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Xenia in Classical Economies: The Function of Ritualized Interpersonal Relationships in Athenian Trade

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Abstract

Drawing on North's New Institutional Economics (enhanced by Finley's substantivist model), this thesis contributes to ancient economic theories by analyzing the role of the social institution of *xenia* in Classical Athenian economies. The significance of this ritualized interpersonal relationship has not yet been sufficiently appreciated, especially regarding its effects as a structural determinant on economic performance within specific trade mechanisms.

The case study of two particular economic services, provided by the Athenian aristocrat Andocides through his *xenia* with Archelaus of Macedon and Evagoras of Cyprus (And. 2.11 and 20-21) not only illustrates the significant effect of such ritualized personal relationships on the Athenian timber and grain trade but also allows us to gauge the quantitative impact of *xenia* on these two Athenian economies. The honorific decrees for Archelaus (*proxenia*: IG I³ 117) and Evagoras (citizenship: IG I³ 113) corroborate the importance of *xenia*-based trade services on Classical Athenian economies.

Keywords

Classical Athens, *xenia*, ritualized interpersonal relationships, ancient economies, economic theory, economic history, Andocides, social institutions, New Institutional Economics, Substantivism

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Abbreviations

Ancient Authors

And.	Andocides
Arist.	Aristotle
Athen.	Athenaeus
Dem.	Demosthenes
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hes.	Hesiod
Hom.	Homer
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lys.	Lysias
Pl.	Plato
Plut.	Plutarch
Theophr.	Theophrastus
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon

Modern Works

Abbreviations for hand-books and journals follow those used in the *American Journal of Archaeology*. The following abbreviations are used for standard reference works.

ML	Meiggs, R. and D. M. Lewis. 1988. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Oxford.
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . 1873-. Berlin.
RO	Rhodes, J., and R. Osborne. 2003. <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 B.C.</i> Oxford.
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> . 1923-. Leiden.
SIG	Dittenberger, W. 1915-1924. <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . 3 ^d ed., 4 vols., Leipzig.
Tod	Tod, M. N. 1985. <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions from the Sixth Century B.C. to the Death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.</i> 2 vols., Chicago.

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Introduction

The scholarly debate on ancient Greek and Roman economies is long and extensive, beginning in the 1890s in Germany with the emergence of the concepts of primitivism and modernism, continuing in the 20th century with Finley's substantivism following well through into the current era with Douglass North's New Institutional Economic Theory.¹ Today ancient Greek and Roman economic history and theory is a thriving field within the discipline of Classical Studies, as a quote from the introduction to *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* demonstrates:

“This emerging account of the Greco-Roman economy is an advance over twentieth-century interpretations. It improves on substantivist approaches by providing crude statistics on economic performance, but it also goes beyond both sides in the old primitivist-modernist debate by developing general theoretical models of ancient economic behaviour and putting them in a global, comparative context.”²

In recent scholarship, the effort to explain and understand both economic performance and structure in full, and to distinguish them from modern economies has grown significantly. This effort is still lacking in certain respects, though. *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* focuses on the determinants of economic performance within the first part of the book, featuring chapters on ecology, demography, households, gender, law, economic institutions, and technology. Each of these determinants is of paramount importance and plays a vital role in the nature and function of ancient economies. Yet, this part of the companion does not account for the significant effect of social institutions (such as ritualized interpersonal relationships) on ancient economies. It is noteworthy, that even though the companion proclaims

¹ See Scheidel et al. 2007, 1-12 for a full history of scholarly debates and theories on ancient Greek economies. See also Engen 2010, 3-36; Bresson 2016, 1-30; and the entirety of Jones 2014 for the application of economic theory to the ancient Mediterranean. Also, North 1981 and 1990 on New Institutional Economics specifically.

² Scheidel et al. 2007, 11-12.

to follow North's New Institutional Economics' injunction to study both structure and performance through time,³ it neglects one crucial determinant that North himself mentions explicitly in his seminal *Structure and Change in Economic History*, i.e. the role of social institutions. North views the task of writing economic history as an attempt to explain the structure (determinants of economic performance and other aspects which make-up economic systems) and performance (assessments of economic success and strength of different sectors) of economies through time, focusing on performance (in typical terms of performance such as production, distribution, and stability) as well as structure, which he defines as the characteristics of a society which account for the basic determinants of performance, including political and social institutions, as well as social ideology.⁴

Of course, the relationship between social institutions and ancient economies has been studied extensively within the school of substantivism, which focuses specifically on economic sociology: defining production, distribution, and consumption within larger networks of cultural power.⁵ Yet, substantivism does not elaborate on the relationship between embedded economies and performance, causing an overall deficiency in the understanding of the mechanisms of ancient economies.⁶ While the exploration of social institutions is extensive within substantivism, it does not fully account for every single ancient Greek or Roman social institution, neglecting even those which appear significant and meaningful to the functioning of

³ Scheidel et al. 2007, v-vii. The table of contents for this work is an enlightening resource regarding the focus of modern economic scholarship. See also 11-12 of the same work.

⁴ See North 1981, 3, as well as the entirety of this work for a full understanding of his theoretical economic model.

⁵ See Finley 1953 and 1973.

⁶ This opinion began with Hopkins, Finley's successor at Cambridge, who recognized that having a single economic model to cover the entirety of the Greco-Roman world had its faults and might appear too static over time. He proposed that Finley's model of substantivism be elaborated to accommodate the possibility of economic growth and decline in the ancient world, associating economic growth with political change and the spread of technologies and social innovations. See Hopkins 1983, xi-xiv.

ancient economies. Finley's influential monograph *The Ancient Economy* makes no mention of guest-friendship, hospitality, reciprocity, or *xenia* in its index;⁷ *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* only mentions reciprocity once (on page 370) and *xenia* once (on page 371). Both of these mentions appear within the chapter *Classical Greece: Distribution*, claiming that reciprocity and *xenia* were institutions developed specifically to reduce transaction costs and foster exchange between individuals. In this chapter, *xenia* and *proxenia* are considered means to guarantee peaceful exchange and offer protection to strangers through established institutions,⁸ otherwise neither *xenia* nor *proxenia* make another appearance in the entire volume. It is in this respect that I believe ancient economic discourse is lacking. By examining the role of ritualized interpersonal relations in Athenian trade during the classical period, I make the case for viewing *xenia* as a vital structural component of ancient economies and a determinant of their performance.

In order to demonstrate the significant role of *xenia* on ancient Greek economies in general, and its effect on Classical Athenian trade mechanisms in particular, I conduct a case study on the Athenian aristocrat Andocides, analyzing two passages from his speech *On the Return*. Both of these passages recount services that Andocides undertook – thanks to his *xenia* with powerful foreign individuals – on behalf of the Athenian state. It is necessary to recognize that there is a certain level of bias within these passages, since Andocides attempted to use these services as a means to have his citizenship reinstated in Athens.⁹ Yet there must still be a certain

⁷ Finley 1973, 255-262.

⁸ Möller 2007, 370-371.

⁹ Andocides was expelled from Athens in 415 BCE due to his involvement in the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. He saved himself (and members of his family) from being put to death by informing on other parties involved in these two incidents. As a result of his role as an informant, the Athenians felt he was no longer trustworthy and he was exiled. See MacDowell 1962, Edwards 1995, and Gagarin and MacDowell 1998, for full accounts of the history and context of his speech *On the Return* as well as *On the Mysteries*.

level of truth in these passages, otherwise his rhetorical argument would have been entirely futile. Furthermore, there are two inscriptions which respectively correspond to the dates, individuals, geographical locations, actions, and events that Andocides recounts in this speech, wherein a foreign recipient is granted *proxenia* with Athens, most likely, for the services which Andocides procured. The first passage I explore relates to a service that Andocides procured from Archelaus of Macedon, with whom he claims inherited *xenia*.

ἀλλ' αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὕσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας, τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφόντων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελαίου ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὅποσους ἐβουλόμην. τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν: εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν (And. 2.11).¹⁰

Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an inherited *xenos* of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I also supplied corn and bronze. (And. 2.11).¹¹

Andocides provided an impressive service to Athens through his *xenia* with Archelaus. The provision of a large amount of timber from Macedon was no small feat (as we will see further in Chapter 4). It is especially significant that he accomplished this because of a pre-existing *xenia* relationship. This passage clearly indicates that there is some kind of relationship between *xenia* and economic activities and services. Furthermore, the Macedonian king Archelaus was awarded a decree of *proxenia* by the Athenian demos – i.e. Archelaus became the Athenians' official guest-friend in Macedon – shortly after Andocides procured this service (*IG I³ 117*). The Athenian *proxenia* decree for Archelaus demonstrates the important relationship between *xenia* and the political and economic situations at Athens. The inscription also demonstrates that

¹⁰ Greek taken from: M. Edwards 1995, *Greek Orators IV – Andocides*.

¹¹The translations are my own, but they draw at times on standard published translations.

services such as the ones that Andocides provided to Athens were considered significant by the polis, and therefore likely had some kind of political or economic effect on it. Scholars argue that Andocides was the *xenos* in Athens through which Archelaus provided this service to the polis. It is likely that the provision of timber and shipment of grain that Andocides provided to the Athenians were of a similar sort.¹² Such a service to the state must have had a significant economic effect for Athens, otherwise it (and similar such services) would not be formally recognized by the polis through a *proxenia* decree. But the question remains: what kind of effect did *xenia* have on Classical Athenian economies, in general, and on Athenian trade in particular, and to what extent? Furthermore, how do we interpret the effects of *xenia* as a social institution on the structure and performance of Classical Athenian economies?

The second passage that I explore is similar in nature. Andocides procured a large shipment of grain from Cyprus for Athens at a time when Athens was apparently not receiving any grain from the island.

ἐπίστασθε γὰρ που ὡς ἠγγέλθη ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐ μέλλει ἐκ Κύπρου σῖτος ἦξειν ἐνταῦθα: ἐγὼ τοίνυν τοιοῦτός τε καὶ τοσοῦτος ἐγενόμην, ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ταῦτα βουλευσάντας ἐφ' ὑμῖν καὶ πράξαντας ψευσθῆναι τῆς αὐτῶν γνώμης. καὶ ὡς μὲν ταῦτα διεπράχθη, οὐδὲν προὔργου ἀκοῦσαι ὑμῖν: τάδε δὲ νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναί, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ καταπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσιν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχθεισῶν ἦξουσιν ἀθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον (And. 2.20-21).

You know, I imagine, how it was announced to you that no corn was to come here from Cyprus. Now I acted so well and with such effect that the men who planned this against you and put it into operation were disappointed in their intention. It is of no importance for you to hear how this was accomplished, but now I do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn and already about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the rest of those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive together not long afterwards. (And. 2.20-21).

¹² See Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 91 for a full analysis and discussion of this particular inscription and the argument for Andocides as Archelaus' Athenian *xenos*.

Unfortunately, this passage does not explicitly indicate that Andocides used his ritualized interpersonal guest friendships (i.e. his *xenia* relationships) in Cyprus. Yet there is other evidence that strongly suggests that Andocides accomplished this grain shipment through *xenia*.

Andocides spent a large portion of his exile in Salamis on Cyprus (And. 1.4, 132; Lys. 6.6; Plut. *And.* 834E-F).¹³ It is important to note that this whole service has not come fully to fruition: 14 ships are about to put into the Piraeus, and more are following, expected to put into the port.

Furthermore, Andocides claims in *On the Mysteries* that he has come together with many people, “from which ritualized guest-friendships and friendships with many kings and cities arose, and from which others have become personal guest-friends” (ἀφ’ ὧν μοὶ ξενίαι καὶ φιλότιτες πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἄλλους ἰδίᾳ ξένους γεγένηται), claiming that if Athens acquits him of these crimes they will have a share of these relationships and be able to make use of them on any occasion (And. 1.145). Lysias too makes mention of Andocides’ proclivities for foreign friendships, claiming that he is the accepted guest of kings and despots (cf. καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἐξενωμένος καὶ τυράννοις; Lys. 6.48). Finally, just as in the first passage, the Athenian demos granted citizenship shortly after this event to Evagoras of Salamis for his provision of a large amount of grain to Athens (*IG I³ 113*), which aids in demonstrating the overall importance of trade services (such as those Andocides’ provided) to Athens. This decree demonstrates the importance of economic benefactions to Athens, and shows that *xenia*-based economic exchanges were of significance to Athenian economies and political situations.

I approach several questions in this project, and attempt to answer them through a representative case study of the *xenia*-based services rendered by the Athenian aristocrat Andocides. Can we determine that *xenia* was a significant factor in Classical Athenian

¹³ See Edwards 1995, 2, 191. The evidence for this will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 5

economies? What role did *xenia* play within Classical Athenian economies, in general, and what effect did it have on Classical Athenian trade in particular? Furthermore, can we gauge the effects of *xenia* as a structural determinant on the performance of Classical Athenian economies?

In a detailed analysis of the two Andocides passages cited above I seek to explain how *xenia* affected both the structure and performance of Classical Greek economies, and to illuminate the function of *xenia* within Athenian trade. It will become apparent that an important element is missing in scholarly analyses on ancient economies when social institutions (such as *xenia*) are not taken fully into account. To make this case, I explore the history of scholarly debates on ancient economies and the theoretical models that accompany them (Chapter 1). In Chapter 2 I examine *xenia* and its evolution throughout ancient Greek culture over time so that we are in a better position to situate the role of *xenia* within ancient economic discourse and theoretical models on Classical Athenian economies. In Chapter 3 I discuss the dating of Andocides' speech *On the Return*, as well as his respective relationships with his *xenoi* Archelaus and Evagoras in order to document the nature and context of the services he provides Athens. In Chapters 4 and 5 I examine the timber and grain trade in Athens during the Classical period, in order to gauge the impact of Andocides' *xenia*-based services on the Athenian timber and grain economies. Through this representative case study I seek to demonstrate that the social institution of *xenia* must indeed be considered a structural determinant of economic performance in Classical Athens, and that studying *xenia* can help us understand and explain the nature of Athenian economies in the Classical period.

We are indeed fortunate to learn the details of Andocides' procurements of timber and grain for Athens through his own speeches. It is important to stress, however, that Andocides' *xenia*-based services for the Athenian state, which ultimately resulted in Athenian grants of *proxenia* and

citizenship for Andocides' *xenoi*, were not exceptions, but a rather common phenomenon in Classical Athens, judging from the 84 *proxenia* decrees which have come down to us from fifth century Athens alone.¹⁴ For most of these *proxenia* decrees were granted in recognition of previous political or economic benefactions provided by foreign individuals to the Athenian state, many of which were surely the result of mediation by individual Athenians on the basis of their pre-existing relationship of *xenia* with these 84 grantees, just as in the case of Andocides and the Macedonian king Archelaus. Clearly, since we have such a significant amount of *proxenia* decrees from the early Classical period, the decrees to Archelaus and Evagoras are no exception. Using these exemplary decrees in conjunction with Andocides' testimony allows us to contextualize *xenia* in relation to Classical Athenian economies, and extrapolate for other existing *proxenia* decrees. This case study on Andocides and his *xenoi* allows us to gauge both the role *xenia* plays as a component of economic structure and its effect on the performance of Classical Athenian economies and trade mechanisms. Andocides' case illustrates in an exemplary way the roles of *xenia* and *proxenia* in Classical Athens, and serves as a paradigm for further study of these social institutions as structural determinants of economic performance in the Classical Athenian world.

¹⁴ See Walbank 1978 for an in depth discussion of all the remaining 84 *proxenia* decrees from fifth century Athens.

Chapter 1: Ancient Economic Theory

Ancient Economies: Introduction to the Debate

The ancient economies of the Archaic and Classical Greek periods are a complicated and diverse area of discourse within Classical Studies. Until recently, questions concerning the ancient Greek and Roman economies were only of interest to specialists in the history of ancient economics. There is yet to be any consensus on one particular theoretical paradigm to follow in the study and development of ancient economic models for the Greek and Roman worlds. Each theoretical approach proves difficult to situate within the broad scope of economic history.¹⁵ Unlike some other economies, those of the ancient Greek world are difficult to classify and fully understand: the nature of ancient Greek politics, culture, and history do little to provide a clear paradigm of economic and financial functions within the full scope of ancient Greek society. Most discussions of ancient economies are purely theoretical, and any developed economic framework or paradigm is the long-laboured result of little more than inference and supposition. As such most theories result in discipline-wide disputes, pitting various theoretical conceptions against one another with no obvious solution. How is it possible to truly quantify an economy for which we have so little evidence? What remains to us from Archaic and Classical Greece regarding economics (in the modern sense) is mostly archaeological and epigraphical evidence.

¹⁵ For in depth development and discussion of various economic theoretical approaches and models in scholarship see Bresson 2016; Jones 2014; Engen 2010; Scheidel et al. 2007; Cartledge et al. 2002; Finley 1973, and 1954; North 1994, 1990, and 1981; Hopkins 1983; Hopper 1979; Hasebroek 1965; and Polanyi 1944.

Furthermore, in textual sources most evidence has to be inferred through laborious study and cross-reference.¹⁶ Nevertheless, it is essential to survey the scholarly debate on the various theoretical models of the ancient Greek economy in order to understand how such extensive scholarship and theories are lacking in regards to *xenia* as a social institution and structural determinant of Classical Athenian economies. By examining various theoretical models, I hope to properly position Andocides' *xenia*-based services to Athens within the constraints of current and past discourse on Classical Athenian economies. I hope to discover where and why scholarship and theoretical models are inadequate in their consideration of *xenia* in relation to Classical Athenian economies. In doing so, my goal is to determine why a lack of focus on *xenia* is a problem for properly understanding the effects of *xenia* as a structural determinant of economic performance and trade mechanisms in Classical Athenian economies. This methodology allows me to situate Andocides' *xenia*-based services to Athens within broader economic discourse and theoretical models, thus contributing to the overall understanding of Classical Athenian economies.

What is the ancient Greek economy, and why is scholarship on the topic so widely divisive? It is difficult to say, but it is hardly surprising that the field of ancient Greek and Roman economies is much smaller relative to comparable aspects of the history of the Greco-Roman world (such as political history, social history, or epigraphy). Unfortunately, most classicists rely largely on a body of literature written by and for an elite class of the ancient world, as well as mostly mute archaeological evidence, plus coinage, inscriptions, and papyri, leaving us largely with only our own modern economic conceptions as means of interpretation and application to the ancient Greek world. The ancient Greeks were hardly aware of their

¹⁶ Scheidel et al. 2007, 1.

economies, at least not in the same way that we are able to conceive of our economies. As elucidated by Finley, ancient Greeks participated in economic activities such as a trade, investments, production, loans, and etc., even writing about these and discussing them in various literary works. Yet, the Ancient Greeks did not conceptualize and amalgamate their economic activities and economies into defined sub-systems. On account of this lack of systematic definition there is little archived quantifiable economic information on which we can rely and interpret.¹⁷

For instance, Xenophon's *Poroi* discusses many Athenian economic activities in depth, such as silver mining, farming, fishing, commercial trade, and labour, but considers each activity individually from the others in regards to any possible financial benefit to an individual or to the state. Nor does Xenophon attempt to quantifiably measure or analyze an economic activity beyond its ability to generate revenue, and neither does he express any quantitative amount or analysis of the possible effects of various activities as a whole on the state. He does urge Athenians to offer honours to people who provide trade-related services to the state in order to increase the states' revenues through taxation, since Athens collects taxes on products both exported from and imported into the *polis* (Xen. *Por.* 2.1-7, 3.3-5).¹⁸ Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* is similar in that it refers to *oikonomia* and economic activities, but defines the sphere as individual and household property and wealth management, and does not expand to state-management of wealth and property within the realm of *oikonomia* as the science of household management. Both of these sources indicate an awareness of economic activity, but not an awareness of economic conceptualizations in the sense of an independent societal sub-system or

¹⁷ Finley 1973, 17-34.

¹⁸ Engen 2010, 77-78; for the original argument see Burke 1992, 199-226. See Hakkarainen 1997, 1-32 for another argument on state revenue as a goal of Athenian trade policy.

overall economic institution. Inflation, market economics, embedded transactions, capital, appreciation, gross domestic product, etc., would all have been foreign concepts to an ancient Greek individual, and the terms ‘economy’ and ‘economics’ in their modern senses would be completely alien.¹⁹

The modern words ‘economy’ and ‘economics’ derive from the ancient Greek *oikonomia*: *oikonomia* is literally translated from the Greek into English as ‘household management’, or ‘household law’. The definition evolved in its application and extension to any sort of large-scale manageable organization. In Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, the term *oikonomia* (1.1) is directly translated as “household-management” and “estate management”, and the text itself is primarily concerned with the household and personal property rather than the ‘economy’ at large of the entire state. *Oikonomia*, here, is the science of personal property, wealth and household management, and the discussion between Socrates and Critobolus focuses entirely on individual management of personal property as the science of *oikonomia*, not on the state.²⁰ The metaphor of *oikonomia* as large-scale affair management did become prevalent in the Classical period, but it was never actually applied to the management of the economy (specifically) of the entire *polis*. Demosthenes was ridiculed for being “useless in the *oikonomia* (management) of the *polis*”, and a similar metaphor appears two hundred years later in the work of the Greek historian Polybius. The word continued to be used by ancient authors, including Quintilian, and would occasionally be used as an overall metaphor for the management of political and state affairs, in an overwhelmingly general sense.²¹ The use of *oikonomia* and its derivatives in this sense continued, and eventually evolved from referring primarily to politics, to acquiring its

¹⁹ Finley 1973, 21; Engen 2010, 3-19; Parsons and Smelser 1956; Bucher 1893, 114.

²⁰ Engen 2010, 4-5.

²¹ Finley 1973, 20-21.

specialized sense regarding wealth. The French originally coined the term “l'économie politique”, yet it remained a solely political term until about 1750. By this time, a large amount of writing on trade, monies, national wealth and income, and economic policy had arisen, so that by the second half of the eighteenth century the specialized sense of ‘economy’ was fully developed.

Economics in its modern sense, is a late nineteenth century innovation, to the credit of the first volume of Alfred Marshall's *Principles of Economics* in 1890.²² Although it is clear that ancient Greeks taxed, loaned, mined, coined, deposited, and accrued money, they did not combine these activities into a particular social, cultural, or ideological structure.²³ Therefore Finley restricts the use of ‘economics’ as a term to capitalist systems: the language and concepts with which we are familiar on account of their predominance in modern society tend to lead to a “false version” when applied to ancient economies.²⁴ While ancient societies had economies, with rules, regulations, and a certain level of predictability, they were not always conceptualized: for instance, both wage and interest rates in ancient Greece were fairly stable over long periods of time, so that discussing a “labour market” or a “money market” creates an anachronistic representation of ancient Greek society and changes the modern conceptions of ancient practices.²⁵ Even though Finley was primarily concerned with “political economies”, he did not

²²See Finley 1973, 21.

²³ Finley 1973, 21; Parsons and Smelser 1956: economics was not a “differentiated sub-system” of ancient Greek society. As such, modern complaints about the lack of ancient economic writings rely on a misunderstanding of what ancient economic literature was actually about. See also Engen 2010, 3-36.

²⁴ Finley 1973, 23; language is fundamental to methodology, although Finley classifies the distinction between modern and ancient economies as arbitrary, it actually proves quite useful in the separation of capitalist and non/pre-capitalist societies. See also Engen 2010, 3-36 for a discussion of the nature of ancient Greek economies and the language used to define them. Cartledge et al. 2002, xv-xvi, also provides a brief discussion on modern economic language and the problematic application of modern terminology to ancient economies, discussing specifically the absence of quantitative analysis and any demand for statistically significant results.

²⁵ Finley 1973, 23-27; Engen 2010, 3-36; Cartledge et al. 2002, xv-6; see Bresson 2016, xxi-xxiv for a discussion of the issues that accompany studying the growth of ancient economies, and the problematic nature of abstract conceptualizations in application to ancient Greek economies.

doubt the presence of economic determinants (market value, production costs, inflation, among others), or that basic data and figures could be presented on production, trade, finances, and profits. Yet he did not see the merit in these exercises since there was no economic logic inherent in this information by which to organize it.²⁶ That is, there is little concern within substantivism for number and quantifiable data, as this particular type of information does not wield the structural evidence upon which substantivists are primarily focused. Numerical and quantifiable data are largely, through the substantivist lens, essays in futility, since we have so little empirical and quantifiable data and evidence remaining to us from the ancient Greek world. Substantivists hold that stretching and extrapolating what little quantifiable data we have to fit particular situations and contexts is problematic, in that it presents a skewed and inaccurate representation of the performance of ancient Greek economies. Substantivists prefer to focus primarily on economic structure and economic sociology, rather than concerning themselves with performance. I find this view largely problematic, as I believe the quantifiable evidence that remains to us can wield interesting results, and at least provides us with a paradigm in which to work and to construct theoretical models for economic performance. It is not possible for us to know the full extent of ancient Greek economic performance, nor to fully understand its structures. Yet, it is important to study as much of the available evidence as possible so as to have a well-rounded, detailed, and functional theoretical model of the ancient Greek economy.

As Finley argues there is a widespread issue of number fetishism amongst both ancient and modern authors, yet I diverge from him in this respect. Finley is exceptionally preoccupied with the sociological aspect of ancient Greek economies, and does not lend any weight to the importance of attempting to analyze what little quantifiable evidence remains to us. It is

²⁶ See Bresson 2016, 1-27, for a breakdown of ancient economic theories and debates in scholarship.

important, as mentioned in the introduction, to follow a theoretical model that considers both the sociological aspects of an economy as well as its performance in order to fully understand its nature and growth over time.²⁷ The question remains: how much exactly could an ancient author know? Is it possible that Thucydides knew for sure the number of slaves that escaped Attica in the final ten years of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 7.27.5)? If so, how did he reach his final number? It is unlikely that someone was stationed at a border between Attica and Boeotia with the purpose of counting escaped slaves. It seems probable that such a number is no more than an estimation of an amount of slaves that would have been a substantial and harmful loss to Athens. Although, the numbers recorded by ancient authors are then repeated by modern scholars. The 20,000 slaves Thucydides estimated is a number repeated religiously, applied in calculations and used to draw conclusions on the Attic slave populations. Yet, this number is no more than a general guess or estimation, an educated one, but by no means concrete.²⁸

Ancient peoples did keep registrars and rosters of quantifiable measures: hoplites, cavalry men, cash, and ships (to name only a few), censuses were taken for tax purposes, and information was filed in the interest of public revenue. Furthermore, what distinguishes these quantifiable lists is the lack of reasoning between the figures and their relationships to political, social, and ideological trends: there was no applied time series available. Any information recorded was for immediate use and information, rather than for future applications, as such there could be no true statistical analysis in the ancient world (something on which modern economics greatly relies).²⁹ Substantivist theoretical reasoning swings too far in the favour of a

²⁷ See North 1981, This idea is the inherent notion behind his New Institutional Economic theory, in that it is necessary to study both structure and performance separately and together in order to understand the nature of any economy.

²⁸ See Finley 1973, 23-27 for a full discussion of this particular incident. See also Rubincam 2012, 2011, and 2010 for the use of numbers in ancient Greek historians, especially Thucydides and Herodotus.

