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Schelling's Naturalism: Motion, Space, and the Volition of Thought

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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Schelling's Naturalism: Motion, Space, and the Volition of Thought

(Thesis Format: Monograph)

by

Benjamin Graham Woodard

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in Theory and Criticism

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Abstract: This dissertation examines F.W.J. von Schelling's Philosophy of Nature (or \textit{Naturphilosophie}) as a form of early, and transcendentally expansive, naturalism that is, simultaneously, a naturalized transcendentalism. By focusing on space and motion, this dissertation argues that thought should be viewed as a natural activity through and through. This view is made possible by German Idealism historically, and yet, is complicated and obscured by contemporary philosophy's treatment of German Idealism in both analytic and continental circles. The text engages with the foundations of Schelling's theory of nature as well as geometry, field theory, inter-theory relations, epistemology, and pragmatism.

Keywords

F.W.J. von Schelling, German Idealism, Gilles Châtelet, Iain Hamilton Grant, Transcendental Naturalism, \textit{Naturphilosophie}, Philosophy of Nature
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**0 - Introduction**

In the following I attempt to outline my general approach to F.W.J. von Schelling as a philosopher concerned with the problem of nature and how philosophy has, historically, ignored or reduced nature's importance. By nature, I mean the open series of nested physical systems which comprise the cosmos. I do not wish to merely defend nature as an object of inquiry, but, following Schelling, hope to demonstrate that philosophy is not possible without a robust concept of nature, a nature that necessarily grounds yet exceeds philosophical conceptualization. It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that philosophy, or human thought more generally, should be *a priori* limited, but that thought is part of nature's spatially and temporally expanding continuum. In order to address this rather abstract conceptualization, I focus on the themes of motion and space. Before approaching these particular themes I will sketch an outline of the contemporary state of philosophy (but focused on realisms and materialisms) and why I believe the work of F.W.J. von Schelling has a useful role to play in it. While any sketch of contemporary philosophy is provisional, and biased from my own viewpoint, I am specifically interested in how contemporary philosophy, both analytic and continental, has returned to questions of materialism and realism while somehow avoiding nature as topic, or problem, *for philosophy*. Even more specifically, I wish to link this avoidance of nature in contemporary philosophy with current thinkers who address German Idealism, and Schelling, both positively and negatively. I then examine recent Schelling scholarship, and my project's relation to it, before going into Schelling's general approach to philosophy as a system, as well as his methodology. Lastly, I provide a chapter by chapter outline of the project.

**0.1 - Schelling and Contemporary Philosophy**

The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground. Spinoza’s realism is thereby as abstract as the idealism of Leibniz. Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can constitute a living whole.¹

The above epigraph, which marks the back cover of Iain Hamilton Grant's *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling*, marks one of the central concerns of this dissertation as well. Unsurprisingly, this flags the current project's fidelity to that text while, simultaneously, generating the necessity of differentiating this text from that one. Or, in a proper Schellingian fashion, identity does not mean equivalence but indicates a bifurcation of dependence and independence. Or, in other words, a difference, to be true to an origin, or an influence, must stretch its consequences to test the ground's, or source's, elastic mettle. In other words, I share the problem that nature is indeed left out of much modern and contemporary philosophy, and take it as an impetus to investigation. However, while Grant's task is largely a historical one, in that Schelling's project requires rescuing from obscurity, fragmentation, and misinterpretation, my project here is more to bring Schelling, and the Schelling resurrected by Grant as well as by Daniel Whistler, Bruce Matthews, Jason Wirth, and others, into contact with specific strands of contemporary continental and analytic philosophy. This requires some brief qualifications.

By contemporary philosophy I mean philosophy from the last decade, and not, as is too often the case, simply post-Heideggerian philosophy. By contemporary, I mean the strains that have developed in the last decade but, that of course, have roots reaching further back. In this regard, I define contemporary continental philosophy as following the rise of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek (at least in the English speaking-world), the emergence of Speculative Realism, and the various 'turns' to materialism, metaphysics, and ontology. A parallel, though differently motivated move, can be observed in the halls of analytic philosophy whereby the increasing complexity and conceptual ramifications of the physical sciences has prompted more adventurous forays into dispositions (Stephen Mumford, Stephen Molnar, David Ellis), modality and possible worlds (David Lewis), process metaphysics (Johanna Seibt), and the like.

While one could easily state that analytic philosophy has ignored nature as potentially exceeding its concept as noted above, particularly in the philosophy of science, or in science and technology studies, I believe there has been a general trend to limit nature's influence in analytic strands of thought that have taken up German Idealism pace Schelling.

While the weight of their particular disciplinary histories no doubt play different guiding roles, in both continental and analytic philosophy a turn towards the outside, in grander and more speculative philosophical gestures, can be observed. This move, however, is couched in quite different, often opposed, methods or ethics. Many figures of New Materialism for instance (Jane Bennett, William Connolly, and Karen Barad's related agential realism) take Derrida and Deleuze as inspirational or, at least, as figures whose general critiques cannot be bypassed. The newness of the New Materialists then, comes from the fact that they are attempting to do materialism while accepting the critiques of Derrida, and the notion of materialism following Deleuze (that matter is material 'stuff' and its inseparability from things that matter such as politics, ethics, etc). Thus, for them, as well as for other ontological liberalists (such as Bruno Latour, Graham Harman, and Markus Gabriel) the argument broadly is that everything equally has being, and, simultaneously, worth. Liberal ontology situates philosophy as far reaching but, while adopting a veneer of modesty, it pursues an ontology or metaphysics out of political, aesthetic, or logical fairness, i.e., due to non-philosophical demands. My question here, is how can all of these approaches eschew any serious discussion of nature as defined above?

Alain Badiou, in tandem with the ever-growing popularity of Slavoj Žižek, on the other hand, both triumphantly embrace the traditional bravado of classical philosophy's reach, albeit supplanting it with finer, non-philosophical tools; mathematics (in the form of Cantorian set-theory for Badiou) and Lacanian psychoanalysis for Žižek. However, while Badiou and Žižek propose, and work out, massive systems of philosophical inquiry, unsurprisingly with and against Hegel and his French reception, they
nevertheless remain focused upon the problematic of the subject, whether political or otherwise, whereas the aforementioned New Materialists, generally see the post-Kantian, or psychoanalytic fixation on the subject, as a residue of anthropocentrism.

It is in this tumultuous cauldron of Deleuze versus Badiou, or Derrida versus Žižek, from which Speculative Realism emerged in the mid-2000s. Following Quentin Meillassoux’s text *After Finitude*, Ray Brassier, who translated the text, came into contact with Graham Harman’s *Object-Oriented Ontology* and, was already aware of, Iain Hamilton Grant’s nascent Schellingian naturalism. While never self-identifying as a coherent movement, these thinkers shared mostly an antipathy to what Meillassoux (interestingly a student of Badiou) had deemed correlationism, namely that subject and object, following Kant, were always-already caught in a co-determining, and thus inescapable, loop. As Meillassoux defines it: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another.”

In addition, Meillassoux names two variants of correlationism: weak correlationism and strong correlationism. Weak correlationism, which Kant is the flag-bearer of, asserts the above claim while maintaining the conceivability of the in-itself whereas strong correlationism dismisses any possibility of thinking the in-itself.

The four figures mentioned each, in their own way, attempted to propose means of escaping such an epistemic loop. The only other common feature, though which excludes Harman, was a general interest in the consequences of the contemporary sciences which led Meillassoux, Grant, and Brassier, to pull from, and investigate, contemporary analytic philosophy as well. The insistence that nature exists prior to human thinking, and that it forms and impinges on human action and thought, goes against decades of hermeneutic, phenomenological, and post-modern *doxa* which would

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otherwise relegate nature as 'just another discourse,' grand narrative, master-signifier, or pre-critical fantasy. While analytic philosophy has been markedly less anti-realist, or at least anti-physicalist, numerous moves in ethics and philosophy of mind have been stalwartly internalist and/or normativist, against the advances of both scientific and philosophical naturalism.  

It is here that Schelling's place, and his potential importance, in contemporary philosophy can begin to be articulated. Contra many traditional readings of Schelling, Iain Hamilton Grant refuses to temporalize the periods of Schelling's thought into two, three, or four slices, and instead argues that his thinking is, through and through, a philosophy of nature. For one, this immediately retaliates against the consistent dismissal of Schelling by Hegelians who take the latter at his word regarding the former. While Deleuze showed some sympathy for Schelling, both Badiou and Žižek repeat the gesture of making Schelling a mere historical note, a stepping-stone between Fichte and Hegel. I will address this in the following chapter. In addition, Grant's claim, which I will refer to as the continuity thesis, runs against much of past, and current, scholarship on Schelling. Daniel Whistler has taken up the continuity thesis as well, while Bruce Matthews, Jason Wirth, and Markus Gabriel, while they argue for philosophical continuity across Schelling's text, do not define this continuity as a strictly Naturphilosophical one.

If one accepts the continuity thesis, then a broad comparison of Schelling to Hegel is instructive here. Is it only that Schelling's method scares would-be Schellingians away? Or, is that those who cherry-pick and chop up Schelling's work into periods do it because he seems to present an anti-Hegelian style of philosophy, because he is a protean or pre-post-modern thinker? One cannot, in good faith, justify either claim in my view. For the former, Schelling and Hegel had equally wide breadth concerning the topics of their philosophical investigations and it seems unlikely that methodological

4 Thus I would argue that Schelling fits into an externalist strain of thought albeit one that is not anti-representationalist such as in the work of Fred Dretske.
difference alone is the deterrent. Following the latter claim, Schelling's approach to philosophy cannot be classified as anti-systematic, or non-systematic, but, as I will argue below, his notion of systematicity is ablative. The reason for this is not the same one that generally motivates post-structuralist claims to knowledge, i.e., that there is no master discourse, but because there is already a system which pre-exists any system of knowledge, that is, the cosmos, or nature. It is this assertion regarding the primacy of nature over thinking, that Schelling, following Grant's reading, is a non-correlationist, or simply, that nature is whether or not we humans exist to think it. I discuss what exactly ablative systematicity means for Schelling below.

But, since we do exist, how are we to think this nature? It is here that Schelling appears both modest and grand in his general philosophical approach. While he believes that the physical sciences provide invaluable knowledge regarding nature, he also believes that philosophy is in the position to identify conceptual biases, as well as local practical limitations, in any given investigation. Hence philosophy is broad and grand yet its tests, like the hypotheses of any scientific endeavor, the locality of any action or deed. Philosophy, for Schelling, consists in testing and mapping the consequences of any given act whether practical or noetic, philosophical or scientific. This is apparent in Schelling's hyper-constructive method which I briefly examine below.

The argument that Schelling's philosophy is a continuous philosophy of nature, has consequences for the practice of philosophy itself. Namely, for Schelling, taking nature as an open-set of nested processes (of which thought is one) means that philosophy studies forces or powers, and treats things as secondary. This move simultaneously empowers and localizes the resources of idealism, as well as, problematizing the resources of realism generally and, for our purposes here, naturalism in particular. If everything is ideal, and a part of a nature with no outer boundary, then our responsibility for our actions becomes deepened. Ignoring the productive ground of nature arises not in the form of an ethical imperative, but as ontologically, and formally, unignorable. Furthermore, this
installs a minimal difference between philosophy of nature and Naturphilosophie. While both philosophize about nature, the latter also attempts to explore how nature philosophizes, and, how nature is impossible without a concept of nature as thinking through us. Given this schema following from the generally continuous, and/or Naturphilosophical readings of Schelling, it is worth providing a brief survey of other past and current literature on Schelling.

The first wave of secondary literature on Schelling (in English, German, and French) is perhaps better known through its reputation than by its actual content. It has become a standard trope of Schelling scholarship in the last few decades, as already indicated, to begin by lamenting the fragmentary treatment of Schelling in the initial wave of secondary literature.\(^5\) This strategy is often justified, by both its proponents and its detractors, as necessary given Schelling’s ‘wild and protean nature.’ That is, since Schelling’s own work was seen as rife with inconsistency and changing form, one was given carte blanche to pick and choose from his various texts and phases. The Essay on Human Freedom is a privileged choice following the attention it has been given by Heidegger, Nancy, Derrida, and others. Alan White's text Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom is one of the first well known secondary English texts following this mode. Bruce Matthews suggests that only four of the texts deserve mentioning: Alan White's Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom (1983), Andrew Bowie's Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (1993), Edward Beach's The Potencies of the God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (1994), and Dale Snow's Schelling and the End of Idealism (1996).\(^6\)

While I agree with Matthews' assessment that all these authors are guilty of 'cherry-picking',

5 This would seem to exclude early secondary literature written by many English thinkers in the late 19th century. Numerous students in part inspired by Samuel Coleridge, attended Schelling’s lectures in the early to mid 19th century and no doubt began a series of critiques and accounts of his work. These accounts, such as Henry Crabb Robinson’s and John Watson’s account of Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism, while scattered, often attempt to grasp the whole of Schelling’s system. This is also true in Henrik Steffen’s autobiography The Story of My Career, trans. William Gage (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1863).

this does not negate many of the broader claims they make in regards to Schelling's wider thought albeit from the perspective of a particular form of Schelling's thinking. Given the focus of Matthews' own project however, the accusation of cherry-picking begs the question of whether any account of Schelling's thought can be totalizing. Following the abductive logic of C.S. Peirce, with whom we will engage below, it seems that the best means of addressing Schelling's work is to begin from a particular field and, following Grant's discussion of extensity in *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling*, push the field to its limit in order to grasp a snapshot, however imperfect, of the absolute (or what I will argue should be discussed simply as nature). Similarly, while I am largely convinced by the general outline of the German Idealist project outlined by Paul Franks' *All or Nothing*, his assertion that Schelling was in pursuit of one complete system seems, to me, questionable.\(^7\)

Matthews does not, however, mention the tendency, beginning most notably with Slavoj Žižek, of placing Schelling in a psychoanalytic context in *The Indivisible Remainder*. This has been followed by treatments of Schelling in this vein by Adrian Johnston, Sean McGrath, and, to a lesser extent, Markus Gabriel. While this trend has brought light on, and expanded knowledge, of Schelling, I would argue that it often, though not always, has the tendency of placing Schelling closer to both Hegel and Kant by molding his *Naturphilosophical* speculations into theories of subjectivity without adequate justification. These texts which, again, following Žižek, are largely supplemented by Lacan and Hegel, tend to focus on the *Ages of the World* and *The Essay on Human Freedom*, at the expense of all others. There is also, however, a variant of this tradition which is less critical of Schelling and, on the other hand, focuses more on the Freudian aspects of Schelling's thought than the Lacanian ones. Here one can mention Sean McGrath's *The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious* (2011) as well as Matt Ffychte's *The Founding of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud, and the Birth of the Modern

While these psychoanalytic approaches can serve to deepen our understanding of Schelling, they risk placing Schelling too firmly in the context of psychoanalysis.

The third wave of Schelling Scholarship, in which we are now engaged (and in which I would place this text) rejects the fragmentary view of Schelling and argues that the breadth of his work is unified by a singular principle. These works are characterized then, not surprisingly, by which central theme they choose. I would argue that this begins with Jason Wirth's text *The Conspiracy of Life* (2003) which, while in many ways mirroring the pre-post-modern reading of Schelling found in Bowie, attempts to concentrate around the theme of life. Wirth's concept of life is heavily theological and reads life not in its organic form but in terms of life as human or divine existence. Also in this third wave is Iain Hamilton Grant's *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* (2006), which takes the form of *Naturphilosophie* itself as the uniting theme in Schelling's work. Like Matthews' text, Grant pays particular attention to how Schelling engages Plato and uses Plato against Kant in order to articulate his one-world physics of both thought and nature.

Most recently Bruce Matthew's *Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy* can be taken as a kind of synthesis between Wirth and Grant's approaches as it argues that life is the unifying theme, but life taken in terms of its organic form. Like Grant's work, Matthews spends considerable time in tying this organic form of thinking to Schelling's utilization of Plato's *Timaeus*. Other texts which have attempted similar approaches are Bernard Freydberg's *Schelling's Dialogical Freedom Essay* and Devin Zane Shaw's *Freedom and Nature in Schelling's Philosophy of Art*. One can also add Daniel Whistler's *Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language* (2013) as well as Tyler Tritten's text *Beyond Presence* (2012).

While this covers the majority of book length studies of Schelling's work, there have texts and essays which deal extensively with Schelling's work though not always in a direct manner, numerous essays by Arran Garre place Schelling's work in the context of Whitehead's Process Philosophy. Robert
Richards, Timothy Lenoir, David Farrel Krell, Christopher Lauer, Tilottama Rajan, and more recently Dalia Nassar have produced excellent works placing Schelling in the broader context of German Idealism and Romantic Thought.

Outside the strictures of Continental Philosophy proper, numerous works on the history of science and technology have provided interesting treatments of Schelling. Gilles Châtelet's *Figuring Space* devotes a third of its pages to discussing the relation of Schelling's work to modern mathematics and physics. L. Pearce Williams argues that Schelling's role cannot be excised from any coherent attempt at developing the history of modern physics in his *The Origins of Field Theory*. Furthermore, Joan Steigerwald's numerous essays are an invaluable source for placing Schelling in the context of romantic science.

In analytic philosophy Schelling's day has not, and may never, come. While in the last few years interest in Schelling's once friend and eventual nemesis Hegel has been piqued (most notably in the work of the so-called left Sellarsians Robert Brandom and Robert Pippin), Schelling, as Andrew Bowie has most openly lamented, is left out of the picture. This is not too surprising given that the Hegel adopted by the thinkers mentioned tends to draw overwhelming from Hegel's logic. An avenue for probing and cultivating the possible analytic roots entangled with Schelling's thought can be found in Peirce's abductive logic and praise of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* and how this feeds into contemporary uses of asymptotic thinking in philosophies of science. The analytic interpretation of Schelling can be supported by the connections that can be drawn in Schelling's use of identity in relation to theories of the continuum, to theories in the natural sciences, which, relying on Peirce, investigate the importance of the continuous over that of the discrete.

**0.2 - Schelling's Ablative Systematicity**

Nothing upsets the philosophical mind more than when he hears that from now on all philosophy is supposed to lie caught in the shackles of one system. Never has he felt greater than when he sees before him the infinitude of knowledge. The entire dignity of his science consists in the fact that it will never be completed. In that moment in which he would believe to
have completed his system, he would become unbearable to himself. He would, in that moment, cease to be a creator, and
would instead descend to being an instrument of his creation. 8

To what extent is a system ever possible? I would answer that long before man decided to create a system, there already
existed one, that of the cosmos. Hence our proper task consists in discovering that system. The true system can never be
created but only uncovered as one that is already inherent in itself 9

The idea or the endeavour of finding a system of human knowledge, or, put differently and more appropriately, of
contemplating human knowledge within a system, with a form of coexistence, presupposes, of course, that originally and of
itself it does not exist in a system, hence that is an [asystaton] – something whose elements do not coexist, but rather
something that is in inner conflict 10

Given the above sketch of the contemporary philosophical climate, as well as, the current forms
of secondary literature on Schelling, how it is that Schelling's thought regarding systemicity
functions is, I believe, even more relevant than it was in his time. As Paul Franks in his impressive text
All or Nothing illustrates, systemicity, the demand that philosophy function as an organized whole,
was central to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel's projects. Franks argues that this requirement for a system,
often alienates analytic, and I would add most contemporary continental, philosophers from addressing
any of the German Idealists. 11 It is prevalent in post-Heideggerian thought to characterize Hegel, in
particular, as the arch-enemy of free-thought who wished to totalize the world. Franks complicates this
caricature by articulating what the German Idealists saw as systems and by pointing out why they
sought systemicity in the first place. Firstly, Franks claims that in attempting to provide the premises
for Kant's critical conclusions, the German Idealists qualified any notion of system with two demands:
namely, that any system must be both monistic and heterogeneous. He defines them thusly: “the
holistic condition that every particular (object, fact, or judgment) be determined through its role within
the whole and not through any intrinsic properties; and the monistic condition that the whole be

11 Paul Franks, All or Nothing: Systemicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism
grounded in an absolute principle that is immanent and not transcendent.”

Quite simply, the positive aspect of German Idealist systematicity is to construct a system that can be as solid and far reaching as Spinoza's (or, at least how the German Idealists understood Spinoza via the Pantheism Controversy), and yet still behave according to Kantian strictures for knowing. The negative aspect, as a result of the Pantheism Controversy, was a deepening of philosophical skepticism following both the revival of Spinoza and Kant's championing of reason. While I will address the controversy in the following chapter, the main thrust is simply that both these strands of thinking forced one to decide the limits of the power of reason vis a vis faith as, to not do so, one would either forgo the fortunes gained from the Enlightenment, or, on the other side, fall into a Godless nihilism.

Franks then steps back from the historical details and formulates the problem in terms of the Agrippian or Munchausen trilemma. The trilemma, which fundamentally has to do with ultimately justifying knowledge, goes like this:

1-Argument by circularity: Makes a justification that does simply relies on its own logic (this we can see as the fundamental logic of correlationism mentioned above, which is reduced to its purest form via facticity in Meillassoux.

2-Regressive argument: Everything requires a further proof which in turn requires further proof ad infinitum (this is accepted by ontological liberalists mentioned above, accepting, to various admitted degrees, infinite regress supported by philosophy as description).

3-Axiomatic Argument: One states an axiom which is supported by accepted percepts (both Badiou and Žižek are central thinkers in this regard)

Here are the possible responses quoting extensively from Franks:

1- You have failed to answer the question until you manage to answer the why-question in a way that falls into none of the three options. Unless that happens, there is no reason to assume that you have given any justification whatsoever, and

12 Franks, All or Nothing, 9-10.
13 Franks, All or Nothing, 10-11.
indeed there is no reason to assume that any justification whatsoever is available.

2- In at least some cases, there must be an answer to the question that falls into none of the three options, even if you have not yet succeeded in giving it. For if there is no reason to assume that justifications are sometimes available, then there is no reason for anything.

3- Even if you answer the question in a way that falls into one of the three options, your answer may still be satisfying. The two previous responses assume that no adequate justification can be, without further reason, infinitely regressive or circular. But this assumption is mistaken. The fact that some line of response to a why-question is vulnerable to the [Munchausen] trilemma does not mean that it is an in-adequate line of response, and it provides no ground for skepticism.14

While, as Franks argues, this ancient trilemma resurfaced, and was the negative condition of the emergence of German Idealism, we can say that contemporary continental, and analytic reactions to German Idealism, indicates that such skepticism has deepened and transformed. Regardless of whether one agrees with the solutions that Meillassoux proposes, it is hard to ignore that he highlighted a particular bias in contemporary philosophy, one that is very much centered on anti-systematicity. Correlationism, one could argue, is the application of this methodological skepticism brought into the very structure of thought itself. This means that much of contemporary philosophy struggles to axiomatize, or otherwise justify, philosophy's broad reach without even appearing as totalizing in a naïve view of German Idealism. Badiou's return to Truth and Platonism is only possible through a mathematics of incompleteness while, similarly, Žižek can be Hegelian only by attaching idealism to Lacanian psychoanalysis, and discussion the subject as rupture, break, et cetera.

The three epigraphs from Schelling above indicate how his view of systematicity anticipates skepticism applied not only to the all (as both Fichte and Hegel did) but also that skepticism applied to philosophical authority itself. Schelling is not merely against systems since he asserts they exist, the problem is, of course, that there are many systems in conflict with one another. A system must then be universal in such a way that its principles are applicable outside of its particular domain (whether it be nature, art, science, mythology etc.) but must, at the same time, be able to identify particular shifts and differences within their domain to do justice to them. Or, put simply, a system must be open to its

14 Franks, All or Nothing, 18.
materials and possibly destroyed by them, yet must hold its form enough to be compared to, and attached to, other systems.

It is in this sense that I must disagree with Franks' articulation of the heterogeneous and monistic demands as applying to Schelling. While Schelling admits that every determination, every thing, determines each other, he does not view this as a closed system, i.e., he is not a holist.\textsuperscript{15} I address this in Chapter 4. This follows from his re-articulation of the transcendental, against the limitations of Spinozist immanence, in that the transcendental is the \textit{a priori} as a generative motion unleashed from sheerly human conception. Put succinctly in Schelling's own terms: “It is not because there is thinking there is being but because there is being there is thinking.”\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, Franks sees Schelling's abandonment of universal validity, i.e., that there must be \textit{one system} that universally applies, as irrational or elitist.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, the uncertainty of the practice of philosophy is difficult because of its obscurity, and Schelling offers no criteria to successfully pursue philosophy other than a stoic-like abandonment of all of one's earthly comforts. I address this in Chapter 6. Thus, and once again to turn to the epigraphs above, the fact that Schelling asserts that we must collect systems, which are always in disarray, in order to even attempt to discover the traces of the cosmos as a pre-exisiting system, demonstrates, if anything, a humility, but one that does not hide behind that claim to humility as a philosophical justification in, and of, itself.

In the wake of a return to 'grand' philosophy (Badiou, Žižek) followed by an explosion of ontological and metaphysical speculation, Schelling's ablative notion of systematicity, as that which degrades to protect what lies beneath (philosophy as such, nature as such) seems an important model. The tension in the above epigraphs, is that between creation and discovery, between acting in such a

\textsuperscript{15} Franks repeatedly stresses Schelling's Spinozism despite the former's critiques of the latter. Furthermore, Franks argues that Schelling's \textit{Potenzen} are analogous to Spinoza's attributes which, as I attempt to show in Chapter 4, is a critical misreading of Schelling's philosophy. See Franks, \textit{All or Nothing}, 137-138.


\textsuperscript{17} Franks, \textit{All or Nothing}, 375.
way that augments knowledge, and discovering that knowledge which already exists in order to augment it. It is here I now turn to Schelling’s method of construction.

0.3 - Schelling’s Constructive Method

The poet Heinrich Heine once compared Schelling and his followers to whirling dervishes who “continue spinning round in a circle until objective and subjective worlds become lost to them.” Heine’s comment no doubt stems from Schelling’s attempts to complicate, through his concept of identity already mentioned, the relation of subject and object, to deprive them of their thing-hood and, instead, extrapolate their synthetic and positional nature. This spinning, which ends in absolute confusion, has haunted Schelling, marking him a thinker of (apparent) motionless identity, an advocate of absolutizing a black night devoid of difference, or worse. Yet Schelling’s notion of identity is not one which nullifies difference, but in which difference follows from a primordial continuity, a meontological continuity which makes possible a unitary approach to Schelling. Philosophy necessarily isolates and divides this synthetic field to think it yet, this does not explain how it is that nature arises in us, i.e., how both nature creates thoughts in us and how we come to have abstract concepts about nature which can be locally applied to manipulate natural phenomena. Or, to refer to points made above, philosophy can only discover by constructing and testing these constructions against other systems and against the world as it appears. This disarray of systems, of thoughts, is part of the world but, to complicate things further, this world is not one of closed immanence, but always augmented, and populated by, Potenzen (or powers). A direct way of seeing how these problems lead to Schelling’s constructive method is to focus on space and motion.

In terms of motion, in a lecture given in Erlangen entitled “The Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” (1821), Schelling begins by discussing how the first cause of nature (insofar as that can be

speculated) is an infinite motion if it is to be claimed that the world begins in disarray, but can be later thought and systematized. Following this, Schelling points out that the assumption of an absolute movement is always a consequent absolute since everything is activity, everything has a past and unknown trajectory. Furthermore, the synthetic distinctions we make are relative to a relatively fixed frame and to ourselves. It is a mark of intellectual laziness, Schelling argues, that critics jump to claiming this is naïve idealism when in fact it speaks to being caught in the momentum of the world and, in a nature, which necessitates the reality of the ideal. As Daniel Whistler has noted, Schelling's brief text “On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature and the Correct Way of Solving its Problems” (1802) clearly states not only of the importance of nature in Schelling but also serves as a response to Heine and the double relativity above:

Without doubt, there is a reason for the fact that I separate philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy from one another and have tried to generate the latter in a quite different direction than the former. If the reason for this fact has not been extensively dealt with in this journal before now, then this is merely because for the time being the journal is devoted more to the internal culture of this science than to investigating and proving its possibility (of which I am personally certain), and also because this proof can be achieved successfully only in a general presentation of philosophy. [...] If there is to be an idealistic type of explanation (or rather construction), then this is not to be found in the philosophy of nature as I have established it. - But then was it just a matter of that? - I have expressly proposed the opposite. If therefore the idealistic construction of nature as I establish it is to be judged then it must be judged according to my System of Transcendental Idealism, but not my Outline of Philosophy of Nature. But why then is this not idealist? And is there even (and the author agrees with this) any type of philosophising other than the idealist? Above all, I hope that this expression is to be further determined [in what follows] that it has been up until now. There is an idealism of nature and an idealism of the I. For me, the former is original the latter is derived.19

The aforementioned dizziness of Heine is remedied by understanding that while the momentum of nature is original, we experience, as beings capable of philosophy, the momentum of ideality first. But, against Franks and other critics, Schelling argues that one breaks out of the 'magic circle of consciousness' by turning it against itself; the rotations of the mind are capable of depotentiating objects, to think their essence without thought. In essence, the highest form of abstraction is what gets us closest to a sense of the objective in a world that is continuously constructed, that is endlessly

produced at the hands of nature. Or, since one is already in the world, one is already being affected by it and, as a consequence, one is already thinking according to it. The only way of thinking the world, while being composed by it, is to acknowledge that pure epistemological escape is impossible and that, instead, one pushes and stresses the material in order to discover what it is original while acknowledging, this origin and for that matter any particular end, has already been decided by other powers.

Attempts to read Schelling's method have generally emphasized its intuitive nature (Forester, Franks) or its temporal form (Beach, Beiser, Tritten), or its constructive aspect (Matthews, Nassar). Given I have already discussed Franks above, I believe that the intuitionist approach, that intuition is Schelling's only method, generally comes from an inability to see Schelling's method whatsoever. Heine's critique of Schelling as a dizzy, or indiscriminate thinker, emerges from a general stereotype of romanticists and, to a lesser extent, German Idealists in that they believed that thought and the world could simply be merged by wanting it to occur. While I argue that intuition, as one form of thinking, is indispensable for Schelling, it does not describe his method. Intuition, for Schelling, is a capacity that helps one pivot between multiple methods distributed between Naturphilosophie and transcendental philosophy. I discuss Forester's particularly dismissive account in Chapter 5 below and set the matter aside for the moment. The 2nd and 3rd approaches, while having more promise, ignore the proto-pragmatic and locative aspect of Schelling's thought, i.e., its properly spatial character. In my reading of intuition below, intuition functions not as an immediate and direct connection between mind and nature, but as an indirect and vague attempt at thinking the continuity between nature and mind in a very localized, and minimal, sense.

Beach in his Potencies of the Gods emphasizes the temporal character of Schelling's method, coupled with what Beach sees as a voluntarism, or emphasis on will, via Schelling's concept of the potencies. While I discuss this at length in Chapter 4, for now, the important aspect is the fact that
Beach sees Schelling as pursuing a method based on all-inclusive succession. While I see merit in Beach's emphasis on temporalization, I believe he over-emphasizes the notion of will, or subject, as a particular human being when I believe Schelling's account of subjectivity, and the potencies, is more generic. Beiser argues that Schelling is heavily indebted to Kant but merely in that he takes Kant's deduction beyond the law, or perhaps, in Schelling's case, under the stable ground which Kant thought was practical. That is, Beiser seems to suggest that Schelling's method is deduction beyond the particularly straight-forward function of the transcendental ideal. Beiser argues that, in this sense, Schelling's method is pulled between an *a priori* method, simply of digging for ever deeper grounds, and one supported, and challenged by, empirical findings in the natural sciences.

This split is also emphasized by Tyler Tritten in his *Beyond Presence*, although he emphasizes the late work as opposed to the earlier texts on which Beiser focuses. Tritten argues that Schelling's method is one that oscillates between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. Specifically, Schelling's method can be viewed as broadly intuitive in that it acknowledges the *a priori* as a problem, and, as a focus for negative philosophy, or a philosophy of pure reason, while acknowledging that philosophy must also attend to the accidental, or the contingent, category of experience. This oscillation, as already suggested above, is what allows thinking agents to test their own grasp of a concept and its expression with, yet beyond, that singular expression of it.

Bruce Matthews focuses on the constructive aspect of Schelling's method, namely, that Schelling's emphasis on freedom necessitates that we construct with nature in order to discover its structure. He writes: “In direct violation of Kant’s doctrine of method, Schelling adopts the procedure of construction as the methodology for his philosophy. Only this productive method of construction

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can supply the possibility of envisioning the dynamic dualisms of our estranged existence."²³

Matthews goes on to state that Schelling does not violate Kant's prohibition on construction simply to oppose Kant, but because, as Schelling sees it, Kant cannot even construct the schema on which he relies without such an intuitive notion of construction.²⁴ Whereas Dalia Nassar argues that Schelling's method is constructive, for her it is constructive in two opposed ways. For Nassar, Schelling's method is caught between philosophy and mathematics, or between demonstrating logically the succession of states that mirrors nature and consciousness, and, the more Spinozistic method of the *Presentations.*²⁵

Paul Franks also endorses a constructive reading but one tied to intuition, a construction taking place in solitary intuition as opposed to a more broadly applicable Hegelian dialectic.²⁶ Franks also suggests that Schelling too quickly aligns construction with exhibition (*Darstellung*).²⁷ Franks' comment reflects a typical, and often Hegelian, gesture in regards to Schelling. The idea that Schelling generated multiple systems because of his own Protean (or indecisive) nature is a claim that can only be made by overlooking his central concerns, which is to say, to reduce him to a moment in the history of philosophy leading up to Hegel. Furthermore, it would be more than tragic, if our choice was between having no system, or having noetic totalitarianism.

In specific regards to intuition, many of the above readings, I would argue, would benefit from analyzing, and taking seriously, the aforementioned continuity thesis. By continuity thesis I mean two interrelated claims. First, Schelling's meontology of potencies asserts that there is a underlying, if difficult to access, continuity composing and connecting all things. Things are, after all, expressions of this continuity but are dynamically free, or individual, in how they express the potencies out of which they are built. Secondly, the continuity thesis expresses Schelling's series of philosophical systems as

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²⁶ Franks, *All or Nothing*, 339.
²⁷ Franks, *All or Nothing*, 373.
necessarily interconnected, and built off of, one another.

Taken up properly, Schelling's intuition, or productive imagination as Matthews orients it, cannot be viewed as merely an exercise in abstract philosophizing, as the armchair philosopher deciding what constitutes the cosmos. The form of isolation that such a notion would require is, for Schelling, impossible. That is, given that we are simultaneously produced by, and in nature, every act requires its potential consequences to be rigorously traced. Philosophy in general, and as Schelling's constructivism via the space of intuition emphasizes, is meant to model and simulate these actions before we take them, and not, to replace or nullify action *tout court*. As I will address below, this applies to both productive and intellectual intuition, to the tacit knowledge of a crafts-person constructing in the former case, and of the philosopher tacitly abstracting in the latter case.

More generally, my aim in this text is to demonstrate that nature, as an open set of nested physical systems, is a topic that continental philosophy has largely minimized in the last fifty years. While this is a broad claim, my hope is that by outlining the use of German Idealism in the contemporary moment that this will demonstrate why, and how, Schelling's thought as a form of naturalism should be taken up alongside Hegel's thought. What Schelling offers is a complex way of addressing how to adequately grasp what it is we think nature is, not only to do philosophy, but to continue to exist as thinking entities that are composed by, and of, such a nature. Because such a task is colossal, I further restrict myself to the notions of space and motion and, in particular, how they relate to the genesis of thought, and thought's relation to action, across Schelling's work.

0.4 - Chapter Outline

In Chapter 1, I begin by outlining how Schelling conceives of thought as a species of motion, a particular form of motion which we humans have access to, an access, while incomplete, demonstrates that we *participate* in thought but cannot claim to *have* it. I demonstrate how this rather speculative argument leads Schelling away from Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza because of their shared insufficiency at
combining nature and freedom, or, the world and thought, in a satisfactorily continuous way. By naturalizing thought, that is, by making thought a process outside of us, but one that has a pressure, or a volition, Schelling is able to claim that Kant's dismissal of teleology is unwarranted if this teleology is merely an objective fact about a nature that has not determinable beginning or end. That is, Schelling naturalizes thinking which, in effect, destabilizes teleology since if nature has a goal to its creation, it is only to create endlessly, or, so it would appear to our limited mental capacities.

To further articulate this naturalization, I then turn to J.G. Fichte, Schelling's mentor, who inspires Schelling in creating a more active form of thought than Kant, in arguing thought must be an uncertainly bounded capacity. But, whereas Fichte saw philosophy as beginning, and ending, with an extreme form of subjectivism, Schelling sees Fichte's treatment of the I, or the subject, as erasing nature as external world in order to grant thought maximum freedom. I then examine how Schelling's reaction to the immanent concept of nature in Spinoza exhibits the opposite concern, namely, that Spinoza's mechanistic and deterministic articulation of nature does not allow for an adequate articulation of human freedom. However, rather than merely asserting human freedom above nature as Fichte arguably does, Schelling suggests a maximally expansive form of naturalism that allows for nature to be dynamically constituted by forces one of which is thought. I then close the chapter by examining Schelling's peculiar utilization of Platonic cosmology and Aristotelian naturalism, in order to further support his argument concerning the motive, or volitional nature, of thought. Specifically, I claim that Schelling utilizes Plato and Aristotle to demonstrate how unifying an abstract image of universal motion (from Plato's *Timaeus*), and a naturalistic ethological view of animal movement (taken from Aristotle's *De Anima*), allows one to naturalize abstraction while demonstrating how seemingly abstract ideas, such as dimension, can emerge naturalistically.

In Chapter 2, I continue to investigate the resources that Schelling utilizes to construct his dynamic concept of nature *vis a vis* the thinking subject. Instead of focusing on the general activity of
thought, however, I analyze how the problem of being in a nature that we seem to be able to contain in
thought becomes apparent in the relation between sense and construction-in-thought (whether in terms
of imagination, intuition, et cetera) to notions of space. The figures which I engage here are Kant,
though focusing on different texts than in Chapter 1, and the post-Kantian Salomon Maimon. In
regards to Kant, I analyze his remarkable text “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”
which defends and describes the function of reason in navigational terms. Kant uses the term
navigation as short-hand for the synthesis of motion and space between the numerous capacities of
inner navigation (experience, intuition, reason, speculation), and that of outer structure (space, horizon,
direction, magnitude, etc). Or, the way in which navigation is described in Kant, can be taken as a
measure of the tensions between the inner and outer grounding of space and motion, and how the
bridge from inner to outer is constructed and considered either analytic (as self-evidently external), or
synthetic (as provisionally internal). In this chapter, I argue that Kant begins to lean upon naturalistic
modes of explanation while disavowing them, i.e., Kant relies on the reasoner-as-navigation through
the physical medium of the body and its resulting feelings. Following this, I move onto Kant's
somewhat controversial Opus Postumum. In the Opus Postumum Kant expands the navigational model
of the orientation essay by returning to the relation of human knowledge to the form of the physical
sciences he had previously explored in The Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences. I
examine warring interpretations of Kant's final text in order lay the foundation of Schelling's further
dynamization of nature, as well as, thinking itself. Following this, I address how Salomon Maimon's
critique of Kant's a priori synthetic, supported by his discussions of mathematics, suggests that
speculation, such as the speculation in which Kant engages in the Opus, breaks the critical system but
in a way that allows for a synthesis of the natural and mental in a fashion that inspires Schelling's
dynamic treatment of nature. This dynamic treatment centers on the problematic relation of the
qualitative to the quantitative primarily in terms of magnitude. Namely, how is it that the intensive and
the extensive can interact, measure, and be measured, from a purportedly neutral location. Maimon's law of determinability, in what appears in a proto-Schellingian fashion, attempts to combine a genetic, or asymmetrical creation of objectivity on the one hand, with a polarity between intuition and conceptualization on the other hand. The notion of the genetic, which accompanies that of determination, is imperative for maintaining difference in any case where dualisms (mind and nature, inner and outer) are questioned. Maimon's attempt at being speculative, yet empirical, presents a particularly helpful way of leaving the gravity-well of Kant's system, while still recognizing the veracity of the transcendental beyond the merely schematic. I conclude by arguing that a physicalization of Kant's perspectival mode, conjoined with Maimon's discussion of magnitudes, creates a historically indirect, but conceptually fertile, ground for Schelling's re-construction of nature via powers or Potenzen.

In Chapter 3, I outline Schelling's concept of mathematics in order to address how intuition, space, and continuity function in his thought. I argue that Schelling's engagement with geometry, in conjunction with his utilization of K.A. Eschenmayer's notion of Potenz as algebraic exponential, speaks to an early form of intuitionist mathematics which is important to Schelling's thought (at least) two areas: one, in discussing the relation of quantity to quality (indexing Chapter 2), and, two, in constructing and describing thought as a species of motion (to point back to Chapter 1). Looking at the geometrical and algebraic themes across Schelling's thought allows one to view how his intuitive, yet continuous, concept of space functions as a way to map the difference between kinds (via geometry), and a difference in intensities (via algebra), in a nature composed of continuous forces. These pursuits, in different but bound ways, illustrate the complex form by which Schelling integrates human thought into nature by naturalizing that which seems most artificial: the synthetic creations of mathematical intuition. To unpack these claims, I contrast and compare Schelling's concept of number as indicator of force, via Maimon, to Schelling's fellow Naturphilosoph Lorenz Oken who argued that numbers were
endowed with substance. In order to address the geometrical tendencies of graphical demonstration, I examine how Schelling utilizes the line to exhibit forces and polarities in nature. Following Gilles Châtelet's reading of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, I argue that the geometrical and the diagrammatic allows Schelling to avoid an over-utilization of logic, and the separability of the logical domain, and to demonstrate how the tracing of nature, via geometry, adds to nature's very expression. I then return to how the diagrammatic and the algebraic can be combined to discuss the relation of powers, intuition, and space.

In Chapter 4, I build off of the previous chapters' focus on Schelling's sources, and his divergences from those sources, and attempt to address the meontological core of Schelling's work over all, namely, his theory of powers (or the Potenzen). The systematic need for these powers, which are not equatable with either modality or possibility, follows consequently from Schelling's explorations of dynamics, via Kant and Spinoza on the one hand, and in the articulation of thought-as-activity via Fichte on the other hand. That is, I explore how the Potenzen are pivotal to naturalizing thought and dynamicizing nature in that they keep nature and thought interconnected but not fully co-determining. Schelling's utilization of the Potenzen, I argue, functions to combine the stability of identity as form, as well as, the creativity and contingency of freedom-as-dynamics. For Schelling, an unavoidable ramification of this freedom, particularly when glancing over the history of philosophy, is the free construction of philosophical systems. My more specific goal in producing a historical survey of Schelling's Potenzen is to demonstrate how Schelling attempts to construct and maintain a minimal difference between motion and space (or, more generally in the terms of the Potenzen) between creation and structure. This difference lies in determining the status of the Potenzen as a domain of inexistenet necessity. Inexistent necessity, or the contingent necessity of necessity, is Schelling's argument for an original (but consequently original) momentum to creation which, because of its inexistence, is necessarily ungraspable (or unprethinkable) for us, yet, is the condition of all forms of
creation noetic and otherwise. This does not mean nature as such, or the Potenz as such, are the unprethinkable (taking the unprethinkbale as an entity) but that finding them in thought, it what seems to be for us, potentially has ontological consequences. But, just because we discover the Potenzen in thought does not mean that thought contains nature or the Potenzen, but that the construction of the Potenzlehre (as always being in thought) is how we create a provisionally minimalistic meontology. Thus, to say a Potenz or power is, only means that there are general classes of can-be-states (or dispositions, or tendencies) that function across numerous dimensions. In approaching Schelling’s use of powers or potencies historically I have two subsequent aims: firstly, to uphold, and do justice to, the continuity thesis, i.e., that Schelling’s work is not fractured into periods conceptually, but only in focus. Secondly, by moving historically through Schelling's use of the Potenzen, I hope to demonstrate how their lack of domain specificity (whether in thought, art, production, natural processes etc.) exhibits their basic functional use as opposed to being viewed as metaphysically domineering or ontologically superfluous.

In Chapter 5, I address the apparently problematic status of epistemology in Schelling's work. Given the (at times) overblown emphasis on Schelling's anti-Kantianism, there would seem to be little hope in articulating anything like a theory of knowledge across Schelling's oeuvre. I emphasize knowledge's spatial and navigational functions in Schelling's texts, in particular, how the navigational locates, and constructively constrains, the capacity of the subject to synthesize. This is accomplished, I will argue, via a spatialized reading of Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition and its relation to construction. Against a generic, or naïve reading of intuition, I argue that intuitive is a rudimentary form of non-intentional abstraction, a genesis of temporary, and experimental, immediate conceptual space. This intuitive spatializaiton of epistemology in Schelling can be viewed as the problem of location and synthesis on two axes. The first vertical axis is the purportedly asymmetrically causal or generative
axis of nature represented by Schelling as the *Stufenfolge* (or graduated stages of nature). The second axis is the horizontal representation of nature in terms of fields or domains of knowledge. Or, put otherwise, Schelling's epistemology must deal with the vertical axis of the transcendental method which manifests as the *Stufenfolge*, as well as the horizontal axis which manifests itself as fields or the scientific classification of the progression of the potencies (*Potenzen*) via a form of Peircean abduction.

I then examine how the horizontal or field-based view of Schelling's thought can be elaborated with the assistance of Robert Batterman's work on inter-theoretical relations between scientific theories when it comes to emergent phenomena. Batterman demonstrates how even a hardcore realism is left with competing theories which requires often indirect methods for examining what seems apparently the case according to our senses. I then turn to another vein of interpretation regarding Schelling's theory of knowledge – that of facticity and fact-based ontologies. Against an overly epistemological reading of Schelling, I examine Markus Gabriel's use of Schelling to argue for a fact-based transcendental ontology. Gabriel's view, in my opinion, far too quickly erases the *Naturphilosophical* roots of Schelling's project in order to make him compatible with, but critical of, contemporary analytic philosophy. I then engage the work of Gilles Châtelet in order to demonstrate the importance of Schelling's indifference points for examining the relation between intuition and construction, between scientific theories, and between philosophy and science. Schelling's combination of construction-as-dynamics and intuition as recognition of those dynamics, is best illustrated by Châtelet's analysis of Schelling's influence on field theory and the diagrammatic tools required to capture fields made of forces. Put more generally, Chapter 5 attempts to discern where Schelling's claim to knowledge falls between reliance on spatial intuition, facticity (the status of facts as facts), and sense as a physical domain.

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate how Schelling's emphasis on motion and space, coupled with his
particular mode of philosophical speculation, leads to a form of proto-pragmatism. I work out this pragmatism via Schelling's turn towards Aristotle in the 1821 *Erlangen* lectures (“On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science”) by moving through the connections between the great American pragmatist C.S. Peirce and Schelling. Specifically, I argue that Peirce's fondness for Schelling demonstrates the links between speculation and pragmatism generally, as well as, indicates how Schelling's use of intuition is an early version of Peircean abduction. I then compare Schelling's proto-pragmatism with the analytic thinkers who have taken German Idealism, in conjunction with the pragmatic legacy of Peirce, as well as Sellars, as implying a philosophy which emphasizes normativity at the cost of nature, namely, McDowell and Brandom (referred to as Left Sellarsians or Pittsburgh Hegelians). I then close by appealing to the contemporary pragmatist Mark Wilson who synthesizes and operates between the scientific considerations of Peirce, and the communicative and practical pragmatism of the Pittsburgh Hegelians. Wilson, through a focus on classical concepts in the physical sciences, demonstrates the limitations of a normative approach to human thought. Specifically in regards to thought, Wilson attempts to argue for a navigational approach to cognition that steers clear of both the normativity of the Pittsburgh Hegelians, as well as, the more hard-nosed neuroscientific articulations of consciousness in the work of Daniel Dennett, and Patricia and Paul Churchland (categorized as Right Sellarsians); the former emphasize reason as *sui generis* from the naturalistic context, whereas the latter investigate the impact of the natural sciences arguably at the cost of normativity. Peirce, Sellars and, as I will argue, Schelling, all in their own ways, attempt to construct a philosophy where the division between the capacity to articulate particularly human concerns, and the capacity to adequately describe and situate our place in the natural world, are not incompatible endeavors.
1.0 - The Natural Forge of the Transcendental: The Movement of Thought and the Space of Nature

My aim, in this first chapter, is to outline how Schelling conceives of thought as a species of motion, and, to argue that this conceptualization arises from three dissatisfactions; 1-Schelling's interest in, and critique of, Kant's use of teleology, 2-Schelling's adoption and critique of the activity of Fichte's system, and 3-Schelling's critique of the immanent concept of nature found in Spinoza. More specifically, these concerns of Schelling lead him to construct a form of maximally expansive, or transcendental, naturalism in which nature as such is an open system that is made of self-augmenting open systems. While this will be fleshed out throughout the entire project, this chapter explores and emphasizes how Schelling's uptake of Kant's concerns with inner space via teleology, Fichte's activity contra a static concept of the noumenal, and Spinoza's active notion of nature, all lead Schelling to fixate on thought as a motion that traverses an open, or unbound, nature. This motion, which cuts across space while synthesizing and augmenting what it encounters along the way, can be taken as a naturalized notion of the Kantian transcendental.

The final question is: What does Schelling's transcendental (or non-eliminative) naturalism mean for the status of thought and the status of nature taken apart, and together, when both center on motion and space? I attempt to answer this question by sketching Schelling's very particular selection of concepts from Plato's cosmology and Aristotle's naturalism in the final section.

1.1 - Thought as Direction: Schelling via Kant

In his early text “Of the I,” (1795) Schelling notes his fascination with a particular passage of Kant's 1790 *Critique of the Power of Judgment* while making the following statement. I quote Schelling at length:

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28 In this regard my initial starting point is similar to Thomas Nagel's as exemplified in his recent text *Mind and Cosmos*. However, as I will argue in the latter chapters of this dissertation, Nagel suffers from a narrow reading of reductionism. As an alternative to Nagel, I believe that Schelling's concept of depotentiation preserves the capacities of thought without over-determining the cosmos with the structure of thought. I return to Nagel in the final chapter of this text.
Since there is no imperative for the absolute I, no practical possibility, then, if the finite could ever fulfill its entire task, the law of freedom (of the imperative) would attain the form of a law of nature (of being). And vice versa, since then the law [241] of the finite's being would have become constitutive only through freedom, and this law itself would inherently be a law of freedom. Therefore, the ultimate to which philosophy leads is not an objective but an immanent principle of preestablished harmony, in which freedom and nature are identical, and this principle is nothing but the absolute I, from which all philosophy has emanated. Just as there are no possibility, no necessity, and no contingency for the nonfinite I, so likewise it does not know of any purposes to be attained (Zweckverknupfung) in the world. If, for the nonfinite I, there were any mechanism or any technique of nature, then, for that I, technique would be mechanism and mechanism would be technique, that is, both would coincide in its absolute being. Accordingly, even the theoretical inquiry must regard the teleological as mechanical, and the mechanical as teleological, and both as comprehended in one principle of unity, although nowhere realizable (as an object).

The young Schelling is skeptical as to whether Kant can so strongly infer that the teleological principle of nature is an adequate defense against a dynamic form of nature that, for Kant, too readily threatens the grounds of practical action. Furthermore, Schelling is skeptical as to whether any teleology of this form can be inferred at all. In other words, Schelling is uncertain as to how Kant can claim the strangeness of biological creatures leads to a regulative concept of natural purposes and why such purposes, even only as regulative ideals, apply only to the biological. For Schelling, Kant's selective use of teleology, even as a mere regulative ideal, is question begging if it serves largely to keep the dynamism of nature at bay. Alternatively, Schelling suggests that a form of unity, between nature and freedom, would remove the artificial barriers that Kant had constructed, barriers which had largely failed to dispel the unease he had sought to vanquish.

The consequences of Schelling's claim are quite extensive as he, even at this incredibly early stage, is attempting to demolish the ontological (or at least anthropological) certainty of inner space (of a notion of a subject distinct from the outside natural world). One possible path would be to trace Kant's thoroughgoing anxiety about the status of the biological vis a vis the ground of reason. That is, one could argue that Kant has to give life-forms an ontological excessiveness, and a purposiveness, in order to subsequently ground the forms of reason that can potentially emerge out of them. The function

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of biological purposiveness would 'pre-ground' the schematic function of reason for Kant in perpetuity.

Yet, as Schelling goes on to explore in his *First Outline* in particular, he does not see such an internally defined ground for the organism (or for any phenomenal product or *Scheinprodukt* for that matter). Organisms, or any form of individuation, any individual thing, are merely meta-stable events composed and decomposed by the forces of nature in which they are nested. But, rather than engaging at length with the differences between Kant and Schelling at the level of the organism, I wish to focus on the interior space which the organism requires for Kant in order not only for purposiveness in nature to hold, but also so that, for him, this purposiveness can be cleanly translated into moral imperatives. The specific focus here is the construction of an inner space to root teleology in order for nature to be properly navigable, and, for human constructs to be appropriately compatible with the natural world. This imperative is central to Schelling as well, but, he is willing to sacrifice the minimal safe distance, or interior space, which Kant insists upon for the sake of compatibility, whereas Kant's priorities, are the reverse. This lack of an inner barrier indicates the related but, in the end, quite different notions of the transcendental in both Schelling and Kant which I will now explore.

Transcendental philosophy, for Kant, as that which fundamentally determines the conditions of experience, is often criticized as a self-justifying juridical model. Or, in other words, the criticism is made that Kant wants to solidify the power of his own (or ostensibly anyone's) brandishing of the scepter of reason via subjective judgment. My critique of Kant's concept of the transcendental, particularly as it applies to judgment, does not share these motivations. I believe judgment can be taken up as a form of categorization at worst, and, as a simultaneously exploratory, and simplifying machine of reason, at best.31 While I believe this view potentially sells Kant's notion of judgment short, it is somewhat easy to see the troubling legislative aspect of Kant's transcendental conditions as they apply

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31 I will take up this issue in the following chapter in relationship to Kant's "What is Called Orientation in Thinking?"
to nature. In *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant goes to great lengths to limit the power of nature through the power of reflection. In the section on the dynamic sublime, Kant quickly squelches any possibility of a dynamic nature stating that nature has power, but never dominion, over us because our safety in the face of an immense natural occurrence (mountain, tidal wave, volcanic eruption etc.) simply increases our own vital powers.\(^\text{32}\)

This passage is indicative of the way in which Kant discusses nature as mechanical, purposive, and lawful, from the very beginning of *The Critique of Judgment*. Furthermore, Kant immediately divides nature and freedom via a separation of the scientific and the practical.\(^\text{33}\) For Kant, nature necessarily conforms to our power of judgment.\(^\text{34}\) As Kant writes: “The special principle of the power of judgment is thus: nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment.”\(^\text{35}\) Thus while Kant's safety-zone simultaneously protects the figure of the thinker from the wrath of exterior nature, as well as, providing a stable ground from which judgment can sort out experience from the formal *a priori* structures which make experience possible, the notion of interior space has an earlier and more physical grounding, as well as one to which Kant, as I argue in the following chapter, returns in the *Opus Postumum* (1802).

In his early text “Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space” (1768) Kant builds the safety-zone of inner space in an altogether different manner. As Eckhart Forster points out, this text marks the end of Kant's long held agreement with Leibniz over the generation of space by way of entities. Whereas Kant had previously held with Leibniz, against Newton, that absolute space made no sense (in that absolute space relied upon an arbitrary decision of the creator of


\(^{34}\) Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 8 (20: 202).

\(^{35}\) Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 19 (20:216).
where to place the universe) in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” Kant sees Leibniz's relative notion of space as unable to address the problem of direction. Kant writes referring to Leibniz's mentioned, but never published, *analysis situs*:

What I am seeking to philosophically determine here is the ultimate ground of the possibility of that which Leibniz was intending to determine the magnitudes mathematically. For the positions of the parts of space in reference to each other presuppose the direction in which they are ordered in such a relation. In the most abstract sense of the term, direction does not consist in the reference of one thing in space to another – that is really the concept of position – but in the relation of the system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe.  

Kant goes on to state that he is attempting to determine whether or not the unity of space has an existence outside of the relations between parts. Kant quickly adds a caveat – namely, that the absolute space which he seeks to determine is not one made of matter, or that is otherwise physical in any strict sense, but that he seeks to construct a form of absolute space not for engineers, but for geometers.  

Kant begins to construct this notion of direction (focusing on the relation of right to left and left to right) by appealing to spiral patterns in organisms, weather, as well as the celestial motions. Kant argues that these motions are anchored to our bodies using, for instance, the example of the compass – east and west must be translated into left and right in order for cardinal directions to have any import on our understanding and subsequent actions. Strangely, Kant converts this natural skew of right over left into an argument that the mechanics of nature provide us with a *feeling* whereby we consequently emphasize the right over the left. Kant then writes: “What we are trying to demonstrate, then, is the following claim. The ground of the complete determination of a corporeal form does not depend simply on the relation and position of its parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that physical form to universal absolute space, as it is conceived by the geometers.”

