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Canada: Multiculturalism, Religion, and Accommodation

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Arts

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CANADA: MULTICULTURALISM, RELIGION, AND ACCOMMODATION

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by

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Graduate Program in Media Studies

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Abstract

In this thesis, I use critical discourse analysis to examine discursive constructions of identity (individual, religious, and national) within the framework of Canadian multiculturalism as they are constructed in two Canadian newspapers (the Toronto Star and the Gazette) between 2003 and 2013. I am particularly interested in how understandings of multiculturalism delimit the boundaries of belonging for religious practitioners in Canada. In chapter one, I establish the academic context of this thesis and give a brief outline of the history of Canadian multiculturalism. In chapter two, I focus on definitions and assessments of Canadian multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants who belong to religious minority groups. In chapter three, I examine identity and belonging through the lens of “Canadian values,” including tolerance and secularism. In chapter four, I examine the construction of the religious other as presented in discourse strands about religious accommodation, with a particular focus on Muslim veiling.

Key Words

Canada, multiculturalism, religion, secularism, immigration, Muslim, veiling, critical discourse analysis (CDA), national identity, reasonable accommodation, minorities
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I dedicate this thesis to my family. To my parents, Allen and Catherine Bonnis, thank you for your unwavering support in all I do. A person couldn’t ask for more love, kindness, and respect than you have given me in this lifetime. To my husband, Michael, I am truly grateful to have you in my life.
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Chapter One

1 The Canadian Context

A Canadian is someone who keeps asking the question, “What is a Canadian?”

Irving Layton

I began this thesis with the question, “How does a multicultural society reconcile the religious differences of its members?” I chose to look at newspaper texts that examined this topic based on the premise that the discourses constructed therein both reflect and inform discourses within Canadian society at large. Canadian multiculturalism proposes a difficult balance between the protection and recognition of individual identities and the construction and maintenance of an overarching national identity. The integration of minority religious practitioners particularly demonstrates this difficulty. In this thesis, I examine texts produced in the Toronto Star and the Gazette (Montreal) over an eleven-year period beginning in 2003. The texts examined are about multiculturalism, religion, and accommodation, but ultimately they are about Canadian identity—they delimit belonging.

1.1 The Making of a Multicultural Nation

On October 8, 1971, in response to recommendations made in the fourth report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau made a statement to the House of Commons in which he announced that the government would adopt all of the commission’s recommendations. Trudeau outlined the role of the federal government:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized. Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society. Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity. Fourth, the government will continue to assist
immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (‘Canadian Culture’ 8546)

Trudeau concluded that the government’s policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” was one based on “the conscious support of individual freedom of choice,” a freedom that needed to be actively “fostered and pursued” because, he said, “if freedom of choice is in danger for some ethnic groups, it is in danger for all” (‘Canadian Culture’ 8546). And thus, Canada became the first country in the world to adopt multiculturalism as an official policy.1 In 1982, multiculturalism became constitutionally entrenched through section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which reads: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” In 1988, the policy of multiculturalism became law when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney passed the Canadian Multiculturalism Act.

The Charter and the Multiculturalism Act established the political and civil rights of Canadians and the ethos through which they are to be interpreted. By design they also provide a foundation for Canadian national identity in the expression of a core of common values. Multiculturalism is a central component in the creation, maintenance, and recognition of identities for Canadians as Canadians. Understanding that cultural self-conceptions can be multiple and competing, Canadian multiculturalism attempts to recognize the equality of individual identifications within an overarching construct of Canadian national identity. This is often a difficult reconciliation, as is sometimes made evident by the language used to describe it:

Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. . . . Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them to integrate into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs. (‘Canadian Multiculturalism’)

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1 Will Kymlicka characterizes the 1971 multiculturalism policy as a “political bargain” through which Canada became a multicultural nation within a bilingual framework, and “in return for not opposing efforts
Canadian multiculturalism proposes that the protection of individual identity is an essential element in the construction of national identity. Among the particular identities that mark the multicultural makeup of Canadians is religious identity. The Charter lists “freedom of conscience and religion” (2a) under “Fundamental Freedoms,” and again under “Equality Rights.” The latter section states, “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on . . . religion” (15.1). In the preamble to the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, these rights are reiterated and given context within the ideology of multiculturalism:

AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada. (par. 8)

Freedom of religion is a fundamental right; its practitioners are protected against discrimination by federal law, and their diversity is recognized as characteristic of Canadian multiculturalism. In Canada, no individual’s rights or freedoms are absolute; the rights and freedoms of others inherently limit them. Further, there is no hierarchy of rights. In a plural society, it is perhaps of little surprise that rights, including religious rights, sometimes conflict and/or compete with other rights. Multiculturalism demands that these conflicts be resolved while maintaining the equality of citizens and their rights.

Initially, the new legal obligations brought into force by the Charter appeared to cause little controversy about the validity of the rights of religious believers. Over the years, religious rights claims made their way to the Supreme Court of Canada, requiring the Court to clarify such concepts as “freedom” in the 1985 *R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.* judgment:

Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others,

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2 In *R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.*, the Court struck down the Lord’s Day Act of 1906, which prohibited the sale of goods on Sundays, on the ground of the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion: “The power to compel, on religious grounds, the universal observance of the day of rest preferred by one religion is not consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multi-cultural heritage of Canadians recognized in s. 27 of the Charter.”
no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs of his conscience. What may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or the state acting at their behest, may not, for religious reasons, be imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view. The Charter safeguards religious minorities from the threat of the “tyranny of the majority.” (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., pars. 95-96)

The idea that the majority religion (or nonreligion) might be a “tyranny” from which religious minorities require protection is an important consideration in this thesis. Throughout my analysis of the newspaper texts curated for this thesis, I have paid careful attention to designations of majority and minority within the texts and noted an emphasis on visible-minority immigrants, majority values, and minority obligations.

In 2004 in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, the Court defined religion as “about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfillment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith” (par. 2). According to the Supreme Court, religious belief/practice is protected for the individual and not as a collective enterprise dictated by external religious officials. Freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials. This understanding is consistent with a personal or subjective understanding of freedom of religion. As such, a claimant need not show some sort of objective religious obligation, requirement or precept to invoke freedom of religion. It is the religious or spiritual essence of an action, not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance, that attracts protection. (Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem par. 3)

3 In Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, the appellants, all Orthodox Jews, successfully appealed a lower-court ruling that had attempted to ban them from building succahs on their balconies in observance of Succot. The majority decision written by Justice Frank Iacobucci acknowledged the rights of religious freedom under the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter and noted, “In a multiethnic and multicultural country such as ours, which accentuates and advertises its modern record of respecting cultural diversity and human rights and of promoting tolerance of religious and ethnic minorities—and is in many ways an example thereof for other societies—the argument of the respondent that nominal, minimally intruded-upon aesthetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the appellants’ religious freedom is unacceptable. Indeed, mutual tolerance is one of the cornerstones of all democratic societies. Living in a community that attempts to maximize human rights invariably requires openness to and recognition of the rights of others” (par. 87).
Legal protection of religious practice is notably assigned to the individual—religion is a personal and subjective observance. This complicates understandings of what qualifies as religion in placing the determination of religious authenticity in the sincere beliefs of the individual. Religious identity most often comprises both individual understandings and group membership, and so while legal religious accommodations are resolved for individuals, they are popularly (and perhaps rightly) understood as applying to groups. Further complicating understandings of what constitutes religion is how closely tied religious practices are to culture and ethnicity. These complications are made particularly evident in my analysis in chapter four of discourses that take up Muslim veiling, where in some discourse strands the wearing of the veil is determined as a cultural or ethnic practice and not as a religious one.

In 2006, the Court adopted the language of “reasonable accommodation” in the adjudication of Charter claims. In the judgment for Multani v. Commission scolaire,4 “reasonable accommodation” is traced “through the context of human rights legislation of private disputes” to “all cases of direct or indirect discrimination” and then to “all persons governed by human rights legislation” (par. 130). Justice Louise Charron, in the majority decision, wrote:

> A total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious practices do not merit the same protection as others. Accommodating G and allowing him to wear his kirpan under certain conditions demonstrates the importance that our society attaches to protecting freedom of religion and to showing respect for its minorities. (par. 79, emphasis added)

Though in Multani the Court was clear that a “duty of reasonable accommodation” was being used analogously (par. 53), the phrase soon “began to seep into public discourse in Canada whenever disputes about the practices of religious minorities were at issue,” and so “the legal framework of reasonable accommodation was transposed into a public framework for discussion” (Beaman, “Exploring” 1-3). The term “Reasonable accommodation” was subsequently applied without distinction in political, media, and public discourses to all varieties of claims by religious practitioners, including those made

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4 In 2001, Multani, at the time a 12-year-old student at Ste. Catherine Laboure elementary school in LaSalle, dropped his kirpan in the schoolyard. When his parents and the school board failed to reach an accommodation, the case ended up in court.
of public institutions and private organizations and businesses, whether they sought exceptions, specialized programming, subsidies, or the exclusion of majority practices from the public domain (Bouchard & Taylor 47-60). Discourses about religious accommodation were reframed around the concept of “reasonableness” and began to focus succinctly on the question of the limits of accommodation. Questions about reasonableness went beyond the assessments of claims and soon came to be applied to the claimants themselves, about whom the query was made, “Are the practices of religious minorities themselves reasonable?” (Bouchard & Taylor 50-53). Debates on reasonable accommodation were extensively taken up in the media, particularly in Quebec. In an analysis of 2,259 texts curated from five Quebec dailies between March 1, 2006, and April 30, 2007, Maryse Potvin noted that in February 2007, in the five newspapers analyzed, more than 275 event-based articles, editorials, and columns were published over the course of twenty-seven out of the twenty-eight days considered, including 119 articles in the week of 1-7 February. Coverage ranged from fourteen articles in Le Soleil to thirty-seven in La Presse. Twenty-six articles appeared on 7 February alone, while eighty-six were published between 8 and 14 February. Without even counting the impact of other print and electronic media, such as radio, television, the Internet, magazines, and so forth, this represents an average of more than ten items per day among five newspapers. (145)

Due in part to the prevalence of discourses about the reasonable accommodation of religious minorities in the press, the debate began to be popularly assessed as a “crisis” (Potvin). By February of 2007, the debates had become so heated in Quebec that Premier Jean Charest announced the formation of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences “in response to public discontent concerning reasonable accommodation” (Bouchard & Taylor 18) and appointed prominent Quebec academics Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor to head it up. The appointment of the commission also, at least in part, was an attempt to remove the issue from the public policy agenda for the upcoming 2008 election. The commission’s mandate included taking stock of accommodation practices in Quebec and

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6 Popularly referred to as the Bouchard-Taylor Commission after its cochairs, Charles Taylor and Gérard Bouchard.
formulating recommendations that would ensure such practices “conform to Québec’s values as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society” (Bouchard & Taylor 17). The idea that group membership is identifiable in shared values is an important concept within this thesis, particularly as it relates to the construction of Canadian national identity. In chapter three, I examine how national identity is constructed through ideas of shared values and how these values are used to exclude some persons from full membership.

In 2008, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission published its 310-page report. In the report, the Commission identified 73 cases of reasonable accommodation reported in the media since 1985. More than half of these cases occurred between March 2006 and June 2007—a period that the report termed “a time of turmoil” (Bouchard & Taylor 53). The report ultimately concluded that the accommodation “crisis” was rather a “crisis of perception,” fuelled by “media enthusiasm” and anxieties about “cultural identities” (Bouchard & Taylor 18). But the report did little to assuage fears within Quebec; the crisis of accommodation was well established in popular imagination. The news media, both in Quebec and across Canada, continued to report accommodation cases. Two events in particular, the tabling of Bill 94 and then of Bill 60, received substantial

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7 Stuart Hall explains national culture as “a discourse—a way of constructing meaning which influences and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves. National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify” (“Identity” 613).
8 It is important to note that the majority of cases reported did not require legal intervention, and nor were they “accommodation” in any real sense. For example, one of the events reported in March 2007 concerned a sugarhouse in Montérégie. The press reported the event as follows: “Muslims arrived one morning at the sugarhouse, which can accommodate 750 people, and demanded that the menu be altered to conform to their religious standard. All of the other customers were therefore obliged at noon that day to consume pea soup without ham and pork-free pork and beans (this prohibition was apparently subsequently extended to other sugarhouses). In the afternoon, the same Muslims entered the crowded dance hall and interrupted the festivities under way (music and dancing) to recite their prayers. The customers in the dance hall were expelled from the sugarhouse” (Bouchard & Taylor 57). In reality, the menu changes had been prearranged and applied only to the group. The prayer room had also been reserved in advance (Bouchard & Taylor 72). Clearly, this event was no more an example of accommodation than would be any group dietary request—the exception is in the designation of motive.
9 A search using Proquest—Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies and the search terms: (accommodation) and (religion) produced 1,120 results between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2013 (250 in the Gazette and 98 in the Toronto Star).
10 An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions, 1st Sess., 39th Leg., Quebec, 2010.
11 Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests.
Introduced by the Quebec Liberal Party in 2010, Bill 94 proposed that both civil servants and those receiving their services must “show their face during the delivery of services” (“Explanatory Notes”). The services outlined by the bill included school boards and universities, health and social services, and daycares subsidized under the Educational Childcare Act (“Purpose and Definitions,” section 3 par.1-3).

In May 2013, the Parti Québécois (PQ) announced that it would table a Quebec Charter of Values Bill (Bill 60) in the fall of 2013. On September 10, 2013, it made good on that promise and the promises of its party leader, Pauline Marois, who had campaigned that if elected she would address the issues of secularism and reasonable accommodation. Bernard Drainville, the PQ cabinet member and minister responsible for democratic institutions and active citizenship, tabled the bill, which in its “Explanatory Notes” section stated its purpose as “establish[ing] a Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests.” The bill also restricted “wearing religious objects that overtly indicate a religious affiliation” for public servants (Bill 60). The PQ additionally posted a diagram on its website13 to illustrate “exemples de signes ostentatoires qui ne seraient pas permis au personnel de l’État.”14 Banned religious symbols included Christian crosses (evaluated according to size), Sikh turbans, Jewish kippas, and Muslim headscarves. Five years after the Bouchard-Taylor Commission submitted its report, worries about religious accommodation continued to hold a prominent place in public concern.

The newspaper texts that I examined for this thesis represent a small fraction of texts produced about religious accommodation in the Toronto Star and the Gazette for the time period chosen. While I would argue that all discourses about religious accommodation in Canada are influenced by ideas of multiculturalism, the texts that I

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13 http://www.nosvaleurs.gouv.qc.ca—the poster has since been taken down. NB “ostentatoire” is variously translated as “ostentatious,” “conspicuous,” and “overt.”

14 See appendix C for poster.
curated where chosen because they speak directly to the subject. Because the search terms that I used were deliberately general and because the time period of 11 years is significant, the texts that I examined relate a long list of events. While the particularities of the events covered add to the discourses produced, I am interested in discourses or topics produced across the events. It is my assertion that the texts examined reveal an ongoing process of identity negotiation. Again and again, the texts examined address the question, “What is a Canadian?”

1.2 Literature Review

Multiculturalism

Canada is the birthplace of official state multiculturalism. While multiculturalism is generally well regarded among Canadian citizens, it has since its inception as a policy in 1971 been much debated in academic circles, especially within Canada itself.

Will Kymlicka, perhaps the best-known advocate of the Canadian multiculturalism model, characterizes multiculturalism as “first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, grounded in human rights ideals, to replace earlier uncivil and undemocratic relations of hierarchy and exclusion” (“Multiculturalism” 9). Paul Bramadat echoes this sentiment: “At the philosophical level, multiculturalism can function as a critical discourse that radically challenges existing and entrenched systems of power. . . . [It] quietly undermines the notion that any ethnic or national group (or cluster of groups) can claim supremacy in this country” (“Beyond Christian Canada: Religion and Ethnicity in a Multicultural Society” 10). Where multiculturalism is endorsed, it is most often advocated as an emancipatory and egalitarian project.

In “Race” and Ethnicity in Canada (2013), Satzewich and Liodakis assert that “until the introduction of the 1971 policy, Canada—although a multicultural society in terms of demography—was dominated by the hegemonic British and the French cultural norms, and the Canadian state actively promoted conformity to these norms by the rest of the population” (161). From its inception to the current day, critics of Canada’s multiculturalism program have argued that it has done little to break the hegemony of these two populations.
Early critics of multiculturalism policy very often asserted that the emphasis was too much on depoliticized activities that were nonthreatening to British economic, political, and cultural hegemony. In 1982, Roberts and Clifton argued in “Exploring the Ideology of Canadian Multiculturalism” that Canadian multiculturalism policy did little more than support “symbolic ethnicity” with its “sponsorship of ethnic conferences, presses, festivals and the like” (91). Other critics argued that an emphasis on the identification of “cultural barriers” served to preclude the identification of structural barriers (Bolaria & Li; Moodley), and so multiculturalism policies had little effect on the daily struggles of minorities. In 1980, Daiva Stasiulus argued in “The Political Structuring of Ethnic Community Action: A Reformulation” that “the relative insignificance of the state’s attendance to the real and articulated interests of Canada’s ‘non-charter’ ethnic groups” is made evident in a lack of funding or autonomy and in vague mandates (33), and that multiculturalism policy in fact had little interest in or effect on significant social change (34). For Stasiulus, multiculturalism policy was not only ineffective in promoting egalitarian change but also allowed the government to distract ethnic minorities from where change was needed:

\[\text{Canadian society—which continues to manifest a clear ethnic hierarchy—was neutralized within the official ideology of multiculturalism by the emphasis placed on mere cultural differences. In practice, the modification of the ethnic ideology by the state involves a subtle process of skewing the original goals of subordinate ethnic groups, such as the reduction of social inequality, by emphasizing tangential goals, such as the retention of different cultural identities. (34)}\]

Four Canadian multiculturalism critics who are very often cited emerged in the 1990s: Reginald Bibby (Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada; 1990), Neil Bissoondath (Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada; 1994), Richard Gwyn (Nationalism Without Walls: the Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian; 1995), and J. L. Granatstein (Who Killed Canadian History?: 1998). Bibby’s concern is that multiculturalism promotes “widespread acceptance of relativism” wherein “all viewpoints are equally valid and . . . all pursuits are equally noble” (9). Moreover, he argues, “in its zeal to promote coexistence, Canada may find itself a world leader in promoting the breakdown of group life and the abandonment of the pursuit of the best” (15). Bissoondath suggests that multiculturalism offers no limits to the accommodation of
different cultural practices (139), that it fails to encourage “oneness of vision,” and that it is “aimed instead at encouraging division” (43). Bissoondath further warns that “multiculturalism has made us fearful of defining acceptable boundaries. . . . And so we find ourselves in danger of accepting, in its name, a slide into ethical chaos” (142). Multiculturalism, he argues, “has failed us. In eradicating the centre, in evoking uncertainty as to what and who is a Canadian, it has diminished all sense of Canadian values, i.e. of what is a Canadian” (Bissoondath 65). Gwyn focuses on English Canadians, who, he claims, are “the country’s principal architects” (115).

Multiculturalism endangers the success of the nation by alienating English Canadians, who might just decide “that the community isn’t their community any longer” (279). The danger, according to Gwyn, is that the “centre” of Canadian community formed in “all the habits, assumptions, and values accumulated and shaped over the decades by people who happened, principally, to be white males of European origin” is being eroded, and “without ever stating it, perhaps without being aware of it, more and more Canadians want to take from that centre all the while taking for granted that the centre will always be there for them” (240). Granatstein argues that multiculturalism is eradicating the teaching of Canadian history and spreading the idea among immigrants and native-born Canadians that Canada, particularly English-speaking Canada, has no culture and identity of its own (91). He claims that “a combination of federal multiculturalism, ignorance of the values of and lack of understanding of their new homeland, and the practices of progressive education have prevented immigrants from becoming what they ought to have become: Canadians” (17). What these critics have in common is a belief that there is a fixed and definable Canadian identity that is both in need of and deserving of protection.

The Library of Parliament publication “Canadian Multiculturalism” names Bissoondath, Granatstein, and Gwyn as the most influential critics of Canadian Multiculturalism (Dewing 11). Kymlicka credits Gwyn and Bissoondath with intensifying the debate on multiculturalism in the mid-1990s, though he argues that neither author provides any empirical evidence in support of his views, and he cites increasing naturalization rates of Canadian immigrants as evidence against the critics’ claims that multiculturalism discourages integration (Finding Our Way 16-18). In his book Multicultiphobia, Phil Ryan examines critics of multiculturalism in Canada, who, he
claims, express “not a well-reasoned argument, nor even a precise, easily identified fear of some particular phenomenon, but a diffuse anxiety” (4). He focuses especially on the critics of the 1990s, noting that among these Bissoondath and Gwyn particularly misunderstand multiculturalism by seeing it as an attempt to preserve every last aspect of a culture and by assuming that cultures are homogeneous monoliths (43-45). Further, Ryan argues that critics continue to fail to acknowledge multiculturalism as an evolving set of policies with potentially contradictory effects (53). In 2006, Ryan examined coverage of multiculturalism in four Canadian newspapers (Calgary Sun, National Post, Le Devoir, and Vancouver Sun) and found that “themes and styles of discourse found in the classic authors continue to permeate critiques of multiculturalism” (117).

Twenty-first century critics such as Richard Day (Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity; 2000), Himani Bannerji (The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender; 2001), and Gerald Kernerman (Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Difference, Constituting Community; 2005) continue to highlight colonial agendas as an ongoing facet of Canadian multiculturalism. For example, Bannerji argues that

in the multicultural paradigm, where difference is admitted, structural and ideological reasons for difference give place to a talk of immutable differences of ethnic cultures. . . . The focus shifts from processes of exclusion and marginalization to ethnic identities and their lack of adaptiveness. . . . It is forgotten that these officially multicultural ethnicities, so embraced or rejected, are themselves the constructs of colonial—orientalist and racist—discourses. (9)

In “Assimilation by Stealth: Why Canada’s Multicultural Policy Is Really a Repackaged Integration Policy,” Randal Hansen argues that opponents who claim that multiculturalism promotes ghettoization and emphasizes differences and supporters who claim that that multiculturalism removes barriers and encourages integration are not arguing about multiculturalism at all but rather “are referring to the broader and far more important set of assimilationist policies into which the small, trivial and over-theorized multicultural policies are nested” (74). Hansen further argues that multiculturalism policy is largely endorsed by social sciences researchers “partly because views on

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15 Themes include ghettoization, dual loyalties, celebrating Canadian “nothingness,” no limits, relativism, and unrealistic demands (Ryan 117-120).
multiculturalism are taken as a proxy for views on immigration” and because few “progressives” want to associate themselves with anti-immigration views (81). Finally, Hansen argues that multiculturalism is popularly endorsed as an identity construct because it is self-affirming that “we are, in effect, giving ourselves a pat on the back” (84).

In Kymlicka’s recent work, _Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future_ (2012), he addresses what he calls the master narrative of the “rise and fall of multiculturalism” presented by scholars, journalists, and policymakers, which, he claims, “mischaracterizes the nature of the experiments in multiculturalism that have been undertaken, exaggerates the extent to which they have been abandoned, and misidentifies not only the genuine difficulties and limitations they have encountered but the options for addressing these problems” (3-4). Kymlicka attributes Canada’s multicultural success to its policies, but also to its construction of identity: “Multiculturalism serves as a source of shared national identity and pride for native-born citizens and immigrants alike” (Multiculturalism 13). Further, he emphasizes that “Canada may be the only Western country where strength of national identity is positively correlated with support for immigration, a finding that is difficult to explain except by reference to multiculturalism” (Multiculturalism 14). Multiculturalism, according to Kymlicka, is a citizenization project that is “a deeply (and intentionally) transformative project, both for minorities and majorities. It requires both dominant and historically subordinated groups to engage in new practices, to enter new relationships, and to embrace new concepts and discourses—all of which profoundly transform people’s identities” (Multiculturalism 10).

Within this thesis, I primarily focus on discourses about multiculturalism as they construct identity and delimit belonging for religious practitioners. Is multiculturalism presented as inclusionary or exclusionary? Transformative or hegemonic? In chapter two, I examine assessments of multiculturalism in Canada and consider whether favorable evaluations are largely used as a means to affirm a positive Canadian national identity. Further, due to the sheer volume of references to immigrants, I consider whether multiculturalism is primarily understood as a citizenization project that transforms immigrants into Canadians.
Secularism and Religion

Secularism is commonly understood as simply the separation of church and state, or the relegation of religion from public to private spheres. Amelie Barras notes in “Transnational Understandings of Secularisms and Their Impact on the Right to Religious Freedom” that, until very recently, “it was considered by many as a neutral apolitical normative framework” (263). Secularism is not atheism, nor is atheism the inevitable outcome of secularism, though these ideas are sometimes linked in popular discourse. While secularism discourses do not necessarily position themselves as against religion, they have “the power to regulate, to transform, and to delimit it” (Barras 263). Secularism is often delineated along two lines: “soft” or passive secularism, which “foresees a place for the public manifestation of religion” and “gives a particular importance to protecting individual sovereignty vis-à-vis the state” (Barras 267), and “hard” secularism, which understands state secularism as duty bound to regulate public expression of religion as a means of “protecting the majority” (Barras 269). Hard secularism demands that interpretations and evaluations be made by the state as to the religiosity of symbols and practices in determining their level of threat to the majority population.

In “The Secular and Secularisms,” José Casanova differentiates between secularism as a “statecraft principle” that “neither presupposes nor needs to entail any substantive ‘theory,’ positive or negative, of ‘religion’” and secularism as “ideology,” where it involves a theory of “what ‘religion’ is or does” (1051). The idea that religion “is a thing that has an essence or that produces certain particular and predictable effects” is, according to Casanova, “the defining characteristic of modern secularism” (1052). Casanova distinguishes two types of secularist ideologies. The first type grounds religion in “progressive stadial philosophies of history that relegate religion to a superseded stage” (1052). The second type “presuppose[s] that religion is either an irrational force or a nonrational form of discourse that should be banished from the democratic public sphere”

16 In Western popular culture, the twenty-first century has seen a rise in prominence of what is sometimes termed “new atheism”—a school of thought that promotes an active criticism of religious belief and that is associated with popular authors such as Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion) and Christopher Hitchens (God Is Not Great). It is interesting to note that the height of “new atheism” as measured in book sales and media attention occurred between January 2006 and March 2008 (Cimino 27)—the same time period as the “accommodation crisis” occurred in Canada and was reflected in the Canadian press.
Political secularism, unlike ideological secularism, does not necessarily hold negative assumptions about religion and is “compatible with a positive view of religion as a moral good, or as an ethical communitarian reservoir of human solidarity and republican virtue” (Casanova 1057). However, political secularism is not a neutral position, in that it requires the maintenance of distinct fields of state and religion—fields ultimately determined and enforced by the state. Secularism acts as “an authoritative discourse defining the boundaries of the acceptable religious subject and his or her sensibilities” (Barras 264). It has found a prominent place not only in the political rhetoric of Western nations but also in many media narratives, including in discussions of nationhood, immigration, freedom of speech, and gender equality.

While Canada makes no official claim of being a secular state, in popular discourse, in academia, and specifically in the newspaper texts examined in this thesis, secularism is the presumptive norm. In chapter three, I examine presentations of secularism as a Canadian value—one that is supposed to be an integral component of multicultural ideology. I propose that understandings of secularism are used not only in the characterization of religious minorities but also in assessments of the success or failure of multiculturalism.

**Canadian Secularism—Christian Traditions**

It might seem counterintuitive to brand Canadian secularism as particularly Christian in nature, but as Charles Taylor notes in his influential work “The Politics of Recognition,” “The division of church and state goes back to the earliest days of Christian civilization. The early forms of the separation were very different from ours, but the basis was laid for modern developments. The very term secular was originally part of the Christian vocabulary” (62). Biles and Ibrahim argue in *Religion and Public Policy: Immigration, Citizenship and Multiculturalism* that an examination of Canadian symbols points to the existence of “Christianity’s status as the quasi-official state religion” (166).  

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17 Biles and Ibrahim note some examples of the “shadow establishment” of Christianity in Canada, including: the preamble to the Constitution (“Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the Supremacy of God and the rule of law . . .”); the Speech from the Throne’s conclusion with the words, “May Divine Providence Guide You in Your Deliberations”；the inclusion in the national anthem, *O Canada,* of the line, “God keep our land glorious and free!”; our currency’s inclusion of the marking “D. G.
While religion has been “pushed more and more toward the margins of Canadian society, Christian symbols, values, and structures still frame many of our institutions and traditions” (167). Biles and Ibrahim argue that one of the reasons why religion is “a blind spot for public policy in Canada” is simply because there is “a refusal to acknowledge the Christian heritage of Canada” (166). While the majority of the Canadian population still reports an affiliation with a Christian religion, Beyer argues that it is possible that this is more of a cultural identification than it is actual religious practice (17). Lori Beaman notes in “Between the Public and the Private: Governing Religious Expression” that “a rhetoric of culture is emerging around what have previously been dominant religions” (54). Beaman’s and Beyer’s observations can be seen in a tendency to characterize Christian holidays such as Christmas and Easter as secular holidays in their common practices by Christians and non-Christians alike. Christian holidays are further secularized in official state decisions such as that of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., where the Court noted that while the public holidays on Christmas Day and Good Friday originated in Western Christian observances, they are now considered “secular pause days.” In its 2008 decision in Markovic v. Autocom Manufacturing Ltd., the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario went on to note of Christmas and Easter: “Although having origins in Western Christian observance, a work calendar which incorporates those holidays should be considered neutral or nondiscriminatory on its face” (par. 19). These rulings support Beyer’s arguments that Christianity is often presented as “Canada’s past, not its present” and that “Christian hegemony is a matter of history and heritage, not of practical everyday consequences” (18). Indeed, this was the argument made by the Quebec National Assembly when it voted unanimously that the crucifix not be removed from the Assembly’s Salon Bleu as it was “an important symbol of Quebec’s heritage and culture” (Beaman, “Between” 54). Recasting Christianity as culture is problematic in a number of ways, but perhaps most importantly because it allows the majority Christian religion to become “invisible” in the public arena, “transformed into a matter of culture, heritage, and values” thus “making minority

Regina” beside the name of Elizabeth II, which stands for “dei Gratia” (queen by the grace of God); and the fact that the national motto, “A Mari usque ad Mare” (from sea to sea), was taken from Psalm 72:8 (“He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth.”).
religions’ claims to public space even more visible—for while ‘ours’ is culture, part of our heritage and values, theirs is ‘religion’ and foreign” (Beaman, “Between” 54-55). It is in this way that “hegemonic religion” claims “physical space in the guise of culture” (Beaman, “Between” 55). Beaman further notes that “an interesting twist in the religion-to-culture move is the denial of the same protection for religious minorities. The wearing of hijab, the practice of polygamy, and other minority religious practices are framed as being cultural and thus not worthy of protection under constitutional and human rights regimes” (“Between” 54).

In chapters three and four, I argue that secularism is only unproblematic in its regulation of very specific types of religion—sects of mainstream Christianity. Further, understandings of secularism as apolitical or normative have allowed the language of accommodation to dominate discourses about the place of religious minorities in Canadian society. And finally, the characterizing of Christian practices as secular practices is problematic in that it presumes that religious elements of practices or symbols naturally fade with time or can be removed simply by dictate of the majority.

**Constructing Religious Others—Looking through a Christian Lens**

At the heart of Canadian multiculturalist ideology lies what Canadian social philosopher Charles Taylor calls a “politics of recognition.” That is, a self-understanding is formed by the recognition or the misrecognition of others. The withholding of recognition is seen as a form of oppression (Taylor 36): it negates equality, and so, for multiculturalism to meet its egalitarian goals, religious identity must be recognized.

Beaman argues that in Canada attempts to make sense of religious practice very often use a “cultural toolkit . . . created in the social context of a nation that has been built as a Christian nation” (“Alternatives” 217). That is, understandings of religious practices (Christian and non-Christian alike) are evaluated according to standards formed in a dominantly Christian context, including Western concepts of secularism. Canadian secularism, grounded in Christian ideas, presumes that religion should be practiced “in the private conscience” and thus considers some religious beliefs to be “incompatible with secularism” (Barras 269). In “Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights,” Peter Danchin argues that “any non-Christian or non-Western religion
such as Islam which deviates from this notion of religion as private belief and subjective experience thus faces a double charge: not only is it a threat to the secular political order but it is also not religion in its true, modern form” (689). Chaudhary notes that forms of secularism that require public spaces to be free of religious expression are “mutually exclusive with the practice of lived religions like Islam and Judaism which have a strong emphasis on orthopraxis (doing correct actions) and orthodoxy (believing correct ideas)” (352).

Recurrent in discourses about Canadian multiculturalism is the notion of tolerance toward difference, an idea that appears egalitarian on the surface, but necessarily contains elements of hierarchy between the tolerant and the tolerated. In Canada, discourses of tolerance and reasonable accommodation find their “minimum standard for the governance of diversity in a society whose social institutions have developed hand in hand with Christianity” and where for “the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, tolerance was largely an idea that was invoked to regulate relations between normatively dominant mainstream Christianity and minority Christian groups and Jews” (Beaman, “Alternatives” 221). In “Towards a Diversity beyond Tolerance,”18 Kiran Mirchandin and Evangelia Tastsoglou describe tolerance as “celebrated as a core feature of the Canadian national identity which is a source of both national pride and international recognition” (49). Multiculturalism, they argue, is a discourse that “is premised on a majority-minority model whereby the majority group tolerates the minority” (56). Haque argues that autonomous liberal individuals (secular) are premised as tolerating nonliberal subjects (religious) who, along with their practices, “are designated as inherently intolerant and potentially intolerable because of their thwarting of individual autonomy with religious or cultural commandments” (83). Bramadat notes that “many of the contemporary controversies regarding religion (most notably, those related to Islam, Sikhism, and fundamentalist Mormonism) exist large because the Canadian institutional structure is not designed to respond to non-Christian (or minority Christian) practices and claims” (“The Public” 9; see also Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture”).

18 Mirchandin and Tastsoglou analyzed texts from 11 major Canadian newspapers and magazines, identifying 726 on “tolerance” between 1988 and 1996 (52).
Within the newspaper texts that I examined, the religious other is particularly defined by her or his inability, or worse her or his refusal, to relegate religious practice to the private domain. In chapter four, I examine this public/private dichotomy as it is portrayed in texts that take up Islamic veiling.

**Disentangling Ethnicity and Religion**

Bramadat observes that “religion is in many ways a wrought object, a complex set of phenomena that are all called ‘religion,’ but which are in some ways disparate” (“Beyond Christian” 12). Further, no religion is a monolith; there are (as there are with Christianity) many distinct forms of Islam, Buddhism, Sikhism, Hinduism, and so forth. Each evolves and is formed and practiced within circumstances that uniquely shape it. Most religions are transcultural, transnational, and transethnic. Extricating religious practice from cultural/ethnic practice is a nearly impossible endeavour. For example, many scholars of Sikhism will argue that since the turban is not explicitly required as one of the traditional Five K’s of Sikhism (uncut hair is the requirement); the turban is a cultural accretion, an element of Punjabi culture or ethnicity that has been absorbed into Sikhism as a religion. Nonetheless, because the place of the turban in contemporary Sikh culture emerges out of long-standing communal practices and values, and out of a social structure in which it is important to appear different (both 16th-century Punjab and 21st-century Canada could be described in this way) the turban has become for many Sikhs a de facto religious requirement, or at least a religious norm. In any case, the usually friendly discussion among the keshdhari (long-haired Sikhs who wear turbans) and sahajdhari (“path of slow adoption” Sikhs who do not wear turbans) continues in contemporary Canada, and it is difficult to describe the debate as simply religious, ethnic, or cultural. (Bramadat “Beyond Christian” 19)

Any identification of religious practitioners and their practices as simply Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and so forth fails to convey the complexity that exists within religious traditions. Even where religious communities share cultural, ethnic, and/or national backgrounds, agreement about religious belief and practice should not be assumed. Bramadat and Seljak importantly note that “issues never divide simply the minority

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19 Throughout this thesis, I have used “Christian” to refer to the dominant forms of Christianity in Canada: Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. While there are variations in Christian practice, even within these denominations, I am primarily concerned with their common perception that religion should be practiced “in the private conscience” (Barras 269).
religious communities against Canadian society; they divide the communities themselves” (232). Further, essentialized constructions assume religion to be of a fixed nature and ignore the fact that

religious ideas, texts, rituals, symbols, and institutions are in the end redeployed by newer Canadians in a uniquely Canadian way. Another way to put it is to say that religion is never relocated (like baggage), but rather is always re-created. Of course, this re-creation happens neither in toto nor ex nihilo—rather, newcomers remake Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc., in Canada out of a combination of old and new building resources. (Bramadat “Beyond Christian” 12)

Zine notes that the “Canadian Muslim diaspora is a complex, contradictory, and hybrid space filled with a mix of liberatory possibilities and productive tensions occurring within and against certain oppressive social and political conditions that create the terrain for a distinctly ‘Canadian Islam’” (“Muslim Cultural” 2). Bramadat and Seljak write that “in response to their experience of the Canadian culture of individualism, self-expression, self-determination, and egalitarianism, many choose to redefine their beliefs, values, and practices” (226).

