nature both enables and interrupts the Poet’s soliloquy of self-consciousness, providing a “genial pillow of [earth] and “a sense of touch from the warm ground” (1.88, 90) and rupturing this internal drama with the startling sound of dropping acorns (1.94).\textsuperscript{281} The “defrauded” Eolian harp and

\textsuperscript{280} In Archive Fever (1996), Derrida defines the messianic as a future to come which cannot be placed within any order of knowledge; messianism, on the other hand, contains the heterogeneity of the messianic (72).

\textsuperscript{281} Nature’s ambivalence toward the Poet’s recumbence is reflected in the text’s revisionary process as well. The Norton Prelude follows 1805 MS. A 1.88ff., in which the Poet is “Cheared by the genial pillow of the earth / Beneath [his] head, soothed by a sense of touch / From the warm ground, that balanced me, else lost / Entirely, seeing nought, nought hearing, save” acorns falling. The Cornell Prelude’s A-B Stage
its resulting disavowal (“Be it so, / It is an injury [. . .] to this day / To think of any thing 
but present joy” [1.104-110]) is amplified into “self-congratulation [. . .] complete / 
Composure, and [. . .] happiness entire” (1.122-23) which ironically reasserts the loathing 
and anxiety of Schelling’s negative, contracting potency. For this “composure” comes at 
the cost of Wordsworth’s own composition of the growth of the poet’s mind. The failure 
of the Eolian harp is followed by textual caesurae in the poem’s individuative rhythm – 
“What need of many words?” strangely represses, through abridgement, the Poet’s travels 
to Dove Cottage in what is supposed to be, after all, a narrative of his own poetic 
development, and addressing Coleridge as answering being the Poet finds himself 
unwilling to communicate such an important feeling of self-congratulation: “I spare to 
speak, my Friend, of what ensued” (1.114, 117).

Working through these “unmanageable thoughts,” his conflicting forces of 
“sickness” and “wellness” (1.148), the Poet’s “rigorous inquisition,” continuing his self-
analysis, subverts 1799’s potencies by making “Elements,” “Agents,” and “Under-
Powers” into “Subordinate helpers of the living mind” (1.164-65). The “philosophic 
Song / Of Truth” on which the Poet decides releases him from the generic formalism of 
the epic catalogue of possible themes he rehearses (178ff), turning from primal historical 
scenes to his own primal phenomenological site of poetic creation. And in the end, all of 
“this” – the Glad Preamble, the Poet’s preoccupation with his own voice and “the mind’s 
/ Internal echo of the imperfect sound” and his “unmanageable thoughts” – designates the 
indeterminate “this” which began 1799 (now 1805 1.272ff). Staging an idealist 
soliloquy, the Ungrund to which 1799 was attuned is now grounded in the Poet’s self-
analysis, wherein Nature becomes a screen for the restricted play of self-consciousness in 
the creation of a “philosophic Song” in which poetry remains sutured to philosophy. In 

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Text (109 n. 90) notes the hypometric nature of this line with a penciled caret marking the omission, 
substituting “though lost / Entirely” from MS. M, the fair copy sent to Coleridge in 1804. “Else lost / 
Entirely” adds a beat to the Poet’s ambivalent rhythm with Nature; Nature’s balancing “warm ground” 
seems to save the Poet from complete mental entropy, only to interrupt this “balancing” with falling acorns. 
Nature’s (im)balance surrounds (balances?) the Poet’s merely rhetorical, chiastic balance of “seeing 
nought, nought hearing.” “Though lost / Entirely” suggests the independence of the Poet’s mind from 
Nature, even as Nature both fosters and interrupts his rhetorical pleasure principle.
this “philosophic Song,” the Promethean amplification is envisioned through the
“Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe! / Thou Soul that art the Eternity of Thought!” that
gives “a breath / And everlasting motion” to both “forms and images,” constricting the
“huge and mighty Forms” of the Stolen Boat episode within a universe overdetermined
by mind and thought where Nature recedes quietly into the background (1.429-32). The
binding of 1799’s aleatorism culminates in the ascent of Mount Snowdon, which figures
a climactic encounter with the Ungrund of the Romantic metasubjective psyche even as
the Poet attempts to work through its trauma via a poetic metapsychology which both
courts and resists its own “under presences.”

The Poet’s ascent of Mount Snowdon, which opens the final Book of the 1805
Prelude, is considered the apogee of his psychological growth. Sublating the trauma of a
previously failed Alps crossing (6.452-648), Mount Snowdon is an emblematic binding,
an ideation of 1799’s spots of time and aleatory phenomenology. Where 1799’s
mythological texture is expressed by “Powers” and “Genii,” the Snowdon episode
congeals this energic matrix into the concepts of Imagination and Nature. The Two-Part
Prelude’s purposive unfolding is re-enfolded into a linear schema whose manifest content
would seem to corroborate Abrams’ crisis-autobiographical model. But just as Jung’s
metapsychology troubles the teleological drive of his therapeutics of presence, Romantic
metasubjectivity opens up a poetic metapsychology in the Snowdon experience that
unworks Wordsworth’s drive to consolidate Nature into the “perfect image of a mighty
mind” (13.69). Snowdon ends 1805 with a psyche whose unruly energies are
nevertheless repressed, bound within the confines of the quasi-Kantian moral law
Wordsworth habitually attaches to the concept of the sublime.282 Nevertheless,
inhibiting 1799’s productive mythological energies, 1805 ends up uncannily reconnecting
with these purposive energies as psyche, even as this sublime event is analogically recast
as spirit’s unfolding as “intellectual love.”

282 Wordsworth’s direct engagement with Kant remains a matter of debate, but Duncan Wu suggests that
he was reading Kant’s Critique of Judgment around the time 1799 was composed (80-81). Thus, Kant may
have directly informed Wordsworth’s notion of the sublime.
The trauma of the earlier failed Alps crossing and its visionary recuperation sets the stage for the Poet’s idealisation of the Snowdon episode. Here, the incommensurability between mind and unruly Nature manifests itself in poetic disappointment with the “soulless image” of Mont Blanc “Which had usurp’d upon a living thought / That never more could be” (6.454-56), a melancholy which privileges the death of a “living thought” for which Nature must make “rich amends” (6.460) with the Vale of Chamouny. Indeed, the Poet’s literal bookishness reflects this missed encounter with Nature as its energies are inhibited into the economy of mind; the scenery is a prophetic “book” in which the Poet and his companion “could not chuse but read / A frequent lesson of sound tenderness, / The universal reason of mankind” (6.474-76). And in the Snowdon narrative, Wordsworth will try to (problematically) synonymise reason and imagination. This textual substitute-formation, in which Nature recedes as a mute stage for “dreams and fictions pensively composed,” serves a “meditativeness” (6.481, 487) which, here and in the Snowdon episode (6.126), marks an interiority in which the idea of imagination is invoked against Nature’s purposiveness, writing it into the drama of the Poet’s self-consciousness as a mute subaltern where the Poet’s natural surroundings are fitted to his “unripe state / Of intellect and heart” (6.470-71).

The trauma of the failed Alps crossing is remembered and recollected through the rhythms of Thanatopoiesis, the progression-regression dynamic characterising the libidinal movement of Romantic metasubjectivity. But its anxiogenic aspect is precisely that it is a rhythm leading nowhere, or only to a state of blockage that resists the linear teleology of the Poet’s self-narrative and is unable to guarantee the ultimate unfolding of poetic spirit. The narrative is prompted by “something of stern mood, an under thirst / Of vigour, never utterly asleep” (6.489-90; my italics) that interrupts the pleasure principle of meditation and the formalism of genre through which the Poet screens Nature. One of several “under-“ compound nouns Wordsworth uses throughout The Prelude to denote unconscious processes, “under thirst” here catalyses the traumatic recollection and the sublation of Imagination. But it also leads to the Poet’s encounter with the “Characters of the great Apocalyps” (6.570) that traumatise, in turn, the imagination’s pretense to teleological sublimation. As a natural phenomenology of the “faded mythology” Schelling sees in language (HCI 40), these “characters” are even more powerfully figured
in the Poet’s experience at Snowdon. In the Poet’s retelling, he and his companion
“[descend] by the beaten road that led / Right to a rivulet’s edge, and there broke off”
(6.502-3) to cross and start up the other side. Missing their comrades and doubting their
way, they meet a Peasant who tells them to go back the way they came and “find the road
/ Which in the stony channel of the Stream / Lay a few steps, and then along its Banks,”
learning that their course lay “downwards, with the current of that Stream” (6.514-19).
This confusion recapitulates the movement of Romantic metasubjective libido, whose
blockage or inhibition leads to regression and a change of form (Jung, Symbols 158).
They cross the stream, going against its flow, and they must retrace their steps and return
(“regress”) to find the right path which follows its flow and current. Not having done
this, and not having (re)connected with the perennial emblem of Romantic
metasubjective libido as part of an authentic rhythm of poetic individuation, they find the
Alps experience was forfeit.283

The following recuperatory apostrophe to the “unfather’d vapour” of imagination,
which “lift[s] up itself / Before the eye and progress of my Song” as a “usurper” (6.525-
26, 533), transpires in the poetic present, an effusion from the Poet in 1805, whose
recollection of past (1790) trauma and existential blockage has brought a moment of
sublation: “I was lost as in a cloud, / Halted without a struggle to break through, / And
now recovering to my Soul I say / I recognize thy glory” (6.529-32). Here Wordsworth
echoes Kant’s argument that sublime trauma catalyses both imagination’s failure before
awe-inspiring magnitude (here the lack of the Alps) and a “simultaneously awakened
pleasure” stimulated by this trauma which clears the way for triumphant “ideas of reason”
(Kant, Critique of Judgment §27). Bringing with it “thoughts / That are their own
perfection and reward” (6.545-46), Imagination becomes Wordsworth’s substitute for

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283 This re-emphasises the point that Schelling makes with regard to evil in the Freedom essay. Just as evil
necessarily participates in the self-centrum rhythm of personality, so blockage and regression is pivotal to
the dynamic of individuation. Jung puts it in a therapeutic context: “How often have I wished to get rid—
so it seemed to me—of some absolutely harmful tendency in a patient, and yet in a deeper sense he was
perfectly right to follow it. I want, for instance, to warn somebody of the deadly danger he is running into.
[. . .] Afterwards I see—if he did not take my advice—that it was just the right thing for him to run into this
danger. And this raises the question: did he not have to be in danger of death?” (“Good and Evil” para.
865).
Kantian reason, and indeed Wordsworth will merge the two in the Snowdon episode where imagination “Is but another name for [. . .] reason in her most exalted mood” (13.167-70).

But does Wordsworth’s imagination simply restore the teleological growth of a poet’s mind? Does the sublime only exist for an Idealism where thoughts need not touch Nature’s contagion? The significance of the failed Alps crossing for the Snowdon ascent lies not only in both episodes’ participation in the Poet’s Aufhebungs dialektik, but also in what is repressed in this sublation. Both episodes figure experiences of radical productivity, the Ungrund of Romantic metasubjectivity which touches and does not touch the Poet as he both courts and resists the traumatic kernel of sublime experience. After the apostrophe to Imagination and its working through of the Alps trauma, it becomes difficult to say whether what follows – the “recuperated” sublime of the “Characters of the great Apocalyps” (6.549-72) – is part of the retelling (part of circumstances “relate[d] / Even as they were” [6.493-94]) or if it is imagination tainting a narrative of things past with the working-through of the poetic present. The Poet returns to the Alps narrative, where he and his companion have “entered with the road which we had missed / Into a narrow chasm” (6.553) following the libidinal dynamism of Romantic metasubjectivity. The regressed libido which the Poet and his companion perform by turning back in confusion has changed form and now bears the aegis of imagination – which, as “unfather’d vapour” (527), lacks the (paternal) origins which could otherwise place it within the psychoanalytic economy of Freudian Nachträglichkeit and primal phantasy. They descend into the chasm and follow once more the libidinal gradient emblematised by the stream. The following experience is worth quoting at length:

The immeasurable height
Of woods decaying, never to be decay’d,
The stationary blasts of waterfalls,
And every where along the hollow rent
Winds thwarting winds, bewilder’d and forlorn,
The torrents shooting from the clear blue sky,
The rocks that mutter’d close upon our ears,
Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side
As if a voice were in them, the sick sight
And giddy prospect of the raving stream,
The unfetter’d clouds, and region of the heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree,
Characters of the great Apocalyps,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first and last, and midst, and without end. (6.556-72)

What imagination brings, then, at the behest of this “stern under thirst,” is something that cannot be entirely bound within the economy of reason. Here as in the Snowdon ascent, the 1805 Prelude unfolds a poetic metapsychology of the radically productive psyche; it is a poetic territory of the “one mind,” but one that is also “sick,” “giddy,” a dissociationist chorus of muttering rocks, speaking crags, and raving streams that reveals Wordsworth’s imagination as a speculative term like Hegel’s Aufhebung, which enantiodromally shifts into its opposite.284 Far from the stage of self-consciousness, we have now returned to what Ages calls the loathing and anxiety of the potencies and the ambivalence of Nature in the Naturphilosophie. The sublime suspension of “woods decaying, never to be decay’d” and “stationary blasts of waterfalls” reflect a Nature in conflict with itself, its own products unwilling to comply with the physics of their existence.

Yet all of these are “Characters of the great Apocalyps, / The types and symbols of Eternity, / Of first and last, and midst, and without end.” As “charactered,” or inscribed (OED 1) Wordsworth’s “great Apocalyps” clearly harks back to the Biblical deluge. But read as contact with the Ungrund of Romantic metasubjectivity, the general economy of archetypal grammatology’s infinite productivity, there is nevertheless an

284 Sublation [Aufhebung] is often understood as the raising up or cancelling out of a state into a new, higher state of being. Indeed, this movement is essential to the Hegelian argument for the ultimate revelation of absolute spirit in history. Yet in the Science of Logic (1813-1832) Hegel is clear about the bivalent nature of sublation: “The German ‘aufheben’ has a twofold meaning in the language: it equally means ‘to keep,’ ‘to “preserve”,’ and ‘to cause to cease,’ ‘to put an end to.’ Even ‘to preserve’ already includes a negative note, namely that something, in order to be retained, is removed from its immediacy and hence from an existence which is open to external influences. – That which is sublated is thus something at the same time preserved, something that has lost its immediacy but has not come to nothing for that. [. . .] But it must strike one as remarkable that a language has come to use one and the same word for two opposite meanings. For speculative thought it is gratifying to find words that have in themselves a speculative meaning” (81-82).
“under presence” of Schelling’s primordial cision and mythological beginnings that Schelling, too, associates with the apocalyptic Flood and the (archetypal) role of water in the involutive (libidinal) turn that stimulates further development. Thus, these inscribed “characters” are not of Biblical experience but rather impressed archetypal experiences from Nature’s mythological phenomenology. Indeed, in discussing the Flood as cisionary moment Schelling fuses mythology and geology: “water has [a crucial role] in all transitions from a dominant principle to a second, to which it yields, not merely in the history of the earth but rather also in mythology. [Noah’s Flood was the] great turning point of mythology [which] was later followed by the unceasing transition itself, the confusion of the languages [. . .] along with the various systems of the gods, and the separation of humanity into peoples and states” (HC1 108), the “characters” of the Apocalypse. We are here at the mythological wellspring, a site of Nature’s auto-alterity and the seethe of autochthonic archetypal forces which we cannot with certainty determine as past narrative or present effusion. Indeed, it is a “stern under thirst of vigor,” a Trieb that drives the Poet to recollect the trauma, interject a paean to imagination, and follow it with an experience of the Ungrund of Romantic metasubjectivity. This experience leads to sleep “close upon the confluence of two streams” (6.576), which suggests a unification of libidinal purposiveness, amplifying into “a lordly River, broad and deep” (6.583). But their rest in a “Mansion [. . .] deafen’d and stunn’d / By noise of waters” (6.577-79) does not allow for an untroubled resolution; the dissociative vocality of the water abides as an under-presence even as the Poet and his companion reach Lake Locarno.

This tension between the purposiveness of the Ungrund and the visionary self-consciousness of the Poet reaches its paradoxical height in the chasmal ascent of Mount Snowdon. Here, Snowdon’s poetic metapsychology amplifies the “Characters of the great Apocalyps,” releasing its grammatological metaphor into the unbound phenomenology of Nature. In the Alps, the “narrow chasm” leads to a sublime encounter with natural products suspended in (geological) time, but nevertheless inscribed, both Biblically and Miltonically, as “characters” of the Apocalypse, overdetermining their infinite productivity with a rhetorical appropriation of Paradise Lost (“Of first and last,
and midst, without end” [6.572]285). In contrast, the Snowdon episode takes place within a Nature that unworks the sovereignty of mind so often attributed to Wordsworth’s “spots of time,” sublime moments of “deepest feeling that the mind / Is lord and master, and that outward sense / Is but the obedient servant of her will” (11.271-73). But the poetic metapsychology of the Snowdon episode figures a Schellingian Nature that

[dominates] the outward face of things,
So molds them and endues, abstracts, combines
Or by abrupt and unhabitual influence
Doth make one object so impress itself
Upon all others, and pervade them so
That even the grossest minds must see and hear
and cannot chuse but feel. (13.78-84)

Nature’s autochthonic qualities here trouble the mind’s Idealism, at times overpowering its egoity through “abrupt and unhabitual influence” so as to (dis)possess the mind. Just as for Jung the archetypes simply happen to one, and just as for Schelling thoughts autonomously “think within” the person (Schelling, On the History 48), so natural objects can traverse a porous boundary between mind and Nature, irrupting within consciousness in an imaginative process Wordsworth both courts and resists.