Kant's example, to which he returns and which will be discussed in the following chapter in relation to magnitudes, is that of chilarity, or handedness. Kant argues that some internal ground is

38 Kant, “Concerning the Ultimate Ground,” 369 (2: 381).
necessary in order for the bodily tendency of left and right to make sense and that, furthermore, this inner ground points to a notion of absolute space, or fixed reference, by which right and left make sense. That is, put otherwise, right and left cannot determine themselves only in relation to the other for this says nothing as to why their orientations are mirrors or, as Kant puts it, incongruent counterparts, of one another.

Kant's absolutization of space however, did not hold for long. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) Kant argues against the reality of space yet maintains the importance of absolute inner space but an inner space which becomes slowly idealized. As Christian Kerslake skilfully outlines it:

So why did Kant soon deny the reality of absolute space, and affirm its ideality? In *The Critique of Pure Reason* he gives two arguments against the reality of space. First, the Newtonians create an absurd proliferation of entities when they think of real things coexisting with an 'eternal and infinite self-subsisting nonentity, which exist[s], (yet without there being anything real)' (A39/B56). Second, geometry is threatened by the reality of space, as its *apriority* would no longer be immediately guaranteed. But there is a clue from a late set of lectures on metaphysics that Kant has another anxiety. ‘If we consider space as real, we assume Spinoza’s system. He believed only in one substance, and all the substances in the world he held for its divinely inhering determinations (he called space the phenomenon of the divine omnipresence)’ (LM 368, AK. 28:666).

We can begin to see how teleology is co-determinate with Kant's concept of internal ground. This internal ground is essentially a navigationally-necessary microcosm of absolute space, i.e., one's sense of direction cannot, for Kant, merely be that of moving within a world, but that movement requires a notion of orientation by which the absolute space of the world is, at least minimally, fixed for the subject. But instead of arguing this fixity through either a mental screening, or manipulation of feelings, or external sensations, or through an appeal to the situated and navigational development of the organism as an organism of a particular species, Kant threads inner space and movement, into purposiveness and teleology which he relies on to fix the parameters of space. That is, Kant makes *a priori* regulations of what could be described as naturalistic derivations.

Schelling takes up and modifies both of these claims by addressing teleology in his early work

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and then the orientation of the organism abstractly in the *First Outline* (1799), as we have seen, and then more specifically in his later Aristotelian work of the lectures on *Pure Rational Philosophy* (1847-1852). In regards to Kant's strange purposive threading, Schelling writes in the *First Outline:*

To Philosophize about nature means to heave it out of the dead mechanism to which it seems predisposed, to quicken it with freedom and to set it into its own free development—to philosophize about nature means, in other words, to tear yourself away from the common view which discerns in nature only what 'happens'—and which, at most, views the act as a factum, not the action itself in its acting.

One could compare this sentiment with that of Kant, albeit at a later stage. In the *Opus* he writes:

"it is we who first provide the data out of which cognitions can be woven (into the cognitions possible from them): e.g. attraction, for the sake of determinations and laws of its relation in space and time. He who would know the world must first manufacture it — in his own self, indeed."

Here Schelling emphasizes a perspectival view altogether different from Kant's that he will articulate throughout his career. For Schelling, one approaches an embodied perspective not by immediately determining what inner ground is necessary for small determinations, but in arguing that only an overview, or abstracted perspective, which is nonetheless built from small determinations, is capable of viewing subjectivity as a problem for, and not a solution to, nature's dynamism. These small determinations, or forms of dependence, are exactly those components of nature on which our cognitive architecture is made and upon which it rests. This point is clear in Schelling's above mentioned lectures on *Pure Rational Philosophy* when Schelling, in opposition to Kant, asserts the species specificity of dimensionality:

What accords with the progressivity of organic forms stands in direct proportion to the separation and actual differentiation

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40 The texts I am working with are lectures translated by Iain Hamilton Grant that appear in Schelling’s complete work in *Philosophische Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie oder Darstellung der Reinrationalen Philosophie* in F. W. J. Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke*, K. F. A. Schelling, (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta,1856), Bd. XI. Throughout I will refer to them as the Darstellung following Grant and Daniel Whistler’s usage.


of dimensions. The slightest change in their relations changes the entire type. The same muscles that draw an animal’s head earthward, when reversed, posited as the past as it were, direct the human apex above. Throughout the entire ascending line of the animal kingdom we may note how the heart is increasingly transposed from the right or the middle towards the left. With this guiding thread in hand it becomes easier to demonstrate the progressive transformation of one and the same primal form through the entire series of organic beings.43

Thus while right and left for Kant must index a inner ground that necessarily computes right and left into all visual activities, for Schelling, whether or not certain motions are privileged or not has to do with the physical constraints those species (or even inorganic entities) have prior to learning to move with and against them.

While much more can be said of how Schelling utilizes and augments the Aristotelian inspired discussion of dimensionality which arises from corporeal constraints, I am specifically interested in how the speculation regarding dimensions, rather than leading to worries about finding immediate ground as in the case of Kant's “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” instead leads, for Schelling, to the immediate, or ultimate ground, as a subject being suspended in the name of further experimentation. The structure of the subject is far less important for Schelling then what the subject, or what subjectivity as human in this location, can do. The problem, and what Schelling gains from Fichte, is how one can best think human thought as an activity when its ultimate ground belongs elsewhere, or, perhaps nowhere at all. While Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical trajectories quickly diverge, the pressure of the act is a concept that Schelling adapts whole heartedly as will be discussed below.

1.2 - Thought as Activity: Schelling via Fichte

There is a fairly well-known saying that the German Idealists (primarily Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) ran through the door which Kant had only wished to peek through. This speaks to, among other things, the cautious uncertainty of Kant's position being 'ruined' by the German Idealists who wanted to talk more about 'things in themselves' or, in various ways, to get rid of the things in themselves all together, and expand the Kantian ground outwards, as a defense against both accusations of dogmatism and skepticism. Whereas Slavoj Žižek has argued that Hegel effectively ontologizes that which Kant had recognized without really recognizing (namely that the subject comes to be substance through a kind of indirect self-recognition), the contemporary Pittsburgh Hegelians take both Fichte's and Hegel's idealism to be one that grounds the stability of the starting subject position on the efficacy of the normative which is *sui generis*, and separate from, what John McDowell calls, following Wilfrid Sellars, the logical space of nature.

In essence, the problem of how mind and world (or thought and nature) interact in Fichte and Hegel is based upon a self-sustaining space of reasons where, via linguistic structures, habit, and rearing, a subject in that space needs to be able to self-test that the world is 'thus and so' in relation to us saying that the world 'is thus and so.' This capacity cannot, following Brandom and McDowell, be anchored in naturalistic processes (to do so would be to fall into the naturalistic fallacy as Sellars called it) because the set of rules governing conceptual behavior is different *in kind* from those laws which govern the logical space of nature. However, the way in which the logical space of nature is described immediately fixes the game in a way that any kind of naturalism, other than empirical explanation, cannot but fail to appease the force of second nature (the space of reasons). That is, I believe that Schelling's naturalism is not a bald naturalism as McDowell would put it, but, given

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Schelling's speculative concept of nature, that it questions the descriptive ground put in place by the Pittsburgh Hegelians (as well as that of Fichte).

Put otherwise: if naturalism is the strand of thought which fundamentally describes laws and their empirical ambit, such a formulation presupposes the efficacy of description, already grounded, as the boundary of the space of nature. Such a formulation dismisses outright the varieties of naturalism, and specifically any speculative tools they wield, whether in Hegel, Schelling, or otherwise. While one can overemphasize the speculative, one can, perhaps not quite as easily, erase the speculative tools of philosophy (as well as those of the physical sciences) whereby the pragmatist pushes past the immediacy of the practical via the risk-taking move of generating a hypothesis. While I will address the Pittsburgh Hegelians at length in Chapter 6, I bring them up briefly here namely in order to suggest that their articulation of Hegel makes him similar to Fichte, particularly, in jettisoning all talk of nature for the sake of reason's power. Schelling's break from Fichte, over the problem of nature, prepares the way for Schelling not to be taken up in contemporary analytic philosophy, as well for the sidelining of philosophies of nature more generally.

Schelling's concept of nature appears at its most critical when it is taken as a naturalism in the form of speculative physics (two terms he explicitly attaches to his philosophy of nature in the Introduction to the First Outline of 1799). Though initially uncertain as to the efficacy of speculation in his earliest texts, Schelling later pushes speculation as the necessary means by which thought can begin to ascertain, however indirectly, what nature should be in order for something like us to exist at all. Schelling begins these speculations though a naturalization of Kantian formalisms (via an appeal to Plato's nature-as-forming in the Timaeus, Aristotle's proto-ethology, and a decentralizing of Fichtean thought-as-activity), thereby making naturalism dynamic, and not substantive, and idealism derivative,

45 The relation of the speculative and the pragmatic against the restrictions of the practical will be the focus of Chapter 6.
This naturalization of Kant's transcendental in Schelling has been most expertly fleshed out in the work of Iain Hamilton Grant. Whereas Kant is concerned with how experience is possible (as a synthesis of impressions into experiences, sensations which, in an empirical register, must be *of nature*), Schelling wonders how nature must be in order for us to be and for us to be able to think of something like nature. The first point – the question of how nature must be in order for us to be -- assumes, as a ground, that nature pre-exists us (or more generally that being precedes thinking). Thus, while Schelling does not at all dispute the starting point of Kantian critical philosophy, Schelling claims that Kant should not be lambasted for peeking through the door at the in-itself illegitimately, but that this peeking (through our speculative capacities) can only ever be grounded in a continuum between the space of nature and the space of reasons. In so doing, Schelling claims that Kant did not go *far enough*, namely in stating that things in-themselves should, to acquire something approaching a 'higher realism,' be forces in-themselves, or activity in itself. In this sense, on a formal level, Schelling appears to go in the opposite direction to Fichte who, in order to shore up Kant's idealism against its critics, denied the noumenal realm *tout court*, replacing it with an internalized not-I.46 Fichte's very project of the science of knowing (*de Wissenschaftslehre*) is a project of internal critique taken to a impressive extreme.47 Seemingly paradoxically, Schelling's fascination with Fichte's I as the form of philosophy, the I as endless doing, is not taken by Schelling as a seed for a rampant idealism (at least, as idealism would be construed by Kant) but as arguing that the activity of being-as-self can only be grounded in an existence outside of it, namely, the speculatively determined dynamics of nature.

As Dieter Sturma puts it:

46 By internalized I, I am referring to the notion of projection that is the focus of Fichte's 14th lecture in the 1804 Wissenscaftslehre. This projection can be taken as the outside world influencing pre-intentional consciousness, or, it can be viewed as simply the capacity to be objective within the realm of consciousness.

As far as Schelling is concerned, it is an unshakable fact of finite existence that the latter does not simply possess the external and inner conditions of its own 'coming to self awareness' at its own disposal. Our various forms of theoretical and practical dependence upon inner and outer nature impose narrow limits on the possibility of self-knowledge. By virtue of the naturalist incorporation of subjectivity, these forms of dependency continue to exercise their effects and do not simply lose their influence when rational individuals enter into the domain of explicit consciousness and self-consciousness.\footnote{Dieter Sturma, “The Nature of Subjectivity: The Critical and Systematic Function of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy:Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedwick (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 227.}  

That is, whereas Fichte took nature (as not-I) to be an internalized and formal constraint on which the activity of the I operates, Schelling sees this activity of nature, and appearing in our minds, as our own activity (as intentionality), as only possible following a self-inhibition of mental activity in order for anything resembling reason to even be possible. Or, the activity of thought weighs itself down with the not-I (as constraint) in order to think cogently not, pace Fichte, to exceed it. While on the one hand this can be read as Fichte simply arguing for the irreducibility of conscious experience, the degree to which he claims existence, and not merely thinkability, depends upon the I, obscures the reality of external beings.\footnote{This is tied to Fichte's notion of facticity, namely, that facticity applies to how sense functions for the natural sciences, as well as, the so-called facticity of the individual. Or, in other words, the question is whether Fichte's notion of fact has more to do with a form of subjective-objectivity of the senses, or whether it is more a proto-phenomenological form of intentionality, when it comes to the topic of nature, or externality more generally.}  

In Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature Schelling writes:

Fichte's philosophy was the first to restore validity to the universal form of subject-objectivity, as the one and all of philosophy; but the more it developed, the more it seemed to restrict that very identity, again as a special feature, to the subjective consciousness; yet as absolute and in itself, to make it the object of an endless task, an absolute demand, and in this way after extracting all substance from speculation, to abandon it as just empty froth, while proceeding, on the other hand, like the Kantian theory, to reconnect absoluteness with the deepest subjectivity, through action and faith.\footnote{Fichte, The Science of Knowing, 21.}  

Fichte's error, according to Schelling, is to locate such activity in the consciousness alone while at the same time bringing in objective constraints (in terms of Kantian schemata) in order to ground the consciousness-as-activity in the world. In other words, Fichte abandons all of nature, because all activity, and all constraint, is internal to thought itself. Fichte does not set out to eradicate nature but to ground philosophy in what he sees as real living.\footnote{Ideas, 54.} Fichte argues that other post-Kantian thinkers (Schelling no doubt being the one he has in mind) have held too close to the thing in itself “as a dead
being” instead of focusing on the absorption of the thing in itself into consciousness.\textsuperscript{52} For Fichte it is not even possible to conceive of an unprethinkable realm as thingness must be always already thinkable.\textsuperscript{53}

This core dimension of Fichte's thought is pulled between the ground of consciousness being rooted \textit{a posteri} in a self-evident \textit{factum}, and, in an absolute beyond facticity as such. Paul Franks argues for the former stating that Fichte, following Niethammer's critique of Reinhold, got around the problem of thought as self-grounding by taking it as a self-evident feature of consciousness.\textsuperscript{54} Allen Wood argues, \textit{contra} Franks, that Fichte fundamentally agreed with Reinhold but simply amplified Reinhold's principle of consciousness into an absolute subjectification of the subject-object (into I and Not-I).\textsuperscript{55}

Given Fichte's influence on Schelling, how is it even possible for the latter that we can think something like nature outside of us? Schelling’s alternative is to place activity, albeit skeptically, within the noumenal realm making the form, and constraints of the subject, a self-inhibition of such activity. Again, the functional constraints of consciousness that allow the activity of thought to recognize itself as thought would be at least partially inaccessible to the mind as self-constraining (hence the importance of Schelling’s assertion that only nature is \textit{a priori}). Or, as Schelling put it in the \textit{Stuttgart Seminars}, quoted above in the introduction, the cosmos existed before any system created by human thought. Thus, mental powers such as reflection and judgment would become second order functions, powers exercising themselves only after the activity of the mind had been restricted to give itself form and to thereby relate to the exterior world. Schelling writes in \textit{The System of Transcendental Idealism}:

\textsuperscript{52} Fichte, \textit{The Science of Knowing}, 25.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
The self *senses* when it finds in itself something opposed to it, namely, since the self is mere activity, a real negation of activity, or state of being affected. But to be that which senses, for itself, the (ideal) self must posit *in itself* that passivity which till now has been present only in the real; and this can undoubtedly occur only through activity.56

For Schelling the real (the logical space of nature) interferes with the space of reasons in such a way that the space of reasons must limit itself (posit something like nature, some outer field, or manifold) in order to recognize its own capacity to act. For Schelling, nature comes to be thought, as thought, recognizes there is nature, as thought would never operate without assuming that that which is real in it is also ideal. The difference between Fichte and Schelling here is apparently slim, yet far reaching. While Fichte recognizes some level of inaccessibility of consciousness' root, for consciousness, this obscure activity must still be *in* consciousness. For Schelling, this 'in' functions only as an ideal copy of the actual, or natural, activity from the outside passing though, and constituting, interiority.

1.3 - Thought as Dynamic Nature: Schelling via Spinoza

To address nature appropriately, Schelling found himself faced with the task of constructing a species of monism that circumvented the limitations and purported dangers of traditional monisms proposed, and criticized within, the Pantheism Controversy--that controversy which, at least partially, spurred German Idealism forward, and centered upon the figure of Spinoza. Following Paul Franks, if the central tenet of German Idealism is what he refers to as heterogeneous monism (of systematizing difference within continuity), Schelling is able to accomplish this construction via a system of philosophy (or, perhaps more accurately, a series of systems) that is disseminative in its structure and is comprised of forces (not substances).57 Furthermore, in such a monism, which for many implied determinism, Schelling articulates a notion of the transcendental as the very movement of form to form, thereby granting an *abstract heterogeneity* to Schelling's thought while maintaining a

meontological (non-being, or power based) continuity.

Schelling's general position regarding the relation of thought and nature should be viewed not merely as a repetition of Spinoza's, or of the reformulations of Spinoza coming out of the controversy (namely Lessing's, Jacobi's, or Mendelssohn's), but as a reformulation of the role of subjectivity-without-subject following a synthesis of Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza in the light of the dynamics of his time. While, like Kant, Schelling is wary of making space merely real in accepting Spinozistic substance, he does not wish to make it as ideal as either Kant or Fichte would have it. It is how Schelling handles the integration of the absolute-as-concept into his thinking of space and motion that interests us here. However it will be of benefit to rehearse the Pantheism Controversy's general contours to get a general grasp of the role that Spinoza, and Spinozism, played at the time.

The controversy, which raged for over a decade, saw the numerous pivotal minds of Germany deadlocked in battle over the importance and reach of reason vis a vis belief. The debate was not couched in the terms of philosophy versus religion, but was made internal to the structure of philosophy itself. It was a debate which centered on the limits or non-limits of reason as a power and whether such a power could be self-grounding, grounded in nature, or needed, necessarily, to be grounded in divine calculations.

The controversy erupted between Frederich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn who were both friends and commentators on the work of the late great Lessing. When Jacobi revealed that Lessing was an avowed Spinozist, debate erupted over what kind of Spinozism Lessing ascribed to (following Spinoza's teachings in any form was tantamount to heresy at the time) and whether reason (without faith) could lead to anywhere but nihilistic ruin. Jacobi claimed that since for Spinoza everything was extended substance, his dogmatic system necessarily excluded God and faith. Mendelssohn's shocking response was that theism and pantheism were essential the same, and, that reintroducing faith or belief into philosophy was exactly what the Enlightenment had attempted to do away with in the first place.
In a sense, the Pantheism Controversy, which Kant attempted to stay out of as long as possible, repeated the debate for which he had supposedly thrown down the gauntlet, and ended, with the advent of his critical system; namely the debate between dogmatism and empiricism in which his creating the transcendental was intended to put a stop to endless skepticism. Following the basic plot of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant denied both the dogmatist's claim that reason could construct knowledge purely, and speculatively, apart from reality (most notably referring to Spinoza and Leibniz) and the empiricist's claim that experience could ground its own justifications without appealing to the non-empirical constructions of reason (namely referring to Hume).

Kant's great legacy, as is well known, was to create a neutral zone between the camps in which we utilize reason, so as to retroactively construct only that which is necessary to make sense of the experiential world with which we are always already in contact. In essence, the Pantheism Controversy posed the question: “What is the Ground of this critical middle-ground in terms of reason or belief?” That is, if the middle ground is a mixture of reason and experience, what is the basis for the very capacity of this mixture? The argument that the retroactive construction via reason of schemata to make experience coherent could be applied to the very possibility of the middle-ground itself, lead to accusations of Spinozism which, in turn, meant nihilism and atheism. On the other hand, Jacobi argued that whether ontological proof could be wagered in its favor or not (which Kant had decidedly said it could not), a belief in God, is necessary in order to have any kind of critical system without falling into godless speculation. Whereas Kant famously left room for faith, but argues that reason could not prove god's existence, the Pantheism controversy demonstrated attempt to force the issue regarding the consequences of the separation of reason and god, i.e., at what point does faith step in to function with, and or against, reason?

In so many words, the Pantheism Controversy was troubled by whether the ground of reason (however carefully delimited by Kant) was a self-grounding function of reason itself, or an externally
gifted and ultimately unknowable ground that was itself unreasonable. Beyond the Pantheism

Controversy being about a crisis of meaning, I would argue that it is actually a crisis of location, of
reason in space (and, subsequently, of the space of reason itself). Jacobi, in recounting Lessing's initial
revelation of his Spinozism to him writes:

‘Jacobi: Whoever does not want to explain what is inconceivable but only wants to know the borderline where it begins: he will gain the largest space for human truth.

Lessing: Words, dear Jacobi, mere words! The borderline you want to fix cannot be determined. And on the other side of it you give free rein to dreaming, nonsense and blindness.

Jacobi: I believe that the borderline can be determined. I want not to draw it, but only to recognize what is already there.’

Whereas Schelling would assert that the answer to the question “Where is Reason?” is ‘in
nature,’ he would also acknowledge the unsatisfactoriness of this reply. As Grant has discussed in
recent lectures, this epitomizes the novel, yet limited, capacity of transcendental thinking to relocate
the tensions within nature, to re-describe them, but in a way that deadens them. Or, for Schelling, the
transcendental should not be a cognitive re-appropriation of nature, but a demonstration of how nature
passes through, and determines consciousness. Hence, the Kantian advent of the transcendental
disavows any covering over its potentiality by submitting it to the practical-as-ground or ethical as
ground – a project which Jacobi initiated brandishing nihilism as the punishing specter if the project
should fail. Against this, Schelling sees Spinoza's mechanistic view of nature, in its immanent form, as
too limiting in that it decides, from the beginning, what the borderline mentioned by Lessing and
Jacobi above is, and, where it is.

That is, while Spinoza's construction of the singular substance of God in nature, and nature in
God, brought down accusations of heresy and eventual banishment on the modern thinker, Schelling is
able to avoid such threats by striking against Spinoza's monism and opening up the productivity of
nature (and incidentally Divinity): process in the sense that the transcendental serves as an

58 Jacobi quoted in Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 67.
59 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Unnamed Presentation,” (presentation for Naturphilosophie Summer School, Pittsburgh, PA, August 5-9, 2013.)
irrecoverable motion of forms-making-forms and not merely as the engine of reason's *schematic* form.

While the Pantheism Controversy set Fichte, Mendelsohn, and others afire with the flames of nihilism (as they made claims for reason's self sufficiency thereby eschewing the need for faith or belief), Schelling remains above the fray as his articulation of the transcendental is not beholden to reason as such, but merely makes possible the emergence of reason out of the unreasonable on the one hand, while troubling the facticity of reason, as we are born into it as unavoidable schema, on the other hand. In other words, Schelling changes the problem from 'where to divide the territory of reason from the territory of faith?' into 'how do we best discover how the apparently unreasonable feeds and forges the reasonable?'

This shift of terrain allows Schelling to critique Kant for separating freedom (or what I will argue is better described as dynamics) from the noumenal realm (the posited realm of things in themselves existing outside of human experience). As Schelling makes clear in a lengthy footnote in his lectures on *The History of Modern Philosophy*, Kant obliterates the possibility for a “higher realism” when he denies the thing-in-itself its properly dynamic character:

[...]If one had to distinguish a *Prius* and *Posterius* in sensuous representation, then the true *Prius* it would be what Kant calls ‘thing in itself’; those concepts of the understanding which it shows itself as affected by in my thinking are, according to Kant himself, precisely that by which it first becomes object of my thinking, thus is able to be experienced by me; the true *Posterius* is, then, not as he assumes, that element which remains after the concepts of the understanding have been removed, for rather, if I take these way then this is the being which is unthinkable, before and outside the representation, it is thus the absolute *Prius* of the representation, but the true *Posterius* is precisely this Unknown (which he himself compares with the X of mathematics). 60

It is in the same text that Schelling charges Spinoza with *a priori* extracting freedom from nature. As Schelling writes: “Spinozism is really the doctrine which sends thought into retirement, into complete quiescence; in its highest conclusions it is the system of perfect theoretical and practical quietism, which can appear beneficent in the tempestuousness of a thought which never rests and

always moves.” Thus for Schelling thought is a form of activity, or real movement, but one that is necessary but not sufficient. In contrast to figures such as Deleuze, Schelling’s naturalization of thought-as-activity, following a combination of Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza, requires a dynamic rethinking of nature and not merely an application of the model of thought onto nature in general. If this were the case Schelling would not require the caveats listed above in relation to Kant, namely, he would need not be concerned with how thought affects reality and how reality affects thought, by replacing the notions of origin and end with Prius and Posterius.

Despite such passages, there remains an attempt to simultaneously claim that Schelling is a pre-critical Spinozist through and through, a thinker who merely ignores the Copernican Turn of the Critical Revolution. A particularly acerbic example can be found in Adrian Johnston's recent *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism* (2014). Engaging with Johnston's text will be helpful in exhibiting not only the constant misunderstandings of Schelling's relation to Spinoza, but also the dominant mode of understanding the transcendental between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in microcosm.

In a chapter entitled “Off with their thistleheads!: Against Neo-Spinozism,” Johnston aligns the Naturphilosophical Schelling, and commentators on him, particularly Iain Hamilton Grant in *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling,* with a contemporary group of neo-Spinozists, a group which includes Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Michael Hardt, to name a few.62

Johnston claims that Deleuzianism is the 'master-matrix' behind Grant's text but without mentioning Grant's critiques of Deleuze, via Schelling, in the closing two chapters.63 Johnston implies that Grant unjustifiably argues that Schelling's work over time has general consistency and then argues

62 Adrian Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!: Against Neo-Spinozism,” in *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 50-65. Johnston is suspiciously silent on the fact that all the neo-Spinozists he cites have largely political motivations for their adherence to Deleuze and/or Spinoza while Grant does not.
63 Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!,” 52.
that Grant's book overwhelmingly focuses on Schelling's work between 1794 and 1804.\textsuperscript{64} Johnston claims that the \textit{Freedom Essay}, as well as other 'later work,' does not feature in Grant's account claiming that this work is more dialectical and speculative.\textsuperscript{65} For one, referring to work after 1809 as 'late' Schelling is not particularly helpful since Schelling's texts continue for longer after 1809 than before.\textsuperscript{66} Next, Johnston implies that Schelling became more Hegelian after 1809 and hence this is why the 'later' work is supposedly missing from Grant's book due to Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism.\textsuperscript{67} In essence, Johnston is claiming that Grant's unacknowledged (though it is acknowledged and critiqued within the book) Deleuzianism means he is anti-Hegel which means he must hide Schelling's later 'Hegelian' texts. Given that Schelling is increasingly critical of Hegel at least from his introduction to a text of Victor Cousin (1834) as well as in \textit{The History of Modern Philosophy} and \textit{The Berlin Lectures}, it is difficult to discern the basis for Johnston's claim.\textsuperscript{68} Despite the young Schelling's claim that he had become a Spinozist in a letter to Hegel in 1795, it is not at all established in Schelling scholarship that Schelling was deeply Spinozistic. While Dalia Nassar has expertly pointed out how Schelling utilized Spinoza to escape Kant, and by association Fichte, Schelling was consistently critical of the limitations of Spinoza's immanence, as well as his inadequate definition of the place of thinking within such a system. This complex relation to Spinozism has been highlighted by Allan White as well as Andrew Bowie, Dale Snow, and recently by Bruce Matthews.

One of the best antidotes to strong Hegelian-Žižekian responses such as Johnston's, which seems to paint Schelling as a mere dogmatic Spinozist, is to note the more recent attempts at analyzing the appeals to nature's form Schelling makes before, during, and after, his utilization of Spinoza, namely that of a combination of Platonic cosmological realism, and Aristotelian biologically focused

\textsuperscript{64} Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!,” 52.
\textsuperscript{65} Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!,” 52.
\textsuperscript{66} Also, Grant's text references texts after 1809 63 times by my count which, in a book of just over 200 pages, is quite substantial.
\textsuperscript{67} Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!,” 53.
\textsuperscript{68} Johnston, “Off with their thistleheads!,” 53.
naturalism. But is this to admit to Johnston's critique orthogonally, to accept that Schelling is only, after all, pre-critical? As I hope to show this is not the case because of how Schelling views the problems of philosophy as cosmological. In essence, Schelling does not believe that the adoption of methodologies closes problems, but only re-spatializes them, it re-locates them.

As evident following his reading of Plato's *Timaeus*, a one-world dynamics allows Schelling to give idealism a physical utility in that, because the ideal is part of the real, continuity becomes not merely an abstract geometrical artifact, but reorientates thought as part of a continuum with nature (and, as I will argue, naturalizes geometry). Whereas Spinoza's immanence and substance left monist philosophy a lifeless realism, Leibniz gives Schelling an overly lively idealism, but one that, despite its errors, which, for Schelling, culminates in Leibniz's reliance upon God's morals to explain physical necessity, demonstrates the power of idealism as a means of navigating and speculating as to what the forms of nature *might be* in order to explain how nature proceeds as a self-lacerating form always giving rise to new forms while still remaining physically continuous. 69

It is here that Schelling's Identity Philosophy appears inseparable from his discussions of nature. Although there is a continuity between thinking and nature, transcendental systems (what Schelling takes from Fichte and Kant and transforms in the Identity philosophy) appear to behave according to their own rules and problems. Given a dynamically productive nature, for Schelling transcendental philosophy does not determine the inner workings of nature but only ever how our own thinking can take in and think those workings through the mediation of experiment (through the detour of the actual). While our thinking is caused, however strangely and indirectly, by nature, the way thought functions is to recapitulate and copy nature according to its own terms. Whereas Kant's systematic constraints were directed fundamentally to make sense of how we have experience at all,

69 I will address Schelling's emphasis on God's personality, as between Spinoza's and Leibniz's, via the work of Edward Beach in Chapter 4.
for Schelling the constraints on nature are skeptically constructed in order to explain how it is that there are things at all given a nature which seems endlessly productive. That is, while Kant's combinations of sense experience and intuition to create experiment does not sound far afield from Schelling's view just outlined, it is the authority of reason to reclassify these combinations as to be decided by reason alone, that separates Kant and Schelling. Put otherwise, Schelling sees limits to the conceptual, in the face of nature that, for Kant, manifest only as a failure reason. Reason, as a juridical function, is insufficient to investigate the depths of nature. This has been read as Schelling being an irrationalist but this would be a hasty declaration. It is not that Schelling doubts reason's importance, or the form of the transcendental for Kant, but only that the bound between thinking (in the form of reason or otherwise) is more intimately bound to a dynamic nature that Kant can allow.

In *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, Schelling writes:

> What then is that secret bond which couples our mind to Nature, or that hidden organ through which Nature speaks to our mind or our mind to Nature? We grant you in advance all your explanations of how such a purposive Nature has come to be actual outside us. For to explain this purposiveness by the fact that a divine intelligence is its author is not to philosophize, but to propound pious opinions […] For the existence of such a Nature outside me is still far from explaining the existence of such a Nature in me; for if you assume that a predetermined harmony occurs between the two, indeed that is just the object of our question […] Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible Nature.⁷⁰

Schelling's assertion that mind is invisible nature, and nature is invisible mind, is thus not an adherence to a form of either crude realism or crude idealism, but addresses the continuity or identity of both (on a natural level or according to nature) while admitting that a methodological, or descriptive split, exists. That is, while reduction is explanation (at the level of nature) the ideal as description has an efficacy (or a power following Schelling's language) because of the natural realm in which it has emerged.

The strangeness of this claim can be reduced if one takes for granted the justificational impenetrability of the empirical as Kant's starting point. Kant, by fully absorbing the fear of Hume's

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skepticism, by accepting there is no ground beneath us, allows him to justify reasons' self-originary state following from the capacity, of the already-always conceptual, of empirically recognizing the appearances floating about us with seemingly no final, supersensible, ground beneath them. Reason must, for Kant, be able to draw final conclusions about all other forms of thought. As Iain Hamilton Grant describes it, such a procedure, whether in Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or Brandom, can only seem to be so much rational bootstrapping. Such a paranoid fear of the groundless can, of course, be covered over, again following Grant's lead, by appealing to the practical. Reason, as immaterial or merely normative boot-strapping, merely becomes so many cracked eggs to create the omelet of practical reason. The other course, is that of Johnston and Žižek which is to ontologically, i.e., transcendentally in a Kantian sense, privilege the form of the human subject as a symbolic rupture, or gap in the world. In both cases, nature is excluded because either the necessity of the practical stops the creep of skepticism, or, the inexplicability of human capacities means we represent the 'weakness' of nature.

1.4 - The Missing Gesture: Plato and Aristotle via Schelling

Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the animals—such stories as are now attributed to them—in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and then we shall be able to get on. In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world.

Some things are only actually, some potentially, some actually and potentially, what they are, viz. in one case a particular reality, in another, characterized by a particular quantity, or the like. There is no movement apart from things; for change is always according to the categories of being, and there is nothing common to these and in no one category. But each of the categories belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways (e.g. 'this-ness'-for one kind of it is 'positive form', and the other is 'privation'; and as regards quality one kind is 'white' and the other 'black', and as regards quantity one kind is 'complete' and the other 'incomplete', and as regards spatial movement one is 'upwards' and the other 'downwards', or one thing is

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72 Žižek has consistently maintained this position at least as early as The Sublime Object of Ideology. For a recent formulation see Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, (New York: Verso, 2012), 266-267.
'light' and another 'heavy'); so that there are as many kinds of movement and change as of being. There being a distinction in each class of things between the potential and the completely real, I call the actuality of the potential as such, movement.\textsuperscript{74}

The best course for a life devoted to philosophy is to have begun with Plato and to end with Aristotle.\textsuperscript{75}

Schelling's transcendental naturalism, a naturalism which takes thought and ideas to be within nature, can be pictured broadly in his augmentation of Plato by Aristotle, and, Aristotle by Plato. This augmentation allows for a minority reading of both thinkers in that, for Schelling, Plato's treatment of the idea only makes sense when it is within one world, a world composed of small naturalistic motions described by Aristotle. In a parallel fashion, Aristotle's treatment of activity, or motion, denies any notion of perfection to close, or contain, the collection of actions that composes and directs the world. Thus, the movement of the idea is one example of a motion that seems uncontainable, as the very notion of containment, moves beyond any notion of closure. How can this picture be articulated?

In his \textit{The Philosophy of Art} Schelling writes:

A picture is symbolic whose subject not only signifies or means the idea, but is itself the idea. You can see yourself that in this way the symbolic painting coincides completely with the so-called historical painting and actually designates the higher potency of the latter. Here again we encounter distinctions according to the object, which can either be something universally human that perpetually recurs and renews itself in life, or refer to completely spiritual and intellectual ideas. The latter is represented by Raphael's \textit{Parnassus} and \textit{The School of Athens}, which symbolically portray the entirety of philosophy.\textsuperscript{76}

We can illustrate the Platonic-Aristotelian tension from within this very image. The reason why Platonic images can exist in this world, and need not exist in their own ideal realm, and the reason why naturalistically explained animal motion must exceed its roots and its future containment, is due to the nature of potency, of powers that exponentially create, and yet are inexistent. Powers function by having the qualities of being and becoming, but not necessarily, the status of things. Inexistence here denotes the constructive amphiboly of being and becoming as that which is already but, may never be,
in a way that we recognize as either being or becoming. Consequently, the inexistent can be taken as the un-painted movement in Raphael's *The School of Athens*: the unseen fall of the hand from Plato's ideal-upwards finger, to Aristotle's actual-emphasizing downward palm. Motion (here as gesture) is the continuum by which Schelling can make the claim that Platonic abstraction and Aristotelian concretion are contiguous rather than oppositional. One begins with Plato because thinking (for us) begins in abstraction, and only through abstraction can we burrow down to the concrete. Yet, abstractions are the result of an augmentative procedure of compounded actualities best understood in an Aristotelian vein. It is this open-endedness of thought, focused through the locality of the concrete, in which Schelling's emphasis on motion highlights the tension between the mobile and the immobile - of explaining the seemingly unlimited power of thought via the unavoidable problems of localized action. Not simply of applying or transforming thought into action but asking how thought and all motion are localized at all.

Or, in Schelling's terms, how do we pass from the Platonic first motion, the World-Soul, to isolated forms of activity thereby allowing them to be animated yet perform their own motions? Or, how does one move from Plato's account of the abstract as universality arising from nature's potencies as becoming, to Aristotle's exploration of the actual in terms of the accretion of dimensionality consequent on animality? In addressing motion and subsequently space through the question of world in the ancient sense, Schelling is able to reintroduce nature as a problem since the Greek world is really that of our modern cosmos, or the all, or nature in its fully creative sense.

*A - Plato*

For Schelling, the *Timaeus* functions as a philosophical Proteus, a form that he couples with the assertion that only nature can be said to *a priori* and therefore philosophy is the attempt to think the unconditioned all. In other words, against the parochial view of Plato as driving a wedge between idea

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77 I discuss inexistence *vis a vis* the potencies in Chapter 4 below.
and existence, Schelling argues for a Platonic nature (however thinly constructed in the *Timaeus*) as that which must be capable of genetically producing both thought and thing. In always being mindful of this ur-form of philosophy (nature as radical continuity without purely thinkable unity,) the question becomes what is the presumed first motion of the world an abstraction of? As the young Schelling pointed out in his essay on the *Timaeus* (1794), the motion that seems to be in matter, in the possibility of an internal alteration of the world, is the notion of motion, or change, that requires the understanding and thus is not original.78

It may appear anathema to claim that the World-Soul, one of the most abstract and ideal components of Plato's system, should be considered an important part of a naturalistic view. Yet, taking physics as a basic if abstract component of naturalism, the non-total absolutization of motion appears less curious given a non-totalized or open-ended world.79 Taking the World-Soul of the *Timaeus* as a one-world physics treated methodologically as two80, gives us basic categories of sameness and difference which can exist in relation to each other in periods of motion and rest around an axis. Thus, for Schelling, existence is the mystery whereas essence is a determination which leaves the residue of ground as remainder. The non-totality of the world is not one justified solely by the insufficiency of knowledge to classify, but by the errancy of production or, the fact that motion is recursively added to itself. If the *Timaeus* provides the ur-form of philosophy itself, and if this form is central to Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, then Speculative Physics, in its present rudimentariness outlined thus far, must apply to Schelling's own way of forming philosophy as such. Taking our

79 While it has become almost commonplace to lean on Cantorian set theory to emphasize the nonexistence of a set of all sets, Schelling's mathematical interests lie in proto-intuitionist geometry and, particularly, in the importance of the trans – an emphasis which the mathematician Fernando Zalamea has recently emphasized as typical of romantic era thinkers. In this sense Schelling's interests lean more towards the categorical than the set-theoretical, more towards transformation (or motion) than in belonging. I discuss Zalamea in Chapter 3.  
80 This was an open debate between specialists in Plato as late as the 1940s and seems to be closed after Arthur Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936) and for a opposed Platonic realist view see Constantin Ritter's *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* (Memphis: Jackson Press, 2007).
aforementioned themes in stride (dynamics, motion, space) we can say that Schelling's own practice of philosophizing is a self-destructive or, perhaps more accurately, an ablative one.

While he is often himself seen as being too protean a thinker due to internal inconsistencies, it can be readily argued that Schelling is in fact committed to a protean form of philosophy as such. This is not to say that Schelling is consistently inconsistent, but that since thought, as a part of nature, is dynamic motion in a continuous space, one can only ever hope to construct local meta-stable constructions. In other words, there can only ever be systems and not one system. If there is a personal motivation to this mode of philosophizing for Schelling it is not manic inconsistency, but melancholy. As seen in one of the epigraphs from the introduction above, Schelling wrote at an early age that nothing saddens the philosopher more than seeing their own system completed. This is also indicative of the concerns leveled at Schelling, via the charge of Spinozism, addressed above in that Schelling absorbs pre-critical metaphysical systems in terms of their demands and neither their forms, nor methods. To ignore the desire and motives for metaphysics is to be less critical than to accept Kant's system whole-heartedly.

Yet the functions of the categorical and the mobile are not divorced. The Platonic dialogue most attentive to motion (after the Timaeus) is The Statesman, which attempts to flesh out the logic of classification in how abstract or theoretical knowledge relates to practical knowledge. The Stranger demonstrates the seemingly unending variety of classes before arguing that a certain fiction needs to be entertained – that of the universe in motion, a motion which at times in the past has retrograded, so that the material of the world is recycled. At its root the illustration functions to say that there is a

81 In his text Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy, Bruce Matthews suggests a similar problem with Schelling's thought but in hermeneutic, and not physical, terms: Matthews suggests that Schelling's proclaimed strategy for discovering the singular thought of a given philosopher is a strategy that is difficult, if not impossible, to apply to Schelling himself.

82 As the Visitor says: "Remaining permanently in the same state and condition, and being permanently the same, belongs only to the most divine things of all, and by its nature body is not of this order. Now the thing to which we have given the name of 'heaven' and 'cosmos' certainly has a portion of many blessed things from its progenitor, but on the other hand it also has its share of body. In consequence it is impossible for it to be altogether exempt from change, although as
material at stake in motion that interferes at the level of the concrete in terms of “the due measure.”

That is, the determination of a particular pragmatic skill (a knowledge coupled with a local-motion) is required to make order out of the spinning chaos of the world. In addition, the art of measure (or determination) is especially important for hunting or tracking (as the visitor describes it) those movements which are not readily visible thereby suggesting the importance of the being of non-being, or the existence of the inexistent, or the motion of the world-soul demonstrated in its products. Schelling's utilization of the World-Soul is due to the abstraction (or de-potentiation) of thought itself as an activity. But this activity, is consequent upon its discovery in thought which in turn is consequent on animal motion.

The immediate problem for a philosophy of nature that Schelling recognizes is that the unconditioned cannot lie in a particular product of nature, but that analysis can only work with products. Transcendental philosophy, under Schelling's transformations, takes up the unconditioned of nature as the process of speculative construction, thereby ungrounding the form of the transcendental put forth by Kant. But, following Aristotle, this speculation has an ontologically naturalistic ground. Yet, and as will be articulated in the chapters that follow, idealism is not about forces above the world, but by being inexistent guarantee that the naturalistic world can function immanently without being bound to a closed form of immanence.

**B - Aristotle**

That is, just as the human reason represents the world only according to a certain form, whose visible expression is the human organization, so every organism is the expression of a certain schematism of the intuition of the world. Just as we surely see that our intuition of the world is determined through our original limitation, without our being able to explain why we are precisely limited in this way, and why our intuition of the world is precisely this and no other, so too the life and the intelligence of animals can be just a peculiar (although inconceivable) kind of original limitation, and only their mode of limitation would distinguish them from us.

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83 Plato, *Complete works*, 327.
84 Schelling, *First Outline*, 132.
Schelling's 21st lecture from the *Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy* begins with a critique of Kant's utilization of Copernican imagery and ends with the corpses of frozen mammoths. Why? Schelling notes that Kepler, following Copernicus, wanted to end 'the ineffable celerity of the world,' to bring things to a calm. Taking this as the model for knowledge as Kant famously did,

Schelling argues has the result of erasing the activity of nature (and the tension between motion and rest) by placing it within reason.\(^85\) Schelling finds in the paleontological work of Georges Cuvier, the opposite gesture, of saying that extinction is to be found in materiality alone yet, such catastrophism erases the movement of forces. He writes: “From matter alone the Invisible that is relentless and as it were knows no other principle that nothing possible remains, that in the place of the disappeared, the now living ever more similar kinds constantly change.”\(^86\)

Neither an internal idealization of absolute motion, nor a complete externalization of motion as material contingency can do justice to nature, a nature which, according to Schelling, functions by the law of the world: that all possibilities are self-fulfilling and everything deploys in equal measure. Yet given this, how do we move in a well-spring of motion that is doubled (as both seemingly external and seemingly internal). That is, how do we come to reason as a compass, a ground of dimension, caught in (at least two) series of motions? Iain Grant addresses this in his text “How Nature Comes to be Thought”:

The 'ground of dimensionality' can only be thought consequently upon dimensionality, or, in other words, dimensionality is emergent, if it is at all, from what is not dimensional. This does not mean that there *are no dimensions prior to their thought*, but that there are none prior to the operation of dimensions such that only such a thought is capable of thinking the emergence of dimensionality from non-dimensionality as such [...] since thought is that dimension of motion that causes the problem of the ground of dimensionality to be a problem, it is clear that thought is amongst the dimensions of the motions of bodies, or better, is precisely the totality of motions of which bodies are capable.\(^87\)

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Grant's point not only re-emphasizes the importance of motion in Kantian and Post-Kantian thought, but also points to a place for physics in terms of grounding reason beyond establishing the physical conditions for the limitation of the senses, physics as speculation in this sense, becomes more closely aligned with the way in which naturalism is utilized to probe the conditions for producing reasons. It also introduces the importance of locality in addressing the relation of thought to nature. In focusing on animal-centric movement (locomotion) we can begin to construct the relation between the abstract and local account of motion in the previous section with and a speculative theory of the numerous kinds of thought rising from basic animal navigations.

In his 19th lecture from the *Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy* Schelling investigates these basic navigations via Aristotle. Schelling points out that Aristotle goes against his own philosophy in indexing a universality (namely perfection) rather than attempting to derive animal dimension from the progression of line, surface, and body.\(^8\) The progression of organic forms is a development of trajectories both in an embodied sense, and in the way in which this very embodiment allows for, and engenders, the ramifications of dimensionality. While external definition of dimensionality (length, width, breadth etc.) is anchorless, Schelling points out that the ground of dimensionality is one internal to species. The difficulty, which Aristotle attempts to avoid through uncharacteristic appeal to perfection (or for our purposes here totality), is how to decide which bonded pair or dialectic (back-forward, right-left) is first? This indecision valorizes the inexistent, or relative-non-being, of ground (again the reason why the presumed first motion is consequent but operates as absolute) which is both origin and the past.\(^9\)

Bemoaning both Aristotle's and Plato's obscure notions of matter Schelling writes: “The first natural motion of what sinks into proto-materiality is to re-emerge as principles, by which means

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\(^8\) *Darstellung* 19, 1-2.
\(^9\) *Darstellung* 19, 7.
dimensions in fact arise. From this motion, which we understand as length, posits a negative ground to move away from and hence motion is the test of its potential escape from its abstracted origin. The voluntary production of movement however requires a mapping of direction. It is the capacity to map and to place, via dimensionality and direction, that Schelling argues is the fundamental meaning of soul in Aristotle's work. Rationality is consequent upon an augmented series of motions built upon a further series of motions – sentience (the ability to track motion and map dimensions) feeds into sapience which pushes sentience behind it as a ground but always exploring the consequences of sentience for sapience (the visual line of navigation becomes the mathematical line of construction). In order to construct such entities, I will now move on to the relation of thought and sense as it is constructed in late Kant, Maimon, and how Schelling's work follows indirectly from these figures.

90 Schelling, Darstellung 19, 9.
91 Darstellung 19, 9.
2.0 - Castles of Ether and Asymptotic Bridges: Kant, Maimon, Schelling, and the Relation of Inner and Outer Sense

If, as we saw in the last chapter, Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (1790) showed the possible escape routes from the critical system, routes which the German Idealists later explored, the *Opus Postumum* (1804) is a work that appears to simultaneously break with, and yet shore up, the speculative reach of the critical project. While one could engage *The Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences* (1786) as the definitive text on Kant's sophisticated engagement with the physical sciences, as fully determining the relation of inner and outer sense, I will address the far more controversial *Opus Postumum* for several reasons.\(^{92}\) Centrally, the *Opus Postumum* is Kant at his seemingly least critical, and most metaphysical, following the much vaunted Copernican turn. Kant's Copernican turn, as is well known, placed the subject-as-observer at the center of the epistemological cosmos. Or, for Kant, the forces and dynamics detected in outer sense should fit the forms of inner sense in order for us to speak about the world at all. Whether this placement is a necessary assumption for a modest epistemological stance, or, whether it amounts to a form of anthropocentrism in thinking, remains a much debated issue. Confusion over the nature of Kant's revolution, I argue, stems largely from collapsing a claim of position (from where do we know) and subject-object relation (what has the final say on the judgment of the knower on the known, or the known on the knower). While Schelling would be critical of Kant on the later point, he would fully appreciate the uprooting of humanity's fixed place in the actual, and epistemological, cosmos.\(^{93}\)

\(^{92}\) While the tension of inner and outer sense may not be central to *The Metaphysical Foundations*, it appears in relation to the degree to which Kant wishes to avoid relying upon construction in relation to nature, and in particular, notions of matter. While Kant's hesitance stems from attempting to avoid Cartesian Idealism, he appears to box himself in regarding nature's dynamism, *vis a vis*, the non-ideal dynamism of the I, or the subject. For an exposition of this problem see Michael Friedman, *Kant's Construction of Nature: A Reading of The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 223.

\(^{93}\) Quentin Meillassoux's already mentioned *After Finitude* is in a long line of thinkers who claim that Kant's turn is actually Ptolemaic, and not Copernican. Thinkers such as Norman Kemp Smith, Bertrand Russell, and Roy Wood Sellars, to name a few, have made similar claims throughout the twentieth century.
In the *Opus*, Kant touches upon Schelling's work (albeit slightly) and, more extensively, engages with numerous Schellingian themes close to the project here: the importance of motion, the continuity of nature, and the division between metaphysics and empirical physics. More specifically, and to link the discussion to chapter 1, while, in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant moved away from absolutizing space to relying on an internal, and ideal, space of observation, he appears to swing back towards something more like absolute space in the *Opus*.

The first two themes are addressed in the *Opus* through the notions of the ether and matter, both of which are connected, and brought to bear on, the metaphysical/physical divide through a lengthy discussion of space. Before discussing the *Opus*, however, I wish to examine a precise treatment of space in Kant's critical thought. Kant's remarkable “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (1786) which additionally addresses the pragmatic navigational terms we will tackle towards the end of this project. I use the term navigation as short-hand for the synthesis of motion and space, between the numerous capacities of inner navigation (experience, intuition, reason, speculation), and that of outer structure (space, horizon, direction, magnitude, etc). Or, the way in which navigation is described in Kant, can be taken as a measure of the tensions between the inner and outer rooting of space and motion, and, how the bridge from inner to outer is constructed, and, considered either analytic (as self-evidently external), or synthetic (as provisionally internal).

Following this discussion, I will then address how Salomon Maimon's critique of the *a priori* synthetic activity, supported by his discussions of mathematics, suggests that speculation breaks the critical system but in a way that allows for a synthesis of the natural and mental in a fashion that inspires Schelling's dynamic treatment of nature which I explore in the last two sections of this chapter.

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94 As far as I can tell, while Schelling was aware the *Opus* existed following Kant's death, I can find no sign that he was aware of, or had read, its contents. The sole mentioned lies in Schelling's obituary of Kant written in 1804. See SW VI, 8.

Maimon's work, as we will see, pushes the tentative dynamism of Kant's thoughts on nature (from *The Critique of Judgment*), on which Schelling indirectly expands.\(^9\) This dynamic push centers on the problematic relation of the qualitative to the quantitative primarily in terms of magnitude.\(^9\) Maimon's law of determinability, in what appears in a proto-Schellingian fashion, attempts to combine a genetic, or asymmetrical creation of objectivity on the one hand, with a polarity between intuition and conceptualization on the other hand. The notion of the genetic, which accompanies that of determination, is imperative for maintaining difference in any case where dualisms (mind and nature, inner and outer) are questioned. Maimon's attempt at being speculative, yet empirical, presents a particularly helpful way of leaving the gravity-well of Kant's system, while still recognizing the veracity of the transcendental beyond the merely schematic.

I wish to argue ultimately that a physicalization of Kant's perspectival mode, conjoined with Maimon's discussion of magnitudes, creates a historically indirect, but conceptually fertile, ground for Schelling's re-construction of nature via powers. That construction will be the focus of Chapters 3 and 4.

**2.1 - Kant's “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”**

Kant's essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (1786) which shares its general theme with the far better known “What is Enlightenment?” essay written two years prior (in focusing on the Enlightenment as thinking for oneself) is Kant's answer to the pressure to speak to the Pantheism Controversy raging in Germany at the time. In both texts Kant argues how reason must subject itself to its own law unless it wishes to be subject to the yoke of external law. But, unlike “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant's orientation essay works with the terms of geography and horizons,

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\(^9\) As far as I can tell, Maimon had no direct influence on Schelling's work. However, Schelling's later focus on empiricism appears very similar to Maimon's general approach to Kant's work.

\(^9\) I will address Schelling's use of determination and intuition, and how it relates to navigation, in the final two chapters of this project.
and seems more wiling to admit the possible pitfalls of reason, specifically, of reason as being potentially dangerous in its somewhat arbitrary selection of a horizon, and, the subsequent navigation towards it. Kant writes:

In the proper meaning of the word, to orient oneself \textit{[Bedeutung]} means to use a given direction (when we divide the horizon into four of them) in order to find the others - literally, to fix the sunrise. Now if I see the sun in the sky and know it is now midday, then I know how to find south, west, north, and east. For this, however, I also need the feeling of a difference in my own subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these two sides outwardly display no designatable difference in intuition. If I did not have this faculty of distinguishing, of the southernmost point of the horizon, or whether I should complete the circle by moving north and east and thus back to south. Thus even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically only through a subjective ground of differentiation; and if all the constellations, though keeping the same shape and position relative to one another, were one day by a miracle to be reversed in their direction, so that what was east now became west, no human eye would notice the slightest alteration on the next bright Starlit night, and even the astronomer - if he pays attention only to what he sees and not at the same time to what he feels - would inevitably become disoriented.\footnote{98}

At first glance, the question of position and horizon suggests that the spatiality of Kant's orientation is (unsurprisingly) neither purely empirical nor purely dogmatic. The insistence on “a subjective ground of differentiation” reasserts the apparent (though tautological) formalism of the critical system. As Schelling argues in \textit{The Grounding of Positive Philosophy}, the transcendental ideal that motivates Kant's critical philosophy is only ever a negative philosophy in that it can only critique from essentially nowhere, or, only from the non-location of its own conditions as the functioning of reason outside experience. At the same time, “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” demonstrates the shift in emphasis, suggested by Peg Rawes, regarding the relation of inner and outer to the conceptualization of space. She writes:

Thus, in the development from the first to the third Critique, the relationship between experience and space undergoes a dramatic shift in which external or transcendental understandings of spatial relations become internalised into the powers of the sensing and reflective subject. Space and time are transformed from limited transcendental forms into indeterminate cognitions or judgments that are constituted by the thinking subject: cognizing geometry and space become embodied aesthetic judgments so that disembodied reason is transformed into a perceiving and embodied sense-reason.\footnote{99}

This transition is evident, in the above passage from Kant, as it becomes somewhat doubtful if the notion of the transcendental, from \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, can account for the articulation of


“feeling” in the embodied sense it immediately invokes. An internal sense of space, referring to external objects (the sun, Kant's hands), allows for one to retroactively accept “a given direction” as analytically valid (the sun is there, so that is west). The act of extrapolating from chilarity (or handedness), to an objective division of the horizon, would appear to be an act more synthetic than Kant might feel comfortable with given the subsequent self-judging responsibility of reason. Rawes argues that whereas in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” (discussed in the last chapter) Kant keeps sense and reason closely related, by the time of The Critique of Judgment, and as already suggested in “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?”, they have become more and more alienated while, somewhat paradoxically, the synthetic power of orientation has become more internalized.

A whole nexus of issues can be investigated here, all of which, are too large for the project at hand. What is important, however, is to note that Kant's uprooting of the subject, which risks falling into a crude idealism, in fact, is coupled with a emphasis on navigation and locality. Inner sense, in this regard, becomes obscure to the extent that Kant chooses to localize it, but arguably without emphasizing any notion of embodiment. It is for this reason, and to return to the present stakes of this chapter, that so much ink has been spilled regarding the status of space, and the relation of sense to space, in The Critique of Pure Reason. While in “Concerning the Ultimate Ground,” Kant seems to rely on some notion of embodiment, Kant, in the first Critique, abstracts, or idealizes, internality but my carefully dividing kinds of thinking, and by relying on the separation of faculties, and careful categorization.\(^\text{100}\)

Beyond this reading, can the Kantian view of sense as orientation, suggest an attention to perspective, one that de-emphasizes the groundedness of the empirical subject, and put in its place a more aimless or abstract navigator? The tension, and one which I will explore both through Kant's

\(^{100}\) For an expert analysis of these kinds of issues in Kant see Angelica Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
wrestling with nature in *The Critique of Judgment* and the *Opus*, is brought into the open most directly by Salomon Maimon. Maimon 'out-Kants' Kant in asserting that what Kant sees as analytic judgments are in fact already synthetic. Maimon's emphasis on mathematics is particularly crucial here since, whereas Kant downplayed the power of mathematics, the internalization of the power of navigation in a more and more abstract subject, requires an extension of the descriptive power of geometry as Rawes suggests. But, before engaging Maimon's critique, as well as Kant's turn towards physics of the sensible (and arguably to Spinoza in the *Opus Postumum*), what can we make of Kant's use of orientation? It would be easy to dismiss the potentially non-critical aspects of the piece as simply adventures in metaphor, but the very opening line of Kant's essay seriously limits, if not completely obliterates, such a possibility. Kant opens the essay with the following: “However exalted the application of our concepts, and however far up from sensibility we may abstract them, still they will always be appended to image representations, whose proper function is to make these concepts, which are not otherwise derived from experience, serviceable for experiential use.”