Perhaps because of the difficulty in disentangling religion from ethnicity, the latter is very often seen as denoting the former.20 Raymond Breyton notes in Different Gods: Integrating Non-Christian into a Primarily Christian Society that “religion can be an ‘ethnic-like’ marker for newcomers in the sense that it is their religious affiliation that shapes their distinct ethno-cultural identity and the ways in which they are perceived by different groups in the receiving society” (3). Bramadat argues that the “conflation between Islam, qua religion, with the largely non-European racial and ethnic backgrounds of Muslims in the West” and “the hazy lines between Sikhism and Punjabi ethnicity” complicate discourses, though they are “not the product of nefarious Western bigots but the consequence of the geographical origins and historical spread of Islam and Sikhism themselves” (“The Public” 8-9). Will Kymlicka argues in “The Three Lives of Multiculturalism” that because of the effects of post 9/11 Islamophobia there is particularly a trend toward the “ethnicization” of Muslim identities. As a result, Muslim is adopted as a “quasi-ethnic identity” by younger generations, who cannot escape the

20 Though beyond the scope of this thesis, there is an argument to be made that concerns about religious integration are in fact equally—or perhaps even a substitution for—concerns about ethnic/racial integration.
identification, regardless of their national origin, mother tongue, or degree of religious devotion (“Three Lives”). Alan Wong argues in “The Disquieting Revolution: A Genealogy of Reason and Racism in the Quebec Press” that in addition to being visibly religious, the accommodation cases reported in the media also predominantly concern practitioners who are racialized (156)—that is, not white. Lefebvre and Guyver argue that “portraits of Jehovah’s Witnesses or Protestant Christian denominations, who frequently request accommodation for religious practices, are altogether absent in the media,” reinforcing the perception that the “crisis” is created “solely by visible religious minorities” (142). Zine argues that within the governmentality of tolerance “the white liberal subject is produced as the arbiter of civilizational norms and of who and what should be deemed worthy of toleration, which in turn positions the white liberal as ontologically superior and culturally and civilizationaly dominant” (“Muslim Cultural” 21). The reality that religious accommodation issues often involve long-established religious minorities, including sects of Christianity, is suspiciously absent in the texts examined. In chapter three, I consider this absence and how it contributes to constructions of acceptable religious practice and the characterization of minority religions as especially problematic.

Religion—Dominant Discourses

Among the dominant discourses about religion in the West, two appear to hold particular sway. The first incorporates some form of “secularization thesis,” the idea that nonreligious considerations necessarily and rightly gain prevalence over religious considerations in the course of social evolution. Bramadat and Seljak note that while in “the field of religious studies, and in some sectors of sociology, it has become almost a cliché to observe that there is very little evidence to support a classical version of the secularization hypothesis,” the idea that “religion will always retreat in the face of individualism, modernization, bureaucratization, and science remains stubbornly popular.

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21 It is especially worth noting that in the texts that I examined, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and minority religious practitioners (particularly Muslims and Sikhs) are nearly interchangeable categories. The religious practitioner of concern is not only a minority in her or his religious practice but also in her or his ethnicity or race. This individual’s “visibility” is thus two-fold; she or he is not white and not Christian.
among what is likely the majority of scholars, journalists, and policy-makers” (228). A belief in the inevitable secularization of society is closely tied to what Nancy Rosenblum calls “liberal expectancy” or the assumption that the principles of liberal democracy exert a levelling force that influences the beliefs and practices of minority groups, including religious groups, toward the liberalized center. Kymlicka argues that the experience of liberal expectancy that has seen generations of immigrants to Canada internalize liberal democratic values has given Canadians confidence in the ideologies of multiculturalism (“Disentangling”151-2).

The second dominant discourse proposes a resurgence of religion generally and particularly an increase in religious orthodoxy, fundamentalism, or radicalization. This discourse associates religion (though most often the religious other) with political upheaval, war, genocide, terrorism, and so forth. It is so ubiquitous that it influences the perception of all religion. In “The Public, the Political, and the Possible: Religion and Radicalization in Canada and Beyond,” Bramadat notes that after 9/11, “religion—especially Islam—came to be understood not only as merely one identity marker among others (such as race and ethnicity) but as the central non-negotiable marker and also, more troubling, as a risk factor for extremism” (12, see also Zine, “Unsettling”). Religious beliefs/practices, including Christianity outside of a moderate or secularized version, are portrayed as posing a real and imminent threat to democratic social order. Religious belief is often inextricably linked with sentiment, superstition, and/or ignorance. The religious believer is suspect, and she or he is seen as incapable of fully exercising reason. Embedded in the dichotomy of reason/religion “is an assumption that these two categories exist in isolation one from the other. . . . A strong religious commitment draws into question one’s ability to reason. . . . ‘Reasonableness’ becomes

22 Bramadat and Seljak rightly note what is often missed in examinations of the religiosity of Canadians—that waning institutional attendance is not a sufficient measure of religious practice or belief. Popular assessments that religious belief is declining are too closely linked to understandings of religion as necessarily tied to institutional membership and do not account for changing and individual forms of religiosity.

23 The actual increase or decrease of religious belief or practice is highly debatable and, I propose, impossible to measure. Scott Higbard notes in “Religion, Nationalism, and the Politics of Secularism” that political movements “may articulate their grievances in a religious and cultural idiom,” and so a rise in “religious fundamentalism” ought also to be seen as “a byproduct of a rapidly changing economic, social and political environment” and not just as a return to religion (103).
something that is outside the purview or assessment capabilities of the religious practitioner” (Beaman, “Alternatives” 212). Media narratives often go further and suggest inherent danger in the beliefs and practices of religious minorities. Canada and Canadians are portrayed as “a secular and tolerant multicultural society in danger from barbaric and intolerant fundamentalist others” (Haque 85). Biles and Ibrahim note that

while fear of the unknown may lead to secularism as the path of least resistance, there is an argument that is more frequently advanced: religions are inherently intolerant. . . . Policymakers remain skeptical about the ability of religious communities to address plurality and difference. In particular, they often raise concerns around controversial issues regarding gender, age, and sexual orientation. There is also an inchoate belief that religion is antithetical to democracy. (Biles & Ibrahim 168)

While religion generally and minority religions particularly are viewed as suspect, Islam is disproportionally represented as problematic. Zine argues that in the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims were cast as the new “enemy within.” Zine writes,

Narratives of citizenship, nationalism, and security have become inextricably linked in public discourse and policy making in ways that disproportionately target Canadian Muslims as potential threats to public safety and compromise their civil liberties. Driven by media sensationalism, narrow and limiting constructions of Muslims are commonly purveyed, reproducing Orientalist archetypes of illiberal and anti-democratic foreigners that test the limits of Canadian multiculturalism. (“Muslim Cultural” 1)

In “The Great Canadian ‘Shar’ia’ Debate,” Itrath Syed notes in her analysis of print-media coverage of the debate on the inclusion of Islamic-based mediation for the Muslim community under the Ontario Arbitration Act that

the proponents of the proposal, with all their faults, were asking for access to existing provisions of Ontario provincial law. They were most explicitly not asking for the transformation of Canadian laws. Yet they were constructed not as Canadians wanting access to Canadian law but rather as part of a larger plan to destroy Canadian society, constituting a full frontal attack on all that is good and decent in the nation. This attack was supposedly such a substantive threat that all of Canada had to be mobilized to defend against it. (65)

24 In 1991, the Arbitration Act was changed to allow faith-based arbitration in the resolution of family law cases such as divorce, inheritance, and child custody. In 2003, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice in Ontario applied for standing to provide arbitration services for the Muslim community. The end result was the repeal of the faith-based option for all religions.
Further, Syed notes that the entire Muslim community was “metaphorically
denationalized” and constructed as “an immigrant community, none of whom have an
inherent right to belong to the nation.” Canada, meanwhile, was constructed as
“essentially pure and untainted—a bastion of equality where women’s rights are
completely uncontested and universal. The only threat to this utopia of gender equality is
the potential of contamination by the Muslim immigrant” (65-66). Karim H. Karim, the
author of *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence* and “Covering Muslims: Journalism
as Cultural Practice,” argues that the frame of violence has dominated the Western
media’s portrayal of Islam since 9/11. He further argues that journalists reinforce
government narratives that rely on negative stereotypes of Muslims in framing the hunt
for “Islamic terrorists” (*Islamic Peril* 105). Negative presentations of Islam in the media
the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* that at no time in
the historical relationship between Islam and the West has Islam been “generally
discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and
political interests” (24). Said further situates Western opinion and presentation of Islam:

Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to the Orient, its particular fate
within the general structure of Orientalism has been to be looked at first of all as if
it were one monolithic thing, and then with a very special hostility and fear. There
are, of course, many religious, psychological, and political reasons for this, but all
of these reasons derive from a sense that so far as the West is concerned, Islam
represents not only a formidable competitor but also a latecoming challenge to
Christianity.” (4-5)

In this thesis, I argue that the “diffuse anxiety” expressed by multiculturalism
critics as identified by Ryan (*Multicultiphobia*) and expressed in the texts examined
(chapter two) reflects a loss in confidence in liberal expectancy compounded by the
perception that religious “radicalization” is increasing, particularly within non-Christian
religions. I further argue that this “anxiety” is made particularly cogent in a focus on
Islam (chapter four).
Islam, Gender, and the Veiling Debate

Much academic scholarship has noted that “Muslim women’s bodies . . . become the battlegrounds which clearly demarcate the line between the civilized secular modern nation and premodern religious fundamentalisms” (Haque 79; see also Razack; Brown). Chaudhary very effectively summarizes the complexity of the subject of Islamic veiling practices:

Few items of apparel evoke quite the debate that the veil/headscarf/ hijab does. It is simultaneously, depending on the speaker, the cause of or solution to the systematic oppression of women; it is either the sign of a civilization’s advancement or its retardation; it is religious, or cultural, or political, or even economic. The one area in which there is consensus is that the veil is problematic. (351)

Islamic veiling within secular societies has found particular prominence in academic study (Chaudhary; Barras). Within the debate about the place of religion in secular societies, the veil is regularly used a symbol of the oppressive or archaic nature of religion, inherently understood as a sign and practice of gender inequality and religious extremism (Chaudhary 357; Conway 203). The veiling debate consistently frames the practices of religious dress for female Muslims as problematic, dangerous not only to individual self-realization but also to the stability of the community or state, and a threat to the public good (Chaudhary; Ardizzoni; Conway). Public religious practice generally is demonstrated, particularly through the veiling debate, as a danger to society (Chaudhary 358). Framing the secularism debate through the religious practices of Islam, specifically the veil, and their relation to public institutions, particularly education, remains the dominant discourse in France (Jones; Thomas; Saas; Iftkhar) and in Turkey (Piatti-Crocker; Borovali). With regard to the United States, Marni Lazreg argues in Questioning...

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25 Islamic veiling comes in many forms and many styles. The three most commonly referred to are the hijab, niqab, and burqa. The hijab covers the head and neck but leaves the face clear and is the type of veil most commonly worn by Canadian Muslims. (It is sometimes also referred to as a headscarf.) The niqab is a veil that covers the head and face, leaving only the eyes clear. The burqa covers the entire face and body, leaving just a mesh screen to see through. Unless otherwise stated, when I use the word “veil” in this thesis, I am referring to the hijab, though when quoting other sources they may be referring to other or all practices of veiling.

26 An EBSCO search for the terms “secular*,” “Islam or Muslim” and “veil or headscarf or hijab” reveals 563 scholarly articles between 2000 and 2015. Omitting the search term “secular*” brought the number to 2,489 in the same time period.
the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women that the power of the veil as a symbol of oppression is made apparent in the way that it helped to make it “acceptable to hail the war launched against Afghanistan in 2001 as a war of ‘liberation’ of women” (1). The Simone de Beauvoir Institute took up this issue in its brief submitted to the Quebec National Assembly concerning the introduction of Bill 94: “As feminists, we must challenge our complicity with the state’s violence against women both in its colonial relations with indigenous people and in its use of the figure of the veiled woman as an alibi for imperialist war and occupation in Afghanistan” (qtd. in Conway 205).

Beaman notes that “feminism, which has frequently had difficulty with religious women and the idea that they make choices, has colluded in the forced ‘emancipation’ of women through its collaboration with the state” (“Between” 57). While Beaman concedes that “the oppression of women has happened and does happen in religious contexts, and religious doctrine has been and is used to justify that experience,” she goes on to caution that “to gloss all religious women’s experiences as ‘oppressed’ is to simplify a complex set of experiences” (“Between” 57). Vrida Narain argues in “Taking ‘Culture’ out of Multiculturalism” that “those opposed to the recognition of minority rights through policies of multiculturalism have blamed it for encouraging the oppression of women” and posited “women’s equality and minority rights as oppositional” (117). According to Narain, “initiatives such as Bill 94 reflect the persistence of colonial and Orientalist discourses whereby the liberal state justifies its intervention to save ‘native’ women from their barbaric, outdated customs” (119). Beaman further argues that “lost or minimized in these discussions is the agency of religious women. Women who choose to cover their faces are imagined as oppressed, unenlightened, and (this is key) unavailable” (“Between” 57). The combination of “orientalist assumptions, racist undertones, and Western patriarchy . . . collude to impact the ways in which the boundary between the public and the private is shaped” (“Between” 57). Najmabadi argues that to ignore the veil as multiple in meaning for its wearers and as historically contingent effectively infantilizes Muslim women, “as if they are mere objects of the contestation between men of state and men of religion, their headscarves but a transparent and ahistorical sign of a threat to secularism” (252). Jasmin Zine writes in “Unveiled Sentiments: Gendered Islamophobia and Experiences of Veiling among Muslim Girls in a Canadian Islamic
School” that the veil as a symbol “has entered into the popular imagination in Western societies as the quintessential marker of the Muslim world and as a practice synonymous with religious fundamentalism and extremism” (242), a phenomena that she terms “gendered Islamophobia.” In their brief submitted to the Quebec National Assembly concerning the introduction of Bill 94, the Ligue des droits et libertés wrote that “wanting to restrain women’s ability to express their convictions, whether or not one agrees with those convictions, is the same as judging them incapable of making their own decisions” (qtd. in Conway 204). The Bouchard-Taylor Commission reported that “in light of extensive, unequivocal testimony, we believe that we can now take it for granted that girls or women who wear the headscarf attach different meanings to it” (235). In chapter four, I conclude with an examination of texts that take up Islamic veiling.

Media—Media Elite and the Authority of the Press

van Dijk asserts that among the “elites,” the media holds a “nearly exclusive role” in the production and communication of public discourse, in large part because it is the media upon whom the other elites are reliant in order to “inform both the public at large and each other, to exercise their power, to seek legitimation and to manufacture consensus and consent” (Elite 253). In “The Social Production of News,” Hall et al. emphasize the role of elite sources: “The media do not themselves autonomously create news items; rather they are ‘cued in’ to specific news topics by regular and reliable institutional sources” (648). So while “the media define for the majority of the population what significant events are taking place” and also “offer powerful interpretations of how to understand these events” (Hall et al. 648), they are not the “primary definer” of news events. Rather, news media “play a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access . . . to the media as accredited sources” (Hall et al. 650).

I have chosen to examine Canadian newspapers not only because they are in themselves elites but also because they have access to and provide platforms for other

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27 van Dijk identifies the other elite producers of discourse as political, corporate, educational, and academic.
elite voices in Canadian society, including academics, politicians, and policy makers. These elites’ voices have the loudest say in the process of constructing Canadian identity. The texts that I have considered contextually in the writing of this thesis vary in source and genre. The newspaper texts at the centre of this thesis also represent different genres. What they have in common is that they are all products of elites as identified by van Dijk and thus are importantly all authoritative voices. In the production of news, Fowler argues that editorials and news texts each support the authority of the other. Editorials, he notes, “have an important symbolic function, seeming to partition off the ‘opinion’ component of the paper, implicitly supporting the claim that other sections, by contrast, are pure ‘fact’ or ‘report’” (208). Fowler further notes that “what is distinctive about newspaper editorial is not that they offer values and beliefs, but that they employ textual strategies which foreground the speech act of offering values and beliefs” (209). While editorials vary in style and textual strategy, Fowler argues that they importantly “illustrate a discourse of institutional power in the sense that it emanates from, and in turn helps construct, the newspaper’s claimed authority” (221). In the writing of this thesis, I imagine my work as a critical intervention within those discourses that assesses the normative and potentially hegemonic assumptions of the elite discourse producers from a position outside of that production.

**Religion in the News**

In the foreword to *Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion*, Michael Gerson suggests that the news media is antireligious and that in the media there is a presumption that “public expressions of religion are themselves offensive” (xvii), as a result of which religion is ignored or dismissed. In the introduction to the same book, Paul Marshall argues that in “media coverage of major news stories in which religion is a major component” (for example, coverage about Iraq and Iran), journalists “often miss, or misunderstand, these stories because they do not take religion seriously” (3). Others

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28 Fowler notes that the “partitioning” is often accomplished through textual symbolism such as layout or typography.

(Underwood; Newman; Silk) argue that religious values are imbedded, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, in the ethical values of journalists themselves and in the practices of journalism. In “Secularists or Modern Day Prophets? Journalists’ Ethics and the Judeo-Christian Tradition,” Underwood argues that “journalists of varying religious orientations tend to endorse a core group of moral and ethical principles at the heart of the religious heritage of the United States and Canada” (33). This position is supported by the research of E. Lambeth (Committed Journalism: An Ethic for the Profession), J. Newman (“The Journalist in Plato’s Cave”), and Mark Silk (Unsecular Media: Making News of Religion in America). Silk uses the concept of topos, traditional themes that circulate in a given culture, to examine the relationship between the media and religion. He identifies seven topoi: good works, tolerance, hypocrisy, false prophecy, inclusion, supernatural belief, and declension (55). For instance, he argues that the topos of “tolerance” is based on the premise of a separate church and state and that it promotes “the virtue of toleration and the vice of intolerance” (Silk 66).

In “Beyond Christian Canada: Religion and Ethnicity in a Multicultural Society,” Bramadat argues that “most of the news stories about religion are, in fact, stories about the intractably combined power of religion and ethnicity (or ethno-nationalism)” (2). Studies by the anthropologists Frances Henry and Carol Tator (Racist Discourse in Canada’s English Print Media [2000] and Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in Canadian English-Language Press [2002]) reveal that racism and white dominance are part of the structural and ideological formation that forms Canadian news dailies. Augie Fleras and Jean Lock Kunz (Media and Minorities: Representing Diversity in a Multicultural Canada; 2001) found that despite the multicultural makeup of Canada, ethnic minorities are conspicuously absent from media coverage, except where they are “denounced as social problems and outsiders that are eroding Canada’s social fabric” (79) or used as “a foil for sharpening the attribute of mainstream heroes, a catalyst for driving plot lines or character development, or a token dash of colour to an otherwise pallid cultural package” (155). While neither of these studies looks specifically at religious minorities, in the newspaper texts that I examined for this thesis, religious minorities are equated with ethnic minorities throughout.
Teemu Taira, Elizabeth Poole, and Kim Knot suggest in “Religion in the British Media Today” that news coverage about religion “tells us a great deal about popular fears and prejudices” (31), particularly on the topic of “Islamification” (33). The dominant frame of violence in Western media’s portrayal of Muslim religious adherents since 9/11, reflects these fears and prejudices and is examined in the works of Dr. Evelyn Alsultany (“Protesting Muslim Americans as Patriotic Americans: The All-American Controversy” and *Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation After 9/11*) and Karim H. Karim.

In its “Ethics Guidelines,” the Canadian Association of Journalists proposes that religion be treated in a fair manner. It states that, in practice, journalists should not “refer to a person’s . . . religion . . . unless it is pertinent to the story” and that they should also “avoid stereotypes of . . . religion . . . [and] take particular care in crime stories.” However, Beaman notes that in the identification of religious practitioners in news media, as in popular discourse, “very often it is the ‘religious’ part of a group or individual that is the standard bearer for an essentialized identity” (“Exploring” 2). That religious practitioners are framed as knowable entirely in their religious practice is due in part to prevailing stereotypes produced both within and outside of the media. Haque argues specifically that Aqsa Parvez’s murder in 2007 was taken up by the media as representational of “the problem of Muslim women in Canada [which] precipitates a crisis of tolerance in a multicultural society” (84) and that media framing of Aqsa’s death “as an outcome of her father’s Muslim culture and religious values was hegemonic and . . . has remained almost impossible to counter” (88). In naming the Parvez family as Muslims, religion became the central focus of the story. Attempts to discuss Aqsa’s death as the result of domestic violence, poverty, or lack of services were obfuscated by the essentializing of the family’s identity as Muslim.

**Journalists—Religion**

In 1986, S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter published *The Media Elite*, in which they surveyed 238 top American journalists and found that 20 per cent were Protestant, about 13 per cent were Catholic, and 14 per cent were Jewish, with about half saying that they had no religious affiliation. Further, “86%
of respondents said they seldom or never attended religious services” (22). This study is often used to characterize the media as liberal and secular. As part of a study that was conducted in 1997 and 1998, the results of which appear in *Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News*, Miljan and Cooper interviewed 123 English-speaking and 55 French-speaking journalists “employed by Canada’s most influential media outlets” (67) and found that the English-speaking group of journalists is “less likely to belong to a religious denomination than the general public” (61% and 42% respectively) (69). Of the French-speaking respondents, “two thirds of journalists (66 percent) eschew religious organizations” (84). Miljan and Cooper underpin their study with the premise that the religious beliefs and practices of journalists matter because “journalists do influence news coverage and that coverage does move in a certain direction” (10) and thus the ideological thinking of individual journalists matters. Their analysis is at times problematic, particularly in their comparative use of statistics with the *Media Elite* findings, as a result of which they claim that “English-speaking Canadian journalists are 10 percent less likely never to attend services than are their American counterparts” (69) without taking into account the ten-year time lapse between studies. Miljan and Cooper are also perhaps too quick, as are others, to equate church attendance with religious belief: “Journalists who indicate they are Roman Catholic attend less regularly than other Catholics. Thus, even if Canadian journalists are disproportionately Catholic, they are still more secular than are other Canadians” (69). From this information, they draw the conclusion that being “more secular” means that journalists are “at the forefront of postmaterialist social change” (70). Further, Miljan and Cooper draw a direct line between journalists’ religious beliefs, or lack thereof, and the content of the news that they choose to produce:

> On the question of belief in God, both journalist populations were significantly less likely to espouse a strong belief compared to their audiences, . . . lead[ing] us to conclude that journalists, especially Anglophones, would, following postmaterialist theory, be more interested in “higher-level” problems such as rights-based claims or environmentalism compared to the general population. (Miljan and Cooper 168)

Both studies presume the beliefs of journalists are reflected in news coverage, and both relate that journalists are more “secular” than the population at large. While journalists may be less religious than the population at large, these studies are primarily concerned
with political bias, and the “secularity” of the journalist examined is assumed to follow a political leaning—that is, the more secular, the more liberal. This correlation has not been proven, and its reliance on religious stereotypes that suppose religion to be fundamentally traditional or conservative is problematic.

Underwood argues in *From Yahweh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press* that “journalists would be better served if they perceived the religious undercurrents of the stories they write about politics, science, psychology, and technology, as well as the way religion works in their own value system” (5). In *Reporting News About Religion*, Buddenbaum suggest that “all journalists will cover stories that involve religion or that have—or should have—a religion angle more often than they imagine” (“Reporting” xvii). While I agree that the religious angle is very often omitted or misrepresented in news media and that journalists are well served in knowing their own personal biases, I do not think that knowing the religious affiliations of journalists is particularly helpful in deciphering bias within bodies of texts. I propose that news articles about religion best avoid bias through the consultation of experts on religion just as news articles about the economy should be written in consultation with economists. Being religious no more makes you an expert on religion than being a consumer makes you an expert on the economy.

**Bias—Practices**

Bias is inherent in the nearly universal practices of professional journalism (Boykoff 205; Cottle 857; Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong 128). Professional journalistic practices that potentially contribute to the production of bias in media include a preference for novelty or drama, emphasis on personal agency over structural factors, the reporting of events as opposed to themes, and a tendency to source institutions and authority figures as experts (Boykoff 206). Hall et al. argue that “the media do not simply and transparently report events which are ‘naturally’ newsworthy *in themselves*. ‘News’ is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selection of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories” (645). Fowler argues that “real events are subject to conventional processes of selection: they are not intrinsically newsworthy, but only become ‘news’ when selected for inclusion in
In *News Reporting and Writing*, Melvin Mencher lists seven determinants of newsworthiness: timeliness, impact, prominence, proximity, conflict, peculiarity, and currency (72-77).

Explanations about how news media shapes discourse often take as their basis the idea of framing. Through a writer’s description of events, some aspects of stories are chosen over others “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 52). In some cases, as Gamson notes, frames come to be encoded in a single term, which once established in public discourse becomes nearly impossible to avoid, even for those who might want to choose to frame an issue differently (9). For example, “reasonable accommodation” frames the debate about minority religious practitioners in Canada by positioning them as asking to be accommodated instead of simply accessing their Charter rights. Journalism institutions also have their own political economy. Critical scholarship argues that media construction is constrained by market forces beyond the control of individual organizations and their elite owners or managers (Herman and Chomsky; Baker; Oberg; Splichal). Ultimately, news and other media are disciplined by a combination of professional practices, culture, politics, and the market. While news media certainly contain bias, this is true of all representational discourses.

### 1.3 Relevant Theory

In this thesis, I rely on critical discourse analysis (CDA) as it is understood and developed in the works of Norman Fairclough and Teun A. van Dijk. I also rely particularly on Ruth Wodak, who notes that CDA “has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. . . . Studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies” (Wodak & Meyer 5). Despite its lack of homogeneity, researchers across disciplines using CDA crucially understand language as social practice while considering the context of language use.
Defining Discourse

Discourse is “a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis* 14) that can be understood as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens” (Wodak, “Discourse and Discrimination” 35-36). Theo van Leeuwen defines discourses as “socially constructed ways of knowing some aspect of reality which can be drawn upon when that aspect of reality has to be represented, or, to put it another way, context-specific frameworks for making sense of things” (144). A discourse is primarily topic related. It is any text or number of texts that is distinguishable from other discourses. Discourses include subtopics, which themselves can be identified as discourse; for example, a discourse on unemployment might contain discourses on education or immigration. As Reisigl and Wodak state, “Discourses are open and often hybrid; new sub-topics can be created at many points” (90). Jager notes that any discourse is more accurately discourses, “intertwined or entangled with one another like vines or strands; moreover they are not static but in constant motion forming a ‘discursive mass’” (Jager 5).

In this thesis, I engage in a process of disentangling through the identification of themes (or topics) and through the analysis of their meanings. I have begun by considering texts that I curated from the *Toronto Star* and the *Gazette* as a singular discourse,\(^30\) under the topic “Canadian multiculturalism and the accommodation of religious practitioners.” In my analysis, I have focused on several subtopics or themes that I have identified as “discourse strands” that are evident in the newspaper texts examined. These include immigration, minority religions, Canadian values (including tolerance and secularism), and Muslim veiling. They are analyzed in an attempt to elucidate their place and their influence within the larger discourse. For example, how does the assessment of Canada as a secular society affect the understanding of religious accommodations?

\(^30\)More accurately, the texts examined comprise a section of a larger discourse that is also found in other media, popular discourse, politics, academia, and so forth.
Discourse as Social Practice

An understanding of language as social practice “implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it” (Fairclough & Wodak 258). Further, discourse is “socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough & Wodak 258). Language as action in social contexts necessarily has consequences. For critical discourse analysts, these are particularly issues of power and ideology: “No interaction exists in which power relations do not prevail and in which values and norms do not have a relevant role” (Wodak, “20th Century” 187). Within discursive practices, power is legitimized or delegitimized; discourses can produce and/or reproduce “unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people” (Fairclough & Wodak 258). Beyond grammatical forms, power is also exerted through “control of the social occasion by means of the genre of a text, or by the regulation of access to certain public spheres” (Reisigl & Wodak 89). It is important to note that a text is very rarely the product of a single person, and so “texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance” (Wodak & Meyer, “Critical Discourse” 10).

In CDA, ideologies are most often considered as they are practiced by the powerful, whom they serve as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse: for example, by establishing hegemonic identity narratives, or by controlling the access to specific discourse or public spheres (“gate-keeping”). . . . One of the aims of the DHA is to “demystify” the hegemony of specific discourses by the deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance. (Reisigl & Wodak 88)

Critical discourse analysts are therefore particularly interested in hidden or latent expressions of ideology that often “appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies” (Wodak & Meyer, “Critical Discourse” 8). Dominant ideologies importantly
appear as neutral and are internalized by the majority population until people potentially “forget that there are alternatives to the status quo” and are manipulated by “organizations that strive for power” for hegemonic effect (Wodak & Meyer, “Critical Discourse” 8).

Eve Haque argues in “Homegrown, Muslim and Other: Tolerance, Secularism and the Limits of Multiculturalism” that “it is not just official state status that makes multiculturalism such a powerful element of national identity, rather it is the ease by which Canadians across regional, class, age, racial and ethnic divides will acknowledge this ‘fact’ regardless of their opinions on the merits of such an identity” (81). I posit that it is this widespread acceptance of Canadian multiculturalism by Canadians that makes it an ideology in need of scrutiny. Multiculturalism as a discourse constitutes knowledge, particularly of what it is to be a Canadian.

**Discourse-Historical Approach**

This study is also influenced by Ruth Wodak’s understanding of the importance of context as developed in the discourse-historical approach (DHA), which asserts that discourse analysis must “transcend the pure linguistic dimension and . . . include . . . the historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimension” (Wodak, “Discourse and Discrimination” 36). DHA aims to “integrate texts of as many different genres as possible, as well as the historical dimension of the subject under investigation” (Wodak, “20th Century” 187); discourse is understood as “related to a macro-topic” (Reisigl & Wodak 89). The central principle of DHA is that texts cannot be understood or analyzed in isolation. Discourses are intertextual:

*Intertextuality* means that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present. Such connections are established in different ways: through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; though references to the same events; by allusions or evocation; by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next, and so on. The process of transferring given elements to new contexts is labeled *recontextualization*: if an element is taken out of a specific context, we observe the new context, we witness the process of recontextualization. (Reisigl & Wodak 90)

All discursive events rely on earlier events: “One cannot avoid using words and phrases that others have used before. A particularly pronounced form of intertextuality is manifest *intertextuality*, whereby texts explicitly draw on other texts, for instance, by citing them”
(Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* 117). Individual texts are understood as a link in an *intertextual chain* (Fairclough, *Media Discourse* 77). For example, survey results, statistics, political speeches, or expert opinion are incorporated into media accounts to create new texts. In the production and the consumption processes, quotations are “de-and re-contextualized, i.e. newly framed. They can partly acquire new meanings in the specific context of press coverage” (Reisigl & Wodak 90). Discourses are linked across texts—they are dynamic, conditioned, and constitutive.

While I concentrate my analysis in this thesis on the newspaper texts that I curated, a number of other texts are important in my understanding of them. I have particularly used government-produced texts, including the B&B Report; Trudeau’s House of Commons speech announcing the adoption of a multiculturalism policy; the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; the Multiculturalism Act; Supreme Court decisions in *R. v. Big Drug Mart Ltd.*, *Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem*, and *Multini v. Commission scolaire*; and the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s Report. All of these are important discourses in and of themselves, and in combination they have aided in my contextualizing of the newspaper texts examined.

**Critical Discourse Analysis and Bias**

CDA is critical in that its aim is to elucidate the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of social situations: “Analysts are not concerned with the study of linguistic structures ‘per se,’ but only insofar as their analysis helps in the understanding or delation of a certain social situation” (Wodak & Meyer, “Critical Discourse” 2). CDA is importantly different from other forms of discourse analysis in that it is not interested, in a crucial sense, in language and advertising, even less so in the language of advertising (or politics, or the media, or education). These formulations and their projects assume a discreteness of the language of advertising from the language of education (or whatever), as though one was dealing with quite different domains. CDA, quite to the contrary, would emphasize the continuity between language in advertising and language in education, for instance, in an attempt to focus on the very real areas of socio-cultural and linguistic/textual continuity between these domains—and with all others. (Kress 92)
Wodak and Meyer summarize the fundamental interest of CDA as “analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifest in language . . . to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized and so on, by language use (or in discourse)” (“Critical Discourse” 10). CDA is not politically neutral; its aim is “change through critical understanding” (van Dijk, “Principles of Critical” 252). In CDA, researchers “choose objects of investigation, define them, and evaluate them. They do not separate their own values and beliefs from the research they are doing; recognizing . . . that researchers’ own interests and knowledge unavoidably shape their research” (Wodak, “20th Century” 186). Interpretations are understood as “more or less plausible or adequate, but they cannot be ‘true’” (Wodak, “20th Century” 187). Texts are open to different interpretations; conclusions are meant to be understood as indicative rather than definitive. CDA is the recognition of biases by biased individuals. It requires researchers to understand that they are not situated outside of the discourse being analyzed and that they themselves are a product of a historical discourse (Jager 34).

**Stuart Hall**

In this thesis, I rely on the works of Stuart Hall, particularly as he understands the discursive constructions of identity and the other. Hall’s discursive approach sees identity as a construction, one that is always in process and never completed. Identity is “conditional, lodged in contingency” (Hall, “Who Needs Identity” 17). Further, identity is “never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions.” As a result, “it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries. . . . It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process” (Hall, “Who Needs Identity” 17). The us/them distinction, according to Hall, is crucial to identity construction: “Identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside,’ abjected” (“Who Needs Identity” 18). Ultimately, Hall argues, “without relations of difference, no representation would occur” (“Cultural Identity and Diaspora” 229). Exclusion, according to Hall, is partially achieved in the representational practice of stereotyping, which “reduces people to a few, simple,
essential characteristics, which are represented as fixed by Nature.” Stereotyping deploys the strategy of splitting; it divides “the normal and acceptable from the abnormal and unacceptable,” creating categories of “us” and “them” and sustaining symbolic social order (“The Spectacle” 247-8). Stereotyping is one of the ways in which ruling groups maintain inequalities of power.

Hall asserts that national identities “represent attachment to particular places, events, symbols, histories” (“Identity” 624). National cultures are composed in cultural institutions, symbols, and representations. However, national culture is importantly “a discourse—a way of constructing meaning which influences and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves. National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify” (Hall, “Identity” 613). National identities do not, according to Hall, “subsume all other forms of difference into themselves and are not free of the play of power, internal divisions and contradictions” (“Identity” 618). National culture is a structure of cultural power. Central to all cultures are “symbolic boundaries” that “mark difference” and can lead us symbolically, to close ranks, shore up culture and to stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure, abnormal” (Hall, “The Spectacle” 226). Hall further argues that “ideological discourse does not depend on the conscious intentions of those who formulate statements within it” (“Racist Ideologies” 274). According to Hall, answering the question, “What is a Canadian?” requires determining what is not Canadian. Throughout this thesis, I identify exclusionary constructions and the argumentation used to support those constructions.

1.4 Research Questions

My examination of the newspaper texts curated for this thesis focuses on the following questions:

1. How is Canadian multiculturalism as an ideological and programmatic accomplishment portrayed/evaluated?

2. How are assessments of “values,” particularly ideas of tolerance, accommodation, and secularism, used to frame, endorse, or limit the boundaries of religious difference within multiculturalism?
3. Where discourses propose the necessity of “limits” (that is, to immigration, accommodation, or tolerance), what is presented as threatened by insufficient limits?

4. How is “Canadian” constructed? Who is included/excluded in its constructions?

1.5 Methods

Because this thesis is necessarily limited, I chose two newspapers: the Toronto Star and the Gazette (Montreal). Each is the English-language newspaper with the highest circulation in its respective province. Toronto and Montreal are also the two largest metropolitan cities in Canada by population. Texts were curated for the time period of January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2013, using Proquest—Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies and the following search terms: (publication title) and (religion or religious) and (accommodation or tolerance) and (multicultural or multiculturalism or pluralism). This search produced 166 texts for the Toronto Star and 174 texts for the Gazette. When reading the texts, I excluded those that did not focus on the questions posed by this study. The final count (118 from the Toronto Star and 150 from the Gazette) included a variety of genres, including editorial, opinion, column, news, and features.

Coding categories available through Proquest differed according to the newspaper. Texts from the Toronto Star were listed according to two document types: News and Commentary/Editorial. Document types for the Gazette included News, Article, Feature, Commentary, Editorial, Statistics/Data Report, Review, General Information, Interview, and Report. More explicit document classifications for the Gazette did not necessarily correspond with genre. For example, texts included in the document type “Feature” included editorials (authored and anonymous), columns, and news items published across different sections of the newspaper. While through Proquest columnists were identified in the Gazette, they were not in the Toronto Star.

31 Excluded texts focused on multiculturalism in other countries, particularly France and the United States, or marriage equality, or were obituaries or reviews.

32 Information about the authors of texts was sometimes included in the body of the text but not consistently. For example, in the 14 texts written for the Toronto Star by Haroon Siddiqui, he is credited as “the Star’s editorial page editor emeritus” five times, simply as the author seven times, and as a columnist twice.
Toronto Star were written by reporters, editorialists, or columnists would have required finding each text in the online version of the newspaper and reading the author’s biography. This option was quickly abandoned, not only because it would have proved prohibitive in terms of time, but also because biographies were often only available for the author’s current position at the newspaper. Because of these limitations, I decided to code the articles according to section of publication, placing texts within the context of each newspaper and providing comparable coding categories for both newspapers.33

Further, my analysis is not based on genre but rather on the topics of the discourses examined. Topics, according to van Dijk, “represent what a discourse ‘is about.’” They embody the “most important information of a discourse.” Topics define “what speakers, organizations and groups orient towards” and thus have the “most impact on further discourse and action” (van Dijk, “Multidisciplinary CDA” 102). Moreover, my analysis is based on the premise that all the newspaper texts examined are doing ideological work by “representing and constructing society” (Wodak, Disorders 18) and that in their medium of publication all of the texts are “elite discourses” as identified by van Dijk (“Elite”) and thus authoritative. Based on van Dijk’s assertions about the interaction of elites in producing media discourse, where accreditation of sources or speakers is given in the texts, I have included it in my analysis.

Finally, whereas studies of media discourses very often focus on a single or small number of texts that have been produced in a time span of a single day or of a few days and that relate to a specific event, a focus on topics allowed me to choose a significantly longer period of time and a larger number of texts. The time period was chosen to include the majority of the period studied by the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (May 2002-April 2008) and the release of the commission’s report in May 2008. I further extended the time period to 2013 to consider whether in the five years following the release of the Bouchard-Taylor Report texts produced in the Toronto Star and the Gazette were significantly different in topic or tone in light of the commission’s conclusion that the accommodation crisis was in reality a “crisis of perception” (18)—one that had been “amplified by media coverage” (38).

