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Embattled Communities: Voluntary Action and Identity in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 1914-1918

Steve Marti
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Francine McKenzie
The University of Western Ontario

Joint Supervisor
Jonathan Vance
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in History

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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EMBATTLED COMMUNITIES: VOLUNTARY ACTION AND IDENTITY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND, 1914-1918

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Steve Marti

Graduate Program in History

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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Abstract

This dissertation examines voluntary mobilization during the First World War to understand why communities on the social and geographical periphery of the British Empire mobilized themselves so enthusiastically to support a distant war, fought for a distant empire. Lacking a strong state apparatus or a military-industrial complex, the governments of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand relied on voluntary contributions to sustain their war efforts. Community-based voluntary societies knitted socks, raised funds to purchase military equipment, and formed contingents of soldiers. By examining the selective mobilization of voluntary participation, this study will understand how different communities negotiated social and spatial boundaries as they attempted to project their communal identity through wartime patriotism.

The process of voluntary mobilization allowed communities to organize their efforts in a manner that reflected and projected their collective identity. By deciding the scale and scope of voluntary efforts, controlling who was included or excluded in these efforts, advertising the community’s achievements, regulating who would benefit from these contributions, the organizers of voluntary patriotic work determined how these efforts would fit into the national and imperial war effort. The records and correspondence detailing the coordination of voluntary contributions reveal the terms by which communities defined themselves through their patriotic efforts.

Yet the extent to which communities could project their identity through their voluntary contributions was mediated by dominion governments, which authorized and accepted voluntary efforts. State authorities determined which communities could mobilize independently, which should be mobilized into an existing effort, and which communities should be prevented from contributing to the war altogether. A comparative study of mobilization in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand will reveal how categories of space, ethnicity, and race factored both in the constructions and negotiations of communal identities, as well as the effacement of marginalized communities.
Keywords

First World War - 1914-1918, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, British Empire, social history, settler colonialism, war and society, identity, imagined communities, voluntary action, patriotic work, migration, ethnic relations, diaspora studies, Indigenous studies.
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Introduction

In April 1915, dominion expeditionary forces experienced their baptisms of fire. At dusk on April 22, units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) led a counter-attack near Ypres, Belgium, to fill the gap left by French colonial troops who withdrew in the face of the first major poison gas attack in history. On the morning of April 25, soldiers of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) rowed ashore to begin an eight-month campaign to control the Gallipoli peninsula. The exploits of these soldiers were lionized in the contemporary popular press, and would later form the foundation for national narratives in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.¹ Military operations such as the Gallipoli Campaign or the assault on Vimy Ridge have been re-written as parables of national maturation, in which British colonies became nations in their own right through the assertion of military power and the sacrifice of human life. But military victories were also celebrated as the collective achievement of countless communities across Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – henceforth referred to as dominions² – which rallied to support the war through their voluntary contributions.

These contributions were substantial. All twenty-three aeroplanes of the 1st Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, were purchased by popular subscription campaigns.³


² ‘Dominion’ was the term adopted at the 1907 Imperial Conference to describe the constitutional status of the self-governing colonies of settlement of the British Empire: then Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, and later South Africa in 1910 and Ireland in 1922.

³ Written records, 1914-18 War (AWM25) Box 375 File 3. Correspondence regarding gifts of Money. Motor Ambulances by Darling Downs District of Queensland. Lady Hamilton Recreation Hut, Tel-el-Kebir. [See also AWM25 item 375/6] Gift of Cinema Plant for each Division from Australian Comfort
In Canada, the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), Canada’s largest women’s voluntary society, collected funds to equip thirty-six hospital wards and provided nineteen motor ambulances, twenty-two sterilizing units, and 942 hospital cots over the course of the war.\(^4\) Of the fourteen motor ambulances needed to equip the field ambulance units of the NZEF, ten were purchased with donations collected by the Hawke’s Bay branch of the British Medical Association.\(^5\)

While contributing to the collective imperial and Allied war effort, these donations also served to identify the communities that came together to produce them. Local identities were entwined with the national and imperial war effort through these voluntary contributions. Donors purchased machine guns to be donated to the CEF and engraved these gifts with inscriptions such as “Abbotsford District” or “Gun to be returned to Sandon if in existence at termination of war.”\(^6\) Volunteers who enlisted in dominion expeditionary forces joined units identified by their hometown, state, province, or provincial district. Recruits in Wellington, New Zealand were mustered into the 1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) Battalions of the Wellington Regiment, each battalion made up of four companies: West Coast Company, Taranaki Company, Hawkes Bay Company, and Ruahine Company to represent the districts of Wellington.\(^7\)

The dominions were colonies of settlement that accommodated excess population from Britain and provided investors with an outlet for their capital. In 1911, the combined

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population of the dominions amounted to nearly a quarter of Britain’s population of 41,273,933.\textsuperscript{8} Canada, the largest of the dominions counted a population of 7,206,643; Australia counted 4,455,005 people; and, New Zealand’s population totaled 1,008,468. The majority of settlers residing in the dominions were attracted from Britain. Nearly ten percent of Canada’s population was born outside of British territory, while only two percent of the population of the Pacific dominions was foreign-born.\textsuperscript{9} Constitutionally, the dominions entered a state of war when Britain declared war but, as self-governing colonies, the dominion governments were free to decide for themselves the extent of their contribution to the imperial war effort. The dominions relied on Britain as a source of capital and as a protector, but sentimental attachments and aspirations to evolve from self-government to active involvement in imperial affairs motivated dominion statesmen and citizens to rally enthusiastically in support of the empire. The dominions certainly bore their share of the imperial war effort. Dominion soldiers accounted for roughly one fifth of the imperial army.\textsuperscript{10} Nearly thirteen percent of military-aged males in Australia and Canada enlisted, while over nineteen percent of New Zealand males served.


\textsuperscript{9} This is based on the number of “foreign-born” residents reported in the 1911 censuses of the three dominions, meaning residents who were not born on British territory. Australia and New Zealand counted roughly two percent of their population as foreign-born (107,885 out of a total population of 4,455,005 in Australia and 19,571 out of a total population of 1,008,468 in New Zealand. Canada counted roughly ten percent of its population as foreign-born (752,732 out of a total population of 7,206,643) although nearly half of these foreign-born subjects (303,680) arrived from the United States. See: \textit{The First Commonwealth Census, 3rd April, 1911}, (Melbourne: J.P. Kemp Government Printer, N.D.) Vol 2, Part 2, Birthplaces, Table 40, “Total Population of the Commonwealth of Australia at the census of 3rd April, 1911, Classified According to Birthplace, Nationality, Length of Residence, Education, Conjugal Condition,” 188-189; \textit{The Canada Year Book, 1914}, (Ottawa: J.L. De Tache, 1915), Table 18, “Birthplace of the Population, 1901 and 1911,” 63-64; “Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand,” Chapter 42. Table II. “Showing (exclusive of Maoris) the Number of Persons of different Birthplaces living in New Zealand at various Census Periods, with the Numerical and Centesimal Increase or Decrease of each Nationality during the Intervals,” http://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1911-census/1911-results-census.html#d50e186952, (accessed 28 April 2015).

\textsuperscript{10} The British Army recruited a total of 4,970,902 men over the course of the war. The 416,809 men served in the AIF; 418,052 men served overseas with the CEF; and, 124,211 men served in the NZEF. See: \textit{Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920}, (London: HMSO, 1922), Part 5.
rates were staggering. The CEF suffered a fifty percent casualty rate; nearly sixty percent of New Zealand soldiers were killed or wounded, as were over two thirds of Australian soldiers.\(^\text{11}\)

Dominion narratives of the First World War celebrate these contributions and sacrifices as national achievements, but the soldiers and civilians mobilized in support of the war effort often represented much smaller communities within these nations. The process of voluntary mobilization offers a unique insight into how communities throughout the dominions, far removed from Europe and the imperial metropole, identified themselves as participants in a distant war, fought for a distant empire. The extension of military history into a wider study of War and Society, which emerged some thirty years ago, explores how society shapes warfare and, in turn, how warfare shapes society. The mobilization of soldiers and civilians in the dominions during the First World War was indeed a reflection of their societies. The roots of national wartime narratives can be traced back to the process of mobilization which ultimately shaped the character and composition of wartime events by determining the staging, the props, and the cast of characters that would be turned into a performance of national identity.

Contributing to the war effort presented communities in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand with an opportunity to express their identity through their volunteerism. Outpourings of voluntary work, such as knitting socks, raising funds, or forming a contingent of soldiers, were orchestrated by community-based voluntary societies. But these offerings were by no means given unconditionally. The labelling of donations such as machine guns or aircraft was a common condition attached to patriotic contributions. The demand to be identified through their donation reveals an important relationship between identity and voluntary participation in the war effort. Identities, however, are fickle. Linda Colley’s landmark study of British identity is prefaced with the observation that, “Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on more than one at a

time.” Colley makes this remark to acknowledge that the rise of a British identity by no means swept away competing loyalties of region or religion. Certainly, the First World War did not obliterate regional identities in the dominions, just as Colley concedes that Napoleonic Wars did not obliterate these competing identities in Britain. This dissertation builds on Colley’s assertion by examining how communal identities were expressed through voluntary contributions, as well as to illuminate the relationship between these communities and the wider nation and empire.

To understand the construction of communal identities, this study draws on Benedict Anderson’s definitions of an imagined community. As Anderson argues, national identities are communities defined by a common, imaginary connection between individuals. These communities are also constructed as limited and sovereign. Rather than examine this phenomenon at the level of the nation, this thesis focuses on the construction of identities in local communities and their relationship to the nation, empire, and the wider world. As volunteers mobilized themselves to support the war effort, the records of their deliberations and correspondence reveal intense debates over who was included in or excluded from these communal efforts. These debates effectively defined the limits of a community. Organizers also articulated their rationale for espousing their efforts to the wider national or imperial war effort and defined a kind of shared sovereignty, as active members of a larger nation. These records provide an insight into the construction and expression of identities as they articulate the relationship between a local community and the wider nation and empire. If identity is the manner in which a community defines itself based on commonalities between its members and distinguishes itself from others based on differences, the mobilization of a community in wartime defined the boundaries – or limits – of communal identity as members self-selected who could contribute to their collective efforts and who should benefit from the


fruits of their labour.

Figure 1: The legend painted down the right side of the DH 5 scout indicates it was a presentation aircraft, paid for by subscriptions and fund-raising in Australia. This particular aircraft, 'New South Wales no 14' (also known as The Women's Battleplane) was presented on 12 April 1917 to 68 Squadron by 'the women of New South Wales and others', who raised £2,700. Australian War Memorial, A02177.

Of particular concern is the importance of space and place in the construction of identity. As voluntary contributions were pooled into a national, imperial, and even an Allied war effort, these efforts were seldom coordinated on such a large scale. The limits of communal contributions were often described in terms of space. Placing the name of a town or state was common, and donors rarely – almost never – wished to identify themselves simply as Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, or even as Britons on their contributions. Donors seldom identified themselves by other hallmarks of identity, such as their gender, ethnicity, race, or religion without attaching themselves to their location. One of the aircraft of the Australian Flying Corps, for example, was inscribed as
the “Women’s Battleplane, subscribed and collected by the women of New South Wales” (see fig. 1). The donors did not simply identify themselves as women, or even Australian women, but specifically as women of New South Wales. Even members of a society such as the IODE, an organization which defined itself in the broadest possible terms – female and imperial – attributed smaller geographical identifiers to their donations. The provincial branch of the IODE in Saskatchewan purchased a motor ambulance for the Canadian hospital in Shorncliffe and christened it the “Saskatchewan Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire Ambulance.” As Anderson argues, nations are imagined to be sovereign, but Saskatchewan – in this particular example – was by no means a sovereign state. Yet the attachment of place to identity asserted a kind of sovereignty. The IODE of Saskatchewan or the women of New South Wales distinguished themselves from other women to emphasize that they acted on their own initiative to organize their efforts as a separate and distinct community to collect the funds necessary to make their contribution. Accordingly, the donors requested to be acknowledged separately. In this way, voluntary contributions identified communities as unique components of a larger whole.

While voluntary mobilization offered an opportunity for communities to define and project their identity, it was the acceptance of these contributions by government agents that ultimately validated their work and acknowledged the identity of the donors. As communities asserted their unique initiatives and accomplishments through their contributions, state authorities needed to strike a balance between encouraging volunteerism and centralizing these disparate initiatives in order to meet the needs of the wider war effort. More than centralizing voluntary efforts, state authorities were also preoccupied with the maintenance of internal security and social stability. In mobilizing themselves, a community collected funds and other valuable resources necessary for the war effort. Controlling those funds or resources empowered communities to shape the

14 List of Gift Aeroplanes Taken on Charge of 1st Squadron, Australian Flying Corps. AWM25. 375/3. AWM.
distribution of their contributions, thus shaping a small part of the national and imperial war effort. Determining how much of this power could be devolved to disparate communities and which communities in the dominions would be granted this power was negotiated with state authorities, which regulated the coordination of voluntary contributions. The communal voluntary effort thus opened a dialogue between communities and the state. If patriotic work was a means of defining and expressing communal identities, the state’s decision to accept, reject, or otherwise influence voluntary efforts determined whether communities could self-select their membership and express their own identity through voluntary contributions.

The reliance on voluntary action reflected the limited state infrastructure of dominion governments. These fledgling states, contiguous British colonies cobbled together under responsible federal governments, did not possess the expertise, the funds, or the population necessary to maintain a sizeable peacetime professional army. The size and scale of the dominions’ military commitments over the course of the First World War necessitated a drastic expansion of warfighting capacity and these needs were met primarily through voluntary action. Expeditionary forces were raised and maintained largely through voluntary enlistments. Even when New Zealand and Canada enforced conscription in 1916 and 1918, respectively, to maintain their overseas contingents, the remainder of the war effort relied heavily on voluntary contributions. Popular donations paid for hospital ships, aeroplanes, and machine guns; volunteers knitted or sewed necessities such as socks, bandages, and gas masks; and public subscriptions provided funds to support soldiers’ families and helped returned soldiers resettle into civilian life. While dominion governments introduced unprecedented wartime regulations over aspects of daily life, such as the sale of alcohol or the institution of daylight savings time, the reliance on voluntary – rather than compulsory – mobilization was intended to extract more resources from the population while mitigating public dissent. As the chapters of this dissertation will show, voluntary mobilization allowed communities to identify their members as they organized their efforts. Individuals identified which communities they belonged to by voluntarily joining in with a collective patriotic effort, while the organizers of those efforts were also free to exclude individuals from participating in their communal contribution. The nature of voluntary action and the ability to project
one’s identity through voluntary action effectively motivated widespread and enthusiastic popular participation in the war effort.

Comparing the three dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand highlights the common social and cultural frameworks which defined these former British colonies. The three dominions share a common history as settler colonies which were shaped by similar constitutions, judicial systems, and cultural institutions based on their shared British traditions. These common roots provided parallel structures in dominion societies, which were segmented by both spatial and social boundaries. Because the dominions were formed by the amalgamation of separate colonies and because of their expansive and difficult geography, the dominions operated on a federal system, with power shared between a federal and state, provincial, or district governments. This federalism operated both within the dominions and without, as the imperial government retained a number of residual powers over the dominions, such as granting royal assent to all laws passed in the dominion legislatures, acting as the highest court of appeal for dominion litigation, and controlling the dominions’ foreign affairs. This geography of concentric political jurisdictions necessitated the attachment of identity to place. The necessity of placing one’s community is understandable in an empire that was commonly depicted on maps as a continuous stain of red or pink. This boundless expansion pressed a community to question the spatial and scalar boundaries of their identity: were the members of a community defined by their town, state or province, region, nation, empire, or all of the above?

Communal identities were also defined along social boundaries. The settlement of the dominions rested on the displacement of Indigenous peoples who were forced from their land through acts of violence ranging from open warfare to calculated campaigns of starvation. To populate and exploit these vacated lands for industry and agriculture, all three dominions depended on British and non-British migration. Non-British communities formed according to varying patterns of settlement which altered the spread, concentration, and relative size of these cultural enclaves. In Canada, for instance, the majority of the population in the Province of Quebec was of French-Canadian ancestry. Asian and South Asian migrants settled in each of the dominions, but racialized attributes
imposed on these migrants confined them to occupations that afforded the least pay for the harshest labour, such as mining or railway construction. Individual immigrants or family units could gain the trust of their Anglophone neighbours, but concentrated communities of immigrants who originated from within the territories of the Austro-Hungarian, German, or Ottoman Empires aroused deep suspicion after the outbreak of war. Legal and social boundaries set the frameworks that determined whether a community was part of the mainstream or pushed further to the margins of society. The demands of the war effort forced dominion governments to reassess the position of marginalized communities, whose resources could be mobilized for the war effort. Would the mobilization of marginalized communities for the national war effort imply their acceptance in the nation?

These social and spatial boundaries set the frameworks by which communities in the dominions could mobilize on their own initiative to make a voluntary contribution to the war effort. Legal and ethnographic categories controlled and contained migrant and Indigenous populations in the dominions. Dominion legislators drafted and enforced the laws that enforced these boundaries, but it must be emphasized that this legislation was driven by the anxieties of British settler society. To a certain extent, however, these boundaries were fluid. A visible voluntary contribution to the war effort provided a means to gain entry into a national project; shared sacrifice offered the promise of equality. Marginal populations such as French Canadian, Asian, or African diasporans; recent Southern and Eastern European migrants; and Indigenous peoples offered their support for the war effort as a means of empowering and enfranchising themselves through visible exercises of citizenship and sacrifice. Dominion governments considered these offers of service as well as their potential implications on internal security and the post-war status quo to determine whether the resources gained from the mobilization of marginalized communities were valuable enough to redefine social and spatial boundaries. The benefits of mobilizing marginalized communities were weighed against the potential public fallout from British settlers who clamoured to contain migrant or Indigenous communities. Comparing the experiences of similar communities in different national contexts illuminates how variations in cultural and legal frameworks shaped the
ability of communities to contribute to the war effort and articulate their relationship to the wider nation through their work.