Kant goes on to argue in “What is Orientation” that image representations in thinking are unavoidable, since how else would we give flesh to the bones of inner sense as logical argument? This point is, of course, important for Kant as the universality of logics and heuristics comes about from articulating the universal appeal of concepts with their contingently attached intuitionistic (or imagistic content). It is not difficult to ascertain why Kant appeals to a practical image, such as orientation, in order to avoid falling into what seems to be a vicious circle, on the one hand, and, to valorize his project of immanent critique on the other. Images, as a conceptual gatekeeper, guarantee swift passage from apparently external objects (horizons) to our already established intuitions about them ('this is my left hand') and allow us to move back out to extrapolate further about the visible horizon. But the status

102 Kant, “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking,” 7 (8: 133).
of synthesis between these moments is the central question here. What both Maimon’s critique, and Kant’s fleshing out of space-as-sense in the *Opus* demonstrates, is that the act of synthesis cannot be as internalizable as Kant suggests in the first *Critique*, but Kant must reject this conclusion out of hand given reason’s (normative) responsibility to itself.

Kant argues that neither the vaunted power of speculation, nor religious faith, can be charged with assigning the location of human cognition; only reason, as a formalized aspect of cognition’s capacity to judge itself can accomplish this. Following the afore-quoted passage above, Kant argues that, in the last instance, what allows for orientation is a subjective ground, or understanding’s feeling for where it is. Kant writes: “it will be a concern of pure reason to guide its use when it wants to leave familiar objects (of experience) behind, extending itself beyond all the bounds of experience and finding no object of intuition at all, but merely space for intuition; for then it is no longer in a position to bring its judgments under a determinate maxim according to objective grounds of cognition.”

Yet what does Kant mean by *objective* ground here? If objective ground is a solidification of cognition by understanding in relation to intuition, as a feeling supplied by external need, then how does such a ground hold steady? While fixing the sunrise, for instance, points to the arbitrariness yet necessity of, moving into the visual field in order to orient oneself, Kant ends his essay by re-inscribing the necessity of following reason’s *internal* rules in order to avoid getting swept up in otherwise unbridled and reckless intellectual enthusiasm. Here I do not mean to critique the oscillation between external force of intuition, and that of reason’s functional rigidification, but to point out that even here, in the last instance, Kant calls in the normative calvary to cut down even the possibility of infinite regress resulting from an orientation affected by nature. Though Kant’s warning against

103 Kant, “What does mean to orient oneself in thinking?”, 8 (8:135).
104 Kant, “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?”, 9 (8:136).
106 See also Stephen Palmquist’s *Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy*
enthusiasm is apt in avoiding getting 'the authorities mixed up in the game,' i.e., in that normative
claims are important to avoid inviting meta-norms, such as state laws, from impinging on intellectual
freedom, this precaution does not seem to justify the means by which he limits the ramifications of
naturalistic analysis. The contemporary philosopher Reza Negarestani has a different concept of
Kant's Copernican navigator as being an advancement towards an imaginary and futural point of
scientific observation. As Negarestani puts it:

Rather than heralding the abolishment of the subject, the perspective operator cuts the subject loose from its immediate
foundation by mapping it from one domain to another. Once the subject’s reference point to any privileged instance or
position (first or last, particular or generic) is removed, it is finally possible to draw a non-trivial passage from the local
subject to the global structure, in effect realizing a continuity that defines an absolutized nature as a universal continuum.

While ostensibly operating within Peircean language, Negarestani goes on to engage Gabriel
Catren's argument (and by extension and relation German Idealism) in stating that this passage of self
to nature incurs a thesis that reflections, judgments, and other forms of thinking can be taken to be
cases of nature relating to itself. As he goes on to state: “If the subject is now immersed in a
continuous global structure, the separation of the subject from nature is a required epistemological
distinction, not an inherent ontological severance. And if such separation is not ontological, then
instantiations of the absolutized nature cannot be measured, or scaled against, the subject.

In Negarestani's functionalist reading, the structural or formal interiority of Kant-as-judge is
nature unfolding itself in the particularity of a generic subject. Yet what remains in question is the
status of the valences of the formal, and why particular forms or fields of the subject can be articulated
as nature relating to itself and not others But do Kant's normative worries not sabotage this radicality?

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107 In separate texts both Hegel and Schelling take issue with Fichte's musings on passports in On the Foundation of
Natural Right. For Hegel and Schelling Fichte falls exactly into the error that Kant warns about – of overly solidifying
the norms of thought into state sanctioned rules. On this latter point see Gregorie Chamayou, “Fichte's Passport: A
108 Reza Negarestani, “Synechistic Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” in Realism Materialism Art, Ed. C.Cox, J. Jaskey, and
109 Ibid. 333.
110 Ibid.
That is, if the normative or navigational mode of reason is continually set up as not ontological, as merely a local or convenient determination, but one which closes down questions about ontology beyond human activity. This negative condition of normativity becomes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a blank-check that absorbs all future consequences of normative actions back into the normative space, back into the domain of inner sense's control. While the degree to which Kant is willing to un-moor the subject remains in question, what is more at stake, for our purposes here, is the ideality of space-as-space in Kant's thought. While the *Opus Postumum* (1804) to which we now move ends with an albeit incomplete doctrine of the self, most of its pages comprise a transformation of Kant's views on space (and time) and, in particular, how they relate to sense and the role of the subject.

### 2.2 - The Ether Proofs: Crystallizing Space or Concretizing Ideality?

The question now becomes whether Kant's late work supports or undoes the suggestions made in the last section with reference to the radicality of epistemological orientation regarding the interior and exterior construction of horizons. Specifically, does the *Opus* physicalize space as an external medium *for* sense, through which synthesis can occur, or, does the text only highlight the physical side of the already present imagistic and intuitional aspects of Kant's treatment of space in the critical system and in the “Orientation Essay” discussed above?

In some respects, Kant's *Opus Postumum* appears as a kind of panic in which his critical system, critiqued at large for being 'too distant' from reality, becomes concerned with philosophically reconnecting with the physical world by addressing Spinoza's legacy in particular. However, this view is complicated by several factors. For one, it does not take into account Kant's pre-critical views in

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111 It is telling that not long after the text cited was written and presented as a talk, Negarestani began to turn more towards a Brandomian position. I will address the consequences of this turn in the final two chapters of this project. See for instance Reza Negarestani's “The Labor of the Inhuman” #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, ed. Robin McKay (Falmouth: Urbanomic Media, 2014), 425-466.
which nature also seems to operate non-mechanically, if not outright dynamically.\footnote{112} While these issues are arguably clearer in regards to the notions of biological life, as Kant's separation of life and freedom from nature, following their definite separation at the opening of *The Critique of Judgment*, to the end pages of the *Opus Postumum*, how exactly dynamics fits into nature, as translated into sensible magnitudes, remains somewhat unclear. The central issue for the moment, however, is whether the role of representation in the *Opus*, whether drawing on Spinoza and/or the physical sciences, especially in the so-called ether proofs, amounts to a fundamental reworking of the critical system or not. That is, does Kant move to embody, or otherwise materialize sense, or does he even further abstract the subject *vis a vis* the sensible outside of nature?

Setting aside the extensive problems with treating the *Opus Postumum* as a coherent text, Kant, in the last work of his life, sets out to finish the critical work, to correct the failings of the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences*, and to make the transition from a philosophy of nature, to physics proper. As Förster argues, Kant begins by critiquing the *Foundations’* inability to address the non-empirical *a priori* dimensions of physics in order to systematize physics' empirical endeavors.\footnote{113} Immediately Kant's endeavor in constructing a physical bridge between the metaphysical and physical worlds is problematic, in the Schellingian view constructed thus far, as the separation (in Kant's terms) transforms physics into merely empirical observation obfuscating the very nature of the construction of the hypothesis based on the import of physical data. In other words, the speculative content of the hypothesis is kept at a distance in Kant's *Opus*. That is, as I will attempt to investigate further, and as was just mentioned above, Kant appears more comfortable with the notion of construction in the *Opus*, but only to degree the powers of such construction are inversely proportional to the embodiment of the

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112 In particular see Immanuel Kant's “On Creation in the Total Extent of its Infinity in Both Space and Time,” trans. Martin Schonfeld, in *Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development*, v.V, ed. Damian Veal (Falmouth: Urbanomic Press, 2012). In this pre-critical text, Kant entertains the possibility of cosmological models which resemble contemporary ones such as the 'big-crunch.' This kind of speculation is not permitted following *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

subject.

However, while this follows the letter of Kant's work, its spirit is troubled in at least two aspects. Firstly, Kant's bridge-building between the metaphysical science of nature and physics, as a systematized collection of empirical facts, relies upon a theory of the ether (or caloric matter) which Kant argues penetrates all of space, and is the basis for the very possibility of representation. While Kant entertains a similar line of argumentation in the opening pages of The Critique of Judgment, there he focuses on reflection and the unity of experience for the subject whereas, throughout the Opus, Kant goes to even greater lengths to discuss intuition, and its importance in probing the admixture of matter and experience. In the Opus, Kant seems to physically harden the field of sense via the ether, while still leaving the subject attached to it (via intuition).

The physical status of this caloric matter is questionable as it is not only material, and all-penetrative, but is also described, in more idealistic terms, as a hypostatization of space itself. Thus, in the Opus, it is hard to distinguish the critical, i.e., representational need for the ether from its physical necessity. While Schelling, as we will see below, weighs heavily on the side of physical necessity, he is able to do this by leaning on a dynamical physicality over, and against, Kant's reliance on mechanics and kinematics, thereby keeping the dynamic philosophy separate from physics (such as under the name of phoronomy, or the a priori study of movement). This difference could be ultimately reduced to Kant and Schelling's respective use of form. Schelling is far more skeptical as to the degree which humans contribute to the forms they find in nature, and yet, these forms make their way into our very thinking. Kant, on the other hand, has a far more participatory model, since forms

115 Kant, Opus, xl.
116 Kant, Opus, 71 (21:222).
117 In this sense, the sublime, as a kind of formless object, (operating in the matter-experience role of the Opus) shifts between the mathematical and the dynamic whereas these domains are brought arguably closer together in the Opus. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 128-134 (5:244-2:251).
are indispensable for us to understand but their subsistence, beyond cognition, moves too close to dogmatic idealism.

It is not surprising that many commentators have zeroed-in on Kant's apparent physicalization of sense and argued that Kant is either falling back into dogmatism (particularly of the Spinozistic variety) or that he is simply expanding the perspectival aspect of the critical enterprise to physics. That is in the former case Kant is usurping schema with sense or, in the latter, 'perspectivizing' matter itself. Paul Guyer in “The Unity of Nature and Freedom” argues that Kant's Opus is a return to Spinoza in that for Kant: “Spinozism is right in its general form of seeing both nature or the order of causes and thought or the order of reasons as modes of an underlying substance, but wrong in identifying God as that substratum.”

Jeffrey Edwards, in the same volume as Guyer's essay, disagrees and argues that the substance of the ether (as a continuum of material forces) is only the object of intuition and nothing more. However, Edwards admits that Kant's text presents a serious roadblock to the separation of causality and freedom. This separation, from which Kant sets off in The Critique of the Power of Judgment, is particularly foggy given the somewhat ambiguous use of both dynamics and of the relation between forces of movement and their translation into the motion of bodies. That is, while Schelling fully entangles freedom and dynamics, in that freedom is a human mode of nature's dynamics, Kant maintains the capacity for movement, separate from, any expression of that movement's deeper underlying dynamism. These problems point to Kant's stake in the noumenal, a stake which Schelling, alone amongst the German Idealists, held to and complicated. While we will engage Schelling in this regard, for the moment it is important to fully explore the ramifications of Kant's final work.

120 Edwards, “Spinozism,” 70.
121 Sturma, “The Nature of Subjectivity,” in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy, 220.
While sense is a central term here, I will not address it directly in relation to the ether proofs but, in keeping with the theme of this project, I will focus on the terms of motion and space. Furthermore, I will address how sense functions as the ground of epistemology specifically in Chapter 5. For now I will attempt to place the Opus (and specifically the ether proofs) in relation to the physical sciences on the one hand, and, the capacities of reason on the other. In so doing it is helpful to examine Eckhart Förster's *Kant's Final Synthesis* and Beth Lord's *Kant and Spinozism*.

Förster argues in the closing of *Kant's Final Synthesis* that the Opus justifies a reordering of the relation of understanding and reason; he claims that whereas the latter appears, at least in the first *Critique*, as a ramified version of the understanding, reason, in the Opus, becomes more creative or constructive, a creativity which is constructively constrained in the forms of understanding. In such an articulation, reason becomes more like an ungrounded force and less a development of well organized pre-existing cognitive systems. Yet Kant's reliance on sense to articulate this power troubles reason's creative relation (or lack thereof) to schematicism, or formalism, as such. This is most apparent in regards to mathematics, and in particular, the work of Salomon Maimon whom I will address below.

Largely in agreement with Förster, Lord sees the Opus as a continuation of the critical project and not its undoing. But rather than putting it in terms of shifting the relations of understanding and reason, Lord argues that the Opus was “an attempt to incorporate a principle of immanent genesis into transcendental idealism.”122 Placing the text in a lineage including Maimon, and stretching all the way to Gilles Deleuze, Lord argues that the Opus was an ambitious, albeit unsuccessful and incomplete, attempt at incorporating difference into Kant's brand of idealism. Lord does an impressive job of demonstrating why she believes this is the case given Kant's diagonal relation to Spinoza.

Complicating the accounts outlined above by Guyer and Edwards, Lord argues that Kant's

knowledge of Spinoza should be viewed as second-hand via the work of Jacobi.\textsuperscript{123} Kant, in attempting to distance himself from Jacobi's attempt to combine the critical philosophy with Spinozistic dogmatism, does not engage Spinoza directly, but only Jacobi's presentation of him. The \textit{Opus} is particularly interesting in this regard as Kant appears to be softening his view of Spinoza to some extent.

Lord argues that in the \textit{Opus} Kant needs to explain how particular bodies could arise from the tension of forces and hence why the ether appears as both a material and a condition,\textsuperscript{124} or, “a single continuum filling cosmic space through the oscillation of force.”\textsuperscript{125} Lord also argues that the ether starts as more as a condition (of sense) but becomes more and more substantialized over time.\textsuperscript{126} For our purposes here what is most striking about Lord's account of the ether proofs is that it demonstrates Kant's admission, however slight, that a material unity, or continuum, must be asserted in order to have even the most base account of thought. Whereas the central key of the critical project is often the much lauded transcendental ideal, in other words, the distributive unity of experience that is achieved by our understanding, or the fact that it is our thought which holds the world together ---in the \textit{Opus} the object of the collective unity of experience is \textit{given} prior to the distributive unity of experience.\textsuperscript{127}

The ether, as a simultaneously material and transcendental condition, seems to trouble not only the normative dismissal of first nature, for the sake of second nature, but also troubles the very attempt of positing of the ether as a universal condition from such a local place (that of the human subject) that falls into the logic of orientation already outlined. The ether becomes the ocean of that navigational project as well as the very capacity for a “dynamical horizon” to be detected as such.\textsuperscript{128} Again, and to follow Rawes' suggestion about the internalizing of space-making capacities, why would the ether need

\textsuperscript{123} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 16.
\textsuperscript{124} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 155.
\textsuperscript{125} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 158.
\textsuperscript{126} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 159.
\textsuperscript{127} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 162.
\textsuperscript{128} Lord, \textit{Kant and Spinozism}, 166.
to function, even abstractly, as a medium for images, if the projective capacity of space were located in the powers of the subject, if inner sense were the final judge?

Lord ends her text with a somewhat critical account of Kant: “Kant's transcendental and genetic condition for the real is positioned alongside a transcendent subject that must still overlay it with those 'external' concepts not to be found in the ether itself.”¹²⁹ In this regard, Kant fails to recognize the limit of the subject, a failure which Lord opposes to the identity thinkers of German Idealism as well as Deleuze who 'truly' appreciated difference. Yet, Lord's account of German Idealism is too unitary and assumes that collectively the Idealists have no concern for difference and, in particular, the difference between thought and being. This is not at all the case for German Idealism writ large and, especially, not in the case of Schelling. That Kant's use of the ether could be read as keeping nature separate from thought more so than Schelling's concept of nature, and its asymmetrical production of thought, appears nonsensical.

In his *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* Grant addresses Kant's ether proofs arguing that Kant makes the ether, as an insubstantial body, into a broad notion of materiality¹³⁰ that, in other words, is the transition from metaphysics to physics that Kant sought in his twilight years.¹³¹ Rather than Lord's emphasis on the ether as having to do with assigning a substratum of material cause, Grant argues, following Schelling's critique of teleological judgment (to be addressed below), that Kant's ether is endemic of the ontologization of access itself.¹³² Grant's account is convincing given, on the one hand, Kant's indirect return to metaphysical concerns in the *Opus* and, on the other hand, his continuous empowering and abstracting of the notion of subject. Arguably, Kant can avoid appearing

¹³¹ Grant, *Philosophies of Nature*, 76.
¹³² Grant emphasizes that Kant's last work marks a return to his earlier Leibnizian roots found in *The Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences* rather than, as indicated often by the critiques above, a return to Spinoza or, at least a version of Spinozism. But what seems more likely, given Forester's evidence, is that Kant recognized the critiques of Maimon and of the then nascent movements of German Idealism as valid not in terms of their different grounds but in that where they wanted to take reason's limitations pointed to territories Kant had ineffectively explored.
to fall back into dogmatic metaphysics, as well as maintain his emphasis on the subject as a free and self-regulating agent by increasing the uprootedness of the subject increases in the final pages of the *Opus*, while strengthening the tether of sensibility between the subject and the manifold above which it floats.

Yet this simultaneous abstraction and empowerment becomes awkward when those powers include acts of construction such as mathematics since, in Kant's time, and soon thereafter, the grounds of mathematics suggests, and necessitates, greater and greater acts of free creation.

In the *Opus*, and already suggested in “What is Called Orientation,” reason's self-policing has to determine sense's externality in order to know the borders that reason is meant to police. Rather than naturalizing sense for thought, as Kant does, there are at least two recognized alternatives: one is Schelling's naturalization of thought as nature which is only subsequently, and methodologically, accessible to us, while the other is Maimon's syntheticization of Kant's analytic realm. As we will begin to develop at length in the following chapter, it is Schelling's insistence on naturalizing thought, and arguing that the difference between thought and nature is one of degree, a degree that requires methodological recognition, that maintains the greatest capacity for difference (or genetic construction as such) as such, for philosophy. Arguing that an ontological distinction between the ground of the subject and the ground of the real preserves difference only preserves the capacity to decide difference at the cost of nature.

I will now move onto the work of Maimon to address how the synthetic power of determination complicates the Kantian appeal to the given in the form of the ether as physicalized sense, as that which makes space, as such, for us. This critique lies, generally, in Maimon demonstrating that Kant cannot adequately articulate the synthetic *a priori*, things or facts that are universally and necessarily true, things or facts that require the connection of concepts to pure *a priori* intuitions (such as Kant's notion of space). Thus, for Maimon, judgment is far more modest in terms of its authority; it can only
make determinations in a cautious and piecemeal sense and, cannot rely on, reason's self-certainty in the same way. It is for this reason, most importantly, that Maimon's emphasis on mathematics is critically different than Kant's.

2.3 - Magnitudes and Determination: Maimon's Polarized Ideality

Although mathematics is not a canon for the science of nature, it is, nevertheless, a potent instrument (organon), when dealing with motion and its laws.

[W]e should take into account the fact that mathematical concepts are not copies of anything, so that we would have to compare them with their originals to determine their completeness; rather they are themselves the originals produced by the understanding out of itself a priori. From this it follows that the completeness of mathematical concepts can be judged only relatively, with respect to the consequences to be drawn from them.

Before jumping into Maimon's particular critique of Kant's synthesis vis a vis mathematics, it is necessary to introduce him generally as, unfortunately, he still remains a somewhat obscure figure. Maimon's Essay on Transcendental Idealism (1790) was recognized by many Kantians, and Kant himself, as one of the sharper critiques of the Kantian enterprise. Maimon suffered from relative obscurity partially because of his economic hardships and also because of his style of writing and use of language (purportedly due to his Lithuanian and Jewish background). Maimon's self-taught philosophical knowledge, and reputedly bohemian existence, caused problems for him until Kant openly praised him after receiving his work from Markus Herz. The central and fundamental aspect of Maimon's critique, one that will reappear albeit in different form in Chapters 5 and 6, is that, for Maimon, the forms discoverable by cognition did not consist in objects to be articulated through sharper forms of inner sense, but were only ever the results of construction, or synthesis of forms, carried out by the investigator. This asymptotic form of investigation, which is central to geometry, involves endlessly approaching one's investigative goal without ever reaching it per se.

135 Maimon focuses on this in Chapter 5 of his Essay. For a discussion of asymptotic analysis in the broader context of German philosophy of the time see John H. Smith “Friedrich Schlegel's Romantic Calculus: Reflections on the Mathematical Infinite around 1800” in The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy, ed.
Now onto Maimon's more specific critique.

Maimon's emphasis on relation and difference (via mathematics) makes a dynamic, yet non-dogmatic, articulation of nature possible, an articulation that indirectly opens the way for Schelling, specifically, by sharpening the concepts of determination, and derivation, which both follow from Maimon's attention to magnitudes. It is with these tools, and by focusing on magnitudes, that Maimon addresses the problematic status of nature in Kant's thought. This indirect approach to nature occurs through Maimon's focus on the notion of the synthetic a priori. Maimon's challenging of this notion arguably makes a combination of transcendentalism and naturalism possible in thinking after Kant. Maimon manages this by the analytic and the synthetic stem from a single root but one whose origin cannot be discovered. Thus, Maimon skeptical doubts things lying outside the mind as absolutely separate from it, but, at the same time, argues that the manifold of experience is only possible if a minimal difference exists between two things co-determining one another.136 Paul Franks' excellent essay “From Quine to Hegel” addresses how this logic of determination leads to a form of methodological naturalism.137 Franks argues that this methodological naturalism cuts Kant so deeply because Maimon argues that Kant's rejection of naturalism, via Kant's critique of Hume, does not adequately separate explanation from justification.138 That is, for Maimon, Kant cannot justify Kant's anti-Humean stance from within thought, i.e., that cause and effect must be in order for cognition to properly function, but that naturalism infers that the relation we perceive must be more than we perceive but not necessarily corresponding to a form for the sake of our cognition. Fundamentally, whereas Kant builds magnitudes from within human conceptualization, Maimon argues that magnitudes are discovered asymptotically by taking apart human experience.

138 Franks, “From Quine to Hegel,” 53.
Here we can take a look back at “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” On one level Kant appears as dualist in regards to thinking and sense (or as he puts it feeling) in order to find one's orientation. While this explanation functions in the practical 'go of things,' the ground by which this occurs would seem to beg naturalistic explanation (hence our argument regarding Kant's late appeal to the ether and his attempt at bridge-building in the *Opus*). It is when explanation (always potentially speculative) encroaches upon rational justification that Kant can (and is) accused of violating, or otherwise leaving behind, the critical project.

It is for these reasons that Maimon adeptly latches onto mathematics as existing in the pivot, or hinge, between inner sense and outer sense. As Meir Buzaglo has pointed out, it is important to notice how Maimon is concerned most precisely with how pure intuitions (and not empirical or sensorial intuitions) relate to *a priori* material\(^{139}\) and, furthermore, how Maimon's emphasis on the division between pure cognition, and *a priori* cognition, is collapsed into the question “How is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?”\(^{140}\) Maimon questions the operational utility of Kant's axiomatic definition of the co-synthesis of sense and understanding.\(^{141}\) The form of the question does not imply that Maimon is disputing the connection between inner sense and outer sense or, intuition and concept, but that he does not believe that the interactive dualism is self-explanatory. In order to combat this apparently inert reaction, Maimon challenges the ideality of space-time in Kant (arguing that they cannot be *mere* intuitions). At the same time, and as we saw in the *Opus* and “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” neither does Maimon believe that the thinker as navigator can simply 'carry' space-time relations with them. For Maimon, difference and relation must dynamically constitute objects (difference and relation are pressures which co-create, or construct).


\(^{140}\) Buzaglo, *Salomon Maimon*, 44-45.

\(^{141}\) As we shall investigate in the final chapters, McDowell, following Sellars, argues that intuitions and sense must always-already be conceptual by the time we can operate upon them. This relies upon a mediating third thing which, for Kant, is that of the aesthetic dimension of judgment which will address in the following section.
Whereas Kant remains agnostic as to construction's abstract functioning (at least beyond that which can be schematically or, we might say, visually demonstrated) Maimon suggests that a degree of speculation is necessary in order to maintain the possibility of difference (and, following Schelling, we could say nature as dynamic productivity). Maimon attempts this through his discussion of magnitudes. For instance, in order to say that 1 is bigger than 2, or that 3 is less than 5, Maimon argues that difference and relativity construct number. The very operations of 'more than' or 'less than' suggest that numbers are co-constituting and that there is nothing in the numbers themselves that suggests that 2 is bigger than 1. So whereas co-constituting relations can be carried on in the mind of the thinker for Kant, for Maimon, such relations construct the very objects of thought.  

These relations are composed of differentials, as the ultimate real unities, and hence, are not real or noumenal objects as in the case of Leibniz's monads. Furthermore, whereas Kant is content to remain within the bounds of Aristotelian logic as explanation, Maimon argues that the differentials, that derivation as such, is more primal than logic, as logic is only manipulation of objects after the fact, and not, their production or construction. Because of this fact, the operation of synthesis carried out in Maimon is an amplification and not an equation, or operation, at the same level as that of mathematical operations. Logical identity, taken in the view of the differentials or magnitudes, means that a statement of identity, a chain of subject and predicate, is one of amplification and not logical equation.  

How is it then that Franks ends his aforementioned essay by arguing that mathematics, which was the central focus of Maimon, proves a 'hard case' for methodological naturalism? As argued in Chapter 1, if the pantheism controversy can be taken as a question of 'what is the boundary and

142 Though, at the same time, Maimon does not abandon the navigational model of epistemology totally as he argues there must be some permanence or unity to the I to explain our consistent relation to the shore line, Essay, 86.
143 Maimon, Essay, 15.
144 Buzaglo, Salomon Maimon, 40.
146 I will explore how this works out in Schelling in the following chapter.
147 Franks, “From Quine to Hegel,” 65.
location of reason?’ then mathematical diagnosis, in its various means, can be skillfully manipulated to speak to basic ontological conditions, i.e., nature as movement, as the engine of derivation on which thought obtains, but does not exhaust. While Maimon was himself uncertain as to the ultimate ontological status of number, he convincingly showed that the demonstrative aspect of mathematical practices demonstrates that intuition and conceptualization can be treated as polarizations flowing from one cognition. Whether or not there are real objects outside of consciousness misses the method by which Maimon determines objectivity: the objective (as a concept) is objective because it has been intuited singularly, and collectively, as a widely shared and thus stable object of interrogation.

To take a geometrical example, whereas the concept of line can serve as the formal ground of the circle, i.e., the circle can be taken as the consequent of the line through the act of bending it, this does not explain the particularity of the circle whatsoever.\textsuperscript{148} This is because the understanding finds the use of the line as ground for the circle only when the line is taken as having a direction of movement.\textsuperscript{149} Here we can see that the notion of amplification (as touching on magnitudes) has both qualitative and quantitative valences.\textsuperscript{150}

Or, put another way, whereas Fichte's groundless ground for the subject is a qualitatively postulated magic circle, for Schelling, following Maimon against Fichte, the quantitative, all too often taken as an abstraction or reduction of the qualitative, is in fact more constructively viewed the other way around. For Maimon quantities simply are, and qualities, such as redness, are abstractions, or extensions of existing differentials.\textsuperscript{151} The language which Maimon utilizes to describe differentials matches that of Schelling's usage of actants in the \textit{First Outline} as limit concepts. In terms of magnitude, Maimon is claiming that what appears as vague qualitative expanses, whether extensive,

\textsuperscript{148} Maimon, \textit{Essay}, 60.
\textsuperscript{149} Maimon discusses this relation in terms of asymptotics which we will approach in the last two chapters of this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{150} For more on this see David Wood's \textit{Mathesis of the Mind: A Study of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Geometry} (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012).
\textsuperscript{151} Maimon, \textit{Essay}, 16.
(plurality thought as unity), or intensive (unity thought as plurality), are in fact abstractions of an expression of differences which, while they can only be accessed synthetically, are not themselves solely synthetic.\textsuperscript{152}

How does Maimon claim that synthesis is a part of this process of differentiation, yet, neither only thought, nor, completely alien to it? He does this by giving determination, as an ideal operation, a naturalistic slant (\textit{contra} Franks cited above). Determination, or determinability, is the notion of asymmetry which Maimon introduces into the ideal reversibility of subject and predicate. Or, as Oded Schecter outlines it, determinable and determinant.\textsuperscript{153} The subject, (or the determinable) according to Schecter, is that which stands on its own.\textsuperscript{154} The asymmetry of the determinable speaks to metaphysical necessity in Maimon, in that only in formal logic can the predicate float freely away from the subject.\textsuperscript{155} To return to a geometrical example, the line determines the circle but only when the action of the lines creation remains following its creation.

The ideal reversibility of Maimon, while still maintaining a granulation of the real, is the resistance of what a rationalist would call the metaphysical but, due to his skepticism, Maimon transfers this grain to the limits of the mind. These limits are not intrinsic however; they are not due to either noumenal withdrawal, nor to inherent human finitude, but are due to the very fact that knowledge, as a picturing or spacing, allows Maimon to transform the schematic making these limits into an outside.\textsuperscript{156} It is in this regard that synthesis (or construction) is the generation of new syntheses. The consequence of this transformation is that the status of the noumenal is skinned of its

\textsuperscript{152} Maimon, Essay, 68.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid}. 22.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{156} Buzaglo, 23, 107.
objecthood.\textsuperscript{157} That is, synthesis produces more syntheses and is due to a deeper process which is not a world of inaccessible things, but a process which makes any notion of thing or world possible (hence Maimon's minimal naturalism).

Immediately, one can see how Maimon's synthesis, in league with the measurement of magnitudes, speaks to a mode of thought that is concerned with trajectories rather than objects, with the use of concepts, and with how far they can be taken. As Schecter puts it, Maimon's notion of reduction is a pendular motion: synthesis creates new concepts which move from the general to the particular, while analysis creates new judgments in the move from the particular to the general.\textsuperscript{158} Yet Elhanan Yakira claims that subject and predicate are not equatable to general and particular for Maimon since he maintains a skepticism which effectively exteriorizes knowledge from things themselves.\textsuperscript{159} Thus it becomes difficult at times to determine the degree to which the synthetic is exterior or interior. In this regard we may see ourselves approaching Kant's navigator again, staring at her hands and then outwards towards the horizon. But while Maimon is critiquing Kant for often not admitting the degree to which aspects of mind must already be synthetic, it is more difficult to ascertain how this maps onto problems of location, i.e., in what sense the degree of construction relate to its proximity in regards to interiority and exteriority. Hence, for Maimon, unlike Kant, the analytic cannot be self-constructing but must be 'picked up along the way,' in the very course of thinking of it.\textsuperscript{160}

Yet, the difficulty for us here, is how this imaginative transference of limitations to the outside is differentiated from the speculations of the German Idealists from which Maimon apparently

\textsuperscript{157} Schecter, 24.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. 27.
\textsuperscript{160} Schecter, 37.
distanced himself.\textsuperscript{161} This transference seems to rest upon the degree to which the outside for Maimon is to be read as an internal limit to thought, or, if it is the limit of thought, as Peter Thielke seems to suggest,\textsuperscript{162} or, as Franks puts it, whether Maimon sees himself as committed to formal distinctions whereas Kant's distinctions, such as that between sense and understanding, are real.\textsuperscript{163} For Thielke these distinctions are taken as formal, thereby aligning Maimon with the likes of McDowell.\textsuperscript{164}

Furthermore, and to connect back to chapter 1, this issue is complicated by the apparently massive role Maimon played in inspiring Fichte. As Frederick Beiser argues, the power of the imagination, as the privileged engine of the synthetic, is what Fichte adopts and transforms into the formal distinction of I and not-I, a distinction which Beiser claims is not merely ideal.\textsuperscript{165} In order to dispute Beiser's claim, and to clarify the naturalistic tendency of Maimon's thinking, I believe that one must return to nature and, specifically, to the notion of dynamics in Kant, to show how the negative account of nature, (as not-I) or as inert only to be discovered as law), in Kant and subsequently Fichte, is problematic.

Furthermore, and as the following section will being to develop, but will be addressed head on in the closing chapters, I believe that Schelling extends Maimon's notion of determination to nature itself in terms of the relation between spatiality and the purported immediacy of intuition. Schelling's emphasis on Kant's third 	extit{Critique} forms the basis of Schelling's philosophy as it becomes that which must ground the first and second 	extit{Critiques}, i.e., the schematic or normative space of reasons which Kant's constructions in the first two critiques requires, for Schelling, the dynamic ground which Kant

\textsuperscript{161} In his introduction Gideon Freudenthal notes that while Maimon influenced the German Idealists that they represent the opposite of their thinking. Gideon Freudenthal “A Philosopher between Two Cultures,” in 	extit{Solomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic: Critical Assessments}, ed Gideon Freudenthal, (New York: Springer, 2003), 16.
\textsuperscript{164} Thielke, 119.
provides in his later critical work. But, whereas Kant combines these dynamics with a notion of teleology, Schelling relies upon middle-grounds of mediation which we find ourselves caught in within any analysis. Or, as begins to become clear in Schelling's Essay on Human Freedom, and remains central to all his work after that point, logic, or predication, is the becoming-of-being; it is how nature functions and not a synthetic add-on. This problem leads to the question of how natural sense, or imagination, as a middle-ground, behaves in Kant's Opus.

2.4 - Schelling's Dynamization of The Critique of the Power of Judgment

Kant's project in the Opus Postumum can be read as an attempt to make thought as natural as it can be, without abandoning the explanatory power of the transcendental method. As Grant puts it, Kant's unsolved problem is “How, if at all, is a non-dogmatic account of the relation of reason to nature possible?” Through mathematics Maimon demonstrates not only the possibility but also the necessity of approaching the dangerous territory of dogmatic speculation but Kant will not give mathematics the power to tightly lace sense and intuition that Maimon does yet, as we saw in our analysis of the ether proofs, he may make conceptualization more developmentally primitive (following Eckhart Förster's reading) in order to grant reason more synthesizing powers. If this is the case, the question I wish to engage in this final section is the question of what happens to Kant's attempt in The Critique of Judgment to quarantine nature if we read his augmentation of sense in the Opus back into it.

To begin, it will serve us to return to what it is that Schelling does with (or to) Kant regarding

167 Here I am extending even further a suggestion made by Iain Hamilton Grant at the Naturphilosophie Summer School in Pittsburgh in August of 2013 where it was suggested that, for Schelling, Kant's critiques should be carried out in reverse order. Here I am stating that the Opus should even precede The Critique of Judgment as attempting to discover the emergence of conceptual sense. While Schelling was apparently aware of the Opus at the time of Kant's death, I have found no indication that he engaged with the text at any length.
the latter's dynamic theory of matter. Simply put, whereas the connection between experience and matter is a regulative unity for Kant, unity, better rendered as productive continuity for Schelling, is the producer of problems namely in terms of nature as *Prius*, as something which thought always lags behind.\footnote{Dalia Nassar in her essay “The Absolute in German Idealism” makes this clear in distancing Kant's regulative unity from the non-substantial yet not strictly regulative concept of the absolute in German Idealism writ large. See Dalia Nassar “The Absolute in German Idealism,” in *Edinburgh Critical History of 19th Century Philosophy*, ed. Alison Stone} Buzaglo's central point is that Kant's split between sense and understanding is particularly problematic when you take the succession of time into account. Schelling's continuity is not a homogeneous continuity but a dynamic one. A dynamic continuum produces actual things because nature itself is polarized between being and becoming, between creative expansion and productive contraction.

One methodological consequence here is that Schelling can be seen as reversing Kant's critiques – in that in recognizing the power of nature in *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* one should restructure the apparatuses of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. The dynamic or de-substantializing possibility, which lies in *The Critique of Judgment* (against the stratifications of the ether proofs), is that of Kant's ascribing teleology to nature. In so doing, in expanding a teleological aspect to all of nature as such, Schelling effectively argues for the decomposibility of all things and asserts, as we saw in the introduction, the primacy of movement, or the *Prius* of motion in nature.\footnote{This is not a cut and dried issue as some have argued that Kant argues against teleology here.} Here, for Schelling, teleology is less about the setting up of definite beginnings and ends for nature, and more about arguing that while nature is purposefully creative, i.e., it creates particular things, we cannot ascertain why this is in a fundamental way. Just as modality only partially captures the ramifications of potency, teleology only partially captures nature's punctuated stability in the incalculable volition of its creativity.

Whether or not nature functions teleologically is central to Kant's second *Critique*, as its initial
and broadest concern with the separability of freedom from nature (or in the terms we have been utilizing, the importance of demonstrating that our motions are our own). This is complicated by Kant as he insists that, though nature behaves mechanically, (an assertion which Schelling will destroy), it appears to act intentionally.\textsuperscript{170} It is especially at the level of the organic, or of biological plasticity, that Kant argues that nature appears to have something akin to a dynamic freedom (putting it in Schellingian terms for the sake of comparison).\textsuperscript{171} Beth Lord argues that Kant's main motion here in supplanting nature's force with judgment's power, is to counter the philosophical moves of Herder's speculative thesis that nature had organic powers.\textsuperscript{172}

However, dynamics is not only a biological concern for Schelling since, as early as the \textit{First Outline}, he is critical of over-determining biological life as conceived by vitalism. Dynamics, expressed by both physics and chemistry, have grounds which must affect everything from inorganic formations to human freedom. Why mathematics is important here, despite Schelling's scant explicit treatment of it, lies in the fact that the kind of abstract dynamism he discusses, both outside the domain of human knowledge, and within it, is best represented by the exponential model of the potencies, a concept which is as mathematical for Schelling (as diagrammatic) as it is organic. Thus, Schelling wishes to avoid both merely taming nature with understanding's stability (via Kant), and giving nature, or particular parts of nature, inexplicable creative, or vitalist, tendencies (\textit{a la} Herder).

Furthermore, the movements on which Kant so heavily relies in “What is Called Orientation in Thinking?” appear straight-jacketed in \textit{The Critique of Judgment}. This is due largely to the fact that the degree of mental movement, particularly that of self-isolation, takes precedence in order to separate the horrible from the sublime.\textsuperscript{173} Kant describes the division of mathematic from dynamic sublimity in

\textsuperscript{171} Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgment}, 36 (20:235).
\textsuperscript{172} Lord, \textit{Deleuze and Spinozism}, 78.
\textsuperscript{173} Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgment}, 128-129 (5:244-5:245).
terms of a “movement of the mind.”174 This movement must be both of, and from, the mind for Kant yet in a way that is not ungrounded by the mind in its movement whereas, for Maimon, the depth of the synthetic reach cannot be erased. Again, Kant translates the depth of synthesis into the language of the aesthetic in that nature, as an external power for Kant, must be fearfully rejected or, its infinity must be recognized as one inferior to the infinite capacity for reason.175 To return to our opening section, and to Peg Rawes' suggestion that Kant focuses the projective power of space starting with “Concerning the Ultimate Ground” and moving till The Critique of Judgment,” the analytic is an exterior space of self-evident law that emerges prior to any sense or act, and yet, the act of finding or creating such laws is subject to reason yet analytic, it effects sense and can be re-done by reason, but it is not of reason, it is exteriorized. One ramification of this is that any substratum is an idealistic instrument for directing the activity of thought and cannot be objectified as part of nature, or, as a necessary condition itself not revisable by nature's forces. It is this worry that leads Maimon to rely upon the 'fiction' of infinite mind, thereby highlighting the impossibility of trying to self-ground the ideal, as well as, to simultaneously ground the real, or nature, as removable from the space of reasons.176

In his remarkable “Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process” (1800) Schelling argues that Kant illegitimately attempts to assert a purity of forces by subsuming forces to logical rule, a rule which, following the assertibility of nature over logic, is only possible because of nature. Kant must rely on forces, Schelling argues, even to construct the very notion of synthesis. Schelling writes:

A great deal of the incomprehensibility of Kant's dynamics has its ground principally in the fact that he thinks them as pure so long as he constructs only logically, but as soon as it comes to real construction (to an encounter) he always takes them bound up with matter which of course for the substrate-seeking imagination power which finds it difficult to think a force without something to inhere in, can be quite comfortable, but which constantly distorts the speculative outlook.177

174 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 131 (5:248).
175 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 144-145 (5:261-5:262).
176 The problem becomes one of measure, the quantitative appears completely arbitrary in relation to quality. One attempted solution, as Iain Hamilton Grant has shown, is to attempt to substantialize the number as was done in the work of Lorenz Oken. I will investigate this treatment of number in relation to Schelling's utilization of algebra in Chapter 3.
It is here that the various themes of this chapter can be brought to a head. On the one hand, Kant seems to argue that the abstract subject must have the capacity of determining the time-space relation (as a kind of navigator) in that, if we follow Förster, reason must be a projective capacity prior to the synthesizing of the understanding. But the sensible must be of a matter following the ether of the Opus, and thus a tension must remain in order for Kant to not fall into absolute idealism. Maimon complicates this picture by inserting movement into nature (or more cautiously we could say space-time) as well as the asymmetry of determinability but, at the end of the Essay, he also holds onto some notion of substantiality. At least, he does so insofar as objectivity is constantly, yet asymptotically, approached by the infinite intellect. The infinite intellect, as Buzaglo argues, is itself nothing but a fictional propellant for the act of thinking. The opening lines of Maimon's Essay are telling in this regard:

If it is true that every being strives as much as it can to persist in its existence, and if it is true that the existence of a thinking being consists in thinking (in accordance with the Cartesian identity claim [identischer Satz], cogito, ergo sum): then it quite naturally follows from this that every thinking being must strive as much as it can to think. It is not difficult to prove that all human drives (in so far as they are human drives) can be resolved into the single drive to think; but I shall save this for another opportunity. Even those who despise thinking must admit this truth, if they would only pay careful attention to themselves. All human activities are, as such, simply more or less thinking.

So what is the middle-ground of mediation, and how to properly create a space for the relation of space, intuition, and thought, if there is no ether, and, if space is not merely dead or formal matter? Given a seemingly overly formal notion of matter, what becomes of the substantiality of Schelling's determinations after Maimon? Or, put otherwise, if reason (or thought more generally) is an exploratory procedure, what is the place of nature if we are to avoid lapsing into the Fichtean-McDowellian isolation of the practical and its derivations (or explicit giving of reasons following

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178 In some ways this demonstrates the connections between Fichte's 'magic circle of consciousness' and Maimon's infinite mind in that both serve as justification for the conceptualization of thought itself as a closed circuit of investigation. But while Fichte's circle emphasizes the non-being of the not-I Maimon's infinite mind emphasizes the the consistency of determination.

179 Maimon, Essay, 5.
Brandom)? Or if we can never 'leave' nature, as I have suggested in the last chapter is argued throughout Schelling's work, then what then becomes of judgment?

Judgment, for Schelling, becomes more like Maimon's determination through the ideal isolation of experiment, in that judgment is always-already occurring in terms of predication, in an intentional sense, and, as spatial intuition, in an immediate sense. The determinability of an intuition's concreteness can be exported to a community of other thinking beings in a normative sense but, particularly in regards to the sciences, this must have some adherence to a logic (or we might better say a geometry) of physical invariants. Whereas Maimon appears more of an idealist than Kant, in that determinability is a product of the activity of the mind (behaving under the auspices of the fiction of the infinite intellect), the limitations of thought are less a priori decided and more pragmatically discovered. In order to further elaborate the pragmatic yet speculative nature of Schelling's thought (and, if there is one theme to remain constant throughout this project, it is that pragmatism is practical thought with speculation built in) I will, in the following chapter, pursue a Schellingian philosophy of mathematics, particularly geometry, in order to move towards a more focused engagement between Schelling and the formalization of nature and the nature of formalization, as it applies to space. Through his abstract utilization of geometry and the exponents of algebra, Schelling is able to present a notion of difference (or quality) that is neither against, nor without, formalization. While Kant required greater and greater powers to be located in more and more abstract, or disembodied, notions of the subject, as a mere 'X' in the Opus, Schelling instead elaborates what subjectivity is both for us, and, without us. Judgment becomes a diagrammatic and experimental tracing and working out of aspects of nature that have invaded our minds and not, as it is for Kant, an attempt to isolate the rigor of our capacities from increasingly unstable grounds on which they rest and navigate.
3 - The Force of the Continuous: Schelling's Naturalization of Mathematics

While much attention has been paid to Kant's, Fichte's, Hegel's, and Maimon's philosophies of mathematics, little to no attention to has been given to the function (and importance) of mathematics in the work of Schelling. In the following, I argue that Schelling's flirtations with geometry, in conjunction with his utilization of K.A. Eschenmayer's notion of Potenz as algebraic exponential, speaks to an early form of intuitionist mathematics\(^{180}\) which is important to Schelling's thought in (at least) two areas: one, in discussing the relation of quantity to quality, and, two, in constructing and describing thought as a species of motion. These pursuits, in different but bound ways, illustrate the complex form in which Schelling integrates human thought into nature by naturalizing that which seems most artificial: the synthetic creations of mathematical intuition.

Furthermore, by focusing on the quantity-quality relation, one can demonstrate Schelling's difference from Fichte, and the later Kant, while also pointing out Schelling's importance for contemporary thought and, subsequently, for the renewed significance of Naturphilosophie. By addressing Schelling's Identity Philosophy, which immediately concerns not only the mathematical through its focus on the logical form so important to Fichte (A = A), his Naturphilosophie, the core of Schelling's thought is expressed when it comes to the addition of quantities and qualities and, subsequently, to the deeper issue of the continuity of nature.

Schelling's Identity Philosophy, which is often considered only slightly less of a dead-dog than his Naturphilosophie, is commonly viewed as nestled in the shadow of Fichte's influence while, simultaneously, attempting to break free from it. In Schelling's Presentation of My System (1801) and Further Presentations of My System (1802) the themes of both motion, and quantity-quality, are evident, as Schelling writes in an Fichtean style (one of geometrical proofs, lemmas, postulates), while

\(^{180}\) While a whole different project in itself, there are identifiable traces of Fichte and Schelling's influence in the work of Brouwer who fathered intuitionist mathematics in the early 20th century.
pushing beyond the strict activity of the I. Yet, to regard these writings as simply amateurish, or as attempting to keep up with Fichte's demonstrable mathematical prowess, does a great disservice to Schelling's thought even at such an early stage.\textsuperscript{181}

Such critiques often rely upon the well-worn thesis that Schelling's protean nature led to his thought being a series of unrelated systems and approaches. These critiques risk making the claim that Schelling was inconsistent, which, in my view, damages the very subject of one's study to an unhelpful degree. If we take the aforementioned continuity thesis seriously, which Iain Hamilton Grant has convincingly articulated, i.e., that Schelling's work is continuous yet varied, then the Identity System becomes 'de-isolated' from the Naturphilosophie and from the later work on freedom, myth, and beyond.\textsuperscript{182} In relation to this, the mathematical themes of Schelling's work are amplified, I would argue, because they concern the very notion of continuity as such, a notion which appears from Schelling's earliest diary writings to the very end of his life. The general form of this continuity, however, can read differently, whether it be a productive model of nature, or the form of myth, or Schelling's theological concerns. This general sense of continuity is indicated in Schelling's particular form of monism discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1. For the project at hand, this continuity has to do with the inability to separate mind from nature ontologically while indicating the difficulty, yet necessity, in creating methodological islands within that monism from which thoughts can coherently operate.

As we will see below, Schelling's 'trajectorialization' of algebraic powers, that diagramming of powers to equate qualitative change with the trajectory of a geometric line, functions to strike this balance. Before addressing the Presentations and Further Presentations in detail it will be helpful to

\textsuperscript{182} Grant is not alone in this, both Bruce Matthews and Jason Wirth similarly argue that Schelling should not be viewed as a divided figure.
examine Schelling's explicit comments on mathematics and particularly geometry in his other texts.

3.1 - Schelling on Mathematics in General

Mathematics is not the rigid and uninspiring schematism which the layman is so apt to see in it; on the contrary, we stand in mathematics precisely at that point of intersection of limitation and freedom which is the essence of man himself.  

Setting aside Schelling's pursuit of geometry in the Presentations for the following section, the question of his general view of the science of mathematics will be addressed. Schelling studied mathematics in Jena in 1796 and then in Leipzig until 1798, while also delving into examinations of physics and medicine. Concerns about the mathematical appear, albeit somewhat obliquely, in his early work “Of the I” (1795) where Schelling makes reference to mathematical properties as only ever following from dynamical categories particularly in reference to magnitudes. Schelling argues that qualities are prior to, and different in kind from, mathematical categories. This early foray is not altogether promising and lends itself to a reading of Schelling's approach in the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797) as anti-scientific or, at least, as against the mathematization of nature as it appeared to him at the time in the form of Newtonian mechanics. But Schelling's attitude towards mathematics is anything but naïve. It can be mistaken as such, because in “Of the I,” Schelling does not thoroughly define dynamics in a scientific context, and his claim is that some notion of dynamics defines the contents of mathematical categories, may therefore appear, as idealist excess.

In an attempt to clarify Schelling's particular approach here, one could see his appeal to dynamics and trajectories, as an attempt to cut across Kant's division in The Critique of the Power of Judgment between the aesthetic and the mathematical treatment of magnitudes. While Kant states that mathematics can measure the greatness of a magnitude to an infinite degree, it cannot grasp the feeling of the sublime, of the overwhelming of a subjective aesthetic dimension reflecting upon the object of

183 Herman Weyl, The Open World (Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press, 1932), 61.
nature. Here it should already be clear that Schelling cannot share this separation since the activity of the I cannot be a priori separable from the dynamics of nature. And, as with Maimon in Chapter 2, the removal of this separation in turn affects the analytic-synthetic distinction that calls for a more exploratory approach to the very notion of construction, i.e., any kind of thinking's capacity to build, whether reason, intuition, or the understanding, is never constructing only from mental material, but from extra-conceptual sources. Thus, whereas certain mathematical truths for Kant are analytic, mathematics' true power lies in its construction of construction, in how enacting what appears as a self-stable measurement of the exterior is itself an effect of exterior powers moving through the purportedly interior I, or self, that is thinking.

This does not mean that one abandons all divisions, but that one accepts the consequences of exactly making and maintaining such divisions and constructions. This is immediately evident in how Schelling attempts to relate philosophy (as that which attempts to construct construction) via the natural sciences. Throughout the Ideas Schelling tries not only to make a place for philosophy amongst the natural sciences but to also keep open a place for nature's productivity within both domains. Schelling critiques and builds off of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) following his concerns with Kant's bracketing off of teleology as was discussed in Chapter 1. Schelling closes the preface of the Ideas in the following manner: “It is true that chemistry teaches us to read the letters, physics the syllables, mathematics Nature; but it ought not to be forgotten that it remains for philosophy to interpret what is read.” The majority of Schelling's early comments on mathematics generally appears in the 1803 supplements to various chapters in the Ideas. In the supplement to the introduction, Schelling connects the equation of the absolute real and the absolute

ideal to the necessary ground for any science, singling out mathematics and specifically geometry.\textsuperscript{187}

Put directly, any science or practice which centers on the generation of abstracta must, in the gesture of that generation, sublate the difference of real and ideal. The production of a line, or the production of a concept is, on the face of it, a demonstration of that generation's own capacity.

It is this equation of ideality and reality in the passages in the 1803 \textit{Ideas} that, as we will see, exemplifies Schelling's particular notion of identity borrowed from Fichte in the logical form of $A = A$. To say that absolute reality $=$ absolute ideality is not to say that there is no difference between them, but to say that the one follows from the other, i.e., that the two are bound as variables, that they are in an equation. They follow in the structure of the equation and are thus only differentiated by their sequence. To say this $A$ equals that $A$ notes a difference of location between two things, things which are not absolutely separated since there is the bridge of equation, and that the first and the second are related in that determination whereas they may or may not be absolutely first and second. It is only by understanding identity in such a manner that Schelling can insist that absolute ideality and absolute reality must have a dependency if the construction of the geometer is to have any effect in the world.

As is clear in the supplement to the introduction, the validity of such an equation is itself constructed, it must be \textit{posited} as a necessity, albeit as a consequent necessity. Relating this fact to mathematics more broadly, Schelling writes:

\begin{quote}
In the Philosophy of Nature, explanations take place as little as they do in mathematics; it proceeds from principles certain in themselves, without any direction prescribed to it, as it were, by the phenomena. Its direction lies in itself, and the more faithful it remains to this, the more certainly do the phenomena step of their own accord into that place in which alone they can be seen as necessary, and this place in the system is the only explanation of them that there is.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

I will address the way in which \textit{direction} can be read quite literally below, but for now it is important to see how Schelling celebrates the pure rationality of mathematics as \textit{the model} of demonstrative systematized construction. While the very structure of finding causes and effects is an

\textsuperscript{187} Schelling, \textit{Ideas}, 45.  
\textsuperscript{188} Schelling, \textit{Ideas}, 53.
endless circular game,\textsuperscript{189} Schelling advocates for a peculiar form of constructive reduction in which one can reduce a phenomenon to a placeholder, but a placeholder which is an ideal foothold for explanation. That is, in the context of the quote above, any thing is an act of creation but the consequences of this creation have to be ideally traced in its consequences. Or, in other words, the certainty of principles is a wager, a foothold, and what they create, in the form of direction or trajectory, is the ongoing proof of that certainty. The systematization of creative acts and consequences is locked into place, but only temporarily, by its location or place in relation to other principles and consequences.

It is this logic that motivates Schelling's critique of Le Sage's usage of particles: Schelling celebrates Le Sage's ingenious use of the mathematical to move beyond experience, but argues that such a supposition is threatened by an appeal to a body or substance, thereby undermining such speculation in demanding explanation. In other words, and in a logic that will reappear in Schelling's adoption, yet alteration, of Kant's physical monadology via the actants in the \textit{First Outline}, atomistic thinking lies at the bleeding-edge between explanatory entity, and a reliance upon substance as universal \textit{explanans}.\textsuperscript{190} The constructed real-ideality of number in Schelling's work most intensely illustrates this critique of substance, while also distancing him from a purely or naively Platonic take on mathematics.\textsuperscript{191} This position can be made clear in reading Schelling's fellow \textit{Naturphilosoph} Lorenz Oken who argued that number was constituted by the very accretion of substance, where base substance is represented by 0. Oken's 'organification' of number can be read as one alternative which makes Schelling's position more clear in comparison, and, in relief.

\textsuperscript{189} Schelling, \textit{Ideas}, 53.

\textsuperscript{190} This pivot is also essential for understanding Schelling's mixture of harsh attack and excited praise when it comes to the mechanism and immanence of Spinoza's philosophy. While Spinoza's use of immanence holds the promise of a complex understanding of identity that Schelling begins to entertain in the \textit{Ideas} and develops more rigorously in the \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism}, Schelling is damning of Spinoza for being too mechanical.

\textsuperscript{191} By naively Platonic, I mean the view that numbers exist separate independently of the manifestations of matter in the cosmos.
This difference, regarding the Okenian thesis concerning the substantive nature of number, can be detected in Schelling's *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*. Like Oken, Schelling begins with an unconditioned nature and argues that polarity can best explain the complexity of nature's products from the simplest, or most basal, form of our speculations about nature,—i.e., that nature is polarized. Iain Hamilton Grant argues that Oken's substantilized zero amounts to a proto-field theory whereby antecedents and consequents (or the higher and lower forms of nature) become regionalized and relative to one another.\(^{192}\) The zero, on the line of a tracing of a power, becomes a hinge (or indifference region) where different intensities, or polarities, cancel each other out. However, whereas Schelling's actants of the *First Outline* are logical footholds, Oken's slime-points are, as Grant argues, fundamentally substantive.

Grant demonstrates in his essay “Being and Slime” that Oken's thought follows a path by which logical or rational forms (such as numbers) entail ontological consequences.\(^{193}\) More specifically, Oken is concerned with how something derived its existence from nothing,\(^{194}\) a derivation which Oken illustrates as the repetition of zero. The question, Grant argues, is to what degree this zero which is repeated is substantive, or formal or, to what degree substance only makes sense as a logical foothold, therein pointing again to the copulation of the real and ideal.\(^{195}\) Whereas Oken relies on the zero as the point of indifference (which could be aligned to the copula or equal sign in Schelling) this zero of Oken's is endowed with substance.\(^{196}\) As Oken puts it in the first page of his *Elements of Physiophilosophy* (1809), mathematics describes the spirit of the cosmos while nature exhibits its material manifestation.\(^{197}\) Or, as he puts it a few pages later, physiophilosophy is mathematics.

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193 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 289.
194 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 290.
195 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 291.
196 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 300-301.
endowed with substance.  