33 Publication section is noted throughout the analysis within citations.
Due to the large number of texts, I began this qualitative discourse analysis with a more quantitative content analysis. Using NVivo software, a word-frequency search was conducted to help determine focus. This process revealed a high occurrence of the following words in both newspapers: “immigration” (Star 325, Gazette 280), “Muslims” (Star 368, Gazette 333), “women” (Star 226, Gazette 139), and “secularism” (Star 121, Gazette 129). In view of the high occurrence of these words, the research questions’ general coding categories were made according to topic—for example: Multiculturalism, Immigration, Secularism, Gender, and so forth. Within these coding categories, text fragments (or discourse strands) were further coded according to positive, negative, and neutral assessments. Coding was ongoing throughout the writing of this thesis, with the identification of new subtopics occurring throughout the process. For the purpose of reducing the sample sizes, texts about specific events were occasionally curated to demonstrate specific aspects of the discourses examined. For example, texts about Herouxville were used to demonstrate discourses about immigration.

Basing my analysis on Wodak and Reisigl (“Discourse-Historical” 72) and Hall’s (“Who Needs Identity” 18) assertions that identity is constructed discursively through distinctions of “us” and “them,” I also coded texts to identify primary social actors. To orient my analysis, I adapted questions presented by Wodak in “The Discourse-Historical Approach” owing to their usefulness in the “analysis of discourses about racial, national and ethnic issues” (73):

1. How are persons and groups named and referred to?
2. What traits, characteristics, qualities, or actions are attributed to them?

Using these questions, I identified social actors constructed as “us” as Canadians and Quebecers and social actors constructed as “them” as consisting of a variety of configurations of immigrants, religious minorities, and ethnic minorities. These identity constructs were further subdivided throughout the analysis. For example, religious minorities were sometimes specifically identified according to their religion, their practices, and/or their gender. (In chapter four, the “them” identified are particularly hijabi Muslims.) van Dijk asserts that access to news media is not available to everyone. Rather, elites “have more or less exclusive access” (Ideology 356). And so throughout my analysis, I have noted who is given a voice and how they are accredited. Having
established the social actors to be considered, I adapted a third question to orient analysis of justification of these categories.

3. By what arguments are persons or groups included in or excluded from groups? How are these positions justified or legitimized?

In my analysis of content-related argument schemes, I adapted topoi from a list developed by Wodak (“Discourse-Historical” 74). They include threat, culture, justice, and reality. Topoi are defined as “parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion” (Wodak, “Discourse-Historical” 74). The topos of threat is based on the following conditionals: if an action has dangerous or threatening consequences, it should be avoided; or if a danger or threat is determined, something should be done to address it (Wodak, “Discourse-Historical” 75). The topos of culture is based on the argumentation scheme: because the culture of specific groups are what they are, problems arise in specific situations (Wodak, “Discourse-Historical” 76). The topos of justice is based on the claims of “equal rights” and argues that if persons/actions/situations are equal, then they should be treated or dealt with in the same manner (Wodak, “Discourse-Historical” 76). Wodak characterizes the topos of reality as “a tautological argumentation scheme,” which she paraphrases as: “Because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made” (“Discourse-Historical” 76). Argumentation strategies are often used in combination throughout the discourses examined.

1.6 Significance of Study

In 1963, Bernard Cohen wrote in The Press and Foreign Policy that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (13). Since that time, critical discourse analysts have proposed that the mainstream press in producing authoritative discourses does more than influence what readers think about. CDA proposes that discourses are socially constitutive—that is, discourse “constitutes
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough & Wodak 258). I posit that the texts examined are contributing to the discursive work of constructing Canadian identity by delimiting the conditions of belonging for religious practitioners. In so doing, they reveal not only the hierarchies and prejudices but also the aspirations of the nation.
Chapter Two

2. Canadian Multiculturalism

One of the challenges in examining discourses of multiculturalism in Canada is the definition of multiculturalism itself. Broadly, multiculturalism is articulated three ways. First, multiculturalism is used as a demographic or sociological descriptor—statistical representations of the various racial, ethnic, linguistic, national, and religious backgrounds of Canadian citizens. Second, it is used to describe public policy—government-funded programs and initiatives. Finally, multiculturalism is an ideology that prescribes how pluralism should be dealt with in a liberal democracy. Will Kymlicka distinguishes three policy stages in what he calls the “unfolding saga” of Canadian multiculturalism: the original incarnation of the 1960s and early 1970s, when “the policy encouraged the self-organization, representation and participation of ethnic groups defined on the basis of their country of origin”; the 1970s and 1980s, when “the logic of ethnicity” turned the focus to dealing with “processes of racialization and racial discrimination”; and the current period, which began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when “groups defined by religion” began to “seek a seat at the multicultural table” (“Three Lives”). Further complicating discourses, multiculturalism as a policy is variously developed at federal, provincial, and municipal levels, and this affects how multiculturalism is enacted and perceived. I began this study with a particular concern with discourses of accommodation in Canadian news media that take up the place of religious practitioners within the federal context of multiculturalism, its policies, and its ideologies. It soon became clear to me that untangling the various discourses of multiculturalism would be problematic, as discourses of multiculturalism are influenced by the passage of time, political and geographical realms, and the identity politics and perceptions of individuals and groups that are engaged both with and within it. Multiculturalism is a moving target—there are, more accurately, multiculturalisms. It should therefore be of little surprise that in the texts examined, the discourses presented are not always addressing the same phenomenon. In the texts examined, however, a common, static, and shared understanding of what is meant by multiculturalism is presumed. “Multicultural” is a dominant construct of Canadian identity—it is what we are.
Or, as Kymlicka puts it: “Multiculturalism is a right in Canada, but it is seen as a right that one possesses as a Canadian” (“Three Lives”). And while interpretations, boundaries, and applications of multiculturalism are problematized, this idea is generally not. We are (a) multicultural nation(s).  

2.1 Federal Policy—A Brief History

On October 8, 1971, in response to recommendations made in the fourth report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,35 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau made a statement to the House of Commons in which he announced that the government would adopt all of the commission’s recommendations. Trudeau outlined the role of the federal government:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized. Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society. Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity. Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (“Canadian Culture” 8546)

Trudeau concluded that the government’s policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” was one based on “the conscious support of individual freedom of choice,” a freedom that needed to be actively “fostered and pursued” because, he said, “If the freedom of choice is in danger for some ethnic groups, it is in danger for all” (“Canadian Culture” 8546). The appendix tabled by Trudeau outlined six programs under the administration of the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State or the coordination of an interagency committee. Studies were commissioned, discussions were undertaken, and monies were pledged.36 This period of federal multicultural policy primarily “concentrated on cultural preservation and intercultural sharing through

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34 Or two nations (Quebec and the rest of Canada).
35 Hereafter the B&B Commission.
36 Nearly $200 million was set aside in the first decade of the policy for special initiatives in language and cultural maintenance (93-6E Leman 5).
promotional of ethnic presses and festivals” (Dewing 5) and has since been criticized for its superficiality. For example, multiculturalism critic and journalist Richard Gwyn argues that during this period the government and the public understood culture primarily in terms of “folklore or high art” (188-89). And Breton argues that early multiculturalism policies resulted in the “fostering [of] the attitude that ethnocultures were not to be taken seriously” and that they were in their “concrete expressions” a “song and dance affair” (277). Immigration patterns began to change in the 1960s and 1970s—between 1962 and 1982, the percentage of European immigrants dropped from 80% to 42%—and “this change increased the salience of ethnic differentiation on the basis of colour rather than culture and/or language” (Breton 282-83). With the increase in “visible minorities” came a shift in policy and a focus on racial discrimination and immigrant integration. An understanding of culture as tied to race also furthered criticisms that federal policy had previously focused too much on long-established groups of largely European descent or so-called “white ethnics.”

In the 1980s, federal governmental programs were “increasingly oriented toward societal institutions” (Breton 283). In 1988, the passing of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act affirmed a policy of official multiculturalism at the federal level. It also provided for the establishment of programs and policies in support of the act. The year 1991 saw the adoption of the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship and the institution of multicultural programs that emphasized “cross-cultural understanding and the attainment of social and economic integration through institutional change, affirmative action to equalize opportunity, and the removal of discriminating barriers” (Dewing 5). In late 1993, the department was dismantled and the programs integrated into the new Canadian Heritage Department. A secretary of state of multiculturalism was appointed under the

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37 “Visible minority” is defined by Stats Canada as including “persons who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour and who do not report being Aboriginal.” Throughout the texts examined, “visible minority” is used unproblematically and without consideration that it is ultimately a racial designation that constructs group membership along the binary of white and other.

38 Including a Race Relations Unit within the Multiculturalism Directorate in 1982, a Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society in 1983, and a House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism in 1985. This last committee, in an extensive report in 1987, called for the enactment of a new policy on multiculturalism and the creation of the Department of Multiculturalism.

39 The Heritage Department also oversaw official languages, broadcasting, arts and culture, historic sites, human rights, national parks, and amateur sports, among other things.
portfolio of the minister of Canadian heritage, and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was established. In February 1997, the secretary of state for multiculturalism, Hedy Fry, announced a renewed multiculturalism program\textsuperscript{40} that focused on three objectives: social justice, civic participation, and identity (Dewing 6). Priorities of the new program notably included “ethnic, racial, \textit{religious} and cultural communities” (Dewing 6, emphasis added) as group-identity designations. Religion, as an individual identity, had found a prominent place in public discourses and public policies. Kymlicka argues that religion as a basis of claims making began to rise in the 1990s as a reflection of “a global trend towards the (re)-politicization of religion” in the context of various religious faiths beginning to contest the “attempt to exclude religion from politics and the public square.” He also asserts that that this trend continued into the twenty-first century due to the “ethnicization of Muslim identities”\textsuperscript{41} (“Three Lives”).

In 2008, responsibility for the multiculturalism portfolio was transferred to the minister of citizenship and immigration, and consequently responsibility for the multiculturalism component of the Department of Canadian Heritage was transferred to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. In December 2009, the minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, said in his opening remarks at the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem, “We have shifted our program of multiculturalism . . . to focus precisely on integration towards liberal democratic values to remove any confusion that may have existed that our approach to multiculturalism justifies abhorrent cultural practices and the expression of hatred.”\textsuperscript{42} And while his remarks were specifically targeted at an audience concerned with anti-Semitic issues, his speech is reflective of multicultural discourses occurring in Canada and of the role of

\textsuperscript{40} The secretary also announced the formation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, established with a one-time, 24-million-dollar endowment.

\textsuperscript{41} “Muslim,” argues Kymlicka, is understood as a “quasi-ethnic identity,” one often chosen by a younger generation who, because of the effects of post-9/11 Islamophobia, cannot escape the identification, regardless of their national origin, mother tongue, or degree of religious devotion (“Three Lives”).

\textsuperscript{42} Without specifically naming religious groups, the “abhorrent cultural practices and the expression of hatred” mentioned by Kenney are understood as religious cultural practices, in part because of his audience and in part because of the program cuts that he goes on to mention. But without these indicators, the policy change can still be understood as addressing problems of a religious nature due to longstanding debates about the difficulties in integrating religious practitioners into plural societies in Canada and globally. Had this speech been delivered in the 1980s, the “abhorrent and hateful practices” would likely have been assumed to be racial in origin—cultural context matters. It is also worth noting that Kenney designates Jewish as a religious identity, not an ethnic, racial, or national identity.
federal multicultural agencies in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Kenney’s clarification of the Conservative Party’s view of Canadian values is also reflected in the 2012 Discover Canada study guide for new immigrants, published by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. In the section “Rights and Responsibilities of Canadian Citizenship,” a banner at the top of the second page under the heading “The Equality of Women and Men” reads “Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings,’ female genital mutilation, forced marriage or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely punished under Canada’s criminal laws” (9). While not directly linked to “freedom of conscience and religion” (8) on the previous page, the cultural practices listed are also popularly understood as religious practices.

Changes in multicultural policy most notably altered the language of cultural recognition (from ethnicity to race to religion). No category, however, was ever really left behind. Rather, changes in the language multicultural policy reflect an expansive understanding of identity in a Canadian context. Individuals are increasingly recognized for what they always were—a complex composite. The newspaper texts that I examined in this study were chosen deliberately for their inclusion of discourses that examine religious identity within that construct.

2.2 Federal Multiculturalism Policies in the Press

In the 268 texts curated from the Toronto Star and Gazette for this study, spanning an 11-year period, only two make direct reference to federal multiculturalism policies. In a text published in the Toronto Star in December of 2013, federal multiculturalism funding is linked to international concerns—specifically the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Harper government is said to have “wooed the Canadian Jewish community (329,000)” and “cold-shoudered Canadian Arabs (780,000),” ignored “well-documented violations of the human rights of Palestinians under the 46-year Israeli occupation,” and “cut off funding to the Canadian Arab Federation, as well as Palestine House” (TS 166

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43 Particularly, Kenney notes that “we” (the federal government) “eliminated the government funding relationship with organizations like . . . the Canadian Arab Federation . . . [We] ended government contact with like-minded organizations like the Canadian Islamic Congress . . . [and] defunded organizations . . . like KAIROS.” All of the groups mentioned are religious-based organizations.
This text demonstrates the complex construction that is multicultural identity, in this instance Jewish/Israeli/Canadian and Muslim/Arab/Palestinian/Canadian identities, which it ties to domestic and international policies.

In an earlier text (2008) also published in the *Toronto Star*, it is reported that Liberal leader Stéphane Dion said that “if he was Prime Minister he would start a $75 million program to beef up security measures for ‘at risk’ non-profit groups such as religious schools and places of worship” in response to an arson attack on a Jewish school in his riding (TS 122 NW). Liberal MP Susan Kadis is quoted as saying, “All Canadians have the fundamental right to feel (safe) and to be safe in their place of worship, religious day schools and community centres.” She also stated that “protection is a main goal of government” (TS 122 NW). This text is unusual within the newspaper texts examined for this thesis in that the threat that is assessed is a criminal threat to minority-community members (since Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and black Baptists are specifically identified). While the threat is clearly posed by other Canadians, who is responsible for the threat is not determined within the text; no individuals, groups, or attitudes are named. Most often in the newspaper texts examined, threats to minority populations are identified as threats of exclusion or stigmatization. However, even in these instances, the focus remains on the majority population—“we” are threatened by “our” own lack of tolerance. In being intolerant, we become less ideal Canadians.

Where the texts examined in this thesis do take up multiculturalism policies, they do so at a provincial level such as the Ontario Arbitration Act or school funding. These are often framed in relation to the ideological stances of multiculturalism—in other words, how pluralism should be managed. Other texts claim multiculturalism as a success story, a failure, under strain, or in need of rethinking, without ever referencing specific programs or policies. That there are so few references to actual governmental policies of multiculturalism in the articles examined is perhaps not surprising when one considers that a 2010 survey (conducted by Leger Marketing for the Association of Canadian

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44 These are the same funding cuts referred to by Kenney in his speech to the 2009 Global Forum. The Canadian Arab Federation lost its funding, used in part for immigrant language instruction and job searches, because of allegations that it was an anti-Semitic organization with ties to known terrorist groups. The federation launched a legal appeal of the decision, but it was held up in Federal Court in January 2014.

45 These will be addressed under ideological assessments of multiculturalism later in this chapter.
Studies) reported that when asked, “What are the actions taken by the government of Canada to promote multiculturalism?” 64 per cent of Canadians (90 per cent of Quebecers) replied that they “didn’t know.” Further, “those who claimed that they did know what actions were taken by the federal government often incorrectly identified such things as direct funding of ethnic groups, a measure that had been dropped two decades earlier” (Jedwab 4). What is clear is that in the newspaper texts that I examined, the focus is resolutely on multiculturalism’s ideology rather than on its policy.

2.3 Demographics—Counting Culture

In the introduction to its fourth report, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism reported that “among those of non-British, non-French origin, some accept official bilingualism without hesitation but categorically reject biculturalism. They consider Canada to be a country that is officially bilingual but fundamentally multi-cultural” (B&B IV 12). The federal government, in establishing a commission whose design was meant to defuse separatist sentiment in Quebec, had unwittingly caused the mobilization of other long-established ethnic groups (particularly Ukrainians, Italians, and Poles) whose leaders feared that their contribution to the building of the nation was being marginalized. The B&B Commission (the first significant inquiry into the cultural differences of Canadian citizens) began with a focus on ethnicity, identifying where Canadians came from and how that influenced their integration, language use, customs, values, and experiences. These ethnic groups were importantly not new Canadians and neither were they to be confused as foreigners (B&B IV 9-10). Nor was ethnic origin to be understood as an ancestral or biological designation shared by a group based on “accidents of birth,” but rather, as “a force which draws its vitality from its members’ feeling of belonging to the group” (B&B IV 7). With this definition in mind, it is of little wonder that the commission quickly equated “ethnic groups” with “cultural groups” (B&B IV 11). And

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46 Its mandate was “to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution” (174).
while the commission was quick to not lump all ethnic/cultural groups into a single group whose “only common feature [was] not being of either British or French ethnic origin,” it stressed that none of the individual groups was “sufficiently concentrated to contemplate the institution of other official languages, or the expansion of the concept of two societies to include four or five” (B&B IV 11). Not only did the B&B Commission not promote the undertaking of a governmental multicultural policy, but it also went so far as to dismiss the very idea of a “third force,” arguing that it did not exist “in any political sense, and is simply based on statistical compilations.” Furthermore, it assumed a policy of biculturalism to be sufficient, suggesting that everyone would eventually integrate into either the Francophone or Anglophone communities, “where they should find opportunities for self-fulfilment and equality of status” (B&B IV 11).

Despite the assertions of the B&B Commission, the federal government went on to adopt a multiculturalism policy. These policies quickly became—and remained—focused on new Canadians or immigrants. The commission was at least partially correct. In the discourses examined, the designation of ethnic is not applied to “long established ethnic groups”; these are subsumed into Anglophone or Francophone culture. While distinctions between Francophones and Anglophones are made (usually categorized as Quebecers and the rest of Canada), these two groups are also portrayed singularly as “us” (or simply as “Canadians”), the standard by which “they” (immigrants) can be measured. The texts examined emphasize the changing demographics of Canadian immigration and its effects on Canadian society. The immigrants taken up in these

47 A demographic distinction that divides the population of Canada into three “forces.” The first force consisted of Aboriginal peoples. The second force, also called the Charter groups, consisted of Canadians of both French and British decent. The third force consisted of all minorities who fell outside the first two groups at the time of the B&B Commission. This latter group was largely comprised of persons of European descent.

48 That immigration is a central concern in the discourses examined is perhaps made evident through a simple word count: “immigrant,” “immigrants,” “immigrate,” “immigrated,” or “immigration” appear 280 times in the texts from the Gazette and 322 times in those from the Toronto Star.

49 Aboriginal peoples are entirely excluded from the discourses examined in this study and discourses of multiculturalism generally. Kymlicka argues that this is because rights claims of ethnic minority groups and Aboriginal rights have moved along separate legal and political tracks, with each responding to their exclusion from B&B’s bicultural program in different ways and with different claims (“Three Lives”).

50 University of Toronto sociologist Jeffrey Reitz explains, “In the ‘70s we opened it up to the world. Now we say all Europeans are the new ‘us,’ and now there is a new ‘them.’ And it’s people who are not European” (TS 38 NW).
discourses are particularly visible in their ethnicity, their religion, or both their ethnicity and their religion.

2.4 Immigrants—Who and How Many

When the Government of Canada considers the multicultural makeup of the nation, in the tradition of the B&B Commission, it counts and tallies the ethnic origin of the population. In the newspaper texts that I examined, “multicultural” is often unproblematically used as a sociological or demographic descriptor. Canada is simply composed of individuals and groups of various backgrounds. The problem of religious integration and/or accommodation within the framework of Canadian multiculturalism is particularly focused on immigration.

In the newspaper texts that I examined, discourses that problematize immigration focus on two related topics: the number and type of immigrants. Immigration has increased, but that immigration is increasing is not the primary focus of the articles examined. Rather, the focus is on a particular type of immigrant whose number is increasing—one who is racialized and religious. In the texts that I examined, immigrants who come from Europe or America are ignored, as are immigrants who are Christians or who claim no religious affiliations, despite the fact that these comprise a significant percentage of immigrants. The 2011 National Household Survey reports that of the over two million immigrants to Canada between 2001 and 2011, over 966,000 were Christians and over 440,000 had no religious affiliation. Yet the focus of immigration discourses within the texts examined remains on Muslims (387,585), Sikhs (107,000), and Jews (21,445). Where immigration is particularly problematized, immigrants are described as composing an increasing percentage of the Canadian population as a whole. In the texts that I examined, the threat of immigration can be generalized as too many of the wrong kind of immigrants.

51 The Canadian census surveys the ethnic origins of Canadians and provides information about ethnic populations (and visible minorities) by metropolitan area and province.
52 “Canada is a multicultural country” (GZ 69 NW, GZ 111 OE) or “our multicultural society” (TS 11 NW, GZ 35 OE); Toronto is “multicultural” (TS 16 NW, 23 NW, 87), and so is Montreal (GZ 8 NW, GZ 22 OE, GZ 42 OE, GZ 87 SE R, GZ 152 NW)
53 GZ 45 NW, GZ 37 NW, GZ 85 NW, TS 38 NW, TS 78 LT.
54 While the number of immigrants to Canada has steadily increased over the years, as a percentage of the population the numbers are fairly stable.
A text published in the Toronto Star in March 2005 is especially explicit: “In 2017, our vivid cultural tapestry may look even more intricate. People of visible ‘minorities’ will be more than half of Toronto and one-fifth of the nation.” That minorities is in quotes is not accidental. The explicit threat is that minority/majority demographics are coming to a dangerous tipping point—half is not a minority population. Later in the text, the projected half is specifically noted as “people of non-European origin . . . made up almost entirely of . . . Chinese, Indian, black and, increasingly, Arab and other West Asian groups” (TS 38 NW). Immigration is framed as largely an urban problem, as “the vast majority of new immigrants—75 per cent—will congregate in the country’s three largest urban centres.” Toronto particularly will “carry the brunt of the immigration load, settling 45 per cent of all newcomers from visible minorities.” Emphasis on visible-minority immigrants as opposed to immigration numbers as a whole demonstrates that the problematic part of the increased number of immigrants is directly related to their ethnicity or race. This reality is further confirmed as problematic by the agreement of “most experts,” who “say the non-European nature of this latest immigrant wave will bring its own unique challenges.” Minority immigrants are further identified as religious by Ursa George, associate dean of the University of Toronto’s Department of Social Work, who is reported as saying that “regressive social or religious attitudes that new immigrants might bring to Canada, about such issues as women’s rights, can’t be allowed to infiltrate the existing culture” (TS 38 NW). The designation of new immigrants as potentially possessing “regressive” traits also serves to characterize Canada and Canadians as progressive and egalitarian. Negative presentations of immigrants (“them”) contrast with positive representations of Canadians (“us”): “Canada’s traditions of tolerance and peaceful integration should ensure that our core institutions and values remain constant as the face of society changes”; “The diversity in Canada’s population has always been a contributing factor to building our nation”; “Most Canadians still support the country’s immigration program” (TS 38 NW). The Canadian “we” is

55 “Tapestry” is an unusual construct. More often, Canada’s cultural diversity is referred to as a “mosaic” and sometimes as a “melting pot.”
56 The point is made exceedingly clear—that visible minorities will make up “more than half of Toronto” is mentioned three times; “one-fifth of the nation” is expressed twice and once more as “about 20 per cent of Canadians.”
reassured. Despite “their” increasing numbers and “their” potentially threatening values, “we” have successfully integrated difference in the past; “our” values are “constant.” This text demonstrates recurrent themes found throughout the texts examined. The threat of too many immigrants, who are particularly not white and not Christian, risks upsetting the current majority/minority demographic and correspondingly threatens the values and traditions of the majority culture. A selection of texts about Herouxville further demonstrates these themes.

2.5 Herouxville—Microcosm of the Nation?

Herouxville became a national and international media sensation when the town council passed the “Herouxville Code of Conduct” in January 2007. Written by Herouxville councillor André Drouin and adopted unanimously by the town council, the code’s stated goal was “to inform the new arrivals that the lifestyle that they left behind in their birth country cannot be brought here with them and they would have to adapt to their new social identity” (Hamilton). The code included prohibitions against stoning or burning women to death; the assertion that Christmas is celebrated though “not necessarily a religious holiday”; and the instruction that school children “cannot carry any weapons real or fake, symbolic or not” (Hamilton). The code, its author, the town of Herouxville, and the discussion that it engendered were widely characterized as xenophobic: “Some of the rhetoric surrounding the discussion has been characterized as xenophobic, prompting warnings from race-relations experts about the dangers of going too far” (TS 75 NW); “We cannot turn a blind eye to intolerance in communities such as Herouxville, Que., where the town council set ignorant and offensive ‘standards’ for Muslim newcomers” (TS 76 ED); and “The Herouxville decree was ridiculed in some quarters as the expression of a small town’s hysteria about issues of which it had little experience” (TS 107 ID). The representation of immigrants, and particularly of Muslims, within the code was criticized as “amount[ing] to a caricature of non-Christian religious practices” (GZ 107 NW). The code came from a seemingly surprising source—a town of

57 The original Code was written in French with no official English translation and has since been removed from Herouxville’s official web page. The version of the Code included in appendix D was printed with permission from André Drouin and is not the original version. It is rather, an amended version produced by the town’s council in February of 2007.
1,300 whose inhabitants were white, Francophone, and nominally Catholic, and which
significantly had no immigrants.58 Taken up by politicians, the public, and the press,
Herouxville and its code ignited debates about multiculturalism, immigration, and
religious accommodation.

Public Opinion Reveals Problems

In the newspaper texts that I examined, Herouxville’s code is largely condemned
for its use of religious stereotype and general alarmism, but the idea that immigration
poses a real threat to Canada’s, and particularly Quebec’s, cultural integrity is not entirely
dismissed. Further, Herouxville’s code is portrayed as revelatory of the actual depth of
unease about immigration and the demographic makeup of the nation that “we”
Canadians feel: “In truth, Herouxville is a lightning rod for the anxiety and confusion
many feel since Sept. 11, 2001. In our increasingly multicultural society, we want new
immigrants to feel welcome in our country, but we don’t want our country to turn into
theirs” (GZ 45 NW); “The celebrated declaration of Herouxville is laughable on one
level, but it also reveals an unease among many Quebecers” (GZ 47 OE); “[Across
Canada,] both politicians and journalists took the episode as important evidence that
Canadians (particularly Quebecers) were growing increasingly anxious about the cultural
integration of newcomers and minority groups” (TS 107 ID); and “Herouxville has
become a symbol for the ‘reasonable accommodation’ debate that’s recently been
twisting Quebec into knots” (GZ 45 NW). The evaluation of the Herouxville Code as
rightly indicative of a real problem goes beyond the initial reporting. More than a year
later, it was reported in the Gazette that “Bouchard and Taylor also—surprisingly—come
to the defence of Herouxville. . . . ‘In a very awkward and excessive way, the Herouxville
text expressed a tension, an ambivalence many French-Canadian Quebecers have’” (GZ
89 NW). In 2010, time and a continued lack of public consensus on religious
accommodation issues led to some qualified reassessments of the code and its author:
“Drouin’s wincingly politically incorrect pronouncements came to symbolize rural
Quebec’s intolerance. But the recent storm over the niqab suggests l’affaire Herouxville

58 One text notes, “one adopted Haitian boy seems to constitute the entire visible-minority population” of
Herouxville (GZ 44 OE).
was no anomaly. Drouin is now lending his support to a nascent coalition that aims to drum up opposition to immigration and multiculturalism in English Canada” (GZ 114 NW). Further, Drouin “emerges as a more complex character than the country bumpkin depicted in reports on the Herouxville affair” (GZ 114 NW) and is recast as a “small-town radical secularist” (GZ 116 NW). Alia Hogben, president of the Canadian Council of Muslim Women, said, “There must be a lot more public discourse about what is expected of newer immigrants” (TS 87 NW). In a Toronto Star text titled “Quebec’s Healthy Identity Debate,” Quebec is sympathetically portrayed as “struggling to work through these issues. . . . [They are] off to a healthy, if noisy, start. It may not be entirely pleasant to watch . . . [this] vital debate” (TS 97 ED).

These texts justify the position of Herouxville using the topoi of reality and culture. The reality is that new minority immigrants (they) have different cultural practices than the majority (us), and therefore “our” unease is justified. Discussion and perhaps even codes are required to assure that new minority immigrants are successfully integrated into majority culture. These texts confirm that the integration of immigrant religious minorities is problematic because of the type of immigrant. This discourse strand confirms that while the people of Herouxville have been decidedly “excessive” (GZ 89 NW) in their reaction, theirs is just an amplified reflection of the anxiety, tension, and confusion that many people in Canada, and particularly Quebec, are feeling. It is a cautionary tale, and not, as it might first appear, one that cautions against the extreme reaction of Herouxville. Authorities (politicians, journalists, governmental commissions) agree: Herouxville points directly to a problem in need of “our” attention. These texts fall just short of calling the Herouxville Code an issue of free speech. Rather, they situate the debate and discussion of the code as a necessary and vital component of a healthy liberal democracy. Immigration integration needs to be discussed in public forums for the benefit of current and future citizens. While the code itself is condemned as exaggerating the problem, it is welcomed as a public good, bringing the issue into a public forum. Multiculturalism is good. Canadians are good. We must protect “our” culture from “theirs.”
Exaggeration and Politicking

Within texts about Herouxville, there is a discourse strand that asserts that fears about immigrant integration are not only largely unfounded but are exacerbated by the press and people using them for their own political gain. Université de Montreal professor Marie McAndrew is quoted: “There is a debate to be had on this issue, but there are really two discussions going on: one that is legitimate, and the other, among people like the mayor of Herouxville, that is a major societal problem that politicians should do something about quickly” (TS 75 NW).

Quebec immigration minister Lise Thériault is quoted as blaming the media directly for fanning the Herouxville controversy: “Journalists like extremist stories, and it just snowballed from there” (GZ 46 NW). A Toronto Star headline calls readers to “look past alarmist headlines” and goes on to note their prevalence in the press: “Since [Herouxville,] two ideas have appeared consistently in the national media. The first is that Canadians are losing their vaunted openness to newcomers” (TS 107 ID). The author goes on to ask, “Are Canadians experiencing some anxiety about the single most ambitious immigration program in the world? Yes. Is Canada giving up on diversity, becoming a hotbed of xenophobia overnight? No.” (TS 107 ID). As proof, the text offers public opinion polls:

Between 2005 and 2006, the proportion of Canadians believing that “too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian values” jumped from 58 per cent to 65 per cent. So, yes, public opinion polling has shown a spasm of concern about the integration of newcomers. Canadian attitudes, however, remain overwhelmingly positive. Canada has the highest immigration rate in the world, but when asked if this country accepts too many immigrants, most of us say no. Canadians are by far the most likely of any G8 country to say immigrants are good for the country, and that immigrants help the economy grow rather than “taking jobs from other Canadians.” Canadians are also the least likely of any Western society to hold the misconception that immigrants commit more crime than “people born here.” In naming things that make them proud to be Canadian, more Canadians say multiculturalism than hockey or bilingualism. (TS 107 ID)

Kymlicka’s assertion that the “strength of national identity is positively correlated with support for immigration” (Multiculturalism 14) is demonstrated in the quote. Positive
evaluations of immigrants are equated with positive evaluations of multiculturalism. The integration of immigrants is not a problem, according to public opinion (or rather, 35 per cent say it is not). Joseph Carens, a political science professor at the University of Toronto, warns against taking “flareups” seriously: “Multiculturalism is a deeply held value for Canadians. There is a deep current within Canada that says anybody can be a Canadian. It doesn’t mean you have to be white or of European descent or of the Christian religion. The vast majority of the population have really internalized that” (GZ 114 NW). Quebec premier Jean Charest calls the Herouxville controversy an “isolated” incident (TS 75 NW & 107 ID). The Bouchard-Taylor Report is cited as including Herouxville as but one of many “trivial incidents . . . blown out of proportion,” though the author of this “Insight” piece is certainly too optimistic in his 2009 assessment, writing that “the commission’s report fell on receptive ears, and the ‘crisis’ disappeared. The moral of the story was that a liberal society must confront bigots, not cower before them” (TS 131 IN). The situation in Canada is presented as better than elsewhere in the world: “Is Quebec aping Europe’s Islamophobia, just as Europe is pulling back from it? . . . On reflection, the answer is this, No, Quebec is not necessarily going berserk. . . . As for Herouxville, its pronouncements have already been widely derided” (TS). One author in the Toronto Star thinks it might just be a Quebec problem: “Public tensions have been reasonably fleeting in Toronto—at least to date. . . . But for the most part, conflicts have been in Quebec, mostly over girls wearing the hijab headscarf. And, in a supremely bizarre case, the village of Herouxville” (TS 87 NW). Université de Montreal professor and expert on race relations and immigration Marie McAndrew, meanwhile, comments with regard to Herouxville that it’s actually a bit strange, because Quebec is the one place where this has been talked about and enshrined in policy for 15 years. . . . But evidently the principles and guidelines haven’t necessarily filtered down to public officials who should implement them. . . . If anything, I would think that this debate

59 The positive presentation of Canadians as not “holding misconceptions” about immigrants “taking jobs” or “committing crimes” is a bit of a misdirection. The threat of concern to Canadians, which is aptly revealed in the poll and in the texts examined, is not a threat of too many but rather a failure of assimilation. The threat of immigration is to Canadian culture or values.

60 The necessity of naming “white” and “Christian” demonstrates where the problem is usually presumed to lie.
would be happening in English Canada, where there is more ambiguity in terms of multiculturalism policy (TS 75 NW).

The problem, as identified in these texts, is a failure in leadership: “Rather than . . . addressing those concerns constructively, some of our political leaders have exploited the issue for short-term political gain, creating even greater unease. . . . Some opportunists suggest that multiculturalism is a threat to the very essence of Canada and Quebec; these fears are entirely unfounded” (TS 106 OP). “Political opportunists” are further discredited in that “none . . . has demonstrated how one Canadian’s expression of their faith or culture diminishes those of others” (TS 106 OP). Herouxville is not the sole example of the exaggeration of religious integration problems:

Herouxville has banned a practice that was not coming, and could not possibly have come, to Canada. This is a replay of Ontario banning the sharia, which was not coming and could not possibly have come to Canada, even if some of its proponents foolishly thought so and some of its critics cleverly exploited the assertion to fan public fears that an Islamic penal code was indeed on the way (TS 80 OP).

In December of 2007, Thomas S. Axworthy, chair of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen’s University, wrote that Herouxville’s code was “aimed at immigrants [and] presumed the worst of them,” and also that it was deliberately used by Mario Dumont, leader of the Action Démocratique du Québec, who “rode this anti-immigration wave to become leader of the Opposition in Quebec’s recent election” (TS 111 OP). Accusations of politicking are also aimed at Dumont by other authors: “[He] has moved quickly to exploit ethnic tensions that surfaced recently and to pose as the defender of majority values against attack by religious and ethnic minorities. . . . [He is] desperate to attract attention to his moribund party and sens[es] widespread resentment among francophone voters” (GZ 36 OE); “In the election, Dumont seized the opportunity to exploit this insecurity (as well as the weakness of his opponents) to make major gains outside of the Island of Montreal” (TS 117 OP); and “There he goes again. Quebec’s small-c conservative leader, Mario Dumont, is up to his old tricks—fanning fears about the province somehow losing its identity, as if it were a set of car keys gone astray. . . . Last year Dumont wooed votes by arguing that Quebec has gone too far accommodating minorities. Remember Herouxville. . . . Well, Dumont felt the town’s pain” (TS 129 ED).
Despite the many instances where Dumont is accused of promoting anti-immigration and antimulticultural sentiment, he too is included as a moderating voice: “I think we had a number of successes in terms of immigrant integration and I think Quebec, in many areas, has done a pretty good job in that . . . there’s no panic here” (TS 75 NW).

This strand of the discourse portrays anti-immigration and antimulticulturalism sentiment as exaggeration. The wrong kind of attention (alarmist) from the wrong people (politicians and the press) has escalated largely unfounded fears. Public opinion is deemed a better gauge of Canada’s successful multicultural program and used as reassuring proof of the assessment that fears are overblown. Present-day success in integrating new immigrants is anchored in multiculturalism’s historic success. Alarmist views are in the minority and attributed to bad motives or other people. This strand of the discourse discounts negative views of immigrants as false, exaggerated, or the product of politicking, and it reifies the majority view as moderate.

Identifying Xenophobes among “Us”

Within the texts that examine Herouxville’s code, its contents are particularly noted as not representative of the feelings or understandings of most, or even many, Canadians. Herouxville and its proponents are deliberately disassociated from the majority of Canadians—“they” are not representative of “us.” Texts about Herouxville assert that anti-immigration and antimulticulturalism sentiment is more prevalent among some people and in some places than others. In particular, it is a “small town” problem. Descriptions of Herouxville as “a tiny Quebec town” (TS 126 NW), a “small town” (TS 134 OP, GZ 56 NW), and a “little town,” whose web page “greets you with the classic image of small-town Quebec: a graceful church, white spire above grey stone” (GZ 44 OE), are at least as much about the town’s cultural homogeneity, its isolationism, and its traditionalism as they are about its actual size. This strand of the discourse posits that rural communities are inherently less socially developed and less sophisticated than their urban counterparts. The divide is emphasized at times by letting small-town residents speak for themselves. André Drouin is quoted as saying to the press, “If Muslims who want to impose sharia law realized that here we don’t stone women, they would never have come” (GZ 44 OE), and on another occasion, “I mop the floor, but if my wife were
Muslim, she’d mop the floor” (GZ 48 NW). Linda Bedard, a Herouxville resident, is reported as “worrying out loud about immigration” and quoted as saying, “We’re strangers in our own country. In 20 or 25 years, we won’t exist anymore as a people” (GZ 114 NW). When Saint-Roch’s town council passed a code similar to that of Herouxville, its mayor was quoted as saying, “This should have been done here long ago.” He conceded that he did not know much about immigrant communities and explained that “we don’t live with them side-by-side here like they do in Montreal, but if I’ve chosen to live here it’s because I like the way we live . . . and I don’t want it to change” (TS 75 NW). Samira Laouni, an NDP candidate in the riding of Montreal North who was described as “the first hijab-wearing candidate in Quebec,” recounted a trip that she and a small group of other Muslims took to Herouxville (TS 126 NW). Laouni reported that the trip was a “success” in that she got to “answer all of their questions.” What kind of questions? “They even asked me, ‘Do people like me wash my hair? Do I do my hair?’ I explained that yes, I wash it, I do it, I cut it” (TS 126 NW).