The social and spatial structures of the dominions present a unique case study of wartime mobilization which challenges historiographical conventions. The process of wartime mobilization has led historians to examine the means by which states compelled their peoples to contribute to the defence of the nation, sparking debates over the extent to which peoples volunteered their efforts or the degree to which states relied on methods of coercion to mobilize resources. Not quite a total war, the First World War witnessed a staggering mobilization of human and material resources. Political and cultural historians who examine how states waged this war identify a “totalizing logic” that blurred the lines between civilians and combatants, as states and their subjects mobilized the totality of their resources for the defence of the nation. Cultural historians have examined the voluntary mobilization of writers, artists, and voluntary societies who dedicated their time, talents, and resources to compel others to rally to the defence of the nation. Social historians have tended to dispute this “war culture” by highlighting episodes of resistance or indifference, such as strikes, mutinies, or campaigns of pacifism. This debate hinges on the mobilization of resources – or local resistance to mobilization – for the sake of the nation, privileging nations as a primary category of analysis.

The status of dominion capitals being both metropoles and peripheries complicates the “totalizing logic” of wartime mobilization. The internal federal structure

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of the dominions reflects the challenges faced by other national metropoles as they mobilized peripheral communities for the war effort, but dominion metropoles were themselves peripheral to the imperial government in London. This imperial hierarchy created a sometimes paradoxical relationship between nation and empire. Debates over matters such as the deployment and command of dominion forces overseas, much to the annoyance of imperial military authorities, highlighted the divergence between national and imperial interests. Identity was the crux of these negotiations. Mobilizing the totality of the dominions’ resources and integrating these too closely into the imperial war effort would efface the dominions’ contributions. Maintaining some independence in the imperial war effort would better identify the extent of dominion contributions. The paradox of imperial nationalism – contributing to an imperial war effort while still maintaining a distinct national identity – was the crux of wartime mobilization in the dominions. This paradox further complicates the “totalizing logic” of the First World War, as dominion authorities weighed between mobilizing their resources as part of a national or imperial war effort, while individual communities likewise debated whether to contribute to imperial or dominion charities. The nation-building narratives of the First World War emphasize the evolving status of the dominions within the empire, yet voluntary mobilization provides an equally valuable insight into the imperial relationship as domestic needs were weighed against imperial obligations.

A study of voluntary mobilization provides a lens to study the construction of identity and the connection between communities and the wider nation, empire, and the war overseas. Pierre Purseigle’s comparative study of mobilization in Northampton and Béziers highlights the confluence of local motivations with larger ideas of nationalism and patriotism but, as he implores, more study is necessary to understand the process of

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mobilization both “beyond and below the nation.” By building on this approach, this study seeks, not to examine how states mobilized their people, but to understand why communities felt compelled to mobilize voluntarily for an overseas war and how categories of identity, such as the nation or the empire, factored into their willingness to contribute to that war. As Robert Rutherford and Ian Miller have argued in their studies of the Canadian home front during the First World War, voluntary mobilization was an opportunity to maintain a connection with those serving overseas. In particular, Miller and Rutherford examine public displays of patriotism as performances that brought the war home and closed the distance between members of the same community who were now separated by the war overseas. Yet voluntary action can be studied more closely to understand how communities constructed their own identity, not just in relation to the war overseas, but also according to their relationship with neighbouring communities. The emphasis on collective voluntary contributions to the war effort turned wartime mobilization into a discourse on belonging.

The very nature of voluntary mobilization defies the “totalizing logic” by which states and societies mobilized for war. Communities were often selective, exclusive, and competitive in the coordination of patriotic work. While the sum of these separate efforts may have reflected a larger willingness in dominion society to contribute to the war effort, the process of voluntary mobilization was heavily mediated by both local organizers and dominion authorities. The process of communal mobilization was self-selecting, while state or military authorities in the dominions actively exercised their own process of selection. Marginalized communities recognized the opportunity of gaining acceptance into the mainstream of dominion society by participating and contributing to the national and imperial war efforts, but British communities often excluded


contributions from marginalized minorities, while dominion authorities could refuse their contributions outright. Communal mobilization, combined with the interjection of government regulations, diluted or effaced the contribution of the marginalized. While the internment of enemy aliens is often framed as a precaution that reflected the onset of total war, the simple exclusion of minorities did little to promote internal security or advance any other needs of the war effort. This selective process of mobilization, where some communities’ voluntary efforts were ignored or underplayed, provides another exception to the “totalizing logic” of wartime mobilization in the dominions.

The selective – rather than total – mobilization of the dominions undercut contributions to the imperial war effort in favour of maintaining social order in the dominions. The tension between maintaining social order in the dominions and fulfilling the demands of the imperial war effort mirrored the framework of settler colonialism, as defined by Susan Elkins and Caroline Peterson. In settler colonies such as the dominions, Elkins and Peterson outline the competing interests of Indigenous peoples, the imperial metropole, the settler state, and settler society and identify the common pattern through which settler societies build a settler state to assert control over Indigenous peoples, usually while also gaining autonomy from the imperial metropole. This process is reflected in the selective mobilization of the dominions, as state authorities curtailed voluntary contributions from marginalized communities, such as Indigenous communities, and thus produced a lesser contribution to the imperial war effort in order to maintain the social status quo in the dominions. An important layer in the national narratives of the First World War is the redefinition of the imperial bonds as a result of their wartime sacrifices, but the imperial relationship is often examined solely in terms of the formal and informal connections between Britain and the dominions.


willingness to prioritize domestic stability over the demands of the empire, through selective mobilization, reveals that the assertion of authority by dominion governments within their territories was as important to the imperial relationship as the assertion of autonomy in the imperial sphere.

The settler state and settler society often worked in concert to efface or displace Indigenous or migrant communities, and this process was reflected in wartime mobilization. State authorities played an important role in this selective mobilization, but the line between the mobilization of British settler society and its regulation by the settler state was often blurred. In each dominion, for example, the monarch’s vice-regal representatives, or their wives, directed the national branches of the Red Cross. Serving or retired legislators, such as Sir Herbert Ames who founded the Canadian Patriotic Fund in 1914, likewise served on the executives of voluntary societies and patriotic associations. This overlap created a generally cooperative relationship between British voluntary societies and state authorities, while non-British communities were more likely to find their patriotic efforts confounded by government regulation. This differential relationship with the settler state was reflected in the process of selective mobilization that shaped the national war efforts of the dominions to reinforce the dominant conception of the dominions as British nations.

More than imposing order by marginalizing Indigenous peoples and gaining autonomy from the imperial metropole, the settler colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand sought to create a Neo-Europe, or “Better Britain.” Creating these New

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Worlds necessitated the construction of settler societies and settler spaces. While settler colonialism is rightly theorized as a struggle between settlers and Indigenous over the control of land, the exploitation of land raised questions about labour and the people who would perform that labour. Alongside the tensions between settler and Indigenous is settlers’ preoccupation with immigration. The removal of Indigenous peoples allowed for the exploitation of land, but the sheer geographical size of colonies such as Australia and Canada necessitated the importation of a sizeable immigrant population. The desire to create a Better Britain in the dominions sparked intense debates over the importation of “servile labour,” particularly from Asia.

The demand for a labour force willing to work for relatively low wages to expedite the exploitation of resources, such as mining, or the construction of infrastructure, such as railroads, was weighed against the sustained impact of this non-British labour force on wage deflation as well as the racial demographics of the dominions. The obsession over race, immigration, and the perceived threat to moral and racial hygiene of nations such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, but also the United States, Argentina, and others, has been examined as part of whiteness studies. Though not explicitly situated in the field of settler colonial studies, the pre-eminence of settler colonies as the focus of these studies, in which anxieties over race and immigration are most pressing, reveals that immigration and its perceived impact on social and racial order is an important element in the ongoing process of settler colonialism. Non-British

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immigrants certainly contributed to the process of settling the frontier, strengthening state infrastructure, and displacing Indigenous peoples, yet they were also excluded, marginalized, or expected to assimilate into a British settler society. Complicit in the displacement of Indigenous peoples but also marginalized by British settler society, non-British immigrants should be considered as both agents and objects of settler colonialism. Selective wartime mobilization excluded or effaced voluntary contributions from marginalized, non-British segments of dominion societies to reflect the process by which settler societies, often working through the structures of the settler state, maintained their cultural dominance in the dominions.

Establishing the dominance of British settler society was predicated on the process of creating British settler spaces. The appropriation of space by settlers is often treated as both a driving force and a defining feature of settler colonialism. Discourse over land ownership and land use legitimized settlement and, more importantly, re-imagined Indigenous lands as empty space or virgin territory to be re-purposed for industry or agriculture through European settlement. Cast in the light of an imagined emptiness, settlement appears to be a benign process which overlooks the violent displacement of Indigenous peoples. The imaginary emptiness of the dominions also provided the basis for settler identities, which were defined by their relationship with the land. The tropes of turning supposedly untouched nature into a productive farm, the ability to sustain oneself in an empty wilderness, or building a new society out of the virgin territory remain powerful narratives in settler colonies.28 In understanding the importance of this process to the construction of settler identities, this imaginary emptying of space can be likened to Benedict Anderson’s argument that national narratives are built on a “homogenous, empty time” to smooth over more complex

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histories into simple nation-building myths. So too are settler societies built on an imaginary, homogenous empty space.

The relationship between settler colonialism and the social construction of space adds an important dimension when considering the importance of space and scale in the construction of identities. Henri Lefebvre’s pioneering study *The Production of Space* argues that space is socially constructed and that the abstraction of space “has homogeneity as its goal.” Imagining the dominions as empty spaces reflected this construction of “abstract spaces.” Though not specifically referring to settler colonies, Lefebvre’s argument is supported by settler practices of imagining space to homogenize settler society and efface their intrusion on Indigenous land. Labelling patriotic donations with place names reveals how settler spaces were represented and reinforced through the process of voluntary mobilization, as attaching place names to patriotic contributions reinforced the permanence of settler place names and affirmed that the community which produced that donation belonged in that place.

The question of who was identified with a place name reflected the process by which British settler colonialism effaces Indigenous peoples and other non-British communities. Marginalized communities that were discouraged or prevented from mobilizing themselves for the war effort were denied the opportunity to identify themselves as communities that belonged in a place. Canada and New Zealand raised racially-segregated units for African Canadians and Maori. Most battalions in the dominions were identified by the place in which they were raised but the Maori Contingent and the African-Canadian No.2 Construction Battalion remained placeless. The volunteers who enlisted with these segregated units gave up or, in the case of the African Canadians, did not have the opportunity to serve with a battalion that was raised


where they lived. Organizing racially-distinct units affirmed a minority community’s contribution to the war effort and these contributions were identified by the soldiers’ race but, unlike almost every other unit in the dominions, were not attached to a place. While marginalized and racialized minorities, such as South Asians were barred from service, the selective mobilization of marginalized communities was orchestrated to dissolve their attachment to the place in which they lived.

The voluntary mobilization of the dominions, as well as the oversight of the dominion governments in regulating this self-mobilization, reveals a process through which social and spatial boundaries were constructed and negotiated to define communities in the dominions and their relationship to the nation and empire. The countless patriotic efforts that sprung up throughout the dominions revealed the complexities that entwined voluntary mobilization with larger questions of identity in the dominions: the scale to which patriotic efforts should be organized, or whether contributing to the national war effort should take precedence over contributions to the imperial war effort. The voluntary war effort also allowed marginalized communities to negotiate their inclusion into the nation by making a collective and visible contribution to the war effort. Attempts to transgress social boundaries, however, were often rebuffed as patriotic offers from marginalized communities were either turned down or received under terms that effaced the community which offered the contribution. The selective mobilization of voluntary efforts reveals the mechanisms by which settler society and the settler state maintained social boundaries to uphold the status quo of British dominance in the dominions.

The first chapter of this dissertation will establish broad patterns in the voluntary mobilization for the war effort to establish the scope of these efforts, the extent to which donors felt compelled to leverage their contributions for concessions from the state, and the utility of these negotiations in examining the construction of communal identities in the dominions. Each subsequent chapter of this dissertation will compare similar communities in the three dominions in order to understand the forces that shaped and re-shaped expressions of identity during the First World War. Chapter 2 examines the work of Anglophone voluntary societies to understand the importance of space and scale in
defining communal identities in British settler societies. The reluctance of state authorities to interfere with the voluntary efforts of British communities, and the extent to which volunteers could resist efforts by state authorities to centralize patriotic work, reveals the relative power relationship between British settler society and the settler state. The ease with which British settler communities reconciled concentric categories of space in expressing their identity also reflected their entrenched power in the dominions and compares starkly with offers of voluntary service from marginalized communities.

While British voluntary societies in the dominions worked in relative concert with dominion governments, the mobilization of non-British communities was often contained or curtailed. The third chapter will examine the work of non-British diasporans such as Asians, Africans, and French-Canadians. These communities were relatively well established. Diasporans born in the dominions were entitled to rights and protections of British subjects, yet their non-British communities still relied on wartime volunteerism to preserve and project an identity that was distinct from the dominant British majority. Comparing the voluntary mobilization of European versus Asian and African communities reveals how state policy generally upheld the prejudices of British settler society in preventing the separate mobilization of non-British communities. This exclusion was accomplished by invoking categories of space to efface the patriotic contributions of non-British communities. Chapter 4 will examine communities of non-British immigrants whose rights were limited because of naturalization laws or wartime policing of enemy aliens, but visible contributions to the war effort presented a means for immigrants to demonstrate their loyalty to their dominion and the empire. Non-British immigrants such as Italians, Russians, and South Slavs originated from territories that were affected by the war overseas; these communities could choose between supporting the war effort of their dominion and sending aid to their beleaguered homeland. The mobilization of non-British migrants reflected the imaginary boundary between the Old World and the “Better Britains” of the dominions. The fifth chapter of this dissertation will examine voluntary contributions from Indigenous peoples to highlight the contrast between the reluctance to mobilize non-British communities and the active recruitment of Indigenous peoples in the three dominions. This selective and deliberate mobilization was motivated by settler colonial designs to assimilate Indigenous peoples through the act of
military service. Successive attempts by non-British communities to mobilize their efforts for the imperial war effort transgressed social boundaries that aggravated British settlers’ anxieties about the presence of non-British communities in the dominions. The terms by which contributions from non-British communities were accepted reinforced the social and spatial boundaries that confined marginalized communities in the dominions.
Chapter 1

1 Volunteerism, Mobilization, and Identity

In February 1915, Mr J. Scott of Toronto offered to donate two machine guns to the Department of Militia and Defence. When relaying the offer to the Militia Council, Major-General William Alexander Logie, General Officer Commanding of No. 2 Militia District, cautioned that “we would not be justified to take advantage of his generosity.” Scott’s donation was offered on the condition that the weapons be used exclusively by former members of the Boy Scouts, and because Major-General Logie felt it was “not feasible” to guarantee that this condition could be met, the offer was declined.  

At first glance, Scott’s spontaneous contribution of two much-needed machine-guns for the war effort fits into the “totalizing logic” of national self-mobilization that occurred over the course of the First World War. Scott’s absurd request, however, that these machine guns be reserved for former members of the Boy Scouts defied logic. Voluntary contributions to the war effort were often conditional and these conditions reveal the underlying tension between voluntary contributions and national mobilization. On the whole, Scott’s gift generally contributed toward the overall war effort but this gift was meant to support a very specific fraction of the imperial army: former members of the Boy Scouts. The rejection of this donation reveals that the process of voluntary mobilization constituted a negotiation between donors and recipients. The Canadian Department of Militia and Defence and its counterparts in Australia and New Zealand depended on donations of military equipment, funds, and material to support the deployment of their overseas contingents but weighed the value of these contributions in terms of their utility to the war effort. In considering Scott’s offer, however, Major-General Logie assessed the benefits of the gift against the impracticality of the attached conditions and recommended that to accept two machine guns on such terms was “not

feasible.” The crux of voluntary mobilization was the gap between the intentions of the donors and the needs of the war effort.

Voluntary action, in the form of philanthropic and friendly societies, has a long history in Britain and its dominions. In peace and war, voluntary societies have acted to assist the state in providing for the welfare of its peoples. The identity of these organizations and their members are intertwined with their actions. Accordingly, historians have examined voluntary action during the First World War to answer questions relating to the construction of identity. The mobilization of women in support of the war effort in nearly every belligerent nation and the coincidence with rising demands for women’s suffrage have led many historians to question how women’s wartime work affected the negotiation of gendered identities. The third section of the collection edited by Margaret Higonnet et al, *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*, is composed of essays that examine the relationship between political activism and women’s wartime service. Suzan Grayzel’s study of women in Britain and France examines the depictions of women and their wartime work in the press and propaganda to draw conclusions about the persistence of traditional gender norms, particularly regarding motherhood, despite the unprecedented entry of women into male-dominated spheres of work. More recently, Peter Grant has approached wartime voluntary efforts to argue that the nature and organization of patriotic work in Britain

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reflected existing structures of gender and class, and that these structures were strengthened through the mobilization of women for war work.⁵

The importance of voluntary action in dominion society is reflected in histories that focus on the work of voluntary societies. Institutional histories of voluntary societies examine the role these philanthropic organizations have played in shaping civilian society, as well as the prominent part they have played in mobilizing the dominions for war. In conjunction with studies of women’s work in wartime, the activities of voluntary societies such as the Red Cross demonstrate how these organizations mediated the mass mobilization of volunteers and resources in support of the dominions’ war efforts. Melanie Oppenheimer’s study of wartime voluntary action in Australia and Sarah Glassford’s study of the Canadian Red Cross Society during the First World War have reinforced conclusions about the importance of traditional conceptions of gender roles and class structures in guiding the coordination of voluntary efforts in wartime.⁶ Desmond Morton’s history of wartime philanthropy in Canada highlights the role that social hierarchies played in the administration of the Canadian Patriotic Fund, as social uplift and social control were intertwined when volunteers judged an applicant’s suitability to receive aid based on classist judgements of morality and propriety.⁷ These studies reveal that because voluntary societies organized their work according to middle-class gendered ideals, the work of these societies advanced hegemonic conceptions of class and gender.