A non-obvious, and somewhat controversial aspect of Grant's reading, is whether slime (or mucus) is the proper name for all of substance in Oken's work generally, and, in his Elements specifically. Grant argues that because Oken clearly aligns the biological with that of the process of individuation of matter as such, this contributes to Oken's 'organification' or 'animalization' of the cosmos in general. This is evident in Oken's Elements when he discusses the processes of the cosmos as occurring within “an aetherial globe of mucus.” Furthermore, while Oken distinguishes inorganic from organic in a classificatory sense, he subsumes all forms of creation, regardless of their category, under the notion of life. How, and to what extent, the inorganic and the organic are both considered life is somewhat unclear, as both are subject to motion and comprised of the repetition of zero. And, because mathesis is best at simply schematizing the motion and creativity of life, Oken argues that science must be a materialized arithmetic. However, since Oken emphasizes the biological sciences as the central organizational paradigm, it is difficult to disentangle how biological, or material mathesis, as such, exists in a context independent manner.  

As Grant points out, Oken equivocates between zero or substance (as slime) as having priority – mathematics is a description of the agglomeration of substance and yet its formal power preexists humanity. But, how does one explain human access to mathematical capacities in a non-trivial manner? Either substances accreted to the point of mathesis or mathesis was, from the start, potentially accessible by creatures capable of thought. From this Oken argues that numbers represent the direction and motion of zero – zero is a primary act and numbers are its repetitions. The zero is the impossible respite between the polarities of nature whereby the expansive and contractive tendencies (which

199 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 299.  
201 Oken, *Elements*, 27.  
202 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 305.
correspond to positive and negative integers) fight against one another endlessly. Nature, including human thought, is the repetition of this combat as substance. Thus, the lateness of human thought implies its evolutionary greatness for Oken and explains how it is we can discover the mathesis implicit in all of nature's working. But Oken's emphasis on the domain of life is not situated properly methodologically, nor does Oken justify how non-biological entities and processes benefit from being described in biological terms (other than a claim to common sense experience in that biological ontogenesis is more recognizable to us).

Oken's zero is an act of creation; it names the points which move and congeal into materiality (as an original mathesis we discover after the fact). Furthermore, it names a place that must be assumed in order to measure the motions and intensities of these creations (as the zero on the number line). While at the end of his *Elements* Oken asserts that spirit and mind are merely blossoms of nature, the act of speculating that mathesis is, in a *material sense*, that which preexists the emergence of mind, can appear to over-idealize the initial *Naturphilosophical* move of naturalizing zero as a slimy building block. So while zero precedes slime, or the primordial ooze from which all life sprang, the questions remains how does one argue that mathematics is throughly material without overly, and retroactively, biologicizing mathematics, or number? Again following Grant, Oken's mathesis is akin to the repetition of identity in Schelling's system; it is a repetition of the logical copula (*das Band*) in a logical sense, or the tension of direction or dimension, in the geometrical sense, whereby form leads to neither dead formalism nor to naïve idealism.203

Thus the inter-mixture of real-ideal is again highlighted: the boundedness or logical connectivity found in the world cannot be merely ideal if its discovery tests the very limits of thought and ideality. Yet, at the same time, Oken's emphasis on arithmetic, and on the anchoring aspect of zero, demonstrates how the zero as an act, demonstrates, in equal measure, its self-sufficiency as zero, as a

203 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 312.
point of observing more and less intensity, difference, magnitude et cetera, as well as the cost of any given demonstration. Oken's zero is thus a more complex account of the traditional philosophical decision, of the subject/object or mind/world starting point since the act, retroactively recognized, was already occurring and, in so recognizing its particularity, produces the problem of materiality (in terms of where one places the decision in the world). For Oken then, ideal and real correspond to intensity (or contraction in Schelling) and extensity (or expansion) of the number series. Thus, the zero and the copula approach one another in that Oken's use of the former, and Schelling's of the latter, both refuse the absolute separation of real and ideal while necessitating an act which appears to enact such a separation. However, as I will attempt to argue below, Schelling differs from Oken in that the difference between the qualitative and quantitative orders, for Schelling, is greater than Oken would allow.

While Oken's polarization of the zero introduces fields within an otherwise immanent nature, Schelling seems to argue that the exponential (or contractive and expansive) status of the Potenz is not adequate to explain the arithmetic of dimensionality. This requires a brief summary. For Oken, mathesis occurs materially which requires treating zero as both building block, and observational post, between intensities or magnitudes. Because of this, movement or activity for Oken motion is captured as acts which are more or less intense from where they are measured while being fully materially constituted.

However, for Schelling, the zero as notion and anchor is a powerful case of the demonstrative capacity of mathematics, but it over biologicizations these determinations. Thus, every determination of zero, whether as building block or indifference point of magnitudinal observation, is always-already within the restraint of life as Oken understands it. Because of this, the organic, or slimy point, leans too close to a reliance upon substance, it appears too close to functioning as an explanatory substratum.

204 Grant, “Being and Slime,” 315.
This is why, for Schelling, the notion of Potenz functions as the least assuming meontological solution to the emergence of things and the position from which one thinks them.

That is, whereas Oken's mathesis explains the intra-Poten function as the least assuming meontological solution to the emergence of things and the position from which one thinks them. Schelling argues in his *Presentations of My Philosophy* (1801) that the adding of dimensions demonstrates a qualitative change of a different order. While the zero, or exponential nature of the Potenz, demonstrates how the direction of the real and the ideal can be reversed (in terms of what is contained within, and what can explain what through the recapitulation of forces) the arithmetic of dimensions, or directions, appears to reinforce the asymmetry of being preceding thinking. Or, put another way, Oken's exponential model, without a corresponding diagrammatic one, can tend toward a materially immanent model of the cosmos, as the exponent, or repetition of zero, is just more of the same however ontologically potentiated. Or, to relate more specifically to mathematics, the generative formalism within mathematics has yet to be grasped by the mathematical navigations of human brains which leaves room for further discoveries about mathematics, as well as, the real ramifications (consequents) of mathematical knowledge.

Schelling keeps mathematics close to philosophy in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), where he reasserts the one-sidedness of knowledge (read: not the ideal dominance of the real) in that “the lamp of knowledge only points forward.” 205 Since knowledge cannot properly uncover the past, but can only extend what little we know of it outwards, mathematics as a formal science of demonstrative *abstracta*, remains imperative. Schelling discusses the difference between mathematics and philosophical knowledge as the difference between the knowledge of the act of construction as intuition – philosophy only trump mathematics as a form of pure reasoning by investigating the act of construction itself, and mathematics as the more pure, yet unreflective form, of this construction. 206

Yet, this distinction becomes harder to maintain given the fact that for Schelling, unlike Kant, mathematical intuition cannot be said to be contained only within the mind, given Schelling’s naturalistic account of thinking. This naturalistic account appears in relationship to intuition later in the System.

It may be worth pausing here to how exactly Schelling’s notion of construction relates to both naturalism, and the naturalization of cognition, and mathematics, and the naturalization of the schema. For Kant, the schema function to link non-empirical concepts with sense impressions. In this regard, and to point back to the “What is Called Orientation,” Kant emphasizes the difference between schema and images. Whereas concepts in “What is Called Orientation” are built and connected to sense impressions, and are a posteriori, schemata are always incompletely captured by sense impressions and are therefore a priori. For example, any triangle one encounters will fail to live up to the concept of a triangle.\(^\text{207}\) Much ado has been made about how cognition generates schemata, particularly as their generation appears to erode Kant’s already mentioned apprehension regarding the limits of construction, and the limits of intuition. That is, the power and necessity of schemata, for Kant, troubles his general claim that intuition is limited in how it can construct, or be productive, without the constraints of sense. Schelling, in naturalizing cognition, can offer an evolutionary explanation for the generation of diagrams, schemas, postulates, and the like, by arguing that they stem from basic capacities of motion, beginning with bodily motions and subsequently genetically informing thought as species of motion, as outlined in Chapter 1. Michael Vater, in his introduction to Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism suggests that Schelling saves Kant’s notion of the schema by attaching it to the importance of time in the development of consciousness.\(^\text{208}\)

For Schelling, the schema is a basal form of intuition that draws the border between concept

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\(^\text{207}\) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 273 (A141/B 180).
and object in thought, thereby allowing the activity of thought to reflect upon itself, to divide the
internal, and the external.\textsuperscript{209} It is basal, or particularly abstract, because it does not bring forth an
object, but merely embodies a rule. Schelling emphasizes that this embodiment of a rule is bound to
the very act of bringing an object into existence, such as in the example of a craftsman. Intuition, in the
sense of the function of the schema, is necessarily productive, and tied to actual generation.

Following the embodied nature of productive intuition, which is necessary for the self to
recognize its own activity, and what appears as almost a nod to the qualitative difference of a different
order (\textit{contra} Oken), Schelling argues that mathematics does not often recognize the difference
between absolute and relative negation.\textsuperscript{210} While the schema informs materially production, it becomes
difficult to separate the function of higher level abstracta, such as that of magnitudes or forces, from
the models we generate of them. This confusion is at risk in the very form of an equation. In the
equation, there is no recognition whether the equal sign means a return to a previous balance of forces,
a previous capture of one force by the other, or the annihilation of those forces. For Schelling,
philosophy and physics recognize that the sequence of positivities and negativities says something
about the underlying tendencies, tendencies which he believes are erased in the operations of
mathematical formulas. Yet, mathematical progress allows for the light of knowledge to be extended
ever forward as the advent of decimal fractions allows for better approximations, for instance, of the
movements of the stars.\textsuperscript{211}

Setting aside \textit{Presentation of My System} to which we will soon move, Schelling's attention to
mathematics seems to largely disappear only to emerge later in life in the \textit{Darstellung} or lectures on
“Exhibition of Pure Rational Philosophy” (1847-1852), particularly as a form of geometry of motions,

\textsuperscript{209} Schelling, \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism}, 136.
\textsuperscript{210} Schelling, \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism}, 80.
\textsuperscript{211} Schelling, \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism}, 119. It is here along with several moments in the \textit{First Outline} that
Schelling appears to be involved in some form of proto-asymptotic thinking in the vein of Peirce, Weyl, and others.
or geometry of dimensionality. I have saved, for the end of this section, Schelling's most direct commentary on mathematics as a science. In 1803 Schelling gave a series of lectures on the method of university study in which hedevotes a lecture to the purely rational science of mathematics.

In his *On University Studies* (1803), Schelling appears to reiterate his sentiments about the role and place of mathematics vis a vis philosophy that he expressed in 1800 – namely that philosophy is almost as adept at setting the conceptual stage for mathematics, as philosophy is at pure rational thought. In his fourth lecture, Schelling rehearses the identity between absolute ideality and absolute reality in order to move to discussing space as the intuition of the negation of activity (or for our purposes here we might say trajectory or dimension). Space is both activity, and the arresting of activity, just as a dimension, or trajectory, is a movement in space (as activity) and a measuring of that movement (as being). Following this Schelling argues that mathematics presupposes the intuition of pure space and pure time as reflections of a deeper unified being (a being which, following Schelling's divide between philosophy and mathematics must be being as self-inhibiting becoming). Or, in order for mathematics to be a demonstrative science of abstraction, it needs to presuppose a continuum in which its demonstrations can occur with proper impact.

Mathematics, for Schelling, rests its laurels on its surpassing the law of causality in that it intuits the idea as such by equating construction and demonstration (again, only philosophy peers into the act of construction itself). Perhaps hedging his earlier statements about the use of mathematics in astronomy, Schelling argues that pure rational mathematics can abuse evidence, and create empirical laws as if they were absolute laws. It is worth quoting Schelling at length as he closes the lecture:

Philosophy and mathematics are alike in that both are founded upon the absolute identity of the universal and the particular. Hence, both are purely intuitive, since every relationship of this type is perceived through intuition. But whereas mathematical intuition is a reflected one, philosophical intuition is rational or intellectual intuition and identical with its object—with primordial knowledge itself. Philosophical construction interprets what is grasped in intellectual intuition. The

213 Schelling, *On University Studies*, 47.
particular identities, which like the universal identity, express absolute primordial knowledge can be grasped only in intellectual intuition, and in this sense are Ideas, Philosophy is therefore the science of Ideas or the eternal archetypes of things. Without intellectual intuition no philosophy.\(^{215}\)

It is worth briefly articulating a broader account of Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition. Following from the above outline of Schelling's methodology as construction (in 0.3), productive intuition is construction embodied in a sensate and mobile subjectivity. This model of intuition has very particular consequences for construction in that mobility conditions and localizes intuition, but in a sense that is initially, and continually, apprehended in higher, or more abstract forms, such as intellectual intuition. This latter form of intuition comes from an indifference point, or a *seemingly* unconditioned place yet, as soon as that intuition encounters any form, its testing of that form's extensity, will demonstrate the locality of any given happening of intuition.

Setting aside the more specific role of intuition to be fully addressed further on, what is important here is the emphasis that mathematics can reconnect to its more primordial roots, a project which I believe Schelling himself pursues in the *Pure Rational Philosophy* lectures. Before proceeding to those lectures and then to intuitionist mathematics, the continuity of Schelling's concern with mathematics should be demonstrated in terms of the centrality of the distinction between quantity and quality. To reach that point however, I believe one must reexamine the possibilities that lie in the purported limits of mathematics' diagrammatic inventions.

### 3.2 - Schelling's Extensity/Intensity Relation

There is one absolute magnitude (= 1) which, though continually annihilated in this series, continuously recurs, and by this recurrence produces, not itself, but the mean between itself and nothing.—Nature, as object, is that which comes to pass in such an infinite series.\(^{216}\)

While Schelling repeatedly noted the interchangeability of analytic and geometrical thinking,

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\(^{215}\) Schelling, *On University Studies*, 49.

he appears to fancy the latter over the former.\textsuperscript{217} Formally the two are compatible as triangularity, for instance, is taken to be the diagrammatic expression of the interrelation, and (relative or consequent) totality of, nature's dynamic processes which corresponds to the triplicity (or we might somewhat oddly say the temporal triangularity) of the copula and its bonded antecedents and consequents. Or, simply put, the labeling of the geometrical with a, b, and c allows for a translation between the figure and the formula. Yet, as I have argued, it would appear that the repetition of number as intensive difference cannot be simply mapped onto the addition (not multiplication or 'exponentialization') of trajectories. This is why the point from which intensities are measured is not a trivial issue as it is not only a question of perspective, but also of the potentiality of different materials and actualities in a particular horizon. Qualities, or excessive intensities, cannot usefully be said to be intense for their own sake but only to better articulate the limits of knowing and navigating.

Previously I mentioned that Schelling's interest in mathematics seems to wane following 1803 yet one can argue that Schelling moves away from the geometrical and simply focuses on the logical structure of predication. This is evidenced in Schelling's increasing attention to temporality and the form of the copula in the language of unground and ground. Temporality allows Schelling to demonstrate the logic of unground and ground in that the generation of any thing is dependent on its ground but only becomes what it is in ungrounding its point of genesis. In terms of space, Schelling complicates any notion of determination as always being a co-determination, as always occurring in a web of co-determining entities. Ground and unground thus become problems of deciding the boundaries between things. As Oken will subsequently argue, Schelling attempts to naturalize formal structures, but, whereas Oken attempts to attach mathematics to the generation of substance as such, Schelling attempts to explain mathematics as a second order form of intuition, one that demonstrates and formalizes how abstracta behave given a continuous space and time as established by philosophy.

\textsuperscript{217} Schelling, \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism}, 143.
This occurs across Schelling's work, but is most evident in *Presentation of My System of Philosophy* (1801), and *Further Presentations of My System of Philosophy* (1802).

While the reflective delay of mathematical intuition can be taken as a weakness, I believe that it is mathematics' strong suit to act as the engineer of conceptual isolation. Throughout Schelling's texts, but particularly in the *First Outline*, Schelling points out the necessity of isolating a product of nature to think it. This operation renders the object inert and disconnects it (in an ideal sense) from nature. This isolation is necessary, however, in order to perform experiments, in order to test how many antecedents and how many consequents this singularity may highlight. In effect, isolation makes the product into an abstract entity whereby its production and productivity can be held in temporal and spatial isolation. It is logic that speaks to the former whereas geometry speaks to the latter. This would, however, assume that logic is over and above the geometrical as the copula connects the object to logical forms over geometrical ones. Or, in other words, the very notion of Schelling's connection is logical, not geometrical. However, I would argue that this imbalance is undone by the geometrical nature of trajectory. Whereas the extensity test is one of temporal stretching, it is equally an intensity test in the object's field-theoretical gravity (where does it want to go, and what is drawn to it) referring to the relation of ground and unground mentioned above. This form of experiment is clarified in the relation of quantity (usually associated with the extensive) to quality (usually associated with the intensive).

If this is the real dimension of mathematical intuition, one could argue that it is reversible as an ideal series – the extensive as spatial, and the intensive as temporal (both thought in organicity – the possibilities of the body in the former, and the particular temporality belonging to the form of life in the latter). Again, referring back to Oken, whereas the material reality of mathematics appeared in different biological forms, for Schelling biological forms and limitations alter the sense and perception of dimensions which inform and contaminate their mathematical codification. We could tentatively say
that, for Schelling, logic approximates the cause and effect relation complicated as a naturalized transcendentalism, whereas geometry is the attempt to diagram the horizons of co-determining things in a given field. This can be brought back again to the division of quantities and qualities.

In *Presentation of My System of Philosophy* (1801) Schelling makes a striking statement about the relation of geometry to arithmetic and quantity to quality. Arguing diagramatically, Schelling states that the triangle is the formal character which represents the totality of the dynamic processes (being composed of the line and the angle which represent magnetism and electricity respectively). Rather than a pure formalism, Schelling's demonstration of the triangle is one of the co-dependence of motions of otherwise unrepresentable potencies, or *Potenzen*. As mentioned above this demonstration seems to suggest a difference in kind, or that the difference *between* the potencies is different than those *within* the potencies. The extension of a shape in space is, on the face of it, radically different from, the creation of an altogether different form. Schelling writes:

The schema of the three basic forms of the dynamic processes is, as is known, the line, the angle, and the triangle, or in addition, these three processes are equated with the first three prime numbers of the arithmetic series. Just as 2 results only from the addition of 1 + 1, and three from the joining of 1 to 2 (so therefore these numbers are not *powers* of 1), so too, therefore, the three stages of the dynamic process [result from successive addition](#)

An immediate concern is raised: how are the potencies (whether formulaic as a, b, c or geometrically as line, angle, triangle) themselves isolated non-arbitrarily within the ideal? Or, how are the stages of the dynamic process themselves not merely ideal footholds? Or we could say, that Schelling appears close, on first glance, to Fichte's infinitesimal calculus (as a form of practical worlding). For Fichte, the I is an auto-positing force which sets itself against the inert materiality of nature (which, since it is internalized, is merely seen as the non-I) by introducing smaller and smaller

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219 Here it would be prudent to address the relation of Maimon's injection of rationalism into the critical project via mathematics to Fichte's utilization of calculus. Like Schelling's actants in the *First Outline*, Maimon's infinitesimals operate on the border between real entities and ideal footholds and hence opposing claims as to whether, via the infinitesimals, Maimon is maintaining a concept of the in itself or a more rigorous notion of the synthetic.
cuts (as infinitesimal calculus) into the material of the world. While I investigate this connection more in depth below, it is here that Schelling’s continuous nature is the central concept by which quantity and quality interrelate without eliminating, or supplanting, one another. In the *Introduction to the First Outline* (1799) Schelling argues that nature must be continuous since it is neither mere being nor mere becoming, but the ongoing attempt to be both. The continuity of nature cannot be directly accessed to the degree which Fichte seems to argue that the practico-ethical can world at nature’s expense as we saw in chapter 1.\(^{220}\) Schelling writes: “As long as we only know the totality of objects as the sum total of all being, this totality is a mere world, that is, a mere product for us. It would certainly be impossible in the science of nature to rise a higher idea than that of being if all permanence (which is thought in the idea of being) were not deceptive, and really a continuous and uniform reproduction.”\(^{221}\)

The substantial difference between Fichte and Schelling here is that the continuity of intuition for Fichte can only come from the source of thought which itself must be cut out of, and isolated from, nature. For Schelling this makes no sense. While Fichte leaves the connection between thought and world intact, in that the world must be ‘out there’ in order for the actions and speech of the I to hold together, how this notion of world relates to nature is not too clear. There is no quarter wherein thought can isolate itself from nature and furthermore the positing of activity in the act of positing (I = I) cannot be formal-practical as there would be no motor (no productive difference) by which thought would come to be thought at all.\(^{222}\)

To return to the mathematical, and to quality and quantity, this speaks to why the second order

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220 As Grant helps make clear, it is not the method of artificial isolation which is damnable but that such a method of isolation in Fichte makes the practical as such causally immune from nature. See Iain Hamilton Grant, *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling* (London: Continuum Publish Group, 2007), 82.
222 Markus Gabriel makes a similar argument towards the end of his *Transcendental Ontology* by equating das *Unvordenkliche* (the unprethinkable) with the analytic concept of logical space. See Markus Gabriel, *Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism*, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011). As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Gabriel’s account too easily erases Nature as a constraint in his articulation of the engine of predication as a factual necessity and not a natural one.
status of mathematics as a form of productive intuition must be reflective to the extent that it recognizes, and can artificially construct, the heterogeneous from the homogeneous, or to how mathematics makes the composite out of the continuous. If it does this in an ideal sense, because of the reversibility of the ideal = real copula, we could say that it is through qualities as trajectories (expressed through the geometrical) whereby the arithmetic of qualities makes the heterogeneous out of the homogeneous (where the transcendental obtains its naturalized status as a symmetry 'break' in nature) in a non-trivial sense. Furthermore, the spatial exploration of the exponential is a navigational exploration whereas every trace of expansion and contraction is registered in the real as condition in the ideal as possible ground for future consequent (in the form of speculation).223

It is in this latter sense that Schelling spends so much time foregrounding his discussion of mathematics with a sense of space as absolutely real and absolutely ideal. The divisibility of space is prominent in both the First Outline and the Ideas. The unconditioned, the purported Ungrund of all qualities, is both the intensity by which the procedure of ungrounding, or isolation, could take place (again pointing to how Schelling's notion of derivation and determination differs from Fichte's) and the intensity which produces qualities. Or, in other words, the unground is the engine of both nature's productions and our constructions224 since “Beyond space only pure intensity is thought.”225 The reason why qualities cannot be constructed is due to the fact that they are pure action.226

This statement reinforces the two-pli duality of thought and world suggested by Oken. One can state that there is an unground, or that there is pure action, but this would only add the concept without potential consequences. But, as soon as one pursues the consequences they would move on the spectrum of ideality and reality. To state that 'the unground ungrounds' is not mere definitional

223 I elaborate this in Chapter 5.
224 Schelling, First Outline, 207-209.
225 Schelling, First Outline, 208.
226 Schelling, First Outline, 209.
tautology when the antecedent (or ground) is so abstract as to transform following the thinnest occurrence of instantiation. Thus, the quality of qualities as pure action noted above, is not explanatory, per se, but forces she who would think them to pursue other means, to decompose, or de-potentiatie, in order to understand.

Or, in the *Ideas*: “For mathematics proceeds, for that reason [the inability to physically ground particles] to dwell upon the infinite divisibility of space, and philosophy, though it may be wary of saying that *matter* (considered in itself) *consists* of infinitely many parts, does not cease, on that account, to insist upon an infinite *divisibility*, i.e., the *impossibility* of any *completed* division.” Or as Schelling emphasizes a few pages later, such divisibility is an ideal procedure which cannot rely upon a physical substratum if that substratum is exempted from physical explanation. Schelling’s very notion of ideality and construction contribute to a naturalism and are far afield from a naïve idealism.

Or to quote Schelling at length once more:

Space is conceptless intuiting, and thus in no way a concept that might have been first abstracted, say, from the relationships of things, for although space arises for me through abstraction, it is still no abstract concept either in the sense that categories are, or in the sense that empirical or specific concepts are; for if there was a specific concept of space, there would have to be many spaces, instead of which there is but one infinite space […] space is merely an intuiting throughout.

To take Schelling at his word in saying that space = intuiting means that since being precedes thinking, since nature is intuiting through us, then intuition, in this productive regard, is space. Here, against Kant's limiting of intellectual intuition because of its temporal immediacy, we might say that intuition, in Schelling's sense, can be taken as a *spatial* immediacy, a snap-shot of the proximal territory.

It is difficult, for these reasons, to define space. On the one hand it seems to be an effortless production (conceptless intuiting) but yet, following Kant, space is prior to thought in that it cannot be

228 Schelling, *Ideas*, 163.
conceptually differentiated in an abstract sense, yet, it is also purely constructed by our moving in it. Philosophy and mathematics both gain ground as they maximize the degree to which ideal construction obtains upon real production. While philosophy and mathematics are not substantively different, they are different in their methods due to the transcendental symmetry breaks through which nature endures before producing the organ of human thought. But this break is not pursued by only testing a correspondence, since the very nature of nature is to invade thought (in addition to producing it). Nature constructs products through thought, products with varying degrees of impact in the world due to the freedom of logical modality which is a simulation of nature's actual potencies.

Finally, we can proceed to the meaning of a quality's trajectory. Pursuant to this is how Schelling, in his later work, approaches a so-called lived, or positive, philosophy. However, this is a lived philosophy not in Fichte's sense whereby life must be given productive autonomy from nature to guarantee the construction of its own ethical stability, but a philosophy in which only by testing the bonds of the real's relation to the ideal do we get some sense of the law of the world and the capacities of our own thought as a peculiar form of dimensionality.

3.3 - Potencies and Trajectories

A thought experiment does not set out to predict a fact or to transform this or that object, but rather to stage the physicist himself grappling with his mental habits, and above all to lay bare the imagery that he uses when he claims to be merely 'commenting on' or 'verbalizing' the operative power that is supposed to be buried in the calculations. We know that Einstein liked to imagine himself being dragged along in a chariot at the speed of light or totally isolated in a lift: to have shown that there is no innocence of intuition is certainly one of his most decisive contributions to the community of physicists.230

The interlacing of romanticism and transmodernity is perhaps surprising at first, but less so when we notice that many great romantics – Novalis, Schelling and Goethe in particular – have taken up, with technical instruments far less robust than the contemporary ones, extensive studies of the trans-.231

If the potencies are the addition of different trajectories, then quantitative difference appears in between two operations of qualitative difference – the original ground of qualities, which can only ever

be ideally posited (and never constructed) and the symmetry-breaks, which result from the non-merging addition of direction, and kinds in motion. Here again we see why space is so important for Schelling – while space is “conceptless intuiting,” this does not mean that intuition creates space in itself, but that intuition moves through a space and fills it as intuition is one of nature's intensities. It is only when such intensity is turned on itself (as when nature thinks itself through us) that space is occupied by intuition: “What occupies space is not matter, for matter is the occupied space itself.”

Furthermore, whereas absolute quality may exist, we only experience relative quality, quality as forces acting between those sites of self-investigation (the entities which, by their very nature as entities, are experiments). But these experiments have trajectories of their own, and so how are we to map the space of the experimental as well as the space of our own navigation?

One can reexamine not only the Ideas and the First Outline but also, with an eye to specific treatments of mathematics, take Schelling's discussions of dimensionality into account. By taking dimensionality seriously in these earlier texts, as well as noting Schelling's attention to it in his later work in the Darstellung lectures, one can see how the intuitive and constructive aspects of geometry are ramified as a lived (or navigational) philosophy. But, whereas for Fichte this lived philosophy is taken in predominately practico-ethical directions, for Schelling it results in a focus on a form of pragmatics, or, what we might call a mechanics, or kinematics, of reason.

What is ultimately at stake is whether, by addressing the embodied nature of dimensionality, Schelling is softening his critique of somaticism, or of substance, (pointing back to Oken's zero), or whether the reflective, or second-order, status of geometry is undone by the embodiment of animal

232 Schelling, First Outline, 207.
234 One can relate this shifts back to the realm of knowledge in terms of what Robert Batterman has emphasized as the importance of inter-theoretic reduction. Batterman argues that asymptotic thought is important for understanding the way in which reduction functions within a field as opposed to across fields. Or, in other words, asymptotic thinking signals the quantitative/qualitative split as operating differently within immanent abstraction and inter-theoretic abstraction. See Batterman, Robert The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
dimensionality or of viewing thought as a species of motion. Furthermore, if quantity is a result of
good's self-affection (or auto-affection) as opposed to a Fichtean auto-positing (of the I extracted
from nature), then how is one to account for the plethora of trajectories in the world? Or, put another
way, if the apparent difference in motion is one of more motion (of quantitative increase), then how
can one account for the conditions specific to species that determine the kinds of motions of which
they are capable?

Against Fichte's divisional derivation, Schelling's naturalistic derivation attaches to the
primordial status of human thought. This move, while initially stemming from his earliest
investigations of the Timaeus is later accelerated by his interest in Aristotle's De Anima. Following this
investigation into the ancients, mathematics appears as the demonstration of the free construction of
reason, of thought playing openly in the constructed space of intuition which is itself then transversed
by intuition. It then seems sensible to tie the naturalistic derivation of mathematical capacity to
movement. How does this map back onto Schelling's geometrical reading of the quantity/quality
relation?

In his remarkable Les Enjeux des Mobiles (translated as Figuring Space), Gilles Châtelet takes
up Schelling’s focus on the indifference point (earlier examined via Oken's kin-concept of the zero) as
itself the producer of two symmetries. In attempting to avoid both the ineffective calm of Spinozism,
and the overly-confident idealism of Leibniz, Schelling sees indifference as a point of analysis between
two operating powers, or polarities. The indifference point is less about nullifying difference, and
simply upon establishing an intuitive place from which differences in kind can be recognized.
Schelling’s productive intuition is what makes possible, and in turn is made possible by (though on a
different scale), the description of the universe as polarities which can only be adequately described in
the diagrammatic register. Where Schelling’s concept of the Potenzen is often reduced (such as by

235 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 75-76.
Beach) to Spinozistic power and nothing more, Châtelet recognizes that it speaks to an original tension of powers in Schelling that exponentially produce and spin out of control producing more and more stages of being (*Stufenfolge*).

Or, as we have already put it, the arithmetic of qualities gives rise to a different order of quantity (or fields). This is why just as identity, and, subsequently powers must be plural but univocal, powers add qualities in such a way that not only are magnitudes, or intensities of their own kind, but also the metric of reading such multiplication, as an addition of quality, in respect to the production of the ideality of nature on the whole. An intensification can, at the same time, be a new intensity, but both of these measures must be related to the continuum of nature which the various powers constitute. As Châtelet’s description of the *Naturphilosophical* project as “feeding on the specificity of the singular to reach the plane where the intuitive and the discursive are born synchronously” illustrates this keenly.

The inhabiting of an exponential, or a potentiated, being, as in the thought experiment of Einstein imaging himself riding a photon, of becoming the photon, creates a productive tension (or delirium as Châtelet has it) between the quantitative and the qualitative, as this intuitive inhabiting produces a potentiation of both, as well as, an intensification of the unknowability of the relation between them. This unthinkable qualitative change again points to the unreflective nature of mathematics regarding the act of construction as such, and as a positive condition, and speaks to the asymmetrical difference of one’s own sense of motion detected in the intuitionistic move to another potentiated body (a photon).

To put it more directly, intuition allows us to put ourselves in the place of another kind of intensity to try and imagine what moving, and operating, according to that intensity would be like. This is not a fool-proof action, however, as the very act of intuition, and its aforementioned lack of

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236 See Beach’s *Potencies of the God(s)* as discussed in chapter 1 as well as below in chapter 4.
innocence, skews the setting down of oneself into another place. But, by taking up the potential motions of another intensity, the very capacity of intuition itself becomes contaminated by those potential alien movements. It is in regards to this later point that Schelling’s focus on dimensionality is fundamental particularly in the *Darstellung* lectures.

In his essay “How Nature Comes to be Thought” Iain Grant writes:

The ‘ground of dimensionality’ can only be thought consequently upon dimensionality, or, in other words, dimensionality is emergent, if it is at all, from what is not dimensional. This does not mean that there are no dimensions prior to their thought, but that there are none prior to the operation of dimensions such that only such a thought is capable of thinking the emergence of dimensionality from non-dimensionality as such […] Since thought is that dimension of motion that causes the problem of the ground of dimensionality to be a problem, it is clear that thought is amongst the dimensions of the motions of bodies, or better, is precisely the totality of motions of which bodies are capable.²³⁹

Thought, taken as motion, creates for us the problem of dimension. Or put otherwise, if thought is a seemingly open-ended motion, then it presents us with an enormous version of “where do we go?” Here Zalamea’s point in the above epigraph is taken seriously: Schelling’s approach to the mathematical is one whereby he attempts to understand how the isolation of a field of space is related to motion or, put otherwise, Schelling’s mathematical interests are proto-category theory (concerned with transformation) rather than proto-set theoretical (or concerned with belonging).

In the 13th lecture of *Pure Rational Philosophy*, Schelling notes that Kant's inability to move beyond Aristotelian logic bears one positive aspect – that of assuming the simultaneity of time in the idea, and that number is the temporal designation of moment; numericity co-evolves with dimensionality.²⁴⁰ In the 16th lecture, Schelling engages the primordial nature of science, a primordiality that numerous forms of mathematics always points to, if only indirectly, through the formation of diagrams. This primordial nature is “the movement resting in what has being is also a

²⁴⁰ F.W.J. von Schelling, “Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, (Unpublished Manuscript), 8-9. An avenue worth exploring but not possible in the space provided would be investigate Schelling’s influence on intuitionist mathematics more generally and particularly in relation to Leopld Kronecker (who studied with Schelling) and his proto-intuitionism coupled with finitism which could draw light on Oken and Schelling’s work.
movement of reason.” Movement is an arithmetic of qualities where the polarized is not negated, but added as different potentialities in the actual thereby appearing as different trajectories. This marked polarization guarantees that “the antecedent has its actuality in the consequent” as this antecedent is what science separates (or in the language we have been using isolates) as Potenz. Following this ideal reversibility, Schelling argues that mathematics is a potential science which demonstrates the conditional necessity of space-time's interrelation. Or, in other words, mathematics is the potential science which diagrams the capacities of being, whereas philosophy looks one step deeper into the possibility of such a potentiality. In Schelling's 19th lecture on Pure Rational Philosophy, he addresses the ground of dimensionality mentioned above by Grant. Schelling attempts to demonstrate how dimensionality, as a problem, exists in the non-living world, or, how it is that dimensionality can be derived at all.

In one sense, dimensionality is the result of the polarity of nature manifested in organic beings (the arbitrariness of right and left for instance) which is species specific. For instance, Schelling celebrates the utility of height for human experience over breadth, whereas breadth dominates in inorganic nature in the layering of the strata, to take one example. In order to explain voluntary movement, Schelling argues that one must invoke some notion of drive (or the Aristotelian soul) as a cause of movement within particular directions according to species' embodiment. Schelling traces the development of animal life to the successive addition of the manipulation of dimensions. Again, what results is an arithmetic of qualitative change whereby trajectories give rise to more than mere dimensions, they produce an altogether different law of worlding within nature. That is, the sum total

244 Ibid. 8.
245 Ibid. 9.
246 Ibid. 10.
of the capacities of motion a species constitutes a consequent all, or abstract range, of motion. Consequently, it is thought that is that species of movement which condenses all antecedent, and material, dimensions.

Dimensionality offers an abstract, yet more concrete, form to thought than intentionality, or other strictly phenomenological tools. However, the organic capacity for motion is not a necessary and indelible mark on the world, nor a domain of infinite freedom, but that which tests avenues of dimensional, and environmental, exploration often failing and/or going extinct. But in their constrained freedom, life-forms change their environments, they redraw, albeit superficially (in the context of the depths of nature), that which conditions their embodied freedom. At the same time, the gestures which discover, and are discovered by, dimensionality suggest the synthetic capacities of reason are unbounded, and bounded, in a productive (or we might say copulating) sense as in the very form of synthesis, or Schellingian identity (A = A).

3.4 - (Re)Constructing Continuity or Folding Math into Nature

The question with which I would like to close, to fold the mathematical back into the philosophical is: what happens to mathematics if its productive blind-spot (of its incapacity to look into the act of its own construction) is revealed by philosophy; i.e., what happens once you apply Schellingian Naturphilosophie to mathematics? This problem is compounded by the fact that, if we take the continuity thesis seriously, then the philosophy of mathematics is a species of Naturphilosophie. And, furthermore, if Schelling ascribes to neither a strictly Platonic, nor instrumental (nor Okenian substantialization) approach to number, what exactly is the status of mathematical synthesis such that it is not purely ideal? Or, simply put, how do we situate, and measure, the consequences of mathematics in nature?

Mathematics' limited sense of self-reflection is a positive constraint that consequently produces

247 In relation to gesture and mathematics I am heavily indebted to numerous conversations with Reza Negarestani.
the capacity of simulation – of feeding constraints forward as apparently unbridled construction, or ideal synthesis. As a consequence, productive intuition is not a revelatory immediacy that conceals such synthesis, but its jumps and leaps highlight the qualitative differences which location, and navigation, engender. Mathematics is closest to its intuitionist philosophical roots as it recognizes a limit, and attempts to manipulate the construction in an unbound space, a space which is the ongoing result of nature's intensity interpenetrating itself through us.

Here, following Châtelet amongst others, post-Kantian thought is not a crude return to metaphysics, or dogmatic rationalism against the Kantian critical spirit, but various attempts to bring Kant to the unstable, and moving ground, of either a unified ideal activity (Fichte), a polarized but productive nature (Schelling), or the productive logic of the absolute spirit (Hegel). While the first and third have been admitted to the realm of mathematical thinkers, Schelling remains cast out and yet, I would argue, that his adherence to the problem of nature makes his thought all the more relevant for thinking mathematics. Ultimately, Schelling's mathematical contributions amount to an arithmetic and a geometry which attempt to incorporate, not only differing quantitative and qualitative magnitudes, but to show that the very structure of a series, of the series that is the dynamic stages of nature (Stufenfolge), must admit to an addition that cannot be erased in the progression of such a series. One avenue that demonstrates this influence, which has been explored by Marie-Luise Heuser, is Schelling's influence on the mathematician Hermann Grassmann and his father J.G. Grassmann. Both Grassmanns began to formalize the Naturphilosophical self-organization of nature in mathematical terms by studying why various matters of nature extend in particular ways. Heuser argues that Hermann Grassmann attempted to develop a theory of extension that took dimensionality and, in particular, the notion of a non-trivial infinity, into account to describe the non-linearity of the
development of matter across time and in space. Similar to, but different from Oken, both Grassmanns attempted to diagram the inner forces of nature as they then appear as phenomenal products. The difference lies in the formal separation between dimensionality, or direction, and quantity since, for the Grassmanns', quantity is the necessary but a posteriori division of a universal continuum of nature under constant morphogenesis. Far more work needs to be done to further flush out these historical connections.

Heuser traces this influence not only in the strictly mathematical world, but also to the history of crystallography and, in particular, the work of C.S. Weiss. Weiss, under the general influence of Naturphilosophie, developed a theory of continuous, i.e., non-atomized crystalline matter to explain inorganic growth, and made the transition from Naturphilosophie to the mathematics of Grassmann possible. Weiss, in an essay entitled “A Dynamic View of Crystalization” (1804), argued that crystalline matter developed dynamically, and that the faces of a crystal were determined along axes offset by non-material polarities. Weiss' emphasis on polarity, in turn, allowed him to describe the faces of crystal formations as snapshots of the movement of polarities, of the forces acting according to their vectorial nature. In this sense Weiss can be seen as following Schelling, where Oken differed from him in relation the the generative nature of the zero, or the indifference point. In the aforementioned essay Weiss writes: “All of nature can be thought of as a development of opposing magnitudes (in the pure sense of mathematics) out of zero or null. One must not attribute an absolute existence to any material substance; each is nothing but a magnitude, a pole which is separated from its

249 Various commentators have suggested that Grassmanns' alliance with Naturphilosophie may have led to the poor reception of his work at the time. For a summary of these views see Michael J. Crowe, A History of Vector Analysis: The Evolution of the Idea of Vectorial System (Mineola: Dover Books, 2011).
opposite and which exists at all solely in that separation.”251 Weiss later developed this theory in a mathematical notion of crystal growth in his essay “An Improved Method for the Identification of the Various Surfaces of Systems of Crystalization, combined with Observations on the State of Polarization of the Surfaces of the Lines of Crystalline Structure” (1816-1817).252

The tension between location and direction speaks not only to Schelling's emphasis on the physics of his time but also to Schelling's unwillingness to abandon neither the importance of form in Plato, nor the messiness of soul-as-entelchy in Aristotle. Or, against Fichte, mathematics and Naturphilosophie are contained in the same world of worlds (or we might simply say say nature). Whereas Fichte's intuition is taken as inspiration for L.E.J. Brouwer's intuitionist approach to mathematics, it is unclear, given the intuitionist's thrust towards establishing the existence of mathematics, why they would steer away from Schelling.253 Whereas Fichte's brilliantly argued self-generating form of the I is clean of nature, it seems doomed in its isolation.254 It is not the intensity of the I's activity which divides the continuity of nature into non-continuous realms of inert matter (not-I) but nature, in not reflecting, operates on its own intensity thereby spreading out the ideas and concepts of mathematics into the continuum. This is why the philosopher must look into the act of construction itself or, in other words, engage in the realm of activity which makes up the form and the trajectory of thought.255

Yet, at the same time, the free construction and wild synthesis of mathematics is a remarkable example not only of a means of suspending (without obliterating) reflection but also the non-trivial importance of intuition; that it does not reduce but fully acknowledges the pressure or momentum of the abstract. It is for this reason that philosophy, as Naturphilosophie, must be ultimately concerned

254 Grant, Philosophies, 90.
255 Grant, Philosophies, 178.
with forces, and more primordially, with the Potenz. Our enacting of the ideal does not mean only we
are capable of it but only that we are caught in its force and, as a result, the world of measure does not
stand apart from nature just as we do not stand apart from nature.

Ultimately, and as Michael Vater has suggested, Schelling's emphasis on the trajectorial nature
of mathematics as an additive procedure, is what separates him most sharply from Hegel and Hegel's
speculative logic. While Vater argues that this shows Hegel's dazzling conceptual breadth as over
and above Schelling's dusty formalism, I would argue, and hope to show in the following chapters, that
it is in fact Schelling's restraint about philosophy's capacity of determining conceptual content, that he
sees as the core of his later project of positive philosophy.

Or, put otherwise, Schelling attempts to describe the embodiment and conceptual weight that
the structures of nature engender without fixing their effect to particular concepts. The crux of this
attempt, as we will explore in the next chapter, is Schelling's development of the Potenzen. The
Potenzen, I will argue, are Schelling's attempt to create the leanest structure of nature possible in order
to determine both transcendental, and immanent conditions, for, and beyond, human cognition.

4 - The Red Threads of the World: *Potenzen, Construction, and Inexistence*

Everything, absolutely everything, even that which by nature is external, must have already become internal to us before we can present it externally or objectively.\(^{257}\)

First of all, everything that is in Nature, and Nature considered as sum total of *existence*, is not even present for us. To philosophize about nature means to *create* Nature.\(^{258}\)

The following chapter provides a historical outline of Schelling's theory of powers otherwise known as the *Potenzen*. Schelling's *Potenzen* emerge following his explorations of dynamics via Kant and Spinoza, on the one hand, and from attempting to place human thought properly in the world following the constraints of identity, and the capacities of construction, following Fichte, on the other hand. Between these theoretical poles, Schelling's *Potenzen*, I argue, function as a structuration of freedom-as-dynamics thereby crossing the mind and world boundary. For Schelling, an unavoidable tension of this naturalized form of freedom, particularly concerning philosophy, arises between the free construction of philosophical systems in general, and the totalizing form of philosophy as such. As was already suggested in Chapter 1, this tension manifests itself in that the philosopher is to never complete a final system, a final container for all being and knowing, but to always provisionally create systems which attempt to do justice to the open-ended world. This open-endedness disavows any heavy reliance upon either origin, or goal, as either ontological states, or normative imperatives.

The immediate problem that arises, and one that should be evident following the discussions of space and sense in Chapter 2, and space and motion in relation to construction in Chapter 3, is how to locate such constructive activities, and the results of such activities, if there are no knowable contours of the world. The immediate temptation, and the reason why I believe Schelling utilizes the cosmology of Plato alongside the biology of Aristotle, is to metaphysicalize dogmatically, or to ontologize enthusiastically. Schelling recognizes, in philosophy at large, what could be called the metaphysical-


ontological demand. This demand is simply the fact that philosophy aims at the all, it attempts to explore the totality of things and each and everything equally. Regardless of one's stated philosophical aims, goals, or methods, Schelling seems to suggest, particularly in the advent of the so-called positive philosophy (arguably beginning after 1809, and surely by 1815), that philosophy will unavoidably explore, and generate, errantly. Philosophy, according to both the early and late Schelling, should not create for the mere sake of creating, nor can it ignore the creative impulse of philosophy as such in the form of the metaphysical-ontological demand.259

The uncertain spatial bounds of Schelling's conceptualization of nature, as having no beginning and no end, pointed to, but not fully explored, in Chapters 2 and 3, necessitates his utilization of the Potenzen. The Potenzen meet the metaphysical-ontological demand while reasserting nature's autonomy, but simultaneously acknowledging, our high, or highly augmented, place in nature. As a result of this complexity, the Potenzen are one of the least understood (and often outright ignored) aspects of Schelling's philosophy on the whole. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that Schelling is not given much, if any, theoretical autonomy, and is seen as either simply agreeing with Kant, Fichte, Spinoza, or being a transition point between Fichte and Hegel that does not warrant deeper investigation.260 Yet, as seen in the last chapter, taking only Schelling's view of constructive knowledge via mathematics into account, the degree to which a powers-based ontology sets Schelling apart from his contemporaries becomes clear. In relation to Chapter 3, the transition from the Fichtean activity of the 'I,' or a general notion of intellectual intuition, does not over-determine nature (such as suggesting that nature is merely the unconsciousness of the I only), but further buttresses the strength of Schelling's abstract, and formal, approach to the quantitative vis a vis the qualitative. This approach

260 In the editor's introduction to The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy for instance Sedwick notes that Schelling is basically consistent with Kant but provides no textual evidence, 1.
allows Schelling to assess what the structure of nature is in how thought is productive with, and not of, nature in a straightforward sense. Or, put otherwise, Schelling’s powers-based ontology allows him to navigate the pitfalls of both mechanism and dynamism in physics, via a non-naive notion of construction; a mode of construction which must epistemologically and ontologically maximally obtain in terms of the diversity of individuation, and the stability of nature as a world system over time. Construction by nature, and by us, does not differ in kind, but only in location and degree.

Schelling illustrates this continuity by simply arguing that thought is the field in which we experience the Potenzen, or powers, as thought. That is, our relation to thought demonstrates the ungroundedness, or inexistence, of nature at both temporal and spatially ‘ends.’ If one asked ‘Where are you thinking in relation to the start and end of thinking, or even a single thought?’ a feeling of both positive and negative freedom would result; a feeling of seemingly unlimited creativity coupled with an apparently unassailable blockage at locating the thing that thinks in relation to the process of thinking. This question demonstrates the apparent unavoidability of the Potenzen as an active oscillation between being and becoming.

Furthermore, overlooking the ungroundedness and constructive account of Schelling’s nature also serves to straw-man Schelling’s notion of freedom as a naïve form of faith, or as demonstrating an impossible immediacy of conceptual acquisition (of over-emphasizing the capacity of intellectual intuition, a tendency I hopefully dispelled in Chapter 3). The immediacy of Schelling’s articulation of intuition is not one of content (since the very concept is only ever a recapitulation of the real series), but an immediacy of form which Kant utilizes in simultaneously connecting the analytic to the synthetic, or matter to experience in the ether proofs of the Opus Postumum. As we have seen, this

261 Karl Jaspers, in Reason and Existenz (1955) refers to the Potenz as indicating a “construction field.” Quoted in Grant's “Remains of the World” Edward Beach affirms this but in terms of Schelling’s notion of will in Potencies of the Gods, 115
262 Sedwick, Reception of Kant. 13.
raises numerous questions in terms of whether Kant's final synthesis is dogmatic, Spinozistic, critical, or something else altogether. What separates Schelling from Kant in this regard, however, is the ungroundedness of such powers. On this point, Schelling is also seemingly close to, and distant from Spinoza, as discussed in Chapter 1. As Schelling makes clear on numerous occasions, he views Spinoza's system as too realistic in a mechanistic sense, or as lacking in dynamics, thereby restricting any sense of contingency or freedom.\textsuperscript{263}

Schelling's emphasis on dynamics, and a powers-based ontology, suggests a broadly Aristotelian orientation whereas ungroundedness, as such, is distinctly Platonic in that it functions, like the Platonic idea, as a real universal condition.\textsuperscript{264} That is, the Aristotelian view that powers inhere in particular natural kinds, or essences, is abstracted, via Platonic cosmology, by a general creation or motion to the world as was highlighted at the end of Chapter 1. For Schelling, essences are always bifurcatory, moving in two directions between their Aristotelian naturalistic basis, and their structural, or abstract capacities following a Platonic conceptualization of the World-Soul, of that which is taken as the first motion of the world. Since, as we saw above, Schelling states that the philosophical life 'should begin with Plato and end with Aristotle' it is not surprising that the \textit{Potenzen}, as a concept used throughout Schelling's work, would attract both historical valences. Put broadly, Schelling's theory of the potencies allows him to simultaneously assert the importance of a nature 'outside us,' while acknowledging our limited ability in understanding it because it is already within us. Or, put otherwise, the \textit{Potenzen} are created to appease skepticism, as well as the metaphysical-ontological demand, in order to avoid the limitations of a brute mechanical philosophy, and, to navigate through a possibly mystifying dynamic atomism, by asking 'why is there neither merely being, nor merely becoming?'

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{264} Frederick Beiser suggests this in his article “Dark Days” in Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship since the 1960s', in \textit{German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives} ed. Aspen Hammer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 81-83.
\end{footnotesize}
Schelling does not achieve this delicate balance by asserting human finitude in the face of nature, nor by over-determining nature's capacity for infinitude. Most importantly, nature is that which precedes and produces us but is, in itself, incomplete, or open, in that anything that it could be said to contain actually determines its borders. To flesh this out I will attempt to construct a history of Schelling's development of the Potenzen beginning with the dynamic forces in his work prior to his formal presentations of them before moving onto the discussion of the Potenzen proper in the Presentations and Further Presentations.

My more specific goal in producing a historical survey of Schelling's Potenzen is to demonstrate how Schelling attempts to construct, and maintain, a minimal difference between motion and space or, more generally in the terms of the Potenzen, between creation and structure. This difference lies in determining the status of the Potenzen as an inexistent necessity. While I will return to this in the conclusion, I would state briefly that inexistent necessity, or the contingent necessity of necessity is Schelling's argument for a consequentially original momentum to creation which, because of its inexistence, is necessarily ungraspable (or unprethinkable) for us, yet, is the condition of all forms of creation noetic and otherwise. This does not mean nature as such or the Potenzen as such are the unprethinkable (thereby making the unprethinkable into an entity), but that finding them in thought, has potential ontological consequences. But, just because we discover the Potenzen in thought does not mean that thought contains nature, or the Potenzen, but rather that the construction of the Potenzen (as always being in thought) is how we have a provisionally minimalistic ontology. Thus, to say a Potenz or power is, only means that there are general classes of can-be-states (or dispositions, or tendencies) that function across numerous dimensions.

I choose the term inexistent with some trepidation as it has roots in Anselm's ontological proof of God's existence as well as Brentano's theory of inexistent-intentionality neither which I wish to directly address. However, both of these usages lend some coherence to Schelling's Potenzen as inexistent. In terms of Anselm, Schelling can be seen as trying to argue that existence does add something to being (contra Kant) and, in relation to Brentano, inexistence functions as an intentionality in terms of the momentum of creation in Schelling's concept of nature.
Given the necessary, yet minimal, ontological consequence of thinking, the fact that Schelling is conscripted to both anti- (or post-) metaphysical camps, and high- (or ultra-) metaphysical camps at once is not surprising given that Schelling attempts to create a lean metaphysics of modality as such or, put otherwise, to construct a theory of how construction occurs with, and without, human participation. For Schelling, modality is the merely ideal expression of the concept of potency. As he puts it in 'On the I' – modality is not, pace, Kant, synthetic, but merely sylleptic. I return to this point in the conclusion of this chapter.

Furthermore, this is why it is difficult to cleanly parse Schelling's epistemological claims from his ontological claims. While the next chapter will deal with the former, the following pages attempt to trace the development of Schelling's notion of the potencies over his career treating them as minimally ontological. Approaching Schelling's use of powers or potencies historically, I have two subsequent aims: firstly, to uphold, and do justice to, the continuity thesis, i.e., that Schelling's work is not fractured into periods conceptually, but only in focus. Secondly, by moving historically through Schelling's use of the Potenzen, I hope to demonstrate how their lack of domain specificity (whether in thought, art, production, natural processes etc.) exhibits their basic functional use as opposed to being viewed as metaphysically domineering, or ontologically superfluous. Finally, discussion of texts that briefly mention the Potenzen, have been relegated to footnotes in the relevant time frame.

4.1 - Schelling's Dynamics as Proto-Potenzen in The First Outline (1799), The Ideas (1797, 1803), System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)

Perhaps the most important contribution of Schelling to the development of field theory was his recognition of what was only implicit in Kant. If matter and material phenomena could be seen only as the results of attractive and repulsive forces, then it seems obvious that all phenomena should be reduced to those forces.266

In her text Schelling and the End of Idealism, Dale Snow argues that Schelling's earliest discussion of dynamic forces sets the stage for the later development of the potencies. Schelling's

adoption of dynamic forces serve as a lineage from Kant, that allows Schelling to simultaneously break from Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza.\textsuperscript{267} To begin, one must distinguish Schelling's \textit{Potenzen} from Spinoza's powers. At the most basic level, Spinoza's doctrine of powers is one ultimately ruled by divine adequation. That is, regardless of Spinoza's pantheism a power, or potency, is always measured by how it would be in the mind of god, i.e., powers are ultimately under the rule of the One-All or, put otherwise, potencies for Spinoza function as \textit{measures within} a domain of pure immanence. For Schelling, the potencies are torn between being additive trajectories and exponential qualities (as we saw in the last chapter). They are additive in their geometrical dimension (as first to thirdness is due to adding degrees of freedom in a physical sense) but exponential in that they are always increasing in intensity, as the function of thinking them, of construction itself, is one of identity-as-intensification. Or, put another way, since conceptual space and actual space are inseparable for Schelling, because of the primordial continuity of nature, more of something means more of something in space and more intense than it was.

The rudimentary source-material for Schelling's generation of the \textit{Potenzen} also separates them from a Spinozist provenance. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Schelling's notion of the \textit{Potenzen} combines mathematical and organic notions of power (taken from Eschenmayer and Kielmeyer respectively). Where Schelling seems to down-play the mathematical aspect of the \textit{Potenzen}, and play-up its biological aspects in terms of how recapitulation is deployed in his notion of natural history for example, I argue that the mathematical (and particularly spatial) aspects of the \textit{Potenzen} guarantee the historical dimension of the \textit{Potenzen} but in a futural, rather than historical, sense.\textsuperscript{268}

Given this, how can Edward Beach assert that Schelling's \textit{Potenzen} are similar to, or even the same as, Spinoza's powers? Beach emphasizes the Spinozistic quality of Schelling's potencies given

\textsuperscript{268} Grant, \textit{Philosophies}, 122.
the fact that he reads Schelling as relying heavily on the potencies to give determination conceptual rigor against Hegel's reliance upon the conceptual as being capable of capturing the totality of the world thus determined.\textsuperscript{269} That is, Beach suggests that Schelling uses the potencies primarily to contradict Hegel's utilization of, and reliance on, logic following Schelling's temporalization of being, or, in other words, the potencies are how Schelling justifies the inadequacy of logic to grasp being.\textsuperscript{270}

In terms of their purely negative, or critical function, Beach's account seems adequate. However, once he begins to discuss the positive explanatory function of the potencies, I believe the discussion suffers from an over reliance on viewing the potencies in an anti-Hegelian, and at times, pseudo-Spinozist fashion. Beach, following Snow and others, claims that not only do the Potenzen function in a dialectical, albeit modified form, but that they are ultimately manifestations of a primordial will. While the discussion of will indexes the need to explain the creativity of the world in time, which can be related to the metaphysical-ontological demand above, it is overly psychologized, or spiritualized, in Beach's text.\textsuperscript{271} Furthermore, this move substantializes the potencies more than Schelling would allow. While the potencies act to transform the possible into the actual, and subsequently treat the possible as material, they themselves cannot be said to be merely, or even primarily, material in nature in a substantive manner. I will discuss Beach's work more at length below given that he largely focuses on Schelling's work after 1815. His general suggestion regarding Schelling's Spinozism, however, seems to require addressing Schelling's earlier phases given the general assumption that Schelling is functioning under a largely Spinozist mode from 1797 until 1802.