²⁹ Finley 1973, 25.

purely sociological perspective: the rationale between the figures and their relationships to social, political, and cultural institutions and factors is indispensable in the study of ancient Greek and Roman economies if there is any hope of reaching definitive understanding. The reconciliation of what little quantitative evidence we have with what we know about the sociological structure of ancient Greek economies allows us to situate economic determinants such as demography, technology, and social institutions within economic discourse in a positive and obliging manner that can be utilised to fully appreciate areas in discourse that are currently lacking, such as *xenia*. I follow Finley's terminology, refraining from referring to ancient Greek economics (a field which did not exist as defined within modern economics) and rather focusing on the ancient Greek economies themselves.

The plural "economies" will be used most often, as per the substantivist school of thought: since there were multiple cultural and social institutions which regulated and determined the structures and performances of any economic aspect of the society, we must consider that there were multiple economies embedded within these, rather than an independent, large entity as we typically conceive of economics.³⁰ Such a differentiation can help us divorce ourselves from the preconceived notions of modern economies that have often been maintained and applied to ancient economies in scholarship. Hopefully we can thus avoid any terminological or conceptual issues in attempting to define the role of *xenia* in ancient economies. By avoiding terminological, conceptual, and anachronistic issues, we can properly address the functional role of *xenia* within Classical Athenian economies as an aspect of structure and as a determinant of performance.

³⁰ Finley 1973, 23-27.

In order to complete this project, I focus on North's New Institutional Economic Theory primarily, because it takes all aspects of Classical Greek economies into account. North's theory allows us to take performance and structure into account simultaneously. The resulting picture of Classical Athenian economies is much more complete than one which is based on the study of structure or performance alone. Even if we do not have the exact quantitative data, it is better to at least attempt to gauge how Classical Athenian economies performed. North's theory builds on substantivism, while simultaneously expanding upon it in order to account for performance based aspects of economies that are under-explored in other theories.

Ancient Economies: Scholarly Debate and Theoretical Models

It is useful to provide a brief description of the five most influential theoretical frameworks for studying ancient economies: primitivism, modernism, formalism/neo-classical, substantivism, and New Institutional Economics. By understanding the nature of scholarly debate on the subject, we can begin to conceptualize where and how the prevalent theoretical models of ancient economies fail to take into account the function of *xenia*. Furthermore, a brief history of the theoretical debates permits me to situate my own notion about the Classical Greek economies within these schools of thought, as well as to argue for my preference for North's New Institutional Economics concerning the study of *xenia* within ancient Athenian economies. I use North's New Institutional Economics model because it provides the best foundation to study both the structure and performance of Classical Athenian economies in conjunction with one another. North's model is the most in depth means to study both the sociological and quantitative aspects of economies and economic development in relation to economic structure and overall performance. I will elaborate on this choice further on in this section.

The evolution of scholarship on ancient economies took place over the course of a century and a half, and gives us the context for the emergence of New Institutional Economics. Incidents involving *xenia*, like Andocides' procurements of grain and timber are discussed and analyzed by scholars within each respective theory. Although, none of them have yet taken it into account as economically effectual outside of the umbrella term "reciprocity". There are several reasons for this: theoretical economic models tend to diverge between overwhelming focuses on either performance or structure. The dichotomy between studying performance or studying structure, and the study of both of these separately, makes it difficult to approach and understand structural aspects of economies that are also determinants of economic.. By separating structure from performance in the study of Ancient economies, it becomes impossible to determine an actual functioning model for Ancient Greek economies. If a single economic model cannot be agreed upon, the debate will continue to center around the separate aspects of performance and structure within each model, which result in problematic approaches to economies within scholarship. In order to find a significant foothold for my argument regarding the importance of the role of *xenia* in ancient economies, it is necessary for me to first demonstrate the effectiveness of each theory and explain how they can aid in the endeavour to better understand the role of *xenia* within the model itself and the economy as a whole.

The first model that will be discussed in this chapter is primitivism: the primitivist theory was developed by Karl Bücher in his 1893 monograph *Industrial Evolution*. It argues that the economy of ancient Greek and Rome fundamentally remained at an underdeveloped stage of expansion with an intense focus on performance.³¹ The primitivist theory characterizes the ancient Greek economy by domestic production that was only intended to meet the immediate

³¹ See Bresson 2016, 2; as well as Scheidel et al. 2007, 2; and also Engen 2010, 20-21.

needs of the familial unit, regardless of the type of production undertaken by the family. Mercantile trade and exchange played an extremely limited role, and the redistribution of products did not take place through traditional exchange but predominantly through gift-exchange, rapine, and war. The limitations of primitivist economic theory also extend to trade specialization and personal exchanges, creating a system in which individuals could only specialize in certain fields so as to provide for their family, and would only exchange with people in their immediate social circles for necessity products, rather than for any type of “gain”.³² This model believes that significantly less trade, and entirely different kinds of trade, happen in the Ancient Greek world (in comparison with other theoretical models). The proponents of this theory take only those features of the ancient Greek economy that are useful for their goals (demonstrating the primitive nature of Ancient economies). This results in overall value judgements that are harmful to the understanding of the true nature of the ancient Greek economy.³³ Furthermore, money has no tangible function within the primitivist theoretical model, outside of the realm of “insurance”, and was simply held in people’s homes without being used. This theory is primarily based on observations, rather than hypothetical-deductive reasoning, and attempts to demonstrate that ancient Greek economies were the product of an institutional arrangement that itself only resulted from a power-relationship among social groups: from this perspective economic institutions are purely social and rooted in the affirmation of the values peculiar to a given society.³⁴ According to this theory, these small-scale economies only truly yielded to larger civic economies in the Middle Ages, and large-scale national trade only emerged in the 16th century.³⁵ The primitivist theory has some merit in that it sparked large

³² See Bresson 2016, 2; Scheidel et al. 2007, 2; Engen 2010, 20-21.

³³ Morley 2007, 4-5, and Bresson 2016, 3-4.

³⁴ Bresson 2016, 3-4.

³⁵ Scheidel et al. 2007, 2; Engen 2010, 20-21; Bresson 2010, 2; Morley 2007, 1-4.

debate in the late 19th century. Yet the theoretical paradigm developed through this model is oversimplified and largely normative in its characterizations of the ancient Greek economy as a whole without the consideration for variation as a result of geography, demography, technology, or other structural determinants. Overall, primitivism is overly concerned with placing ancient Greek economies in relation to our own modern capitalist or market economies: there are significant attempts within primitivism to discover to what level the ancient Greek economy resembles the modern market economy.³⁶

Secondly, the modernist model arose in response to the primitivist model, led by Eduard Meyer, essentially refuted Bücher's views in his work *Industrial Evolution*.³⁷ Modernism argues for the large-scale evolution of the economies of antiquity, demonstrating that ancient Greek economies had all the characteristics of early-modern and modern economies. Meyer was so confident in his views that he equated various periods of ancient Greek economic developments with the economic development of early Europe, from the early Middle Ages to the of the early 20th century. Meyer aligned Bronze Age Greece with the early Middle Ages, Archaic Greece with the end of the Middle Ages, and Classical Greece with the end of the Middle Ages to the early 20th century.³⁸ The association between ancient Greek and early modern economies arose from a belief that economies follow a universal path of development from primitive to modern over time. According to modernist theory, the ancient Greek economy was defined by the Classical period and by its large scale attributes. Classical Greek economies were considered qualitatively similar in organization to modern market economies, characterized by specialization and impersonal exchanges at prices determined by aggregate supply and demand

³⁶ Engen 2010, 20-21.

³⁷ Bresson 2016, 2.

³⁸ Bresson 2016, 2; Scheidel et al. 2007, 2.

for goods among interconnected markets.³⁹ The core of this model consists of the belief that modern economic development differs from ancient economic development only in quantity, not quality (i.e. structure and exchange systems), whereas primitivism holds that the ancient economy was both qualitatively and quantitatively different from the modern economy.⁴⁰ In order to place ancient Greek economies in relation in to modern economies, it is necessary to gauge ancient Greek economies in the terms and context of modern economic structures. It is very problematic, however, to consider that the Western market economy is the only successful paradigm for economic development and to separate economies between modern and primitive stagnation.⁴¹ Furthermore, modernism (like primitivism) does not allow for a measure of independence from other eras and societies. Associating them with other cultural periods and systems (such as modern capitalism) is problematic and does not provide a proper understanding of ancient economies within their own contexts and in relation to their own societies.⁴²

Overall, the primitivist versus modernist debate is oversimplified. The debate between primitivism and modernism characterizes the ancient Greek economy as a whole without consideration for the effect of variation among structural determinants of economies, such as geography, economic sectors, agriculture, labour, trade, manufacturing, and others.⁴³ Many scholars come down on the side of modernism in this debate, sparking numerous and important contributions to the overall discourse on ancient economies, including Rostovtzeff's studies on ancient Greece and Rome as market economies. It has been made clear by scholars, such as Weber, Polanyi, and Finley, that a solely performance-based focus on the study of ancient

³⁹ Engen 2010, 21.

⁴⁰ Morley 2007, 4.

⁴¹ Morley 2007, 6-7.

⁴² Bissa 2009, 2.

⁴³ Engen 2010, 5, 23.

economies is limited and problematic. Therefore it is widely agreed that the primitivist-modernist debate oversimplified the nature of ancient Greek economies, on account of the ultimate goal of whole economic model characterization.⁴⁴ Neither theory allows for the exploration and discussion of various cultural, geographic, or economic sectors. Agriculture, trade, labour, and manufacturing were all amalgamated into one large economic system, and were considered as a separate institution from the socio-cultural whole of ancient Greece.

Max Weber suggested that the performance of an economy on a primitive to modern scale is less important than the overall understanding of the structure and function of an economy, as well as the significance of social class and social order on production, circulation, and consumption of goods and services within the ancient world.⁴⁵ Weber's criticisms of the primitive and modernist theories paved the way for later scholars to diverge from the traditional debate, and create new theoretical systems to organize and study ancient economies. For instance, Weber's concepts were further developed by Karl Polanyi in his substantivist economic theory, the third major economic theory discussed in this chapter. He argues that only three mechanisms are available for exchange: reciprocity, redistribution, and market.⁴⁶ Both reciprocal and redistributive economies are embedded in other social and cultural institutions; it is only within market economies that individual transactions are dis-embedded and focused solely on profit and gain.⁴⁷ Reciprocity here indicates an equal and delayed exchange between partners who trade items of indeterminate value between each other with no formal market-based

⁴⁴ Engen 2010, 21.

⁴⁵ See especially Weber 1891, and 1923 for an in depth discussion on this topic of economic thought and theoretic processes.

⁴⁶ Scheidel et al. 2007, 2; See especially Polanyi 1944 for the full theoretic discussion of the substantivist framework.

⁴⁷ Scheidel et al. 2007, 3; these type of economies emerged in the Medieval period with the revolutions against palatial-serf systems and the emergence of bourgeoisie and middle classes whose main focuses were mercantile and trade based as a means to make profit for themselves.

exchange or pre-determined market price.⁴⁸ These reciprocal exchanges are not necessarily ritualised, as is *xenia*, but are often considered in the anthropological realm of gift exchanges, which includes *xenia*.⁴⁹ The implication of *xenia* constituting a type of reciprocal exchange is that *xenia* clearly fits within the paradigms of substantivism, and yet it is rarely discussed on a prominent level. By holding to these three categories of exchange as developed by Polanyi, we are able to see where in the overall structures of exchange various structural determinants fit. If we follow these three categories, it is easier to determine the function of different types of exchange within Classical Athenian economies. Dis-embedded market exchange accounts for those aspects of economies that are not fully integrated into different cultural, political, or social systems. Market exchange is wholly economic in nature, and accounts for mercantile exchange, mercenaries, general labour, or any exchange where monetary payment is provided in direct exchange for a good/service. Embedded forms of exchange are more complicated. Redistributive, or administrative exchange accounts for types of exchange which require direct government intervention. Types of redistributive exchange include taxation and duties, as well as liturgies. The third type, i.e. reciprocal exchange, is the most important for this project, since *xenia* falls directly into this category. Reciprocal exchanges are embedded in nature, and are typically governed by a social or cultural institution. These exchanges include feasts, military assistance, and marriage, as well as *xenia*. Reciprocal exchanges take place on a basis of immediate or delayed reciprocity (not including the direct exchange of money for a good or service).⁵⁰ Classical Athens included significantly more than just market exchange. To ignore

⁴⁸ See Polanyi 1944, 49-50, 57-58, 64, 277-278.

⁴⁹ See Polanyi 1944; there are certain rituals which much be completed between two individuals before their relationship can fall into the specific realm of *xenia*, including a declaration of intent, the exchange of objects, feasting, and taking of oaths; see Herman 1987, 58-72 on the initiation ritual and continuity of *xenia*-based ritualized interpersonal relationships.

⁵⁰ See Bresson 2016, 1-30; See all Engen 2010, 3-36.

this fact was a mistake of modernism and primitivism. This will be further demonstrated over the course of this project, since I will establish that *xenia* as a structural determinant of economic performance effects and influences Classical Athenian economies outside of market exchanges. *Xenia* facilitates reciprocal exchange between two people, and so fits into the category of reciprocal exchange. Redistributive exchange is any kind of administrative or state-influenced exchange, such as the grain tax law of 374/373 BCE (RO 26). Reciprocity and redistribution are subject to particular social and political structural determinants, and do not function independently outside of their socio-cultural constraints, and are considered embedded economies.

According to his model, Polanyi's final category is market exchange, which is the only dis-embedded form of exchange present in the ancient world. Market exchange is considered dis-embedded because it is constrained only by purely economic structural determinants, such as supply and demand, production cost, market price, inflation, and value. Market economies (much like our modern capitalist market economies) were separate from the overall structure and constraints of a culture or society. Polanyi's work shifted the focus from performance to structure, especially influencing the work of Moses Finley, who consistently emphasized the function of class and social status as a determinant in the function and nature of an economy. Scholarly focus moved towards a sociological understanding of the economy: it became important to situate individual economic concepts (production, distribution, consumption, etc.) within larger power-based frameworks in order to establish a working structural framework for ancient economies. An economy's self-sufficiency at its lowest level was its defining characteristic: however, some scholars still argue along the primitivist and modernist views. For instance Hopkins (a modernist) claims that Athens and Rome were outliers in the largely self-

sufficient ancient Greek world.⁵¹ He argues firmly that large-scale maritime and land trade made up the smallest and least significant portion of trade in the ancient world, and he focuses on production costs, supply-and-demand, transport costs, and technological investments as a means for supporting his argument.⁵²

Although Hopkins' arguments appear valid, it had already been clearly demonstrated (some ten years previously by Moses Finley) that ancient Greek peoples had no concept of their own economies. Any apparent facet of an economy in ancient Greece was embedded within larger, and much more substantial social institutions.⁵³ Finley's *World of Odysseus* is an exploration of Bronze Age Greece through a close reading of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and demonstrates that the social institutions apparent in these worlds form a coherent system. Building upon his own earlier study on Bronze Age Greece, Finley was able to determine a different theory on the function and nature of ancient economies. Drawing on Polanyi's work, Finley further cultivated the substantivist theory and demonstrated the embedded nature of ancient economies. Similarly, Hasebroek builds on substantivism in this regard, and argues that there was no national trade in the ancient Mediterranean. For Hasebroek, as well as other scholars, economies were not conceived of as "Athenian commerce" or "Boeotian commerce", nor was there any kind of national mercantile marine; national economies did not exist, instead economies were cosmopolitan and entirely divorced from any sense of "nationality".⁵⁴ For Hasebroek, ancient economies stand as an autonomous and separate cultural system, divorced from other socio-cultural institutions in ancient Greek society. Yet, it is much more likely that the economies were not divorced from their nationality, as Hasebroek argues, but rather

⁵¹ Scheidel et al. 2007, 4; Morley 2007, 2-3; See also Hopkins 1983.

⁵² See Hopkins 1983.

⁵³ See Finley 1973.

⁵⁴ Hasebroek 1965, 101.

integrated into the concept of a nation as a whole: economies were embedded into society and so they were not conceived of as independent market structures such as our modern ones.⁵⁵

According to arguments such as Hasebroek's, we can see that Hopkins' (and other modernist scholars') use of modern economic concepts and accompanying modern jargon as a means to provide evidence for his argument is problematic. Production and transportation costs, supply and demand, and market function would not have influenced the nature of ancient Greek trade or their economies in the same way that they do modern economies as such concepts did not exist as they do in modern economies. That is, ancient Greeks did not measure their economies quantitatively as we do in modern economies. Ancient Greeks were absolutely concerned with cost and profit, supply and demand, and the like, but would not have considered these concepts through a modern economic lens.⁵⁶ The anachronistic terminology and language appropriated by scholars and applied to ancient Greek economies suggest that ancient Greek people were quantitatively measuring the performance and outcomes of their economies. Such language makes it appear that ancient Greek peoples understood their economies on similar (or the same) quantitative indicator scales that are currently used to measure and understand modern economies. Ancient Greek, and especially Classical Greek, economies were a part of a larger structure that determined the overall organization of society and its functions. Unlike in the study of modern economies, we cannot wholly separate the function and performance of an ancient Greek economy from its structure, especially since ancient Greek people themselves did not consider their economies as a separate entity independent from the whole of their societal structure.

⁵⁵ This is the nature of an embedded economy, as per Finley 1973, 17-34.

⁵⁶ Hasebroek 1965, 101-102.

Debate continues about the similarities and differences between ancient and modern economies, and the question remains as to how closely we are able to draw analogies between the two. Ancient economies were not conceived in the same way we conceive of our modern ones: the nature of an embedded economy would necessitate the focus instead on the possible political, social, or military gains of any particular transaction, rather than formal economic determinants such as we see in modern market economies. The concept of money and the emergence of coinage were still relatively new to the ancient Greeks until at least the Classical Period, wherein money and coinage became necessary to conduct proper transactions with other apolitical bodies or foreign powers.⁵⁷ Newer still would be the concept of invisible wealth: investments, supply and demand ratios, production scales, and profit margins were not a significant reality, or even a necessity for the function of any ancient economy, even within a democracy. Governments and states in ancient Greece were influenced essentially by the elite alone, had little concern for any ‘economy’ per se, and had no real economic or trade policies in place to regulate trade or exchange. In essence, a *polis*’ only ‘economic’ interest was consumptive and political in nature: the obtainment of revenue came primarily through taxes and the main purpose of trade was to acquire any necessary goods or services through trade or exchange. Ancient Greek economies were not focused on developing their economies, nor was there any significant merit to this practice in the Ancient world. Economic development was not helpful in political or diplomatic development, nor did economies have the same effects on state policies as in the modern world. The modern state has its commercial policy developed from the old associations and unions of merchants, as merchants arose from the wealthiest and most influential families. It was only in this way that the state took over the care of commercial and

⁵⁷ See Seaford 2004 for a full discussion of the emergence of money (as a concept) versus coinage (as an artefact) in Archaic and Classical Greece and its sociological and ideological effects.

economic organization. Nothing like modern merchant unions existed in ancient Greece; there were no associations or unions for ancient Greek merchants, and it was uncommon for more than two or three merchants to work together to facilitate ventures in common.⁵⁸ Based on the organization of the ancient Greek states, the self-centered preoccupation with trade that dominates economic thought after the Middle Ages did not exist: there was no reason for the promotion of the economic interests of particular merchants or traders.⁵⁹ Greek agricultural production was the only exclusively ‘national’ form of production, since foreigners were unable to hold land. Yet, it is clear that the state was not protected against foreign imports of grain to Greece, and especially Athens. Greek *poleis* were not protected against foreign imports, and their economic and political policies were not determined by export interests of farmers at home. Furthermore they were not controlled by the desire to claim a foreign market for any given product, although resource acquisition did largely affect the colonisation patterns of the Ancient Greek world. Trade related policies were not meant to support state economic interests but instead ensured that domestic products were not being sold to foreign people when people at home were in need (i.e. Solon’s export ban). The primary concern in large part when it comes to state intervention in trade in ancient Greece was to ensure that there would be sufficient supply of products to provide for their citizens at home before providing for people abroad. Trade was conducted as was seen fit, sometimes driven by demand (in the case of corn, especially); but mostly it was unorganized and was certainly not driven by any state incentives or national economic goals. Hopkins’ focus on the expansion of Finley’s theories to include economic

⁵⁸ Hasebroek 1965, p. 101-102.

⁵⁹ Hasebroek 1965, 101-102.

growth within self-sufficient economies has taken off largely within discourse on Roman economies, where the focus has returned largely again to performance.⁶⁰

The fourth major economic theory discussed in this chapter is formalism, or neo-classical economic, which is one of the first theories that focuses primarily on performance. Unlike substantivism, which focuses primarily on the structure of economies, formalism focuses on performance. Essentially, formalism believes that the value of a good is determined by the utility value of its last unit consumed or produced. That means that a product or service is only valuable if it is useful, and that its value is only proportionate to its usefulness in society or to a particular person. For formalists, economics is a science focused on the analysis of the quantitative aspects of economies. Formalist analytical models have nothing to do with historical categories, but rather reflect consequences of choices made by free individuals operating in a market where they can exercise their judgement. Individuals acting within this market will not fail to pursue their own interests. According to this model, a person is an *Homo oeconomicus*, functioning with rationality and making predictable choices. Therefore, formalism is based on the principle of predictability, fundamentally deductive and methodologically individualistic.⁶¹ This sort of neo-classical/formalist analysis focuses solely on quantifiable evidence, which is of limited use within the larger realm of ancient Economic theory. In this model there is no focus on the structure, organization, or goals of trade, nor the statuses, interests, or methodologies of states within trade. Formalism is useful because it can demonstrate what was traded, how it was traded, and when it was traded, as well as quantify such evidence. This is useful because it indicates economic performance on both large and small scales. Hasebroek defined trade as a clearly

⁶⁰ Bresson 2016, 5-6.

⁶¹ Bresson 2016, 5-6.

demarked and distinct form of economic activity that was pursued only by a class of full-time professional traders. Impersonal exchanges of goods and services were undertaken over long distances at prices determined by the market forces of supply and demand. Yet, formalism theory overlooks other forms of trade and it implies that the trade policies of modern states are the only true trade policies: in other words, that the ancient Greek world had no actual, functional trade policies. According to Polanyi, formalist economic theory functions only through quantitative analysis, which only applies to a market economy.⁶²

Many Hellenists still find themselves primarily focused on either performance or structure, yet the emergence of Douglass North's New Institutional Economic Theory has a balance between the concepts of "structure" and "performance" in economic discourse. New Institutional Economic Theory breaks the study of ancient economies down into three parts. Firstly, performance in the most typical senses of production, output, and income distribution. Secondly, structure in the sense that it accounts for the basic determinant of economic function and performance, such as politics, social institutions, technology, demography, and ideology. Thirdly, both performance and structure, when taken together, must be able to explain changes in performance or structure across time, resulting ultimately in an explanation as explicit theorizing with the potential for refutability.⁶³ By using economic structure and performance in conjunction, we should be able to determine and predict how and why economic structure and economic performance can change, and determine why these changes happen. The measurement of performance is especially difficult, as Athenian trade and economic 'policy' were not concerned with economic growth or profit, since Athenian mentality seemed to lack the concept of growth

⁶² Engen 2010, 15, 22-23.

⁶³ See North 1981.

in relationship to economies:⁶⁴ Athenians did not tangibly invest in the growth of their economies. State interests in trade were more political in nature than explicitly economic. The lack of focus on economic policies was most likely due to the embedded nature of ancient economies and the inability to separate and conceive of an economy as an institution independent of the nature of the state; trade and exchange were political tools which the state often employed in order to achieve political or military goals.⁶⁵

Within substantivism there is an issue with the limitations of the embedded/substantivist approach in that it is constrained only to the social concerns about status and is minimally effected by state interests in trade and exchange.⁶⁶ Yet, there is no reason that the growth and performance of an ancient Greek economy must be defined by only social or only state concerns. It is more likely within an embedded economy that economic growth and structure are determined by both social *and* political concerns, since the two are ultimately and intimately intertwined in ancient Greek culture. It is necessary to combine substantivism and New Institutional Economics in order to clarify the role of *xenia* within Classical economies: since Classical economies are embedded in nature (as per substantivists such as Polanyi and Finley), *xenia* (as a cultural institution) makes up a part of the structure of classical society. Therefore, since *xenia* is part of the social structure of Classical Athens, it is also one of the many determinants of economic performance. Much like the substantivists, North also participates in and utilizes the discourse of embedded/dis-embedded economies, since he recognizes that social, political, and other cultural institutions can act as structural determinants of economic performance. Through the recognition that economies and economic performance are

⁶⁴ Samuel 1983, 1-10.

⁶⁵ Engen 2010, 7.

⁶⁶ Engen 2010, 7.

constrained by non-economic factors, we can see that a functional paradigm for ancient Greek economies must be multi-faceted. Focus on performance or structure alone will not indicate a clear, or well-rounded model of ancient Greek economies and their functionality as an aspect of society, and North builds upon this by integrating performance into his theoretical model. Since economies are embedded within the social structure of ancient Greek society, it is not possible to distinguish the “structure” and the “performance” of an economy from one another. The two aspects function simultaneously and mutually, with structure defining and determining the essential aspects of economic performance, and performance also influencing the nature of structure. Understanding the nature of ancient economic theoretical models is essential to understanding the role of *xenia* within classical Greek economies. With structure and performance of economies so closely dependent on the social structure of society as well as the society’s cultural institutions, the relationship between *xenia* and economies is symbiotic: the reciprocal trade and exchange facilitated by *xenia* as a social institution continually contributes to the overall performance of the economies of the Classical world.

The examples that I will discuss in the later chapters of this project demonstrate the interdependent nature of *xenia* (and other such social institutions) as a structural determinant of the performance of Classical Athenian economies. Andocides’ procurement of timber for the Athenian fleet at Samos from Archelaus of Macedon and grain for Athens from Evagoras of Salamis (respectively) indicate the effect *xenia* can have on economic performance and trade mechanisms in Classical Athens. These examples, as well as other such instances which I will discuss, demonstrate that *xenia* is a structural determinant with an effect on economic performance in both its informal (*xenia*) and formal (*proxenia*) forms. I shall demonstrate that

xenia (and ritualized interpersonal relationships) are important aspects of economic structure and should be studied more closely within theoretical models of ancient Greek economies.

In order to properly demonstrate the importance of *xenia* within Classical Athenian economies I employ both substantivism and New Institutional Economics as theoretical models, and use them in conjunction with one another. Using both theories allows me to get beyond the realm of social institutions and determine what Andocides was able to contribute through his *xenia* in regards to both economic structure and performance. Furthermore, the use of both theories enables us to get an overall sense of the role of *xenia* as a structural determinant within an embedded economy, as well as its effect on the performance of Classical Athenian economies within the realm of reciprocal exchange-based embedded economies. In my opinion, there is no reason why ancient Greek economies must be defined by structure (such as the social and political determinants of economic structure) or performance alone, as many of the theoretical models previously discussed in this chapter have attempted. As North's New Institutional Economics demonstrates, structure and performance must be taken in conjunction in order to gain a clear understanding of the function of ancient Greek and Classical Athenian economies. Both substantivism and New Institutional Economics make clear the importance of social institutions within their theories, but there is nevertheless a lack of discussion of specific social institutions (including *xenia*) and their effects on the performance and structure of ancient economies. Through the examples from Andocides' speech *On the Return*, I aim to demonstrate the importance of considering social institutions such as *xenia* in the study of ancient Greek economies. The case-study I provide will demonstrate not only the role of *xenia* as a structural determinant of performance in Classical Athenian economies, but also illustrates aspects of

economic performance and trade mechanisms in Classical Athens that have thus far been overlooked in scholarship.