Université de Montreal professor Marie McAndrew points out that the controversy about Herouxville has only deepened the “rural-urban rift in Quebec.” It is an example of “the disconnect between those who actually live among minority groups, and those who don’t” (TS 75 NW). Jeffrey Reitz, credited as “a leading expert on multiculturalism at the University of Toronto,” points out that “the strongest criticisms of multiculturalism often come from people who have little or no contact with minorities. . . . They actually have very little experience dealing with cultural diversity in their communities” (GZ 114 NW). And of Herouxville he says, “Let’s face it, the issues they raised were not prominent anywhere in Canada. There’s no burning and stoning of women. Those concerns are completely fanciful and I think that reflects their being out of touch with reality” (GZ 114 NW). Jack Jedwab, executive director of the Association for Canadian Studies, is reported as saying of Herouxville that “such views will never fly in urban Canada.” He goes on to say that “there is no really organized anti-immigration movement and the people of Herouxville have not been able to mobilize such a movement because the percentage of immigrants here is so significant. . . . It’s very hard for me and many other Canadians and Quebecers to identify with the idea that there is ‘an us and them,’ meaning immigrant and non-immigrant” (GZ 114 NW). In this text (GZ 114 NW), anti-
immigration stances are equated with antimulticulturalism stances. The two positions are treated interchangeably throughout the text, supporting the perception that multiculturalism is primarily concerned with the integration of immigrants. Of André Drouin, the creator of Herouxville’s code, an unauthored editorial in the Gazette asserts, “He is, we hasten to say, wrong. The notion other people, even our neighbours, must ‘live like us’ sounds to most people downright tribal. Who can find a Muslim in Quebec who stones women, anyway?” (GZ 44 OE). It is unclear who constitutes the “we” being referring to—the Gazette? Canadians? The majority? Quebecers? Montrealers? Academics? Journalists? Likely it is all of the above. What can be said definitively is that within this strand of the discourse about Herouxville, binaries are constructed around two types of people: the urban/tolerant/erudites represented by professional academics (and who not coincidently support multiculturalism and immigration) and the rural/bigoted/benighted who are both the propagators of negative stereotypes about religious minority immigrants and the victims of those who use their fears for political gain.

While texts about Herouxville present an urban/rural binary, one text in a series analyzing data from a poll conducted by the Gazette and published in September 2007 further constructs this “attitudes and understanding” binary according to age differences: “A new poll suggests open-minded young people—not older baby-boomer decision-makers—will lead Quebec out of its existential morass over ‘reasonable accommodation’ of religious minorities and new immigrants” (GZ 59 SE). Further, “attitudes toward most immigrants and non-Christian minorities—and especially of Muslims—get more negative the older a person is, with people under 24 years of age being the most tolerant and least fearful of change” (GZ 59 SE). Those most opposed to accommodation are over the age of 65, “have less contact with minorities, generally live in eastern Quebec, and worry more about Quebec losing its French-Canadian identity through increased immigration by Muslims, Sikhs and other minorities” (GZ 59 SE). Sirma Bilge, an assistant professor of sociology at Université de Montreal, offers reasons for the disparity. She is quoted as saying, “The younger generation has first-hand experience of diversity, and they did not

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61 These use as their basis a Leger Marketing poll undertaken for the Gazette in collaboration with the Association of Canadian Studies.
live through the Quiet Revolution. So they tend less to worship French-style secularism and feel less anxious about religious diversity and immigration” (GZ 59 SE). The poll also reports higher levels of contact between youth and minority populations. Most of the statistical reporting by age concentrates on the two groups (under 24 and over 65) and ignores the larger middle demographic group. Where the middle group’s views are reported, they represent a range of opinion: “Asked outright whether they think immigrants should abandon their traditions and become more like the majority . . . opinions of people age 25 to 64 ranged from 48 per cent in agreement to 65 per cent, rising progressively with age” (GZ 59 SE).

This discourse strand about age binaries is also evident in a Toronto Star text report on the Bouchard-Taylor Commission public forums. It reads, “For months, the commissioners have heard from a parade of mostly old-stock francophone Quebecers expressing fears about the survival of the province’s traditional French-speaking, Catholic identity, and fretting over how to make immigrants embrace the majority’s culture” (TS 109 NW). Jacques Beauchemin, a Université du Quebec a Montreal professor advising the commission, is quoted: “The vision of the children of Bill 101 will have a profound effect on the future. We’re seeing young people come forward who can easily reconcile the concept of ‘other’ with their own identity and expression of nationalism. . . . They stand in opposition to the previous generation, which is struggling to see the influx of immigrants as anything more than a threat to the identity it has known” (TS 109 NW). The text continues: “Many of the statements made by those in attendance fired back at the concerns voiced by old-stock worriers.” It quotes Alain Berger, who is described as a “twentysomething resident of Cote-des-Neiges”: “As for this concern expressed in regards to accommodations, expressed mostly by the generation that precedes me, I’d like to respond by saying your fight is over. You won. . . . Now we will take care of integration. And we have a way of doing it that is properly accommodating” (TS 109 NW).

Youth are portrayed in this discourse strand as more “open minded” about immigration and multiculturalism, but also about religion generally. According to the Toronto Star, “findings of an opinion survey among 2000 respondents across Canada age 16-30 indicat[e] there is no conflict between support for multiculturalism and Canadian
identity. . . Those who strongly support multiculturalism also strongly adhere to Canadian values” (TS 48 LT). Spencer Boudreau, a professor of education at McGill, is reported to be “optimistic” about the emerging generation’s attitudes: “They’re very curious, they’re very open. . . The religion classes at McGill are full. The students want to know more” (GZ 107 NW). Alia Hogben, president of the Canadian Council of Muslim women, also characterizes opinions about immigrant integration along generational lines and is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot of feeling among older Canadians—‘Why don’t you all just fall into line?’” (TS 87 NW).

This strand of the discourse names the xenophobic element in Canadian society. Those voices expressing anti-immigration and/or anti-multicultural sentiments are generally confined to rural populations and those over the age of 65. They are importantly not the majority of Canadians or Quebecers. Anti-immigration and antimulticulturalism are portrayed as a temporary problem that is rectified simply by the eventual rise to power of today’s youth.

**Herouxville—Conclusions**

The Herouxville case demonstrates that discourses about multiculturalism are intricately tied to discourses about immigration. Multiculturalism is portrayed as a positive attribute of Canada that is supported by the majority of Canadians. Social actors identified within these texts include: immigrants (characterized as ethnic minorities and religious), majority Canadians or Quebecers (characterized as supporting both immigration and multiculturalism), minority Canadians or Quebecers (characterized as anti-immigration, antimulticulturalism, over 65, and rural), minority politicians (characterized as feeding the fears about minority Canadians for political gain), and the press (characterized as exaggerating the anti-immigration and antimulticultural sentiment in sensationalist reporting). The threat identified in the positions of all social actors is that the changing demographic of immigrants is potentially a real threat to Canadian culture and values. The conclusion is that discussion is needed among majority Canadians and that Canadian values need to be made clear to new immigrants. The passive solution is that anti-immigration and antimulticulturalism opinions will eventually die out with the older population.
Anti-immigration and/or antimulticulturalism sentiment is deemed exaggerated in the press and exploited by politicians for political gain. Further, such sentiments are largely relegated to certain sections of the population, particularly rural residents and the aged. Within the positive self-evaluation of majority views, however, a real problem is acknowledged: some types of immigrant, ethnic and religious, are of real concern. The changing demographics of Canada are framed as a potential threat to majority values.

### 2.6 Ideology

Canadian multiculturalism is an ideology—a system of ideas and ideals that serves to tell us how pluralism is best managed in a liberal democratic society. van Dijk argues that “ideologies mentally represent the basic social characteristics of a group such as their identity, tasks, goals, norms, values, position and resources.” Ideologies “are constructed by a group-based selection of relevant social values” (“DA as Ideology Analysis” 18). As a policy and an ideology, multiculturalism is “part and parcel of the larger process of liberalization in the 1960s and 70s,” a time that included the rise of many “rights” movements, “all of which were committed to redressing inherited forms of inequality and stigmatization” (Kymlicka, “Disentangling” 145). Multiculturalism, as a cultural rights ideology, is based on the premise that inequity is insufficiently addressed by formal programs within state institutions. What is further required is a broadening of the social understandings of citizens.

Janice Gross Stein notes in “Searching for Equality” that Canadians “know pretty well what the ‘multi’ in multicultural means, but are much less confident about the ‘culture’” (4). While the 1971 multiculturalism policy declaration did not explicitly define culture, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism defined it as “a way of being, thinking, and feeling. It is a driving force animating a significant group of individuals united by a common tongue, and sharing the same customs, habits, and experiences” (B&B I 38), as well as “a style of living made up of many elements that colour thought, feeling, and creativity, like the light that illuminates the design of a stained-glass window” (B&B IV 11). Ironically, not very illuminating. In his speech to the House of Commons, Trudeau referenced the commission, saying that cultural
belonging is determined by a group’s “collective will to exist” (“Canadian Culture” 8546). Trudeau went on to say that although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all. . . . In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the view of the government that a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework is basically the conscious support of individual freedom of choice. (“Canadian Culture” 8546) 62

That the definition of Canadian culture is elusive is perhaps its defining quality. But within this speech, the beginning of the expression of an ideology of multiculturalism can be found. Multicultural ideology posits that nationalism, equality, freedom, and social justice begin in the acknowledgment of the individual. The passing of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988 equally did not provide concrete definitions of Canadian multiculturalism. Again, the essence of the ideology of can be found in it. In its preamble, the act answers not the “what” of Canadian multiculturalism but rather the “why.” It is because of a commitment to civil liberties, equality, and international human rights, and the recognition of the diversity of Canadian citizens—including their ethnicity, language, and culture—that the Canadian government has established an “Act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada.” Hall argues that national culture is “a discourse—a way of constructing meanings which influences and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves” (Hall, “The Question” 292-93). This definition is made evident in the newspaper texts that I examined.

62 Responses to the prime minister’s speech included Mr. Réal Caouette (Témiscamingue): “Mr. Speaker, if there is no official culture in Canada, I do not see how we could succeed in really becoming a nation. . . . I am positive that we have in Canada a culture peculiar to us.”
Multiculturalism’s Ideology

Multiculturalism is only referred to as an ideology once in the newspaper texts examined. Andrew Renahan, a master’s student in the history and philosophy of religion at Concordia University attending a McGill University symposium on religion and public reasoning, argues that the “the unspoken command to conform” and the exclusion from “economic, political and social opportunities . . . undermines the entire ideology of multiculturalism” (GZ 69 NW). Nonetheless, discourses of ideology are evident in statements about what multiculturalism values and more often what threatens it. In the texts that I examined, multiculturalism as an ideology is described as valuing diversity, equality, and tolerance: “The word itself is open to interpretation and means different things to different people. It can mean tolerance, a ‘mosaic’ model for assimilation, pluralism, but above all, the equality of all cultures” (TS 102 OP); “Multiculturalism values the diversity of the immigrant society by accepting differences” (GZ 21 IN). Multicultural ideology is described in terms of how we behave: “In a multicultural society, sensible people strive to respect differences and be considerate” (GZ 35 OE). It is also visible in how it works: “Common understanding, respect and tolerance bind together multicultural societies such as our own” (TS 129 ED); “Multiculturalism . . . actively supports diversity as a source of collective strength and shared identity. . . . Respecting each other—not simply for our common humanity, but precisely for our uniqueness—is the way to build a strong and creative society” (GZ 170 OE). And while descriptions of multiculturalism as an ideology are sometimes reductive, “multiculturalism is nothing but the celebration of difference” (TS 58 LT). It is also expansive:

Multiculturalism is important because it dilutes and dissipates the divisiveness of ignorance. It is important because it encourages dialogue, often between radically different cultures that have radically different perspectives. It is important because it softens the indifference of tolerance, and embraces it with the genuine humanity of acceptance. It is a bridge between the divide of tolerance and acceptance. Differences aside, human beings, regardless of their specific culture of origin, strive to provide the best they can for their family, and to live in as peaceful and harmonious a world as possible. These two goals unite us all. Multiculturalism makes the ideal and altruistic notion of

63 The idea of tolerance as a multicultural ideal, particularly as it relates to ideas of equality, will be problematized in chapter three.
loving our fellow man a tangible possibility, rather than a nebulous philosophical concept. (TS 73 ED)

Canadian multiculturalism as an ideological accomplishment is presented as proven in daily experiences:

Scarcelly a day goes by without a complaint about some minority, a poll showing that Canadians are becoming less tolerant or a commentary suggesting that immigrants take too much and give too little. It would be easy to conclude that Canada’s 36-year quest to be a home to people of all backgrounds, beliefs, races and cultures has run aground. It would be tempting to write off multiculturalism as a noble—but naive—mistake. But to anyone who rides the subway, visits an elementary school, lives in a mixed neighbourhood or has friends and colleagues from different cultures, that flies in the face of the evidence. (TS 104 ED)

It is further demonstrated in the experiences of immigrants, with one Toronto Star text reading,

From the first day, we were made to feel welcome. . . . North America was tense after the events of Sept. 11. Canadians felt personally angry and violated. But our politicians, police forces and media worked in tandem to bring communities together. There were no angry youths rampaging through Toronto attacking visible minorities. . . . Canada is inclusive, building a truly diverse society by embracing other ethos. (TS 49 LF)

And sometimes it is presented with some self-deprecating humour: “Once back, when I received a Christmas card from Calgary MP Deepak Obhrai, I could joke with colleagues when a Hindu MP sends a Jewish person Christmas greetings, we have reached the acme of multiculturalism” (GZ 75 OE).

Where multicultural ideology is portrayed as failing, it is often as a failure of understanding or application. Multiculturalism fails where it results in isolation: “My generation allowed multiculturalism to become a Canadian standard, and maybe that is the problem. We saw multiculturalism as the acceptance of all. Somehow the vision has been distorted to suggest that multiculturalism is the right to keep and practise one’s own culture and keep it apart from the mosaic called Canada” (TS 93 LT). It also fails where its ideals are practiced in excess: “An overweening ideal of multiculturalism almost snuck sharia law into Ontario a few years ago when Barbara Hall foolishly advocated selling out gender to Islamic fundamentalists in the name of minority rights and religious
“equivalency” (TS 145 NW). Sometimes its practice veers from the values at its foundation: “In pursuing multicultural tolerance, Canada has been negligent in reinforcing essential, common-denominator values” (TS 57 OP). Discourse strands that examine the ideology of multiculturalism portray it as experiential: how Canadians act, what they feel, and what they believe. It is an achievement or a failure of the lived ideals of civil liberty and equality.

Where the ideology of multiculturalism is critiqued, expert opinion again moderates the discourse, reiterating the values, intent, and successes of multiculturalism and calling for consensus. Keith Banting, research chair in public policy at Queen’s University, explains, “We respect difference, we encourage people to celebrate their differences but we also encourage them to join the mainstream, join the economy, understand the country and accept basic liberal democratic values” (GZ 169 NW). Direct appeals are made to combat negative opinions:

Rather than question multiculturalism, Canadians can best combat the violent few by reaffirming the tolerance and inclusiveness that have made this country a success. . . . We must guard against becoming a society that cringes at kippas, turbans and kirpans. . . . Look around. Canada is a thriving nation, one of the world’s best. Our diversity is a great source of strength. Millions of successful “new” Canadians and their children are living proof that multiculturalism works. (TS 59 NR)

Appeals to compromise are made: “In other words, minorities in Canada are constitutionally guaranteed not only full and equal rights as Canadian citizens, but also the right to promote their heritage and live by the values their ancestors brought to this country. When those choices come into conflict with others in society, there’s a solution: compromise” (GZ 37 NW). Discourses in these texts affirm the value and values of multicultural ideology and present a positive construction of Canadians.

Canada’s multicultural ideology is further affirmed through a discourse strand that designates multiculturalism as an acknowledged success: “Our society is not yet a perfect embodiment of our egalitarian ideals,” but Canadians do “have an enviable record of multiculturalism” (TS 77 ED). This discourse strand further compares Canada to other immigrant nations: “I don’t mean it’s some inter-ethnic utopia in Canada. For some people, they (visible minorities) are less desirable as newcomers. . . . Discrimination is
not absent from Canadian society, but relative to other countries we’ve embraced these changes,” says Jeffrey Reitz, director of ethnic, immigration and pluralism studies at the University of Toronto (TS 38 NW). Canada is held up as an example: “In fact, many European states are coming around to this Canadian view. After decades of discriminating against their minorities, and creating islands of alienation, they are reaching out with more flexible legal rules of live and let live” (TS 113 OP); “There is no question that our multicultural policy has been viewed as a success, referred to the world over as the ‘Canadian model.’ Equally pluralistic Australia followed its lead, at least at first, when creating its own program. More recently, it’s been scrutinized by European leaders wrestling with the implications of an unforeseen influx of non-Western immigrants” (TS 88 NW).

Multiculturalism as a positive Canadian ideology is also confirmed in the regard of other nations. The Aga Khan, leader of Ismaili Muslims and based in France, is quoted: “Canadian multiculturalism is ‘an asset of enormous global value. . . . One of the most important tests of moral leadership is whether our leaders are working to widen divisions—or to bridge them” (TS 142 OP). Jan Niesen, director of Migration Policy Group in Brussels, says of Canadian integration: “Canada does this much better . . . . You have done very well in getting past issues of race, skin colour, ethnicity and religion—something Europe is yet to fully come to terms with but simply must” (TS 80). Trevor Phillips, head of Britain’s Commission on Equality and Human Rights, says, “You’ve found a way of negotiating differences successfully that’s possibly unique in the world. . . . I think it’s because you regard immigration as a plus, a welcome thing, while we regard it with suspicion. We need a little bit more of what you’ve got” (TS 120 ID).

Quebec—“Canadian Multiculturalism” v. Interculturalism

In the texts that I curated from the Toronto Star, there is no “Canadian-style” multiculturalism. There is, simply, multiculturalism accomplished with varying success. It is, however, an idea that permeates discourses in the Gazette. Between Canadian multiculturalism and Quebec multiculturalism and/or interculturalism, ideological differences are sometimes difficult to spot—both are concerned with diversity, liberal rights values, and the integration of new citizens into a common culture. In the texts
examined, the differences between federal multiculturalism and interculturalism are
delineated in three ways. The first position proposes that interculturalism is more
inherently egalitarian than multiculturalism in that it understands integration as a two-way
street where majority and minority cultures compromise to create a new common culture.
The second position proposes that not all values are good and not all rights are equal, as
well as that interculturalism rightly privileges Quebec Francophone culture as one to
which new immigrants must conform. This view is criticized for significantly deviating
from the multicultural ideal of equality in creating hierarchal systems that exclude
minority participation. The third, and most frequent, position proposes that there is in fact
little discernable difference between the two policies and that distinctions are most often
made for political purposes.

**Mosaics and Melting Pots**

Mosaic or melting pot: each is an ideological symbol that embodies how
integration and cultural pluralism ideally work. Most often, they are used to contrast the
ideologies of Canada and the United States, but they are also taken up in the texts
examined as distinguishing Canada from Quebec. “Canada’s cultural mosaic model is not
the same in this province, where the melting pot is more the rule” (GZ 27 OE). Or more
explicitly, in an op-ed written by Diane De Courcy, the PQ minister of immigration and
cultural communities and the minister responsible for the Charter of the French
Language:

I would like to point out that multiculturalism is neither the only way, nor the
best way, to ensure that Quebecers of all origins contribute to Quebec’s
development. We have made our own choices in Quebec, and we do not deem
difference to be a value to be preserved, but instead regard it as the starting
point for an enriching mixing of cultures. The proposed Charter of Quebec
Values reflects this stance. . . . We have opted to promote rapprochement and
interplay to achieve a harmonious mixing of cultures in Quebec, where
newcomers become part of Quebec culture and their originality influences it.
This approach moves away from the Canadian multiculturalism model, which
perceives differences as values to be preserved rather than the starting point
toward a welcomed rapprochement. (GZ 165 OE)
In the “Identities” series of articles examined earlier, the poll revealed that when asked, 46 per cent of Quebecers preferred the “American-style melting pot idea, in which cultures blend together to form a new national community”; “31 per cent said multiculturalism—in which minorities keep their customs and traditions—is what Quebec should be all about”; and “19 per cent . . . felt Quebec should be a civic society, in which minorities are discouraged from forming their own communities and are urged to abandon their cultural practices” (GZ 65 NW). These positions are then used to demark group opinions about the integration of diversity. To the statement “Quebec society has been strengthened by the diversity of cultural and religious groups,” 52% of those who advocate the civic model are reported as in agreement, 78% of “Canadian-style multiculturalists” agree, and the agreement of the “melting pot” group is unreported (GZ 65 NW). Another text in the series, published the same day (and including the questions and the responses), reveals that 79.8 per cent of the melting pot group “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” with the same statement (GZ 66 NW). So why isn’t the melting pot group reported in the first text? In excluding the “melting pot” group’s response, the fact that they report positive opinions about the benefits of diversity at the same level as the “mosaic” respondents is obscured. A closer examination of the first text reveals that despite appearing to do little more than relay statistics, it is a position that is decidedly promulticulturalism and critical of interculturalism as advocated by intellectuals and politicians:

Since the 1990s, Quebec has had its own model of integration, what nationalist intellectuals like to call interculturalism, said Sirma Bilge, an assistant professor of sociology at Université de Montreal. “Canada selects the crème de la crème, highly educated immigrants, but in Quebec we also want them to come with a fleur de lys tattooed on their chest,” Bilge said. “And sustaining this cultural anxiety and the linguistic insecurity is the ‘fond de commerce’ of the nationalist elite and the indépendantist project. When the elite can no longer guarantee social and economic security, it tries to guarantee cultural security to perpetuate its influence and legitimacy.” (GZ 65 NW)

This text belongs to a strand within the discourse that positions interculturalism as the domain of academics and as a means for sovereignists to advance their political agenda,
not the position or the understanding of the majority of Quebecers. That differentiating interculturalism from multiculturalism is a product of nationalist or academic rhetoric is further reflected in other texts through statements such as: “Not many Quebecers—at least outside the chattering classes—have even heard of interculturalism, but it’s a dérigeur idea among politicians in Quebec City” (GZ 164 O). A text in the Gazette reports that “the distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism is not obvious to the average Quebecer . . . according to a recent survey for the Association of Canadian Studies. Fifty-three per cent of Quebecers are unclear on the difference between the two concepts” (GZ 138 NW). Peter Leuprecht, director of the Montreal Institute of International Studies and law professor at the Université du Quebec à Montreal, argues that “the differences between interculturalism and multiculturalism have been greatly exaggerated. . . . To play Quebec interculturalism against Canadian multiculturalism, I think it’s pretty artificial. . . . In fact, interculturalism is just another way of saying that society should accept cultural diversity while upholding commonly held values” (GZ 138 NW). The authors of the newspaper texts that I examined largely support multiculturalism and understand it as the mosaic model.

The position that an interculturalism that privileges the majority population is necessary to preserve Quebec culture is not taken up by the authors of the texts examined. Rather, it is evident in quotes from Quebec politicians and intellectuals. For example, Pauline Marois says, “French predominates, Quebec culture is protected and promoted, men and women are equal and state institutions are secular. . . . What we’re saying is that there are fundamental values we hold to. . . . There can’t be any ambiguity for anyone who comes to live here. . . . They’re coming to a francophone country with its own culture and its own heritage—that’s what it means to live together” (GZ 85). Gilles Duceppe is quoted as saying, “Quebec should avoid becoming too permissive by putting all cultural differences on an equal plane. That would lead to Canadian-style multiculturalism, which would be a dead end that would divide our society” (GZ 82). Gérard Bouchard’s opinion is that “Interculturalism in Quebec—as opposed to multiculturalism in the rest of Canada—must not only safeguard minority rights, but also secure the future of the majority culture” (GZ 109 NW). The predominant response/analysis of these types of claims within the texts examined critiques these assertions as hierarchical, discriminatory,
and/or politicking. Criticisms of this position are aptly represented in texts that examine what has been called the “kirpan debates.”

**The Kirpan Debate: “Multiculturalism—Not a Quebec Value”**

In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in *Multani v. Commission scolaire* that a Quebec school authority that had barred Multani from wearing his kirpan to school had violated his rights under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In rendering its judgment, the Court said,

> Lastly, the argument that the wearing of kirpans should be prohibited because the kirpan is a symbol of violence and because it sends the message that using force is necessary to assert rights and resolve conflict is not only contradicted by the evidence regarding the symbolic nature of the kirpan, but is also disrespectful to believers in the Sikh religion and does not take into account Canadian values based on multiculturalism. (*Multani*)

The controversial decision was especially unpopular in Quebec. An editorial in the *Gazette* suggests that a “possible explanation is that the Canadian ideal of multiculturalism to which the Supreme Court refers in its ruling is not shared by Quebec. While the Canadian model of integration has long been the ‘mosaic’ in which ethnic identities are preserved, that of Quebec is the assimilating ‘melting pot,’ like that of the United States and France” (*GZ 27 OE*). The *Multani* decision is often cited as the high point of the accommodation crisis in Quebec. What can be said for certain is that the *Multani* case stayed in the consciousness of Quebecers. Nearly five years later, in January 2011, four members of the World Sikh Organization were turned away from the Quebec National Assembly because of the kirpans that they were carrying. Louise Beaudoin, chief PQ spokesperson on Bill 94, was interviewed after the incident. She said, “I agree with this decision. . . . Security made this decision after reflecting and this decision is a good one” (*GZ 125 NW*). She went on to comment on the *Multani* decision: “We did not agree with that decision. We can disagree with the Supreme Court. Religious freedom exists but there are other values. Multiculturalism may be a Canadian value but it is not a

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64 The four men had been invited to the Assembly to appear before a legislative committee debating Bill 94—popularly known as “the niqab” bill—which proposed that all persons dispensing or receiving public sector services, including education and health services, must have their faces uncovered.
Quebec one. And we haven’t signed the constitution of Canada because it contains this notion of multiculturalism. I think we can be different” (GZ 125 NW). Beaudoin’s assertion that multiculturalism was “not a Quebec value” would be taken up eight times in the *Gazette* and twice in the *Toronto Star* over the next few weeks. The next day, the *Gazette* reported that

*Gazette* readers had little sympathy for Sikh leader Balpreet Singh, who was barred from the National Assembly Tuesday when he insisted on being allowed to wear his kirpan (ceremonial dagger) while he testified before a committee on religious accommodation. However, our readers had even less sympathy for Parti Québécois spokesperson Louise Beaudoin, who responded by claiming that multiculturalism is not a Quebec value. (GZ 127 OE)

Is multiculturalism a Quebec value? The discourses examined reveal that it is, but with some caveats for an understanding of Quebec as a distinct society.

Charles-Philippe Courtois, a historian and teacher at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, writes that integration and not multiculturalism has always been Quebec’s “preferred option,” and that this is particularly evident in Quebec’s rejection of Canada’s policy in two domains: “Defining the rules of secularism in a modern democracy and the integration of immigrants” (GZ 133 OE). He lists politicians’ stances against multicultural policies and cites polls: “85 per cent of Quebecers” rejected the *Multani* decision; “79 per cent approve of Bill 101”; and “66 per cent see multiculturalism as a threat to the future of French in Quebec.” Ultimately, he concludes, “it is thus not exaggerated to conclude that Quebec’s official positions and public opinion converge in preferring a policy of integration to Quebec’s majority culture and secularism to the federal policy of multiculturalism” (GZ 133 OE). But when it comes to assessing the “not a Quebec value” question in relation to the National Assembly incident in the texts examined, he is alone.

As was evident in the coverage of Herouxville discourses, accusations of politicking and xenophobia are common responses to antimulticulturalism claims. An op-ed published in the *Gazette* describes Beaudoin’s comments as “jaw-dropping” and the incident at the Assembly as “a shameful violation of religious freedom,” and it suggests that Beaudoin is deliberately trying to raise “anti-Canadian hackles in Quebec” (GZ 128 OE). In the same text, the author proposes that “if they thought that the Sikhs would leave
their kirpans at home or surrender them at the Assembly building door they were simply being ignorant, which is shameful enough in itself. If they were aware that there would be a problem with the kirpans and figured to exploit the incident to send a message, then it was doubly shameful.” The author adds, “The only logical explanation for this week’s incident at the Assembly and the support for the antikirpan policy by the Parti Québécois and the Bloc is that it is an expression of xenophobia and intolerance” (GZ 128 OE). Editorialist Pearl Eliadis also accuses the PQ of politicking, saying that the antimulticulturalism discourse is “strategic,” that the debate is wrongly framed or “aimed at the wrong target,” and that “the main protagonist here is not multiculturalism but equality.” She goes on to say, “It is obvious that the politicians who are responsible for this latest incident are using it to thumb their noses at the Supreme Court of Canada’s [Multani] decision” (GZ 129 OE). Navdeep Singh Bains, a Sikh and Liberal MP for Mississauga-Brampton South, comments that he was “born and raised in this country” and has worn his kirpan to the “Supreme Court . . . [and] the U.S. Congress . . . and had no problems.” He accuses the Bloc of “using reasonable accommodation as a guise for promoting intolerance. ‘I believe that the politics of fear is taking over now. They’re trying to plant a seed of confusion and distort the truth. . . . I don’t think that’s the way we need to deal with this. It’s very un-Canadian” (GZ 126 NW). Though being un-Canadian is very much Beaudoin’s point.

Despite the apparent controversy over the decision to bar the Sikh delegation earlier in the year, on February 9, 2011, by a vote of 133 to 0, the Quebec National Assembly adopted a motion barring kirpans from legislative buildings (GZ 130). Beaudoin, who tabled the motion, is reported as saying, “Its purpose was to force the governing Liberals to take a stand on the matter and affirm that while multiculturalism might be a Canadian value, it is not a Quebec value, even though it is a fact of life in the province” (GZ 132 OE). In an op-ed in the Gazette, the author begins, “There they sat in the National Assembly, beneath the crucifix above the speaker’s chair, 113 members present, and one by one they rose, every last one of them, to register a vote in favour of religious intolerance.” The author indict the Liberals, along with the PQ, who, she or he

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65 A necessary distinction, considering dominating discourses about accommodating immigrants.
argues, have long made “playing the xenophobic element” their “stock in trade.” Liberal immigration minister Kathleen Weil is reported in the texts as refusing to comment (GZ 125 NW), supporting January’s decision (GZ 130 NW), and finally, after the February 9 vote, as contending that for the Liberals the kirpan was merely a security concern (GZ 132 OE). Claims that the kirpan is a weapon or a security risk are dismissed in six of the ten Gazette texts, with five referencing the Multani decision (GZ 125 NW, 128 OE, 129 OE, 130 OE, 132 OE). Two texts particularly, perhaps by the same author, mock the idea that the kirpan is a security concern: “If the Assembly security service is intent on keeping the premises a weapons-free zone to the extent of banning kirpans, it should logically also seize all the scissors and letter openers from the building’s offices, as well as the knives and forks from the Assembly restaurant” (GZ 128 OE); “If security is really the Liberals’ concern, they should also ordain that the Assembly restaurant be henceforth limited to plastic knives and forks. Or do they think that only Sikhs would run amok in the building if allowed possession of pointed implements?” (GZ 132 OE).

In the Toronto Star, one of the two texts suggests that while the “PQ keeps stoking the fires, . . . anchor[ing] the demagoguery in its anti-Canadian creed,” the “Liberals need to stand up for liberal, democratic, secular principles including freedom of religion.” It also calls Beaudoin’s explanation for Quebec not signing the 1982 Constitution “revisionist nonsense” (TS 143 OP). The second Toronto Star text indicts Stephen Harper and the federal Conservative party for failing to “condemn the banning of the Sikh kirpan from the Quebec National Assembly,” saying it is a reminder “that almost by definition, the human rights of minorities are vulnerable when parties are in search of majorities in and around election time” (TS 144 ED).

Conclusions

Discourse strands that take up multiculturalism in the newspaper texts examined discuss its ideology and not its policies. Overall assessments of multiculturalism are positive. Multiculturalism is embraced as an identity construct of being Canadian and reified in the good opinion of others. Multiculturalism is not only conveyed as generally popular, but also is consistently explained and supported by academics. The use of academic experts on religion and/or immigration in the texts examined is significant.
They are quoted, when they are not the authors of the texts, regularly and at length. However, throughout the texts examined, there is an acknowledgment of a “diffuse anxiety” about the integration of religious minority immigrants and a general consensus that the changing ethno-cultural and religious makeup is potentially problematic and in need of discussion by “us.” Within the dominant construction of “us” as multicultural, tolerant, and egalitarian, two groups are disassociated: the rural and aged, whose views are antiquated and informed through a lack of contact with ethnic minorities; and politicians, who use the fears of rural populations and the general anxiety of the population at large to advance their own political powers. These two groups are decidedly condemned for their antimulticulturalism and particularly their anti-immigration views. Discourses in these texts also propose that the differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada are exaggerated. Quebec is portrayed as in line with multiculturalism. Views that differentiate interculturalism from multiculturalism are only reported in quotes from politicians who overall are portrayed as self-interested. The authors of the texts resolutely condemn the use of multiculturalism, immigration, and religious difference for political purposes. Further, interculturalism is portrayed as an intellectual and not a practical distinction.

A positive view of immigration is equated with a positive view of multiculturalism and is attributed to the majority of Canadians. The emphasis on immigration demographics is problematic, however, as is an emphasis on the ethnicity of those immigrants. Outside of the designation of anti-immigration opinions as xenophobic, un-Canadian, or politicking, nowhere is the characterization of immigrants related as anything other than potentially problematic. Rather, the immigration of minority ethnic and religious persons is portrayed as a problem that multiculturalism can handle. The positive representation of “us” includes an ability to deal with “them.” The immigrants addressed in the discourses examined are all ethnic and religious minorities, and the absence of discussion about white, Christian, or nonreligious immigrants suggests that the problem of immigration is relegated to a very specific type of immigrant. Emphasis on the ethnicity of immigrants further suggests, problematically, that ethnicity is a meaningful evaluation in the assessment of integration potential. Ethnic (and religious) immigrants require management and discussion, while others are ignored. Further, the
designation of “immigrant” is not a transitional one. Immigrants are not portrayed as citizens or as becoming citizens. Even where immigration is positively portrayed, immigrants remain outside of the designation of “Canadian.”

In a text published by the Toronto Star, the author compares multiculturalism in Holland and Canada (and frames the problems of Holland as a cautionary tale). Han Entzinger, credited as a professor of migration and integration studies in Rotterdam, is quoted as saying about multiculturalism debates, “It’s much more fundamental. ... It’s not just a debate on immigration, but it’s a debate on identity: Who are we? And who are they? And how can we make them more like us?” (TS 25 NW). This quote aptly represents the discourses examined in this chapter. The answer provided in the texts examined is that “we” are Canadian multiculturalists, “they” are other, and their integration requires our intervention.
Chapter Three

3 Being Canadian—Our Values

A rise in nationalism . . . has drawn on the discourse of values to solidify visions of the imagined community. Acceptable practices and behaviours are mediated with the language of values, with, for example, polygamy, niqab wearing and honor killing being situated outside of who We are. (Beaman, “Alternatives” 215)

Determinations of group membership are very often constructed in terms of values. Shared values denote shared identity, and determining those values then distinguishes ingroups from outgroups—who is us and who is other. Multiculturalism as an ideology seeks to produce a collective identity that is Canadian. As examined in chapter two, the collective values that shape this identity are described as an acceptance of diversity, the promotion of equality, and the sentiment of tolerance. In Quebec, shared values comprising identity are further articulated as the predominance of the French language, gender equality, and secularism. The articulation of values delimits belonging. The religious other is portrayed as one who does not, cannot, or will not share in these values. In this chapter, I focus on tolerance and secularism as values that define membership in the construct of Canadian.

3.1 “Our Values”—Tolerance

Like assertions that Canada is a multicultural nation, assertions of Canadian tolerance are often unproblematized. Tolerance is a characteristic of Canadian based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which “gives primacy to universal values like liberty and equality, but it also balances these with the virtues of diversity” (TS 111 OP).

Immigrants “come to Canada because of the protection of the Charter. They value the rule of law it upholds and the tolerance that forms its core” (TS 111 OP). Tolerance is directly tied to religious freedom: “Wearing a turban, a hijab or a yarmulke, for example, is simply a matter of individual choice and takes no one’s freedom away” (TS 111 OP). The

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66 These three values are listed in succession by politician across political parties—Jean Charest, QLP (GZ 47); Pauline Marois, PQ (GZ 73 OE, 85 NW); Mario Dumont, ADQ (GZ 96 OE); and Gilles Duceppe, BQ (GZ 82 NW, 94 NW).
Charter itself makes no mention of tolerance, and yet tolerance is the frame through which its mandate to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians is routinely interpreted. An author at the Gazette asserts that “Section 27 requires us to consider diversity and tolerance” (GZ 129). Canada attracts immigrants because it is “a country known around the world for its diversity, tolerance and prosperity”; it is a reputation that is “well deserved” (TS 92 ED). The importance of tolerance is affirmed by immigrants themselves: “A rich tapestry of diversity and tolerance is what immigrants like Khawja and others queried in the poll cherish and respect most about Canada. ‘To me, this is a civilized country,’ Khawja says. ‘My country . . . is not civilized’” (TS 60 NR). In a 2004 text, the place of minority religions in Canadian culture is determined as “resolved nearly 15 years ago” with the RCMP’s modification of its dress uniform to allow for turbans (GZ 16 OE). The author of this text goes on to propose that “it’s unlikely that any Canadian politician is willing to reopen the debate about religious symbols being displayed in public places such as schools,” as a ban of religious symbols would “run contrary to the religious freedom and the freedom of expression clauses of our Charter of Rights,” and “it would contradict multiculturalism policies that have evolved from an encouragement to immigrants to maintain their cultural and linguistic traditions into ones that increasingly value all cultures and traditions equally” (GZ 16 OE). Canada, the author affirms, “has done this in the name of tolerance, in the belief that encouraging immigrants to maintain their customs and traditions enriches rather than weakens the entire society” (GZ 16 OE). While the texts that I examine in this thesis that were produced after 2004 prove that the place of religious minorities in Canada is decisively not resolved, the sentiment that it is resolvable because of the tolerance of the Canadian people and Charter protections remains a dominant discourse across the 11 years of texts.

