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Municipal Associations, Membership Composition, and Interest Representation in Local-Provincial Relations

Alison Katherine Shott

*The University of Western Ontario*

Supervisor
Dr. Robert A. Young

*The University of Western Ontario*

Graduate Program in Political Science

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATIONS, MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION, AND INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Alison Katherine Shott

Graduate Program in Political Science

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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Abstract

Municipal associations carry out two core functions – advocacy and providing member services. How associations prioritize and perform these functions is largely unclear. This dissertation explores how membership composition affects their activities. Canada’s 18 provincial level municipal associations all provide advocacy and services for their members, but there are considerable differences within their memberships. Some associations represent all municipalities within a province while others are divided along linguistic, regional, or rural/urban lines. In addition, the municipalities they represent can vary by size, legal type, region, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. Two measures of membership composition are employed: rural/urban dominance and population size. They are used to examine three areas of associations’ activities: issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.

The three research questions employed in this dissertation share the approach of measuring the input of membership composition and correlating it with the outputs of organizational behaviour and policy requests. In total, seven hypotheses are tested. 1: Unified associations pursue functional, municipal issues. 2: Rural associations pursue socio-economic issues. 3: Urban associations pursue stronger municipal regulatory control. 4: Associations with homogeneous member populations lobby for provincial programs to meet their requests. 5: Associations with heterogeneous member populations request the resources to institute municipal programs. 6: Small municipalities positively affect an association’s level of service delivery. 7: Large municipalities negatively affect an association’s level of service delivery. The results of analysis provide strong evidence that associational behaviour is not determined by the external environment alone, but also by internal composition of membership. Associations use organizational structures – boards of directors, caucuses, sub-associations, and district meetings – to represent the cleavages in their membership, but the extent of these cleavages impacts the mix and content of the associations’ activities. Rural/urban dominance influences the type of issues associations pursue in intergovernmental lobbying. The dispersion of member populations affects both the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests and the allocation of collective resources between services and advocacy. These findings provide exploratory, empirical evidence that membership composition influences associational behaviour. They advance our understandings of municipal associations and of collective action.

Keywords: Municipal Associations, Interest Group Behaviour, Collective Action, Multilevel Governance, Local Government, Interest Representation, Public Policy, Canada
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List of Abbreviations

AAMDC – Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties
AFMNB – Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick
ALIDA – Alberta Local Improvement Districts Association
AMMB – Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba
AMM – Association of Manitoba Municipalities
AMO – Association of Municipalities of Ontario
AOCCR – Association of Ontario Counties (and Regions)
AOMR – Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves
AUMA – Alberta Urban Municipal Association
AVNB – Association of the Villages of New Brunswick
CFM – Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities
CNBA / CNBA-ACNB – Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick
DCM – Dominion Conference of Mayors
FCM – Federation of Canadian Municipalities
FNM – Federation of Newfoundland Municipalities
FPERM – Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities
FQM – Fédération québécoise des municipalités
MAUM – Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities
MNLR – Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador
MUA – Manitoba Urban Association
NBRMA – New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association
OARM – Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities
OMA – Ontario Municipal Association
PARCS – Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan
SANC – The New North: Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities
SARM – Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities
SLIDA – Saskatchewan Local Improvement Districts Association
SUMA – Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association
TNBA / TNBA-AVNB – Towns of New Brunswick Association – Association des Villes du Nouveau-Brunswick
UAM – Union of Alberta Municipalities
UBCM – Union of British Columbia Municipalities
UCM – Union of Canadian Municipalities
UMM – Union of Manitoba Municipalities
UMNB – Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick
UMQ - Union des municipalités du Québec
UNBM – Union of New Brunswick Municipalities
UNBT – Union of New Brunswick Towns
UNSM – Union Nova Scotia Municipalities
USM – Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities
VTNBA – Villages and Towns of New Brunswick Association
Chapter 1

1 Introduction

Municipal associations, also known as municipal leagues and local government associations, normally include as members municipalities lying within a geographic area, usually that of a sovereign country or, in a federation, of a sub-national unit like a state or a province. The core functions of municipal associations are advocacy and providing member services. Advocacy refers to the promotion of common objectives, usually by lobbying senior governments. Member services are provided to member municipalities, normally more cheaply than self-provision by local governments would cost. Little empirical research has been undertaken on municipal associations, particularly in the Canadian context. There is no existing comparative analysis of municipal associations in Canada, and the literature on associations in other countries has been dominated by analyses of their lobbying strategies.

Researchers have been preoccupied with understanding where associations target their lobbying efforts and the tactics they employ. In answering these questions, two dominant explanations have been identified: institutional structures and degrees of access to senior levels of government. However, when other aspects of associational activities

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have been considered, a third explanation of their behaviour has emerged: composition of membership.\(^2\) This dissertation expands on this third explanation by examining two aspects of member composition: rural/urban dominance and population size.\(^3\) It tests how membership composition affects three aspects of associational behaviour: the allocation of collective resources, approaches to jurisdictional responsibility, and the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying. This dissertation focuses on the relationship between inputs of associational characteristics and the outputs of resolutions, demands on senior levels of government, and services.

At present, there are eighteen independent, provincial level municipal associations in Canada. There is considerable range in the size and type of municipalities represented within these associations. The Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick has eight members and la Fédération québécoise des municipalités has more than 1,000. The municipalities that belong to associations can vary by size, region, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. In order to maintain

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3 “Rural” and “urban” are contested concepts, but in this dissertation, provincial and associations’ own definitions of rural and urban municipalities are used. This captures self-identification and provides consistency in longitudinal analysis, but does cause some limitations in cross-provincial comparisons. The definitions of rural and urban in each province and association are discussed later, in the selection of case studies. There are also some exceptions to rural/urban divisions, such as special municipalities in Alberta that contain both rural and urban areas. Where exceptions exist they are also discussed within the selection of case studies.
their membership bases, associations must use advocacy and member services to represent and meet the interests of their members.

Municipal associations have existed in Canada since 1899. Despite their endurance, little is known about their actions and activities. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is twofold. It furthers our understanding of local government associations’ behaviour and of collective action, and it advances our knowledge of municipal associations in the Canadian context. These contributions are important for two reasons. First, membership composition has emerged as an explanation of associational behaviour, but minimal empirical research has been undertaken to test this theory. Second, this dissertation is the first cross-provincial analysis of Canadian municipal associations. It develops a dataset of Canadian municipal associations’ memberships and structures. In short, it contributes to our knowledge of local government associations, collective action, and Canadian local government.

1.1 Formation, Development, and Functions of Municipal Associations in Canada

Canada experienced a rapid diffusion of municipal associations during the first decades of the twentieth century. The first provincial association formed in 1899, and a federal association and nine other provincial associations formed in the following two decades. Unified associations, which were intended to represent all municipalities within a province, were founded in six provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia). Separate associations for rural and urban municipalities were founded in two provinces (Saskatchewan and Alberta). Unified associations later formed in Newfoundland and Labrador (1951) and Prince Edward
Island (1957). Numerous associations underwent divisions and mergers in the following decades. At present, there are six provinces with unified associations (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador) and three provinces with separate rural and urban associations (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Quebec). New Brunswick has distinct anglophone, francophone, and urban associations. Manitoba has an association for bilingual municipalities, and Saskatchewan has associations for northern municipalities and resort communities.

Municipal associations were established as forums for elected government officials to discuss common concerns and collectively lobby provincial governments on municipal issues. The formation of provincial associations coincided with the establishment of a federal organization, the Union of Canadian Municipalities (UCM), in 1901. In 1937, the Union merged with the Dominion Conference of Mayors (DCM, est. 1935) to form the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM), later renamed the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM). For decades, the relationship between provincial associations and the FCM was competitive. Although the provincial associations are members of FCM, they lobbied at both the federal and provincial levels. FCM also involved itself in provincial matters. In the early 1980s, though, provincial associations and the FCM re-organized their priorities. Provincial associations began to limit their lobbying activities to the provincial level, while the FCM concentrated on issues where the federal government had direct control, such as the

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national Goods and Services Tax (GST) and infrastructure, and refrained from involving itself in provincial lobbying.\(^5\)

The establishment and evolution of Canadian associations coincided with the rise of state municipal leagues in the United States, and the formation of North American leagues followed the establishment of local government associations in Europe. The first municipal association was founded in the kingdom of Hanover in 1866. Its formation has been attributed to increased service provision by the urban local state and the flourishing of associational culture.\(^6\) Other jurisdictions adopted the local government association model in the following decades. In England and Wales, the Association of Municipal Corporations formed in 1873 and the County Councils Association was established in 1889. In North America, the first attempt at league formation occurred in 1891 in Indiana, and the first formal leagues were established in three states (California, Iowa, and Wisconsin) in 1898. Other early leagues formed in Prussia (1896), Bavaria (1896), Italy (1889), Germany (1905), Ireland (1912), and France (1920).\(^7\)

By 1956, 64 national local government associations had been established – 1 in Africa, 4 in South America, 5 in North America, 5 in Oceania, 12 in Asia, and 37 in Europe.\(^8\) In a survey of local government associations conducted that year, 45 of the 57 responding associations reported that they formed for reasons that fit with the purposes of: “To represent the common interest of the municipalities, to foster the exchange of

\(^{5}\) Ibid., 538-9.
\(^{7}\) Ibid.
experiences among them, and to advise the government in the preparation and the carrying out of such laws and regulations as concern the common interests of the municipalities.”

Eleven associations reported that they had formed for a specific reason. These included fighting a specific threat from a senior level of government and sharing experiences when implementing new legislation that affected local governments.

In North America, while American leagues preceeded Canadian associations, Canadian associations spread more rapidly than their counterparts in the United States. The Union of Canadian Municipalities (UCM) was formed in 1901, but an enduring national association of municipalities was not established in the United States until 1924. The early formation of UCM quickened the diffusion of provincial level municipal associations in Canada. By 1919, eight of nine provinces had an association, compared to only eighteen of forty-eight states. Canadian municipal associations and municipal leagues in the United States also differ on a key organizational factor. While a number of

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9 Ibid., 17.
10 The 1956 survey was conducted by the International Union of Local Authorities. The Union, which was founded in 1913 and headquartered in The Hague, represented national municipal associations until its merger with the United Towns Organization in 2004. The merger formed the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), an organization that represents both national associations and individual city governments. In 2015, UCLG had 124 associational members, but it does not include all national associations nor any sub-national associations as members. See: The City Mayors Foundation, “Unification of IULA and UTO Creates Largest International Local Government Association,” www.citymayors.com. United Cities and Local Governments, “UCLG Local Government Associations,” www.cities-localgovernments.org.
11 Two short-lived associations had been formed previously. The American Municipal Improvement Society and the League of American Municipalities (est. 1911) were “focused on improving city services and maximizing efficiency in administration,” and did not become involved with intergovernmental lobbying at either the state or federal level. Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of State Leagues of Cities,” Social Science History 29:4 (2005) 554-574.
Canadian provinces have multiple associations, in the United States there is one municipal league per state.\textsuperscript{12}

The efforts of municipal associations to persuade municipalities to become members have largely been successful. As a result, associations indirectly represent almost everyone in Canada. Nearly 90 percent of the Canadian population lives in a municipality that belongs to a provincial level municipal association. The City of Toronto, which is not a member of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, accounts for most of the population that is not represented in a provincial association, and Toronto is a member of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. When Toronto is excluded, more than 98 percent of the Canadian population lives in a municipality that belongs to a provincial-level association.

The high level of membership uptake in associations is a source of collective strength and legitimacy in their work. Municipal associations have high degrees of access at senior levels of government and their work attracts the attention of provincial officials. Premiers and opposition leaders address associations’ annual conventions. At most conventions, entire cabinets participate in ministerial forums, or “bear pit sessions,” that give municipal officials the opportunity to question the premier, ministers, associate

\textsuperscript{12} The exception to this rule is Hawaii, which does not have municipal government structures comparable to other US states, and subsequently does not have a municipal league. 47 states also have an association of counties. Ibid., 562. Outside North America, the terms used to describe municipal associations vary widely by country and within the literature. At present, terms used include: association of governments, association of municipalities, council of governments, government association, government conference, government group, government interest group, government lobbying group, intergovernmental group, league of cities, league of municipalities, local government association, local government pressure group, municipal league, public interest group, public official association, and state-level generalist association.
ministers, and parliamentary assistants about issues in their community and in the province.

Image 1-1. Ministerial Forum at the 2014 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties Annual Convention


High membership uptake gives an association legitimacy and leverage at the provincial level, but it can also be a source of internal conflict. Associations can have deep cleavages in their membership – between small communities and large cities, metropolitan and remote regions, anglophone and francophone municipalities, and rural and urban areas. In order to maintain the membership of diverse municipalities, associations must bridge divisive interests, achieve legislative changes, and provide beneficial services to their members.
Municipal associations work to protect and represent the interests of their members through advocacy. The majority of their advocacy efforts involve direct contact with senior levels of government. The status of associations as the representatives of elected officials affords them high levels of access to elected officials at other levels of government. Associations frame their advocacy efforts as “government-to-government relationships.” They use these relationships to make formal policy requests, question cabinet ministers at their annual conventions, appear before legislative committees, and meet regularly with government officials. In Ontario, Nova Scotia, and British Columbia, municipal associations have secured a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with their respective provincial governments. The MOUs mandate that the provincial government must consult with the municipal association on any proposed legislative and regulative changes that would affect municipalities.

Associations’ direct advocacy tactics have been successful in achieving legislative changes. In recent years, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) has secured local government representation in Aboriginal treaty negotiations and had social assistance costs removed from the property tax. 13 L’Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) has successfully lobbied for an increase in the variation of electoral riding populations, from +/- 5% to +/- 15%. This gave greater representation to francophone communities. 14 The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities’ (UNSM) efforts led to the creation of an integrated coastal management

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framework for the province that guaranteed municipal consultation and involvement.\textsuperscript{15} Beyond their large-scale achievements, associations regularly advocate for small and incremental changes that meet their members’ needs and interests. Recent issues pursued by associations include: drainage upgrades, timber salvage fees, development control bylaws, business revitalization zone regulations, policing levies, and wastewater infrastructure funding.

Associations also attract and maintain members through the provision of member services. There are a number of services that are offered by the majority of associations, including insurance, fuel supply, bulk purchasing and employee benefits. But associations also tailor their services to provincial and member conditions. In Newfoundland and Labrador, three-quarters of municipalities have a population under 1,000. These small municipalities have few employees. In response, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL) provides services that would be met internally by larger municipalities, including a telephone legal referral service and a parliamentary procedures advisory service. The Saskatchewan Association Rural Municipalities (SARM) addresses the needs of its members through the provision of agricultural products and programs. SARM sells discounted rat and gopher control products, administers the Provincial Rat Eradication Program, and provides invasive weed management support and education.

Association staffs provide support for advocacy efforts and the implementation of services. On average, municipal associations have 18 employees, but the number ranges from three for the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities to 76 for the Alberta

Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA). Despite the variation of their advocacy issues, member services, and staff sizes, what all associations have in common is their core functions of collective intergovernmental lobbying and the provision of member services. They facilitate local input at higher levels of government and provide collective benefits to their members.

1.2 Methodology

The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are drawn from the local government association and collective action literatures. They share the common approach of measuring the inputs of municipal associations, and correlating the inputs with measured outputs of associations’ behaviour. Two inputs are evaluated, and both are measures of membership composition: rural/urban dominance and population size. These measures can be tested empirically, vary across Canada’s provinces and municipal associations, and are rooted in the literature. The three behavioural outputs that are correlated with inputs of membership composition are: the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.

The main sources of data are associations’ own records – including the resolutions passed at their conventions, annual reports, and financial documents – and population statistics. Correspondence, media reports, and academic literature supplement these sources. Data collection was carried out in person, by traveling to associations’ offices; provincial archives; and legislative assembly, university, and public libraries. At these locations, printed records of, and about, municipal associations were digitized. Between
6 and 31 days were spent in each province. In total, 115,418 pages of municipal association records were digitized over 114 days of field research. The specific dates and locations of fieldwork are detailed in Appendix A.

Using the records collected through fieldwork, case studies for the three research questions are drawn from the local government association literature and are based on the histories and compositions of municipal associations in Canada. The first research question examines instances of associational restructuring studies to test the impact of restructuring on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying. The resolutions passed by associations before and after instances of restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario are compared. The second research question is used to compare the dispersion of associations’ member populations to the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. The resolutions of two associations with homogeneous memberships – the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, and the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities – are compared to two associations with heterogeneous memberships – the Union of British Columbia Municipalities and the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. The distribution of their resolutions between 1999 and 2013 are correlated with their population dispersions. The sources of resolutions used in the first and second research questions are detailed in Appendix B. Finally, multiple regression analysis is used to test the relationship between member populations and the allocation of collective resources. The analysis is based on 2013 financial and membership data from eleven associations in nine provinces. The specific methodological choices for each of the

16 Quebec was excluded from fieldwork because its municipal associations do not make most their records publically available. Therefore not enough records are available for a rigorous, comparative analysis comparison between Quebec’s municipal associations and those in other provinces.
dissertation’s three research questions are discussed in their respective chapters, but three all measure inputs and correlate them with outputs, rather than focusing on internal politics to evaluate associations behaviour.

1.3 Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, with the common approach of measuring outputs of organizational behaviour and correlating them with inputs of membership composition. The second chapter reviews the existing literature on local government associations. Most research on government associations has been focused on the lobbying tactics they employ, but membership composition has emerged as a determinant of associational behaviour. This chapter situates the hypotheses tested in the dissertation within the wider literature on local government associations. The third chapter examines how municipalities and their associations deal with cleavages in their memberships. It compares the organizational structures used by associations to represent municipalities that vary by size, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. All eighteen independent, provincial level associations in Canada are discussed. Chapters Four, Five, and Six are used to test the hypotheses of different research questions on the relationship between membership composition and associational behaviour. In total, they test seven hypotheses. These hypotheses are used to consider how rural/urban dominance and population size affect three aspects of associational behaviour: the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and how associations allocate collective resources between advocacy and the provision of member services.
In Chapter Four, the comparison is made between rural/urban dominance and associational behaviour. Canadian local government associations differ from those in other federal states because some provinces have separate associations for rural and urban municipalities. In most federal countries, there have only been unified associations at the sub-national level, containing both rural and urban members. In Canada, four provinces have undergone associational restructuring, where the number and type of associations formed by their municipalities changes. The chapter is used to examine instances of restructuring between unified, rural, and urban associations to test how changes in membership composition affect the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.

Hypothesis 1: Unified associations are expected to pursue functional, municipal issues that are common to all of their members. When a group of municipalities leaves a unified association to form distinct rural or urban association, the new association institutionalizes a shared sense of place and creates stronger membership cohesion. It is expected that these changes manifest themselves differently in rural and urban associations. Hypothesis 2: Rural associations are expected to pursue the socio-economic issues that are of common interests to their members. Hypothesis 3: The greater density and diversity within, and between, urban municipalities are expected to drive them to request stronger regulatory control over municipal functions. Instances of associational restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario are used to test these expectations. The issues pursued by unified and rural/urban associations in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan are also examined.

The results of analysis in this chapter are mixed. Rural and urban associations act as expected. Rural associations pursue a higher percentage of socio-economic issues than
the unified associations they left, and urban associations pursue a higher percentage of
jurisdictional resolutions. Unlike rural and urban associations, unified associations do
not act as expected. The resolutions they pass reflect the interests of their predominant
municipal type, whether rural or urban. The behaviour of a unified association is not
changed by the presence or absence of their minority municipal types.

Chapter Five examines a second measure of membership composition: population
size. This measure is compared to associations’ requests for jurisdictional responsibilit
in intergovernmental lobbying. Do associations request increased municipal responsibilit
essibilities or for the province to act on their behalf? A key variation between
provinces, and subsequently their municipal associations, is the relative heterogeneity of
municipal populations. This variation is expected to affect how associations approach the
jurisdictional aspect of intergovernmental lobbying. Hypothesis 4: Associations with
relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for provincial
programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as similar to
their own. They will trust the provincial government to enact uniform legislation to
address their concerns. Hypothesis 5: In associations with significant dispersion in
member populations, it is expected that members will request the resources to institute
programs at the municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other
members share their interests.

Four associations are used to test for a relationship between municipal population
dispersion and the jurisdictional aspect of associational policy requests. They come from
three provinces: two with unified associations (Nova Scotia and British Columbia), and
one with split rural and urban associations (Alberta). The dispersions of their member
populations are compared to the dispersion of lobbying requests between different configurations of jurisdictional responsibility: municipal, provincial, federal, or shared control. The findings give support to the argument that the heterogeneity of member populations influences how they approach jurisdictional responsibility in intergovernmental lobbying. Homogeneous associations request provincial action and heterogeneous associations request the power and resources to carry out programs at the municipal level.

As discussed above, the core functions of municipal associations are advocacy and the provision of member services. In Chapter Six, the focus is on how membership composition influences the prioritization of these two activities. Two variables are drawn from the literature: the presence of small members and the presence of large members. Hypothesis 6: Small municipalities are reliant on the services associations provide due to their limited internal resources and capacity. Hypothesis 7: Large municipalities, that have the human and financial capital to provide most services for themselves, join associations for their collective weight in lobbying senior levels of government. Taken together, the two factors affect the number of services an association provides and the allocation of expenditures between member services and advocacy. Using data from eleven associations in nine provinces, the results from multiple regression analysis give strong support to the proposition that both aspects of membership composition are significant determinants of associational behaviour.

In short, every province and provincial level association is discussed in at least one chapter. This is shown in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2.
Table 1-1. Provincial Case Studies by Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Descriptive Chapter</th>
<th>Research Chapter One</th>
<th>Research Chapter Two</th>
<th>Research Chapter Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Saskatchewan</td>
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<td>Alberta</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Table 1-2. Associational Case Studies by Chapter

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<tr>
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<th>RC2</th>
<th>RC3</th>
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</thead>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cities of New Brunswick Association-Association Cites du Nouveau-Brunswick</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fédération Québécoise des Municipalités</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union des Municipalités du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association of Municipalities of Ontario</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association des Municipalités Bilingues du Manitoba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association of Manitoba Municipalities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New North – SANC Services Inc. (Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union of British Columbia Municipalities</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 1.4 Conclusion

The literature on municipal associations has been dominated by questions related to their lobbying strategies. In answering questions about where associations target their lobbying efforts and the tactics that they employ, the dominant explanations for
associations’ actions are institutional structures and access to senior government officials. However, membership composition has emerged as an important determinant of behaviour. This research seeks to expand on this finding and broaden the understanding of municipal associations. Two measures of membership composition – rural/urban dominance and population size – are used to test how memberships affect three aspects of associations’ behaviour: how they allocate collective resources, requests for jurisdictional responsibility, and the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying. These areas do not cover all aspects of associational activities or measures of membership composition, but they do provide initial, testable means of measuring how membership composition influences associational behaviour.
Chapter 2

2 Theories of Government Association Behaviour

The literature on government associations is small, but a few common threads have emerged in how they are studied. Researchers have focused primarily on the factors that shape associations’ lobbying strategies: where they target their lobbying efforts and the tactics they employ. To a lesser extent, researchers have also sought to identify the issues upon which associations lobby, why they formed, and the degree of support they receive from their members. In answering these questions, three dominant explanations for associational behaviour have emerged: institutional structures, high degrees of access at senior levels of government, and the composition of association memberships. This chapter reviews the literature on lobbying strategies, issue priorities, and membership support and engagement before it details prior research on two aspects of membership composition: rural/urban dominance and population size.

2.1 Intergovernmental Lobbying Strategies

The predominant focus in the government association literature has been on lobbying tactics and targets. This dissertation is focused on the content of associational lobbying, rather than the strategies they employ. However, it is important to recognize the other factors researchers have identified as determinants of associational behaviour. On the

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1 As Beverly Cigler has summarized: “Although there is a substantial literature on interest groups and lobbying, the empirical research or theory development focused on governments lobbying governments is sparse.” Beverly A. Cigler, “Not Just Another Special Interest: The Intergovernmental Lobby Revisited,” in *Interest Group Politics*, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012).
question of where associations target their lobbying activity, the most common factor identified is institutional structures. In his discussion of federal level state and local government associations in the United States, Donald Haider argued that Governors are more likely to lobby Senators, while mayoral groups are more likely to target members of the House of Representatives. Anne Marie Cammisa reinforced this argument with her research on intergovernmental lobbying in the United States Congress. She contended that the division of powers is a strong determinant of associations’ lobbying activities. Her interviews of government associations and Congressional staffs demonstrated that state-based associations focused their lobbying efforts in the Senate, while local government associations concentrated their efforts in the House. Both Haider and Cammisa attributed these lobbying patterns to the geographic implications of the division of powers. The jurisdiction of Senators matches governors’ own constituencies. For mayoral groups, their constituencies more closely mirror House districts. Haider and Cammisa argued that associations’ strategic recognition of these differences has shaped their lobbying activities.

Beryl Radin and Joan Boase expanded on Haider and Cammisa’s approach by accounting for institutional structures beyond the legislative branch. In a cross-national comparison of federal-level government associations, they found that Canadian associations were more likely to target the bureaucracy than their American counterparts,

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who focused their efforts on the legislature. Jens Blom Hansen also attributed associational lobbying strategies to the institutional structure of the state. He examined the policy-making environments of central-local relations in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In his analysis, he found that the relative strength of advocates (bureaucrats) vs. guardians (finance ministries and budget committees) determined where associations targeted their lobbying efforts and the degree of access that they enjoyed. Stronger bureaucracies afforded greater degrees of policy involvement. Peter Johnson also identified an institutional influence on intergovernmental lobbying. His longitudinal study of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities demonstrated a shift in the Union’s strategy from targeting cabinet ministers to lobbying civil servants. He argued that this was a strategic response to the growth of the provincial civil service.

However, while Cammisa, Haider, Radin and Boase, Blom Hansen, and Johnson identified institutional structures as a determinant of lobbying strategies, there is a second perspective in the literature: the limitations that legislative institutions place on effective lobbying in the United States. Frederic Cleaveland identified a core institutional limitation on intergovernmental lobbying: legislative committees are organized by function and cut across the concerns of geographic areas. In his discussion of two urban associations in the United States, Cleaveland documented six House committees and six Senate committees that played a central role in managing bills concerned with urban

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issues. He also found a lack of cohesion and cooperation between them on how such issues should be addressed. Cleaveland argued that this tension between function and geographic space created a lack of Congressional leadership on urban issues and fractured the weight of urban associations.\(^7\) Haider teased out this argument further:

The age-old administrative problem – area and function as competing bases of organization and governance – conflicts the groups in their Washington lobby. The scope of immediate concerns to the government interest groups is influenced by geopolitical boundaries. Policies and problems tend to be defined largely within the context of a spatial setting determined by city, county, and state lines. But since Congress and its committee structure are organized along functional and not geopolitical lines, the government interest groups confront a chronic and overriding problem. That is, they seek the imposition of spatial concerns on functionally oriented and structured institutions.\(^8\)

The committee structure of American legislatures necessitates that government associations target their lobbying efforts across committees, but this diminishes their collective influence. Institutional structures shape where associations target their lobbying activities in senior levels of government, but they also create limitations on lobbying effectiveness.

Prior research on government associations has also focused on a second aspect of their lobbying strategies: the tactics they employ. There is a consensus in the literature that association members enjoy access to, and personal relationships with, senior government officials. There is also consensus that their access is enabled by their status as elected officials, and that this is the strongest determinant of their lobbying tactics.\(^9\)

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8 Haider, 223.
However, whether this access is a source of strength or a constraint is a point of contention.

Haider argued that gubernatorial and mayoral groups used direct tactics – contacting senior officials directly and testifying before committees – due to the geographic overlap of state and federal politicians’ constituencies. They shared a common constituency base with senior officials and drew on this overlap for legitimacy and persuasion.\(^\text{10}\) Patricia Freeman and Anthony Nownes, and Cammisa expanded on this argument by comparing the lobbying techniques of government associations to non-governmental interest groups. At the state level, Freeman and Nownes found that government lobbyists used more direct tactics than their non-governmental counterparts. They attributed this to their “closer relationship with public officials than lobbyists who represent other types of groups.”\(^\text{11}\) Cammisa’s interviews of Congressional members and staff also provided evidence that state and local interest groups had more access in the legislative branch than other interest groups. She found that local groups used more conciliatory, direct tactics – testifying and personally contacting members of Congress – while other groups used more indirect tactics, such as attracting media attention and organizing grassroots movements. She argued that access was reason for associations’ direct lobbying. State and local groups used their personal connections to contact senior officials directly, while other groups turned to the media and public to increase public pressure on Congress. However, Cammisa noted that direct tactics also had the effect of

\(^{10}\) Haider, 265.

\(^{11}\) Freeman and Nownes, 619-634.
not alienating Congress.\textsuperscript{12} Other scholars have offered a more pessimistic interpretation of this effect.

The common, pessimistic view of associations’ tactics is rooted in the idea that personal connections get associations in the door at senior levels of government, but they also create limitations on how such access is used. Peter Johnson argued that the personal relationships – and political aspirations – of municipal officials created caution in taking action against the provincial government. From this, he questioned whether, if the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities was unwilling to undertake measures that would hurt or embarrass the provincial government, did it really have any power at all? Could it get government to do what it does not want to do?\textsuperscript{13}

In his discussion of local authority associations in England and Wales, K. Isaac-Henry attributed their failure to achieve their major objectives to their close relationship with the central government. Isaac-Henry argued that associations should adopt a “more discriminating response in relation to [the] central government” and that their role had been reduced to “explaining government policy to member authorities.”\textsuperscript{14} He believed that their use of direct tactics made them “prisoners of the centre” rather than independent actors.\textsuperscript{15} In the context of the United States, David Berman also argued that personal connections between members of municipal leagues and state government officials grant them access, but limit their willingness to act. He attributed the mild, direct forms

\textsuperscript{12} Cammisa, 28-32.
\textsuperscript{13} Peter Johnson, 80-85.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. 145.
lobbying to municipal officials’ unwillingness to denounce higher levels of government publically, lest they need their support in the future.\textsuperscript{16}

Like Johnson, Berman understood this as an issue of personal aspirations, but he also identified the unequal distribution of power between levels of government as an important factor in how these relationships affect the associations’ lobbying tactics.\textsuperscript{17} In their analysis of the Local Government Association (LGA) in England and Wales, Tom Entwistle and Mark Laffin pushed this argument further. They identified three main tactics of associational lobbying – partner, player, and think-tank – but argued that the last strategy is prioritized, as it is believed to have the greatest rewards. Due to unequal distributions of power, the LGA has a “chronic weakness of voice” as a partner or a player, but it can provide senior government officials with information on issues.\textsuperscript{18} The LGA can input information, but it cannot leverage action. Personal connections give associations access, but the unequal nature of these relationships creates an unwillingness to employ tactics that might put this access in jeopardy.

2.2 Issue Priorities

Although the literature on government associations has been dominated by analysis of lobbying strategies, there have been some efforts to identify the issues associations pursue in their lobbying activities. Two dominant methods have been used to categorize issues. In the context of the United States, the first follows the issue areas of committee

structures. American scholars have grouped issues by where they are targeted in senior legislative committees. A second approach has been to group issues by what they seek to change. For example, Beverly Cigler developed four issue types – internal operations, structural change, intergovernmental arrangements, and policy issues – in her analysis of state-level county associations.

In both of these approaches, composition of membership has been identified as the dominant determinant of the issues associations pursue. William De Soto examined whether municipal interests are cohesive, despite regional and cultural diversity. He surveyed elected officials in 403 municipalities in the United States with populations greater than 60,000 and the executives of state-level leagues of municipalities. When asked to identify their issue priorities, the former gave equal weight to tax and revenue, environment, and crime, while the latter overwhelmingly identified tax and revenue as their core priority. De Soto attributed this gap to a greater reliance on municipal leagues by smaller cities (pop. 60,000 – 100,000) than their more populous counterparts. Larger cities (pop. > 100,000) reported viewing municipal leagues as unable to address the diversity of their interests. As a result, they often pursued individual, direct lobbying. Smaller cities were the most active within associations and, therefore, their interests were reflected in the associations’ issue agendas.19

Allen Hays also identified diversity of membership as a determinant of associations’ issue prioritization. Hays used testimony before Congress as an indicator of lobbying priorities, and found a difference in groups’ activities. State and county

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associations targeted their lobbying activity where they did not want to gain responsibility or involvement. In particular, they targeted redistributive and regulatory policies to push for continued federal control. Federal-level city groups, however, targeted areas where they wanted greater control. They concentrated their lobbying efforts on issues where they sought to gain regulatory, but not redistributive, responsibility. This active lobbying, compared to state and local groups’ defensive efforts, was attributed to the more cohesive interests of members in city associations. Cities were able to reach agreement on shared interests, while state and local associations deflected responsibility due to a lack of member cohesion.  

Beverly Cigler found further evidence that member composition is a determinant of the interests pursued in collective intergovernmental lobbying. Her analysis of state-level associations of counties found that 31 of 48 associations reported organizational challenges due to conflicts between rural and urban counties, and that these challenges were reflected in their policy-issue agendas. Cigler established that state population had a positive relationship with the number of issues on associations’ lobbying agendas. In particular, intergovernmental arrangements and substantive policy issues were significantly affected. Associations in more populous states lobbied on a greater number of these issues. In addition, Cigler found that there were negative correlations between rurality and the number of issues on an association’s agenda. The more rural a state’s

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population, and the greater proportion of residents in nonmetropolitan areas, the fewer issues an association was likely to pursue in intergovernmental lobbying.\textsuperscript{21}

The formation of government associations also provided evidence that there is a relationship between population, urbanization, and collective intergovernmental lobbying. Bertram Johnson identified four significant factors of why state-level associations formed in the United States. Three were related to membership composition: the population of the state in the 1900 Census, the percentage of the state vote for the Progressive Party presidential campaign of Robert LaFollette in 1924, and the level of urbanization in 1900.\textsuperscript{22} These findings provide further evidence that composition of membership is a determinant of associations’ behaviour.

\subsection*{2.3 Member Support and Engagement}

Another strand of research concerns members’ support for associations, and their willingness to engage in collective action. Membership composition clearly influences support. De Soto, for example, found that larger municipalities are more likely to pursue individual lobbying rather than rely on municipal leagues.\textsuperscript{23} Lionel Feldman and Katherine Graham made the normative argument that large cities \textit{should} pursue

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} The fourth significant factor was institutional, whether a state ban on special legislation – legislation that dealt with a single municipality – was in place. Bertram Johnson, 551. Lowery et al. also sought to identify the factors that led to the growth of public sector lobbies, and concluded that fiscal stress and Republican controlled legislatures are the most significant factors. David Lowery, Virginia Gray, John Cluverius, and Jeffrey J. Harden, “Explaining the Anomalous Growth of Public Sector Lobbying in the American States, 1997-2007,” \textit{Publius} 43:4 (2013), 580-599. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith also attributed the formation of Bulgaria’s National Association of Municipalities to political stress and changes in municipal law. Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Organising for Mutual Advantage: Municipal Associations in Bulgaria,” \textit{Public Administration and Development} 26:5 (2006), 373-382.
\item \textsuperscript{23} De Soto, 189.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
individual, rather than collective, lobbying. They argued that the only way the “true interests” of municipalities can be articulated is through individual lobbying and that collective action diminishes the overall power of urban centres.\textsuperscript{24} However, William Browne highlighted that opinions vary on whether smaller or larger cities are best served by collective action. He interviewed officials in nine suburban municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri and found that smaller cities perceived associations as big-city oriented. This perception translated into ambivalent attitudes towards associations’ lobbying activities. From this, they reported that they more highly prized the member services associations offered than their lobbying efforts.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, Pamela Goldsmith-Jones demonstrated that both lobbying activities and member services were important determinants in members’ support of municipal associations. Her research did not address membership composition, but it did add depth to others’ findings on lobbying and member services. To provide a descriptive account of these activities, Goldsmith-Jones surveyed members of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM). Forty percent of respondents identified lobbying as UBCM’s most important function and fifty-six percent believed lobbying and member services to be of equal importance. Different members had different priorities in belonging to UBCM. Despite the split in most important function, members perceived the Union as equally effective in these two areas of activity; eighty-three percent of respondents perceived UBCM as effective in the provision of member services and as a means of


changing provincial legislation. These findings, taken with Browne and De Soto’s research, indicate that rural/urban dominance and population size may be determinants of associational behaviour.

2.4 Membership Composition and Associations’ Behaviour

This dissertation sets about to measure what municipal associations do – that is, their policy outputs. This is accomplished by employing Thomas Dye’s model of public policy analysis. In his analysis of state and community governments in the United States, Dye identified measurable characteristics of the state, or inputs, and then ran regressions between those inputs and policy outcomes.

Dye focused on the evidence of correlations between characteristic inputs and policy outputs, rather than on the internal politics of policy formation. In his analysis, he asked questions that included: “Are single-industry states more likely to have powerful pressure groups dominating the state legislature than multi-industry states? Are governors generally more powerful in the urban industrial states than in the rural agricultural states? What effect does urbanization have on party competition in the states?” and then approached them from a comparative, empirical viewpoint. His analysis identified patterns of behaviour in policy outcomes that cut through the complexity and diversity of state conditions and legal frameworks.