Unlike the Alps crossing, where the Poet and his companion are symbolised as two streams ultimately uniting in one purpose into a “lordly River,” the ascent of Mount Snowdon begins with an interiorised “preparatory intercourse” in which the Poet’s silence is broken only by encounters with the anxiety and conflict intrinsic to Nature’s products as part of its auto-alterity and self-differentiation. In this sense, the “barking turbulent” with which the shepherd’s dog unearths a hedgehog is mirrored by the Poet’s own agon with Nature, proceeding “With forehead bent / Earthward, as if in opposition set / Against an enemy” (13.18-31). Indeed, in a Romantic metasubjective chain of Being, Nature’s auto-alterity proceeds from animal (dog-hedgehog) and human (Poet-Earth) not to the theological or preterhuman, but to the geological: a “huge sea of mist,” a “still Ocean” whose “vapours shot themselves, / In hedlands, tongues, and promontory

285 Paradise Lost 5:165.
shapes / [into] the real Sea, that seem’d / To dwindle and give up its majesty, / Usurp’d
upon as far as sight could reach” (13.43, 46-51). This geological figuration of Nature’s self-usurpation unfolds in what both Schelling and Wordsworth (here and in Book Six) see as a mythological space, where the archetypal grammatology of Nature’s auto-alterity represents the “first poesy” of mythology, “a poesy originally preceding all plastic and compositional art, namely, one originally inventing and producing the raw material” (HCI 167).

Where Book Six presents us with “types and symbols of Eternity,” here archetypal grammatology is represented through Nature’s auto-alterity as the curious symmetry of the breach. The Poet’s visuals lead us from “positive” breaches of phenomenological presence, the “hundred hills” which “their dusky backs upheaved / All over this still Ocean” (13.45-46), to their supplementation by a “negative” breach of phenomenological lack, an ekphrasis eclipsed by the aural, Wordsworth’s recrudescent “organ of vision” in the dissociationist “voice” of “streams / Innumerable”:

A blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour,
A deep and gloomy breathing-place thro’ which
Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams
Innumerable, roaring with one voice. (13.56-59)

This phenomenological lack is privileged by the Poet as the authentic site of both “Soul” and “Imagination,” now synonymous, recasting Imagination as “under presence”:

The universal spectacle throughout
Was shaped for admiration and delight,
Grand in itself alone, but in that breach
Through which the homeless voice of waters rose,
That dark deep thorough-fare had Nature lodg’d
The Soul, the Imagination of the whole. (13.60-65; my italics)

The Poet’s sight is trained first to the “meek and silent” spectacle of the positive breaches which “rested at [his] feet” (13.44) – a passive scene of Nature’s auto-alterity – then to the blue chasm in a visual movement back in figural time to the Ungrund of origins. In “Freud and the Scene of Writing” Derrida takes up Freud’s theorisation of the breach in Beyond (71-72) as marker of the trace and the opening of an absence which has always been “present” in presence, as part of a project to discover, in psychoanalysis, “condensed and sedimented” elements of deconstruction that “can only uneasily be
contained within logocentric closure” (198). For Derrida, from the earliest days of psychoanalysis (here Freud’s Project), the psychoanalytic breach (Bahnung) is Freud’s metaphor for the creation of memory in the psyche as a movement of difference, designating memory itself as the essence of the Freudian psyche through a “metaphories of the written trace”: “Breaching, the tracing of a trail, opens up a conducting path [presupposing] a certain violence” (“Freud” 200). As “the first representation, the first staging of memory,” this constitution of memory is “the very essence of the psyche: resistance, and precisely, thereby, an opening to the effraction of the trace” within a psyche which is “neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of force but the difference within the exertion of forces” (201; my italics).

The blue chasm represents a Romantic metasubjective scene of writing, the formation of (poetic) memory as the play of differential forces, but one which Freudian metapsychology can only do justice to, ironically, through repression. In this sense, read through Romantic metasubjectivity, the blue chasm and the metaphoricity of the breach puts Derrida’s fort/da with psychoanalysis under analysis. In this light, the blue chasm is not a “first staging of memory,” a scene for the (dis)appearance of the trace and a following repression of first memories. It does not amount to the “erasure of selfhood” (230), although the “homeless voice of waters” amounts to a sublime suspension of presence before the “dark deep thorough-fare” of the blue chasm (13.63, 65). Rather, the chasm is a staging of first memory, an epigenetic site where the Poet is confronted with a “weave of traces” at the creation of a memory which is not bound to Freud’s representative unconscious. The chasm is a limit-experience of the archetypal-grammatological site of historicity itself, the “dark foundry, the first forging place of mythology” (HCI 17) from which emerge Schelling’s system of the gods and which is analogous to Jung’s collective unconscious.

Instead of repression one must speak of Schellingian inhibition: for where repression marks the conflict-model of the Freudian psyche (where one can, at best, come to an uneasy truce with one’s infantile past), we have seen that inhibition inaugurates Nature’s Thanatopoietic bidirectionality with regard to its products. Thanatopoiesis ungrounds nostalgia with a futurity that cannot be folded back into Freud’s “short-
circuits” on the way back to inorganicity, or a *Nachträglichkeit* ultimately bound to the spectre of primal phantasy. If *The Prelude* is an epic of “soul-making” (Hartman, *Wordsworth’s Poetry* 220), this soul is now the unruly imagination which, as “under presence,” will resist the Poet’s efforts to inscribe it within the project of showing “how the mind of man becomes / A thousand times more beautiful than the earth / On which he dwells [. . .] as it is itself / Of substance and of fabric more divine” (13.446-52). In other words, “soul” here is now the soul of *Ages*, an interiority that opens out onto its Outside, one which only “commences with the arousal of that internal bifurcation that spreads throughout all of nature” (*Ages* 58). As Wirth puts it, soul is “the deformative force indwelling within all form [. . .] the excess of the form within the form, its animistic life” (“Translator’s Introduction” xii).

Book Eleven of *1805* captures the fundamental dynamic of Thanatopoietic movement: “the hiding-places of my power / Seem open; I approach, and then they close” (11.336-37). What closes these “hiding-places” of radical productivity to the Poet is the “meditation” (13.66ff) occurring after he encounters Snowdon’s “breaches.” Like the “meditativeness” of Book Six, this meditation remembers and works through the experience of the *Ungrund* at Snowdon, binding it under the visionary rubric of Imagination, sublimating the indeterminate purposiveness of the “dark deep thoroughfare” into a teleology which, in working through sublime trauma, appropriates the symbol of the stream as a condensation of potencies, in effect diluting their synchronistic charge. In other words, *The Prelude*’s teleological therapeutics put the ecstasy of this encounter under erasure. The Poet figures the scene atop Snowdon as

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The perfect image of a mighty Mind,
Of one that feeds upon infinity,
That is exalted by an underpresence,
The sense of God, or whatsoe’er is dim
Or vast in its own being. (13.69-73)
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The poetic metapsychology here both courts and resists the potency of the original sublime event at Snowdon. The “underpresence” so consanguineous with the “under thirst” driving the Poet in Book Six paradoxically “exalts” a “perfect image,” but the “sense of God” is *also* equated with this underpresence and whatever is “dim or vast” in itself. God is thus supplanted through analogy even as 1799’s language of potentiation
(retrospectively judged as “careless” [13.124]) is now transcendentalised: the “higher minds” which now monopolise an obedient imagination are now “Powers” emanating “from the Deity” (13.106-7).

But the Poet’s triumphant reassertion of teleology now equates Snowdon’s unruly imagination with “reason in her most exalted mood” (13.170) as it poeticises the emergence of consciousness from the depths of the unconscious. *The Prelude* now becomes a Hegelian phenomenology of spirit, a project “[tracing] the stream / From darkness, and the very place of birth in its blind cavern” to its paths “Among the ways of Nature” only to lose and find it once more “reflecting in its solemn breast /The works of man and face of human life” (13.172-81). This human, all too human teleology represses the geo-mythological Ungrund encountered at Snowdon. Ironically, it is the very figure of God – here both “Deity” and “underpresence” – that marks a persistent unruliness, a purposive energy underwriting the Poet’s sublimation of these powers just as the Poet’s “History” is “brought / To its appointed close” (13.269-70). The consummated “Poet’s mind” takes a bow while Nature, as “softening mirror of the moral world” (13.271, 288), recedes. *The Prelude* manages to retain some semblance of lyric voice through its constitutive tension between Nature’s purposive energies and the mind’s teleological impetus. But turning to *Prometheus Unbound*’s dissociative topography of the Romantic metasubjective psyche we find – paradoxically, in a lyrical drama written years after *The Prelude* – a dark precursor to Wordsworth’s poetic voice where the lyric voice is almost completely subsumed by the chorus of Romantic metasubjectivity’s inscrutable beginnings.
5.3 *Prometheus Unbound*: The Traumatic Awakening of Romantic Metasubjectivity

In “To Wordsworth” (1816), Shelley criticises what he sees as a conservative turn in Wordsworth’s political thinking. Shelley’s desire in this poem to emancipate Wordsworth from the shackles of a perceived conservatism reflects a sentiment that persists in *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) which, as Shelley wrote to Thomas Peacock in 1819, is “a drama, with characters & a mechanism of a kind yet unattempted” (*Poems of Shelley* 2.458). But the unfoldings of Shelley’s lyrical drama problematise the political Idealism he deploys to bind its dramatism. In his short essay “On Life” and the “Defence of Poetry,” both conceived and published contemporaneously with *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley insists that things only exist as they are perceived (“On Life” 508; “Defence” 533). In the Preface to *Prometheus Unbound*, however, Shelley tells us the poem’s imagery is meant to show “the operations of the human mind, or [. . .] those external actions by which they are expressed” (l. 45). As we will see, it is the problematic transferential imagery of the poem, whereby *dramatis personae* adopt each other’s characteristics and (at times) thoughts, that make perception something less than the dependable arbiter of existence Shelley wants.

I argue that this transferential fluidity also resists a critical orthodoxy surrounding *Prometheus Unbound* which constellates its dynamisms around the mind of Prometheus as a self-present being. And if psychoanalytic criticism of *Prometheus Unbound* has

286 “In honoured poverty thy voice did weave / Songs consecrate to truth and liberty, – / Deserting these, thou leavest me to grieve, / Thus having been, that thou shouldst cease to be” (11-14). The “Songs consecrate to truth and liberty” are ostensibly political, but Shelley’s connection of poetry with the “moral improvement of man” and view of the imagination as “the great instrument of moral good” (“Defence” 517) clearly align poetry and moral action; inhibition of poetic energy brings with it inhibition of political freedom. Indeed, the rhyme structure of Shelley’s sonnet (ababcdedecdefg) is neither Petrarchan nor Shakespearean, almost as if Shelley wants to *poetically* liberate Wordsworth through his poem’s irregular generic structure.

287 Shelley’s ambiguity here is intriguing; the enigmatic conjunctive “or” can be read either as substitutive (“external actions” are what the “operations” of the mind are really all about) or inclusive (the poem depicts the mind’s operations *as well as* its external actions, which are not necessarily commensurate with these operations).
tended to focus on the personalist Oedipal agon between Prometheus and Jupiter as tyrannical father, it has also been subject to the orthodox Jungian archetypal taxonomy. Either way, the focus falls on a character conspicuously absent from much of the text (and significantly the entire final act). This renders problematic the arbitrary centring (or binding) of Shelley’s “lyrical drama” on a single “lyric” voice – indeed, one doubts if such a single voice can be found in a text whose diachrony exceeds the purview of Prometheus. For example, Earl Wasserman’s highly influential study of *Prometheus Unbound* claims that

> for the human revolution and the history of human perfection [. . .] have here been transposed to the level of total Existence, the metaphysical reality here named “Prometheus.” [. . .] [E]xcept for Demogorgon, Prometheus is the only reality actually present in the play, and it would be short of the truth even to say that the drama takes place in his mind; he is the One Mind. [As opposed to unknowable Being,] the limited domain of *Prometheus Unbound* is that unitary mode of Being that appears in thought-constituted existence. (257)

Like many psychoanalytic readings of the poem, Wasserman obliquely privileges consciousness in the form of Prometheus as both dramatic figure and mythological emblem. He thus elides the degree to which the poem’s psychic topography intuits a profoundly preconscious, prediscursive Romantic dynamism, a dramatic unfolding of the emergence of the personal from the nexus of nonmolar forces which constitute its

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288 Thomas Frosch, for example, argues that “Shelley tells the story of both Prometheus and Asia emerging from parental figures into their own maturity” (128). Focusing on Promethean individuation, Jungian readings often adopt a similarly reductive standpoint. Dutifully applying an orthodox Jungian taxonomy, William Hildebrand adopts the language of “Jungian romance” to describe Asia as Prometheus’ “anima” and Demogorgon as the “dragon guarding the treasure-hard-to-find” (195). These figures ultimately turn back to the personalised figure of Prometheus; the transition from Acts One to Two is a Romantic reverie involving “an inner dialectic among figures that are aspects of [Prometheus’] self” (194). Similarly, Thomas Simons views the poem as “being played out against a mental/mythic, terrene/cosmic subjectively shifting backdrop where everything that arises has its source in the various aspects of, and conflicts in, the mind of Prometheus” (2-3). Frosch also suggests a pantheon of stable lyrical unities in *Prometheus Unbound*’s unfolding individuative movement: “from a Jungian perspective, we might read act 1 as a confrontation with the shadow, or dark side of Prometheus, and act 2 as a confrontation with the anima, or his female side” (316 n. 2). However, I want to rescue the text from these personalistic trappings and think the status of its poetry (specifically Prometheus’ curse and Demogorgon’s proclamation at the end of the poem) in its properly Romantic dimensions, as something irreducible to Oedipal dynamics or Jungian structuralism.
In a lyrical drama about the unbinding of Prometheus, the rubric of potency and trace is entirely apropos here. Reading Prometheus’ curse and the protean figure of Demogorgon through the lens of Romantic metasubjectivity, I want to show how *Prometheus Unbound* offers a topography of the productive, differential unconscious emerging through this dissociative fault-line between lyric and drama. Structured through the differential of archetypal grammatology, the *dramatis personae* (Jung’s complexes) both differ from and meld into each other in the play of intensities, coming forth, speaking, and receding in a dramatic unfolding which figures Prometheus not as epic centre, but as a Schellingian natural product neither fixed nor stable within the poetic economy of Shelley’s drama. Through *Prometheus Unbound* Shelley does not figure the operations of the idealist mind, but unfolds the moments of individuative *Trieb* and the dissociative psyche from which they emerge, even as the tension between lyric and drama leads him to attempt to re-bind this psyche’s indeterminacy in his own troubled Idealism.

In what follows, I read *Prometheus Unbound* as a topography of the dissociative psyche, a dramatisation of the traumatic double-bind which marks Romantic metasubjectivity’s epigenesis. This topography is informed by two narratives which touch and do not touch each other: Prometheus’ revolution against Jupiter’s tyranny, and the emergence of consciousness from the unconscious. The inability of these narratives to tell each other allegorises Jung’s dissociationist historical psyche as the motor force of Romantic metasubjectivity. The traumatic and dissociative substructure of Shelley’s

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289 As Rajan writes, “The interdiscursive nature of the Romantic lyric problematizes the mode by revealing the traces of another voice within the seemingly autonomous lyric voice. [In *Prometheus Unbound*, while] the lyrics bear the freight of the play’s idealistic vision, [. . .] their insertion into a dramatic context radically decentralises this vision, potentiating the traces of its differences from itself. [Lyric] is associated with a logocentrism that mutes the difference between language and what it signifies, whereas drama makes explicit the dialogic nature of language, because the presence of more than one speaker makes the text as a whole and even the individual speeches within it a perpetually shifting intersection of textual surfaces rather than something fixed” (“Romanticism” 195, 203). Indeed, Rajan’s critique of the lyric sheds light on an unresolved contradiction in Frosch’s account, perhaps typical of efforts to centre *Prometheus Unbound*’s poetic energies solely on Prometheus. Frosch writes that “to change the world, Prometheus must change his words,” but “words are like things or physical forces” (134). The ego-centricity of the former is undermined by the suprapersonal nature of the latter; the performative aspect of Romantic language offers a productive way of thinking this contradiction, but leads away from Frosch’s personalist account.
poem is evident from the beginning: *Prometheus Unbound* opens with Prometheus chained to a rock in the Caucasus, unable to remember the words of his momentous curse which precipitated his imprisonment. This inability catalyses his dialogue with “voices” of Nature and ultimately the Earth, who brings forth the phantasm (who is and is not Prometheus) to utter the curse’s cisionary words which impel the poem’s unfolding through a fluid economy of *dramatis personae* who at times synaesthetically adopt each other’s attributes. Shelley’s classical framework thus dramatises Schelling’s unprethinkable cisionary moment, the *naturphilosophische* economy to which it gives rise, and the purposive drive of a Romantic metasubjective individuation which is not confined to Prometheus himself. Away from (or perhaps “beneath”) *Prometheus Unbound*’s political allegory, Schelling’s “drama of a struggle between form and the formless” becomes the dramatic emergence of consciousness from an infinite productivity emblematised by gods, spirits and chorea. Through their own fluid dramaturgy, and thus their problems with identity akin to the problems of type shared with actant and archetype, these Shelleyan forces write Schelling’s alignment of language with mythology as psychic topography. I thus read the complex nature of Prometheus’ curse of Jupiter, the dramaturgic (counter)transferences between the text’s characters, and the oft-discussed significance of Demogorgon, as focal points of the dissociative topography of the Romantic metasubjective psyche.