Accusations of “using reasonable accommodation as a guise for promoting intolerance” are characterized by Navdeep Bains, a Sikh Liberal MP, as “very un-Canadian” (GZ 126 NW). The qualities of “tolerance, civility, decency, and such political objectives as fairness and peaceableness” have been “made almost into sacred cows,”

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67. "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Charter of Rights and Freedoms Sec. 27).
writes multiculturalism critic Richard Gwyn in a text in the *Toronto Star* (TS 55 OP).\(^{68}\)

Reactions to criticism of multiculturalism include that it should not be questioned and that instead “we should reaffirm the inclusiveness and tolerance that has made modern Canada a success” (TS 101 ED). Multiculturalism is affirmed: “Millions of ‘new’ Canadians and their children are living proof that multiculturalism works” (TS 59 NR). Canadians are called to be international examples: “We must be a global role model of tolerance, compassion and the celebration of diversity” (TS 74 ED). Tolerance, like multiculturalism, is assumed to be a virtuous pursuit, one that affirms the positive characterization of Canadian as an identity. That in the newspaper texts examined tolerance is routinely tied to both minority religious practices and immigrants is problematic, however, as my analysis in this chapter will demonstrate.

While tolerance as a Canadian value is pervasive in the discourses examined, it is sometimes accompanied by a second discourse of limits. “What’s not to love about Canadian diversity and tolerance? Put me down as a lifelong fan,” reads the byline of a 2008 *Toronto Star* article. It continues, “Here’s what can go wrong: you can have too much of a good thing” (TS 130 ED). Limits discourses assert that there is an abiding uncertainty about the extent to which different identities can legitimately be incorporated into an overarching national identity. Distinctions are made between differences that can be tolerated, assimilated, or accommodated and those that cannot. Where tolerance is presented as a value that engenders belonging, a relationship between equals is presumed. However, in the newspaper texts that I examined, identity constructions are distinctly binary and include Canadians/immigrants, majority/minorities, and secular/religious. These binaries do more than assess practices or beliefs as tolerable or intolerable. They create two subjects: the tolerant and the tolerated. Brown asserts that

> in every lexicon, tolerance signifies the limits on what foreign, erroneous, objectionable or dangerous element can be allowed to cohabit with the host without destroying the host—whether the entity at issue is truth, structural soundness, health, community, or an organism. The very invocation of tolerance in each domain indicates that something contaminating or dangerous is at hand, or something foreign is at issue, and the limits of tolerance are determined by how

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\(^{68}\) Gwyn’s description, “Made almost into sacred cows” denotes his assessment that these qualities are overvalued—cows in Canada are not sacred.
much of this toxicity can be accommodated without destroying the object, value, claim or body. (Regulating Aversion 27)

My examination of the newspaper texts in this thesis revealed more than a distinction between the tolerant and the tolerated; it revealed a binary in which the tolerated religious subject is constructed not only as potentially intolerable but also as intolerant. Additionally, there is an assumption that tolerance is a temporary condition. The tolerated are expected to assimilate and to adopt the values of the tolerating Canadian majority. Tolerance is not inclusive; it demarks the boundaries of belonging. In naming what or who is being tolerated, discourses name the threat to Canada and Canadian identity.

**Who Are the Tolerated?**

Within the newspaper texts examined, sometimes who or what is being tolerated is clear: “While religious symbols like the hijab and turban have generated controversy in Quebec, they are generally tolerated in the rest of Canada” (GZ 169 NW); “To date the hijab, niqab and burqa have been accepted in Canada and the U.S. without catastrophe, while, ironically, intolerance is touted and practised in the name of tolerance in Europe” (TS 136 OP). Another example states that “in an era when 9/11 tensions dominate the headlines” and in a context of “threats to Canada by Al Qaeda, bombings in London and Madrid, and the arrest in Toronto of 18 Muslims allegedly bent on wreaking havoc here, . . . most Canadians recognize violence for what it is: the work of an extreme minority, not some manifestation of a broader culture.” This recognition affirms that “tolerance remains alive and well in Canada” (TS 76 ED). Canadian identity is positively constructed in its tolerance of religious minorities, particularly Muslims. More often, however, the tolerated are not so directly delimited. And so statements that appear to simply validate the value of tolerance—for example, “Canada’s traditions of tolerance and peaceful integration should ensure that our core institutions and values remain constant as the face of society changes”—must be examined within the context of the entire narrative of the text, which in this case notes that a “current wave of immigration will bring a record number of people belonging to visible minorities to the country,” namely immigrants who are “notably Chinese, Indian, black and, increasingly, Arab and other West Asian groups” and who potentially bring “regressive social or religious attitudes . . . about issues such as
women’s rights” (TS 38 NW). A text in the Toronto Star printed in March of 2007 under the headline “Multiculturalism Policy Falling behind the Times” is particularly explicit in explaining the inadequacies of multiculturalism in integrating a new type of immigrant:

The post-war immigrants originally addressed by the policy (mainly European, nominally Christian) have been replaced by a wide range of culturally and religiously diverse groups. The old assumption that integration—a sense of belonging to Canada—almost always occurs by the second generation no longer holds up. Breaking the silence that usually surrounds the subject, some analysts are asking whether it’s time to rethink the policy, revamp it to reflect the new, 21st-century “mosaic.” In no way at present, they say, does it encourage newcomers to move from immigrant “them” to citizen “us.” Nor does it stress that Canada holds certain non-negotiable values—the rule of law, sexual equality, freedom of expression and tolerance. If nothing else, they argue, that must be made explicit. (TS 88 NW)

Non-European and non-Christian immigrants are assumed not to share “our” values. The values listed are not randomly selected from a larger list of Canadian values; they are those values that immigrant religious minorities are routinely presumed not to share. The author goes on to cite Randall Hansen:69 “Immigrant applicants should be told up front, he says, what integrating will mean, and ensure they understand ‘You’re welcome in Canada. There is no inherent problem in your retaining most of your culture. But there are common values we expect you to adopt.’” The text continues,

In the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, political philosopher Joseph Heath has argued that immigrants should be given advance notice that integration may be “incompatible” with their cultural beliefs and “will probably require considerable willingness to adjust.” He cites, as an example, the fact that many non-Western newcomers underestimate the extent to which the Charter’s gender equality provisions will diminish their daughters’ willingness to conform to traditional male-dominated customs. As it stands, some minorities wrongly assume that, if Quebecers have self-governing rights, then under the multiculturalism act, they can too, and that their religious rights supersede all other Charter provisions. (TS 88 NW)

The expert opinions of Hansen and Heath are used by the author to characterize the religious minority immigrant as other. Not only do they not share “our” values (particularly gender equality and tolerance), but once made aware of them they are still

69 Hansen is a multiculturalism critic—see the literature review in chapter one.
potentially unwilling to conform. The misunderstanding of our values and the potential unwillingness to conform to them name minority religious immigrants as a threat to Canada and point to the failure of multiculturalism. These criticisms echo those of 1990s critics like Bissoondath in their assertion that multiculturalism provides insufficient guidelines and regulations and particularly that it fails to engender “oneness of vision” (43).

Tolerance must have limits—it must exclude the intolerant. The danger of tolerating the intolerant is a concern for individuals: “Well-meaning religious tolerance, taken to an uncritical extreme, can give licence to extreme religious interpretations: Muslim women insisting on ankle-length skirts despite safety hazards when working beside conveyer belts; and ultra-Orthodox Jews demanding that a local YMCA frost its windows so young boys wouldn’t be tempted” (TS 130 ED). But it is also a threat to the nation as a whole: “Religious extremists actually care a lot about Canadian civility and decency. They hate it. They hate liberalism and tolerance. They’d like to blow them off the face of the earth” (TS 55 OP). Intolerance is often seen as a problem that is inherent in religion itself. Fleming Rose, an editor at the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, writes with regard to publishing cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad that they “had no idea” that it would “create an international firestorm, but they did intend to test the limits of Muslim tolerance”—though “we certainly didn’t intend to trigger violent demonstrations throughout the Muslim world” (GZ 25). The violent reaction characterizes all of Islam as if not intolerant then at least potentially intolerant. The cartoons were not a test of some Muslims’ tolerance but simply of “Muslim tolerance.”

In its submission to Marion Boyd’s review of the Ontario Arbitration Act, the YWCA of Toronto is reported as writing that “in the name of religious freedom we wind up tolerating the oppression of those deemed by their particular community to have no legitimate claim to equality rights because their identity and conduct are seen through a moral lens” (GZ 21 IN).70 Of particular concern are the rights of women: “The YWCA’s submission argues that equality is not yet a given in Ontario, not for women of any faith or creed, and certainly not for Muslim women. The assumption that rights can be

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70 The moral lens ascribed to religion is importantly presumed absent in Canadian culture. This presumption will be addressed in my examination of secularism as a Canadian value later in this chapter.
accessed or waived with true consent is naïve” (GZ 21 IN). While religion generally is characterized as oppressive in the newspaper texts examined, Islam is regularly singled out. Author and academic Irshad Manji (The Trouble with Islam Today) is quoted: “Those most likely to tolerate intolerance by Muslims are, paradoxically, the most progressive and open minded members of society. ‘We’re willing to tolerate the intolerance of others merely because they are practicing that intolerance in the name of something that we do not consider ours, whether it’s culture or religions’” (GZ 140 BK). An excess of tolerance is dangerous, Manji charges, because “failing to call cultural groups on abuses can lead to tragedies like the 2007 honour killing of 16-year-old Aqsa Parvez, murdered by her father and brother for refusing to wear a hijab head scarf” (GZ 140 BK). The danger of intolerant religion, particularly Islam, is presented as ranging from domestic violence to international terrorism. There is no facet of life that is untouched by the potential violence within Islam.

Despite allegations about the dangers of too much tolerance, discourse strands most often condemn intolerance in Canadians. In the face of intolerance, Canadians must not concede and become intolerant themselves. Discourses warn against the marginalization of minority religious adherents: “The trend in our country and elsewhere to consign religious communities to the private realm is, in fact, a drift toward intolerance, despite claims to the contrary” (TS 84 OP). They critique the assignation of blame: “To blame Canada’s celebration of diversity for spreading ‘terrorism’ will only lead to racial profiling and stereotyping of visible minorities and immigrants. I would hate for Canada to head down the slippery slope of intolerance due to this faulty logic” (TS 58 LT). Ottawa Citizen columnist Robert Sibley is criticized:

Robert Sibley has called for this country to abandon “the cultural relativism of multiculturalism.” He argues that the Canadian mosaic is not compatible with immigrants who return tolerance with intolerance and who refuse to accept our

71 The perceived vulnerability of women of faith generally and Muslim women particularly will be examined in chapter four.
72 Haque argues specifically that Aqsa Parvez’s murder in 2007 was taken up by the media as representational of “the problem of Muslim women in Canada [which] precipitates a crisis of tolerance in a multicultural society” (84), and that media framing of Aqsa’s death “as an outcome of her father’s Muslim culture and religious values was hegemonic and . . . has remained almost impossible to counter” (88).
liberal-democratic ideals. Sibley is seeking an explanation for terrorism in the wrong place, not least because those assumptions don’t apply to the majority of second-generation Muslims. (GZ 29 OE)

In the author’s criticism of Sibley, the assumption that religion, particularly Islam, is inherently intolerant is reified in the assertion that Sibley’s assumptions do not apply to “the majority of second-generation Muslims.” Immigrant Muslims, and some second-generation Muslims, are thus still subject to the characterization of intolerant. Intolerance is not absent in Islam—it is waning. This discourse strand cautions the majority that “there’s no room for complacency, even here. We cannot turn a blind eye to intolerance in communities such as Herouxville, Que., where the town council set ignorant and offensive ‘standards’ for Muslim newcomers. Or to vandalism at a Muslim school in Montreal. We still have work to do, overcoming barriers” (TS 76 ED).

Tolerance requires dedicated effort and commitment:

Yes, it’s all been said. But clearly we need to keep saying it. We are better than this. We have a collective obligation to think critically and to speak out respectfully against unjust institutional rules, policies, government bills or laws that organize and divide people along religious, linguistic, ethnic or cultural lines. We have a responsibility to break the cycle of xenophobia, intolerance and fear and build a more positive collective sense of identity and belonging. (GZ 146 OE)

In this discourse strand, tolerance is not only a value; it is also an obligation. Tolerance is required in the construction of Canadian. “We” are obligated to be tolerant and engender tolerance in others. Intolerance in political leaders, then, is particularly condemned in this discourse strand. Accusations move beyond politicking to ignorance, self-delusion, and xenophobia. With regard to the Quebec Charter of Values (Bill 60),

what is certain is that its sponsors, for the most part, would not consider themselves intolerant. Indeed, they would be appalled at the thought. They have adopted all of the signs and gestures, if not the beliefs, of liberalism, and if they draw the line at multiculturalism, it is not because they are xenophobic or intolerant, pas du tout: they are merely being honest about a problem—a “crisis,” Drainville says, that, franchement, has been allowed to fester too long. Thus it is that people who see themselves as the soul of enlightenment can in good

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73 The designation “second-generation to immigrants,” though infrequent in the texts I examined, is problematic. It denies full membership in the construct of Canadian by assigning a foreign element to identity. I suggest that while “Canadian-born children of immigrants” is a bit unwieldy, it is more accurate and less stigmatizing.
conscience support a proposal to, in effect, cleanse the public sector of much of its existing representation of religious (and, not coincidentally, ethnic) minorities. It is human nature: where the self-image and the facts conflict, the facts must be made to fit the self-image. (GZ 160 OE)

On the vote to formalize the ban on kirpans in the Quebec National Assembly, a text published in the Gazette is explicit in its condemnation of political intolerance toward minority religion:

There they sat in the National Assembly, beneath the crucifix above the speaker’s chair, 113 members present, and one by one they rose, every last one of them, to register a vote in favour of religious intolerance. It may be that a majority of their constituents approves, and in democracy majority rules, but that doesn’t make it right. . . . The National Assembly motion was put by the Parti Québécois, whose spokesperson on the issue, Louise Beaudoin, said its purpose was to force the governing Liberals to take a stand on the matter and to affirm that while multiculturalism might be a Canadian value, it is not a Quebec value, even though it is a fact of life in the province. Indulging intolerance, it would seem from what she says, is a Quebec value. (GZ 132 OE)

Tolerance, in this text, is a Quebec value in danger from politicians who yield to popular prejudices.

In the newspaper texts examined, tolerance is presented as a value that defines not only Canadians but also multicultural ideology. The minority ethnic religious practitioner is constructed as other firstly in her or his need to be tolerated and secondly in her or his perceived lack of the quality of tolerance. While tolerance is predominantly portrayed as a necessary and positive attribute of Canadian identity, secondary discourses warn that too much tolerance is dangerous in that it potentially fails to recognize the intolerable. What is intolerable is at the discretion of the majority population, reinforcing hierarchies between majority and minority populations.
3.2 “Our Values”—Secularisms

Foundational to discourses that examine the place of religious practitioners within multiculturalism are debates as to necessity, degree, and type of secularism. In the newspaper texts that I examined Canada is presumed to be a secular state. The type of secularism that best supports multiculturalism (or interculturalism) and thus national identity is, however, sometimes debated. Like claims that Canada is a multicultural country, claims of secularism are very often not problematized—secularism is simply a modern fact. However, what is meant by secularism is sometimes unclear. In a text in the Toronto Star, author Rev. Michael Smith, an associate professor of philosophy at St. Peter’s Seminary in London, Ontario, proposes that “one way to clarify what constitutes a secular society is to compare it to its opposites. A secular society is not a theocracy. . . . A secular society is not an officially atheistic state” (TS 84 OP). This definition, however, is clearly insufficient, especially if one considers the argument made by Biles and Ibrahim that Christianity continues to exist as a “shadow establishment” (167) within Canadian government (see footnote 17).

For the purpose of analysis, I consider secularism in two forms: hard secularism, which positions the state as the protectorate of majority values and relegates religion to the private sphere; and soft secularism, which positions the state as the protectorate of minority practices and allows for the public practice of religion. In the newspaper texts that present hard secularism as desirable or necessary, secularism is also presented as a value that is particularly hard won: “It took centuries of struggle against theocracies of many kinds to establish the modern separation of church and state” (TS 63 OP). A text in the Gazette affirms this assessment:

It is easy to forget that the secular tolerance in the West resulted from exhaustion after centuries of religious war. . . . It took devastation to convince people that a standard of common sense separate from sacred injunctions to righteousness was needed. Feel-good calls for multicultural tolerance disregard this long painful history. They emphasize civil rights as fundamentally human, forgetting what it took to exclude religion from the daily regulation of civic life. (GZ 103 OE)

74 Secularism is not only a central aspect of multicultural ideology but also very often equated with tolerance. A secular state is presumed to be a tolerant state. This understanding will be questioned in my analysis presented in this chapter.
“Struggles against theocracies” and “centuries of religious war” imply that violence was required to extricate religion from government. Further, that the theocracies and religious wars can remain unnamed in these claims speaks to a pervasive understanding of religion as the cause of conflict, both presently and historically. The implication that civil rights and religion are mutually exclusive is also problematic. Modern secularization is presented in this discourse strand as a continuing struggle against religion:

The interpretation of religious texts should be left to religious authorities, and those who accept their hegemony should have the right to bow down to their findings. However if we, as a society, want to live in a harmony, we have to agree to some kind of consensus. This is what we call secularism—that matters of religion and politics be kept separate. Secularism is a positive value that allows us to live together without killing each other over different deities, symbols or customs. (TS 136 OP)

The characterization of religion as hegemonic in this text affirms the necessity of secularism. Further, failing to keep religion out of the public domain risks violence: secularism keeps society from chaos. Religion in the public domain is portrayed as a transgression of the rights of others: “If a believer demands that I, as a non-believer, observe his taboos in the public domain, he is not asking for my respect, but for my submission. And that is incompatible with a secular democracy” (GZ 22 OE). Hard secularism demands that religion be kept out of the public domain because, as is demonstrated in the above two texts, religious practice in the public sphere acts on others, requiring their combativeness or their submission. Some supporters of hard secularism present their argument against religion in the public domain as not against religion per se but rather against its location: “Secularism has just one meaning—the exclusion of religion. Accommodation is not an absolute. In this country, unlike in many Islamic ones, . . . Muslims are free to practise their religion any way and any time they want. They just cannot insist on doing so anywhere they want” (TS 146 OP). The naming of Muslims again points to Islam as a particularly transgressive form of religion. This discourse strand characterizes secularism as emancipatory. Religion is hegemonic, dominating, and transgressive, while secularism creates harmonious boundaries and ensures public safety. Proponents of hard secularism are most often against multiculturalism or in favour of
interculturalism. These positions are directly tied understandings of religion as actively illiberal and thus potentially dangerous to the majority population, who is presumed secular or agnostic.

Discourses that advocate soft secularism, the type most often advocated by supporters of federal multiculturalism, question the relegation of religion to the private sphere: “In trying to enforce its program, an aggressively secular state would attempt to marginalize religious communities into a private realm where it is difficult for them to live” (TS 84 OP). Hard secularism is thus portrayed as economically exclusionary; it forces teachers to “choose between their profession and their faith” (GZ 174 NW).

Soft secularism is presented as egalitarian and inclusionary. It is inclusionary in its capacity to recognize religious identity: “Religious persons and groups, as well as those opposed to religion, are understood as having a public and social identity. They are thus free to show their colours in public, to make policy proposals, and to seek to have their ethical values influence public policy” (TS 84 OP). In this discourse strand, displays of religion in the public arena “are affirmations of personal and communal identities and values from which we all can learn,” while “excluding personal expressions of culture, religion and spirituality by employees working in public institutions will prevent people from learning about each other and will lead to more stereotyping, discrimination and social exclusion” (GZ 170 OE). Hard secularism, this discourse strand asserts, makes unrealistic demands of religious persons: “People are expected to comport themselves as pro forma agnostics in public even when they are religious in private” (TS 84 OP). Hard secularism is presented as demanding the bifurcation of identity into public secular and private religious domains, a position those advocating soft secularism designate as not only undesirable but in fact impossible: “How can you tell someone to only be Muslim after 5 p.m.? It just doesn’t work with Islam. My hijab is not a Nike swoosh, or a pair of sunglasses” (GZ 174 NW). Discourses that advocate soft secularism in addition to calling for a place for religion in the public domain are often explicit about assigning where secularism lies in forming a secular society: “A secular society is one in which there is no state religion, with no religious test for those aspiring to public office, and equal treatment for all” (GZ 154 OE). Where secularism is accused of going too far, it is critiqued: “The dogged insistence of the forces of secularization in advancing their project to remove
religion from the public forum in Quebec in recent years has made it plain that they bear their own version of religious zeal. . . . Neutrality suddenly looks suspiciously like a government-enforced creed” (GZ 122 OE). In this text, too much secularism is characterized by negatively associating it with religious zeal. The language is problematic in its implication that excessiveness is a quality that is characteristic of religion and not of secularism.

Both discourse strands posit secularism as necessary. However, the type or degree of secularism proposed is dependent upon understandings of what is threatened. Discourse strands that support soft secularism propose that the role of the secular state is to protect the practices and identities of all citizens, religious affiliations or practices notwithstanding. Religion is understood as residing in the individual—it does not impose on either the state or citizens. Discourse strands that support hard secularism position the state, or at least the citizens of the state, as in need of protection from religion. Religion is inherently hegemonic and potentially violent, and so its public practice must be restricted. Understandings of religion dictate understandings of the type and degree of secularism required.

Secularism—Constructing Identity in Quebec

In Quebec, many narratives about secularism find their roots in the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s (Wong; Conway), which was an era of massive formalized secularization and increased nationalist sentiment. In the newspaper texts that I examined, secularism in Quebec is described as particularly emancipatory in extricating society from the control of the Roman Catholic Church: “In the 1950s and ‘60s, Quebeckers systematically, forcefully and decisively rejected Catholic religious authority over public life. That many Quebeckers now show clear antipathy to the idea of any religion having authority over society or public life is not racist, or even necessarily regrettable” (GZ 44 OE). Negative views of religion as authoritative are legitimized in the historical role of the Catholic Church. The appearance that Quebec is more sensitive to accommodation cases or more intolerant of religion than the rest of Canada is explained in a historical context: “The issue of ‘reasonable accommodations’ has long been a hot-button topic in Canada, but particularly in Quebec. The province historically was marked by the Catholic
Church’s dominance in every aspect of life, including education and health care, until a mass rejection during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s” (TS 160 GT). Similarly, “it was only a generation ago that Quebecers renounced religion—with no small effort—through their Quiet Revolution. They have created a secular-liberal francophone utopia within their borders and are highly sensitive to any threat to that hard-won paradise—especially threats rooted in religion” (TS 107 ID). Fo Niemi, director of the Centre for Research-Action on Race Relations, is quoted: “French Quebecers feel they’ve worked so hard to get religion out of the public space but some groups now want to bring it back” (GZ 13 NW). Quebec is described as “emphatically French and, given the province’s all-too-recent domination by the Catholic Church, vigorously secular” (TS 138 NW). Discourse strands that situate antireligious sentiment in Quebec as a product of the historical hegemony of Roman Catholicism very often miss the fact that antireligious sentiment in Quebec (and also in Canada generally) is not directed at the vestiges of Christianity but at minority religions. This discourse strand portrays antireligious sentiment as directed equally at all religion and is thus misdirection.75 Further, this discourse strand ignores the reality that the non-Christian Quebecers whose practices are most likely those regulated by hard secularism polices are also not white. In “The Disquieting Revolution: A Genealogy of Reason and Racism in the Quebec Press,” Wong argues that secularization in Quebec is tied to “integration nationalism” (147) and has become, through the production of discourses in politics and the media, a means of privileging “white” Quebecers and marginalizing “immigrants,” effectively resulting in “new racisms” in Quebec (157). The Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s report interprets the situation in Quebec differently:

French-Canadian Quebecers are sometimes severely criticized. Caution is in order here. We must always be wary of imputing to racism certain attitudes or remarks that in actual fact stem from collective insecurity or, more precisely, from the exploitation of this insecurity. (Bouchard &Taylor 239)

75 The fear that minority religions are attempting to institutionalize their beliefs is only overtly argued in texts that examine the inclusion of the use of Muslim law within the Ontario Arbitration Act. Due to limited space, this discourse strand was excluded from this thesis.
Discourse strands that propose that secularization is indiscriminately about all religion ignore the reality that the minority religious practitioners addressed in accommodation debates are also most often ethnic (or racial) minorities. While advocates of hard secularism may not be deliberately targeting ethnic minority groups from inclusion in the public domain or identity constructs of “us,” the reality is that that is the inevitable result.

The process of secularization that began in the Quiet Revolution developed hand in hand with an increasing nationalist sentiment in Quebec, and the two are closely related to this day, as is apparent from this excerpt: “Part of the reason secularism has itself almost become sacred in Quebec is that it has historical roots in both Quebec nationalist federalism and in the sovereignty movement” (GZ 139 OE). Hard secularism positions are equated with Quebec’s national aspirations: “It is not accidental that this issue keeps erupting in Quebec, in a way it does not elsewhere. No, it is not because Quebecers are more intolerant, as a people. But it is a hazard of nationalism, at least of the kind the PQ espouses, and Quebecers are drawn toward nationalism” (GZ 153 OE).

Discourses critiquing Quebec nationalist movements, such as those advanced by the PQ, are particularly condemning of the use of secularism as a front for the intolerance of religious differences. As one author asserts, “No one seems to be under any illusions that we’re having a debate about secularism, least of all the PQ minority government itself” (GZ 158 OE). Another author charges that “the charter really isn’t about intercultural harmony. It’s about the potential for electoral gain in exploiting Quebecers’ insecurities about diversity” (GZ 167 OE). One author goes so far as to as to accuse the PQ of actively precipitating crisis: “Why do we suddenly need a Charter of Quebec Values? Simple. The PQ wants to put sovereignty back at the top of the agenda. And to get the public fired up about nationalism requires a crisis of identity and belonging among the majority population. If there is no real crisis, you make one up” (GZ 158 OE). A text in the Toronto Star proposes that the political climate in Quebec has shifted as well as the PQ and that “all three major Quebec parties have tilted toward the resurgent old-school vision of ethnic nationalism” (TS 105 NW). The author of this text suggests that a rising rhetoric of “nous” in Quebec can be attributed to the fact that “many francophone Quebecers see the protection of their identity as a substitute for national aspirations.” In this text, a “Marois confidant” is reported as saying, “Identity has always been at the heart
of the sovereignist enterprise. If we can harness this sentiment then we can steer the
discussion back to sovereignty” (TS 105 NW). This discourse strand proposes that where
the demarcation of “nous” for Quebecers was once sufficiently understood as a culture
based on language, this is no longer considered sufficient to drive sovereignty agendas.
Differentiation from the rest of Canada requires hard secularism as a construct of Quebec
values and identity. Sovereignists are accused of promoting anti-immigration,
antireligious, and antiethnic sentiment in a bid to shore up political agendas.

Discourse strands that critique the policies and the practices of the PQ nationalist
agenda are not antinationalist per se. Rather, they tend toward the inclusionary vein of
soft secularism, calling back to the early years of Quebec’s modern identity movement:

That era’s nationalism wasn’t about rigidly defining and enforcing Quebec
values—it was about exploding them and the excitement of what might come
next. . . . A community or nation isn’t about having common values, not if it’s
vital and alive; it may create values (and then reject them and create others, as
Quebec did in those days). But it’s about community itself: sharing your
experiences and your destiny with others in mutual respect. (TS 156 OP)

This discourse strand asserts that nationalism need not be exclusionary. Further, it
presents the policies of the PQ as outside of the ideology of Quebec’s historic nationalist
movement:

René Lévesque said that “a nation is judged by how it treats its minorities”; his
immigration minister, Gérald Godin, urged Quebecers to “form with the cultural
communities a new world, a model society, better, free, open and welcoming”; and
Lucien Bouchard spoke of a nationalism that “no longer seeks homogeneity
but embraces diversity and pluralism.” . . . Banning manifestations of religious
belief—both for those who work in public institutions and for those served by
them—would constitute a radical break not only with our provincial and federal
charters of rights and with international human rights law, but with Quebec values
themselves, as articulated by icons of Quebec’s nationalist movement. (GZ 154
OE)

Authors in this discourse strand assert that the shared values of Quebec nationalists are
now, as they were in their formation, inclusionary and in line with policies of soft
secularism.

As with discourses that take up immigration, secularism discourses also focus on
the legitimacy of feelings of unease among Quebecers. The focus is particularly on the
potential influence of visible religious practitioners on Canadian and/or Quebec values.
Unlike in anti-immigration discourses, anxieties are not relegated to older, rural, and Catholic Quebecers. Rather, “A more progressive segment of society fears losing a national identity to the benefit of another culture whose religious foundations it sees as counter to the western ideals of liberalism and individuality. These progressives fear the erosion of modern social achievements, which would lead to a reversal” (GZ 173 OE). The progressive element includes not only secularists but also some feminists who advocate hard secularism as necessary for gender equality. The Quebec Charter of Values is described as having formed an “unholy alliance of leftist feminists, right-wing bigots and Quebec nationalists” (TS 137 ED). Another author writes that it is an alliance that “at first seems impossible” and has allowed the “emergence of a new type of majority” but is only temporary as it “only exists because there is the perception of an imminent threat and a sense that urgent action is necessary to preserve ‘Quebec values.’” (GZ 173 OE)

Identity anxiety plays a crucial role in the understanding of how secularism as a value is understood in Quebec. Whereas the identity claims of “old-stock” Quebecers are generally dismissed in anti-immigration discourses, where the discourse identifies immigrants as particularly non-Christian or visibly religious, identity claims take on new legitimacy. The value of secularism allows for the clear identification of threat, an identification that is importantly less susceptible to claims of racial or ethnic prejudice. Religious difference is a threat to public interests and construction of national identity where it fails to remain in the private domain.

The crisis of where and how religious belief can be expressed in the public realm extends beyond the political halls of Quebec. Where hard secularism is successfully tied to ideas of what it is to be a Quebecker, religion is suspect, not just in civil service but anywhere outside of private homes and religious institutions. That a significant population within Quebec has internalized discourses of hard secularism is made particularly evident in the case of sport. When the Fédération de Soccer du Québec banned the wearing of turbans, keskis, and patkas, a text in the Gazette situated the discourse as about identity:

The truth is that the controversy has nothing to do with soccer safety. This conversation falls squarely into the broader political debates about identity and belonging in Quebec. If we want to get specific, this is about who gets to set the rules and define the parameters for identity and belonging, and who does or does
not get to lay claim to our shared public spaces. And in case anyone was under any illusions to the contrary, this has nothing to do with FIFA. (GZ 146).

Six years earlier, the ejection of Asmahan Mansour, 11, from a soccer game in Laval, Quebec, for wearing a hijab had similarly provoked controversy. In each case, arguments for the ban (of hijabs or turbans) claimed that the ban was the result of safety concerns, but this argument was quickly dismissed in all coverage. An assessment of the Mansour incident reflects the overall discourse of secularization, religious accommodation, and identity as one that is centrally about the integration of difference in society and its effects on identity constructs:

Asmahan Mansour should probably be allowed to play soccer even in her hijab. . . . While such cultural and religious identities are extremely important, . . . cultural baggage must not prevent newcomers to Canada from adopting the overarching values of Canadian society, which guarantee equal rights to men and women and uphold the separation of religion and state. . . . Identities can be multiple and they need not remain static. In a society that continues to evolve, identities, too, must be willing to adjust to changes that benefit all. . . . All communities are respected equally as Canadians while they uphold Canadian values. (GZ 50 OE)

The crisis in soccer is the crisis in society as a whole: religious practitioners fail to understand the Canadian value of secularism and adjust their public identities accordingly. The evolution of national identity is assumed to move away from religious identification toward secularization. Religious practitioners need to slough off their cultural baggage, including religious dress, to be fully recognized in Canadian/Quebec society. A text in the Gazette explains,

The debate over reasonable accommodation revitalized the issue of Quebec identity—the new buzz phrase for political parties, including the Bloc Québécois in Ottawa. The result has been that the original debate over reasonable accommodation has become a confused mess that seems now to include everything but the kitchen sink: immigration, multiculturalism, religion, language, values and what not. (GZ 73 OE).

But the issue is not so much confused as it is complex. All of these (immigration, multiculturalism, religion, and language) play a role in the construction of Canadian and Quebec identities. Andrew Coyne writes,

Intolerance of differences is not an aberration in identity-based movements. . . . What defines identity politics—what is indeed its raison d’etre—is not, as it
pretends, a pluralistic concern for difference, but a monotonic insistence on uniformity. It is not the differences between groups that is its concern, so much as sameness within the group. That, after all, is what “identity” means. Where identity—ethnic, cultural or other—is the basis of affiliation in a group, it is necessarily about conformity. The group, in this case called a nation, is not something for its members to define collectively as they go along—the “referendum of all the people every day” to which Ernest Renan referred: it has already been defined for them. All that remains is to insist upon adherence to this prewritten script. (GZ 153 OE)

In this text, the criticism of identity politics runs deep. However, in the texts that I examined, the idea that there is an identity crisis in Quebec is cause for concern to nearly all of the authors. Two discourses propose solutions. The first promotes hard secularism and interculturalism as the answer, and the second offers soft secularism and multiculturalism. Overall, the assessment is that either can go “too far” and so, whatever the solution proposed, the state crisis is maintained by each. That “Quebec’s idea of its history is one of cultural survival—la survivance—in the face of external threats” (GZ 161 OE) underlies all discourses.

3.3 “Our Values”—Invisible Christianity

In the newspaper texts examined, secularism is very often claimed not only as a Canadian and particularly a Quebec value; it is also a presumptive norm. That is, the discourses most often present Canadians and/or Quebecers as nonreligious. Religious belief is routinely ascribed to minority ethnic immigrants and occasionally to aged and/or rural Canadians. The fact that a majority of Canadians report an affiliation with Christianity and a majority of Quebecers with Catholicism is largely ignored. Lists that relate the demographics of Canada’s religious makeup concentrate on the increase in numbers of minority religions through immigration, rarely considering Christian or nonreligious immigration at all. Further, Christianity is very often considered a cultural affiliation—that is, its practices are continued but largely devoid of religious sentiment or requirement.

Assessments of the religious makeup of the Quebec population vary considerably. The following two texts were published a month apart in the Gazette: “In a survey of 1,001 Quebecers, a very large minority—40 per cent—said they’re religious. Of those,
almost one in five—18 per cent—said they’re very religious. Sixty per cent described themselves as not religious. Of those, one in four—25 per cent—said they were not religious at all” (GZ 60 NW); “According to the 2001 census, 83.2 per cent of Quebecers said they were Catholic, 4.7 per cent Protestant, 1.5 per cent Muslim, 1.3 per cent Jewish, 0.1 per cent Sikh and 5.6 per cent said they had no religious affiliation” (GZ 72 NW). As demographical representations, the discrepancies are significant. Are 60 per cent of Quebecers “not religious” or without “religious affiliation,” or are 5.6 per cent? Are 40 per cent of Quebecers Catholic, or are 83.2 per cent? With regard to the first text, entitled “Catholic Majority Largely Isolated: Little Mixing among Faith in Quebec,” (GZ 60 NW) despite the majority of the population of Quebec being named as Catholic in the headline, the text goes on to describe Quebec as secular. It does this first through the statistics themselves: “Sixty percent describe themselves as not religious. Of those, one in four—25 per cent—said they were not at all religious” (GZ 60 NW). The distinction between “not religious” and “not at all religious” is unclear, and it could as easily be phrased, “45 per cent of the population are somewhat religious, while 15 per cent are not religious at all.” Further, the phrasing "25 per cent said they were not at all religious" is somewhat misleading, as it is only 25 per cent of 60 per cent and could just as easily be phrased as “15 per cent of those surveyed.” The way the statistics are presented emphasizes the composition of Quebec as nonreligious. The text then goes on to define “religious”: “By religious, of course, most Quebecers mean Roman Catholic. Even four decades after the Quiet Revolution, the province is still overwhelmingly Catholic, if not in people’s daily practice, at least in their faith or sentimental attachment to Quebec’s roots and values.” Despite naming Catholicism here, the emphasis remains on the secular nature of Quebec society, first in invoking the Quiet Revolution, but more importantly in implying that what Catholics remain are nonpracticing—they are Catholics in name only.76 Despite the numbers given, the “French Canadian majority” described as “nominally Catholic” is still presumed sufficiently Christian to find “itself at odds with the rise of other religions” (GZ 60 NW emphasis added). This text refers to minority religions as “other faiths” throughout; these are specifically named as Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews. The text also uses

76 The examination of Christianity as culture will occur later in this chapter.
stats to make a direct link between a person’s level of religious belief, her or his reported level of contact with other persons of various beliefs, and her or his opinions about those persons. It concludes that “the lower the level of contact, the less was their level of esteem,” and that “the less religious you are in Quebec, the more likely you’ll favour Muslims” (GZ 60 NW). Further, “by the same token, the more religious you are, the more strongly you feel that Quebec society is changing too fast because of minorities and is under threat by non-Christians” (GZ 60 NW). Thus, intolerance is linked to lack of contact and religious belief, echoing the texts about Herouxville. In the second text, “Reflection of ‘Fundamental Values’: Change Very Important,” the stats are used to support the idea that “the issue of reasonable accommodation has been overblown in the media” (GZ 72 NW). Here the high number of Christians is meant to prove how little accommodation is needed. The text goes on: “Among the 60,000 Muslims in Quebec in 1995, the council affirmed, barely 70 young girls covered their heads in schools” (GZ 72 NW). In the first text, numbers of Christians are downplayed and this group is characterized as secular, while minority religions are portrayed as causing intolerance. In the second, the number of Christians is used as proof that not a lot of accommodation is needed because people are largely Christian.