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28 Ibid., 4-5.
This dissertation uses Dye’s model of measuring inputs and correlating them with outputs to test how different variations in the membership composition affect the mix of associations’ activities. This is accomplished by focusing on evidence, rather than the internal politics. Future research can examine internal politics – including norms, conflicts, and power – but this dissertation is concerned with the relationship between inputs and outputs.

The literature on government associations has demonstrated that composition of membership is a determinant of associational behaviour. Thomas Dye’s methodological framework is used expand upon that finding by testing how different variations in composition affect the mix of associations’ activities. Although there are a number of ways to measure membership composition, including economic status, ethnic/linguistic character, and geographic distribution, a typology of membership characteristics is used to identify three core categories of variation in groups’ memberships:

1. Group size
2. Dominant member type
3. Heterogeneity

1. Group size, the number of members within a group, is a common measure within the collective action literature and is often considered in the context of free rider problems and selective incentives. 2. Dominant member type measures whether one kind of member – rural or urban, large or small, anglophone or francophone – is the primary kind of member within a group. This category is concerned with how a dominant member type can influence the agenda and activities of a group. 3. The third way to conceptualize membership composition is heterogeneity. This measures the dispersion and diversity of
group members, and how the extent of dispersion influences a group’s approach to issues and jurisdictional control.

These measures are rooted in the literature, can be tested empirically, and vary across Canada’s municipal associations. However, while membership composition has emerged as a common factor in the government associations, the literature on local government associations is still small. The broader group behaviour literature and the more narrow research on business associations offer natural parallels for municipal associations. Both municipal and business associations are institutionalized groups: they have stable and limited memberships, enjoy close relationships with government, and employ professional staffs. As well, their members represent groups of people, rather than individuals. Therefore, the group and business association literatures are used in the subsequent chapters for the formation of research questions and hypotheses.

Membership Composition: Rural/Urban Dominance

One way to measure membership composition is to measure the mix of rural and urban municipalities within an association. This falls under the membership composition measure of dominant member type. The definition of rural and urban municipalities varies by province, but in each province, the provincial Municipal Act and the self-identification of municipalities are used to designate which member type is dominant within an association. The particulars of this methodological choice are detailed in Chapter 4. The category of dominant member type is rooted in the idea that differences in rural and urban interests influence associational activities and will be tested in Chapter Four. Cigler established that rural/urban conflicts caused organizational challenges for associations and that a state’s degree of urbanization shaped its lobbying agenda. Taken
with Bertram Johnson’s finding that urbanization was a significant factor in the founding of associations, there is a strong indication that member dominance is a key factor in how associations behave.

The importance of this factor is increased when the structure of Canada’s municipal associations is considered. Whereas the county and municipal associations Cigler and Johnson studied were statewide and unified, incorporating both rural and urban members, not all provinces in Canada share this structure. The American literature has established that the conflicts between rural and urban members limit issue activity. The institutional difference in Canada, between split and unified associations, offers further opportunity to test how member dominance shapes the behaviour of associations. If the mix of rural and urban municipalities creates organizational challenges, how does the separation of these municipal types into distinct organizations change their pursuit of member interests?

Hays’ research on federal level government associations in the United States offers insights on how differences in membership composition affect the issues they pursue in intergovernmental lobbying. As discussed earlier, Hays found that city associations pursued more jurisdictional control in intergovernmental lobbying than associations representing counties, state legislatures, and governors. Hays attributed this difference to more cohesive member interests in city associations than in groups that represented both rural and urban regions.29 This dissertation tests whether interest and membership cohesion manifests itself differently in rural and urban associations.

29 Hays, 1084-1092.
Membership Composition: Population Size

The second measure of member composition tested is population size. Within the typology of membership composition measures, this is a measure of heterogeneity. It will be explored in Chapters Five and Six. The use of population size as a measure of membership composition provides further insights flowing from Mancur Olson’s discussion of group behaviour and collective action. Olson identified public goods (lobbying) and selective incentives (member services) as the core components of group activities. He argued:

Large or ‘latent’ groups have no incentive to act to obtain a collective good, however valuable the collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization working in the latent group’s interest, or to bear in any other way any of the costs of the necessary collective action. Only a ‘separate and selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way.30

In his analysis of group activities, Olson focused on the measure composition of group size as a determinant of behaviour.31 Larger groups need selective incentives to motivate members to act in a group-orientated way, yet as his discussion of groups was limited to considering group members as individuals, rather than businesses or governments that represented multiple people, he did not account for the potential of greater variation in interests and internal capacities when group members represent populations. Do members that represent populations prioritize the balance of public goods and selective incentives differently than individuals? Do larger populations prioritize public goods and selective incentives differently than less populous members?

31 Ibid., 50.
Goldsmith-Jones found that municipal officials differ in how they prioritize municipal associations’ functions. As noted earlier, when asked whether they viewed lobbying or member services as the UBCM’s top priority, forty percent of municipal officials chose lobbying, compared to fifty-six percent who gave the two activities equal weight.\(^{32}\) Although Goldsmith-Jones did not correlate responses with population size, William Browne’s findings offer a potential explanation of the root cause: smaller municipalities prize member services over intergovernmental lobbying.

In the context of European employer organizations, Alessia Vatta argued that small- and medium-sized enterprises join these organizations because they rely on the services the organizations provide.\(^{33}\) Smaller firms were reliant on the collective pooling of resources, whereas larger employers could afford the services offered by associations individually. Larger firms, then, join associations for their lobbying activities. However, while these authors identify how population influences membership in associations, they fail to consider how members’ preferences translate into behaviour. Does the dispersion of member populations shape the mix of activities an association undertakes?

Martin Perry has theorized on how the dispersion of member sizes affects group behavior. In his research on trade associations in Ireland and New Zealand, Perry identified eight characteristics of associational structures and hypothesized how each would influence group behavior. One of these variables was the mix of members’ sizes, in particular whether larger or small enterprises were predominant. He argued that this would influence the balance of associational activity between lobbying and providing

\(^{32}\) Goldsmith-Jones, 48-50.  
member benefits. If an association was dominated by small enterprises that had greater needs for the services they were unable to provide autonomously, then the association would focus the majority of its collective resources on service provision. If large firms that could self-provide services dominated an association, then the association would allocate most of its resources to lobbying efforts.\textsuperscript{34} Matilde Bombardini tested this theory on trade associations in the United States, and found that industrial sectors characterized by a higher share of larger firms exhibited greater levels of political intensity. That is, they allocated more resources for lobbying.\textsuperscript{35} These findings provide support for the proposition that the extent of small members and the presence of large members within an association can influence the allocation of collective resources between service provision and lobbying.

Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini built on Olson’s arguments about group size and collective action. They argued that it is not just the size of a group, but also the size of group members that determines its behaviour. Terry Moe extended this idea by considering how the competing demands of large and small members interact. He theorizes about internal group dynamics and how they influence an association’s goals:

a) Members of latent groups can only be induced to join through the operation of selective incentives, yet b) the sale of selective incentives yields a surplus (in selective groups) that can be used by group leaders for lobbying and other expenditures on collective goods; it follows that c) these political activities are the by-products of the operation of selective incentives – they have nothing to do with why members join, but are made possible because members join; therefore d) the leaders of latent groups may pursue any collective goods they wish without fear

of losing member “support,” since contributions are independent of political considerations. Groups offer services to gain and retain members, but these services are also profitable for the group. They can use these profits to carry out the advocacy prioritized by large members.

Olson argues that, in large groups, the focus of group behavior is on the provision of member services, but he does not attempt to analyze internal politics. Moe addresses this gap by considering the interactions of small and large members’ competing interests, and the distribution of member sizes. Internal group dynamics shape the goals that associations pursue. Moe argues that groups offer services to small organizations attract and retain members, but these services are also sold at a cost. The profits of service provision can be used to carry out advocacy. Group members that are small organizations create the need for service provision, but large organizations are motivated to join groups because of their advocacy. They can self-provide services, but groups need them in order to have collective weight in advocacy. Therefore they must direct profits made from the services provided for small organizations to carry out advocacy on behalf of large organizations.

Moe identifies that the competing demands of small organization members for services and of large organization members for advocacy can create “a disjunction between member goals and group goals.” Small organization members are driven by service provision, but the presence of large organizations within a group make the

37 Moe, 75.
provision of services more economical, due to economies of scale. Groups must be responsive to the advocacy goals of large organizations in order to meet the service goals of small organizations. From this, the advocacy goals of a group may not reflect the advocacy interests of most of its members. Rather, they will reflect the goals of its largest members. Taken together, Olson and Moe’s theories suggest that associations must balance the provision of member services and advocacy, and that this balance is dependent on the sizes of its members.

Beyond the influence of membership sizes on member services and advocacy, the literature offers another perspective on the distribution of member populations. Whereas small municipalities are expected to influence the mix of associational activities, population distribution is also expected to influence the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. That is, the shape of size distributions will affect which level of government member municipalities want to meet their needs. As Cammisa discussed, “while government lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, unlike other groups (or at least to a greater extent than other groups), are also interested in the spatial dimension of any policy, that is, who will have the authority in implementation and control of funds.”

In lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with whether their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through transfers to fund municipal programs. Hays attributed the difference in jurisdictional requests to the greater of cohesiveness of members in city associations, but the relationship between the shape of size distributions and jurisdictional responsibility can also be considered in the inverse.

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38 Cammisa, 25.
If a narrow dispersion of member populations translates into more cohesive interests, it can be expected that cohesive associations would lobby for provincial programs to meet their needs, as they see the interests of other members as similar to their own. In associations with a high variation in member populations, it can be expected that members will request the resources to institute programs at the municipal level. They are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests.

In their analysis of trade association lobbying, Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi pinpointed dispersion of membership as a factor in collective lobbying. They found that the less differentiated an industry, the more likely its members were to pursue lobbying through their trade association, as opposed to individually. Although they measured differentiation by firms’ range of products, rather than their size, their findings still present strong evidence that whether or not actors see the interests of other members as similar to their own influences their approach to associational lobbying.\(^\text{39}\) Iain Osgood tested this finding in a specific policy-area: US-Korea and US-Australia Free Trade Agreements. He found that product differentiation was a significant factor in lobbying activity. Industries with low product differentiation were more likely to reach consensus on trade liberalization and have an active trade association.\(^\text{40}\)

Cammisa and Hays recognized that jurisdictional responsibility is an important aspect of municipal associations’ concern, but we need to know whether this concern is influenced by member heterogeneity. The business literature provides insights into how


the membership characteristics of associations influence members’ perceptions of shared interests. Both aspects of membership composition – the percentage of members that are small municipalities and the preponderance of a single size type – are drawn from the literature on group and associational behaviour.

2.5 Conclusion

The following research chapters draw on prior government association and collective action research to develop hypotheses that are rooted in the literature and empirically testable. Most of the literature on government associations has focused on the tactics they employ and has attributed their use of direct lobbying to institutional structures and high degrees of access at senior levels of government. When researchers have examined the issues pursued by associations, a third explanation of their behaviour has emerged: membership composition. The research questions in this dissertation build on that explanation by testing how rural/urban dominance and population size affect three aspects of associational behaviour: issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.
Chapter 3

3 Membership Cleavages and Association Structures

Minimal research has been conducted on provincial level municipal associations in Canada. The literature that does exist has been focused on individual associations.\(^1\) This chapter examines how associations deal with cleavages in their memberships. To address this question, a comparable dataset of associations’ memberships and structures was compiled. Associations use fee structures, boards of directors, caucuses, sub-associations, and district meetings to represent and accommodate municipalities that vary in size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban composition. When associational structures are examined, three predominant divisions amongst members emerge: size, region and legal type. Once the variation amongst associations is established, the effect of membership differences on their behaviour can be tested.\(^2\)

3.1 The Complexity of Association Memberships

Prior research on local government associations has argued that they pursue “issues which affect all of the units represented” in order to maintain their membership bases.\(^3\) The ability of associations to identify and pursue common interests is complicated by the

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2 Other aspects of associational behaviour – member services, advocacy, and resolutions – are discussed in depth in Chapters 4-6 and are therefore not discussed here.
diversity of municipal conditions. Associations represent municipalities with widely different populations (Table 3-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>First Quartile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Third Quartile</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>106,172</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>5,545</td>
<td>10,838</td>
<td>390,096</td>
<td>16,947</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEIM</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>34,562</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMNB</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>69,074</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNB</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>56,224</td>
<td>3,823</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>7,190</td>
<td>19,899</td>
<td>1,296,814</td>
<td>39,315</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>2,394</td>
<td>663,617</td>
<td>5,766</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARM</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>8,354</td>
<td>5,890</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>222,189</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>10,061</td>
<td>92,490</td>
<td>9,218</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>1,096,833</td>
<td>11,435</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>5,021</td>
<td>16,701</td>
<td>603,502</td>
<td>22,249</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on 2013 membership lists and 2011 Census data.

At the extreme, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s (AMO) member sizes range from 145 to nearly 1.3 million. Even in an urban association, the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), member populations range from a village of 10 to more than one million in Calgary. The Gini coefficient of each association, which measures statistical dispersion, shows that there are variations in the distribution of member populations. The Gini coefficients range from 40.3 in SARM to 91.5 in AUMA. The populations of SARM members are relatively similar, whereas AUMA members’
populations are the most widely distributed. Most member populations are widely dispersed and associations must balance the diverse needs of their other members.

As hypothesized in the previous chapter, a wide range of member populations can constrain an association’s ability to develop a cohesive message and lobbying priorities. In practice, an association can pursue issues relevant to all of its members, balance interests relevant to different groups, or find other means of ensuring that its members feel well represented within the organization. An association can limit its work to common interests or risk alienating portions of its membership by pursuing issues that are not universal. This tension challenges associations’ executives and staff, and is felt by their members. In 2001, the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) carried out an extensive internal review of its operations, including a survey of its members. The review identified the “lack of unity and cohesiveness owing to diverse membership needs” as a systematic internal limitation.⁴

The diverse needs of associational members are rooted in their regional, legal type, socio-economic, ethnic/linguistic, and rural/urban variations. Legal type refers to different kinds of municipalities that can be formed under a province’s Municipal Act. For example, Manitoba’s Municipal Act defines four legal types: cities, towns, villages, and rural municipalities.⁵ Association members can include municipalities in densely populated metropolitan regions and remote northern villages, affluent bedroom communities and struggling one-industry towns. Associations use structural mechanisms – including board of directors, caucuses, and regional meetings – to allow different types

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⁵ Government of Manitoba, The Municipal Act, 427(1) and 427(2), web2.gov.mb.ca.
of municipalities to voice and represent their needs. The development of municipal associations in Canada reflects the complexity of member interests.

### 3.2 Formation of Associations

The early decades of the twentieth century saw a rapid growth in Canadian municipal associations. Between 1899 and 1919, ten associations were established in eight provinces. Seven were formed between 1905 and 1907. As noted in Chapter One, the growth of municipal associations in Canada coincided with the development of state municipal leagues in the United States. A convention of Ontario municipalities was held in Toronto in the late 1880s, but a second meeting was not held until 1899. The first attempt at league formation in the United States occurred in Indiana in 1891. In July 1893, a meeting was held to form The Municipal Association of British Columbia. Delegates at the meeting passed a constitution that provided for periodic gatherings to: 1. Discuss municipal matters, 2. Promote legislative enactments in the interest of good municipal government, 3. Develop uniformity in municipal government, and 4. Share information. But the association did not meet again. The first lasting American state leagues were formed in California, Iowa, and Wisconsin in 1898.

Bertram Johnson’s research on state municipal leagues found that they formed in response to state constitutional bans on “special legislation” – laws that were specific to individual cities. He argued that these bans changed the incentive structure of collective action for municipalities. Local governments could no longer advocate for laws that

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6 *The Evening Citizen*, September 7, 1899.

affected their individual municipalities and began to work together for legislation that addressed common interests.\(^8\) Canadian municipalities did not face similar constitutional changes, but they adopted the structure of municipal unions to address a different issue: the growth of public utilities.

The Ontario Municipal Association (OMA), Canada’s first enduring municipal union, was formed in 1899, one year after the first state leagues were established. An impromptu meeting of Ontario municipalities occurred in the spring of 1899 and they decided to hold a formal convention in September of that year. The core issue addressed at the founding convention was the method of assessing personal property. Municipal officials in attendance unanimously agreed that the existing method was unjust and elected a delegation of municipal officials to present their proposed changes to the provincial government.\(^9\) A national municipal association, the Union of Canadian Municipalities (UCM), was started in 1901. It was founded “largely to contest the utility companies’ assumptions that they could tear up public infrastructure without negotiating municipal rights-of-way.”\(^10\) UCM encouraged all Canadian municipalities to become members and its advocacy for collective action spurred the formation of municipal unions at the provincial level.

The Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM), the second provincial level association to form, was founded in March 1905. The Mayor of Brandon, John Fleming, organized a meeting with the intent of forming a municipal association in Manitoba.

\(^8\) Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of State Leagues of Cities” *Social Science History* 29:4, 554-.
\(^9\) *The Evening Citizen*.
Municipalities in the province had been fighting for oversight of telephone companies. Fleming believed that a municipal union “would be better equipped than to confront these challenges [of utility oversight].”¹¹ He also referenced the success of the new Union of Canadian Municipalities in pursuing collective action against utility companies.¹² At the March 1905 meeting, delegates from 31 rural and urban municipalities voted unanimously to create UMM. The new association “resolved that any provincial or federal bills affecting railways, telegraph, telephone and electric power lines should be vetted by the municipalities which might be affected by them.”¹³ Delegates passed a constitution for UMM and voted on resolutions that addressed tax revenue for public works, railway crossings, and assessments of swamplands.

The next UCM convention was held in Winnipeg in August 1905. At that meeting, Fleming encouraged delegates to form municipal unions in their own provinces. He argued that unions would help municipalities fight affronts to their authority, including utility companies.¹⁴ The next month, representatives from 22 municipalities in British Columbia met and voted to create the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM). The Vancouver Daily Province reported that municipal unions were formed out of the necessity of “securing some means of protection for encroachment … of private companies against the rights of the people.”¹⁵ Several municipalities in BC had begun meeting on an informal basis in 1903, but the organization of UMM spurred the

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¹² Ibid., 12-15.
¹³ Ibid., 15.
¹⁴ Ibid., 12-13.
¹⁵ *Vancouver Daily Province*, September 29, 1905.
Mayor of Kamloops, Charles Stevens, to spearhead the establishment of a formal association. He organized the September 1905 meeting where UBCM was founded.\(^\text{16}\)

Representatives of municipalities in Alberta also met in September 1905, following Fleming’s call to action at the UCM convention. The Mayor of Calgary, John Emerson, who was also the Vice-President of UCM, organized the inaugural meeting. The Union of Alberta Municipalities (UAM) was established two months later. At a UAM convention in March 1906, delegates voted on the association’s chief objectives.\(^\text{17}\) They were: 1. Uniformity in assessment law, 2. Protecting municipalities from corporate encroachments, 3. Enacting provincial legislation for uniformity in municipalities, and 4. “Making arrangements in reference to indigent persons chargeable to municipalities.”\(^\text{18}\) UAM did not pass a constitution until 1910, by which time the independent Alberta Local Improvement Districts Association (ALIDA) had been founded.\(^\text{19}\) ALIDA members included local improvement districts, rural municipalities, and hamlets.\(^\text{20}\) The 1906 UAM convention had been open to all municipalities, but its 1910 constitution specified that UAM membership was open to cities, towns, and villages.\(^\text{21}\) ALIDA represented rural local governments.\(^\text{22}\)


\(^{17}\) UAM was renamed the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association in 1966.


\(^{20}\) The Granum News, December 08, 1911.

\(^{21}\) Patterson, 4-5.

The inaugural meeting of the Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities (USM) was held in August 1906, ahead of the UCM annual convention. Regina’s Mayor, Peter McAra, Jr. organized a meeting of representatives from 12 Saskatchewan cities, towns, and villages. He invited the Mayor of Calgary, John Emerson, to speak about the Union of Alberta Municipalities and encourage USM’s formation. At the meeting, delegates voted on resolutions concerning municipal jurisdiction over public utility companies, taxation, funding for hospitals, hail insurance, and quarantine enforcement. The Saskatchewan Local Improvement Districts Association (SLIDA) had formed the year prior, but its founding purposes are unknown. At the founding convention, USM made its membership open to all municipalities and advocated for local improvement districts to become rural municipalities. Despite these efforts, USM did not address the division between itself and SLIDA directly, and rural-urban tensions still arose in convention debates.

At the inaugural USM meeting, there was a discussion of town municipalities bearing the cost of hospitalization for the residents of rural municipalities. Delegates at the USM convention expressed discontent that their towns and cities had to “take care of people from the country who do not contribute towards the support of [hospitals].” At the same convention, USM passed a resolution asking the provincial government to

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24 SLIDA’s inaugural convention was held on September 4, 1905, the same week that the province of Saskatchewan was founded. Its formation did not receive coverage in provincial newspapers. Like ALIDA, SLIDA’s early meeting records have been lost. SLIDA was renamed the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities in 1911. Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “History,” sarm.ca.

25 The Leader (Regina), August 7, 1906. The Leader (Regina), August 9, 1906.

26 Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities, “Discussions at the Inaugural Meeting of the Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities,” August 6, 1906, 4-5.
mandate a blanketed hail insurance for all cultivated land, citing the negative effect of
crop failure on town business communities.27 SLIDA formed first, but when cities,
towns, and villages came together to form USM, they used their new association to
express rural-urban tensions to the provincial government.

The first meeting of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) was held
at the UCM annual convention in August 1906 in Halifax. Mayor W.M. Black of
Wolfville put forward a motion that “a Provincial Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities
be formed.”28 It passed unanimously. Delegates who supported the motion cited the
success of municipal unions and municipal ownership of “telephones, street railways,
water works and electric lighting” in other provinces.29 They passed a proposed
constitution “similar to that which has been adopted by other Provincial Unions.”30 The
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM) was founded in 1906/07, but records
of its proceedings are not available until 1912.31 Seven associations had formed in two
years. ALIDA followed in 1909, but it was a longer period of time before there was a
municipal association in every province.

The Province of Quebec established a Ministry of Municipal Affairs in 1918.
Municipalities formed the l’Union des municipalités du Québec (UMQ) the following
year. UMQ attributes its formation to the end of the First World War, urban reform, and

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27 Ibid., 15.
29 Ibid. 4.
30 Ibid., 5-6.
31 Later records of UNBM conventions have conflicting reports of what year UNBM first met. Some records indicate that its inaugural meeting was held in 1906, while others report 1907.
industrialization in Quebec.\textsuperscript{32} The inaugural meeting of the Newfoundland Federation of Municipalities (NFM) was held in 1951, just two years after Newfoundland joined Confederation. The founding purpose of the NFM was to “increase efficiency and raise the standard of municipal administration throughout the Province.”\textsuperscript{33} At that meeting, delegates from 19 municipalities passed a constitution and voted on resolutions concerning the cost of road construction, traffic regulations, vehicle registration, firefighting, and town planning acts. The last province to establish a municipal association was Prince Edward Island. The Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM) was founded in 1957, with the objectives of “the guidance and improvement of legislation upon municipal issues, united action on matters of municipal concern, and the fostering of a fraternal spirit among members.”\textsuperscript{34} Delegates who supported the formation of a municipal union on Prince Edward Island cited the accomplishments of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM).

Between 1899 and 1909, one national and nine provincial municipal associations were founded in Canada. There are two common themes in the formation of these associations: the perceived need for collective action in contesting utility companies and the sharing of information between associations as they organized. The Union of Canadian Municipalities brought together municipalities from across the country and spurred the development of provincial level associations. UCM’s founding concerns about municipal jurisdiction over railways and telegraph, telephone, and electric power

\textsuperscript{34} Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, “A Brief History of FPEIM,” www.fpeim.ca.
lines were reflected in the early organizing of at the provincial level. There was a rapid diffusion of provincial unions.

At the 1905 UCM convention, John Fleming used the formation of UMM to rally municipalities in other provinces to establish their own municipal unions. Six associations formed in the following two years. Associations also shared information as they formed. Municipal representatives in British Columbia and Alberta answered Fleming’s call to action within a month. USM invited a representative of UAM to its inaugural meeting. UNSM drew on the constitutions of other associations when drafting its own. Municipal leagues were first established in the United States, but they spread quickly in Canada. The expansion of public utilities created new problems for municipalities, problems they felt would best be addressed through collective action. UCM and provincial unions were founded in response to the encroachment of utility companies on municipal authorities, but their constitutions encourage cooperation on other areas of joint concern.

In short, by 1919 unified association were founded in six provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia). These were intended to represent all municipalities within a province. Separate rural and urban associations were founded in two provinces (Saskatchewan and Alberta). Unified associations later formed in Newfoundland and Labrador (1951) and Prince Edward Island (1957) (Table 3-2).
### Table 3-2. Original Municipal Associations in Each Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding Name</th>
<th>Founding Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Municipal Association (OMA)</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan Local Improvement Districts Association (SLIDA)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Alberta Municipalities (UAM)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM)</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities (USM)</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM)</td>
<td>1906/07</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Local Improvement Districts Association (ALIDA)</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des Municipalités du Québec (UMQ)</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland Federation of Municipalities (NFM)</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the twentieth century, the number and type of associations formed by municipalities became larger and more complex.

### 3.3 Current Municipal Associations in Canada

At present, there are six provinces with unified associations (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia) and three provinces with separate rural and urban associations (Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Alberta). New Brunswick has distinct anglophone and francophone associations, and an association for cities.\(^\text{35}\) Saskatchewan has associations for its northern and resort communities, and Manitoba has an association for bilingual municipalities (Table 3-3)\(^\text{35}\)

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\(^{35}\) AFMNB’s membership is open to francophone and bilingual municipalities. The Constitution of UMNJB states that the association is bilingual and that every municipality in the province is eligible for membership. Despite this assertion, UMNJB does not designate any board representation for Zone 8 in the
Table 3-3. Provincial-Level Municipal Associations (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM)</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM)</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA)</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC)</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des municipalités du Québec (UMQ)</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Primarily Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM)</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Outside Major Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities of New Brunswick Association-Association Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL)</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New North – SANC Services Inc. (Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities) (SANC)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The types of municipal associations have become more complicated since the original unified, rural, and urban associations were established. In the discussion, the term province, which is entirely francophone. UMNB has six bilingual and no francophone members. AFMNB makes UMNB an anglophone association by default.
“section associations” is used to denote associations that represent a particular type of municipality within a province, but are not the largest municipal association available for these municipalities to join. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, where there are split rural and urban associations, these are the broadest, largest provincial level association available to either rural or urban municipalities. In New Brunswick, the anglophone and francophone associations are the largest organizations. These rural/urban and linguistic associations, along with unified associations in other provinces, are the primary associations for their members and are referred to as “primary associations.”

Section associations represent more niche memberships. The four section municipal associations in Canada are the Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), The New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and L'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBMB). All of their members are eligible to join a larger municipal association, but the section and the primary associations do not have formal, legal relationships with each other. These legal types chose to break away from

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36 Section associations are not included in the subsequent analysis. Because they represent narrow memberships, they do not have to deal with internal divisions to the same extent as other associations.

primary associations in order to voice their needs independently within the provincial political sphere.

In summary, the types of municipal associations in Canada are:

**Primary:** The broadest, largest provincial association available for a municipality to join. All municipalities in a province can be eligible for membership in a primary association, or a primary association’s membership can restricted on a rural/urban or linguistic basis. An association is primary when there is no larger association that its members are eligible to join.

**Examples:** The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities is a primary association because it is the only municipal association in Nova Scotia.

Members of Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) are not eligible for membership in the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA), and vice-versa. They are the largest municipal association for their eligible members. SARM and SUMA are both primary associations.

**Section:** The association represents a particular type of municipality within a province, but is not the largest municipal association available for its members to join.

**Example:** Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS). All resort communities are eligible for membership in the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA).

**Example’s self-description:** “PARCS is the independent association that supports and represents the interests of cottage communities in Saskatchewan.”

The categories of primary associations in Canada are:

**Unified:** The only primary association in a province. All municipalities are eligible for membership.

**Example:** The Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM).

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“The AMM helps our rural and urban municipal governments with one voice.”\textsuperscript{39}

**Split:** A primary association whose membership is drawn from only a portion of municipalities in the province. Another split association represents the other municipalities in the province.

**Example:** Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities.

“The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities is the independent association that represents rural municipal government in Saskatchewan and is the principal advocate in representing them before senior levels of governments.”\textsuperscript{40}

The types of split associations are:

**Rural:** The association’s membership is limited to rural municipalities, defined either by the province’s *Municipal Act* or the association’s constitution.

**Example:** Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties.

“The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties is an independent association comprising Alberta’s 69 counties and municipal districts. Since 1909, we have helped rural municipalities achieve strong, effective local government.”\textsuperscript{41}

**Urban:** The association’s membership is limited to urban municipalities, defined either by the province’s *Municipal Act* or the association’s constitution.

**Example:** Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association.

“SUMA is the unified, respected, and influential voice of urban municipalities promoting effective governance and progressive public policies that improve the quality of urban life.”\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “About,” www.amm.mb.ca.

\textsuperscript{40} Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “About,” sarm.ca.

\textsuperscript{41} Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “About AAMDC.”

**Linguistic:** The association’s membership is limited to either francophone/bilingual municipalities or anglophone/bilingual municipalities. All municipalities that meet its linguistic requirement are eligible for membership. For primary linguistic associations, there is not a larger association that is open to both anglophone and francophone municipalities.

**Example:** Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB).

“Agir comme porte-parole des municipalités francophones et mixtes sur les dossiers d'intérêt commun.”

In short (3-1):

**Figure 3-1. Types of Municipal Association Memberships**

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The division between municipal associations in Quebec is less straightforward than in other provinces. La fédération québécoise des municipalités was founded in 1944 for municipalities “outside major cities.” This made l’Union des municipalités du Québec, founded in 1919, primarily urban. Despite this distinction, both associations position themselves as a voice for rural and urban municipalities in Quebec. UMQ states that it represents municipalities of all sizes and in all regions of Quebec. FQM describes itself as “interlocuteur incontournable des municipalités et des régions du Québec.” Neither UMQ nor FQM make their membership lists publicly available, but they must have an overlap in membership. There are 1,111 municipalities in Quebec. FQM states that it has approximately 1,000 members and UMQ has over 300. The two associations lack clear divisions and are in competition for members.

Finally, two associations (AMO and UBCM) have internal groups, called sub-associations. Sub-associations have their own staffs and annual conventions, but are part of a larger association. They are organized along legal type, regional, mayoral/warden, and/or linguistic lines. Unlike section associations, they are not independent. Municipalities automatically become members of a sub-association when they join its primary association.

In addition to the growing number of section associations, the number of linguistic associations in Canada has also expanded in recent decades. FQM split from UQM in 1944, but francophone or bilingual associations formed in New Brunswick (AFMNB, primary), Ontario (AFMO, sub-association), and Manitoba (AMBM, section)

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45 Fédération québécoise des municipalités, “fédération Québécoise des municipalités,” fqm.ca.
between 1989 and 1995.\textsuperscript{46} AFMNB makes New Brunswick’s other primary association, UMNB, anglophone by default.

Patterns of municipal association mergers and splits are discussed at length in Chapter Four and Appendix D, but the majority of provinces have had stable associations over time. In four provinces, there has been one association that has remained unified since its formation (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia). In Saskatchewan and Alberta, the founding urban and rural associations have remained split over time. New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba all started with one unified association, but have undergone changes in the number and type of associations formed by their municipalities.

With the exception of CNBA-ACNB, section associations have formed in recent decades. Manitoba’s association for bilingual municipalities (AMBM) was started in 1989. Saskatchewan’s association for resort communities (PARCS) began as a working group under SUMA in 1983, but became an independent sectional association in 1986. The association for northern communities in Saskatchewan (SANC) was formed in 1996. At present, there are 18 independent, provincial level municipal associations in Canada.\textsuperscript{47}

\section*{3.4 The Non-Partisan Status of Associations and their Staff}

A feature of all 18 provincial level municipal associations is their status as non-partisan, not-for-profit organizations. Their non-partisanship is informed by the absence of

\textsuperscript{46} Sub-associations are organizations of municipalities within a larger association’s governing structure. Unlike section associations, they are part of another municipal association, rather than independent. They are discussed at greater length later in the chapter.

\textsuperscript{47} There are also municipal associations in two territories, the NWT Association of Communities (NWTAC) and the Association of Yukon Communities. Because of legal differences between territorial communities and provincial municipalities, they are not considered in this dissertation.
partisan affiliation at the local government level in most provinces, formalized in their constitutions and governing documents, and reinforced through the work of association staff. Although elected municipal officials in eight provinces do not have formal partisan affiliations, association staff members offer a neutral face to counter any informal partisan networks that exist among associations’ elected leaders.

The Executive Director or Chief Executive Officer of an association plays a key role in maintaining a non-partisan stance, as provincial governments and association board members change. Executive Directors often have long tenures in their position, and can exercise a degree of autonomy in their role. The autonomy of Executive Directors to pursue the issue priorities voted on by members and the non-partisan status of associations both work to quell internal frictions among association members. These features also contribute to associations’ success in attracting and retaining municipalities as members.

3.5 Membership Uptake Amongst Municipalities

Associations focused their early activity on persuading all municipalities to become members. These efforts have been largely successful (Table 3-4). In every province the municipal association, or associations, collectively represent the majority of municipalities. The lowest percentage is found in Prince Edward Island (55.6%), but in twelve of the thirteen associations where membership lists are available, the association

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48 Table 3-4 reflects the member populations of Manitoba before its large-scale set of municipal amalgamations that went into effect on January 1, 2015. The amalgamations that reduced the number of municipalities from 197 to 137, but the most recent Census data gives municipal populations for the 197 pre-amalgamation municipalities. The Association of Manitoba Municipalities maintained full municipal association both before and after the amalgamations.
represents more than 90% of eligible members. In three provinces (Nova Scotia, Manitoba, and British Columbia), the unified provincial association represents every municipality. There are municipalities that do not belong to an association in the seven other provinces, but associations could have a more severe free-rider problem. All associations represent the majority of their province’s population, either individually or together with their urban, rural, or linguistic counterpart. The lowest percentages are found in Ontario (78.1%) and PEI (87.0%), but in seven of ten provinces, municipal associations account for more than 99% of the provincial population living within municipalities.\textsuperscript{49} This is a source of collective strength and legitimacy in their representation of municipal interests.

\textsuperscript{49} The associations in Quebec, la Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM) and l’Union des municipalités du Québec, are excluded because they do not make their membership lists public.
Table 3-4. Membership Uptake Amongst Municipalities (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Members / Municipalities Eligible for Membership (% members)</th>
<th>Population of Members / Population of Municipalities Eligible for Membership (% population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>275 / 281 (97.9)</td>
<td>457,021 / 459,763 (99.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>54 / 54 (100)</td>
<td>915,138 / 915,138 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEIM</td>
<td>40 / 72 (55.6)</td>
<td>82,558 / 94,854 (87.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMNB</td>
<td>52 / 52 (100)</td>
<td>284,891 / 284,891 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNB</td>
<td>59 / 65 (90.8)</td>
<td>221,705 / 382,038 (58.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>412 / 444 (92.8)</td>
<td>9,991,963 / 12,764,756 (78.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>197 / 197 (100)</td>
<td>1,135,956 / 1,135,956 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARM</td>
<td>296 / 296 (100)</td>
<td>174,585 / 174,585 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>450 / 495 (90.9)</td>
<td>799,046 / 803,104 (99.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>69 / 70 (98.6)</td>
<td>636,076 / 640,127 (99.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>274 / 274 (100)</td>
<td>3,133,274 / 3,133,274 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>191 / 191 (100)</td>
<td>4,400,056 / 4,400,056 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on 2013 membership lists and 2011 Census data.

The municipalities that are not members indicate that the dispersion of member populations complicates the ability of associations to represent diverse member needs. In MNL, FPEIM, and SUMA, non-members are amongst the smallest villages and communities in each province. All towns and cities are members. This is also true for all
but one non-member in AMO. The City of Toronto, which left AMO in 2004, represents the other challenge in membership uptake: maintaining large population outliers as members. In New Brunswick, only two of eight cities belong to UMNB. Associations represent diverse member populations and face difficulties in maintaining population extremes as members, in part due to the financial cost of membership. In very small municipalities, financially limited councils must always question whether membership is worth the price. In a very large municipality, like Toronto, there may not be any services that an association can provide more cheaply than the city can provide itself. Despite the issues with population extremes, associations are largely successful in attracting and maintaining municipalities as members. They are examples of voluntary inter-municipal cooperation and their high levels of membership uptake indicate that the benefits they offer outweigh the cost of membership for nearly all municipalities.

These calculations do not account for First Nations or those living in unincorporated areas. New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have the most significant populations living in unincorporated areas, 35.5 percent and 32.0 percent, respectively. In British Columbia, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities has begun to allow First Nations to become members. As of May 2015, six of the province’s 203 First Nations had joined the association. In Manitoba, First Nations can be associate members of AMM. As of 2015, no First Nations are associate members, but AMM, the Treaty Relations Commission of Manitoba, and the Treaty Land Committee of

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Manitoba have signed a partnership agreement. This agreement establishes regular meetings between the three groups.\footnote{Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “We all Work Together: Municipalities and First Nations Join Forces to Streamline Treaty Land Entitlement Process,” March 17, 2015, www.amm.mb.ca.}

### 3.6 Membership Fee Structures

With one exception, all municipalities pay membership fees to belong to an association.\footnote{The one exception is SANC, which receives a grant for operating through the provincial Northern Municipal Trust Account. Matt Heley, Research and Communications, New North, Email to the Author, October 31, 2014.}

Numerous associations do not make the cost of membership publically available. Where fees are available, there is a mix of fee structures determined by population size, tax base, and provincial assessment (Table 3-5).