The emergence of consciousness from the productive unconscious in *Prometheus Unbound* is conditioned by its unfolding within a history both allegorised by Shelley’s political Idealism and troubled by the metapsychology *avant la lettre* which makes this political history possible. This “impossible and necessary double-telling,” “the inextricability of the story of one’s life from the story of one’s death” (Caruth 8), marks the traumatic nature of *Prometheus Unbound* and its double-telling of both the “life” of (political) consciousness and the “death,” the cision into time and history, which represent the poem’s diachronic and synchronic elements.290 Put differently, if the

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290 For Cathy Caruth, trauma is “a fundamental enigma concerning the psyche’s relation to reality. [. . .] Traumatic experience, beyond [psychological suffering], suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may
history of trauma (or the trauma of history) means that “it is referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully perceived as it occurs [. . .] that a history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (18), the incommensurability between these two stories bespeaks the trauma of Romantic metasubjectivity’s historical psyche.

What for Jung recedes into the inchoate “mists of time” is encrypted here in the hieroglyphics of myth. As Rajan puts it, *Prometheus Unbound*’s action “takes place in a space outside the space of history: a mental space that risks implication in the ambiguities of the historical process if it seeks to embody itself in fact and event, and accepts a certain abstraction if it does not achieve such embodiment” (*Dark Interpreter* 91). But *Prometheus Unbound*’s dual narrative of trauma, in fact, suggests that this risk has already been assumed. Through the lens of Romantic metasubjectivity, the transferential dynamic running through the lyrical drama marks the movements of a dissociative psyche without conceivable origin – always already placed in history. Even as Shelley’s rewriting of Aeschylus resists reconciliation between Jupiter and Prometheus, the end of the poem (exemplified by Demogorgon’s warning: we are free, but tyranny can always return) both courts and resists this tyrannical return to stasis in a Thanatopoietic rhythm. Without naming *Thanatopoiesis*, the transference Jerrold Hogle sees at the heart of Shelley’s poetry is described in Freudian terms as a “*thanatos*, the fading of [whose] past moments is simultaneously an *eros* seeking another relation” (22). For Shelley, this transference has an ontological charge; “language itself is poetry” (Shelley, “Defence” 512), and as such this transference becomes “the force moving through all writings and take the form of belatedness” (91-92; my italics). For Caruth trauma entails the ethical obligations of survival – telling the story of one’s *inability to tell the story* (105). Trauma involves a fundamental bifurcation, a cession into two stories: the latent, “originary” trauma whose origins are lost in their very emergence, and a more manifest narrative of repetition-compulsion whose trauma is redoubled in its own melancholy, its quest for the dis-appeared trauma of its beginning. Trauma is a failed exorcism, or rather an exorcism aware of its own traumatic origins – exorcism haunted by its archaic meaning of “to conjure up” as well as to dispel (*OED* 3). Taking the classic example of *Beyond*, Caruth argues that trauma is not just an irruption within the ego, but makes consciousness a phylogenetic synecdoche for the problem of life itself. Trauma engenders an inexplicable yearning for inorganicity in the form of the death drive.

291 Indeed, although he looks for this language in other discourses, the Jungian rubric of (counter)transference strongly informs Jerrold Hogle’s important work on ontoaesthetic transference in Shelley’s major works.
readings” of literature and culture (Hogle 5). Thus, one can read *Prometheus Unbound*’s dual narratives of emancipation and emergence as the robust exposition of a Romantic hermeneutics which, as “a process with consequences for the intellectual life of the interpreter,” risks a productive transference with the reader (Rajan, *Supplement* 70-71). Shelley’s troubled Idealism leads him to attempt to gather up the transferential dynamic of *Prometheus Unbound* into a Trieb toward freedom in the guise of “Necessity.” But the figure of Demogorgon, as the poetic force of Schelling’s “No that resists the Yes, [the] darkening that resists the light, this obliquity that resists the straight” (*Ages* 6), persists as an indeterminate remainder in the text’s economy, a dark figure whose presence eternally frustrates this idealist thrust even as it guarantees its persistence. Indeed the final act of *Prometheus Unbound*, as “a polyphonic hymn in which different voices are part of a single harmony” from which Prometheus himself is conspicuously absent (Rajan, *Dark Interpreter* 93), has an indeterminate, metapsychologically dissociative horizon that resists Shelley’s Idealism. Let us turn, then, to *Prometheus Unbound*’s compulsive beginnings.

In *Prometheus Unbound* the drama of dissociation presents us with the paradox of a “prediscursive discourse” – metadrama and metadialogue, words spoken about a state of time and history which both has yet to come into being and has somehow already transpired (Prometheus is, after all, bound for a reason). The poem thus marks a Romantic yearning for the Ungrund, the quest for erased origins. Across its mythological, political and metapsychological determinations, the trauma of *Prometheus Unbound* is thus Shelley’s staging of the erasure of beginnings already present in the actants’ mutual derangement in the *First Outline* and which also informs *Ages*’ rotatory motion. It is the liminal state of Jung’s archetypes and the collective unconscious, the unprethinkable beginnings of the “operations of the human mind.”

Indeed, like *Ages* and *The Prelude, Prometheus Unbound* begins, and begins again in a cyclic motion. In this, it emulates the willingness to repeat that drives the Jungian archetype as a force on the cusp of Being, of its own differentiation in time and history. Like the archetypes and the collective unconscious, it has happened (the there is of the unconscious), and yet has yet to happen (insofar as this there is only comes to be in
time and history, in specific manifestations). Act One begins in an unconscious virtual space of “the shadows of all forms that think and live” (1.195ff), with Prometheus’ confrontation with his curse as écriture, as deep “imageless truth” (2.4.116), followed by his torment at the hands of the Furies as traumatic affect, motile forces that, like Jupiter’s phantasm, do not “know” in the conscious sense, “execrable shapes” at which Prometheus stares in “loathsome sympathy” because they emerge from himself (1.463, 451, 470-72). Act Two compulsively re-begins on the other side of Prometheus Unbound’s psyche. Here, Asia and Panthea awake from sleep, both recollecting and repressing knowledge of Prometheus’ trauma in Act One (one dream simply cannot be remembered) through a visionary ekphrasis that congeals its play of forces into a perfect analytic scene in which one can “read” not only the other, but Prometheus’ “soul” (2.1.61ff). Act Three recapitulates Act One’s traumatic beginnings: in Jupiter’s court, Thetis is congealed into an image of thought (“bright Image of Eternity!” [3.1.36]), a representation concealing Thetis’ traumatic rape by Jupiter which begets “a third / Mightier than either [of them], which, unbodied now / Between us, floats, felt although unbeheld, Waiting the incarnation, which ascends [. . .] from Demogorgon’s throne” (3.1.43-48). And this repressed trauma leads to Demogorgon’s appearance as “fatal child.” His conquering of Jupiter (3.1.53ff) recapitulates the cosmogony of Prometheus’ curse on the level of history, which inaugurates historicity itself as the contracting force (A¹) of tyranny is exploded by Demogorgon as the indeterminate, infinite expansion of A². The final Act, like Act One, is a primal site which contains no scenes. It opens in visionary mode, replete with spirits and choruses whose rhyming songs now supplant the more disjunctive, traumatic rhythm of the curse. In other words, these beginnings play out the differentiating economy of the collective unconscious. But the Act closes with Demogorgon’s warning of tyranny’s return, invoking the text of Prometheus Unbound itself as “spell” (4.568), an interminable rotatory motion meant to assert the purposiveness of historicity (as Necessity) against any efforts to congeal it into a
hegemony of the Same – even the tyranny of Shelley’s troubled Idealism. The text compulsively repeats itself as a circle of knowledge without circumference.292

Thus the text aptly begins with a cosmic view of “bright and rolling worlds” whose ever-present activity, visible only to Prometheus and Jupiter, is unavailable to Asia’s desire for truth’s visionary disclosure in Act Two. In response to Asia’s desire for proper names and presence, Demogorgon replies: “a voice / Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless; / For what would it avail to bid thee gaze / On the revolving world?” (1.2, 2.4.115-18). And Earth, as the first Act’s rotatory motion of the “revolving world,” is anxiogenic for Prometheus. Like Asia’s demand for visionary presence in Act Two, Prometheus asks Earth for the proper words of the curse. As a dissociative force both itself (Earth) and a chorus of “Voices,” the Earth cannot give an answer, but gives answers dispersed across the four elements and traumatic events in natural history (1.74ff). The Earth’s following account of the Magus Zoroaster’s vision (1.191ff) might seem to promise a Shelleyan version of Wordsworth’s “preparatory intercourse” to the sublime convergence of real and ideal. Zoroaster’s vision is synchronistic, revealing a continuity between ostensibly Promethean consciousness and its shadowy Other in “two worlds of life and death,” a world of the living and a Demogorgonian world inhabited by Gods, “Powers,” “The shadows of all forms that think and live” which are uncannily consubstantial with the products of the imagination (1.195-202). The curse is known by all of these powers (“Son, one of these shall utter / The curse which all remember” [1.209-10]), and the Earth tells Prometheus to “Call at will / Thine own ghost, or the

292 In this sense, read as what Jung calls an archetypal situation (birth, coming into consciousness but also the struggle for freedom), the entire work of Prometheus Unbound is a deconstruction of the archetype into its unmanageable and potentially infinite forces. The transferential dynamic between dramatis personae in Shelley’s lyrical drama emblematises the impossibility reflected in Jung’s “as if” regarding the archetype/archetypal situation. Of course, the drama unfolds in the sequence of events Shelley intends, but Demogorgon’s reference back to the text of the play at the end (reminiscent of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake) reflects a compulsive repetition which insists on the reader’s revisiting the text again (and again?) to re-experience the act of reading, even as every reading is different. This self-referentiality – Prometheus Unbound’s archetypally repetitive pattern – ensures the repetition of difference within the Same in precisely the same way the archetype is experienced. Like Prometheus’ curse, Prometheus Unbound is language beside itself in precisely the same sense as mythology when Schelling writes that “every meaning in mythology is merely potential, like in chaos, but without therefore allowing itself to be limited or particularized” (HCI 14).
ghost of Jupiter, / Hades, or Typhon, or what mightier Gods / From all-prolific evil”
(1.210-13). But repressing this traumatic revelation, Prometheus admonishes his mother
Earth to “let not aught / Of that which may be evil, pass again / My lips, or those of aught
resembling me” (1.218-20), calling forth Jupiter’s phantasm which, in his infatuation
with an idealist self-consciousness, he takes to be absolutely different from himself.293

Prometheus asks for the curse and instead receives accounts of its effects in
Nature from the four Voices, whose lines of unified rhyme paradoxically express scenes
of natural cataclysm. This makes Prometheus lament his maternal Earth as Other, as a
chorus and not an answering being: “I hear a sound of voices: not the voice / Which I
gave forth. [. . .] Know ye not me, / The Titan? he who made his agony / The barrier to
your else all-conquering foe?” (1.112-13, 117-18). This stands in stark contrast with the
second beginning, the perfect transference Asia enjoys with Panthea as perfect
questioning and answering beings (2.1.35ff), but it also ironically points to Prometheus
Unbound’s entanglement in early nineteenth-century discourses. These “operations of
the human mind” – particularly throughout Act Four and the encounter with Demogorgon
– are written through and between geology, astronomy and evolution in a proliferation of
scientific discourses arguably unprecedented in English Romantic poetry (The Poems of
Shelley 469). This disciplinary transference resists a metaphysically privileged reading or
an idealist personalism that asserts, for example, that “Jupiter has been created and
sustained in being by the actions and attitudes of Prometheus himself” (Wasserman
467).294 In this intertextual sense, Prometheus Unbound establishes constitutive

293 This trauma is precisely why Prometheus, once freed, seeks to recuperate an illusion of himself as “one
mind” without an unconscious, retiring with Asia outside of history where they “will sit and talk of time
and change, / As the world ebbs and flows, ourselves unchanged” (3.3.23-24). But even as the cisionary
power of the curse now seems to be mere banter, the Titans’ preoccupation with “time and change” reflects
the persistence of historicity as a lost object which can irrupt again; Demogorgon’s warning at the end
extends even here.

294 While this statement duly reflects the transference between Jupiter and Prometheus (shown most
forcibly in the dynamics of the curse), its subjectivising turn back to Prometheus reflects a sort of Fichtean
egoity resisted by a Romantic-metasubjective reading.
metaphors\textsuperscript{295} of natural processes and phenomena for its psychic topography in precisely the spirit in which Jung writes that “the unconscious is Nature” (\textit{Symbols} 62). In this spirit, Hogle argues that a density of textual transferences in the opening of the poem informs the dynamic of Promethean “disruption and reconstitution” from Aeschylus to Milton to the Jesus of Thomas Paine (174).

Within this dissociative topography, Prometheus’ curse exists as both \textit{ideology} and \textit{aetiology} – as the political declaration of freedom from Jupiter’s political tyranny, but also a locution of the Schellingian cision into time and history, a curse pronounced in Shelley’s version of Wordsworth’s “characters of the Apocalyps.” The curse is a poetic locution of Jung’s archetypes and Schelling’s actants, whose origins in language and Nature, respectively, are crystallised in the pronunciations of a being which has begun, and has yet to begin. \textit{Prometheus Unbound}’s first beginning is thus one of cision and separation: Prometheus is chained to the precipice and, pitted as he is against Jupiter, they are both nonetheless the sole witnesses to the rotatory motion of the planets. Already they are linked in the transference, the “apparent separation and combination” that persists throughout the poem to its ambivalent ending. They are witness to the imbrication of forces at the heart of the cosmos. We are already in an anxious psychic topography.

While Everest and Matthews point to the strangely (and significantly) contrived turning point in Prometheus’ wish for vengeance on Jupiter (1.53-59),\textsuperscript{296} the curse itself is subject to several levels of determination. “The Curse / Once breathed on thee I would recall” (1.58-59): the significant ambiguity of “recall,” which can mean either “remember” or “revoke,” has been the focus of much debate (481 n. 59). But within the

\textsuperscript{295} For a good discussion of Schelling’s \textit{naturphilosophische} break from Kant regarding Nature as regulative or constitutive, see Beiser, \textit{German Idealism} 519ff.

\textsuperscript{296} Here (\textit{The Poems of Shelley} 480 n. 53-9), Everest and Matthews touch on Stuart Sperry’s significant observation that Prometheus’ change of heart from disdain to pity is perhaps less Promethean waffling and more representative of the vicissitudes of universal change. But seen through a depth psychological lens these two positions converge: Prometheus, marking the emergence of consciousness out of the unconscious and the dawn of freedom over tyranny, \textit{himself} experiences enantiodromal shifts of flux and change. Thus his “liberation” into consciousness and freedom redoubles the dissociative unconscious which engenders it.
framework of Romantic metasubjectivity’s dissociative topography, the terms in fact converge to punctuate the curse’s cisionary status. Prometheus’ curse is always already unthinkable apart from its phantasmic nature. Alien to Prometheus himself, it is “breathed” as language beside itself, Schlegel’s arche-poetry in its enigmatic density, an utterance eluding its own nature as “language” while retaining its cisionary performativity. Put differently, as a trope of the grammatology of Being, trauma is the curse’s arche. With one exception, the curse is the only language “breathed” and not “spoken” or “told;” the other instance, fittingly, is in the Spirit of the Hour’s post-liberation vision, where nymphs synaesthetically “look” the love “felt” by Prometheus, Asia, and the Earth, and no hollow talk “makes the heart deny the yes it breathes” (3.4.150). Shelley would doubtless be attuned to the significance of breath as spirit, afflatus. This liberated “yes,” read as a terrestrialisation of the loving yes of Schelling’s God and the impetus of creation (Ages 73, 65), forms the obverse of the curse (which, as a declaration of political separation but also of binding transference, can be seen as Schelling’s No).