Chapter 2: *Xenia* and *Proxenia*

Xenia: A Brief History

The ancient Greek cultural institution of *xenia* is often translated into English as ‘guest-friendship’ or ‘hospitality’, and carries connotations of trust, loyalty, friendship, and reciprocity.⁶⁷ The English translations do little to encompass the socio-cultural phenomenon of ancient Greek *xenia*, and can lead to a misunderstanding of an important ancient Greek social institution and ideological concept. Gabriel Herman argued that *xenia* can be placed within the anthropological category of ritualized interpersonal relationships. These relationships are defined as “a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units.”⁶⁸ *Xenia* encompasses a broad range of social and cultural obligations between individuals, falling somewhere between kinship and friendship. Pitt-Rivers devised a classification system of various interpersonal relationships based on the key principle of ‘amity.’ He defines the term ‘amity’ as the “moral obligation to feel (or feign) sentiments which omit the individuals to the actions of altruism,” which separates these interpersonal relationships from non-amiable ones. Pitt-Rivers defines five categories: real kinship, adoptive kinship, ritual kinship, ritual friendship, and un-ritualized friendship.⁶⁹ Herman

⁶⁷ Bolkestein 1939, 87-88; Whitehead 1977, 10-11; and Herman 1987; for the etymology, see Benveniste 1969, 87-101; Frisk 1970, vol. 2; Gauthier 1973; as well as Taillardat 1982.

⁶⁸ Herman 1987, 7, 10; Engen 2010, 39; when studied in relation to other similar systems from other cultures, *xenia* clearly fits the same criteria, yet it appears that many individual aspects of *xenia* have been divorced from one another in the absence of a proper framework under which to study the phenomena, and that many of these divorced aspects are just different manifestations of *xenia* in various forms. Transactions and exchanges of ritual relationships were intended to be carried out in a non-mercantile manner, as a means for creating moral and social obligations. Some other forms of ritualized personal relationships include the relationship of blood brothers within the central African Azande tribes, as studied by Tegnaeus in 1952; as well as the relationship between god-parents and their god-children within Christianity and Catholicism.

⁶⁹ Pitt-Rivers 1973, 76.

argues that *xenia* falls between the ritual kinship and ritual friendship categories; the partners in each case are typically non-kin, and come from different social, or at least different familial units. The most crucial aspect of this is that both types of relationships are clearly non-kin, but are considered in terms of kinship, which ultimately supports the extension of kinship rituals to non-kin.⁷⁰

Other scholars have disagreed with Herman and Pitt-Rivers, arguing rather that *xenia* fits into the overall category of *philia*, which covers a disparate set of relationships ranging from kinship to friendship, holding reciprocity as the only common link between them.⁷¹ In discourse, the various manifestations of *xenia* have been separated from each other and so appear to be different phenomena; however, when explored in light of similar cultural systems,⁷² it is clear that *xenia* is a social institution with clear boundaries, well defined rules, and internal cohesion. Furthermore, these relationships encompass a sense of moral obligation, and a responsibility to reciprocate, and would most often take place between two partners of similar social status, although not necessarily. Ritualized friendship becomes a lot less common further down on the social ladder. *Xenia* was a mark of high social status and rank, and usually designated a person of particular wealth and nobility. It is extremely rare for women to be *xenai*, and non-free men are entirely absent from this cultural institution. It was only through an equal social standing that the ritual relationship was able to achieve ideal reciprocity.⁷³

The definition demonstrates the most distinct features of the social institution, and supplies further information to extrapolate its existence even when a *xenia*-relationship is not

⁷⁰ Herman 1987, 32; Pitt-Rivers 1973, 76; Engen 2010, 37-41, 47-51.

⁷¹ Mitchell 1997, 3-21.

⁷² *Xenia* is often divided into different categories, such as *proxenia*, *idioxenia*, and *doryxenia*.

⁷³ Herman 1987, 7, 34-35; Engen 2010, 37-41, 47-51.

explicitly named in any sources. Some relationships are excluded from this categorization, although they appear to meet one or more of the above categorizations of friendship: any relationship that solely involves payment for goods and services, such as merchant-trader or mercenary-employer, do not meet the necessary ‘friendship’ criterion implicit in the social institution.⁷⁴ The differentiation between friendship criteria as elucidated above is especially important for understanding the role of *xenia* within an economy, it is distinct from typical mercantile and trade-based exchanges. Unlike *xenia*, trade is not reciprocal, but an impersonal transaction which take place on (what is often) a solitary basis at a predetermined price. Due to the reciprocal nature of *xenia*, wherein a good or service is often exchanged at delayed reciprocal rate (the reciprocity did not necessarily occur immediately, but may have come at any point in time after the initial exchange) for another good or service, it is not quantifiable in the same manner as trade. We are unable to extrapolate price, value, interest, or tax on any *xenia*-based exchange, even if it was a large-scale ritual exchange. Of course, we can determine how much the goods themselves was worth, in terms of quantifiable value. We are unable, however, to determine what a *xenia*-based exchange is worth to the individuals themselves, since the value of the transaction exists within the development of delayed reciprocity and moral obligation to reciprocate between the two partners. The valuation of a *xenia*-exchange is dependent on the partners involved in the exchange and on the value each individual gave to the benefaction on personal terms.

The above definition of *xenia* can be further broken down into specific criteria: firstly, it must encompass and agree with all the variants of the Archaic bond, secondly it must be separated from seemingly similar systems, and thirdly it must demonstrate controlled

⁷⁴ See Engen 2010, 40; Humphreys 1978, 70, 160-161, 201; and Herman 1987, 10 and note 1 for exemplar.

comparisons with similar institutions in other cultures.⁷⁵ It is also necessary that a *xenos* must have a distinct social identity from his partner, they must originate from different geographical or political groups: one *xenos* must always be an outsider to the other's social group. In fact, within the evidence explored by Gabriel Herman, no two individuals within the same social unit are referred to as *xenoi*, as it seems to be a contradiction to call a friend from the same social circle a *xenos*. *Xenos* and the rarer derivatives *idioxenos* and *doryxenos* refer unequivocally to individuals originating from separate social units.⁷⁶ The 'outsider' criterion is clearly demonstrated by the connotations carried by the words: among Athenians, friends who came from different demes, *trittyes*, or tribes would be referred to each other as *philoï*, *hetairoï*, or *epitedeioi*, but not as *xenoi*.⁷⁷ Other words that refer to forms of friendship and kinship (*philos*, *hetairos*, *epitedeios*, *anankaios*, *oikeios*, *syngenes*, and *euergetes*) are used of both insider and outsider relationships, with the semantic range having developed from differences in emphasis on types of relationships. The insider-outsider dichotomy is seemingly easy enough to navigate, however the civic ideologies and allegiances imposed by the Classical *poleis* and emerging democratic political systems greatly affected the function of *xenia* and its accompanying individual-oriented ideology which arose in Bronze Age Greece and was sustained well into the Archaic period.

⁷⁵ Herman 1987, 8; Engen 2010, 37-41, 47-52; Humphreys 1978, 201.

⁷⁶ See Engen 2010, 119-139 for a discussion of different types of honorary language, as well as Herman 1987, 11-2, and Appendix A for passages in which *xenia* partners are described as *xenoi*, *idioxenoi*, or *doryxenoi* with traceable social origin; his research indicates even fictitious accounts follow this same paradigm. *Idioxenoi* refers specifically to a friend in another state, while *doryxenoi* is translated literally as "spear-friend" or "war-friend", and *proxenoi* is a "public-friend" as instituted by the state. The aspect of 'strangeness' or 'stranger' is implicit in the word *xenos*, as the term is commonly used to describe or address strangers and foreigners. Provenance appears to be inseparable from individuals as indicated by ancient writers' predisposition to include it when discussing the participants in *xenia*-based relationships; group identity appears to be an important aspect of personal identity. See the Homeric formula for inquiring a stranger's provenance: ξεῖνε φίλ' ... τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἢ δὲ τοκῆς; (*Od.* 1.158-170); provenance and personality are deeply intertwined, and a person is often defined and understood by their city or state.

⁷⁷ Herman 1987, 11-13 and note 6 for exemplar; See especially Engen 2010, 119-139 on honorific language.

The social, political, and cultural landscapes shifted dramatically during the transition between the Archaic and Classical periods, changing and influencing not only various social and cultural institutions, but also their accompanying ideologies. Herman demonstrates the stark difference between Archaic and Classical ideologies quite simply, using as an example the interaction of Diomedes and Glaucus in the *Iliad* and an encounter between the Spartan King Agesilaus and the Persian satrap Pharnabazus in Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Diomedes and Glaucus meet on the battlefield, and discover that their grandfathers had been *xenoi*, and thanks to this fact they too are *xenoi philoi* to each other; on account of this relationship, the two heroes agree not to fight each other, and even trade armour in order to demonstrate to their peers their hereditary bond (Hom. *Il.* 6.224ff). The episode in the *Hellenica* cited by Herman comes from a much later period, roughly 394 B.C.E, wherein the Persian satrap Pharnabazus reproaches Agesilaus for destroying his private property, and claims that Agesilaus has breached the obligations of *xenia*. While his men are ashamed at the thought of this, Agesilaus argues that individuals are constrained by the nature of their civic duties and citizenship identities (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.31-5). It is worth examining this scene in detail: the interaction begins with Pharnabazus and Agesilaus approaching each other in the customary way and then Pharnabazus speaks since he is the elder (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.31). Addressing the Lacedaemonians, Pharnabazus says he had been a “φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος” when they had been at war with the Athenians, having provided money to their fleets and fighting alongside them (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32). Pharnabazus then reproaches the Lacedaemonians for ravaging and destroying his land, saying that Agesilaus must not understand what is righteous or just, or how these are the ways of men who repay favours (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33). At first the Lacedaemonians are filled with shame at his words, but Agesilaus responds quickly that even Pharnabazus should know that people in the Greek *poleis*

can become ξένοι of one another (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33). He continues by saying that when their *poleis* go to war, even οἱ ἐξενωμένοι must fight against one another (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33). Since the Lacedaemonians are at war with Pharnabazus' king, they must regard all his land as hostile, although they hope to remain φίλοι of him regardless (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33). Within these two interactions we are able to see the initial formulations of *proxenia*, as well as *xenia* itself. The first interaction took place in the Bronze Age and the latter in the Classical period. Herman easily reveals the ideological shift that occurred with the rise of the *polis*: individuals in the Bronze Age were able to exercise the rights and duties of *xenia* freely and without concern, since individual ideology prevailed at this time. The obligations of guest-friendship for Diomedes and Glaucus supersede the obligations to their respective commanders and their military alliances. This appears to be the natural order of allegiances to the poet, as this assumption that enables him to create such an interaction at all. The adherence to the obligations of ritualized friendships is an exercise of the individual's allegiance to himself. During Homer's heroic age, the hero/individual was the pinnacle of his own social pyramid: he was not obligated to anyone other than himself, and his private affairs could take precedence over communal ones. This is the individualistic ideology that permeates and defines the Bronze Age and the Archaic Greek periods, and one of the primary processes in Bronze Age and Archaic Greek society. With the emergence of city-states, the dominating individualistic ideology was replaced by the civic-citizenry ideology. Citizenship was an entirely new creation, utilized as a means to subject the individual to a set of compulsory rules and obligations, wherein communal needs and interests superseded the individual's private affairs. Civic obligations did not rise out of a sense of morality in so much as their legal enforceability, and were often found to be conflicting in nature with the personal moral obligations which defined individual ideologies and *xenia*-based

relationships. Yet, those individuals in the Classical period could not do so, it was expected of them to value the *polis* and their civic identity and duties above their personal relationships.⁷⁸ It is the dichotomy between moral and civic obligations that led to the development of *proxenia*, which arose in conjunction with the *polis*.

When the concept of the city-state began emerging in the eighth and seventh centuries BCE, the ancient Greek world had already developed and functioned on an extensive network of personal alliances under the paradigm of ritualised personal relationships. These alliances linked together myriad apolitical bodies, and functioned primarily on the personal and private level on which they had been established. The *polis* framework was superimposed on top of this pre-existing network, but did not dissolve it or replace it. Rather, when *poleis* became the official and dominant form of social organization, networks of ritual personal relationships existed beyond civic boundaries. *Xenia* continued to function and maintained powerful connections between various citizens and apolitical bodies. On account of the simultaneous existence and development of these two exceptionally different systems of social organization, *xenia* became an active agent in the shaping of civic and political value systems within the *polis*, developing some of the most integral ideologies and action patterns.⁷⁹ Therefore, the *polis* and its accompanying civic and political ideologies and frameworks also played a large role in the re-shaping of *xenia* and redevelopment of its functions within ancient Greek society, *proxenia* being the prime example of the effect of civic ideologies on the functioning of *xenia*. *Xenia* and other ritual personal relationships did not cease to exist, but rather adapted to the constraints of

⁷⁸ Herman 1987, 1-2; Hom. *Il.* 6.224ff and Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.31-5.

⁷⁹ Herman 1987, 6; Herman discusses the nature of and effects of the co-existence of contradicting ideologies and social systems, and explores the periods between Homeric times and the Roman conquest of Greece and focuses on the interactions between city-states and guest-friendships at the ideological level.

Classical Greek society, both used and functioned within and outside of the paradigm of *poleis*-based culture and society.

Luckily, *xenia* is copiously documented in both literary and epigraphic evidence of the Classical period. The evidence for *xenia* available to us is from a civic-political perspective: the perspective of the *polis*.⁸⁰ The nature of the *polis* and its value systems greatly influenced the understanding and representation of Ancient Greek culture, and so *xenia* was reimagined through the framework of the civic paradigm of the *polis*. In the works of the Greek historians, many historical events are defined by ritualized interpersonal relationships: the Ionian revolt, the Persian revolt, and even Athenian Imperialism. Many accounts of ritual friendship were reinterpreted through and on account of such events, acquiring new meanings and appearing as larger overall links between historical incidents. The expectation of historical authors was that co-operation between powerful political men during this period could only have occurred through pre-existing relationships built on trust, and *xenia* was the only alternative to marriage for creating bonds between foreigners.⁸¹ It is difficult to determine whether *xenia* actually played a significant role in many of these events as foreign policy, or whether it was a rhetorical trope applied by an author to explain amicable relationships between people from different political communities for the sake of the audience's understanding. It seems likely to me that it is some combination of the two; ritual interpersonal relationships were essential to the structure of society, but were only truly pertinent to the elites who were able to participate in the institution. The use of *xenia* as a rhetorical or plot device provided a framework through which an elite could understand a historical event through contemporaneous ideology. The civic-political

⁸⁰ Most of our evidence for *xenia* comes from the Classical period, and therefore is accompanied with a civic bias.

⁸¹ See Engen 2010, 47-50, 146-147, 152-154; Humphreys 1978, 201, 214; Herman 1987, 13-14; and also Walbank 1978, 9-23.

perspective is common within evidence, but it causes some difficulties in the understanding and study of the function of *xenia*, but also in defining it as a value system.

It is not possible to measure *xenia* on a quantitative scale, and in order to define it qualitatively, it is necessary to look beyond the general definitions and context provided above. Important qualitative features include the various elements shared with kinship and with friendship. The occupation of the space in-between kinship and friendship allows for a flexible and unique relationship. Most importantly, as with kin, *xenia* was maintained in perpetuity and could be passed down through a family regardless of the level of interaction between the *xenoi* at any given time. There was also a presumed bond and outward demonstration of mutual affection, although it was not necessary for an inward sentiment to exist.⁸² Other similar features include the ritual of naming: it was demonstrated that a *xenos* would often name his son after his own *xenos*.⁸³ The bond of *xenia* functioned as kinship also in that it extended to the mutual protection of *xenoi* as well as their associates, including offspring and families. While ‘foster-parenting’ (an accurate enough neologism) was romanticised in mythology, it was recognized in reality as a manner of solidifying a relationship or alliance. Furthermore, much like kin, *xenoi* were expected to perform ritual duties for one another: including the provision of marriage dowries for the daughters of a deceased *xenos*, and the care and treatment of the earthly remains of a dead *xenos*.⁸⁴ *Xenoi* were expected to be responsible for the entirety of their *xenoi* estates, duties such

⁸² Herman 1987, 16-17; See also Engen 2010, 47-52; and Humphreys 1978, 70, 214.

⁸³ See Perlman 1958, 187 on Cimon naming his son Lakedaemonius after the geographical area of his *xenos*; Herman 1987, 19-22; this occurred in three variations: a man would name his son after the *xenos* himself, by the name of the geographic area of the *xenos*, or the naming of a son by compound names from the cultural institution itself; see Herman 1989, 86-87 on Nikias and Epimenides, who named several generations of sons after one another. See also Engen 2010, 41; as well as

⁸⁴ See Pouilloux and Salviat 1983; Cartledge 1984; and Herman 1987, 22-26; the responsibility of the foster-parent extended even if the child and foster-parent lived apart. Mythological examples include Strophios to Orestes in Euripides’ *Electra* and *Orestes* plays (*Electra* 83, *Orestes* 1015), as well as with Peleus and Chiron (Apollodorus 3.13.3-6). In historical practice, Cleandrus of Mantinea took in the son of his *xenos*, Craugis of Megalopolis (Polybius 10.22). There are other instances of such relationships, including between Iphicrates, an Athenian general,

as money lending or practical daily advice are also typical aspects of *xenia*-based relationships. The similarities between *xenia* and kinship are strong. They differ significantly in that kinship involves a familial relationship, whereas *xenia* is an acquired relationship, somewhat similar to the level of kinship achieved through marriage.

Moreover, *xenia* also shares many features and obligations with *philia*, many of which fall outside the realm of kinship obligations, which supplemented and fulfilled the potential of kinship-based relationships. Typically, in ancient Greek culture, friendship was achieved and maintained by individuals within the same social system or unit, and shared similar cultural and political value systems on which there was a basis for growth and confidence. Yet, one of the defining aspects of *xenia* is in fact the social and geographic separation of the partners, who originated from drastically dissimilar cultural systems.⁸⁵ There was little to interrupt or affect *xenia* based relationships since the ritual personal relationship was often the only relationship tying two *xenoi* together into the bond of pseudo-kinship. It was uncommon for *xenoi* to have a relationship outside of their *xenia*-based relationship. Civic friendships existed on multiple levels and through various obligations by virtue of the participation in common cultural and social activities, political institutions, and other informal groups. On account of these, friction between civic friends was more likely: Aristotle even believed that *xenia* was the strongest form of friendship; the separation allowed for the avoidance of political, civic, and social strife (Arist. *Magna Moralia* 2.1211a 46). There was no formal or civic institution that held a person accountable if they did not fulfill their obligations as a *xenos*. *Xenoi* were bound only by their

and Amyntas, father of Philip of Macedon (Aeschines, *On the Embassy* 2.28), as well as Diogetnetos and Pausanias according to Lysias 18.10. Satyros of Athens provided dowries for the daughters of a dead partner, and Xenophon provided a votive offering in honour of the deceased *proxenos*. There is evidence of grave stele having been inscribed either by or for a *xenos*, including the inscription set up for Megistias by Simonides of Ceos after the battle of Thermopylae “for the sake of *xenia*” (Herodotus 7.228.1-4).

⁸⁵ Engen 2010, 39-41, 47-52; Herman 1987, 29; Humphreys 1978, 70.

moral responsibility and commitment to one another. *Xenia* was actually quite different from *philia*, especially in regards to social separation, interpersonal obligation, and reciprocal enactment, as well as in terms of its function within a civic cultural system. *Xenia* did not fall subject to the civic machinery of the Classical period.⁸⁶ *Xenia* is therefore considered a kind of friendship, due to the “bond of solidarity” it formed between two partners, but shows itself much closer in nature to kinship, although it is not considered so because it does not fit the proscribed kinship paradigm. *Xenia* existed within a systematic limbo, neither quite kin nor friend, but still held to moral and social obligations to another individual as laid out by the nature of the cultural institution.

Proxenia: A Brief History

As noted above, the dominant *polis* system that emerged in the Classical period disrupted the function of *xenia* and the ability of ritualized personal partners to utilise it to the fullest of their and the institution’s potential. On account of this, it is clear that *xenoi* had to adapt their relationships and the nature of the ritual cultural institution in which they took part.

Understanding the role of *xenia* within the *polis* is essential for understanding the role of *xenia* within Classical economies; it helps us conceptualize the role of *xenia* and its functions as an institution. *Xenia* itself is an informal institution, initiated and undertaken through an informal interpersonal system with no real regulations, rules, or boundaries of established formal political or civil institution.

⁸⁶ Engen 2010, 40; Herman 1987, 30; *xenoi* could not bring direct social pressure to bear on their partners, and they operated largely outside the framework of civic social order on account of their separation.

One of the ways in which people adapted *xenia* was by developing sub-institutions, offshoot institutions of a similar nature following similar rules and patterns with some adjustments. The most important sub-classification of *xenia* is *proxenia*, an institution which emerged sometime at the end of the seventh century BCE.⁸⁷ *Proxenia* emerged with the polis itself, and was a means for city states to utilise pre-existing relationships for their own political and diplomatic reasons. *Poleis* sought to utilise the powerful institution of *xenia* for their own purposes by appointing *proxenoi* in foreign cities, who like *xenoi* were supposed to further their guest-friends' interests, i.e. in this case the interests of the entire *polis*. Hasebroek considers *proxenoi* "appointed representatives in a foreign city", which suggests that *proxenia* is an impersonal, political institution, as opposed to the interpersonal, private counterpart. No citizen could become the *proxenos* of his own community, and the distinction between citizen and foreigner persisted even after *proxenia* was established. The notion that *proxenia* might function independently of its original institution is unlikely, as there is no true separation between their emergence in ancient Greek society, since they are variations of the same social institution: how could *proxenia* exist without its original *xenia* counterpart? Or how could it function separately from *xenia* when it used the original *xenia* relationships in order to form new *proxenia* relationships?

The main difference between *xenia* and *proxenia* was the partnership and the nature of the reciprocal exchanges: a decree of proxeny was always granted by a community, and the *proxenos* was always initially the member of another community, although they were often granted citizenship with their *proxenia* decrees. The grantees of *proxenia* were obligated to further the interests of the granting community in the communities of the respective *proxenoi*,

⁸⁷ See Walbank 1978, especially regarding proxeny decrees of 5th century Athens. See also Herman 1987, 130.

and abroad.⁸⁸ Unlike *xenia*, *proxenia* is essentially a public institution, with a collective group of people taking up the role of an individual, fulfilling a similar relationship with another individual, governed by the same general rules as the original cultural institution. Cities and *proxenoi* performed various ritual services for each other, and the cities fulfilled many of the same roles as a *xenos*, *proxenia* is still an all-purpose relationship⁸⁹ Unlike in the case of *xenia*, *proxenia* relationships was not fulfilled by the ritual initiation and sealed with the act of feasting, but rather someone come into *proxenia* by their own actions, or be recommended for it by an individual, or even due to the political intentions of a community. The theory is that the emerging *poleis*, did not devise their own impersonal systems, but simply utilized the pre-existing system to their advantages. Therefore, in order to expand their power abroad, civic and political communities would utilise an individual citizen with pre-existing *xenia* ties of their citizens as intermediaries, and then brought a foreign *xenos* into a relationship of mutual reciprocity and dependence with the city itself, as we will see in the case of Andocides.⁹⁰ Mitchell supports this, arguing that the Athenian polis system exploited the pre-existing *xenia* between great men, and appropriated it to aid in her own diplomatic affairs.⁹¹

Many scholars argue that exchanges facilitated by *xenia* and *proxenia* were more about forming relationships and signifying shared elite status rather than creating wealth or obtaining goods or revenue.⁹² *Xenia*-based transactions are portrayed in elite sources as being carried out in

⁸⁸ Hasebroek 1965, 130; Herman 1987, 130-131; Engen 2010, 52, 106, 122, especially 146-155.

⁸⁹ See Engen 2010, 146-155 especially for the functions and roles of *proxenoi*; as well as Hopper 1979, 116-117; Herman 1987, 132, 135.

⁹⁰ Herman 1987, 137-139; Engen 2010, 49, 52; Hopper 1979, 58, 109.

⁹¹ Mitchell 1997, 50-51.

⁹² Engen 2010, 40; Finley 1978, 66-67, 98; Herman 1987, 10, 61, 80, 121-122, 128-129, 136; *xenia*-based transactions are portrayed in elite sources as being carried out in an altruistic manner, with friendship and mutual aid being of utmost importance. It is clear, however, that goods and services exchanged through *xenia* were often necessary, and usually contained some level of self-interest.

an altruistic manner, with friendship and mutual aid being of utmost importance.⁹³ It is clear, however, that goods and services exchanged through *xenia* were often necessary, and usually contained some level of self-interest. Furthermore, such relationships were fundamental to the function of the *polis*, affecting the conduct of economic, political, and diplomatic policies within states. The polis appropriated *xenia*-based relationships and harnessed them for diplomatic use between states. *Poleis* used people with these relationships as diplomats to target states with whom they shared other relationships.⁹⁴ According to Polanyi's substantivist theory, *xenia* constituted a form of trade, and was included in the trade policy of the late Classical period.⁹⁵ Other scholars argue similarly; Hasebroek, for instance, argues that ancient Greek economies were reliant almost entirely on foreigners, aliens, and metics: Athenian policy especially was directed towards encouraging and attracting them, which clearly demonstrates the "inability of Athenians to run their industries for themselves".⁹⁶ He deems *proxenia* merely a form of protection for a foreigner which had evolved from the more primitive *xenia*, for which the state received some form of service in return. Hasebroek argues that a *proxenos* was a private representative who acted as a middle man between a foreign state and the city which appointed him: unlike a consul, he was not formally recognized by his own state to be in a position of power. *Proxenia* was not a formal institution, and it was not voted on or developed by the Athenian government: the position of *proxenos* was essentially unofficial, and was dependent on a person's behaviour towards a *polis*. There were also no official relations or agreements between the two cities with whom a *proxenos* was working.⁹⁷ It was up to the *proxenos* to watch

⁹³ Engen 2010, 40.

⁹⁴ Mitchell 1997, 41-72.

⁹⁵ Engen 2010, 40.

⁹⁶ Hasebroek 1965, 128-129; Finley 1957, 64.