#### Table 3-5. Municipal Association Membership Fees (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNL</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per Capita Membership Fee ($280 Minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First 5,000</td>
<td>$1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 10,000</td>
<td>$0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Craig Pollett, CEO, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Email to the Author, June 10, 2015.

**UNSM**

1. All units with the exception of those units paying the capped membership fee pay a base fee of $1000; and
2. A combination of the unit’s population and assessment be used to calculate the remaining dues based on 85% population and 15% assessment; and
3. A capped fee is annually established by the Board.

Note: Entries based on Judy A. Webber, Event Planner/Financial Officer, UNSM, Email to the Author, June 16, 2015.
### FPEIM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per Capita Membership Fee ($400 Minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 5,000</td>
<td>$1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.6275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.3825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.1375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 5,000</td>
<td>$1.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### AFMNB – Based on the Tax Base of Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Category Tax Base</th>
<th>Maximum Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.005%</td>
<td>0 - 54,999,999</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.004%</td>
<td>55,000,000 - 99,999,999</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0035%</td>
<td>100,000,000 - 199,999,999</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0025%</td>
<td>200,000,000 - 399,999,999</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0015%</td>
<td>400,000,000 - 749,999,999</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0009%</td>
<td>750 million and +</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Mathieu Voyer, Responsable de la recherché et des politiques, AFMNB, Email to the Author, October 2, 2014.

### UMQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Membership Fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-300</td>
<td>$71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-500</td>
<td>$96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-700</td>
<td>$172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701-900</td>
<td>$344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>901 and more</td>
<td>$0.510 per capita</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lower/Single Tier Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Flat Fee of</th>
<th>Plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-300</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-1,000</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td>0.9586 per household above 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001-4,000</td>
<td>$1,245</td>
<td>0.5933 per household above 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001-20,000</td>
<td>$3,025</td>
<td>0.4709 per household above 4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000</td>
<td>$10,560</td>
<td>0.0931 per household above 20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Upper Tier Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Flat Fee of</th>
<th>Plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-30,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2336 per household up to 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 30,000</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td>0.0183 per household above 30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Separated Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Flat Fee of</th>
<th>Plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-300</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-1,000</td>
<td>$575</td>
<td>0.9586 per household above 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001-4,000</td>
<td>$1,245</td>
<td>0.5933 per household above 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,001-20,000</td>
<td>$3,025</td>
<td>0.4709 per household above 4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000</td>
<td>$10,560</td>
<td>0.0931 per household above 20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### SUMA

**Base per voting delegate $508.03, plus:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per Capita Fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 100,000</td>
<td>$0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 100,000</td>
<td>$0.275 (50% the per capita rate of &lt; 100,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SUMA – Number of Voting Delegates Per Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal Population</th>
<th>Maximum Number of Voting Delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-500</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-2,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001-5,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,001-10,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-50,00</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,001-100,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 100,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Lindsay Peel, Manager, Financial Services, SUMA, *Email to the Author*, November 12, 2014.

### AUMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per Capita Membership Fee ($560 Base Fee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3,5000</td>
<td>$0.7610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,501-10,000</td>
<td>$0.8353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001-20,000</td>
<td>$0.6312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>$0.3908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,001-600,000</td>
<td>$0.2598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600,000+</td>
<td>$0.1300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Dan Rude, Chief Financial Officer, AUMA, *Email to the Author*, June 18, 2015.

### Associations with Flat Fees and Formulas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Fee / Formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SARM</td>
<td>$500 per municipality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>$2,600 + $5.95 per million and $0.58 above $2 billion (based on provincial equalized assessment).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Minimum or Base Fee</th>
<th>Per Capita: Regressive</th>
<th>Per Capita: Progressive</th>
<th>Assessment: Regressive</th>
<th>Assessment: Progressive</th>
<th>Capped Fee</th>
<th>Flat Fee</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HRM calculated separately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per household; regressive within legal types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEIM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMNB</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMQ</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AMM entry based on Joe Masi, CEO, AMM, *Phone Call with the Author*, June 10, 2015.

In five associations, the per capita cost of membership decreases as population size increases. More populous municipalities pay higher membership fees, but the regressive rates ease the cost of membership for them. Regressive fee structures allow associations to address the wide dispersion of member populations. Large municipalities pay a higher membership fee than smaller units, but they do not bear the majority cost of membership. This structure is used in provinces with large population outliers – St. John’s in MNL, Charlottetown in FPEIM, Saskatoon and Regina in SUMA, and Calgary
and Edmonton in AUMA. It is also used in AMO. AMM and USNM use progressive fee structures, but cap the cost of membership for Winnipeg and the Halifax Regional Municipalities, respectively. SARM and AAMDC – both rural associations – have either a flat fee or flat formula. In SARM, all municipalities pay an annual membership fee of $500. AAMDC’s membership fees are calculated by provincial equalized assessment. Associations use different fee formulas to address the variations the range of member populations. Other organizational structures are also used to represent internal divisions and factions.

3.7 Board of Directors Structures

One structure that is used to represent different member segments is the board of directors. All municipal associations in Canada have a board of directors composed of elected officials from member municipalities. Despite this commonality, the size and composition of boards varies considerably between associations (Table 3-7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Total Board Size</th>
<th>At Large Reps.</th>
<th>Regional Reps.</th>
<th>Legal Type Reps.</th>
<th>Nested / Cross-Appointed Reps.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Board Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Regional</td>
<td>Legal type representatives: urban towns, small towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legal type</td>
<td>Association of Municipal Administrators has a representative on the Board. Legal types are: regional, towns, rural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEIM</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Nested</td>
<td>Each county (Kings, Queens, Prince) has three cities/towns representatives and two communities representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMNB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primarily Regional</td>
<td>One cities representative. CEO of association sits on the Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNB</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Regional</td>
<td>2 delegates are elected from the 8 provincial zones represented in UMNB. *Between 1 and 7 delegates must be from cities that also belong to the Cities Association of New Brunswick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FQM</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Regional</td>
<td>Type representatives are bilingual municipalities and municipalities with a population &gt; 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMQ</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Regional</td>
<td>7 board members are cross-appointed as regional and legal type representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Legal type</td>
<td>Regional reps. are from the Northern Caucus.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each of the 6 regions has 1 rural director and 1 urban director. Northern region has 2 directors. The City of Winnipeg has 1 director. Municipal Administrators’ Association has 1 representative.

The 3 VPs are based on Cities, Towns, and Villages and Resort Villages. There is an Executive Member for Saskatoon/Regina and 4 Cities Representatives.

Regional representation is nested: South, West, and East each have 1 Villages and 1 Towns representative. Calgary and Edmonton each have their own VP.

Regional representation is 1 member from each area association, plus representation from Vancouver (1 director), Metro/Greater Vancouver Regional District (2), and Vancouver Metro Area Representative (2).

Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports or websites.

The number of board members ranges from 7 in AAMDC to 44 in FQM. The mean is 20.5 and the median is 17. Positions on Boards of Directors are used to represent different groups and factions within an association’s membership. They recognize and give voice to different factions of municipalities. The two predominant criteria for
representation are regional and legal type. In no association are the majority of directors elected at large. All associations except UMNB elect some at large members, but they are a small fraction of the total board. Most are presidents, vice presidents, and past-presidents. In UBCM, 9 of 21 directors are elected at large. The other 12 associations elect between 1 and 3 at large members.

Amongst the 14 primary municipal associations, 10 allocate their board positions using a combination of regional and legal type representatives. However, regional is the predominant type of representation. In six of the associations (MNL, AFMN, UMNB, FQM, UMQ, and UBCM) that use both regional and legal type representation, the majority of representatives are regionally based. Two associations (SARM and AAMDC) only use at large and regional representation. SARM only has one legal type, rural municipalities, and 65 of AAMDC’s 69 members are municipal districts. Their memberships do not contain a range of legal types.

Two associations (FPEIM and AMM) incorporate both regional and legal type representation by nesting director qualifications. In FPEIM, each county is designated three cities/towns representatives and two communities representatives. AMM’s six regions each have one rural director and one urban director. The Northern region is also given two representatives on the board and one is delegated to the City of Winnipeg. On SUMA’s Board of Directors, there are an equal number of regional and legal type representatives.

Only three associations – UNSM, AMO, and AUMA – have more directors representing legal types than regions on their board. In addition to three at-large

\[55\text{ The other four are special municipalities, which incorporate rural and urban areas.}\]
members, UNSM’s three caucuses – regional, towns, and rural municipalities – each have three board representatives. It has no representation of regions within the province on its board. AMO and AUMA do have both regional and legal type representation on the board, but the distribution of regional to legal type directors are 6 to 32 and 2 to 11, respectively. AUMA also has six nested seats on its board. Municipal associations use their boards to represent different constituencies and factions within their membership. Although 11 of 14 associations incorporate both regional and legal type divisions, regional representation is the predominant criterion for board positions. Only three associations designate the majority of their board seats by legal type, compared to eight associations that delegate most seats by region.

In general, associations designate more board seats for regional representation than the representation of different legal types for boards of directors. Most provinces have more regions than legal types. The majority of Municipal Acts set out five or fewer legal types, whereas most associations divide themselves into six or more geographic areas. These differences affect the balance of board representation between regions and legal types, but most associations ensure that they include representation for both regional and legal type cleavages.

3.8 Caucuses, Sub-Associations, and District Meetings

In addition to regional and legal type representation on boards of directors, a number of associations have caucuses and sub-associations organized along these lines. Unlike the predominance of regional representation on their boards, the majority of caucuses are organized by legal type (Table 3-8).
Table 3-8. Municipal Association Caucuses (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Legal Type/Size Caucus</th>
<th>Regional Caucus</th>
<th>Other Caucus</th>
<th>Caucus Type</th>
<th>Caucuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legal Type</td>
<td>Regional, towns, rural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEIM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legal Type</td>
<td>Cities/towns, communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMQ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primarily Legal Type</td>
<td>Municipalités locales, municipalités de centralité, cités régionales, grande villes, municipalités de la Métropole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Primarily Legal Type</td>
<td>Large urban, northern, regional and single tier, rural, small urban, county.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legal Type / Mayors</td>
<td>City Mayors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legal Type / Mayors</td>
<td>City Mayors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Legal Type / Mayors</td>
<td>Mayor’s caucuses: populations under 2,500, populations from 2,501 to 10,000, populations greater than 10,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mayors</td>
<td>Mayors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports or websites.

Caucuses are found in 8 of 14 primary associations. In four associations (UNSM, FPEIM, UMQ, AMO), the caucuses are open to all elected officials within the specified legal type or region. In the other four associations (AMM, SUMA, AUMA, and UBCM), caucuses are only for mayors. AMM and SUMA each have one caucus for city mayors, and AUMA has three caucuses for mayors from small, medium, and large municipalities. UBCM’s one caucus is open to mayors from all municipalities.

In addition to caucuses, AMO and UBCM have more formalized sub-associations that pass resolutions at their own annual conventions. In AMO, the resolutions passed by
sub-associations are forwarded to the board of directors for their consideration in setting lobbying priorities. UBCM has “area associations” that pass resolutions. The resolutions passed by these associations are forwarded to the annual UBCM convention to be voted on by the full, general membership. AMM passes resolutions at the district level, but unlike AMO and UBCM, its districts do not have their own staffs. AMM staff and executives organize and facilitate the district meetings where resolutions are voted on before being forwarded to the general membership.

AMO’s sub-associations are organized along legal type, regional, mayoral/warden, and linguistic lines (Table 3-9). They reflect the extensive complexity in AMO’s large membership.

Table 3-9. Sub-Associations in the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association francaise des municipalités de l’Ontario (AFMO)</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA)⁵⁶</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Northern Ontario Municipalities (FONOM)</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Ontario Wardens Group</td>
<td>Regional / Wardens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Ontario Wardens Group</td>
<td>Regional / Wardens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Urban Mayors Caucus Ontario (LUMCO)</td>
<td>Legal Type / Mayors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Chairs Group</td>
<td>Legal Type / Chairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Ontario Municipal Association (ROMA)</td>
<td>Legal Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Small Urban Municipalities (OSUM)</td>
<td>Legal Type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “AMO Board & Executive Committee Structure,” www.amo.on.ca.

⁵⁶ The Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA) is composed of three of its own sub-associations: the Thunder Bay District Municipal League, the Rainy River District Municipal Association, and the Kenora District Municipal Association. These associations meet independently and then collectively as NOMA. They are represented as NOMA in AMO’s Board of Directors. Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association, “About NOMA,” www.noma.on.ca.
UBCM has five area associations, organized along regional lines (Table 3-10).

### Table 3-10. Area Associations in the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Mainland Local Government Association</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central Local Government Association</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Interior Local Government Associations</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “BC Area Associations,” www.ubcm.ca.

Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador does not have formal caucuses, but its governing structure does include an Urban Municipalities Committee and an Ad Hoc Rural Secretariat. Five associations (AFMNB, UMNB, FQM, SARM, and AAMDC) do not have caucuses or sub-associations.

Caucuses are organized predominantly by legal type, but 9 of the 14 primary associations also hold annual meetings that are organized for regions of the province. In UBCM, regional divisions are the area associations. In other associations, yearly meetings are held in the different regions in the province. Different associations use the names regional, zone, district, and division meetings (3-11). The number of divisions within each province ranges from four in AUMA to eight in UMNB. The mean and median are both six.
Table 3-11. Annual Meetings for Regions (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Name of Meetings</th>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>Regional Meetings</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>Regional Meetings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNB</td>
<td>Zone Meetings</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>District Meetings</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARM</td>
<td>Division Meetings</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>Regional Meetings</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>District Meetings</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>Zone Meetings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>Area Associations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports and websites.

Associations use their regional meetings as roundtables on regional issues and as workshops. As noted above, AMM members vote on resolutions at their district meetings. In all associations with regional meetings, the meetings are used to disseminate information to members in between annual conventions and keep travel costs lower for municipalities to attend.

Caucuses, sub- and area associations, and district meetings all demonstrate the various ways that associations work to accommodate divisions within their memberships. The same legal type and regional divisions that constitute board representation are found in the organizational structures of caucuses, sub-associations, and meetings.

3.9 Inter-Association Collaboration

Associations use organizational structures to represent and address internal divisions, but there are instances of inter-association collaboration. In provinces with split associations, there are varying degrees of collaboration between associations. In Alberta, AUMA and AAMDC hold an annual joint Board of Directors Meeting. In Saskatchewan, SARM and
SUMA are both represented in the Municipal-Provincial Forum, where they meet with representatives of the provincial government. The executive directors of SANC, SARM, and SUMA, along with representatives from the province’s two municipal administrators’ associations (the Rural Municipal Administrators Association and the Urban Municipal Administrators Association of Saskatchewan) meet on a quarterly basis with the province’s Municipal Programs and Services Steering Committee.\(^{57}\) In New Brunswick, there is little formal collaboration between AFMNB, CNBA-ACNB, and UMNB. However, unlike in Alberta and Saskatchewan, there is considerable overlap in their memberships. Seven of eight CNBA-ACNB members are members of AFMNB and two CNBA-ACNB members belong to UMNB. As noted earlier, both AFMNB and UMNB also have formal CNBA-ACNB representation on their boards of directors.

The primary municipal associations in Manitoba (AMM), Saskatchewan (SARM and SUMA), and Alberta (AAMDC and AUMA) are all members of the Western Canada Municipal Association (WCMA).\(^{58}\) Saskatchewan’s section associations (PARCS and SANC) are not members. The association meets annually to discuss common issues and share best practices. WCMA releases joint statements directed to the federal and prairie provincial governments on issues of joint concern. In recent years, meetings have focused on infrastructure funding and disaster relief.\(^{59}\) Although all municipal

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associations are members of FCM, WCMA is the most formalized inter-provincial associational collaboration.

There is also collaboration between francophone associations in Canada. Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) and Union des Municipalités du Québec (UMQ) have a formal partnership. They participate in one another’s annual conventions and have collectively lobbied the federal government on common issues. They have also held meetings with Association des Municipalités Bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) and Association française des municipalités de l’Ontario (AFMO), the francophone sub-association in AMO.

Inter-associational cooperation is influenced on provincial conditions and types of associational memberships. The close relationship between associations in Saskatchewan is typical of the province’s culture of cooperation. Alberta’s associations are both part of the Western Canada Municipal Association. This encourages them to discuss issues common to Alberta municipalities on a regular basis. In New Brunswick there is no external organization that facilitates or encourages its three associations to meet. New Brunswick’s associations differ from those in Alberta and Saskatchewan because they formed from a unified association that broke apart, whereas AAMDC/AUMA and SARM/SUMA have always been divided. The split associations in Alberta and Saskatchewan also differ from the associations in New Brunswick because they share the same language of operation.

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Like collaboration in Saskatchewan, the existence of WCMA has been attributed to the culture of collaboration in Western Canada.\textsuperscript{62} Finally, the francophone associations and sub-associations in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba developed much later than the anglophone associations. The development and sharing of best practices between anglophone associations occurred in the early 1900s. Collaboration is now occurring between the more recently established francophone associations. By partnering and collaborating with older and more developed UMQ, AFMNB, AMBM, and AFMO are able to share best practices in the language of their members.

3.10 Conclusion

Municipal associations use organization structures to accommodate cleavages in their membership. The diversity amongst municipalities includes the inter-related conditions of size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. Three divisions – size, region, and legal type – are used by associations to represent and give voice to their members in boards of directors, caucuses, sub-associations, and district meetings. The following chapters test how different membership compositions affect other aspects of associational behaviour: member services, advocacy, and intergovernmental relations.

Chapter 4

4  Associational Restructuring, Rural/Urban Dominance, and Issue Representation

Rural/urban character is a major division within the memberships of municipal associations. It can be used as a measure of the dominant municipal type within an association. The separation of rural and urban members in distinct associations changes the internal dynamics of membership cohesion, and makes one municipal type more explicitly and formally dominant within each group. Municipalities in four provinces have undergone associational restructuring, where the number and type of associations formed by a province’s municipalities changes. During restructuring, a number of municipalities move their memberships to a new organization. Canadian municipal associations differ from those in other federal states because the majority of provinces either have or had separate associations for rural and urban municipalities. In most federal states, there have only been unified associations at the sub-national level, which contain both rural and urban members. As Andrew Sancton noted in his discussion of unified and split associations in Canada, “whether this makes much difference in the overall scheme of things is unclear.”¹ This chapter examines municipal restructuring between unified, rural, and urban associations to test how changes in membership composition affect their behaviour.

When municipalities leave a unified association to form a distinct rural or urban organization, the new association institutionalizes a shared sense of place and stronger

membership cohesion. It is expected these changes will manifest themselves differently in rural and urban associations. 1. Rural associations are expected to pursue more socio-economic issues because of the relative social and economic homogeneity of their members, compared to urban municipalities. 2. Urban associations are expected to pursue greater jurisdictional control for their members. The commonality amongst urban municipalities is that they must address diverse and complex conditions. Jurisdictional responsibility allows each municipality greater control in addressing its own needs. 3. Unified associations are expected to pursue functional, municipal issues that are common to all of their members, both rural and urban. Restructuring creates natural experimental case studies to test how changes in membership composition affect the issues pursued by associations vis-à-vis the provincial government.

4.1 A Theory of Membership Cohesion and Advocacy Requests

As discussed in Chapter Two, the government association literature has demonstrated that membership composition is a determinant of associational behaviour. This chapter tests the effect of rural/urban divisions as the dominant member type measure of membership composition: rural/urban dominance. This measure can be tested empirically and varies across Canada’s provinces and municipal associations. Unlike other measures of membership composition, rural/urban dominance has not been tested directly in prior research. The literature on the behaviour of local government associations in other states does not have to account for separate rural and urban associations or associational restructuring. Indirect observations of how rural/urban tensions and membership cohesion affect association behaviour are therefore used to develop testable hypotheses.
All state municipal leagues in the United States are unified, but Hays’ examination of federal level intergovernmental groups identified the different compositions of their memberships as a determinant of the issues they pursued. He used testimony before Congress as an indicator of lobbying activity and found a relationship between associations’ membership type and their lobbying requests. State and local associations (the National Governor’s Association, the National Association of Counties, and the National Association of State Legislators) targeted their lobbying activity where they did not want to gain responsibility or involvement. In particular, they targeted redistributive and regulatory policies to push for continued federal control. City groups (the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors) behaved inversely. They concentrated their lobbying efforts on issues where they sought to gain jurisdictional responsibility. This active lobbying, compared to state and local groups’ defensive efforts, was attributed to the more narrow and cohesive interests of members in city associations. State and local associations deflected responsibility due to a lack of member cohesion.2

Other research on state-level associations in the United States has found that internal rural/urban conflict constrains their lobbying activities. When Beverly Cigler examined state-level associations of counties, 31 of 48 associations reported organization challenges due to conflicts between rural and urban counties. These challenges were reflected in their policy issue agendas. High levels were inversely related to the number

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of issues on an association’s lobbying agenda.\(^3\) Taken with Bertram Johnson’s argument that urbanization was a significant factor in the founding of associations, there is a strong indication that rural/urban dominance is a key factor in how associations behave.\(^4\)

Despite these findings, the impact of rural/urban dominance on associational behaviour has not been tested when there are separate urban and rural groups in the same geographic territory. This chapter is used to test the affect of restructuring on rural/urban lines. Hays’ research on intergovernmental groups found that: “Each has a broad membership base among the sub-national units which it represents. To maintain its base, each group pursues issues which affect all of the units represented.”\(^5\) In unified associations, functional municipal issues affect all units represented. When the scope of units represented is narrowed to either rural or urban municipalities, the types of issues that affect all members change.

The separation of rural and urban municipalities into their own associations institutionalizes both place distinctiveness and greater membership cohesion. The definitions of rural and urban differ by province, and between provincial Municipal Acts and Statistics Canada. Villages are legislated as urban in Alberta, but may be considered rural in Ontario. No provincial Municipal Act employs the Statistics Canada definition of urban as “centres with a population of 1,000 AND with 400 persons per square kilometre” (1981-2011) or “centres of 1,000 population” (prior to 1981), or the Statistics Canada definition of rural as “persons living outside centres with a population of 1,000

\(^5\) Hays, 1084.
AND outside areas with 400 persons per square kilometer” (1981-2011) or “populations outside centres of 1,000 population (prior to 1981). This lack of consistency in provincial definitions of rural and urban creates complications in comparative analysis. Statistically and legally speaking, what constitutes “rural” in Manitoba is not the same as what constitutes “rural” in Ontario. Despite this, the separations of municipalities into distinct rural and urban associations have the shared factor of self-identification. In all provinces that underwent divisions and mergers, a group of municipalities identified as rural whereas another group identified as urban. This self-identification enables comparisons between groups of rural, urban, and unified municipalities.

In provinces where municipalities self-divided, restructuring is expected to have a different affect on groups that identify as urban vs. rural because of different degrees of membership heterogeneity. Two types of heterogeneity are present urban associations. First, there is external heterogeneity. That is, there is a large range of populations between urban municipalities, to a greater extent than there is amongst rural municipalities. Second there is more socio-economic heterogeneity in urban municipalities than their rural counterparts. The density and diversity in urban environments creates a stronger need for government regulation. The shared complexity of urban municipalities is expected to translate to requests for control over these regulations, without the financial responsibility for redistributive programs. When they form their own association, cities, towns, and villages can pursue greater regulatory control without compromising on areas of shared interest with of rural municipalities.

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6 Starting in 2011, Statistics Canada replaced the term “urban” with “population centre, but it continued to use the statistical definition of “an area with a population of at least 1,000 and a density of 400 or more people per square kilometer.”
Rural municipalities have less heterogeneity both externally, in population size, and internally, in their political economies. From their greater cohesion in socio-economic conditions, associations of rural municipalities are expected to lobby on social and economic issues that are of a shared interest to their members, but fall outside municipal functions. In short, urban municipalities are expected to share an interest in gaining greater legal powers to address their own conditions, whereas rural municipalities are expected to advocate about their shared conditions. Finally, unified associations are expected to pursue functional issues that affect all of their members. The restructuring of associations along rural/urban lines changes the extent and basis of member cohesion within an association. This is expected to change the types of issues they pursue in intergovernmental lobbying.

4.2 Types of Associations

Before the expectations of behaviour can be tested, it is important to distinguish between the different types of associational memberships that can result from restructuring. There are five types of associations based on rural/urban divisions.

**Unified Association**: Any municipality within a geographic territory province is eligible to join, and the association incorporates both rural and urban members. Its membership is not primarily rural or urban by default due to the existence of another association in the province that is formed on an urban or rural basis.

**Rural Association**: An association that is explicitly rural in name. It may allow urban members to join, but there is minimal urban uptake in membership.

**Primarily Rural Association**: An association that is unified in name and allows any member to join, but its membership composition is affected by the presence of a separate urban association in the province. Membership uptake in the association is much higher amongst rural municipalities than urban municipalities.

**Urban Association**: An association that is explicitly urban in name. It may allow rural members to join, but there is minimal rural uptake in membership.
Primarily Urban Association: An association that is unified in name and allows any member to join, but its membership composition is affected by the presence of a separate rural association in the province. Membership uptake is much higher amongst urban municipalities than rural municipalities.

Membership cohesion and rural/urban dominance are expected to determine associational behaviour. From this, it is predicted that primarily rural and primarily urban associations will act like rural and urban associations, respectively. Instances when groups of municipalities reorganized, moving their membership from one type of association to another, can be used to test the effect of restructuring and changes in membership composition on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.

4.3 Selection of Case Studies

Four provinces in Canada have experienced major changes in the number and type of associations formed by their municipalities: New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba. They are natural case studies for testing how restructuring shapes the behaviour of municipal associations. Quebec’s municipal associations – La Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM) and l’Union des municipalités du Québec – do not make their full records publicly available. There is insufficient evidence to test how restructuring has affect their behaviour. The historical records of associations in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba are not complete, but the majority of them are available. Their restructurings are discussed at length in Appendix D, and are summarized in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Figure 4-1. Municipal Association Restructuring in Manitoba

Note: Blue denotes a unified association; green denotes a rural or urban association – whether primary or explicit. A dashed line indicates than an association formed after its members broke away from another association.

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7 Manitoba uses four classifications of municipalities: city, town, village, and rural municipalities. The province classifies cities, towns, and villages as urban municipalities. Government of Manitoba, The Municipal Act, 427(1) and 427(2), web2.gov.mb.ca.
Figure 4-2. Municipal Association Restructuring in New Brunswick

1906/07:

1949-1959:

1966:

1972:

1974:

1989:

1995:

Note: Blue denotes a unified association. Purple denotes a rural, urban, or section association that has complete membership overlap with a unified association. NBRMA required its members to belong to UNBM. CNBA did not. The membership requirements in the Union of New Brunswick Towns are unknown. Green denotes a rural, urban, or section association without full membership overlap in a unified association. Pink denotes an association formed on a linguistic basis. A green or purple arrow indicates than an association formed from the fragmentation of another association.

Prior to 1966, counties in New Brunswick were classified as rural municipalities. Cities and towns were urban. After counties were dissolved in 1966, many rural areas became unincorporated, but incorporated villages were established.
Note: Blue denotes a unified association; green denotes a rural, urban, or section association. A dashed line indicates that an association formed after its members left broke away from another association.

Ontario employs less clear-cut definitions of rural and urban municipalities than Manitoba or New Brunswick. In this chapter, the associations’ own definitions are employed to categorize membership compositions. Although there was some membership overlap between OMA when it was primarily urban and OARM, the majority of OMA members were cities, towns, and villages and the majority of OARM members were townships. The membership of counties in organization was near parity. Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings: Sixty-First Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1959), 83-85. Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention of Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (Toronto: Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, 1960), 83-85.
The complex histories of municipal association restructuring in Quebec, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario stand in stark contrast to the remarkable stability of associations in the other provinces. Four provinces – British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador have only ever had had one unified municipal association. The Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) was founded in 1905, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) in 1906, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL) in 1951 and the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM) in 1957. Two provinces have had separate rural and urban associations since their formation. The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) was founded in 1905, the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) in 1906, the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) in 1905 and the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) in 1909.¹⁰

Stable cases afford less analytical leverage because there is no longitudinal variation, but they offer insights into how membership composition affects issue representation. In particular, the permanently split associations can be used to examine the issues pursued by rural and urban associations when they do not have an overlap in membership. The changes in associations in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario

¹⁰As discussed in Chapter Three, Saskatchewan does have two “section associations,” which represent small subsections of municipalities within the province. They are the Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and l'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) – have overlapping memberships with larger municipal associations. The majority of their members belong to SUMA. Although AUMA was called the Union of Alberta Municipalities until 1966, it excluded rural municipalities from membership starting in at least 1918. Records from 1905-1918 are unavailable. As discussed in Chapter Three, MNL, SARM, SUMA, and AAMDC also underwent name changes after they were founded.
never resulted in complete breaks in memberships. Some overlap of rural and urban members persisted, although associational memberships were predominantly rural or predominantly urban.

One unified association and one set of rural and urban associations are used to evaluate the issues pursued by stable associations. The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities is used as the stable unified association. UNSM and UNBM shared the same legal types of city, town, and county; referred to themselves as “sister organizations;” and attended one another’s annual conventions.¹¹ Yet UNBM saw the formation of separate cities, towns, and rural associations between 1949 and 1951, whereas UNSM remained stable as one unified association. UNSM can be used to evaluate the issues pursued within a unified association where restructuring has not occurred. The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities and the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association are used as the case studies for stable separate associations. Saskatchewan and Manitoba share the legal types of city, town, village, and rural municipality. Unlike in Manitoba, as discussed in Appendix D, rural municipalities in Saskatchewan have never shared an association with other legal types. There is also no membership overlap between Saskatchewan’s rural and urban associations. This provides insights on how separate rural and urban associations when their membership bases are completely separated.

The associations of municipalities in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario have undergone complex restructurings. All have had at least one association split and

¹¹ The New Brunswick Equal Opportunity Program dissolved the province’s county governments, but associational restructuring occurred before this change.
one merger. New Brunswick and Ontario have experienced numerous splits and mergers. The history of associations in these provinces can become convoluted. This chapter tests whether there is a question that cut through the complexity of the individual cases. Are there patterns in the behaviour of associations across the diversity of restructurings, the overlapping memberships, and provincial conditions? Are there commonalities in how mergers and divisions affect issue representation in associations?

4.4 Resolutions as Indicators of Membership Cohesion and Interests

The resolutions passed by municipal associations at their annual conventions can be used to measure their behaviour. Resolutions are drafted and voted on by association members, and directed to the provincial government. In order to be forwarded to the provincial government, a resolution must receive the support of the majority of delegates at an annual convention. This chapter will test whether, and how, membership composition affects the content of resolutions that receive majority support.

12 The resolution processes of municipal associations are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Five.

13 On the matter of resolutions, it is important to note associations’ voting structures. In a number of associations, one vote is given to each elected official from a member municipality in attendance. This is not always the case. The records of voting structures of this chapter’s case studies are incomplete, but different structures have been used amongst the cases where records are available. OMA’s voting structure was based on municipal type and population, with more populous municipalities receiving more votes. The voting structures in OARM and the Association of Mayors and Reeves (AOMR) are unknown, but when AMOR and OMA merged to form the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) in 1972, the new voting structure was based purely on population, rather than a combination of municipal type. When OARM and the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions joined AMO in 1982, the voting structure was amended to set separate population requirements for counties, and metropolitan, regional, and district municipalities. In Manitoba, the Union of Manitoba Municipalities’ (UMM) voting structure allotted one vote per elected official from each member municipality, both before and after the Manitoba Urban Association (MUA) formed. There are no known records of MUA / MAUM’s voting structure, but after it merged with UMM to form the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM), UMM’s structure of voting was used. Under AMM’s constitution, each elected official and municipal administration in each municipality is given a vote. The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities’ records do not contain any descriptions of past voting procedures. The records of the Cities of New Brunswick Association and the
Passed resolutions address issues with majority support amongst associational members and they are pursued through collective intergovernmental lobbying. Again, it is expected that when a rural association breaks away from a unified association, it will pursue more socio-economic issues. An urban association is expected to pursue more jurisdictional issues than the unified association it left. Unified associations are expected to pursue functional issues because they are of common interest to all members.

4.5 Methodology

This chapter tests how changes in membership composition, caused by municipal association restructuring, affect the issues pursued in collective intergovernmental lobbying. To test these changes, the resolutions passed ten years prior to, and ten years following, instances of restructuring are analyzed. However, in analyzing these time periods, the issue of incomplete records must be addressed. Some years of records are missing from the associations, provincial archives, and the AMICUS Canadian National Catalogue of libraries and archives. In other years, the available association records contain all resolutions voted on at an association’s annual convention, but do not indicate which resolutions passed or failed. These years are not included for analysis. Passed

resolutions are indicators of where a majority of members were willing to support a common interest and they are submitted to the province. The inclusion of all resolutions, including some that may have failed, would skew the results of membership cohesion and interest representation vis-à-vis the province.

Manitoba has the most complete association records. Passed resolutions are available for 50 of 60 time-period years. In each ten-year time period, at least seven years of passed resolutions are available. In New Brunswick, every year is available for the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM) and only one year is missing for the Cities of New Brunswick Association (CNBA). However, only two years are available for the New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association (NBRMA) and all Union of New Brunswick Towns (UNBT) records are missing.

In Ontario, the majority of records are available for the designated time periods of the Ontario Municipal Association (OMA) and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO). AOMR’s records of resolutions are also available, but it has been excluded as a case study because its membership composition is unknown. The time periods of OMA and AMO are not complete, but there is an average of six years available for each of their ten-year periods (Table 4-1).
### Table 4-1. Resolutions Passed by Associations by Time Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province: Association (Years)</th>
<th>Total Passed</th>
<th>Years Available</th>
<th>Average/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMM (1940-1949)</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMM (1950-1959)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUA/MAUM (1950-1959)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMM (1989-1998)</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUA/MAUM (1989-1998)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM (1999-2008)</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBM (1939-1948)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNBA (1949-1958)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBM (1949-1959)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNBM (1940-1949)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBRMA (1950-1959)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBM (1950-1959)</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA (1923-1932)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA (1933-1942)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OARM (1945-1967, odd years)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO (1972-1981)</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO (1982-1991)</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>119.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARM (1946-2011, fifth years)</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMA (1946-2011, fifth years)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM (1946-2011, fifth years)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (OARM) formed in 1933 and merged with AMO in 1982. The desired years of analysis are 1933–1942 and 1972-1981, but records of passed resolutions are only available from 1945 to 1967. In order to get a sense of the resolutions passed by OARM during its existence, every other year from 1945 to 1967 is analyzed. Finally, the records of the Association of Ontario Counties (and Regions) are missing.

For the control cases of Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the intent is to have an overview understanding of the issues pursued by permanently rural, permanently urban, and permanently unified associations. To establish these overviews, a sample of the resolutions passed since the Second World War is taken for each association. The associations’ resolutions are analyzed in every fifth year, starting in 1946.

In order to analyze how restructuring affected the resolutions passed by associations, each resolution is coded as functional, socio-economic, jurisdictional, specific-location, or federal. The following criteria were employed in coding:

**Functional:** The resolution addresses a municipal responsibility that is common to all members.

**Example:** Union of New Brunswick Municipalities – 1949: #1

WHEREAS the cost of education is placing an extremely heavy burden on Municipalities;

AND WHEREAS such costs are steadily increasing;

AND WHEREAS the Municipalities have suffered to a very large extent in vacating to the Federal and Provincial Governments certain fields of taxation previously held by them.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities views with considerable alarm the present heavy tax burden resulting from
educational costs and urgently represents to the Government of the Province of New Brunswick the necessity of making provision for increased financial aid to the municipalities for education.\(^{14}\)

**Socio-Economic:** The resolution addresses an issue that is concentrated in parts of the province, along social or economic lines. The issue is not a functional responsibility of municipal governments.

**Example:** Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities – 1976: Group No. 4 #12

THAT the Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture purchase bulls for community pastures from Saskatchewan breeders.\(^{15}\)

**Jurisdictional:** The resolution asks for a change in regulatory, but not financial, responsibility for a specific category of municipalities. The resolution can apply to more than one category (e.g., cities and towns), but is not applicable to all municipal types in the province.

**Example:** Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association – 1961: 5

THAT SUMA request the Provincial Government to amend the City Act provisions respecting power to pass bylaws adopting the National Building Code to spell out clearly a City’s power to pass a bylaw adopting the National Building Code in whole, or in part, with or without amendments to the Code as the City sees fit.

**Specific-location:** The resolution addresses a particular municipality, region, or geographic portion of the province.

**Example:** Manitoba Urban Association (Manitoba Urban Municipalities Association) – 1957: 9

WHEREAS flooding of the Assiniboine River has caused adversity to many residents of the City of Brandon;

AND WHEREAS residents have suffered damage to their homes;


AND WHEREAS residents have suffered loss by virtue of flooding of garden property and thereby been deprived of their livelihood;

NOW THEREFORE the Council of the City of Brandon in meeting assembled enacts as follows: That the Government of the Province of Manitoba be urgently requested to consider a policy of relief for flood victims and suggests and appraisal and payment thereof be made by the Provincial Government in a manner similar to policy adopted in the year 1955.16

**Federal**: The resolution is directed to only the federal government and/or the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. A resolution that is directed to the federal government and the provincial government is categorized as one of the other codes because it does address an issue vis-à-vis the province.