The study of voluntary societies in wartime has also illuminated the tensions that developed as state infrastructure expanded to provide the services offered by voluntary societies. Margaret Tennant’s history of voluntary action in New Zealand takes a wider


view of volunteer work to examine the position of voluntary societies as they negotiated with state authorities over the roles and responsibilities of administering philanthropic aid and social services to the wider population of New Zealand. Christopher Capozzola’s examination of the construction of American citizenship over the course of the First World War likewise focuses on the role of volunteers and voluntary societies in augmenting the state’s bureaucracy in the mobilization of the United States. These tensions ultimately gave way to the rise of modernity as the discord of overlapping or competing voluntary societies was calmed by the regulation and bureaucracy of the corporate state. Unlike James Scott’s *Seeing Like a State*, which examines the disastrous effects of “high modernist” re-ordering of society and the environment, Tennant and Capozzola explore contexts where voluntary action played a leading role in moulding society through their active involvement in coordinating social services, public health, and civic engagement. Negotiations between the state and the voluntary sector over matters of public life in the dominions reveal that, relative to the fledgling state apparatus of dominion governments, voluntary societies wielded considerable influence and resources to mediate the relationship between people and the state.

This chapter will delve into the chaos of voluntary contributions. The correspondence surrounding the donation and acceptance of voluntary contributions will be examined to highlight the competing priorities between donors and the state in the mobilization of the dominions. While many of these tensions were quickly resolved, the discord between the intentions of the donors and the needs of the state were symptomatic of their competing interests. This chapter will demonstrate how ideas of community shaped voluntary contributions, particularly when contributions were orchestrated by voluntary societies. As Katie Pickles observes in her study of the Imperial Order

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Daughters of the Empire (IODE), individual chapters of the IODE were “local containers of identity,” whose membership and actions were defined by more than gender or class, but reflected such categories as ethnicity, location, and religious beliefs.11 Darren Ferry likewise concludes his study of mechanical institutes in late Victorian Ontario by arguing these societies constructed “communities,” whose values and identity can be inferred from their activities.12 By building on these methodologies, this chapter will examine the conflicts between donors and the state in order to understand how the communal focus of voluntary societies motivated and shaped voluntary contributions to the war effort.

The correspondence generated by voluntary contributions reveals a variety of motives behind these patriotic gifts. A number of donations were offered simply because they made convenient gifts. In other cases donors, particularly persons of wealth, offered to contribute to the war effort in order to gain favour from military authorities and secure advancements for themselves or family members who had enlisted. These pragmatic contributions reveal the limited extent to which donors could negotiate to convince the state to accept their contribution. In the majority of cases, however, voluntary contributions were motivated by strong emotional bonds between donors and soldiers overseas. These emotional bonds highlight the role of community and communal identity in motivating patriotic gifts, while the relative reluctance of state authorities to reject these gifts suggests the necessity of maintaining goodwill among donors to sustain the voluntary war effort. Most importantly, these contributions reveal the importance of space and place as a component of communal identity and as a motivating force for voluntary organizations that came together to support the war effort.

1.1 Patriotism and Pragmatism

The outbreak of war prompted an outpouring of voluntary support as communities across the dominions offered what they could to support the imperial war effort. Voluntary

societies had played an important role in supporting previous deployment of dominion soldiers overseas. When military contingents were raised to fight in New Zealand, the Sudan, the Northwest Territories, and the Transvaal, colonial and dominion governments relied on voluntary efforts to send additional comforts to soldiers overseas, provide for the families left behind, and support those who returned permanently disabled. Under the guidance of a respectable middle class, the people of the dominions stood once again ready to contribute when war broke out in 1914. The dominion governments, without an established military-industrial complex and drawing on this long tradition of voluntary action to support wartime mobilization, relied once again on generosity and goodwill to provide for the needs of their newly-raised expeditionary forces. Though popular and pervasive, the patriotic response to support the war effort through voluntary means was far from perfect.

One of the biggest complications of this reliance on voluntary contributions was the fact that patriotic donations did not always meet the needs of dominion military forces. In the fall of 1914, Canadian farmers offered part of their crops to help feed the soldiers of the First Contingent mustering at Valcartier. Victor Sinclair, a barrister from Tilsonburg, Ontario, wrote to Sir Sam Hughes on behalf of local farmers who offered their harvest of winter apples to the expeditionary force, if the Department of Militia could wait three weeks while the rest of the crop was prepared for storage. The contingent, however, was scheduled to depart before the donation could be distributed to the soldiers. Elliot G. Stevenson wrote on behalf of the Independent Order of Foresters of Toronto to donate apples from the orchard maintained by their Orphan’s Home in Oakville, but only if the Department of Militia could “see to the freight or expenses.”

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15 Ibid.

16 Letter from E.G. Stevenson to Sam Hughes, 6 Oct 1914. RG 24. Vol 1036. HQ 54-21-33-4. Offer of apples to Overseas Contingent, by Independent Order of Foresters. LAC.
When it was discovered that Camp Valcartier was closed, Stevenson informed the Director of Supplies and Transport, Colonel J. Lyon Biggar, that the Independent Order of Foresters had no means of storing the apples for a subsequent contingent, and would sell the apples at market value if the Department of Militia did not pay the freight to bring them to where they were needed. The Department of Militia agreed to ship the apples, but due to an error, they were delivered to Captain Wilson of Toronto’s Salvation Army and distributed among the urban poor, rather than to soldiers of the CEF.

Australians likewise responded to the outbreak of war with generous offers of support. A register kept by the Australian Department of Defence lists almost two hundred separate donations of cash and kind made in the opening months of the war. The items varied from a barrister’s offer to draft soldiers’ wills, free of charge, to “a quantity of papaw ointment.” Donations of foodstuffs, particularly those with a longer shelf life, were readily received while some gifts, such as the use of 500 camels and their drivers from Abdul Wade of Wangamana, New South Wales, were dismissed as “not required at present.” Other donations seemed useful but were difficult to accept. Gifts of livestock were a particular challenge for defence authorities, who did not possess the facilities or manpower to tend these animals or to slaughter and process the carcasses into rations. Melbourne barrister E.J. Cordner brokered a donation of 100 sheep on behalf of his clients, but these were simply sold by the Department of Defence for £118/15. The Premier of South Australia presented the Defence Department with a gift of 500 sheep, meant to feed South Australian soldiers, but the gift was declined unless the sheep were

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17 Letter from E.G. Stevenson to Col J. Lyon Biggar 16 Oct 1914. Ibid.
18 Letter from Capt A. Bell to Col J. Lyon Biggar, 30 November 1914. Ibid.
19 Lines 87, 117. AWM 27. Records arranged according to AWM Library subject classification. Box 576. File 3. Register of gifts to assist the war effort, arranged by military district. AWM.
20 Line 104. Ibid.
21 Line 88. Ibid.
slaughtered and shipped overseas at the donors’ expense.22 Other donations were less practical. A.E. Gadd of Nagambie, Victoria offered a pair of binoculars, on the condition they were returned at the cessation of hostilities, while Miss A.M.A. Gibson donated her binoculars but was told to have them repaired before they could be accepted.23

Farmers in New Zealand were equally ready to contribute to the deployment of the dominion’s expeditionary force departing for Samoa. James Allen, Minister of Defence, approached the New Zealand Farmers Union for assistance in finding and feeding the contingent’s draught animals. The branches of the Farmers Union offered sufficient forage to supply all four troopships for the expedition and enough draught horses were donated to meet the requirements of the artillery and transport detachments.24 Other organizations were less suited to supporting the dominion’s military mobilization. Twenty members of the Napier Motor Cycle Club offered to form a new motorcycle corps for home defence, arguing that such a corps “would form a highly useful arm of defence.”25 In responding to a similar offer from the Pioneer Motorcycle Club in Christchurch, Major-General Alexander Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand Forces, replied that there was “no present necessity” for such a corps.26 Professor Siblini of the Siblini Company found his troupe’s tour interrupted by the outbreak of war and offered to hold a patriotic concert of “conjuring, novelty musical acts, ventriloquism, ... singing and hypnotism” in Wellington, on the condition that Wellington City Council provide a hall and newspaper advertising, and let Siblini keep

22 Line 170. Ibid.
23 Line 141, Ibid.
26 Telegram from MGen A.J. Godley to P.R. Harman, 5 August 1914. AAYS, 8638, AD1, 772/9/24. Expeditionary Force - Offer of Services in Connection with the War - Individual Cases - Sub Nos. ANZ.
forty percent of the show’s revenues. The Town Clerk politely declined Siblini’s offer.27 Donations at the outbreak of war were often hastily assembled, based on what donors had to offer. These were of sometimes limited value to national mobilization.

Donations were offered in the spirit of patriotism, but patriotic zeal had its limits. While donors offered surplus foodstuffs, equipment, or services, these gifts were sometimes offered with the expectation that the state would subsidize part of the costs or at least allow the donor to recoup some of the lost profit. Pragmatism was as characteristic of these donations as patriotism. Farmers offered surplus apples, provided the state bore the costs of shipping, packing, or storing those apples so they could reach the troops. Sheep were offered whether or not they were needed, and some were simply sold for cash while others were returned unless they were slaughtered, frozen, and shipped. Entertainers were prepared to perform for patriotic purposes, provided they could still earn their living by retaining a share of the show’s takings. Some gifts, such as the use of 500 camels and their cameleers, were not deemed of any use. In making these gestures of generosity, donors struck a fine balance between patriotism and pragmatism, just as agents of the state weighed the costs and benefits of accepting these gifts and investing the additional expense of shipping, storage, or repair that was required to make them useful. The outbreak of war prompted widespread patriotic enthusiasm that manifested in a multitude of donations to support the national and imperial war effort.

The reliance on voluntary contributions to sustain the dominion war efforts turned wartime mobilization into a dynamic exchange between the state and its constituents, which shows how both sides of this compact understood the process of mobilization. Under this system, the outbreak of war afforded an opportunity for individuals and communities to feel more involved with the conduct of the war overseas. Whether it was apples, sheep, or a circus act, donors offered what they had on hand or offered to purchase or produce material that they believed was essential to the war effort. In many cases, there was an expectation that the state would accept responsibility for some of the

cost of storage or shipping, or provide some other compensation in exchange for a donation. The agents of the state could accept or reject these gifts in the interests of an efficient war effort. The calculus that determined the value of a donation was complicated by the personal relationships that motivated patriotic gifts.

1.2 Family Ties and Communal Contributions

The records generated from voluntary contributions reveal much about the donors’ intentions, and while many donors were responding to the perceived needs of soldiers, some donors were responding specifically to the needs of their friends and family. Wealthy individuals extended their largess to provide soldiers with the necessary weapons and equipment to win the war. Those with greater financial means purchased a machine gun, an airplane, a staff car, or an ambulance so it could be donated to defence authorities. Donations of military equipment were more appropriate to the needs of dominion forces, but these gifts still created complications for defence authorities because such generous contributions were expected to benefit specific individuals.

In the spring of 1915, Sir Sam Hughes wrote to thank J.B. Fraser of Nepean, Ontario, and his wife, for offering to purchase three Colt machine guns for the 8th Canadian Mounted Rifles, whose machine gun detachment was commanded by the Frasers’ son. Sir Sam informed them that the Department of Militia would supply a fourth gun to complete the detachment.28 Mr. Fraser wrote to acknowledge Sir Sam’s letter and to express his dismay that the Department of Militia was only supplying one gun to fulfill the machine gun detachment’s allotment. The Frasers believed the Department of Militia should supply all four of the battalion’s machine guns and that the three machine guns donated by the Frasers “ought to be extra.” 29 This proposed arrangement would leave the young Lieutenant Fraser with an enlarged detachment of seven guns under his command. Much as the offer of three machine guns, valued at

28 Letter from Sam Hughes to J.B. Fraser, 13 April 1915. RG 24. Vol. 1038. HQ54-21-33-24. Gift of two machine guns by JB Fraser to 8th CMR, CEF. LAC.

29 Letter from J.B. Fraser to Sam Hughes, 16 April 1915. Ibid.
roughly $758 apiece, was a generous contribution to the national and imperial war efforts, the correspondence behind the donation reveals that it was partly intended to aggrandize the command of Lieutenant Fraser. The donation of the Fraser family was evidently driven by nepotism as much as nationalism.

Captain E.W. Wilson, the Field Cashier of the 2nd Brigade, Canadian Mounted Rifles, wrote to his brigade commander to inform him that a friend had offered to purchase a car for the brigade. Wilson explained that his friend, Mr. A.S. Pierce, was “unable to go to the front himself and wishing to do something for his country,” offered to purchase a four-seat, 72-horsepower Marmon Automobile for Wilson’s “personal use” in the performance of his duties. The Brigade Commander, Colonel C.A. Smart, inspected the vehicle and, considering it to be a “useful acquisition,” recommended that the offer be accepted. Much like the donation made by Mr. and Mrs. Fraser, A.S. Piers’ donation of an automobile was motivated partly by his desire to aid the national war effort and partly by his desire to assist his friend, Captain Wilson, who benefitted more from the gift than anyone else in his brigade.

Wealthy Australians were also apt to offer donations as a means of leveraging a promotion for friends and family. At the request of his nephew, Lieutenant Clyde Johnson, railway magnate Henry Teesdale Smith sent a letter to the Undersecretary of the Defence Department offering to purchase an aeroplane for the War Office, provided that Johnson was able to pilot the aircraft. Teesdale Smith offered to donate the £2,250 necessary to purchase the aircraft, as well as an additional £50 to subsidize his nephew’s training, and requested that his son Paul be transferred from the 9th Light Horse to the Royal Flying Corps so he could train as an airman alongside his cousin. After relaying

30 Letter from Capt E.W. Wilson Jr to Col C.A. Smart, 26 May 1915. RG 24. Vol. 1038. HQ54-21-33-43. Presentation of Automobile to Field Cashier, 5th CMR by Mr AS Piers. LAC.
31 Letter from Col CA Smart, to AAG i/c Admin 4th Div Montreal, 27 May 1915. Ibid.
the offer to the War Office, the Defence Department informed Teesdale Smith that the offer could be accepted, though no guarantee could be made that the aircraft purchased would be flown exclusively by Lieutenant Johnson. Teesdale Smith recognized that “neither Lieutenant Johnson or my son will be allowed to enter the Machine if it is found that either or both of them are unsuited, and must … be subject in every way to the instructions of the Authorities, [sic]”, but his son seemed to have little inclination to transfer to the Royal Flying Corps. Paul Teesdale Smith fought prominently as a member of the 9th Light Horse; he won the Distinguished Conduct Medal in July 1916, earned a commission as a lieutenant, and stayed with the same unit until his discharge. The donation of an aircraft was nevertheless an attempt by Henry Teesdale Smith to leverage transfers for both his nephew and his son away from the front lines and into one of the more prestigious services.

Victor Florance, a twenty-seven-year-old lawyer from Dunedoo, New South Wales, wrote to Colonel R.H.J Featherston, Director General Medical Services, offering to donate a Clement-Talbot automobile to the Australian Army Medical Corps, if his younger brother Hubert was accepted as its chauffeur. For himself, Victor was “very anxious to get to the front” and sought Colonel Featherston’s assistance in obtaining a commission because, as a practicing lawyer, “it would be somewhat more of a sacrifice to go into the ranks than as an officer.” The secretary of the Defence Department’s Motor Transport Board, Major W.H. Osborne, informed Colonel Featherston that the donation of a Clement-Talbot automobile may be acceptable, depending on the model’s year, mileage, tire tread, and quantity of accessories included, but cautioned that “no commissions are granted because cars are given.” Colonel Featherston replied to Victor

33 Letter from Teesdale Smith to Thomas Trumbe 8 December 1915. Ibid.
35 Letter from Victor Florance to Colonel R.H.J Featherston, 18 February 1915. AWM 27, Box 576, File 2, Correspondence concerning possible gift of a Clement-Talbot car by Mr V A Florance to assist the war effort [Feb 1915]. Location: Australian War Memorial. 1915 – 1915. AWM.
36 Memo from Maj W.M. Osborne to Col R.H.J. Featherston, 24 February 1915. Ibid.
Florance advising him to make his offer to the Military Commandant in Sydney, who may accept the automobile, but made no promises to help Victor or his brother secure a commission, warning that “only doctors and Q[arter]M[aster]s get commissions in the A[ustralian]M[edical]S[ervices], drivers are p[riva]tes with other duties.”37 The offer of an automobile was not sufficient to obtain a commission for Victor Florance, who enlisted as a private with the 15th Reinforcements in August 1915, though he was selected for officer training in June 1917 and commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in September.38 Hubert Florance, who managed a farm, only attempted to enlist in April 1918 and was found unfit for service.39 Despite their best efforts, the Florance brothers had to navigate their way into the AIF, to varying degrees of success and without benefitting from any additional favour curried by the donation of their Clement-Talbot automobile.