⁹⁷ Hasebroek 1965, 129.

over all the buying, selling, and exchange of commodities, goods, and services between individuals from each city.⁹⁸ The concept of the *proxenos* as the middle man has its importance, as many trades and exchanges are facilitated for a *polis* or state through *proxenos*; often, the *proxenos* of any particular city was facilitating the exchange on behalf of an original *xenos*, who has asked for a favour on behalf of their pre-existing *xenia* relationship⁹⁹ There are also instances where an individual was awarded *proxenia* by a state for conducting their business, trading, and exchanging with their state instead of another one.¹⁰⁰ Outside of *proxenia*, Athenian citizens were never directly involved in any foreign mercantilism or trade, besides the act of money lending:¹⁰¹ if an Athenian wished to involve himself in foreign trade, he did so in as much of a “behind the scenes” manner as possible. The honourand system involved a variety of socioeconomic and legal statuses, as well as trading services, which are not often accounted for by modernist models which focus on production, revenue and performance.¹⁰²

On account of shifting ideologies and the superimposition of the *polis* on the pre-existing *xenia* network, civic allegiance became a priority, and *xenia* could no longer be used in its original form. Therefore, the *polis* became the third member of *xenia* relationships, transforming the institution of *xenia* (or relationship) into one of *proxenia*, while still utilising the original relationship ties between the two original individuals. Furthermore, other institutions (such as

⁹⁸ Hasebroek 1965, 129; Aesch, 3.258-9, cf. Fornara 69 on Arthmius; Isocr. 15.165-166 Fornara 52 on Pindar; Thuc. 2.29.3-7, 2.67.1-4, 2.85.3-6; Fornara 65B, 134.20, 136 n.13, 144.20 on Nicias; *IG I³* 118, Fornara 155 on Apollodorus; *IG I³* 117, Fornara 161 on Archelaus; *IG I³* 113 on Evagoras; Fornara 106.26 on Coroebus; Fornara 134.18, 144.6, 15, n. 3 on Demosthenes of Athens. We see this especially with Andocides and Archelaus in chapter 3.

⁹⁹ Hasebroek 1965, 129; a similar “middle-man” is found in the Middle Ages: often a foreign business trader would conduct his business under the control of a local personage (the turcimanus, or dragoman). This was not intended as a restriction, but an advance on the (so-called) primitive “silent trading” which originated out of mistrust and language barriers.

¹⁰⁰ Hopper 1979, 58; this was especially granted in instances where a product was provided for free, or at a lower cost than usual.

¹⁰¹ Hopper 1979, 109.8ygu

¹⁰² Engen 2010, 77.

asulia and legal redress) worked with *proxenia* to form a sort of cultural framework for international trade.¹⁰³ On account of this we can begin to ask how exactly *xenia* (in its role as a cultural institution) effected the economies with which it worked in conjunction.

¹⁰³ Hasebroek 1965, 130; this is an excellent point, Hasebroek, however does not expand on it beyond this.

Chapter 3: Andocides and his *Xenoi*

Andocides: A Brief Historical Background

A prime example to illustrate the relational dynamic of *xenia* and the relationship between *xenia* and economies in Classical Athens is the case of Andocides, an aristocratic orator born around 440 BCE to a wealthy family of supporters of the democracy. Andocides' great-great grandfather had been a treasurer of Athena, a position which could only be held by the wealthiest of Athenians. His other great-great grandfather had the option to marry into the family of the Peisistratides, but instead went into exile with the Alcmaeonids and other democratic supporters (And. 2.26). Andocides' family helped expel the Peisistratides from Athens in 510 BCE, and expelled the Spartans and Alcmaeonids (And. 1.106). Moreover his grandfather had been a supporter of Pericles, and invaded the Megarid with him in 431 BCE, and was a general alongside him at Samos in 441-440 BCE. Furthermore, Andocides' grandfather had been one of ten Athenian envoys who made the Thirty-Years Peace with Sparta in 446/445 BCE (And. 3.6). His grandfather had also been a *xenos* with the king of Macedon (And. 2.11), and was to him from Athens in an embassy in 426 BCE Andocides' father Leogoras had married a sister-in-law of Pericles' son Xanthippus.

Andocides was exiled in 415 BCE on account of his participation in the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries (And. 1.11-69), a particularly heinous and anti-democratic crime. The Athenians feared the retribution of the gods, and believed these

crimes were an attempt at the subversion of democracy.¹⁰⁴ It has been suggested that the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries had been an attempt to deter an Athenian expedition against Syracuse to be led by Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus (Thuc. 6.8). Of course, it was in Andocides' best interest to portray himself and his family as supporters of the democracy in order to win the sympathy of his Athenian audience: the speech *On the Return* which references Andocides' *xenoi*, was a ploy to have himself reinstated as an Athenian citizen. There Andocides' actions were biased in favour of what won him the most sympathy. Whether or not Andocides or his family were actually supporters of the democracy to the degree that he claimed is difficult to tell. Nevertheless it is important to be aware of Andocides' and his family's background and political history.

Andocides, his father, and other members of his family were denounced as involved in these crimes against Athens, and were only saved from prosecution by betraying their friends and providing evidence against them (And. 1.48-53, 61-64). Andocides' account of the crimes and betrayal of his fellow criminals was viewed as an admission of guilt by the Athenian citizens. As a result he became exceptionally unpopular. Soon afterwards, a decree of Isotimedes was passed which forbade anyone guilty of impiety from entering any temples or the Athenian Agora (And. 1.70; *Lys. Against Andocides* 9, 24). Andocides was forced into self-exile. Andocides spent his time away from Athens primarily in Cyprus. According to *Lysias* 6,¹⁰⁵ Andocides had fallen on such hard times that he had to become a trader and merchant ship owner in order to survive (*Lys.* 6. 19, 49).¹⁰⁶ Hasebroek argues that Andocides made his living as a merchant trader for a considerable length of time, since he was compelled by circumstance. Yet

¹⁰⁴ Gagarin and MacDowell 1998, 95-96.

¹⁰⁵ Of course this is another instance of biased information, since *Lysias* is arguing against Andocides' return to Athens, he will attempt to portray him in the worst possible (and least democratic) manner.

¹⁰⁶ Edwards 1995, 1-2; Missiou 1992, 15-25; MacDowell 1962, 1-6.

the revenue from trading was not substantial, and so Andocides tried to have his citizenship reinstated on multiple occasions, since he had fallen on great poverty and hardship (And. 2.11-14). I contend this point: Andocides sold the timber back to the Athenians only at what it cost to fell and export, less than 5 drachmae an oar (And. 2.11). If Andocides was truly as impoverished as Hasebroek claims, he would not have been able to absorb so much loss of revenue, and would have tried to gain some financial profit from the transaction. Furthermore, Andocides claims he also supplied bronze and grain (And. 2.11-12), but does not state that it also came from Archelaus of Macedon, which suggests that these were gifts of good-will to the Athenian fleet at Samos from Andocides himself. It is unlikely then that Andocides was actually as poor as he himself, Lysias, and Hasebroek claim.¹⁰⁷

Andocides' background demonstrates the deep connection of his family to the democracy and their important relationship with the city-state. As a result, Andocides' crime was especially dishonourable and insulting, considering his ancestors had fought for the democracy and democratic rights countless times, despite their aristocratic heritage. Considering his background, Andocides' decision to become a merchant was uncommon. It was more common for a wealthy elite to commission a professional trader or finance a merchant ship than actually to participate in the trade himself,¹⁰⁸ but since Andocides was exiled it would have been especially difficult for him to have organized such an arrangement. It was also much more financially responsible of him to handle the trade himself than to outsource it to someone else, since it would have cost him additionally to commission and pay a professional merchant. It was been easier to participate in and facilitate the exchange himself rather than to pay someone else

¹⁰⁷ Hasebroek 1965, 9-10.

¹⁰⁸ Hasebroek 1965, 9-10.

to do it. He attempted to return to Athens twice, both times having facilitated large scale transactions by means of the *xenia* he held with foreign kings to gain the favour of the Athenians so as to be reinstated as a citizen. Transactions such as these were typical of both *xenia* and *proxenia* in the Classical period, and Andocides' attempt to use them to facilitate his reinstatement as a citizen demonstrated the level of self-interest that remained from the original institution of *xenia* and pervaded the 'public' *proxenia*. In this instance, by using his pre-existing *xenia* with Archelaus, Andocides established Archelaus as a *proxenos* of Athens, and facilitated a transaction between Archelaus and Athens that fit the paradigm of *proxenia*. Through his private *xenia* connections and subsequent actions, Andocides ensured that the Athenians perceived Archelaus as their benefactor and make him their *proxenos*, something which is supported by a honorary inscription to Archelaus in Athens.

As demonstrated above, *xenia* and *proxenia* were acceptable means through which someone might attempt to generate some kind of benefit for himself (the benefit for Archelaus being the honorary decree, and for Andocides his reinstatement as an Athenian citizen). Yet, it was not the intention of either social institution to further the interests of professional, private, or public traders.¹⁰⁹ Regardless, relationships of *xenia* and *proxenia* no doubt facilitated trading, especially between elite individuals, as well as between elites and *poleis*. With the emergence of commerce and mercantile trade, these institutions became inadequate,. In all likelihood *xenia* still existed as a means for trade between men of equal or similar rank.¹¹⁰ Andocides presents these acts under the guise of benefitting Athens, rather than focusing on the benefit he was doing

¹⁰⁹ Hasebroek 1965, 117.

¹¹⁰ Migeotte 2009, 138, 152-153.

himself, since it must have been clear to him considering civic ideology that a self-interest strategy would be unsuccessful in front of the assembly.

Andocides: Services and *Xenoi*

The exchanges which are of most importance to us appear in his speech to the council titled *On the Return*. In this speech Andocides discusses the procurement of a large shipment of timber, corn, and bronze for an Athenian fleet at Samos, which he facilitated through to his pre-existing *xenia* with the king of Macedon.¹¹¹ By analyzing these services and their contexts, we are able to gauge the role of *xenia* within Ancient Greek economies, and establish the effect of *xenia* on trade mechanisms in Classical Athens.

ἀλλ' αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὖσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας, τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφόντων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελαίου ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὀπόσους ἐβουλόμην. τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν: εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν. (And. 2.11)

Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an inherited *xenos* of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I also supplied corn and bronze.

According to this excerpt, Andocides supplied a substantial amount of timber at a fraction of the usual cost, charging the Athenians only what it cost him to fell it. Andocides made no profit on this particular transaction (And. 2.11-12). Bissa concentrates specifically on the exploitation rights rather than the exportation rights. No scholar seems to believe that Andocides had to pay

¹¹¹ The date of this speech is sometimes contested in scholarship, but most scholars date *On the Return* to around 411-410 BCE.

for the timber itself, and rather paid just for the right to fell the timber.¹¹² It seems as if the cost of the timber was absorbed by Archelaus as part of the *xenia* held between them. Though the exact number is impossible to calculate, using Thucydides we can extrapolate that Andocides furnished enough oars to outfit roughly 82 Athenian triremes stationed at Samos, which would have needed roughly 16,400 (Thuc. 8.79.2). The benefit to Athens must have extended beyond just the procurement of timber itself, and probably included political and trade benefits for the state. It is likely that Athens had other sources through which they could procure timber,¹¹³ corn, and bronze to furnish their triremes. Following New Institutional Economic Theory, the reduction of transaction costs was regularly sought in Classical economies.¹¹⁴ Andocides' use of *xenia* provided exactly that, and allowed channels of trade and exchange to open between the Macedonian king and the Athenian *polis*. Furthermore, by providing the timber to Athens at a lower cost than market price, Andocides successfully reduced typical transaction costs for the Athenians in this particular instance. This may have opened up further channels for trade deals between Athens and Macedon that could have reduced the cost of further transactions between the two states.

The shipment of timber to the Athenian fleet at Samos was not the only service that Andocides provided the Athenian state. Later on in his speech *On the Return*, he also references a large shipment of grain which he procured for Athens from Cyprus, again through his pre-existing *xenia* with some important Cyprian (And. 2.19-21):

τάδε δὲ νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ
καταπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσιν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ
Κύπρου ἀναχθειςῶν ἥξουσιν ἀθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον. (And 2.21)

¹¹² Bissa 2009, 112-115.

¹¹³ Likely southern Italy, especially before 413 BCE, according to Engen 2010, 76-78.

¹¹⁴ On North's New Institutional Economic Theory, see North 1981 and 1990.

But I now do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn which are already about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the rest of those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive altogether not long afterwards.

Again, Andocides' *xenia* opens channels of diplomacy between Athens and a foreign body. He claimed emphatically that he managed to provide fourteen ships of grain from Cyprus to Athens, with more on the way (And. 2.20-21). Due to the revolt of several allies in the Hellespont region in 411 B.C.E, Athens was in the midst of a grain shortage until the middle of 410 BCE. The danger of a grain shortage disappeared after the Athenian victory at the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE. The victory at Cyzicus reopened the Black Sea to the Athenians after it was blockaded by the Peloponnesians. It seems natural that Andocides would take the first opportunity available to return under democracy at Athens, and having succeeded in obtaining such a large amount of corn from Cyprus would have likely headed to Athens with (or at the same time of) the shipment of grain.¹¹⁵

The blockade at Cyzicus began in September 411 BCE when Abydos and Byzantium revolted against Athens, and Athens lost control of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont. Cyzicus and Chalcedon followed suit. When the Spartan naval forces were concentrated in the north-eastern Aegean in September, the grain route to Athens was seriously endangered. Athens briefly managed to regain the Hellespont after the battle of Cynossema during the same month of September, and was successful off the coast of Abydos shortly afterwards. Yet, the Spartans recovered Cyzicus in early 410 BCE, and held it until they were defeated in the Battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE. It was after the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BCE that Athens managed to regain control of the Propontus, and her grain supply was once again secure.¹¹⁶ Ignoring the context of Andocides' speech, Mitchell dates Evagoras' shipment of grain to Athens at 407 BCE.

¹¹⁵ Rhodes 2006, 65-67; Edwards 1995, 89; Missiou 1992, 25-27.

¹¹⁶ See Rhodes 2006, 65-67; Maidment 1941, 454-455.

He makes this decision based on Evagoras' associations with Conon.¹¹⁷ I disagree with this, considering the context of Andocides' speech taken in conjunction with the political situation at Athens at the time of delivery of *On the Return*. It does not make sense that the grain delivery he discussed would come through some 3 years after he mentioned it to the Athenian people.

Andocides: Dating *On the Return* and Andocides' Services to Athens

Before we are able to determine the significance of either of these exchanges, we must establish the date around which they occurred. This task is particularly difficult, as there are many aspects to take into consideration, scholarly debate regarding the date of the speech itself as well as the services described by Andocides. Firstly, the dating of Andocides' speech is essential in order to put the dates of the services he has undertaken in context. Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to demonstrate that services such as the ones Andocides procured for Athens were indispensable to the Athenian *polis*. We can infer the importance of timber trade services and grain trade services to Athens by looking at two inscriptions that correspond well with the services Andocides procured, and with the locations and persons involved. Whether or not these inscriptions account for, or are direct reference to the services that Andocides procured specifically is extremely difficult to determine. Yet even if the services in the inscriptions are not the ones provided by Andocides, analyzing the inscriptions is still essential, since they provide context for the services such as those that Andocides facilitated, and also demonstrate the

¹¹⁷ Mitchell 1997, 68.

interrelationship of *xenia*, *proxenia*, and trade within Classical Athenian economies, during the period under discussion.

Dating *on the Return* is difficult, but not impossible. Andocides attempted to regain his full citizenship rights three different times. He made his first attempt in 411 BCE under the oligarchy of the Four Hundred that was unsuccessful and resulted in his imprisonment (And. 2.13-16). Andocides' second attempt was at the time when he delivered *On the Return*, which scholars agree cannot have been delivered later than 405 BCE. This speech was seemingly delivered before the Athenian Assembly, or at least to a democratic audience. Scholars have proposed different dates for this speech. Jebb originally suggested that it was delivered in 410 BCE immediately after the democracy was restored, roughly April of 410 BCE. Some scholars argue for a date in late 409 or early 408, and others even date the speech as late as 407 BCE since this would coincide with the recall of Alcibiades.¹¹⁸ I agree that this speech was delivered immediately after the democracy was reinstated, and follow Jebb and others in dating this speech to April of 410 BCE. Most scholars agree that the speech must be dated after the collapse of the oligarchic regime in September 411 BCE and likely at the restoration of the democracy in April 410 BCE (And. 10-16, 26-8). It seems unlikely that Andocides would have attempted to return during the period between September 411 BCE and April 410 BCE, since the Five Thousand were in control, and Andocides was already aware of what kind of reception he would receive from an oligarchy based on his initial attempt to return to Athens. Moreover, Andocides claims that he provided the Athenian fleet at Samos with oar-spars after the Four Hundred had taken over at Athens, Andocides could not have delivered the speech before the oligarchic coup at Athens in 411 BCE. Furthermore, Andocides claims that there had been an estrangement

¹¹⁸ Meiggs and Lewis 1978, p. 278-280.

between the men on service at Samos and the Four Hundred by the time of his trial, which would indicate a full restoration of the democracy (And. 2.14). Most importantly, Andocides argues that this service contributed to a defeat of the Peloponnesians at sea, which most scholars agree is a reference to the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE (And 2.12).¹¹⁹

The first inscription that I analyze is *IG I³ 117* (ML 91), which is important to this study because it indicates a clear relationship between trade based services, economies, and *xenia* in the Classical Athenian world. In this inscription Athens honours Archelaus of Macedon for various services to Athens, including the provision of timber for oars. This decree is extremely difficult to interpret, because a large part of the decree is missing. Nevertheless, scholars have attempted to restore the decree in order to date and understand it. The decree in question was found on the Athenian *acropolis*. It has been studied intensely, resulting in argument within scholarly discourse. The decree runs as follows:

[ἔδοχσεν τεῖ βολεῖ καὶ τοῖι δέμοι· Ἀκα[μα]- 1
 [ντις ἐπρυτάνευε, Φελ]λεὺς [ἐγρ]αμ[μ]άτ[ευ]-
 [ε, Ἀντιγένες ἔρχε, Σιβ]ύρτιο[ς ἐ]πεστά[τε],
 [Ἀλκιβιάδες εἶπε· ἐς τ]ὲν πο[ίε]σιν τῶν [νε]-

(...)

... .. [ἔδ]-
 [οχσεν τοῖι δέμοι· ἐπειδὲ δὲ Ἀρχέλας καὶ] 25
 [νῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖι πρόσθεν χρ]ό[ν]οι ἐσ[τὶν ἀν]-
 [ἔρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ Ἀθηναί]ος τὸς τε ἐκπ[λεῦ]-
 [σαντας ναυπεγὸς ἀνέλ]αβεν καὶ ἐς τὸ [...]-
 [... 18] ἀπέπεμφσεν κα[ὶ] 30
 [... 18]ο στρατόπεδον κ-
 [αὶ ἔδοκεν αὐτοῖς χσύλ]α καὶ κοπέας καὶ
 [ἄλλα ἡ ὅσον ἐδέοντο παρ'] αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ, ἐπα-
 [ινέσαι Ἀρχέλαι ἡ ὅς ὄν]τι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθοῖ
 [καὶ προθύμοι ποιῆν ἡ ὅ τ]ι δύνανται ἀγαθ-

¹¹⁹ See Edwards 1995, 89; Missiou 1992, 25-27; MacDowell 1962, 5-6; Maidment 1941, 455-457.

[όν, καὶ ἀνθ' ὃν εὐεργέτεκ]εν τέν τε πόλιν
[καὶ τὸν δεῖμον τὸν Ἀθηναί]ον ἀναγράφσα- 35
[ι αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας προχσένο]ς καὶ ε[ὕερ]-
[γέτας ἐμ πόλει ἐστέλει λιθίνει] ...

[Resolved by the Boule and] the people, Aka[ma]- 1
[ntis held the prytany, Phel]leus was secretar-
y [Antigenes was archon, Sib]yrtio[s] presided
[Alcibiades made the motion. For the construction of]

(...)

... ... [what has been decreed]
[by the people. Since Archelaus is]
[now and in former] times has been 25
[a good man to the Atheni]ans, for the
[shipwrights who sailed out he has rec]eived and to the [..]
[....18....] has sent (them?) off, and
[....18....] encampment,
[and he has given them timber] and oars and 30
[and all other things they required of] him, of good quality,
[Archelaus shall be commended being] a good man
[and zealous to do] whatever good he is able,
[and in return for his benefactions] to the city
[and the people of the Athenians], 35
[he and his sons] shall be inscribed
[as proxeno]i and e[uergetai]
[on the *Akropolis* on a stone stele] ...

The debate surrounding this decree is especially concerned with the dating of the decree and the services discussed within it. Due to the mentions of oars at line 30, and Macedon at line 15, the restoration of Archelaus at line 32 as the recipient of the decree is not contested. Archelaus did not ascend to the Macedonian throne until the period of 414-410 BCE when King Perdiccas died. Scholars agree on much, but there is debate surrounding the content of the decree and its effect on the dating of the services mentioned. The two proposed dates of this decree are 411/410 BCE and 407/406 BCE. The dating of 411-410 BCE was largely accepted in *IG I²* on account of

Wilhelm's restoration of Theopompus as the archon in line 3. This restoration is entirely dependent on the hypothetical restoration of Pydna at line 28, which associates the decree with the operations of Theramenes in 411-410 BCE. In response, certain scholars have argued for a date of 407/406 BCE on the basis of: the full restoration of democracy at Athens by the time of this decree,¹²⁰ and because Akamantis (mentioned in line 1) was not the Prytanis at the end of 411/410 BCE, when the democracy was have been restored. Meiggs and Lewis chose to follow Merritt in his restoration of Antigenes as archon in line 3, rather than Theopompus, which puts the dating of the decree to 407/406 BCE.

Regardless, the most important element of the decree for my purposes is the fact that Athens honoured Archelaus for these services with *proxenia*.¹²¹ Many services are mentioned in this decree, and the specific discussion of the provision of oars demonstrates that services such as the ones Andocides' provided Athens on account of his *xenia* with the Macedonian king were clearly appreciated and were often rewarded by Athens with similar decrees of benefaction. There are 34 decrees in which Athens honoured men for trade-related services down to 307 BCE, and 11 of those 34 are grants of *proxenia*. Out of the remaining 23 decrees, 10 are too fragmentary to determine whether or not *proxenia* is among the honours listed. 12 of the remaining 13 decrees received grants such as citizenship, or had already received a grant of *proxenia*. The remaining decree is the only one of which we know that did not grant either *proxenia* or mention *euergesia*, and is therefore problematic.¹²² *IG I³ 117* demonstrates the formal role of *xenia* within the official institutional position of *proxenia*, and allows for the establishment of a formal relationship between not only *xenia* and trade, in its informal context,

¹²⁰ The phrase [ἔδοχσεν τῆ βολεῖ καὶ τοῖ δέμοι at line 1 indicates the full restoration of the democracy. See Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 278-280.

¹²¹ Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 278-280 for a full description and analysis of *IG I³ 117*.

¹²² Engen 2010, 149.

but also between *proxenia* and trade in a formal, politically institutionalized context. Such decrees demonstrate that large scale trade services occurred for Athens through foreign benefactions which were rewarded with the recognition and establishment of an official *proxenia* relationship

This interpretation is corroborated by the existence of a similar decree for Evagoras of Salamis, from whom Andocides most likely procured the large shipment of grain for Athens from Cyprus mentioned in Andocides' speech *On the Return* (2.11). Much like the previous decree discussed, *IG I³ 113* is difficult to interpret, since much of it is missing:

[Εὐαγόρα 26. Σα]λαμινί
 [. 33.]ο ἄγγελοι ν
 [ἔδοχσεν τεῖ βολεῖ καὶ τοῖ δέμοι· . . . εἰς ἐπ]ρυτάνευε,
 [— — — ἐγραμμάτευε, — — — ἐπεστάτε, Φρ]ασιδεμ[.]
 [. 36.] [. . .]
 5
 [. 35.] [. . 5. .]
 [. 35.] αὐτ[. . .
 .]
 [. 33.] σγραφσα[. . .]
 [. 33.] εν ἡ έντινα
 [. 29. εὐερ]γέτεν Ἀθεν-
 10
 [αἰον 24. τὸν ἀφ]ικνόμενον
 [. . . . 9. . . . ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ αὐτῷ τέν τε βο]λὲν τὲν αἰε-
 [ἰ βολεύοσαν καὶ τὸς πρυτάνες καὶ τὸς στρ]ατεγὸς ἡ ὄπ-
 [ος ἂν μὲ ἀδικεῖται 14. μεδὲ] ἡ υφ' ἑνός. περ-
 [ἰ δὲ 29.] ἄλλο δέεται
 15
 [. 30. κ]αὶ βασιλεῖ ἡ ο
 [. 30. ε]ῦνοίας καὶ πι-
 [. 32.] δῶναι ἀγενα
 [. 32.] δὲ Σαλαμινι
 [. 32.] ἐνθένδε λει-
 20
 [. 34.]ς ἡ ὅπος ἂν
 [. 35.]ι τὰς δίκ-
 [ας 32. χ]συμβολα
 [. 36.]αρχοσε

[. 38.]σ[. . .]
25
[. 34.]ε[. . . 7. . .]
[. 14. τὸν γραμματέα τεξ] βο[λ]εξ ἐν σ[τέλει]
[λιθίνει καταθεῖναι ἐμ πόλει . . 6. . .]ογ[. .]ετο[. .] ἡ ε[. .]
[. 28. ε]ῦ πο[ι]εῖν Ε[ὐ]αγόρα[α]-
[. 27. π]ερί π[ο]λλοῦ ποιεῖτ[α]-
30
[ι 27.]ο μεχρι ἀνδρῶν [. . .]
[. 27. ἐ]ς ἡ ἀύριον. Κλεο[. . .]-
[. εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τεῖ βολεῖ]ι, ἐπειδὲ δὲ ἐστ[ι]ν]
[. 20. Εὐαγόρα]ς ἡ ο Σαλα[μ]ίνιο[ς . . .]
[. 24. ἡ ὁ τ]ι δύναται ἀγαθὸ[ν τ]-
35
[ὸν δεῖμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βασι]λέα καὶ τὸς ἄλλ[ο]ς χ]-
[συμμάχος 14. ἡ ὅπος] ἂν πλεῖστοι φ[.]
[. . . 5. . . τοῖ δέμοι τοῖ Ἀθηναίων κ]αὶ βασιλεῖ κα[ὶ τοῖ]-
[ς ἄλλοις χ]συμμάχοις . . . 7. . . Τις]σαφρένεν ἡ ο[. . . 5. . .]
[. 24. Εὐα]γόρα καθάπ[ερ]
40
[. 26. ἡ]ο δεῖμος περι[. . . 5. . .]
[. 27.] πρᾶχσαι ἡ αλ[. . . 5. . .]
[. 27.]ς καὶ τὸς στρ[ατεγὸ]-
[ς 27.] ἂν ταῦτα γε[. . . 5. . .]
[. 28.] λοιπὸν τομ[. . . 5. . .]
45
[. 27. κ]αὶ περὶ ἡ ο[ν . . . 5. . .]
[. 28.]ας Χίας
[. . . 8. . . .]
[. 29.]ο καθά[περ . . . 5. . .]
[. 27. πρ]υτανε[. . . 8. . . .]
(IG I³ 113)

It is impossible to provide a proper translation for this decree, since so little of the decree is preserved. It is typically dated to 410/409 BCE, and is thought by most scholars to contain the grant of citizenship to Evagoras by Athens (inter alia).¹²³ Such grants of citizenship are rarer versions of Athenian honorary decrees and were usually granted to people who had previously received other honours and it has been suggested that Evagoras may have already been a

¹²³ Engen 2010, 149.

proxenos at the time Athens' granted him this decree.¹²⁴ He is honoured here for the services he provided to 'Athens, the king, and other allies' (lines 35-37). If we take this in conjunction with the mention of Tissaphernes at line 39, it seems likely that Evagoras was granted this decree on account of (unnamed) services that he provided to the Athenian state. Unfortunately we do not know exactly the nature of these services. Both Isocrates and Demosthenes attest even before Evagoras regained his kingship in Salamis that he had been a friend and benefactor to the Athenian state (Isoc. 9.54; Dem. 12.10). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated by Engen that foreigners who received Athenian citizenship were (in most cases) already *proxenoi* before they were granted their citizenship. There are 34 decrees similar to the previous inscription (*IG I³ 117*). 12 of these 34 decrees for trade related services from the Classical period grant citizenship, and Engen counts this decree for Evagoras (*IG I³ 113*) as one of these 34 trade-related decrees.¹²⁵ Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what services Evagoras provided to Athens that resulted in this decree, but line 9 clearly indicates that Evagoras provided something to Athens. The decree states "Evagoras treated the Athenians well" (εἰς πρ[ο]ξεν[ί]αν Ε[ὐ]αγόρ[α]) at line 29, and "did well with respect to Athens, the king, and other allies" ([. 24. ἡ ὀ τ]ι δύναται ἀγαθὸ[ν τ]-[ὸν δεῖμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βασι]λέα καὶ τὸς ἄλλ[ο]ς χ]-[συμμάχος] at lines 35-37, which is the basis for being an *euergetes* to Athens. Thanks to extensive work done by Osborne, Walbank, as well as Engen,¹²⁶ it is possible that the services provided were in some part trade related. The most likely trade-related service provided was related to the grain trade, since Salamis was an *entre-pot* for

¹²⁴ Engen 2010, 149; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 50-53; Walbank 2007, 137.