Schelling writes: “There is no dawning of consciousness [...] without positing something past [...] something that is at the same time excluded and contracted” (Ages 44). The curse signifies a Schellingian apostrophe to/of the lightning flash, the indeterminate birth of both language and poetry for Shelley (“Defence” 520, 528), and Schelling’s “incomprehensible primordial act” which both “decides” human freedom and marks the beginning of time and history (Ages 77-78). Thus, to remember the curse would be precisely to revoke it, to bring it into the purview of the thinkable – to speak it in a discourse which has not yet come into being. And yet, this past is “posited,” with no conceivable beginning. The curse, then, is language beside itself, language whose performativity is always already written into Nature in the guise of the reactions of the four spirits to the event, as well as the “many-voicèd Echoes” of the Mountains, which can only echo the curse, iterate it in the discourses of natural science and geology (1.60 & ff) as vicissitudes of archetype and actant. Mind can only express itself in Nature – indeed, one wonders how porous the boundary is between them.
When the curse of Prometheus finally manifests itself, it is through the phantasm of Jupiter summoned by the Earth. It is not spoken, but emerges ventriloquised through a transferential dynamic. In a Jungian therapeutics of presence, Prometheus is a stubborn analysand who both disavows (as “evil” [1.218-21]) and invokes Jupiter as Prometheus’ “shadow” (Wasserman’s “moral opposite” [259]) – a figure of the tyranny of which Prometheus himself is capable. But the relationship between Prometheus and the phantasm of Jupiter exceeds the orthodoxy of self-present archetypes such as Shadow, Anima and Animus, just as it exceeds Wasserman’s taking Prometheus at his word to reductively judge the curse as an “evil” (259). Rather, the mesh of dissociation and transference surrounding the curse amplifies its status as cisionary signature, a marker of the unthinkable beginnings of the productive unconscious to which *Prometheus Unbound*’s dramaturgy attests. To be sure, the curse’s profound statement of egoity ironically enunciates the dissociative transference between Prometheus and Jupiter: Jupiter’s phantasm, ventriloquising Prometheus, proclaims: “O’er all things but *thyself* I gave *thee* power, / And *my* own will” (1.273-74; my italics). Indeed, when the phantasm speaks under the influence of this spirit, “the heaven / Darkens above” in a re-manifestation of the natural events attending the original curse, seemingly in contradistinction to the undifferentiated underworld of “shadows of all forms that think and live / Till death unite them and they part no more” (1.198-99; see also 1.101-2, 1.256-57). Dissociations upon dissociations; the overdeterminations of this statement pile up to make these words less intersubjective locution and more impersonal dynamism. The first line, “O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power,” recognises the fundamental dissociation in both dramatic figures of this encounter, who are both given power by their respective Other (through the floating signifiers “thyself,” “thee,” and “my”) and yet lack the idealised self-consciousness which never materialises in the “polyphonic hymn” closing the drama. After all, Prometheus cannot remember/revoke the curse which

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297 Wasserman acknowledges the mirroring of Prometheus and Jupiter, but maintains that Prometheus “has dispelled these evils from himself now that he no longer hates but pities.” However, this argument sidesteps Ione’s reassurances, after Prometheus “doth repent” the curse, that “’tis but some passing spasm, / The Titan is unvanquished still” (1.314-15). The indeterminacy underwriting the “polyphonic hymn” at the poem’s end persists in spite of Wasserman’s insistent Idealism (see Wasserman 260).
catalyses his liberation, or “self-dawning” as consciousness of freedom, and the curse is spoken here by a phantasm whose words are not “informed by thought” (1.249), a phantasm itself “seized” and “torn” by a “spirit” even from the inhabitants of the “world of death” to which Prometheus must turn to remember the curse (1.254). This Promethean “analysis” at the dynamic core of Prometheus Unbound is an anamnesis, in effect a schizoanalysis with a pantheon of forces (Earth, Voices and Echoes) symbolising the indeterminate forces of Schellingian actant and Jungian archetype.

We have seen that actant and archetype are both attended by the same epistemological difficulties; Schelling can no more set down the laws by which actants (de)compose than Jung can move beyond the posited “as if” of archetypal economy. Even though each “decombined” individual actant, for Schelling, follows a trajectory of “free transformation” when left to its own devices (FO 33), it is only when they are combined that they approach the “most original fluidity” from which all products come, a body without organs, liminal in itself, held tense against the moment of its very dissolution and reconstitution. This is Schelling’s naturphilosophische statement of the paradoxical relationship between freedom and necessity, which figures so importantly in the later Freedom essay as a theory of personality. What he elsewhere describes as “centripetal” and “centrifugal” movements is framed here quasi-subjectively as the “compulsion and freedom” inherent in both the natural products and the host of actants forming this tension. Analytical psychology typically frames this tension as a complex of opposites – male/female, light/dark, etc. and the horizon of their union. Complementing Schelling’s metaphysics, however, Jung’s focus on the interplay of opposites informs his

298 Schelling’s Philosophy and Religion (1804), framed as a polemic against Eschenmeyer’s faith-based “nonphilosophy,” is described as “ripped from a higher,” more dialogic “organic whole” which was never written, but would have been in the style of Bruno (1802) (3). Despite his insistence on preserving philosophy from the contamination of religious faith (8), Schelling ends this short treatise with a quasi-Hegelian description of history as “an epic composed in the mind of God [with] two main parts: one depicting mankind’s egress from its center to its farthest point of displacement; the other, its return. The former is, as it were, history’s Iliad; the latter, its Odyssey. In the one, the direction is centrifugal; in the other, it becomes centripetal” (44). To be sure, the “progressively evolving revelation” harking back to the more indeterminate nature of the First Outline sits uneasily with Schelling’s closing apocatastasis, “a process of reincarnation of the ideas across all levels of finiteness” culminating in Nature’s ultimate “purification” into “an identity with the infinite” and its arrival “as reality also at [its] highest ideality” (49).
ideas on the transference as “a special form of projection,” a “carrying over from one form into another,” a “dynamic relationship between subject and object” which Jung equates with translation (Tavistock pars. 311f, 317).\(^{299}\) This is the only sense in which we can talk about *Prometheus Unbound* as a “personalised” drama – through the transferences between *dramatis personae*, analogous to the dance of (de)composition in Schelling’s actants and the general economy of the archetypes which articulate the dissociative topography of Romantic metasubjectivity. Shelley’s text even shares Jung’s ambivalence over the phenomena of the transference. On the one hand, embodying the very interplay of freedom and necessity, the transferences in *Prometheus Unbound* serve Shelley’s troubled Idealism in the form of characters who can read each other perfectly and synaesthetically share experiences. On the other hand, the confluence of Prometheus and Demogorgon in the poem’s opening and (as we will see) in the curse unsettle the integrity of the boundaries which make this Idealism possible.

“Lift up thine eyes / And let me read thy dream” (2.1.55-56): thus begins the second beginning, the idealised analytical scene between Asia and Panthea. What Panthea brings to Asia – “music” of “wordless converse; since dissolved / Into the sense with which love talks” (2.1.51-3) – ventriloquises Prometheus, yet this “sense” of love synaesthetically combines seeing, reading, and hearing. What follows in the exchange between Asia and Panthea is not merely the analysis of a subject presumed to know. Panthea not only “knows” her first dream and can communicate it to Asia in a perfect scene of counter-transference; Asia can also read the dream Panthea cannot recall (2.1.127ff) – a dream of pure *Trieb* whose “follow! follow!” impels them toward Demogorgon’s Cave just as it serves as the occasion for Panthea’s recalled dream, in turn, to “Fill, pause by pause, [Asia’s] own forgotten sleep / With shapes” (2.1.142-43). Both dreams of vivid imagery, signed with “methought” as a troubling of the ekphrastic containment both seek to impose, uncannily mirror each other as they gesture toward a

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\(^{299}\) Indeed, Hogle sees Prometheus *himself* as transferentially constructed: “each point of departure [. . .] finds itself at least half-repeating shapes in the repository of older forms that is the ‘ground’ of the new figure [. . .] and, whatever happens, cannot be left entirely for dead. Hence the Titan is this drama” (176; my italics).
Trieb which can only be a formless imperative. Both are accompanied by a wind with ill portent (“unwilling” or “frost-wrinkling” [2.1.137, 147]), and in both dreams this imperative is “stamped” and narrated in the forms of the natural world, bringing together the dark imperative of poetic language with the stamp, or type, of archetypal forms themselves saturated with the nature they “typify” (2.1.139-40, 152, 155).300

The utterance of the curse, however, points to a darker confluence which does not eclipse the transference between Asia and Panthea, but is rather the focal point of Prometheus Unbound’s dramatic telos. The confluence between Prometheus and Demogorgon, allusively embedded in the fabric of the curse (“One being only you shall not subdue” [1.265]), is rendered more obscurely than Asia’s and Panthea’s idealised commingling. Written outside any phantasy of commensurability, the suggestiveness of this “One” points to an “other,” darker side of transference not predicated on an anamnestic desire to (as de Man would say) “intentionally forget” Prometheus as object of desire through the reminiscence of dreams.301 Rather, in its erasure of metaphoricity the allusiveness of this “One” asserts ontological difference – the “imageless” deep truth – against intentional structure; indeed, both instances of allusive transference between Prometheus and Demogorgon (1.2, 265) mark “One” as an absent image – a bodying-forth of One which is always already many.

Insofar as across these two key passages “One” refers variously to Prometheus, Jupiter and Demogorgon, this Shelleyan “One” can be read as a depth-psychologisation avant la lettre of Schelling’s Godhead in the Ages of the World. That is, the “One” is the “No” (Jupiter as “consuming No, an eternally wrathful force that tolerates no Being outside itself” [Ages 73]), the “Yes” (Prometheus as Love, “an eternal outstretching, giving, and communicating of [. . .] being” [Ages 11]), and the third term, or (in)compossibility of the Yes and No (Demogorgon as Necessity, born from Jupiter/the

300 Everest and Matthews catalogue the extent to which this imperative is “written in nature and humanity” (The Poems of Shelley 2.535 n. 141)
301 De Man writes: “[Romantic imagery’s] nostalgia for the natural object, expanding to become nostalgia for the origin of this object [. . .] can only exist when the transcendental presence is forgotten” (6).
unconscious, who frees Prometheus by claiming Jupiter [3.1.52ff] while averring that Jupiter/the unconscious can always return).  Put differently: just as consciousness emerges from the unconscious through some inscrutable historical process for Jung, and just as for Schelling the cisionary break into time and history must have happened (through precisely the Necessity Shelley here imputes to mythological-historical processes), so Shelley’s Promethean narrative of the “operations of the human mind” posits this emergence in a narrative of political revolt which cannot narrate its own topography.  Indeed, the transferences between characters, their variations in intensity and determinacy, figure Schelling’s assertion that Yes or No can be dominant and recessive at different times, depending on “the simultaneity among the different forms being sublimated and transformed into a succession” (Ages 77).

Demogorgon’s “appearance” is thus heralded by the Trieb of follow! (2.1.132 & ff), which moves away from the phenomenological object even as it compulsively repeats its own refrain (indeed, Panthea’s and Asia’s blank verse is increasingly punctured by hyphenated caesurae with the waxing of the Song of Spirits [2.3.22ff]).  Yet as evinced in Asia’s and Panthea’s encounter in Demogorgon’s cave, there is something more to Demogorgon than a symbol for the power of language to posit things or “do things,” as Frosch avers (135).  To be sure Demogorgon is, in one sense, “a name for a beginning or a name by which a beginning is made, a mystification that both clears the way for new forward developments and stops things from developing backward in an infinite regression” (Frosch 167).  But this is only one of Prometheus Unbound’s narratives – a linear narrative of (for Shelley political) progress that, as I have said, does not account for the traumatic conditions of its emergence.  For in another more significant sense Demogorgon resists the very idea of origins, as “a basic silence at the heart of things which refuses to be defined and yields no ultimate assurances” (Rajan, Dark Interpreter 89).  And it is this un-beginning, this absence of origins and unwriting of finality that constitutes Demogorgon as the essence of Romantic metasubjective Trieb.  Indeed Demogorgon’s dual aspect, as both before beginning and time and a historical entity which overthrows Jupiter, makes him an emblem of the problem of Schellingian beginnings.  That is, Demogorgon embodies the paradoxical, erasural act of beginning in a lyrical drama which ends without ever having truly begun.  This un-beginning, in
Schelling’s mythological terms, is a crisis of consciousness which narrates the transferences between the theogonic forces which engender it.

It is precisely in Demogorgon as the figure of Necessity – of Trieb itself – that we find the Thanatopoietic drive of Romantic metasubjectivity which systolic-diastolically regresses and progresses toward the horizon of “Self”hood. It is tempting to see Prometheus, retired with Asia in their timeless cave and idly bantering about time and change, as an emblem of the “Self of one’s self” in Shelley’s poem. But it is precisely their depotentiated language that removes them from the fundamental historicity of Romantic metasubjectivity’s grammatology of Being, making Demogorgon the force of purposive individuation as the “absent center” of the Self. Asia and Panthea are led to Demogorgon’s cave by the same “echoes music-tongued” which exist in a liminal suspension between the mimetic and the epigenetic. These echoes do not simply mimic Asia’s recounting of her dream (“follow! follow!” [2.1.162]). They speak, as it were, with the strange utterance of Trieb’s necessity, and in sustained rhyme reserved almost exclusively for Voices (1.74ff), the Furies (1.95ff), the Chorus (1.539ff), and the Song of Spirits (2.3.54ff). The echoes speak a rather odd epigenesis – the imperative to follow! is expressed as an epistemological shift away from de Man’s intentional Romantic image and toward abstractions of lack and phenomenological absence. “Dew-stars” which “fade away” (2.1.168-69); a pursuit “Where the wild bee never flew” (180); “Through [. . .] darkness” and “By” the synaesthetic “odour-breathing sleep” of

302 Examining the aetiology of Demogorgon’s name, Everest and Matthews suggest along political lines that it represents a play on the Greek for something akin to “the terrible people,” referring to the power of the “unrepresented multitude” (The Poems of Shelley 2.468-69). Given the traumatic narrative bifurcation of Prometheus Unbound as a metapsychology showing the “operations of the mind,” however, this more significantly denotes the “terrible multitude” of nonmolar forces and indefinite forms represented by Demogorgon in the poem’s dissociative fabric. Indeed, this is Shelley’s figuring of the “terrors of an invisible world” Schelling’s backs away from in the Philosophical Letters.

303 Significantly, Everest and Matthews (537 n. 166ff) observe that in an earlier fair copy (Notebook 8) Shelley specifically cancelled out “V” for speaker identification and replaced it with Echoes. This further corroborates a reading of Shelley’s lyrical drama resisting egoic personalism in favour of the dynamics of a Necessity irreducible to a Freudian family romance.

304 This is an epistemological negation of the image/object of the bee, but could also refer to the Fourth Spirit who, representing human imagination, metaphorically “sleeps on the lips of” a Poet who “watch[es]
flowers; and finally, “To the rents, and gulfs, and chasms, / Where the Earth reposed from spasms / On the day when He and thou / Parted” (202-5). These negations accompany the refrain “O follow, follow” (2.1.173ff) under the governance of “Demogorgon’s mighty law,” which “draws” spirits forward, even as these same spirits are affectively “impelled” through “soft emotion” in the paradox of freedom and necessity characterising both actant and archetype (2.2.43-44, 50-51).305

It is no accident that Asia and Panthea’s final passage to Demogorgon’s cave is through “rents, and gulfs, and chasms” – figurations of the Ungrund which uncannily mirror the 1805 Prelude’s chasmal Promethean phenomenology in Wordsworth’s own “perfect image of a mighty mind.” Demogorgon is not one of the poem’s mythic personae: described as “Power,” “veilèd form,” and “mighty Darkness,” Asia and Panthea nevertheless feel Demogorgon affectively as “living Spirit” (2.3.11; 2.4.1, 2, 7). In response to Asia’s autoerotic wish for commensurability between the “discourse of her heart” and revelation from this “living Spirit,” Demogorgon instead

refers her to the intentionality rather than the autonomy of the transforming imagination. In his equivocal and indirect answers he allows [Asia’s discourse] to come up against a wall of silence which allows it to hope, but only in solitude and monologue, and without the support of dialogue with a transcendental source.

(Rajan, Dark Interpreter 89)

Asia’s encounter with Demogorgon is the exact obverse of her earlier, perfect analytical transference with Panthea. Asia asks Demogorgon for a proper name (2.4.9ff), a transcendental signified behind “the living world,” the human psyche’s faculties of

from dawn to gloom / the lake-reflected sun illume / the yellow bees i’ the ivy-bloom,” which prompt the Poet to create “forms more real than living man / Nurslings of immortality!” (1.737-49). The Trieb of “follow!,” then, leads beyond the representative Romantic imagination (“where the wild bee never flew”) to a pretherhuman order of Demogorgon as Necessity.

305 The paradox of freedom and necessity exists in Schelling’s thought at least as far back as his On the World-Soul (1798/1809), where the individuative organisation of the organism presupposes that “Nature must be free in its blind lawfulness, and conversely lawful in its complete freedom [. . .] We have no other concept for this union of freedom and lawfulness than the concept of the drive” (527). Pagination follows vol. 2 of Schelling’s 14-volume Sämmtliche Werke, ed. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: J.G. Cotta, 1857). I am indebted to Iain Hamilton Grant for generously sharing his translation of On the World-Soul prior to publication.
“thought, passion, reason, will, / Imagination,” and indeed the yearning essence of imaginative drive itself: “that sense which [. . .] Fills the faint eyes with falling tears which dim / The radiant looks of unbewailing flowers, / And leaves this peopled earth a solitude / When it returns no more” (2.4.12-18). Her response to Demogorgon’s enigmas is to supply her own theogony – yet another beginning in Shelley’s poem that establishes Demogorgon as Ungrund at the origins of mythology itself. Asia’s theogony (2.4.32ff) is a cosmogonic screen memory, eliding the nonmolar (Demogorgonian) origins of the universe to make the cause of Nature’s auto-alterity (the “unseasonable seasons” [52]) Jove and not the Promethean curse in a primal scene of Saturn’s overthrow (49-58). In this vision’s categorical imperative, man receives the gift of speech, and “speech created thought / Which is the measure of the universe” (72-73) as well as the “harmonious mind,” whose “all-prophetic song” (76-77) takes the form of love as binding force for the “disunited tendrils” of history (63-65). But this harmony is resisted by the polyphonic hymn at the poem’s end, and the repressed element of the curse returns to reveal her theogony as a working-through that does not quite manage to measure the universe. For prophecy lays claim to a Necessity that remains indeterminate at the end of the theogony. The latent question beneath the manifest narrative is: who – significantly not what, but still who – underwrites the curse? (108-9). Asia’s theogony adopts what Schelling calls the “poetic view” of mythology, mythology as merely poetic fabrication without truth (HCl 12ff). Schelling does not dismiss this view of mythology as false, but it must be sublated, thought to a higher potential by recognising the power (truth) of its generative ground.