These examples of voluntary contributions present a different aspect of wartime patriotism. Attempts to offer a useful piece of military equipment to benefit a particular individual, especially to advance that individual’s standing in the armed forces, reveal that voluntary contributions cannot always be viewed as selfless acts of patriotism. The offer of a few machine guns or of an aeroplane certainly responded to public appeals for contributions of much-needed material to assist the national or imperial war effort, but these gifts reveal that the voluntary mobilization of the home front also opened opportunities for individuals to leverage their generosity in order to ensure that their contributions benefitted themselves, their friends, or their family, as well as the wider war effort. These requests for favour in exchange for a contribution to the war effort change the meaning of a patriotic donation. These were more than simple patriotic gifts; they were an attempt by donors to negotiate with the state in order to improve the conditions of a friend or family member overseas.

37 Letter from Colonel R.H.J Featherston to Victor Florance, 26 Feb 1915. Ibid.
38 B2455, Florance Victor Aikman. NAA.
39 B2455, Florance Hubert Oakley. NAA.
After dominion contingents experienced their first major combat operations at Gallipoli and Ypres in late April 1915, the public became acutely aware of the human and material costs of industrialized warfare and the importance of sustaining the war effort through organized patriotic efforts. As recruiting committees pressed men into uniform, donors continued to make contributions of money, knitted comforts, and home-made bandages, to sustain the material needs of the war effort. Some donors strove to make more substantial contributions by offering to purchase vital equipment such as machine guns, aeroplanes, or motor ambulances. Through letters from loved-ones at the front and from accounts printed in newspapers, the residents of the dominions pieced together their impression of the challenges that soldiers faced on the front lines and mobilized their resources to provide soldiers with the means to win the war. As Bruce Scates and Joan Beaumont have argued of the Australian home front, participation in the voluntary war effort was an “emotional labour” that provided donors with a means to fulfil gender or class roles, to socialize, or to cope with the separation or death of loved ones serving overseas. The emotional investment behind patriotic work certainly motivated individuals to contribute voluntarily to support the war effort, while also strengthening communal bonds as donors and volunteers pooled their efforts for the benefit of friends and relatives serving at the front.

Donations of military hardware were more commonly offered by communities, which pooled their resources to make a collective contribution to the war effort. Individual donors could make very specific demands in exchange for their contribution, such as requesting a commission or ensuring that their gift directly benefitted a friend or relative. Like those contributions made by individuals, communal donations to the war effort were often accompanied with certain conditions. Just as patriotic donations can

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reflect how individuals on the home front perceived the needs of soldiers at the front, collective contributions to the war effort can be used to understand more about communities on the home front, particularly how they understood their relationship to the state through their work.

Voluntary contributions that responded to the needs of soldiers reflected the public desire to alleviate the hardships and dangers faced by soldiers. As Canada’s First Contingent faced the cold, wet winter on the Salisbury Plain, Elizabeth Evans wrote on behalf of the Home Workers of Quebec City offering to supply wood-burning stoves for the soldiers. Eugène Fiset, Deputy Minister of Defence, did his best to explain that the proposed donation was not practical because the soldiers would not be able to take the stoves when they crossed the Channel, as “the road to glory cannot be followed with much baggage.”42 The offer of stoves seemed like a perfectly rational and practical solution to address the conditions endured by Canadian soldiers training on the Salisbury Plain, but pragmatism led the Department of Militia to reject this attempt to alleviate the hardship of Canadian soldiers.

Once dominion soldiers entered sustained combat operations, descriptions of trench warfare convinced many at home of the pressing need for sandbags. In Sydney, the executives of the 19th Battalion Comforts Club debated whether they should devote their efforts to making sandbags, respirators, or fly-veils and it was decided that sandbags were the most pressing need for soldiers at the front.43 Mrs Lloyd Williams, Honorary Secretary of the Queensland Sand Bag League, pleaded for the state premier’s attendance at their next meeting, in the hopes that the residents of Brisbane could do “equally well” as the effort in Victoria and New South Wales, who were “producing bags by the hundred

42 Letter from Eugène Fiset to Elizabeth Evans, 3 November 1914. RG 24. Vol 1036. HQ 54-21-33-9 Elizabeth Evans offers to supply through 'The Home Workers' Quebec Giant Heaters for use of Overseas Troops, European War. LAC.

In Melbourne, the Lady Mayoress’s Patriotic League made a public appeal to collect empty 70-pound sugar sacs so they could be shipped to the front and repurposed as sandbags. An appeal from the Western Australia Sand Bag Committee prompted the citizens of Williams, Western Australia to form the Williams District War Emergency League, whose first action was to organize a dance in aid of the Western Australian Sand Bag Fund Day appeal.

There were fewer appeals for sandbags in Canada, but some organizations responded to what they believed was a genuine need. The IODE chapter in Port Hope, Ontario, offered to produce 100 sandbags per week, if only the Department of Militia would pay for the shipping charges to deliver these to the front. The offer was declined by the Militia Council. Mrs. A.G. Ostell, Honorary Treasurer of the Soldiers’ Wives League in Montreal offered a donation of £20 to help supply the soldiers of the 1st Canadian Division with sandbags, but when it was found that Canadian units received all their sandbags through the BEF supply chain it was decided that the funds should be used to purchase a telescope for one of the CEF musketry schools in England. Efforts to provide soldiers overseas with stoves or, more commonly, sandbags provide further examples of voluntary initiatives that were not quite suited to the needs of dominion forces overseas. These initiatives were, nevertheless, orchestrated in response to needs that were interpreted from newspapers or letters home. These examples of voluntary

44 Letter from Mrs Lloyd Williams to Chief Sectary, Premier’s Department, 29 December 1915. Minister of the Premier and Cabinet. Correspondence and papers re Great War, 1914 – 1918. Queensland State Archives Item ID861783, Batch file. Queensland State Archives, Brisbane (hereafter QSA).

45 Undated notice about drive to collect sugar-bags for use as sandbags in Gallipoli. VPRS 16668/ P0001/ 15. Subject Correspondence Files. Recruiting Campaign 1916. Public Records Office of Victoria, Melbourne (hereafter PROV).


patriotism reveal how individuals on the home front understood events at the front and mobilized themselves to respond to a perceived need. The Home Workers readily offered to buy wood-burning stoves for Canadian soldiers billeted on the rain-sodden Salisbury Plain, while small communities everywhere undertook to make or collect sandbags to help soldiers reinforce their trenches’ parapets because they genuinely believed they were responding to the needs of soldiers overseas. The crux of turning disparate voluntary contributions into a cohesive war effort was whether gifts would be accepted by the state. The emotional investment of patriotic labour was driven by a belief that these efforts were useful and necessary contributions that would ease the hardships of overseas service.

The desire to help friends and relatives and the compulsion to help soldiers overseas often combined into communal contributions. Much like gifts that benefited an individual, contributions donated by a group of volunteers were often presented on the condition that the donation should benefit members of the donors’ community. In Queensland, for example, the Brisbane Courier devoted its “Courier” Fund to diverse wartime needs, such as the shipment of foodstuffs for the Red Cross, the purchase of babies’ milk for mothers in Britain, and a fund to provide for the welfare of departing soldiers and their families. It was also suggested that the “Courier” Fund be used to equip a unit of the Light Horse to be raised in Queensland as “a fine example to other states.”

The “Courier” Fund was unable to raise its own regiment of Light Horse, but donations to the fund were used to purchase additional equipment, particularly field kitchens, for units of the AIF. Four field kitchens were purchased and offered to defence authorities if the kitchens could be given to units of the Light Horse that were raised in Queensland: the 2nd and 5th Light Horse Regiments each received a kitchen, and two were sent to the 11th Light Horse Regiment. A fifth field kitchen was purchased for the 25th Battalion, and

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49 “The ‘Courier’ Funds, ‘As we go Marching Along,’” The Brisbane Courier, 17 August 1914, 7.

50 Letter from P. LeBrocq to P.J. McDermott, 7 June 1915. Minister of the Premier and Cabinet. Correspondence and papers re Great War, 1914 – 1918. Queensland State Archives Item ID861781, Batch file. QSA.
two more were donated to the 26th Battalion, both units raised in Queensland. Not only were the donations of the “Courier” Fund forwarded to units from Queensland, the donors of these kitchens requested that their gifts be labelled to reflect their origin. It was requested that plaques be mounted onto the field kitchens sent to the 11th Light Horse identifying them as “The Saltbush Park (Q) Kitchen” and “The Darling Downs and Maranoa (Q) Kitchen,” while the 25th Battalion’s kitchen was to be named the “Residents of Queensland Travelling Kitchen.”

The “Courier” Fund was not alone in placing such conditions on its donations; when the Springsure Red Cross had collected enough funds to purchase a motor ambulance, the Honorary Secretary, Frances McLean, offered the funds to the Defence Department on the condition that the gift be sent “to where it would be of most service to the Queenslanders,” and further requested that the ambulance be labelled “Springsure Queensland” to identify the origin or its donors. McLean further requested that at the end of the war “any part of it that is left [be] sent back to be placed in the yard of the Shire Hall.” As late as mid-1917, instructions were sent from the Officer Commanding of Australian Motor Transport in London to the Headquarters of the 3rd Australian Division in France asking that a brass plate with the inscription “Presented by the St Kilda Patriotic Committee and Victorian Artists Society, Melbourne” be affixed to an ambulance serving with a Victorian unit, and that photographs be taken of the ambulance, along with six other vehicles upon which plaques had been previously sent for


52 Letter from P. LeBrocq to P.J. McDermott, 7 June 1915. Minister of the Premier and Cabinet. Correspondence and papers re Great War, 1914 – 1918. Queensland State Archives Item ID861781, Batch file. QSA.

53 Letter from Frances C McLean to P.J. McDermott, 26 October 1915. Minister of the Premier and Cabinet. Correspondence and papers re Great War, 1914 – 1918. Queensland State Archives Item ID861783, Batch file. QSA.
mounting. By requesting that their gifts be used to benefit units raised in their own communities, and by requiring that a plaque or inscription acknowledge the community which provided the donation, communities wished to be identified through their contribution to the war effort.

Requesting that a plaque be affixed onto a piece of donated equipment was relatively easy for military authorities to accommodate. Ensuring that donations of comforts or foodstuffs be directed to members of a particular community could be difficult, given the scale and complexity of the imperial supply system. Donors, however, were often adamant that gifts reached their intended recipients. Colonel John Wallace Carson, Sam Hughes’ ‘special representative’ in London, was obliged to confirm that the fifty pounds of tobacco donated by the Nova Scotia Steel Company had indeed reached the Quartermaster of the 17th Battalion so that it could be distributed among soldiers from Nova Scotia. Daniel Chisholm, a commissioner of the City of Toronto, wrote to the Canadian Army Post Office to inquire about the distribution of 14,000 packages of cookies that the city had sent as a Christmas gift for the soldiers of Toronto. Chisholm’s inquiry was prompted when the Mayor received a letter of thanks from a soldier in the British Army, which raised suspicion that the Canadian Army Post Office was less than diligent in delivering the 14,000 packets to their intended recipients.

Crawford Vaughan, the Premier of South Australia, enquired about a donation of sheep made in December 1914, intended to benefit soldiers from South Australia. The sheep were slaughtered and shipped, as instructed by the Department of Defence, but


could not be re-routed to Egypt to join the AIF and were thus sent to England to be sold so that the profits from the sale could purchase comforts for the benefit of South Australian soldiers. Having lost track of the funds, Vaughan enquired to the Defence Department because he believed it was “advisable that the donors should be consulted as to the disposal of the amount realized.”

Mr J. Brodie of the British Empire Trading Company wrote to New Zealand’s Department of Defence to ascertain the whereabouts of the 100lbs of tobacco that the company had donated for the contingent departing for Samoa. Brodie explained that it was “not the matter of the few pounds of Tobacco, but the principle concerned” which drove his queries. When donations were made on behalf of a collective or corporate contribution, the donors were particularly invested in making sure that their gift reached the intended recipients.

It was no accident that communities often felt inclined to devote their contributions to locally-raised battalions. The military organization of the dominions drew heavily on Britain’s regimental model which, since the 1880s, had deliberately paired every regular battalion with a geographically-defined community from which to recruit. This system, codified in the Cardwell-Childers reforms, was meant to create a lasting bond between civilian communities and their ‘local’ regiments. The wording of defence legislation in the dominions, however, meant that existing formations could not be mobilized for overseas service and that the contingents sent overseas in 1914 and beyond were newly-created units that did not benefit from an existing relationship with their local community. Despite the creation of new units for the dominions’

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57 From Crawford Vaughn to PMO 30 June 1915. Prime Minister's Office. A2. Correspondence files, annual single number series. 1915/3920. Meat - Gift of For South Australian Troops in Egypt. NAA.

58 Letter from J. Brodie to James Allen, 13 November 1914. AAYS, 8638, AD1, 772/46/62/13. Miscellaneous - Donation of 100lbs tobacco for use NZEF. ANZ.


expeditionary forces, many donors who contributed gifts for the comfort of departing soldiers insisted that their donations be directed to soldiers recruited from their local community.

In some cases, the mobilization of dominion soldiers was not so conducive to creating kinships between soldiers and the communities from which they were recruited. The chairman of J.B. Clarkson & Co Wholesale Motorcycle Merchants originated from Wanganui and wished to donate a Douglas motorcycle to the company of the 7th Wellington Coast Regiment that was mobilized in Wanganui at the outbreak of war. The response from the New Zealand Department of Defence was that it was not possible to earmark donations for units smaller than a battalion, so J.B. Clarkson & Co could donate a motorcycle to the Wellington Battalion of the NZEF but not to the company within that battalion that was raised in Wanganui. The executives of the Wellington Imperial Patriotic Fund Committee discovered that their intended donation of £200, to be divided between the Wellington sections of the artillery battery and engineer company that were deployed with the expeditionary force to Samoa, could not be forwarded because artillery and engineer units of the contingent were not organized by regional distinctions. The New Zealand Medical Corps was only required to purchase fourteen motor ambulances to meet the requirements of the New Zealand Division which embarked for Egypt, and ten of these were paid for by a fund established by the Hawkes

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61 Letter from J.B. Clarkson to Col Arthur Myers, 12 September 1914. AAYS, 8638, AD1, 772/23/60/10. Administration and Miscellaneous - Motor cyclists - Offering services NZEF. ANZ.

62 Copy of letter from Col Arthur Myers to J.B. Clarkson, ND. Ibid.

63 Meeting Minutes, 12 November 1914. 00104:0:1 Minutes of the Wellington's Imperial Patriotic Fund Committee. CWA.
Bay branch of the British Medical Association.\textsuperscript{64} Local patriotic societies thus paid into the Hawkes Bay fund to support the acquisition of ambulances, rather than purchase individual ambulances for one of the four regional Field Ambulance units in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{65} The organization of dominion military forces along structures that mirrored civilian society, such as the organization of regional battalions, accorded itself well to the practice of sustaining military expeditions through collective voluntary contributions. Military structures that did not mirror the structure of civilian communities sometimes forced donors to alter the terms of their donations.

Military necessity sometimes forced other discussions regarding the conditions donors placed on their gifts to the war effort. W.D. Flatt, of Hamilton, Ontario, organized a fundraiser to purchase an ambulance for the Canadian hospital at Shorncliffe. Flatt wanted to send the ambulance to Shorncliffe because Doctor James Edgar Davey, also of Hamilton, was stationed there and was an acquaintance of many of the guests who contributed to the fund.\textsuperscript{66} This episode began like the examples of wealthy donors providing a contribution to the war effort because it would benefit a friend or a relative, but when Major-General MacDonald, the Quarter Master General, wrote to Flatt instructing him to purchase a Cadillac 145, the chassis upon which all Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC) ambulances were mounted, Flatt responded that he decided to purchase an ambulance from McLaughlin. Flatt explained that “[a]s the funds were secured for a patriotic purpose, we felt that we should also be sufficiently patriotic to place the order for the ambulance with a Canadian Manufacturer”.\textsuperscript{67} Flatt’s insistence that the ambulance he had purchased with funds donated by guests at his garden party be acquired from a Canadian manufacturer certainly reflected the values and identity of the

\textsuperscript{64} A. D. Carbery, \textit{The New Zealand Medical Services in the Great War, 1914-1918}, (Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1924), 23.

\textsuperscript{65} Meeting Minutes, 19 October 1914. 00104:0:1 Minutes of the Wellington's Imperial Patriotic Fund Committee, CWA.


\textsuperscript{67} Letter from W.D. Flatt to LCol Charles F Winter, 29 September 1915. Ibid.
donors. Flatt was not alone in making such a request. Grace Macoun, Regent of the Bertram Division Chapter of the IODE in Innisfail, Alberta, wrote to Colonel Cruickshank, Officer Commanding of No 13. Militia District in Calgary, to offer an ambulance for the proposed hospital being organized by the University of Alberta’s Faculty of Medicine. Macoun likewise insisted that the members of her chapter “are quite fixed in their opinion that a Canadian Machine should be purchased”. 68

The offer of an ambulance, on the condition that it was purchased from a Canadian manufacturer, created a conundrum for the Department of Militia. The Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin, considered Macoun’s proposal and could “not see how we can decline this offer,” reasoning that “use, no doubt, could be made of the motor ambulance on the other side.” 69 For Gwatkin, Macoun’s offer meant acquiring a much-needed ambulance for which, even if it could not be used in the CAMC, a recipient could be found somewhere among the countless Allied military, paramilitary, and civilian hospitals operating in England, France, and Belgium. In discussing Flatt’s decision to purchase a McLaughlin ambulance, rather than the standard Cadillac, Lieutenant Colonel W. Owen Thomas, Supervisor of Mechanical Construction, reminded Guy Carleton Jones, Director General Medical Services, that the CAMC had purchased 40 Cadillac chasses for their ambulances and recommended that any group wishing to supply an ambulance should be told to make a cash donation of $2,100 so that the CAMC could then purchase an ambulance of the required pattern. A minute penned onto the memorandum by the Assistant Deputy General Medical Services observed, possibly out of frustration, that “This arrangement, whereby a standard pattern will be used, will be very advantageous for many reasons.” 70 The adoption of a standard pattern of vehicles should have been an obvious choice in a modern, rational military, but in a


70 Memo from LCol W Owen Thomas to Maj L. Drum, 23 July 1915. Ibid.
system that relied so heavily on voluntary contributions, as did Canada’s, the requests of the donors held some weight. Many, like Gwatkin, were weary of squandering donors’ generosity by refusing donations that did not conform to the military’s standard pattern. Weighing between the two impulses of respecting the donors’ wishes and promoting military efficiency turned voluntary contributions from a projection of the donor’s identity into a negotiation between desires of the donor and the needs of the state.