¹²⁵ Engen 2010, 120, 149.

¹²⁶ See Osborne 1972, and Engen 2010 for larger discussion on the nature of honorary decrees. See especially work by Walbank on Athenian *proxenia* decrees, including Walbank 1978 and 1985.

Egyptian grain, serving as a port for the export of grain from Egypt throughout Greece.¹²⁷ A grain related trade service can be demonstrated by Andocides' speech. He discusses Athenian concerns over hearing that they would not be receiving any grain from Cyprus (And. 2.21). Once again, there is no evidence that allows us to determine for what services Evagoras received his initial honorific decree and grant of citizenship outside of the general realm of trade related services. The argument for grain-trade related services can be made through the study of historical context and circumstance. We are able to learn the importance from this inscription that Athens placed on trade related services, especially during the Peloponnesian War. Citizenship was granted least of all honours at Athens, only being granted for particularly significant services to the states, and only given out (regarding trade-related services) for pure benefactions. Athens did not grant citizenship lightly, and did not honour individuals with citizenship for providing trade related services at lower prices than usual. A grant of citizenship required pre-existing *proxenia* ties.¹²⁸ Once again, this inscription illustrates the connection between *proxenia* (and similar institutions) and trade mechanisms in Athenian economies.

In relation to the passage in question from Andocides' speech (2.19-21), we are able to see a multi-faceted relationship between *xenia*, *proxenia*, and Athenian trade within Classical economies. Andocides is able to procure a substantial service through his *xenia* with Evagoras. Unfortunately, the secrecy of this procurement of grain from Cyprus, Andocides does not directly mention Evagoras by name in the same manner that he mentions Archelaus, nor does he mention any kind of *xenia* in this situation, since it would disrupt the secretive nature of the service he has undertaken (And. 2.19-21). Yet, there is sufficient evidence for a *xenia*-based

¹²⁷ Moreno 2007, 254-256.

¹²⁸ Engen 2010, 149.

relationship between Andocides and Evagoras from both Andocides and Lysias, who claim Andocides had several *xenia*-based relationships with kings and tyrants in multiple foreign locations (And. 1.145; Lys. 6.48). Furthermore, Andocides spent a large portion of his exile in Cyprus, and was eventually granted a plot of land near Salamis (Plut. *And.* 834E-F).¹²⁹ It is likely that Andocides had important or influential *xenoi* in Cyprus, since he spent so much of his exile there, and was able to procure such a large shipment of grain for Athens from Cyprus.

The date of Andocides' grain deliveries and the date of his speech, *On the Return*, are difficult to determine, but neither could have happened after the summer of 410 BCE.¹³⁰ The Athenian victory at Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE was the catalyst for the reopening of the Hellespont in the summer of 410 BCE. So if the import happened after this, it would not have been as beneficial as Andocides makes it appear. The main grain route from the Black Sea had been blocked off, and Athens was desperate for grain. Andocides was able to procure grain from an alternative source and import it into Athens (And. 2.11). If the Hellespont had been open at the time that Andocides procured the grain from Cyprus, his actions would not have been nearly as beneficial to Athens as they would have been with the Hellespont still inaccessible.

MacDowell argues that it cannot be the case that the Hellespont was still inaccessible, since Andocides returned during the democracy: the opening of the Hellespont and the reinstatement of the democracy happened after the battle of Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE, i.e. at the same time.¹³¹ Even if this is the case, and the Hellespont was open, such context does not diminish the significance of Andocides' procurement of such a large shipment of grain for the Athenian *polis*.

¹²⁹ “from which ritualized guest-friendships and friendships with many kings and cities arouse, and from which others have become personal guest-friends,” (And. 1.145). “But with all his wealth, and the power of his possessions, the accepted guest of kings and despots,” (Lys. 6.48). Edwards 1995, 1-2; Missiou 1992, 15-25; MacDowell 1962, 1-6.

¹³⁰ MacDowell 1962, 5, note 9.

¹³¹ MacDowell 1962, 5-6.

Grain was in high demand in Athens at all times, and especially during the Classical period (the Classical period will be further discussed in chapter 4). These inscriptions (*IG I³ 113 and 117*) demonstrate the close relationship between honorific decrees, especially *proxenia*, and their roles within Athenian trade services and Classical economies. In order to understand the function of *xenia* within Classical economies, it is necessary to understand the various facets of *xenia* as a social institution in both its informal and formal forms in Athenian society. In understanding how both forms of *xenia* (*xenia* and *proxenia*) function in conjunction as well as separately, we can formulate a paradigm for the role of *xenia* and *proxenia* within Classical Athenian economies and trade mechanisms. Full explorations of both the grain trade at Athens and the timber trade at Athens will follow, specifically focusing on the services that Andocides procured through his *xenia* with Archelaus and Evagoras, in relation to the specific mechanisms of the grain trade and the timber trade in Classical Athenian economies.

Chapter 4: The Athenian Grain Trade

Athenian Grain Trade: The Significance of Grain at Athens

To better understand the role of *xenia* in Classical Athenian economies, I will first try to gauge the significance of Andocides' contribution to the grain trade by looking at Athenian grain trade as a whole. The organization of the grain trade at Athens is complicated, and demonstrated the enormous importance of grain for Athens. According to Aristotle, Athens had ten *agoranomoi* (magistrates in charge of supervision of the markets) who were elected by lot. Five of these presided over the *polis* itself, and five presided over the Piraeus, and were charged with supervising the goods that came into Athens, and ensured that the goods were pure and unadulterated. Furthermore, there were ten *metronomoi*, five for the *polis* itself and five for the Piraeus, who were the inspectors of weights and measures. Most important for the Athenian grain trade were the *sitophylakes*. These were the commissioners in charge of the grain supply at Athens, and of a number of things directly related to grain at Athens. The *sitophylakes* ensured there was no malpractice in the selling of grain on the market, as well as ensured that milled barley and un-milled barley were sold at prices proportionate to one another. There were originally ten *sitophylakes*, five for the *polis* and five for the Piraeus, but these numbers grew to twenty and fifteen respectively. Furthermore, they ensured that baked bread was sold at a price proportionate to wheat, and that it contained the full measure of wheat required by law. Finally, they were in charge of ensuring that two-thirds of corn imported into Athens was brought into

the *polis*-proper (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51). The grain trade at Athens was further regulated, which was expressed in both Archaic and Classical period legislation. Some Athenian grain trade laws include the ban on grain exportation (Plut. *Sol.* 24) and the imposed purchase limitation of 50 *phormoi* (baskets) of grain at a time (Lys. 22.6). Furthermore, it was a capital offence for Athenian residents to export, import, or ship grain to any harbour besides the Piraeus (Dem. 34.37, 35.50; Lycurgus 1.27), or to provide maritime loans on any shipments of grain unless the ship was under contract to return to the Piraeus (Dem. 35.51, 56.6, 56.11).¹³²

Grain could come into Athens in myriad ways; typically through importation from colonies, or from other states. Areas such as the Black Sea and Egypt were large exporters of grain to Athens. Other sources of grain included taxes that were payable in grain, specifically the Athenian grain tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in 374/373 BCE which dictated an 8 and 1/3 tax on grain production on the islands to be paid to Athens in grain. Otherwise, Athens offered incentives to traders to bring their shipments of grain into the Piraeus. Such incentives included the reduction of taxes, and the extension of rights to traders who remained in Athens for extended periods of time. Once the grain made it into Athens, it was typically held in the *Deigma* for local merchants to inspect and purchase from the importers or farmers, and eventually made its way into the agora for sale to the public. When Athens found herself in a grain shortage or food crisis, money could be pulled from the *sitionia*, which was a fund set up for the purchase of public grain, and used to purchase grain from allies or colonies.¹³³

Andocides mentioned the procurement of a large shipment of grain for Athens from Cyprus. This particular service is significant, because it demonstrates the effect of *xenia* on trade

¹³² Bissa 2009, 177.

¹³³ See Bissa 2009, 155-167, 177-183; Hopper 1979, 52-53, 71; See Moreno 2007 on grain at Athens in general.

mechanisms at Athens, and indicates that *xenia* does have an effect on Classical Athenian economies.

τάδε δὲ νυνὶ βούλομαι ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι αἱ μέλλουσαι νῆες ἤδη σιταγωγοὶ καταπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ εἰσὶν ὑμῖν τέτταρες καὶ δέκα, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχθεισῶν ἥξουσιν ἀθρόαι οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον. (And 2.21)

But I now do want you to know this, that the ships conveying corn which are already about to put in to the Piraeus for you are fourteen in number, and the rest of those that sailed from Cyprus will arrive altogether not long afterwards.
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This particular passage from Andocides demonstrates that large-scale trade ventures was easily undertaken through personal channels. But what does this mean for the role of *xenia* in Classical economies and Athenian trade? Taking this in conjunction with the previous discussion in Chapter 3 about Andocides' relationship with Evagoras of Cyprus, we can begin to visualize a paradigm for the functionality of *xenia* within the realms of Classical Athenian economies and the mechanisms of Athenian trade. In order to determine the extent and effect of Andocides' *xenia* with leading men in Cyprus and gift of grain to Athens, it is necessary to explore and understand the nature of the Athenian grain trade and its role in Athens' overall economies. Fundamentally, the questions that we must consider are what are the mechanisms of the Athenian grain trade, and how do we consider these in conjunction with Andocides' gift and the nature of Athenian economies? The Athenian grain trade is a complicated, multifaceted system involving internal and external grain supplies.¹³⁵ It was often a primary concern of Athenian politics and diplomacy, in the Classical period and especially during the Peloponnesian War.

¹³⁴ It is clear from this passage that the date of delivery of this speech coincides with Andocides' delivery of grain from Cyprus. Both events occurred most likely in April 410 BCE. See also Chapter 3.4 above.

¹³⁵ Internal and external meaning produced inside of Attica and outside of Attica, respectively.

Athens was not capable of feeding her population on internally grown grain, and was dependant on external sources for maintaining her citizens. Politically and diplomatically Athens was focused on ensuring a substantial and consistent flow of grain into the *polis* through significant treaties and trade arrangements with merchants and foreign states. She had civil servants devoted to maintaining the honesty and success of her grain trade, and managed public grain resources in case of any blockades or grain shortages. Many of our primary sources demonstrate Athens' overwhelming political focus on grain, and its overall importance to the political and economic functions of the *polis*. There are many extant political speeches regarding grain trade and foreign relations between Athens and her grain suppliers, and many honorific inscriptions dedicated to suppliers, benefactors, and political *proxenoi* who have provided Athens with gifts of grain, or provided it at distinctly lower than market price.¹³⁶ It is necessary to explore the grain trade as a whole, as well as the political climate of Athens in the Classical period to understand the economic ramifications of Andocides' *xenia* with Evagoras of Cyprus, and to see the effect of *xenia* on ancient Greek economies in general.

The grain production in Athens was complicated, and was highly influenced by both rural and urban areas, as well as consumption. In the late seventh century BCE Greece was rapidly expanding, both politically and economically. Greece was still provincial compared to Assyria and Egypt, but there were now new opportunities for people to sell and purchase goods at both internal and external markets. There was plenty of trade happening between Greek *poleis* and countries to both the East and West, as well as within Greece, although the economic advantage of one Greek region over another Greek region was much smaller: amphora distribution indicates that Athens had an advantage in oil and wine, and Corinth was the dominant power in ceramics,

¹³⁶ Bissa 2009, p. 155-167, 177-183; Hopper 1979, p. 52-53, 71; See Moreno 2007 on grain at Athens in general.

and there were always open markets within Greece for grain. There was only a small quantity of goods being mobilized in this way, since at least 80% of all production was consumed by the primary producer, and no more than 2% of all product was transported more than a few dozen miles. The generalizations in our primary sources indicate that trade was dangerous and was only pursued by men who were ready to take risks: Hesiod presents the various dangers of sailing to his brother Persse, and argues that a rational man would only pursue *credos* (“gain”) overseas out of desperation, hunger, or debt (Hes. *O* 618-94, especially 628-9, 646-7), and it is quite likely that most Greeks remained at home.¹³⁷

The four property classes put in place by Solon in 594 BCE indicate that the most profitable means to satisfy a desire for gain was to market agricultural produce, specifically barley or wheat.¹³⁸ Agricultural goods accounted for the bulk of trade until other industries further developed in the late Archaic and early Classical periods during certain points in a family life-cycle, farmers might have produced beyond their actual needs, allowing them to market their surplus with little risk. There is evidence, however, it was less common, because it would have risked survival in many cases to grow specialized crops for the market and depend on barter or trade for survival staples. An Athenian needed to be quite wealthy in order to produce grain on a scale larger than the average family farm was capable of producing, and to afford the risks of large scale trade endeavours. The prosperity of a farmer or landholder was dependant on his circumstance: his skill, the skill of his labourers, weather, and market prices. Furthermore, farming was a difficult enterprise to break into, especially in the Classical period. During the

¹³⁷ Morris 2002, 31-32

¹³⁸ Morris 2002, 33; See Moreno 2003 on the specificity of Solon’s 500-measure-men (pentecontio *medimnoi*) as reference to measures of grain; Solon’s language, as well as the language of the Grain Tax Law from 374/373 BCE indicates that the measure men were distinguished specifically by the amount of grain measures they produced, not measures of oil or wine.

early 6th century, as Aristotle notes, all the land was in the hands of the few, who experienced serious labour constraints that made fully utilising their land difficult.¹³⁹ Xenophon makes a similar point in his *Oeconomicus*, he illustrated that not all arable land was used for cultivation, or was cultivated properly when it was in use, since both Ischomachus and his father had made a profit from the purchase of and improvement of misused and improperly cultivated arable land (Xen. *Oec.* 1.20.22-26).

Labour in the Archaic period was problematic on account of the nature of free rural labour as non-homogenous. Farmers who have enough land to sustain themselves and their families will work it themselves, rather than sell their own labour power on the market for a living. Maintaining independence was a key concern for any farmer, especially on economic foundations after Solon abolished debt-bondage in the Archaic period. A family farm provided a measure of security against poverty, starvation, unemployment, and even old-age, and also provided inherited security for descendants. While family owned farms allowed for a certain level of security, families could rarely afford to hire and pay labourers, outside of the cost of upkeep for slaves (for some families), or offer enough to tempt desirable workers. A family farm was likely a subsistence only farm, and some wealthier properties would have been as well. Others wealthy properties were cash-crop-producers in their entirety, with profit as the primary concern.¹⁴⁰ The “few” landowners that Aristotle referred to would often invest in some form of coercion in order to compel others to work for them at a much lower price than the ‘free market’ would allow: such coercion appeared in the Archaic period in the forms of debt-bondage, wherein a citizen (and sometimes his family) was enslaved to another citizen as a form of debt

¹³⁹ Morris 2002, 33; Hopper 1979, 153; Gallant 1991, 72-101.

¹⁴⁰ Hopper 1979, 153-155; Morris 2002, 33-35 for a brief discussion of the relationship between free and paid labour in relation to farming.

repayment, as well as in the form of *pelatai* and *hektemoroi*, who would live on the land of a wealthy citizen and pay rent in labour and a 1/6 portion of any harvest.¹⁴¹

Of the grain produced on a given plot of land, whether by a family owned farm, or a larger plot of land owned by a wealthier citizen, a portion would be used to feed the family, landowners, slaves, and also any chattel animals. The grain was also divided if the farmer was expected to contribute a 1/6th portion as rent to the land owner, or if they had to provide their produce as a form of security for any form of debt-bondage. Whatever was left after these commitments was surplus that a farmer or landowner was be able to sell in the market, directly to grain dealers.

Alternately, farmers might even have maintained their own shops to sell any excess produce. There is an example of a property marker (*horos*) that indicates it was set up on a property that included a house, a garden, and a shop. This suggests that the owner grew product in his garden and sold it in his shop, but this seems to be an unusual arrangement (*horoi* 92A).¹⁴² It has been suggested that retailers remained in the agora every day, and that farmers were much more content to sell to them directly rather than go to the market and remain away from their fields for extended periods of time (Pl. *Res* 371 c-d).¹⁴³ There is not much known about farmers and agricultural development, or about organizations that were proxies between the producer and the exporter. Yet temple dedications to Athena on the *Acropolis* indicate that some farmers and land-owners fared well, even if there are only a few dedications that named farming as a trade. It is unlikely that there were fewer farmers than craftsmen or artisans (as the dedications seem to

¹⁴¹ Morris 2002, 35; *hektomorage* is an important concept but it is not essential for our discussion here. See Morris 2002, 35-41 on the function of debt-bondage and *hektoromoi* and their relationship to Athenian economics and agricultural production in the Archaic period.

¹⁴² I use the *horoi* numbers assigned by Finley 1985.

¹⁴³ Harris 2002, 69.

suggest), but rather that more people were named these as their trades since farming was a common employment. A few of these dedications refer to a tithe of land, i.e. a dedication of 10% of land or profit to a god or goddess, which could in some cases account for a type of war tax, or as a means to keep a landowner under the total capital liable to liturgies.¹⁴⁴

The farming process itself is described by Xenophon in his *Oeconomicus*, where Ischomachus is teaching Socrates how to cultivate the greatest quantity of barley and wheat; Hopper uses this point to demonstrate that the emphasis of farming and production was on cereals. The process starts with preparation of the fallow, ploughing the fields in the spring only, and using any weeds before they seed as ‘green manure’; this is followed by turning the soil to bake in the high summer in order to kill the weed roots. Afterwards, the fields are sowed during the autumn rain season, based on the type of soil and type of seeds, and what type of hoeing takes place in the winter season. Finally, Xenophon finishes with advice on reaping, threshing, and winnowing, which are followed by the burning of the standing straw to enrich the soil (Xen. *Oec.* 9.8ff).¹⁴⁵ After farming, a farmer or landowner would likely divvy up his produce based on their needs for consumption at home, for a portion of rent or taxes on their land or product, or for sale in the market or abroad. The largest portion of grain produced in Athens was consumed in Athens, typically by the grain producers themselves, but was nevertheless occasionally sold in the market for consumption by other Athenians.

Athens was so dependent on grain that they could not export it. This is indicated by the Solonic export ban from the 594 BCE, Athenians were only legally allowed to export olive oil (Plut. *Sol.* 24.2). Grain was an important commodity all over ancient Greece, as demonstrated by a passage from Herodotus in which Xerxes was at Abydus and saw boats sailing down the

¹⁴⁴ Hopper 1979, 153-154.

¹⁴⁵ Hopper 1979, 153-156

Hellespont with cargoes of food from the Black sea for Aegina and the Peloponnese (Hdt. 7.147.2). The nobles with Xerxes learned that they were enemy vessels, and prepared to seize them; however Xerxes learned where the ships were headed and that they were filled with grain, and decided to let them sail on to their ultimate destination (Hdt. 7. 147.2). He claimed there was no harm in allowing the ships to carry the grain for them, since they themselves were heading to the same destination and would be in need of grain upon their arrival (Hdt. 7.147.2).¹⁴⁶ Grain was an important resource for smaller cities as well, including Teos, where a law was instituted between 475-470 BCE that forbade people from preventing grain imports or from re-exporting previously imported grain by the death penalty (Tod II.30).¹⁴⁷ Thucydides as well is an important source regarding the large scale of grain trade throughout the ancient Mediterranean: he discusses an embassy of ships sent from Athens to Sicily on account of a war that had broken out between Syracuse and Leontini.¹⁴⁸ It was on behalf of an inherited alliance with their fellow Ionians that Leontini sent an ambassador to Athens in 427 BCE requesting they send ships to help them. Athens did send ships under this pretense, however Thucydides comments that the real reason that Athens sent ships was to prevent grain from reaching the Peloponnese from Sicily, and to attempt to take control of the Sicilian region (Thuc. 3.86.4).¹⁴⁹ Clearly grain was an extremely important resource for the whole Mediterranean. Yet we must focus our considerations on Athens alone in order to determine the significance of Andocides' *xenia*-based gift of grain to Athens from his connections in Cyprus.

¹⁴⁶ Reed 2007, 16 fn. 6.

¹⁴⁷ Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 97

¹⁴⁸ Reed 2007, 16-17

¹⁴⁹ Reed 2007, 16-17

Athenian Grain Trade: Grain Production vs. Consumption

The grain trade was extremely prominent throughout the Classical Greek world, and Athens demonstrated a particularly unique large-scale dependence on grain imports that was not seen anywhere else in the Classical Mediterranean. Demosthenes calculated how much grain was imported to Athens from the Bosphorus over a one year period in order to emphasize the importance of the Bosphoran king Leucon's role in the Athenian trade. According to his calculations roughly 400,000 bushels of grain were exported from the Bosphorus to Athens with exemption from the typical toll of 1/30th for the exporters.¹⁵⁰ On account of this toll, Leucon was able to make a gift to Athens of 10,000 bushels of grain for every 300,000 exported to Athens, and a present of roughly 3,000 for the remaining 100,000. By exempting Athens from the 1/30th toll, Athens was able to purchase 1/30th more grain than they would have otherwise. As such, Leucon was making a small (but nevertheless significant) benefaction to Athens, essentially allowing the Athenians to pay less for more grain. Furthermore, Leucon opened up a second port at Theudisia, granting Athenian exporters the same exemption to the typical export toll. Demosthenes also notes that Leucon provided enough grain during a shortage that Callisthenes had a surplus of 15 talents of silver to dispose of (Dem. 20.31-33).¹⁵¹

In another speech, Demosthenes quotes a law that forbids any Athenian to transport grain to any harbour that was not Athenian. It was unlawful for any Athenian, metic resident of Athens, or anyone over whom either of them had control, to contribute or provide any size of

¹⁵⁰ A tax of 1/30th of the value of the total export load. If a tradesman is exporting 300,000 bushels of grain, their toll is the value of 10,000 bushels, 1/30th of the whole load.

¹⁵¹ Callisthenes was a *sitonos*, or food controller, who was able to use Leucon's supply to not only meet the Athenian consumption needs, but also had enough left over in order to sell the surplus and make a profit of 15 talents of silver for the treasury, i.e. more money to purchase public grain.

maritime loan on any vessel that was not going to bring their load back to Athens. If a man were to lend out money on a maritime trade venture contrary to this law, information and an account of the money would be laid before the harbour masters, as well as in regard to the ship and the product. If anyone lent money on a maritime trade venture that was not set to return to Athens, he would not be able to bring any action or suit to trial for the money lent on the voyage, if it was not returned to him (Dem. 35.51).¹⁵²

There is evidence in the speeches of other orators as well regarding the importance of grain to Athens and grain shortages. Lysias' speech, *Against the Grain Dealers*, was against the grain sellers in the market, accusing them of stockpiling grain and overcharging the population for their stores. This type of speculation was not technically illegal, but there was a law in place which forbade retailers to purchase more than fifty baskets of grain at a time, and it was under this law that Lysias was bringing forth charges. Lysias demonstrated that the grain sellers were lying about their reasons for purchasing large amounts of grain: they claimed to have done so for the benefit of the city (i.e. to sell it at a reasonable price). Yet, Lysias claims that they were selling the grain at a profit of a drachma several times in the same day, as if they were buying up the grain a *medimnos* at a time. The grain sellers bought up such significant amounts of grain that they were able to overcharge for it in the market, since it seemed to the public that there was less grain for sale than they believed. By buying up such large quantities of grain, the grain sellers were attempting to create a grain shortage themselves, as a means of increasing personal profit. Since less grain was available to purchase in the market, they were able to overcharge for their stores, even though there were still sufficient amounts of grain. This way they made several drachma more than usual in a day (Lys. 22.11-17).

¹⁵² Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 95.

Other primary sources, especially inscriptions, indicate similar findings. Athens is extremely dependant on grain imports in order to sustain her population. These appear often as decrees set up to honour foreign merchants for providing grain as a gift, or even charging for grain at a price lower than current market value. There are instances of these all across the Mediterranean in the Classical period. An inscription at Ephesus, for instance, praises a Rhodian merchant for selling grain at a low price and rewarded him with Athenian citizenship: Agathocles of Rhodes was importing roughly 14,000 *hekteis* of grain to Athens, and discovered that grain was being sold in the agora for more than six drachmae. Persuaded by the *agoranomos*¹⁵³ Agathocles sold all of his grain more cheaply than it was being sold in the agora, since he knew that he would likely be rewarded for doing this favour to the Athenian people (SIG³ 354).¹⁵⁴ Heraclides of Salamis also sold a shipment of grain at a reduced price during a particularly severe food crisis in Athens during 330-329 BCE, as noted in the inscription of a *proxenia* proposal that was initiated by Demosthenes. Heraclides sold Athens 3,000 *medimnoi* of wheat at a price of 5 drachmae per measure, and also gave 3,000 drachmae as a gift to the Athenian *sitonia*.¹⁵⁵ On account of these benefactions, Heraclides was granted the titles *proxenos* and *euergetes* to Athens, which allowed him and his descendants to own land and houses in Athens; it also subjected them to the limits of the law, and granted them the right to perform military services and pay the *eisphora* (mandatory citizen taxes): essentially, this decree granted Heraclides and his descendants citizenship at Athens (SIG³ 304).¹⁵⁶ Other inscriptions provide even more quantitative numbers that help us contextualize the degree to which Athens relied on

¹⁵³ The *agoranomos* was a magistrate charged with supervision of the agora, including handling imports and exports and ensuring everything met Athenian standards; see Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 97.