Where arguments are made to restrict the public practices of religious minorities, critical discourse strands point out the reality of the inclusion of Christian religion in public institutions and government: “Some Quebecers don’t want to know that Canada, in fact, does not pretend to strictly separate church and state (Ontario funding for Catholic schools, for example). Nor do such Quebecers suggest how to ban a nun’s habit or a cardinal’s skull cap from public places. Or what to do about the huge cross on Mount Royal” (TS 113 OP); “The niqab dilutes the secular nature of society—Quebec’s, in particular. Not so. The Constitution recognizes the supremacy of God. The Quebec National Assembly displays the crucifix. Some Quebec municipalities begin meetings with a prayer. Catholic and other churches are given tax breaks” (TS 137 ED); and

Some commentators attributed the opposition to the kirpan in schools here to a secular backlash against all religion following centuries of repression by the Catholic Church. But this explanation is unconvincing. Public schools in supposedly secular Quebec still give Catholic and Protestant religious instruction
(though this will end by 2008) and fly the provincial flag on which the Christian cross is prominent. (GZ 27 OE)

In 2010, it was argued that the removal of religious instruction did not entirely remove Christianity from public schools: “While we proclaim our secularism, . . . nuns and priests continue to teach, even if they no longer wear the habit. They have every right to do so, and many of them make a priceless contribution to education in Quebec. However, most of them are identifiable by their dress and often are called by their religious title” (GZ 113 OE). With regard to Marion Boyd’s review of the Ontario Arbitration Act, the comment is made that “she correctly stated in her report ‘for many individuals who come to this country from other lands, Western laws, rather than appearing to be secular, look patently ‘Christian’ in nature, enshrining as they do such ‘Christian’ values as monogamy in marriage or restrictions around divorce’” (GZ 21 IN).

This discourse strand also suggests that the problem is not religion, but rather other people’s religion: “Something about minority groups, or their religious practices, is raising hackles in Canada these days. In both Ontario and Quebec we see attachment to the forms of Christianity and continued acceptance of old compromises, but little public willingness for new ones” (TS 100 ED, GZ 71 OE). In a text in the “Identities” series published in the Gazette in September of 2007, an attachment to Christianity in Quebec is explained:

“There’s a large reservoir of guilt among French Canadians about the rapid rejection of Catholicism during the Quiet Revolution—that’s a fact,” said sociologist Morton Weinfeld, who runs McGill University’s Canadian ethnic studies program. “And an easy way to assuage that guilt is by symbols—it’s what I call religion-lite,” Weinfeld said. “People say, ‘We don’t have to go to church, we don’t have to follow the dictates of the church, but we’re very comfortable with all the visual imagery around us that reminds us of our heritage and reinforces our identity.’” (GZ 61 NW)

As for Quebecers’ views of minority religion, the same text reports the following opinion poll results:

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77 This anonymous editorial appeared in the Gazette on October 3, 2007, under the headline “Ontario Shares Our Pain” and was reprinted in the Toronto Star on October 5, 2007, under the headline “New Challenges for Multiculturalism.”
• They don’t think Jews or Muslims should get time off work to pray (72 per cent are against).
• They don’t think religious minorities should get special meals at a traditional cabane sucre (69 per cent).
• They don’t want the government to subsidize religious schools (67 per cent).
• They don’t want Muslim women to walk around with their faces covered (63 per cent).
• They don’t want Muslim teachers to cover their hair with a hijab (61 per cent);
• They don’t want Muslim girls to wear the hijab in school (61 per cent).
• And they don’t want prayer rooms in colleges and universities (59 per cent). (GZ 61 NW)

The religious affiliations, or lack thereof, of the survey respondents are not given. In a footnote to the article, the survey’s “Methodology, Design and Analysis” are given as: “Leger Marketing polled 1,001 Quebecers by phone from Aug. 22 to 26. Respondents were 18 years or older and were able to express themselves in French or English. Using Statistics Canada data, their answers were weighted by region, age, gender and mother tongue to make the poll representative of the entire adult population” (GZ 61 NW). So the “they” expressing anti-Muslim sentiments are more accurately Quebecers. The use of “they” allows both the author and the reader to distance themselves from the negative opinions expressed by respondents—“they” are not “us.” I propose that this is problematic in the same way that isolating anti-immigration sentiment to the rural and the aged is; it allows the majority population to remain unaccountable for prevailing prejudices. At a hearing of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, “one woman said she doesn’t want a Quebec future that makes her ‘pure laine, French-Canadian’78 grandchildren feel like foreigners in their own land. Bouchard asked her what she’d think if her kids wound up being fervent Catholics. ‘I have nothing against religions,’ she replied, just special privileges demanded by some, like Muslims who want sharia courts” (GZ 63 NW).

Throughout the newspaper texts examined for this thesis, lists of religions exclude Christianity. The populations of Canada and Quebec are presumed nonreligious or at least

78 “Pure laine” means “pure wool” and refers to persons descended from French settlers. It is also a term with clear racial connotations.
moving toward an abandonment of religion. Canadians and Quebecers are secular or becoming secularized in the culturalization of Christianity. There are two categories of religion: Christianity and other.

3.4 “Our Religious and Historic Heritage”

There are a number of reasons why Christianity is very often ignored in the discourses about religious accommodation, including the fact that Christian forms, symbols, and traditions are so ubiquitous that they are often understood simply as societal norms. For example, the traditional Canadian workweek of Monday to Friday is considered secular without consideration that its form was historically set up so that Sunday was available for Christian institutional worship or that it is currently prohibitive to Muslim Jumu’ah (Friday congregational prayers). As the texts examined have demonstrated, there is an assumption that Christians particularly are becoming increasingly secular—that is, while many still claim Christian affiliations, their practices are understood as cultural practices undertaken in the name of tradition and not belief.

On May 22, 2008, despite the recommendation made by the Bouchard-Taylor Commission in its report that the “in keeping with the notion of the separation of Church and State, we believe that the crucifix must be removed from the wall of the National Assembly” (20), Jean Charest (QLP premier), Mario Dumont (ADQ leader of the Official Opposition), and Pauline Marois (PQ leader of the Second Opposition Group), jointly moved in the Quebec National Assembly:

That the National Assembly reiterate its desire to promote the language, history, culture and values of the Québec nation, foster the integration of each person into our nation in a spirit of openness and reciprocity, and express its attachment to our religious and historic heritage represented particularly by the crucifix in our Blue Room and our coat of arms adorning our institutions. (Votes and Proceedings No. 87 840)

The motion was carried 100 to 0. Crucifixes, particularly the one hanging in the National Assembly, had become and would remain a touchstone for all sides of the debate about the place of religion within Quebec. The government’s assertion that keeping the crucifix was an acknowledgement of historic inheritance, as opposed to a current attachment to its
religious significance, was generally not called into question, despite the significant number of Quebec Catholics for whom it undoubtedly continued to have religious significance. Rather, discourses evident in the newspaper texts examined for this thesis characterized the actions of the government as an attempt at cultural hegemony, a failure to meet secular standards, and/or ignorant hypocrisy.

The passing of the motion to keep the crucifix at the National Assembly is condemned as a “rejection of the ‘open secularism’ advocated by commissioners Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor” (GZ 98 OE). Another text in the Toronto Star implies an ongoing Christian hegemony:

That Bouchard and Taylor could not hide the contradictions at the heart of the Quebec enterprise was exposed when Jean Charest led the National Assembly in unanimously voting to keep the crucifix. Expect municipalities to continue with their prayers. Expect the opposition to continue playing identity politics. Strip away the sophistry and what we see is not pretty: Old-stock Quebecers have abandoned Catholicism and swear by secularism, but they refuse to give up their quasi-religious tribalism and its dogma of making others subservient to it. (TS 124 OP)

More often, the discourses presented propose that the keeping of the crucifix is hypocritical, as in this instance:

“The public face of the state must not reveal religious beliefs,” which is why the crucifix erected in the National Assembly to symbolize the non-neutrality of the Quebec state in the Duplessis era must remain there to symbolize . . . er . . . the history of non-neutrality of the Quebec state? It is somewhat ironic that De Courcy’s veneration of selective symbolic state neutrality borders on the religious itself (sacre, indeed!). (GZ 166 OE)

And, “In promoting her Charter of Secularism, PQ Leader Pauline Marois proposes to ban civil servants from wearing the hijab, the kippa and the turban but not the crucifix. Nor does she want to remove the crucifix from the National Assembly or ban Christmas trees, even as she espouses ‘the neutrality of the state’” (TS 152 OP). This hypocrisy is situated within the historical context of Quebec’s extrication from Roman Catholicism. The “Quebec government says it is important both that the state be neutral and appear to be neutral. . . . The glaring exception to the proposed rules would be the crucifix that has hung in Quebec’s national assembly since 1936, a time when the Catholic Church’s
influence over the province was all-encompassing” (TS 161 NW). A text in the Gazette reports that when asked “how he justifies keeping the crucifix in the National Assembly” (the crucifix is described as having been “put there by the clerico-nationalist government of Maurice Duplessis in 1936 to cement the alliance between the Roman Catholic Church and the Quebec government”), Bernard Drainville replied, “We’ve made the choice . . . that we won’t turn our backs on the past” (GZ 158). The author points to the hypocrisy in the change in the PQ’s stance given its historical position:

It is important to remember that in the span of a generation—and in many cases under the stewardship of the PQ, control was wrested away from the powerful Catholic Church and the minority anglophone elite and put into the hands of the francophone majority through a newly nationalized state apparatus. This move represented a meaningful change in self perception among francophones who were now understood—and understood themselves—as the majority dominant culture. (GZ 158)

This discourse strand also proposes that “keeping Catholic symbols in the name of tradition but excluding the Star of David in the name of secularism, even though the first Jews came to Quebec in 1760” (TS 165 OP) ignores the historic heritage of non-Christian religions within Quebec. Further, “confronted with the irony of exempting the large Christian crosses in the National Assembly, on Mont Royal and on the Quebec flag, charter advocates insist these are essential parts of Quebec’s historical patrimony, and not strictly religious. This view fails to comprehend the meaning and message of these symbols to those who are not Christian” (GZ 170 OE).

Once again, throughout the texts examined, there are accusations of politicking, such as those in this article that says,

Of course, the PQ doesn’t want to ban all religious symbols. The party’s own ads during the last provincial election campaign featured a lingering aerial shot of the enormous cross on Mount Royal accompanied by promises to “take pride in our values.” And legislators in Quebec’s National Assembly famously debate laws in a chamber where a crucifix hangs above the Speaker’s chair. If Premier Pauline Marois and Co. proposed to take down the cross on the mountain and the crucifix in the assembly in the name of secularism, they would at least have consistency on their side. As it is, they are pandering to the insecurities of Quebec’s old-stock francophone voters who identify with Catholic symbols—even though the province abandoned the church en masse decades ago. (TS 155 OP)
An author in the *Toronto Star* echoes these sentiments:

> With every passing day her government’s argument that the separation between church and state needs to be reinforced is giving way to less secular and more identity-driven considerations. . . . The PQ hopes its charter will help set the clock back to the glory days of its coalition; that it will unite that the most traditionalist segment of the Quebec electorate and the progressive francophones who have been at the forefront of the battle for gender equality and for secularism under its banner. (TS 159 NW)

Accusations of politicking are not reserved for the PQ:

> None of the major parties has endorsed the largely symbolic recommendation of the Bouchard-Taylor commission to remove the crucifix that hangs over the president’s chair in the National Assembly. To justify this glaring contradiction, the three major parties insist the object is a historical artifact. . . . Politicians who repeat the “historical artifact” mantra keep a close eye on the polls, as a majority of respondents favour retaining this symbol. (TS 157 OP)

Keeping Catholic symbols in public spaces is reported as a position of compromise, Jean Dorion, the president of the Quebec nationalist Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, is reported as saying, “the SSJB favours a secular Quebec and agrees that prayers have no place in civic forums. As for crucifixes, he would keep those like the one in the National Assembly that are historic artifacts as much as religious symbols, but is opposed to adding new ones to civic spaces” (GZ 95). Gérard Bouchard is reported as saying in 2011 that

> the Catholic crucifix should not be hanging over the speaker’s chair in the National Assembly . . . if Quebec really wants to be a neutral secular society. . . . The real challenge today, as it was three years ago, is finding the right balance between total religious freedom and a total ban on expression. For example, . . . roadside crosses, the ringing of church bells on Sunday or the cross that sits atop Mont Royal are technically violations of the religious neutrality of the state, but they are tolerated. (GZ 134 NW)

Bouchard is quoted as noting that “the laws of neutrality tolerate exceptions, tolerate restrictions. But you have to have good reasons” (GZ 134 NW). While the good reasons are not explicitly laid out in this text, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s report explains how some crosses are historic while others are not:

> An adequate conception of secularism must, in our view, seek to distinguish between what constitutes a form of establishment of religion and what is part of the society’s historic heritage. . . . Certain practices or symbols may originate in
the religion of the majority without necessarily genuinely restricting those who are not part of this majority. This is true of practices and symbols that have heritage value rather than playing a regulatory role. For example, the cross on Mount Royal does not signify that Montréal identifies with Catholicism and does not demand of non-Catholics that they act against their conscience. It is a symbol that reflects a chapter of our past. A religious symbol is thus compatible with secularism when it is a historic reminder rather than a sign of religious identification by a public institution. As the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec has emphasized, a symbol or ritual stemming from the religion of the majority “does not infringe basic freedoms if it is not accompanied by any restriction on individuals’ behaviour.” (Bouchard & Taylor 152)

I propose that the distinction is still unclear. Discourse strands that advocate keeping the crucifix at the National Assembly reflect discourses of an increasing secularization in Quebec and present the crucifix as a religious symbol with little and/or diminishing potency. In contrast, arguments to keep minority religious symbols out the public domain assume that they are both powerful and proselytizing. The general consensus is that the Catholic Church has been so sufficiently divested of its power that all that remains are symbols of its defeat—symbols that can (and do) invoke little but sentimentality from true Quebecers. Discourse strands that are critical of keeping the crucifix accuse those who wish to keep it of hypocrisy (they are not true secularists), cultural hegemony (valuing Christian cultural heritage over other cultural heritage), and/or politicking. Neither discourse strand suggests that anyone (outside of “old-stock” Quebecers) might have current religious reasons for keeping the crucifix. Reducing Christian symbols to cultural or historical symbols is problematic. In denying their religious significance (even if it is only to a minority population), Christianity is allowed to remain the sole and dominant public expression of religion.

Conclusions

In the newspaper texts that I examined, interpretations of Canadian belonging are contingent upon the performance of dominant ideals, values, and practices. The value of tolerance is portrayed as integral component of Canadian multiculturalism and Canadian identity. Canadians are tolerant. The problem arises in the understanding (and in the

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79 This discourse strand is examined in chapter four.
portrayal) of religion (and thus religious practitioners) as prone to intolerance. Religious practitioners test the tolerance of the Canadian (secular) majority by being intolerant themselves. I posit that while some antimulticulturalism, anti-immigration, and limits-of-tolerance discourses have at their core a desire to maintain current hegemonic hierarchies that place ethnic, religious, and immigrant minorities outside of the Canadian “we,” more often these discourses reflect an anxiety about the sustainability of liberal expectancy and are based on the perception that overt expressions of religious identity preclude integration into a larger Canadian identity construct. Too much tolerance, then, becomes a threat to Canadian identity in the construction of the religious other, not just because they are potentially intolerant, but importantly because of the importance that they place on their religious identities. Tolerance—even mutual tolerance—demands at best that the persons or things being tolerated are deemed insufficiently important to protest and that the threat that they present is minimal or transient. Religion as a central component of an individual identity construct and the perception of religion as static and illiberal make the tolerance of the religious other problematic. As they are presented in the newspaper texts examined, discourses of tolerance decisively delimit power and belonging; the tolerant majority adjudicates the limits of religious expression of minorities and determines the standards of Canadian identity.

Discourses about secularism primarily address secularism in Quebec and are produced in the *Gazette*. This is in part due to the articulation of secularism as a Quebec value by Quebec politicians. More importantly, however, secularism, as demonstrated in the texts examined, is viewed as particularly emancipatory in Quebec. Secularism in Quebec is an ongoing project of the Quiet Revolution from an era of massive formalized secularization and increased nationalism when the control of education, health care, and social services was transferred from the Catholic Church to the state. Conway argues that in the project of secularization “Quebec’s leaders saw . . . a way for a minority Francophone culture to assert its identity and gain control of its destiny in a majority Anglophone country” (198), and so secularism is tied to Quebec identity in a way that it is not to Canadian identity. Discourses about secularism in Quebec stress an underlying and pervasive identity anxiety in Quebecers.
Throughout the discourses that I considered here, Christianity is presented as normative. This is accomplished partially in a failure to understand that the relegation of religion to the private domain is an aspect of secularism formed in Christian ideals and partly in the omission of Christianity in lists of problematic religions. More overtly, in the texts examined, Christianity is presented as cultural and historical, and thus of no real present consequence. Politicians advocating hard secularism very often propose that Christian religious symbols are made into historical symbols simply through the decline of the number of practicing Christians or, more radically, simply by dictate of the government. Characterizations of the population of Canada as secular not only marginalize minority religious practitioners but also allow the hegemonic presence of Christianity to go unchallenged. Throughout the texts examined, values are used to mark symbolic boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.
Chapter Four

4. Reconciling Multiple Identities—Religious Canadians

Multiculturalism, as it is officially and informally understood, has a dual emphasis on the recognition and integration of difference. That is, there is an assumption that diverse identity constructions can be recognized, protected, and celebrated in a harmonious and unified way, producing a single and inclusive Canadian identity. In Trudeau’s 1971 announcement of Canada’s multicultural policy he asserted that “no citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian,” and that national unity “must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions” (“Canadian Culture” 8546). National identity is dependent upon the recognition of individual identities. The feasibility of recognizing and protecting individual/group identities while fostering a national identity is the question at the heart of the accommodation debates. Are some identity constructs inherently incompatible with an overarching national identity? The answer, as it pertains to minority religious practitioners, is dependent upon the majority’s willingness to recognize them as full citizens.

4.1 Recognizing Difference

Religion can be the primary context within which identity is formed, but it is never the sole context. The confluence of identities in individuals as it relates to their ethnic, national, cultural, and religious identity is often incomprehensible to others. Where secularism is assumed, religious affiliation can require some explanation. For some people, religious identity requires religious practices that cannot simply be relegated to the private sphere. In response to Sikh children being barred from the soccer field for wearing turbans, Andrew Coyne writes,

An earnest young student asked, via Paul Wells’s blog at Maclean’s, whether it were not possible to just leave to one side all other considerations, “for an hour and a half,” and make the soccer field a place to take part, alike in our unadornment, in the pure joy of sport: naked, as it were, in the Garden of Eden? After all, he noted, baseball caps are not allowed, either. However well meant, I can’t help feeling that implicit equation, of a sacred religious headdress with a
baseball cap, could only be made by someone with no understanding whatever of the centrality of religion in the believer’s life, their culture, their very identity. To the parents of these children—and parents have at least as much right as anyone to impose their values on their own children—the ban on turbans amounts to putting up a sign saying: No Sikhs Allowed. (GZ 148 OE)

A secularism that demands an absence of religious symbols from the public domain effectively ostracized religious practitioners, who understand religious dress as a requirement of faith. Religious elements of identity constructs cannot simply be set aside. Riad Saloojee, executive director of the Ottawa-based Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, writes about McGill University’s refusal to provide prayer space for its Muslim students:

The issue of prayer is one of principle, not a politics of agitation. In an age of deepening skepticism regarding religion, many may view the request for a prayer space as an odd or unwarranted affront. How does one explain the centrality of prayer in the Islamic faith? To be sure, the Islamic prayer is unique in the sense that it is a required pillar, to be observed five times a day during specific time windows, and requires both mental focus and physical movements. Although the requirements of prayer often bring its practice into public relief—say, at a mall or airport—the essence of prayer is not public statement but pure grace: a chance for an intimate communion with the divine. It is difficult, too, to recount the anxiety and distress of being unable to pray. Before having access to a prayer room, many Muslim university students recall, unfondly, praying “on the fly” in various nooks and crannies, stairwells, empty classrooms and fire escapes. (GZ 20 OE)

Saloojee challenges the premise that religious practitioners who bring their practices into the public domain do so for political reasons. Where religious devotion requires practice, it does so regardless of location. While the overall tone of the discourses contained in the newspaper texts that I examined in this thesis supports religious accommodation and religious freedom, rarely is religious practice portrayed as legitimate or valuable in and of itself. Further, there is very often a fundamental misrecognition of the centrality of religion to the identity of some religious practitioners. Where religious practitioners bring their practices into the public domain, they are often constructed as wilfully transgressing the public/private boundaries of acceptable religious practice. Their exclusion from the
majority “us” then becomes a product of their refusal to conform. These texts are unusual in the body of newspaper texts examined and should be understood as a response to the public/private demands of secular ideology.

4.2 What Is Religion and What Does It Do?

Discourse strands that advocate the necessity of a place for religious practice in the public domain are in line with what Casanova terms “political secularism,” a nonideological form of secularism that is “compatible with a positive view of religion as a moral good, or as an ethical communitarian reservoir of human solidarity and republican virtue” (1057). These discourse strands frame public religious practice as a tenet of multiculturalism and very often rely on a presentation of religious practice as a right. Federal Liberal leader Stéphane Dion asserts that religious rights are constitutional rights: “In our country, the government itself has no religion. But the government and all the public institutions are committed to protect the right to have a religion and to practice it everywhere in Canada. . . . It is a principle in the Charter of Rights that the government, itself secular, must protect” (GZ 94 NW). Federal Conservative multiculturalism minister Jason Kenney further frames religious rights as having been firmly established in Canadian law: “Both the Canadian Charter of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ‘speak of freedom of religion, not freedom from religion, and there’s a very robust jurisprudence already in Canada that defines what that means’” (TS 161 NW).

Dion and Kenney are both explicitly defining political secularism in that neither makes any claim for the validity of religion itself. Rather, the role of the politically secular state is protecting the right to practice. This discourse strand affirms a secularism that is nonideological.

Casanova proposes that secularism as an ideology does more than delineate where religion can be practiced; it also involves a theory of “what ‘religion’ is or does” (1051).

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80 For example, from the Kirpan-debate texts examined in chapter two, consider how the Sikh delegates’ entry is a product of their “refusal”: “Four Sikhs were barred from entering the National Assembly for refusing to remove their ceremonial daggers” (GZ 125 NW); “Sikh leader Balpreet Singh, who was barred from the National Assembly Tuesday when he insisted on being allowed to wear his kirpan (ceremonial dagger) while he testified before a committee on religious accommodation” (GZ 127 OP). The delegates’ exclusion is framed partly in their unwillingness to conform.
Within the texts examined, advocates of multiculturalism most often presume that religion does not actually do much that is inherently problematic and that where religious practices are potentially problematic, they are currently, and likely sufficiently, addressed in Canadian law. In 2009, Haroon Siddiqui wrote in the *Toronto Star* that multiculturalism has nudged Canadians of long-established ancestry into making the difficult psychological journey toward accepting all Canadians as equal—white or not, Canadian-born or foreign-born, recent arrivals or those who migrated here decades ago. Canada is a Christian-majority but not a Christian country. The debate over “Who’s a Canadian” has long been resolved. A Canadian is one who lives legally in Canada, period. There are no second-class citizens. A minority of Canadians has found this hard to swallow. Periodically, some float such hare-brained ideas as a social contract between the host society and the newcomers, setting out some ill-defined limits on this or that immigrant religious/cultural behaviour. But we already have a social contract, the rule of law. There can, therefore, be no arbitrary limits set by self-appointed busybodies on what minorities or new Canadians can or cannot do. How far can respect for difference go? As far as the law allows and no further. This is not a negative assertion. Rather, it is one of the core constitutional values of modern Canada. The strong shall not dictate to the weak on what is, or is not, acceptable. The power to define citizen conduct rests only with the people’s parliaments. (TS 131 IN)

Limits to religious practice are framed in this discourse strand as already determined by law. Limits debates, then, are the superfluous self-indulgence of people who do not acknowledge the accomplishments of Canadian multicultural ideology.

Casanova argues that secular ideologies either ground religion in “progressive stadial philosophies of history that relegate religion to a superseded stage” or “presuppose that religion is either an irrational force or a nonrational form of discourse that should be banished from the democratic public sphere” (1052). The discourse strands examined in chapter two clearly posit Christianity as relegated to a superseded stage—that is, it is only historically relevant or powerful. Discourse strands that propose religion is increasingly a historic concern imply criticism of minority religious practitioners for their failure to understand religion as belonging in the past. While Casanova proposes that secular ideologies view religion as antiquated or irrational, in the newspapers texts that I examined, advocates of hard secularism accuse minority religion of both.

In the texts examined, discourse strands that advocate hard secularism or the necessity of banishing religion from the public domain are rarely explicit as to the danger
that religion poses to society outside of failing to maintain the public/private dualism or a general characterizing of religious minorities as intolerant. Even in texts that advocate soft secularism, lists of minority accommodations are very often presented as evidence of a values divide between the majority and minority religious practitioners:

Reports in competing media of recent conflicts between the values of religious minorities and those of the majority have made “reasonable accommodation” an explosive issue. . . . Two weeks ago, members of a YMCA in Montreal’s Mile End district protested against the installation of frosted windows so Hasidic boys at a neighbouring synagogue couldn’t see women in revealing exercise clothes. In another incident involving Hasidic communities, Montreal police suggested female officers should let male partners interview male Hasidim who for religious reasons would not speak to a woman. And a local community services centre, the CLSC Park Extension, excluded men from pre-natal classes because of objections from Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. (GZ 36 OE)

While this text is summarizing events printed in other newspapers, the characterization of these events as “conflicts” and reasonable accommodation as “an explosive issue” raises the events described to the status of “incidents.” The threat is made real in the portrayal of minority religious practitioners’ refusal to acknowledge the current norms of Canadian society. Windows should not be frosted. Women police officers must be acknowledged. Men must be included in prenatal classes. Minority religious practitioners are problematic. The assessment of the requirement of hard or soft secularism lies in the evaluation of how problematic.

In the same text, ADQ leader Mario Dumont is reported as commenting, “Quebec police didn’t kidnap anybody and force them to come to Quebec,” and ADQ founder Jean Allaire asserts, “We greeted these people with open arms, but a certain number of fundamentalists of thought and religion are trying to impose their way of living and seeing things on us” (GZ 36 OE). While the author is critical of the ADQ leadership, describing Dumont as “desperate to attract attention to his moribund party,” the characterization of minority religious practitioners as immigrant fundamentalists is not directly challenged. Another text, printed four days later and listing largely the same events, asserts that “by complying with the demands of such traditionalists and fundamentalists, or even—in the case of the Montreal police—anticipating what their objections might be before any even arise, Quebec institutions and businesses have
provoked a backlash of public opinion” (GZ 37 NW). In this text, the blame is partially assigned to the majority population because of their acquiescence to minority demands. In both texts, the characterization of minority religious practitioners as fundamentalist marks them as inherently unwilling to conform to majority practices. The events are thus “incidents” and point to the inherent incompatibility of minority religious practitioners within Canadian society.

The characterization of minority religious practitioners as traditionalists and fundamentalists (and again as immigrants) in these texts points to a dominant discourse of increasing fundamentalism. What is implied is that religion generally, and minority religions particularly, are inherently at risk of fundamentalism. It is a position that is supported in the following quote by an expert in religion:

“When we were educated,” Arvind Sharma, professor of comparative religion at McGill University, said in an interview, “we were all brought up in the secular hypothesis that, as society progresses, religion would either disappear or at least disappear from public life and become a purely private affair. “Events since then have made it clear, frequently in unpleasant ways, that religion is here to stay, Sharma, a Hindu, said. The world has experienced “a rise in fundamentalism in all religions, Buddhism and Hinduism not excepted.” (GZ 31 LF)

That the statement is made by a member of a religious minority adds credibility of the claim—if a Hindu is saying it about Hindus, it must be true. Further, representations of Buddhism or Hinduism as problematic religions in Canada are entirely absent from the newspaper texts that I examined. Naming them here enforces the idea that any and all religion is susceptible to fundamentalism. Martin Regg Cohn reports that in his overseas postings for the Toronto Star he came to understand that “fundamentalism holds powerful, universal appeal for people of all faiths.” He warns,

Canadians can no longer turn a blind eye to the world beyond our borders; the globalization of terrorism has shattered our splendid isolation. Overseas, there is a different mentality: You are your tribe, and your tribe is you. Fundamentalism and tribalism, once so alien to the Canadian psyche, have migrated from foreign war zones to our own shores. If we want to maintain our Canadian values of tolerance and harmony at home, we need to wake up to the terror and hatred abroad—not only infecting the Middle East but now poisoning the rest of the planet. (TS 61 ID)
In the newspaper texts examined, religious fundamentalism is largely framed as problematic owing to the failure of minority religious practitioners to adjust to modern lifestyles and values. However, the predominant discourse of religious fundamentalism as leading to or equated with violence and/or terrorism that occurs outside of these texts occasionally bleeds through. While Cohn does not directly name Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to Canadian values, it is understood in his reference to the Middle East.

4.3 “All the Time—It’s Muslims, Muslims, Muslims”

A text published in the *Gazette* in October 2007 about the Bouchard-Taylor Commission hearings begins,

First they gave a public platform to the controversial spokesmen of Herouxville. Then they spent the evening in a private meeting with what they called a “courageous” group of model immigrants from Latin America. The next morning, they turned their attention once again to more negative outpourings against immigrants at one last public hearing in the Mauricie. And then they lost a bit of their cool. (GZ 74 NW)

Gérard Bouchard is reported as “chastising” a speaker at the hearing who is reported as having proposed that

Quebec should force new immigrants—especially those with special religious demands, like devout Muslims—to settle in the regions rather than allow them to “take possession” of some Montreal neighbourhoods. “That’s a way to target Muslims,” Bouchard replied. “All the time—it’s Muslims, Muslims, Muslims.” (GZ 74 NW)

And indeed, in the newspaper texts examined for this thesis, the focus is disproportionately on Islam and its practitioners.

Islam’s status as particularly problematic among religions results in the construction of two types of Muslims in the newspaper texts examined—the “good” or “real” Muslim, and the “bad” Muslim. Good Muslims share Canadian values and importantly acknowledge and denounce Muslim extremists. This construction is consistent across the entire 11 years of texts that I examined for this thesis. In 2003, an author at the *Toronto Star* wrote,

Ahamad Kutty is a leading Canadian Islamic scholar and cleric in a community of 600,000, the nation’s biggest religious group after Christians. He is also a voice of decency and tolerance. After the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States he
denounced such attacks as “un-Islamic,” saying “This . . . is against all the values the majority of Muslims hold dear.” The Qu’ran explicitly declares that “God does not love aggressors,” he warned those who might be tempted to turn the mass murderers into heroes. Kutty firmly believes that Muslims today “have no enemy greater than fanatics in their midst,” and he routinely preaches “pluralism and tolerance” in sermons and on the Internet. (TS 8 ED)

In 2008, Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress, constructed a battle between moderate Muslims and dangerous “Islamists”:

There is no doubt the aboriginal, Sikh, Tamil and African-Canadian communities have their share of troubled youth, as do other ethnic and religious groups living within Canadian borders. But the present and more pervasive threat to the security of Canada, including its largely law-abiding Muslim population, comes from radical Islamist fundamentalism. These extremists continually work to undermine Canadian values of pluralism and tolerance, while openly pursuing an agenda to quash the reasonable voices of moderate and progressive Muslims. (GZ 100 OE)

Hassan’s depiction of the Islamist threat as a “pervasive threat” to the security of the nation also adds to the characterization of all Muslims as potential threats. She offers no means by which to distinguish extremists from “largely law-abiding” Muslims.

In 2006, Peter Beyer, a University of Ottawa professor of religion, was reported as “breaking new ground with the first Canadian study on the religious values of second-generation Muslims” and finding that “they’re more like us than those taking aim at the cultural mosaic would have you believe” (GZ 29 OE). Beyer’s characterization of Muslims as “more like us” importantly implies that they are not entirely like “us”:

Beyer found that despite being more religious and socially conservative than Hindus or Buddhists, second-generation Muslims are highly attuned to Canadian values. In fact, this country’s greatest virtues—its respect for differences, its protection of individual rights and freedoms—are among the core values that young Muslims are quick to embrace. As a result, they question everything and insist on seeking their own answers. Many denounce extremism and name it as the No. 1 challenge facing Islam today. (GZ 29 OE)

If only “many” Muslims denounce extremism, the implication is that there are also a significant enough number who do not. In 2007, a text in the Toronto Star affirming the success of Canadian multiculturalism assured readers that their fears about Muslims were unfounded:
People generally express two fears about Muslims in Canada: they are unwilling to integrate into secular society and they are sympathetic to terrorism. . . . As for terror, our survey found that Canadian Muslims overwhelmingly condemn it, and nearly nine in 10 say that ordinary law-abiding Muslims have a duty to report on any extremism they may be aware of in their own communities. (TS 107 ID)

While appearing to present Muslims as assimilating, the subtext remains: 10 per cent of Muslims do not believe that they should report extremists in their midst.

The construction of good and bad Muslims is persistent in the newspaper texts that I examined for this thesis. Even where the authors are asserting that Muslims are not problematic and that they are integrating, some Muslims are acknowledged as extremists. The problem inherent in this construction is that determining good Muslims from bad is nearly impossible. For any Muslim to potentially belong to the Canadian construct of “us,” they must not only be seen to be embracing Canadian values such as tolerance but also actively repudiating other Muslims who do not. A silent Muslim is, then, a potential threat.

Islamic Veiling—Religion and Agency

On March 24, 2010, Quebec justice minister Kathleen Weil (PLQ) tabled Bill 94. In addition to outlining guidelines for accommodation requests, the bill proposed a ban on religious dress for civil servants. Public hearings for the bill in Quebec’s National Assembly were the cause of controversy, not only due to the contents of the bill itself but also because of the refusal to admit a Sikh delegation for wearing kirpans (see chapter two). Though Bill 94 did not name the niqab or the burqa, it was to become popularly known as “the niqab bill.” Bill 94 died on the order paper in 2010. Attempts to legislate limits on religious dress in Quebec were undertaken again in 2013, when PQ cabinet member Bernard Drainville tabled Bill 60. In the “Explanatory Notes” section of the 16-page bill, the reasoning behind the proposed legislation is explained:

Public bodies must, in the pursuit of their mission, remain neutral in religious matters and reflect the secular nature of the State. Accordingly, obligations are set

81 Bill 94—An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions.
82 Bill 60—Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests.
out for personnel members of public bodies in the exercise of their functions, including a duty to remain neutral and exercise reserve in religious matters by, among other things, complying with the restriction on wearing religious objects that overtly indicate a religious affiliation. As well, personnel members of a public body must exercise their functions with their face uncovered, and persons to whom they provide services must also have their face uncovered when receiving such services. (3)

The PQ additionally posted a diagram on its website to illustrate “exemples de signes ostentatoires qui ne seraient pas permis au personnel de l’État,” which included large crosses, turbans, kippas, niqabs, and hijabs. Despite the inclusion of multiple religious symbols in the proposed ban, media coverage focused primarily upon the niqab and hijab.

Within the texts examined, representations of veiling as inherently problematic are not confined to texts that take up Bill 94 and Bill 60. A text printed in the Toronto Star in April 2010 is representative of the topics and positions that I found throughout the newspaper texts examined for this thesis:

The niqab may not be a religious requirement. I agree. So do an overwhelming majority of Muslim women, including observant ones, who do not wear it. But that does not negate the right of those who believe it is a religious requirement. . . . It is essential to see the face for the purposes of I.D. documents and security. Absolutely. . . . But there are no reported cases of niqabi women objecting to any of that. The niqab is “a symbol of oppression,” decreed by Islam or the men of the household. . . . Let’s say that it is. But she would invoke her freedom of religion, also her freedom of choice of dress. What then? Would our argument be that we do not recognize her sovereignty. . . . Or would we argue that a niqabi woman is too dumb to decide for herself or is under the sort of severe oppression that we assume she is, without having to prove that she is? . . . The niqab impedes integration. Yes. . . . Charest’s bill, if passed, would isolate them even more. The niqab dilutes the secular nature of society—Quebec’s, in particular. Not so. The Constitution recognizes the supremacy of God. The Quebec National Assembly displays the crucifix. . . . The niqabi women are not demanding any favours anyway, only their rights. (TS 137 ED)

While this text relates the arguments against veiling specifically to the niqab, within the newspaper texts examined (with the exception of security or identification concerns) these arguments are equally applied to the hijab.