The tradition of voluntary patriotism as a means of sustaining the dominions’ war efforts placed military authorities in a difficult position. Wartime mobilization on the scale and intensity that was required during the First World War necessitated a degree of efficiency, but a system based on decentralized voluntary contributions was often chaotic. The continued reliance on the public’s willingness to offer donations forced defence authorities to weigh between the needs of the armed forces and the will of the donors. The conditions attached to collective contributions to the war effort thus constituted a form of negotiation between donors and the state. Donations of equipment could be accompanied with minor requests, such as the addition of a plaque or marker to identify the community that collected the funds necessary to purchase that piece of equipment. The donors of collective contributions often sought to ensure that their donation was directed to soldiers who were recruited from the same community as the donors, and these requests were often pursued by subsequent enquiries to ensure that the intended recipients had indeed received their gifts. The mayor of Toronto wanted to ensure that the 14,000 packets of cookies the city purchased had indeed reached soldiers from Toronto, just as the Premier of South Australia wanted to ensure that the sheep donated by South Australian pastoralists had benefitted South Australian soldiers. Holding military authorities accountable for the distribution of gifts ensured the emotional bonds between donor and recipient remained intact through the act of patriotic contribution. A display of collective achievement, such as affixing a plaque onto a donated ambulance, strengthened the bonds within the communities that united their efforts to produce a collective contribution. The communal structure of voluntary societies played an important role in motivating and shaping wartime patriotism in the dominions.
1.3 Conclusion

On the surface, the national mobilization of the dominions produced a large, cohesive war effort that projected thousands of men and millions of dollars or pounds overseas. By peering below the surface of these efforts and examining the voluminous correspondence generated by donors, however, the cohesion of the dominion war efforts is revealed as a thin veneer covering an amalgam of disparate initiatives motivated by personal and communal attachments. Each donation of funds or labour represented a separate community that offered its services to the war effort on their own terms. Whether they were apples presented by farmers in Ontario, an aeroplane purchased by an Australian railway magnate, or a night of entertainment orchestrated by a Wellington magician, voluntary contribution were driven by the initiative of the donor, rather than the needs of the state.

Patriotic contributions were not tributaries that flowed gently into the collective national and imperial war efforts. Voluntary contributions constituted an emotional labour sustained by communal ties. Donors maintained their connection to friends, family, and neighbours by participating in communal patriotic work and specifying the recipients of their efforts. Donors expected that their gift of 14,000 packets of cookies were distributed among soldiers of Toronto because these conditions ensured that the communal bonds between donors and recipients would remain intact. These expectations also reveal the imaginary boundaries between communities, as donors protested when their contributions were distributed among members of the wrong community. The outraged correspondence and the ensuing investigations initiated because donors suspected that the intentions behind their donation were not respected demonstrate how communal ties entangled military authorities and cut across larger imagined communities such as the nation or empire. That a donation benefitted the overall imperial or national war effort was little comfort to donors who mobilized their efforts to benefit a specific community. Communal contributions reflected the specific bonds that tied communities together and the boundaries that distinguished separate communities.

The communal ties that motivated patriotic donations could be reshaped by the needs of the state. A motorcycle shop owner could not donate a motorcycle to a company
from Wanganui but could offer that same gift to the Wellington Battalion. J. Scott’s
donation of two machine guns for former members of the Boy Scouts would probably
have been accepted by the Department of Militia if he expanded the imagined community
he wished to support. Donations were sometimes turned down, not because the gift was
unsuitable, but because the conditions were restricted by communal bonds that were not
conducive to the interests of military authorities or the state. Military authorities could
thus reshape the communal ties that motivated these gifts to suit the designs of the state.

The challenge for state and military authorities in the dominions was how to
incorporate these separate communal contributions into the “totalizing logic” of national
mobilization. The countless self-motivated initiatives to contribute to the war effort were
driven by enthusiasm, but a modern, efficient war effort necessitated uniformity and
conformity so that material could be directed when and where it was needed. Military
authorities, however, relied on communal ties to sustain voluntary participation because
these bonds presented such a powerful motive to support the war effort. Allowing
communities to mount plaques on their donations of military hardware turned patriotic
donations into communal display of their collective achievements. The reliance on
voluntary contributions, however, meant that state and military authorities could not be so
totalizing in their acceptance of voluntary contributions. Military authorities in the
dominions decided whether to accept disparate communal contributions or to re-order
these gifts to fit the needs of the war effort. Creating a cohesive national war effort went
hand-in-hand with building a cohesive nation-state. The crux of voluntary mobilization
was the balance of power between the desires of the donors and the needs of the state.
Not all donors, however, held the same power of leverage when negotiating their
contributions with dominion authorities. As the remaining chapters of this dissertation
will argue, the ability to express communal identities through wartime voluntary
contributions reveals the underlying power-structures that shaped dominion societies.
Chapter 2

2 Space, Scale, and Patriotism

In December 1915, Private William Thompson received a Christmas Billy while recovering at Abbassia Camp in Egypt after his evacuation from Anzac Cove. Voluntary societies across Australia prepared billies – or kettles – by filling them with comforts and a Christmas pudding before sending them to soldiers overseas (see fig. 2). Thompson’s billy included the name and address of William Butler, who had purchased and packed his billy. In writing a letter of thanks, Thompson hoped that Butler would not be “disappointed to hear that the ‘Billy’ was received not by a lad from your own state but by one from New South Wales.”

Figure 2: Christmas Billies being distributed to members of the 1st A.L.H Regiment by workers for the Australian Comforts Fund at the 1st A.L.H Bde Camp at the Aerodrom, Heliopolis, Egypt, Xmas 1915. Australian War Memorial, J02506.

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1 A version of this chapter has been published: Steve Marti, “For Kin and County: Scale, Identity, and English-Canadian Voluntary Societies, 1914-1918,” Histoire sociale/Social History, Vol. 47 no. 94 (2014): 333-351.

2 Letter from Pte William Thompson to Wm Butler, 27 Dec 1915. AWM 27 Records arranged according to AWM Library subject classification. Box 576. File 1. Thank you letter from Pte Thompson to Mr Butler for billy can sent at Christmas. AWM.
Thompson’s letter highlights the importance of spatial boundaries in the relationship between identities and voluntary patriotism. Rather than celebrate the kinship created between two Australians through the offer of a Christmas gift, Thompson assumed that Butler would be dismayed to discover that his billy had been given to a soldier from another state. The state border reinforced an imaginary boundary in Thompson’s mind which implied that he and Butler were members of different communities, each defined in terms of space and scale. The distinction between communal identities according to state boundaries, rather than their common nation or even their common empire, reveals that communal identities were defined according to categories of space such as their hometown, province, region, nation, or empire. Each of these categories represents a different geographical scale: concentric constructions of space defined by relative size. While Thompson’s reaction to receiving a billy from a donor in a different state demonstrates how geographical scales served to identify and differentiate communities, voluntary societies also organized their efforts according to these geographical scales by limiting the scope of their work to prioritize the needs of a particular scalar category, such as their home town or province, over the wider needs of the nation or empire. Debates over prioritizing the needs of the local over the national, the regional or the imperial, or any other combination of competing geographical scales, created conflicts between neighbouring voluntary societies as well as with state authorities. By recognizing patriotic work as an expression of identity, a broader examination of voluntary efforts demonstrates the importance of space and scale in defining communal identities in settler colonies.

The previous chapter explores cases in which individuals or communities in the dominions interacted directly with representatives of the state through their voluntary contributions to the war effort. Most patriotic work, however, was organized through voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross, The Saint John Ambulance, the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) or the countless patriotic societies that incorporated at the outbreak of war. Many of these organizations were national in scope and were affiliated with larger international networks, while some, particularly the patriotic societies formed as wartime contingencies, limited their efforts to a much smaller scale. In mobilizing for war,
however, the members of voluntary societies did not just negotiate their efforts with the state but also with their own society’s executives, as well as with neighbouring societies. Because their work was self-directed, the members of a local sub-branch or primary chapter of a voluntary society could determine for themselves whether or not to participate in efforts that were coordinated on a larger scale. By deciding to limit patriotic work to one particular geographical scale, the members of voluntary societies constructed the boundaries of their community in terms of space and scale.

The impact of the First World War on communities in the dominions has been examined in a number of local histories. Historians describe the events of the First World War in rich detail to demonstrate how communities such as Regina, Winnipeg, Toronto, Christchurch, Dunedin, and Camden experienced the war. Larger examinations have also examined the impact of the war on Australian states such as Western Australia or Tasmania, New Zealand provincial districts such as Otago and Taranaki, or Canadian provinces such as New Brunswick. Regional studies, meanwhile, have questioned the relationship between rural and urban communities in wartime. Collectively these studies examine conflicts between opposing political ideologies – particularly with regards to conscription – or the impact of the war on the tensions of race, class, and gender. While communal studies highlight the social divisions within communities, the conflicts and connections generated between communities has been difficult to infer from studies that only examine a single geographic entity. While local and regional histories emphasize the divisions within communities, interrogating the interactions between neighbouring communities as they mobilized for war will reveal how mobilization factored into the spatial construction of communal identities.3

This chapter will argue that ideas of space and scale were as much a component of identity as race, class, or gender. The relationship between space and identity is particularly important to understand British communities in the settler dominions. As members of a British diaspora who settled in the British Empire, British residents in the dominions could imagine themselves as members of any number of concentric communities, ranging from their hometown, region, state or province, nation, and empire. The voluntary mobilization of communities, however, prompted conversations among and between disparate communities throughout the dominions as they coordinated the scale of their efforts. These conversations, which have been preserved in the records of voluntary societies, provide a lens through which to examine how British residents of the dominions weighed these concentric spatial categories by directing their voluntary contributions to support the war effort on a local, regional, national, or imperial scale.

Rather than treat spatial categories as fixed or permanent, this chapter draws on poststructural studies of space and scale, to argue that conceptions of geographical scale were fluid constructions that could be defined and redefined through social processes such as volunteerism and philanthropy. Gender and domesticity are important to understand conceptions of geographical scales as a measurement of space because women performed and coordinated much of the voluntary and patriotic effort. The connection between women’s work and scalar identities has been explored in Sallie Australia, Tasmania, Otago, Taranaki, and New Brunswick, respectively, see: Bobbie Oliver, War and Peace in Western Australia: The Social and Political Impact of the Great War, 1914-1926, (Nedlands, W.A: University of Western Australia Press, 1995); Marilyn Lake, A Divided Society: Tasmania During World War I, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1975); Keith Douglas Scott, Before ANZAC, Beyond Armistice: The Central Otago Soldiers of World War One and the Home They Left Behind, (Auckland: Activity Press, 2009); Graham Hucker, “The Rural Home Front: A New Zealand Region and the Great War,” PhD Dissertation, Massey University: 2006); Andrew Theobald, The Bitter Harvest of War: New Brunswick and the Conscription Crisis of 1917, (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2008). See, for example: John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); John McQuilton, Rural Australia and the Great War: from Tarrawinge to Tangambalanga, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000).

Marston’s study of the domestic work performed by middle-class American women in the late nineteenth century. Marston argues that this domestic work connected a woman’s private sphere in the home to the wider nation because the practices of home economics or domestic science prescribed in popular periodicals were modelled as practices of good citizenship. The domestic work of household management, then, doubled as an exercise of citizenship, thereby transcending the scale of the household to conjoin a woman’s home to the nation. Given that women’s war work often took forms that reflected ideals of domesticity, such as knitting or nursing, Marston’s argument about the transcendence of concentric scalar categories through work is particularly useful for a study of wartime voluntary societies. If the consumption of domestic goods can bring the nation into the household, as Marston argues, then the production of knitted items and the performance of domestic work for the war effort can be seen as a projection of the household outward, into larger geographical scales. Building on Marston’s assertion that the performance of work can be examined to reveal the fluidity of spatial conceptions of identity, this chapter will examine how imagined communities were constructed in terms of space and scale, in relation to neighbouring communities, as well as the wider nation and empire.

William Thompson identified himself and the donor of his Christmas billy by their state boundaries, rather than as individuals, just as voluntary societies identified themselves, their patriotic contributions, and the recipients of their charity, by the spatial boundaries of their community. By attaching spatial boundaries to individual identities, Thompson created “abstract spaces” where entire states were stand-ins for himself and the donor of his billy. This abstraction of space had the tendency to homogenize individual identities by attributing them according to the geographical boundaries of either individual’s home state. In collecting and sending donations for soldiers overseas, individuals and communities likewise defined their identities and those of their recipients according to spatial boundaries of the hometown, the province or state, the region, the


nation, or the empire. Coordinating voluntary efforts in this manner constructed communal identities in terms that reflected these abstract geographical spaces.

As the previous chapter demonstrates, the work performed by the members of voluntary societies and the funds they raised provided the imperial war effort with a considerable quantity of material. To understand the importance of space and scale in constructing identities, this chapter will examine the conflicts that erupted in the coordination of patriotic work by British voluntary societies, as local volunteers considered cooperating or competing with neighbouring efforts. In addition to coordinating their works with nearby communities, the organizers of voluntary efforts also contended with intrusions from state authorities, which sought to improve the efficiency of the voluntary war effort by encouraging or imposing the collectivization of patriotic work. The importance of space and place as a component of communal identities raised tension between local autonomy and collective efficiency.

2.1 Canada

When volunteers decided who would receive their patriotic efforts they were, in effect, defining the limits of their imagined community. The desire to make a specific type of contribution to the war effort and to then direct its distribution reflected how donors channelled their efforts to recipients who were part of a clearly defined community. The members of a voluntary society often worked as part of a larger national or international organization, yet local branches retained a degree of autonomy in coordinating their work. Because of their scope, records saved by the IODE are especially useful in demonstrating the degree of autonomy that local chapters could exercise in a national organization. At its inception, the IODE was a collection of local, independent primary chapters which affiliated with the National Chapter in Toronto. The growth of the organization prompted the formation of provincial chapters and even municipal chapters that coordinated the activities of primary chapters within a given jurisdiction. The minutes of the various chapters, however, reveal the limited authority of the National Chapter. In December 1915, for example, the national executive of the IODE incurred a debt of over $20,000 to purchase a small Christmas gift for every Canadian soldier overseas. The following month, the National Chapter asked its primary
chapters to donate funds to correct this overdraft. The Provincial Chapter of New Brunswick reluctantly decided to contribute some funds but its members observed that, despite the good intentions behind their spending, the National Chapters “should not be encouraged to do it too often.” The Loyalist Chapter in St John, New Brunswick, acknowledged the National Chapter’s request but refused to commit any funds, while the Coronation Chapter in Vancouver dispatched a letter to protest the incursion of such a large debt without even consulting the provincial chapters. After issuing this protest, the Coronation Chapter also opposed a by-law that would allow the Municipal Chapter of Vancouver to make similar expenditures without consulting its primary chapters. When the members of primary chapters resisted requests from their national or provincial executive, it revealed the tensions that surfaced when the members of voluntary organizations such as the IODE tried to define the scale of their efforts.

The autonomy of primary chapters of the IODE gave members considerable freedom to direct their own contributions to the war effort. In October 1915, the Royal Edward Chapter of the IODE clearly preferred to limit its efforts to a provincial scale as it chose to devote $400 of the $438 the chapter raised that month to support the Prince Edward Island Ward of the Canadian Stationary Hospital in Le Touquet, while only contributing $25 to the National Chapter’s 1915 Trafalgar Day appeal to raise funds for the British Red Cross. In 1917, the Victoria and Albert Chapter, in Prince Albert, 

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8 Meeting Minutes, 3 January 1916. MC525 IODE Loyalist Chapter Fonds. Minute Book, 1915-1919. PANB.


10 Minutes of Annual Meeting, 14 March 1916. Ibid.

Saskatchewan, declined to participate in the provincial chapter’s appeal to raise funds to send Christmas gifts to soldiers overseas because it had organized its own campaign to send parcels “directly” to local soldiers serving overseas. When faced with the option, many chapters usually preferred to organize their own initiatives to support the war in ways that benefited members of their local community.

The pull of local communities could even blur the lines between different voluntary societies. In March 1915, the Victoria and Albert Chapter voted to knit under the direction of the local Red Cross, rather than send its work to be collected and counted by the Provincial IODE. In Calgary, the Royal Scots Chapter struck a deal with the local Red Cross, agreeing that if the chapter purchased its own supplies, all of its knitted works would be included in Red Cross shipments but counted as a separate contribution. The autonomy enjoyed by primary chapters of the IODE allowed each chapter to decide whether credit for their wartime contributions would be shared with other organizations in their local community or if they would be counted as part of the provincial or national contributions of the IODE. Most primary chapters preferred to coordinate their work on a local scale, rather than contribute to provincial or national efforts. The question of counting, recording, and publicizing patriotic contributions of funds or knitted items raised the issue of choosing between collaborating with members of their local community or as part of a larger imagined community. Primary chapters of the IODE weighed these two impulses as they directed the work of its members and sought recognition for their contributions to the war effort. Funds and comforts could be turned over to the provincial or national chapter to be counted as IODE contributions, or patriotic initiatives could be coordinated with other local organizations and distributed to ensure that the work benefited members of their local community. It was up to the

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13 Meeting minutes, 23 March 1915. Ibid.

members of a primary chapter to determine the scale at which their efforts would be projected.