**Example**: UNSM – 1996: 6A Northumberland Ferry Subsidy and Service

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities request the Federal Government take whatever action is necessary to ensure that there is no significant diminution of Nova Scotia/PEI ferry service from the 1995 levels.17

Specific-location and federal resolutions are removed for the purpose of examining how association restructuring affects the resolutions passed by member municipalities. Most specific-location resolutions are reactions to natural disasters or economic crises (for example, the closure of the Sydney Steel Corporation in Sydney, Nova Scotia). Their inclusion skews the relative distribution of resolutions across the other issue types. Federal resolutions are excluded because they do not address the core question of how restructuring affects association behaviour vis-à-vis the province. With the specific-

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location and federal resolutions removed, the effect of restructuring on the distribution of functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional resolutions can be observed and compared.

There is a considerable range in the number of resolutions available for analysis from each pre- and post-restructuring time period (Table 4-1). There are only 10 resolutions available from the New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association (NBRMA) between 1949 and 1954. As discussed in Appendix D, they maintained stronger ties with UNBM than CNBA. UNBM continued to be the main association for resolutions amongst NBRMA members. This, and incomplete records, account for the low number of NBRMA resolutions. The largest number of resolutions within an associational time period is 650, passed by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) between 1972 and 1981.

The incomplete records of associations account for part of the variation between time periods, but there are differences by province. Amongst New Brunswick associations, the number of resolutions passed by time period ranges from 10 (NBRMA, 1949–1954) to 132 (UNBM, 1950-1959). In Manitoba, the number of resolutions passed per time period ranges from 179 (Manitoba Urban Association, 1950–1959) to 384 (Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 1999-2008). Ontario’s range is 149 (Ontario Municipalities Association, 1923–1932) to 650 (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1972-1981). In the control cases, where every fifth year was counted between 1946 and 2011, the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) 399 resolutions are available for analysis, with 145 from Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association

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18 The calculations of the number of passed resolutions available from each time period exclude legal and federal resolutions. Only those germane to the hypotheses are counted as available for analysis.
(SUMA), and 280 from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM). The average number of resolutions available for analysis from each association’s time periods is 214. There is a weak, but positive relationship between the number of municipalities in an association and the number of resolutions passed by that association.

The average number of resolutions passed by associations within each time period is also calculated. The total number of resolutions within a time period is divided by the number of years for which passed resolutions were available. The range of average number of resolutions per year is from 3.9 (Cities of New Brunswick, 1949-1958) to 119.5 (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1982–1991). Here too, there is provincial variation. Amongst the New Brunswick Cases, the average number of resolutions passed per year is 7.8. In Manitoba it is 29.0 and in Ontario it is 54.3. For the control cases, SUMA’s average is 24.2, UNSM’s 25.5, and SARM’s 44.3. For all cases, the average number of resolutions passed per year is 29.6. In nearly every association, there is a growth in the average number of resolutions passed per year over time. In total, there are 4,287 resolutions available for analysis.

4.6 Analysis

The case studies allow each hypothesis to be tested at least once. The hypotheses and cases are:

1. Unified to Rural
   a. When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified association they left.
      i. OMA (1923-1932) to OARM (1945-1967, odd years)
      ii. UNBM (1940-1949) to NBRMA (1950-1959)
b. When a unified association becomes primarily urban, the percentage of jurisdictional resolutions passed by the unified association will increase.  

   i. OMA (1923-1932) and OMA (1933-1942)

2. Unified to Urban

   a. When urban municipalities form their own association, the new urban association will pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association its members left.

      i. UMM (1940-1949) to MUA (1950-1959)
      ii. UNBM (1939-1948) to CNBA (1949-1958)

   b. When a unified association becomes primarily rural, its percentage of socio-economic resolutions will increase.

      i. UMM (1940-1949) and UMM (1950-1959)

3. Unified

   a. When a unified association is formed from a merger of rural and urban associations, it will pass a higher percentage of functional resolutions than the associations that preceded it.

      i. OARM (1945-1967, odd years) and AMO (1972-1981) to AMO (1982-1991)

The results of the case comparisons are as follows:

1. Unified to Rural

   a. When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified association they left.

      i. OMA (1923-1932) to OARM (1945-1967, odd years)

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19 The formation of rural, cities, and towns associations did not change the membership composition of UNBM. The effect of their formation on UNBM is discussed later in the chapter, but the association did not become primarily rural or primarily urban after the other associations formed.
Figure 4-4. Distribution of Resolutions: OMA to OARM

Hypothesis: supported.

ii. UNBM (1940-1949) to NBRMA (1950-1959)

Figure 4-5. Distribution of Resolutions: UNBM to NBRMA

Hypothesis: insufficient data (only 2/10 years are available, totaling 10 resolutions).
b. When a unified association becomes primarily urban, its percentage of jurisdictional resolutions will increase.20

i. OMA (1923-1932) and OMA (1933-1942)

**Figure 4-6. Distribution of Resolutions: OMA and OMA**

Hypothesis: not supported.

2. Unified to Urban

a. When urban municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association they left.

i. UMM (1940-1949) to MUA (1950-1959)

---

20 The formation of rural, cities, and towns associations did not change the membership composition of UNBM. The effect of their formation on UNBM is discussed later in the chapter, but the association did not become primarily rural or primarily urban after the other associations formed.
Figure 4-7. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM to MUA

**Hypothesis**: supported.

ii. UNBM (1939-1948) to CNBA (1949-1958)

Figure 4-8. Distribution of Resolutions: UNBM to CNBA

**Hypothesis**: supported.
b. When a unified association becomes primarily rural, its percentage of socio-economic resolutions will increase.

i. UMM (1940-1949) and UMM (1950-1959)

Figure 4-9. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM and UMM

Hypothesis: not supported.

3. Unified

a. When a unified association is formed from a merger of rural and urban associations, it will pass a higher percentage of functional resolutions than the associations that preceded it.

i. OARM (1945-1967, odd years) and AMO (1972-1981) to AMO (1982-1991)
Figure 4-10. Distribution of Resolutions: OARM and AMO to AMO

**Hypothesis: mixed results.**


Figure 4-11. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM and MAUM to AMM

**Hypothesis: not supported.**
The findings give mixed support to the hypotheses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.A.i</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.A.ii</td>
<td>Insufficient Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.B</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A.i</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A.ii</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.B</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.A.i</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.A.ii</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the cases are collapsed into the individual hypotheses, the results are still mixed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.A</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.B</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.B</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.A</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two hypotheses receive support from the data:

- When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified association they left.
- When urban municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association they left.

When a group of municipalities, either rural or urban, breaks away from a unified association to form their own organization, they act differently than the association they left. When they are in their own association, rural municipalities pass a higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions. Urban municipalities pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions when they are in their own, independent association. These
findings support the argument that greater membership cohesion manifests itself differently in rural and urban associations.

The findings also support the idea that rural and urban municipalities formed independent organizations because their interests were not being well represented in unified associations. Their formations had little effect on the associations they left. The unified associations reflected the interests of the more numerous municipal type, whether rural or urban. The formation of OARM did not change the distribution of resolutions pursued by OMA, and the formation of MUA resulted in only minor changes in UMM’s behaviour (Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11).

It was expected that unified associations would pass more functional resolutions than urban or rural associations because functional issues are common to all members, but the distributions of resolutions give little support to this hypothesis. Unified AMO passed a much higher percentage of functional resolutions than OARM, but its distribution of resolutions was almost identical to AMO during its first ten years, when it was still primarily urban. In Manitoba, the hypothesis receives no support from the findings. The distribution of resolutions in AMM was nearly identical to the distribution in primarily rural UMM, and the percentage of functional resolutions was almost 10% lower in AMM than in MAUM. In these cases, unified associations reflected the interests of predominant member type rather than interests that were common to all members. The minority municipal type is drowned out in unified associations.

The two hypotheses about rural and urban associations are supported, but the hypotheses about the behaviour of unified associations were either not supported or had conflicting results. Unified associations did not act as expected. In considering why
these hypotheses were not supported, it is important to identify other patterns in the results and consider alternative explanations of associational behaviour.

4.7 Consideration of Alternative Hypotheses

In all cases and time periods, the majority of the resolutions passed are functional in nature. All associations advocate for common interests, but there are distinct differences in how rural and urban associations act. The control cases provide further evidence of this.

**Figure 4-12. Distribution of Resolutions: SARM, SUMA, and UNSM**

More than a third of SARM’s resolutions are socio-economic and more than a third of SUMA’s resolutions are jurisdictional. In UNSM, which has always been unified, neither jurisdictional nor socio-economic resolutions account for more than 10% of the total resolutions, but both types did receive some attention. UNSM pursued a slightly higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions (7.4%) compared to jurisdictional
resolutions (4.9%), even though its membership is more urban than rural. In 1946, UNSM membership was composed of 2 cities, 42 towns, and 13 rural municipalities. In 2015, it is composed of 2 regional municipalities, 30 towns, and 22 rural municipalities. UNSM has more urban than rural members, but socio-economic and jurisdictional issues have both received attention from its members. UNSM’s behaviour differs from the unified associations that underwent restructuring.

In OMA, AMO, UMM, and AMM, the minority municipal type, whether rural or urban, was drowned out in unified associations. These findings may explain why rural and urban municipalities formed independent associations in Manitoba and Ontario, but it raises questions of why these patterns of behaviour occurred in these provinces, but not in others. Eight provinces started with a unified municipal association, but only four underwent restructuring. In Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia the original unified associations have remained stable.

Have Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities been successful at balancing rural/urban tensions, where their counterparts in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba failed? Or have they persisted as a unified association despite the minority municipal type being drowned out? These differences also raise the question of why remerged associations in Ontario and Manitoba have persisted, despite the priorities of their minority memberships being overshadowed. The answers to these questions are harder to infer than how restructuring

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has changed associational behaviour, but comparisons of associational structures and memberships provide some insights.

In UNSM, both jurisdictional and socio-economic issues have received attention, with relative parity. And unlike UMM and OMA, UNSM has a long history of explicitly balancing rural/urban representation within its structure. UNSM’s 1946 Annual Convention Proceedings report that there was a suggestion “that it would be well to have at the Convention, for part of the time, separate meetings of rural delegates, and the same time for urban delegates, so that they could discuss their problems respectively by themselves.”22 Other delegates at that meeting thought the sections would be a mistake, and that “separate meetings would tend to disunity, while joint meetings would inform everyone of all problems, rural and urban, and so promote understanding and unity, and as well sympathetic co-operation.”23 The motion on sections was referred to the Union’s Executive.

At the next annual convention, the UNSM Executive reported that they had “unanimously and decidedly of the opinion that [rural and urban sections] would be a mistake.”24 They argued that “ample time could be arranged for dealing with all problems,” rather than implementing separate meetings that could cause disunity. The Executive decided against rural and urban sections, but the issue of rural/urban differences did not go ignored. Starting that year, in 1947, the Union’s Constitution mandated that: “In alternate years there shall be a President from an urban municipality

22 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention, 64.
21 Ibid., 64.
and a President from a rural municipality. One Vice-President shall be from a rural municipality and the other Vice-President from an urban municipality.” UNSM chose to use its executive structure to represent rural and urban interests within its executive. It addressed rural/urban differences by ensuring that both voices were at the same table, rather than meeting at different tables.

In 1957, UNSM made the seats on its Executive Committee “fairly apportioned between rural and urban municipalities.” Seven years later, the Executive Committee structure was changed to give equal representation to cities, towns, and rural municipalities.” At present, UNSM’s Board of Directors has equal representation for regional municipalities, towns, and rural municipalities, but in 2004 it added a caucus structure – akin to the sections proposed in 1946. The three caucuses, Regional, Towns, and Rural “meet at least twice annually to discuss issues of mutual interest and bring them forward to the UNSM for action.” UNSM has added internal sections, but it has maintained equal representation for each legal type on its Board. In addition, members representing regional municipalities, towns, and rural municipalities must fill the Executive positions of President, Vice President, and Past President.

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25 Ibid., 98.
28 A 2013 Halifax Regional Municipality report on the UNSM caucus structure stated that caucuses were “an attempt to address the varying priorities of municipalities of different sizes and areas, without breaking apart into multiple associations as other provinces have done. UNSM grapples with rural/urban differences, but it has been able to maintain associational cohesion. Halifax Regional Municipality, “Executive Committee Report on UNSM Caucus Structure,” July 22, 2013, www.halifax.ca.
AMO and AMM now balance representation for rural and urban municipalities in their organizational structures and boards, but these accommodations were not in place in OMA, UMM, or UNBM when they fractured. During times of restructuring in Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, UNSM was striving to balance rural and urban representation. The distribution of UNSM’s resolutions between jurisdictional and socio-economic issues is closer than in other unified associations. This gives support to the argument that UNSM’s longstanding, careful attention to balancing rural and urban interests is reflected in the passage of resolutions.

In the case of Manitoba, it is worth noting the shift from rural/urban to Greater Winnipeg vs. non-Greater Winnipeg as the province’s predominant municipal tension. This shift is reflected in the distribution of resolutions from when the MUA formed compared to the years before it remerged with UMM to form AMM.

30 AMM elects one Vice-President Rural and one Vice-President Urban, and there is one urban representative and one rural representative from each of its geographic districts on the association’s Board of Directors. AMM explicitly seeks to balance rural and urban members within the association. Such steps were not taken in the UMM prior to MAUM’s formation. In the decades prior to MAUM’s formation, the officers of UMM included one vice-president, as well as one representative from each of the geographic districts. There was no guarantee of rural/urban distribution on the Board. Union of Manitoba Municipalities, Programme and Hand Book for the Forty-Fourth Annual Convention (Portage la Prairie: Union of Manitoba Municipalities, 1947), 1. Prior to the formation of OARM, OMA had rural and urban sections, but they had minimal powers. They could vote on whether a resolution should be passed by the general membership, but did not determine the ultimate outcome. In AMO, the caucuses and sub-associations are more formalized. They account for both rural/urban and geographic divisions and meet independently from the AMO annual convention. Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Convention, 2 and 144.
There was a small increase in the percentage of socio-economic resolutions and a moderate drop in the percentage of jurisdictional resolutions. Despite this change, there were still differences between MAUM and the primarily rural and unified associations (Figure 4-11). This indicates that the behaviour of associations is influenced not only by membership restructuring, but also by shifts in the distribution of provincial populations. The factors that affect the distribution of resolutions are complicated, but the outcomes of restructuring indicate that there are patterns of behaviour that cut through this complexity.

4.8 Conclusion

In summary, there were several patterns of associational behaviour in the data.

- When a rural or urban association forms, it acts differently than the unified association it left.
o Rural associations pass a greater percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified associations they leave.
o Urban associations pass a greater percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified associations they leave.
• Unified associations reflect their predominant municipal type, whether rural or urban, when restructuring occurs.
o A minority municipal type leaving a unified association does not change its pattern of behaviour.
o Unified associations formed by mergers reflect the predecessor organization that became the majority municipal type, rather than prioritizing functional resolutions.
o Unified associations that have not undergone restructuring appear to better balance rural and urban interests.
• In all case studies and time periods, the majority of resolutions passed were functional.

Unified associations that experienced restructuring were not affected by the presence or absence of the minority municipal type, whether rural or urban. Municipal associations use organizational structures to represent different divisions within their membership, but there is evidence that these structures do not always translate to the passage of resolutions, where voting outcomes are dependent on majority interests. The distribution of resolutions in UNSM, compared to the other unified cases, indicates that strong representative structures may translate into the passage of resolutions, but further research is needed to support this finding.

Hays’ research on federal level associations in the United States found that associations pursued issues common to all members, but the Canadian experience belies Hays’ U.S. findings. Canadian provincial level associations show two different patterns of behaviour. 1. The majority municipal type in an association drowns out the interests of the minority type and 2. When a group of municipalities forms an independent association, they act differently than the unified association they left. Restructuring along
rural/urban lines changes the extent of cohesion of an association’s membership and the distribution of resolutions along functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional lines.
Chapter 5

5 Member Populations and the Jurisdictional Aspect of Policy Requests

Earlier research on government associations has established that it is important to identify the jurisdictional component of associations’ policy requests. Chapter Four found that urban associations were more likely to request legal changes to their province’s Municipal Act. This chapter considers another aspect of jurisdiction in municipal association behaviour: which level of government associations request to carry out proposed policies. Do associations request provincial programs or resource transfers in order to enact programs at the municipal level? A key variation between provinces, and subsequently their municipal associations, is the relative heterogeneity of their municipalities’ populations.

This chapter examines the expectation that the dispersion of municipal populations affects how associations approach the jurisdictional aspect of intergovernmental lobbying. Two hypotheses are tested:

- Associations with homogeneous member populations will lobby primarily for provincial programs.
- Associations with heterogeneous member populations will lobby primarily for the resources to enact municipal programs.

Associations with relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for provincial programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as similar to their own. In associations with significant dispersion in member populations, it is expected that members will request the resources or authority to institute programs at the municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests. These hypotheses are tested by comparing the dispersion of member populations.
municipalities’ populations and the level of government identified in associations’ lobbying requests.

5.1 A Theory of Membership Cohesion and Jurisdictional Requests

As discussed in Chapter Two, the U.S. literature on government associations has demonstrated that composition of membership is a determinant of associational behaviour. Although there are a number of ways to conceptualize membership composition, this chapter continues to build on one measure of heterogeneity: the differentiation of municipal population sizes. This measure is rooted in the literature, can be tested empirically, and varies across Canada’s municipal associations. However, while membership composition has emerged as a common factor in the government associations literature, this literature is still small. Research on business associations offers natural parallels for municipal associations. Both municipal and business associations are institutionalized groups: they have stable and limited memberships, enjoy close relationships with government, and employ professional staffs. As well, their members are organizations, rather than individuals. Therefore, the government and business association literatures are used in the formation of a research question and hypotheses on how population size dispersion affects approaches to jurisdictional responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying.

Population dispersion is expected to influence the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. That is, the distributions of member populations will affect which level of government they want to meet their needs. As Cammisa discussed, “while government lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, unlike other groups (or at least to a
greater extent than other groups), are also interested in the spatial dimension of any policy, that is, who will have the authority in implementation and control of funds.\textsuperscript{1} In lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with whether their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through transfers to fund municipal programs. Hays shed some light on how the dispersion of member populations influences the jurisdictional aspect of associations’ policy requests. In his analysis of Congressional testimony by state, local, and urban groups, he found that state and local groups sought to evade jurisdictional responsibility, while urban groups sought to gain control over policy areas. He attributed this difference to the greater cohesiveness of members in city associations. State and county associations have broader inter-member differences in populations than city leagues.\textsuperscript{2} However, the relationship between the shape of size distributions and jurisdictional responsibility can be considered in the inverse.

If a narrow dispersion of member populations translates into more cohesive interests, it can be expected that cohesive associations would lobby for provincial programs to meet their needs, as they see the interests of other members as similar to their own. In associations with a high variation in member populations, it can be expected that members will request the resources to institute programs at the municipal level. They are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests. In their analysis of trade associations, Bombardini and Trebbi pinpointed dispersion of

membership as a factor in collective lobbying. They found that the less differentiated an industry, the more likely its members were to pursue lobbying through their trade association, as opposed to individually. Although they measured differentiation by firms’ ranges of products, rather than their size, their findings still present strong evidence that whether actors see the interests of other members as similar to their own influences their approach to associational lobbying.³

Cammisa and Hays recognized that jurisdictional responsibility is an important aspect of government associations’ concern, but we need to know whether this concern is influenced by dominant member type and membership heterogeneity. Bombardini and Trebbi provided insight into how the heterogeneity of associations influences members’ perceptions of shared interests. From these insights, heterogeneous and homogeneous municipal associations are used to examine how the perception of shared interests affects their behaviour in collective intergovernmental lobbying.

5.2 Selection of Case Studies

Four municipal associations are used to test for a relationship between municipal population dispersion and the level of government they request to have jurisdiction over policy formation and implementation. Each association in Canada varies in its degree of member heterogeneity, but two homogeneous and two heterogeneous associations have been selected as case studies. These four cases are drawn from three provinces: two with unified associations (Nova Scotia and British Columbia), and one with split rural and urban associations (Alberta). They account for structural differences in split and unified

associations. There is one homogeneous unified association – and one homogeneous split association – as well as one heterogeneous unified association and one heterogeneous split association. This accounts for the institutionalization of place-distinctiveness in split associations as an alternative explanation for the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. Comparing a heterogeneous association and a homogeneous association within the same province also controls for provincial conditions as an explanatory variable.4

The Alberta Urban Municipal Association (AUMA), with 274 members, has a heterogeneous membership. Its members are dispersed among six legal types: cities (17), towns (108), townsite (1), villages (94), summer villages (49), and special municipalities (5).5 There is considerable variation in member populations both within and between legal types (Table 5-1). The association also lacks a majority legal type.

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4 The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) is, arguably, the most diverse unified association in Canada. Its 412 members are mix of large and small; upper-, lower-, and single-tier municipalities and are divided into six caucuses: county, large urban, small urban, regional and single tier, rural, and northern. However, AMO’s process of setting the intergovernmental lobbying agenda differs considerably from other municipal associations. While the other municipal associations pass resolutions at their all-member annual conventions, AMO’s members pass resolutions at the annual conferences of their caucuses, which are then forwarded to the Board of Directors for consideration in its policy development process. Since the resolutions are not voted on by the membership at large, it does not have a comparable tension between member heterogeneity and the perception of shared interests in its resolutions process. For this reason, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities is used as the unified heterogeneous case study. Ontario Small Urban Municipalities, “Policy Statement,” www.osum.ca. Like Alberta, Saskatchewan has a homogeneous rural association and heterogeneous urban association, but these two associations (the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities and the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association) were used as case studies in chapter four.

5 In 2013, three summer villages were not members of AUMA. These populations of these non-member municipalities are very small: Gull Lake, pop. 122; Whispering Hills, 109; and Mewatha Beach, 79. While the full membership of other legal types – cities, towns, townsite, villages, and special municipalities – remained constant over the time period, the number of summer villages remains just under total participation. The three summer villages that were not members in 2013 were members as recently as 2011 (Whispering Hills and Gull Lake) and 2010 (Mewatha Beach). Due to their recent membership in AUMA, they are included in analysis of member populations. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual Report 2013,” www.auma.ca. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual Report 2011,” www.auma.ca. “ Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual Report 2010,” www.auma.ca.
Although there are more towns than any other legal type, they make up less than 40 percent of the total membership.

Table 5-1. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), Member Population Statistics by Legal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Members</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,096,833</td>
<td>11,313</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11,707</td>
<td>1,096,833</td>
<td>144,632</td>
<td>26,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>24,511</td>
<td>4,184</td>
<td>2,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townsite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer Villages</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Municipalities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,051</td>
<td>92,490</td>
<td>35,719</td>
<td>10,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on AUMA 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.

Conversely, the membership of Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) is largely homogeneous. A single legal type, municipal districts, makes up 64 of AAMDC’s 69 members (Table 5-1). Its other five members are composed of four specialized municipalities, which contain both rural and urban areas, and the rural Special Areas Board. The membership of the Union of Nova Scotia

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6 Although some municipal districts in Alberta continue to use the label of “county,” this term is anachronistic and no longer distinguishable from municipal districts in legal terms. As Lesage and McMillan explain: “Alberta has only one formal classification of rural municipality – the municipal district (MD). Another form, the Alberta ‘county’ was established in the early 1950s and abolished with the school and municipal reforms of 1994.” Edward C. LeSage, Jr. and Melville L. McMillan, “Alberta,” in Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 387.

7 The four of Alberta’s specialized municipalities are members of both AAMDC and AUMA. Specialized municipalities in Alberta are eligible for membership in both associations as they contain both rural and urban areas. The specialized municipality of Jasper is only a member of AUMA. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Annual Report 2013. Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, Membership Map, www.aamdc.com. The Special Areas Board is a designated rural municipality, but its elected advisory council is overseen by three provincially-appointed officials. The provincial oversight...
Municipalities (UNSM) is also relatively homogeneous. As a unified association, it represents all municipalities in Nova Scotia, but its 55 members come from just three legal types: towns (31), rural municipalities (22), and regional municipalities (2). Like AAMDC, UNSM also has a majority legal type. Towns account for 56.3% of its membership. The relative homogeneity of AAMDC and UNSM is evident in the populations of their members (Tables 5-2 and 5-3).

### Table 5-2. Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC), Member Population Statistics by Legal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Members</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>92,490</td>
<td>9,218</td>
<td>5,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Districts</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>36,461</td>
<td>7,138</td>
<td>5,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Municipalities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,565</td>
<td>92,490</td>
<td>43,637</td>
<td>38,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Areas Board</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,729</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on AAMDC 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.

began in 1938, when the area was particularly hard-hit by drought. In response to the drought, the province began to provide municipal services and supports to the region, in order to assist in its recovery. The provincial oversight of service provision has remained to this day. Alberta Municipal Affairs, “Types of Municipalities in Alberta,” municipalaffairs.gov.ab.ca.

8 In 2012, the Town of Canso dissolved and its citizens became part of the Municipality of the District of Guysborough. However, it was still a town during the 2011 census, and was for thirteen of the previous fifteen years examined. It is therefore included for the purpose of measuring the dispersion of UNSM members. “Town of Canso to dissolve July 1,” CBC News, January 19, 2012, www.cbc.ca/news. Although the Region of Queens Municipality is a regional municipality, within UNSM, it is treated as a rural municipality. The Halifax Regional Municipality and Cape Breton Regional Municipality make up the entirety of UNSM’s Regional Caucus. Therefore, Queens is treated as a rural municipality for statistical purposes. Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws,” unsm.ca. Finally, rural municipalities are divided between nine counties incorporated to cover an entire county and six counties split into two municipal districts each. In both cases, counties and municipal districts do not have jurisdiction over the towns situated within their geographic area. David M. Cameron with Paul A.R. Hobson, “Nova Scotia,” in Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 138. Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Membership Directory,” unsm.ca.
Table 5-3. Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM), Member Population Statistics by Legal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Members</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>390,096</td>
<td>16,639</td>
<td>4,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Municipalities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97,398</td>
<td>390,086</td>
<td>243,747</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>12,059</td>
<td>3,464</td>
<td>2,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Municipalities</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>47,814</td>
<td>14,558</td>
<td>10,758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on UNSM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.

The fourth case study, the Union of British Columbia (UBCM), is also a unified association. It represents all municipalities in British Columbia, but its membership is more heterogeneous than UNSM. Its 194 members come from seven legal types: cities (49), district municipalities (52), towns (14), villages (43), regional districts (27), First Nations (6), and special municipalities (3). District municipalities are the most predominant legal type, but account for only 26.8% of UBCM members. Similar to AUMA, there is also considerable variation between the populations of legal types (Table 5-4).

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Table 5-4. Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM), Member Population Statistics by Legal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Members</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>603,502</td>
<td>22,249</td>
<td>5,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>603,502</td>
<td>59,716</td>
<td>18,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Municipalities</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>109,752</td>
<td>16,308</td>
<td>4,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>13,627</td>
<td>6,251</td>
<td>5,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3,398</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Districts</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>37,750</td>
<td>14,720</td>
<td>14,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Nations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Municipalities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>4,987</td>
<td>3,069</td>
<td>3,402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on UBCM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.

The diversity of legal types and descriptive population statistics indicates that UBCM and AUMA have heterogeneous memberships, while the memberships of AAMDC and UNSM are relatively homogeneous. These initial findings are reinforced when the Gini coefficient is employed. Although most often used to measure income inequality, the Gini coefficient can be used to measure the dispersion of member populations. When applied to population statistics, it measures inequality in the distribution of population between municipalities. A higher Gini coefficient indicates a more heterogeneous membership. 0 = all equal. 1 = totally unequal.

The Gini coefficient for the full membership of each association produces mixed results. The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties has the lowest score (54.0), and therefore greatest equality between member populations. The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association has the highest coefficient (91.5), while the Union of Nova
Scotia Municipalities (74.0) and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (77.0) fall in the middle (Table 5-5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Associations’ 2013 Annual Reports and 2011 Census data.

However, here it is important to remove outliers from two associations – the Halifax Regional Municipal (HRM) (pop. 390,096) and Cape Breton Regional Municipality (CBRM) (97,398) from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, and Calgary (1,0968,833) and Edmonton (812,201) from the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. First, these municipalities are statistical outliers. When they are removed, the average member population in each association decreases by more than 50 per cent (AUMA: 60.6%, UNSM: 51.5%) (Table 5-6). Second, and more importantly, they are also governance outliers.

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10 The removal of these two case studies has a dramatic effect on the average population of members, even with an N of 274 in the AUMA and an N of 55 in UNSM.
### Table 5-6. AUMA and UNSM Member Population Statistics with and without Outliers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUMA – All Members</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,096,833</td>
<td>11,313</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA without Calgary</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>92,490</td>
<td>4,453</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Edmonton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM – All Members</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>390,096</td>
<td>16,639</td>
<td>4,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM without HRM and</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>47,814</td>
<td>8,069</td>
<td>4,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on AUMA and UNSM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.

In their discussion of Alberta’s municipal associations, LeSage, Jr. and McMillan note that while “AUMA is the accepted voice for the province’s urban municipalities … the two largest cities often work separately in the promotion or defence of their interests.”\(^{11}\) Edmonton and Calgary often collaborate in efforts to increase financial transfers from the province and pursue joint lobbying efforts. Edmonton and Calgary are also given special status, separate from AUMA, in provincial-municipal relations. On the 2001 Minister’s Provincial/Municipal Council on Roles and Responsibilities in the 21\(^{st}\) Century, membership included the mayors of Edmonton and Calgary in addition to the presidents of AUMA and AAMDC.\(^{12}\) In 2014, the Government of Alberta signed a framework agreement with the mayors of Edmonton and Calgary on developing charters for their cities. The charters, which are to be finalized by 2016, will give the two cities stronger powers than other municipalities and change their fiscal frameworks.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) LeSage, Jr. and McMillan, 427.
\(^{12}\) Membership on the Council also included the Minister of Municipal Affairs, a representative from the Alberta Economic Development Authority, and three members of the Legislative Assembly. Ibid., 394-444.
Edmonton and Calgary are well represented within the governance structure of AUMA, but they enjoy a closer, more direct relationship with the province than other urban municipalities in Alberta and will have a different legal status than other urban municipalities in the near future.

There is also close collaboration between the Halifax Regional Municipality and the Cape Breton Regional Municipality in Nova Scotia. Cameron and Hobson note that much of this cooperation occurs within the regional caucus of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, but the collective weight of their populations affords them a special relationship with the province.\textsuperscript{14} The HRM and CBRM account for 53.0% of the provincial population.\textsuperscript{15} The Halifax Regional Municipality, in particular, has a unique status within the province. The municipality operates primarily under \textit{The Halifax Regional Municipality Charter}, passed in response to lobbying by the HRM. \textit{The Municipal Governance Act} is the primary legislation for all other municipalities in the province.\textsuperscript{16} However, the close relationship between the HRM and CBRM within the UNSM and in intergovernmental relations demonstrates that they share unique status within the province. The municipalities of Edmonton and Calgary, and the Halifax and Cape Breton Regional Municipalities represent both governance and statistical outliers within their respective associations. If their primary interactions are with the provincial government directly, rather than collectively through their municipal association, their populations should not be counted when measuring membership heterogeneity. For this

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} Cameron and Hobson, 153.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Statistics Canada, “Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census Subdivisions (Municipalities), 2011 and 2006 Censuses,” www.statscan.gc.ca.}  
reason, they are removed when calculating the population dispersion of associational members.

When the four outliers are removed, the case studies’ Gini coefficients demonstrate a clear divide between the heterogeneity of AUMA and UBCM’s member populations and the relative homogeneity of AAMDC and UNSM’s memberships. The coefficients of AAMDC (54.0) and UNSM (52.8) indicate that there is not complete homogeneity in member populations, but they do have greater equality than the population dispersions of AUMA (80.6) and UBCM (77.0) members (Table 5-7).

Table 5-7. Gini Coefficients of Associations’ Member Populations with Outliers Removed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUMA without Calgary/Edmonton</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM with HRM/CBRM</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on Associations’ 2013 Annual Reports and 2011 Census data.

This divide reinforces the appropriateness of using these case studies to examine the relationship between the dispersion of member populations and the jurisdictional aspect of municipal associations’ intergovernmental lobbying. It is expected that AUMA and UBCM will lobby primarily for the resources to enact municipal programs, while AAMDC and UNSM will lobby primarily for provincial programs to meet member needs.
5.3 Resolutions as Indicators of Jurisdictional Responsibility

Resolutions passed by four municipal associations are used to test whether there is support for these hypotheses. The resolutions that associations pass at their annual meetings are the foundation of their policy making and agenda setting. Resolutions are drafted and voted on by members, and most are directed at the provincial government. They reflect which level of government municipalities want to be responsible for the implementation of policy requests. Associations also require resolutions to contain explicit instructions on how municipalities want the issue in question to be addressed. The language related to jurisdictional responsibility is clear and straightforward. Nearly all associations vote on resolutions at their annual meetings, and while there are slight variations in their resolutions processes, the majority of them follow a remarkably similar pattern of how resolutions are drafted, reviewed, and voted upon. This enables a valid comparison between different associations’ resolutions.

Background on the Resolutions Processes of Municipal Associations

Municipal associations have passed resolutions at their annual conventions since their formation, and the resolutions process remains a critical part of their activities.17 The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties states: “Resolutions act as marching orders for the AAMDC. They provide formal guidance for AAMDC advocacy

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efforts by highlighting issues of local importance that have province-wide impacts.”

The Union of British Columbia Municipalities echoes a similar sentiment: “The main forum for UBCM policy-making is the annual resolutions cycle.” The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association describes its resolution process as “a comprehensive, inclusive, and pragmatic framework for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing issues important to members.” Finally, in explaining how its priorities are set, UNSM explains that the resolutions process “identifies areas of concern for [the] majority of municipalities.”

Resolutions are a core aspect of association activity, but they also reflect how municipalities approach collective intergovernmental lobbying.

In short, resolutions indicate priority areas and propose solutions of what to do about problems. The language and scale used in proposing solutions to meet these priorities areas is expected to influence the relationship between membership heterogeneity and jurisdictional responsibilities. All four associations are explicit in their expectation that resolutions should be provincial in scope. AAMDC’s Resolutions FAQ explains to members: “as an association that represents all municipal districts and counties in Alberta, having resolutions that are provincial in scope supports the advocacy process.” In its Writing Guidelines for Resolutions, UBCM suggests “the issue identified in the resolution should be relevant to other local governments across the province [as] this will support productive debate and assist UBCM to represent your

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22 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change.”
concern to the provincial or federal government on behalf of all BC regional districts and municipalities.”\textsuperscript{23} AUMA’s Resolutions Policy and UNSM’s By-Laws share the same expectation – that resolutions “should strive to address a topic of concern to municipalities throughout the Province”\textsuperscript{24} and “should address a topic of general concern to municipalities on a provincial level and not deal with local concerns.”\textsuperscript{25} When drafting resolutions, municipalities have to frame local issues or concerns as provincial in nature – and consider whether the majority of members share their interests. This perception of shared interests is expected to influence how they propose the issue in question to be addressed.

The Resolutions Process

The majority of resolutions originate at the municipal level, and associations provide writing guidelines for their members.\textsuperscript{26} After resolutions are drafted, considered, and passed by a municipality, they must be received by the association before being admitted for debate at an annual meeting. As discussed earlier, these processes vary, from specific Resolutions Committees, to a committee that has other responsibilities, to a two-step process of review, where resolutions are first considered at the district level or by an area association. Despite the variations in process, they share a common purpose:

\textsuperscript{25} Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws.”
to review the proposed resolutions for format and content, and to categorize them prior to consideration by the membership at large.

In the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, the Board of Directors appoints a fourteen-member Resolutions Committee. The committee can make editorial changes that do not alter the intent of the resolution or can make recommendations for altering the intent of the resolution. It then categorizes them as: issues of provincial interest, issues of primarily of local concern, matters that have been considered at any of the three previous annual conferences, or matters of internal, UNSM concern. Finally, the Committee offers a recommendation for each resolution, including the rationale for its recommendation in favour of or against passage. This report of recommendations is distributed to all member municipalities prior to the annual conference.27

The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association does not appoint a specific Resolutions Committee, but its nine-member Municipal Governance Committee serves as the Resolutions Committee of the Association. Like UNSM, the committee reviews the content and format and content of resolutions and categorizes them as: AUMA Strategic/Business Plan Priorities, Provincial Scope, Targeted Scope, Endorsement Requests, or Non-Municipal Matters. It also produces a resolutions report that recommends whether the Board of Directors should admit each resolution for debate. These recommendations may include comments from the Committee on the background of the resolution.28

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AAMDC and UBCM are amongst the associations that follow a two-step review process. AAMDC recommends members vet resolutions within their district, to allow “for resolution wording to be clarified and endorsed at the district level.”

The six-member Resolutions Committee reviews all resolutions endorsed at the district level and those submitted individually. The core function of the Committee is to determine the order in which endorsed and submitted resolutions are considered. Unlike other associations, AAMDC has biannual conventions – one in the spring and one in the fall – and votes on resolutions twice per year.