Asia’s theogony is a history which she, as subject presumed to know, relates to herself in the face of Demogorgon’s refusal to do anything other than refer her to her own transformative energies (2.4.111-12). As actant or archetype in this dramatic topography Asia does not “bind,” and is forced by Demogorgon, as Trieb of Necessity, to undergo her own “free transformation” prior to her later “recombination” with Prometheus in Act
Indeed, only after this transformation can Asia retire with Prometheus to participate in the imaginative activity of making “Strange combinations out of common things, / Like human babes in their brief innocence” and “[weaving] harmonies divine, yet ever new, / From difference sweet where discord cannot be” (3.3.32-33, 38-39). But the analytic encounter between Asia and Demogorgon in fact mirrors the movements of Jung’s transcendent function, whereby new knowledge is created – here, a Thanatopoietic third which supplants Asia’s poetic theogony. Only when Asia demands that Demogorgon answer “As my own soul would answer, did it know / That which I ask” (2.4.125-26) is that intentional representation reinstated in a vision of the cars of the “immortal Hours” which embody the Thanatopoietic progression-regression dynamic of Jungian libido that is considerably more abstracted in the figure of Demogorgon, who ventriloquises Asia’s “soul” as answering being. Here, in the vision “demanded” by Asia (2.4.141), the Hours which ostensibly measure the progress of Promethean revolution, but more fundamentally the “operations of the human mind,” both look “behind, as fiends pursued them there,” and “lean forth, and drink / With eager lips the wind of their own speed, / As if the thing they loved fled on before, / And now, even now, they clasped it” (2.4.133, 135-38).

But even here, in the seeming recrudescence of Shelley’s troubled Idealism as Jupiter’s inevitable downfall, the similes “as” and “as if” mark the indeterminacy of this very movement. The vision of the Hours is a product of the encounter between Asia and Demogorgon as questioning and answering beings: Demogorgon pulls the vision, so to

306 See *FO* 33.

307 Compare Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey,” where this Thanatopoietic movement of “fearing behind, yearning ahead” is encrypted in the Poet’s dubious “picture of the mind:” here he is “more like a man / Flying from something that he dreads, than one / Who sought the thing he loved” (71-73). At the same time, however, the Poet equates himself to a roe (68) in a “becoming-animal” marking the Poet not with a totem animal, but rather with a contagion with a multiplicity, a certain flow. As Deleuze and Guattari write, becoming-animal is not to identify with this or that animal’s structural characteristics, but with specific and unique “modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 239). This contagion with multiplicity, encrypted in the “picture of the mind” as a lack (an absence of “seeking what one loves”), informs the movement of futurity in “Tintern Abbey” ostensibly served by the “lofty thoughts” instilled by Nature (129).
speak, from Asia’s soul (a soul Asia does not know), and in this vision is a “spirit with a
dreadful countenance,” a “shadow of a destiny” (2.4.142ff) emblematic of the nonmolar
mythological forces beyond the merely poetic view of Asia’s theogony. This vision is
the third of Jung’s transcendent function, except that where Jung conceives the
transcendent function between analyst and analysand as human psyche, here it is between
Asia and Demogorgon as the force of the Ungrund itself. This is why, in the reinstated
intentionality of Asia’s poetic imagery, Thanatopoiesis is not quite “real” – indeed, it
only acquires real formative force with the unbinding of Prometheus and its proclamation
by Demogorgon as Ungrund, or the Trieb of Necessity. Thus, Asia’s theogony remains
imaginary, incommensurable with the mythological historicity represented by
Demogorgon as “absent force.”

With a phantasmal liminality mirroring Prometheus’ cisionary curse,
Demogorgon’s final speeches are marked by “words that are not words.” They unfold
dramatically, on the level of language, across apostrophes and invocations to Earth,
Moon, “Daemons and Gods, / Ethereal Dominations,” “Ye happy Dead,” “Ye elemental
Genii” and Voices (4.519ff). As “a mighty Power [. . .] rising out of Earth, and from the
sky [. . .] showered like night, and from within the air / Burst[ing]” (4.510-13),
Demogorgon’s address manifests itself first as “a sense of words” and “an universal
sound like words” which disrupts Ione’s and Panthea’s exclamations with caesurae
(4.517-18). His address only gradually coalesces into proclamatory “words” once it turns
to invoke forces tied more to Earth’s temporal sphere – “elemental Genii,” “Spirits whose
home are flesh” and the various phenomena of the natural world (539ff). Demogorgon’s
final invocation, as linguistic and supralinguistic force, opens the horizon of futurity
commensurate with Prometheus’ unbinding, heralded by the blowing of a “many-folded
shell” (3.3.80).

But if the shell’s “mighty music” heralds futurity, its “thunder mixed with clear
echoes” (3.3.82) nevertheless marks a remainder troubling any Idealist conception of
Demogorgonian Necessity as unbridled progression, or the unmitigated dawning of
Promethean consciousness. But what is at the heart of this futurity, this poetry of the
shell? What are “the spells by which to re-assume / An empire over the disentangled
Doom” (4.568-69)?

Do they refer to Demogorgon’s final proclamations, or to the fraught “moment” of Prometheus Unbound itself as a dramatisation of the unaccountable beginnings of metasubjective Trieb? Either way we are confronted with the enigmatic density of poetic language which offers no guarantees, and the “Self of one’s self,” the provisional totality of Romantic metasubjectivity, is not figured as Prometheus (who is nowhere to be seen). Rather, it is the deep imageless truth of Demogorgon-as-Necessity, an individuative drive irreducible to its embodiment in any single (personalised) form. As Romantic metasubjectivity’s psyche, Prometheus Unbound figures individuation as a force that cannot be reduced to any one of its dramatis personae. Demogorgon proclaims that what is “alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory” is when “Hope creates / from its own wreck the thing it contemplates” – a poetic figuration of analytical psychology’s project of becoming its own object, and the fusion of real and ideal at the heart of Schelling’s philosophical project (4.574ff). But this is not the Promethean. This victory is “like” Prometheus glory, but this similitude nevertheless encrypts a difference which folds Shelley’s hopeful Idealism back into the dissociative grammaology which engenders it. Demogorgon is not simply a force of “good” or “freedom.” The dubious “empire” of his final speech signals the negation of Romantic metasubjectivity’s purposiveness, which is no longer repressed yet lacks recognition in the discursive register of the poem’s political Idealism. This “empire” reminds the reader that “past time is not sublimated time. What has past certainly cannot be as something present, but it must be as something past at the same time with the present” (Ages 76; my italics). The self-referential reflection of Demogorgon’s language – which also makes Prometheus Unbound’s dissociative trajectory itself the “spell” and antidote to the hegemony of the One or the Same – positions Demogorgon as the centripetal force of a narrative Trieb, a transferential contagion.

308 “Empire” has various meanings in Prometheus Unbound, but the OED, apart from a definition (possibly obsolete in Shelley’s time) simply as “independent nation” (3), overwhelmingly defines “empire” in terms of absolute rule by a sovereign figure. Thus, this “re-assumed empire” retains the possibility of tyranny’s return (or the recrudescence of unconscious forces) despite the final association of empire with the “Good, great and joyous, beautiful, and free” (4.577-78).
With both *The Prelude* and *Prometheus Unbound*, the psyche of Romantic metasubjectivity unfolds in an anxiogenic topography in which its purposive individuation exists in tension with Idealist teleology. Determined by the Promethean mythologem, *The Prelude* inscribes this individuation within a *Bildungsroman* narrative whereby the poetic mind’s maturation ostensibly contains the “careless” indeterminate energies of primal sites of contact with the productive unconscious. *Prometheus Unbound* can be used to analyse Wordsworth’s poetic psyche, mirroring the cursive writing of Romantic metasubjectivity’s trauma with a similarly idealistic political narrative of emancipation that also fails to contain the radical, nonmolar energies of its psyche. In other words, the Promethean in these two poems is far less an idealist epic of the “one mind” and far more a seething entanglement of the freedom of unconscious productivity, with self-consciousness as a systemic emblem of political discourse or the imperative of the moral sublime. Both poems seek on some level to elide this tension by presenting a moral view of the world, suggesting, through poetry’s equivocal fluidity, ways in which the poetic can nevertheless lead to a moral human existence. This perennial tension between art and morality – one not always acknowledged by the Romantics, who often attempt to synonymise them – leads us to the crucial question with which I will conclude: is there, or can there be an *ethics* of Romantic metasubjectivity?
Conclusion: “Romantic Meth-subjectivity”

Let us crystallise the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity whose domain we have mapped in the previous chapters. Romantic metasubjectivity is a model of personhood which, fed by the tributaries of Schelling’s philosophy and Jung’s analytical psychology, describes more of the true compass of Romantic thinking on the person than the amalgamation of Freudian psychoanalysis and deconstruction which has prevailed in Romantic criticism. Unbound by economies of either nostalgia or endless difference, Romantic metasubjectivity unfolds in the world according to a rhythmic ontology of progression and regression and introversion and extraversion, traversing traditional metaphors of height and depth, darkness and light without remaining bound to these metaphors as transcendental signifying matrices. What Novalis calls the “Self of one’s self,” as the unique organising force of knowledge and experience in the individual, is not the preformed endpoint of an inevitable teleological drive toward absolute knowledge; it is not a final plateau of consciousness to be reached by an individual or the species, nor is it a mode of transcendence removed from the indeterminacy of the natural world. Rather, this nonmolar force marks the epigenetic, purposive unfolding of a self-organising personality, and this is precisely what is figured by Schelling as the absolute subject and by Jung, in a more explicitly psychological framework, as the Self. This unfolding – Schelling’s absolute subject moving through everything without being anything – is what Jung puts at the heart of analytical psychology as the individuation process, around which Jung’s core concepts are constellated.

When we turn to the question of an ethics, we are faced with the question: how can one derive an ethics from an individuation process so intimately connected with the indeterminate productive energies of Nature/the unconscious? Must we derive an ethics from this, and is an ethics the only viable human outcome for Romantic metasubjectivity’s being in the world? We have seen that for Schelling, personality is inextricably linked with the Ungrund of existence and that the person is “the world writ small,” and that for Jung consciousness is always already imbricated with the unconscious, which is Nature. The very coextensivity between mind and Nature intrinsic
to Romantic metasubjectivity makes discursive ethics at best provisional, but nullifies its claims to universality. But I want to argue by way of conclusion that this need not mean jettisoning ethics altogether; rather, it involves bracketing its universality in favour of the experiences which make such discourses possible in the first place – experiences which cannot be reduced to or contained by the “thou shalt’s of the ethical. In other words, Romantic metasubjectivity cannot promulgate ethical discourse, but instead unfolds as what John Caputo, in his Against Ethics (1993), has called a poetics of obligation, a species of morality which “happens” in an event unbound by the discursive confines of ethics (4-5). In a word, this happening is morality as obligation, which contains an undecidability that destabilises ethics as its dangerous supplement even as it insists on decision, albeit decision freed from the guarantee of the ethical.

We can state the issue in terms of the tension between the system of ethics and the freedom of obligation, the freedom to be bound by obligation’s inscrutable magnetic pull, a pull which follows the purposive energies of the “Self of one’s self.” While Caputo does not go so far as an organising purposiveness, he nevertheless sees this obligation as fundamentally religious, and in a manner which resonates with Schelling’s positive philosophy and Jung’s conception of analytical psychology as a fundamentally religious enterprise. To articulate this nonethics I will first briefly examine Jung’s Answer to Job (1952), a controversial commentary on the Book of Job which presents Jung’s view of evil as energy in a manner closely resembling Schelling’s Freedom essay, and uncannily mirrors the emergence of time and history in Ages. We will then turn from Job’s Yahweh to the more specifically nonhuman conceptions of the archetypes and individuation as rather remarkable extensions of the crystallogeny which plays a profound role in Romantic thinking about organic and inorganic matter alike. This profoundly amoral and nonhumanist dimension to individuation grounds Caputo’s critique of ethics, even as Romantic metasubjectivity goes further than Caputo by

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309 “The impossible is the religious, the re-ligare, which means the one-on-one bond of the existing individual with the Absolute, the absolute relation to the Absolute. The re-ligare is the ob-ligare, the absolute bond, the obligation, but without the shelter afforded by the universal, the rational, the eternal” (Caputo 18).
presenting the specifically nonmolar dynamics of this ontology. I will then end with an all too brief analysis of Walter White, the antihero of the hit TV series *Breaking Bad* (2008-2013), who provides us with an uncannily resonant case study of Romantic metasubjectivity in contemporary culture.

**Answer to Job: Even God Must Individuate**

The *Book of Job* is known as an Old Testament book concerned with the issue of divine justice and the problem of human suffering. *Job* opens with Yahweh praising the righteous, God-fearing nature of his worshipper Job, and Satan, who is strangely part of God’s court,\(^ \text{310} \) bets Yahweh that Job would curse God were he deprived of his material possessions and health. To very generally summarise the narrative of this complicated theological text: *Job* is structured by a beginning Prologue, the speeches by Job and his friends where they debate divine justice and Job’s complaints, and the climactic exchange between Job and Yahweh, where Yahweh justifies his treatment of Job in a series of speeches invoking the creation of the universe and Nature (*Job* 38:1 ff) – speeches which do not, however, address Job’s specific complaint. The extraordinarily ambivalent ending of *Job*, which concerns us here, has generated a great deal of commentary. But what is salient for us here is how Jung reads *Job* into analytical psychology as a crucial cisionary point in a larger Biblical individuation process culminating in Christ as a figure of totality, and what this means for morality in analytical psychology as it informs Romantic metasubjectivity. Jung’s basic argument in *Answer to Job* (1952)\(^ \text{311} \) is that the

\(^{310}\) David Clines makes the important observation that here, Satan is “not the ‘devil’ of later Jewish and Christian literature. [. . .] Here he acts as God’s eyes and ears on earth” (*The Book of Job* 727 n). This point removes Satan from the binarist tendencies of contemporary Christianity to bring him closer to being an aspect of Yahweh, an organ of sensation, a way of perceiving the materiality of his created world. This understanding is sympathetic to Jung’s psycho-ontological reading of the *Book of Job*. Here as elsewhere in my citations of *Job*, I rely on Clines’ annotations.

\(^{311}\) *Answer to Job* occupies a unique place in Jung’s oeuvre. Although its reception was certainly chequered, and often harshly condemned (see Bishop, *Jung’s Answer to Job* 44ff), Jung saw it as an integral part of his own individuation process, writing that its genesis was from “an increasingly urgent feeling of responsibility which in the end I could no longer withstand” (letter to Pastor Walter Uhsadel, 6 Feb 1952, 39).
Holy Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be supplemented by Satan as the dark side of God to make it a quaternity and authentic expression of totality. Of interest for our discussion of Romantic metasubjectivity is that Jung reads Job far from its orthodox theological grain, in the light of an analytic scene where Yahweh’s encounter with Job reveals a “divine darkness” (Answer to Job para. 561) at the heart of God. Indeed, it is because Yahweh is “too unconscious to be moral” (para. 574) that Job is a catalyst for Yahweh’s own individuation process: the final encounter in Job effectively inaugurates Yahweh’s own libidinal gradient which, for Jung, culminates in Christ as the fulfilment of Yahweh’s “intention to become man” (para. 648). As we have seen, there is no evidence that Jung read any of Schelling’s work firsthand before the mythology lectures. But seen through a Romantic metasubjective lens, Answer to Job is Jung’s onto-psychological response to the cosmological concerns of Ages, irrespective of the moral superiority Jung attributes to Job over Yahweh in an attempt to inhibit the text’s cosmological potency into a personalised encounter (para. 640). Paul Bishop describes Answer to Job as “a miniature exercise in cultural history” (Jung’s Answer to Job 26), but this misses the point of Answer to Job’s distinctly preterhuman dimensions and their significance for the moral implications of Romantic metasubjectivity. Indeed, in articulating the preterhuman aspects of Jung’s reading of Job, I argue that Jung recapitulates the cisionary drama of God’s coming to be in time and history of Schelling’s Ages, recasting this drama in contemporary terms of the problem of evil and the genesis of morality. The nonhuman aspects of individuation in Answer to Job also make this text a corroboration of Jung’s mature thinking on the archetypes and individuation, connecting this thought to contemporary critiques of discursive ethics. Let us then briefly trace the contours of Jung’s reading of the Job-Yahweh encounter.