Schelling's repeated critiques of Spinoza, already noted in Chapters 1 and 2 above, indicate that a substantialist reading of the Potenzen does not comply with Schelling's general call for substratum-

\textsuperscript{270} Beach, \textit{Potencies}, 111.
\textsuperscript{271} Beach, \textit{Potencies}, 114-115.
independence in both philosophy and science. Furthermore, the temporal unboundedness of the Potenzen which rely neither on limited, nor total being (pure immanence a la Spinoza), nor on pure or unruly becoming (a la Bergson or Deleuze), break Schelling out of the purely Aristotelian trajectory of philosophy. The notion of inexistence, which has roots in the medieval philosophy, better fits the status of the Potenzen and of Schelling’s conceptualization of nature in general: that of always coming to be but affected by what it already is. Thus, I argue that taking the Potenzen as part of a metaphysical holism, which leads many commentators back to Spinoza’s immanence, is the wrong move. As mentioned above, Schelling sees any notion of origin or end as provisional, hence why he utilizes the term Prius and Posterior. Therefore while everything exhibits the all, or the cosmos, no claim can be made that this all is a closed whole.

Schelling writes in the Ideas that: “form and matter are inseparable […] every organization is a whole; its unity lies in itself, it does not depend on our choice” but, at the same time, unity is a concept, and something constructed by us through reflection. 272 This relation of the absolute ideal, and the absolute real, is a lynch pin to philosophy itself, and philosophy as a science. 273 Or, as Schelling puts it earlier in the Ideas: “we require to know, not how such a Nature arose outside us, but how even the very idea of such a Nature has got into us; not merely how we have, say, arbitrarily generated it, but how and why it originally and necessarily underlies everything that our race has ever thought about Nature.” 274

The use of “originally and necessarily” should give some pause given the opening statements of this chapter, namely, that necessity is always consequent for Schelling, and that origin is always provisional. Nature allows the processes by which we come to have a concept of nature, a concept

273 Ibid. 44.
274 Ibid. 41.
which leads us to posit an origin only if it functions as an ideal starting point to organize our thoughts about a nature that has long pre-existed us as a race. Yet, the being of nature is what makes it impress its limits on us, which, since these limits are at least discoverable orthogonally by us conceptually, then particular concepts can be taken to be structurally, i.e., maximally consequential.

Thus, there appears to be some resistant granules, some traces of structure, which do not disappear in the creative folding and unfolding that are the processes of nature. These entities are not origins but are more original than other products so far discovered. This is evident in Schelling's early interest in chemistry which arguably foregrounds his construction of the Potenzen. Chemistry, as an early combinatorial model of dynamic nature, helps justify the use of the original actant in the opening sections of the First Outline. He writes: “The individuality of the original actants however, strives against this universalization. The individuality of all actants ought to be maintained in the absolute product together with the most complete combination.” Towards the end of the First Outline Schelling writes: “This idea of pure intensity is expressed by the idea of the actant. It is not the product of this action that is simple, but the actant itself abstracted from the product, and it must be simple in order that the product may be infinitely divisible.”

The specificity of the relation between terms here foreshadows the particular contours of the Potenzen to come later. The actants can participate in universality, and in all combinations of nature's products, but something of their individuality must remain. This individuality is then later connected to pure intensity, but pure intensity is an idea which is expressed by the actants. The simplicity of the actant is not that of a decomposable object, or product, but that which allows any given product, any collision of forces which registers as a Scheinprodukt, to be viewed and measured quantitatively, because its being depends upon the intensity of the powers which compromises it.

275 Schelling, First Outline, 28.
276 Ibid. 208.
Iain Hamilton Grant takes issue with the articulation of actants as natural monads in his *Philosophies of Nature after Schelling*: “The units of activity' or natural monads effectively recover the Kantian project in the *Physical Monadology*, and do not serve to buttress the identity of forces in nature (the identity of which in any case lies in the construction of matter) but rather to identify unites of natural activities with those of transcendental ones.” Here I believe Grant's anti-Kantianism, mentioned in Chapter 1, is overemphasized, albeit slightly. It is less the case, I would argue, that Schelling is transcendentalizing action in nature as such, and is instead problematizing the question of access between the transcendental position, and that of *Naturphilosophie*, while taking into account that the transcendental perspective is thoroughly natural. In making cuts into nature, in treating the flow of nature in a punctuated fashion rehearses, *in utero*, the difference between potencies *to the extent they can be detected in thought*. Thus, the dynamic atoms, or actants, are expressions of intensity *as an idea*, i.e., as another potency translated into thinking as a kind of interference pattern, or distortion, which requires an asymptotic, or otherwise highly experimental, approach. The notion of the *Potenzen* in relation to real patterns, and thus to Plato's ideas, lead us to Schelling's *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*.

*Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1799, 1803)*

Schelling's introduction of the potencies ties them immediately to both Leibniz's monadology (therein linking them, albeit slightly, to Schelling's actants of the *First Outline* just discussed) as well as to the proper means of reading the Platonic ideas (*Idee*). Throughout Schelling's *Ideas*, experiments in the physical sciences, particularly regarding magnetism, light, and gravity, are attached to discussions of how nature is conceived transcendentally. In this regard, the *Ideas* can be taken as the

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277 Grant, *Philosophies*, 151.
278 The fact that the *Ideas* was written in 1799 and revisited in 1803 creates difficulties for my chronological attempt here. Especially given the fact that the explicit mention of the *Potenzen* occurs in the 1803 Supplements and not the original text. I leave the discussion of the *Ideas* here, however, since he relates the *Potenzen* to the natural sciences, and is thus in the same spirit as the *First Outline*.
reverse image of the *First Outline* in which transcendental philosophy is set into nature, where, in the *Ideas*, nature makes transcendental philosophy, as such, possible. This latter point is further unfolded in *The System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) while the former is worked out in the *Presentations* (1800-1802).

In relation to the Platonic ideas, the potencies function as a means of explaining how a hierarchy of difference emerges from within nature's unity without relying upon holism or pure immanence. The infinite is embodied in the finite, but this finite is added to the unity that is nature. In this sense, nature is best viewed not as *a whole* but as an extensive all (or the whole-so-far). Thus, nature creates by adding its failure to recreate itself, to reflect fully or to contain itself as a finite entity thereby expanding outward.\(^{279}\) Potencies function as a way of particularizing types of unities that contribute to this expansion in that Schelling is attempting to explain how nature unfolds itself through particularities, which are always relative infinities, or unities.\(^{280}\) He writes:

> These unities, each of which signifies a definite degree of embodiment of the infinite into the finite, are represented in three potencies of Nature-philosophy. The first unity, which in embodying the infinite into the finite is itself again this embodiment, presents itself as a whole through the *universal structure of the world*, individually through the series of bodies. The other unity, of the reverse embodiment of the particular into the universal or essence, expresses itself, though always in subordination to the real unity which is predominant in Nature, in *universal mechanism*, where the universal or essence issues as *light*, the particular as *bodies*, in accordance with all dynamical determinations. Finally, the absolute integration into one, or indifferencing, of both unities, yet still in the real, is expressed by *organism*, which is therefore once more the *in-itself* of the first two unities.\(^{281}\)

This organism, or living unity, enters ideality as reason reflecting upon itself, as complete but ongoing creation by reason. But, this process is not mere reflection, as it is expressed by something out of it, the unity, and indifference of, the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite. It is important to note that the whole is a *presentation* of a series (pointing back to the expression function of the actants above) while the particulars also can be extrapolated as demonstrating their place in the all. In the language above it is important to note the potencies are neither things, nor even processes, but

\(^{279}\) Schelling, *Ideas*. 49.  
\(^{280}\) Ibid. 49.  
\(^{281}\) Ibid. 51.
second-order tendencies which appear as unities, but they are unities which are always imperfectly captured because of their mediated expression. However, this image is slightly complicated, as throughout the rest of the text, the potencies are used in a plural sense as if they are powers, i.e., chemical or magnetic potencies as opposed to the strictly structural sense that Schelling seems to emphasize earlier. Later on in the supplemental texts to the Ideas, the potencies are further broken down into a three step system as is commonly done in his texts: The first dimension, also known as the formative principle, is discussed as the repetition of the same process in the attempt for stability (where matter emerges as the first existent), while the second is the contraction of such irritability represented by electricity, and the third step is the emergence of sensibility via light (the expansive force).  

It is important to note once again that while the First Outline can be read as a transcendental account of the Naturphilosophie, i.e., a discussion of nature from the view of thought (as the epigraph about thinking nature being a mode of creation suggests), the Ideas attempts to view nature in terms of particular physical theories and experiments. What remains the same, however, and what Schelling will formalize most directly in the Presentation of My System, is that either in a transcendental or empirical sense, the Potenzen are those tendencies which seem identifiable as individuals but, at the same time, are infinite in their particularity. Pursuing the transcendental view in the following years, Schelling develops this particularity as infinite in kind in terms of a self, thereby modifying the Fichteian inspiration of activity as we saw in Chapter 1.

It is worth returning here to Beach's aforementioned emphasis on will and its relation to the potencies above. Given the notion of self, of self as an activity which is particular, yet seemingly infinite, in its expressibility, it would seem that the notion of primordial will is even more likely a means of discussing the potencies. Yet, the notion of the self, or of the subject, must be taken in its fully complex Schellingian articulation. This does mean subjects in a Kantian sense, or as personality

282 Ibid. 137-138.
rooted in a particular soul, or person, but self as a particular whose expression is particular but, importantly, this particularity, and what the self is expressing, is not of it alone. This will become clear in investigating the Potenzen further in The System of Transcendental Idealism and how this relates to Schelling's use of the concept of identity.

The System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)

In The System of Transcendental Idealism the discussion of the potencies seem to shift, at least in terms of describing them as potencies in nature, as opposed to potencies or powers that are integral to the development of consciousness as such. In the text, Schelling is attempting to relate Fichte's exacerbation of Kantian self-hood to some account of an external, or natural, world. This requires addressing the relation of a subject to an object in such a way that preserves that capacity of both. In discussing the Fichtean proposition 'self = self' or 'A = A,' Schelling argues that this is not a statement of identity traditionally understood, but one of synthesis. Schelling claims that synthesis and identity are synthetic and identical together, most obviously, when spoken about in terms of a self. Schelling states that this is because the notion of self clearly, at least for us, nominates that which is a duality within identity, or a subject-object, a thing that is simultaneously a thing and a process, or activity. Schelling then brings this in relation to the Potenzen in the following way:

Natural science proceeds arbitrarily from nature, as the simultaneously productive and produced, in order to derive from the concept the particular. The identity in question is an immediate object of knowledge only in immediate self-consciousness; in that the highest power of self-objectification, to which the transcendental philosopher raises himself at the outset-not arbitrarily but through freedom; and the fundamental duality in nature is itself ultimately inexplicable only inasmuch as nature is taken to be intelligence.

Thus, the potencies are discovered necessarily in the very structure of thought thinking something, of some content being taken as a thing at all. The immediacy of knowledge here is not one of full understanding, but a structural necessity that states in order for a self (an activity particularized)

284 Ibid.
to interact with another activity, a form of self-objectification is accomplished by a power, a power that, while encountered by intelligence, must be other than intelligence but not so other (not outside the unity) as to allow these activities to interact. At the same time, the above quote serves as a metaphilosophical, or methodological, note on Schelling's own approach to the Potenzen in his earliest work.

But the raising of the philosopher's consciousness mentioned above, and the importance of Potenz for synthesis is not merely a bridge of communication, but a means of augmentation. The self-objectification of the philosopher can be taken to be 'higher' in the sense of viewing conceptual space, as placing the conceptual space beneath her to view critically, thereby connecting the exponential nature of the Potenzen as having a quantitative increase coupled with a direction (and not an arbitrarily 'better' or, a more abstract qualitative shift in and of itself) as seen in Chapter 3.

As Schelling writes:

I find that the consciousness of an objective world is implied in every moment of my consciousness, and conclude, therefore, that something objective must already enter from the beginning into the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must again issue from the latter in its developed form [...] The self, once transposed into time, consists in a steady passage from one presentation to the next; yet it remains, after all, within its power to interrupt this series by reflection. 285

This interruption, which activity has the power to do, is not an ontological break in the fabric of things, but an ideal series that treats the break as if it were an origin, even though origins cannot be found and are always artificial (to be discussed in more epistemological detail in chapter 5). In treating the necessary, or the original as free, as a choice, it becomes a new series of acts (at least for us) but this does not entail a 'blank check,' or, an easily won form of freedom. The imitation must be exact in order to do justice to the real which forms the basis of the ideal copy, and yet, the ideal copy is an addition to the real only insofar as the consequences and investigations of the real, via the ideal, allow for more about the real to be discovered. 286 Again the exponential nature of the Potenzen should be

285 Ibid. 48-49.
286 Ibid. 49.
evident – it is a sameness with an addition of a trajectory that may or may not add to that from which the power issues as ground.

The testing of whether or not the ideal methods of the self-as-activity obtain on the world results in the self, once it limits itself via intuition, and appears as a being caught between constant expansion and contraction. The self-as-activity must encounter its own limits in order to expand beyond them otherwise idealism, and the very notion of the ideal, simply makes all the world illusory.287

Whereas in the First Outline Schelling encounters, and begins to sketch, the actants (or pure qualities) as having a distinct dynamic power, in the System, Schelling engages productive intuition in order to explain how the very notion of potencies come to be for us. Both terms exhibit the synthetic identity of the real and ideal series in that actants, are speculative entities which make thinking about intensities, or the world outside of us possible, whereas in the System, the pure activity of the self is only possible through the invasion of an outside world in us.

Once again, the tensions and difference between the transcendental and Naturphilosophical use of Potenz is reflected in the arguments over whether the Potenzen are derived more from mathematical (algebraic) sources or organic sources. In the System, Schelling defines transcendental philosophy as such as the power of raising the self to a higher power which, in the history of the genesis of intelligence, means the re-drawing of the origin of a decision from being rooted in blind necessity to free choice. This choice, or general act of intelligence, however, does not mean that human decision ruptures the ontological fabric of the world pace Johnston and Žižek as discussed in chapter 1, but that methods which trace the consequences of a particular world at least appear as freedom, appear as redirecting the succession of the activities of a self.288 It is more the case, as Schelling puts it in

287 Ibid. 76.
288 Ibid. 118.
relating human intelligence to that of animals, that it is the recognition of the 'naturalness' of the succession of representations and intelligence's hand in moving them along, or, of reflection effecting the natural capacities of sense for instance, that a different direction, or act of free choice, occurs.\footnote{Ibid. 124.}

Here Schelling appears to be shifting back to the notion of the \textit{Potenzen} discussed above in the \textit{First Outline}. As Schelling argues organization, and the individuation of nature, is simply nature operating on itself thereby leading to the emergence of things from a dynamic and relative oneness.\footnote{Ibid. 126.} This self-operation has fascinating consequences for the analysis of nature, and makes a spatial and motive account of natural processes embodied in their particularities an interesting avenue of analysis. But this is not the direction that the \textit{System} pursues. Schelling entrenches the raising of the self-as-activity to the higher power in stricter and stricter human terms in the closing pages of the text.

While this is recuperated in the \textit{Philosophy of Art}, for the years following Schelling is more interested in discussing the \textit{Potenzen} in ways less directly applicable, it would appear, to the internal functioning of human consciousness. In the so called Identity philosophy to which we now turn, Schelling attempts to abstract the notion of the \textit{Potenzen} to their formal and natural limit. This is evident in the next phase of Schelling's use of the potencies applied to physics, art, and geometry particularly in regards to Platonism most evident in the \textit{Bruno}.

\textbf{4.2 - Schelling's Potenzen in the Universal Deduction (1800), Presentation (1801), Further Presentations (1802), and Philosophy of Art (1804)}

Whereas our discussion of the potencies in the last section relates to Chapter 2 in terms of relating the actants, or proto-physical singularities, to the transition problem of moving from the conditions of physics to physics as such, the break with Fichte, which occurs in the letters and in the \textit{Presentations (Presentation of My System of Philosophy and Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy)}, demonstrates a more geometrical or spatially-constructive approach. In a broader sense,
the second phase of Schelling’s utilization of the *Potenzen* (from 1800-1804) appears split between diagrammatic and *Naturphilosophical* means (the *Presentations* and *The Universal Deduction*) and more artistic, or generally creative, attempts to express them (*The Philosophy of Art*). The reason for this is already evident in the above discussion, that is, it is Schelling continuing to struggle with identifying creativity, and separating expression from nature, or being itself. The diagrammatic becomes a way to discuss abstract expression of quality, *vis a vis* quantity, whereas the Platonic style of *Bruno*, and the litany of examples in *The Philosophy of Art*, attempt to demonstrate a unity through continuous creativity.

*Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process or the Categories of Physics* (1800)

Following both the style and content of the *Ideas*, Schelling begins his abstraction of natural processes, via the diagram, in the *Universal Deduction*. Schelling states that in order to understand nature one must speculate as to the universal properties of it, even if investigating these properties, is an infinite task. Schelling speaks of these “primitives” (thereby echoing the language of the *First Outline*) as “the self-construction of matter repeated at different levels.”

Construction is the overwhelming theme of the *Universal Deduction* as it follows, generally, the language, and method, of the *Ideas* but addresses the nature of the *Potenzen* through a geometrical mode also found in the *First Presentation* and *Further Presentations*. *The Universal Deduction* also makes references to the *Potenz* as types of forces in nature as exhibited in the *First Outline*. These general motions can be detected from the fist line of the text “The sole task of natural science is to construct matter” to just a few paragraphs later “Our entire endeavour [4] can therefore be restricted only to seeking out the universal principles of all natural production; but it must also treat their applicability, which runs to infinity in all dimensions, as a non-finite task. – Just as the astronomer

knows the general laws governing the motions of the universe, without for that very reason penetrating to the very depths of the heavens.”

Here the transcendental goals of the First Outline are expressed in the applications of knowledge within their particular field (which, while present in the First Outline, is closer in its specificity to the Ideas). A few pages below Schelling introduces the use of points and lines in order to explain how magnitudes of different kinds of forces are in fact in the same continuum. Schelling repeats this theme, half-way through the text, but in direct relation to the Potenzen. The Potenzen turn out to be the key to uniting forces which appear dynamically opposed, yet united, in the intuition of the natural scientist or philosopher.

He writes:

We will arrive at a resolution of this problem through an exact determination of its consequences. The two forces are to be exhibited as opposed in one and the same intuition. When the two are opposed and separate, then just as in the preceding moment, each will produce a surface for itself (§§18-19). But the two must again be posited as identical for intuition. Since the antithesis of forces itself must persist, this is only possible only when their productions are exhibited in a common third, and since, as was said, each of these forces produces the surface for itself, the common force (which must be thought not as a mere addition, but rather as arising through an actual penetration or multiplication of products by one another) must be the surface to the second power, or the cube. With this reciprocal potentiation of production on either side, the construction first breaks away from the merely geometrical, the third is added to the first two dimensions, and the genuine mediating link by which the two forces may be posited as simultaneously non-identical and yet as united in intuition, is (not the line or the surface, but rather) space itself, i.e., magnitude extended in three dimensions.

Thus the question remains whether Schelling's discussion of the Potenzen shifts from the biological to the mathematical, or, whether it was always already something else altogether. The biological impulse appears in the movement that allows the diagrammatic to occur at all, whereas the compact mathematical expression of such motion, to be extended outward in an abstract sense, is the consequence of the diagram. In either case, the Potenzen appear as the least noetic account of Schelling's philosophy, they appear as the most real, or maximally consequential, components or perhaps the only non-sheerly ideal components of nature. This is evident as early in “Of the I” where Schelling claims that the unconditioned, which is comprised of the potencies, is not effected by

292 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 1.
293 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 3-4.
294 Schelling, Universal Deduction, 18-19.
modality (possibility, necessity, etc) and therefore determines logical categories rather than being defined by them. As he writes in a dense note a few pages below:

The result of these deductions is that only the forms of being, of not-being, and of not-being determined by being can belong to logic, since they precede all synthesis and are the basis of all synthesis, and since they contain the original form according to which alone any synthesis can be performed. It also follows that the schematized forms of possibility, reality, and necessity, made possible only by an antecedent synthesis, -belong to logic only because they themselves are determined by those original forms. Thus, for instance, problematical theorems do not belong to logic insofar as they express objective possibility but only inasmuch as they express objective-logical possibility; not insofar as they express a being-possited in the synthesis as such, but only inasmuch as their logical thinkability has been transmitted at all through this synthesis.

Arguably, Schelling's reliance on the Potenzen put him in a difficult situation; that of attempting to argue that a determinable structure of nature can be detected, but one that is not logical per se. While we will investigate the epistemological difficulties of this claim in the following chapter, for the argument following, I will attempt to demonstrate how Schelling's Potenzen minimally formalize creativity as such. It is the difficulty of trying to formally, but non-logically, present, or exhibit creativity as such, that Schelling will rely more and more heavily on the diagram, and the algebraic expression of the Potenzen. Schelling's most direct expression of the Potenzen can be found in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801).

Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801)

Following from the above section, Schelling's introduction of the Potenzen in the Presentation is tied to questions of individuation in nature. Schelling writes:

Each individual is certainly not absolute, but it is infinite in its kind. It is not absolutely infinite, since there is something outside it and it is determined in its being by something external. It is infinite in its kind, however, or, since mode of being is determined by the quantitative difference of sbjectivity and objectivity, and since this difference is expressed in the potency of one or the other, it is infinite within its potency, for it expresses absolute identity for its potency under the same form as the infinite. Therefore the individual is itself infinite within the scope of its potency, even if not absolutely infinite.

How the Potenzen grow out of the difficulty of thinking abstract dynamics processes on the one hand, and how to represent factors or actants within such processes, becomes clear following the above

paragraph. Schelling identifies the *Potenzen* as localizations of the infinite in terms of kinds, tendencies, or qualities. Localized in a particular way, that is, relative to their proper *Potenz*, kind-internal infinity does not appear ontologically, or epistemologically, strange. Taking the example of the color blue can be instructive here. That a shade of blue is infinitely blue according to its kind (that is, according to its color) is quite different from saying this or that instance of blue is infinitely blue. There is a quantitative measure of blueness but it cannot be said to be infinite, or absolute, in a way that would eliminate, for instance, all other colors. One of the connected footnotes to this passage is crucial and is the closest Schelling ever comes to defining what a potency is outright: “The concept of *power* or *potency* can be most accurately understood in the following way. *What is in existence* is always [and] only indifference, and nothing truly exists *outside it*: but it exists in infinite ways too, and it never exists otherwise than under the form *A = A*, i.e., as cognition and being.”

One again, and to return to the above discussion of the *Potenzen* being discovered in thought, this means that the meta-stability of phenomena, is due to the fact that subjecting and objecting tendencies have reached a point of indifference. This indifference is not an absolute indifference since, if absolute indifference occurred, then all creation would cease. As I will explore in Chapter 5, the indifference point can be treated as a hinge, or point, from which new bifurcations can be measured. In *The Philosophy of Art* (1804) Schelling attempts a quite different way of expressing how raising things to a higher level can manifest without assuming the change is necessarily qualitative.

*Philosophy of Art* (1801-1804)

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299 Here I am skipping over Schelling's *Bruno* (1802). It must be immediately noted that given that the form of the *Bruno* is that of a Platonic dialogue, it is difficult to count it in the progression of Schelling's thought in the same fashion. For one, Schelling does not speak in his own voice but in the titular character of Bruno (named after that of Giordano Bruno). This fact itself however indexes the importance of the potencies in an interesting sense. The Platonic style of the *Bruno* allows Schelling to place the *Potenz* in a cosmological context, something that will remain important for the rest of his career. That is, instead of oscillating between discussing the *Potenz* in *Naturphilosophical* or transcendental terms (although the limits of the latter are strained in the *Presentation*) Schelling makes the *Potenz* as abstract as possible within the *Bruno*. As will be clearer in Schelling's later works and is first detectable in *Of the I*, the *Potenz* are a means of explaining the modality of existence as more than merely cognizable modality.
In the introduction to his lectures on The Philosophy of Art, Schelling introduces the potencies as if for the first time. In discussing the construction of the forms of art, Schelling discusses the potencies, in the highest sense, as the battle between necessity and freedom.\textsuperscript{300} Yet, throughout the Philosophy of Art Schelling discusses the potencies as “ideal determinations” referring to the 1804 Wurzburg system as a secondary account.\textsuperscript{301} What is striking is that Schelling discusses the potencies as the flight of creation from mere matter. As he writes:

The essential nature of art clothes itself here, as does the pure essence of nature, completely in matter and body. That matter becomes ideal through the second potence: in nature through light, in art through painting. Finally, in the third potence, the real and ideal potences become one. That which is bound to or informed into the real or into matter becomes sonority or sound; within art it becomes music and song. Here, then, the absolute cognitive act is more or less freed from the fetters of matter; positing that matter as a mere accidental, it becomes objective and recognizable as the act of the informing of eternal subjectivity into objectivity.\textsuperscript{302}

At least two points are worth emphasizing here. One, given Schelling’s emphasis in the Universal Deduction on matter, and the construction of matter as a Platonic problem, it is worth noting what it is that Schelling means by matter, in that it appears to be a question of material construction, and not of existence, or being, more generally. The second point, which follows, is how this appears to be an almost mirror reflection of the way in which Schelling will talk about matter in the Freedom Essay. Once again, this relates to Schelling’s concept of the potencies being individuals yet infinite in their kind, i.e., the potencies are infinite powers interior to their organic consistency, or algebraic self-referentiality, but are limited by one another. Again, the trajectorial or vectorial/spatial emphasis explored in Chapter 3 shows why Schelling emphasizes that the adding of potencies create formal differences, or what appear as, qualitative changes. In the Philosophy of Art, for instance, the potencies correspond to different kinds of art. However, since Schelling refers to potencies as unities (note the plurality here), the notion of ideal determination is not one that supervenes on real creation. This is

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid. 281.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid. 200.
particularly evident in the following lengthy passage:

One can extract the individual potence out of the whole and treat it in and for itself, but only insofar as one really presents the absolute within it is this presentation itself philosophy. In every other case, where one treats the individual potence as a particular and presents laws or rules for it as a particular, it can only be a theory of a specific object, such as a theory of nature or a theory of art. One can comprehend this in a more general sense by noting that all antitheses and differences are merely different forms that are nonessential within those differences. Only in their unity are they real, and since the unity of all cannot itself be a particular, they are real only to the extent that each in itself represents the absolute whole, the universe. By basing laws on the particular as particular, one thereby removes the object from the absolute, and science from philosophy.303

Much can be gleaned from this passage. For one, Schelling demonstrates, once again, how the Potenzen can be treated as individuals in the form of a useful fiction (again indexing the actants of the First Outline) and, furthermore, the general notion of Schelling's theory of knowledge can be taken in that individuals are articulated as ideal determinations, or extensions, which must be treated as representations, or mirrors, for the entire cosmos. I will address this in Chapter 5. But, for now, I wish to focus on the use of extraction in regards to the question of matter and unity. As argued above, I believe that the multiplication of unities, coupled with the fact that an object, or an individual, can be real or ideal, that realness, or the absolute, underlies every ideal determination. But it is not that case that we can finally discover the singular absolute realness, since all notion of singularity is relative to the location of it, and, the means of its expression. Thus, when Schelling speaks of matter and thought escaping it, its arbitrariness is that of the choice of expression which matters far less than what it represents. Realness is determined by how maximally consequential the representation is, or, how universal it is, and not by what it is made of.

4.3 -Philosophy of Religion (1804), Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809), Stuttgart Seminars (1810)

In his short text that serves as a response to C.A. Eschenmayer, Schelling focuses largely on the concept of the absolute as it relates to reason and faith as capacities capable of determining the absolute and whether it has an outside. Schelling argues that the only way the absolute is known is

303 Ibid. 282.
through intuition in that the process of intuition is continuous with the absolute whereas both faith and rationale address the absolute in a different register. Schelling struggles to define the absolute as on the one hand, 'the only actual' and yet, on the other hand, as something from which, and in which, creation occurs without the absolute containing all that is created (thereby falling back into Spinozist immanence) or by the absolute decaying via the ancient and medieval doctrine of emanation. Both these concepts of the absolute predetermine an origin for the absolute that overly determine what follows from it. Schelling argues, in a line of thinking that will reappear shortly thereafter in the Freedom essay, that one can apply neither finitude nor infinitude to the absolute or the universe because we cannot grasp to what it is that predication (cause and effect or antecedent and consequent) is applying. This feeds directly into the aforementioned darkness of Platonic matter which he explores, particularly in regards to predication, in On the Relation of the Ideal and the Real in Nature, or, Development of the First Principles of Naturephilosophy from the Principles of Gravity and Light (1806). But before moving onto this text, Schelling's short text The Philosophy of Religion must be addressed.

Philosophy and Religion (1804)

Schelling begins his text by noting that it should be read as a continuation of the failure of the Bruno, or On the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things (1802) to launch a series of new philosophical dialogues. Just as the Bruno attempted to demonstrate the movement of the potencies in various works of art, and, in the formulation of the capacity to produce art as such, the Philosophy of Religion attempts this by separating philosophy's treatment of the absolute from faith's relation to God. Philosophy and Religion does not address the Potenzen in the Naturphilosophical fashion, or the more

305 Ibid. 26.
306 Ibid. 24.
307 Ibid. 36.
formal Identity philosophy mode but, in the letters to Eschenmayer following the text, Schelling addresses the *Potenzen* in relation to the concept of the absolute as such. He writes to Eschenmayer “the *Absolute* is not a potency since it comprehends and dissolves all potencies within itself. *This Absolute* is what you seem to call God.” 308 The dissolution of the potencies is not one of a great being containing them but here Schelling means the principle by which the potencies are to the extent that they do not override other potencies in their determinations. The absolute in question is not a big object, or even an infinite process, but the indifference of all the creative powers of the cosmos. For Schelling, the absolute as absolute, cannot be equated with God since this absolute is structurally prior to, or above, all unities or composites. The absolute cannot be the unity of unities, nor merely their indifference, but that space which makes both unites possible as open yet coherent structures. 309

The question that is begged by such an articulation however is how to account for the particular *Potenz* or, even, the particular *experience* of creation for us. This is what Schelling attempts to address in the *Freheitschrift* (or Freedom Essay) of 1809.

*Freedom Essay (1809)*

In regards to the role of the potencies, Schelling’s much vaunted *Freedom Essay* is concerned with the *Potenzen* as they relate to the problem of individuation, and the non-totality suggested in *Philosophy and Religion*, which in turn is tied to issues of predication or, the bond and the bonded, in *On the Relation*. Schelling attempts to reconcile the experience of freedom, of the capacity to perform seemingly free acts, with the notion that every consequence, every purportedly free agent, is dependent upon a ground. Schelling attempts this by arguing for a non-modern concept of identity, which, appeared in direct relation to the *Potenzen* in his *Presentation*.

These themes are all immediately evident in the opening pages of the text. For instance,

308 Ibid. 60.
309 Ibid.
Schelling argues that the statement 'the body is blue' does not of course insinuate an identity between having a body, and having blueness, but that the notion of 'a' blue body follows.\textsuperscript{310} Thus, the statement individuates in that it determines a thing that has bodiness and blueness, but does not equate the qualities, nor even the level of having them. Thus, for Schelling, 'the body is blue' means there is here a thing which has blueness and, in a different way, has bodiness.' Furthermore, the making of the statement itself admits a perspective, as does the 'the' and the 'is' which exhibits the ontological cost of making determinations as such. Or, put otherwise, the blueness unfolds from the body, whereas the notions of bodiness and blueness unfold, but in a different sense, from the determinator's determination.

Through a subsequent engagement with the pantheism controversy (addressed in Chapter 1) Schelling arrives at the problem of freedom within identity. Schelling's point is that identity, that even tautegorical statements, or seemingly lifeless unities, are creative in the act of making them.\textsuperscript{311} To quote Schelling at length is helpful here as the following passage encompasses the aforementioned issues:

\begin{quote}
"In the relation of subject and predicate we have already shown that of ground and consequence, and the law of the ground \textit{[Gesetz des Grundes]} is for that reason just as original as the law of identity. Therefore, the eternal must also be a ground immediately and as it is in itself. That of which the eternal is a ground through its being is in this respect dependent and, from the point of view of immanence, also something contained within the eternal. But dependence does not abolish independence, it does not even abolish freedom. Dependence does not determine its being and says only that the dependent, whatever it also may be, can be a con-sequence only of that of which it is a dependent; dependence does not say what the dependent is or is not. Every organic individual exists, as something that has become, only through another, and in this respect is dependent according to its becoming but by no means according to its Being."\textsuperscript{312}
\end{quote}

Freedom is thus not a container of ontological liberalism, nor is it a specifically human, yet ontological, capacity.\textsuperscript{313} Furthermore, on the other side, Schelling argues that the one (which is not) cannot be created from the combination of things deriving from the original into the original, or, put

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid. 17.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid. 28
otherwise, the all cannot be made into the one and yet, the all is the closest form to the one.\footnote{Ibid. 13.} Thus, there is a freedom which in part entails treating sets of alls \textit{as if they are ones}, or absolutes. An easy but incorrect path to take here would be to assert that, in the vein of Žižek, that Schelling is asserting that human freedom is \textit{ontologically exceptional}, that human freedom is a rupture in the absolute or in the ontological fabric of being, that the non-all or, more accurately in Schelling's account, the non-one, is not due to the status of human subjectivity, but is the status of the world as such.

Schelling argues that human freedom cannot be different \textit{in kind} from the freedom that is nature's dynamics. This is evident in the fact that Schelling states that idealism's task is to demonstrate the difference of human freedom in the absolute. Yet, since the potencies demonstrate there is no first nor last, no alpha nor omega that can be found, but only asserted, then freedom \textit{within} the absolute cannot be viewed as an exception to it since it is only possible as a consequence of what came before, and because there is no boundary, that we know of, that freedom could be said to be rupturing.\footnote{Ibid. 28.} An overemphasis on freedom, or any particular potency, can lead to misrepresenting the absolute. Hence why Schelling warns regarding the erasure of nature\footnote{Ibid. 26.} and furthermore, Schelling is critical of those who would assert the priority of the understanding who “attempt to make smoke from lighting.”\footnote{Ibid. 29.} As already mentioned, and as Schelling will further elaborate in the \textit{Ages of the World}, Schelling articulates potencies as individual unities which are infinite in their capacity yet specific or determinable from one another.

\textit{Stuttgart Seminars (1810)}

\begin{quote}
In the \textit{Stuttgart Seminars} Schelling has a long digression on powers focusing on the real and the
\end{quote}
ideal as subordinate unities, subordinate forms of the absolute.\footnote{Schelling, “Stuttgart Seminars,” 203.} Powers are outlined as periods of the absolute that move in a series where the ideal must logically follow the real. The first power takes logical precedence but this does not cancel the balance of the powers in the absolute. The real difference which emerges between the two unities, which is so important for the aforementioned capacity of freedom discussed above, is that of position or location (which will be discussed in Chapter 5).

Real difference between unities, between the real and the ideal as methods, sets value judgments against ones of existence. The relation of real and ideal begins to shift to that of actual and potential as the actual becomes the position from which the real and ideal are treated as either actual or potential.

Positing is the procedure by which the potencies are identified as powers for us.\footnote{Ibid.} The point of engaging in an analysis of powers means retreating into one of them which, for us, is often that of reason. This retreat is not a reduction but the only means of forming a position from which to distinguish powers, to formulate priorities and a chain of consequences. These chains are only methodologically useful and cannot simply override the bifurcation of matter and spirit which necessarily takes place in nature of which humans, as a relatively recent development of nature, are at a threshold.\footnote{Ibid. 217. See also F. W. J. von Schelling, \textit{Clara, or, On nature's connection to the spirit world}, trans. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 79-80. The particularity of human existence in relation to the potencies is taken up in Schelling's \textit{Clara (1811)}. Schelling's strange pseudo-novelistic text places the potencies as both characters (foregrounding the connection of potency to personality present in the \textit{Ages}) and as marking the transition from the natural world to the spiritual world. This transition is not absolute as the worlds are of one world or one unity and are different only in the position (or character) from which they are articulated. Furthermore the process of transition or transcendence (the movement of development) individuates or turns inward in the form of a conflict. \textit{Clara} can be read in conjunction with Schelling's scattered remarks on philosophical anthropology found in his writings on mythology in particular. At the same time, the concepts and characterization (thought of in a more literal narratological sense) preview the emphasis on the potencies being modes of expression in Schelling's work to follow.}
condensed and matter of fact, in comparison to the *Bruno*, or even the diagrammatic version in the *Presentations* and *Further Presentations*. That is, Schelling merely describes how the powers ground themselves in one another as the exponentially augment one another, passing from the form $A = B$ to $A = B^3$ through the asymmetrical dialectic by which nature natures.\(^{322}\) While it may simply be that the lecture structure forced Schelling to present the *Potenzen* in such a form, it is there he appears to be falling into simply a return to dogmatic metaphysics.


In the 1813 version of the *Ages of the World*, Schelling engages with material quite similar to that in the opening pages of the *Freedom Essay*, namely, identity and predication. Although the text sets out to address temporality more specifically, Schelling quickly moves from the past as a necessary concept for philosophy to recognize its own history, to notions of the unconditioned and contradiction in order to demonstrate how the past can be known in a way that is not merely that which was the present.\(^{323}\) In essence, Schelling argues that that which is, and that which has existence, are the same which he refers to using the *Naturphilosophical* term of the unconditioned.\(^{324}\) Repeating language from *Philosophy and Religion*, Schelling attempts to articulate that which is, and that something is, with unity and eternality respectively. This relates to Schelling’s view of contradiction following Plato, as contradiction is not absolute but merely a difference that has not yet been properly articulated.

Or, in other words, the continuum which allows things to be is the base of being, or whatness, whereas the emergence of particularities has to do with the continued attempt at unity, or continuity, at

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\(^{324}\) *Ibid.* 126.
constantly being produced. For Schelling, unity can only be unity by producing particularities. Thus, time and contradiction are bound together because the mobility of the unconditioned, or the eternal, appears as time because the eternal cannot be being, and existence, simultaneously. By the same logic, unity must appear as heterogeneous continuity in order to appear at all.

The key term for Schelling, in regards to these conditions, is that of expression. An expression cannot express contradiction as such, but only equally express two active powers in a statement. This leads Schelling back to the formula of identity expressed in the Freedom Essay. He writes: “The true sense of each judgment – for example, that 'A = B' – can only be the following: THAT which is = A IS THAT which is = B, or, THAT which is A and THAT which is B are as one.”

Schelling goes on to say that the 'is' is the ground of being which is the unity of unities in that all expressions are expressions of this ground. Thus, anything resembling a contradiction must in fact be merely a tangled, or lost connection, and not an absolute breakage given that that which is expressed, is only expressible, because of an underlying unity. As already mentioned, what is difficult is how exactly to articulate difference in kind or, the qualitative distinction between things (things being limitations or conditions of the unconditioned), and their relative infinity. Again, pointing back to the Freedom Essay, Schelling addresses this problem in regards to will or personality. He writes:

The unconditioned can express itself as what-is and as being, and it can refrain from expressing itself as both; in other words, it can be both, or it can let both alone. Free will is just this ability to be something along with the ability to not be it. But further, the Highest can be what-is, and it can be being.

Freedom, or will, is thus the same as the unconditioned except that freedom, which is connected here to the highest (which, elsewhere, Schelling defines as the onto-epistemological location of human

325 Ibid.
326 Ibid. 128.
327 Ibid. 129.
328 Ibid. 130.
329 Ibid. 131.
330 Ibid. 131-132.
beings) is a maximally extensive view of conditions, an indifference not only between conditions or choices, but also between what is, and what is being. These two tendencies are unified in a third moment which Schelling expresses in the exponential language of the potencies.\(^{331}\)

Once again, potencies become the structures which attempt to explain how qualitative difference, which is infinite in kind (will, or personality), can exist equally when all power, as such, can only ever be measured as quantity in terms of power. That is, since like can only be known by like, and because there could be no motive contradiction unless there was an underlying unity or continuity, the difference between potencies must be one that is not absolute contradiction, but relative. Yet, at the same time, this relativity appears differently, and is viewed differently, according to the conditions it takes up, i.e., where a potency is located in the all. This leads Schelling, in the 1813 *Ages of the World*, to shift the emphasis on contradiction to one of grounding (*Verhaltnis des Grundes*) in which there is not total sublation, nor contradiction, but a cooperation which issues a trajectory whether spatial, or temporal.\(^{332}\) As Schelling puts it, a judgment that expresses a ground and a consequent does not determine a different degree of existence, or contradiction, but a relation of dependence and independence (again repeating the opening pages of the *Freedom* essay). The difference between the antecedent and consequent, or the subject and the predicate, is one that can be defined in term of potencies: “The preceding will would act as the ground of its successor, and hence as the first potency. Now it could certainly fail to be active in the potency of the other will, but this does not stop it all the while as active in its potency as the other is in the other's potency.”\(^{333}\) In addition to the potencies restricting one another, and determining succession depending on their grounding relation or ratio to one another, this co-determination is re-oriented by a particular act or decision of will or motion.\(^{334}\)

\(^{334}\) *Ibid.* 177.
“Because the negating will is posited as preceding, it is also posited as the ground of existence [Existenz], as being, as the (A = B) of what is higher. Moreover, the affirming will (which is grounded by the negating will) would act as A². Finally, the third – their living unity would be to them A³ is in the expressible.”³³⁵

At the end of the text Schelling settles back into a discussion of eternality and appears to abandon how the will, or how a particular aspect of willing, constructs or expresses itself as a particular existence or as a particular Potenz, or how construction relates to the potencies as coming out of, and exteriorizing the eternal. The 1813 version of the Ages of the World appears to suffer from how the eternal relates to the reorientation of the world, or a particular world to the particular agent doing the constructing.

Before addressing how Schelling attempts to solve this problem, it is worth addressing the 1815 version of the Ages.

Ages of the World (1815)

In the 1815 draft of Schelling's The Ages of the World Schelling introduces the potencies in relation to the question of unity and how it relates to the law of predication. The potencies are introduced following Schelling's statement that knowledge requires “movement,”³³⁶ as the exploration of knowledge is the unfurling of a judgment into a conclusion.³³⁷ This unfurling cannot be mere change but most be a form of creation that does not fully erase its immediate grounding and potential direction hence why all potencies have a degree of self-hood.³³⁸ Later Schelling defines this self-hood in terms of having being,³³⁹ of being potencies amidst the All and not being merely immanently internal to the One. In relation to the 1813 version, the 1815 version of the Ages highlights the tension

³³⁵ Ibid.
³³⁷ Ibid. 8.
³³⁸ Ibid. 9.
³³⁹ Ibid. 24.
between the eternal, the individual, and how powers fit in between. It is clear that there are potencies (plural) and they are infinite in kind. While individuals are generally inhibitions of underlying forces, the potencies are defined as externalizations (or expressions) of the eternal.

Schelling writes:

The true meaning of this unity that has been asserted in the beginning is therefore this: "one and the same \( = x \) is as much the unity as it is the antithesis. Or both of the opposed potencies, the eternally negating potency and the eternally affirming potency, and the unity of both make up the one, inseparable, primordial being.\(^{340}\)

And then:

And here, first after the consummate unfurling of that initial concept, can we glimpse the first nature in its full vitality. We see it, in an equally originary way, decomposed, as it were, into three powers. Each of these powers can be for itself. Hence, the unity is a unity for itself and each of the opposite powers is a whole and complete being.\(^{341}\)

Beyond noting the *Naturphilosophical* language of the above (powers and their relation to decomposition) the completeness of each *Potenz* is a particular statement since, as it appears above that the *potenz* determine one another's limits, that their wholeness is limited externally. However, given the central themes connected with the potencies, particular that of All replacing the One, and first and last, or low and high, replacing origin and teleology, there is no external to the external, to the totality of the potencies. This totality cannot be at rest or merely being since, again to quote Schelling:

This [being at rest] is impossible in that initial equivalence since both potencies, so to speak, want to be in a single point because both make the same claim to be that which has being. But if the negating / principle \( A = B \) only knows itself as a potency of the being and thereby makes space for the other principle opposed to it \( (A \neq B) \), then the opposed principle can become helpful to it and become its liberator from contradiction since the opposed principle is, in accordance with its nature, unlocking and liberating.\(^{342}\)

The phrase 'making space' is the important emphasis here, as the will or particular directionality made possible by one potency, in relation to another, is not merely determined by the grounding relation, but also one of relative spatiality. Just as the potencies can be related to the succession of times, they should be articulated as an orientation of spaces though, I argue, is only implicit in Schelling's work.

\(^{340}\) Ibid. 10.
\(^{341}\) Ibid. 11.
\(^{342}\) Ibid.
As Schelling goes on to write:

Now, we maintain the possibility that what does not now have being could endeavor to emerge from out of the state of potentiality and elevate itself again to what has being. From this comes an intensified concept of what does not have being which we are often enough forced to acknowledge in nature and life. This clearly persuades us that there would be something mediate between what is and nothing, namely, what is not and also should not be, but which still endeavors to be. It is not because it only endeavors to be. And it is not nothing because in a certain way it must be in order to covet.\textsuperscript{343}

Furthermore, Schelling goes on to state that the Potenz determine the succession of time given the fact that powers cannot exist all at full force at the same time, or, for that matter, in the same place. Schelling makes the important distinction of noting that as individuals, the Potenz are different in that they have being in every time.\textsuperscript{344}

Or as he puts it again:

When one potency is compared with another potency, the proceeding potency appears lower than the preceding potency, because the preceding potency necessarily appears as a higher potency in its time than the proceeding potency does in its time. But when one time is compared with another time and one epoch is compared with another epoch, the proceeding one appears decisively higher. Hence, such seeming regressions are necessary in the history of life.\textsuperscript{345}

There is, I argue, an epistemological consequence here in that the Potenz can be read from above, in terms of the various potencies limiting one another or, they can be viewed in a temporal sequence, in terms of higher and lower. But I will address this more in detail in Chapter 5.\textsuperscript{346}

\textit{History of Modern Philosophy (1833-1834)}

In his lectures in Munich, Schelling returns to the history of philosophy, starting with Descartes, and working up to his present. In the section on Na\textit{ur}philosophie, Schelling once again goes over the Potenzen and their relation to individuation and temporality in particular. In passing over Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff, Schelling indicates tensions between how they utilize being and how, and in what ways, being can be active in their relative systems. In particular, Schelling focuses on how delicate the problem of the origin of being or, what he transforms into the firstness or

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid. 48.
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid. 82.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid. 84.
\textsuperscript{346} Chronologically speaking I am skipping over Schelling's Erlangen lectures (due to their little referencing of the potencies) as well as Schelling's Darstellung lectures as I will focus on them in chapter 6.
Prius of being, is. Schelling adds the caveat that this firstness is a determination, but not merely a fact, i.e., the first being is determined as first but can be thus determined because of the innumerable consequences that firstness would mean. In such a move Schelling attempts to simultaneously critique and absorb the dogmatic gesture of necessity. Quoting Schelling:

we ourselves spoke first of all of what Is and determined it as the Prius, as the original state (Urstand), i.e. as the possibility of being. Quite right; but we also immediately added that it could not be sustained in this priority, therefore, even though the Prius, never as the Prius; the transition was inevitable, what Is should not be, thus to think it as not-being (nicht seyend).\footnote{347}

In this way Schelling attempts to separate the necessity of necessity (as inexistence) from a necessarily existing being. A necessarily existing being would, for Schelling, eliminate the dynamism within any system yet, at the same time, Schelling maintains necessity in that necessary stages determine subsequent ones (whether viewed as the historicization of nature, or the structure of predication) but there is no means of determining the original necessity, only that a chain of necessitation occurs and that material existence is a primary, not originary, step. Schelling approaches this the other way around in regard to Spinoza. Instead of focusing on the Prius contra the originary, Schelling notes that Spinoza's immanent monism requires an absolute outer boundary in order to make coherent the correspondences between modes. Schelling argues that Spinoza's notion of being swallows possibility inside of it\footnote{348} and that the great flaw of Spinoza's system is that it lacks an external notion of infinite.\footnote{349}

Schelling finds Spinoza's account unsatisfactory as he believes that Spinoza cannot account for creation within the closed being of God as anything but combinatorial, yet somehow, infinite. Thus there is not infinite capacity in Spinoza but only relative and contained capacity which is measured relative to God. Again, against commentators such as Edward Beach who would place Schelling's

\footnote{348} Ibid. 65.
\footnote{349} Ibid. 71.
Potenzen close to Spinoza's powers, the difference lies in the fact that for Schelling the Potenzen have personalities, or possess infinity relative to themselves, which can not be contained but only limited by the activity of other potencies.

Returning to the language regarding the dynamics of nature, Schelling argues that nature must have the structure of a being that would be pure becoming if it did not have a desire to be something to itself, for it to come to rest as finitude.\textsuperscript{350} This contradictory notion of becoming is one of intensification, since the infinitude of creation, or becoming, raises itself to a higher level by attempting and failing to become an object to itself.\textsuperscript{351} The uninhibited power of creation appears as nothing until it inhibits itself, until it attempts to become a being. Here Schelling is repeating, though perhaps less poetically, ideas from his earliest texts but, in particular, the passages cited sound similar to those of the Ages of the World. The rotary motion of creation, which even God cannot escape, is cast in the History as an originary motion which turns in on itself thereby creating finite things. This creation is a necessity but, not a existent necessity, and therefore the emergence of contingency comes with existence, with finitude. The three-fold structure of the Potenzen then demonstrates how finitude emerges as a consequence of infinity, and how that consequent infinity becomes a particular infinity by locating itself in the world as a kind, as a potency.\textsuperscript{352} The finite being, working as a pure subject, can likewise treat itself as infinite (in the $A^2$) after it has submitted itself to finitude. The pre-history of the Potenzen is thus folded into their status as an essence, their origin, which allows for further augmentation or intensification.\textsuperscript{353}

Schelling then quickly shifts to the language of the dynamic processes from the First Outline, and the Ideas in discussing the dynamic treatment of the potencies as categories of physical

\textsuperscript{350} Ibid. 117.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid. 114-115.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid. 116.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid. 117-118.
emergences within the three-fold structure. The first stage, A\(^1\), is connected to matter, A\(^2\) to light, and A\(^3\) to the organic; the level which operates on both as real, and ideal, material.\(^{354}\) Schelling thus indicates, by way of a cursory review of his earlier texts, how the potencies mark the stages of augmentation which, in a linear view of nature, leads up to the emergence of humans. The difficulty is that these stages of potentiation lead to the capacity of thought, and, to the possibility of pure knowledge since, in the past, potencies eventually become essences, or mere forms, in order to make room for further augmentation. But how would such a sublation be conceivable once the process of conceiving emerges? Schelling states that the human, burdened with the apparent infinitude of thought, finds herself in the position of the \textit{Prius} of nature as unconditioned becoming. Thought appears to itself as completely unconditioned yet, has come after a long chain of determinations in nature. Because of this, thought copies the determinations in nature as ideal but, in order for thought to intensify, to progress, it treats the stages of this ideal copy as objects, or tools, whereby action can be justified.\(^{355}\)

\textit{Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology (1842)}

Schelling’s lectures on mythology expand his concerns regarding the personality of God expressed in \textit{The Ages of the World (1813,1815)} as well as his discussion of the \textit{Potenzen} as personalities or subjectivities.\(^{356}\) Like \textit{The Philosophy of Art}, or \textit{Bruno}, Schelling attaches the \textit{Potenzen} to a particular discourse which, in the case of this text, is of course mythology. As is the general function of the \textit{Potenzen}, Schelling argues that mythology, taken in a very general sense, cannot be merely subjective but, on the contrary, must be an instance of powers manifesting themselves through consciousness. He writes:

In this explanation there is also a return to the primordial Being \textit{[Urseyn]} of man: mythology is no less the consequence of a

\(^{354}\) \textit{Ibid.} 122.
\(^{355}\) \textit{Ibid.} 125-126.
\(^{356}\) Beach makes this argument as well in \textit{Potencies}, 136-140.
nonarbitrary process, to which man falls prey because he stirs himself from his original position. But as you yourself see, according to this explanation mythology would be only something false [XI 207] and also something merely subjective, namely, what exists in such representations, to which nothing real outside them would correspond, for divinized natural objects are no longer actual ones. But especially to be accentuated, however, would be the contingency that the drawing-on things brings into the explanation, while alone the manner in which we have reached the concept of the process brings with it that nothing is required for this process except consciousness, nothing outside the principles it itself posits and constitutes. It is not at all the things with which man deals in the mythological process by which consciousness is moved, but rather it is the powers arising in the interior of consciousness itself. The theogonic process, through which mythology emerges, is a subjective one insofar as it takes place in consciousness and shows itself through the generating of representations: but the causes and thus also the objects of these representations are the actually and in themselves theogonic powers, just those powers through which consciousness is originally the God-positing consciousness. The content of the process are not merely imagined potencies but rather the potencies themselves—which create consciousness and which create nature (because consciousness is only the end of nature) and for this reason are also actual powers. The mythological process does not have to do with natural objects, but rather with the pure creating potencies whose original product is consciousness itself. 357

While much can be said about Schelling's articulation of God and of the theogonic (the origin of the Gods) in general, I will restrict myself to how Schelling's articulation of the potencies emerges within the discussion of mythology. Immediately, one can take notice that the general thrust of Schelling's argument regarding the potencies here concerns their environing in the consciousness of humans.

Powers arise in consciousness, but are not merely due to consciousness, since nothing can be self-grounding. Because of this outsideness, this exteriority, the mythological content is not only determined by consciousness but myth, as a creative act, is a narrativization of powers in which thought encounters its own creativity. As Beach emphasizes, Schelling's discussion of the Potenzen is connected to his distinction of whatness (Was) and thatness (Das), or, Being and Existence. 358 This distinction, particularly in relation to the Potenzen, will become more central in Schelling's lectures on the split between the negative and positive philosophies. The potencies thread themselves through any particular domain of representation, but, this does not mean that such a domain is only ever an example of those powers. The expressive nature of the domain of action aligns its own notion of modalities with, and against, the larger exterior of pure-possibility. This tension between possibilities interior to

358 Beach, 147.
their kind, and possibility-as-such (or potency) is why Schelling finds it necessary to divide philosophy into positive and negative kinds.

Negative philosophy, which Schelling will associate most directly with Kant, is negative because it closes the possibility of creativity and, according to Schelling, makes a dogmatism out of an *a priori* logic. Or, to return to the language above, Kant attempts to define whatness in such a way that predetermines all possible forms of thatness without taking into account how thatness forces us to redefine whatness. Mythology is one attempt at narrativizing such genesis in its most primordial state by attempting to outline how certain *a priori* structures came to be from what was before, from what Schelling designates as the *Prius*.

*Grounding of Positive Philosophy* (1842-1843)

Schelling’s lectures on positive philosophy, myth, and revelation in Berlin in the place of the recently deceased Hegel, maintain the overtly historical trajectory of the lectures on modern philosophy albeit with different emphasis. In particular, Schelling focuses on how the potencies function in reason following Kant's re-articulation of reason in the critical enterprise. Quoting Schelling at length:

According to Kant, reason is nothing other than the faculty of knowledge as such, so that what is posited within us becomes, from the standpoint of philosophy, an object for us—so that reason itself considered entirely objective is the infinite potential of cognition (for reason remains this even apart from its subjective position, apart from its being in [63] any one subject). Potency is the Latin *potentia*—power—and is opposed to the actus. In the conventional use of language, one says, “The plant in its seed is the plant in its mere potency, in *pure potentia*, whereas the real mature or developed plant is the plant in actu.” Here, potency is considered merely as a *potentia passiva*, as a passive possibility; the seed is not necessarily the potential of the plant; there must be other external factors—fertile soil, rain, sunshine, and so on, added to it so that this potency becomes actus. As the faculty of knowledge, reason also appears as a *potentia passiva*, insofar as it is a faculty that is capable of development and, in this respect, is admittedly also dependent on external factors. Here, however, reason is not the faculty of knowledge subjectively considered, rather that standpoint has already been assumed from which reason itself is its object. Considered as an object, where the limitations of the subject are removed through abstraction, it can be nothing other than the infinite potency of cognition.359

Once again Schelling’s skepticism regarding a necessary being, or any existent which contains all its own potential is apparent. He will formulate this sentiment more directly in one of his

Darstellung Lectures, a point which has been highlighted by Iain Grant: “[n]o primal germ, scattered into chaos by ourselves as if fallen from the creator’s hand, is required. Everything is primal germ or nothing is.”