¹⁵⁴ Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 96-97.

¹⁵⁵ The *sitonia* was a treasury at Athens used specifically for the purchase of grain in times of shortage.

¹⁵⁶ Reed 2003, 84, 128; Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 42.

grain imports from other cities: one list from Cyrene that dates between 331-324 BCE shows how much grain it gave to various Greek cities during a particular grain-shortage across the ancient Mediterranean. Athens is listed at the very beginning of this inscription, with 100,000 measures of grain having been given to Athens by Cyrene. This is the largest amount of grain listed on this inscription, accounting for roughly 1/8 of the 775,000 measures that Cyrene provided to a total of 53 different *poleis* and areas in Greece (Tod II.196).¹⁵⁷

Such sources demonstrate not only the dependence of Athens on imported grain, but also the quantity of grain necessary to import in order to properly support the Athenian population. Athens did still produce a portion of their own grain supply, however it was clearly an insufficient amount for their population. The quintessential source for evidence on Athenian grain production in the fourth century is an inscription from 329-328 BCE which identifies the offerings of first fruits made at the sanctuary of Eleusis in honour of Demeter and Kore (*IG II²* 1672). The inscription lists the various offerings made by Athenian tribes, as well as the offers by all the territories which were controlled by Athens. This list includes Drymos, Oropos, Salamis, Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros. Alain Bresson utilises this information to calculate the amounts of domestic and foreign Athenian grain and barley production. In determining the production amounts for Athens and its controlled territories, Bresson is able to extrapolate how much grain Athens needed to import from foreign territories. Building on Garnsey and other sources,¹⁵⁸ Bresson determines that, since the *aparchai* represents only a small fraction of the harvest, the fruits of barley were based on a rate of 1/600, and the fruits of wheat were based on a

¹⁵⁷ Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 97.

¹⁵⁸ Garnsey 1988, 88, table 5.

rate of 1/1200.¹⁵⁹ The following table illustrates Bresson's calculations of internal and external grain production for Attica, as per the inscription *IG II² 1672* found at Eleusis:¹⁶⁰

Table 1: Internal and External Grain Production Totals¹⁶¹

Area	Barley Product in Medimnoi	Percent of Barley Product	Wheat Product in Medimnoi	Percent of Wheat Product	Total Grain Product in Medimnoi	Total Grain Product in Quintals	Percent of Total Grain Product
Total Attica	339,925	50%	27,062.5	18%	366,987.5	100,1699.125	44%
Total External	340,475	50%	120,375	82%	460,850	129,244	56%
Total General	680,400	100%	147,437.5	100%	827,837.5	229,413	100%

These figures are exceptionally precise for both Greek and Roman antiquity, and are essentially unique. Therefore we have no means of comparison to determine whether this harvest was good, average, or poor; Bresson uses some statistics from a harvest in 1911 as a means of comparison in order to help determine the nature of the harvest. The area of cultivation in Attica in 1911 measured roughly 49,500 hectares (roughly 500 km²), a little more than 1/5th of the whole territory of ancient Attica (21% of 24,000 km²). In 1911, the region of ancient Attica produced 124,129 quintals of grain, the 16,000 hectares of land devoted to grain cultivation (13,000 hectares for wheat, and 3,000 hectares for barley), which averages out to roughly 7.75 quintals of

¹⁵⁹ Bresson 2016, 406; Garnsey 1988, 98-106, and 1998, 201-213.

¹⁶⁰ Bresson 2016, 405-409; There is some question regarding the accuracy of the numbers provided, since peasants tend to under-declare their harvests, and administrators and political officials tend to inflate their figures, Bresson argues that this is, nevertheless, an accurate depiction of grain production in Attica and its territories. Moreno includes similar calculations in his 2007 monograph, *Feeding the Democracy*. He does not consider the decree at Eleusis significant.

¹⁶¹ Bresson 2016, 406-407, Table 14.1, 14.2.; I have chosen to follow Bresson's units of measurements, with a quintal measuring 100 kilograms; the weight of a *medimnos* varies depending on the item in question: Bresson lists a *medimnos* of barley at 27 kilograms, and a *medimnos* of wheat at 31 kilograms. See also Stroud 1998, 55.

grain per hectare.¹⁶² Although the number appears low, we must be aware of differing units of weight for grain measurement, as a modern hectoliter of wheat is heavier than its ancient counterpart by 17-22 kg: a modern hectoliter of wheat weighs between 80-85 kg, and an ancient hectoliter weighed closer to 63 kg, as the grain law of Athens indicated.¹⁶³ These measures, and cross comparison with figures from 1914 and 1921, Bresson concludes that the harvest of grain in 1911 is average, since figures from 1911-1920 reflect similar numbers, only declining after 1918 due to the war between Greece and Turkey.¹⁶⁴ On this basis, Bresson argues that the harvest of 329-328 BCE is in fact a decent harvest, probably not exceptional, but not catastrophic either, which allows him to extrapolate Attica's dependency on foreign sources of imported grain.¹⁶⁵

Hansen proposes a population estimate of 250,000 inhabitants of Athens after 350 BCE. These may have been as high as 330,000 in the fifth century.¹⁶⁶ Following the estimation of roughly 250,000 inhabitants between 340-330 BCE, and Garnsey's speculation of 400,000 *medimnoi* of grain feeding 80,000 persons for an entire year based on the carrying capacity of Attica's soil being 33 persons/km² (that is 5 *medimnoi* a person per year), the grain consumption during that period would have been roughly 1,250,000 *medimnoi* per year.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, based on

¹⁶² Bresson 2016, 407-408; this number appears low by our present criteria, but is realistic given the nature of Mediterranean agriculture before mechanization, furthermore, the proportions of wheat a barley are reversed in 1911 compared to their 329-328 BCE counterparts.

¹⁶³ Bresson 2016, 407; Stroud 1998, 55.

¹⁶⁴ Bresson 2016, 407-408

¹⁶⁵ Other scholars calculate entirely different numbers, yet after much research, Bresson's calculations seem to me to be most accurate. The amount of grain produced by Athens can change drastically depending on what information is used and which sources are consulted. I had originally planned to include far more information on Athenian grain production, however it seems pertinent to only use what is necessary to prove that Athens was absolutely dependant on external grain sources for population sustenance. For more on Athenian grain production, see: Jarde 1925; Garnsey 1988; Moreno 2007; Osborne 1987, 2004; and Sallares 1991.

¹⁶⁶ Hansen 1988, 12; 2006, 56.

¹⁶⁷ Bresson 2016, 409; Moreno 2007, 4; Garnsey 1988, 91-97; See also Auguste Jardé 1925, 43; that is 5 *medimnoi* of grain per person, at 250,000 people, making a total consumption of 1,250,000 *medimnoi* over the period of a year.

the (roughly) 370,000 *medimnoi* of grain produced by Attica and its external possessions in 329-328 BCE, Attica was capable of feeding roughly 30% of its population during that harvest year.¹⁶⁸

Moreno argues differently in his 2007 monograph *Feeding the Democracy*, wherein he states that no figures exist to help us determine how much grain was cultivated, consumed and imported into Athens, since there is no census nor calculations regarding arable land in Attic territory. He suggests that the use of the First-Fruits inscriptions (*IG II² 1672*) is a fragile premise, because the receipts on the inscription cannot be converted into actual production figures without adopting proportions of 1/600th for barley and 1/1200th for wheat, which comes from a separate Eleusinian inscription dating to 416-415 BCE (*IG I³ 78*). The issue, of course, is that it is impossible for us to know if the proportions decreed in 416-415 BCE were still in use as late as 329-328 BCE, and since *IG II² 1672* was superseded before 353-352 BCE by the lost First-Fruits law of Chairemonides it is likely that the proportions of taxation had been adjusted over that near hundred year period. The absence of contextual information for the *IG II² 1672* inscription makes it likely that the receipts do not represent normal production for any given year, and therefore the use of these figures to determine production rates will likely produce incorrect numbers. Moreno simply averages the previous calculations done by Jardé, Garnsey, Sallares, and Osborne, accepting an estimate of roughly 700,000 *medimnoi* of grain produced in Attic territory in a year.¹⁶⁹ Bresson finds this number to be far too high, as it doubles the figures

¹⁶⁸ Bresson 2016, 409; Bresson uses 340,000 *medimnoi* for his calculation, rather than the total 370,000, therefore he calculates 27% of Attica's population could be fed by their own grain supply in 329-328 BCE, however, I am unsure of why he uses this number instead of the total amount of wheat and barley produced by Attica during this period. I have adjusted my calculation accordingly in order to reflect the total number of *medimnoi* in grain (both wheat and barley) that Attica produced in order to determine what percentage of the population it was capable of feeding.

¹⁶⁹ Moreno 2007, 3, 10, 13-14.

that can be derived from the inscription at Eleusis (*IG II² 1672*), and convincingly argues that this figure does not fully reflect the extent to which Attica was dependent on grain imports.¹⁷⁰

A summation of these calculations can be found in nearly every study on the grain trade,¹⁷¹ but there is little agreement among scholars about which ones are correct. Many scholars find the use of such calculations a pointless venture; even Garnsey, to whom these figures have been essential, has stated that “inquiring into yields is like chasing a phantom”. Even if these calculations are an exercise in futility, since it is unlikely that we will ever discover actual quantitative amounts of Athenian grain yields, they nevertheless are a useful exercise which aids in understanding the extent to which Athens was actually dependant on grain imports.

There are, of course, other variables that determine Athenian dependence on grain imports and affect yield quantities. The issue of urbanism was raised by Garnsey,¹⁷² but he left the question unanswered: Whitby argues that Athenian farmers were largely too concerned with self-sufficiency to truly consider this concept.¹⁷³ The lack of concern with conurbation is demonstrated by Pericles’ strategy during the Peloponnesian war to move the population of Attica inside the Long Walls. He was able to convince the people of Athens to abandon their rural property and any arable agricultural land in favour of the protection of the citadel (Thuc. 2.14). This alone indicates that Athens did not depend on internal grain production, since the farmers would not be able to simply abandon their land if the population was wholly dependent on internal production for survival. As long as the Athenians had access to the Piraeus, they had

¹⁷⁰ Bresson 2016, 406, fn. 101.

¹⁷¹ See especially Moreno 2007 for an in depth summary of scholarship on the quantitative aspects of Athenian grain trade.

¹⁷² Conurbation is the urbanization of rural areas, or the amalgamation of suburbs and the whole city.

¹⁷³ Whitby 1998, 104-105.

access to their grain supply. As our sources have indicated so far, Athens was more than capable of sustaining its population on externally produced and imported grain.

It seems that Athenians deliberately used their land for growing other (more profitable) products than grain. Sometimes farmers would sell their own crops for economic purposes, and simply repurchase whatever products they would need over the course of the year, and there is a high probability that they would have devoted a decent portion of their arable land to crops with the highest economic return. Such a system would be easily maintainable since Athens was importing a large amount of grain to the state and ensured decent, affordable prices by means of governmental intervention in trade. Furthermore, there is some evidence for gardens on arable land with irrigation access in competition with grain for cultivatable land, which further supports the limited use of arable land for grain cultivation. A passage from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* corroborates that not all arable land was used for cultivation, or cultivated properly, since both Ischomachus and his father had made money from the purchase of and improvement of misused and mal-cultivated arable land (Xen. *Oec.* 1.20.22-26). It is likely then that there were significant portions of land that were being misused, improperly cultivated, or were entirely out of use during various harvest seasons, that have the potential to drastically affect the amount of arable land available for cultivation. Additionally, a large portion of land owners with significant holdings would likely own oxen, or even horses, and would need to dedicate a portion of their arable land to growing food products for their animals. Flocks of goats and sheep could be sustained on non-arable grasslands and hillsides, and would not require any excess consumable grains or legumes. Yet both oxen and horses require a substantial amount of cultivated grain for sustenance. The amount of arable land used for animal consumables would vary depending on the number of horses or oxen owned, and would increase significantly higher if the land-owner

also practiced animal husbandry in breeding horses and oxen for sale, or cows and bulls for sacrificial purposes.¹⁷⁴ Whitby argues that this alone would take us from a possible 50% of arable land use per harvest year down to a more likely 30% of arable land use in a given harvest year, which considering biennial fallow trends, would actually leave us with 15% of arable land used in a given year for the production of grain for human consumption. This is at the lowest end of Garnsey's variables for percentage of arable land cultivated in a year, since he prefers between 20-25%, but is higher than Jardé's preferred 10% figure. Garnsey's figures are of course based on the use of a 2/3 fallow system, rather than the traditional biennial fallow, and also on the assumption that olives and vines were grown primarily on less arable land, such as hillsides. Furthermore, he advocates for both spring and summer sowings, on top of the typical winter one. These considerations are dubious: Sallares has discussed and proven that the olive is not naturally suited to the dry Mediterranean climate, and performs much better on arable land with a good water supply (of rain or irrigation). Furthermore, Gallant demonstrates that spring and summer planting was only an option if the farmer had an excess of wealth, and extensive seed and labour resources.¹⁷⁵ The scholarly debate concerning when exactly supply and demand for grain in Athens became imbalanced demonstrates the political nature of grain trade in Attica; some scholars are willing to date it as far back as the 7th c. BCE.¹⁷⁶ Yet the 6th c. BCE is a more typical estimation since scholars take Solon's export ban as the first indication for Athens' failing agricultural productivity, and also the Peisistratid interest in the Hellespont as an early concern for the Pontic grain route to Athens.¹⁷⁷ The psychology of the Athenian economy is

¹⁷⁴ Whitby 1998, 104-106; See also Van Wees 2006 for more on animal husbandry, especially arable land ownings and use by the equestrian social class.

¹⁷⁵ Whitby 1998, 106-107.

¹⁷⁶ Hopper 1979, 53.

¹⁷⁷ Whitby 1998, 102.

especially difficult to understand in light of our modern economies. It is essential to explore various economic spheres in relationship to their political and historical contexts within the Athenian world.

Athenian Grain Trade: Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy

Grain trade happened on a large scale, and the network of grain trade relationships encompassed a large portion of the ancient Mediterranean. Clearly, this scale could change, becoming smaller in a poorer harvest and larger during a significantly more successful one. But this still leaves Attica needing to import roughly 70% of their grain from either their externally controlled sources, or separate political entities. Clearly then, Attica's dependence on imported grain dictated a large portion of their politics and foreign policies; Pericles, for instance, was able to convince the population of rural Attica to take shelter behind the long walls of the *polis* and the Piraeus and to abandon their cultivatable territory since the largest portion of grain-sustenance was imported from external sources.¹⁷⁸ Even Solon's measures from the sixth century BCE demonstrate the tensions between available grain supply and the demand on account of the population size, since he made it illegal to export any agricultural product except oil from the region of Attica (Plut. *Sol.* 24.1). The grain law of Athens from the fourth century BCE (RO 26) also demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining grain sustenance for Attica's large population, since it provides evidence for the 8 and 1/3 grain tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, either newly instituting these regulations or enforcing legislative changes to the collection and

¹⁷⁸ Bresson 2016, 410.

distribution of these taxes.¹⁷⁹ Either way, the law regulates the grain-tax of the islands controlled by Attica, and enforces direct state intervention in the collection of the tax, its storage, and redistribution. Typically the transportation, import, and sale of grain rests in the hands of private, independent ship owners and merchants. This grain law and the Athenian regulations that accompany it are examples of the aforementioned embedded redistributive exchange that Polanyi marks out as one of 3 categories of exchange in the Ancient Greek world. This law is the only evidence that remains to us of an 8 and 1/3% tax, as most Athenian tax denominations appear in amounts of 1/5%, 1%, 2%, 2 and 1/2%, 5%, and 10%. This is the only instance of a tax to be collected fully in grain, whereas most taxes were collected in various forms of money.¹⁸⁰ It also demonstrates state intervention in the distribution and sale of grain, clearly outlining the elected officials (originally totalling thirty, but growing to 65) referenced by Aristotle (Tod II 26; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51),¹⁸¹ as well as the large amount of grain that was necessary for Attica to import on a yearly basis in order to provide the demos with sustenance.

Athens made a point of colonizing and gaining control over territories with distinctly agrarian dimensions throughout the Classical period, starting by seizing the territory of Oropos after the Athenian defeat of the Boeotians in 506 BCE, and their settlements in the Thracian Chersonese, and especially with the conquests of Lemnos and Imbros (*IG II² 1672*). The inscription at Eleusis, Lemnos and Imbros alone produced 274,525 *medimnoi* of barley and 72,850 *medimnoi* of wheat for a total of 347,375 *medimnoi* of grain; the production of grain on

¹⁷⁹ Stroud 1988, 16; it appears that this inscription is enforcing legislative changes to a previously existing law, since Agyrrius was especially active in the late 5th century BCE, as he is mentioned in Andocides' *On the Mysteries* as the leader of a group of men who farmed the 2% grain tax (And. 1.133-134). Evidence suggests Agyrrius died in the early to mid 4th century BCE since there is no evidence of his activities after 374-373 BCE. This grain-tax law was a general tax on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, but it is the only evidence we have for a tax that was to be paid in grain, rather than a form of money.

¹⁸⁰ Stroud 1988, 26-27; this is with the exception of the *eichoste* of the Peisistratidai, which appears to be in kind.

¹⁸¹ Meijer and van Nifj 1992, 38.

these islands was well above what was necessary to sustain their relatively modest populations, and so the surplus was sent to the Attic market in addition to the 8 and 1/3 tax levied by Athens on the islands as shown by the grain law of 374-373 BCE Bresson proposes that 150,000 *medimnoi* came from Lemnos and Skyros to Attica, 400,000 from the Pontus region, slightly less than 100,000 *medimnoi* from the region of Cyrene, roughly the same from Egypt, and also from the West, with anything additional coming to Attica from other minor grain producers.¹⁸² From these numbers, Bresson derives the following figures as supplemental to Athens' own grain production in order to sustain the population of Attica:

Table 2: Source and Percentage of Grain at Athens¹⁸³

Grain Source	Amount in <i>Medimnoi</i>	Percentage of Total Grain at Attica
Attica	340,000 ¹⁸⁴	27.2
Lemnos and Imbros	150,000	12.0
Pontus	400,000	32.0
Cyrene	90,000	7.2
Egypt	90,000	7.2
West	90,000	7.2
Various	90,000	7.2
Total	1,250,000	100.0

Based on the figures as presented by Bresson, Attica's dependency on the import of grain from external sources, either their own external territories or various imports from other countries, is

¹⁸² Bresson 2016, 410; Pazdera 2006, 101-172; Stroud 1998.

¹⁸³ Bresson 2016, 411, Table 14.4.

¹⁸⁴ Bresson calculates 340,000 *medimnoi* of grain being produced at Athens, however the numbers provided in fig. 1 differ by roughly 30,000 *medimnoi*, totaling closer to 370,000 *medimnoi* of grain total being produced internally at Attica. This changes the provided totals and percentages slightly, since 370,000 *medimnoi* of grain account of 30% of the necessary 100% in order to maintain the internal population of Attica, rather than the given 27.2% attached to the number of 340,000 *medimnoi* that Bresson provides.

evident. Furthermore, the primary source evidence provided supports the notion that Athens was exceptionally, and possibly uniquely, dependent on external sources for grain in as much as this dependence dictated their political organization at home and their foreign policy abroad. Our primary sources indicate that this, in fact, was the situation since so many of Athens' political and foreign policies were primarily concerned with the regulation, taxation, sale, and import of grain. This is contradicted by Thucydides. Pericles is able to convince even the rural population of Athens to take protection behind the long wall (Thuc. 2.14). This would not have been a possibility if the sustenance of Athens was almost wholly dependent on its own rural population.

While all of the secondary sources discussed provide interesting speculation regarding the exact figures for Athenian grain production over the Classical period, there are far too many variables to consider to get an accurate quantitative representation of Athenian grain production and import. The primary literary and epigraphic sources should constitute enough evidence for the scale, importance, and necessity of grain import to Athens, and therefore lend themselves as evidence for Attica's inability to sustain itself on internal grain production. Athens' intense dependency on imported grain to feed its population accounts for a substantial portion of their political behaviour, which will help demonstrate the inseparable nature of politics and economies, and support Morris' substantivist interpretation for the embedded nature of ancient Greek economies.¹⁸⁵

The political and historical circumstances were extremely significant in two aspects of Athenian grain trade policies: grain-trade routes for import and grain shortages at Athens were the most effected by the socio-political context of the Classical world. It is essential to

¹⁸⁵ For Morris' particular interpretations on substantivism see especially Morris 1994.

understand that not all trade passed through the Piraeus and the *deigma* into Athens.¹⁸⁶ Yet they were likely the most important ports of the Classical world. Of course, transportation by sea was easier than transportation by land, but Thucydides demonstrates that commodities were transported north-east overland from Oropos instead of going around Cape Sunium before the occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians in 413 BCE (Thuc. 7.28.1), although it was more expensive (Athen. *Deipn.* 15. 700b). Some trade from Megara could come into Athens through Eleusis, and trade from Boeotia by sea likely used one of Attica's eastern trading ports. The Piraeus was of course the most commonly used port, however we cannot quantify the extent of the trade that passed through it, as we only have one indication for the sum of the 1% import and export taxes in the Piraeus.¹⁸⁷

On account of the various trade routes and ports available for imports to Athens, a certain level of state intervention was necessary to maintain and control grain trade (as well as the trade of other commodities) in order to ensure that the Athenian populace would not be subject to grain shortages or other complications. One of the most common ways in which Athens intervened directly in the grain trade was through her use of honorary decrees as a means to entice traders and foreigners to not only import their grain to Athens, but to also provide her with acts of benefaction. We have seen some previous examples of these decrees.¹⁸⁸ When a foreign merchant, king, or aristocrat was willing to charge less than the market price for a shipment of grain, Athens would reciprocate with an honorary inscription for the foreign merchant.

Furthermore, grain trade was of such importance that in each assembled prytany, that is ten times

¹⁸⁶ The Deigma is the grain-holding area on the Makra Stoa. It was an area in which Merchants could inspect samples of product that were set up on small reed-stalls.

¹⁸⁷ Hopper 1979, 52-53, 71.

¹⁸⁸ *SIG*³ 304, Heraclides of Salamis sold 3,000 *medimnoi* of grain at 5 drachma per measure and was honoured as a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of Athens; *SIG*³ 354, Agathocles of Rhodes and all his descendants are granted citizenship at Athens because Agathocles sold 14,000 *hekteis* of grain at a price less than 6 drachma a measure.

a year, there was a plenary session devoted specifically to grain supply, (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43-4):¹⁸⁹ it was necessary that any man with political interests be well-versed in the context and nature of Athens' grain supply and her current agricultural circumstances.

Furthermore, it was necessary for the Athenians to elect ten *agoranomoi*, five for the Piraeus and five for the *polis* itself, in order to supervise goods for sale and ensure that merchandise was pure and unadulterated (Arist. *Ath. Cons.* 51). Similarly, they elected ten *metronomoi*, five for the Piraeus and five for the *polis*, in order to ensure that honest weights and measures were being used by the sellers (Arist. *Ath. Cons.* 51). They also elected ten *sitophylakes*, five to both the Piraeus and the *polis*. Those numbers grew to twenty for the city and fifteen for the Piraeus. Their responsibilities included ensuring there was no illegal practice in the selling of unprepared corn in the market, ensuring millers were selling their barley flour at a price proportionate to un-milled barley, and that bakers were selling their loaves corresponding to the price of wheat and containing the full weight which had been laid down by the commissioners (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51). There were also ten commissioners of trade elected to supervise trade and to ensure that at least two-thirds of the corn imported to Athens is brought into the city itself (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51).¹⁹⁰

We are better informed about grain imports specifically since they were of public and political importance, and were the primary matter of Athens' diplomatic relationships with the rulers of grain-producing regions: grain imports were of special interest not only to feed the Athenian population, but also to control and dictate political and foreign policy, particularly during wartime. During the Peloponnesian War, Athens was concerned with keeping her armies fed and in the field, and also with ensuring that any enemy grain imports were being intercepted

¹⁸⁹ Hopper 1979, 52-53, 71.

¹⁹⁰ Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 38.

and not reaching their final destinations. Athens was interested in regions like the island of Cythera, which was a trade stop on the route from Egypt, Cyprus, and Crete to the Peloponnese. Athens was also interested in Sicily because it was a fertile region and avid grain exporter. Other areas of importance were Thessaly, which is demonstrated by Xenophon regarding their high level of exports to Athens' high level of corn imports (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56, 6.1.2; Dem. *Olyn.* 1.22; Dem. 1.22; Arist. *Oec.* 2.27). Other regions mentioned are of course, Lemnos, Thasos, and Sciathos, with no discussion of their importance or use (Dem. 1.32); Euboea was also important, and was kept exclusively for Athens, by Athens (And. *De Pace* 9).¹⁹¹

During the revolt in Lesbos in 428-427 BCE, there was no close control of imports of corn from the Pontus by Athenian allies. Under Pericles, however, Athens developed a strong relationship with the Euxine, and therefore controlled the Black Sea, or at the least approaches to it and the coast of Thrace. These areas were far more accessible and easily controlled than Sicily, Cape Malea, or even Egypt. It was not until the mid-fifth century that Athens demonstrated increased interest in the West and Egypt, since there were disturbances in the Pontus region and in Thrace. It appears that this interest was more likely political and imperial than it was about grain trade, although we cannot fully exclude this concern; as soon as the North-East area settled, Athens' attention turned back there quickly, even though Egyptian rebels against Persia were tempting the Athenians with free gifts of grain. Later in the Peloponnesian War, Athens exercised even stricter control over the import of timber and grain supplies, and their movement around Hellas. After the Sicilian expedition in 413 BCE failed, and with renewed hostilities from Sparta, and interventions by Persia, Athens began to fight a naval war to defend their most vital trade route to the North Aegean and the Black Sea. After the Athenian defeat at the Hellespont in

¹⁹¹ Hopper 19797, 53-54, 71.

405 BCE, Sparta gained control over this trade route and was able to impose a blockade and starved the Athenians into submission.¹⁹²

The North-Eastern trade route continued to play an important role in Athenian politics and diplomatic activities in the fourth century BCE: it was at the heart of Athenian interests in renewing a maritime league, and was considered justification enough for maintaining Athenian naval strength. It is apparent that at home in Athens, the price of corn was the measure of Athenian political and diplomatic influence abroad: thus any hostile relations with Sparta, Boeotia, and Macedon also involved the corn trade. The fourth century also brought new challenges to the Athenian corn trade: the dependence of all city-states on domestic corn production increased, and more markets were open to grain traders, which led to significantly more competition between ports and cities.¹⁹³ Many *poleis* on the Aegean coast were faced with grain shortages, and often focused their political efforts on protecting their maritime grain trades, and the grain trade would often dictate the nature of political relationships.

Speeches such as Isocrates' speech *Trapeziticus*, and Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* show concern for foreign entities and the privileges Athens accorded them. Even well into the fourth century Greek merchants returning to Athens with cargo were accorded priority over others and were well treated in any court proceedings, and due to previously existing relationships Athens often received corn at an extremely cheap rate or as benefaction from other states.¹⁹⁴ Athens' political behaviour in the fourth century was similar to that in the fifth. Yet, her concern shifted to the disruption of trade by Alexander the Great, rather than Spartan hostilities, while still searching for new and foreign sources of grain. Of course, the nature and dimensions

¹⁹² Hopper 1979, 54-55, 71.