“The archetype, as a natural phenomenon, [. . .] possesses no moral quality in itself but is amoral, like the Yahwistic God-image, and acquires moral qualities only through the act of cognition. Thus Yahweh is both just and unjust, kindly and cruel,

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312 Jung states the matter plainly: “The real reason for God’s becoming man is to be sought in his encounter with Job” (Answer to Job para. 624).
truthful and deceitful” (“A Psychological View” para. 845). Thus Jung links the Janus-faced collective unconscious and its archetypes to the ambivalence of the God of the Old Testament. Just as Schelling insists that God is “not a system, but rather a life” (Freedom 62), Jung insists that individuation is “the life in God” (“Jung and Religious Belief” para. 1624), and thus the cosmogony informing Jung’s reading of Yahweh is marked not only by a yearning for time, history and individuation, but also by the not-God within God Schelling discerns in the Freedom essay. Thus, in turning to focus on the exchange between Yahweh and Job, Jung writes: “the inner instability of Yahweh is the prime cause not only of the creation of the world, but also of the pleromatic drama for which mankind serves as a tragic chorus” (Answer to Job para. 686). This “inner instability” amounts to a lack of reflection, an unconsciousness on the part of Yahweh as a God who, omnipotent and (we are led to believe) omniscient, nevertheless takes Satan’s cynical bets regarding Job’s loyalty. As emblem of the not-God within God (the accuser in Yahweh’s attendance), Job’s Satan, consanguineous with the questioning Job, catalyses Job’s repetition of the cision into time and history as Yahweh’s creation of the world. But at the same time, Jung notes that in Yahweh’s display of power there is a projection on to Job of something “we would not ascribe to him but to God [. . .] Yahweh projects on to Job a sceptic’s face which is hateful to him because it is his own, and which gazes at him with an uncanny and critical eye. [. . .] Job is challenged as though he himself were a god” (Answer to Job pars. 591, 594; my italics).

Jung thus conceives of Yahweh and Job as questioning and answering beings in an analytic scene. But they are also potentiated in a way that reveals something more than a personalised encounter. Viewed in this light, Yahweh’s first speech to Job (Job 38:1 ff) begins with a certain transferential ambiguity not dissimilar to the curse in Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound; indeed, “Who is this that darkens counsel [the divine principles of creation] by words without knowledge?” (38:2), spoken to Job, also reflect on Yahweh’s lack of reflection as undifferentiated unconsciousness. Jung writes:

In view of the subsequent words of Yahweh, one must really ask oneself: Who is darkening what counsel? The only dark thing here is how Yahweh ever came to make a bet with Satan. It is certainly not Job who has darkened anything and least of all a counsel [. . .] Naturally this development was foreseen in omniscience,
and it may be that the word “counsel” refers to this eternal and absolute knowledge. If so, Yahweh’s attitude seems the more illogical and incomprehensible [. . .] [So] Whose words are without insight? [. . .] The answer to Yahweh’s conundrum is therefore: it is Yahweh himself who darkens his own counsel and who has no insight. (Answer to Job pars. 585-87)

For Jung, Yahweh’s unconsciousness establishes him as the equivalent of Schelling’s contractive potency, the A\(^1\) of self-withdrawal whose anxiogenic rotatory motion is expressed as rage and indignation. But what follows as part of this anxiogenesis is nothing less than what Ages calls an involution preceding evolution, a recapitulation of the creation of the world: the laying of the foundation of the earth and the measuring of its dimensions, light and darkness, and the elements and the constellations (Job 38:4-38) are followed by a narrative of the creation of the animals (38:39-39:30). Although Yahweh is ostensibly questioning Job (“I will question you, and you shall declare to me” [Job 38:3]), Job, as one who “induces” Yahweh “to open the sources of knowledge that are hidden and still concealed in itself” (HCI 7), holds his tongue (Job 40:3-5) as Yahweh continues his narrative.

Thus, like Yahweh, Job is also both a questioning and answering being in this transferential dynamic, Schelling’s A\(^2\) which calls the first potency to expansion into time and history – here, as Yahweh’s anamnesis in the world of the creation of the world. Job’s final response preserves the ambivalence of the encounter: he mirrors Yahweh’s initial questions (42:2-3) with profound irony, and when he says that “therefore I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know” (42:3), Job is reflecting on the nature of the God which he did not know, but has now metaphorically “seen” (42:5) – a God of which God himself is not fully aware – in an experience which causes him to take comfort in “dust and ashes,” the materiality of the

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313 This can also be measured in terms of Yahweh’s proclivity to make binding contracts (covenants) with humanity (the Noahic Covenant; Gen. 12-17), the Israelites (the Mosaic Covenant; Ex. 19-24, the Davidic Covenant; Jer. 33:17-22), to name a few.

314 Clines notes that “therefore I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:6) most likely means “I yield” or “I am discouraged,” which could be read as an acknowledgement of the failure of transcendental justice in the face of the melancholy of Being.
world in which even God must individuate. In this sense, Jung describes Job in the Prefatory Note to *Answer to Job* as he “who expected help from God against God” – in other words, he who provokes the yearning of God for Being in a way which leads to Yahweh’s recapitulation, *in time and history*, of the coming into being of time and history. Indeed, the idea of needing God’s help against God encapsulates the moment and movement of potentiation in *Ages*: Job’s complaint speaks directly to the not-God within God, Yahweh’s lack of reflection and universal justice but also the yearning for time and history as individuation which, for Jung, leads to God’s ultimately becoming man as Christ. \(^{315}\) In other words, this “help” is the beginning of Yahweh’s coming-to-consciousness which, for Jung, reaches its climax in Christ as the figure combining “heterogeneous natures” of Yahweh and Job “in a single personality” (*Answer to Job* para. 648). To this end, Jung points out that after his encounter with Job, Yahweh loses his specifically contractive potentiation, and there is a shift to “apocalyptic communications” which gesture toward a futurity:

> After Job, we hear nothing further about new covenants. Proverbs and gnomic utterances seem to be the order of the day, and a real *novum* now appears on the scene, namely apocalyptic communications. This points to metaphysical acts of cognition, that is, to “constellated” unconscious contents which are ready to irrupt into consciousness. (para. 637)

God has been displaced from his specifically contractive potency; Job, as the expansive potency, has bewitched (to use Schelling’s word) Yahweh into the time and history always already present as Satan, who “[goes] to and fro on the earth, and [walks] up and down on it” (*Job* 1:7, 2:2). As representative of the world’s materiality and the suffering in it which challenges faith, Satan raises the doubt which catalyses Yahweh’s individuation.

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\(^{315}\) To this end Tod Linafelt notes the profound ambivalence of the word “bless” (ךרב) in *Job*, noting the ways in which it harbours Derridean traces of its opposite, “curse.” Thus, Yahweh’s “blessing” of Job (and vice versa) is a hermeneutical “faultline” which “evinc[es] a fundamental ambivalence about the character of YHWH” (156).
Thus Jung argues, as does Schelling, that even God must individuate. Indeed, in the final paragraphs of *Answer to Job* Jung thinks the incommensurability between mind and Nature in terms of different modalities of individuation. On the one hand, there is a nonpsychic, “unconscious” individuation approaching a preformationist understanding of the organism, which “means no more than that the acorn becomes an oak, the calf a cow, and the child an adult” in which “consciousness nowhere intervenes [and] the end remains as dark as the beginning” (*Answer to Job* para. 756). On the other hand, there is individuation as “a process of differentiation of human consciousness” more closely aligned with the premise of dynamic evolution in Schelling’s *First Outline* (para. 758). Leaving aside for a moment Jung’s fluid conception of the psyche, which he at times identifies with Nature itself, the crucial point here is that *individuation is not exclusively, and perhaps not even primarily a psychic process*. This idea of individuation as the recapitulation of the difference between psyche and Nature summarises their uncanny affinity in Romantic metasubjectivity. With this, let us turn one last time to

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316 “You can never say with certainty whether what appears to be going on in the collective unconscious of a single individual is not also happening in other individuals or organisms or things or situations” (Jung, *Synchronicity* para. 912).

317 Thus Jung anticipates the work of Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), French philosopher best known for his sophisticated work on the concept of individuation. Sadly, little of Simondon’s work has been translated into English, but his influence can be seen in contemporary philosophers such as Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler. Simondon’s critique of the concept of individuation is a critique of first terms, an attempt to get past the *principle* of individuation (typically assumed in the organisms in which it operates) to considering individuation as the primordial operation of Being itself: “Instead of understanding individuation starting from the individuated being, the individuated being must be understood starting from individuation, and individuation from preindividual being, according to several orders of magnitude” (“Position” 10). Individuation is “true ontogenesis” insofar as it “designate[s] the character of becoming of being, that by which being becomes, insofar as it is, as being” (5). Simondon thinks individuation in terms of what he calls a *metastable equilibrium* – a system which includes *becoming* and is thus outside the restricted economy of the stable equilibrium (10). Simondon distinguishes between three different modes of individuation: in *physical* individuation, the metastable system individuates and “resolves” into stable natural or “manufactured” objects (e.g., molecules). *Living* individuation pertains to the living organism, which “conserves within itself a permanent activity of individuation” as “a system of individuation, an individuating system and a system individuating itself” (7). Unique to the human subject, *psychic* individuation is “the continuation of the vital individuation in a being that, in order to resolve its own problematic, must itself intervene as an element of the problem by its own action, as a *subject*” (8). Simondon read Jung and credited him with discovering, among other things, the “affective emotional regime” (*le régime affectivo-émotif*) in which psychic individuation operates (*L’individuation* 99-100). Chabot’s account of Simondon’s engagement with Jung is admirably open-minded, although he overlooks the multivalency in Jung’s concept of individuation and thus its possible influence on Simondon (115).
Jung’s archetypes which Jung, in his late thinking, describes in profoundly nonhuman terms in ways which complement their theoretical affinity with Schelling’s actants. Indeed the crystal, as Jung’s guiding image for describing the archetype’s self-organisational nature, situates it in a wider tradition of what Novalis called Romantic “crystallogeny” which reads the crystal’s epigenesis as a force of Being.

Schelling writes in the First Outline that life is “nothing other than an intensified condition of common natural forces [. . .] life is not anything in itself, it is only the phenomenon of a transition of certain forces from [this] intensified condition into the usual condition of the universal” (FO 68). Indeed, Eric Wilson writes that in his On the World-Soul (1798),

[Schelling] maintains that all nature is a vast crystal. Rock or ice crystals are primitive organizations of life that will one day evolve into more conscious geometries – plants, animals, and humans. Crystallization is a primary phenomenon. It is the archetypal organization of the absolute. Crystals are early humans. Humans are advanced crystals. (28)

This fluidity of organic and inorganic characterises Jung’s post-1946 thinking on the archetype. Jung writes in 1948 that the archetype’s organisational potency can be “compared to the invisible, potential presence of the crystal lattice in mother liquor. [. . .] Empirically considered, [. . .] the archetype did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon of organic life, but entered into the picture with life itself” (“A Psychological Approach” para. 222 n. 2, trans. mod).318 This metaphor represents Jung’s shift in thinking about the archetype from its “merely psychic” operations to its psychoid basis in both mind and organic substrate. Let us dwell briefly on this jarring passage, which returns analytical psychology to the quasi-subjective space of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Jung makes two remarkable claims about the archetypes: first, that they are coterminous with life before human instinct comes on the scene. Second, he suggests a difference between “organic life” and “life itself,” emphasised in the

318 “Mother liquor” (or “bittern”) is a term in chemistry referring to the solution which remains after the process of crystallisation.
archetype’s comparison to a “crystal lattice” which establishes an ordering principle in inorganic Nature analogous (but not equivalent) to that of organic Nature. In chemistry, the crystal lattice [Kristallgitter] is an integrated network of atoms whose intrinsic nature impels them to unfold regular, symmetrical patterns in an interwoven structure (the square shape of salt crystals being the most obvious example). We have already seen how Schelling’s Nature “forms itself” around the “seed” of the actant in an analogous manner (FO 21 n. 1), and indeed Schelling also sees the organic as a “higher species of crystallization” in Nature’s propensity to produce regular forms (FO 194).

Crystallisation also determines individuation in Jung’s alchemical studies, where individuation is the process of an unknowable centre acting “like a magnet on the disparate materials and processes of the unconscious and gradually captures them as in a crystal lattice. […] Indeed, it seems as if all the personal entanglements and dramatic changes of fortune that make up the intensity of life were […] almost like petty complications and meticulous excuses for not facing the finality of this strange and uncanny process of crystallization” (Psychology and Alchemy 217-18). This conception of the crystal returns in 1954, when Jung writes that the archetype’s form might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own. [The individual crystal’s concrete form] may be either large or small, and it may vary endlessly by reason of the different size of its planes or by the growing together of two crystals. The only thing that remains constant is the axial system, or rather, the invariable geometric proportions underlying it. (“Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype” para. 155)

Archetype as crystallogeny: the OED lists the first English use of “crystallogeny” in 1837, but the term is Novalis’ – one can expect no less from a student of mineralogy and geology (Notes #893). This Romantic crystallography has its roots in Paracelsus and Swedenborg (both of whom influenced Jung heavily), rethinking the crystal’s epigenesis through the archetype as organising principle of human knowledge and life itself. But Novalis also sees crystallisation as a master trope of both geological and human history. The earth’s development is governed by the waxing and waning of “states of flux” which cause “new, necessary mixtures” of natural forces and “new, purer crystallization” of
“new, beautiful forms” (“Faith and Love” #21). Growing in volume and mass, man is seen as a unity of “external, superficial” development and internal “formation in the depths” – “man is like a crystal of such a mass—capable of bringing forth infinite crystals. The perfect crystal, as it were, must consist of an innumerable number of similar smaller crystals” (Notes #446). Indeed, in this Brouillon entry Novalis continues to poeticise the general economy of both the actant and archetype. These rhizomatic lines of “infinite crystals” articulate the “fundamental form” of the “seed of the human being,” where all differences and “imperfections” in the “raw” system “must be brought into balance through the life of the system” in a way which preserves previous syntheses – “just as through the non-ego, the developed and perfected ego is the synthesis, as it were, of the raw ego and its infinite alterations” (#446). In this way, Novalis approaches the ontological “poetics of self-organization” (Wilson, The Spiritual History of Ice 61) unfolded in crystalline structures central to both the dynamism of Schelling’s Nature and the organisation of knowledge in the metasubjective psyche that emerges from this Nature. Crystallogeney, then, is the emblem of the purposive self-organisation marking Romantic metasubjectivity.

The Darkness of Obligation

What, then, happens to ethics if all of Being is always already implicated in individuative processes with no final endpoint? We live in a century marked by a recycled Kantian morality which presumes to create a globalised ethics and kingdom of ends in the form of universal proclamations of human rights. This morality decrees

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319 Hegel’s Naturphilosophie also makes extensive use of the crystal trope, referring to the “archetypal crystal,” in its “abstract identity” and “transparency,” as “the diamond of the Earth […] the first-born son of light and gravity” (Philosophy of Nature 184). For Hegel, “crystallinity was both the culmination of the inorganic process, and foreshadowed the organization of life. It provided a conceptual entry into a consideration of the geological process, and of the structural composition and life of the earth” (Levere 110).

320 Indeed, one could argue – as Schelling does of the European philosophy of his time – that for the United Nations and the global capitalist enterprise it serves, “nature does not exist for it […] it lacks a living ground” (Freedom 26; trans. mod). To be more specific, Nature exists for global capitalism as a dual phantasy, both an infinite resource and an infinite garbage dump, when in reality it is neither.
that Nature’s sole purpose is to provide the opportunity for the teleological unfolding of human freedom as a “systematic union of human ends” (Guyer 412). And there are some who do want to give Schelling’s Nature the ethical stamp of political activism. For example, Bruce Matthews argues that Schelling’s mythology of nature harbours a “utopian potential” with “an emancipatory power capable of liberating an engaged hope from its bondage to the ideology of irony that currently emasculates transformative political action” (203). To be sure, Matthews points to the interminable “chaotic rhythm” that is the Ungrund of Romantic metasubjectivity we have explored in Chapter Four – in Matthews’ terms, “an organic, and thus partially chaotic, process of self-differentiation that generates increasingly complex iterative systems” (“The New Mythology” 207-8). But he nevertheless gathers up this imbrication of freedom and necessity into an idealist project of “balanced relationship [and] reciprocity with nature’s nexus of living forces” in the name of “redemptive harmony” (212). Matthews ends up resuscitating an anthropocentric fantasy of “realizing a unity with nature” (213) which, in an ideological sleight-of-hand, reinstates human freedom in its idealist intensity as a future which “offers unseen possibilities and thus an open-ended orientation to what should be” (215). In other words, Matthews acknowledges the aleatory energy of this self-differentiation but asserts transformative political action as an unproblematic possibility within this stochastic matrix, insisting on a “subversive and emancipatory power” (216) in Schelling’s “mythology of nature” which cannot be corroborated by this Nature. In attempting to cast Schelling’s Nature as a platform for a neo-Kantian kingdom of ends, Matthews ultimately eclipses Nature’s radical productivity by assuming, as part

321 Had he read more Kant than he did, Jung may also have been dismayed to discover that Kant deemed a “science of psychology” impossible (see n. 1, above). This is the psychological equivalent of the political disavowal of a Nature which resists the logical imposition of human ends.