In stating that “only the infinite potential of being can correspond to the potency of being” Schelling distances himself from the Scholastic notion of Ens omnimod interminatum. In essence, Schelling wishes to argue that neither pure possibility (nor pure contingency) exists, nor does being as such always-already exist, but only a tension between potentiality and actuality exists.361 Schelling attacks Hegel and, in particular, his use of logic, as failing to recognize that predication, the activity of the potency recognized in the move from antecedent to consequent, is not the same as it actually occurring. To equate the motion of the concept with the thing is, for Schelling, to erase the effect of experience as it would be merely superfluous to the real-conceptual motion occurring. Or, in other words, to confuse embodied motion with conceptual motion is to confuse that something is, with what something is, to confuse being with a being.362

While I will address the use of experience in Chapter 6, to remain with the notion of the Potenzen, Schelling states that reason chases the Potenzen as reason, like nature, wishes to be their original content, to be infinite potentiality, but to be this, it must continually empty itself of specific content, it continually chases potencies and finds content that is not itself, and thus has a negative concept of being as its motor.363

Schelling attempts to address this by returning to the language of will that he utilized in the Freedom essay as well as the Ages of the World. Following the relation of individuation to the Potenzen, Schelling shifts to the language of movement, and here to focus on the experience of reason

360 Quoted in Grant, “Remains of the World,” 5
361 Schelling, Grounding. 133.
362 Ibid. 134.
363 Ibid. 137.
as movement, in that reasoning, as a kind of motion, only encounters possibility and not being as being since the being sublated, and treated like essence (that is the perspectival position of the self), is what allows the particular individual example of will, or reason in motion, to occur at all.\textsuperscript{364}

After a detour through Kant, Schelling returns to the motion of reason via the \textit{Potenz} arguing that being is the content of thought only as potency since potency is a leap toward a being. If this leap is objectified, or verified, that is, becomes relevant for experience, thought must move beyond itself again in order for thought to remain thought.\textsuperscript{365} Later on, Schelling states that this moving within the \textit{Potenz}, as the science of reason, is a negative philosophy, one that sets aside the philosophical ramifications of experience. Experience, for Schelling, is one that category of sense that takes reason alongside that which is, existence as infinite in itself, and not merely as infinite possibility as it is conceived in reason. Schelling states that:

The pure or infinite potency (the beginning of the negative philosophy) is the content identical with thought, which, because it does not go toward thought (since it is identical to it), only proceeds out from thought. In contrast, that which simply is is the content that is not identical with thought; indeed, it is excluded from the very start and, for this very reason, it can and must be first conveyed to thought since it is originally external to thought.\textsuperscript{366}

It is Schelling's focus on Aristotle's work which appears in the \textit{Erlangen Lectures} (1821), and which intensifies for the rest of his life, that is imperative for the positive philosophy, or a philosophy which, instead of exploring the \textit{Potenzen} in their development following from an inhabiting of being, instead constructs an ultimate or goal, or free choice, based on the fact of existing things working as potential but, importantly, not a potential that can be sublated and is possible in theory, but a notion of potentiality that follows from the reality of its actualization. While chapter 5 will address the epistemological ramifications of such a split between the negative and positive view of the \textit{Potenz}, I wish to close now with articulating how Schelling's \textit{Potenzlehre} can be taken in the context of the last period of his life via a return to Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.

\textit{364 Ibid.} 138.  
\textit{365 Ibid.} 160.  
\textit{366 Ibid.} 209.
The negative/positive split in Schelling’s work, is complicated by the Presentation of Pure Rational Philosophy (1847-1852) in which he attempts to refashion what Kantian criticality means, or, what it means to thoroughly apply the power of reason to itself, alongside a discussion of the philosophy of mythology. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Schelling’s last period of thinking tends to combine Aristotelian naturalism with Platonic cosmology in order to get at the core of philosophy as a science of reason. To this end, Schelling engages often, and at length, with Kant’s critical system. In the 13th Darstellung lecture, Schelling discusses the Potenzen as representing that which is ineliminable in thought contra Kant. Schelling argues that Kant’s determination of tenses (past, present, and future) cannot be a mere logical form, but represent that which thought obtains upon only incompletely.\textsuperscript{367} It should be evident that Schelling’s language is returning to his earliest writings on potentiality as expressed in “Of the I” where he makes the claim that Kantian modality incompletely grasps the possibility outside of it. This return to his earlier thinking is repeated again, only a few passages below the above referenced one, where Schelling invokes the relation between Aristotelian dynamism, and Plato’s concern for motion in the Timaeus. Schelling emphasizes that the pure actuality of a being cannot be purely captured by a concept.\textsuperscript{368} Here Schelling references the line from the Timaeus which fascinated him as a young man:

What is that which is Existent always [28a] and has no Becoming? And what is that which is Becoming always and never is Existent? Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an object of opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes and perishes and is never really existent.\textsuperscript{369}

Schelling continues this line of thinking in the subsequent Darstellung lectures. In the 16th lecture he writes:


\textsuperscript{368} Schelling, Darstellung, Lecture 13, 10.

For in what has being, i.e. in reason, not only the material but also the law of movement is predetermined. The principles that, in the Idea – in what it is that is being – are merely possible or are potencies, were in pure thought the hypotheses or presuppositions of what the actual in itself is, but each of them is however is immediately the hypothesis of what is consequent upon it, - A is the hypothesis of +A, both together the hypothesis of +A: all ultimately of what is the pure principle, the purely actual, in which there is no longer any possibility. This connection amongst the potencies entails that the converse of the usual order holds, that, namely, the antecedent has its actuality in the consequent in respect of which it is accordingly mere [376] potency.570

Once again, Schelling emphasizes the difference between possibility, and pure possibility, or potentiality (Potenz). The tumbling determinations of the potencies, is that in treating them as pure potentiality, they can upset the normal causal order of things in that the consequent of a hypothesis contends that the hypothesis, as an activity, already existed prior to its hypothesizing, though it would seem the instance of the potency caused the hypothesis. It is this expressive function of the potencies, mentioned above via the actants, that can be misread as human-caused actions. In the 17th lecture, Schelling continues to discuss the Potenzen in terms of the problem of causes. Due to the complexity of the text I quote Schelling at length:

The three causes are the first, the pure possibilities, from which the concrete possibilities lying between beginning and end are derived. And they too act in relation to each other as beginning, middle and end. The beginning, first at the gate of Being, is what immediately can be, and by nature, is pure can-being. Following it is the pure being [Seyende] from nature, to which the strength (potency) for actualisation must first be given. The end is what is itself originally powerful, self-possessing. Due to this natural order we have also spoken of a first, a second and a third potency, and without thinking of an analogy with mathematical thought, we have designated them accordingly. Given what can be in general = A, the immediately able to be must be designated as A1, but as such it first appears at the end, in the process (for with the relations of the causes a process is also promised) it appears immediately as ‘unsolved’, i.e. as subjectless Being and would thus be designated as the B, which is first to be brought back into A; the pure being, first posited by B in potentiam, is elevated to the subject, and thus A2, and the last, which as object is subject and vice-versa, will be designated A3. I demand of these designations only that they serve clarity and brevity; nor, for the same reasons, would I reject to designating what stands higher than all potency, that is what is and is the cause of Being and itself pure actuality, as earlier, A0, although we are not thinking here of the arithmetical A0 =1.571

Immediately one can see how Schelling again returns to the critique of Kantian modality, as well as, re-emphasizing the open-endedness of any determined system. Modality, temporalized as beginning, middle, and end, functions between the unprethinkable beginning of end that lies in the pure-possibilities as potencies. The appearance of immediacy, or givenness, must be fed back into the

370 Schelling, Darstellung, Lecture 13, 2.
notion of pure can-being, to treat the given as-if it is the consequence of pure being. The givenness as immediate A becomes B, and then is fed back into A and thus is registered as A2. Thus the action of B, as a determination, is merely ideal, is a hypothesis, unless its consequences can be viewed as being that of A and thus can be re-designated as A2 (as always-already a part of A but more of it, A to a higher power). It is then in the subsequent work of determining what about that higher-power that is not merely based on our determination, as subject, that it can be treated as adequate ground for future testing (and thus can be treated as A3).

Here one can begin to see how Schelling is struggling, but not without purpose, to create an open system of being, and subsequently, of philosophizing, which accepts the consequences of contingency as well as the consequences of necessity without relying upon, or metaphysicalizing, either. In the quote above, Schelling carefully toes the line between ideality, or human thinking in particularity, creating the world, and humans being merely participatory in the Potenz that is thought, thought being merely a consequence of nature's self-augmentation. But since we 'have' the capacity to think, we participate, and affect, this augmentative process.  

But, the important third motion (the A3), is that this movement, is itself, only fully potentiated in its capacity to be a ground for another. The consequences this structure has for human knowing, and for the practice of philosophy, will be the focus of Chapter 5. To close this chapter, however, I would like to look at how Schelling's notion of potency relates to the notion of world, and, in turn, to modality (as related to possible worlds).

4.5 - Potencies and Modalities: Potency and World

In conclusion, the ontology of powers, with its modal determinations (necessity, contingency, possibility, actuality), can only be regarded as a reducibly metaphysical problem if the physical dimensions of its actuality are ignored […] powers necessarily involve modal concepts. Against Hegel’s denial that the categories of Modality determine anything objective, objectality is nothing other than a set of potentials for actualisation, as Plato insisted. Powers make contingency into an ontology, a metaphysics and a physics.

372 Here I skip over the 19th Darstellung Lecture in which Schelling does discuss, but not extensively, the Potenzen. I do this in part because I discussed the relevant passages above in Chapter 1.

According to modality—pure being [Sein]. Specifically this determination separates the original concepts [Urbegriffe] of being [Sein], not-being [Nicht-Sein], and existence [Dasein] from the derivative concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity.374

The concept of not having being, but especially the not being that occurs everywhere in so many forms, has always led the beholder astray and, like a real Proteus, manifoldly brought them into confusion. For just as it is manifest to hardly anyone that actual power lies more in delimitation than expansion and that to withdraw oneself has more to do with might than to give oneself, so is it natural that where they encounter that which through itself does not have being, they rather regard it as "nothing" and, when it is asserted that it "is" precisely as that which does not have being, they rather explain this away as the greatest contradiction.375

Given this admittedly cursory examination of Schelling's development of the potencies, one may ask, why Schelling uses them, and why does he feel like he needs them? Fundamentally, I wish to argue that Schelling's use of the Potenzen is about the insufficiency of modality to obtain as such.

More than the Leibnizian question of 'Why is there something instead of nothing?' it would seem that the Potenzen try to answer the awkward question of 'how does our thought thing?' or, less awkwardly, if there are no absolute divisions between thought and nature, how do we account for creation and motion when everything is potentially naturalized? At the same time, and taking into account Schelling's proto-pragmatic emphasis on positive philosophy, the question of 'how does our thought thing?' might be coupled with the question 'how does experience think?'

As the epigraphs above show, Schelling was concerned with how to separate knowledge, or reason, from representation. In Chapter 5 I will investigate the epistemological concerns of this distinction but, to conclude the investigation of the potencies, the present question is why does Schelling need the potencies in relation to creation and reason's categories (specifically modality)? Or, to point to the discussion above in relation to the negative and positive split, the potencies are what allow for Schelling's method of construction to function, while not reducing the potencies to merely subjective construction.

Returning to the introduction above, I argued that Schelling's Potenzen make up for the

insufficiency of modality as mere categories, as well as, marking the importance of necessary inexistence. That is, in both the negative and the positive philosophies, there are constraints of generation which themselves become sublated in the process of generation whether merely ideal or merely real. The relation between the real and the ideal are skewed by Schelling's utilization of the Potenzen hence the questions above. Instead of the general question of 'how do mental acts or representations obtain?' Schelling assumes they do and asks how is it that thought creates things? In dealing with everyday existence, Schelling does not ask after the relation between theory and practice, but asks 'how does experience think?' assuming that being in existence, and existing as this particular thing, this will, is an admixture of theory and practice, that is the price of human freedom. The further danger of the closeness of Schelling's epistemology and his ontology is to risk a complete conflation of deontic modality and alethic modality. Deontic modality has to do with morals and choices (should and can) whereas alethic modality has to do with truth claims (contingency, necessity, and so on). Since the following chapter focuses on Schelling's epistemology and, in particular, how it relates to intuition, here I wish to end by discussing what exactly the philosophical import of Schelling's Potenzlehre is for alethic modality.

Importantly, Schelling's Potenzen index a notion of creation or novelty existing before the world, or before any thinkable world but, in opposition to philosophies of the event (such as in Deleuze and Badiou), Schelling is far more skeptical about the means and capacity of human beings to harness, or even think, this evental status. Potenzen are can-beings but they are, to some extent, particular, or, can only be detected in, the tracing out of their consequences. Schelling appears to be straddling two sides of a split in the history of philosophy namely, between Spinoza and Leibniz. While Kant attempted to suture this split, the German Idealist tradition spread it open by questioning Kant's grounds in building the critical system.

This split can be read in numerous ways but perhaps, most clearly, in the status of human
freedom. As was hopefully apparent in the first chapter, and what we will return to in the conclusion, is that Kant forced the point of whether human freedom is exempted from, or submitted to, the causal structure of the world. This can be summed up quite simply in the question: 'While our free acts always seem free for us, are they free in themselves?' While Žižek has famously argued that Hegel ontologizes Kant's indecision to decide between noumenal and phenomenal freedom, I do not see his account as taking Hegel's skepticism seriously. While the German Idealists on the whole attempted to seek grounds for Kant's critical conclusions, these grounds are not clearly ontological, but take up differing processes as a middle-ground between sheer being, or sheer becoming, or between skepticism and dogmatism.

As has hopefully been outlined above, this is evident in the case of Schelling's *Potenzen*. The potencies are tendencies which are more or less stable depending on how many consequences issue from them, they are the forces behind real patterns in the cosmos, forces which are apparent in physical processes and noetic endeavors alike. So, in this sense, it appears that Schelling must therefore abnegate any difference between deontic modality (morals and choices of should and can) and alethic modality (ontology and questions of truth via necessity and contingency) but this overlooks the necessity of position, or location, in Schelling's thought. Location, or determination as will be outlined in Chapter 5, puts limits on the constructivism implied in Schelling's *Potenz* while remaining attentive to the ontological status of the potencies not as things, but, as universal tendencies or qualities.

Schelling's potencies index his Platonism and, in particular, the 'realness' of ideas – which he maintains from his earliest work (such as in *On the World Soul*) to the *Darstellung* lectures. Yet, at the same time, Schelling emphasizes that physical and perceptual limitations (such as those that arise with different species' sense capacities) affect where, and when, we detect such ideas. To separate these conditions according to real and ideal assumes a 'view-from-nowhere' but, at the same time, Schelling is not endorsing a full-blown constructivism, or perspectival system, where there are not matters of fact.
or universals. Things are facts, or universals, 'so-far,' just as the Potenzen are can-beings. Universals are in-process but should be viewed as absolute till they are overturned, whereas the Potenzen, are speculated to exist, but can only be seen, or encountered, in the process of tracing them. Again, while I will investigate the epistemological consequences of this in the following chapter, for now, I am interested in the ontological stakes of these claims. This talk of can-beings immediately brings us to talk of possible worlds, and modality, given that if something can be said to be possible then it exists in some possible world. These themes are generally discussed primarily in semantic terms following Kripke and David Lewis whereas Meinong, as the primary forger of possible worlds, is dismissed as being too literal, or ontological, in his discussion of possible worlds in stating that non-existent beings exist due to the fact that being understood in a proper sense is beyond being (as actual) and becoming (as creation). This relation is complicated directly in Schelling's theory. As Bruce Matthews writes in the translator's introduction to The Grounding:

Thinking is movement, but it is not self-propelled; rather, thought is carried along incessantly from predicate to predicate by the power of what Schelling calls the infinite potency of cognition. Like Kant’s unconditioned absolute, the actus of this potency is transcendent to the series of its members, but transcendent only in the sense that it is absolutely other than thought: as the pure actuality of reality [Wirklichkeit], that which simply exists excludes potency, and thus the possibility indicative of thought.376

Numerous thinkers and commentators on Schelling have, following William Hogrebe, read Schelling's philosophy of the Potenzen as primarily a theory of predication. Iain Grant, in his essay “Remains of the World,” complicates this view albeit slightly. While Markus Gabriel and others have focused on predication as a particularly human capacity, as one rooted in judgment as defined by Kant, this leaves out not only the ontological constraints on logic and judgment, but also overlooks inexistence as well as existence as having actual consequences on predication, on the logical-ontological function of predication. As Grant writes: “Powers cannot originally inhere in some essence or existent, but must, as powers, exceed that existence, and since what exceeds existence is inexistence,

376 Schelling and Matthews, Grounding, 49-50.
inexistence must be a power paradoxically ineliminable from nature.”

Schelling’s theory of the Potenzen attempts to generate the most creative world in which creation is not bounded by pre-set limits nor overly determined by thought. Modality then, is a formal re-presentation of the Potenzen or powers. Furthermore, whereas Kant famously argued that existence is not a real predicate Schelling argues against this but not for ontological reasons, as was commonly the case, but in that realness, for Schelling can only be provisionally asserted in its consequences. As Beach outlines, Schelling thinks through Kant's existence is not a real predicate by questioning what the jump, or leap, is from being to existence. Following Matthews above, the volition of reason is as powerful as it is because it is of the potencies. As Schelling emphasizes in the 1815 Ages, the potencies limit one another’s existence, or inexistence, in a reciprocal fashion.

As Markus Gabriel has highlighted, the relation of mind and world is explicitly addressed (particularly in regards to creation, contingency, and necessity) in David Lewis' theory of possible worlds. Lewis' theory, as Gabriel outlines, is that the semantic variability of language suggested by modal statements, means that one must take seriously that possible worlds are as real as our world. Put crudely, words like can, or maybe, suggest that one should treat worlds in which those events take place as real as our own.

While Lewis' theory is (in)famous for inviting the 'incredulous stare' of other philosophers, since the positing of so many worlds spits in the face of Occam's razor, it can be argued that Lewis' statement is one of behavior, or pragmatics, and not an ontology at all. Either way, Schelling's Potenzen, in a similar sense, demonstrate the necessity for positing a lean ontology if, for no other reason, than to stave off dogmatic, or overly reckless or enthusiastic speculation, of asserting that all logical statements have ontological consequences or that all ontological predicates are completely

378 Beach, Potencies, 142.
379 Schelling, Ages. 22.
translatable into currently existing logic.

Following Schelling's reading of Plato put forward in the introduction, there is only one world and not separate realms for ideas and for things. This seems like a uncontroversial proposition yet, because of how Schelling views Platonic ideas as being real, Schelling's singular world could invite incredulous stares of its own. The distinction between real and ideal is one of method and not one that can be constitutively separated, either in terms of separate realms (such as the natural versus the normative), or in terms of material (physicalist reduction and rampant idealism on the other end).

Schelling distinguishes the real and the ideal in terms of actual and potential which do not map on to the terms directly, but instill a concept of motion and a derivative form of judgment. Actual and potential are modes which are more than formal modality (necessity, contingency, etc) but, whereas Lewis suggests that modal statements imply possible worlds, for Schelling, the plasticity and creativity of the singular world manifests, however imperfectly, in modal categories. Because of the actual and potential relation, whether something is real or ideal, is more a question of what something does than what it is. Subsequent analysis of something's consequences determines its actuality and potentiality. Given the potential ubiquity of creation, the tracing of consequences in turn requires means of determining one's location in the world and, therefore, one's own creative or constructive capacities. How one determines one's own location epistemologically and pragmatically will be the emphasis of the following two chapters.
Chapter 5 – Lamps, Rainbows, Unicorns, and Horizons: Spatializing Knowledge in Naturphilosophical Epistemology

Since I seek to ground my knowledge only in itself, I inquire no further as to the ultimate ground of this primary knowledge (self-consciousness), which, if it exists, must necessarily lie outside knowledge. Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but it casts its light ahead only, not behind […] Whether it is absolutely autonomous can be left undecided, until such time as the science itself has determined whether anything whatever can be thought, which is not to be derived from this knowledge itself. 380

In the present chapter, I address the apparently problematic status of epistemology in Schelling's work. Given the (at times) overblown emphasis on Schelling's anti-Kantianism, there would seem to be little hope in articulating anything like a theory of knowledge in Schelling's thought. For the sake of brevity, and to touch on the thrust of this project, I will emphasize knowledge's spatial and navigational functions in Schelling's texts. For Schelling, the navigational is that which locates, and constructively constrains, the capacity of the subject to synthesize. This is accomplished, I will argue, via a spatialized reading of Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition. While this form of intuition initially resembles that of Fichte's, Schelling soon transforms the term, using it tandem with construction, in order to maintain both the sensory immediacy, yet abstract form, of intuition as the initial means a knowing subject, immersed in the activities of nature, comes to recognize its own capacities and begins to form claims about the world.

Epistemology in Schelling can be taken to revolve around the problem of location and synthesis on two axes. The first vertical axis is the purportedly asymmetrically causal, or generative, axis of nature represented by Schelling as the Stufenfolge (or graduated stages of nature). The second axis is the horizontal representation of nature in terms of fields, or domains, of knowledge. Or, put otherwise, Schelling's epistemology must deal with the vertical axis of the transcendental method which manifests as the Stufenfolge, as well as the horizontal axis which manifests itself as fields or the scientific classification of the progression of the potencies (Potenzen) via a form of Peircean abduction.

Abduction, which will be addressed in the following chapter, is Peirce's name for a non-deductive inference, a hypothesis, or the logic of creation. This is, to point back to Chapter 1, merely an extension of Schelling's attempt to radicalize the materiality of Spinoza, and the ideality of Leibniz, to do justice to the creative capacity of both nature and the idea.

If either of these axes could be perceived purely abstractly, the horizontal axis would view all domains, or fields of knowledge, as co-determining one another in a massive web or network. Viewing the vertical axis purely abstractly (as the *Stufenfolge*) one would see an evolutionary series, a line of higher and higher potentiation. This view is complicated by the fact that, for Schelling, being an embodied spectator or observer does not allow for these views to be abstracted apart from one's embodied position. Furthermore, and as the above epigraph suggests, Schelling advocates a form of constructivism, but one that is augmentative, in which powers express themselves at ever higher levels. The question becomes: “What remains of the epistemological enterprise following a world of potencies on the one hand, and co-determination of facts, or objects, on the other?”

As was illustrated in the previous chapter, the potencies project the unity of subjectivity and objectivity as subject-object which are separated to think their parts and can never, on pain of contradiction, be separated ontologically. Schelling claims that due to this function of the potencies, an irresolvable dualism wedges itself in the very attempt to think philosophy, and thus, one is given negative and positive philosophies, or, philosophies which think in terms of the 'what there is' (the negative) and 'that there is' (the positive). Hence Schelling's consistent references to a third thing (*tertium quid* in the early work) which eventually shifts to indifference point in the Identity Philosophy. Gilles Châtelet, who will be engaged once more, demonstrates the importance of indifference points for examining the relation between intuition and construction, between scientific theories, and between philosophy and science.

Extensively laying out the positive, the negative, and the indifferent would be an altogether
different project and one too massive for the present concerns. These concerns can be oriented and narrowed following the spatio-temporalization of knowledge mentioned above: that of the horizontality of fields, and the verticality of the *Stufenfolge*. This in turn will lead us into the proto-pragmatism of the next and final chapter in that, as Schelling argues in *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy*, positive philosophy is a 'higher empiricism' because it utilizes the world of sense as a material for an epistemological gesture that expands the power of reason. Or, in other words, the positive philosophy uses experience's relative sensorial stability as a ground for reason rather than concerning itself with the deeper structures of reason (as Kant does in the *Critiques*). The threat remains that such a positive philosophy can be misconstrued as a romantic or naïve phenomenological enterprise, but, I believe this is clearly not the case especially when the Berlin lectures are viewed in light of their re-articulation in the *Darstellung* lectures which immediately followed.\(^{381}\)

To address these issues, and to set the stage for Schelling's late proto-pragmatism, the present chapter will deal with Schelling's attempt to articulate a theory of knowledge that is co-constructive with nature (as derivation), that isolates and extracts kinds of knowledge as fields (as determination), that relies upon neither a naïve, nor purely factical account, of intuition or sense. That is, one must construct a notion of determination that relies on neither the apparent self-evident appearance of things in sense, nor because they can equally be addressed as facts in a human-buit system of meaning. The alternative to these two paths is ultimately best represented as a form of navigation following the work of Gilles Châtelet.

5.1- Epistemology and the *Stufenfolge* (Derivation)

The *Stufenfolge*, as a divided series of graduated stages, involves a logic of ground that

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\(^{381}\) One could tenuously argue that while negative philosophy works ascendentally and positive philosophy descendentally, as Schelling puts it, *Naturphilosophie* is negative philosophy properly made dynamic, whereas transcendental philosophy, is positive philosophy properly restrained. See F.W.J. von Schelling, *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy*, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 196.
functions to impart the transcendental as an *a priori* logical structure to the genesis of nature, and consciousness, over time. Yet, at the same time, the *Stufenfolge* can be read as the naturalist demand in Schelling’s thought as it asserts an asymmetrical generation that affects humans as deeply as all the rest of nature.

Derivation, as a natural occurrence, arises from the fact that nature, to be as productive as it can be, must self-inhibit in order to create at all (otherwise there would be either pure creation, or pure stasis). As Schelling argues in the *First Outline*, the dynamic graduated series in nature (*Stufenfolge*) is what must be deduced in order to argue that these inhibitions maintain some level of permanence as things, as individuals in nature.\(^{382}\) It is with the advent of the *Stufenfolge* that Schelling may be pushing his luck with regards to the kinds of claims he can make about nature without falling back into pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics.

As will be investigated in the following chapter, it is these kinds of worries about the relation between causes and reasons (or nature and norms) that lead many contemporary analytic thinkers who invoke Germany Idealism to abandon the former for the strength of the latter. Following in the footsteps of thinkers such as Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, it is presumed by Robert Brandom and Robert Pippin, that the space of reasons, the place of normative commitments and operative reasons, must be strictly divorced from the realm of causes, or the realm of nature. As was touched on in the first chapter, and what will be returned to below, is how the Kantian root of this separation lies in his treatment of teleology in relation to human freedom and the nature this freedom purportedly escapes.

This normative cut-off, as we will investigate in Chapter 6, is utilized by current strands in analytic philosophy that have taken up German Idealism in order to complicate, if not only to combat

directly, the possibility of a ground of naturalism. This is done largely by an appeal to categories of normativity, due to the fact that the normative dimension of human behavior seems operationally (if not necessarily causally) divorced from scientific explanation or some other epistemological articulation of the natural world. That is, as is the case in Schelling, if we assume a one-world physics suggested in the Introduction, as well as in the conclusion of Chapter 4, what is the best way to account for the seemingly non-natural tools of human existence (morals, values, laws, etc.) without conceding a form of pure relativism, scientific nihilism, or as David Bell has aptly demonstrated, a strange patchwork world where local ideal claims are somehow made to supervene on a natural, or physical world? As I will argue in relation to reductionism below, and Mark Wilson's work in the following chapter, this patchwork approach may be fundamentally unavoidable. We are left then with the difficult task of ascertaining Schelling's position between bald naturalism and anti-naturalist idealism. Whether this means that Schelling is a liberal naturalist, or some other kind altogether, will be addressed below.

As has been the case throughout this work, skepticism is the operational pivot between naturalism and idealism, or between nature and freedom. But, unlike Kant's skepticism, Schelling's does not attempt to ground itself on the reality of our experience in order to determine its conditions (that being the definition of the form of transcendental argumentation according to Kant) but, as we have seen in Schelling broadly and, in Chapter 1, the naturalization of the transcendental means that the apparent necessary conditions of our being-as-experience must defer to the seemingly necessary conditions for Nature to be as productive as it is. This statement is the general form of what Schelling

384 The term liberal naturalism is used by several thinkers who accept the claims of scientific naturalism but believe that such a form cannot account for the primacy of rational decision making. While Markus Gabriel has argued that the transcendentalism of German Idealism opposes it to liberal naturalism (which Gabriel aligns with figures such as McDowell) Michael Blamuer has argued that Schelling in fact embodies perfectly the liberal naturalism of figures such as Thomas Nagel.
takes from Fichte, and transfers to nature. That is, the productivity of nature is a postulate that seems unavoidable if one is to make any further claims about anything let alone nature or the entity that is postulating.

The subsequent difficulty lies in how we get from such a weak meontology (as I believe that to be what Schelling advocates) to knowledge claims that are neither ontologically liberal nor anti-ontological.

As was touched on in Chapter 2, the exploration of the epistemological navigator requires re-entering the fray between the normative examination of German Idealism, with its deflationary account of the school’s connections to nature and naturalism, and Schelling’s one-world physics as something between a hard (or reductive) and soft (or liberal) naturalism. The problem with these articulations of naturalism, is that the former transforms epistemological certainty into a metaphysical frame (we might say ignoring the difference between structure and form) whereas the latter over-relied on an anti-reductionism which reinstates its epistemological premises against investigation. Essentially, the former normative approach transcendentalizes a non-parochial (but not universal) practice as a norm, whereas the latter crude, or bald naturalist approach, immunizes a field of knowledge into an exacerbated ontology. This again brings us to the methodological split of Schelling’s epistemology, which, I would argue, ignores the false choice between soft or liberal and hard or bald or reductionist naturalism, as well as avoids a crude notion of reductionism, is also seen in one of Perice's greatest heirs, and the figure who stands before the split between the natural and normative, namely Wilfrid Sellars. But before getting there several other territories need to be crossed and examined.

The apparent alternative to a normative approach (that argues reasons are fundamentally distinct from causes), and bald naturalism (which argues there are only causes and entities), is one of an exchange between epistemological and ontological minimalism or weakness. That is, a normative approach is epistemologically strong but ontologically weak in that it asserts the importance of
knowledge claims over, and above, ontological claims, perhaps dismissing ontology altogether. Bald naturalism may be equally strong about epistemological claims, but may claim that the knowledge claims of science trump those of philosophy, if the arbiter is server to protect human freedom and action from the judgments of neuroscience for example. Another possibility, is to argue that ontology trumps all other claims but then establish a minimal ontology, such as that things exist. A fourth option, and one I believe Schelling takes up, is to claim that there is a speculative meontology that is necessitated by being in a world that limits out capacity to know it, but seems to simultaneously engender thinking agents to create with and beyond what we know of it. The problem becomes how to locate, and properly delimit, the capacity to know against, and with, other capacities.

Despite broad claims about the systematicity of German Idealism, I would argue that the problem of locating reason (which was focused on in the first chapter) emphasizes the non-totalizing character of this approach of systematicity. Whether it is Fichte's internal light of determination, Schelling's unprethinkable as engine of predication, or Hegel's constant reinstatement of the measure of necessity (or what Zizek has referred to as the contingency of necessity), it becomes apparent that German Idealism, even though it was attempting to be far-reaching, was not attempting to construct a view from nowhere. In fact, it is the very emphasis on capacities such as construction, derivation, determination, and the like which emphasize the work which is always required in order to make any kind of claim to universality or the Absolute, or to nature.

In fact, it is Kant's inability to properly ground how transcendental schema come to be known and function, that can be read as the impetus for the German Idealists to set about their project. For Schelling, productive intuition, which follows from the immediate world of sense, sets the powers of the imagination off in constructing and creating outwards. But, once the subject, or more generally any constructive force, recognizes its limitations, it turns inwards and accesses itself. Even these earlier stages of conscious development, restricted to the human, demonstrate for Schelling the difficulties in
asserting a schematic universality as Kant does. Yet, Schelling does not dismiss that something like universality is capable given the fact that the universality is expressed from a local point that may very well dislocate the place from which that thought occurs. Schelling's conceptual bind here, is how can be invoke a concept that is far reaching (consequently or potentially universal) given the locality-constraint he has put on conceptual production? In part, this is possible because Schelling cautiously utilizes concepts as demonstrations or exhibitions and never things-in-themselves nor meta-stable categories. The *Stufenfolge* adapts the genetic-version of the transcendental from Fichte, which, as Daniel Breazeale lucidly outlines, sought to demonstrate how the kind of subjectivity, or consciousness that Kant presupposed, could be demonstrated by accounting genetically for the series of acts by which it comes to recognize itself as such.\(^{385}\) Schelling, as we will outline more below specifically in reference to intuition, sees this as a middle step (as intellectual intuition) which cannot, for him, be the sole, or at least main, ground from which construction/derivation occurs. For Schelling, to maintain the continuity between sensory experience, the production of the imagination, the recognition of the self as a producer, and then subsequent production, one must set the very process of derivation, of self-construction as graduated, outside the subject's control. Whereas, for Fichte, anything set outside the sheer production-by-consciousness would be merely factual, for Schelling the assumption that the creative activity is proved by demonstrating *our ability to act*, overly localizes the underlying dynamics of action as such.\(^{386}\) At the same time, Schelling does not wish to merely ignore the impressive constructive capacity of the mind hence why the transcendental is naturalized via its being opened at both ends, in that our schematization of it is a selection of a potentiated evolutionary process which he only view from a place, though a temporally 'late' one, inside of it.

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For instance, Schelling’s *Stufenfolge* model presumes, for better or for worse, that the human organism sits atop the graduated stages, that the human is the *highest* production of the cosmos thus far. Highest does not of course mean perfect (as Schelling is consistently critical of perfection as well as any notion of completeness), but means the most potentiated. The strangeness of the *Stufenfolge* model is that while we are viewing the series of developments from a high point, this gives us the responsibility of being so potentiated as to see how potentiated we are.\(^{387}\)

As Schelling writes in his lecture “The Exhibition of the Process of Nature” (1843):

We must of course assume that the Earth is the point of emergence for humanity – why, we do not know, it refers to relations we cannot survey, but humanity is therefore not specifically a product of the Earth – it is a product of the entire process – not the Earth alone, the entire cosmos contributes to humanity, and if of the Earth, as, continuing from the earlier standpoint, he is, then humanity is not exclusively created for the Earth, but [390] for all the stars, since humanity is created as the final goal of the cosmos. If humanity appears to be a local essence, this is not what it originally is, but has become localized.\(^{388}\)

Also relevant is the following sentiment from Introduction to the *First Outline*:

But if Nature is absolute productivity, then the ground of this limitation cannot lie outside of it. Nature is originally only productivity; there can, therefore, be nothing determined in this productivity (all determination is negation) and so products can never be reached by it.—If products are to be reached, the productivity must pass from being undetermined to being determined, that is, it must, as pure productivity, be canceled. If the ground of determination of productivity lay outside of Nature, Nature would not originally be absolute productivity. Determination, that is, negation, must certainly come into Nature; but this negation viewed from a higher standpoint must again be positivity.\(^{389}\)

While I will address determination below, derivation, as graduation, must be a natural process and not something merely added to nature from the outside. The struggle here is how can Schelling claim that structures and forms are real but discoverable by humans but that there are also some concepts which refer to things we cannot, or have not yet, discovered. How can any claim to knowledge be more than only an artificial claim, how does any statement of fact in Schelling obtain on reality if everything is nature yet we are limited or localized aspects of it? This is also complicated by the fact that Schelling no doubt realigns, in various ways, the relation between *Naturphilosophie* and

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387 To wax poetic, we could view Schelling’s *Stufenfolge* as simultaneously the wreckage heap of Walter Benjamin’s angel of history, and the medieval Great Chain of Being.
389 Schelling, *First Outline*, 204.
transcendental philosophy, in the almost fifty years separating the above quotes. While the human, as organism, hardly appears in the First Outline, or the Ideas, as they are discussed in terms of their thought processes in idealistic language, this division seems to slowly disappear over time.\(^{390}\)

While these questions are more directly addressed through determination (and the horizontal model of knowledge), the concept of the Stufenfolge, of the discovery of non-trivial derivation as a natural occurrence, addresses the temporal dimension, or temporal pressure, that is creation. That there is generation proposes the hypothesis that generation can be understood, or can be mapped as a consequence of that generation. The status of the human as the highest comes from the fact that, as far as we know, our understanding of generation allows for an augmentation of that generation in a way that often is used to support the fundamental difference of thought from nature, i.e., the realm or space of reasons over, and above, the space of causes or nature.\(^{391}\)

The Stufenfolge is, above all, the problem of entities, or points of inhibition, from within creation which seems, definitionally, as if it should be unceasing. The standpoint of the highest issues a perspective downward into the chain of causes (as well as upwards in terms of speculation). The perspective of the human, being as high as it is, allows for the creation of a concept such as the Stufenfolge whereby we can attempt to place ourselves within the chain of ongoing causes, within the dynamics stages of nature. Thus anything functionally akin to a space of reasons in Schelling (from the vertical view of the Stufenfolge) would be consequent upon a natural process even when that space of reasons is absolutized. In this sense, the Stufenfolge is a radical form of epistemological perspectivism or constructivism but one that admits not only the foundational, but the ongoing, limit-factors of nature in the process of constructing knowledge systems. Thus, the transcendental, as a provisional subordination of the real by the ideal, can be viewed as a vertical orientation in that it attempts to trace

\(^{390}\)I must thank Tilottama Rajan for pointing out the strange non-role of the human in the First Outline.

\(^{391}\)I am aligning determination with a horizontal model of knowledge in that it requires a depotentiation of the human's place, as in the vertical view, thereby flattening all kinds of beings on one horizon.
the evolutionary, or augmentating, repetition of forms over time from atop what is traced.\footnote{392 Schelling, First Outline, 226.}

Whereas Fichte's geneticism could be claimed to be also as vertical, as evolutionary, the difference is that, for Fichte, the external or the not-I functions as a boundary, and thus human subjectivity is always at the bleeding-edge of construction. For Schelling, on the other hand, our capacity to thought is a late development, but it also demands that we properly localize its emergence naturalistically \emph{even in a transcendental context because thinking is derived from nature}. Thus activity is more than ideal propellant for Schelling but is also the not-sheerly thinkable medium by which, and on which, humans act.

\textbf{5.2 - Epistemology and the Field Problem (Determination)}

Unprethinkable being is the fundamental presupposition of all determination.\footnote{393 Frederick A. Mortensen, The Fate of Finitude: Schelling and the Question of the World (Doctoral Thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2012), 108.}

Unprethinkable being is Schelling's name for the facticity of reason. This facticity for him is resultant of the fact that a mere dimension of distinction without anything distinct still has no relationship to a differentiation in judgments and is therefore indeed a necessary proposition.\footnote{394 Markus Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 134.}

The fundamental question of fields of knowledge, as I see it, is that of how Schelling's system can account for meta-functions, such as systems of knowledge, if he claims no special capacity of the human to know the depth of things, and if (on the side of nature we might say for conceptual clarity), being and thinking are within a heterogeneous monism (nature as subject-object). That is, whereas the emergence of things or facts is credited to the self-inhibition of an abstract identity (put most directly in order anything to be something it must inhibit itself into things) how is it that we have privileged access to domains such as biology, chemistry, physics and so on?

To bring the question specifically to the domain of epistemology: how is it that the domains which we have constructed (such as the physical sciences) seem more than ontological, but less than
metaphysical? Or, put another way, does Schelling ontologize knowledge claims, epistemologize ontology, or pursue a different path altogether? The unprethinkable (Unvordenkliche) is referenced above since instead of pointing to a brute metaphysical or ontological claim about the impossibility of complete knowledge, or to the simple fact that there is always more knowledge produced, the unprethinkable is the status of the continuum (addressed in chapter 3) as an ongoing synthetic activity, an activity which is as real as it is ideal.

As has hopefully become evident in the previous three chapters, Schelling's semi-abductive method follows from the fact that one cannot merely remove oneself from their own sensual domain but, this does not mean, as Schelling takes from Kant, that the domain of sense is necessarily physical, or real, nor is it simply factual (contra Fichte) as I will address below. Schelling argues that nature produces real structures or universals but that these are discovered only through the constant tracing of their consequences. This problematic situation, I would argue, centers on the forgetting of the field problem as being one of assumed authority, i.e., the question of fields is one that belongs to science and philosophical investigations into such concerns of nature which, unfortunately, are no longer the purview of continental philosophy, and, increasingly, are that of analytic philosophy. The former, more often than not, simply stands behind a blind rejection of the validity of the hard sciences, while the latter stands behind blind acceptance (and often of seriously outdated forms of science in both cases). While this is not always the case, and various fields such as science and technology studies, or philosophy of cosmology in analytic fields, are generally more open to finer questions of method, experiment, and, the conceptual history proper to science, the analytic-continental split has done serious damage to cross-discipline communication. While this may seem a trivial concern, or one that forces the thinker into either accepting or rejecting the total authority of the physical sciences, I believe that the avoidance of this question has become accepted as a central characteristic of post-war
thought.395 This avoidance is part and parcel of the avoidance of the question of nature. As Schelling noted:

The entire new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground. Spinoza’s realism is thereby as abstract as the idealism of Leibniz. Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can constitute a living whole.396

Before pursuing the ontology-epistemology relation in a general sense to move towards Schelling, a historical excursus is useful here. An added complexity arises in discussing Schelling's use of fields as his work, in a broad sense, functions as a base for field theory in modern physics. This is a contested claim but one, for the sake of this project, finds additional support in that field theory, abstracted into the field problem, appears central to Schelling's thought. Or, put otherwise, the status and treatment of physical fields (such as electric, or electromagnetic fields) cannot be separated from the question of what the borders of epistemological fields are in Schelling’s work. This is not merely to claim a generic irreducibility of historical context, but to demonstrate that whether in the case of physical fields, or fields of knowledge, the diagrammatic and explanatory function of field, is necessary given Schelling's removal of objects or any substratum as final explanation of both how we act, and how we know.397

As L. Pearce Williams argues quite convincingly in his text The Origins of Field Theory, the history of certain physical theories (such as electromagnetism) appears odd if the influence of German Idealism, and particularly Schelling, is not taken into account.398 Williams demonstrates that in contrast to the Newtonians and atomistic chemists of Schelling's time (such as Lavoiser) Schelling influences a field theory as that which fundamentally embraces the synthetic construction of scientific

395 While this is a broad claim I see very few exceptions in the continental tradition. Besides Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty, and scattered adventures into ethology in rather rare moments in hermeneutics and phenomenology, I do not see nature as a productive constraint existing for philosophy.
397 As is hopefully evident following chapter 3, my use of diagram is following Châtelet. For Châtelet, the diagram is the solidification of the gesture which, in turn, is the first act of intuition.
concepts, that discovery must be supplanted with the creation of concepts that must be extended till they break. Williams writes: “The fertility of these mental concepts will be determined by the manner in which these mental conceptions lead to further discourses and causal chains.”

The connection between physical field theory, or what is more often than not called classic field theory, and that of fields of knowledge, is not too difficult to make. Field theory came into existence as a means of describing how forces act in a space not dependent upon matter but acting upon matter or, in matter's place. Classical field theory generally discussed gravity and electromagnetism – forces which were important for Schelling from his early works in Naturphilosophie till his later lectures on Pure Rational Philosophy. In several places Iain Hamilton Grant has indicated the importance that field theory has for Schelling, and Schelling for field theory. But what Grant does not emphasize is the diagrammatic function that the field theories instill in German Idealism and vice versa. That is, it is not merely a question of the scientific success of field theories as explanatory across domains, but also of the fact that the diagrammatic thrust of fields allows for a non-trivial constructive approach by loosening the break between the space of reason and the space of nature via an intuitive placing of the observer as Châtelet puts it.

To link back to the previous two chapters, the importance of field theory and fields of knowledge for Schelling, demonstrates once more the importance of continuity and the asymmetrical production of nature before thought; that the idealism of the I follows from the idealism of nature. The emergence of field theory particularly in the work of Humphry Davy (who was influenced by Coleridge's Schellingianism and adopted Naturphilosophical terminology), as well as in the work of Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell, shows how diagrammatic non-material forces were

399 Williams, The Origin of Field Theory, 36.
401 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 69.
imperative for understanding the productivity and general functioning of nature at scales both small and immense as the eighteenth century shifted into the nineteenth.

Furthermore, because of the synthetic nature of these domains, the diagrammatic and the geometric become the methods best suited to present them as part of nature. Whereas, for Châtelet, the diagram is any mark on a material surface, the geometric presupposes a system of relation into which the diagram may, or may not be, added. This transition is evident in the first diagrams of field-physics. Lines of force, bent lines of magnetic poles, or, later for Oersted, the cosmos itself was a plenum of forces, a net of surging powers generating all things. Field theory was a field of study which allowed further discovery, coupled with diagrammatic rigor, which productively formalized, but did not restrain, the forces of nature. As Schelling’s synthetic philosophy emphasizes, and again as Williams indicates, any philosopher who relies upon a physical substratum is no philosopher at all.402

As Châtelet remarks, German Idealism writ large can be taken as that which attempted to trace the generation of structure as such from apparently free speculation or intuition. The leaps made possible through intuitive means, in the same stride freed certain forms of mathematical and scientific creativity, but this is not a freedom from rigor but a freedom from certain common sense, or sensorially hardened constraints, or we might say constraints of the practical which, again as we will see below, Markus Gabriel emphasizes perhaps indirectly.403 Thus, it is imperative to determine what exactly replaces the physical substratum in the wake of fields. If not facticity, or matter, then what? Châtelet suggests an abstract answer – that any mark retroactively identifies its potential medium whereas the assumption of a medium quickly becomes epistemologically restrictive. Châtelet highlights how intuition functions to lace together thought and nature in a way that is neither purely real (where the real determines the ideal only) nor purely ideal (where thoughts produce entities). As

402 Williams, Origin of Field Theory, 114.
403 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 73.
we will engage in the following chapter, neither does Schelling support a merely ideal separation of the real from the ideal, i.e., a normative cut-off endorsed by thinkers such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell (who will be addressed in Chapter 6). That is, for Châtelet, any act, as evidenced by the diagram, immediately threatens to contaminate the normative given the fact that it is creative yet stable.

For Schelling the substratum is a gesture and is posited, and its consequences are either found, or not, in the act of tracing its potential consequences. This act of tracing is, as we will trace out in the rest of this project, one essentially of abductive demonstration built on speculative motion. It is this tension that Châtelet emphasizes in the use of the gesture. The gesture, or the figure, are two means of demonstrating the intuitive field or open space of motion while, at the same time, demonstrating the material effect of such a motion as caught in the memory of the gesture or as a diagram.

In terms of substratum and intuition, Schelling, like those who pursue field physics after him, creates electromagnetic space, or, a space which is boundless except for those dimensions created by motions that appear to occur 'within' that space. This speculative 'within-ness' is defined only as being neither at the beginning or ending edge of it in a spatial sense or, in a temporal sense, at the alpha or the omega of creation (pointing back to the previous chapter, as well as, the use of the *Stufenfolge* above). Before addressing the relation between fields (whether scientific or philosophical) in the following section, it is worth examining the diagrammatic ways in which Maxwell and Faraday attempted to draw the motions of an intuitive substratum.

As Williams highlights, Maxwell dealt the final blow to the physical substratum by mathematizing the work of Faraday\(^{404}\) and discussed the interaction of various forces and fields analogically as vortices or gear wheels.\(^{405}\) As has been indicated earlier, the genesis of field theories

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\(^{404}\) Williams, *Origin of Field Theory*, 121-122.
can be traced from Schelling’s influence on Davy via Coleridge. Faraday, as Davy's lab assistant, picked up the language and it, in turn, influenced Maxwell. Châtelet traces this progression through the ways in which the electromagnetic space as such is visualized. Drawing on Schelling's *Deduction of the Dynamic Processes*, Châtelet discusses how a free space is produced in the barest notion of system following Schelling's combination of intuition and the potencies (the virtual or intensive force of construction).406

For Châtelet, Faraday and Maxwell use diagrammatic figures such as gear wheels and vorticies in order to organize a willful or “deliberate ambiguity.”407 To attempt to situate these figures as real or ideal would be insufficient and the emphasis on figures and diagrams indicates the complex interplay of fields and asymmetrical generation between the two methods. Châtelet goes on to argue that Faraday and Maxwell utilize wheels, gears, and screws to demonstrate collections of motions but that these figures are to be expanded and unwound as the consequences of experiments emerge: “Lines of force are neither 'real nor 'artificial'; they do not mathematize forces; they do not pin geometrical onto physical, rather they substitute an ideal, but elastic and tough, network, which allows virtuality to reclaim its rights.”408 And, in addition: “The lines of force weave a 'field', a system of reverberation and resonance between the space and the geometer or physics: one might speak of a preparation of space for experimentation, analogous to that of the moved awakened to mobility.”409

He goes on to write:

Faraday takes an inspired position: the diagrams of interlaced axis and loop possess a peculiar autonomy and an allusive power that must be respected and not treated like an exercise in which a mathematical 'form' is applied to physical 'phenomena.' Faraday's experiments are not enslaved to 'predictions', but instead strive to establish a new overhanging point in physics by defining a ritual of gestures which is always carefully accompanied by diagrams. Their aim is to produce a protocol for approach that is sufficiently bold and sufficiently articulated to release all the possible reverberations of the

406 Similarly, Joseph Esposito argues that Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* should be viewed as a precursor to general systems theory. See Joseph Esposito, *Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature* (London: Bucknell University Press, 1977), 10.
408 Châtelet, *Figuring Space,* 166.
409 Châtelet, *Figuring Space,* 163.
Schelling's inspiration for the field theoreticians, as well as his later reflections on their experiments, exhibits the difficulties arising from there being an inability to rely upon origin, or substratum, or upon ideal factors of the idea in constituting any one thing or force.\footnote{Châtelet, \textit{Figuring Space}, 164.} If forces merely are, then what appears as things are intersections of forces, thereby being the result of different co-determinations. It is not merely sufficient to state that forces are and everything else is a result of them as a concluding remark.\footnote{See F.W.J. von Schelling, “On Faraday’s Most Recent Discovery: Lecture to an Open Sitting of the \textit{Bayerische Akademie [des Wissenschaften]} on May 28, 1832,” trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, (Unpublished Manuscript, 2014).} It is the advent of the positive philosophy in Schelling’s later work that attempts to do justice to the consequence of determinations as more than merely a net of forces, i.e., to ask what it means for us as creatures capable of a peculiar kind of force (ideation) that forces just seem to be.

Esposito reads this ambiguity as a hard opposition between experiment and speculation,\footnote{This problem is what Schelling viewed as “the riddle of the world” according to Esposito, \textit{Schelling’s Idealism}, 42-43.} but this would seem to read abduction out of Schelling's method of determination. Even speculation would require some embodied resources placed in a particular location. That is, as creatures who produce thoughts, humans are still situated in particular locations and are subject to certain forces over others. In other words, while the doctrine of forces largely addresses the ream of negative philosophy (that things are), the gestural aspect of field physics lends itself to the positive philosophy, in that it addresses what it is that things are specifically. Thus, ideal constructions (or constraints) contribute to a situated form of knowledge not because ideas create things in the same way that forces do, but because ideas are contributory to pre-existing forces.

How this process contributes directly to the practice of philosophy will be examined in the final section of this chapter as well as the concluding chapter but, for now, it is important to examine the
consequences of how determination is focused in a particular activity, particularly, that of the sciences. Fields of inquiry, whether scientific or otherwise theoretical, are not self-standing but are meta-stable fields of co-determinations which, at least for us, are constituted by the results of experiments. These experiments follow from, and are at times regulated by, entities which lie between our creation of them and their discovery 'in' nature. As Esposito writes: “Nature itself cannot be an object to anything that is a part of it, so that we must reject any explanation that does not also contain a way of explaining the possibility of such knowledge without the Archimedean assumption.”

However, as Châtelet emphasizes, this does not mean that all of our determinations, or observations, are always-already thwarted in terms of their epistemological efficacy, but that a determination is like the potential grasping of a puzzle piece without knowing the final picture. As he writes in “Interlacing the Singularity, the diagram, and the metaphor” (1999):

We are at the antipodes of the 'abstraction' which always results from the violent deduction of a part, and thus of a mutilation, whereas while the 'lever' does not subtract anything and acts like certain fragments of a puzzle which, from the outset, emerge and impose or dictate the solution: to be absolutely concrete is to persevere to some extent in a kind of tangential approach of thought which grasps its own movement.

Schelling’s epistemology, and the field physics with which it is entwined, attempts to minimize (without obliterating) the constraints not only of conceptual creation but creation as such. This entails, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, that inexistence is a part of nature in that a reservoir of creation which is not contained within nature but, in the form of the potencies, runs through nature without determinable end or beginning (in space or in time).

Schelling’s impact on field theory is not merely of historical note but imperative to understand the relation between philosophy and the sciences broadly. The conceptual work of philosophy on science and science on philosophy is important as long as it avoids being neither conciliatory or atavistic in regards to science, as is often the case in analytic circles, or hostile and reductive towards

414 Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism, 98.
science, as is often the case in continental thought.\textsuperscript{416} In the following section I will address this in more detail with an eye to relations between fields, and, between fields and the observer.

5.3 - Rationalizing Rainbows: Between Sense and Observation

In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in themselves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the rain, the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as that which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined, and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally, and inquire, without reference to its accordance with all our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental; and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown.\textsuperscript{417}

The aim here is to demonstrate through a detailed discussion of a concrete example (the rainbow) how fruitful it is to study the asymptotic domain between theories. We will see that there are phenomena—various observable features of the rainbow, in particular—that require for their description aspects of both the ray theory and the wave theory. To my mind, from a philosophical point of view, this is an extremely important fact. It means that the reductive programs championed by philosophers actually miss out on a lot of interesting physics […] We ought to give up on the notion of reduction in any sense and consider what of philosophical (and physical) interest can be learned by studying the asymptotic limits between theories.\textsuperscript{418}

Rainbows glorify neither the subject nor any region of the universe. As the generic light of the universal continuum traverses regional horizons—each a droplet or a crystallized particle open to light—it enters them. Upon entering a regional horizon, the light refracts, bringing into the equation the internal conditions of the region. Once the light reaches the end of the horizon (the back of the droplet), it reflects back. As the light departs the regional droplet, it changes direction once again, indicating a departure from the regional conditions (the composition of the droplet) into the open, and accordingly, the continuation of this synthetic illumination for other regions.\textsuperscript{419}

Taking the asymmetric generation of nature as the model of the \textit{Stufenfolge} above, in tandem with the field problem of substantializing the observer, I move on to the necessity of de-romancing the notion of observer in order to combat knee-jerk reactions (in both directions) in terms of the validity of knowledge claims as either being totally free of, or completely corrupted by, observation bias whether

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{416} Esposito argues that Schelling's relation to Kant centers on the conceptual boundaries between philosophy and science namely that the critical enterprise makes a proper relation between them impossible. Esposito, \textit{Schelling's Idealism}, 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{417} Immanuel Kant, \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007 ), 84.
  \item \textsuperscript{418} Robert Batterman, \textit{The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77.
  \item \textsuperscript{419} Reza Negarestani, “Rainbows and Rationalism,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2013), 6.
\end{itemize}
that bias is coded in terms of naturalistic or normative limitations. I will then, in more specific terms of
the sciences, attempt to show, through Robert Batterman’s expert analysis of scientific and
philosophical reduction, that these moves ignore Schelling’s approach which asserts the reality, yet
epitomological graspability, of fields of science (or systems of knowledge) which at different levels
approach one another more ‘roughly’ or, more ‘smoothly,’ depending upon the apparatuses utilized.\textsuperscript{420}

I want to argue that the contemporary hard sciences present an appealing model of the invariance of,
and relation between, the fields of knowledge in a way that reflects the use of the potencies in the \textit{First
Outline} discussed in section 5.1. Furthermore, and following from Schelling’s logic of determination in
5.2., I will focus upon a somewhat odd example, but one that is quite frequent in discussions of
emergence and knowledge claims, that of the rainbow.

Following the quotations above, and given Schelling’s complex epistemological stance, how is
one to grasp the weight of knowledge claims that can be made about, and based upon, an ephemeral
entity such as a rainbow? Beyond this, and as the above epigraphs suggest, rainbows are tricky
phenomena because they bring into question the tension between sense, knowledge, and existence in
that they can be adequately, but not completely, described by different physical theories. As Batterman
and others have pointed out, the ray theory of light explains certain aspects of the rainbow, whereas the
wave theory of light is preferable in other instances. In essence, rainbows demonstrate universality at
the level of particularity as universality means, for him, that “systems of very different microscopic
constitution exhibit identical behavior under certain circumstances.”\textsuperscript{421} For this reason Batterman
argues that rainbows point to the need to restrain, but not eliminate, the very concept of emergent
entities because emergence operates in a 'no-man's land' of theoretical description. Emergent entities
are thus not inexplicable but partially explicable according to different, and bordering, knowledge

\textsuperscript{420} This is also expertly explained, in pseudo-pragmatist terms by the contemporary philosophy Mark Wilson in his
monumental work \textit{Wandering Significance}.

\textsuperscript{421} Batterman, \textit{Devil}, 37.
domains.

These no-man’s lands, or zones of transition, are not merely ideal but indicate a system's internal structure. Constructing a theory to bridge bordering knowledge domains details, but only obliquely, the relevant correlations between them; the passage from one field to another that makes the locally detected motion important. Thus, the macroscopic or emergent results of a phenomenon's transition are phenomenologically relevant, as is the context of embodiment or, more generally put, locality.

Or, in other words, if an object such as a rainbow can be constructed from the materials of two different theories (the ray and wave theories of light) then is the insufficiency of these theories alone a result of some noumenal status of the rainbow, or, of the limits of the structure of how theories themselves are constructed from particular perspectives?