¹⁹³ Hopper 1979, 55-56.

¹⁹⁴ Hopper 1979, 55-57.

of any trade or imports into Athens were determined by her population and economic situation. It is likely that, as with modern states, exports paid for imports; and that these imports were many and various,¹⁹⁵ and came from many different sources.¹⁹⁶

Athenian Grain Trade: Grain and Andocides

As demonstrated thus far, grain was an extremely important asset for Athens. The livelihood of her population depended on external procurement of grain, and so grain trade dictated many of her political and diplomatic policies. This was well known throughout the ancient Mediterranean, and Athenian grain imports were also the subject of the political and diplomatic strategies of other states and *poleis*. For instance, the Spartan blockade of the Hellespont at the end of the Peloponnesian War essentially halted grain imports into Athens from the Black Sea region, its most important provider of grain.¹⁹⁷ In addition, Lysander instituted a naval blockade of Athens after his victory at Aigospotami in the fall of 405 BCE. It lasted until peace negotiations were completed in the spring of 404 BCE. As I previously mentioned,¹⁹⁸ the Athenian grain supply from the Black sea region had been cut off when the Spartans controlled the Hellespont before the Athenian victory at Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE. During this period Andocides managed to procure 14 triremes of grain because of his *xenia* with Evagoras in Salamis (And. 2.20-21). This blockade that made Andocides' *xenia*-based service particularly

¹⁹⁵ Hopper 1979, 55-57, 71.

¹⁹⁶ Hopper 1979, 71.

¹⁹⁷ Hopper 1979, 71.

¹⁹⁸ See the section above "Dating *On the Return* and Andocides' Services to Athens" in Chapter 3, 58-59, for discussion of the date of *On the Return* and Andocides' grain delivery from Cyprus.

outstanding, since supplying Athens with grain came at great political risk for Salamis.¹⁹⁹ By exporting grain to Athens while the Peloponnesians were in charge of the Hellespont could have turned Spartan attention to Cyprus, which would have caused significant issues for the island.

We must also consider the dimensions and weight bearing capabilities of a ship, as this information allows us to gauge how much grain Andocides imported to Athens from Cyprus. If we consider more conservative weight bearing capabilities of a typical mercantile ship, around 250 tons, and the total of 14 ships that Andocides is able to bring to port, we can see that he provided to Athens a shipment of 3,500 tons of grain. At the more generous side of the spectrum, with each ship being able to carry as much as 400 tons, Andocides may have provided as much as 5,600 tons of grain to Athens. Unfortunately for us, we will never know exactly how much grain Andocides imported to Athens from Cyprus through his *xenia*, since there is no numerical evidence that remains on Andocides' grain shipment to Athens. I have converted these numbers to *medimnoi*: 129,629 *medimnoi* of wheat (at 27kg per *medimnos*) if the ships could carry 250 tons, or 207,407 *medimnoi* of wheat (at 27kg per *medimnos*) if the ships could carry 400 tons. According to Bresson's calculations from table 2 above,²⁰⁰ Andocides provided somewhere between 10%-16% of the annual amount of grain that Athens had to import to sustain her population.²⁰¹ The importance of this benefaction cannot be understated. Only in 405 BCE did Lysander realize the effectiveness of blockading the Hellespont in order to effectively starve out and subdue the Athenians, as it seems to have been coincidental in 411/410 BCE. While Andocides himself received no honour or benefit from this action (he was not allowed to return

¹⁹⁹ By supplying grain to Athens through the Spartan blockade, Salamis easily could have incurred the wrath of Sparta and may have found themselves further embroiled in the conflict of the Peloponnesian War.

²⁰⁰ Chapter 4.3: "Athenian Grain Trade: Grain Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy."

²⁰¹ If Andocides imported barley instead of wheat, the numbers would be slightly different. Barley weighs 31kg/*medimnos*, so Andocides would have transported 112,903 *medimnoi* if the ships carried 250 tons each, or 180,645 *medimnoi* if the ships carried 400 tons each, totally 9%-12% of Athens' total necessary amount of grain for population sustenance.

to Athens, and he was not recognized by any kind of honorific decree), Evagoras was granted proxeny with Athens.²⁰²

This fits the system developed by Athens in which those people who did favours to her would receive recognition and reward in return. The specific grant of *proxenia* demonstrates the importance of *xenia* within the Classical Athenian world, as well as the close relationship between the activities of her economies and *xenia* as a social construct and cultural institution. Had it not been for Andocides' *xenia* based relationship with Evagoras of Salamis, Athens would not have received such a large shipment of grain during such a trying time. This benefaction saved Athens a substantial amount of money: they had their *sitionia* available for the purchase of grain for the public during shortages. It would have been fiscally more responsible to encourage trade on an individual level between *naukleroi*, *emporoi*, merchants, and sellers than to spend large portions of the treasury. Grain was typically sold at a price of 5 drachmae a *medimnos* (SIG³ 304).²⁰³ According to Bresson, a *medimnos* of wheat is roughly 27kg, and a *medimnos* of barley weighs roughly 31kg.²⁰⁴ If Andocides shipped only wheat at 27kg/measure filling the total weight of all fourteen 250 tonne vessels, wheat shipped to Athens would have been 129,629.63 *medimnoi*; at the higher end of the spectrum with fourteen 400 tonne vessels carrying the shipment, it would have accounted for 207,407.41 *medimnoi* of wheat. With barley at 31kg a measure, fourteen 250 tonne vessels would have accounted for 112,903.26 measures; fourteen 400 tonne vessels would have carried 180,645.16 *medimnoi* of barley. We do not know exactly what kind of grain Andocides was able to bring in, since he does not specify (And. 2.21): for

²⁰² See my above argument in Chapter 3, "Andocides: Dating on the Return and Andocides' Services to Athens".

²⁰³ This is the price indicated by Demosthenes that Heraclides sold his grain to Athens for, as such, this price is likely lower than what Athens would spend on a measure of grain, since this benefaction resulted in Heraclides being honoured with citizenship at Athens.

²⁰⁴ Bresson 2010, 439.

purposes of speculation, I average out the shipment of grain from the above four totals to be 125,271 *medimnoi* of grain. This amount of grain, based on Bresson's calculated 5 *medimnoi* of grain per person per year, would feed roughly 25,055 members of the Athenian populace. Typically this amount of grain would cost the Athenians a total of 626,355 drachmae (or 104 talents) from the *sitionia* for public grain, or from the grain-buyers, at a price of 5 drachmae a measure.

It is unlikely that Andocides (or Evagoras) would have been able to afford to make such a substantial gift to Athens. It is more probable that Andocides procured the grain to be sold in the agora as usual, but at a lower cost. There is evidence for similar benefactions made to Athens by Agathocles of Rhodes, and Heraclides of Salamis. As previously discussed, Agathocles of Rhodes sold 14,000 hekteis of grain at a price lower than market value at which it was being sold in the Athenian agora, since it was probable that he would be rewarded for this benefaction to the Athenian people (*SIG*³ 354). Furthermore, during the food crisis in Athens in 330-329 BCE, Heraclides of Salamis sold 3,000 *medimnoi* of wheat to Athens at a price of 5 drachmae per measure, and gave a gift of 3,000 drachmae to the Athenian *sitionia*. On account of this service, Heraclides of Salamis was granted the titles *proxenos* and *euergetes* to Athens, among other honours, essentially making him and his descendants Athenian citizens (*SIG*³ 304).²⁰⁵

The battle of Cyzicus reopened the Hellespont in the spring of 410 BCE, coinciding with Andocides' speech *On the Return* and his delivery of grain from Cyprus, Athens would still have been in the midst of a grain shortage. Typically, during food shortages, the price of grain skyrocketed in the agora, making it difficult for Athenian citizens to afford. The price of grain during the food shortage of 330-329 BCE was higher than 5 drachmae per measure, since the

²⁰⁵ Meijer and van Nijf 1992, 96-97.

Athenians considered the price of 5 drachmae per measure of grain charged by Heraclides of Salamis to be a benefaction to the *polis* (*SIG*³ 304). Even 6 drachmae a measure of grain was viewed as expensive in comparison to the typical prices in 300 BCE (*SIG*³ 354). If Andocides provided 125,271 *medimnoi* of grain to Athens from Cyprus at a price of 5 drachmae a measure, the total delivery from the 14 known ships would have a value of 104 talents worth of grain. Based on the examples of Agathocles of Rhodes and the Athenian food crisis of 330-329 BCE, we can estimate that grain was being sold for (at least) 6 drachmae a measure in Athens during the food crisis of 411-410 BCE. At the price of 6 drachmae per measure of grain, the shipment of 125,271 *medimnoi* of grain would have cost the Athenians 751,626 drachmae (or 125 talents). At the price of 5 drachmae per measure (only one drachma less than market price) Andocides saved the Athenians a total of 125,271 drachmae (or 21 talents). This situation is not improbable: both Agathocles of Rhodes and Heraclides of Salamis received a grant of citizenship for a similar benefactions, i.e. the selling of grain at Athens at lower than market price. The first decree to Evagoras discussed in Chapter 3 (*IG* I³ 113) is also a citizenship decree, likely granted to him on the grounds of a similar benefaction to the Athenians.

It is unlikely, though, that Andocides was able to pay for this entire shipment of grain on his own, even as a wealthy aristocrat. Andocides was able to provide this shipment of grain to Athens on account of his *xenia*-based relationship with Evagoras, probably by convincing the king to send a shipment through the blockaded Hellespont, regardless of political risk. Or that Evagoras provided Andocides with a loan to be re-paid on the delivery of grain to Athens and its purchase by Athens and its citizens. Either of these situations are possible: I believe the second scenario is most likely, especially since Andocides found himself in a large amount of trouble in Cyprus shortly after his failed attempt to return to Athens. Andocides was imprisoned

in Cyprus, but none of our sources indicate the reason for his imprisonment. The fact that Andocides was able to provide this shipment to Athens in the spring of 410 BCE, but was imprisoned shortly afterwards, indicates that he was most likely imprisoned on account of an issue with this shipment of grain to Athens. I theorize that Andocides reneged on the repayment of his loan to Evagoras of Salamis, and was therefore imprisoned..

The extent of this benefaction is clear, and it is possible for us to see the exceptional significance of the relationship between Athenian economies and cultural institutions and social constructs as *xenia*. Through her political and diplomatic policies, as well as her foreign strategy, Athens carefully placed herself in the ideal position to receive these sorts of benefactions. Andocides would have known that by facilitating such a large benefaction through his *xenia* within Cyprus, Athens would likely reward the benefactors (as she was accustomed to do). Of course, Andocides wished to recoup some of this gain for himself, as he hoped that facilitating a significant benefaction for the *polis* would lead Athens to reinstate him as a citizen. Unfortunately for Andocides, his efforts did not pay off for himself on this occasion, but it did pay off significantly for Athenian economies as a whole. There are plenty of other inscriptions and decrees that honour foreign persons for their benefactions to Athens, mentioning either gifts of grain or other goods, or the sale of products at a reduced price. If we compiled these and estimated totals based on what little circumstantial evidence we have, we would be able to develop a quantitative model for benefactions to Athens, and cross-reference this information with our evidence for Athenian economic expenditure as a means to develop a quantitative and qualitative model for the role of *xenia* and other benefactions within Athenian economies as a whole. While this information is, to a considerable extent, speculative, it is nevertheless useful,

as it demonstrates the embedded nature of the Athenian economy, as well Athens' overall economic dependence on their cultural, political, and social institutions.

Chapter 5: The Athenian Timber Trade

Athenian Timber Trade: An Introduction to the Timber Trade at Athens

The timber trade in Athens was just as complicated as the grain trade, and exhibits many of the same qualities during the Classical period. Therefore, it is important to consider the larger function of the timber trade within the Athenian economies in order to fully understand the significance of Andocides' *xenia* with Archelaus of Macedon. Unfortunately, we do not have nearly the same amount of primary or secondary evidence for the timber trade as we do for the grain trade, especially regarding quantitative figures and information. Nevertheless, there is still more than enough information available to demonstrate both the importance of the timber trade in Classical Athenian economies, and the Athenian dependence on timber imports. As a result, it is possible to determine the significance of *xenia* within this sphere of Athenian economies using Andocides' *xenia* with Archelaus of Macedon as an example of the benefits of interpersonal ritualized relationships to Athenian economies. Andocides describes his *xenia*-based contribution to the Athenian timber trade as follows:

ἀλλ' αὐτίκα μὲν τότε εἰσήγαγον εἰς στρατιὰν ὑμῶν οὕσαν ἐν Σάμῳ κωπέας,
τῶν τετρακοσίων ἤδη τὰ πράγματα ἐνθάδε κατειληφόντων, ὄντος μοι Ἀρχελάου
ξένου πατρικοῦ καὶ διδόντος τέμνεσθαί τε καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι ὅποσους ἐβουλόμην.
τούτους τε εἰσήγαγον τοὺς κωπέας, καὶ παρόν μοι πέντε δραχμῶν τὴν τιμὴν
αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐμοὶ κατέστησαν·
εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῆτον τε καὶ χαλκόν. (And. 2.11)

Indeed, I at once supplied your forces in Samos with oar-spars at a time when the Four Hundred had already seized power here, since Archelaus was an inherited *xenos* of mine and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished. I both supplied these spars and, although I could have received a price for them

of five drachmas apiece, I did not want to charge more than they cost me; I also supplied corn and bronze.

This passage raises many questions about the nature and mechanisms of the timber trade in Classical Athens. How was Andocides able to procure a seemingly large shipment of timber for the *polis*? Why exactly is this particular service of any significance to the timber trade at Athens? What makes this particular instance so important? In light of these questions, and the *proxenia* decree discussed in Chapter 3 (*IG I³ 117*), how do we consider Andocides' *xenia*-based transaction in regards to theoretical economic models, especially North's New Institutional Economics? What is the effect of *xenia* on economies, and how does *xenia* define and constrain certain kinds of embedded economic activities as an aspect of structure and determinant of performance? What do these types of *xenia*-transactions mean for economic performance, and how can we use *xenia* to help define the nature of structure and performance of economies and trade mechanisms in Classical Athens?

Athens was in need of timber, especially for larger scale building projects such as naval programs and temple construction. According to Theophrastus,²⁰⁶ silver-fir was the ideal shipbuilding material and only grew at an altitude of 800m or higher (*Theophr. Hist. pl4.5.5*). Silver-fir was found primarily in Macedon, Thrace, Southern Italy, the south shore of the Black Sea at Sinope and Amison, Mt. Olympos in Mysia, and Mt. Ida in Troad (*Theophr. Hist. pl4.5.5*). Theophrastus does not list Athens or a region near Athens as a source of silver-fir (*Theophr. 4.5.5*). Möller argues that Athens was capable of meeting her own timber needs from local mountain slopes, the Boeotian border, and Euboea during the first half of the fifth century, since her shipbuilding regime was not yet fully fledged. Even at this time, Macedonian timber and

²⁰⁶ Borza 1987, 33; Meiggs 1982, 113-114.

pitch were in extremely high demand. The Persians were already present in the North Aegean, and knew that forests along the Strymon were a likely source of timber for the Athenians (Hdt. 5.23). The demand for timber continued throughout the Classical period, as demonstrated by the alliance between Amyntas III of Macedon and the Chalcidians at the beginning of the 4th century.²⁰⁷

The mechanism of timber trade in Classical Athens is not as clear as that of the grain trade; yet it was still a primary diplomatic and political concern for the *polis*. Many of Athens' political and diplomatic actions during the Classical period were dictated by her need for external resources, and timber is no exception. She was unable to provide local timber for her ship-building programs, since silver-fir was essentially unavailable in her territories. It was of high-importance for Athens to procure a sustainable, constant supply of timber after the Persian War, in order to be prepared for any other military activities. Naval prowess was essential to the Greek defeat of the Persians, as well as to the maintenance of the Delian league, and later, the Athenian empire. After her defeat by the Peloponnesians in 404 BCE, timber was still a necessity for the Athenian *polis*, as it was soon necessary for her to rebuild her naval fleet.

Many primary sources indicate Athens' overwhelming need for imported timber, including speeches, treatises, and inventories, as well as various honorary inscriptions that present different individuals with decrees of *proxenia* for their timber contributions to the Athenian *polis*. The large scale demand for timber was met through various economic channels, largely through political treaties and benefactions. There is also evidence for large scale timber trade occurring through interpersonal ritualized relationships of *xenia*, and the Athenian institution of *proxenia*. These social institutions were indeed significant to the overall function of

²⁰⁷ Borza 1987, 33-34.

the timber-trade mechanism in Classical Athens. It is necessary then to focus on Athenian political and diplomatic relationships, as well as their economic nature, in order to understand the overall economic ramifications of Andocides' *xenia* with Archelaus of Macedon, and the effect of his *xenia*-based benefaction on Athens' timber economy. Understanding how the timber trade functioned and the extent to which Athens was dependant on timber from elsewhere allows us to place *xenia* in the context of timber trade, and Athenian economies in general. A brief discussion of the historical background elucidates the complexities of the Athenian timber trade, and the channels through which it was necessary for Athens to pursue and receive timber. Through this history, we are able to see that *xenia* played a significant role in the timber trade at Athens, and that it helped define the structure and mechanisms of economic activity within this particular sphere, while also having a wider effect on Athenian economies in general.

Athenian Timber Trade: The Politics of Athenian Timber Procurement

In order to understand the mechanisms of timber trade, and to put Andocides procurement of timber in the context of the Athenian timber trade and Athenian economies, it is necessary to provide a history of timber use and procurement in Athens. As seen in the preceding chapter on grain, Athens' need for resources seems nearly insatiable and determined to a large extent her foreign, political, and diplomatic activities. Her need for timber was a large influence on her political and diplomatic policies, beginning early in the fifth century BCE with Themistocles' naval program proposals in 483 BCE (Hdt. 7.144).²⁰⁸ Yet the Athenians were not the first ones to possess a large naval power; it is likely that there was a substantial naval

²⁰⁸ Borza 1987, 33.

presence in the ancient Mediterranean long before then, starting with the considerable fleet of Bronze Age Crete in the 16th-15th centuries BCE.²⁰⁹ The ability of Mycenaean Greeks to conquer Knossos and take over the Cretan civilization also indicates the presence of considerable naval powers on the Greek mainland around 1450 BCE. The colonisation movements of the eighth century BCE necessitated a re-opening of trade and naval routes after the collapse of the Bronze Age world in the Eastern Aegean. With colonisation came a great increase in maritime trade activities, as well as a large need for warships to defend the movements of maritime traders. It is roughly a century after this that - according to Thucydides - the first naval battle took place in Greece, between Corinth and Cocyra. But he makes it clear that there was still no substantial Greek naval fleet before the Persian invasion (Thuc. 1.8.1).²¹⁰ Significant Athenian interest in naval prowess and ship-timber appears earlier than the Themistoclean naval-program, as the Persian forces in the North Aegean were aware that the Strymon River area was a potential source of timber for the Athenians (Hdt. 5.23). There was no real need, however, for any particular naval program until at least the 480s: grain and pottery trade did not yet require naval accompaniment for protection, and the 20 ships sent to aid Ionia against the Persians in the 490s were likely pentakonters, which were significantly smaller than triremes and required less timber resources for their construction.²¹¹

When Athens was in need of ships for warfare with Aegina a decade afterwards, she purchased more pentakonters from Corinth, since Corinth was already a leader in ship-building by this time (Hdt. 5.99).²¹² Thucydides demonstrated that apart from Athens, only one state was

²⁰⁹ Borza 1987, 33.

²¹⁰ See Meiggs 1982 for an in depth discussion of the early history of Athenian naval prowess, and especially 120-121 for what has been discussed here.

²¹¹ Borza 1987, 33.

²¹² Borza 1987, 33; Haas 1985, 45-46.

able to contribute 50 ships of the Greek fleet at the time of the Persian invasion, although Herodotus recounts that Athens contributed a total of 180 ships to the overall 378 that appeared at the battle of Salamis in 480 BCE (Hdt. 8.44, 8.48). The emergence of naval programs and a more immediate need of warships resulted in the need for silver-fir, which was unavailable in Attic territory. Due to the Themistoclean naval program roughly 200 triremes were built in a period of two years, a project that would have required substantial timber, labour, and financial resources. The most pressing issue with the Themistoclean building program was the short period of time in which it was completed: two years is a seemingly short period in which to fell the timber, prepare it for proper production, carry it by river to the coast, transport the timber to Phalerum or other Attic ship-building centres, and then convert these into triremes. Some scholars argue for the use of timber from mountain forests on Attica's borders. The shortage of time does not seem to be an actual issue, since later sources demonstrate that the Romans had once built 120 ships in 60 days, and 220 ships in 45 days.²¹³ One should not put too much weight on this evidence, since it is anachronistic to compare Roman building technology to that of the early Classical Athenian period. It does demonstrate, however, that two years may not have been entirely unreasonable to supply and build 200 triremes, no matter where the timber was coming from.

On account of the lack of timber resources at Athens and burgeoning naval programs, Athenian political and diplomatic policy turned towards the procurement of timber for ship-building. Athens became focused on the regions of Macedon, Thrace, and Southern Italy. The political relationship between Athens and Macedon was the most important, as well as the most complex: there is little evidence for Athenian use of Macedonian timber before the 5th century

²¹³ Meiggs 1982, 121-122, 125.

BCE. Yet, Alexander I of Macedon was already a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of Athens by 480/479 BCE (Hdt. 8.136.1), likely on account of timber grants to the Themistoclean building program of 483-482 BCE.²¹⁴ Meiggs calls into question the actual likelihood of Athenian procurement of timber from Macedon during this period, since Macedon was a vassal state of the Persians at this time, and it is unlikely that the Macedonian king would have wanted to provoke Xerxes, or that a large maritime shipment of timber to Athens would have gone unnoticed by Persia. Meiggs settles on southern Italy as the source of timber for the Themistoclean building program of the early fifth century: he supports his hypothesis with Themistocles' threat to take the Athenians to Southern Italy (Hdt. 8.43), and Corcyra's obligations to him. Themistocles had been recognized as a benefactor to Corcyra, and had settled a dispute between them and the Corinthians (Plut. *Them.* 24.1; Thuc. 1.136.1). Themistocles had also given his daughters the programmatic names Sybaris and Italia. The evidence Meiggs provides seems merely circumstantial, and there is no physical or literary evidence for Athenian timber trade with southern Italy until 408-407 BCE, when the commissioners of Eleusis included a stock of thirty timbers which had been imported from Thurii.²¹⁵ Furthermore, Macedon was not under direct control of, nor occupied by Persia during the 480s BCE, and did not yet possess the forests of Strymon (with which Persia was most concerned) in her territories.

It is important to trace the history of the timber trade throughout the Classical period, as it helps us put Athens' relationship with Macedon in context, so that we can understand how the timber trade developed over the Classical period. Furthermore, according to both Herodotus (6.89, 92, 7.144.1-2) and Plutarch (*Them.* 4.1-2), Themistocles proposed his naval program for a war with Aegina, possibly as an attempt to divert Persian suspicion from Athenian actions. Persia

²¹⁴ Borza 1987, 42.

²¹⁵ Meiggs 1982, 122-126; Borza 1987, 42.

eventually released Macedon in the early 470s BCE, but Athenian ambitions for Macedonian timber were unfulfilled until the death of Alexander I in 454 BCE. The political instability that followed Alexander I's death allowed Athens the opportunity to seize and establish a colony at Amphipolis on the Strymon in 437/436 BCE. The possession of Amphipolis by Athens was a fundamental cause of tension between Macedon and Athens extending into the fourth century BCE.²¹⁶ This is important because as long as Athens possessed Amphipolis, she had much better access to timber and did not need to rely as much on foreign imports of timber from other *poleis* or kingdoms.

The Peloponnesian War only furthered tensions between the two states on account of Athenian possession of Amphipolis and her support of factions that were hostile to King Perdiccas II. It also further stimulated Athens' timber requirements since she was dependant on her naval force in order to maintain her empire.²¹⁷ The Athenian decrees giving preferential treatment to Methone in Macedonia in the 420s BCE is a clear example of a diplomatic attempt to sustain a constant alternative supply of timber throughout the Peloponnesian War.²¹⁸ When Amphipolis fell to the Spartan general Brasidas in 424 BCE, Sparta also won the favour of King Perdiccas of Macedon, but the alliance fell apart after Perdiccas attempted to exploit his friendship with Brasidas in order to engage Sparta's assistance in a campaign along Macedon's western border. After Brasidas' death, the alliance collapsed and Perdiccas was forced to act independently. It is the death of Brasidas and the failure of the Spartan-Macedonian alliance which led to the treaty between Perdiccas and Athens, wherein Macedon promised to provide

²¹⁶ Borza 1987, 42.

²¹⁷ Borza 1987, 42, 44.

²¹⁸ Borza 1987, 44; Methone was an outlet for Pierian timber, and was an alternative source to Macedon. Athens pledged to assist Methone in various ways, and asked Perdiccas to refrain from interrupting or restricting Methonian trade. See also Meiggs 1982, 119.

oars exclusively to Athens (*IG I³ 89*). This treaty has been dated variously between 432-413 BCE; Borza concludes that it likely arose in the aftermath of the previously described events as a means to supply timber-hungry Athens and support an 'insecure' monarch.²¹⁹

Although this treaty fell through and hostilities were reopened when Macedon joined the Spartan alliance, it is likely that thanks to this treaty (as well as the Peace of Nicias) many of the ships Athens sent to Sicily in 415 BCE were outfitted largely from Macedonian timber. On account of the disastrous outcome of the Sicilian Expedition, Athens was forced to rebuild her fleet quickly (Thuc. 8.1.2, 4), using both public and private resources: consequently she turned again to Macedon. By this time, Perdiccas had passed away and had been succeeded by Archelaus, who supported Athens with timber sales.²²⁰ He also granted exploitation and export rights to individual Athenian citizens, such as Andocides (2.11). Archelaus was able to maintain a neutral position by avoiding any direct alliances with Athens, but rather by granting or selling rights for exploitation and exportation to individuals as well as the Athenian state.

Hostilities were renewed after the death of Archelaus in 399 BCE, and continued until 373 BCE when Amyntas III and Athens signed a treaty securing Macedonian timber and pitch (a resin produced from timber to caulk and seal timber for shipbuilding to make it stronger and more 'waterproof') for Athens. According to this treaty, the Athenians were able to export all pitch and ship-building materials except for fir (RO 12).²²¹ Even with this treaty in place, it was necessary that the export of fir for ship-building still be reported to the king and paid for in full for exploitation and export by the Athenians.²²² Meanwhile, it appears that Athens sought timber sources elsewhere, especially among the prosperous Chalcidic cities of the North (Xen. *Hell.*

²¹⁹ Borza 1987, 44; Meiggs 1982, 119, 126-127.

²²⁰ Borza 1987, 44; Meiggs 1982, 119.

²²¹ Borza 1987, 45.

²²² Meiggs 1982, 118-1119.