83 See appendix C for poster.
Discourse strands for and against the ban of the niqab and the hijab frame the issue as one of choice. In 2004, in response to the French ban on Islamic veiling in public schools, a text produced in the Toronto Star featured interviews with high school students in Toronto: “‘It’s not right to believe someone is oppressed because she is wearing a head scarf,’ said Asha Alam, 18. ‘What about a nun wearing a habit? I wear the scarf by choice. No one is forcing me. If I chose to take it off, I could, though my parents would be disappointed. This is what it means to live in a democratic society—to live freely and openly’” (TS 16 NW). In a 2006 text about immigrant integration, Zafar Khawja, described as a “49-year-old former cloth merchant [who] came to Canada from Bangladesh in 1990,” is reported as recounting that while his wife and eldest daughter wear the hijab, his younger daughter does not. This is “proof, he says, that his family has adopted Canada’s respect for individual rights.” Khawja is quoted: “It is her choice” (TS 60 NR). Within discourse strands that support multicultural ideology, choice is a central element of successful multiculturalism. Regardless of the value of religion or its potential ill effects on the individual or society, choice must be protected. The protection of choice as central to multiculturalism can be traced directly back to Trudeau’s 1971 announcement of Canada’s multicultural policy, in which he stated, “If the freedom of choice is in danger for some ethnic groups, it is in danger for all” (“Canadian Culture” 8546). Discourse strands that argue against veiling bans characterize veiling as a choice that does not impose on other individuals, and they are consistent with discourse strands that characterize religion as largely benign: “How does allowing a Muslim to wear a hijab or a Sikh to wear a turban diminish the rights or beliefs of others? These expressions of faith do not require any compromise by others because they are simply individual life choices. Clearly, they are red herrings in the ‘reasonable accommodation’ hysteria” (TS 106 OP). Questioning veiling as a choice is equated with questioning the agency of religious women and is most often negatively portrayed. For example, covering a hearing of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, one author reports that “Christiane Pelchat, president of Quebec Council on the Status of Women, thought the hijab sends ‘a message of the submission of a woman.’ No room in this feminist’s universe for a hijabi’s right, or capacity, to make her own choices” (TS 113 OP).
However, within the texts examined there are a few very direct depictions of veiled women as oppressed. Rosie DiManno of the Toronto Star writes,

In a free country, one would like to believe that women—including Muslim women, in conservative communities—are making independent choices, based on their own needs and wishes and comfort zone. But let’s not be disingenuous here. There is ample evidence, overwhelming evidence, of religious and cultural pressures, those steeped in a firmly patriarchal code of conduct, for the marginalizing of adult females, practices that are fundamentally at odds with basic concepts of gender equality. . . . I do not trust the sophistry inherent in a pedantically twisted intellectualization of the veil, as if it were something other than what it demonstrably is: segregation of women by other means. . . . It is not patronizing to acknowledge that many Muslim women who wear the niqab—and they are themselves in a small minority—do so not out of personal choice but because they are bullied, tacitly or overtly, into doing so. They must hide their faces so that their men don’t lose face. And I care a great deal more about their predicament than I do their Islamist sisters who choose to veil under the rubric of feminism. (TS 66 NW)

A year later, in 2007, DiManno wrote,

Muslims obviously don’t have a monopoly on sanctimoniousness, although a great many wear their devoutness with moral superiority, just as their women are made—pressured, coerced and threatened—to wear head covering, at minimum the hijab and at worst the burqa. . . . In my experience, educated and worldly women who wear the hijab, by choice, are more commonly making a political statement—anti-West, anti-ecumenical, and anti-homogenization. . . . In Afghanistan, a girl once sobbed in my lap because she was taking the burqa the next day. Do not dare try to tell me she had a “choice.” . . . The hijab is not the burqa? When coerced, there’s no difference. . . . Where are the feminists? The civil libertarians? The secularists? Browbeaten into silence. (TS 115 NW)

DiManno presents a position that is nearly absent (except in rebuttals) from the newspaper texts that I curated for this thesis but that is widely evident outside of these texts. In the first text DiManno, divides veiled Muslim women into two categories: victim or Islamist. In the second text, DiManno, qualified by her experience, refines the second category of veiled Muslim women as essentially not religious but political. The ability to choose is ascribed only to the second group, and their motives are portrayed as decidedly anti-Canadian. In the second text, DiManno is not as explicit as to how veiling oppresses but equally adamant that it does. Equating the niqab with the burqa is not a sustainable argument if the premise is that the burqa is oppressive, because “they must hide their
faces.” Ultimately, DiManno’s assessment of veiling is as much about Muslim men as it is about Muslim women. The subtext is that Muslim men are bullies who subvert the rights of women to maintain patriarchy.

It is sometimes noted in the texts that niqabi Muslims are a small minority within the Muslim community, in one case very explicitly: “Now the flash point is the niqab, a full-face veil worn by approximately 25 Muslim women in Quebec” (GZ 111 OE). This text, written in 2010, does not provide a reference for the stated number of niqabi Muslims. In Islam in the Hinterlands, Jasmin Zine presents the same numbers:

According to the Muslim Council of Montreal, there are presumed to be about twenty-five women in all of Quebec who actually wear the niqab. Further, out of approximately 118,000 people who accessed Montreal’s health board services in 2008 and 2009, only ten asked for accommodation, and out of approximately 28,000 who accessed city services, not one asked for special treatment (Shakir 2010).” (qtd. in Zine, “Muslim Cultural” 11)

If the number of niqabi women in Quebec is even in the vicinity of 25 people, the sheer volume of press coverage, academic research, and political interest the niqab engendered in Canada seems staggeringly out of proportion. The reality is that the words “niqab” and “hijab” are very often used interchangeably and that debates about Islamic veiling practices are more often about perceptions of motives and assessments of difference than the realities of practice.

Within the newspaper texts that I examined, arguments that posit veiling bans as necessary to secularism or as providing gender equality are criticized not only as untrue but also as political misdirection:

But no one seems to be under any illusions that we’re having a debate about secularism, least of all the PQ minority government itself. There is a good reason it has rebranded its original Charter of Secularism as a Charter of Quebec Values. Case in point: In a recent interview with news anchor Celine Galipeau on Radio-Canada, cabinet minister Bernard Drainville was asked to explain why, under this proposed charter that would emphasize the equality of men and women in Quebec, his government would potentially force Muslim women who wear the hijab to choose between a job in the public service or expressing their faith, while allowing Muslim men who wear a beard full access to the public domain. Drainville became flustered and was unable to answer the question. (GZ 158 OE)
Throughout the texts examined, the PQ is portrayed as using religious accommodation for political ends (see chapter two). The ban on the wearing of religious dress by civil servants is framed in the proposed legislation (Bill 60), and by its supports, as necessary to secularism or about state neutrality. This proposition is most often criticized as xenophobic pandering to rural French Canadians. Within the proposed ban, the issue of Islamic veiling is additionally framed by proponents of the bill as about gender equality. In discourse strands that oppose the ban, gender equality claims come under serious scrutiny. In 2013, Charles Taylor was interviewed by the Toronto Star about the proposed Charter of Values (Bill 60):

[Taylor] said that a majority of Quebec feminists understand the absurdity of firing women in the name of gender equity. “It’s only the hard-line feminists that don’t. They get all wound up arguing that the hijab means submission. In fact, the women working in schools and daycare are more likely to be independent women. It would be terrible for them to lose their jobs. It’d be catastrophic, really, taking away their livelihood.” (TS 164 O)

In the same interview, Taylor defends the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s support of the “appearance of impartiality” (TS 164 O) in public servants and the recommendation that “with regard to the wearing by government employees of religious signs, judges, Crown prosecutors, police officers, prison guards and the president and vice-president of the National Assembly of Québec be prohibited from doing so” (“G2” 271). Taylor “said his commission ‘talked only of a limited number of people, those with coercive authority—people who could arrest you or put you in jail. That’s a totally different category than teachers or daycare workers. It’s ridiculous to try and fudge that and say that teachers and daycare workers are persons of moral authority’” (TS 164 O). According to Taylor’s argument, delimiting the boundaries of religion in the public domain requires not only determining which symbols are acceptable but also in which occupations. The irony in Taylor’s argument is that women who practice religious dress are excluded particularly from positions of authority. In the Gazette, Andrew Coyne argues that the proposed ban on religious dress reveals the hypocrisy inherent in the adjudication of religious practices when it claims equality as its premise:
It is the details that clarify. As long as the debate remained shrouded in generalities like “reasonable accommodation” or “secularism”—or, to use the Parti Québécois’s preferred euphemism, “Quebec’s values”—it was possible for people of goodwill to persuade themselves that nothing unusual was going on. . . . But now that we have the document, complete with that wonderful graphic showing exactly which religious symbols would be forbidden in the Quebec public sector, it is no longer possible to indulge in such self-delusion. Come down from the windy plane of “values” and it soon becomes clear that what we are really talking about is dismissing the woman who works in the local daycare because she wears the hijab. . . . We will only truly grasp the reality of what the PQ is proposing, should it ever pass into law, when it is put into effect: on the day, in offices and schools and hospitals across the province, when their managers call each of those observant Sikhs and Muslims and Jews and Christians to explain to them that, because they refuse to comply with the law ordering them to shed all outward symbols of their faith—or at any rate, the “overt and conspicuous” ones—they are no longer permitted to work there. . . . It is difficult to say for sure whether the PQ is sincerely unaware of just how revolting this plan is, or is, as the prevailing view holds, cynically exploiting the cultural insecurities of its pure laine, largely rural base. (GZ 160 OE)

Coyne’s critique of the proposed Charter of Values deconstructs the language of values, secularism, and accommodation, and it explicitly names the real-world effects of religious segregation in a way that other texts only imply. This text is unusual within the texts examined in that the economic and social effects of hard secularism are rarely addressed.

A text in the Gazette covering the public hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission reports the testimony Mohammed Akhil. Described as “another recent arrival,” Akhil is reported as “wonder[ing] why the hearings are being held at all when minority rights are already protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” and calling the veiling debates “nothing more than a red herring” (GZ 69). Akhil asserts, “It is good for women to cover the face, but it is not an obligation. There are fundamentalists in all religions. Some people follow their religions very strictly. But no one is imposing the burqa on society. It’s the government that made the burqa a problem, not the people with the burqas” (GZ 69). A text in the Toronto Star affirms the position that veiling is not a problem and places the debate in the realm of rights discourses: “The hijab case is just another variation on finding reasonable accommodation for a myriad of minority practices. Catholics, Hutterites, Jews, Sikhs, and others have posed similar challenges before. Muslims are now following the honourable Canadian tradition of
standing up for their rights, and Canadians will no doubt use common sense to find common ground” (TS 80 O).

4.4 Religious Dress—Conspicuous or Overt?

The use of “signes ostentatoires” (“ostentatious symbols”) to describe religious attire is not uncommon in accommodation debates, particularly in debates about Sikh turbans and Muslim hijabs. The use of “ostentatious” to describe religious dress can be traced to secularism debates in France and a 2004 law that banned “ostentatious religious symbols” from schools there. In Canada, describing certain religious symbols as “ostentations” became a standard practice when the PQ used the term in its proposed Quebec Charter of Values. The designation of kippas, turbans, niqabs, burqas, and crosses (though crosses particularly by size) as ostentatious came to be used relatively unproblematically and is reproduced in the texts examined—for example: “The PQ’s current push for a comprehensive ban of ostentatious religious symbols from Quebec’s public arena is a difficult balancing act” (TS 139 NW); “The banning of ostentatious religious signs in public institutions is the one hot potato that Marois chose to leave to Bouchard and Taylor” (GZ 73 OE); and “The PQ wants the government to adopt a law banning all ostentatious religious signs” (GZ 130 NW). Given that “ostentatious” is defined by Merriam-Webster as “displaying wealth, knowledge, etc., in a way that is meant to attract attention, admiration, or envy; marked by or fond of conspicuous or vainglorious and sometimes pretentious display,” this designation is problematic. The characterization of religious symbols of dress as ostentatious does more than accuse those wearing them of trespassing into the public domain by being overtly religious; it further ascribes negative or shallow motives. Where “ostentatious” is put in quotes, the ban is sometimes being questioned as inegalitarian: “Marois’ proposal copies French rules that forbid ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols, such as the yarmulke, the hijab and the turban, but not small crosses. This places ‘an unequal burden,’ as Nussbaum notes; the first three items are religiously obligatory for the observant while the cross is not” (TS 152 O); “One of the council’s recommendations is that public-sector employees in the province should not be allowed to display ‘ostentatious religious signs in their workplace,’ a measure Islamic groups say would discriminate against Muslim women working in
Quebec’s hospitals, schools and the civil service” (GZ 72 NW). However, most often “ostentatious” is used without criticism, irony, or even qualified definition.

The description of religious symbols as ostentatious also reveals something about the understanding of religion held by advocates of hard secularism. A text in the Gazette reporting an interview Pauline Marois gave to Le Devoir about her government’s Quebec Charter of Values makes this understanding explicit:

Marois said a daycare educator wearing a hijab, an Islamic head covering that does not cover the face, gives “a connotation of a gap with respect to the equality of men and women, a kind of submission.” The educator could also want to show children she is “a very good practising (Muslim)” and incite them to religious practice, Le Devoir quotes the premier explaining. “She is in authority, this woman, with children.” (GZ 156 NW)

In another text, printed a week later, the author notes that in Marois’s “warning that a kindergarten teacher’s hijab could itself incite religious practice in children” was a warning in that “she notably chose to communicate by reference to the hijab rather than the cross” (GZ 159 OE). This text points out the hypocrisy in assuming that minority religions, particularly Islam, are proselytizing in a way that Christianity is not. In reaction to the proposed Quebec Charter of Values (Bill 60), Sylvain Mallette, the president of the Fédération Autonome de l’Enseignement (FAE), is quoted: “The government is arguing that the simple fact of wearing a symbol is passive proselytization. . . . Is the government then also saying that a student wearing a symbol can also convert others passively?” (GZ 174 NW). The FAE is reported as coming to their position against banning religious symbols for teachers in a three-year consultation with its members and in asking, “Are we able to show one single case of a teacher who, because he or she was wearing a symbol or certain clothing, tried to convert a student? Is there any history of having to discipline a teacher for this? It doesn’t exist” (GZ 174 NW). Speaking to the fact that the proposed bill applies only to public and not private schools, Mallette is quoted: “Are public school students more impressionable than private school students?” (GZ 174 NW). In the same text, high school teacher Furheen Ahmed, who “who started wearing a hijab four years ago, said she feels under attack. . . . ‘We’re being told that when we wear a hijab or a kippa, we are less professional than our colleagues. Instead of being evaluated based on how I teach, a snap judgment is being made about me because of what I wear’” (GZ 174
McGill education professor Kevin McDonough is also quoted: “All kinds of people hold values that are reprehensible and they could well be working in public settings. They could be teachers. But what the charter does is target and heighten concern for one particular group—religious people who display it publicly. But there’s no reason to assume they are abusing their power” (GZ 174 NW). This discourse strand clearly calls into question the assumption presented by advocates of hard secularism that religious dress equates to proselytizing. The implied threat of religious dress in discourses that advocate hard secularism is that religion acts like a contagion, infecting those in its immediate vicinity by inducing them to take up religious practice. This discourse strand repudiates that assumption. Further, this discourse strand refutes assumptions that religious practitioners are inherently illiberal or irrational.

In the newspaper texts examined for this thesis, discourse strands that take up veiling are distinguishable in terms of understandings of multiculturalism, secularism, and religion. Discourse strands that advocate multiculturalism argue for the rights of minority religious practitioners, including the right to publicly display religious affiliation. In this discourse strand, veiling is presented as relatively unproblematic and largely framed as a matter of individual choice with no real consequences to Canadian society as a whole. Discourse strands that question multiculturalism and advocate hard secularism envision religious practice, particularly religious dress, as acting on the public. Antiveiling sentiment in this discourse strand paradoxically frames the veiled women as a victim of oppression and as an oppressor—infected and infecting. The veil represents the threat of all religion’s invasion into the public sphere. Problematically, both discourse strands assume the veiled Muslim woman to be an immigrant.

4.5 Assessing Accommodation

Accommodation discourse strands focus on which practices are acceptable to the majority and which are not. And so the debate is essentially about the limits of tolerance and the application of secularism. What is problematic about the frame of accommodation is that it assumes that majority cultural or religious norms are rightly the yardstick by which “other” minority practices must be measured. “We” debate how “they” might be accommodated. Discourse strands that advocate accommodation as necessary often do so
in terms of upholding rights and laws: “It’s when competing rights clash that we make accommodations. We do so not to mollycoddle a minority but to uphold the rule of law” (TS 113 OP). Accommodation is also assessed as necessary to equality. A text in the Gazette proposes that for equality to be achieved, negotiation and thus accommodation must be an ongoing process and cannot therefore be codified:

In free societies, minority rights are not subject of majority rule. Proponents argue as well, that without clear rules delimiting religious accommodation, we will have to keep perpetually navigating the grey areas of religious difference. Well, yes. There are complications inherent to diverse societies, but banning diversity is no solution. Indeed, the only societies with greater problems than those that embrace pluralism are those that do not. (GZ 154 OE)

A text in the Toronto Star proposes that accommodation request are in fact easily acknowledged: “Of course, there may be instances when respecting someone’s cultural or religious practices necessitates some accommodation, like requesting a prayer space or providing for special dietary needs. However, such requirements are both minimal and reasonable” (TS 106 OP). The author of a text printed in the Gazette suggests that accommodation is both temporary and integrative:

Accommodation has to be measured not against an ideal vision of secularism that everyone does not share, but against the policy of integration that we want to apply to everyone. . . . If we decide to accommodate, very few in the next generation will seek the same privilege, and a large number will have married outside their community. Accommodation is largely a temporary phenomenon. (GZ 113 OE)

While characterizing accommodation as a privilege reifies hierarchical constructions, accommodation is presented as securing the movement of religious minorities toward a liberal center. Accommodation, in this text, promotes assimilation.

A text in the Gazette proposes that accommodation is a debate that is not inherent to multicultural ideology, but rather to pluralism:

There is, of course, a legitimate issue underlying all this, though it is far from new; nor is it confined to Quebec, or the rights of religious minorities. It is as old as liberal democracy and we were grappling with long before anyone thought to call it “multiculturalism.” In which circumstances, that is, is a society entitled to impose its norms on a minority within it, and in which is it obliged to accept their differences? The answer we have been groping our way toward is this: The majority may and must prevail in those cases, and only in those cases, where
minority differences are the source of harm, either to the fundamental interests of the majority or the rights of individuals. (GZ 160 OE)

The author of this text takes accommodation debates out of the Canadian context and places them firmly within the context of all plural liberal societies. The debate, this author proposes, is inherently about the negotiation of the inclusion of minority practices within majority populations.

The authors of the newspaper texts that I examined largely present religious accommodation as a positive, if sometimes difficult, endeavor. Multiculturalism advocates propose that accommodation is necessary to ensure equality and integration. The particular accommodations addressed within these texts are most often presented by advocates of soft secularism as requiring minimal adjustments by the majority population or as legally mandated. Discourse strands that call for limits to accommodation or an end to accommodation are most often the product of politicians or reported in the hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. These are decidedly characterized as un-Canadian or not the majority opinion by the authors of nearly all of the texts. The language of accommodation is, however, problematic in the same ways as is the language of tolerance—it quietly maintains hierarchies while presenting the majority as benevolent and minorities as demanding. It is especially problematic where it is termed “reasonable accommodation,” which implies that the assessment of reasonable is in the purview of the accommodator. Majority standards are presumed reasonable and normative.

4.6 Representing Religion

Religious identity intertwines with other identity constructs, but where religion is visible in dress or assumed visible in race or ethnicity, it is very often the religious part of identity that becomes the standard bearer for the individual. Essentializing the identities of minority religious practitioners makes their inclusion in the construct of Canadian dependent upon the perceptions of the majority about the practitioner’s entire religious community. Recognition of individuals is obscured in primarily understanding them as belonging to groups. Visible religious practitioners are assumed knowable entirely through their religious practice. For Muslims in Canada, this is particularly problematic in view of the dominant discourses that present Islam as particularly prone to patriarchy,
fundamentalism, and intolerance. Within the newspaper texts examined for this thesis, two first-person accounts are given that explain the difficulties that are encountered when living within a society that stereotypes Muslims as inherently problematic citizens. Not coincidentally, they were both published in September, the first on September 11, 2003, and the second on the September 14, 2011.

In September 2003, Hanadi Loubani, who identifies herself in the text as a nonpracticing Muslim, explains how public perception of Muslims after September 11, 2001, changed the way in which she was treated by the majority population, her self-perceptions, and her understanding of other members of the Muslim community:

For me, Islam was not a factor in structuring my identity at an early age. My parents were both secularists. I wasn’t brought up according to Islamic tradition, but an Arabic one. Even after moving to Canada in 1990, Islam continued to play a marginal role in my life. . . . Islam for me was a cultural backdrop, a collection of linguistic expressions that I use in my everyday life. Sept. 11, 2001 all of a sudden changed that. People started to identify me as a Muslim. They would ask, You are from the Middle East, are you Muslim? For a while it was incredibly confusing. It was not a question that I could answer simply. It needed a lot of qualification that people did not have the patience for. People wanted a yes or no answer. Yes, I come from a Muslim family, yet my parents are not religious. Yes, Islam defines some part of my character but I am not a practising Muslim. It was as if I woke up one day to find that a specific type of a Muslim identity was imposed on me. Prior to 9/11, I never identified with women who wear the veil. . . . But all of the sudden, I take the public transportation in the week following the attacks, and the driver of the bus allows me in but closes the door in the face of a veiled woman waiting at the bus stop. This happened a number of times. At a certain point I started thinking it could have been my cousin or a member of my family, some of whom cover their hair with a scarf. Some of my students who wore a headscarf stopped coming to class for a while, fearing for their safety. It was then that I started identifying with them, not only as victims of discrimination, but also as women that are incredibly powerful; women who despite all of the targeting and blaming that was heaped on them, were not afraid to keep the hijab and their faith. . . . I hope Muslims will advance their true identity. One that is not hostile to the West but an integral part of it. The Muslim element in Canadian life cannot be erased or permanently marginalized. It is part and parcel of Canada’s distinctive cultural fabric. (TS 7 NW)

Eight years later, a text by written by CTV National News reporter Omar Sachedina reiterated these same themes:
Like many of you, watching Sunday’s 9/11 memorial coverage got me thinking about where I was on that horrific Tuesday in 2001. A student at McGill University at the time, I was on my way to the gym when a random stranger told me a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. Little did I know my world would change forever. Before then, I always considered being Muslim a part of my identity, but not the only part. I was a son of Ugandan immigrants, with ancestry in South Asia. I was a (sometimes annoying) brother, a journalist, a lover of good music and travel—who also happened to be Muslim. But after 9/11, my religion became an increasingly larger part of who I was—not because I wanted it to be, but because things evolved that way. Others started seeing my religion first, and the rest of me second. . . . What’s even worse is that some still believe Islam is a religion that condones war and blowing up buildings. It isn’t. It certainly wasn’t the Islam I grew up with. . . . We can’t let the radical few define the faiths they claim to be a part of. . . . We must begin to start quenching a world that is thirsty for tolerance and understanding. And as Canadians we play an important role. Yes, our country is the envy of nations around the world. Yes, people dream of coming here. And yes, we are a relatively open society. We are a model for religious and cultural pluralism. . . . It’s not just enough to accept and tolerate your Baha’i neighbour, or your Sikh co-worker. It’s about engaging, asking questions, taking interest in someone else’s belief system, even if it’s not your own. As Canadians we do that to a certain extent, but we can do even more to lead the way. (TS 148 OP)

These two first-person accounts are explicit about the difficulties that religious minorities (or perceived religious minorities) face as the result of religious stereotype. It is important to note that both of the authors challenge the discourse that minority religious practitioners are not fully Canadian. These authors deliberately include themselves in the construct of Canadian through their assertions of belonging and shared values. It is also not a coincidence that both are Muslims. Given the prevailing discourses of exclusion, being a Muslim-Canadian requires an assertion of the Canadian component of that construct. Within the texts examined, the centrality of religion to a person’s identity is assigned to very specific types of religious believers, namely those who are visibly non-Christian in their practice and dress.
Conclusions

Constructing Canadian Identity—Multiculturalism Makes “Us”

Overall, in the newspaper texts that I examined in this thesis, the authors of the texts advocated multiculturalism and political or soft secularism. Multiculturalism critic Randal Hansen’s argument that multiculturalism is popularly endorsed as an identity construct because it is self-affirming is, however, not too far off the mark. Within the discourses that I examined, the authors of the texts construct a national identity of “we Canadians” that is decidedly positive. “We” are a liberal, democratic, egalitarian, secular, and accommodating nation in no small part thanks to “our” multicultural ideology.

Multiculturalism, according to Will Kymlicka, is a citizenization project that is “a deeply (and intentionally) transformative project, both for minorities and majorities. It requires both dominant and historically subordinated groups to engage in new practices, to enter new relationships, and to embrace new concepts and discourses—all of which profoundly transform people’s identities” (*Multiculturalism* 10). But the majority population in the newspaper texts that I examined is portrayed as not very interested in its own transformation—“we” are good. Critics of multiculturalism in the texts that I examined suggest that “we” are perhaps too good—too tolerant and too accommodating. In this discourse strand, multiculturalism risks all that is best about “us” through “our” failure to set appropriate limits for minority populations. Within the texts examined, the ideology of multiculturalism was used in descriptive and prescriptive ways. That is, multicultural is not just what Canadians are; it also instructs Canadians about who they should be.

Multiculturalism provides an interpretive frame that gives meaning and definition not only to events but also to Canadian identity. What is problematic in the constructions of Canadian presented in the texts that I examined for this thesis is that, sometimes overtly but most often inadvertently, Canadian identity is constructed at the expense of the immigrant minority religious practitioner.
Immigration

When I was determining my search terms for this thesis, I quickly realized that I did not have to include the term “Canadian”—multiculturalism is about Canadians. What I did not initially realize was that had I included the terms “immigrant” or “immigration” in my search, I would have curated more than half of the same texts. Multiculturalism, religion, and accommodation are a discourse that is primarily concerned with the integration of immigrants. The designation of “immigrant” is particularly problematic in that it fixes identity outside of the Canadian construction of “us.” “Immigrant” is not a transitional designation in the texts examined. “They” are not in the process of becoming “us.” Immigrants are often constructed as having a less legitimate claim in establishing Canadian mores or values; theirs is not the inherent right that comes with Canadian birth. Positive assessments of immigration do not necessarily translate into positive assessments of immigrants. More often, texts that frame immigration as a positive do so in making attitudes about immigration a positive aspect of Canadian identity—“we” value diversity. Positive assessments of immigration are often framed as about “our” ability to tolerate minorities and “their” practices. Canada’s immigration program is characterized as ambitious. It is something “we” do. Where immigrants integrate successfully, it is “our” success.

The immigrants of concern in the discourses examined are crucially identified as ethnic and religious minorities. In reading the newspaper texts curated for this thesis, one might reasonably assume that there are no immigrants who are European, white, or Christian coming to Canada. Immigrants are depicted as a decidedly “ethnic” group. Groups at the heart of the accommodation debates are very often referred to en masse as ethnic or religious minorities. I propose that the terms are very nearly interchangeable. Religious minorities are assumed to be ethnic and ethnic minorities are very often assumed to be religious—both are assumed to be immigrants. Further, immigrants are generally portrayed as coming from countries that are less liberal or progressive than
Canada, and it is sometimes presumed that they are unduly attached to their unenlightened ways.

Reports of anti-immigration sentiments among Canadians very often take an apologist stance. Within the texts, it is acknowledged that a very small number of Canadians might be anti-immigration or perhaps even xenophobic, but the problem is assessed primarily as a lack of contact between majority and minority populations. Outside of politicians who are depicted as inflaming anti-immigration sentiment for their own benefit, persons expressing anti-immigration opinions are treated a lot like a drunk uncle at a wedding—there he goes again, loud, annoying, but ultimately harmless. Yet in text after text, opinion polls repeatedly point to a significant portion of the population holding negative opinions of ethnic or religious minority immigrants in some combination. Speakers at the Bouchard-Taylor Commission hearings are reported as expressing a litany of complaints about “them.” Even so, in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s report, these opinions are justified: “We must always be wary of imputing to racism certain attitudes or remarks that in actual fact stem from collective insecurity or, more precisely, from the exploitation of this insecurity” (Bouchard & Taylor 239). In a text printed in the Toronto Star in 2009, Haroon Siddiqui refers to a poll done for the Trudeau Foundation in Montreal. Siddiqui writes,

As for the much-maligned Muslims (an estimated 750,000), they are a satisfied lot. . . . They register higher levels of pride in Canada than the population at large. . . . They did cite discrimination as a problem, but “the thing Muslims least like about Canada is the cold weather”—just like all other immigrant groups. If that’s their biggest complaint, they and the nation must be doing just fine. Vive le Canada. (TS 141)

Given the discourses presented in the texts that I examined for this thesis, “cold weather” is not very likely to be the “biggest complaint” of Canadian Muslims. It is kind of Bouchard, Taylor, and the authors of the newspaper texts to assume that those expressing racist sentiments are not really racists or that those on the receiving end of such sentiments are not especially concerned. But it is not at all helpful in addressing racism. A willingness to dismiss xenophobic discourses as isolated, while often reporting their prevalence, allows for their continued reproduction and gives them authenticity. I propose
that the texts that I examined for this thesis make it evident that “we” are not “doing just fine.”

**Constructing “Canadian” through Values**

In the newspaper texts that I examined, full membership in the Canadian “us” is contingent upon the performance of majority values—particularly the values of tolerance and secularism. Tolerance is presented as the purview of the established Canadian—and presumed to be secular—majority. Where the majority fails to be tolerant, it is decisively condemned because tolerating religious minorities is required if “our” multicultural project is to work. But therein lies the dilemma: religion and its practitioners are perceived (and portrayed) as having an inherent tendency toward intolerance and are thus potentially intolerable. Tolerance requires constant assessment and reassessment by the majority of the values and practices of minorities. Tolerance—even mutual tolerance—demands at best that the persons or things being tolerated are deemed insufficiently important to protest and that the threat that they present is minimal. Further, there is an assumption that tolerance is a temporary condition. The tolerated are expected to assimilate and to adopt the values of the tolerating Canadian majority.

Tolerance is a discourse that establishes and maintains hierarchies. Tolerance does not require the majority population to assess or reassess its practices or beliefs. I propose that tolerance is in fact antithetical to the goals of multicultural ideology in that it is inherently a hierarchical construct. Discourses of tolerance point directly to immigrant minority religious practitioners and name “them” as not “us”—they reify hierarchies. The celebration of tolerance as a central feature of Canadian identity needs to be reasserted. A move away from tolerance toward respect requires a significant realignment of thought. First and foremost, it requires the majority “we” to consider that “our” values and practices might not be superior to “theirs.”

The value of secularism is presented in the texts examined as not only a Canadian value but also as a crucial element of multiculturalism. The proper application of secularism is required for multiculturalism to succeed. Secularism is advocated in two distinct discourse stands. The first discourse strand advocates hard secularism, relegating
religion (more specifically minority religion) to the private domain. This discourse strand is most often articulated by politicians, critics of multiculturalism, and advocates of interculturalism. Hard-secularism discourses further present public expression of religion as a threat to Canadian identity; they assume that religion “is a thing that has an essence or that produces certain particular and predictable effects” (Casanova 1052). The objectionable “essence” of religion is found in discourse strands that posit religion as inherently intolerant, prone to fundamentalism, and actively proselytizing. The second discourse strand advocates a soft secularism that allows for the public expression of religion and is closely tied to positive assessments of difference as a Canadian multicultural value. This discourse strand assumes that religion is not a significant marker of difference.

What is problematic with these discourse strands is that most often the soft-secularism discourse strands are produced in reaction to hard-secularism discourse strands, and so hard-secularism advocates set the terms of the debate. The debate becomes framed by questions of permissibility—the majority population debates what is acceptable practice for minorities. Advocates of soft secularism must argue that religion does not pose a public threat, does not impose its belief on others, or is nothing more than a personal choice. These rebuttals are particularly problematic where they produce discourses about Islam. For example, soft-secularism advocates in the texts examined often construct narratives of the “tolerant” or “assimilating” Muslim and in so doing reify the stereotype that Islam is intolerant and unassimilable.

Further, there is a general failure in the texts that I examined to acknowledge the influence of Christianity on Canadian norms, particularly with regard to how it has shaped understanding of secularism. Secularism is presented as a neutral and apolitical position. I propose that presentations of secularism as apolitical or normative have contributed significantly to constructions of religious practitioners as transgressive and problematic. Secularism not only marginalizes minority religious practitioners but also reifies hierarchical structures that benefit the majority population. A religiously neutral state is necessary in the achievement of the ideological goals of multiculturalism. However, where secularism is advocated as an ideology, it is always exclusionary. The state cannot dictate the religious practices of some its citizens and uphold their equality.
The freedom to practice religion in a multicultural state must include the freedom to engage in religious practices that the majority finds unusual or even offensive.

Discourses about secularism primarily address secularism in Quebec and are largely produced in the Gazette. This is in part due to the articulation of secularism as a Quebec value by Quebec politicians and in part due to the historical power of the Roman Catholic Church within Quebec. Outside of Quebec, secularism is portrayed as unproblematic.

The “Muslim Other”

While minority religions are very often presented in lists in the texts examined and include Sikhs, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims, most often the problematized religious practitioner is Muslim. In fact, while Hindus and Buddhists are mentioned in the list of “increasing visible minorities” or “the changing religious make-up of Canadians,” nowhere in the texts examined are the religious beliefs or practices of Canadian Hindus or Buddhists called into question. Islam is portrayed as particularly susceptible, among religions, to fundamentalism. Islamic law is portrayed as mutually incompatible with liberalism and democracy. In the texts examined, the most prominent discourses about Islam take up the practices of Islamic veiling. Within discourse strands that advocate for hard secularism, veiled Muslims are used as symbols to represent religion as oppressive, unenlightened, isolationist, and patriarchal. Veiled Muslim women are represented as the ultimate religious other. They are oppressed yet proselytizing. They are isolationists while they transgress the public limits of secularism. Their veils are religious, political, and/or cultural. They are ethnic. They are immigrants. They are not “we.” Veiled Muslims are the subjects of stereotypes about gender, immigrants, religious practitioners, race, and politics.

In the texts examined, the cost of membership of a Canadian “we” is higher for Muslims than for other religious minorities, if it is attainable at all. Dominant discourses that occur largely outside of the texts examined for this thesis taint Islam as violent and prone to extremism or terrorism. Canadian membership requires all Muslims to denounce the radicals within their midst. Within the newspaper texts that I examined, Muslim practitioners attempt to assert their Canadian identity not only in directly denouncing
terrorism but also in claiming Canadian values such as tolerance. Even in discourse strands that advocate multiculturalism and soft secularism, negative assessments of Islam are insufficiently addressed. Authors who do not identify themselves as Muslims routinely dismiss accounts of public anti-Muslim sentiment, characterizing Canadians as tolerant and Muslims as assimilating. While negative characterizations of Islam are obviously problematic for Muslims, I propose they are also problematic for all religious minorities, as Islam routinely is used to represent the potential problems within all religion.

The Media

Across the 11 years of newspaper texts examined for this thesis, in the *Toronto Star* there is a steady increase in coverage, with a discernable peak in texts produced in 2006-2007, followed by a rapid decline until 2013. In the *Gazette*, there is a hard peak in 2007 and again in 2013, with erratic coverage in between. These peaks conform with the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, which notes a high point in media coverage of religious accommodation between March 2006 and June 2007 and a significant drop in coverage after June of 2007 (Bouchard & Taylor 53-60), a trend that the commission proposes was in part due to “media enthusiasm” about accommodation issues (Bouchard & Taylor 18). It important to note that the newspaper texts that I examined in this thesis are a small portion of texts produced in either paper about religion, accommodation, or particularly religious accommodation. The texts curated for this thesis are constrained by the inclusion of “multicultural” or “multiculturalism” in the search terms. Future research might note what events or topics lead to an increase in multiculturalism discourses in the media. While the texts that I examined are about religious accommodation, I cannot say whether there was also an increase generally in multiculturalism discourses during the peaks in coverage noted in this thesis.

While I examined the texts curated for this thesis as though they were a single discourse, there are some differences worth noting about texts produced by each news outlet. First, it is of little surprise that the events taken up in the texts are often situated in the province of their production. That is, texts in the *Gazette* are more often about events occurring in Quebec, and those in the *Toronto Star* about events in Ontario. Authors at
the *Toronto Star* were also more inclined to place Canadian multiculturalism and religious accommodation in an international context. That being said, both newspapers regularly address events in the other province and note similarities in events and topics of discourse. Very rarely does either newspaper take up topics or events occurring within Canada but in provinces outside of Ontario or Quebec. For example, the 2009 Supreme Court decision in *Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony* is entirely absent from coverage in either newspaper.\(^84\)

It is important to note that in examining texts produced by the *Gazette* I am not making any claims that these represent newspaper texts produced in French-language newspapers in Quebec. Currently, the *Gazette*\(^85\) claims to be “the dominant medium for reaching Montreal’s large English market” (“Fast Facts”). Considering that the *Gazette* is targeted to an Anglophone minority within Quebec, it is perhaps not surprising that in the texts that I examined for this thesis there is a notable lean toward Canadian federalism and a popular endorsement of multiculturalism. I cannot say that these same tendencies would be represented in French-language newspapers, though I suspect that they would not. Future research comparing the *Gazette* and French-language newspapers in Quebec would likely reveal differences in themes and topics and potential provide a better reflection of majority discourses within Quebec.

What I found particularly noteworthy about the newspaper texts examined for this thesis is the ubiquitous reliance on “elite” sources as defined by van Dijk. Where I have noted professional or institutional accreditations in my analysis, they were provided in the texts themselves. Particularly in the *Gazette*, texts were very often centered on the comments of politicians. This is partially due to coverage of the 2007 provincial election, the often inflammatory remarks of PQ and ADQ members of Parliament, and the tabling

\(^84\) In *Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony*, the Wilson Colony of Hutterites in Alberta challenged the constitutionality of provincial regulations that mandated photos be taken in the issuance of driver’s licenses, alleging an unjustifiable breach of their religious freedom. The majority decision (4 to 3) ruled that the requirement was not a violation of freedom of religion under section 1 of the Canadian *Charter*. The case is sometimes cited as a turning point in the relationship between religious communities and the state. Beaman notes, “The *Hutterian Brethren* decision shrinks the domain of reasonable accommodation, sidestepping that discussion to go down another equally problematic road, that of the ‘special’ request. The discussion thus becomes cast around the idea of an exemption to general laws that apply to everyone and the identification of those who would dare to think they are worthy of exception” (“Alternatives” 210-11).

\(^85\) The only other English-language daily produced in Quebec is *The Record*, which is published out of the city of Sherbrooke.
of bills 94 and 60. However, as noted throughout my analysis, there is also a strong tendency in both newspapers to quote academics. Across the newspaper texts examined, more than 50 individual professors, academics, or university staff are cited. These academics, and not members of the communities themselves, very often offer expertise on the religious practices of minority groups. Additionally, a few authors produce a large portion of the texts examined. In the Gazette, Jeff Heinrich is the author of 20 of the texts curated for this thesis (Don McPherson 6, Marian Scott 6, and Kevin Dougherty 5). In the Toronto Star, Haroon Siddiqui is the author of 13 texts (Sean Gordon 6 and Rosie DiManno 5). These numbers do not always adequately reflect the presence of some voices in the discourses examined. For example, Jack Jedwab is the author of 2 texts in the Gazette but is quoted in 7 others. Jedwab is also credited with helping to design and analyze the survey used in the “Identities” series authored by Heinrich.

Elite voices dominate the discourses presented in the texts examined. In my analysis of the newspaper texts curated for this thesis, I very often felt that I was witnessing a conversation being held among journalists, politicians, and academics. What is largely missing from these texts is the voice of actual minority religious practitioners, who are only occasionally given voice through associations such as the Muslim Council of Montreal and the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. While I cannot claim to know the individual biases of the authors of the newspaper texts examined, I can say that secularism (in its various forms) is presumed and promoted across the texts examined. Further, there is prevalent assumption among the authors who support multiculturalism that religion does not actually do much in the public domain and that, like cultural practices such as food or dance, it has little political effect. This could be a reflection of the “secularity” of the press, but I propose that it is more likely a reflection of the dominant discourse of increasing secularization or the product of liberal expectancy.