In addition, rainbows index the relation between sense and being, in terms of what can be gleaned from something that appears to be a mere appearance. The above quote by Kant suggests that ephemeral phenomena, in particular, point to the fact that all particular entities are carved out of sensuous material (here pointing back to Chapter 2 and the physics of sense) but this begs the question, as Maimon pointed out, of how one then distinguishes analytic propositions from synthetic ones? Schelling argues that synthesis occurs in any act and that analytic stability is only a meta-stability, when another form of synthesis is treated as ground or, more unstably, as reason. This treatment of a particular form of synthesis as ground is what ties Schelling to Peirce, and, to pragmatism more generally; that of the asymptotic approach to natural phenomena. Schelling's intuition and speculative temporality-as-derivation is coupled with his horizontal field-based concerns over space and systematicity. In both cases, reasons are the results of grounds being treated as if they were absolute

422 Batterman, Devil, 38-40.
423 Batterman, Devil, 43.
(pointing back to Chapter 3 and the extensity test) in order to test the extent to which a particular entity
(which, after all, is only an inhibition of natural processes) is connected to nature. This is evident not
only in Schelling's emphasis on productive intuition (to be discussed in the following section) but also
in terms of the emphasis on location in Schelling's thought. For Schelling, the problem of location, or
individuation, is one of simultaneous epistemological and ontological bordering. Reduction, and
asymptotic investigation, both highlight the difficulty in navigating multiple fields of knowledge where
asymmetrical generation over time does not explain but, in fact, inhibits discussion of the resulting
field's interaction.

To return to Batterman, the zone between theories demonstrates the problems with easy critique
and utilization of reduction (both scientifically and philosophically). Reduction is tempting because
quite different entities and forces in different explanatory realms (such as a organism on the one hand
and the reaction to stress of a metal beam on the other hand) may exhibit similar (or what Batterman
calls universal) tendencies. This places one, at least abstractly, in a similar space as Schelling's axis of
horizontal and vertical knowledge, or, between the difference that thought makes in relation to the
difference that time makes (understood from our particular perspective). Or, in pointing back to
Chapter 3, between apparently qualitative and apparently quantitative distinctions. Or, to put things in
the language of inter-theoretic relations, between derivation and connection. Schelling engages the
inter-theoretic space through extending the possible grounds of phenomena or apparent products
(Scheinprodukt).

One difficulty here, in connecting Batterman's discussion of inter-theoretic relations to
Schelling's thought, is how to properly relate theory and method. The terms are of course mutually
reinforcing in that, for Schelling, by using constructive or productive intuition, he is able to take the
freedom of the transcendental method and restrict it with the demonstratively unavoidable theory, in
his case, that nature is prior to thinking. Nature functioning as *Prius* in turn allows, or in fact
necessitates, that thinking functions dynamically, i.e., constructively and intuitively. Both theories and methods are tests, or experiments, but the former are speculative grounds which justify the locality of the latter.

As already noted, Schelling’s method is one of constructive-extension, of extending an experiment to its breaking point (to determine whether something is merely ideal or real according to its consequences and not its substances). This is why, in the Erlangen lectures, philosophy is that practice where one must face the infinite. For reason, this points to a certain asymmetry that we have already encountered: “the lamp of knowledge that only points forward.” In one sense, Schelling appears to endorse the power of Kant's critical project, of what the science of reason can do and its necessity for the progression of philosophy yet, at the same time, Schelling does not believe that the critical project can be constructive based on the slim premises its sets out from, or its method begins to function as a theory to the extent it does not justify its claim to universality. This is why Schelling classifies Kant's work as negative philosophy. At times this classification has been obscured by readings of Schelling that either emphasize his anti-Kantianism (Iain Grant) or claim he is resolutely Kantian (Arran Garre).\(^4\) In essence, Schelling attempts to de-couple Kant's transcendental method, which he sees as a novel development in philosophy, from philosophy as such. Partially the issue is that for Schelling experience is accessible to reason since determination is about ‘whatness’ and not ‘thatness,’ or, what something is (being) versus that something is (existence). Whatness connects to the augmentative model where the qualitative is only experienced, is only conceptually registered, post-factum. This is the most basic division of the negative from the positive philosophies.

Furthermore, Schelling wishes to argue not only that reason cannot fix its experiential content and still remain reason but, in regards to the positive philosophy, that the relation between reason and

\(^4\) Bruce Matthews deserves mention for providing one of the more extensive analyses of Kant's relation to Schelling in his text Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011).
experience is one in which reason must take experience as essence. The complexity here is that while Schelling admits the myth of the given, i.e, that what is sensed is already conceptually laden (since one cannot be sure how real and how ideal a determination is), Schelling acknowledges that while thought can, and must, set out to see the extent of an object or concept’s consequences, experience, as issuing from both conceptually-coded sense and that which necessary is, existence as we are already immersed in it, must be treated as a constructive condition for the content of reason. In this regard, Schelling follows Wilfrid Sellars in his skepticism regarding the given, but admits that experience must be treated as given not ontologically but as locative, as locally given in a way that is not immediately conceptually readable. Or, put in a simplified sense, Schelling rejects givenness as pure or non-conceptual, but accepts the givenness of experience as proximate and local.

But this is not to denounce reason as such but acknowledge the continuing pressure to push reason alongside experience. It is to try and ascertain the mediation between mind and world (ideal and real), the question of what is the third thing (tertium quid) as the consequence as consequence (as a non-trivial result of the investigation of mind into world) as a trajectory (as the appearance of quality in quantity). Is it both reason and experience which recognize the potency as trajectory, as having occurred in, and out of, experience and reason. Thus reason is that which determines the inexistente as a what since this occurs in experience, and as sensed, for reason.

In this relation of negative and positive philosophy, naturalism falls somewhere in between in terms of being strictly methodological or strictly ontological. The distinction between ontological and methodological naturalism is made methodologically (and would later be determined by one to be more or only ideal) if one follows a Kantian method. As creatures capable of reason, human entities investigate their own investment in the world. From the perspective of a self-conscious entity a method

is a filtering device in order to make motion and navigation (as the systematization of motion), into
determination and speculation.

This determination is more than ideal if it expresses a real potency in an actuality. There
appears to be no way of knowing ahead of time (without experience) how many potencies there are, or
how they function which is why, as indicated in the previous chapter, they index inexistence. The
relation between knowing and being can be articulated in terms of determination and derivation, in
terms of horizontal fields establishing one another’s boundaries and a vertical evolution, or derivation,
in terms of evolution. The vertical/horizontal distinction is immediately a crude one, one surpassed and
complicated in the topological and geometrical mathematics.\textsuperscript{426} The spatial articulation of Schelling’s
epistemology, being one of extensity, of the real-ideal relation becoming one of vertical (evolutionary)
and horizontal (recapitulative) exploration, allows for an embodied or enacted form of skeptical
knowledge. That is, given that experience is treated as an essence in the positive philosophy,
skepticism cannot undo the constraint of experience but questions its applicability outside of its local
context (extended outward).

The question of knowledge then becomes whether to focus on the \textit{Stufenfolge} (the
transcendental but naturalized) or fields (methodological cuts into nature that may be more real than
their ideal construction). Since there is no ultimate ground nor ultimate end, the vertical model must
determine the scope of the derivation taken for a particular investigation, i.e., the question becomes
how far back or how speculative should one be in cutting out a slice of the progression of a particular
motion in nature?

Fields, on the other hand, are determinations of kinds of knowing (intuition, reason,
speculation) as well as subfields of science (geology, chemistry, physics etc). These determinations

\textsuperscript{426} As was hopefully demonstrated in Chapter 3, Schelling's interest in both geometry and the emerging algebra of his time
both inspires and limits his ability to spatialize his concepts.
disrupt or amplify derivations as cause and effect as being purely or absolutely real. If fields are a part of nature the endless question becomes whether or not the fields of the sciences, to take one example, necessarily mean that they are real patterns in nature, i.e., does the field known as chemistry point to a set of potencies that is not absorbed or superseded over time? Or, in other words, at what point does the success of a particular field of inquiry imply a field of being (of a potency) as opposed to being merely ideal or merely a methodological distinction? Whereas the transcendental pays attention to the motion away from the speculative excess or *ek-statis* of an augmentation and its potential consequences, fields presume that each augmentation, each creation of a new field, may necessitate a new field, a new method in order to even perceive, let alone measure, the consequences of this potentially new field.

To return to the theme of extensity mentioned above, observing the relation between mind and world (between knowing and being) in terms of extensity, in terms of fields, means that creation does not add to an existing world *ex nihilio* but expands the boundary of the known world outwards. In paying attention to fields Schelling is hypersensitive to the material context of what might be considered otherwise merely ideal creation.

Two immediate concerns and temptations emerge – does the vertical and horizontal reading map on directly to the negative positive distinction and, furthermore, does it map onto a temporal versus spatial split (reading the vertical *Stufenfolge* as temporal and the horizontal as spatial)? These binaries would immediately seem not to match as, the negative and the positive philosophies engage in both spatial and temporal characteristics as in the negative potentially being associated with Schelling’s own *Naturphilosophie* wherein temporal and spatial characteristics are explored, the positive philosophy is referred to as historical by Schelling. By focusing on a spatial and navigational reading of Schelling’s thought generally and, specifically in reference to the positive and negative split, I hope to clarify the relation between mind and world or, in Schelling’s terms more specifically, reason.
and experience.

5.4 - Rationalizing Unicorns: Facts and Intuition

Following the previous section, if Schelling sees intuition as coupled with determination then a possible means of distinguishing fields from one another arises. This view of determination, as well as the passage between determinations, can be attempted from a different view of the transcendental; that of the irreducible particularity of certain objects or facts. Numerous commentators on Schelling have remarked on his fascination with the emergence of particular objects following the Leibnizian question of 'why is there something rather than nothing?'

Given the previous sections regarding Schelling's constructivism, and the ad-mixture of the real and the ideal, it would be tempting to suggest that ideation is the same kind of creation as that which happens before, or without, human intervention. This would place Schelling against various forms of naturalism and closer to various forms of ontological liberalism. One of the more common examples or figures of ontological liberalism is that of the unicorn, that is, what does it mean to say they do or do not exist? In the Further Presentations Schelling utilizes a similar example, that of the gold mountain. Just as the rainbow is a test case for physical theories of emergence as they obtain or fail to obtain on different explanations, the unicorn is a test case for the relation between facthood and existence.

Markus Gabriel in his text Transcendental Ontology, addresses this relation by bringing reason and experience closer together under the rubric of sense and specifically in terms of what he calls fields of sense. In his later work, and in numerous lectures, Gabriel emphasizes that fictional objects such as unicorns exist but that meta-conceptual objects, such as 'the world,' do not. He makes this argument by extrapolating from a particular view of Schellingian determination.

While Schelling's “knowledge is a lamp that only points forward” sounds fairly idealist, it can be tempered by the statement that nature always remains a book closed in darkness. This darkness is seen productively most notably in Schelling's concept of Das Unvordenkliche. Markus Gabriel, against
any naturalistic reading of Schelling, has associated the unprethinkable with the very notion of logical space, that it is the unprethinkable that gives itself as the source of ongoing thought as such. Gabriel thus reads the relation between reason and existence in Schelling in terms of the relation between facthood and sense. The upshot of examining the reason/existence (or thought/world) relation in terms of facts and sense, is that it implicitly and explicitly shows the links between the concerns of analytic thought and those of German Idealism or Post-Kantian thought more generally. Gabriel argues that everyday usage of language points to certain cognitive biases which he sees as central to an outmoded and metaphysical view of the world, namely, in the very concept of world itself. Gabriel argues that the notion of totality, whether described as world or universe, is one that is simply the result of long-standing fears of uncertainty, that behind much of our everyday thinking is the assumption that there is a maximally big object which contains everything.

Rather than making a direct appeal to Cantorian set theory in terms of asserting the impossibility of a set of all sets following Alain Badiou or Quentin Meillassoux via Cantor, Gabriel argues along similar lines that a thoroughgoing physicalist approach to the universe, or to the world, cannot account for the existence of facts. Facts have an accretative function since for every fact there is the fact of that fact ad infinitum. This errancy of logic, Gabriel argues, makes it impossible for their to be a maximally 'big thing' or, viewed in terms of factiality, there cannot be a list of all lists because the most recent list would itself have to be included on a new list.\footnote{Whereas for Fichte facticity referred to the unquestionability of the status of a fact, for Meillassoux facticity refers to the impossibility of determining an ultimate ground for anything.}

While not always direct in his references, Gabriel's argument that the world does not exist but unicorns do, is because the latter has identifiable contexts which verify certain qualities and aspects of unicorns whereas the assumption of the world, having no context but its own, cannot exist. Gabriel argues that instead of totalities then we should utilize what he calls fields of sense or \textit{Seinsspharen}. 427
Thus for Gabriel sense is simply the organizing (non-factual) power of facts. Hence why there can be no world but there can be fictional entities (as long as the occupy their proper field).

While Gabriel gives a convincing account of the history and current use of German Idealism as that which is best suited to bridge the gap between analytic and continental thought, I find his articulation of fields of sense somewhat unclear other than as a vague form of ontological liberalism. As Gabriel writes: “Being is nothing other than a side effect of the transfinite, nontotalizable plurality of fields of sense.” For Gabriel existence is determined not by real objecthood but by anything appearing in a field of sense, as a mode of presentation most generally.

Relating back to our first section, however, one can see that Gabriel is promoting a weak ontology that, as has come to be expected, poses no epistemological apparatus as to the appeal, for instance, to facthood. Gabriel states that there are facts following a logic of factiality, i.e., the self-grounding postulate that facts are stable, that the fact there are facts is more than a fact. Whereas Quentin Meillassoux admits the groundlessness of the regime of facthood as such, Gabriel does not. Gabriel takes it as a given that facts are, that they are as ontologically certain as things we can physically manipulate. Gabriel argues that facticity is rooted in sense and that sense need not belong only to subjects. Gabriel takes Frege's notion of sense and reduces it to the most bare notion possible.

Given Schelling’s heterogeneous monism as defined by Paul Franks, as well as Iain Hamilton Grant's reading of idealism as asserting not the triumph of ideas over 'the real world' but in exploring the reality of the idea, this seems to fit. Gabriel refers to his own thought as an objective idealism which allows for internal realism (in terms of the reality or coherence of facthood holding for the sake of reference), yet, at the same time, he argues that facts as facts with the most cosmological meaning that is, have having the widest facthood (such as a star in a galaxy far far away has exploded) requires knowing very little about it. Whereas Gabriel states that a subjective mental state requires more

428 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, viii.
specific knowledge about mental states in order to ground its particular context.

Gabriel appears to be following largely in Heidegger's footsteps given his emphasis on both world and fact. In Heidegger's text on *The Essence of Human Freedom*, he emphasizes the importance of distinguishing fact and factuality.\(^{429}\) However, unlike Gabriel and like Châtelet, Heidegger does emphasize the naturalistically perspectival aspect of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* via Schelling's incorporation of Kant's notion of world view into the sciences\(^{430}\) as well as emphasizing that following Kant's discussion of perspectives (as analyzed in Chapter 2) is taken up but altered by the German Idealists in that they focus on constructing such systematic perspectives alongside being as opposed to finding those structure as *a priori* epistemological structures.\(^{431}\)

Against the scientific-synthetic approach, Gabriel argues that ontology, in his sense of it, relies upon and, also indexes, a transcendental logic. The motor of this logic, as we touched upon in the first chapter, is Schelling's notion of the unprethinkable, that concept which determines there is always more to be predicated, that there is always another antecedent to be discovered and a consequent to be found or produced. The brilliance behind Schelling's unprethinkable is that it deploys the function of a meta-rule (as Gabriel names the field of sense of all fields, i.e., the maximally biggest thing) but is constitutively underdetermined. Thus, it functions as a necessary logical structure but one that is so as to make sense as the basic structure of a non-closed world, or an open set of the sensible.

My disagreement with Gabriel's reading is that while anti-Kantian readings of Schelling would usually over-emphasize derivation (the naturalist thrust of Schelling's work) Gabriel over-emphasizes the constructed nature of determination, of determination being only ideal. This is why Gabriel can claim that unicorns exist while the world does not. In essence, Gabriel overemphasizes determination by putting too much stock in the ungroundedness of things produced being ungrounded because of the

lack of all derivation, a lack stabilized, in his view, by fields of sense (his name for the distribution or web of determination).

Given Gabriel’s focus however, it is odd that he, and many other contemporary readers of Schelling, set aside the question of intuition even when they focus on knowledge and methodologies of knowledge acquisition. In many of the texts on Schelling, intuition is erased or, more egregiously perhaps, equated with Schelling’s method as such (as Eckhart Förster attempts in his *The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy*).\(^{432}\) Gabriel’s text is practically devoid of any discussion of Schelling’s intellectual intuition whatsoever which, given his emphasis on how sense and facthood interact to make claims, appears particularly strange. While neglecting one Schellingian concept among many is no crime, it is particularly interesting that Gabriel’s text, which focuses primarily on knowledge claims, could make such an omission. It will be helpful to outline a typical view of Schelling's notion of intuition as put forward by Eckart Förster.

For Förster, in his *Naturphilosophie*, Schelling errs by erroneously applying Fichtean intellectual intuition to nature. From this Förster argues that Schelling's observations of nature merely function to prove the power of intellectual intuition. Furthermore, Förster argues that Schelling's notion of intuition, as well as that of identity, are dead or inert in that he claims that Schelling is attempting to add activity to nature via a Fichteanism. However, Förster claims that the observational key of productive intuition, that the intuiting and the intuited are the same, cannot be the case for nature.\(^{433}\) But Förster gives no justification for why this is so, as if it is self-evident, but how is this possible?

Förster detours through the question of inhibition and Kant's theory of matter as an influence on Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* before returning to the issue of intuition as a method. Förster repeats that Schelling's notion of intuition is taken from Fichte and crudely inserted into the *Naturphilosophie* and

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\(^{433}\) Förster, *Twenty-Five Years*, 238-238.
that Eschenmayer had raised a similar objection to this transplantation. Yet even though Förster analyzes Schelling's response to Eschenmayer, Förster still claims that Schelling's method “is wholly insufficient” because the method of cognition must be the same for nature and the I.

Förster writes:

[Schelling] is fundamentally mistaken when he infers that the method of cognition must be the same for both nature and the I, namely intellectual intuition, for he has clearly failed to learn the lesson of what I referred to above as Fichte's central insight: that 'I am' and 'it is' express two wholly distinct modes of being.

In so doing this Förster is reading Schelling like a Fichtean in assuming that the kind of activity at ground must be a form of cognition whereas, for Schelling, cognition is a form of this activity, a form which intellectual intuition, along with other kinds of thinking, enacts but as thought. Thought is a form of a more primordial activity and, at the same time, it is the privileged form of human access to that primordial activity. Intuition, as opposed to reflection, speculation or other forms of cognition, is spatially immediate and not non-conceptually immediate since, for Schelling, reason is always accompanied by experience, there is no mystical connection only different articulations of conceptual space. To ignore the spatial aspect of intuition is to also assume a crude notion of synthesis or construction in relation to idealism. So, whereas Forster follows a traditional assumption that intuition is a merely romantic category, thinkers such as Heidegger in his text on Schelling, rightly dismisses this naïve assumption. Heidegger notes that Schelling's intuition, as an attempt at systematic or absolute knowing, is merely a knowledge which recognizes the original, if obscure, unity between knower and the known.

The evidence pointing to intuition's complexity is clear enough in Schelling's own texts. In the Ideas Schelling puts forward the hypothesis that unity only exists for thought, or for the thinking

434 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 247.  
435 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 249.  
436 Förster, Twenty-Five Years, 249.  
437 Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise, 47-48.
being, but that intuition suggests absolute simultaneity of nature and mind. This might suggest that unity is only intellectual but the intellectual capacities cannot be separated from nature. As Schelling also makes clear in “On the True Concept” this does not mean that mind merely generates entities or forces, but that mind and nature realize one another.

This is further explained in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* where intuition is a limitation, whereas the self is a localization of the real and the ideal as limiting one another. As has been addressed already, separated things are ideal determinations but the ideality of these determinations cannot be known to be merely in the mind since the mind is a part of the world, and hence, the quality of the thing is as real though its location and potential consequences may be limited. Intuition’s simultaneity is more structural than temporal, intuition is merely a local instance at an attempt at individuation for the sake of navigation, for navigating between determinations. Intuition, to point back to Batterman, is intertheoretic.

As Bruce Matthews puts it, Schelling’s progressive method, as a combination of a transcendental method and an abductive method, attempts to grasp the unconditioned in terms of combining the sensual and the intellectual in treating both as ground or essence to construct outwards or, again as Matthews puts it, construction is the human imagining of natural powers. Formally, the question is simply how to incorporate, yet maintain methodologically, the distinction between the particular thinking subject and the nature in which it is embedded, and that it thinks, from that particular location.

While I cannot in the space allotted combat each of these views what I wish to pursue is the

441 Matthews, *Schelling's Organic Form*, 149.
interesting fact that they generally approach the avenues they do only by rejecting the obvious place to go in order to combat Hegel's theory of representation: that of Schelling's use of intellectual intuition.

Schelling's notion of intuition, I believe has been largely misunderstood, taken as fundamentally misguided and succumbing to Kant's critique of it in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. However, given Schelling's reading of Kant, I believe that the former's notion of intuition cannot be read as completely compatible with that of the latter's critique.

One of Schelling's later statements on intuition is made in relation to Hegel and is one of the strongest portrayals of the capacity. In *On the History of Modern Philosophy* Schelling lays out how he came to his own formulation of intellectual intuition. He notes that the concept moved from Kant's typically cautious definition to Fichte's elaboration. For Fichte, according to Schelling, intellectual intuition was the fact of the I's immediacy. Schelling argues that, against his former master, he wished to assert the immediacy of the content of the subject-object over and above the immediacy of content in the Fichtean 'I am'.

Schelling writes in summary:

This first basis, this true *prima materia* of all thought, cannot, therefore, be what is really thought, not be what is thought in the sense that the single formation is. When thought is concerned with the determination of this matter, it does not think about this substrate (*Unterlage*) itself, but rather only of the determination of the concept which it puts into it — (sculptor—clay) — it is, therefore, what is not really thought in thinking. A thinking which does not think (*ein nicht denkendes Denken*) will, though, not be far from an intuiting thinking, and, as such, a thinking which has an intellectual intuition as its ground, goes through the whole of this philosophy, as it does through geometry, in which the external intuition of the figure which is drawn on the blackboard or where-ever is always only the bearer of an inner and spiritual intuition. This, then, is said in relation to a philosophy without intuition.

While for Hegel, according to Schelling, it would seem that intuition is completely allergic to anything approaching rational, or even systematic, thought (and therefore be what Kant critiques) Schelling faults Kant for limiting thought's outer limits. So while one could abandon intuition as a flawed but early attempt on Schelling's part to break through such limitations, in fact, for the late Schelling, intuition is the fact and embodiment of thought and nature's coexistence. Intuition, as a

means of conceptual and constructive navigation, is not mere idealistic fancy, but the vagueness of being in a nature that we can manipulate but not fully understand. In its final rendition, Schelling opposes intuition to Hegel's emphasis on logic, particularly, on logic being that which is, and that which ends, once nature starts.\textsuperscript{445} Intuition then, is an important category as it toes the line between merely accepting a common sense view of the world and admitting that philosophy's role is to reduce or decompose common sense into simpler, and also potentially deeper, reservoirs. One such instance of this is is how Schelling argues that teleology, though a naturalized teleology, is no less inscrutable than the mechanic causality Kant favored.\textsuperscript{446} Or, as Joshua Meddelson has pointed out, while Kant abjures teleology because it threatens normativity, Schelling sees teleology as an objective part of the world.\textsuperscript{447}

To return to the epistemological axes with which we started, intuition can be said to be the necessary passage between the horizontal fields (immanent condition) and the vertical evolutionary Stufenfolge (transcendental condition). Furthermore, intuition, from the located position of the thinker steeped in experience, is the means by which one can determine the difference between the positive and negative philosophies, between those forms of thinking which work alongside experience and those that abstract away form it.

In the \textit{Grounding} Schelling argues that the positive philosophy is the application of the transcendental within an immanent context.\textsuperscript{448} Where the \textit{Naturphilosophie} attempted to naturalize the transcendental, to explore the transcendental as an augmenting motion of natural processes later articulated into fields, in the positive philosophy the transcendental, or act of transcendence, is simply an augmentation relative to a location.

Thus, in taking Kant’s critique to heart, Schelling makes the transcendentent of this world thereby

\textsuperscript{446} Esposito, \textit{Schelling's Idealism}, 76.
\textsuperscript{448} Schelling, \textit{Grounding}, 205-206.
getting around Kant’s prohibition of it as being above, or out of, experience. Experience transcends reason but not because it is absolutely separate from it, but because of the manner by which reason functions in relation to experience. Experience transcends reason simply because reason cannot 'catch up' to experience as movement in the world. Whereas the transcendental method attempts to reconstruct derivation either by naturalizing it or localizing it, intuition functions via immediacy, not in the manner which Kant prohibits against, but via the processes of knowing which follow from continuous relations between our position as knowing against, and being unknowingly connected to, that which we are attempting to understand. Or, put otherwise, whereas the transcendental method attempts to trace the paths of derivation, intuition measures the local co-determinations of subject-objects in an immediate context.

To put this in navigational terms, the transcendental method which tracks derivation, moves from the general to the specific in that it reduces a chain of derivations to fuel an instance of action. Intuition, on the other hand, starts from the immediate, or local, and expands it outward. Once again it is worth returning to the work of Gilles Châtelet as he puts an emphasis on intuition, and *Naturphilosophie*, in relation to the gestural. As intuition can be said to spatially map the difference between determination as a web, and derivation as a chain, Châtelet's diagrammatic approach to intuition and *Naturphilosophie* views potentiation (or the naturalized transcendental) as an unfolding and depotentiation (or the reductive notion of immanence) as a folding.

**5.5 – Gestural Scars: Châtelet and Intuitive Anchoring**

In his remarkable text *Figuring Space* Gilles Châtelet writes:

Any detailed inspection of a landscape or of a domain of knowledge presupposes a survey, and the horizon is what endows caution with some style. If this survey were reduced merely to prescribing a 'horizontal' reading and a 'vertical' reading, it would lead only to a fixed stratification. The survey induces an axis of distribution of the mobilities that reactivate knowledge: the strata become a field, whose exploration implies a norm of virtual grasp of the statements. This norm never offers itself up placidly for analysis and always evades anyone who would seek it 'on the near or far side' of the horizon that controls it. Its withdrawal is always painful and is paid for by a 'metaphorical" dislocation of the field or by its reduction to
significant networks subordinated to a code. The implicit pressure of the horizon is like the scar of a gesture...

In *Figuring Space* Gilles Châtelet takes up Schelling’s focus on the point of indifference as itself the producer of two symmetries – an argument which Schelling uses to situate himself between Spinoza and Leibniz in his *Investigations*. Schelling’s intellectual intuition is what makes possible, and in turn is made possible by (though on a different scale), the description of the universe as polarities which can only be adequately described in the diagrammatic register. Where Schelling’s concept of the *potenz* is often dismissed (such as by Beach and Vaughn) as Spinozistic power and nothing more, Châtelet recognizes that it speaks to an original tension of fields in Schelling that exponentially produce, and spin out of control, producing more and more stages of being (*Stufenfolge*). Or, put another way, the arithmetic of qualities gives rise to a different order of quantity. This is why just as identity and subsequently powers must be plural, powers add qualities in such way that not only are magnitudes multiplied, but the metric of reading such multiplication, as addition of quality, is the production of the ideality of nature.

In examining Châtelet’s reading of Schelling, I hope to provide a transition from intuition as a localizing function between facts and sense, to intuition as providing a springboard for action in the form of a proto-pragmatism, or positive philosophy, to be addressed in the following chapter.

What are these symmetries exactly?

The problem is that fields, viewed one at a time, obscure the fields beneath them whereas viewing nature as derivation minimizes the fields’ relation to each other as well as de-spatializes the *Potenz* (making them appear as nothing but generation over time). Châtelet’s emphasis on both gesture and horizon can be used to tilt the *Stufenfolge* (bisected all along the way with fields) over, to deform it slightly into a horizon. As the above quote emphasizes, the style of the gesture, the particular form of

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449 Châtelet, *Figuring Space*, 54.
450 Châtelet, *Figuring Space*, 75-76.
motion in the individual, is what allows for the Naturphilosophen in the field to address the horizon as that which is ontological, and epistemological, in equal measure through a navigational assertion.

The symmetries produced, or made possible by the observer as the blank X in the field, in relation to the horizon, is one of depotentiation and potentiation. In the case of depotentiation the synthesis of the Stufenfolge and the repetition of fields, becomes the horizon from which the thinker reduces one aspect to a singular ground to then re-expand or construct a new horizon from that one point or ground as if this were the origin of the world as such. Potentiation, on the other hand, treats the hybrid of derivation and determination as the foreground thereby fashioning a speculative vanishing point as if this point were the goal of nature.

Following Châtelet above, norms function as a reactive gesture to figure out this oscillation between viewing the horizon as such and viewing it as a vertical progression, or, as a horizontal (yet flattened) plane. The indifference point, taken as an observation post, functions as an hinge which is not merely a hinge between material elements but as a hinge which produces an orientation.452 Furthermore, Châtelet notices in Schelling's Naturphilosophie an emphasis on the productive or constructive function of intuition that furthers, not only epistemological endeavors, but also expands nature as we know it.

Châtelet writes:

We are touching here on the tender spot of the philosophy of nature: that of the intuition of the degrees of articulation, those where Being overhangs, where quantitative difference and 'canoical' choices of paramatrege vanish.”453 Intuition allows the philosopher-scientist to occupy a space by which one can occupy a motion that is not merely of the self. Intuition creates maximal ambiguity, but not as a kind of debilitating fog, but in that it frees the observer for creating between things. In this regard, intuition functions as potentiation, as it creates space as space free of all constraints, where construction occurs only according to thought but, this thought, is itself of the same kind of the natural forces which produce it.454 Relating back to Chapter 3, the exponent as a potentiation of a number is the power whereas the number is the indifference point, the particular individuation thus either potentiated or depotentiated.455

This leap of intuition, a leap which Schelling addresses in the Erlangen lectures, sets Schelling

452 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 75.
453 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 76.
454 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 77.
455 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 89.
apart from either simply following exhaustive deduction or abstraction from common features.

Châtelet’s understanding of Schelling’s notion of intuition comes largely from the *Bruno*. The *Bruno*, as an expansion of the identity philosophy, attempts to articulate the relation between the potencies as the kinds of thinking of which humans are capable.456 Furthermore, and to return to our methodological axes, the point of indifference as where the observer locates themselves and intuits from. This pivot complicates the two methods which, again following Grant, are not reducible to one another.457 Schelling is neither endorsing deduction or induction but transcendental naturalism and material abduction.

Châtelet masterfully demonstrates how Schelling, following Kant’s discussion of negative magnitudes, allows for thought to escape mad and endless deduction,458 for separation of fields and transcendental generation, to set up stakes, to trace consequences not merely real or merely ideal.459 Thought does not merely produce things, nor is thought produced by things alone but, again tracing Schelling’s Fichtean roots, points to an activity in which thought and nature are of a singular kind.

Châtelet goes to great pains to attempt to demonstrate how the stake, how the particular inhabiting of an indifference point is not merely arbitrary that is, it is not a division of two methodological processes within the ideal only, but that this has stakes for nature. Châtelet attempts to do this by discussing the shift from 0 as merely a point (whether merely ideal or material real as in Lorenz Oken’s terms) to where the 0 becomes a loop of forces.

Châtelet discusses the '0' as the heart of the kinematic scale where it is not merely the tipping point of a physical scale but it is the point from which negative and positive forces encircle, and move

458 This is how Brady Bowman describes Schelling’s method as opposed to Hegel’s sober dialectics in Brady Bowman, *Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 227.
459 Châtelet, *Figuring Space*, 81.
away from, one another in relation to the '0'. Intuition functions as the identification of difference and indifference, as the point from where two different dimensions (such as length or width mentioned above in relation to electromagnetism) emerge.460

Following the famous electric experiments of Volta, Châtelet describes how Schelling's zero becomes a loop. He writes:

“A new around has been grasped diagrammatically in nature and thought and we do indeed rediscover the creative ambiguity of the indifference centre: disrupt a unity to reach the next plateau of Being.”461

The indifference point, the sprout of intuition,462 shows how articulation strikes out in the progress of becoming in the stream of becoming. Intuition functions as a form of individuation that is simultaneously a point of observation. 463

Intuition, as Châtelet understands it, and as Schelling reads it in relation to Kant, is a form of thinking which functions as a form of knowledge which is non-purposive or at least, as Forester puts it, does not require the assumption of purposiveness.464 Thus Schelling's position appears quite close and quite far from Kant's following the navigational mode outlined in chapter 2. The motive or motile zero also distinguishes Schelling from Oken. Whereas Oken's zero was substantively additive, Schelling's zero is a trace or gesture composed of motion and is thus augmentatively additive.

Intuition is the introduction of a disturbance that is simultaneously a vantage point and a hinge. The inscribing of this disturbance is never an arresting of becoming, nor the mark of being, but a gesture or inscription of the being of becoming and the becoming of being in tandem. In the case of the 0, the mathematical mark is a knot, or tying of the stream of becoming, it is a gesture or instance of being that, nevertheless, stays in motion. Potentiation and depotentiation occur as either the untying of

460 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 90, 94.
461 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 154.
462 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 85.
463 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 94.
464 Châtelet, Figuring Space, 144.
this knot, or of testing its extensity through the application of experiment which, indexing Chapter 3, can be represented in the form of the exponent. The gesture, or intuition, is the transit between these stages that leaves a trace of its action while attempting to emphasize not the means of its path, but the potential impacts of how it has already moved. This is the strange kind of navigation present in Schelling's theory of knowledge: that of a self-inhibiting exploration that speculates about the spaces it may find.

As I will aim to show in the next and final chapter, Schelling's navigational mode differs from Kant's not only via the emphasis on intuition, but also in terms of Schelling's commitment to naturalism, but a form of naturalism different form the more common forms adopted by contemporary philosophy.
6 - Conclusion or Speculative Pragmatism: Navigating the Richtungen of Nature and Thought

In this concluding chapter I demonstrate how Schelling's emphasis on motion and space, coupled with his particular mode of philosophical speculation, leads to a form of proto-pragmatism. I work out this pragmatism via Schelling's 1821 Erlangen lectures ("On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science") by moving through the connections between the great American pragmatist C.S. Peirce and Schelling. I then compare Schelling's proto-pragmatism with the analytic thinkers who have taken German Idealism, in conjunction with the pragmatic legacy of Peirce as well as Sellars, as implying a philosophy which emphasizes normativity at the cost of nature, namely, McDowell and Brandom (referred to as Left Sellarsians or Pittsburgh Hegelians). I then close by appealing to the contemporary pragmatist Mark Wilson who synthesizes and operates between the scientific considerations of Peirce, and the communicative and practical pragmatism of the Pittsburgh Hegelians. Wilson, through a focus on classical concepts in the physical sciences, demonstrates the limitations of a normative approach to human thought. Specifically in regards to thought, Wilson attempts to argue for a navigational approach to cognition that steers clear of both the normativity of the Pittsburgh Hegelians (or Left Sellarsians) as well as the more hard-nosed neuroscientific articulations of consciousness in the work of Daniel Dennett, and Patricia and Paul Churchland (categorized as Right Sellarsians); the former emphasize reason as sui generis from the naturalistic context, whereas the latter investigate the impact of the natural sciences arguably at the cost of normativity. Peirce, Sellars and, as I will argue, Schelling, all in their own ways, attempt to construct a philosophy where the division between the capacity to articulate particularly human concerns, and the capacity to adequately describe and situate our place in the natural world, are not incompatible endeavors.
6.1 - Abducting Intuition: Schelling and Peirce

The heart of the dispute lies in this. The modern philosophers -- one and all, unless Schelling be an exception -- recognize but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object's crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that existence.\textsuperscript{465}

I carefully recorded my opposition to all philosophies which deny the reality of the Absolute, and asserted that 'the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind' This is as much as to say that I am a Schellingian, of some stripe; so that, on the whole, I do not think Dr. Carus has made a very happy hit in likening me to Hume, to whose whole method and style of philosophizing I have always been perhaps too intensely averse. Yet, notwithstanding my present disclaimer, I have little doubt apriorians will continue to describe me as belonging to the sceptical school.\textsuperscript{466}

My views were probably influenced by Schelling -- by all stages of Schelling, but especially *the Philosophie der Natur*. I consider Schelling as enormous, and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the trammels of system, and his holding himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is like a scientific man. If you were to call my philosophy Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard.\textsuperscript{467}

In Chapter 5, I attempted to demonstrate the epistemological space Schelling attempts to construct, and then navigate, in order to re-establish the relation between the real and the ideal, as well as, between the activities of determination and derivation. This entailed avoiding the *Charybdis*, on the one hand, of a factial and logical based account of our production of knowledge, buttressed by the apparent self-sufficiency of sense (Gabriel) and, on the other hand, the *Scylla* of a physicalist, or hard-nosed naturalist position, where causal or teleological models of nature can explain all worldly capacities both human and non-human.

Schelling attempts this navigation by accepting a naturalist position but one that admits non-physical or process-based ontological (or perhaps more accurately meontological) powers into nature. Thus, Schelling attempts to avoid an ontologically liberal approach that grants equal being to all things, as well as, an appeal to facthood as such in order to avoid negating an appropriate dose of epistemological skepticism. Furthermore, Schelling dodges an over-reliance on becoming or meontology that reduces everything to mere emergence without worrying about positionality or

\textsuperscript{466} Peirce, *Collected Papers of Peirce*, 2182.
methodology. In other words, Schelling does not allow becoming to replace epistemology as a negative constraint (position, or from where do you think) or as a positive constraint (knowledge claims are strong because one has established a method).

The complex midway position that Schelling constructs, one that puts him in close proximity to C.S. Peirce, can be summarized in the following manner: there is a self-inhibiting creative structure where the realness of things is determined by the reach of their consequences, i.e., realness is simultaneously its synthesis and the testing of its extensity by another agent. Realness is thus less about the matter or substratum upon which a thing or fact rests, as was discussed in Chapter 5, but more about the measurable activity of a meta-stable individuation (a Scheinprodukt). Ideas are a peculiar part of nature that index inexistence, as discussed in Chapter 4, whereas objects tend towards, and index, existence.

In emphasizing Schelling's proto-pragmatism here, I wish to argue that intellectual intuition, as it functions for Schelling, is an abstract form of Peircean abduction, or, Peircean abduction is Schellingian intuition put into disciplined practice. Both concepts represent their respective creator's attempts to find a third way between realism-as-mechanism and idealism-as-overly speculative, in Schelling's case, and between crude empiricism and crude nominalism in Peirce's case.

A passage from Schelling's *System of a Philosophy as a Whole* (1804) captures the predicament nicely:

Merely reflective humanity has no idea of an objective reason, of an Idea that as such is utterly real and objective; all reason is something subjective to them, as equally is everything ideal, and the idea itself has for them only the meaning of a subjectivity, so that they therefore know only two worlds, the one consisting of stone and rubble, the other of intuitions and the thinking thereupon.⁶⁶⁸

Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition, as was addressed in Chapter 5, has been criticized for falsely suggesting the possibility of immediate knowledge (this was Kant's central objection to the very notion of intellectual intuition). But, as I attempted to show, the immediacy at stake does not

suggest an immediacy in terms of intimate knowledge, but a faster but more crude form of knowledge in comparison to the slowness of reason in the wake of an immediate natural response of mentation-as-intuition. That is, intellectual intuition is Schelling's way of pointing out the slowness and locality of reason in relation to the kind of information indirectly gathered due to the continuity of reason and nature. Or, in other words, intellectual intuition is the name for the process by which we are capable of localizing thought, to simply to say 'this thing is here' with the navigational self or observer-as-X being one of those determinations.

As a result, the capacity to determine whatness (or being), is inexorably tied then to a thing's whereness, its location. Or, to say what something is, requires asking where it is since the ontological arises from location, in so far as, the productivity of the thing is determined by, and determines, its location in terms of origin and emergence. The whereness of intuition is, again pointing back to the previous chapter, the question of transit between the negative philosophy of whatness and the positive philosophy of thatness.

If every individual thing is a production of the interaction of powers, as Schelling seems to consistently argue, then the question of which powers, and in what proportion they function, indexes the importance of location. A thing as a location in a nexus of powers is a failed containment or, as Schelling puts it in the *First Outline for a Philosophy of Nature*, every thing recognized as a product of nature is a failure.\(^{469}\) Powers produce things which are not strictly reducible to the powers, nor are powers reducible to the products they produce, things can be viewed as trajectories of a stalled becoming, or as a mobile capture of powers or potencies. A thing is a less mobile capture of those powers, a knot of particular potencies in nature, which is a consequence of them. As Schelling puts it

Thus, the immediacy of intellectual intuition is an auto-coincidence of thinking and being or, of the transcendental method and the naturalistic method gaining shared traction on the world. Intuition is immediate because it is ideally determined to be spatio-temporally contained or, as was put in the closing of Chapter 5, intuition functions as the extensity test of an object's roots and consequents. Thus determination-as-such suspends space-time to augment it, or, the isolation of a thing isolates that which produced and continues to produce it as ground.

To say that determination is ideal, as crude caricatures of idealism would have it, because of its suspension of the not-merely ideal (the mixture of subject-object) is to erase the augmentative capacity of thought in the merely ideal as well as in terms of the non-thought that thought carries with it (the inexistent potentialities it bears). Or, as Schelling puts it in “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science,” (1821) while all ability is a form of knowledge not all knowledge is necessarily ability. Here we can investigate the re-allocation of the ideal given its determinative capacity not being merely ideal, but being so only in the inadequacy of its consequents to be materialized.

That thought purportedly floats above the world at the cost of the earth (as Kant's crude reading of Plato would have it) misses the thought composition of the very notion of the world. The purported motionlessness of the world is itself ideal, but a more real, or existent ideal, whose apparent self-evidential status seems to grant it automatic materiality. Yet, if nothing is what it is on its own (if nothing is self-standing) then to say that the world is only material depotentiates the world without augmenting it, in other words, without feeding the notion of the world back into itself properly it determines the world by re-mobilizing the immobilized by stretching or extending the isolated (or determined) thing as if it was the world. Or, as Schelling puts it, thought is a stretching as opposed to

knowledge which is a mirroring. 472

Once one forgets the space-time suspension of a determination, the fact that determination depends on derivation, then all sense of materiality is lost as anything consequent – it becomes merely that which it is for us. But if the world was self-standing or self-determining, how exactly would it be contained? Schelling’s notion of the world is consequent and thus any determination is an extainment (Ausschließung), an unfolding, but not of a predetermined one or wholeness but a self-augmenting non-One that adds its self to the entirety of its existence though possibly as inexistent (though no less real). 473

Thus determination is both stronger and weaker than containment. Determination implies an exploratory model of knowledge whereas reason attempts to locate the drawing of conclusions, or the self-aware activity of thought, outside of the problem of space-time. Schelling explicitly explores the tension between the exploratory and the navigational, or, between systems of reason and the asystaton of coexistence. 474 In order to recognize this ‘inner tension’ the human “must have already searched in every possible direction” or, as Schelling argues, systems come after not only an internal disarray in thought from individual practitioners, but, their imperfect collectivization. 475 Or, put otherwise, reason is the drawing of conclusions but within an already stabilized space, whereas pure navigation, as wandering, would simply be exploring chaos. Systems are the vessels by which knowledge claims can explore the world without replacing the system of the world with the system of reason.

It is this combination of meontological musings on the notion of individuation in relation to space via local experiences, and time in terms of the slowness of reflection, that Schelling’s thought

472 Ibid. 234.
473 Extainment is Iain Grant’s translation of Ausschließung which is more commonly translated as separation. Grant borrows the term from Châtelet as a term that is not merely opposed to containment, but is a spilling outswards that retains its connection to that which it appears separated from. See Iain Hamilton Grant, “How Nature Came to be Thought: Schelling’s Paradox and the Problem of Location,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 44 (1) (Newcastle: Newcastle University, 2013), 40-41.
474 Ibid. 209, 213.
475 Ibid. 210-211.
begins to appear in the form of a proto-pragmatism. Pragmatic should not be taken as commonsensical in a naïve sense, but a practical way of handling local existence given the complexities of space-time or the slowness of reflection, or whatever lurks behind the everyday use of concepts and the everyday consequences of actions. This brings us to Peirce and Peircean abduction.

Peirce's notion of abduction is generally situated between deduction and induction (while being 'closer' to the latter), and can be defined crudely as an educated guess, or the form of thought that produces hypotheses, or what functions as the logic of discovery. Despite its wide usage one may be surprised to find that there is no single text of Perice's that focuses on the concept specifically, its definitional traces have to be tracked across Peirce's infamously wide and rambling oeuvre.

K.T. Fann in “Peirce's Theory of Abduction” explicates how abduction is a synthetic form of amplifying inference. While induction is also amplifying and synthetic, deduction is explicative and analytic.\(^\text{476}\) Peirce asserts that while deduction is secure, its security is at cost of its creativity, and thus abduction inhabits the opposite end of the inferential spectrum.\(^\text{477}\) Here the general character of Peirce's abduction should not seem alien to Schelling's thought. The creative and synthetic nature of abduction, of a risky form of creation, should appear similar to Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition. My hope is that the spatial qualification of Schelling's intuition given immediately above and, in Chapter 5, should ease the strain between these contextually disparate concepts. Numerous authors have commented on Schelling's relationship to Peirce. Most notably Joseph Esposito, Bruce Matthews, Jason Wirth, and Tyler Tritten have compared the knowledge claims of both thinkers to arrive at various results.

Matthews emphasizes Peirce's respect for Schelling's early attitude towards systematicity (reflected in our introduction under the title 'ablative systematicity') as well as an appreciation for

Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*. This appreciation is also echoed by Esposito following the epigraphs above. Tyler Tritten, on the other hand, is more skeptical of Peirce and Schelling’s methodological closeness. In his *Beyond Presence* Tritten argues that Peirce’s notion of abduction is too empirical for Schelling’s taste in that Peirce’s model of hypothesis attempts immediately ground to the object of inquiry. Furthermore, Tritten argues that Peirce’s arbitrary guessing is too capricious for Schelling’s model of freedom, that there is a kind of internal self-certainty which gives Schelling’s investigative process more noetic, if not external, confidence. As Tritten writes:

Schelling does not arbitrarily posit a hypothesis among other possible ones but attempts to scientifically and objectively corroborate that for which subjective conviction already exists. Doubt and certainty are not theoretical but practical, and one does not test the practical by means of experimentation, just as one cannot afford to experiment and play with one’s life but must always act with resolve. Abduction searches and hunts while for Schelling the hunting is over as he strives only after that having already seized him; one must only ask if a scientific path leading to the predetermined destination exists.

Tritten’s reading, in my view, overemphasizes the epistemological function of revelation and grace at the cost of epistemological navigations whether those navigations are of apparently external nature or of apparently internal mental episodes. In addition, being seized by powers, or by objects in the continuum of nature as conglomerations of powers, requires that one divide oneself methodologically from the certainty of inner episodes of knowing in order to test that knowing. The certainty that Tritten highlights is thus by no means incompatible with abductive investigation. It is only that Schelling’s notion of intuition treats the mind itself like an environment which abduction can navigate but, since our own epistemological and, in particular, reflective limitations require us to objectify our own thoughts, it is only by externalizing ourselves that we abductively approach anything that we wish to investigate even if that thing is our own certainty of investigation, i.e., the activity of

481 Ibid. 63.
Lastly, what many accounts of abduction, and its relation to Schelling overlook, but what is clearly evident in the above epigraphs from Peirce, is the future-orientedness of abduction against what Peirce sees as crude nominalism. Peirce's emphasis on laws or universals is not because he believes these things can be definitively articulated for all time, but because he believes pragmatic activity requires justification for its future or, in a spatial sense, possible non-local ramifications. Thus there must be something that guarantees future creation with and without us; and is necessary not in a metaphysical sense but in an explanatory sense. To use a simple example, the fact that stones fall when we drop them cannot be reduced to the pragmatic logic of "because it works." If this were the case, how would we augment, or amplify, our existing activities without being able to speculate as to their broader meaner outside that one particular activity? That is, how could we properly systematize our experience with nature if if was merely an accumulation of happenstance or an accretion of habits?

Given the emphasis on the local status of experience for thought in the *Erlangen Lectures*, and in *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy*, the immediacy of intuition is not that of a thinker being mentally 'attuned' with all of nature, but of the continuity of nature allowing for the possibility of a local gesture or action to be a more than a local account of synthesis. Examining the above epigraphs, it is no stretch on Peirce's thinking to argue he is invested in the continuity of mind and nature, nor to affirm the importance of local wanderings or investigations to synthesize systems, however provisional they may be. It is in this sense that speculation, or the threats of notions of idealistic vagueness orbiting intuition, can be addressed if they are tools in pragmatic engagement. This aspect of intuition, unlike abduction, is often ignored following a crude caricature of idealism, or of philosophy more generally.

482 This difference hinges on the degree to which one sees the importance of God or of the theological in Schelling's work. While I do not have the space to engage in such an enormous issue, my intuition is that Schelling's ungrounding of God in the *Weltalter* drafts, as well as, his general skepticism regarding treating God as equivalent with a justificatory absolute in general, seriously questions this theological emphasis.
The idealist is portrayed as the arm-chair philosopher *par excellence* who philosophizes so that she need not set out into the world. As Schelling puts it to quote the *Erlangen* text yet again:

Those who dare set out to sea can certainly, due to storms or by their lack of skill, lose their way and be led astray, but those who never even leave port and whose entire endeavor, rather, consists in not leaving port and in preventing philosophy from ever beginning, by endless philosophizing about philosophy, those, of course, have no dangers to fear. 483

But this is not to merely equate intuition and abduction. The reason for caution, I believe, is that of the core of pragmatism itself, i.e., that the navigations in the world inevitably alter our concepts, if those concepts were ever good to begin with. Schelling is also taking aim at Kant's overly cautious schematism, his inability to accept challenges to the critical philosophy. Thus, it would be erroneous to claim that Peirce's abduction is only a repetition, or differently clothed, form of intuition. Abduction is the experimentally-fueled skeptical pragmatism that follows the locative function of intuition.

Abduction functions as a formalized or ramified form of intuition. If intuition is spatially-immediate mental movement between methods, then abduction is this reading of intuition co-extensive with experience. Experience, in the context of abduction, functions as 'experimental feedback,' adding to the evolutionary paths of knowledge, which folds and unfolds the continuum through our concepts. Less extravagantly, Peirce's abduction moves between deduction (or Schelling's derivation) and induction (Schelling's determination) as a progressive, or evolutionary, attempt at constructing a piecemeal net of conceptual reference that does not over-determine its own internal composition, nor, too stringently derive its derivations either into the past (as origin) or into the future (as a pre-thinkable human future). Thus the insuperability of thought and world does not entail that 'anything goes' but emphasizes the necessity of experience in locating and contextualizing reason. That is, because it *seems like anything goes, we must be incredibly careful with our local activities.*

The speculative aspect of Perice's pragmatism lies in his aforementioned anti-nominalism, against those that would claim that the facticity of things is more important than either their sensual or 483 Schelling, “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science,” 212.
lawful (universal) ramifications. It is perhaps unsurprising that Peirce would be attracted to various forms of Objective Idealism as a third way of avoiding both speculative and anti-speculative excesses. We can ask then, to advance the experiment of Schelling and Peirce's proximity, if the sensual and universal stages (or Peirce's notion of firstness and thirdness) are to be found analogously, or otherwise in Schelling's thought, and if this has consequences for the emphasis here on motion, space, and nature.  

Beyond the connections between Schelling's intellectual intuition and Peircean abduction, there is a relation of spatio-temporality to cognitive continuity that links Schelling and Peirce. Schelling closes his *Essay on Human Freedom* in the following way:

We have the greatest respect for the profundity of historical investigations, and believe to have shown that the almost universal opinion of man only gradually arose from the dullness of animal instinct to rationality if not our own. Yet we believe the truth lies closer to us, and that we should first look for solutions to the problems stirred up in our day at home, on our own soil, before we wander to such distant sources. The time of mere historical faith is past when the possibility of immediate knowledge is given. We have an older revelation than all written ones-nature. It contains prototypes that no man has yet interpreted, whereas those of written revelations have long since received their fulfillment and interpretation.

Take also the following quote from Peirce:

How was it that man was ever led to entertain that true theory? You cannot say that it happened by chance, because the possible theories, if not strictly innumerable, at any rate exceed a trillion – or the third power of a million; and therefore the chances are too overwhelmingly against the single true theory in the twenty or thirty thousand years during which man has been a thinking animal, ever having come into any man’s head. Besides, you cannot seriously think that every little chicken, that is hatched, has to rummage through all possible theories until it lights upon the good idea of picking up something and eating it. On the contrary, you think the chicken has an innate idea of doing this; that is to say, that it can think of this, but has no faculty of thinking anything else. The chicken you say pecks by instinct. But if you are going to think every poor chicken endowed with an innate tendency toward a positive truth, why should you think that to man alone this gift is denied?

Thus, what is immediacy of action in relation to the immediacy of knowledge if the immediacy of knowledge is spatially determined? What becomes of the relation of activity and location, of the pragmatic maxim of 'what works' being what must be followed? These questions bring the general

484 As we will see below Sellars advocates the use of analogy in relating the known to the unknown as Brassier will later emphasize.
issue of intuition, abduction, and navigation, into the purported isolated interiority of thought. If intuition and abduction feed into navigation (both mental and pragmatic) because they allow us to fix points, objects, or hypotheses, in order to carry out any act whatsoever, then inverting this problem becomes one of determining the geometry or topography of a given mental space.

Given Schelling's minimalist definition of subjectivity for example, in the Erlangen lecture, when he states that the subject only is the movement that is what is, that moves without remaining, how can the navigational model be made introspective? Tracing Schelling's commitment to the book of nature in the quote above, we can say that his answer to this conundrum is his particular form of naturalism, of what in Chapter 5 was discussed in terms of the temporality of the vertical measure of the Stufenfolge. The question becomes what form does Schelling's naturalism take in a contemporary context? As I will argue below, Schelling attempts to push the consequences of naturalizing consciousness to the extreme but in a way that amounts to neither panpsychism (consciousness is merely inserted everywhere) nor a pure scientific-naturalist treatment of consciousness where it is merely an effect of matter.

Clearly, Schelling is skeptical of any naturalist explanation in appeasing the emergence of reason. But rather than arguing that mind or thought is different in kind from nature, or from the natural processes of evolution, Schelling recognizes the material effect of methodology on nature, because methodology is a part of it. However, this part cannot be defined in terms of its absolute location, because the cosmos is unbounded, and so can only be thought in relation to its effects on its neighbors, on those things and processes in its vicinity. How the seemingly unbound mental space of conceptualization can be related to its localized material instantiation, the brain, may appear as an unnecessary detour here.

But, as I will argue, the way in which one perceives the mind perceiving the mind, and the

brain producing the concept of mind, becomes increasingly dilapidated without a robust theory of nature to support it. Furthermore, this apparent digression into naturalism will serve as an inroad into the thought of Wilfrid Sellars who attempted to develop not only a transcendental naturalism, but also, a theory of pure processes. While these facts may not themselves justify an investigation into Sellars' work the fact that Sellars serves as the direct inspiration for a multitude of contemporary theorists utilizing German Idealism, warrants this path.

6.2 - What Does Naturalism do to the Brain? What Does Nature do to the Mind?

In its ordinary functioning, science seems to limit itself to the gestures that guarantee the preservation of knowledge and leave undisturbed the patrimony of those that set it alight and multiply it. Those are also the ones that save it from indefinite accumulation and stratification, from the childishness of established positivities, from the comfort of the transits of the 'operational ' and, finally, from the temptation of allowing itself to be buckled up in a grammar. They illustrate the urgency of an authentic way of conceiving information which would not be committed solely to communication, but would aim at a rational grasp of allusion and of the learning of learning. The latter, of course, would be far removed from the neuronal barbarism which exhausts itself in hunting down the recipient of the thought and in confusing learning with a pillaging of informational booty. Schelling perhaps saw more clearly: he knew that thought was not always encapsulated within the brain, that it could be everywhere, 'outside ... in the morning dew.'

Naturalism is generally divided into methodological and ontological strains. First, methodological naturalism can be discarded insofar as it merely claims that the methods of the natural sciences are the best methods tout court especially when the historical and developmental nature of the methods of natural science are adequately situated. Ontological naturalism is most directly defined as the claim that nature is all there is, but the question arises what is nature if it is not merely what natural science tells us? If the conceptual engagement with nature supersedes the methods of the natural sciences, then how can nature be conceptually separated from both nature and the concept? Or to put this in a way that would fit Schelling's and Peirce's inquiries: what must nature be in order for it to continually test and allow for our amplified knowledge of it? Or, to put it in yet another way, in what philosophical cases does ontological naturalism (or some other strong form of naturalism) have a pragmatic function? Rather than outlining every form of naturalism, in the following I will attempt to

488 Châtelet, *Figuring Space*, 14. While he does not cite the source, Châtelet is no doubt referring to a passage from Schelling's *Clara*, 22.
address various thinkers who relate various forms of naturalism to Schelling and to the Sellarsian lineage (Sellars, McDowell, Brandom, Sebit) in order to determine what Schelling's form of naturalism, particularly as it relates to the role of consciousness, is.