322 This same drive to discern a political activist agenda is expressed negatively vis-à-vis Jung by Paul Bishop, who faults Jung for what he sees as “the potentially devastating moral deficit at the heart of analytical psychology,” its “failure to develop any ethical standpoint, particularly in the political sphere” (Synchronicity 163 & n. 43). In my view this is a grievous misunderstanding of the more radical points analytical psychology makes with regard to individuation and the Self; it is, in effect, throwing the metapsychological baby out with the ethical bathwater.
of his desire for transformative politics, that humanity can and will one day annihilate Nature.

It is perhaps obvious by now that I counterpose Romantic metasubjectivity to the activist humanism Matthews sees in Schelling’s “mythology of Nature.” For while there is little doubt that humanity is damaging its environment to a degree which imperils the future of the species, we have seen that Schelling’s mythology, like the actants in the First Outline, precedes humanity; indeed, mythology is tied to geology and the history of the Earth, thus resting on Nature’s purposiveness, which is not bound to either anthropocentric teleology or the preservation of our species. It was Carl Kielmeyer, the comparative anatomist who in Schelling’s words opened “a completely new epoch in natural history,” who situated Nature against transcendental philosophy, emphasising their incommensurability to the extent that the latter’s conditions of possible experience can only exist “against the backdrop of a natural history full of extinction events” (qtd. in Grant, Philosophies 120-1).323 In other words, “if transcendental philosophy reaches its limit with a merely possible nature, actual NATURE confronts merely transcendental necessities with the stark inevitability of the eventual elimination of species whose experience is conditioned by them” (121). Nature, then, is indifferent to what Idealism conceives as its chosen child, humanity.324 And while it is clichéd these days to talk

323 For another engaging discussion of Schelling’s view of Nature relative to the early nineteenth-century discovery of fossilised evidence of mass species extinction, see Chapter One of Wirth, Schelling’s Practice of the Wild.

324 The position I take here with Romantic metasubjectivity contra Matthews is ventriloquised by the late comedian George Carlin. In a 1992 performance Carlin says: “Saving endangered species is just one more arrogant attempt by humans to control Nature. It’s arrogant meddling. It’s what got us into trouble in the first place! Doesn’t anyone understand that? Interfering with Nature! Leave Nature alone...haven’t we done enough? We’re so self-important. So self-important. Everybody’s going to save something now. [. . .] And the greatest arrogance of all: save the planet. What? Are these fucking people kidding me? Save the planet? We don’t even know how to take care of ourselves yet! We haven’t learned how to care for one another, we’re gonna save the fucking planet? [. . .] Besides, there is nothing wrong with the planet. [. . .] The planet is fine. The people are fucked! [. . .] Compared to the people, the planet is doing great! Been here four and a half billion years. [. . .] We’ve been here, what, a hundred thousand? Maybe two hundred thousand? And we’ve only been engaged in heavy industry for a little over two hundred years. Two hundred years versus four and a half billion. And we have the conceit to think that somehow we’re a threat? [. . .] The planet has been through a lot worse than us. [. . .] Been through earthquakes, volcanoes, plate tectonics, continental drift, solar flares, sun spots, magnetic storms, the magnetic reversal of the poles [. . .] hundreds of thousands of years of bombardment by comets and asteroids and meteors, worldwide floods, tidal waves,
about the death of metanarrative, it is less so to argue that human discourses are castles built upon the fluid, shifting sands of indeterminacy. We have seen clearly idealist moments in both Schelling’s and Jung’s oeuvres: for example, Schelling wants to retain a promissory confluence of truth and fable in *Ages* that surpasses primordial indeterminacy, even as he criticises Idealism as “denial and nonacknowledgement” of the same (7). At times Jung, too, speaks of human individuation as something achievable through a teleological progression through the analytic encounter, even as his metapsychology makes this impossible. But as a psychologist who survived two World Wars and lived in an atomic age marked by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Jung’s age was conditioned by an unprecedented loss of life and the dawning of the nuclear age we now take for granted. Thus, Jung’s writing is more ominous and even less idealist than Schelling’s in several ways with respect to the destructive potential of the human psyche. And why should this not be the case? Given that Jung was a man who, it is said, had an hour-long precognitive vision of the First World War in the form of floods, drowned bodies, and a sea of blood (*Memories* 175-76), one can understand why analytical psychology, for all its futurity, harbours a pessimism far beyond that of psychoanalysis’ split subject. Thus, if humanity, Nature, and even God must run the risks of differentiation, there can be no overarching ethics without disavowing and repressing entirely the drives and imperatives of individuation.

worldwide fires, erosion, cosmic rays, recurring ice ages...And we think some plastic *bags* and some aluminum *cans* are going to make a difference? [. . .] The planet isn’t goin’ anywhere. *We* are! We’re goin’ away...pack your shit folks, we’re going away. [. . .] Just another failed mutation, just another closed-end biological mistake, an evolutionary *cul-de-sac*. [. . .] The planet will be here for a long, long, long time after we’re gone and it will heal itself, it will cleanse itself ’cos that’s what it does. It’s a self-correcting system. The air and the water will recover, the earth will be renewed, and if it’s true that plastic is not degradable, well, the planet will simply incorporate plastic into a new paradigm: the earth plus plastic. The earth doesn’t share our prejudice towards plastic. Plastic came *out* of the earth. The earth probably sees plastic as just another one of its children. Could be the only reason the earth allowed us to be spawned from it in the first place: it wanted plastic for itself. Didn’t know how to make it; needed us. Could be the answer to our age-old philosophical question “Why are we here?” “Plastic, assholes!” [. . .] I think we’re part of a greater wisdom than we’ll ever understand. A higher order – call it what you want. You know what I call it? The Big Electron. [makes rhythmic pulsating sound]...it doesn’t punish, it doesn’t reward, it doesn’t judge at all. It just is, and so we are, for a little while” (George Carlin, “Saving the Planet,” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W33HRc1A6c], accessed 28 Nov 2016). The reader is encouraged to watch the full clip to experience Carlin’s performance.
In response to the dubious project of a neo-Kantian universal ethics and its “merely possible” Nature as an object of human consumption, the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity insists on the supplementation of ethics with a purposive, decentred model which authentically represents the rhizomatic, aleatory dynamisms of actant and archetype, of the energetic matrices of what for both Schelling and Jung is represented by mythology, but which for Jung is also figured psychically as the collective unconscious and its entanglement with Nature. Caputo has called this a poetics of obligation, the outcome of a deconstruction of ethics which preserves a connectedness with others, both human and nonhuman. For Caputo, this obligation is

the feeling that comes over us when others need our help, when they call out for help, or support, or freedom, or whatever they need, a feeling that grows in strength directly in proportion to the desperateness of the situation of the other. The power of obligation varies directly with the powerlessness of the one who calls for help, which is the power of powerlessness. (5; my italics)

This obligation is displaced from all epistemes, ideologies, or moral codes as a sublime event cutting through discourses: “obligation happens” (6). Obligation is a chemical binding, a magnetic pull between the person and “the Other” in its most general sense, as “a deep anonymity in things, in the world, in the stars as in ourselves,” the uncanny force within ethics that ethics nevertheless cannot contain (18) – to use the Jungian parlance of Romantic metasubjectivity, we may even call it the ethical’s purposive unconscious.

Far from a Hegelian sociohistorical embodiment of ethics [Sittlichkeit], as “a spontaneous causality, a cause without antecedent that breaks in upon the unbroken regularity of phenomenal succession” (12) we may also say with Schelling that obligation dissociatively “thinks in me.”

As a dissolution of the guarantees of the ethical, the poetics of obligation always risks what others will inevitably call obscenity: the risk that Yahweh’s command to

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325 “The natural flow of libido, this same middle path, means complete obedience to the fundamental laws of human nature, and there can positively be no higher moral principle than harmony with natural laws that guide the libido in the direction of life's optimum[. which] can be reached only through obedience to the tidal laws of the libido, by which systole alternates with diastole” (Jung, “The Type Problem” para. 356).
Abraham that he sacrifice Isaac stands on the same footing as the commands given to Nazi soldiers by their officers to kill Jews (10). To be sure, this obligation, this magnetic pull between an entity and its other, leads us into dark waters whose undertows remain opaque to the gaze of discourse. But this magnetism is precisely the energy of the individuation process, the power that draws together entities as complexes of opposites to create new iterations of Being: new products in Nature or new knowledge and experience in the human sphere. To this end Schelling writes: “[c]haracter is the fundamental condition for all morality. Lack of character is in itself immorality” (Ages 85). Pursuing the “Self of one’s self” removes one from the “thou shalt” of the ethical, because it always and everywhere *predates* the ethical (predate: to come before, but also to pursue, consume, to hunt for one’s own needs). And while one’s line of flight may intersect with, or at times run parallel to the rigid trajectories of ethical paradigms, the individuation marking Romantic metasubjectivity is destined for moments of collision, rupture with the ethical – de-cisions away from its security and comfort. This obligation which underwrites Romantic metasubjectivity does not annul what we traditionally call “human rights.” Rather, it brackets their pretense to universality so as to interrogate the anthropocentrism which grounds the discursive interiority that makes Nature “merely possible” in service to the human, rather than the actual in its indeterminacy, the *there is* of Being. So when Bataille writes that “there is no need to entangle oneself with strictly moral considerations, but to entangle morality with intensity” (“The Consequences” 116), he is expressing the impotence of the merely ethical before the purposive magnetism of obligation. In other words, what is “right” is always implicated with the intensity of nonknowledge, the ecstatic, traumatic encounter with what I have articulated as the Romantic metasubject. Moreover, this interrogation of ethics has been the basis of some of the most acclaimed recent works of fiction in contemporary culture, and there is no more poignant contemporary example of Romantic metasubjectivity than Walter White.

**Breaking Bad: Crystal Clear Morality**

*Breaking Bad* (2008-2013) is one of several recent TV series which share a common contemporary ethical issue: what happens when the evil one hunts is in one’s
own ranks? When, in this case, a methamphetamine (crystal meth) kingpin is brother-in-law to a taskforce leader for the Drug Enforcement Administration? Moreover, *Breaking Bad* focuses on a question directly relevant to everyone struggling in a twenty-first century capitalist economy marked by widening wealth gaps between rich and poor: is it immoral or unethical to break the law (in this case, manufacture crystal meth) to pay skyrocketing medical bills and support your family, even if your product could ruin the lives of others? Indeed, this question strikes at the heart of the social contract: (when) is it moral to put one’s family before the State? In dealing with such questions, *Breaking Bad* is uniquely connected with a specifically Romantic matrix of ideas which sets it apart as a particularly resonant example of how the concept of Romantic metasubjectivity can inform contemporary insights about who one is and how one should act. Against the backdrop of modern science and chemistry, *Breaking Bad* presents us with a fictional case study of an antihero’s libidinal Trieb, a purposive unfolding which is far from “ethical” but which nevertheless unfolds a purposive line of flight traversing obligations to society, family and self. In my limited space here I will follow the most basic contours of the series, which, I hope, will provide an example of what Romantic metasubjectivity can offer contemporary criticism.

Walter White is married and father to a son with cerebral palsy and an unplanned baby on the way. As a graduate student he co-founded Grey Matter Technologies with colleague Elliott Schwartz, only to sell his share years ago for several thousand dollars. The company is now worth billions, and Walter’s damaged pride leads him to harbour resentment over this for the rest of his life. He is a vastly overqualified high-school chemistry teacher and former chemist specialising in X-ray crystallography. Struggling to make ends meet for his family, he moonlights at a car wash where he is at times ridiculed by the high school students he teaches. Very early in the series, Walter collapses and is taken to hospital, where he discovers that he has terminal lung cancer.

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326 This theme is also taken up in *Dexter* (2006-2013), the story of Dexter Morgan, a blood spatter analyst for Miami Metro Police Dept. who moonlights as a serial killer, and *Hannibal* (2013-2015), the story of Hannibal Lecter, serial killer and cannibal who is also a criminal psychiatrist for the police.
Walter’s brother in law Hank Schrader is an Albuquerque DEA agent who takes him on a ride-along to a meth bust, where he spots a former high-school student of his turned meth cook (Jesse Pinkman) escaping the scene. After deliberation, Walter confronts Jesse with an ultimatum: help him cook crystal meth or be turned in to the police. At this point begins Walter’s rise to become international meth kingpin, alias “Heisenberg,” with a never before seen drug purity of nearly 100%.

“No matter how one looks at it,” the aphorist Georg Lichtenberg writes, “philosophy is always chemistry” (qtd. in Chaouli 38). And when Schelling writes in 1815 that his time is one “when all similes and metaphors are gotten from chemistry” (Ages 96), he is also describing Breaking Bad’s guiding trope. At various points the series insists on the isocolon between Walter White and the American Romantic poet Walt Whitman – in fact, this connection is at the heart of Hank Schrader’s eventual discovery of Walter’s identity as Heisenberg (in the form of an inscribed copy of Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, addressed to Walter by an admiring fellow meth cook). But more to the point for Romantic metasubjectivity, the dynamic heart of Breaking Bad, and Walter’s metasubjective Trieb, is in chemistry. In the Pilot episode Walter describes chemistry to an apathetic high-school class as the study of “matter…but I prefer to see it as the study of change [. . .] molecules change their bonds, elements combine and change into compounds…well that’s all of life, right? [. . .] It’s the constant, it’s the cycle, it’s solution, dissolution, over and over and over. It is growth, then decay, then transformation.” This description establishes the self-organising, purposive rhythms of change and differentiation that inform the chemistry behind Walter’s production of crystal meth. But meth also crystallises a “meth-subjectivity” as Walter’s line of flight,

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327 The signifier “Heisenberg” is multivalent, evoking both an authoritarian signification (Werner Heisenberg, the German physicist who developed nuclear fission for the Third Reich) and a more unbound reading as Heisenberg the pioneer of quantum mechanics, which concerns itself with nonmolar quanta beyond classical physics. The latter reading may also include Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which basically states that we can know a particle’s position only in inverse proportion to knowing its momentum (and vice versa). In these discursive and theoretical registers, then, “Heisenberg” can be read in terms of both White’s growing authoritarian narcissism as he consolidates his drug empire and the purposive (and literal) crystallisation of his metasubjective Trieb as crystal meth cook, which unfolds in a continuum in which position and direction cannot be judged with absolute certainty.
combining an antiheroic Promethean social myth (Walter’s “breaking bad,” his break from the rigid trajectory of ethics into the possibilities of post-ethical consciousness) with the “meta” of meth as inorganic emblem of the self-organising “Self of one’s self,” Walter’s individuation following the inscrutable affinities of chemistry. Myth, meta, meth – a conjugation, in the grammatology of Being, of Romantic metasubjectivity’s operations in the antiheroic narrative of *Breaking Bad*. But just as Shelley’s dual narratives of psychic epigenesis and political Idealism can never successfully tell each other, so the melancholic incommensurability between psyche and Nature at the heart of all being imbricates *Breaking Bad*’s dual narratives, which touch and do not touch. In other words, Walter’s *scientific* narrative of creating the perfect crystal, as a projection of his own purposive *Trieb*, underscores his unconsciousness of the latter in his *personal* narrative, which is marked by egotism and a failure to understand the natural processes at work in his life. What he objectivises as crystal meth, he never fully subjectivises as the crystalline unfolding of purposive individuation.

Walter has just found out he has terminal cancer. In the early morning hours he sits in his backyard in front of his swimming pool, alone, lighting matches and throwing them into the water, pondering his fate. An image of suburban despondency, to be sure. But it is also the symbolically charged scene of Walter’s decision to “break bad” and accompany Hank on the ride-along to learn what is involved with creating a meth lab. Walter sits before a pool as a perennial symbol of the *unconscious*, and his repetitive act of lighting a flame and extinguishing it in the water – a rhythmic process of growth and decay of flame as a perennial symbol of *consciousness* – is the rhythmic insistence of an archetypal scene of Promethean awakening. Cooking crystal meth emerges as a means to fund Walter’s cancer treatment and provide for his family after his death, but it is also a

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328 Indeed, Chouli argues that the concept of early nineteenth century chemistry is a significant cultural influence on Schlegel’s experimental poetry, which is “reticulated with ideas of auto-formation, open-endedness, and uncontrollable contingency,” a work consisting “of an open-ended process of combinatorial formation and deformation, a process, furthermore, over which the artist by no means retains full control” (5). Goethe’s *Elective Affinities* (1809) was, of course, the novel of the day to explore the chemistry of intersubjectivity.
scientific process whose symbolic import he never fully comprehends.\textsuperscript{329} Indeed, the crystalline becomes a master trope for Walter’s connection with his line of flight, even as this connection is often only intimated negatively in the chemical discourse of meth manufacture.