The sheer size of an urban centre could also change the importance of place on the performance of patriotic work. The Municipal Chapter of the IODE in Montreal oversaw a predominantly Anglophone membership, divided among twenty-seven primary chapters, and constituted the largest of the municipal chapters.\textsuperscript{15} Located near an embarkation point for soldiers sailing overseas, the Montreal chapters of the IODE took part in entertaining passing soldiers,\textsuperscript{16} but the size and scope of the Montreal IODE is also a significant consideration because the Municipal Chapter was large enough to send its work overseas without outside assistance. At the outbreak of war, the Municipal Chapter quickly established a central depot for the collection of knitted comforts from its primary chapters and displayed their communal accomplishments by labeling all items and boxes “IODE Montreal.”\textsuperscript{17} In September 1915, the Municipal Chapter engaged its own agent in Le Havre to receive the chapter’s shipments and distribute them amongst Canadian soldiers in France.\textsuperscript{18} The Montreal IODE was thus entirely independent from the National IODE’s effort to send comforts overseas.

The Municipal Chapter of Montreal took great pride in the role it played coordinating patriotic activity in the region of Montreal, and even parts of Eastern Ontario, and became quite protective of its territory.\textsuperscript{19} When the National Chapter


\textsuperscript{17} Minutes of executive meeting, 27 October 1914. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Minutes of executive meeting, 28 September 1915. Ibid.

suggested changing the representation of primary chapters in the IODE, The Municipal Chapter of Montreal interpreted this measure as an attempt to wrest primary chapters located outside of Montreal from its jurisdiction and responded with a strong letter of protest. When it was understood that the National Chapter only meant to amend the number of delegates each chapter could send to the national convention, the municipal executive ordered that its letter of protest and all other correspondence relating to the incident be destroyed. This sharp reaction suggests that the Municipal Chapter strongly resented incursions from the National Chapter. The organization of the Municipal Chapter of Montreal created a unique place in which it coordinated patriotic work. The weight of resources it was able to marshal, as a result, surpassed most provincial chapters and allowed the chapter to coordinate its war work independent of the National Chapter. In resisting direction from the national executive in Toronto, while still exerting control over the primary chapters in Montreal and the surrounding area, the Montreal Chapter of the IODE drew boundaries that made it clear its efforts were to be coordinated on a local scale.

Tensions did not just arise between the national and primary chapters of the IODE, but also between chapters in the same province. The organization of a provincial chapter in Fredericton, New Brunswick, in 1915 received considerable resistance from members of the Valcartier and Loyalist Chapters in St John, who refused to recognize the authority of the provincial chapter. The primary chapters in St John eventually participated in the meetings of the Provincial Chapter, but local rivalries were a persistent barrier to cooperation. Rumours circulated well into 1916 that the more established primary chapters in St John were conspiring to force the Provincial Chapter to relocate

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from Fredericton to the larger city of St John.22 At the Provincial Chapter’s annual meeting in April 1917, delegates from St John stormed out in response to the Provincial Chapter’s “unbusinesslike & unsatisfactory” conduct and later forwarded a letter of protest to the National Chapter.23 Tensions remained high during the following meeting when Mrs Chisholm, a representative from St John, opined that the present meeting was invalid. Chisholm argued that the annual meeting was still ongoing because quorum was lost when the St John delegation walked out, and the meeting could thus not vote to adjourn.24

The source of this obstinacy was nothing more than a rivalry between New Brunswick’s largest city and its provincial capital. The Provincial Chapter was derided for conducting its meetings in an “unbusinesslike” fashion, but it achieved considerable success in its patriotic work. In January 1916, the Provincial Chapter set a goal to raise $4,000 to support the IODE’s Maple Leaf Club in London.25 By April, the Provincial Chapter had surpassed its goal by $2,000 and used the surplus funds to purchase an X-ray machine for the Daughters of the Empire Hospital in London.26 In February of 1915, before the Provincial Chapter was organized, members of the Valcartier Chapter in St John noted that they should make an effort to conduct its meetings in a more “business like” fashion, yet refused to recognize the Provincial Chapter only a few months later because it was “not being properly organized.”27 As voluntary societies expanded along


23 Meeting minutes, 7 May 1917. S66-1. IODE Valcartier Chapter Minute book, 1914-1918. NBM.


25 Meeting minutes, 19 January 1916. Ibid.

26 Meeting minutes, 24 April 1916. Ibid.

with popular support for the war effort, the federal and provincial executives of these societies attempted to assert some control within their jurisdictions to coordinate the collective efforts more efficiently.

Elsewhere, gaps were created as local communities focused their efforts on their own needs. The Canadian Patriotic Fund (CPF) was formed to provide the families of Canadian soldiers with separation allowances, but its decentralized structure left gaps as municipal organizers limited the scale of their efforts. Initiated by Montreal businessman, philanthropist, and Member of Parliament Sir Herbert Ames, the CPF was incorporated into law by act of Parliament on 28 August 1914 under the chairmanship of the Governor General. The fund was intended to operate on a national scale by establishing a network of sub-branches across the country. These branches raised funds through public appeals and forwarded collections into a national fund administered in Ottawa. Local committees, where they existed, drew on this central fund to administer relief payments to families of local soldiers.28 The result, as Desmond Morton describes, was a hodgepodge of local and provincial patriotic funds, some of which paid into the Canadian Patriotic Fund, while others chose to remain independent. Of the nine provinces, only Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia eventually established provincially-administered branches of the Canadian Patriotic Fund. Two regional branches were established in in the north and south of Alberta, each administered by independent executives in Calgary and Edmonton. Elsewhere, branches of CPF limited their scope to urban centres. In New Brunswick, Fredericton and St John each organised independent branches but neither extended their activities further than their suburbs, leaving the rest of the province’s rural population to fend for themselves. To fill the absence of CPF sub-branches, the provincial government levied public funds to support families in rural New Brunswick not included in the urban funds. In Ontario and Quebec, branches of the CPF could be found in larger towns, but soldiers’ families in rural villages beyond the reach of these branches were forced to apply directly to Ottawa for funds. Voluntary contributions implied voluntary compliance, and without a means of compelling wider cooperation

28 Morton, Fight or Pay, 62.
these disparate initiatives were not united into a cohesive effort leaving some Canadian families with little direct support.\textsuperscript{29}

The proliferation of voluntary and patriotic work caused some tensions, as competing public appeals taxed the patience and pocketbooks of the general public, but the members of voluntary societies often reconciled these competing interests by coordinating their efforts within their community. At the outset of the war, the members of the Royal Edward Chapter of the IODE eagerly contributed to the CPF.\textsuperscript{30} Two years later, however, the members voted to stop raisings funds for the CPF as a chapter because most were already making donations to the CPF through their church.\textsuperscript{31} The Women’s Institute of Crossroads, Prince Edward Island, changed the date and time of its meetings to ensure that its members could also participate in the patriotic work of the Hazelbrook Ladies Aid Society, while the Red Cross Society in Mount Herbert, Prince Edward Island, amalgamated with the MacDonald Women’s Institute, on the condition that Red Cross work was continued. \textsuperscript{32} The competing efforts of contributing socks for local soldiers serving overseas or donating funds to support their families left at home could be reconciled because all of these local initiatives supported the local community.

With the completion of the transcontinental railroad at the turn of the century, the Canadian West experienced its largest wave of migration. A significant number of those migrants were from Britain and the United States, which was reflected in the membership of Anglophone voluntary societies.\textsuperscript{33} Voluntary societies whose networks extended outside Canada tended to accord their work to suit their international identity. The United States’ entry into the war prompted American women living in Canada to organize their

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 65-66, 68-70, 73-83.
\textsuperscript{30} Meeting minutes, 8 September and 21 October 1914. IODE Fonds. Acc 2990. Royal Edward Chapter, Series 1, File 3. Minute Book, Feb 1913- Jan 1917. PARO PEI.
\textsuperscript{31} Meeting minutes, 28 February 1916. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Meeting minutes, 11 October 1916. Ibid.
efforts in support of the war. An American Women’s Club was organized in Winnipeg in May 1917 as a patriotic response to the American declaration of war, but the organization also sought to “help cement the spirit of friendliness between the American and Canadian women.” The desire to balance the dual imperatives of supporting the American war effort and promoting good relations between the two nations led the American Women’s Club to divide their efforts. Socks were knitted for sailors in the United States Navy, but the club also donated funds to the local IODE to buy a public bench for the exclusive use of returned soldiers in Winnipeg. Sometimes the two identities overlapped, as the club purchased fresh fruit to be given as a parting gift for soldiers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force who had been recruited from the United States and were training near Winnipeg. An American Women’s Club was organized in Calgary in 1911, but its wartime voluntary work prior to 1917 was limited to a single fundraiser for the Serbian Relief Fund and a small drive to collect “dainties” for Canadian soldiers at the front. Work began in earnest in April 1917, when the club voted to raise money to purchase a sewing machine to expedite the manufacture of Red Cross comforts. The Calgary club was less concerned about balancing its dual American-Canadian identity. In December 1917 the club raised $402 for the United States Navy League, but only sent $25 to assist with the relief of the Halifax Explosion.

35 Meeting minutes, 9 November 1917. Ibid.
36 Meeting minutes, 3 July 1918. Ibid.
37 Minutes of annual meeting, April 1918. Ibid.
39 Meeting minutes, 27 April 1917. Ibid.
40 Meeting minutes, 28 December 1917. Ibid.
The fluid boundary between national and transnational efforts was even more common as Canadian funds supported British charities. Over the course of the war the National IODE changed its mandate from championing imperialism in Canada to promoting Canadian nationalism, but ties to Britain and the Empire remained strong in certain chapters of the IODE.41 The Baden-Powell Chapter in Quebec City sewed children’s clothing for Belgian relief and later contributed to the care given to convalescing soldiers arriving into Quebec, but the chapter always honoured its namesake with prompt answers to local and international appeals from the Boy Scouts; $60 was sent to purchase warm clothing for Boy Scouts on coast guard duty in England.42 The Royal Scots Chapter of the IODE was based in Calgary and in January 1918, the chapter raised $622 to send maple syrup to soldiers of the Royal Scots, a regiment of the British Army, while in June 1918 the chapter forwarded $625 to the City Chamberlain of Edinburgh in order to provide additional comforts to the soldiers of the Royal Scots.43 Similarly, a number of Welsh women in Vancouver organized the Tywysog Cymru Chapter of the IODE in May 1918 and sent whatever funds they raised to Margaret Lloyd George, for the benefit of Welsh soldiers of the British Army.44 These elaborate efforts reflected a desire to turn patriotic work into a tangible connection with a larger imagined community, but the process of sending comforts from Calgary or Vancouver to Scotland or Wales in order to then be forwarded to Scottish or Welsh soldiers in France was terribly inefficient. These efforts by American, Scottish, and Welsh organizations collected funds in Canada to support the soldiers of other nations.


43 Meeting minutes, 2 January 1918; 6 June 1918. IODE (Calgary) fonds. M-1690 f.1, IODE Royal Scots Chapter. Minute book, 1917-1924. GA.

The fluidity between nation and empire could congeal under the right circumstances. An illustrative example of the growing tension between national and imperial identities within the IODE was the commemoration of Paardeburg Day. The IODE commemorated Canada’s Boer War victory at Paardeburg as a significant contribution to the defence and maintenance of the Empire. In February of 1916, however, the Regent of the Beaver House Chapter in Edmonton raised a motion against the continued celebration of Paardeburg Day because it was “a most ungracious and ungenerous act” given the sacrifices the Union of South Africa had made during the current war.45 This motion was meant to acknowledge the incorporation of South African into the empire, but was also prompted by local factors, as a prominent member of chapter originated from South Africa and served as a reminder of the holiday’s contradiction to imperial unity. Paardeburg Day ceased to be observed by chapters of the IODE in Edmonton and the motion was forwarded to the National Chapter for consideration at the next national convention.46 The delegates to the IODE’s 1917 convention decided that “national patriotic holidays” that framed an ambiguous – if not complementary – relationship between nation and Empire, such as Empire Day, the monarch’s birthday, Victoria Day, and Dominion Day, would remain mandatory. Celebrating Paardeburg Day, however, was made optional.47 Primary chapters were left to debate whether to prioritize nation over empire by deciding whether or not commemorating the Canadian victory at Paardeburg was a nationalist affront to imperial unity.

The records of discussions kept by various chapters of the IODE reveal the importance between spatial categories of identity and the scale to which a chapter coordinated their efforts. The publication of statistics advertising the achievements of a


particular chapter and the collective achievements of these cooperative efforts were contentious issues that drove wedges between chapters of the IODE. The Victoria and Albert Chapter in Saskatoon preferred to coordinate its work with the local Red Cross rather than be counted among the provincial IODE’s statistics. The IODE of Montreal labelled all of the parcels it sent to France and shipped them so they could be distributed through their own agent in Le Havre. As volunteers in a given city identified their work, and wished to be identified through their work, their contributions to the war effort became a collective accomplishment through which they could project a communal identity.

While the general tendency among voluntary societies was to coordinate their efforts on a local scale and distribute their collections among local soldiers and their families, Canadian voluntary societies also extended their work beyond the boundaries of the nation. International organizations such as the American Women’s Club certainly demonstrated how voluntary organizations were motivated by transnational connections as well as national and local conditions, but tensions between national and imperial identities were just as difficult to negotiate for an organization such as the IODE. Some chapters projected their work on a scale that supported the wider imperial or Allied war effort, to reflect their members’ transnational identities while others kept their efforts strictly local. The composition of a voluntary society’s membership reflected their imagined community and shaped the decision to shrink or expand their efforts to ensure that their voluntary contributions maintained a connection with other members of that imagined community through their patriotic work.

The conversations and conflicts that arose between different chapters of the IODE reveal the extent to which different communities in Canada felt connected to each other as they debated the scale of their patriotic efforts. In examining the relationship between space and patriotic work, the correspondence between these different chapters reveals the relationship between space, scale, and identity. The members of a primary chapter of the IODE were able to discuss amongst themselves whether they would collaborate with another local organization or whether they would contribute to the initiatives of a distant provincial or national executive. In doing so, voluntary societies defined the spatial
boundaries of their community as they determined the scale of their patriotic work as local, provincial, or national. In a nation as vast as Canada that was part of an even more vast empire, competing ideas about the scale of patriotic efforts illustrates the passion with which English Canadians grappled with the spatial limits of their imagined community.

2.2 New Zealand

The mobilization of voluntary societies in New Zealand followed similar patterns as in Canada, with local volunteers determining for themselves the scale of their efforts. The losses suffered during the Gallipoli campaign and the subsequent discussions of universal conscription as a means of sustaining the ranks of the NZEF prompted some to advocate for a rational centralization of voluntary efforts. As the activities of Canadian patriotic societies reveal, voluntary organizations were inconsistent in determining the scale of their efforts. Throughout New Zealand, local patriotic societies were formed and debates likewise ensued over the scale of their efforts. The dominion government and ambitious leaders of patriotic societies attempted to rationalize the voluntary effort in New Zealand, but these calls were met with suspicion and resistance by local organizers. Voluntary societies were relatively free to determine the geographical scale of their efforts and exercised a significant amount of power to ensure that they retained this freedom.

Well-meaning advocates clamored for the centralization of patriotic funds to increase efficiency and guarantee that New Zealand soldiers and their families had equal access to patriotic funds. The Wanganui Patriotic Committee suggested creating a common comforts fund for the various patriotic committees of the Manawatu District to support local soldiers departing for overseas.48 Once it was agreed to unite the patriotic societies of the Manawatu District, James Nash, Mayor of Palmerston North and chair of the Manawatu Patriotic Society, proposed to create a dominion-wide comforts fund for

all New Zealand soldiers departing for service overseas. Nash’s goal was to raise £4 per soldier in the NZEF, for a projected total of £32,000, which he believed could be achieved by dividing the sum among the various districts and setting quotas based on each district’s population.\(^4^9\) While Nash’s proposal fell on deaf ears, Charles Perrin Skerrett, a prominent Wellington lawyer and later Chief Justice of New Zealand, used his influence to organize a conference for all patriotic funds in New Zealand to discuss terms to regulate the voluntary war effort. Skerrett’s scheme was discussed at a conference of patriotic societies, chaired by the mayor of Wellington in late July 1915. While the delegates at the conference approved the creation of a Dominion War Relief Association, to which local and regional patriotic societies would contribute, the scheme was difficult to implement.\(^5^0\) The Auckland Patriotic and War Relief Association had met the following month to unite the various patriotic societies of Auckland province under one executive and discuss the question of participating in a national fund. The participating committees unanimously agreed to unite the various patriotic societies of Auckland province, but remained opposed to the nationalization of patriotic funds.\(^5^1\)

The stance taken by the Auckland Patriotic and War Relief Association was shared by others societies across New Zealand. The executive of the Patriotic Fund in the district of Marlborough conferred with their counterparts in Otago and agreed that Auckland’s effort to unify its local patriotic funds was preferable to the united fund Skerrett had proposed.\(^5^2\) The Tamaruni District Patriotic Association likewise sent a telegram to the Otago Patriotic Association to enquire about its position on the issue, to

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49 Circular letter from the Manawatu Patriotic Committee to Chairman of Fielding Patriotic Committee, 15 September 1914. Ibid.