The two-step process followed by UBCM is similar to the one carried out by AAMDC. UBCM outlines:

Members are urged to submit resolutions first to Area Associations for consideration. Resolutions endorsed at Area Association annual meetings are submitted directly to UBCM for consideration and do not need to be re-submitted to UBCM by the sponsor. Both UBCM and its member local governments have observed that submitting resolutions first to Area Associations results in better quality resolutions overall. If absolutely necessary, however, local governments may submit council- or board-endorsed resolutions directly to UBCM prior [to the annual general meeting].

Each area association has its own Resolutions Committee and procedures for handling resolutions, but they work in close collaboration with UBCM. As the Constitution of the Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments states, “The Role of the Resolution Committee is to examine, comment and make a recommendation on all resolutions submitted to the Annual General Meeting, after it has received comment back

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29 Alberta Association of Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change.”
30 Ibid.
31 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Resolutions Procedures.”
from UBCM.”

UBCM also refers resolutions to area associations for their consideration.

The resolutions endorsed by area associations are forwarded to the four-member UBCM Resolutions Committee, which reviews, organizes, and makes recommendations on all Area-endorsed and individually submitted resolutions. They are also categorized as: “priority issues relevant to all local governments; “resolutions that support established UBCM policy;” “resolutions on new issues or issues considered previously but not endorsed, within the jurisdiction of local government;” “resolutions on new issues or issues considered previously but not endorsed, outside the jurisdiction of local government;” and “resolutions that are referred to similar resolutions in the Resolutions Book; to policy papers, reports, or special sessions at Convention; or to Area Associations.”

Resolutions that are categorized as similar to other resolutions or UBCM work are not admitted for debate at annual conventions.

In all four associations, resolutions are forwarded to annual meetings for consideration. The full membership debates and votes on each forwarded resolution. In each, when resolutions are voted on, one vote is given to each elected official from a member municipality in attendance. Motions that are passed at the annual meetings become official positions of the association and are used to set lobbying priorities. In addition to setting internal agendas, the resolutions passed by associations are forwarded to all relevant government ministries, provincial and/or federal.

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32 Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments, “Constitution and Bylaws,” akblg.civicweb.net.
33 Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities, “AVICC Conference Rules and Procedures for Handling Resolutions,” avicc.ca
34 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Resolutions Procedures.”
Provincial Government Responses to Resolutions

The governments of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia all offer official responses to the resolutions passed by the municipal association(s) in their province. The formality of these responses, and associations’ reactions to them, vary by province and association, but that responses are offered is relevant to the issue of jurisdictional responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying. The fact that all four case studies receive written responses to their resolutions strengthens the validity of using resolutions to measure how members approach jurisdictional responsibility. Municipalities draft resolutions with the knowledge that, if they are passed at the association level, they will be seen and responded to by the relevant government ministry.

In Nova Scotia and Alberta, associations receive ministry responses on a rolling basis. The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities publishes them in its newsletter as they are received.\textsuperscript{35} The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association collects responses and then distributes a report detailing the government response to each resolution, published in the spring following each annual convention.\textsuperscript{36} The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties also collects the responses it receives and then releases an Advocacy Report twice annually that reports on active resolutions (those passed within the past three years). Each active resolution is assigned one of four statuses:

- **Accepted** – The intent of the resolution has been met fully and the AAMDC does not need to formally advocate further on this issue.
- **Accepted in Principle** – Either the response or actions from government or appropriate organizations have made steps towards


meeting the intent of the resolution but there is still work to be done. Resolutions with this status are continually monitored.

- **Unsatisfactory** – Either the government response or actions do not address the request in the resolution. The AAMDC will continue to advocate on this issue.
- **Incomplete Information** – The AAMDC requires further information from the provincial or federal government, or targeted organization to determine a status for the resolution.\(^{37}\)

AAMDC also provides a written update for each resolution in the Report Card that details the rationale for its assigned status.

The Government of British Columbia offers the most formalized response of the three provinces. Whereas responses in Nova Scotia and Alberta are given to municipal associations on an individual and rolling basis, the Government of British Columbia releases a single, formal document that details its response to every resolution passed by the Union of British Columbia Municipalities. Relevant ministries separate responses to specific resolutions. They are then collected and published by the Local Government Policy and Research Branch of the Ministry of Community, Sport, and Cultural Development.\(^{38}\) Although the response process varies by province and association, member municipalities in all four cases have the common experience of receiving responses to their resolutions.

### 5.4 Methodology

Resolutions capture how municipalities approach collective intergovernmental lobbying, and can therefore be used to analyze the relationship between membership heterogeneity and jurisdictional responsibility. To test this relationship, the resolutions passed by the

\(^{37}\) Alberta Association of Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change.”

four case studies over a fifteen-year period, 1999 – 2013, are examined. The fifteen-year time period creates a database of over 3,200 resolutions (Tables 5-8 and 5-9).

Table 5-8. Number of Resolutions Passed by Association per Year, 1999-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AUMA</th>
<th>UBCM</th>
<th>AAMDC</th>
<th>UNSM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-9. Average Number of Resolutions Passed by Association per Year, 1999-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolutions</th>
<th>AUMA</th>
<th>UBCM</th>
<th>AAMDC</th>
<th>UNSM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of resolutions passed by each association in this time period ranges from 249 from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities to 1,858 from the Union of British
From 1999-2013, The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties passed 529 resolutions and the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association passed 625. Although there are significant differences in the number of resolutions passed by each association, there are still a large number of resolutions from each association within the selected time period. There are differences in the average number of resolutions passed by associations per year, but this does not prevent valid comparisons between the distributions of resolutions by requested jurisdictional responsibility.

In order to compare the distribution of resolutions by requested jurisdictional responsibility, each resolution is coded as municipal, provincial, federal, municipal-provincial, municipal-federal, municipal-provincial-federal, provincial-federal, or non-jurisdictional. The following criteria are employed in coding:

- Municipal: The resolution requests sole municipal responsibility to act on an issue. This may or may not include a request for financial support to carry out its actions.
  - Example of non-financial municipal resolution: Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 2013: 3C – Off-Highway Vehicle Use:

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WHEREAS Off-Highway Vehicles are a source of economic prosperity to many rural Nova Scotia communities; and

WHEREAS other provinces have bestowed upon their municipalities the ability to regulate the use of Off-Highway Vehicles on the shoulders of municipal roads;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the UNSM call upon the province to grant municipalities the authority to legislate, through bylaw, if, where and when Off-Highway
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39 The 2007 UNSM resolutions are unavailable. Tracy Verbeke, Receptionist, Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, *Email to the Author*, July 9, 2013.
Vehicle use is appropriate on the shoulders of municipal and provincial roads.\textsuperscript{40}

- **Example of financial municipal resolution:** Alberta Urban Municipalities Association – 2002: P12 – Ambulance Services:

  WHEREAS Municipalities under the Municipal Government Act have the right to provide Ambulance Services; and
  
  WHEREAS Municipalities may pass by-laws with respect to safety, health, and the welfare of their communities; and
  
  WHEREAS Municipalities have provided high quality and affordable services to their communities for many years; and
  
  WHEREAS many Alberta Municipalities have combined ambulance and fire fighting services; and
  
  WHEREAS many combined ambulance and fire services have fully integrated personnel doing both duties equally; and
  
  WHEREAS this creates efficiencies for their Municipalities in the delivery of ambulance and fire services;
  
  NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association request the Government of Alberta to ensure that municipalities continue to have the responsibility in the delivery of Ambulance Services; and
  
  FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association request the Government of Alberta to provide funding for these services.\textsuperscript{41}

- **Municipal-Provincial:** The resolution requests that municipalities and the province share responsibility on an issue:

  - **Example:** AUMA – 2006: C.v.4 – Support of Trail Systems:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{40} Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolutions – 108th Annual Conference,” unsm.ca.
\end{flushright}
WHEREAS trails provide an important mode of active transportation for Alberta citizens both within and among our communities and regions, enabling walking and the use of bicycles and other active forms of transportation on safe routes as an alternative to motor vehicles;

AND WHEREAS the use of trails promotes health and wellbeing among our citizens, providing an opportunity for inexpensive, easily accessible all season physical activity and enjoyment;

AND WHEREAS trails promote tourism and economic benefit for communities along regional train systems;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association encourage the Government of Alberta to recognize trails as an important part of the local and provincial transportation infrastructure and develop, in conjunction with municipalities, a policy framework that will facilitate and encourage the development of trail networks in a local, regional and provincial context.  

- **Municipal-Provincial-Federal**: The resolution requests that all three levels of government share responsibility in addressing an issue:

  - **Example**: Union of British Columbia Municipalities – 2004: B48 – Police Governance:

    WHEREAS while policing agencies are moving towards integration of services to better respond to public safety and security needs, there has been no collaboration between levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal) to reform current methods of policing;

    AND WHEREAS in addition to providing policing needs at a local level municipalities cannot sustain increased policing costs as a result of the demands of the integrated policing approach that is required today:

    THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of BC Municipalities request that the Province and the federal

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government establish a task force (with municipal police input) to develop a model for a national unified police governance that will clearly identify the roles and funding responsibilities of each level of government and ensure a process that will work effectively and efficiently across the three levels of government.\footnote{Government of British Columbia, “Provincial Response to the Resolutions of the 2004 Union of British Columbia Municipalities Convention,” www.ubcm.ca.}

- **Municipal-Federal:** The resolution requests that municipalities share responsibility with the federal government in addressing an issue.
  
  o **Example:** AUMA – 2012: A1 – Advocacy in Support of New Long Term Federal Plan for Municipal Infrastructure Funding:

    WHEREAS, The Building Canada Plan and a number of important federal-provincial transfer agreements vital to Canada’s municipalities will expire in March 2014;

    WHEREAS, Federal investments over the last few years have helped to slow the decline of our cities and communities, and the Government of Canada has committed to develop a new long-term plan for municipal infrastructure funding in consultation with municipal and provincial/territorial governments;

    WHEREAS, a seamless transition from the Building Canada Plan to a new long-term plan is necessary to ensure that municipalities can continue planning their capital spending effectively;

    WHEREAS, The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) has launched a campaign to ensure the new plan reflects municipal priorities across the country and asks its members to support this campaign; and

    WHEREAS, AUMA has been a strong advocate for the need for stable and flexible, long-term municipal infrastructure funding for Alberta’s urban municipalities;

    NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that AUMA endorses the FCM campaign and urges the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to work with
FCM to ensure the new long-term infrastructure plan meets the core needs of cities and communities;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT AUMA urges the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to ensure that the new long-term plan is fully in place when existing programs expire in 2014.44

• **Provincial:** The resolution requests that the provincial government have full responsibility for addressing an issue.

  o **Example:** Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties – 2007: 12-07F – Provincial River Management:

    WHEREAS jurisdiction for rivers, lakes and other water bodies is the responsibility of the Provincial or Federal Governments;

    WHEREAS prior to 1996 Alberta Environment planned, managed and undertook work necessary for the management of riparian issues and “training” of rivers, which program has been discontinued; and

    WHEREAS municipalities are now being pressured to address riparian issues following major flooding, erosion, or other significant rainfall/flow events;

    THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties urge the Province of Alberta to establish a policy framework for evaluating river management issues within Alberta as well as developing a financial program for addressing problems associated with river flooding and erosion, and that the responsibility for the program be assigned to Alberta Environment.45

• **Federal:** The resolution requests that the federal government have full responsibility for addressing an issue.

  o **Example:** UNSM – 2011: 34A - Removal of M.V. Miner by Federal Government – Town of Canso:

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WHEREAS the M.V. Miner was grounded on Scatarie Island during the month of September; and

WHEREAS the ship is considered a clear and present danger to Nova Scotia’s coastal environment and regional fishery; and

WHEREAS the Federal Government has not accepted any legal or financial responsibility for salvage or removal costs leaving same at the hands of Nova Scotia taxpayers;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities support the Province of Nova Scotia in removing this potential danger to our environment and fishery at the earliest possible date at no cost to Nova Scotia taxpayers; and

FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities support the efforts of Nova Scotia to have the Government of Canada accept legal and financial responsibility for similar navigational tragedies in the future.46

- **Provincial-Federal:** The resolution requests that the provincial and federal governments share responsibility in addressing an issue, without responsibility for policy enactment.

  - **Example:** AAMDC – 2001: 25-01F – Joint Lobbying:

    WHEREAS local rural and urban municipalities presently cooperate on many services and initiatives successfully, such as mutual fire protection, ambulance authorities, waste management authorities, emergency services, recreation and library services, water and sewer agreements and seniors housing;

    AND WHEREAS the Province of Alberta has reduced its debt and tax rates by placing more of the burden of services and financing on the backs of municipalities, creating significant financial hardships for both rural and urban municipalities;

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AND WHEREAS this situation has resulted in rural/urban conflict, which the Government of Alberta has attempted to address by promoting/providing mediation assistance and regional initiatives to resolve cost/revenue sharing solutions, rather than assuming responsibility for funding programs of a provincial nature;

AND WHEREAS the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties as invited the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association to participate in a joint member advisory committee to examine intermunicipal cost-sharing issues;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties work together with the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association to do what it is best for all Albertans;

AND FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that the AAMDC work together with the AUMA to jointly lobby the Government of Alberta and the federal government to take back their responsibilities in funding and/or providing programs which are provincial or federal in nature.\(^47\)

• **Non-Jurisdictional**: The resolution does not request action that is jurisdictional in nature.

  o **Example**: UNSM – 2009: 18A – Resolution to Increase Participation in FCM Conferences by Using Audio-Visual Teleconferencing and Electronic Voting Systems

  THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) petition FCM to consider opening up the FCM conferences via teleconference and webinar technology to all members across the country; furthermore, that electronic voting methods that have been tried and proven, by (sic) utilized voting on resolutions thus allowing significantly greater participation in this democratic process.\(^48\)

\(^47\) Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolutions Database.”

Non-jurisdictional resolutions are removed for the purpose of comparing the frequency of resolution types by association. Although they can be indicative of associational behaviour, they do not indicate how members understand and approach jurisdictional responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying. With these resolutions removed, the relationship between membership heterogeneity and the distribution of resolution types can be examined and compared.

5.5 Analysis

The distributions of resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility by association support both hypotheses. In the two homogeneous associations, AAMDC and UNSM, the majority of resolutions request a higher level of government action without municipal responsibility. In the heterogeneous associations, AUMA and UBCM, a plurality of the resolutions request sole municipal responsibility and a majority request either sole or shared responsibility. Associations with homogeneous member populations lobby primarily for provincial programs, and associations with heterogeneous member populations lobby primarily for the resources or authority to enact municipal programs (Figure 5-1).

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49 The four associations passed a similar number of non-jurisdictional resolutions during the time period. The average annual number of resolutions passed by association ranged from 2.8 by UNSM to 6.2 by UBCM.
Figure 5-1. Requested Jurisdictional Responsibility in Municipal Associations’ Resolutions (1999-2013)

In the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and the Association of Alberta Municipal Districts and Counties, the majority of resolutions request no municipal responsibility. This percentage is higher in UNSM (62.1%) than AAMDC (53.1%), but both are distinct from AUMA (35.2%) and UBCM (38.6%). The majority of AUMA and UBCM’s resolutions request some form of municipal responsibility, either sole or shared. There is also a clear difference in the frequency of “provincial” resolutions between the heterogeneous and homogeneous associations. Less than one-third of resolutions in AUMA (30.5%) and UBCM (31.7%) request that the province have sole jurisdictional
responsibility, compared to 41.7% of resolutions in AAMDC and more than half of UNSM resolutions (53.6%) (Tables 5-10 and 5-11).

**Table 5-10. Frequency of Associations’ Resolutions by Jurisdictional Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUMA Heterogeneous</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(234)</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM Heterogeneous</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(755)</td>
<td>(280)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(544)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC Homogeneous</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(165)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(194)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM Homogeneous</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are percentage of each association’s resolutions with number of resolutions in parentheses.
Table 5-11. Distribution of Resolutions by Aggregated Jurisdictional Responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Sole Municipal Responsibility</th>
<th>Shared Responsibility with Another Level of Government</th>
<th>No Municipal Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>41% (234)</td>
<td>24% (137)</td>
<td>35% (201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>42% (755)</td>
<td>19% (337)</td>
<td>39% (657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>36% (165)</td>
<td>11% (53)</td>
<td>53% (247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
<td>22% (47)</td>
<td>16% (33)</td>
<td>62% (130)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are percentage of each association’s resolutions with number of resolutions in parentheses.

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the type of associational membership (homogeneous or heterogeneous) and the distribution of resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility. The relationship between these variables is significant, $X^2 (6, N = 2,996) = 113.31, p = < .001$.

Resolutions that are either municipal or provincial total more than 70% of resolutions in all four associations – and there is a clear divide between how these two types of resolutions are distributed between the homogeneous and heterogeneous associations (Figure 5-2). In the simplest terms, the two homogeneous associations pass more resolutions requesting provincial responsibility than municipal responsibility, and the two heterogeneous associations pass more resolutions requesting municipal responsibility than provincial responsibility.
Comparisons between associations on the frequency of municipal responsibility resolutions produce less distinct results. While AUMA and UBCM have the highest percentage of municipal resolutions – 40.9% and 42.1%, respectively – the percentage of municipal resolutions in AAMDC (35.5%) is closer to the heterogeneous associations than to UNSM (22.3%). However, AAMDC has the lowest percentage of resolutions that request shared responsibility with the province, 11.4% compared to 15.6% in UNSM, 19.3% in UBCM, and 23.9% in AUMA. This low level of requested collaboration helps to explain the fact that less than half of AAMDC’s resolutions ask for some form of municipal responsibility, whether sole or shared. The relationship between homogeneous and heterogeneous associations and the distribution of municipal
populations and resolutions is also significant. The results of a chi-square test are, $X^2(1, N = 2,224) = 47.90, p = < .001$. We can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between dispersion of member populations and the frequency of resolutions by requested jurisdictional responsibility.

Although there are significant differences between the heterogeneous and homogeneous associations on the frequency of municipal and provincial resolutions, there are similarities between them. In all four associations, less than 12% of resolutions request federal involvement. Where resolutions ask for action by the federal government, there is little request for federal collaboration with municipalities. More resolutions request that the federal government act unilaterally or in collaboration with the province than request shared municipal responsibility.

There are other similarities between the associations. In all four cases, more than 27 per cent of resolutions are “municipal” and at least 30 per cent of resolutions are “provincial.” Homogeneous associations pass more provincial resolutions than municipal, and heterogeneous associations pass more municipal resolutions, but all associations do pass both municipal and provincial resolutions. Examples of specific issues also highlight where commonalities exist within policy areas.

On the issue of library funding, AAMDC, AUMA, AAMDC, UNSM all passed resolutions requesting that the provincial government provide funding for libraries, but to maintain responsibility for library operations at the municipal level.\(^{50}\) AAMDC

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\(^{50}\) The Alberta Libraries Act “recognizes the municipality as the foundation for public library service,” and establishes municipal and community boards at the local level, as well as system boards at the regional level that have resource sharing agreements with other boards throughout the province. Government of Alberta Municipal Affairs, “Structure of Alberta Library Services,” www.albertalibraries.ca. Under the British Columbia Libraries Act, libraries are established and operated by municipalities. Once established,
requested that “the Government of Alberta increase their financial support to fully fund libraries for all Albertans,” 51 while AUMA requested that the Government “make an annual increase in the per capita grant to libraries to equal the Canadian Consumer Price Index.” 52 In British Columbia, where the provincial library budget line item had been subsumed into the overall education budget, UBCM passed a resolution asking the province to “recognize the broader mandate of libraries in British Columbia and reinstate the line item for library funding in the provincial budget.” 53 The UNSM 2000 resolution “Library Operating Costs,” requested that the province commit to library costs being born “equally by the Province and all of the municipal funding partners.” 54 In all four cases, association members requested financial support from their respective provincial government, but wanted to maintain the status quo of library operations as a municipal responsibility.

In the area of community-based seniors’ care, AAMDC and UBCM both passed resolutions that sought provincial responsibility for the issue. AAMDC urged the Province of Alberta to “maintain auxiliary extended care beds, assisted and designated assisted care living beds, within their communities so that seniors can feel secure and

they can file a request with the province to assume responsibility for providing library service in the municipality. If granted, they are then eligible for provincial funding. Government of British Columbia, “Library Act,” www.bded.gov.ca. In both provinces, the library funding comes from both municipal and provincial sources.
comfortable and receive proper care and compassionate health care, as well as maintaining a connection with their family, friends, and home communities.” The UBCM’s “Community-Based Care for Seniors” resolution echoed a similar sentiment. The resolution asked the province to “significantly enhance BC’s system of community-based seniors’ care, in order to ensure timely access to the full range of public services that support seniors to age and die with dignity.” The two associations took similar positions on how community-based programs should be addressed, despite the difference the dispersion of their member population sizes.

How municipal associations address shared issues can indicate commonalities, but they also demonstrate the varied approaches to jurisdictional responsibility between heterogeneous and homogeneous memberships. The issue of Family and Community Support Services is one such example. The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association’s 2010 resolution “Funding to Family and Community Support Services (FCSS)” requested that “the Government of Alberta increase provincial funding to municipalities for Family and Community Supports Services (FCSS) to $100 million dollars (currently $75.7), thereby relieving the pressure on crisis intervention and prevention services.” The Union of Nova Scotia’s 2002 “Funding for the Early Intervention Project for Action

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57 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Funding to Family and Community Support Services (FCSS),” 2010: Provincial Scope 18, “Resolutions.” In 1999, the Government of Alberta established an 80/20 cost-sharing agreement between itself and municipal governments for FCSS organizations. However, the amount of FCSS grants has remained stagnant, despite the population growth in many communities. By 2015, nearly 140 of Alberta’s 320 municipalities were over-contributing “in order to keep their FCSS programming sustainable.” The Lacombe Globe, “FCSS Fighting Losing Battle for More Government Funding,” January 22, 2015.
Against Family Violence” resolution also sought to reduce family crises, but through provincial action. The motion requested that the province’s Minister of Finance and Minister of Justice “establish the Department’s commitment for Action Against Family Violence by including in the Provincial Budget funding for the Early Intervention Project for Action Against Family Violence on an ongoing basis.”58 Both sought to address the same policy area through increased funding, but only AUMA’s members sought jurisdictional responsibility in program implementation.

It is expected that perceptions of shared member interests factored into the associations’ different approaches to the issue of family violence prevention. Whereas the majority of UNSM members are small towns or rural municipalities, with relatively homogeneous populations, it is probable that most members would perceive other municipalities as having similar needs in addressing family violence. If needs are perceived as similar, municipalities would be well served by a uniform provincial program that addressed their common needs. However, the greater heterogeneity in AUMA’s membership would likely create a perception of varied need between municipalities. It is expected that this perception factored into the decision of AUMA members to request provincial funding to carry out family services at the municipal level.

The issue of watershed management demonstrates a similar divide in how issues are approached by heterogeneous and homogeneous associations. In 2007, the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties requested that the Province of Alberta “establish a policy framework for evaluating river management issues within Alberta as

well as developing a financial program for addressing problems with river flooding and erosion, and that the responsibility for the program be assigned to Alberta Environment.  

When the Union of British Columbia Municipalities addressed watershed management in 2011, its focus was more narrow – related to local government acquisition of management control – but it requested municipal jurisdictional responsibility. Its “Control of Watersheds” resolution argued that “watersheds are not recognized in legislation, leaving local governments without adequate tools to enact measures for the protection of watersheds” and requested that the provincial government “develop a funding program that facilitates local government acquisition of both the watershed and adjacent land for those local governments with water systems on privately owned land.”

In Alberta, with similar watershed needs in relatively homogeneous, rural municipalities, AAMDC’s members requested a broad program of watershed management under provincial control. UBCM’s members – heterogeneous in population and therefore in watershed use and impact – requested a transfer of authority in order to control their own watersheds.

Renewable energy is a third such area. In 2006, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities passed a resolution requesting that the provincial government afford municipalities the “opportunity to participate in the creation of new green, renewable energy projects.” The resolution also requested that the provincial government make it mandatory for BC Hydro to purchase power “created by BC local government-supported, renewable energy projects.”

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green, renewable power projects. Six years prior, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities passed a resolution that symbolically supported the creation of a Nova Scotia Power Incorporated Green Energy Program – but did not request municipal involvement in its development or operation. UNSM members were content to have a program operated at the provincial level, whereas municipalities in BC wanted to control the development of green energy projects at the local level.

Municipal associations address a wide array of issues in the resolutions passed at their annual conventions. These issues are often specific to provincial events or conditions. However, comparisons of how different associations address common issues are indicative of the broader pattern in the relationship between membership heterogeneity and jurisdictional responsibility. While all four associations pass resolutions that request sole, shared, or no responsibility, there are distinct differences in the approaches taken by homogeneous and heterogeneous associations.

5.6 Consideration of Alternative Hypotheses

The two hypotheses tested in this chapter receive support from the evidence. However, as this is a bivariate analysis, there is the possibility of alternative explanations or confounding variables. Two possible alternative explanations are worth careful consideration: 1. That the smaller memberships in the homogeneous associations create a greater sense of interest cohesion and 2. That there is a lower demand for municipal services in rural areas, which make up a significant portion of the homogeneous

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62 Ibid.
members. Group size could be a factor in the perception of shared interests, while the expected level of service provision in rural vs. urban areas could contribute to whether there is pressure on municipal governments to request greater powers or resources to provide services for their citizens. Both have the potential to be alternative explanations for the results of requested jurisdictional responsibility by association.

If the relationship between member populations and jurisdictional responsibility is expected to rest on the perception of shared interests, it is important to question whether the number of members within an association influences how shared interests are perceived. The two homogeneous associations have smaller memberships than the heterogeneous associations. UNSM and AAMDC have 55 and 69 members, compared to 194 and 274 members in UBCM and AUMA, respectively. But is the difference in membership size large enough to account for differences in how municipalities view the interests of other members? Are the differences in size enough to explain for differences in behaviour?

In his taxonomy of groups, Olson distinguishes between small and large groups by their relationships between members. He states: “If, in a reasonably small organization, a particular person stops paying for the collective good he enjoys, the costs will rise noticeably for each of the others in the groups.” Under this definition, AAMDC and UNSM, while smaller than AUMA and UBCM, are still considered large groups. The relationships between members are not close enough that the removal of one would result in a considerable increase in the costs for others. This distance in member

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relationships is expected to translate to perceptions of shared interests. The homogeneous associations have fewer members than the heterogeneous associations, but all four have enough members to follow the behavioural patterns of large groups.

Chapter Four found that urban associations pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than rural associations. The second alternative hypotheses – that there is a lower demand for municipal services in rural areas – implies that citizens in urban areas place a higher demand on municipalities to deliver services, which translates into more requests for transfers of funds or authority for municipalities to carry out services at the local level. Here, though, the definitions of rural and urban in the context of service delivery need close consideration, particularly in the case of the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. It is not clear that “urban” in the context of AUMA translates into a greater expectation of services for most its members, even thought of its members act differently from their counterparts in the Association of Municipal District and Counties on approaches to jurisdictional responsibility. Rather, it is the diversity of member sizes and conditions, the external heterogeneity of members as discussed in Chapter Four, that drives the higher rate of jurisdictional resolutions.

The Alberta Municipal Government Act defines urban municipalities as those where “a majority of the buildings are on parcels of land smaller than 1850 square metres.”65 This definition varies from the one employed by Statistics Canada – which defines urban, or a population centre, as “an area with a population of at least 1,000 and a

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density of 400 or more people per square kilometre.”\textsuperscript{66} Only 42\% of AUMA members have population greater than 1,000. More than 88\% of AAMDC members have a population of at least 1,000. In addition, of a random sample of 50 Alberta urban municipalities with a population under 1,000, less than two-thirds had a website – compared to 100\% of the rural members of the AAMDC.\textsuperscript{67}

These can be taken as indicators that there is not a higher demand for services among AUMA members than in municipalities that belong to AAMDC. Yet requests for municipal jurisdiction still dominate AUMA’s resolutions – at a rate comparable to UBCM, where only 18\% of members have a population of less than 1,000. This pattern of behaviour provides further support for the hypothesis that member heterogeneity and the diversity of member conditions – to a greater extent than expectations of service delivery in rural vs. urban areas – are determinants of municipal and associational behaviour on jurisdictional responsibility.

5.7 Conclusion

The two hypotheses tested in this chapter are supported by the evidence. Associations with homogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for provincial programs and associations with heterogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for the resources to enact municipal programs. Analysis of the resolutions passed by the four associations produced distinct differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous associations. In Alberta, where both associations operate under the same provincial institutions and


\textsuperscript{67} A Google search was conducted for a random sample of 50 of the 158 AUMA members with population under 1,000. Of 50 sample municipalities, 32 had a website. Four sample municipalities did have a community profile on the website of a tourism bureau or neighbouring municipality.
government, the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties and the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association had different patterns of behaviour. When the Gini coefficients are compared to the distribution of resolutions, the results demonstrate a clear relationship between the heterogeneity of member populations and the jurisdictional responsibility that municipal associations pursue through resolutions and collective intergovernmental lobbying. It is not just norms or external conditions that drive influence how associations approach jurisdictional responsibility, but also their internal composition of membership. As provincial governments review, respond, and sometimes act upon, the resolutions passed by municipal associations, the relationship between member heterogeneity and requested jurisdictional responsibility has important implications for municipal-provincial relations and divisions of power.
Chapter 6

6 How Municipal Associations Choose to Allocate Collective Resources

The core functions of municipal associations are advocacy and the provision of member services. Advocacy refers to the promotion of common objectives, usually by lobbying senior governments. Member services are provided to member municipalities, normally at a lesser cost than self provision by local governments. It is unclear which function associations prioritize, and how resource allocation may vary by association. Do associations view advocacy as their primary focus, or are more resources allocated to member services? This chapter investigates whether membership composition determines how associations prioritize their functions and allocate their collective resources.

The collective action literature is employed to develop testable hypotheses of whether membership composition determines municipal associations’ choice between services and advocacy. Two variables are drawn from the literature: the presence of small members and the presence of large members. Small municipalities are reliant on the services associations provide due to their limited internal resources and capacity. Large municipalities, that have the human and financial capital to provide most services for themselves, join associations for their collective weight in lobbying senior levels of government and advocacy more generally. Associations must balance these competing demands on their collective resources. Their responsiveness to demands is measured in two aspects of association behavior: the number of services they provide and the percentage of their budgetary expenditures that is allocated to service provision. The
findings provide strong support for the proposition that membership composition determines associational behavior.

6.1 A Theory of Group Behaviour and Collective Action

Mancur Olson’s theory of public goods and group behavior identifies two core functions of groups. These are the achievement of common goals and the provision of selective incentives; that is, goods or services that are only available to members of the group. Olson argues that although groups form on the basis of common interests, they are only able to cohere because of the selective incentives they provide to their members. He argues that associations provide public goods, but:

Just as a state cannot support itself by voluntary contributions, or by selling its basic services on the market, neither can other large organizations support themselves without providing some sanction, or some attraction distinct from the public good itself, that will lead individuals to help bear the burdens of maintaining the organization.

This is because potential members have an incentive to free ride. Any individual’s efforts “will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he was working in support of his organization.”¹ The problem of collective action means that a shared purpose among members is not enough for a group to form and to pursue a common interest. Members must be motivated to adhere to the association through individual, selective incentives. These incentives enable groups to treat “those who do not join the organization working for the group’s interest [to be] treated differently than those who

Selective incentives make it valuable for members to join a group regardless of whether collective action is carried out on their behalf. They are effective in motivating individuals to join a group, but they create an inherent tension in how groups allocate collective resources. Groups need members in order to carry out advocacy, but they must use services to attract and retain these members. Groups must split their resources between these two functions of service provision and advocacy.

The tension between advocacy and services is inherent in municipal associations. All associations carry out both functions, but they must choose how much of their resources they allocate to each. There is a diversity of allocative strategies among municipal associations in Canada. This diversity is explored before hypotheses are drawn from the collective action literature to test whether there are explanatory variables that can make sense of this complexity.

6.2 Member Services

The number and type of services offered by municipal associations vary considerably from association to association. At the extremes, the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) offers four services and the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) offers 21. Some services – municipal insurance, fuel procurement, and employee benefits – are offered by the majority of associations. Others, like discounted rat and gopher poisons, and a wild boar control program, are association specific and reflect provincial conditions (in this case, those particular to Saskatchewan).

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2 Ibid., 51.
The delivery of services can also be complex. A few of them, such as commercial discounts and legal services, are automatically available to members, without any cost above membership fees. Other services are offered as optional, quasi-commercial programs. These are only available to member municipalities, but their costs are additional to membership fees. They include insurance and benefits for municipal employees. Finally, there are services that combine elements of the automatic and opt in structures. Members can receive discounts on fuel and other products through bulk

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3 Associations where budgetary data is not available – UNBM, FQM, UMQ – are excluded.
purchasing and fuel procurement, but they must opt in to cooperation with other members in order to receive premium rates. The discounted rate that members receive is dependent upon how many other members choose to participate.\textsuperscript{4} The diversity in the number, type, and structure of services provided by associations demonstrates considerable complexity in how associations deploy selective incentives to attract and maintain members.

The selective incentives offered by associations are largely static. They have certainly evolved – SARM once offered its members a discounted rate on DDT – but most are firmly established and stable from year to year.\textsuperscript{5} The fact that some are offered by all provincial level associations in Canada is evidence of their status as a core function of associational behaviour. However, the range of services offered indicates that associations adapt their core functions to attract and maintain members. There are common services, but there is also considerable diversity in how selective incentives are provided by associations. The diversity is found in how associations deliver selective incentives to their members and the mix of associational-specific services that are offered.

Common Services

Municipal associations use member services to respond to local conditions and member needs. Still, there are a number of common services. All municipal associations hold annual conventions. Municipal insurance, fuel supply, bulk purchasing, and employee benefits are common to the majority of associations. Municipal insurance

\textsuperscript{4} A full list of services by association can be found in Appendix C.
\textsuperscript{5} Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, \textit{Sixty-Third Annual Convention} (Regina: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 1968), 118.
is offered to members in eleven of the fourteen primary, provincial level associations in Canada. Bulk fuel supply is a selective incentive in eight of the fourteen, and non-fuel bulk purchasing and municipal employee benefits are both offered by seven. Only one primary association (UMNB) does not offer any of these services, while three (MNL, UMQ, and SARM) offer all four.

Table 6-1. Common Member Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Insurance</th>
<th>Fuel Supply</th>
<th>Bulk Purchasing</th>
<th>Employee Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SARM</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSM</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNL</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries based on associations’ 2013 Annual Reports.

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6 The term “primary association” is used to distinguish from the four “section associations” that represent small subsections of municipalities within a province. These associations – the Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and L’Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) – have overlapping memberships with larger municipal associations. The majority of members in SANC, PARCS, CNBA-ACNB, and AMBM belong to another, larger municipal association in their province, and can access that association’s member services.
The commonality of these services indicates that there are shared municipal needs across provinces. However, there are variations in the delivery methods of these services, providing further evidence of associations’ flexibility and adaptability in meeting member needs. A key difference between associations is the extent to which the services are legally institutionalized within the broader organizational structure.

Wholly Owned Subsidiaries for Service Provision

The structure of selective incentives varies by associations, but the Association of Ontario Municipalities (AMO) and the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) have the most institutionalized method of service delivery. These associations have separate, wholly owned subsidiaries that provide services to their members. The Local Authority Services Company (LAS) was established by AMO in 1992 and AUMA established the Alberta Municipal Services Corporation (AMSC) in 2005. In evaluating these bodies, it is noteworthy that AMO and AUMA are two of the larger municipal associations in Canada. AMO has 413 members, and AUMA has 272. Only two associations have more members than AMO – Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM), with 1,000+ members, and the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) with 451. The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM, 296 members) and l’Union des municipalités du Québec (UQM, 300+) have slightly more members than AUMA, but AMO and AUMA still have a large number of member municipalities. In addition to the size of their memberships, it can be surmised that the

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8 It should also be noted that AMO founded LAS before the Ontario amalgamations, when it had 673 members. Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Annual Report 1992-93 (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1993), 40-48.
number of services offered by AMO and AUMA was a factor in their decisions to form wholly owned subsidiaries. The LAS offers 14 member services and AMSC 15, compared an the average of seven. Of the fourteen primary associations, only the Fédération québécoise des municipalités, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL), and Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities offer more services than AMO and AUMA. FQM and MNL each offer 17 member services, and SARM offers 21.

Service Divisions

In addition to the wholly owned subsidiaries under AMO and AUMA, a number of municipal associations have distinct service bodies. As discussed, eleven of the fourteen primary associations offer municipal liability insurance to their members. Three associations – the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC), the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), and the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) – own and operate their own insurance programs. They are Jubilee Insurance Agencies, AAMDC’s member-owned non-profit insurance agency; MUNIX, AUMA’s reciprocal insurance exchange between associational members; and the SARM Liability Self-Insurance Plan. The

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Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association co-manages the SUMAssure Program with an independent insurance company to provide a hybrid program of self-funded and traditional insurance coverage for its members. The other associations that have municipal insurance as a selective incentive – MNL, UNSM, FPEIM, AFMNB, UMQ, FQM, and AMM – provide discounted group rates with private insurance companies. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities do not offer municipal insurance programs to their members. Municipal insurance is a common service, but its delivery varies.