5.2.16). Athens procured her timber from these cities through both treaties and individual rights granted by a controlled-leasing system, usually through a benefaction decree, as is the case with Timotheus in 370 BCE, when he procured enough timber for several Athenian triremes.²²³ The relationship between Athens and Macedon continued to fluctuate throughout most of the 4th century BCE. Yet, the previous discussion is of the greatest relevance for understanding the effect of Andocides' *xenia* with Archelaus on the Athenian timber trade and on Classical Athenian economies in general.²²⁴

Athenian Timber Trade: Mechanisms of Timber Transport and Ship Building

Unfortunately, there is little information that remains to us regarding the felling, and overall production of timber for ship building. Borza constructs a plausible model for Macedonian timber procurement based on universal factors such as topography and technology, as well as inference, while utilising what little information is available to us. He suggests that timber was felled in teams of three, with two men cutting at the same time, and the third sharpening axe-blades for the other two men (Philostratus *Imagines* 2.17).²²⁵ Axes were also employed to strip branches, whereas saws were primarily used to cross-cut trees to shorter lengths for easier shipping, unless long pieces were needed for oars, masts, beams, or other speciality equipment. It is likely that the timber was then transported overland by yoke-animals to a finishing destination, or to a port for direct transport. There may be some evidence for

²²³ Borza 1987, 45-46.

²²⁴ I will draw on this historical sketch in the subsequent sections on "Athenian Timber Trade: Mechanisms of Timber Transport and Ship Building" and "Athenian Timber Trade: Economic Ramifications".

²²⁵ Borza 1987, 36-38.

timber-slides down particularly steep mountain slopes. Yet unlike quarry slides, they would have left little to no archaeological trace since they were surely made out of wood. Water transport was also utilised. The major Macedonian rivers were likely used for timber floatation, since they were suitable year round for timber transport to lower regions. After felling and transporting, some level of seasoning was necessary for the timber, in order that it be lighter and straighter for ship building; there is no substantial evidence for when the wood seasoning took place, but Borza suggests that the timber pieces were squared and sawn where they were felled, and were seasoned just enough so as not to hinder bendability for joins in the planking of the hulls.²²⁶ Bissa also argues that timber operations were typically done in-situ in the forest, by a pool of export oar-makers she emphasizes Andocides' ability to export oar-spars from Macedon to Samos on account of his royal *xenia* with Archelaus as evidence.²²⁷ The exportation of unfinished oar-spars is atypical in Classical Greece, since the oars would be less likely to break or be damaged if they were already fully finished before they were transported. Andocides' exportation of oar-spars to Samos is an exception to the norms of timber trade, making his service to Athens especially unique.²²⁸ The Macedonian king had a royal monopoly of the forest land, and used a controlled leasing system with exploitation and exportation rights granted by royal decree. Such direct giving of concessions as gifts to friendly individuals recalls the oriental practice of rewarding loyal subjects, such as with Histiaios and Themistocles.²²⁹

²²⁶ Borza 1987, 36-38.

²²⁷ Andocides' procurement of specifically *unshaved* oars comes from the language he employs in *On the Return*. The word used by Andocides to discuss the provision of oars to the Athenian fleet at Samos is *κωπέυς* (And. 2.11), from *κωπεύς*. Liddell and Scott, and *LSJ* define *κωπέυς* as "a piece of wood fit for an oar, a spar for an oar". The word for a finished oar is *ἔρετμόν*, which Liddell and Scott, *LSJ* and Autenrieth define as "oar"; *ἔρετμόν* appears only in the neuter form.

²²⁸ Bissa 2009, 113-114.

²²⁹ Bissa 2009, 113.

Oar production is a particularly difficult skill: since fir-trees are made up of multiple layers of wood, it is essential for oar-wrights to evenly shave off each layer of wood individually in order to make a strong oar. Improper oar production, and uneven layer-removal resulted in *kopai adokimoi* (or “unfit oarspars”), of which there were regular listings in the Athenian naval inventories of the fourth century.²³⁰ On account of this fact, Bissa’s argument that oar production typically occurred in-situ seems even more likely: Theophrastus indicates that each individual oar is made from a single tree in order to prevent it from snapping due to stress or force (*Hist. pl*5.1.7).²³¹ Silver-fir from Macedon and Southern Italy had the highest reputation, since they produced the longest length of straight timbers, with fewer knots, and were therefore better for producing oars. Even so, good pine was considered better for ship-building than poor fir, demonstrated by the presence of two pine-timber triremes in Aristophanes’ *Knights*, so it seems unlikely that the Athenian navy was built entirely from fir in the fifth century BCE.²³² Natural resins from fir and pine (i.e. pitch) were another product necessary for ship-building and maintenance, both in solid and liquid form, and while some types of wood could be replaced with another during construction, there was no alternative to this timber by-product that was essential for sealing and conditioning the hulls of ships.²³³ Considering this, it is clear that an almost-constant timber supply would be necessary during the Classical period on account of continuing warfare and large scale naval building programs.

The differing regional forests made the import of timber indispensable: Central Greece, which had few and overly depleted forests, imported construction timber primarily from Macedon and North-West Asia Minor. Since it was imported in such large amounts, wood for

²³⁰ Meiggs 1982, 119.

²³¹ Borza 1987, 34.

²³² Meiggs 1982, 119-120.

²³³ Borza 1987, 34.

construction was sold by measured volume, rather than by weight (free-wood) or unit (charcoal) volume.²³⁴ essentially, the rule of transport cost is that the unit of transport cost is inversely proportionate to the value per unit of weight and volume. When the unit value of a given quantity decreases, the cost of transport increases proportionately. Accounts from Delos (279 BCE) demonstrate that for a load of tiles shipped from Syros (by sea), 25.5% was added to the cost of the cargo on account of freight charges. Two years later, in 277 BCE, freight charges increased to 250% of the purchase price for a load of bricks, which have a much lower value than tiles for weight per unit. The costs for transport became so expensive for construction materials at Delos that the sanctuary administrators attempted to decrease it by directly regulating it. The above equation also applies to the transport of timber, which based on the weight and value, was extremely expensive to transport and necessitated extremely high freighting costs. Therefore it was difficult for the Athenians to transport, and to pay for the transportation of timber, on top of paying for exportation and (sometimes) exploitation rights. In some instances, Athenians would send shipbuilders out to the locations from which they were importing the timber for shipbuilding, and pay for the right to build their ships in foreign bays, rather than paying for freighting costs.²³⁵ There is some evidence that wood was floated down the rivers of Thrace to Asia Minor, however this is fairly unique and likely due to the large size of the rivers in the region. Not all areas of Greece were equipped to transport heavy loads of timber in this manner, and due to the poor quality of the roads and excessive weight of timber shipments, maritime transport was a necessity and a decisive factor in economic activity.²³⁶ Therefore, the fact that Andocides paid to transport the oar-spars, in addition to paying what it cost him to fell the trees

²³⁴ Bresson 2016, 74.

²³⁵ This seems to have been the case during the reign of Archelaus as *IG I³ 117* demonstrates.

²³⁶ Bresson 2016, 80-84, 85-86.

for the oar-spars, suggests that this particular endeavour would have been quite expensive.

Andocides charged less than the typical 5 drachmae an oar, and charged only what it cost him to fell the timber (And. 2.11), in conjunction with the high cost of shipping expensive and heavy materials such as timber, suggests that Andocides might have lost money on this particular venture, or might have barely broken even.

On account of the weight capabilities of many ships, transporting the large amounts of timber necessary for ship-building and construction would have presented some significant problems for the Athenian ship building programs. For instance, between 480-410 BCE, Athens maintained at least two hundred warships, and at times approached a naval fleet of 300 warships. Borza estimates that roughly 1,500 triremes were constructed during this period, calculating the average life-span of a trireme as 20 years; he also takes into account the 20 ships replaced each year due to deterioration, storm-loss, and battle-loss. Timber requirements for this scale of building regimen were huge: a single trireme required 170 oars, and kept 30 oars in reserve (*IG* II² 1611). Therefore at least 300,000 oars were necessary to sustain these ships over this 70 year period; from 357-356 BCE Athens had 46,600 oars in storage for its fleet of 233 triremes.²³⁷ It is impossible to determine exactly how many trees were felled to meet this requirement, as the amount of timber necessary for actual ship building can only be estimated. Ship-wrecks indicate hull thicknesses of anywhere between two and ten centimetres, and ancient sailors claim only to have been separated from the sea by two to four finger-widths. Borza suggests a general board thickness of roughly 1½ to 2” for hulls, planks, strakes, and decks, which would total approximately 2700-3600 square feet of timber, without the inclusion of keels, masts, framing, and parts for the bow and the stern.²³⁸

²³⁷ Meiggs 1982, 131.

²³⁸ Borza 1987, 34-35, see also Meiggs 1982.

Athenian Timber Trade: Economic Ramifications

In order to fully understand the economic (and political) ramifications of the Athenian-Macedonian timber trade, we must consider the nature of timber trade in Macedon proper. The ownership of the Macedonian forest land, and the granting of exploitation and export rights are essential for understanding the timber trade mechanism at Athens. It is largely agreed upon in scholarship that Macedon's forest-land was part of a royal monopoly.²³⁹ Moreover, Bissa argues that Macedon used a controlled leasing system in conjunction with this monopoly: exploitation and export rights were granted solely by the king, often through some form of treaty or decree. A controlled leasing system can be inferred from Alexander's ban on timber sales from Mt. Dysoron,²⁴⁰ which still presumably allowed for local private use of the woodland. Controlled leasing means that the king would essentially "rent out" the rights to export timber: whoever was hoping to export timber from Macedon would have to pay a fee to export the timber, while also paying the contracted workers employed by the king to exploit the land and the timber, paying for it to be felled, processed, and transported to a port for exportation. Presumably, exploitation rights were reserved for Macedonian contractors, whereas export rights could be granted to either states or individuals, as demonstrated by Perdiccas' treaty with Athens that allowed the exclusive export of oars to Athens, but not of all timber and timber by-products (pitch) (*IG I³ 89.31*). Yet, this treaty did not grant exploitation or exportation rights to Athens alone, but rather granted

²³⁹ Bissa 2009, 112-115.

²⁴⁰ See Hammond 1988, 382-383 for the inscription proper, and 383ff. for discussion of the inscription.

some rights to Athenians under controlled leasing. Amyntas' provision of export rights to the Chalcidian League for all timber related products (RO 12.9-18) also indicates a controlled leasing system. In both cases Chalcis and Athens were only granted export rights of pitch and shipbuilding materials with the exception of silver-fir, but not exploitation rights. Therefore Macedon's controlled leasing system was not a closed royal monopoly: the king had essentially total control of production (i.e. the felling and processing of timber), exploitation, and exportation, but in this way managed to avoid the cost of a large number of public employees, saving the kingdom significant sums of money in public finances.²⁴¹

The controlled leasing system employed by Macedonian royalty is what makes Andocides' procurement of timber for oars so unusual. According to Bissa, Andocides' case may have been exceptional due to his *xenia* with Archelaus. She argues that Andocides' situation was particularly unique, demonstrating that his position as a royal *xenos* gave him access to aspects of Macedon's controlled leasing policy that were typically reserved only for Macedonian citizens.²⁴² It is specifically his position as a *xenos* that allowed him access to unlimited exploitation rights in this case. The example illustrates the enormous impact *xenia* had on economic transactions between two partners. Not only was Andocides given export rights, which was fairly typical of the controlled leasing system at Macedon, he was also granted exploitation rights. A grant of exploitation rights was significantly more uncommon than a grant of export rights: what makes this instance so exceptional, is that Andocides received a grant without limitations, and was able to export the timber from Macedon to Samos, presumably before it was shaved into oars (And. 2.11). Bissa argues that Andocides' emphasis is not on the permission

²⁴¹ See Bissa 2009, 112-115; Meiggs 1982, 123, 126-127; Borza 1987, 39.

²⁴² Bissa 2009, 112-114.

itself, but rather on the rights to use unlimited quantities. As far as we know, any trader could receive export rights from a controlled leasing system, but exploitation rights were likely reserved for Macedonian contractors alone. Furthermore, the permission to export the oars, unshaven, to Samos supports the argument that oar-production was normally done in-situ, and suggests that there was probably a pool of export oar-makers in Macedon and in employment of the king.²⁴³

The date of Andocides' procurement of oars for the Athenian fleet at Samos is 411 BCE, a particularly problematic time since the 400 had taken control of Athens at this time (And. 2.11). Presumably, regular supply lines to the democratic Athenian fleet at Samos were stopped on account of their resistance against the oligarchic regime of the 400 who had taken control at Athens. The Athenian fleets at Samos could not expect their typical supplies from Athens and were likely in desperate need of timber for ship building and other supplies for sustenance. The Athenian fleet at Samos did not recognize the government of the 400 at Athens as legitimate. The fleet at Samos behaved like a *polis* in exile, even holding their own elections of generals. As such, the fleet could not expect any supplies or reinforcements from Athens. Andocides' delivery of oars, corn, and bronze would have been of extreme aid and value to the democratic fleet at Samos.²⁴⁴ These circumstances are in large part what made Andocides' procurement of timber for Athens so valuable. At this time, the Athenians were in the midst of the Peloponnesian War, and were also struggling with the emergence of the rule of an oligarchic clique of the 400 in Athens. Relations with Macedon were not at their strongest. But Archelaus proved to be a much friendlier ally to the Athenians than his predecessor Perdiccas. Yet, the oligarchic coup at Athens

²⁴³ Bissa 2009, 112-114, Meiggs 1982, 123, 126-127; Borza 1987, 39.

²⁴⁴ Rhodes 2006, 65-67.

made the procurement of timber particularly problematic, cutting off regular supply lines to the democratic Athenian fleet at Samos. Utilising Thucydides, we can estimate that there were roughly 82 triremes at Samos at this time that would have been in need of new oars and supplies (Thuc. 8.79.2). Each of these triremes needed 170 oars, and 30 reserve oars at any given time,²⁴⁵ which amounts to a total of 16,400 individual oars in order to fully outfit this particular fleet. Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence for the exact number of oars that Andocides provided for this fleet. Yet, the emphasis on unlimited exploitation rights indicates that it must have been a significant number. At his price of 5 drachma per oar-spar (And. 2.11) it would have cost the Athenians 1000 drachma to fully outfit each individual trireme, or a total of 82,000 drachmae for the entire fleet (roughly 14 talents). If we presume that Andocides sold the oars for half the typical price and provided enough oars to replace 10% (1,640) of the oars of the fleet (which seems to be reasonable, considering the lack of any actual numerical data), it would have amounted to a gift of 0.7 talents for the fleet (or 4,100 drachmas).

Andocides emphasizes that the price for which he was able to sell the Athenians these oars as only what it cost him to fell the timber, which suggests that the typical price of 5 drachma an oar was significantly more expensive than the low price Andocides was charged. Furthermore, the fact that he exported the oar-spars to Samos suggests that he saved Athenians additional expenses. It also seems that Andocides did not charge the Athenians the cost of exportation or transport. As we have seen previously in this chapter, transport costs for a product as heavy and valuable as timber would have been exceptionally high. It is typical that Athenians would build their own ships in foreign *naupegia*, paying for that service, rather than the cost of shipping the timber back to her city. As previously discussed, oar manufacturing is a precise and

²⁴⁵ Borza 1987, 34.

intricate process, and was therefore likely to be expensive. This is further supported by the Macedonian king's unwillingness to personally employ an outfit of oar manufacturers on his land, opting instead to contract out to a pool of oar-makers who would be paid by the person or state that had been granted exploitation and export rights by the king's controlled leasing system. The Cypriot kings held a similar controlled leasing policy over their forest land, declining to cut down and export the timber themselves since they already paid for the care and husbandry of the land, choosing rather to contract out and charge for the exploitation and export of their products (Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.8.1).²⁴⁶

The nature of oar production and the tendency of controlled leasing systems to opt for contracts and permissions for exploitation and export rights indicates the expensive nature of timber production and trade. Consequently, Andocides seems to have done the Athenians an enormous favour and made a significant contribution to their timber trade. Considering the costs of exportation, transport, or renting a *naupegia*, Andocides likely provided the oars to the Athenians at Samos at a seemingly much lower cost than usual. Samos was an island and she was also a producer of ships, using substantial amounts of pine instead of silver-fir (Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 5.7.1). Since there is evidence that other kingdoms (i.e. Cypriot kingdoms) operated on a similar controlled leasing system to that of Macedon,²⁴⁷ it is likely that there was a pool of oar manufacturers available in Samos to aid the Athenians in shaving and finishing the oars for their fleet.

Since we do not know exactly how many oars Andocides provided the Athenians or at what price, it is unfortunately impossible to quantify his *xenia*-based benefaction to the Athenian

²⁴⁶ Bissa 2009, 112-116. Timber was clearly an expensive resource, since it cost 131 drachmae for a ship's ram alone in the fourth century BCE, and a single trireme necessitated 35 tonnes of timber to fully construct; for more regarding the cost of shipbuilding see Casson 1971, 85 fn. 42; and Bissa 2009, 119 fn. 14.

²⁴⁷ Bissa 2009, 115-116.

fleet at Samos. Yet, in light of the political and diplomatic circumstances at Athens at the time of this benefaction, it is clear that Andocides provided a significant economic and political service to the *polis*. For, due to Macedon's volatile political nature, the effects of the Peloponnesian War, and the influence of the oligarchy of the 400 on Athenian supply chains, the Athenian fleet at Samos was unable to maintain the constant uninterrupted supply of timber that was necessary in this particularly risky historical situation. The Athenian democrats were heavily dependent on the procurement of timber through individual actions: Andocides' procurement of timber for oars for the fleet at Samos demonstrates both the quantitative and the qualitative effect of *xenia* on the mechanism of timber trade in Classical Athenian economies.

Conclusion

This study of the role of ritualized interpersonal relationships in Classical Athenian economies has produced a number of results. Firstly, we have seen that the theoretical analysis of ancient Greek economies is a complex and burgeoning field in Classical Studies, proving to be both a challenging and enlightening lens through which to study the ancient Greek world. Secondly, I have demonstrated that *xenia* and *proxenia* are significant and important socio-cultural institutions in the Classical Greek world, affecting societies and the rules that govern them. Finally, I have attempted to take these two distinct subjects in conjunction in the hopes of finding a means to study the effect of *xenia* on Classical Athenian economies by conducting a case study on Andocides' *On the Return*, and by focusing on the mechanisms of the grain trade and timber trade in Classical Athens.

It is difficult not only to measure ancient Athenian economies on a quantitative scale, but also to determine their overall structure and qualitative features. Unlike in modern economies, the ancient Greeks were not overly focused on analysis, quantification, and overall understanding of economic performance and structure, and therefore have left us with little evidence for interpretation or extrapolation. Furthermore, our modern day conceptions of economies and economics often cloud our judgement and affect our understanding of those of the ancient Greek world. Drawing on North's New Institutional Economics as my methodology for this project, I have endeavoured to provide an understanding of the relationship between structural determinants of economies (in this case, *xenia*) and *performance* within various economic spheres of trade and exchange, specifically grain and timber. The case study conducted on Andocides *xenia*-based economic services to Athens provides a paradigm for studying *xenia* in

conjunction with ancient Economic theory: Andocides' ritualized interpersonal relationships with Archelaus and Evagoras have demonstrated that there is an important connection between *xenia* and the trade mechanisms of Classical Athenian economies. These exemplary *xenia*-based economic services demonstrate that large scale trade endeavours could be and were often facilitated through ritualized interpersonal relationships, and that such large scale trade endeavours could not only affect the structure of an economy (as a structural determinant) but could also affect economic performance quantitatively. The honorific decrees for Archelaus (*IG I³ 117*) and Evagoras (*IG I³ 113*) for trade-related benefactions to Athens demonstrate the official recognition of these services through a formal political institution (i.e. *proxenia*), which substantiates and corroborates the importance of *xenia*-based trade services on Classical Athenian economies.

Based on the large number of *proxenia* (and other honorific) decrees for trade-related services that survive from Classical Athens, it is obvious that such services as those procured by Andocides could not have been uncommon in Classical Athens. The breadth of Classical Athenian economies is much wider than typically imagined, and the roles of social institutions as structural determinants are integral to the overall function and nature of Classical Athenian economies. Andocides was able to provide a large amount of grain to Athens from Cyprus on account of his personal relationship with Evagoras of Salamis. Any provision of or benefaction of grain was essential to Athens, especially during the harsh times of the Peloponnesian War and the oligarchic coup of the 400 in 411 BCE, when typical supply lines for the democratic Athenian fleet at Samos were inaccessible. As my analysis on the Athenian grain trade (Chapter 4) has shown, Athens' severe reliance on imported grain is not to be underestimated: based on

the number calculated from Tod II.196,²⁴⁸ we can see that Athens would take whatever amount of grain she could possibly get, from wherever she could possibly get it to feed her large population. In fact, the smallest amount of grain contributed on that list is 900 *medimnoi* from Cyrene to the Cnossians (Tod II.196). It is clear then that Andocides' contribution of presumably somewhere between 129,000-207,000 *medimnoi* of wheat to Athens from Cyprus was not insubstantial (at 27kg/*medimnos* of wheat),²⁴⁹ especially considering that I was only able to calculate the amount of grain for the 14 ships mentioned, and not for the remainder that were said to be still on the way to the Piraeus. Such a substantial amount of grain could feed 25,055 or 10% of Athenians, and accounted for anywhere from 10-16% of the total amount of grain (1,250,000 *medimnoi*) Athens imported annually to sustain her population. Even if Andocides was able to procure and provide this grain to sell at Athens at a price of 5 drachmae a measure (only one drachma less than the probable market price of 6 drachmae per measure during the food crisis of 411-410 BCE), he saved the Athenians a total of 21 talents through this benefaction.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, Andocides' *xenia*-based relationship in Cyprus demonstrates his high level of political power, which he is able to transfer to the Athenian political sphere in order to 'secretly' orchestrate the shipment of grain from Cyprus to Athens. Since we have other evidence within other speeches and inscriptions for similar benefactions (although not always as

²⁴⁸ A total of 775,000 *medimnoi* of grain from Cyrene to 53 different *poleis*.

²⁴⁹ These numbers are different if the shipment was barley, since it weighs approximately 31/kg per *medimnos* the total amount of barley delivered would be somewhere between 112,000-180,000 *medimnoi*.

²⁵⁰ The full calculation can be seen in Chapter 4: Athenian Grain Trade: Grain and Andocides. This calculation is based off an estimate typical price of grain at 5 drachmae a measure, based on Bresson 2016, 439. I chose 5 drachmae per measure as the typical price since we see in SIG3 354 that 6 drachmae a measure was considered expensive by Classical Athenian standards, and in SIG3 304 that Heraclides of Salamis was convinced to sell his grain to the Athenians at 5 drachmae a measure, a seemingly more reasonable price than it was being sold for in the agora at this time. Therefore, if Andocides provided 125,271 *medimnoi* of grain (an average number based on my calculations for the same section) at 5 drachma a measure, the shipment Andocides provided would have had a value of 626,355 talents. If the grain in the agora was being sold at a price that was even 1 drachma higher during the food crisis of 411-410 BCE, a shipment of grain of that many *medimnoi* would have been worth 741,626 drachmae. Based on these calculations, Andocides saved the Athenians 125,271 drachmae, or 21 talents.

sizeable), there is room for further studies regarding the effect of *xenia* on Classical Athenian economies.

Andocides' procurement of timber from Macedon for the Athenian fleet at Samos is equally impressive (Chapter 5). As with grain, Athens was unable to fulfill her own needs and demands for timber through her resources at home. Therefore, we once again find Athens almost entirely dependent on imported timber in order to build and maintain her navy, especially during the Classical period. Thanks to his inherited *xenia* with King Archelaus of Macedon (And. 2.20-21), Andocides was able to provide a significant number of oars to the Athenian fleet at Samos. According to Thucydides there were 82 triremes at Samos at this time, each trireme needing 170 oars with 30 in reserve at all times, which amounts to a total of 16,400 oars necessary to maintain this particular fleet. Unfortunately, Andocides does not mention the exact number of oars that he provided to this fleet; nevertheless, even if Andocides replaced only 10% of the oars for this fleet, he still provided a total of 1,640 oars to the Athenians. This is no small number. As we have seen in his speech, each oar could have sold for 5 drachma: 1,640 oars would thus typically cost 8,200 drachma. Yet, Andocides sold the oars to the Athenians at a much lower price than was typical (And. 2.11). If we assume that Andocides charged the Athenians half the normal amount, the Athenians saved 4,100 drachmae (approximately 0.7 talents). Furthermore, thanks to his *xenia*, Archelaus allowed Andocides to access Macedonian timber resources through a channel that was normally inaccessible to the Athenians. Andocides was able to procure not only exportation rights from the Macedonian controlled leasing system, which would be procured by any individual or *polis* typically achieved through either payment or royal decree, but he was also able to procure unlimited exploitation rights of Macedonian timber resources. Andocides' ability to access exploitation rights of Macedonian forest-land is an exceptional incident, since

under the Macedonian controlled leasing system only Macedonian contractors were able to exploit timber resources. Andocides' *xenia* opened up an entirely different channel to access resources, which is what allowed him to export the oars from Macedon to Samos unshaven, and is also what allowed him to charge the Athenians "only what it cost him to fell" the timber (And. 2.11). This particular incident, as presented by Andocides, demonstrates the extreme reach and exceptional power of *xenia* as a social institution within both the political and economic realms of Classical Athenian society.

The honorific decree to Archelaus of Macedon discussed in Chapter 3 in which Athens grants the king of Macedon *proxenia* for his services to the *polis* demonstrates the recognition of the importance of such services to the Athenian state. Athens felt the provision of oars by Archelaus to the Athenian *polis* important enough to be formally recognized in an official decree and grant of *proxenia*. Even if the benefaction mentioned was not the one discussed by Andocides, this grant of *proxenia* for Archelaus demonstrates the importance of this type of economic service to Athens. Why should Andocides' procurement of oars from Macedon not be considered of similar importance? Decrees such as *IG I³ 117* make evident Athens' focus on trade related services, and the level to which she was dependant on benefactions from foreign entities in order to maintain many aspects of her society. The formalization of *proxenia* decrees establishes the official relationship between social institutions and economies. *Proxenia*, as well as *xenia* prove themselves, through such decrees, to be important aspects of, as well as determinants of economic structure within Classical Athenian economies.

These two particular cases demonstrate that *xenia* has, in both its informal and formal manifestations, an effect of Classical Athenian economies. In the grand scheme of the Classical Greek world, these examples from Andocides can seem unimportant or insignificant. Yet,

considering that there are 84 extant *proxenia* decrees from the Classical period, and likely many more examples of *xenia* within other textual and literary sources (such as the orators, or historians) it seems clear that there is a significant relationship between *xenia* as a social institution and Classical Athenian economies. Through extrapolation of what little quantitative evidence remains to us from Classical Athens, we can endeavour to construct a paradigm for studying Classical Athenian economic performance in relation to structural determinants, such as *xenia*, and try to gauge their overall effects on Classical Athenian economies and the trade mechanisms that function within them. Even though the issue at hand is still largely unexplored, this project is a means through which to examine fully and establish a paradigm of functionality for *xenia* and *proxenia* in relation to current ancient economic theoretical models.

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