52 Telegram from Spence Hon Secty Patriotic Fund Blenheim to James John Clark, ND (probably Aug 1915). AG 113/207. Otago Provincial Patriotic Association; Correspondence. Hocken Library, Dunedin (hereafter HL).
which the mayor of Dunedin replied that Skerrett’s scheme was “too elaborate and cumbersome to be practicable” and that the Otago Patriotic Association was “definitely committed to the principle of local control and administration.”\textsuperscript{53} While patriotic societies in New Zealand were open to the possibility of cooperating and collecting funds on a national level, many were suspicious of any arrangements that would surrender local control of funds to a national executive. Resistance to closer coordination between patriotic funds created a patchwork of independent provincial and district patriotic funds to collect, administer, and distribute patriotic funds within their own jurisdiction.

With provincial and district patriotic committees resisting the initiative to nationalize voluntarily, the \textit{War Funds Act} was passed in October 1915, to provide some minor regulations for the activities of disparate patriotic funds. Besides regulating permits for public fundraising, this legislation created the National War Funds Council to oversee patriotic funds. The resistance to collectivizing funds was evident at the National War Fund Council’s first meeting, when the case of the West Coast Patriotic Fund was discussed. Many volunteers for the NZEF originated from the West Coast of New Zealand’s South Island, but as an under-developed mountainous region dotted by remote mining communities, the districts of the West Coast struggled to raise funds for the eventual repatriation of soldiers.\textsuperscript{54} To address this disparity, John Roberts, former mayor of Dunedin and recently retired Chairman of the Union Steamship Company, moved that the Council “invite assistance” from other district patriotic societies to donate funds that could be pooled and redistributed to meet the needs of returned soldiers in poorer districts.\textsuperscript{55} The National War Funds Council operated primarily to ensure that the generosity of patriotic New Zealanders was not abused. The Council had little power to redistribute patriotic funds to correct local disparities.

\textsuperscript{53} Telegram from James John Clark to Karl Atkinson, ND (probably October 1915). Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Meeting Minutes 19 November 1915. AAYO W3120 7 / 1 National War Funds Council Minutes. ANZ.

\textsuperscript{55} Meeting Minutes 19 November 1915. Ibid.
The emphasis on locally-organized efforts also left some New Zealand battalions with less support than others. The battalions of the NZEF were raised in the four major centres of New Zealand, each benefitting from the collections of their corresponding patriotic funds. The expansion of the NZEF necessitated the formation of an additional brigade of infantry: the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade. The battalions of the Rifle Brigade were formed out of reinforcement drafts training at Camp Trentham and were not assigned regional affiliations. By late 1917, the 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifles was fighting in France and had nearly exhausted its battalion funds. Seeking funds to supplement its rations with locally-purchased fruits and vegetables, the battalion appealed for donations from various patriotic societies in New Zealand. The Wairarapa Patriotic Association took the initiative to lobby for the 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifles and successfully persuaded the Auckland Patriotic Association to devote some of its funds to support this unit. While the Auckland Patriotic Association readily devoted some funds, the Auckland Women’s Patriotic League reasoned that because the 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifles “has no particular claim on any district” the welfare of the unit should fall to a society with no regional mandate, such as the Federated Women's Patriotic Societies. Because the battalions of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade were not associated with a particular district or province, the district and provincial patriotic societies did not always feel obligated to provide them with funds or comforts. In this case, soldiers overseas received fewer comforts than others simply because the unit they were drafted into had no communal affiliation.

The limiting of patriotic work according to boundaries of exclusion created more serious complications, as district or provincial patriotic societies disagreed about the

56 The Auckland Women's Patriotic League defended its policy of collecting exclusively for the Auckland battalions by arguing that similar efforts were being coordinated in Canterbury, Wellington, and Otago for regiments recruited in those regions. Meeting Minutes 20 June 1917. MS 875. Auckland Patriotic and War Relief Association. AWMM.

57 Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1917. Ibid.

58 Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1917. Ibid.
limits of their responsibilities. Patriotic societies only looked after returned soldiers and dependents in their own districts, but not all parts of New Zealand were covered under this scheme. In mid-1916, the Secretary of the Auckland Patriotic Association discovered that the township of Huntly, which lay between Pukekohe and Hamilton, was not covered by either the Hamilton or Pukekohe Committees. The Chairman of the Hamilton Committee, Arthur Edward Manning, was asked to present his society with a proposal to include this “no-man’s-land” under its responsibility.\(^{59}\) The consensus that each district should coordinate its own patriotic efforts, according to local conditions, only worked so long as there were no gaps between the districts and every component of national mobilization was divided along district or regional lines. The difficulties faced by the units of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade in receiving support from regionally-based patriotic societies reveal one of the shortfalls of this patchwork of patriotism. Regionally-defined patriotic societies were devoted to the needs of their own region, but their members were sometimes reluctant to contribute to projects on a larger scale. Communal ties motivated voluntary patriotic work, but stretching those ties beyond the boundaries of the community could be difficult. The omission of the township of Huntly from the responsibilities of the various committees that operated under the direction of the Auckland Patriotic Association reveals that the patchwork of patriotic societies sometimes left gaps, as district committees drew the boundaries of their own community to the exclusion of smaller isolated communities.

The continued struggle between local and national coordination of voluntary activities prompted a number of attempts to assemble disparate patriotic societies into a federal system. In January 1916, George Warren Russell, the Minister of Internal Affairs, sent out a circular to all registered patriotic societies to invite them into a collaborative federation. In light of the staunch resistance faced by earlier attempts to centralize the voluntary war effort, Russell phrased his invitation in the most cautious terms. Russell suggested assembling a national conference to establish a “system of intercommunication … by which overlapping may be prevented.” Careful not to aggravate those who guarded

\(^{59}\) Meeting Minutes, 19 July 1916. MS 875. Ibid.
their local autonomy most dearly, Russell professed that he had “no desire to in any way interfere with the Patriotic Committees in their administration” and that beyond convening the conference he proposed “to take no part in it unless requested by the conference.”

Consistent with its initial resistance to centralization, the Otago Provincial Patriotic Association declined Russell’s invitation. G.A. Lewin, the Honourary Secretary, wrote to Russell on behalf of the Association’s executive explaining that in their opinion there was “no advantage to be gained by holding a conference at this present time.” J. Johnstone, the Chairman of the Association’s Public Appeals Committee, wholeheartedly supported this aversion to centralization, expressing his opposition to “any schemes that will in any way interfere with the freedom of action of the Association in its administration of the funds it has been entrusted with.” For Johnstone, the association was accountable to the members of the Otago public who had generously contributed to their collections for the past eighteen months of war. “As trustees for the subscribers,” Johnston argued, the Otago Provincial Patriotic Association “must jealously guard their interests and see that the funds are administered in accordance with the guarantee of the Public Appeal Committee gave when collecting the funds.” That guarantee was the promise that financial contributions would be administered locally by the executive that was elected by the members of the Association. Despite these reservations, the Otago Provincial Patriotic Association participated in the proposed conference of patriotic societies in February 1916 and a constitution was drawn up to establish a federal network of patriotic societies.

By mid-March 1916, the constitution of the Federation of New Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies was drafted and endorsed by patriotic societies around the

60 Circular Letter from GW Russell, 5 January 1916. AG 113/207. Otago Provincial Patriotic Association; Correspondence. HL.

61 Letter from Hon Secty Otago Patriotic to GW Russel, 20 Jan 1916. Ibid.

62 Letter from J Johnstone to GA Lewin, 8 February 1916. Ibid.
dominion. The delegates at the first annual meeting elected an Advisory Board composed of representatives from all of the major provincial districts: Auckland, Taranaki, Hawke's Bay, Wellington, Marlborough, Nelson, Westland, Canterbury, Otago, and Southland. The Advisory Board set quotas for each provincial district’s contribution to a national fund that would correct the disparities of local patriotic funds. The Advisory Board resolved to create an annual fund of £15,000 and set triannual quotas for each provincial district, based on their proportion of the population.63 A circular was sent out in March 1918 soliciting donations to meet the first quota of £5,000, but by September only £3,000 was raised for the NZEF.64 Though the Federation had not met its goal, the establishment of a national collection for all New Zealand soldiers overseas provided a sizeable sum that was divided among the units of the NZEF.65 The distribution of these funds helped correct some of the inequality of regionally-raised donations. In disbursing the £3,000, the 1st Battalion Otago Regiment received £68 and the 1st Battalion Auckland Regiment received £68, while the battalions of the Rifle Brigade received sums three times larger.66 Though it could not force other societies to contribute to a centralized fund, the New Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies was able to disburse its modest funds to correct the disparities created by localized efforts.

Another challenge faced by the Federation of New Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies was the need to ensure that returned soldiers and their families could access separation and repatriation funds anywhere in New Zealand. The movement of soldiers to and from their place of enlistment or demobilization raised questions about determining when a patriotic society should be responsible for a soldier’s allowances. The Wellington War Relief Association cited the case of Private J. Lapraik, to argue that a soldier’s

63 Circular Letter from W.W. Snodgrass, 11 March 1918. TDC 00220 : 2 : 1 Federation of NZ Patriotic War Relief Societies. AC.

64 Copy of Letter from MGen G.H. Russell, 13 September 1918. Ibid.

65 Copy of Divisional Routine Order No. 3893. Ibid.

66 Letter from Lt Col J.H. Kitchen, 13 September 1918. Ibid.
residence prior to enlistment should determine which society was responsible for him. Lapraik had lived near Gisborne for two years before coming to Wellington to enlist in the NZEF, and only having spent two days in Wellington, the Wellington War Relief Association did not believe it should be responsible for the cost of his resettlement. The Gisborne Patriotic Society was the closest committee to Lapraik’s pre-war residence, though still over one hundred kilometers away, but declined to entertain any of his claims for assistance because Lapraik did not enlist in Gisborne.67

The movement of returned soldiers created especially complicated arguments regarding patriotic societies’ liability for the claims of soldiers’ families. The Akitio County War Relief Association readily paid a claim forwarded by the Wairarapa Patriotic Association to cover the hospital and funeral expenses associated with the passing of a returned soldier, William Samuel Kelly. Because Kelly’s attestation papers listed his pre-war place of residence in Akitio County, the Wairapara Patriotic Association felt justified in forwarding the claim to Akitio County War Relief Association, which readily contributed £5 toward these costs. The Hawke’s Bay War Relief Association agreed to cover a share of these expenses, given that Kelly’s wife and next of kin resided nearby.68 William Carr Haggart also lived the itinerant life of a labourer before he enlisted with the 3rd Battalion New Zealand Rifles. After his discharge in 1917, Haggart applied to the Wairapara Patriotic Association for assistance, but on finding that he also resided near Akitio for three months before his enlistment, the Wairapara committee forwarded his claim to Akitio County.69 The executive of the Akitio County War Relief Association asked the Wairapara Patriotic Association if they would consider paying a share of Haggart’s claim, but the Wairapara committee considered the file closed. The Akitio

67 Lapraik lived near Waipiro Bay, near Gisborne, before the war. Minutes of Advisory Board, 7 Jun 1917. Ibid.
County War Relief Association again asked the Hawkes Bay War Relief Association to consider taking on some of Haggart’s claims, but the latter association did “not see its way clear to recognise any responsibility in the claim of this soldier.” In determining the scope of their responsibilities, patriotic societies decided definitively who was a member of their community and who was not.

Calls for equal contributions and equal access to repatriation benefits prompted demands for national coordination of patriotic activities in New Zealand. Some of the larger patriotic societies, such as those in Auckland and Otago, were suspicious of any arrangement that would mean losing control over the funds they had collected, and the Minister of Internal Affairs was reluctant to aggravate these suspicions by becoming directly involved in regulating patriotic associations. The result was a compromise that sought to encourage free association between disparate patriotic societies in New Zealand by organizing a federation of patriotic funds. The Federation of New Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies afforded each provincial district representation on its Advisory Board, set fundraising goals, and established proportional quotas based on each province’s population, but the collections for the New Zealand War Contingent Association fell short of the objectives. The Federation sought to encourage unity of action among New Zealand’s patriotic funds, but its Advisory Board did not have any means of enforcing its decisions. More importantly, the Federation was unable to enact a comprehensive network that could disburse funds to returned soldiers in any district, regardless of their prewar residence or place of enlistment.

While the various patriotic funds in New Zealand raised funds to provide separation allowances to the families and dependents of soldiers in the NZEF and support the costs of their repatriation and return to civilian life, the Navy League of New Zealand worked to raise funds to support the sailors of the Royal Navy. The question of raising funds in New Zealand for the dependants of British sailors raised questions about the relationship between nation and empire. In June 1916, the president of the Auckland

70 Meeting minutes, 6 October 1917. Ibid.
Branch of the New Zealand Farmers Union, Alexander Ross, questioned the purpose of raising funds for the Navy League in New Zealand, arguing that the role of the British government was to provide for British sailors and that the British government’s allowances were meeting the current needs of sailors’ families. Ross explained that the stance taken by the New Zealand Farmers Union against collecting funds in New Zealand to support the Navy League was intended to counter “the criminal waste which follows upon senseless duplication in these matters.” 71 The executive of the Canterbury Branch of the Navy League of New Zealand, however, “strongly disapproved” of Ross’ comments, arguing that “no man in this Dominion could maintain his self-respect whilst sheltering wholly behind the British tax-payer, considering the safety and welfare of one and all depend absolutely on the supremacy of the British Navy.” 72 Duty to Britain and, especially, the Royal Navy was a matter of national honour and national security for the members of the Navy League of New Zealand. While many patriotic societies focused on the needs of local soldiers and their dependants, the imperial community likewise drew on voluntary contributions.

There was some overlap between domestic relief funds and the goals of the New Zealand Navy League, as a number of New Zealanders served in the Royal Naval Reserve before the war and were called up for service. The Canterbury Patriotic Fund provided for the families of local soldiers and sailors and solicited a donation from the Canterbury Branch of the Navy League, but the executives of the Navy League declined to share their funds. 73 The decision not to cooperate with the Canterbury Patriotic Fund was not due to any financial duress on the part of the Navy League. The Minister of Internal Affairs had informed the League that the demands from naval dependants in New Zealand were “comparatively few,” so the Canterbury Branch to forward the

71 “Farmers and Naval Relief”, New Zealand Herald, 20 June 1916, 10.


73 Meeting Minutes 6 August 1916. Ibid.
majority of its War Fund to be disbursed by the trustees of the Navy League in London.\textsuperscript{74} By March 1919, the Canterbury Branch’s War Fund had sent £30,200 to London while only £429/11/9 was distributed to local sailors and their families or spent on administrative expenses.\textsuperscript{75} The funds raised by the Navy League of New Zealand were raised locally, but forwarded to Britain to benefit of the sailors of the Royal Navy and their families.

In most cases, contributions to the dominion war effort, such as the provision of equipment to the NZEF, were complimentary to the imperial war effort. The debates surrounding the collection of funds in support of the Navy League, however, present a scenario where supporting the imperial war efforts preceded the needs of the dominion. Alexander Ross of the New Zealand Farmers Union believed that collecting funds in New Zealand to benefit the sailors of the Royal Navy was unnecessary and preferred to centralize funds under the dominion government. Without any interventions from the state, however, the Navy League of New Zealand collected and administered funds in a manner that was almost entirely exclusive of the needs of New Zealanders. The few sailors who resided in New Zealand, and their families, certainly benefitted from the assistance of the Navy League of New Zealand, but sharing their resources with the local patriotic societies was out of the question. The vast majority of the funds collected were forwarded to London to be distributed among British sailors. The executives of the New Zealand Navy League clearly prioritized the collective security of the empire over domestic concerns.

The resistance to centralization among New Zealand’s patriotic societies demonstrated a clear preference for limiting voluntary efforts to a local scale. Successive organizations were created to coordinate the integration of disparate patriotic societies under a centralized effort, but the challenge of determining a system of equitable contributions, in proportion to population, or the arrangement for reciprocal payments

\textsuperscript{74} Meeting Minutes 17 October 1916. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} Treasurer’s Report, 11 March 1919. Ibid.
when providing repatriation benefits to soldiers from other districts consistently raised discord between patriotic societies. As much as the achievements of these communities served to project their identity, the debates between various patriotic societies reveal that patriotic work also defined identity in opposition to neighbouring districts or province. Efforts in the four major centres of Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin, and Wellington were mostly successful in uniting neighbouring districts into provincial patriotic associations, but local committees such as Gisborne, in Auckland provincial district, and Akitio, in Wellington provincial district, were wary of extending the gains of their collections to support efforts beyond the boundaries of their own district, much less their own province.

As with the Canadian Patriotic Fund, the varied patchwork of patriotic societies in New Zealand reflected the fluidity in scales of identity that different associations could adopt, some remaining staunchly local, others banding into provincial associations, a few championing a national federation of patriotic societies, but the absence of centralized authority left some soldiers or their families with little support. While most patriotic societies focused inward, the New Zealand Navy League supported an imperial mandate largely to the exclusion of local needs. Each patriotic society negotiated with its neighbours to determine the scale of their efforts and the spatial boundaries of their communal contribution to the war effort. Without a stronger intervention from the state, patriotic societies retained their independence to determine for themselves the scale of their efforts and to disburse their collections according to their own conception of a communal identity.