Cancer, as we all know, is the uncontrollable growth and proliferation of cells in the body; it is radical productivity out of bounds. By the end of the first season, Walt has grudgingly agreed to chemotherapy; in the second season of \textit{Breaking Bad} Walter’s cancer is in remission, and while the chemotherapy may have had a role to play in Walter’s improvement there is a more profound relationship between Walter’s decision to cook meth and the shrinking of his tumour. Indeed, in the final season Walter stops cooking meth permanently, which is followed by the return of his cancer (and his chemotherapy) until his death in the final episode. Viewed through the lens of Romantic metasubjectivity, the purposive emblem of the crystal constitutes a new beginning for Walter. What in Jungian terms is the emergence of a new awareness in a state of proximate individuation (which “invariably has a healing effect” [Jung, \textit{Symbols} 433]) is also, quite literally, a Schellingian inhibition of cancer’s radical productivity into a new life, a self-organising libidinal gradient which guides Walter through the slings, arrows, and bullets of face-offs with Mexican cartels, White Power gangs, and rival drug dealers. But while Walter objectifies this process as the \textit{science} of meth, he remains relatively unaware of its existential import: at a post-remission party, he cryptically remarks: “When I got my diagnosis…cancer…I said to myself, you know, ‘why me?’ And then the other day, when I got the good news…I said the same thing.”

In stepping away from the ethical to establish a meth empire, Walter continually maintains that he is doing what he does for his family – to secure their financial security after his death. And while it might seem as if \textit{Breaking Bad} recapitulates a contemporary

\textsuperscript{329} The tension between meth’s scientific and artistic dimensions – that is, between its chemistry and alchemy – unfolds in Walter’s and Jesse’s different approaches to the meth process. Jesse: “This ‘aint chemistry, ok? This is \textit{art}. Cooking is \textit{art}.” After their first batch, Jesse exclaims: “This is glass grade…Jesus, you’ve got crystals here two inches, three inches long!…You’re a goddamn artist! This…this is art!” Walter replies: “Actually, it’s just basic chemistry.”
distinction between the needs of the State and the needs of one’s family members, Walter’s relationship with his crystalline individuation moves across discourses of State, family and self with the fluidity of a poetics of obligation that is irreducible to any single interpellation. Indeed, in the final episode, Walter White breaks from the family discourse he has held to throughout the series. In this reckoning, having irrevocably fractured the lives of his wife and son, and with his ex-partner Jesse working with the DEA for his downfall, Walter’s final words to his wife reflect his own personal involvement in his individuative line: “I did it for me. I liked it…I was good at it…and I was…alive.” Walter’s meth empire was ostensibly for his family; now it appears to be for himself. But the poetics of obligation is not annulled on this account; rather, the magnetic intensities of his obligations shift and fluctuate. For the series ends with Walter coercing his former partners from Grey Matter Technologies into laundering his last nine million dollars into a trust fund for his son and daughter. Walter’s final moments unfold in an encounter at the White Power camp which has enslaved Jesse as permanent meth cook, to which Walter travels for revenge against the men who stole his meth fortune. In an elaborate plan, Walter triggers a heavy machine gun in the trunk of his car which massacres the gang; Walter catches a stray bullet which will take his life. Thus, in a consummate act of individuation Walter kills himself unintentionally, un-consciously; like his life, his death follows the crystallised unfolding of his vocative line of flight. Crucially, Walter is not caught by the police – he collapses as they close in, dying with a Mona Lisa smile on his face, surrounded by laboratory equipment.

The clichéd cultural appeal of Walter White as antihero lies in the temptation that we all break out into our own “bad” lines of flight without concern for anything else. But this antiheroic discourse, emerging as a contumacious reaction to an increasingly authoritarian State discourse and widening wealth gap between the rich and the rest of us, misses the point of Romantic metasubjectivity and its lived experience. The obligation at the heart of Romantic metasubjectivity’s purposive unfolding points precisely to a magnetism between self and Other with meaning outside the interiority of the ethical and its “thou shalt/not”s. But there is still meaning in the obligation to the Other. The concept of Romantic metasubjectivity does not involve jettisoning ethics altogether (even if such a thing were possible); there will always be ethical paradigms and norms, and the
vast majority of citizens will abide by them (with minor deviations). What Louis Althusser famously called interpellation by ideological state apparatuses is a crucial part of human identity. But Romantic metasubjectivity points us, finally, to the fact that these ethics are inventions, idealist constructs superimposed on an unruly Being, which, as Nature, can never be naturalised as one ethos or another. In Romantic metasubjectivity, the poetics of obligation is always the dangerous supplement to ethics, the freedom antagonising the margins and limits of system. In Schelling’s words, it is the realisation and experience of the fact that “God is something more real than a merely moral world order” (*Freedom* 26). In Denise Gigante’s words, Romantic metasubjectivity demands that we “think of living forms as stubborn particulars, resisting logical abstraction and preserving (however partially) their freedom, [and in doing so] better understand the critical problem facing [...] Romantic natural philosophers” (28-29). Romantic metasubjectivity reminds us that ethics is not Nature (and Nature can never be ethical); that Being will never conform to the discursive logics with which we make limited sense of the world; that there is nevertheless a purposive organisation with which we can make fleeting connection (sometimes at our own peril); and that the trajectory of the human life as it negotiates psyche and Nature, reason and ecstasy, suspended in doubt before the fleeting glimpse of Self or absolute subject, must always remain undecided.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Disentangling Romantic Metasubjectivity

Between Romantic poets and writers such as Novalis and Schlegel, a protean philosopher such as Schelling, and a depth psychologist like Jung, there are many words used to describe the human being. Because this thesis makes reference to several terms which are different from the “subject” (understood here as the human subject-ed to, and interpellated by, cultural, economic, and political discourses), I want to supply some very provisional definitions of these different terms that will aid the reader in tracking their differences.

The Romantic metasubject / Romantic metasubjectivity: the Novalis epigraph at the beginning of this thesis refers to the “Self of one’s self,” a term I use as a refrain throughout as synonymous with the Romantic metasubject as the “subject of the subject.” The “meta” quality of this subjectivity refers to what Novalis calls a “transcendental Self,” which points to an organising factor in the human psyche that is not identical with egoity. In the epigraph, the “Self” also has a collective quality to it, linking the individual to both knowledge of his/her own ignorance as well as a “feeling for others,” a sympathy which entwines the egoic “self” with a broader substrate common to humanity. This entwinement reflects the concern with uniting the ideal and real, mind and nature, which concerned the major philosophers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the epigraph emphasises that only by understanding oneself in this way (that is, as an entwinement of individual and collective) can one understand others.

Self: Where Novalis’ “Self of one’s self” signifies the collective substrate to the egoic “self,” Jung uses the capitalised term “Self” in a similar yet palpably different manner. Where for Novalis the Self is a transcendentual quality enabling sympathy and opening the way for knowledge, Jung more actively theorises the Self as an absent centre, a centripetal organising force that makes knowledge possible by organising archetypal energies in a way unique to the human individual. But where the epigraph from Novalis
seems to insist on “seizing the mastery” of one’s Self to make it available to the “self” as consciousness, analytical psychology emphasises that the Self is the goal of an “endless approximation,” the striving of an individuation process that can never ultimately reach its goal. So, while “self” and “subject” both signify the human being as s/he exists in time, history and discourse, the Self is the self’s unprethinkable substratum.\(^{330}\)

**Personality:** In his *Opus Maximum*, Coleridge differentiates “personeity” from “personality,” stating that “we have proved that the perfection of person is in God, and that personeity, differing from personality only as rejecting all commixture of imperfection associated with the latter, is an essential constituent in the Idea of God” (177). But both Schelling and Jung conceive personality as something categorically different from what the ego presents to others; it retains the “transcendent” nature of Coleridge’s “personeity” but not the latter’s idea of perfection. In the *Freedom* essay, personality is the link between man as selfish, particular being and man as spirit – indeed, it is “selfhood raised to spirit,” the human being’s connection with the (un)ground paradoxically responsible for both man’s unity with and separation from God (33, 38). Personality includes the egoic, but is not reducible to it: “Only in personality is there life, and all personality rests on a dark ground that indeed must therefore be the ground of cognition as well. But it is only the understanding that develops what is hidden and contained in this ground” (*Freedom* 75). For Schelling, personality is ultimately the expression of one’s character – the preexistent yet unknowable stamp of uniqueness sculpting each individual’s unfolding.

Jung defines personality as “a well-rounded psychic whole that is capable of resistance and abounding in energy [. . .] The achievement of personality means nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being [in its] innate

\(^{330}\) Jung writes that the Self can be symbolised by human or animal figures, as well images of symmetry or order (*e.g.*, a mandala, squares, circles, cubes). But any symmetrical properties of the Self’s figure-image (following Lyotard), as part of “the order of the visible,” should not be confused with attributes of the *figure-matrix*, whose unconscious origins instantly recede before the “schema of intelligibility” imposed on it from without (268). That is, symmetrical figures of totality can still be attended by experiences of profound difference and disjunction. See also note 161, above.
idiosyncrasy” (“The Development of Personality” pars. 286, 289). In other words, for Jung personality is the expression of the whole person through the process of individuation – the unfolding of the Self.331 But while Jung sometimes suggests that “achievement” is a realisable goal, in characteristically equivocal style he goes on to state that “it is impossible to foresee the endless variety of conditions that have to be fulfilled” (para. 289). Thus, when I refer to “personality,” I use it in Jung’s latter sense as a process of unfolding, the goal of the endless approximation of the individuation process. I occasionally refer to “the person,” which should be understood as a general locutionary mark.

Absolute subject: Where the “subject” is the human being interpellated by discourse, Schelling’s absolute subject is his attempt to get at what makes this subject possible. The absolute subject is a placeholder in the copular logic developed in the *Freedom* essay. According to copular logic, the statement “the ball is blue” is logically indefensible because a thing cannot be two things (a ball *and* blue) at the same time. When we say this, we are in fact saying that *there is something that is both a ball and blue*, but this “something” cannot be an object available to consciousness, since an object cannot be two things at once. It is the copula (the is, or = in “the ball is blue”) that gestures toward this something as an “object = x,” but this unthinkable object is also an absolute *subject* – that is, an unconditioned *subject* to which everything in Being is a *predicate*, but which remains irreducible to any single predicate or series of predicates. This absolute subject is what makes it possible for us to conceive of subject-predicate statements in the first place. In “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (1821) Schelling will more explicitly describe the absolute subject as a force which proceeds through everything without being anything (215). In its capacity to organise knowledge and experience while remaining irreducible to it, Schelling’s absolute subject is synonymous with the Jungian Self; both share the same purposive movement.

331 Jung will later extend individuation to the domain of the inorganic and preterhuman,, which I take up in Chapter Four and the Conclusion.
Appendix B: Situating Romantic Metasubjectivity

The contours of the debate into which I insert Romantic metasubjectivity are roughly defined by the poles of the so-called “reflection theory” and the “Heidelberg school” (inaugurated by Dieter Henrich, with Manfred Frank as its most notable thinker). The reflection theory of the subject, undoubtedly more familiar at present, sees self-consciousness as a “subject supposed to know” emerging from the mirror-stage (Lacan), or as an epiphenomenon of signifying play (Derrida) or discursive entanglement (Foucault). Key to the reflection theory is the rejection of any prediscursive or prereflective aspect of self-consciousness. The Heidelberg school, on the other hand, draws more explicitly on early German Romantic thinking. Manfred Frank maintains that discursivity is crucial for the formation of “subjectivity,” but preserves “individuality” against a “pathogenic” Enlightenment reason by revealing this reason’s fantasy of universality: “individuals are subjects (although not all subjects are individuals) [who] are immediately self-conscious in the sense that they disclose their world in the light of interpretations that would remain unintelligible without consciousness. [While] this does not exempt individuality from the linguistic context [. . .] words do not mean by themselves, or by force of some anonymous institution; they [mean] only through hypothetical interpretations whose carriers are individuals” (“Subjectivity and Individuality” 23). The fantasy of rationality is thus founded on irreducible individuals who contest its closure, “who [make] possible the intersubjectivity of meanings exchanged in communicative acts, while at the same time [prevent] the given communicative system from becoming truly universal, in the sense that all meanings would become strictly determined and exhaustively definable. Thus reason opens out to history, and no terme final can be envisaged” (“Two Centuries” 75).

Robert Pippin’s “On Not Being a Neostructuralist” (2005) is sympathetic toward Frank’s critique of “neostructuralism” (which for Frank means the reflection theory, including deconstructionist and poststructuralist positions on subjectivity), but remains sceptical of Frank’s “Schellingean-romantic” position’s ability to establish a “positive philosophical project” (180, 169). Clearly stating his pro-Hegel, anti-Schelling position regarding “claims about the ineffable, the irreducible, the simply and eternally
unrepresentable” (170), Pippin argues for considering intentionality within a matrix of “possible inferences” without a Platonic or “transcendental” basis (183), concluding that thinking cannot involve the ‘internalization’ of some ‘universal’ by an individual consciousness. [Thinking] must be a subscribing to a norm, not any private internalization, and if a norm is to be a norm, it must be backed by reasons, implications, and commitments. [. . .] understood as the results of social interactions within communities over time, collectively self-constituted norms. [. . .] The important point here is that these are engagements with public matters not realizations in private. (185)

As a more pointed critique of Frank’s position, Slavoj Žižek’s “The Cartesian Subject Versus the Cartesian Theater” (1998) is one of the more fundamentalist stances of the reflection theory. In this quizzical, neurotic text, Žižek frames Henrich’s school as an “enemy” and, “instead of engaging in a direct dialogue with Henrich’s school,” offers the insights of cognitive science as a screen for the deconstructive position he wants to defend against Frank, while at the same time conceding an unbridgeable gap between cognitive science and the “deconstructionist ‘metatranscendental’ probing into the conditions of (im)possibility of the philosophical discourse” it is meant to defend (247-49). Without meaningful citation of Henrich (and no citation whatsoever of Frank), Žižek raises straw men (e.g., the endorsement of “direct experience,” which Frank does not endorse) to knock them down in the name of (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. Ironically, Žižek’s exposition of Daniel Dennett’s cognitive science articulates a psyche more Jungian than Freudian (an insight which would no doubt appal Žižek), despite the attempt in Žižek’s essay to smuggle a phylogenetic unconscious into psychoanalysis via Hegel.

Romantic metasubjectivity is clearly more sympathetic toward Frank and the Heidelberg school, although the psyche of this metasubject (which does not concern Frank) resists the more formalist and teleological tendencies in some of Frank’s writing, where the language of normativity (but one contra Habermas) tends to cast the individual as monadic agent in the progression toward an idealised community of individuals under the auspices of the Kantian Idea (“Two Centuries” 83-84). By definition, Romantic metasubjectivity also cuts across the public/private, internal/external boundaries assumed by Pippin’s critique of Frank. And insofar as Frank’s discussion in “Two Centuries”
leaves out the question, even the existence of Nature, Romantic metasubjectivity also vigorously questions the idealised ethics such a community might assume, which I discuss in the Conclusion.
Appendix C: Self and Archetype

In his (in)famous proclivity for imprecise language, Jung often refers to the Self as an archetype – a label which has been far too uncritically picked up by a vast amount of writing (Jungian and otherwise) about individuation and the Self. Yet his late definition of Self as “borderline concept” points not only to Jung’s ambivalence over just how to define this “empty centre,” but to the woefully underexplored but critical theoretical problems that surround seeing the Self as an “archetype of wholeness.”

The Self is Jung’s name for the horizon of totality toward which the forward movement of individuation strives; it organises archetypal images, affects, and experiences. But Jung’s hazy language leads us to the crucial question: can the Self, as that which constellates archetypes, be an archetype? We are presented with a similar dilemma to Russell’s Paradox in set theory. Briefly, Russell’s Paradox is as follows: given a multitude of sets in the world (of apples, concepts, nuclear warheads, vegetables etc), the question is: can there be a set (X) which contains all sets? Herein lies the paradox: if X contains all sets, it must also contain itself. But if X contains itself, it thus becomes a member of all sets and is then not the set which contains all sets. Thus, in becoming the set of all sets, X also does not become the set of all sets. In the language of analytic philosophy, the end result is that the “set of all sets” cannot be determined – it does not exist insofar as it cannot be definitely posited. Russell’s ultimate resolution of this dilemma was to posit something outside sets, which is tantamount to stating that not everything can be contained in a set. In other words, the complete system must paradoxically recognise that which is outside of itself – in effect, “completing” itself by recognising its incompletion. But this also brings us back to Schelling’s critique of Hegel: Hegel’s system proposed itself as a “set of all sets” which explained Being dialectically as the unfolding of Absolute Spirit. Schelling’s critique, as we have seen, is that this system cannot explain its own facticity in Being.

To bring this back to the question of Jung’s Self, it means that the Self cannot be determined as an archetype. The language here is important: the Self can certainly be experienced archetypally (as an experience of rebirth or transition in which the entire human race shares), but this is not the same as to posit (determine) the Self as an
archetype strictly speaking, which would pose the problem of how the archetypal matrix determines all of Being from entirely within itself. It is perhaps most useful to see the borderline concept of the Self as copular, as liminal with the archetypal, something which touches but does not touch the archetypal. If the Self had no connection whatsoever with the archetypes, it would have no constellating power. Yet it is also something else, that which is not-archetype – that which falls outside the set “archetype.” Indeed, Jung says as much when he writes of the Self: “If I assert, ‘The self exists,’ I must supplement this by saying, ‘But it seems not to exist’” (Transformation Symbolism para. 399 n). As should be obvious by now, Romantic metasubjectivity falls on the Schellingian side of the Continental-philosophical version of this debate by conceiving the Self as Trieb which moves through archetypal energies without being any one configuration.
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