Another common, but varied, selective incentive is bulk purchasing. MNL, AFMNB, UMQ, AMM, SARM, SUMA, and AAMDC all offer bulk purchasing to their members, and four others have distinct trade divisions. AMM operates the

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14 Local Services Authority, “Services.” Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Services,” www.ubcm.ca. In 2011 AMO surveyed its members on the costs of municipal insurance, and found that its members used a mix of insurance companies, and non-profit insurance reciprocals and pools. In its report on the survey, AMO stated that its next step for action on municipal insurance was to lobby the provincial government to “change [its] legal environment and explore alternatives such as proportional liability.” Association of Municipalities of Ontario, AMO’s Municipal Insurance Survey Results (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2011), 2.
Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. (MTCML), SARM runs a SARM Trading Department, SUMA offers bulk purchasing to its members under SUMAdvantage, and AAMDC runs a Trade Division through its Aggregated Business Services.¹⁶ A few examples of supplies available through these trade divisions include office supplies, pest controls, and dog tags through MTCML; office and election supplies, maps, and pest control products through SARM; tires, traffic signs, janitorial supplies, sporting goods, and office supplies under SUMAdvantage; and paint and supplies, tires, fencing and posts, and office supplies through AAMDC’s Trade Division Suppliers. Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador’s bulk purchasing is narrow – it is offered for tires only – and UMQ has four bulk purchasing groups: dust control, water treatment chemicals, fire safety products, and tires.¹⁷ The bulk purchasing offered by Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick is flexible and ad hoc. It coordinates purchasing groups for common-use items when a need arises amongst its members.¹⁸ Like insurance, there is considerable diversity in how bulk purchasing is delivered.

Association-Specific Services

Wholly owned subsidiaries and service divisions demonstrate associations’ flexibility in how they meet common needs, but the variety of association services further demonstrates the complexity of selective incentives. In order to achieve common goods, groups must offer services that incentivize membership – and the services provided indicate that there are varied needs across provinces and associations. Association-specific services include a closed meeting investigator for Association of Municipality of Ontario members, discounts at the Halifax Westin Hotel for members of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, and a commercial vehicle program for Union of British Columbia Municipalities members.\(^\text{19}\) The extreme of tailored member services is the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM). Many of its services are tailored to the agricultural industry, and include a Feral Wild Boar Program, Beaver Control Program, Invasive Plant Management, and a Provincial Rat Eradication Program. SARM even has its own brands of rat and gopher poisons (see Image 6-1).\(^\text{20}\)


Image 6-1. Advertisement for SARM Gopher Poison (1953)

Note: Advertisement is from the 1953 SARM Annual Convention Handbook. SARM Gopher Poison is still sold through the association’s trade division.

Association-specific services indicate the success of associations in developing programs that member municipalities are interested in accessing.

Although a number of association-specific services are unique to provincial or regional circumstances, others could be by any municipal association. These include consolidated energy billing, offered by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario; the election work training available to the members of the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association; and the Telephone Parliamentary Procedures Advisory Service run by Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador. These further demonstrate the complexity

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21 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, Forty-Eighth Annual Convention (Regina: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 1953), 106.
of selective incentives – a complexity reinforced by the services offered in section associations.

Services in Section Associations

As discussed in Chapter Three, the term “section associations” is used to denote associations that represent a particular type of municipality within a province, but are not the largest municipal association available for these municipalities to join. In provinces where there are split rural and urban associations, these associations are the broadest, largest provincial level association available to either rural or urban municipalities. Section associations represent more niche memberships. They differ from sub- or area associations, like the the Association française des municipalités de l’Ontario (AFMO) and the Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities (AVICC) that are part of the broader structures of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities, respectively. Sub-associations represent caucuses within a larger municipal association. Municipalities are part of AFMO by virtue of their membership in the Association of Municipalities in Ontario. They receive member services from their AMO membership and their interests as francophone municipalities are represented with AFMO and on AMO’s board structure. The Chair of AFMO is a member of the AMO Board of Directors.23 In addition to its linguistic sub-association, AMO has sub-associations organized by municipal size. For example, the Rural Ontario Municipal Association (ROMA) describes itself as “the rural arm of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Board of Directors 2014 - 2016,” www.amo.on.ca. Association française des municipalités de l’Ontario, “Nos partenaires et collaborateurs,” www.amfo.on.ca.
Municipalities of Ontario” and “an integral part of AMO.” UBCM has five area associations, including AVICC. Their relationship with UBCM is akin to AMO and its sub-associations. They are organized along geographic, rather than population or linguistic lines, but they are part of UBCM.

Section associations are distinct entities, rather than part of a larger organization. However, the membership overlap between section associations and larger municipal associations affects the member services these distinct entities provide. The four section municipal associations in Canada are the Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and L'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM). All of their members are eligible to join a larger municipal association. This means that their members can join the larger associations to access their services. The majority of CNBA-ACNB, PARCS, SANC, AMBM members belong to a larger municipal association, but the section and the primary associations do not have formal, legal relationships. This lack of formal

relationships means that municipalities do not automatically receive primary association services through section association membership. However, the ability of municipalities to join both associations discourages section associations from offering services that duplicate primary associations. And, in fact, none of the section associations offer services that duplicate those offered by the primary association their members are eligible to join, with the exception of annual conventions. Instead, services in section associations focus on the conditions unique to their subset of municipalities.

In AMBM, the association’s staff support the development of municipal policies in favour of bilingualism. They also provide, and help municipalities to develop, the resources required for bilingual municipal services.\(^\text{27}\) In PARCS and SANC, where member municipalities are small communities, the service is capacity building through member education workshops.\(^\text{28}\) Excluding its annual convention, CNBA-ACNB does not offer any member services.\(^\text{29}\) The members of CNBA-ACNB are like PARCS, SANC, and AMBM members in their ability to receive services through another municipal association, and seven of CNBA-ACNB’s eight members belong to Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick and/or the Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick. However, CNBA-ACNB differs from other section associations with respect to the internal capacity of its members. PARCS and SANC members are small and/or isolated communities. Neither association has a member with


more than 3,000 residents.\textsuperscript{30} They address this by providing capacity building workshops. AMBM was formed on the shared need of bilingual municipalities to provide services and resources in French, and it has worked to support its members in meeting these challenges. With the exception of the City of Winnipeg, all AMBM members have a population under 5,500.\textsuperscript{31} However, the eight members of CNBA-ACNB have populations that range from 7,400 to 70,000, with an average of 34,000.\textsuperscript{32} CNBA-ACNB members have the biggest populations, largest bureaucracies, and biggest tax bases of New Brunswick municipalities. Their members have the capacity to provide services internally. The mix of services in section associations reinforces the broader complexity of service provision amongst municipal associations.

6.3 Advocacy

There is also diversity in the advocacy tactics employed by associations. Lobbying tactics have been the primary focus of research on government associations in the United States, and the range of tactics they employ has been well documented. There is consensus that direct contact with elected officials in senior levels of government is the predominant lobbying strategy of groups that represent elected officials. The predominance of direct tactics has been attributed to the status afforded to elected officials.

\textsuperscript{31} Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Nos municipalités.” Government of Saskatchewan, “Census and Population.” The entire City of Winnipeg is a member of AMBM, but councillors representing the neighborhoods of St. Boniface, St. Vital, and St. Norbert, the main francophone communities in Winnipeg, are most heavily involved with the association. These neighborhoods are officially bilingual under the Winnipeg City Charter. Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Quartier Riel,” directionmanitoba.com. Site for Language Management in Canada, “City of Winnipeg Charter (2002),” slmc.uottawa.ca.
\textsuperscript{32} Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cities du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Members.” Statistics Canada.
officials as elected officials. From this status, government associations enjoy access to, and personal relationships with, senior government officials.  

In the context of the United States, Donald Haider argued that gubernatorial and mayoral groups are effective in using direct tactics – contacting senior officials directly and testifying before committees – because of the geographic overlap of state and federal politicians’ constituencies. State politicians share a common constituency base with federal officials, and they can draw on this overlap for legitimacy and persuasion. Patricia Freeman and Anthony Nownes and Anne Marie Cammisa expanded on this argument by comparing the lobbying techniques of government associations with nongovernmental interest groups. At the state level, Freeman and Nownes found that government lobbyists used more direct tactics than their nongovernmental counterparts. They attributed this to their “closer relationship with public officials than lobbyists who represent other types of groups.” Cammisa’s interviews with Congressional representatives and their staffs confirmed that state and local interest groups had more access in the legislative branch than other interest groups. She also found that government associations used rather conciliatory, direct tactics, such as testifying and personally contacting members of Congress, whereas other groups used more indirect

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34 Haider, 652.

35 Freeman and Nownes. Cammisa.

36 Freeman and Nownes, 634.
tactics, such as attracting media attention and organizing grassroots movements. She argued that their superior access facilitates associations’ direct lobbying.\(^{37}\)

The advocacy strategies employed by municipal associations in Canada reinforce these findings. As the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) has reflected: “We have worked to establish a respectful ‘government-to-government’ relationship with both the provincial and federal governments. We know that much can be achieved by keeping the lines of communication open and working together.”\(^{38}\)

Municipal associations use the legitimacy afforded to them by virtue of their status as the representatives of elected officials to lobby provincial governments directly. The most common advocacy strategies are methods of direct contact with senior officials. These include: resolutions, questioning cabinet ministers in “bear pit sessions” at annual conventions, appearing before committees, and meeting regularly with the government. Some associations have occasionally “gone public” when they are in disagreement with the provincial government, but direct contact and quiet persuasion are the predominant method of advocacy.

**Face-to-Face Access**

In addition to resolutions, which were discussed in Chapter Five, there are other common tactics of direct advocacy employed by associations. Conventions offer municipalities the opportunity to vote on resolutions, but they also afford them direct access to government officials. As part of their conventions, associations hold ministers’ forums – often called “bear pit sessions” – that give municipal officials the opportunity to

\(^{37}\) Cammisa.

question the premier, cabinet ministers, and parliamentary assistants about issues in their community and the province. Resolutions allow municipalities to forward their concerns to the provincial government, but bear pit sessions give them the opportunity to voice their concerns face-to-face. These allow municipal officials to voice concerns that do not receive support from the general membership through a resolution, as well as to reinforce passed motions through direct contact with ministers.

In addition to contact with cabinet members during ministers’ forums, conventions often afford municipal officials contact with the leaders of opposition and third parties. Elected officials from outside the government frequently attend conventions, and opposition leaders are often given the opportunity to address delegates. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario also organizes Ministers’ and Parliamentary Assists’ Delegations as an avenue for direct advocacy. Municipal officials apply through AMO for a fifteen-minute meeting with a minister or parliamentary assistant. In this time, they are able to discuss any local issue that falls under the minister’s portfolio. The presence of cabinet ministers, party leaders, and political staff at associations’ annual conventions demonstrates both the ability of associations to attract the attention of provincial governments and the direct access afforded to municipal officials through membership in associations.

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Other Methods of Direct Advocacy

In addition to the contact at annual conferences, associations engage in other forms of direct advocacy. A common method of direct input at the provincial level is annual meetings held between the executives of associations and provincial cabinets. These meetings offer associations the opportunity to reiterate the issues passed as resolutions, as well as to express other concerns and priorities of their members. The frequency of these meetings varies by province, but they afford association executives regular, direct access to government officials.\(^{42}\) In addition to formal annual or semi-annual meetings, the executives of associations often seek meetings with ministers on particular issues throughout the year.

Associations also convey the interests of their members through submissions to provincial committees, commissions, and reports. Examples include the Federation of Prince Edward Island’s Submission to the PEI Task Force on Land Use and Local Government and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities’ submission to the Government of British Columbia’s Report on Gaming Legislation and Regulation.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{42}\) For example, UNSM’s Memorandum of Understanding with the Province of Nova Scotia guarantees it three meetings with cabinet per year. Saskatchewan associations are guaranteed quarterly opportunities for advocacy – although advocacy in these meetings must be in collaboration or competition with other associations in the province. The executive directors of SUMA, SARM, SANC, and the province’s two municipal administrators associations (Rural Municipal Administrators Association and the Urban Municipal Administrators Association of Saskatchewan) meet on a quarterly basis with the province’s Municipal Programs and Services Steering Committee. Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of Nova Scotia, **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) between: The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and The Province of Nova Scotia** (Halifax: The Province of Nova Scotia, 2005), 2. Joseph Garcea and Donald Gilchrist, "Saskatchewan," in **Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada's Provinces**, eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 357.

Resolutions provide short descriptions of member interests, and executives must prioritize issues in their meetings with ministers, but submissions allow associations to convey the concerns of their membership in detail. These submissions are more ad hoc than annual meetings, and they are in response to government initiatives, rather than grassroots concerns brought forward by members, but they demonstrate that municipal associations utilize numerous methods of direct advocacy.

Formal Advocacy: Memorandum of Understanding

In some provinces, the input of municipal associations at the provincial level has been formalized through memoranda of understanding. These memoranda commit the provincial government to consult with municipalities on all issues that affect local governance, or in specific areas of municipal jurisdiction. These commitments provide formal avenues for associations to represent their members’ interests and advocate on their behalves. The first comprehensive memorandum of understanding was signed between the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) and the Government of Ontario in 2001.44 In 2005, the AMO-Ontario Memorandum of Understanding was enshrined in the province’s Municipal Act, through Bill 92, the Municipal Amendment Act.45 At present, the Memorandum commits the province to consult with AMO on:

- Proposed changes to legislation and regulations that will have a significant financial impact on municipalities,
- Negotiation of agreements with the federal government on specific matters that have a direct municipal impact.46

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45 Ibid.
In 2007, AMO and the Province of Ontario agreed to release an annual public report on the MOU. The AMO-MOU annual report details meetings between the association and government in the preceding year. These include formal working groups, task forces, consultations, policy reviews, and table discussions. Although the issues change from year to year, the regular meetings and collaborations between AMO and the provincial government demonstrate that the MOU has created a formalized, entrenched process for AMO advocacy at the provincial level.

Memoranda of understanding between other municipal associations and provincial governments have occurred on a more ad hoc basis. The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and the Province of Nova Scotia signed a Memoranda of Understanding in 2005 that recognized the role of the UNSM as the “single, unified voice of municipalities in Nova Scotia.” The MOUs committed the Province to consulting with UNSM “in a timely manner on any municipally related legislative, regulatory, policy or financial proposal that has any specific impact on the Province or on municipalities.”47

The 2005 MOU also committed to provincial-municipal roundtables three times annually.48 However, UNSM and the Government of Nova Scotia have signed subsequent, issue-specific MOUs. These have included “Promoting and Developing Age-Friendly Communities,”49 climate change,50 and municipal contributions to

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48 Ibid.
services. The Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) has signed eight memorandums of understanding with the Government of British Columbia since 1996 and fifteen other protocols of recognition, memorandum of agreement, and consultation agreements. The foci of these MOU have included independent power projects, offshore oil and gas development, resort development, and local government participation in the negotiation of Aboriginal Treaties and Agreements. The Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities has been working towards a formal MOU with the Provincial Government for several years, but has not been successful in getting one signed. The openness of provincial governments to institutionalized associational input is not universal across Canada.

Going Public: Media Strategies and Public Campaigns

The literature on government associations has found that they are less likely than other groups to turn to the media and public as an advocacy strategy. This trend has

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51 The MOU on financial responsibility of services was intended to provide savings to the municipalities in three key areas over seven years. The province committed that it would not increase municipal contributions to education by more than the consumer price index; not increase municipal contributions to corrections for the first three years, and then phase them out by year seven; and phase out municipal contributions to public housing between years three and five. However, in year four of the agreement, the Province announced that it would unilaterally change the MOU, and require municipalities to continue to make contributions to public housing. As UNSM summarized, there was “no legal recourse for municipalities to force the Province to honour their commitments under the MOU.” Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, UNSM Briefing Note to Municipalities: Provincial Dismantling of UNSM-Provincial MOU (Halifax: Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 2011), 1-6.


54 Cammisa, 28-32.
been attributed to two characteristics of government associations: 1. As elected officials, they have more direct access to higher levels of government than other groups, and 2. The personal connections between municipal officials and provincial governments make them unwilling to undertake measures that would hurt or embarrass higher levels of government. In the context of the United States, David Berman attributes the direct forms of lobbying to municipal officials’ unwillingness to denounce higher levels of government publically, lest they need their support in the future. Resolutions, bear pit sessions, meetings with government, and memoranda of understanding all provide evidence that municipal associations undertake significant direct lobbying, afforded to them by close relationships with provincial governments. However, there is also evidence of associations “going public” in recent years, particularly on issues where there is strong disagreement between municipalities and the province.

When the Province of Nova Scotia unilaterally changed its 2007 Memorandum of Understanding with the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, reneging on a promise to eliminate municipal contributions to public housing costs, UNSM went public with its disagreement with the provincial government. The association sought to increase public pressure on government to uphold its commitments. This strategy proved unsuccessful, but it demonstrated a willingness by UNSM to try to embarrass the province. The Association of Manitoba Municipalities has also fought a public battle against the

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Province of Manitoba on the issue of forced amalgamations. After a year of lobbying against the amalgamations, AMM took the Province to court “in an attempt to block what it calls the ‘forced nature’ of the Selinger government’s plan to get small municipalities to merge.” AMM lost the lawsuit, and has continued to walk a careful line of speaking against government actions and recognizing the importance of provincial access for advocacy. In the association’s 2013 Annual Report, President Doug Dobrowolski summarized:

Throughout the year, the AMM met with both Cabinet Ministers and the Premier individually, and with the Premier and Cabinet as a whole. These meetings are invaluable in order to build relationships and to ensure the AMM’s issues are communicated and understood. While some of these relationships have been tested this year, I do thank Premier Greg Selinger and his team for always being open to meeting with us.

However, Dobrowolski also made harsher public statements against the Selinger government. At the 2013 AMM Convention, in front of Manitoba’s Minister of Municipal Government, Stan Struthers, Dobrowolski stated: “Last year I said I know the province wants to see municipalities grow and prosper. It angers me that I can no longer make that statement one short year later. The relationship has eroded over the past year

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57 Bill 33, The Municipal Modernization Act, required any municipality with fewer than 1,000 residents to amalgamate with another municipality with whom it shares a boundary by January 1, 2015. At their 2013 convention, 65 percent of AMM members voted to “oppose forced amalgamation through legal proceedings, representing those municipalities that did not wish to amalgamate.” “AMM legally challenges Amalgamations Act," Steinbech and Area Community News, December 13, 2013.


and trust has been lost.” Most association advocacy is direct, but associations are willing to go to the public on major issues of municipal-provincial disagreement.

In addition to “going public,” a number of municipal associations have undertaken media campaigns and social media strategies in recent years. In 2011, AMM ran its first paid media campaign to drive awareness of its “Putting Communities First” campaign and attract attention to municipal issues during the provincial election. Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador undertook a public campaign, “What’s the Plan?,” in 2013. MNL’s 2013 Annual Report stated that the purpose of the campaign was to “place our issues front and centre with the media, our [Members of the House of Assembly], and Cabinet Ministers.” MNL has also adapted a Communications Plan and Social Media Plan to expand the association’s media presence. The core of association advocacy continues to be direct contact with officials in higher levels of government, but the growth of media strategies and “going public” on areas of municipal-provincial disagreement complicates how associations pursue common goods. Like service provision, there is significant variation in the methods of advocacy employed by associations. It is evident that municipal associations can provide a range of services and can use different advocacy strategies, but it is less clear how associations prioritize their

60 Lorraine Stevenson, “Struthers says amalgamation could have been handled better,” Manitoba Cooperator, December 5, 2013.
63 Ibid., 6.
work. All associations carry out both functions, but what determines the choice each association makes when choosing how to allocate their collective resources?

6.4 Prioritization of Association Activities

In his discussion of group behavior and collective action, Mancur Olson identified group size as the primary determinant of behavior. Larger groups need selective incentives to motivate members to act collectively because in large groups, individual member contributions are not perceptible, and individuals benefit even when they did not contribute to the collective effort. The limitation of Olson’s theory is that he focused primarily on group members as individuals. He did not give full consideration to the greater range of internal capacity of members when they represent populations. Individuals must be motivated by selective incentives if their contributions to a common goal are negligible, but does the same hold true for groups made up of organizations? Do members of such groups prioritize advocacy and selective incentives differently than individuals? The group behavior literature provides some insights on these questions. Two measurable concepts from this literature – the presence of small members and the presence of large members – can be used to develop testable hypotheses.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Pamela Goldsmith-Jones found that there were differences in how members of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM), prioritize its functions. When asked whether they viewed advocacy or member services as UBCM’s top priority, 40% of municipal officials chose lobbying, compared to 56%
who gave the two activities equal weight.\textsuperscript{64} Goldsmith-Jones did not correlate responses with characteristics of the participating municipalities, but respondents were clearly divided. William Browne’s research investigated further. He found that smaller municipalities value member services more than intergovernmental lobbying. He interviewed officials in nine suburban municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri and found that those in smaller cities perceived associations as big-city oriented. This perception translated into ambivalent attitudes about associations’ lobbying activities. Although officials in small municipalities did not feel well represented in collective advocacy, the services offered by associations made their membership cost-effective. Small municipalities valued the services associations offered; they expressed that services better met their needs than collective lobbying.\textsuperscript{65}

In her research on European associations of employers, Alessia Vatta examined the motivations for group membership of different sized firms. She found that small and medium enterprises belonged to these organizations because of the services they provide. Smaller firms relied on collective resources, whereas larger employers could afford the services offered by associations independently. Larger firms were motivated to join because of the collective weight organizations offered when lobbying. The political clout afforded to groups that spoke for an entire sector was higher than that of an individual firm. This clout bolstered the legitimacy of larger firms in their interactions with

\textsuperscript{64} Pamela J. Goldsmith-Jones, "A Reevaluation of Local Government Associations: A Case Study of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities" (MA, University of British Columbia, 1988).
government. Larger members were not motivated by groups’ selective incentives, but by the advantages of collective advocacy.  

Browne and Vatta identified how a member’s size determines its motivation for group membership. But they did not trace how these preferences translate into organizational behavior. How responsive are groups to the various needs and demands of their members? Martin Perry has theorized on how the dispersion of member sizes affects group behavior. In his research on trade associations in Ireland and New Zealand, Perry identified eight characteristics of associational structures and hypothesized how each would influence group behavior. One of these variables was the mix of members’ sizes, in particular whether larger or smaller enterprises were predominant. He argued that this would influence the balance of associational activity between lobbying and providing member benefits. If an association was dominated by small enterprises that had a greater need for the services they were unable to provide autonomously, then the association would focus the majority of its collective resources on service provision. If large firms that could self-provide services dominated an association, then the association would allocate most of its resources to lobbying efforts. Matilde Bombardini tested this theory on trade associations in the United States, and found that industrial sectors characterized by a higher share of larger firms exhibited greater levels of political intensity. That is, they allocated more resources for lobbying. These findings provide support for the proposition that the extent of small members and the presence of large

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members within an association can influence the allocation of collective resources between service provision and lobbying.

This line of research builds on Olson’s arguments about how group size influences collective action. Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini argue that it is not just the size of a group, but the size of members within a group, that determines how it behaves. Terry Moe extends this idea further by considering how the demands of small and large members interact within an association. He theorizes about how internal group dynamics influence the goals that associations pursue. As discussed in Chapter Two, he argues that groups offer services to gain members, but they sell these services at a profit. Hence, they can use these profits to carry out advocacy. Group membership gives large members legitimacy in government relations because the association lends numbers and unity when it advocates for larger members’ interests.\(^6^9\)

Moe argues that the service demands of small members and the advocacy demands of large members can create “a disjunction between member goals and group goals.”\(^7^0\) Members who belong to a group for its selective incentives may continue to belong even when they disagree with the policies advocated by group leaders. The selective incentives can make it cost effective for them to stay within the group, as long as the association does not spend too many resources on advocacy. When large members make demands for advocacy, a group can pursue this advocacy as long as small members are receiving sufficient service provision. It is of key importance for groups to maintain large organizations as members because their presence and membership fees make the

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\(^6^9\) Vatta.

\(^7^0\) Moe, 75.
provision of services more economical. Without them, groups weaken their lobbying power and the provision of services for smaller members becomes more difficult and costly. If they leave a group, it impacts that group’s ability to advocate and to provide services. Because of this, groups must pay careful attention to attracting and maintaining large organizations as members.

Olson argued that large group “are those where ‘no single individual’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole, or the burden or benefit of any single member of the group,” but this does not account for the greater influence of large organizations as members. The presence or absence of small organizations as members would not make a perceptible difference to a group, but the presence or absence of very large organization does affect a group’s ability to have weight in advocacy and provide services cost-effectively. For this reason, groups must tailor to their behaviour to the advocacy interests of large organization members.

If their service provision is valuable to small members, group leaders do not have to respond to their lobbying demands. Small members do not place significant constraints on lobbying efforts. However, the presence of large members has a different effect on how associations allocate their resources. Large members have the financial and human capital to provide the services that motivate small members themselves. Large members place demands on group leaders to pursue their interests through advocacy. They join groups with the aim of achieving collective goods, and therefore “group leaders must take action to see that these goods are supplied or risk losing these
members and their contributions.”  Group leaders have an incentive to dedicate collective resources to pursuing advocacy on behalf of large members.

Olson and Moe’s theories of group behavior appear to be in competition with one another. Olson argues that, in large groups, the focus of group behavior is on the provision of member services. As he states, large groups need selective incentives because “the larger the group, the less the likelihood that the contribution of any one will perceptible.” However, Olson does not consider the case when members are not individuals but instead represent populations. Large groups need selective incentives to motivate small members, but large members place different demands on groups. As Moe states, Olson does not attempt to analyze internal politics. Moe addresses this gap by considering how the presence of large members shapes internal group dynamics. He states: “The only members that leaders have an incentive to represent are those that join out of an interest in collective goods, for their contributions are rationally contingent upon political considerations.” In order to represent the interests of large members, and therefore retain their membership, group leaders must allocate collective resources for advocacy. The question, then, is how do associations balance these competing member needs? Associations must balance demands for advocacy and for services, but how do they make decisions of resource allocation?

This chapter tests the idea that Olson and Moe’s theories are complementary. Municipal associations must offer selective incentives in order to attract and retain members, but the extent to which they prioritize services or advocacy is dependent on

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71 Ibid., 74-5.
72 Olson, 45.
73 Moe, 78.
their membership composition. Selective incentives are needed in all large groups, but as Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini argue, services are most needed by small members. Due to their limited internal capacity, small municipalities or firms in an association have a high demand for services. If these demands are not met, group membership is no longer rational for them. So, the more small members there are, the greater is the pressure to provide services. Moe specifies an inverse, yet complementary, force in the internal dynamics of associations. The rationale for large members to join groups is based on political, rather than service, considerations. The greater the presence of large members, the more responsive associations must be to their demands for advocacy. That is, the higher the percentage of group size that is accounted for by large members, the more resources will be devoted to advocacy work.

The two internal pressures arise from membership characteristics that can be categorized as high or low. Table 6-2 displays the resulting matrix of service provision levels. All municipal associations carry out both service and advocacy. This chapter tests the expectation that how they choose to allocate their collective resources between the two functions depends on the composition of their membership.
### Table 6-2. Matrix of Service Provisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of Large Members</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium Service Provision (UBCM, AAMDC, AMO)</td>
<td>Low Service Provision (UNSM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High Service Provision (SARM, MNL)</td>
<td>Medium Service Provision (AUMA, SUMA, AMM, AFMNB, FPEIM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Municipal associations are placed within matrix quadrants, in parentheses, based on their presence of small members and presence of large members, detailed in section 6.6.

### 6.5 Selection of Case Studies

Eleven of Canada’s eighteen provincial level municipal associations are used to test how membership composition affects associations’ behavior. Two of the eighteen associations – l’Union des Municipalités du Québec (UMQ) and Fédération Québécoise des Municipalités (FQM) – are excluded because their membership lists are not

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74 When predominance of small members is divided into three categories – low, medium, and high – as discussed later in the chapter, three associations have medium predominance of small members and a high predominance of large members (AUMA, AMM, and AFMNB). No association has a medium predominance of small members and a low predominance of large members.
publically available. The Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB) is excluded because its financial statements are not available to the public. Finally, the four section associations in Canada are excluded. Removing section associations and the associations with missing data leaves eleven cases in nine provinces. Six of these provinces – Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia – have one association that all municipalities are eligible to join. Saskatchewan and Alberta have separate rural and urban associations. All four are included, as is the association of francophone municipalities in New Brunswick. Taken with the six unified associations, the cases account for nine of ten provinces and a range of membership sizes.

When considering membership size, it is important to ask whether all municipal associations fit within Olson’s definition of large groups. The number of members in the eleven associations ranges from 40 in the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM) to 450 in the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA). According to Olson’s taxonomy of groups, large groups are those where “no single individual’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole, or the burden or benefit of any single member of the group,” and where, “it is certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements that will lead the members of the large group to act in their common interest.”

75 Ester Berryman, Adjointe exécutive et Agente - service aux members, UMQ, Email to the Author, October 31, 2014. Claudia Trudel, Adjointe administrative – affaires corporatives et direction générale adjointe, FQM, Email to the Author, October 1, 2014.
76 Raymond Murphy, Executive Direct UMNB, Email to the Author, October 30, 2014. The financial records of UMQ and FQM are also not available.
77 Olson, 44.
the eleven associations fall clearly within the category of large groups. These all have at least 191 members – large enough that no single municipality’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group. It is therefore expected that these associations must provide incentives to attract and retain small municipalities as members.

Whether the four smallest associations can be considered large groups is less obviously clear. In addition to FPEIM’s membership size of 40, the Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) has 52 members, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) has 54, and the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) has 69. In his taxonomy of groups, Olson argues that a small group is one in which “one or more members gets such a large fraction of the total benefit that they find it worthwhile to see that the collective good is provided, even if they have to pay the entire cost.” In Prince Edward Island, where only 40 of the province’s 72 municipalities belong to FPEIM, it could be argued that the larger municipalities are willing to shoulder the cost of action in order to achieve common goods. FPEIM also differs from other municipal associations because it only represents 55.6% of eligible members. The membership rates in all other associations are above 90%. The Federation works to attract new members through selective incentives and new member discounts. Larger municipalities within FPEIM may be willing to carry the majority of cost of working towards common goods, but they believe that having a larger number of municipalities as members increases their chance of achieving them. In

78 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL), Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM), Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM), SUMA, Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), and Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM).
79 Olson, 46.
response, FPEIM allocates its collective resources to both advocacy and service provision. The Federation acts as a large group, despite its small membership size.

A second aspect of Olson’s taxonomy of groups, one discussed in Chapter Five, must be considered when asking if AFMNB, UNSM, and AAMDC are large groups. Would one member leaving the group raise the cost considerably for other members? Olson argues that, “if, in a reasonably small organization, a particular person stops paying accordingly, the cost will rise noticeably for each of the others in the group.”80 In both AFMNB and UNSM, all eligible municipalities are members. The question of whether one member leaving the group would raise the cost for others has not been tested in AFMNB and UNSM, but the case of AAMDC can be examined. One municipality that is eligible for AAMDC membership does not belong, but it does not place a considerable burden on other members. In this way, AAMDC functions as a large group. AFMNB and UNSM draw legitimacy from the fact that they represent all eligible members, but it appears unlikely that the cost of collective action would rise considerably for municipalities if one member left either association.

6.6 Selection of Variables and Methodology

Now the effect of membership composition on service provision is tested. This is accomplished through multiple regressions. Two independent variables are used to measure the concepts of the presence of small members and the presence of large members. The concept of small members is measured by calculating the percentage of members that have a population under 2,000. The concept of large members is measured

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80 Ibid., 43.
by calculating the percentage of an association’s membership population that is accounted for by its five most populous members. These calculations are made by comparing 2011 census data to associations’ member lists.

The first independent variable is the percentage of member municipalities with a population under 2,000. This cut point is used to measure small municipalities because it roughly divides the associations into three categories: high, medium, and low presence of small members. In four associations (FPEIM, MNL, SARM, and SUMA) between 85% and 97% of municipalities have a population under 2,000. For three associations (AFMNB, AMM, and AUMA) the percentage is between 63.5% and 73%. Finally, in four associations (AMO, UBCM, AAMDC, and the UNSM), less than 30% of members have a population under 2,000. The lowest percentage is 21.7 in AAMDC. The median is 68.2% and the average is 60.4%. The percentage of member municipalities with a population under 500 and 1,000 were also tested. Their regressions produced similar results to those discussed below because of the high correlations between the percentages of municipalities with populations under 500, 1,000, and 2,000. The correlation coefficients between the three measures were 0.88 (500 and 2,000), 0.96 (500 and 1,000), and 0.97 (1,000 and 2,000).
The second independent variable is the percentage of membership population accounted for by the five most populous members. This measures the presence of large members in associations. For example, the total population of MNL members is 457,021. Its five largest members – St. John’s, Conception Bay South, Mount Pearl, Corner Brook, and Paradise – have a total population 192,885. They account for 42.2% of the total population of MNL members. As with first variable, this cutoff point is chosen because it sorts out the associations rather well.

In six associations, the five most populous members account for at least 60% of the total membership population. In five associations, the five most populous members
account for less than 42.5% of the total population. The percentages range from 12.9 in the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities to 83.6 in the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities. The average proportion of an associational population accounted for by the five most populous members is 51.8%, with a median of 62.5%. The presence of the top ten most populous municipalities was also calculated. Similar to 500 and 1,000 as measures of small populations, the 10 most populous members produced similar regression results as the 5 most populous members, because of the high correlation between the two members. The correlation coefficient between the percentage of the membership population accounted for by the 10 largest members and the 5 largest members is .99.
Associations carry out both advocacy and services, but advocacy is more difficult to quantify and compare across organizations. All associations report firm numbers for their service provisions, but their advocacy efforts are reported as generalizations. Much of the work undertaken by associational staffs and elected officials to persuade senior levels of government is not formally recorded, and the informal nature of advocacy work does not produce the same clear-cut, comparable record of work as member services. For this reason, only service provision is measured. It is not assumed or expected that the full remainders of associations’ budgets are devoted to advocacy – their expenditures include rent and occupancy fees, utilities, general staff salaries, honorariums to board members –
but services can be quantified and compared across all associations. Measures of member services do not capture the full extent of advocacy, but they do capture a measurable piece of the services / advocacy tradeoff.

The member services offered by associations vary widely, as discussed earlier. In order to make service provision comparable between associations, a few rules are employed for counting the number of services that are offered. First, bulk purchasing is counted as a single service. This is chosen rather than counting each individual item that is available through associations’ trade divisions. The one exception to this rule is fuel procurement programs, because they are treated as separate service entities in associations that have a trade division and fuel procurement. For example, AMM operates both the Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. (MTCML) and the Petroleum Products Buying Group (AMM 2013). Similarly, where associations offer both insurance for municipalities and extended insurance programs for municipal employees, these are counted as separate services. They address distinct aspects of municipal governance – liability and human resources.

Associations’ annual conventions are counted as a service, for two reasons. First, although conventions do include advocacy work, such as the passage of resolutions and opportunities to meet with provincial government officials, they offer significant services to members. They provide municipal leaders with networking venues, make available training and workshops, and include trade shows with access to service providers.

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81 The number of services and the percentage of budgetary services are used, rather than the number of staff members who work on service provision. This is because the allocation of staff work is less clear than other measures of services. Although some associations designate staff positions as advocacy or services based, not all associations have this clarity. This is particularly true in small associations – where a staff size of three or five means that all employees work on both advocacy and service functions.
Second, it is not possible to separate convention costs from other service expenditures in all of the associations’ financial statements; that is, many associations treat conventions as services for accounting purposes. Under these guidelines, the number of services offered by the eleven associations ranges from 4 offered by AAMDC and AMM to 21 offered by SARM (Figure 6-1). The median is six and the average is nine.

The second dependent variable used in testing the relationship between membership composition and how associations allocate collective resources is the percentage of associational budgetary expenditures used to provide member services. These figures are calculated from the associations’ 2013 Statement of Operations. All associations have a line item of “member services” in their financial statements. But other line items also commonly represent member services and are therefore counted here in calculations of service expenditures. These items include insurance and benefits plans, conventions, and training and education for elected officials or municipal employees. Where separate legal entities exist to provide services – such as the Municipal Employee Pension Centre Ontario, affiliated with AMO, and the Alberta Municipal Insurance Exchange (MUNIX) operated by AUMA – their expenses are added to the totals for member services and total expenditures. The median is 38.0% and the mean is 39.4%.
The distribution of budgetary expenditures and the number of services offered (Figure 6-1), by and large, fit with the matrix of expected service provision. SARM and MNL are expected to have the highest levels of service provision, and UNSM is expected to have the lowest. SARM does the highest level of service provision in both measures, and MNL is second highest number of services and has a high percentage of budgetary expenditures designated to services. UNSM has one of the lowest levels of service provision in both measures.

With these indicators specified, one can test the hypotheses about membership composition and the allocation of collective resources. First, Table 6-3 displays the
bivariate correlations between all the variables. There is a slight relationship between the independent variables. Their bivariate correlation coefficient is 0.18 but this relationship is not strong enough to disturb our analysis. There is also a relationship between the dependent variables, but the correlation coefficient of 0.35 between the number of services and service expenditures is not as high as might be expected.