Bana Bashour and Hans Muller's collection *Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications* provides a succinct overview of various naturalist positions. A minimalist or tenuous naturalist position would simply be that of an anti-supernaturalism, i.e., that only entities or processes we can at least vaguely describe should be said to be natural. From this minimalist naturalism the positions become more and more methodologically and ontologically strict regarding the place of reasons. Generally, this resolves around whether one can claim that reason evolved from primarily biological or other natural sources, or, if some normative emergence is required. While Schelling's naturalized transcendental method (discussed in chapter 1) rules out his adherence to methodological naturalism a strict alliance to ontological naturalism is complicated, but not ruled out, by Schelling's utilization of processes over things.

Immediately the threat of anachronism arises, of how *Naturphilosophie* relates to contemporary naturalism. Since *Naturphilosophie* was a philosophical investigation of nature in its totality, it relied upon transcendental methods to critique scientific claims, if not, necessarily, scientific methods. Schelling's work in particular demanded that science think carefully about the claims it could make from particular fields of study but, as was investigated in Chapter 5, he clearly saw more merit in some methods (such as field theory) than others (such as atomism). Clearly, Schelling fits neither into ontological or methodological naturalism. This leaves liberal naturalism and transcendental naturalism.

Liberal naturalism is generally described as a form of naturalism that recognizes the explanatory power of scientific naturalism (as a combination of ontological and methodological

strains) but argues that other forms of knowledge can explain the world as well and, perhaps, in better ways than a strictly reductive scientific approach. Schelling would seem to fit in this category straight away.  

Markus Gabriel, however, argues that Schelling's transcendentalism does not permit liberal naturalism. In Transcendental Ontology, Gabriel associates liberal naturalism with John McDowell's position in Mind and World. For Gabriel, liberal naturalism must assert a physical totality, the world must be one giant physically closed object, in order or its claims to hold. Yet, as far as I can discern, Gabriel offers no specific proof of why liberal naturalism, or any scientific theory, requires a closed world made of matter only in order to make scientifically valid claims. Gabriel notes that Schelling's notion of totality (or of what Schelling refers to as either the All or the Absolute) should be taken as a meta-theory and not as a physically massive thing yet this does not make Schelling's generally thinking regarding nature anti-naturalistic. Gabriel's argument for Schelling's concept of non-totality stems from the concept of the unprethinkable functioning as the tireless engine of logical predication, whereas I argue, that the same argument can be made following a lean ontological structure of nature. Again, to assume that Schelling's advocacy of non-totality, of a collection of systems as opposed to one system, does not override his insistence that the cosmos pre-exists all logical construction. But, since that cosmos contains logical construction, since we exist and can logically construct, logical construction is not merely ideal but always a mixture of particular acts of creation, and their more than local consequences. The absence of this natural structure, I would argue, causes problems for both sense and logic, as well as many fields beyond strictly human concerns, which justifies the speculation

490 A central flaw of liberal naturalism, which is important to note here, is it generally collapses reduction interior to particular scientific fields, with reduction that is eliminative, i.e., it believes scientific explanation necessarily eliminates entities in other fields. As was seen in Chapter 5, this confuses ontological and methodological meanings of reduction as Robert Batterman argues.
492 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 11.
that non-totality and construction is not merely ideal.

If nature affects conceptualization then it becomes imperative to understand naturalism as a concept, in the space of nature, that proposes a space of reasons without cutting the ontological or generally constitutive tether between them. The division, following McDowell and other left Sellarsians, is one anchored in a plea for coherence in that the space of reasons cannot function (normativists claim) with the impingement of nature. Yet, without the acknowledgement of nature, the normative space has no material with which to work unless it amplifies the immateriality of thought and human action. The appeal to reason as a social exercise, put forth by Robert Brandom, attempts to circumvent this problem. Here we can investigate whether Schelling fits better in the category of transcendental naturalism as opposed to liberal naturalism since, for Schelling, the Hegelian-Brandomian socialization of reason does not adequately address how reason occurs in nature in a structural sense for Schelling.

But if naturalism is the thought that nature, as the nested set of physical systems, is what there is, then how does one explain the strange positionality of that thought can abstract the cosmos – that a view can be constructed that knows about nature as a non-totalizable whole or, following Paul Franks, a heterogeneous monism. The claim that everything is nature is less problematic (in an ontological sense), than a two-worlds solution.

While I will address the normativists McDowell and Brandom as well as their forefather Sellars below, for now the question remains: what is the stuff of thought in relation to the very notion of totality? Is it methodologically efficacious to divide mind and world, or thought and nature, into kinds of spaces at all? Is it necessary that mind be ontologically or operationally separate from world in order for mind to abstract in terms of totalities? Or, perhaps more pertinently, to what degree do we need to think thought operates independently from nature in order for thought to reach its 'proper' potential which is, *a priori*, unknowable?
Frederick Mortensen argues in his text *The Fate of Finitude*, that Schelling's position is quite close to that of Thomas Nagel and, in particular, his *View from Nowhere*. If mind is in the world, and mind cannot be adequately explained through evolutionary means, then Mortensen argues that this opens the door for the religious naturalism of Nagel, which is closely aligned to liberal naturalism. Both religious and liberal naturalism emphasize the importance of nature, of a world out there, but argue that other methodological approaches are integral to the investigation of nature as such. However, these approaches do not seem to adequately account for why it is then that the natural sciences are so apt at producing new entities and manipulating the external world.

In *Mind and Cosmos* Nagel attempts to get around this problem by claiming that the hard sciences, particularly biology, are fundamentally limited because they had to abstract mind from the world in order to set out to investigate it. Nagel claims that the physical sciences are therefore incapable of describing subjective experiences and argues that this dismisses physical reduction as a means of explaining nature and thought's role and location in it. While Nagel's non-materialist naturalism appears, at first glance, very much like Schelling's form of naturalism, I believe that Schelling's investment in the physical sciences, particularly physics, means he cannot (*pace* Mortensen) be associated with religious or liberal naturalism. While Schelling is a non-materialist in the sense that he argues for knowledge and science that is substratum-independent, he thinks that processes such as gravity, chemical decomposition, and the like have a epistemic impact that is not on par with other kinds of knowledge, at least, when it comes to discussing nature. That is, when Schelling discusses light, gravity, or the unfolding and enfolding of organic entities, the formal structure of these motions are extended into the all of nature. Furthermore, they are formal to the extent

we detect them operating in thought but, this operation within thought, needs to be properly tested so that it is not merely in thought, or merely ideal. To assume a form discovered by thought belongs to thought only, does not properly account for the constructive subordination of thought to nature.

Furthermore, Schelling's great heresy against Kant, besides his general attack on the critical system as merely negative, i.e., non-creative, is his argument that existence is a real predicate. What is interesting is that Schelling's reason for this is not to re-claim an ontological proof of God, but instead to demonstrate that thought and actions have processual or physical (if we read physical in terms of fields and not hard stuff) effects since they are in the world and there is only one world.

If nature is even partially similar to what we think it is, then we are natural beings with naturally endowed capacities. Assuming that mind is either unnatural, or functions in an unnatural domain separate from nature, i.e., that mind acts according only to its own rules, ignores the pre-existence of nature; nature as the processes and structures without which we cannot explain why anything holds together at all. As Michael Halley puts it “The concept of nature, does not entail that there should also be an intelligence that is aware of it. Nature it seems, would exist even if there were nothing that was aware of it.” Yet how does the mind determine, or decide, from a degree, or space, of unnaturalness? A certain coherency is acquired following any kind of normative isolation and yet why should this be taken as more than a methodological distinction, how could the advent of the normative, the space of reasons, be a cut in the real? How could the space of reasons be separated from the space of nature?

If the creation of a space of normativity is because of a need for coherency, then the space of nature must be fully abandoned to the natural sciences. The problem is not to question the authority of science as such, but to acknowledge the fact that if philosophy is to be as generic, or universal, as it claims, then it must apply to the sciences as well. Even if one separates the space of reason from the

space of nature, it is granted that a degree of self-reflexivity allows for a process to identify itself, but in the case of the normative system, to also isolate itself operationally, maybe even ontologically, from the natural world.

Intelligence, for Schelling, is a hyper-active (or for us proximal) form of self-relation, it is a form of self-relation that convinces itself it is without limit but its limit becomes that it thinks it has no limit. Thought appears to itself as a boundless trajectory yet the path it has taken only matters if the material consequences are worked out, followed through. This pragmatism works against a normative space that would confuse, or at least conflate, cause, ground, and reason. Grounds and reasons are held apart from one another in Schelling’s work (Vernunft is a different term than Grund) since reason is a human capacity where grounds are both human and nonhuman.496

Thus, the space of reasons cannot contain the space of nature, but the space of nature can be said to produce the space of reasons as a consequence, and thus, reason can be viewed as an augmentation of nature, at least insofar as nature comes to know itself as nature for us, and in itself. In both the space of reason and the space of nature, what is is it that which structurally engenders the very base capacity for self-reflexivity. Or what does the very process of self-modification consist in? If reason is a later version of nature, in that it is another form of self-reflection, does this properly account for reason's capacities? For Schelling, only an appeal to the senses, but an appeal that remains aware of reason’s, and experience’s transformation of what is sensed, can demonstrate the insufficiency of reason in the space of nature. As he writes:

Of itself, reason cannot realize or prove any actual, real being even in the sensible world; it cannot realize or prove any present existence, for example, the existence of this plant or this stone. If reason wants a real being, if it wants as something real any type of object discovered within itself in a concept and, thus, as something merely possible, then it must submit to the authority of the senses. For the testimony of the senses is nothing other than an authority, since through it we know the present existence, the plant that exists here, which cannot be realized from the mere nature of things, and thus from

496 This is evident in the example of legal jargon which separates grounds and reasons. Whereas one’s reasons are understanding they may not count as legal grounds for performing an action, i.e., grounds require justification outside an individual’s desires or individual reasons for doing something.
It is manifestly demonstrable that claims that the mind or cognition is a product and operator of nature does not deny the possibility of self-modification. Therefore, the question becomes what a theory of expansive, or transcendental naturalism does to the mind, to the very concept of mind or mindedness? This raises a different, but not unrelated question: what does the normative mind think of the scientifically determined concept of brain or cognition? The question of what naturalism does to the mind becomes ‘what directives are not engendered by naturalism for the mind?’ What does it mean to be operating both according to nature and according to our own freedom or direction (to put it again in a navigational sense)?

There are thus two interrelated questions: ‘What does naturalism do to the brain?’ and “What does nature do to the mind?” If nature is capable of self-modification (of augmentative recursion) then how is the self-modification that we seem to do to the mind and the brain related to how nature modifies the mind and the brain? Are the relations of mental and natural self-modifications themselves natural or normatively determined without concern for nature, or only concerned with nature after the fact?

The danger that arises here, in combating liberal and or religious naturalism, is that following a nature of processes one falls into panpsychism to explain mind in general. That is, if thought is a process, and all that there is are processes, then does thought become a ubiquitous feature of the cosmos? Or, in other words, what are the adequate means of differentiating, but not not sundering, thought from nature given that we inhabit thought and, in a quite different sense, inhabit nature?

One temptation here is to follow numerous interpreters who see Schelling as therefore endorsing either a traditional monism, or a panpsychism. Since the former has been addressed in chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on the charge of panpsychism. Paul Hayner, in his text *Reason and Schelling, Grounding*, 210.
Existence for instance, claims that Schelling’s monism is a panpsychism following a complete identity of mind and nature.498

However, Hayner seems to suggest that this is a traditional notion of identity and not one of copulation and genesis as outlined in Schelling's Freedom Essay. That is, as Daniel Whistler, Iain Grant, and others have pointed out, and as has already been discussed above, Schelling’s notion of identity is a thesis of univocal extension such that the statement A = A does not mean that entity one is equal to, or the same as entity 2, but that it means entity 1 is the ground of entity 1 and is expressed by the consequence of entity 2. It is only in ignoring the difference between a literal understanding of identity, as opposed to Schelling’s particular notion of identity, that Hayner can claim that the absolute is a category that ruins all of Schelling’s early work both in the philosophy of nature and the identity philosophy.499

Michael Blamauer in his “Schelling's Real Materialism,” argues that Schelling's Naturphilosophie, which denies body, or any other physical substratum at bottom, necessitates that Schelling is therefore a panpsychist.500 For instance, not every thought re-writes the brain but thoughts contribute to consciousness as self-modification. Becoming convinced by an argument, or watching an incredible film, may adequately be described as natural occurrences as visual and or auditory stimulai change the way we think about some state of affairs. Thus, while there is clearly weak emergence, things combine in a way that is pre-determined by the qualities of their components, the question remains of whether strong emergence, or radical novelty, occurs or not.

To refer back to Chapter 5, strong emergence, the claim that reduction erases or fails to explain novelty, could be seen to be guilty of what Robert Batterman has referred to as property dragging; in other words strong emergence does not appear to maintain any distinction between structure and

change, between potency and actuality. Following the discussion of the potencies in chapter 4, all creation is constrained but all constraint is subsequently expressed (thus adding to creation). The world is as creative as it can be while still holding itself together again pointing back to chapter 4. In this regards, and following Schelling's notion of identity as a thesis of extended univocity, he would most likely be critical of strong emergence as it would negate the properly expressive relationship of the consequent from its antecedent.

The navigational character of Schelling's notion of creation can be expressed in creation being the production of constraints, of creation being the extending of boundaries and not the rupture of boundaries. Production, or creation, is the motion of inhibitions. Nature can be described in its most basic sense as merely self-deforming space, or, nature is the universe's most plastic aspect. Or, as Gabriel puts it in logical terms: “the absolute necessity of the origin must therefore be compatible with the contingency of everything that originates.”

Because self-modification and recursion occurs within one world, or one space, only a space of nature, then it cannot be methodologically efficacious to merely naturalize epistemology fully, as thoughts act according to other thoughts, in a very particular way, and at least for us, seem to be contained by the concept of the mental. Yet, as Iain Grant emphasizes in his *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling*, epistemology must undergo significant change if 'what thinks in me is outside of me.' To address this, the apparent externality of the world, as well as the apparent irreducibility of interior thoughts and or experiences, it will now serve us to move onto the thought of Wilfrid Sellars whose critical combination of nominalism, naturalism, and process-ontology, allows for a nuanced approach to maintaining a space for reason's seemingly unnatural capacities given the efficacy of naturalism without falling into either crude empiricism, materialism, or panpsychism.

**6.3 - Impure Immediacies: Sellars and Schelling**

The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars has a novel attempt to deal with the problems of naturalism and epistemology. Furthermore, Sellars is a remarkable bridge between post-Kantian analytic thought and contemporary utilizations of German Idealism in the English-speaking world. Sellars' most important concepts for our purposes here are his synoptic image of the human, the myth of the given, and his later concept of pure processes. As I attempt to show, Sellar's dual methodology, and his reliance on a metaphysics of pure processes to link the two domains of knowledge, appears compatible with Schelling's general philosophical trajectory. Sellars' synopticism is simply the methodological dualism in viewing human beings either in terms of the manifest image or the scientific image. The manifest image treats humans as cultural, meaning centered, and concept-mongering creatures while, in the scientific image, the human is treated as a mere biological entity, an animal subject to the laws of nature.

As he puts it in “Philosophy and The Scientific Image of Man”:

The 'manifest' image of man-in-the-world can be characterized in two ways, which are supplementary rather than alternative. It is, first, the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world. It is the framework in terms of which, to use an existentialist turn of phrase, man first encountered himself—which is, of course, when he came to be man. For it is no merely incidental feature of man that he has a conception of himself as man-in-the-world, just as it is obvious, on reflection, that 'if man had a radically different conception of himself he would be a radically different kind of man'.

He then later in the same text discusses the scientific image thusly:

The scientific image of man-in-the-world is, of course, as much an idealization as the manifest image --even more so, as it is still in the process of coming to be. It will be remembered that the contrast I have in mind is not that between an unscientific conception of man-in-the-world and a scientific one, but between that conception which limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events and that which postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles. It was granted, of course, that in point of historical fact many of the latter correlations were suggested by theories introduced to explain previously established correlations, so that there has been a dialectical interplay between correlational and postulational procedures. (Thus we might not have noticed that litmus paper turns red in acid, until this hypothesis had been suggested by a complex theory relating the absorption and emission of electromagnetic radiation by objects to their chemical composition; yet in principle this familiar correlation could have been, and, indeed, was, discovered before any such theory was developed.) Our contrast then, is between two ideal constructs: (a) the correlational and categorial refinement of the 'original image', which refinement I am calling the manifest image; (b) the image derived from the fruits of postulational theory construction which

Despite Sellars' daunting verbiage, the thrust of the argument is straightforward. Simply put, Sellars wants to argue that we cannot avoid having a quasi-historical and pragmatic view of ourselves as a species, as being a type of thing located in a world. Yet, at the same time, in order to navigate that world, we have to make speculations or theory constructions which redefine our position in the world as it allows us to move through it. The caveat is that our relation to ourselves is no less problematic or nuanced than our epistemological relation to facets of apparently external reality. This general attitude of Sellars, divided between naturalism and pragmatism, is what leads him to the myth of the given as well as the theory of pure processes.

Sellars' myth of the given is outlined in his famous essay “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind.” Sellars wants to preserve inner episodes of consciousness (the fact that we have immediate experiences, or at least reliably can talk about, these experiences in a scientific world view) while not granting some special status to the given, or givenness, in philosophical theories of sense. In other words, Sellars wants to preserve internal states but argue that our purported immediate knowing of something is a loose attachment of language to a process and that, between language and process, there is a game-like give and take which occurs.

This is often diagrammed via the inconsistent triad. Sellars, and his followers, argue that only two of three statements regarding the relation of sense and knowing can be true.

A) ‘S senses red sense content x’ entails ‘S non inferentially believes (knows) that x is red.’
B) The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired
C) The capacity to have classificatory beliefs of the form ‘x is F’ is acquired.\(^{504}\)

Or, sense means one can know a fact, that we know what we sense is automatic, and our ability to claim a fact is learned. If we think that we have immediate access to sense, and that this also gives

\(^{503}\) Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” 19.
\(^{504}\) Ray Brassier, “Bergson, Lived Experience, and the Myth of the Given,” talk given at To Have Done With Life - Vitalism and Antivitalism in Contemporary Philosophy conference at MaMa, Zagreb, June 17-19, 2011.
us unmediated knowledge, then we have fallen into the myth of the given. As Ray Brassier argues, Sellars selects the first and third capacities leaving out the second. What this means is that for Sellars, the passage from recognizing sense to making a fact about the world is conceptually coupled with the fact that facthood is something that must be learned. The process of saying that this apple looks red therefore is possible because 'it is red' is automatically true for the interior thoughts of the observer but, for them to communicate with other observers, they must be trained to make classificatory beliefs (for them to know about redness generally). Or, not all experience is conceptual, but all communicable experience is conceptual.

To point back to both Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 Sellars view is, I believe, compatible with that of Schelling since Schelling emphasizes that the co-dependency of thought and world requires an appeal to intuition but an intuition that is about immediate locality (objects in the field of sense) that may have deeper conceptual import for philosophical navigation of space. Furthermore, as I have begun to demonstrate above via Schelling's transition to the positive philosophy, such a philosophy treats experience itself as a material to demonstrate the insufficiency of reason by itself. So while negative philosophy has its function (to say what something is, to make classificatory statements in Sellars' language) it requires the immediacy of experience but locally limited (that x is this or that) in order to furnish the beginnings of a form of proto-pragmatism, to adequately grasp how or why something exists.

Practical activity tests the cut of the normative named above as occurring only within the normative, of being only according to the stability of reason, and thereby quarantining nature. Sellars pragmatism is transcendental in Schelling’s sense (in being about conceptual and not merely

505 Here I follow Ray Brassier's reading of how Sellars treats the inconsistent triad as opposed to Robert Brandom's. Brandom argues that Sellars merely drops option A. See Robert Brandom, “Guide to Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind,” available online. For further discussion of the inconsistent triad see James O'Shea Naturalism with a Normative Turn as well as John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, 235-237.
conceptual motion) because it makes reasons into causes. Sellars' pragmatism, in treating reasons like causes, is close to Schelling's positive philosophy in treating experience as causes. For Sellars, nature as a series of extended physical processes, is evident to us in our own doings and sayings (Robert Brandom will go on to emphasize the latter to great effect).

It is here that the importance of Sellars' late notion of pure processes emerges. Like Peirce's open notion of universal laws that are never known but only abductively approached, Sellars' notion of pure process not only keeps open a space for future knowledge, for what we might not know that we do not know, but also allows for the play-space between language, or pragmatic activity, and its grip on what seems to be a relatively stable physical world. This emerges in Sellars' Carus Lectures.

Sellars' lectures, which were printed in the Monist in three parts, re-examine his critique of the myth of the given in relation to an ontology of pure processes. In the first lecture printed as “The Lever of Archimedes” (1981) Sellars re-presents his general account of sense. While Sellars maintains that a sensed quality like red is already conceptually coded by the time we can refer to it, our experience of it is more or less immediate, but this immediacy is not conceptually accessible in the same way that the sense-as-quality is. However, Sellars argues, this access problem is not due to the fact that we have a concept of experience before we have experiences, but because of the complexity of quality-as-process.

In essence, Sellars argues that knowing the difference between 'the apple looks red' and 'the apple is red' does not hinge upon knowing, a priori, the iffyness of experience as such, that it is intrinsically indefinable, but because our immediate conceptual grasp is not of objects per se but of processes, of expanses of red. Or, in other words, it is not because we know experience is relative that we assume that we may experience a disjunction between is, and seems, but because the character

of experience *is* processual, we are always working to update our knowledge of redness. While the distinction may seem trivial, Sellars is advocating for reduction but a reduction to processes which, he argues in an odd but convincing fashion, that adverbial forms are the most useful reductions we can perform. This is Sellars attempts to hang onto some notion of nominalism in the wake of his naturalism.

This is, I would argue, akin to Schelling's wholesale rejection of substratum-reliance. It is quite telling that Sellars closes his third Carus lecture by quoting from his earlier “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” in which he states:

But the scientific image is not yet complete; we have not yet penetrated all the secrets of nature. And if it should turn out that particles instead of being the primitive entities of the scientific image could be treated as singularities in a space-time continuum which could be conceptually 'cut up' without significant loss? In inorganic contexts, at least? into interacting particles, then we would not be confronted at the level of neurophysiology with the problem of understanding the relation of sensory consciousness (with its ultimate homogeneity) to systems of particles. Rather, we would have the alternative of saying that although for many purposes the central nervous system can be construed without loss as a complex system of physical particles, when it comes to an adequate understanding of the relation of sensory consciousness to neurophysiological process, we must penetrate to the non-particulate foundation of the particulate image, and recognize that in this non-particulate image the qualities of sense are a dimension of natural process which occurs only in connection with those complex physical processes which, when 'cut up' into particles in terms of those are features which present in inorganic the common least as well as organic of physical process?--the complex alike---become denominators processes system of particles which, in the current scientific image, is the central nervous system.507

To point back to Chapter 5, we can see how Sellars argues that particles, or other entities, function as descriptive footholds for processes, particularly processes which are not, due to our naturalistic albeit technological appended capacities, perceptible to us in the same way events like thunderings or runnings are. That is, a particle is an indexer of a process which we are attempting to come to grips with, while events we can perceive occurring between objects, as more sensibly accessible, can be defined either in the relation of the objects, or, can be reduced to the event. That is, the phrase 'Socrates ran on Sunday,' can be productively reduced to 'a running took place.' Similarly, Sellars' discussion of particles, like Schelling's use of actants, demonstrate the difficulty in objectifying processes or qualities which requires the opposite move, of added objects to explain the underlying

event. Things are objects which are logical cuts into the continuum (to point back to Chapter 3) which, if they have operative or pragmatic efficacy, does not make them less real since, following Schelling, realness is a measure of consequence (what that event means) and not material composition (not what this particle is made of, but what it does in this particular instance).

Furthermore, and to point back to Chapter 5, Sellars is skeptical of the kind of fact-ontology which Markus Gabriel utilizes, since the immediacy of sense, and the purported simplicity of fact, cannot be aligned prior to the collective mediation of facticity either by inferential training (such as a child by its parents to know what facts are) and/or by social filtering and amplifying (as Brandom highlights in a Hegelian vein). Thus for Sellars and, I would argue, for Schelling, the problem is not immediate knowledge as long as one recognizes the conceptual and local features of that immediacy which have already been processed prior to reflectively acknowledging it.

Beyond these surface level similarities, I believe that there are methodological congruities between Schelling and Sellars. The methodological bifurcations of Schelling’s work (whether discussed as negative versus positive, or Naturphilosophie vs transcendental philosophy) can be compared (though as not strictly analogous to) Sellars’ scientific image versus the manifest image, or viewing things as bundles of micro-physical processes, as well as sensa or, irreducible causes in, and of, experience. What is central here, as James O’Shea points out in relation to Sellars, is that physical grounds and logical grounds need not be collapsed. This ties in to Schelling’s relation to Peirce discussed above. These divides, in both Schelling and in Sellars, are due to underlying processes but these processes are apparent because of the informative ambiguity of sensory experience.

For Schelling, the informative status of experience in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy is imperative for the very practice of philosophy itself as well as its non-sensorial or intuitive consistency.

The necessity of experience as a material is not in order to bring philosophy 'down-to-Earth' so to
speak, in an Aristotelian sense, but in order to account for the demands of dogmatic metaphysics without accepting their substantial metaphysical claims. Or in other words, taking experience as a material means taking its insufficiency as explanatory in itself thereby absorbing the desire for a metaphysical structure but, at the same time, acknowledging that the extravagance of metaphysical systems can, and has, gone far beyond being instructively compensatory in relation to sense.

Schelling’s claim about the thirdness of the subject-object distinction (mentioned above in Chapter 5) is the claim that matter is synthetic, or constructed, in a way that makes it neither strictly subject or object (nor is it strictly potency) since it is, is existent, but is not dead or brute as matter is often reduced to in the case of materialism or mechanism (both of which Schelling rallied against particularly in the First Outline and in The Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. The synthetic dimension is the creative dimension of metaphysics reduced (in a positive since as discussed above) to the creative potentiality of subject and object.

Given his treatment of sense, it may not seem surprising that Sellars work has, though with quite a temporal delay, fed into contemporary analytic utilizations of German Idealism namely by John McDowell, Robert Brandom, Robert Pippin, and Brady Bowman, just to name a few. However, the form this reception has taken seems to be very much against Sellars' spirit as the reception of his work has divided into the commonly known split of left and right Sellarsians with the former being Hegelians who emphasize the manifest image of Sellars' work, while the right Sellarsians (who include Daniel Dennett, Ruth Milikan, and Patricia and Paul Churchland) emphasize the scientific image. In addition, the Hegelianism of the left Sellarsians, which I will engage below, has been criticized as being a Fichteanism at heart, since it emphasizes the Logic and the Phenomenology over, and above, all of Hegel's other texts regardless of the subject matter being discussed. Furthermore, these left Sellarsians display little to no understanding of Schelling and, in regards to the legacy of Sellars, seem to overlook or purposefully ignore Sellars' emphasis on pure processes.
Johanna Seibt is the Sellarsian who has contributed the most to reinvigorating the process-reading of Sellars work. In her masterful “Pure Processes and Projective Metaphysics” Seibt argues that despite Sellars' general emphasis on semantic games as the corner-stone for his thinking, processes function as a “projective metaphysics,” which is indispensible to his overall project. Seibt states that Sellars' very notion of picturing, of the projecting and use of the scientific image and the manifest image for example, is only possible with the concept of pure processes. Ultimately, and in a way that I argue aligns itself with the discussion of Schelling's method, Seibt calls the utilization of this process as “a transcendence from within.”

This transcendence has to do with the fact that the processes function, not only as, a bridge for the manifest and scientific images, but because an altogether different technique of thinking is suggested by the processes. Seibt argues that processes go beyond the correlational techniques of the manifest image, the use of analogy to move slowly through the world, as well as those techniques of the scientific image which proposes entities. As noted above, the techniques of either explaining events with objects, or constructive objects to explain events. Alternatively, she argues that the positing of the processes is about proposing new formulas for a potential new model. The following statement sums up their function:

In ontology as in science, then, the external significance of a theory is something we assert ‘from within,’ comparing the theory with its competitors rather than with ‘reality.’ Such external significance essentially remains comparative significance, since it derives from the comparative explanatory force of a theory relative to a data-set whose degree of picture correctness is unknown. Moreover, it remains projected external significance in the following sense. Sellars claims that ideal coherence and ideal picture-correctness go hand in hand, which allows for the possibility that in the sequence of frameworks leading up to the Peircean framework increases in picture-correctness and coherence or inferential integration may be occasionally out of step.

In essence Seibt is saying that framework independence, or admitting the limited ground from which one's knowledge claims begin, does not mean that those claims cannot have external significance.

509 Seibt, “Pure Processes,” 266.
significance, on the contrary, it is only through such an admission that one can see what is exterior or, following the discussion of Schelling above, the speculative gesture can tell us about the actual ramifications of our local actions. The temptation, and one which Schelling rallies against in a different form in his own time, is to overemphasize the degree to which reason is the sole capacity for stabilizing and projecting a possible picture of the world. It is this over-reliance on the normative structure of reason that will be addressed next.

6.4 - Netting Nature through Norms?

The whole world lies, so to speak, in the nets of the understanding, or of reason, but the question is how it entered these nets, since there is obviously something other and something more than mere reason in the world, indeed there is something which strives beyond these limits.513

We can now investigate, head on, the normative uptake of Sellars' work that engages with the broad themes of German Idealism, though, never Schelling specifically. It is Schelling's difficult method, as well as his emphasis on nature, that removes him from the Sellarsian use of German Idealism.

What is interesting here, in regards to the concepts of space and motion, is that a spatial division is made by Left Sellarsians, the division between the space of reasons and the space of nature, in order to defend the very process of reason. Our guiding question here will be: how can these thinkers divide nature from reason in a spatial metaphor, in order to justify a movement within, but not across, these spaces, given the naturalist roots of consciousness and the non-normative explanatory power required to discuss movement and space as such?

As Markus Gabriel points out, all post-Sellarsian Hegelians interpret the division of mind and world, or reasons and causes, or thought and nature in different ways, means following Sellars' famous, and already discussed, “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind.”514 However, while Brandom and

514 Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology, 35-36.
Gabriel emphasize the semantic aspect of this division, as we have seen in the work of Seibt, the later Sellars complicates the strictly semantic character of the treatment of such spaces. If the tissue of the world is made of processes or occurings it appears that Brandom, Pippin, and to a lesser extent McDowell, take the division of spaces that justifies its act of cutting in merely normative terms. Normativity becomes a netting of nature that then proceeds by splitting nature into two halves and throwing out the nature part.

Given this it can hardly be surprising that in the ongoing adoption of German Idealism by contemporary analytic philosophers, Hegel has been the star, Fichte the understudy, and Schelling the enfant terrible. Schelling receives little or no mention, other than as kook, romanticist, or half-stepping stone, half-obstacle to Hegel's meteoric rise to greatness. But given the contemporary emphasis on German Idealism as helping to navigate the gap between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature it is odd that Schelling is ignored, as his work, is so focused on the relation of thought and nature, or mind and world.

The purported dubiousness of Schelling's Naturphilosophie is often held up as the glaring metaphysical hex damning him from contemporary appropriation yet, his critics fail to even consistently critique him, oscillating between accusing Schelling of being a bad influence on the physical sciences of his time to claiming he had no influence at all, and citing little proof in both cases. As a corollary, Schelling's work on Absolute Identity (or what he saw as the ur-logical form undergirding his numerous systems of philosophical inquiry discussed in geometrical language) is dismissed by reputation alone following Hegel's infamous statement that Schelling's conception of the Absolute was the 'night in which all the cows are black.' Thus Schelling is critiqued for simultaneously being too specific in his empirical claims and too vague in his philosophical claims with little or no attention given to Schelling on his own terms, or to the positive citing of his work in the physical sciences by figures such as Humphry Davy, Michael Faraday, and Hans Christian Oersted.
Against this reputation, and following the work of contemporary Schellingians such as Iain Hamilton Grant, I will argue that Schelling's work can be brought to bear on the nature and mind divide in a way that can inform the uptake of Hegel by figures such as John McDowell and Robert Brandom. Specifically, Schelling's work can account for a more positive description of the space (or logic) of nature than one demonstrated by the aforementioned Pittsburgh Hegelians.

A brief overview of McDowell's work and the motivations behind it would serve here. McDowell's *Mind and World* is a text which aims to clear the philosophical field of a large swath of misunderstandings. Following Kant and Sellars in particular, McDowell argues that contemporary philosophical problems stem from an inability to accept the idealistic power of human thought above, and against, the sense of world. McDowell argues that too much hand-wringing has been done in concern over a world 'out there' and in attempting to explain how our minds may or may not be able to map it.\(^{515}\) For McDowell the problem stems from either giving into what Sellars' the aforementioned myth of the given (the claim that the outside is somehow immediately compatible with human thought) or stressing over the dualism between sense and intuition in the wake of Kant.

McDowell's solution is to argue that there is no fundamental limit to the conceptual following from his Sellarsian reading of Kant.\(^{516}\) That is, in order to avoid the myth of the given, spontaneity and receptivity must be co-constitutive. In essence, receptivity and spontaneity are always-already working in conceptual space and therefore it is fundamentally contradictory to draw a line between conceptual space as interior and natural space as exterior. For McDowell the relation between mind and world must be normative one and hence the world (or nature) will be understood in normative terms or as empirical laws.\(^{517}\) Following a particular reading of Sellars, McDowell defines the logical space of

\(^{515}\) As Ray Brassier has pointed out however, this elides the emphasis on Sellars' use of processes in his later work namely the Carus lectures.

\(^{516}\) McDowell's reading of Kant is also heavily influenced by P.F. Stawson's text *The Bounds of Sense.*

nature negatively, as functioning according to different rules from the space of reasons. Beyond this nature and naturalism are only to be operated upon in terms of epistemological description. While McDowell argues that receptivity, and spontaneity, co-construct reason, McDowell must seriously downplay the latter as having any contribution other than as suggesting epistemological images of what nature may be.\(^{518}\) For McDowell, freedom can only describe itself in its own terms, and thus, nature must be navigated away from following normative rules alone. Or later on he states “independent reality exerts a rational control over our thinking but without falling into the confusion between justification and exculpation.”\(^{519}\) Here I find it difficult to ascertain how McDowell can account for the infinite speed of reason, of reason being embedded in nature in such a way that is completely conscious to us. McDowell ends his short text with an appeal to a kind of “naturalized Platonism.”\(^{520}\)

As should be evident from the above discussion of the various forms of naturalism, McDowell works under a mode of soft or liberal naturalism, that attempts to accept the ramifications of nature but only to the extent that they are produced by the natural sciences. Furthermore, McDowell claims that, because of the emergence of the space of reasons, nature is transformed into a second nature, over which our own human spontaneity allow us control.

Robert Brandom, who in many ways takes up the reins of McDowell’s project, and is classified as a left-Sellarsian alongside him, further distances nature from reason. Like Robert Pippin, Brandom argues that McDowell does not go far enough in downplaying the active role of the space of nature. Brandom attempts this by emphasizing the social aspect of reason. In his impressive *Reason and Philosophy*, Brandom argues that reason is fundamentally normative due to the centrality of the concept of recognition – recognition of any and all ingredients to normativity and to the efficacy of

\(^{519}\) McDowell, *Mind and World*, 27.
\(^{520}\) McDowell, *Mind and World*, 92-95.
normativity itself as the giving and taking of reasons in order to explain and justify behaviors in ourselves and other (presumably) rational agents.\textsuperscript{521} Brandom justifies his engagement with Hegel in asserting that “We are social, normative, rational free, self-consciously historical animals. This powerful and finely conceptually articulated vision of ourselves is the crowning achievement of German Idealism.”\textsuperscript{522} For Brandom this is possible because, in following Kant, the German Idealists (which for Brandom means Hegel up-most) took the activity of searching for a unity of apperception as the ground of rationality itself. Rationality, for Brandom, becomes a triangulation of the conceptual via inferences and incompatibilities of the use of numerous predicates. Brandom effectively argues that, at base, the subject is simply that which attains definiteness in a social setting.\textsuperscript{523} An essentially naturalistic account of the individual, and its acquisition of language skills, is accelerated by social (or normative) existence as Brandom argues that Hegelian recollection (\textit{Erinnerung}) utilizes the Kantian integration of concepts into reason and casts it in a broader and historicized light.\textsuperscript{524} Brandom argues that: “Kant replaces the \textit{ontological} distinction between the physical and the mental with the \textit{deontological} distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom: the distinction between things that merely act regularly and things that are subject to distinctively normatively sorts of assessment”\textsuperscript{525} and hence Hegel historicizes, and socializes, this process.

In this regard, within the normative realm, Brandom's rational Hegelian agent is capable of determining both the behaviors of itself and others (via the linguistic giving and taking of reasons) as well as ordering historical or other grand narratives in order to construct a progressive or evolutionary account of reason's or, in a more embodied sense, humanity's ascension.

\textsuperscript{522} Brandom, \textit{Reason and Philosophy}, 17.
\textsuperscript{523} This speaks to a tension between continental and analytic readings of Hegel where the former emphasizes his metaphysical aspects whereas the latter emphasizes his historical uses modified for the present. These lines have become significantly blurred in works such as that of Adrian Johnston, Brady Bowman, and Markus Gabriel to name but a few.
\textsuperscript{524} Brandom, \textit{Reason and Philosophy}, 90-91.
\textsuperscript{525} Brandom, \textit{Reason and Philosophy}, 115.
Brandom emphasizes, in summoning the figure of Minerva's owl, that the Hegelian dialectic gives contingency the form of necessity.\(^{526}\) Within this discussion Brandom emphasizes the 'newness' of Hegel's concept of determinateness yet it appears, albeit in an slightly more abstract form, throughout Maimon's work as the law of determinability as was discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas Brandom's account acknowledges the heuristic and pedagogical roots of determining, the very form of the act is mystified beyond being the propellant of language. Brandom explains determination as occurring through the giving of taking of reasons. Whereas McDowell offered some space for nature, for Brandom, determination as such occurs only with normative reasonable *discourse*. In addition, Brandom's erasure of Sellars' pure processes, can only beg the question of how is it that the relation between saying and doing can be *fully* articulated with human controlled normative functions? Here Brandom goes even beyond Fichte in asserting that activity, *as such*, is the sole purview of human beings.

In *Tales of the Mighty Dead* Brandom again connects Hegel to determination as a form of subjective-objectivity that centers upon processes of individuation.\(^{527}\) Here I believe that Brandom, once again, over-determines the linguistic skeleton of determination itself in order to better stitch together mind and world with tools crafted from and within the logical space of reasons without recourse to the space of nature (to say nothing of whether this latter space is logical as such). My point here is not that there is an easy alternative by which we could describe the space of nature as it asymmetrically forms the space of reason (of normative space) but to argue that the patchwork means by which we construct theories of X are naturalism at work in that our senses (although they may already be present to us consciously as always-already conceptual content via Sellars). But this does not speak to the spatio-temporal kinematics of ourselves in relation to those concepts locally isolated.

\(^{526}\) Brandom, *Reason and Philosophy*, 102.
Or to return to the discussion of Seibt above, and Schelling’s discussion of experience and sense in *The Grounding*, just because our sensed world is already conceptually riven, categorized, and formed, does not mean that everything subsequently affected by that content must be fully conceptually graspable. Nor, however, does it mean one should throw out the conceptually coded of the world and claim we can sneak thoughts into the world before epistemologically treating it. The difficulty is once experiences or senses have been recognized to have been conceptually coded, how do extend our concepts of those experiences while, at the same time, acknowledging that the ‘matter’ of those concepts, are not only conceptual?

To reconnect to the discussion of naturalism above, one can also engage with some of the Right Sellarsians’ critiques of Brandom and McDowell. The neuroscientist and philosopher Daniel Dennett has critiqued the division of normative space from the space of nature albeit for different reasons. In his essay “The Evolution of Reasons” Dennett points out the difficulty in distinguishing questions of ‘what for?’ from those of ‘how come?’ from within the so-called normative space of reasons. 528 While Dennett admits that reasons of ‘what for’ can be discussed effectively in terms of socially mediated practices, those of ‘how come?’ generally require a more engineering or practical model to explain their function. 529 A consequence of this is to say that termites and architects both have reasons for why they construct the way they do but humans can represent those reasons to one another whereas termites cannot. 530 But this difference does not adequately justify the normative form of ‘what for’ replacing or overriding the questions of ‘how come?’ Dennett argues that Brandom, and other Pittsburgh Hegelians, use of the space of reasons effectively terminates inquiry if it keeps reason so

530 Ibid. 54-56.
isolated from nature.\textsuperscript{531}

As I hope to show, while Schelling and German Idealism writ large similarly endorses closing the ontological gap between mind and world (or between thought and nature), the way in which McDowell proposes such a suture does not provide an adequate grounding for the ambit of the practical for which he argues. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how exactly the very split between mind and world (between thought and nature) is merely ideal \textit{for us}, and how this split for our own sake maps onto the split (or perhaps more tentatively the emergence) of thought from nature ontologically. Or in other words, a de-ontological account of nature and myself as a thinking being cannot account for natural impediments on my capacity to think in the same way my giving of reasons affects nature.

\textbf{6.5 - Tethered \textit{Ekstasis} and The Speculative \textquote{Go of It}}

But a glimpse into its recent history provides adequate material for melancholy reflections on philosophy; this is because until now there has been no way to philosophize, or, as one otherwise says, none of the different philosophical systems has been able to survive over the course of time. I contend that it is also the duty of the teacher to reveal this side of philosophy, which repulses more than it attracts. For whoever considers how many people have shipwrecked on this rocky sea, how some with no vocation for philosophy have consumed the best years of their life, emptying their very soul in the fruitless and foolish pursuit of philosophy, who, without mentioning the desolate halls of prehistoric schools of wisdom, wander among the weather-beaten tombstones of former doctrinal systems\textsuperscript{532}

To start our project upon grittier wheels, we must appreciate how easily humble and natural musings about concepts and attributes can insinuate themselves into our practical affairs and lead us onward to unhappy conclusion. Sometimes the process resembles a familiar species of nightmare. We have been cheerfully ambling along a pleasant country lane when we notice that our surroundings have turned grim. Now we seem trapped within some vast cemetery that sprawls endlessly over gray hills. We find nothing but huge mausoleums that honor dynasties of abstracta of which we’ve never heard. “Where did all these edifices come from?” we ask and wonder what faulty turn in the road could have led us into this disconcerting City of the Dead. It’s better that we do not linger long amongst the marble but instead retrace our way back to that sunny lane.\textsuperscript{533}

How to bring together transcendental, \textit{Naturphilosophical}, and pragmatic (or positive) sciences

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\item \textsuperscript{531} Ibid. 59.
\item \textsuperscript{533} Mark Wilson, \textit{Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behaviour}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
as well as bring Schelling's thought into the 21st century? The enduring legacy of Schelling's thought is that nature, of how the basic power of inexistence, of a self-deforming space, is a necessity reverse engineered from the momentum of being thinking creatures in a world, a world that depends upon a physical history but one that generates not only technological objects but also fictional entities, contradictions, and a self-altering neuronal architecture. Put otherwise, the great problematic which Schelling outlines is that we humans are products of nature that have a capacity (thought) so powerful, that it constantly appears to contain all of nature, or exclude nature when, in fact, it is nature which is always thinking through us. Thus, nature is always inexistente because it is always trying to become an object to itself and yet it fails to do so and instead extains, it generates time and space. Nature produces more constraints and this failure of easy access produces distance, produces a self-altering topology which in turn engenders more extainment (Ausschließung). Thinking, just as much as it can point to the inexistence of the past, of what has gone and left only traces, or no traces at all, points to the creativity of the future, of a more-than, but a more than in which we have a current creative stake. Or, what does the conjunction of speculation and pragmatism mean in Schelling's view of a freedom that is bound to its antecedents but uncontainable in the form of its potentially countless consequents?

One threat is a tendency to wander, to have to explore the consequences of Ideas that may have no tooth or claw to them. But is not the advantage of thought the generally 'low-cost' simulations of the potential consequences of Ideas? As hopefully was shown in the previous section, the strictly normative approach of the Pittsburgh Hegelians sacrifices too much in the name of discursive and rational stability. Broadly speaking, the normative approach overloads the restrictions on concepts before deploying them while emphasizing clarity over extension. In emphasizing clarity however, the normativists cut short the model of conceptual use for philosophy in that concepts, overwhelmingly, re-emphasize their own groundedness at the cost of exploration. Schelling, on the contrary, attempts to synthesize an ecstatic account of embodiment (taken from his extrapolations on Aristotelian
naturalism) with the Platonic Realist approach to the life of the idea. While this would seem far afield from any pragmaticist concerns, this tension regarding conceptual use is central to the contemporary pragmatic thinker Mark Wilson.

Mark Wilson's mammoth text *Wandering Significance* aims to redraw the map of conceptual use broadly, arguing that both the linguistic turn in philosophy, and the classical picture of how language and concepts grasp meaning, are presented either in too loose or too stringent a light. While addressing the function of language in Schelling would be its own project, it is the linguistic ramifications of the conceptual that I am interested in connecting to the relation of pragmatic and speculative navigation. Why pragmatism and speculation?

Schelling's fascination with the classic Leibnizian question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' has been interpreted in a multitude of ways but, I would argue, that it is the statement that captures Schelling's thought as pulled between pragmatic and speculative concerns. By pragmatic I mean thought that is driven to do justice to action which means both the productive processes we can observe, as well as, the very activity or process of thought which is arguably the most basic fact of our existence. By speculative I do not intend the pejorative sense of the armchair philosopher who creates out of her mind alone, pulling monads and explanatory specters from the ether, but the sense shared by the German Idealists broadly, namely, the possibility of unbinding thought from the obvious and apparent in order to service not only thought but, seemingly paradoxically, in order to dismantle potential barriers to action if one were to focus on only the immediate horizon.

The question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is essentially Schelling's way of asking why individuation occurs given the fact that, at bottom, there seem to be only processes. It is this question which haunts Schelling for his entire life in letters, that manifests itself in a process or powers based meontology that has no determinable origin and no determinable end. It is a meontology

534 See for instance Tritten's *Beyond Presence.*
that must cut this continuum of powers, which are speculative and can be said to inexist (see chapter 4) in that they allow for the retro-revisal of epistemological practices as well as the ongoing production of new forms of knowledge.

Schelling's interesting move is to use these desires to philosophize, to check and balance one another: to reduce the world to navigate it (pragmatic maxim) and to expand the world to truly understand it (speculative maxim). The difficulty here is that the figure of the philosopher becomes a lonely wanderer, not only of the world, but a figure that must attempt to engage in ekstasis, to float above the world without leaving it, a leaving the world that pushes against its edges. Ekstasis should be taken to be the embodiment of conceptual abstraction in the most literal sense.

How can this procedure be fleshed-out in a pragmatic and speculative sense?

Just as Schelling attempts to navigate between Kantian restrictions and metaphysical inebriation, Mark Wilson attempts to show the importance of finding a place between inflexible classical definitions of concepts and the conceptual play of post-modern thinkers. Wilson's difficult task is to demonstrate how it is that concepts can be plastic yet robust without appealing to a definitively realist sense of the world 'out there' that the concepts necessarily grip onto, and on the other hand, without reducing conceptual use to merely a socially mediated language game unfolding over time.

Wilson argues that it is by investigating dull things, such as concepts, pragmatism is at its most powerful as a philosophical field. Furthermore, this application of pragmatism, of the maxim do what works, to abstract capacities such as conceptualization, further indicates the important difference between practical and pragmatic, one that, as hopefully was seen above, the normativist camp elides. Practical thought takes the immediate horizon for granted as it sets about its tasks. A pragmatic view, on the other hand, is constantly distilling a greater horizon in order to act in such a way that is local, yet future oriented. Wilson argues that a pragmatic approach allows one to avoid both associating
conceptual authority with hidden desires of domination while also critiquing concepts for being overly rigid, for not allowing transformation or movement between domains. Furthermore, Wilson's pragmatism is constantly in contact with, albeit an abstract, conceptualization of nature. As he writes: “It is then commonly presumed that Nature's uncooperative tendencies with respect to descriptive acquiescence emerge mainly with the rise of relativity and quantum mechanics but this is not true; allied difficulties glower sullenly even at the core of what we may mistakenly regard as the most stolid and respectable corners of engineering.”

He then goes on to say:

The main consideration that drives the entire argument of the book is the thesis that the often quirky behaviors of ordinary descriptive predicates derive, not merely from controllable human inattention or carelessness, but from a basic unwillingness of the physical universe to sit still while we frame its descriptive picture. Like a photographer dealing with a rambunctious child, we must resort to odd and roundabout strategies if we hope to capture even a glimpse of our flighty universe upon our linguistic film.

Wilson's proximity to Sellars contra Brandom and McDowell, should begin to become clear. Wilson's doubt about the self-consistency of the so-called space of reasons begins to emerge and, in addition, he draws the ontological strings tighter between pragmatic activity and concept-use. This is possible, which is again evident from the quote above, due to Wilson's focus on engineering, on what in a conceptual sense could be called applied physics. Wilson is thus particularly focused on construction both in an ideal and in a real sense (to transpose his concerns to Schellingian language). It is from this middle-ground of concept-into-action that Wilson makes his philosophical stakes in favor of pragmatism and against the normativists, explicit. But this requires a brief detour through Wilson's notion of ur-philosophical concepts.

Wilson warns against ur-philosophical concepts or those concepts which under-gird, with almost utopian naivete, the general thrust of a philosophical endeavor. Just as one can, looking at the

536 Ibid. 9.
537 Ibid. 11.
above epigraph, get lost in the graveyard of concepts, one can also advance too quickly on the sunny lane of non-contingency. This ur-philosophical favoritism which asserts that the world is fully graspable, is exactly the kind of bias that Schelling attempts to torpedo with both the unprethinkable and the inexistence of the Potenzen. That is, Schelling opens up the beginning and the end of the world and runs it through with a plurality of processes not to explain it dogmatically, but to make it possible for us to think its complexity, our role in that complexity, but never in a complete manner.

While a strict sense of the pragmatic maxim might seem, on the face of it, rule out speculative entities, the inexistence of the potencies and the singularity of the world of powers, allows pragmatism to apply to both thought and action, to treat thought as a kind of activity that our limited access, and not our ontological or theologically decreed finitude, makes pertinent.

Inexistence and the potencies are speculations which in fact function as meta-pragmatic in that they epistemologically, and meontologically, keep pragmatic thinking functioning into the future. If the world was closed via a philosophy of immanence (Spinoza and his heirs) or, if we resort to a fact based ontology (Gabriel), then pragmatism would become nothing other than a local adumbration of philosophical riches where, in fact, the richness of the world as discovered and as created only occurs because of local activities, and, furthermore, these activities are local because of the limitations of our particular individuations and locations within bigger processes not because things are, in and of themselves, unknowable or ungraspable. As Wilson illustrates through and against Hume, one cannot simply ban oneself from speculation, keeping our noses to the immediate conceptual ground, as to do so would fail to locate the local space of action in any meaningful sense.

One can take the various forms of naturalism above as case and point. How could one in good faith claim that biologists, or even technicians working in biological fields, should not, or could not

538 Ibid. 16-17.
539 Ibid. 600.
540 Ibid. 602.
benefit from, grand theories of biological development such as Darwinian evolution? Only with such theories does local pragmatic work in biological realms have more than local meaning. This does not mean that such acts are only in service of a particular theory, but it is only when couched in a theoretical or speculative context of some kind that such activities could ever even contribute to a new theory.

It is here that we can investigate Wilson’s direct critique of the normativist approach to nature and reason. While Wilson supports Brandom’s general objective in terms of trying to identify what human mental capacities are in the wake of the failure, or insufficiency, of our past attempts at self-reflexivity, Wilson becomes increasingly skeptical of the socially-normative tissue that Brandom and his enclave aim to articulate. Wilson begins by critiquing John McDowell’s claim that conceptual authority can be easily replaced by social agreement and that, as a result of this, that the purposes of science are conceptually limited because a concept's proper home is in the space of reasons as opposed to the space of causes. Wilson furthers his critique by stating that he does not think the normative move of segregating human use of concepts, and their sub-personal or neurophysiological activity, will hold over time. One can return to the Schellingian approach to naturalism above, as well as the concerns of the previous chapter as Schelling articulates this problem, though in a very different historical context, in terms of the epistemological conundrum of ‘what thinks in me is outside of me.’

Or, in other words, concepts must not only be flexible in terms of their observable content (as was emphasized via Sellars above) but also in terms of the point of their generation, i.e., in terms of it being my concept as well as a concept, of a locality within the mind, and an intuitive locality of immediate surroundings. That is, local and universal conceptual use may function differently, but this does not mean that two different concepts are at play.

541 Ibid. 30-31.
542 Ibid. 613-614.
As Wilson puts it:

With respect to the terms of macroscopic classification we have investigated, public norms, however formulated, are implausible as a final magistrate of conceptual correctness, simply because our chief objective is to make practical headway within an often uncooperative external world. Getting matters right with respect to those externals usually matters more to us than the opinions of our chums.543

He then concludes the sentiment with the following:

Once we are concerned with building a skyscraper or laying down long extensions of telegraphic cable, the standard ‘get the right answer’ represents our avatar, not any norms promulgated by civic rigorists. Indeed, these are the exact concerns that led us to conclude, long ago, that environmentally determined standards of correct use apply even to the lonely mumblings of a Robinson Crusoe, at least when he is busy counting his goats or planning a mousetrap.544

If pragmatism functions on thought in relation to questioning what a thing does, then Schelling’s thought focuses on the where and when of creation or generation. A concern with nature is all too quickly written off as appealing to pre-critical metaphysics, as wanting merely to go on speculative fancies without constraint or measurable consequence. Yet, once again, this caricature ignores the generative, and regulative, power of nature on the pragmatic.

As Wilson makes clear, conceptual use is always interfaced with the environment in which one is engaged and, at times, the same environment in which one became conceptually trained. Again, following Sellars above, it is only this kind of training which allows to amplify our naturalistically granted capacities, in order to get a better sense of the world in which we are forced to navigate.

Schelling applies this problematic to the very nature of philosophy itself via the notion of Ekstasis in “On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science” in which the philosopher makes the world into an object of thought, while recognizing that the philosopher herself is only ever operating on the world second-hand, and that this conceptual delay applies to the thinker viewing herself as a philosopher.

As Schelling writes outlining the dire task of philosophy as navigation:

Those, then, who want to find themselves at the starting point of a truly free philosophy, have to depart even from God. Here the motto is: whoever wants to preserve it will lose it, and whoever abandons it will find it. Only those have reached the ground in themselves and have become aware of the depths of life, who have at one time abandoned everything and have themselves been abandoned by everything, for whom everything has been lost, and who have found themselves alone, 543 Ibid. 615. 544 Ibid. 616.
face-to-face with the infinite: a decisive step which Plato compared with death. That which Dante saw written on the door of the inferno must be written in a different sense also at the entrance to philosophy: 'Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.' Those who look for true philosophy must be bereft of all hope, all desire, all longing. They must not wish anything, not know anything, must feel completely bare and impoverished, must give everything away in order to gain everything. It is a grim step to take, it is grim to have to depart from the final shore. This we can infer from the fact that so few have ever been capable of it.545

Thus Schelling's speculative sailor, the one who engages in apparently reckless *Ekstasis*, if she cheats death, can only hope to become Wilson's Crusoe, to pragmatically attune such explorations on stable land even if such stability is only temporary. But does this mean that Schelling's philosophy implies or even requires the lonely thinker, one who must abjure the collective labor of thought and practice so celebrated by McDowell and Brandom. I do not believe that this is the case.546

The upshot of Schelling's entire philosophy, I believe, is the importance of the worldliness of ideas, where unworldliness, or mere ideality, is replaced by inexistence, by that which has not yet come to be. This in fact burdens the thinker with responsibility. At the same time, it disallows any privileging of thought or action — in that the typical advantage of action over thought is that thought is of another world (even when Platonism is attacked). Or the purported advantage of thought over action is that it had, or has, some purity, some aloofness. Following the general thrust of Schelling's thought, if realness is measured in terms of consequences then action, for its own sake, or armchair thinking, for its own sake, can not appeal to being only of, or never of, this world. That is, actions are not immediately more valuable because they are right before us, nor are ideas only things to be aspired to. Actions are not merely before us, nor are ideas merely above the world before us as there is only one world in Schelling's Aristotelian naturalism combined with his Platonic realism. There is a natural Aristotelian world but stripped of its essences and its perfection, haunted by the open ended temporality of a Platonic world, a world that restlessly churns with chaotic change.

This is why the subject for Schelling, whether engineer, philosopher, naturalist, or geometer, is

546 Interestingly, Wilson discusses the importance of nautical metaphors in Peirce in regards to conceptual behavior *Wandering Significance*, 42.
nothing but an instance of eternal freedom. But it is a freedom that does not mean freedom from as, once again, there is only this world, rather it is the freedom to adopt a form, to carve out a space and navigate it.  

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