**Future Research**

In addition to considering French-language media sources in Quebec, future research would benefit from an examination of discourses that are produced in “ethnic

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86 Jeff Heinrich won a 2008 Canadian Association of Journalists award in the category of Faith and Spirituality for his coverage of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission.
Discourses produced by and for minority populations would likely reveal discourses not present in the texts that I examined for this thesis. Future research would also benefit from an examination of new media discourses, including those produced on social media sites. Given that Canada also has a public broadcaster, future research might consider whether coverage of religious accommodation differs in public and private outlets. In my research, I concentrated on textual analysis and the revelation of dominant discourse strands across the eleven-year period. In conducting research for this thesis, I was surprised by the estimated number of Muslim women who wear the niqab in Quebec. In following religious accommodation debates over many years, I had been left with the impression that this number would be significantly higher. I posit that this assumption was formed partially in the visual representation of Muslims in the press. Future research would benefit from considering the visual elements of the discourses examined.

Recommendations

I chose to look at newspaper texts for this thesis based on the premise that the discourses presented within the texts both reflect and inform discourses within Canadian society at large. I propose that the texts that I examined for this thesis do more than examine the topic of religious accommodation within the multicultural context of Canada—they contribute to the construction of Canadian identity. The texts that I examined very often portrayed a Canadian identity whose membership is largely limited to the majority population and to those who seamlessly conform to its norms. I propose that this is not the intent of many of the authors but rather a product of allowing the terms of the discourse to be determined by those who would suggest that multiculturalism is failing the majority in its inability to integrate minority religious practitioners. The debate is thus framed by a series of questions that inherently limit membership of the Canadian construct of “we” by setting up a dichotomy between the majority and minority ethnic religious populations. Are “we” letting in too many immigrants? Are “we” too tolerant? Are “they” too different? Simply reconstructing the questions would go a long way toward the inclusion of immigrant religious minorities. Further, the language used to describe the reconciliation of religious difference within multiculturalism is inherently
hierarchical. The language of tolerance and accommodation reifies binaries, and hierarchies and should be abandoned. Finally, the premise that secularism is neutral or apolitical insufficiently accounts for traditions and beliefs that developed outside of predominantly Christian cultures, and so it bears greater scrutiny.

I propose that constructing Canadian identity using immigrant ethnic religious minorities as the “other” by which membership in the construct of “us” is determined is problematic not just for minorities but for the nation as a whole. If the egalitarian goals of Canadian multicultural ideology are to be met—if “no citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly” (“Canadian Multiculturalism”)—then hard evaluations about how belonging is delimited must be made. Canada’s multiculturalism project cannot succeed if Canadian identity is imagined as static. What is required first and foremost is a willingness on the part of the majority population to be transformed. I have written this thesis with the understanding that language is social practice. We are, all of us, discursive constructions. We shape and are shaped in the recognition of each other. What we say matters. I propose that the egalitarian goals of multiculturalism’s ideology cannot be achieved in discourses of tolerance and accommodation. It may appear a simple beginning, but it is foundational. Discourses of tolerance need to be replaced with discourses of equality and respect. Discourses of accommodation must be replaced with discourses of mutual collaboration. Immigrants must be represented and understood as fully Canadian citizens. The religious, cultural, or ethnic practices of Canadians cannot be used to justify their exclusion from the public domain. To engender change, we must first notice that change is needed. I propose that change is needed in discourses of multiculturalism and perhaps that change begins here. Finally, I propose that the answer to the question, “What is a Canadian?” must be: “Someone who keeps asking.”
Works Cited


*Bill 60: Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests.* Government of Quebec. 1st session, 40th legislature. Québec Official Publisher. 2013. Web.


# Appendix A

## Coding Glossary

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<th>The Gazette</th>
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<td>World and Comment</td>
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Appendix B

The Gazette

GZ 1 OE NA
"Supreme Court decision affirms values of diversity, respect"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 3, 2003

GZ 2 OE
"The West has failed to promote its values"
Author: Brandwein, Irvin
Publication Date: January 16, 2003

GZ 3 NW
"There's been so much progress"
Author: Boone, Mike
Publication Date: May 8, 2003

GZ 4 NW
"Anti-Semitism 'escalating'"
Author: Todd, Phillip
Publication Date: June 2, 2003

GZ 5 RW
"Cool Canada"
Author: Bauch, Hubert
Publication Date: October 4, 2003

GZ 6 RG
"'Clash of civilizations' defied"
Author: Shepherd, Harvey
Publication Date: October 11, 2003

GZ 7 OE
"One law for all"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: December 1, 2003

GZ 8 NW
"Biggest contest is outside ring: Series: Faces of discrimination"
Author: Stubbs, Dave
Publication Date: February 18, 2004

GZ 10 NW
"Quell the fire of hate"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: April 9, 2004

GZ 11 NW
"'New Eden' not immune to anti-Semitism"
Author: Atherton, Tony
Publication Date: April 10, 2004

GZ 13 NW
"Quebecers least accepting of minorities, poll shows"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: July 17, 2004

GZ 15 OE
"Daniel Pipes twists 9/11 report"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: July 31, 2004

GZ 16 OE
"Rebuilding the firewall between church and state:"
Author: Bramham, Daphne
Publication Date: October 19, 2004

GZ 17 OE
"Questions that need answering in hijab affair"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: November 18, 2004

GZ 19 OE
"What's the point of public schools?"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 15, 2005

GZ 20 OE
"Let us pray at McGill"
Author: Saloojee, Riad
Publication Date: March 21, 2005
GZ 21 IN
"Sharia law has no place in Canada"
Author: Yassini, Ayman
Publication Date: May 8, 2005

GZ 22 OE
"Wise decision on right to wear hijabs"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: June 16, 2005

GZ 25 OE
"The right to offend"
Author: Rose, Flemming
Publication Date: February 25, 2006

GZ 26 NW
"Kirpans OK in schools"
Author: Thompson, Elizabeth
Publication Date: February 25, 2006

GZ 27 OE
"Kirpan ruling is tough sell in Quebec"
Author: MacPherson, Don
Publication Date: March 4, 2006

GZ 28 NW
"Iran, U.S. urged to back off"
Author: Curran, Peggy
Publication Date: March 4, 2006

GZ 29 OE
"Second-generation Muslims integrate more easily than others:"
Author: Tam, Pauline
Publication Date: July 3, 2006

GZ 31 LF
"Out of the ashes, the rise of religion:"
Author: Shepherd, Harvey
Publication Date: September 9, 2006

GZ 32 OE
"Committee's task is difficult but crucial"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 12, 2006

GZ 35 OE
"A cop is a cop, regardless of gender"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 12, 2006

GZ 36 OE
"Exploiting ethnic tensions"
Author: MacPherson, Don
Publication Date: November 21, 2006

GZ 37 NW
"Re-evaluating minority rights in Quebec"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: November 25, 2006

GZ 38 OE
"No two-way street in Ontario"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: December 20, 2006

GZ 41 NW
"Multiculturalism eroded by controversies, poll say"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: January 6, 2007

GZ 42 OE
"Mario Dumont deserves no one's support"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 19, 2007

GZ 43 OE
"What counts in polling are the questions and how they are interpreted"
Author: Jedwab, Jack
Publication Date: January 20, 2007

GZ 44 OE
"Town tests the limits of accommodation"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 30, 2007

GZ 45 NW
"Let's look beyond the parkas and burqas"
Author: Freed, Josh
Publication Date: February 3, 2007
GZ 46 NW  
"Huntingdon pledges to welcome newcomers"  
Author: Carroll, Ann  
Publication Date: February 7, 2007

GZ 47 OE  
"Respectful dialogue the right approach"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: February 9, 2007

GZ 48 NW  
"Minorities lag, expert says"  
Author: Block, Irwin  
Publication Date: February 13, 2007

GZ 49 NW  
"Muslims decry soccer referee's call on hijab"  
Author: Heinrich, Jeff  
Publication Date: February 27, 2007

GZ 50 OE  
"A cultural balance"  
Author: Hassan, Farzana  
Publication Date: March 6, 2007

GZ 51 NW  
"Philosopher Taylor wins largest prize for bridging modern life, spirituality"  
Author: Curran, Peggy  
Publication Date: March 15, 2007

GZ 52 OE  
"Taylor's vision is stirring"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: March 19, 2007

GZ 54 BK  
"Diversity and rights; Tough questions, nuanced answers"  
Author: Majeed, Omar  
Publication Date: June 30, 2007

GZ 55 OE  
"Aga Khan a role model"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: July 13, 2007

GZ 56 NW  
"Flashpoints: How we got here from there"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: August 15, 2007

GZ 57 OE  
"Accommodation tour promises to be lively"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: August 16, 2007

GZ 58 OE  
"Article bordered on hatred"  
Author: Sud, Rajinder  
Publication Date: August 27, 2007

GZ 59 SE  
"Generation accommodation Series: Identities"  
Author: Heinrich, Jeff  
Publication Date: September 8, 2007

GZ 60 NW  
"Catholic majority largely isolated: Identities"  
Author: Heinrich, Jeff  
Publication Date: September 9, 2007

GZ 61 NW  
"Immigrants welcome - as long as they conform: Identities"  
Author: Heinrich, Jeff  
Publication Date: September 10, 2007

GZ 62 NW  
"Mainstream blind to integration efforts Series: Identities"  
Author: Heinrich, Jeff  
Publication Date: September 11, 2007
GZ 63 NW
"Chairman apologizes for 'clumsy comments'"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: September 11, 2007

GZ 65 NW
"Melting pot wins out as model for Quebec: Identities"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: September 12, 2007

GZ 66 NW
"The mosaic Series: Identities"
Author: Harrold, Max
Publication Date: September 12, 2007

GZ 67 NW
"McGill symposium is warned against 'inherent condescension'"
Author: Ravensbergen, Jan
Publication Date: September 14, 2007

GZ 68 OE
"Ontario election campaign is anything but dull"
Author: Webster, Norman
Publication Date: September 16, 2007

GZ 69 NW
"What's all the fuss? immigrants ask"
Author: Hustak, Alan
Publication Date: September 23, 2007

GZ 70 NW
"Greek schools quietly lose funding"
Author: Johnston, David
Publication Date: September 29, 2007

GZ 71 OE
"Ontario shares our pain"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 3, 2007

GZ 72 NW
"Reflection of 'fundamental values'; Change very important"
Author: Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: October 11, 2007

GZ 73 OE
"PQ's constitutional proposal just confuses the debate"
Author: Legault, Josee
Publication Date: October 19, 2007

GZ 74 NW
"Bouchard, Taylor take a stand"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: October 26, 2007

GZ 75 OE
"Politically correct liberals sparked the accommodation debate"
Author: Lakritz, Naomi
Publication Date: November 1, 2007

GZ 76 OE
"Teaching bigotry"
Author: Harrison, Maryann
Publication Date: November 18, 2007

GZ 77 NW
"Sikhs want rules bent, hearing told"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: November 29, 2007

GZ 78 OE
"I don't want to be 'accommodated'"
Author: Lotayef, Ehab
Publication Date: November 29, 2007

GZ 79 NW
"Anglos speak in many voices"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: November 30, 2007
"Anglos don't seem to understand accommodation crisis"
Author: MacPherson, Don
Publication Date: December 1, 2007

"Education minister promises accommodation guides"
Author: Branswell, Brenda; Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: December 7, 2007

"Duceppe warns of 'too permissive' changes"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: December 12, 2007

"Church gave Quebec a lot, cardinal says"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: December 13, 2007

"One size will not fit all"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: December 14, 2007

"Marois outlines 'audacious' vision"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: December 14, 2007

"Sharia-law fight mirrors our debate on accommodation"
Author: Sevak Manjikian
Publication Date: February 18, 2008

"Commission and side show"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: March 29, 2008

"Time for Quebecers to be more open"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: May 17, 2008

"Common fallacies are shot down"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: May 17, 2008

"Common sense about reasonable accommodation"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: May 17, 2008

"Time to change our lingo"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff
Publication Date: May 19, 2008

"Charest to outline action plan after authors get chance to explain report"
Author: Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: May 22, 2008

"Bloc pushes stronger Bill 101"
Author: Thompson, Elizabeth
Publication Date: May 23, 2008

"'Accommodating' reaction from nationalists"
Author: Bauch, Hubert
Publication Date: May 23, 2008

"Bouchard-Taylor report is a mix of apple pie and analysis"
Author: Legault, Josee
Publication Date: May 23, 2008
GZ 98 OE
"Sovereignists keep trying to kill report, even though it's dead"
Author: MacPherson, Don
Publication Date: June 12, 2008

GZ 99 NW
"Taylor joins an elite group"
Author: Heinrich, Jeff; Wisenthal, Lucas; Maughan, Christopher
Publication Date: June 21, 2008

GZ 100 OE
"Seven years after Sept. 11 danger endures"
Author: Hassan, Farzana
Publication Date: September 11, 2008

GZ 101 OE
"Parents should have the right to choose religion curriculum"
Author: Murphy, Martin P
Publication Date: October 3, 2008

GZ 103 OE
"Hijab ban is right"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: November 6, 2008

GZ 104 OE
"Fair accommodation for Gabriel"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: May 3, 2009

GZ 105 OE
"Rights not violated"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: May 6, 2009

GZ 106 OE
"Loyola has had a World Religions course for 25 years"
Author: Donovan, Paul
Publication Date: May 21, 2009

GZ 107 NW
"Religious knowledge is fading; Sodom, Gomorrah?"
Author: Hamilton, Graeme
Publication Date: October 4, 2009

GZ 108 NW
"Quebec identity assailed"
Author: Block, Irwin
Publication Date: February 20, 2010

GZ 109 NW
"Accommodation needs to be two-way street"
Author: Solyom, Catherine
Publication Date: March 4, 2010

GZ 110 NW
"Tories offer limited support in niqab row"
Author: de Souza, Mike
Publication Date: March 6, 2010

GZ 111 OE
"Unreasoning anxiety elevated to law"
Author: Mariano, Christopher
Publication Date: March 26, 2010

GZ 112 SE
"Dateline: Sanaa, Yemen"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: April 3, 2010

GZ 113 OE
"The accommodation debate; It's an argument that just won't die"
Author: Grey, Julius H
Publication Date: April 8, 2010

GZ 114 NW
"Hérouxville goes national"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: April 13, 2010
GZ 115 WI
"Niqabs more than welcome at Parkdale"
Author: Seidman, Karen
Publication Date: May 6, 2010

GZ 116 NW
"Multiculturalism policy is 'idiocy', Bill 94 hearing told"
Author: Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: May 21, 2010

GZ 119 NW
"Loyola free to drop ethics course"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: June 19, 2010

GZ 120 NW
"Court backs Loyola over ethics course"
Author: Mennie, James
Publication Date: June 19, 2010

GZ 121 NW
"Ethics class ruling might affect other schools"
Author: Montgomery, Sue
Publication Date: June 20, 2010

GZ 122 OE
"Being 'neutral' on religion involves making a choice"
Author: Zucchi, John
Publication Date: June 23, 2010

GZ 123 OE
"Liberals deserve to win"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: September 9, 2010

GZ 125 NW
"National Assembly turns away Sikhs"
Author: Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: January 19, 2011

GZ 126 NW
"Calls to ban kirpan 'un-Canadian'"
Author: de Souza, Mike
Publication Date: January 20, 2011

GZ 127 OE
"Kirpans and multiculturalism"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 20, 2011

GZ 128 OE
"A shameful violation of religious freedom"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 21, 2011

GZ 129 OE
"The National Assembly should not be a rights-free zone; The kirpan debate"
Author: Eliadis, Pearl
Publication Date: January 26, 2011

GZ 130 NW
"National Assembly supports ban of Sikhs wearing kirpans"
Author: Dougherty, Kevin
Publication Date: February 10, 2011

GZ 131 OE
"MNAs are right"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: February 11, 2011

GZ 132 OE
"Has intolerance become a Quebec value?"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: February 11, 2011

GA 133 OE
"Integration has always been this province's preferred option"
Author: Courtois, Charles-Philippe
Publication Date: March 1, 2011
GZ 134 NW
"Accommodation issue 'not settled'"
Author: Authier, Philip
Publication Date: March 3, 2011

GZ 135 OE
"Religion should unite us, not divide"
Author: Jamal, Zara
Publication Date: March 26, 2011

GZ 136 OE
"Mixed unions lead to more tolerance and respect for cultural differences"
Author: Josiane Le Gall; Meintel, Deirdre
Publication Date: April 19, 2011

GZ 138 NW
"Defining interculturalism"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: May 25, 2011

GZ 139 OE
"God protect us from radical secularists"
Author: Fogarty, Stephen J
Publication Date: June 8, 2011

GZ 140 BK
"Reconciling faith and freedom"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: June 18, 2011

GZ 142 SE
"Young Muslims reflect"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: September 10, 2011

GZ 145 NW
"Canada gets Office of Religious Freedom"
Author: Kennedy, Mark
Publication Date: February 20, 2013

GZ 146 OE
"We can do better than this"
Author: Cooper, Celine
Publication Date: June 10, 2013

GZ 147 NW
"Some N.D.G. parents voice outrage"
Author: Derfel, Aaron
Publication Date: June 13, 2013

GZ 148 OE
"Soccer and sovereignty"
Author: Coyne, Andrew
Publication Date: June 13, 2013

GZ 149 NW
"Loyola High School's case is headed to high court"
Author: Seidman, Karen
Publication Date: June 14, 2013

GZ 150 OE
"The falsehoods behind the disastrous turban ban"
Author: MacPherson, Don
Publication Date: June 20, 2013

GZ 151 SS
"When did home begin to feel like foreign territory?"
Author: Weinstein, Andrea
Publication Date: June 26, 2013

GZ 152 NW
"PQ idea is out of touch with reality"
Author: Curran, Peggy
Publication Date: August 21, 2013

GZ 153 OE
"When minorities oppress minorities"
Author: Coyne, Andrew
Publication Date: August 29, 2013

GZ 154 OE
"Is this the Quebec of Levesque, Godin and Bouchard?"
Author: Cotler, Irwin
Publication Date: August 30, 2013
"Pur et dur' versus a mosaic"
Author: Baron, Lois
Publication Date: September 4, 2013

"Marois says charter will be introduced gradually"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: September 7, 2013

"The real identity crisis for the PQ"
Author: Cooper, Celine
Publication Date: September 9, 2013

"Charter has real-life consequences"
Author: Coyne, Andrew
Publication Date: September 12, 2013

"From London, Marois's view of British multiculturalism looks odd"
Author: Webber, Grgoire
Publication Date: September 12, 2013

"Greater tolerance here for activist government"
Author: Maher, Stephen
Publication Date: September 14, 2013

"Pauline Marois is ignoring lessons she herself wanted taught"
Author: Green, Robert
Publication Date: September 16, 2013

"Just like Bill 101, PQ says"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: September 17, 2013

"Rights trump 'values'"
Author: Eliadis, Pearl
Publication Date: September 18, 2013

"Newcomers need to become part of the province's culture rather than follow the Canadian model of preserving differences"
Author: de Courcy, Diane
Publication Date: September 20, 2013

"Multiculturalism, assimilationism and Quebec values"
Author: Beaulieu, Paul
Publication Date: September 25, 2013

"De Courcy's sugar-coating won't persuade minorities"
Author: Jedwab, Jack
Publication Date: September 27, 2013

"PQ's reality of separation and image of inclusion"
Author: Coyne, Andrew
Publication Date: October 5, 2013

"Secularism crossroads"
Author: Scott, Marian
Publication Date: October 12, 2013

"The values charter would be unhealthy"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 15, 2013

"Values and identities"
Author: Griffin-Donovan, Bernadette
Publication Date: October 26, 2013
GZ 172 NW
"Students' debate heated, respectful"
Author: Solyom, Catherine
Publication Date: November 8, 2013

GZ 173 OE
"Quebec's 'identity anxiety' gives rise to a new majority"
Author: Philippe Bernier Arcand
Publication Date: November 16, 2013

GZ 174 NW
"Education Charter Chill"
Author: Solyom, Catherine
Publication Date: November 30, 2013
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**TS 1 NW**  
"Cleric stands by call for 'jihad'"  
Author: Allan Thompson and Tonda MacCharles  
Publication Date: April 8, 2003

**TS 4 NW**  
"Police honour their own"  
Author: Najm, Fatima  
Publication Date: June 26, 2003

**TS 5 OP**  
"The case for religious schools"  
Author: Morgan, Ed  
Publication Date: June 27, 2003

**TS 7 NW**  
"Hanadi Loubani"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: September 11, 2003

**TS 8 ED**  
"Affront to Muslim voices of peace"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: September 16, 2003

**TS 10 LT**  
"Citizens deserve equal treatment"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: November 7, 2003

**TS 11 NW**  
"Abella, Weston share honours"  
Author: Bruser, David and Ashante Infantry  
Publication Date: November 26, 2003

**TS 13 ED**  
"Multiculturalism must include all"  
Author: Lam, Jse-Che  
Publication Date: December 24, 2003

**TS 14 NW**  
"RCMP chief vows to protect Muslims"  
Author: Cockburn, Neco  
Publication Date: January 3, 2004

**TS 16 NW**  
"Scarf ban? Not in Toronto"  
Author: Scrivener, Leslie  
Publication Date: February 16, 2004

**TS 18 ED**  
"Our Canada must defy racial hatred"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: April 7, 2004

**TS 19 OP**  
"Khadr hysteria needs sober debate"  
Author: Travers, James  
Publication Date: April 15, 2004

**TS 23 NW**  
"Choosing a new chief What attributes are needed to lead Toronto's police force?"  
Author: Hall, Joseph and Betsy Powell  
Publication Date: April 27, 2004

**TS 25 NW**  
"The Dutch transformation"  
Author: Duffy, Andrew  
Publication Date: October 1, 2004

**TS 32 LT**  
"We have always been a deeply religious people"  
Author: No Author  
Publication Date: January 4, 2005

**TS 36 NW**  
"Where is the justice for Air India dead?"  
Author: DiManno, Rosie  
Publication Date: March 18, 2005

**TS 38 NW**  
"Weaving a new Canada"  
Author: Hall, Joseph  
Publication Date: March 23, 2005
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TS 39 NW
"Sharia law out of question, Quebec government insists"
Author: Hurst, Lynda
Publication Date: March 26, 2005

TS 41 NW
"'Baby step' for interfaith group"
Author: Keung, Nicholas
Publication Date: April 18, 2005

TS 46 NW
"Religious discrimination alleged"
Author: Brown, Louise
Publication Date: October 6, 2005

TS 48 LT
"Couldn't happen here"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: December 13, 2005

TS 49 LF
"Hospitals adapt to city's changing face"
Author: Keung, Nicholas
Publication Date: January 13, 2006

TS 52
"The West's 'secular bias' A brief history of blasphemy"
Author: Chung, Andrew
Publication Date: February 12, 2006

TS 53 OP
"Secular people just don't get symbols"
Author: Bhikkhu, Punnadhammo
Publication Date: March 4, 2006

TS 54 RG
"Accent on tolerance"
Author: Zohar, Gil
Publication Date: March 11, 2006

TS 55 OP
"Coming to grips with new realities"
Author: Gwyn, Richard
Publication Date: April 4, 2006

TS 57 OP
"National interest must come first"
Author: Travers, James
Publication Date: June 6, 2006

TS 58 LT
"Celebrating difference"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: June 9, 2006

"Canada's mosaic serves nation well"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: June 10, 2006

TS 60 NR
"Sharing a strong sense of belonging"
Author: Monsebraaten, Laurie
Publication Date: June 24, 2006

TS 61 ID
"Pious people with lost souls"
Author: Cohn, Martin Regg
Publication Date: August 13, 2006

TS 63 OP
"Pope should stay out of Canadian politics"
Author: Manning, Joanna
Publication Date: September 15, 2006

TS 64 NW
"Canadian couples keeping the faith"
Author: Henry, Michele; Nicholas Keung
Publication Date: October 4, 2006

TS 66 NW
"Since when is covering women's faces feminism?"
Author: DiManno, Rosie
Publication Date: October 25, 2006

TS 67 NW
"Montreal police in 'men-only' uproar"
Author: Gordon, Sean
Publication Date: November 16, 2006
TS 68 OP
"Clash with Hasidim easily resolvable"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: November 19, 2006

TS 71 NW
"Muslims rejoice at Eid holiday"
Author: Srikanthan, Thulasi
Publication Date: December 31, 2006

TS 73 ED
"The value of multiculturalism"
Author: MacPherson, Louis
Publication Date: January 1, 2007

TS 74 ED
"Some positive changes for 2007"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: January 4, 2007

TS 75 NW
"Quebec town spawns uneasy debate"
Author: Gordon, Sean
Publication Date: February 5, 2007

TS 76 ED
"Triumph of tolerance"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: February 20, 2007

TS 77 Ed
"Diversity lags in the workplace"
Author: Konrad, Alison M
Publication Date: March 1, 2007

TS 78 LT
"A kick at multiculturalism"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: March 1, 2007

TS 79 NR
"Is anyone listening?"
Author: Gordon, Sean
Publication Date: March 3, 2007

TS 80 OP
"Don't give in to prevailing prejudices"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: March 8, 2007

TS 82 OP
"The perils of enforcing rules on multiculturalism"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: March 18, 2007

TS 84 OP
"Religion in a secular society"
Author: Smith, Michael
Publication Date: April 6, 2007

TS 85 OP
"Transforming society"
Author: Mendes, Errol
Publication Date: April 16, 2007

TS 86 NW
"The Star, and its mission, evolve"
Author: Pike, Jagoda
Publication Date: May 28, 2007

TS 87 NW
"When rights collide with freedoms"
Author: Diebel, Linda
Publication Date: May 28, 2007

TS 88 NW
"Multiculturalism policy falling behind the times"
Author: Hurst, Lynda
Publication Date: May 29, 2007

TS 91 NW
"Mixing and matching, to mom's chagrin"
Author: Simona Siad, Ashifa Kassam; Surya Bhattacharya
Publication Date: July 1, 2007
TS 92 ED
"Canada's values worth celebrating"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: July 1, 2007

TS 93 LT
"Glorious, free and divided"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: July 3, 2007

TS 95 OP
"Faith-based schools study already exists"
Author: Morgan, Anna
Publication Date: August 5, 2007

TS 96 OP
"Do you think the Lord's Prayer should be recited in public schools?"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: August 13, 2007

TS 97 ED
"Quebec's healthy identity debate"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: August 19, 2007

TS 98 LT
"Time to break down barriers"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: August 21, 2007

TS 99 OP
"Balkanized by cultural heritage"
Author: Nasrallah, Elie
Publication Date: September 21, 2007

TS 100 ED
"New challenges for multiculturalism"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 5, 2007

TS 101 ED
"Canadian reality is multicultural"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: October 15, 2007

TS 102 OP
"Multiculturalism under the microscope in Quebec"
Author: Abraham, George
Publication Date: October 17, 2007

TS 103 OP
"Our diversity makes us a think-tank for the world"
Author: Mafinezam, Alidad
Publication Date: October 22, 2007

TS 104 ED
"Keeping problems in perspective"
Author: Goar, Carol
Publication Date: October 26, 2007

TS 105 NW
"In Quebec, it's 'hous' vs. them"
Author: Gordon, Sean
Publication Date: October 27, 2007

TS 106 OP
"All Canadians flourish in climate of tolerance"
Author: Alghabra, Omar
Publication Date: November 7, 2007

TS 107 ID
"Surprise, Canadian pluralism is working"
Author: Adams, Michael
Publication Date: November 10, 2007

TS 109 NW
"Quebec's own two solitudes"
Author: Gordon, Sean
Publication Date: November 26, 2007

TS 110 OP
"Good news on diversity from gasp! Quebec"
Author: Maioni, Antonia
Publication Date: November 27, 2007
TS 111 OP
"Keep doors wide open in Canada"
Author: Axworthy,
Publication Date: December 2, 2007

TS 112 Ed
"Diversity defines modern Canada"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: December 5, 2007

TS 113 OP
"Quebec clings to old assimilationist ideal"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: December 9, 2007

TS 114 OP
"Tolerance of diversity still a work in progress"
Author: Sterling, Harry
Publication Date: December 13, 2007

TS 115 NW
"Keeping the faith for the sake of all our Aqsa Parvezes"
Author: DiManno, Rosie
Publication Date: December 15, 2007

TS 116 OP
"Connecting in a season of faith"
Author: Morgan, Anna
Publication Date: December 23, 2007

TS 117 OP
"Big test for Charest's survival skills"
Author: Martin, Pierre
Publication Date: January 2, 2008

TS 119 OP
"It's a prayer well worth keeping"
Author: Marmur, Dow
Publication Date: February 24, 2008

TS 120 ID
"Multiculturalism's nemesis"
Author: Hurst, Lynda
Publication Date: March 15, 2008

TS 122 NW
"Dion vows to boost religious security"
Author: Talaga, Tanya
Publication Date: April 11, 2008

TS 123 ED
"Must reading on minorities"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: May 22, 2008

TS 124 OP
"In Quebec, equality for minorities just talk"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: May 25, 2008

TS 125 OP
"Lose-lose situation on prayer"
Author: Coyle, Jim
Publication Date: Jun 13, 2008

TS 126 NW
"New look for Quebec politics"
Author: Chung, Andrew
Publication Date: Sep 10, 2008

TS 127 NW
"York U to stop cancelling classes on Jewish holidays"
Author: Brown, Louise
Publication Date: Oct 28, 2008

TS 128 ED
"New faces join community board"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Oct 28, 2008

TS 129 ED
"Dumont plays the identity card"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Nov 12, 2008

TS 130 ED
"An unholy zeal for tolerance"
Author: Martin Regg Cohn
Publication Date: Nov 25, 2008
TS 131 IN
"How Europe gets the mosaic wrong"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: May 9, 2009

TS 134 NW
"Sports hijab aims to be game-changer"
Author: Chung, Andrew
Publication Date: Nov 12, 2009

TS 136 OP
"Veiling and a woman's right to choose"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Mar 20, 2010

TS 137 ED
"Picking on Muslim women smacks of hypocrisy"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Apr 4, 2010

TS 138 NW
"Religious piety or is it vanity?"
Author: DiManno, Rosie
Publication Date: Apr 5, 2010

TS 139 NW
"The Quebec media have distinct power to stir niqab debate Province's news organizations have shown they can hype an issue, distort its importance"
Author: Hebert, Chantal
Publication Date: Apr 5, 2010

TS 140 IN
"Why Canada's mosaic is cracked multiculturalism"
Author: Marche, Stephen
Publication Date: May 1, 2010

TS 141 NW
"Belgium's burqa ban widens intolerance debate"
Author: Campion-Smith, Bruce
Publication Date: May 8, 2010

TS 142 OP
"Ranting from the right deafens Canadians to success of pluralism"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Oct 24, 2010

TS 143 OP
"PQ demonizes minorities to advance separatism"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Jan 20, 2011

TS 144 ED
"Uneasy alliance with PQ"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Jan 23, 2011

TS 145 NW
"Polygamists, critics both fear law"
Author: DiManno, Rosie
Publication Date: Jan 28, 2011

TS 146 OP
"Prayers in public schools"
Author: Anonymous
Publication Date: Jul 16, 2011

TS 148 OP
"9/11 changed my world forever"
Author: Sachedina, Omar
Publication Date: Sep 14, 2011

TS 149 IN
Paranoia infects North America
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Sep 18, 2011

TS 150 OP
"Freedom of religion is a fundamental right"
Author: Gunawardena-Vaughn, Sue; Aaron Myers
Publication Date: Feb 24, 2012
TS 151 GT
"Program apologizes for anti-Jewish teachings"
Author: Brown, Louise
Publication Date: May 9, 2012

TS 152 OP
"Separatists' narcissistic inconsistency"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Aug 19, 2012

TS 153 IN
"What are 'values' we champion?"
Author: Mascarenhas, Roland
Publication Date: Apr 13, 2013

TS 154 NW
"Religion, law clash in court"
Author: Gillis, Wendy
Publication Date: Jun 9, 2013

TS 155 OP
"A cynical ploy"
Author: No Author
Publication Date: Aug 22, 2013

TS 156 OP
"Less like Putin, more like poutine"
Author: Salutin, Rick
Publication Date: Aug 23, 2013

TS 157 OP
"Quebec values' issue not a priority"
Author: Martin, Pierre
Publication Date: Sep 1, 2013

TS 158 NW
"Marois hatches new plan to gain sovereignty"
Author: Woods, Allan
Publication Date: Sep 4, 2013

TS 159 NW
"Quebec debate reveals irreconcilable differences"
Author: Hebert, Chantal
Publication Date: Sep 7, 2013

TS 160 GT
"Quebec charter suggests Canada has work to do"
Author: Gallant, Jacques
Publication Date: Sep 7, 2013

TS 161 NW
"Feds may fight 'values' charter"
Author: Woods, Allan; Tonda MacCharles
Publication Date: Sep 11, 2013

TS 162 NW
"PQ defied its own lawyers' advice"
Author: Woods, Allan
Publication Date: Sep 14, 2013

TS 163 NW
"Former top court judge backs PQ's values charter"
Author: Woods, Allan
Publication Date: Sep 24, 2013

TS 164 OP
"In Quebec, Sikhs and Jews are 'collateral damage'"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Oct 10, 2013

TS 165 OP
"PQ wages all-out war on the religious"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Nov 10, 2013

TS 166 OP
"Foreign issues become local issues in globalized Toronto"
Author: Siddiqui, Haroon
Publication Date: Dec 5, 2013
Appendix C

UN ÉTAT NEUTRE AU SERVICE DE TOUS

EXEMPLES DE SIGNES NON OSTENTATOIRES QUI SERAIENT PERMIS AU PERSONNEL DE L'ÉTAT

EXEMPLES DE SIGNES OSTENTATOIRES QUI NE SERAIENT PAS PERMIS AU PERSONNEL DE L'ÉTAT
Appendix D

Herouville Code

About women
We consider that men and women share the same status of equality. To this effect, a woman can amongst other things, drive a car, vote freely, sign checks, decide for herself, speak her peace, dress as she sees fit while respecting common decency, walk alone in public places, study, have a job, personally own things and be able to dispose of them as she pleases. This constitutes our living standards and our way of life. Consequently, we consider as undesirable and prohibit any action or gesture that would be contrary to the above statement such as: killing women by lapidation or burning them alive in public places, burning them with acid, excising them, or treating them as slaves. Out of respect for women and in order to ease the application of civil laws on divorce, polygamy is prohibited in Quebec. Also, marriage only becomes legal if it was carried out in accordance with the Quebec laws in force.

About Festivities.
We listen to music and we drink beverages, alcoholized or not. We feast, dance, and towards the end of our calendar year, we individually or collectively decorate a fir or a spruce tree with ornamental balls and lights. This is what we commonly call “Christmas decorations” or “Christmas trees” which recalls our notions of patrimonial rejoicing but does not necessarily confer to this practice a religious character. These festivities are authorized as much in public spaces, schools, institutions or private places. In these places, no area is reserved for prayer or religious manifestations. These customs and tradition should not offend whoever chooses to relate them to ancestral Pagan values.

About sports and leisure.
Since time immemorial, boys and girls have practised sports, and often, together. Boys and girls even swim together in the same pool. That was not the case fifty years ago, but our society has since evolved. Thus, you will see men and women skiing together on the same slopes simultaneously. You will frequently meet men and women who are part of the same or different hockey teams play on the same ice with or against each other at the same time.

In public pools, we have male and female lifeguards who supervise males and females swimming together or amusing themselves in the pool. Many sports require wearing appropriate security headgear in order to practices of them, from cycling and motorcycling right up to combat sports.

Sports are compulsory for students in our schools. The practise of most sports requires a dress code ruled by municipal, national or international laws. The State favours the practice of sports to improve the health of citizens, and regulates it to eliminate as much as possible the risk of serious accidents while attempting to reduce the medical cost they generate.

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About business.
Our businesses are governed by multiple laws deriving from our democratic system. In our businesses, men and women work together at the same time. Both can speak with male or female colleagues and clients.

The products that are sold in our businesses are of all nature. For example, food products must be approved by different governmental instances before distribution and sale. The State agencies must assure and control salubrity; incurred costs are thus paid by taxpayers.

No other organization can certify a food product and pass on certification costs to consumers. Regardless of utilized means, no additional steps or phases for certification are authorized. Once the sale of the product has been approved, business can distribute, promote, and sell it in all liberty.

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About Food.
For millions of years people have evolved and came to appreciate different foods and drinks. Using their own analysis capacity, they were able to distinguish with time what was good for their survival and pleasure. In Quebec traditional cuisine (cooking) is generally liked and appreciated by all. In our homes boys and girls eat together, eat the same food at the same table. They eat all kinds of meats, fruits and vegetables. They don’t have to eat meat exclusively or vegetables exclusively and can eat both anytime of the year. More so the majority of our restaurants use recipes and kitchen tools to cook meet dishes of all kinds and also a variety of dairy products in the process. Regardless of the shape of the animal or its hooves, regardless of the shape of the fish be it covered by scales or a shell, we will enjoy eating its flesh if it is prepared properly and presented tastefully. Food nourishes the body, the soul is nourished differently.

It is accepted and known that men and women can participate in the different processes of fabrication or distribution of foods and beverages. Generally, we believe that different Gods out of respect for their own creatures and their nourishment cannot impose nor proscribe certain foods. It is up to an individuals conscience to decide.

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EDUCATION

2015  **Master of Arts.** Media Studies.
The University of Western Ontario. London, Ontario.

2013  **Bachelor of Arts (Honours).** Communication Studies.
Laurentian University. Sudbury, Ontario.

2011  **Bachelor of Arts (Honours).** Religious Studies.
Laurentian University. Sudbury, Ontario.

EXPERIENCE

**Teaching Assistant** (2013-2015) University of Western Ontario

2015  Winter  MIT1500  The Matter of Technology.
2014  Fall    MIT1700  Information and Its Contexts.
2013  Fall    MIT1200  Media in Society.

**Research Associate** (April – August 2014)
University of Western Ontario. The Social Innovation Lab - Ivey Business School