**Table 6-3. Correlation Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of members with a population &lt; 2,000</th>
<th>% of membership population accounted for by the five largest members</th>
<th>% of budgetary expenditures allocated to services</th>
<th>Number of member services offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of members with a population &lt; 2,000</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of membership population accounted for by the five largest members</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.59*</td>
<td>-.61**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of budgetary expenditures allocated to services</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>-.59*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of member services offered</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.61**</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are two-tailed Pearson correlations.
* p. < 0.10
** p < 0.05
The correlations between the membership characteristics and the allocation of sources to services run in the expected direction. For example, the percentage of members with a population under 2,000 had a positive effect on the number of services offered. However, none is significant at the .05 level except for the correlation between the percent of membership population accounted for by the five largest members and the number of member services offered. From these basic results, multiple regressions can be run to test four hypotheses:

- There will be a significant relationship between membership composition and the percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision.
  - The percentage of member municipalities with a population under 2,000 will have a positive effect on the percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision.
  - The percentage of an association’s membership population accounted for by its five most populous members will have a negative effect on the percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision.

- There will be a significant relationship between membership composition and the number of services provided by an association:
  - The percentage of municipalities with a population under 2,000 will have a positive effect on the number of services provided.
  - The percentage of an association’s membership population accounted for by its five most populous members will have a negative effect on the number of services provided.

### 6.7 Analysis

The results give support for all of the hypotheses (Table 6-4). On the percentage of budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision, the F is significant overall. Both independent variables are also significant at the 0.05 level and exert opposing forces of on the dependent variable. Those forces are roughly similar in strength. The percentage
of members with a population under 2,000 has a standardized coefficient of 0.559 on the budget allocated to services, whereas the percentage of the membership population accounted for by the five most populous members has a standardized coefficient of -0.692.

### Table 6-4. Basic Regression Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of Budgetary Expenditures Allocated to Services</th>
<th>Number of Member Services Offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>13.68**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(4.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of members with a population (&lt;) 2,000</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(4.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of membership population accounted for by the five largest members</td>
<td>-.88**</td>
<td>-20.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(7.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>7.52**</td>
<td>4.60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square (adjusted)</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

** p < 0.05

On the number of services offered by associations, the F is significant overall (4.60, sig. = .047), but only one independent variable – the percentage of the membership population accounted for by the five most populous members – is significant at the 0.05 level. The other variable – the percentage of members with a population under 2,000 – acts as expected, but its effect is just shy of the 0.05 confidence level.

Both multiple regressions give support to the hypothesis that membership composition is a significant determinant of how associations balance service provision and advocacy. The ANOVAs for the whole equations are significant at the 0.05 level. In both cases, the null hypotheses can be rejected. The adjusted R-square for budget
allocated to services is .57 and the adjusted $R$-square for the number of services is .42. Both account for a significant portion of the variation in the dependent variables.

6.8 Conclusion

There is considerable diversity in how municipal associations carry out the core group functions of member services and advocacy, but these findings support the idea that membership composition can help to explain patterns in this complexity. Olson argued that large groups must provide services to their members, and the fact that all municipal associations provide member services reinforces this argument. However, the regressions also provide support for the notion that Olson’s theory on group size and collective action is complemented by Moe’s argument that large members have different needs, and therefore exert different pressures on the behavior of associations. Taken together, two aspects of membership composition are expected to influence how associations behave: the presence of large members and the presence of small members. The results support the idea that Olson and Moe’s theories interact in determining associational behaviour.

Municipal associations carry out two core functions: advocacy and member services. Olson has argued that group size influences the extent of service provision. Other authors studying associations made up of organizations have contended that the size of members within a large group determines the extent of group work focused on selective incentives. The limited internal capacity of small members increases the pressure they place on groups to provide member services. Moe furthers these arguments by contending that, as small members are reliant on selective incentives, associations can sell them at a profit, and use the profit for advocacy. As Moe argues, large members exert pressure on groups to undertake advocacy. Large members have the internal
capacity to self provide services; their membership in groups is driven by the legitimacy and weight of a group speaking with a powerful and representative voice in intergovernmental relations.

The findings of this chapter provide further support for Olson and Moe’s theories by testing how the presence of small members and the presence of large members interact in determining the allocation of associational resources between service provision and advocacy. Municipal associations provide a complex mix of selective incentives and employ diverse range of advocacy tactics. The results of analysis provide strong support for the idea that membership composition helps determine how associations balance their core functions.
Chapter 7

7 Conclusion

The memberships and behaviours of municipal associations in Canada are complex. There are 18 provincial level associations, with membership sizes that range from 8 municipalities to more than 1,000. There are associations that represent all municipalities in a province, and others that are organized along rural/urban, regional, or ethnic/linguistic lines. In eight provinces, at least one association formed between 1899 and 1919, but five provinces later underwent changes in the number and type of associations formed by their municipalities. What the 18 associations in Canada share is their core functions of advocacy and the provision of member services. They provide services more economically than self-provision by local governments could, work to strengthen and improve local governance, advocate for collective interests, and represent their members in dealings with senior levels of government.

Despite their prominent role in local-provincial relations and municipal governance, little has been written about municipal associations. This dissertation employed three research questions to empirically test whether there are patterns of behaviour that cut through the complexity of municipal association memberships and structures. The findings indicate that two measures of membership composition, rural-urban heterogeneity and population size, affect different aspects of associational behaviour: the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources. The results of each research
question are summarized before theoretical contributions and future research are discussed in detail.

7.1 Theoretical Contributions

The literature on municipal associations has been dominated by questions related to their lobbying strategies.\(^1\) In answering where associations target their lobbying efforts and the tactics that they employ, the dominant explanations for associations’ actions are institutional structures and access to senior government officials. Membership composition has emerged as an important determinant of behaviour, but most research on local government associations has remained focused on lobbying tactics.\(^2\) This dissertation makes an important theoretical contribution by expanding our understanding of how membership composition affects other aspects of association behaviour: the allocation of collective resources, requests for jurisdictional responsibility, and the distribution of issues in intergovernmental lobbying.

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Associations carry out two core functions, advocacy and member services, but how they prioritize these functions and allocate their collective resources is shaped by the population sizes of their members. Small municipalities join associations for the services they provide. Large municipalities, that can provide the goods sought by smaller members themselves, prioritize advocacy and the collective weight small members provide in intergovernmental lobbying. Small and large members place opposing pressures on associations. These findings make a substantial contribution to our understanding of collective action in the municipal sector and other interest groups, including trade organizations and professional associations.

This dissertation also furthers our understanding of the substance of municipal associations’ advocacy. Part of this substance is the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. Unlike other lobby groups, municipal associations represent another level of government that can request the authority and resources to carry out policy programs. In lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with whether their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through resource transfers to fund municipal programs. The dispersion of municipal populations, and the sense of shared interests among members, influences how associations approach jurisdictional control in intergovernmental lobbying. These findings can be used for future research on how provincial governments respond to the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests.

Another major contribution of this dissertation is that it is the first direct analysis of how rural/urban dominance and association restructuring affects the behaviour of associations. Prior research on local government associations asserted that they pursued
issues of common interest to all members, but did not provide evidence to substantiate this claim. The findings in Chapter Four provide evidence to the contrary. Rural and urban associations pursued issues that were common to their members. Rural municipalities pursue a higher percentage of socio-economic issues when they are in their own association, and urban associations pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions. The pattern of pursuing common interests does not hold true in unified associations. The distribution of resolutions in unified associations is not altered by the present or absence of the minority municipal type. Unified associations do not pursue functional issues that are common to all members at a higher rate than rural or urban associations. These findings provide a foundation for further research on how the separation of municipalities along rural/urban lines affects their success in achieving policy change at the provincial level. The interests of some municipalities are drowned out in unified associations, but it is unknown which type of membership has the strong success rate in persuading provincial governments to enact their requests.

The final, important, empirical contribution that this dissertation makes is adding analysis of Canadian municipal associations to the broader literature on government associations. The literature on government associations has been dominated by research in the United States, particularly at the federal level. This dissertation is the first empirical, cross-provincial examination of municipal associations in Canada. Every province and provincial level association is discussed in at least one chapter and the majority of them are analyzed multiple times. The descriptive chapter developed a comparable dataset of associational memberships and organizational structures, and the subsequent research chapters tested how membership composition affects different
aspects of associational behaviour. These findings advance our understanding of municipal associations in Canada and serve as a basis for future research in this area.

7.2 Results by Research Question

Each research question was designed to test how an aspect of membership composition affected an aspect of associational behaviour. Chapter Four examined how the restructuring of municipalities between unified, rural, and urban associations influenced the distribution of functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional issues in intergovernmental lobbying. Chapter Five analyzed how the dispersion of member populations within an association influences the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, whether associations request the power and resources to carry out programs, or whether they request the provincial government to carry out programs on their behalf. Finally, Chapter Six tested how the competing interests of small and large municipalities affect how associations allocate their collective resources between member services and advocacy. The findings all lend support to membership composition as a determinant of associational behaviour.

Restructuring and Membership Cohesion

Chapter Four examined rural-urban heterogeneity as a measure of membership composition. This measure has not received direct attention in early research on local government associations. In other federal states, each sub-national unit has one association containing both rural and urban members. In Canada, provinces either have, or had, multiple associations divided along rural/urban lines. The municipalities in four provinces have undergone associational restructuring, changing between unified and
rural/urban associations. Prior research on local government associations found that they pursue issues common to all members, but restructuring and the altering of membership composition changes what issues are of common interest.

It was expected that the effect of restructuring would manifest itself differently in rural and urban associations. Rural areas were expected to pursue socio-economic issues and urban associations were expected to pursue jurisdictional issues. Unified associations were expected to pursue functional issues that were common to all municipalities in the province. The results gave support to the hypotheses on the behaviour of rural and urban associations, but found that unified associations reflected the interests of their majority municipal type, rather pursuing common, functional issues.

The chapter tested the relationship between membership cohesion and the degree of non-financial control that associational members want over programs and policies. In the research questions, heterogeneous and homogeneous were used to describe the dispersion of member populations. When municipalities split into separate rural and urban associations, these are both more homogeneous than the unified association they left, and as a result they are expected to approach intergovernmental lobbying differently. When rural municipalities form their own organization, there is a greater cohesion in socio-economic conditions than in a unified association. What urban municipalities share is the diversity of their conditions. It is this shared diversity that is expected to translate to requests for jurisdictional responsibility in urban associations. When associations restructure along rural/urban lines, the extent and basis of cohesion in their membership changes. This is expected to change the types of issues they pursue when lobbying at the provincial level.
Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario were used to examine how restructuring affected the issues pursued by associations in intergovernmental lobbying. In each province, a unified association was formed between 1899 and 1907. Between 1933 and 1949, municipalities left each unified association had municipalities leave to form either an urban association (Manitoba), a rural association (Ontario), or rural, cities, and towns associations (New Brunswick). New Brunswick and Ontario both underwent further restructuring in the following decades. Municipalities would later remerge into unified associations in Ontario (1982) and Manitoba (1999). These changes are natural case studies for measuring how restructuring and changes in membership composition affect association behaviour.

To test the effect of these changes, the resolutions passed by associations ten years prior to, and ten years following, instances of restructuring were coded and compared. Two of the hypotheses were supported by the data: 1. When rural municipalities left a unified association to form their own association, the percentage of socio-economic resolutions increased and 2. When urban municipalities left a unified association to form their own association, they passed a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association they left. These findings support the idea that rural and urban associations act differently. The findings did not support the hypothesis that unified associations pursued functional issues because they were common to all members. Instead, unified associations reflected the interests of their majority municipal type and were not affected by a group of their members leaving to form a separate association. The minority municipal type, whether rural or urban, gets drowned out in a unified association. In short, the findings indicate that restructuring changes the
ability of the minority municipal type to express its interests in intergovernmental lobbying, but has little effect on the unified association.

Jurisdictional Aspect of Policy Requests

Chapter Five analyzed the relationship between the overall dispersion of member populations and how associations approach the jurisdictional aspect of advocacy. It considered whether associations request provincial programs or resource transfers in order to enact programs at the municipal level. It was expected that associations with relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for provincial programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as similar to their own. In associations with significant dispersion in member populations, it was expected that members request the resources or authority to institute programs at the municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests. The findings gave support to these hypotheses.

Prior research has established that associations use direct tactics to lobby senior levels of government. There is little research on the nature of these lobbying requests, but local government associations differ from other interest groups because they are a level of government, and can request to carry out public policies themselves. As Cammisa discussed, “while government lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, unlike other groups (or at least to a greater extent than other groups), are also interested in the spatial dimension of any policy, that is, who will have the authority in
implementation and control of funds." In Hays’ examination of Congressional testimony by state, county, and urban groups, he found that state and local groups sought to evade jurisdictional responsibility, while urban groups sought to gain control over policy areas. He attributed jurisdictional requests to greater cohesion amongst city members, but Chapter Three considered the inverse of the extent of population dispersion and what associations demand in jurisdictional policy requests. If a narrow dispersion of member populations translates into more cohesive interests, it is expected that cohesive associations would lobby for provincial programs to meet their needs, as they see the interests of other members as similar to their own. In associations with a high variation in member populations, it is expected that members will request the resources to institute programs at the municipal level. They are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests.

The chapter used four municipal associations to test the relationship between population dispersion and the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests. The four cases were drawn from three provinces: two with unified associations (Nova Scotia and British Columbia) and one with split rural and urban associations (Alberta). Gini coefficients were used to calculate the extent of statistical dispersion with their member populations. The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) had highly heterogeneous memberships, where as the members of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and the Alberta

Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) and more homogeneous populations.

The resolutions passed by four municipal associations were analyzed to test the hypotheses. Resolutions are drafted and voted on by members, they are passed at their annual conventions, and they are the foundation of associations’ policymaking and agenda setting. In short, they: 1. Indicate priority areas, and 2. Propose solutions of what to do about problems. The governments of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia all offer official responses to the resolutions passed by the municipal association(s) in their province. Municipalities draft resolutions with the knowledge that, if they are passed at the association level, they will be seen and responded to by the relevant government ministry.

To test the relationship between the dispersion of member populations and jurisdictional requests, the resolutions passed over a fifteen-year period, 1999 – 2013, were examined. Resolutions were coded by requested jurisdictional responsibility: municipal, provincial, federal, municipal-provincial, municipal-federal, municipal-provincial-federal, provincial-federal, or non-jurisdictional. The distribution of resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility by association supported both hypotheses. In the two homogeneous associations, AAMDC and UNSM, the majority of resolutions requested that a higher level of government act without any municipal involvement or responsibility. In the heterogeneous associations, AUMA and UBCM, a plurality of resolutions requested sole municipal responsibility and the majority of them requested municipal involvement, through either sole or shared responsibility. Associations with homogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for provincial programs, and
associations with heterogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for the resources or authority to enact municipal programs. These results reinforce the findings from Chapter Four that member diversity, whether rural/urban or population size, has a positive relationship with association requests for greater jurisdictional control.

Allocation of Collective Resources

Municipal associations carry out two core functions – member services (the provision of selective incentives) and advocacy (the promotion of common goods). How associations prioritize these functions is largely unclear. Chapter Five explored how two aspects of membership composition affect their activities. These were the presence of small communities in the membership and the membership presence of large municipalities. Multiple regression analysis found strong support for the aspects of composition affecting the number of services an association provides and the allocation of budgetary expenditures between member services and advocacy.

The chapter found that there is diversity in the member services offered by associations and the advocacy tactics that they employ. The majority of prior research on local government associations has been focused on lobbying tactics, and the range of tactics they employ has been well documented. There is a consensus that direct contact with incumbents at senior levels of government is the predominant lobbying strategy of groups that represent elected officials. The predominance of direct tactics has been attributed to the status afforded to elected officials as elected officials. The findings in Chapter Three reinforce the consensus in the literature. Municipal associations in Canada use a variety of tactics to appeal directly to the provincial government. These include conventions and resolutions; “bear pit sessions” with the premier and cabinet ministers;
ministers’ delegations; annual meetings with government officers; submissions to provincial committees, commissions, and reports; and memorandum of understanding.

There have been some instances of associations “going public” with media strategies and public campaigns, but these are the exception, rather than the norm. Recent examples of public appeals indicate that associations only employ indirect advocacy when direct tactics have been exhausted and relations with the provincial government are strained. In 2007, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) went public after the provincial government breached its Memorandum with UNSM. In 2013 and 2014, the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) went public on the issue of forced amalgamations. Most associational advocacy is direct, but associations are willing to go to the public on major issues of municipal-provincial disagreement.

Olson and Moe’s theories of group behaviour were used to test whether there are patterns that could cut through the complexity of advocacy and member services in associations. Municipal associations offer selective incentives in order to attract and retain members, but how they balance services or advocacy is dependent on their membership composition. Due to their limited internal capacity, small municipalities or firms in an association have a high demand for services. If these demands are not met, group membership is no longer rational for them. So, the more small members there are, the greater is the pressure to provide services. The rationale for large members to join groups is based on political, rather than service, considerations. The greater the presence of large members, the more responsive associations must be to their demands for

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advocacy. That is, the higher the percentage of group size that is accounted for by large members, the more resources will be devoted to advocacy work.

Multiple regressions were used to test how these competing pressures interact. Two independent variables were used to measure the concepts of the presence of small members and the presence of large members: the percentage of members that have a population under 2,000 and the percentage of an association’s membership population that is accounted for by its five most populous members. Two dependent variables were used: the number of services that associations offer and the percentage of budgetary expenditures that are allocated to service provision. It was expected that the percentage of member municipalities with a population under 2,000 would have a positive effect on percentage of an association’s budgetary and the number of services provided. It was also expected that the percentage of an association’s membership population accounted for by its five most populous members would have a negative effect on the percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision and on the number of services provided.

The results gave support to all of the hypotheses. Both independent variables were also significant at the 0.05 level and exert opposing forces on the dependent variables. There is considerable diversity in how municipal associations carry out the core group functions of member services and advocacy, but these findings support the idea that membership composition can help to explain patterns in this complexity.
7.3 Future Research

The findings from this dissertation advance our understanding of how membership composition affects the behaviour of municipal associations, but they also create four avenues for future research.

1. Evaluate provincial responses to associations
2. Extend research by looking at other membership inputs and policy outputs
3. Generalize through replication
4. Examine internal politics

As noted above, the research questions focused on associational input at the provincial level, but provincial responses to policy requests are still largely unknown. This is the first avenue for future research. The heterogeneity of member populations influences the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, but to what extent do provincial governments follow an association’s requested course of action? Associations with homogeneous populations are more likely to request provincial action and heterogeneous associations requested resource transfers to carry out programs at the provincial level, but do these translate into policy differences at the provincial level?

Similarly, Chapter Four found that the interests of some municipalities are often drowned out in unified associations. What remains unknown is whether unified or split associations have better success in changing public policy. The Union of Manitoba Municipalities and the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities merged, in part, because the provincial government used their division to defend inaction. Future research can test whether provincial governments are more responsive to the policy

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requests of unified or split associations. Should minority municipal types advocate for better representation within unified associations or form their own, independent organizations? Municipal associations facilitate local input at higher levels of government. This dissertation examined how membership composition shapes the issues associations advocate for, creating a foundation for future research on provincial responses to associational requests.

The second avenue for future research is extending the methodological approach of correlating membership characteristics with associations’ behaviour to other membership inputs and policy outputs. Two inputs – population size and rural/urban dominance are used – but other factors of membership composition can be employed. Does the number of member affect their behaviour? What is the affect of members’ financial status? How does the the geographic dispersion of municipalities affect their sense of member cohesion? Likewise, three outputs are measured in this dissertation – issue types, jurisdictional requests, and the allocation of collective resources – but other aspects of associations’ behaviour can be measured and tested. How do association staff and executives prioritize the resolutions passed by their members? What determines the number of resolutions passed? Which municipal functions receive the most attention in advocacy work? What types of services do associations offer? Extending this dissertation’s methodological approach to other policy outputs can deepen understandings of municipal associations’ behaviour.

Another avenue of future research is generalizing findings through replication. The research questions employed in this dissertation can also be extended to other federal and unitary states. The 49 municipal leagues and 47 associations of counties in the
United States can be used to test whether the relationship between member populations and the allocation of collective resources holds true with a larger number of cases. The more than 124 unitary state and federal-level local government associations can also be used to re-test the hypotheses in Chapter Six when advocacy is carried out a higher level of government. Are the interests of small and large municipal balanced in the same way at both sub-national and national levels?

National level local government associations can also be used to expand the scope of the hypotheses tested in Chapter Four. Although Canada is the only federal state to have separate rural and urban associations at the sub-national level, a number of countries have multiple associations at the national level. These include: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United States. 7 Do the patterns of behaviour between rural and urban associations found in Chapter Four hold true in other cases? The research questions and methodologies used in this dissertation can be replicated in future research to test whether the relationships between membership composition and associational behaviour found in Canada’s sub-national associations hold true in other countries and in local-national relations.

The fourth avenue of future research is examining the internal politics of associations. This dissertation used the approach of correlating inputs and outputs, without focusing on internal dynamics, but there are future research opportunities to study internal politics. What are the internal processes of electing association officials and ensuring the representation of diverse interests in board meetings? What role does

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the executive director play? How strategic are associations in using unofficial partisan
ties of their elected officials? How, and to what extent, is the formally non-partisan
nature of municipal governments in most provinces used in advocacy work? What types
of resolutions fail, and what factors contribute to resolution failure? How has the change
by AMO to pass resolutions within subsidiary groups changed its lobbying behaviour and
effectiveness? To what extent are internal tensions between members addressed in
meetings and conventions? How often do municipal association work with other interest
groups? Has the growth of other interest groups diminished municipal associations’ role
within the policy process? All four of these avenues of future research can be pursued to
expand our understanding of local government associations and associational behaviour
in Canada and abroad.

7.4 Conclusion

Municipal associations carry out a number of important functions in municipal
governance and local-provincial relations. They all provide services and carry out
advocacy, but the forms that these functions take vary widely by association. There are
commonalities amongst them – all use organization structures to represent internal
divisions, hold annual conventions, and lobby senior levels of government – but services
reflect provincial conditions. SARM members can purchase discounted gopher poison
and AMBM helps its members provide services in French. The policy requests made to
senior levels of government reflect the same kinds of differences. AFMNB advocates for
greater francophone representation at the provincial level and UNSM has been heavily
involved with the development of coastal management strategies. Associations must also
grapple with the internal diversity of member interests and needs. Municipalities vary in
size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. Associations can represent tiny villages and large urban centres, local governments in strong economic regions and those in decline, densely populated areas and remote rural municipalities.

Despite the diversity of association members and their interests, the majority of research on local government associations has been focused on the lobbying tactics they employ. Little has been written on the substance of their lobbying. This dissertation does not cover all aspects of associational activities or measures of membership composition, but it does provide exploratory, empirical findings on how membership composition structures association behaviour. More research is needed, but this dissertation provides evidence of the diversity in municipal associations’ memberships, structures, and activities, and how these areas interact. In short, membership composition cuts through the complexity of municipal associations to explain patterns in how they function.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Record of Fieldwork

Newfoundland and Labrador

Locations and Dates Visited:
• St. John’s, July 20 – 27, 2013

Pages of Records Digitized: 4,883

Records Digitized at:
• Legislative Library, Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly
• The Rooms Corporation of Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial Archive)
• Memorial University of Newfoundland (MUN), Centre for Newfoundland Studies

Digital Records Received from:
• Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador

Categories of NLFM / MNL Records Digitized:
• Annual Briefs to the Provincial Government
• Annual Conventions: Report of Proceedings
• Clippings of Newspaper Articles Referencing the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Municipalities (NLFM) (Collected by the Legislative Library / Department of Municipal Affairs)
• NLFM Committee Proceedings (Interventions Committee, Pension Benefits Committee, Resolutions Committee)
• Miscellaneous Printed Documents
• NLFM “Municipal News” Newsletter
• President’s Report
• Press Releases
• Reports
• Speeches

Nova Scotia

Locations and Dates Visited:
• Halifax, June 9 – August 4, 2013 (excluding July 7-12 and 20-27)
• Wolfville, July 30, 2013

Pages of Records Digitized: 16,492
Records Digitized at:
  • Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia
  • Legislative Library, Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly
  • Acadia University Library, Esther Clark Wright Archives

Digital Records Received from:
  • Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities

Categories of UNSM Records Digitized:
  • Annual Proceedings
  • Resolutions from Annual Meetings
  • Briefs and Submissions to Royal Commissions
  • Newsletter
  • Papers / Articles on UNSM
  • Press Releases
  • Publications (Municipal Councilor Orientation Guides, Candidates Guides, Handbook on Inter-Municipal Partnership and Co-Operation)
  • Reports
  • Speeches

Prince Edward Island

Locations and Dates Visited:
  • Charlottetown, August 5 – 21, 2013

Pages of Records Digitized: 3,353

Records Digitized at:
  • Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities
  • University of Prince Edward Island, Robertson Library

Categories of FPEIM Records Digitized:
  • Annual and Semi-Annual Meetings (Agendas, Minutes, and Proceedings)
  • Annual Submissions to Provincial Government
  • Constitution
  • Correspondence
  • Municipal Forum (Newsletter)
  • Presentations
  • Reports by FPEIM
  • Reports to FPEIM
  • Speeches to FPEIM
  • Submissions to Royal Commissions and Legislative Assembly Committees
New Brunswick

Locations and Dates Visited:
• Fredericton, July 5 – 12, 2015

Pages of Records Digitized: 7,590

Records Digitized at:
• The Legislative Library of New Brunswick
• Provincial Archives of N.B.
• University of New Brunswick Library, Archives and Special Collections

Digital Records Received from:
• Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick
• Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick
• Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick

Categories of Association of Villages of New Brunswick Records Digitized:
• Budgets and Financial Statements
• Meeting Minutes (Committees, General)
• Constitutions
• Reports
• Resolutions
• Speeches

Categories of Cities of New Brunswick Association Records Digitized:
• Briefs
• Constitutions
• Minutes of Executive Council Meetings
• Minutes of Proceedings
• Reports
• Resolutions
• Resolutions of the Executive

Categories of New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association Records Digitized:
• Minutes of Meetings
• Proceedings

Categories of Provincial Municipal Council Records Digitized:
• Briefs
• Budgets and Warrants
• Correspondence
• Financial Documents
• Meeting Minutes
• Reports
• Resolutions

Categories of Research and Information Centre Records Digitized:
• Committees
• Minutes
• Reports
• Summary of Activities

Categories of Towns of New Brunswick Association Records Digitized:
• Agendas
• Auditor’s Report
• Lists of Board of Directors Members
• Correspondence
• Financial Statements
• Minutes
• Reports
• Resolutions

Categories of Union of New Brunswick Municipalities Records Digitized:
• Financial Documents
• General Correspondence
• Minutes
• Miscellaneous Undated Documents
• Proceedings
• Programmes of Proceedings
• Reports
• Resolutions
• Submissions to Government
• Supporting Papers for Meetings

Categories of Villages and Towns of New Brunswick Records Digitized:
• Resolutions

Ontario

Resident, 2011 – 2015

Visited:
• Toronto, October 21-23, 2014; January 14-15 and March 27, 2015

Pages of Records Digitized: 13,943

Records Digitized at:
• Association of Municipalities of Ontario
• Toronto Public Reference Library
Digital Records Received from:
- Association of Municipalities of Ontario

Categories of AMO Records Digitized:
- Annual Reports
- Conference Programmes
- Policy Guidelines and Positions
- President’s Reports
- Resolutions

Categories of AOMR Records Digitized:
- Resolutions
- Submissions to the Premier

Categories of OARM Records Digitized:
- Convention Proceedings
- Resolutions

Categories of OMA Records Digitized:
- Annual Briefs
- Convention Proceedings
- Resolutions
- Submissions to the Provincial Government

Manitoba

Locations and dates visited:
- Winnipeg, June 7 – 14, 2014
- Portage la Prairie, June 12, 2014

Pages of Records Digitized: 13,495

Records Digitized at:
- Association of Manitoba Municipalities
- Legislative Library, Government of Manitoba
- Provincial Archives of Manitoba

Digital Records Received from:
- Association of Manitoba Municipalities
Categories of AMM Records Digitized:
  • Annual Convention Programmes
  • Annual Reports
  • Financial Statements
  • Lobbying Highlights
  • Presidential Messages
  • Reports

Categories of MAUM Records Digitized:
  • Annual Conference Proceedings
  • Reports

Categories of UMM Records Digitized:
  • Annual Convention Programmes
  • Minutes (Conventions, Executive Meetings, General, June District Meetings)
  • Reports

**Saskatchewan**

Locations and Dates Visited:
  • Regina, May 25 – June 6, 2014

Pages of Records Digitized: 19,236

Records Digitized at:
  • Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Legislative Library
  • Saskatchewan Archives Board
  • Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities
  • Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association

Digital Records Received from:
  • The New North: Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities
  • Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan
  • Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities
  • Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association

Categories of SANC Records Digitized:
  • Memorandum of Understanding
  • Newsletter
  • Resolutions
  • Strategic Plan

Categories of PARCS Records Digitized:
  • Constitution
  • Convention Proceedings
• Policy Papers

Categories of SARM Records Digitized:
• Annual Convention Proceedings and Resolutions
• Annual Reports
• Briefs to the Provincial Government
• Minutes of Executive Government Meetings
• Financial Statements
• Policy Positions
• The Rural Councilor (Newsletter)

Categories of SUMA Records Digitized:
• Annual Conventions
• Annual Reports
• Constitutions
• Minutes of Executive Government Meetings
• Internal Reviews
• Reports
• Resolutions
• Strategic Plan Documents
• Submissions to Government
• Task Force on Urban Government Renewal – Various Documents

Alberta

Locations and Dates Visited:
• Edmonton, May 12 – 24, 2014

Pages of Records Digitized: 15,176

Records Digitized at:
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association
• Legislature Library, Legislative Assembly of Alberta

Digital Records Received from:
• Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association

Categories of AAMDC Records Digitized:
• Annual Convention Programmes
• Annual Reports
• News Coverage of AAMDC
• Position Statements
• Submissions to Government
Categories of AUMA Records Digitized:
• Annual Convention Programmes
• Annual Reports
• Briefs to the Provincial Government
• Reports
• Resolution Books
• Statuses of Resolutions

British Columbia

Locations and Dates Visited:
• Victoria, April 26 – May 3, 2014
• Vancouver, May 4 – 10, 2014

Pages of Records Digitized: 21,250

Records Digitized at:
• BC Archives
• Legislative Library of British Columbia
• Union of British Columbia Municipalities

Digital Records Received from:
• Union of British Columbia Municipalities

Categories of UBCM Records Digitized:
• Annual Convention Minutes
• Annual Convention Programmes
• Annual Reports
• Electoral Boundaries Commission
• Okanagan Mainline Municipal Association
• Provincial Responses to Resolutions
• Speeches
• Submissions to the Provincial Government
## Summary

Table Appendix A-1 – Summary of Fieldwork

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Appendix B: Sources for Resolutions

Alberta:


British Columbia:


Manitoba:

- Union of Manitoba Municipalities, Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities and Association of Manitoba Municipalities Resolutions, Compiled by Gordon Goldsborough.

New Brunswick:


Nova Scotia:


Ontario:

Saskatchewan

Appendix C: Member Services Provided by Primary Associations

AAMDC
- Trade Division
- Jubilee Insurance Agencies
- PFA Canada

AFMNB
- Municipal Insurance
- Non-Profit Insurance
- Accounting Standards
- Bulk Purchasing
- Payment method for procurement process

AMM
- Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd.
- Petroleum Products Buying Group
- Municipal Insurance

AMO
- 311 Service for Municipal Information
- Energy Procurement
  - Electricity
  - Natural Gas
  - Fuel
- Planning Tools
  - Energy Planning Tool
  - Energy Management Tool
- Home and Auto Insurance
- Closed Meeting Investigator
- Energy Consulting
- Investments
- Solar Photovoltaic
- Consolidated Energy Billing
- Group Benefits for Municipal Employees
- Municipal Risk Management
- Streetlight Program
- Training Programs
AUMA

- Consulting Services
- Election Worker Training
- Casual Legal Services
- Sample Service Agreements
- Human Resources
  - Benefits Services
  - Retirement Services
  - HR Documents and Templates
  - Job Postings
- Energy Services / Energy Program
- Insurance and Risk Management
- Investment Services
- Aggregated Utility Services
  - Electricity
  - Natural Gas

FPEIM

- Professional Development Training
- Group Insurance
- Discounted Furnace Oil Rates

MNL

- Government Purchasing Authority
- TRIO – NL Municipal Employee Benefits Inc.
  - Complete Group Health and Life Insurance Programs
  - Pension Plan
  - Group Retirement Savings Plan
  - Employee Assistance Program
- Municipal General Insurance Program
- Telephone Parliamentary Procedures Advisory Service
- Community Cooperation Office
- Enterprise Rent-A-Car Discounts
- World Lynx (Corporate Share Plan)
- Telephone Legal Referral Service
- Infonote (Email/Fax Broadcast System)
- Municipal Symposium (Training)
- Human Resources
  - CareerBeach.com Job Postings
  - Free Human Resources Telephone Advisory Service
- Le Grow’s Travel Discounted Travel Agency Services
- MNL – PFA Fuel Program
- MNL Tire Program
• Provincial Airlines Ltd. Travel Agreement (Discounted Flights)

SARM
• Municipal Support (Training for Elected Officials and Municipal Administrators)
• Information Services
• Legal Services
• Community Planning Services
• Employee Benefits Programs
• Trading Department
• Municipal Fund Management
• Beaver Control Program
• Provincial Rat Eradication Program
• Invasive Plant Programs
  o Plant Management
  o Plant Control
• Strategic Initiatives Program
• Municipal Capacity Development Program
• Beaver Control Program
• Irrigation Structures Program
• Wild Boar Control Program
• Municipal Leaders Development Program
• Crown Land Survey Fund
• Rural Municipal Administrator Internship Program
• SARM Fuel Supply Program
• Municipal Insurance

SUMA
• Group Benefits Program
• Insurance for Municipal Protective Services Volunteers
• SUMAssure Insurance Programs
• SUMAdvantage (Bulk Purchasing)

UBCM
• Advertising and Sponsorship
• Commercial Vehicle Licensing Program
• Cat and Dog Tags
• Group Benefits Program
• Petro-Canada SuperPass Rebate Program
Appendix D: Background on Municipal Association Restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario

The effects of municipal association restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying are tested in Chapter Four. This appendix provides further, descriptive details on these restructurings, including how associations have dealt with internal conflicts and external divisions.

Manitoba

Of Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario, Manitoba has undergone the simplest set of changes in municipal association structures. The province started with one unified association in 1905. An urban association formed in 1949, making the unified association primarily rural. In 1999 the two associations remerged into a unified organization. The first meeting of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM) in March 1905 was attended by 31 rural and urban municipalities. Within five years, its membership grew to 102 municipalities. This number declined to 86 by 1924, and would continue to fluctuate in the following decades. In his history of municipal governance in Manitoba, Gordon Goldsborough attributes this fluctuation to the dire economic status of many municipalities in the province during the World Wars and Great Depression. He

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8 There is a section association in Manitoba, l'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM), that formed in 1995. AMBM is not considered in this chapter because it does not use a resolutions process to carry out lobbying at the provincial level. AMBM’s mandate is to help municipalities adopt bilingualism policies and provide municipal services in French. Its seventeen members all belong to the Association of Manitoba Municipalities and have the opportunity to pursue issues through AMM. Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Mandat,” directionmanitoba.com.
argues that the choice of municipalities to leave UMM was “more a reflection of tough economic times that caused penny-pinching municipalities to forego a perceived luxury than dissatisfaction with the UMM itself.”\textsuperscript{10} Dissatisfaction with UMM amongst urban municipalities did come to the surface in the 1940s and ultimately resulted in the formation of an independent urban association.

In October 1949, delegates from urban municipalities across the province met to consider forming a new association of urban municipalities. The Mayor of Dauphin had put forward the proposal of a new association in response to growing tensions between UMM’s urban and rural members. At the meeting, delegates cited discontent with UMM’s priorities. \textit{The Winnipeg Free Press} reported that:

The Mayor of Portage la Prairie, Rev. H.L. Henderson criticized former work done by the Union of Manitoba Municipalities on behalf of urban municipalities … [and] called for the formation of an ‘aggressive’ association to find a solution to the many problems in connection with provincial assistance in education, charity relief, fair distribution of the gasoline tax, and the maintenance of high-speed heavy roads, now facing urban municipalities.\textsuperscript{11} Others at the meeting, including Mayor John W. Pratt of Birtle, argued that it was “unfair to expect a group of rural men in the union to spend their time trying to solve problems which were related to towns and cities.”\textsuperscript{12} Delegates at the meeting voted to form the Manitoba Urban Association (MUA), later renamed the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities (MAUM).\textsuperscript{13} Delegates were split on whether the new association should be affiliated with, or stand in opposition to, UMM. The issue was not resolved at the

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Goldsborough, 46.
meeting, but affected urban membership in UMM the MAUM and went on to become fully independent.

A number of municipalities, including the Cities of Winnipeg and Brandon, maintained membership in both UMM and MUA, but after MUA formed, UMM’s urban membership immediately dropped by 40%. In four years, the majority of cities, towns, villages, and suburban municipalities in Manitoba were MUA members. MUA used this fact to leverage increased urban representation at the provincial level. In 1953, MUA members passed a resolution that asked the provincial government “to have a representative from the Manitoba Urban Association appointed as a member of the various Provincial Boards on which there [were] representatives from the Union of Manitoba Municipalities.”

Rural and urban municipalities in Manitoba were polarized, and MUA strove to institutionalize this division. The two associations would remain split for fifty years.

Despite their formal division, membership overlap between UMM and MUA/MAUM persisted. Membership in both associations was open to any municipality. Many of MUA/MAUM’s records have been lost, but in 1987, 17 municipalities belonged to both associations (Figure Appendices-1).

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15 As Goldsborough notes: “In February 2001, the early history of the MAUM and UMM vanished in an avalanche of snow when the roof of the AMM office in Portage la Prairie collapsed.” Two of UMM’s secretary-treasurers had deposited most of UMM’s early records in the provincial archives, but MAUM’s records were not archived. The City of Brandon had kept most resolutions passed by MAUM, which Goldsborough compiled and shared with the author, but nearly all other MAUM records have been lost. Goldsborough, 104.
Figure Appendix D-1. Membership Overlap of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM) and the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities (MAUM) (1987)
Fifteen of the overlapping members were urban municipalities (one city, ten towns, and four villages) and two were rural (one local government district and one rural municipality). In addition, two rural municipalities (both local government districts) belonged only to MAUM and 29 urban municipalities (one city, eight towns, and 20 villages) belonged only to UMM. Despite the overlap, MAUM was an explicitly urban association and UMM was primarily rural. UMM had started as a unified association, but after MUA’s formation, it formalized rurality in its constitution. A 1993 resolution noted that “the Union of Manitoba Municipalities constitution only [allowed] Rural Municipal Councillors to be eligible to run for Director of the U.M.M. Board.”\(^\text{16}\) UMM and MAUM’s memberships overlapped, but there were still distinct rural and urban differences between them.

In spite of their distinctiveness, UMM and MAUM began discussions of reunification in the late 1980s. In part, these discussions reflected a change in Manitoba’s primary municipal division. When the Manitoba Urban Association formed in 1949, the core municipal tension was rural/urban. By the time UMM and MAUM entered into merger talks forty years later, the core tension had shifted to Greater Winnipeg vs. non-Greater Winnipeg. This shift is evident in the activities of MAUM in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite being an association for urban municipalities, its members passed resolutions that argued for “justice for rural Manitoba,”\(^\text{17}\) asked the province to

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protect rural interests vis-à-vis Winnipeg when drawing electoral boundaries,\(^\text{18}\) and advocated for changes in legislation to assist farmers.\(^\text{19}\) In 1996, they passed a resolution that stated:

WHEREAS 60% of the population of Manitoba is concentrated in the City of Winnipeg; and WHEREAS this is detrimental to the rest of the province socially and economically; and WHEREAS the Rural Municipalities are losing their youth population; NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Manitoba Urban Association of Urban Municipalities urge the Province of Manitoba to take steps to decentralize and redistribute the population of Manitoba through strategic economic planning.\(^\text{20}\)

UMM and MAUM were split along rural/urban lines, but this division had become incongruent with the primary municipal division in the province. It no longer served the primary interests of many municipalities.

In addition to this incongruence, merger talks were spurred by a sense amongst UMM and MAUM officials that “having two municipal organizations in the province was counter-productive to the advancement of municipal interests,” and that “a common response to both UMM and MAUM was along the lines of ‘that’s a good idea but we will have to consult with the other organization.’”\(^\text{21}\) Former MAUM president Jae Eadie later noted:

When there were two associations in Manitoba, there were often the challenges of ‘divide and conquer’ employed by the provincial governments, whereby they would pit urbans against rurals on many issues. These tactics allowed provincial governments to avoid dealing with serious issues while they sat back and watched the two municipal associations … battle things out with each other.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 110.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 111.
This recognition coupled with the shift from rural/urban to Greater Winnipeg vs. non-Greater Winnipeg created openness to merging UMM and MAUM.

The formal push for a merger originated with the City of Brandon. Brandon had changed its membership multiple times between UMM and MAUM between 1972 and 1984. Although Brandon was the second-largest city in Manitoba, it felt overshadowed by Winnipeg in MAUM. In 1984 it encouraged informal talks between the UMM and MAUM executives on reunification. In 1989 and 1990, Brandon submitted resolutions to UMM’s annual convention that called for a merger between the two associations. Both of these motions failed, but Brandon mayor Rick Borotsik continued to push for UMM and MAUM to merge.23

MAUM and UMM formed a joint task to consider a merger in 1995. In 1997, MAUM’s members considered two resolutions on a potential merger. One, put forward by the Village of Ste. Anne, called for MAUM to “discontinue its negotiations with the UMM for the purposes of amalgamation.” It argued that “there [was] little to gain [from] such a move and that the concerns of the UMM [were] quite different in most part from those of the MAUM.”24 The second resolution, put forward by Brandon, asked MAUM to “proceed with the Union of Manitoba Municipalities in the formation of one municipal association to represent all municipalities in Manitoba.”25 MAUM members passed the second motion, and UMM members voted to support a merger the following year.

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23 Ibid. 111-13.
25 Ibid., 9.
In 1999, the unified Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) was founded. AMM’s formation was promoted as a merger, but was it effectively a takeover of MAUM by UMM. Twenty years after leaving UMM, Manitoba’s urban municipalities were folded back into it – albeit under a new name. Despite this, AMM did create accommodations for rural/urban representation that had not been present in UMM. AMM elects a Vice-President Rural and a Vice-President Urban. Each of its six geographic districts elects one rural representative and one urban representative to the Board of Directors. The City of Winnipeg is also given one seat on the Board. The use of the Board structure to represent both rural and urban interests in AMM appears to be effective. All 201 municipalities in Manitoba joined AMM within its first year and it has maintained full municipal membership.

New Brunswick

The initial restructuring of municipal associations in New Brunswick mirrored Manitoba, but its outcome has been more complex. In 1948/9, an urban association broke away from the province’s unified association, the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities.
By 1951, two more associations were founded in the province, one for towns and one for counties. The complexity continued to grow in the following decades. A total of nine municipal associations have existed in New Brunswick, with up to four existing at one time.

The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities was founded in 1906/7. Its early records did not report membership lists, but by 1949 all but two municipalities in the province were members. In 1948/9, elected officials from the province’s three cities – Fredericton, Moncton, and Saint John – formed an association independent from UNBM. It was initially called the New Brunswick Tri-Cities Federation. After a series of name changes, they settled on the Cities of New Brunswick Association (CNBA). Their early work focused on the financial status of cities and securing financial aid from the provincial government. At their inaugural meeting, CNBA members passed a resolution stating that, unless their requests for financial assistance were given proper attention, “the responsibility of the three cities will cease when a financial crisis is reached.”

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29 The first recorded meeting of the cities association in New Brunswick was held in January 1949. The minutes of this meeting reference a prior meeting of the association, but do not specify its date. The New Brunswick Tri-City Federation, “Minutes of the Proceedings of the ‘Tri-City Meeting,’” January 20, 1949, 1.


32 Ibid., 5.
resolutions to inform the provincial government when cities were not consulted in the preparation of UNBM briefs.\textsuperscript{33} The cities maintained their individual memberships in the Union, but used CNBA to lobby the provincial and federal governments independently.

By 1951, associations for both rural municipalities (counties) and towns were also formed. The records of the Union of New Brunswick Towns (UNBT) have been lost, but details on restructuring can be drawn from the records of UNBM, CNBA, and the New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association (NBRMA). Their records show that the formation of the associations was not without dissent. The motion to form the “Rural Municipalities Association of New Brunswick” and meet independently before the UNBM’s annual convention passed unanimously at the initial meeting of counties, but conflict followed. At the second meeting of NBRMA, L.P.A. Robichaud of Kent County put forward a motion to disband the rural association and express disapproval of the cities “meeting together and separately for any purpose.”\textsuperscript{34} Robichaud argued that any grievances should be aired at UNBM conventions. He believed that separate organizations could lead to the downfall of the Union. Referencing the inaugural meeting, Robichaud stated: “If I had known that one of the purposes of the meeting was to form a new association, I would have certainly been here, even if I had to walk.”\textsuperscript{35} He argued that rural municipalities were only reacting to the formation of CNBA and that they were being jockeyed into forming their own.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 2.
His motion did receive some support, but others did not share his belief that the formation of a rural association would break up UNBM. W.L. Durick from Northumberland County argued:

As we all know the cities have a good many conditions to contend with that we in the rural municipalities have not. But we, in the rural municipalities also have conditions that the cities are not faced with at all. Now, Mr. Robichaud has stated, ‘Don’t let ourselves be jockeyed.’ We have been jockeyed for ten (10) years at least. We have been jockeyed by the cities and towns and we have been jockeyed and gotten nowhere. It is coming to a time today that in June, 1952, when the subsidy of the Dominion runs out we shall have to fight for anything we might get. But we should have an association. We should be able to talk this matter over with the association. The conditions that exist in towns and cities and rural municipalities are entirely different in each of them. They come with force and knowledge and all influence necessary [from] these cities and towns they have got all they want … we take the dregs or left-overs. We don’t want in any way to bust up the Union of Municipalities. I don’t think there is any necessity of busting up the Union.  

Ultimately, Robichaud’s motion was not voted upon and delegates confirmed the existence of a rural association. They proceeded to elect a new president, H.L. Thomas of Carleton County. When he addressed the meeting, he echoed Durick’s sentiment that a rural association was needed, in part, because of the knowledge gap between urban and rural officials. He stated: “It seems to me that many of us are farmers and fishermen in the rural districts and we are not up to the latest of everything of the resolutions that come before the Union.” He argued that the new association could be a space for rural councillors to learn more about proposed resolutions before they were voted on at the UNBM convention. Rural municipalities formed their own union not only because they had distinct interests, but also because they perceived themselves as having different

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36 Ibid., 5.
37 Ibid., 9.
capabilities in addressing municipal issues. This sentiment was not unanimous, but there was enough support to form a rural association.

The formation of the cities, towns, and rural associations also caused friction within the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities. At the 1953 convention, the UNBM Executive put forward a special resolution on the matter:

WHEREAS during the past few years several categories of municipalités, cities, towns and counties, have each set up separate organizations to foster the interests of their respective groups;  

AND WHEREAS this action if continued, may result in the destruction of the Union because of friction arising between the several groups;  

BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED THAT the Union of N.B. Municipalities recommends to the several groups that such separate organizations be discontinued and that the provision be made in the Union programme for the cities, towns and counties to meet separately as committees during the Union meeting to consider any matters referred to such committees as having reference only to such group and that the reports of such committee be then referred to the general meeting of the Union for action.  

Consideration of the resolution was deferred after representatives of the separate associations stated that they intended to keep meeting independently. W.J. Gallant spoke on behalf of NBRMA and stated that the rural association discussed the UNBM Executive’s motion, but had decided to carry on as an independent organization. Gallant argued that the rural union was set up as a study group, rather than a pressure group. He pledged that NBRMA would “co-operate in every way with the parent Union of Municipalities.” The CNBA spokesperson, Mayor Thomas Horsler of Lancaster, stated that that the cities had come to the same conclusion as the rural municipalities. He

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39 Ibid., 17.
argued that the cities association was a study group that would co-operate with UNBM but wanted to maintain independence. Only the towns association was “prepared to discontinue their organization if it would be beneficial to the Union.”\textsuperscript{40} They argued that there had been conflicting interests within the Union since the separate organizations formed.\textsuperscript{41}

NBRMA and CNBA claimed that they were only study groups, and did not intend to act as pressure groups, but their actions do not support these claims. Both associations passed their own resolutions, and while some of them were forwarded to the Union for consideration by its full membership, others were sent directly to the provincial government. Both associations were exerting independent pressure at the provincial level. UNBM continued to push for reunification, but CNBA rejected a request from the Union for them to disband in 1954.\textsuperscript{42}

In the years that followed, the cities, towns, and rural associations interacted with one another outside of UNBM. In 1954, CNBA requested to meet with UNBT because “The Cities’ problems were pretty much the same as those of ‘The Towns.”’\textsuperscript{43} There is no record of whether this meeting occurred. CNBA requested collaboration with the Towns again in 1959. They passed a resolution that: “‘The Cities’ invite the Union of N.B. Towns to support the request of ‘The Cities’ that the Provincial Government

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 18.  
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 18.  
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 10
participate to the extent of paying 50% of the total cost of snow removal." Discussions around the role and affiliation of associations also continued within UNBM.

In 1960, the President of UNBM, Ralph T. Pearson, took a softer tone on the issue of separate associations. In his address at the UNBM annual convention, he argued:

It is good to have the Cities, Towns and Rural Municipalities meet as they do and discuss problems that are common to each and then when they meet here as a Union of New Brunswick Municipalities let it be a Union of All and let the deliberations be for the best interests of all Municipalities so that they may go with near as possible the unanimous vote of this the Government closest to the people."

By 1962, the UNBM Executive had changed its tone again. They put forward a resolution for consideration at the convention that stated:

RESOLVED that whereas for the past several years there has been a division in the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities through having both a rural and cities organization;

AND WHEREAS a common objective should be the aim of this Union in its relations with the Provincial Government;

BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED that the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities revert to its original intent, one Union united for progress."

UNBM members did not vote on the motion. The following year, the Union’s President proposed that the “subsidiary” organizations – Cities, Towns, and Rural – either cease to function or come under the purview of UNBM as caucuses. If the groups continued to meet, he wanted them those meetings to happen within the UNBM structure, rather than independently. This time, UNBM members adopted a resolution to undertake a study of

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incorporating the subsidiary associations as Union caucuses.\textsuperscript{47} However, provincial plans for the restructuring of municipal governments further divided municipalities in the province and thwarted the idea of a remerging.

The 1964 Report of The Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation in New Brunswick, or Byrne Report, proposed large-scale restructuring of municipal governments. Its recommendations would affect cities, towns, and counties differently. Most of the 1964 UNBM convention was devoted to discussions of the Byrne Report and members passed a resolution that asked the provincial government “not to implement the report of the Byrne Commission in its entirety.”\textsuperscript{48} The UNBM Executive called a special meeting in December 1965 to articulate further objections, but it had a difficult time reaching consensus on the issue, because NBRMA, UNBT, and CNBA were submitting their own reports to the Byrne Commission. UNBM’s Executive members voted unanimously to reject the Byrne Report, but they could not agree on a proposed alternative.\textsuperscript{49}

CNBA passed a motion to inform UNBM that stated: “the Cities’ delegates will take a very keen and active part in the [Union’s] deliberations with the understanding that if the matter comes before a vote, the Cities’ delegates will not be bound by the vote as it is the intention of the Six Cities of N.B. to submit a brief regarding the Byrne Report to

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 36.
\textsuperscript{48} Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, \textit{Proceedings of the 56\textsuperscript{th} Annual Convention} (Fredericton: Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1963), 25.
the Provincial Government.”50 Again, CNBA was acting as independent pressure group vis-à-vis the province.

The Byrne Report furthered CNBA’s independence, but the New Brunswick Equal Opportunity Program caused UNBM to disband. Equal Opportunity dissolved the province’s county governments, whose membership fees provided the majority of UNBM’s funds. The last recorded UNBM convention was held in 1964. In 1968, former UNBM members held a meeting intended to restart the Union. Minutes from that meeting stated: “When the Municipal Re-Organization went through it left the Union in a state of disorder, with a large portion of the executive ceasing to exist, because of the fact that the Municipalities which they represented did not exist, and therefore the Union did not have a full executive at the present time.”51 If UNBM reformed it would need new leadership. Prior to the 1968 meeting, the Union’s honorary secretary-treasurer, Mark Yeoman, sent letters to all cities, towns and villages in the province “regarding the reorganization and re-establishment” of UNBM. He reported that “five out of seven Cities rejoining and paying their dues, fourteen of twenty towns done the same, and twenty-two out of seventy-six villages,”52 but not all elected municipal officials shared Yeoman’s vision of how, or whether, UNBM should be reestablished.

A number of delegates at the meeting noted that associations for cities and towns already existed, and proposed than an association for villages should be formed. Some argued that the Union could exist as a federation amongst three associations, but that the

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52 Ibid., 2.
separate associations should continue to exist. A village councillor argued that the priority should be the formation of a village association, in case the UNBM did not restart. A resolution was passed to form a “committee of representatives from villages, towns, and cities who are now members of this organization in good standing, to make a study include the name or any changes which they may wish to bring out, on the reorganization and planning of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities.” It included six representatives, split evenly between cities, towns, and villages. There are no records of whether the committee met, but UNBM did not reorganize as a functional body.

A July 1969 letter from Mark Yeoman to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion in Ottawa stated:

I regret to tell you that our Association is now dormant and has not carried out any activities for the last two years or more.

The Association was composed of the representatives of all the Municipal Governments of New Brunswick, including Cities, Counties, Towns and Villages. However, the financial backbone of the organization was provided by the Counties, and when these were abolished by the Provincial Government it became impossible for the Association to function.

He echoed the same sentiment in a January 1970 letter to the Executive Director of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM):

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53 Ibid., 3.
54 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion,” July 14, 1969. A letter to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities also stated “Our Union is made up of representatives of the Cities, Towns and Villages and Counties of New Brunswick, but the Counties contributed far the larger part of the costs of operation. In the course of the municipal re-organization carried out by the present Government, the Counties were abolished, and with that the Union ceased to function.” Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities,” 25 September 1969.
The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities still exists, but I very much regret to say that it is entirely dormant and has no funds with which to pay the [CFMM] dues.

This Organization gave sixty years of honourable service to the citizens of New Brunswick. I hope to see the day when it will be possible to revive it and make it useful again. For the present, however, I can only ask you to allow our membership to remain in abeyance and to forego collection of dues.  

This letter is the last recorded activity of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities. The province’s other associations continued to function in its absence.

The post-UNBM period of municipal associations in New Brunswick was marked by disorganization and confusion. The Cities of New Brunswick Association continued to be active and meet regularly, but the associations representing towns and/or villages were less formalized. The 1968 meeting of UNBM members noted that the province had a towns association, but a 1969 letter from Yeoman to The Special Senate Committee on Poverty in Ottawa stated “There is, in existence, an Organization representing the Cities, which is fairly active [and] there is also a Union of Towns, but as far as I know it is almost completely inactive.” A January 1970 letter from the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities to Yeoman noted “the confusion that surrounds the situation

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56 Although the Cities of New Brunswick (Association) was the most active of the municipal-type organizations both before and after UNBM dissolved, it was still less formalized than UNBM. The Cities began to meet in 1949, but did not pass a constitution until 1970. As well, the association’s internal records show that at least six names – The New Brunswick Tri-City Federation, the Three Cities of New Brunswick (The) Cities of New Brunswick, The Six Cities of New Brunswick, Cities of New Brunswick Organization, and Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cite du Nouveau-Brunswick have been used since its formation.
with regard to municipal associations in New Brunswick.”\(^\text{58}\) The incomplete records of municipal associations in the decades that followed clear up only part of this confusion.

Pieced together, the fragmented records give a rough outline of what associations existed when in New Brunswick. There is correspondence between the City of Campbellton and a Villages & Towns of New Brunswick Association (VTNBA) in 1973.\(^\text{59}\) By 1976, an Association of the Villages of New Brunswick (AVNB) had formed.\(^\text{60}\) New Brunswick towns, which had organized under the name the Union of New Brunswick Towns prior to VTNBA, formed the Towns of New Brunswick Association – L’Association des Villes du Nouveau-Brunswick (TNBA-AVNB).\(^\text{61}\) During this period of change and instability, the integration of the province’s municipalities into a unified association was considered several times.

In 1971, a Municipal-Provincial Conference was held, which established the Provincial-Municipal Council (PMC). The Council’s mandate was “to act as a liaison between the associations and the Province of on all issues of common concern.”\(^\text{62}\) It met every second month and involved representatives from the associations and the Department of Municipal Affairs. The associations paid dues to belong to the Council, but the Council not have official jurisdiction over them. It acted as an “umbrella


organization,” rather than an independent association or federation of municipalities.63

Following the formation of the Council, CNBA continued to forward its resolutions directly to the provincial government, but sent copies of them to the other members of the Provincial-Municipal Council.64

Outside of the Provincial-Municipal Council, CNBA continued to consider further affiliation with the other associations in the province. In 1970, the CNBA Executive proposed to associate with urban towns, in order to strengthen the voice of urban New Brunswick in provincial affairs.65 That same year, the CNBA’s President met with the President of the UNBT on the possibility of a “loose association” between the two organizations. The CNBA President reported that the Towns’ President had agreed to discuss the proposal at towns’ next meeting and report back to the Cities. The matter was not discussed at CNBA’s next meeting in December 1970. It was next addressed in February 1974. At that meeting, CNBA members passed a resolution that stated: “RESOLVED that the Cities of New Brunswick Association request the Minister of Municipal Affairs to convene a meeting of the three municipal associations of elected officials in the Province in the early spring, with a view of discussing the notion of one integrated municipal association for New Brunswick.”66 Two months later, CNBA tabled a motion to endorse an amalgamation of the province’s associations into one

63 Ibid.
union.⁶⁷ This amalgamation did not occur. A 1980 TNBA-AVNB Annual Meeting agenda includes a report from the “Federation of New Brunswick Municipalities Committee,” but there are no records of this committee’s work and a federation did not form.⁶⁸

In 1989, L’Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) was founded.⁶⁹ Its membership was open to any francophone or bilingual municipality in the province. There are minimal records of New Brunswick’s municipal associations from the 1980s and 1990s, but in 1994, *Morrison v. New Brunswick, 1994 3949 (NB QB)* named “Villages of N.B. Association, Towns of N.B. Association, Cities of N.B. Association, and L’Association des municipalités du Nouveau Brunswick” as the province’s four municipal associations.⁷⁰

The most restructuring of municipal associations in New Brunswick occurred in 1995. The Association of the Villages of New Brunswick and the members of the now anglophone Towns of New Brunswick Association merged to form the Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB). Under UMNB’s constitution, “every municipality of the Province of New Brunswick, so incorporated by the virtue of Chapter 20 of the Statutes of New Brunswick 1966, shall be eligible for membership in the organization.”⁷¹ UMNB was intended as a unified association, but it functions as an

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⁶⁷ Cities of New Brunswick Association, “Minutes of Meeting of Cities of New Brunswick Association,” April 27, 1974, 8.
association for the province’s anglophone towns and villages. AFMNB and CNBA have continued to function. There is some membership overlap between the three associations, but only two cities belong to UMNB and only four other municipalities belong to both UMNB and AFMNB.

Figure Appendix D-2. Membership Overlap of New Brunswick Municipal Associations (2015)

UNBM and AFMNB now refer to one another as “sister organizations,” but do not have a formal relationship and neither association has a formal relationship with CNBA.

Ontario

Ontario has also had a complicated history of municipal association restructuring. The Ontario Municipal Association (OMA) was founded as a unified association in 1899. Since then, Ontario has had five independent municipal associations and more than a dozen sub-associations. Independent associations are the focus of analysis, but the
history of sub-associations will be discussed, as they highlight how municipal associations in Ontario have attempted to represent divisions amongst municipal types and geographic areas.

OMA was founded as a unified association, but by 1919 it had created a Rural Section and an Urban Section to ease rural/urban tensions within the organization. The sections met at OMA’s conventions and were used as forums for rural and urban municipalities to discuss proposed resolutions that were germane to their members. Section members voted on recommendations as to whether germane resolutions should be passed by OMA’s general membership.\(^2\) The attempt to ease rural/urban conflict proved largely futile. The association’s membership was too closely divided. In 1929, OMA’s membership was nearly evenly divided between rural and urban municipalities. 64 of the 126 members were townships, and there were 26 cities, 21 towns, 6 villages, 8 counties, 1 municipal union.\(^3\) However, the number of votes that each member received was based on its municipal type and population. Each member was allocated one voting representative, plus an additional representative for each $5.00 of its membership fee, as long as each representative was a member of the council or an officer of the municipality.\(^4\) Fees were based on municipal type, with urban municipalities paying more than their rural counterparts, entitling them to greater representations. At the extremes, cities with a population over 100,000 were entitled to have 41 representatives, while townships and villages were only entitled to 3. The number of urban and rural


\(^3\) Ibid.

municipalities that belonged to OMA was near parity, but the majority of votes belonged to urban representatives.

The effect of this split and the association’s rural/urban tensions became evident in the resolutions process. In 1929, 74.2% of proposed resolutions were carried. In 1930 the percentage fell to 55.8% and by 1931, the percentage dropped to 31.8%. That year, only 56 of the 176 resolutions voted on by OMA received consensus from the general membership. In 1932, the percentage of resolutions that passed jumped to 80.6%, but this jump reflected a large-scale exodus of rural members, rather than consensus between rural and urban members. Between 1929 and 1932, OMA lost 27 members. Twenty-four of them were townships.\(^75\) In 1933, a separate municipal association, the Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (OARM) was founded.

The early records of OARM are missing, but it had a clear and immediate effect on OMA’s membership composition. The year after OARM was founded, the number of townships in OMA fell to 36. There was a 43% drop in township membership between 1929 and 1934.\(^76\) OMA’s membership, including townships, grew steadily over the next decade and then doubled in size between 1940 and 1944. Despite this growth, there was still a sharp rural/urban division between OMA and OARM.

1949 is the first year where OARM membership records are available. That year OMA had 262 members and OARM had 219. 50 municipalities were members of both associations. Of OARM’s 219 members, 177 were townships. Its other members were

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15 villages, 8 towns, and 19 counties. It did not have any city members. Conversely, OMA had 29 city members, as well as 67 towns, 42 villages, 18 counties, 98 townships, and two sub-associations. Despite the high number of townships in OMA, more than half of its members were urban (cities, towns, and villages). OMA and OARM’s memberships both grew over the next decade, but their urban-rural divide remained pronounced. In 1959, OMA had 270 members and OARM had 322. The majority of OMA’s members were still urban, and 252 of OARM’s members were townships.

OARM’s formation was the first municipal association restructuring in Ontario, but two additional independent associations formed in the following decades. The Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves (AOMR) was founded in 1944. The Association of Ontario Counties, later renamed the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions (AOCR), was founded in 1960. Many of AOMR’s records are missing, but the name “Mayors and Reeves” indicates that its membership was open to both rural and urban municipalities. A 1972 submission to the Province of Ontario listed AOMR’s past presidents and current executive. All of its past presidents were the mayor of a city. Its 22 vice-presidents were composed of 7 city mayors, 8 town mayors, 2 village mayors, and three township reeves. Its 32-member executive was composed of representatives

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from 6 cities, 18 towns, 2 villages, 6 townships, 1 borough, and 1 regional municipality. AOMR was founded as an association for elected officials, and it included rural members, but this record indicates that it may have been primarily urban.

After OARM, AOMR, and AOCR were founded, rural/urban issues continued to arise within the primarily urban OMA, but urban municipalities pursued greater representation internally. In 1971, the City of Oshawa put forward a resolution that stated:

Whereas the trend of future growth in Ontario is everywhere anticipated to be marked by continuing rapid urbanization;

And whereas, the pressures of this urbanizing process will continue to cause cities to be confronted with more and greater peculiarly urban problems which can only be solved by a united and co-operative effort on the part of urban municipalities in conjunction with the senior levels of government;

And whereas, there now exists a number of associations which adequately reflects (sic) the views of predominantly rural municipalities;

And whereas, at the present time no similarly suitable organization vehicles exist from which the cities in Ontario might speak with a united voice on these urban problems, as well as on all matters of common interest to urban municipalities;

Be it resolved that the Ontario Municipal Association be petition to organize an Urban Section of the OMA in which membership will be open to all cities, boroughs and other similar urban municipalities in the Province of Ontario.

At OMA’s convention that year, the resolution was referred to the association’s executive for consideration. When OMA merged with AOMR the following year, the newly

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81 Ontario Municipal Association, Resolutions Adopted at the 73rd Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1971), 52.
formed AMO included five sections: Large Urban, Small Urban, Rural, Second Tier, and District.  

The formation of AOMR in 1960 highlighted an important feature of OMA’s structure: the formal involvement of appointed officials and affiliated associations. OMA’s constitution gave both elected and appointed official voting rights. In addition, OMA involved a number of affiliated associations that represented non-officials in its work, including the Ontario Municipal Social Services Association; the Association of Municipal Tax Collectors of Ontario; the Association of Municipal Clerks of Ontario, the Association of Municipal Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario; the Society of Directors of Municipal Recreation of Ontario; the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association; the Ontario Municipal Administrators Association; and the Welfare Officer’s Association. In OMA, and in AMO from 1972-1982, affiliated groups had the right to submit resolutions for consideration and be involved with the resolutions committee. AOMR was founded on the belief that policy was “exclusively within the jurisdiction of elected representatives.” It was a space for municipal elected officials to vote on policy stances, without the influence of appointed officials or affiliated associations.

In addition to the affiliated associations, a number of sub-associations were part of OMA. These associations contained municipalities in geographic regions of the province. They held their own annual conventions, but were still a part of OMA, rather than independent. These included the Rainy River Municipal Union, the Parry Sound

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83 Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of Kitchener, June 1965 (Toronto: Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, 1965), 54.
84 Ibid.
Municipal Association, the South Temiskaming Municipal Association, the Association of Mining Municipalities of Ontario, the Sudbury District Municipal Association, and the North Eastern Municipal Association.\textsuperscript{85} Rural/urban tensions had led to the formation of independent municipal associations, but regional groups chose to work within OMA.

In 1972, only twelve years after the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions was founded, municipal associations in Ontario began a decade-long period of reunification. In 1972, the Ontario Municipal Association and the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves merged, forming the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO).\textsuperscript{86} The idea of reunification was first put forward by the City of London in 1956. That year, London proposed resolutions in both OMA and AOMR that called for the two associations to amalgamate. The resolutions failed, but in the decade that followed, the associations collaborated on several issues.\textsuperscript{87} In the early 1960s, the two associations also set up a Special Joint-Committee of the Association of Mayors and Reeves and the Ontario Municipal Association, Organized to Explore Areas of Mutual Cooperation.\textsuperscript{88} In 1965, AOMR passed a resolution that stated:

WHEREAS this Association is convinced that policy is exclusively within the jurisdiction of elected representatives, and

WHEREAS the present constitution of the Ontario Municipal Association provides equal voting rights for elected and appointed officials, and

\textsuperscript{86} Association of Municipalities of Ontario, \textit{Resolutions, Proposals and First Report of the Resolutions Committee to be Considered at the Founding Convention} (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1972), 6
\textsuperscript{87} Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, \textit{Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of Kitchener}, 54.
\textsuperscript{88} Ontario Municipal Association, \textit{Resolutions Presented and Taken Action at the Sixty-Seventh Annual Convention} (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1965), 65.
WHEREAS this results, on many occasions, in action on resolutions dealing with policy matters being determined by the preponderance of the votes of appointed officials who are delegates at the annual convention of the Ontario Municipal Association and

WHEREAS there is a duplication of effort in that many elected representatives attend conferences of both organizations and also attend upon the Provincial Government on more than one occasion for the discussion of identical matters, and

WHERE the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves has been in existence since the early 1930’s and speaks for the elected representatives exclusively, and

WHEREAS this Association believes that it is in the interest of sound municipal government in Ontario to have the Ontario Municipal Association and the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves amalgamated into one organization having a constitution which would provide that only elected representatives vote on matters of policy.

Therefore be it resolved that we express in the strongest possible terms the opinion that the Ontario Municipal Association and the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves should be amalgamated.

That same year, OMA passed a similar resolution, put forward by the Special Joint Committee:

The joint committee recommends continued co-operation between the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves and the Ontario Municipal Association and that the Associations set up a joint committee, with representatives from both organizations, to explore greater areas of co-operation and to develop the basis for a new organization to absorb both associations and which would represent all municipalities and which would provide for representation by municipalities through elected and appointed representatives.

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90 Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, *Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of Kitchener*, 54.

In 1972, the two associations finalized their merger and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) was formed.

The Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities and the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions remained independent at the time of AMO’s formation, but there were instances of cooperation between all associations, both before and after AMO was created. In 1969, for the first time, all four associations supported the same provincial-municipal relations presentation to the Ontario cabinet. The next year, they submitted a joint brief. In 1972, they submitted another joint brief, one with a much larger scope. The 1972 brief addressed provincial-municipal relations, tri-level consultation, social welfare, assessment, education, environmental control, government structural reform, administration of justice, Northern Ontario, transportation, and urban renewal. In the brief, the associations stated that problems of “local government structure, fiscal reform, reassessment, welfare and environmental control” had driven their collaboration. That, “as the problems become more complex and the responsibilities [for municipalities] become more onerous, the questions of meaningful Provincial-Municipal partnership, the equitable redistribution of tax resources and the re-alignment of responsibilities between the Province and its municipalities become matters of utmost priority with us.”92 Ontario municipalities formed independent associations out of internal conflicts, but external issues of financial resources and provincial offloading brought them back together.

In addition to their unified stances vis-à-vis the province, AMO, OARM, and AOCR began to work together on internal functions. In 1973-1975, a representative from

OARM sat on AMO’s resolutions committee. In 1974, the resolutions committee included a representative from AOCR. Each association continued to submit their own resolutions to the province, but inter-associational involvement during the resolutions process was part of the shift toward greater collaboration and unity between the associations.93

Finally, in 1982, both OARM and AOCR joined AMO. Ontario had a unified municipal association for the first time since in 1933. The new association used sub-associations and caucuses to manage population and geographic divides amongst municipalities. When OARM and AOCR joined, AMO had four sub-associations: the Federation of Northern Ontario Municipalities (FONOM), the Northwestern Ontario Municipalities Association (NOMA), the Ontario Small Urban Municipalities (OSUM), and the Association of Municipal Districts (AMD). AMO’s founding policy guidelines also recognized a Northern Ontario distinction: “The communities of Northern Ontario have unique problems that require solutions different to those of Southern Ontario. The Association believes that consideration of this principle is consistent with the sound and healthy development of the whole province.”94 Although Northern Ontario was the only sub-association to be identified in AMO’s policy guidelines, the establishment of OSUM and AMD within AMO indicated that the new association wanted to reduce the tensions

94 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Resolutions, Proposals and First Report, 6
that had caused its predecessor, OMA, to fracture. Over the following decades, AMO could create additional sub-associations for its internal factions.

At present, there are nine sub-associations and caucuses: FONOM, NOMA, OSUM, the Rural Ontario Municipalities Association (ROMA), the Large Urban Mayors Caucus of Ontario (LUMCO), the Eastern Ontario Warden’s Caucus (EOWL), the Western Ontario Warden’s Caucus (WOWL), the Mayors and Regional Chairs of Ontario (MARCO), and L'Association française des municipalités de l'Ontario (AFMO). In addition, AMO’s board has representation from six caucuses (County, Large Urban, Regional and Single Tier, Rural, Small Urban, and Northern) as well as AFMO. AMO has incorporated the divisions that existed between the four independent associations, and accounted for other municipal divisions within the province.

Despite its complex structure of caucuses and sub-associations, AMO has had to take further steps to minimize instances of intra-associational conflict. Since the mid-1990s, AMO members have voted on resolutions at the caucus and sub-association level, rather than as a full membership. The resolutions passed by caucuses and sub-associations are forwarded to AMO’s Board of Directors, which uses them to set the association’s lobbying priorities. Ontario is the only province where the largest municipal association does not vote on resolutions at its annual convention. OMA demonstrated how rural/urban tensions could make the resolutions process tumultuous in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but AMO’s current resolutions process undermines its status as a “unified” association. Municipalities only vote on resolutions within their own

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95 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “AMO Board and Executive Committee Structure,” www.amo.on.ca.
caucus and the full membership is never forced to vote collectively. AMO members do not have to grapple with what issues are of common interest to all municipalities in the province. This may reduce intra-associational conflict, but it also prevents the membership from taking a truly common stance.
Curriculum Vitae

NAME:

Alison Katherine Shott

EDUCATION:

The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2011-2015 Ph.D.

Acadia University
Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada
2010-2011 M.A.

University of Prince Edward Island
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada
2009-2010 Fulbright Fellow

American University
Washington, District of Columbia, United States
2005-2008 B.A. (Honors)

SCHOLARSHIPS/ACADEMIC AWARDS:

Social Science Graduate Research Award, UWO 2014
Graduate Research Assistantship, UWO 2011 – 2015
Social Science Dean’s Entrance Scholarship, UWO 2011 – 2012
Acadia Graduate Award, Acadia University 2010 – 2011
Fulbright Fellowship, United States Department of State 2009 – 2010
Honors Thesis Research Grant, American University 2008
Killam Fellowship, Foundation for Educational Exchange Between Canada and the United States 2007
Dean’s Scholarship, American University 2005 – 2008

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

T.A. for PS-2246E: Public Administration (2011-2014)

Acadia: T.A. for POLS-1303: Intro to Law & Politics (2010-2011)

PUBLICATIONS:


CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

June 2015 Together and Apart: The Impact of Municipal Association Mergers and Divisions on Place Based Lobbying and Local-Provincial Relations – CPSA, Ottawa


June 2011 Citizen Action, Perceived Quality of Life in the New London Bay Watershed of Prince Edward Island, with Irené Novaczek – Coastal CURA, Halifax

February 2011 Mitigated Change: The Power of Prince Edward Island’s Rural Political Culture – Carleton University, Ottawa

June 2010 Change Has Come: Reflections on the History of the Southwest River, with Mitch O’Shea – NiCHE, Charlottetown