### 2.3 Australia

The declaration of hostilities in August 1914 was met with an immediate outpouring of donations in support of patriotic initiatives in Australia, but the rapid proliferation of patriotic funds during the first months of the war generated anxiety that criminals or businesses could abuse patriotic sentiment for profit. Echoing debates in New Zealand, the growing number of patriotic societies raised concern that parallel organizations would result in the wasteful duplication of voluntary efforts. The redundancies of enthusiastic, well-meaning but disparate efforts could lead to unhealthy
competition between patriotic societies and members of the Australian public would bear the brunt of ubiquitous collections and solicitations. For rural districts, where means were most scarce, many simply refused to support more patriotic fundraisers than could be sustained by their community. When the Tasmanian Department of Education formed its State Schools Patriotic Fund, for example, the head teacher at the Balfour State School, A.F. King, decided not to organize a collection because the local Red Cross already planned a patriotic concert. King explained that ‘things are very bad here at present,’ and that he did not think it wise to overtax the residents of his community with another fundraiser. Miss H.W. Wright, a teacher at Mount Pleasant State School in York Plains, explained that ‘this district is by no means wealthy’ and thus declined to press her students to collect for the State School Patriotic Fund because the Ministering Children’s League had already started a collection. In late August 1914, Taylor Bonnacord telegraphed the Premier of Queensland on behalf of the council of Dalby to complain that there were already ‘too many war funds.’ Bonnacord wrote with the recent drought in mind when he suggested the organization of ‘one big fund, and one administration. Or there will be waste.’ Much of the same mind, William Victor wrote to the Town Clerk of Perth to suggest the creation of the West Australian Patriotic League, under the direction of the Mayor of Perth, to collect and distribute all patriotic funds in Western Australia. Despite the tradition of relying on voluntary contributions to support Australian deployments overseas, the swelling number of public solicitations taxed Australians’ generosity and goodwill.

76 Letter from A.F. King to Director of Education, 9 September 1914, State Schools Patriotic Fund, ED9/1/1280. 845/1914, Tasmanian Archives and Heritage Office, Hobart (hereafter TAHO).

77 Letter from Miss H.W. Wright to Director of Education, 26 August 1914, Ibid.

78 Telegram from Taylor Bonnacord to Premier, 22 August 1914. Correspondence and papers re Great War. Chief Secretary's Correspondence, The Premier and Cabinet Department 1914 – 1918. Batch file 5384. 861779. BATCH 19; 7511/1914 - 9754/1914. QSA.

State authorities were responsive to the desire to regulate patriotic work. The state and Commonwealth governments worked to promote the centralization and collectivization of voluntary efforts. With tensions lingering from pre-war debates over the division of powers between the Commonwealth and state governments, responsibility for war-related work such as social services for soldiers’ families, the repatriation of returned soldiers, and the coordination of patriotic work was left to the state governments.\(^80\) By early 1916, four of the five states passed legislation to grant authority to State War Councils to regulate patriotic activities. The government of Queensland passed the Patriotic Funds Administration Act, Victoria enacted the State War Council Act and the Control of Patriotic Funds Act, while patriotic funds in New South Wales and South Australia were governed by the Commonwealth Relief Fund Act and the War Funds Regulation Act, respectively.\(^81\) The regulation of patriotic work was not uniform across the Commonwealth, but State War Councils were at work in all five states to regulate and rationalize the chaos of voluntary contributions and maintain public morale by preventing abuses of good faith and minimising redundant or competing efforts. Though State War Councils did not take direct control of patriotic work, centralization was encouraged by regulating public fundraising efforts. Denying patriotic societies the ability to raise funds through public appeals gave State War Councils the legal leverage to encourage disparate voluntary initiatives to unite under larger, established voluntary societies.

The largest philanthropic and patriotic societies also played a significant role in shaping the voluntary war effort in concert with the State War Councils’ directives to reduce redundancies in patriotic work. Patriotic societies negotiated among themselves, with the blessings of their State War Council, to demarcate boundaries between their respective efforts. In South Australia, for example, four different societies were permitted to organise public fundraising for the welfare of Australian soldiers, each according to a


\(^81\) Acts and Regulations Governing Patriotic Funds. A2479, 17/601. NAA.
separate mandate that was assigned by the State War Council. The League of Loyal
Women’s Trench Comforts Fund (TCF) sent comforts to Australian soldiers at the front,
while soldiers in hospital would receive gifts from the South Australia Division of the
British Red Cross Society (BRCS). The YMCA provided comforts to Australian soldiers
training in camp, while the Cheer-Up Society provided the same for Australian soldiers in
transit.82 Similar negotiations took place in New South Wales when it was discovered
that soldiers and their dependants were receiving aid from more than one fund. The New
South Wales Division of the BRCS, the Patriotic Fund, the War Chest, and the National
Relief Fund organised a conference of patriotic funds to define their separate roles in the
war effort and avoid redundant efforts.83

The division of labour was discussed in the minutest detail. A conference of South
Australian patriotic societies was convened to negotiate the collection of newspapers and
periodicals for soldiers. It was resolved that the Cheer-Up Society would solicit donations
of newspapers through public appeals, then forward material to the South Australia
Division of the BCRS so it could be distributed to Australian soldiers in hospital, while
reading material whose subject matter was deemed not suitable for hospital recovery was
forwarded to the League of Loyal Women to be sent to Australian soldiers at the front
through their branch of the TCF.84 This division of work was mirrored in other states and
strictly enforced. When Lieutenant Colonel A.M. McIntosh, the Primary Medical Officer
of the 1st Military District, discovered that recruits from Charter Towers were being
supplied with two pairs of socks from the local branch of the Red Cross, he informed the
executive of the Queensland Division of the BRCS of this deviation. The executive
promptly circularised all branches in the state that it was not for the Red Cross to provide

82 Circular letter No 4, 6 March 1916. GRG32, State War Council of South Australia. 1, Correspondence
of the State War Council of South Australia. Consignment, 00002 Correspondence, 1916. File 45. State
Records of South Australia, Adelaide (hereafter SRSA).

83 Executive Meeting, 30 September 1915. Executive Minute Books of the British Red Cross Society of
New South Wales, No. 2. ARCS.

84 Circular letter No 4, 6 March 1916. GRG32/1/00002, File 45, SRSA.
comforts for fit soldiers in transit. A more rational voluntary effort was achieved by dividing patriotic work between different societies and enforcing these boundaries with state law. In effect, state law dictated the geographical scale that patriotic work was conducted; all efforts were coordinated at the level of the state.

An important division of patriotic work was the timing of public fundraising. The State War Councils ensured that only one patriotic organization was soliciting funds from the Australian public at a given time. The Queensland State War Council, for example, divided the year between the Queensland Division of the BRCS, the YMCA, the Queensland Patriotic Fund, and the Queensland Comforts Fund, giving each organization a month or two in which theirs was the exclusive right to raise funds by public solicitation. Likewise in Victoria, the months of April, May, and June 1917 were divided between the Victorian Division of the BSRC, the Lady Mayoress's Patriotic League, and the YMCA. By requiring public fundraising to abide by these schedules, State War Councils spared Australians from being hounded on street corners by multiple patriotic societies simultaneously raising funds for parallel but competing efforts. The creation of State War Councils, the division of effort between existing voluntary societies, and the synchronization of public appeals were mechanisms put in motion to centralize Australia’s voluntary war effort.

The centralization of the home front, however, was not achieved without resistance. While it was relatively easy to coordinate fundraising schedules among different organizations in major urban centres, requiring rural or country branches to conform to the fundraising schedules established by their executives in the state capital was problematic. The difficulties encountered by the South Australian Soldiers’ Fund

85 Meeting Minutes, 10 September 1917. Ibid.

86 Memorandum for the Comptroller Department of Repatriations, 10 October 1918. Dates for Patriotic Appeals. A2483, B18/6092, NAA.

87 Letter from Frank Stapley to Senator Millen, 25 June 1918. Patriotic Funds. Lord Mayor's Fund, Melbourne, A2, 1918/2872, NAA.
(SASF) reveal how the state’s fundraising schedule raised tensions between the society’s executive in Adelaide and its country branches. The State War Council assigned the SASF the month of July 1917 to make its state-wide Australia Day appeal, which would culminate on 27 July. The YMCA would then raise funds during the month of August, the Red Cross in September, and the Navy League in October. The SASF planned for its two-hundred rural sub-branches to conduct a series of one-day festivals marking Australia Day, but local volunteers were reluctant to organize an outdoor event during a rainy winter month. The State War Council received complaints that two sub-branches of the SASF were planning to hold their Australia Day festivals as late as October. Further inquiries prompted requests from sub-branches in Gumeracha, Piccadilly, Mount Torrens, and Basket Range for permission to delay their Australia Day in September or October, owing to the difficulty of conducting an outdoor festival during the rainy winter months. The secretary of the committee in Houghton feared the local show grounds would be flooded, while volunteers in Mt Baker who remembered the “deluge” of rain that struck during the previous Australia Day fundraiser refused to pledge their efforts again unless festivities were postponed to a drier month.

The weather was not the only consideration for postponing country festivals. Replies also came from country branches asking to reschedule their celebration to avoid conflict with other efforts in nearby communities. The secretaries of sub-branches in the neighbouring districts of Keyneton, Tanunda, and Angaston all wrote separately asking to hold their celebrations on specific dates so as not to conflict with each other, knowing that the success of their own festival depended on attendance from the other two towns.

88 Letter From V.H. Ryan to W.E. Winterbottom, 16 June 1917. GRG32, State War Council of South Australia. 1, Correspondence State War Council South Australia. Consignment 00004, Correspondence 1917. File 83. SRSA.

89 Letter from F. Cox to W.E. Winterbottom, 19 June 1917; letter from T. Oliver to W.E. Winterbottom, 21 June 1917; letter from E.O. Mullins to W.E. Winterbottom, 25 July 1917; letter from W.T. Cramond to W.E. Winterbottom, 19 June 1917. GRG32/1/00004, File 83. SRSA.

90 Letter from F.L. Evans to W.E. Winterbottom, 20 June 1917. Letter from H Williams to WE Winterbottom, 20 August 1917. Ibid.
The sub-branch in Mannahill wanted to wait until September because most of the festival’s potential participants would be occupied with sheep shearing until the end of August, while the committee in Tanunda believed that a September appeal would receive better attendance from fruit and vine growers.91

Frustrated with the intrusion on their schedule, the acting secretary of the Morphett Vale sub-branch warned that “if the War Council will not allow us to hold our day when we think best and would meet the greatest success then they had better raise the amount required themselves.”92 Threatened with the loss of volunteers, the State War Council extended the window for Australia Day appeals to the end of August and eighty-six sub-branches took advantage of this extension. A further sixteen sub-branches obtained special permission to hold their Australia Day celebrations in September or October.93 Having resolved their conflict with the country branches of the SASF, the State War Council received a complaint from the YMCA Army Department, which protested that the SASF was given permission to raise funds during the month allocated for YMCA appeals.94 The imposition of a coordinated fundraising schedule by the State War Council raised the ire of patriotic societies in country districts, which flooded the executive of the SASF with requests for exemptions and exceptions to accommodate local conditions. Volunteers gained concessions from the state by protesting and threatening to withhold their efforts.

The division of patriotic work between different organizations also made it illegal for patriotic societies to share their profits with neighbouring societies, yet the nature of voluntary work allowed volunteers to bypass these regulations by withdrawing their efforts or changing their affiliations. In June of 1916, the secretary of the Red Cross sub-

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91 Letter from W. Tuohy and W.A. Bentley to W.E. Winterbottom, 14 July 1917. Ibid.

92 Letter from A. Anderson to W.E. Winterbottom, 19 July 1917. Ibid.

93 Meeting Minutes, 16 July 1917. GRG32 State War Council of South Australia. 3, Minute Books. Consignment 00001, Minute books 1916-1939. SRSA.

94 Meeting Minutes, 16 Jul 1917. Ibid.
branch in Bell, Queensland, forwarded the proceeds from its most recent fund raising appeal to the executive in Brisbane, but reported that £91/12/1 would be held and turned over to the local wounded soldiers’ fund. The executive in Brisbane quickly responded by informing its sub-branch in Bell that, in accordance with Queensland’s Patriotic Funds Administration Act, funds raised under the auspices of one voluntary society could not be turned over to another society for a different purpose.95 Over the following months, the Red Cross executive in Brisbane issued similar warnings to its sub-branches in Isis, Toowoomba, Sandgate, Tiaro, Peachester, and Cleveland advising members in each location that sharing proceeds from Red Cross collections with local repatriation funds was illegal under state law.96 In some cases, such regulations dissuaded volunteers from affiliating with the Red Cross. The Ladies Patriotic League in Halifax declined to incorporate as a branch of the Red Cross when it was made clear that this affiliation would prevent them from cooperating with local repatriation funds.97 The Queensland Women’s Electoral League also declined to organize itself as a branch of the Red Cross for similar reasons.98 Patriotic societies could cooperate in public appeals for donations, but the proceeds from that collection could not be shared between the participating societies. By enforcing Queensland’s wartime legislation, the Red Cross was able to invoke state law to prevent its sub-branches from collaborating with local patriotic funds and ensured that all proceeds raised by the various branches of the Red Cross in Queensland were forwarded to the executive in Brisbane. Not only were rural branches of patriotic societies required to follow a fundraising schedule set in their state capital, wartime legislation could raise barriers to prevent cooperation between neighbouring patriotic societies while reinforcing the authority of organizational hierarchies.


96 For Isis see Meeting Minutes, 12 Feb 1916; for Toowoomba see Meeting Minutes, 26 Feb 1916; for Sandgate see Meeting Minutes, 14 May 1917; for Peachester see Meeting Minutes, 23 July 1917; for Cleaveland see Meeting Minutes, 22 October 1917. Ibid.

97 Meeting Minutes, 28 August 1917. Ibid.

98 Meeting Minutes, 24 June 1918. Ibid.
In Western Australia, the trustees of the Goldfields Patriotic Fund were alarmed by the prospect of sending their funds to Perth. The secretary appealed to Senator George Millen arguing that their incorporation with a state-wide scheme as a ‘breach of faith’ with local soldiers who depended on the fund’s assistance and predicted that their income would drop by two-thirds as subscribers would no longer feel compelled to contribute to a general fund.99 The members of the War Service Committee of Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, were outraged that their local returned soldiers were receiving such a small share of the £3,630 the town had forwarded to the state repatriation fund in Sydney.100 Everywhere that state authorities attempted to impose the collectivization of patriotic funds, volunteers countered with the familiar refrain that locally-raised funds were intended to benefit soldiers from the local community. To redistribute these collections further afield would break faith with donors and their intended recipients.

Lawmakers in each state sought to encourage the centralization of the voluntary war effort through indirect means. Wartime legislation empowered State War Councils to regulate patriotic work, and these councils worked in concert with the most established philanthropic organizations and patriotic societies to encourage the collectivization of voluntary effort by controlling which societies could raise funds publicly and how these funds could be spent. Yet these measures were met with resistance from local efforts that prioritised the needs of their community. Teachers in Tasmania declined to participate in the State School Patriotic Fund in order to spare schoolchildren and their families from such impositions at a time of financial hardship. Sub-Branches of the SASF coordinated their Australia Day fundraisers according to the local climate, the patterns of seasonal employment, and the timing of fundraisers in neighbouring communities. The Queensland Division of the BRCS was forced to remind many of its members that they could only raise funds for the Red Cross, while the State War Council in South Australia

99 Telegram from Charles Eccles to George Millen, 20 July 1917. Goldfields Patriotic Fund. Copy of Report, etc, A2479, 17/848. NAA.

100 Newspaper clipping ‘Control of Patriotic Funds – Centralisation in NSW.’ Patriotic Funds, Local Control and Distribution. A2479 17/192. NAA.
denied many local patriotic funds permission to raise funds unless the proceeds were forwarded to one of the state’s five major patriotic societies. Patriotic funds in Western Australia and New South Wales decried the requirement to forward their collections to the state capital as a breach of faith with their donors. The laws passed to collectivise the Australian voluntary war effort were met with widespread resistance by patriotic organizations that sought to coordinate their patriotic work independently, according to local requirements.

Not all states pursued centralizing policies with such vigor, and these variations in policies produced paradoxical results. As part of their efforts to centralize the voluntary war effort, state war councils encouraged disparate battalion comforts clubs to contribute to larger organizations, such as the Australian Comforts Fund (ACF) or the TCF, which were authorized to conduct public fundraisers to cover shipping costs and benefitted from subsidies from the Department of Defence. These larger organizations did their best to distribute parcels among all Australian soldiers and refused to deliver parcels addressed to individuals. The appeal of battalion or unit comforts clubs was noted by the Victoria League in Western Australia. The Victoria League had been approached by the Ministry of Defence to administer a branch of the TCF in Western Australia. In their early efforts, the Victoria League exercised their state-wide mandate by ensuring that contributions to the TCF benefited all Australian soldiers at the front, but the executive was met with increasing demands for the formation of separate battalion clubs that would allow their members to send parcels to soldiers of a particular unit. In November 1916, the Victoria League conceded to demands for the formation of separate battalion clubs. In 1917, the work of the Victoria League was divided between the general TCF, which strove to send comforts to all Australian soldiers overseas, and a collection of newly formed battalion clubs and committees. The proliferation of battalion or unit clubs that operated under the TCF left a measurable impact on their fundraising efforts. The TCF had collected £3,548 between August 1914 and the 31 December 1917 but after smaller battalion clubs were authorised to raise funds and ship comforts, the Victoria League increased its revenues eight-fold. The general TCF collected £8,083 in cash donations, while the collected
efforts of the battalion committees raised a total of nearly £11,000. The disparity between donations to the general TCF and the battalion clubs suggests that donors were more willing to contribute to a battalion fund that was guaranteed to benefit soldiers from a local unit, rather than send a parcel to an anonymous Australian soldier through the TCF.

The proliferation of independent battalion comforts clubs attracted more donations, but these were concentrated among units recruited in Western Australia. Comforts clubs dedicated to the 11th, 28th, and 44th Battalions, and the 10th Light Horse each collected in excess of £1,000 in 1917. The club supporting 16th Battalion, which drew three-quarters of its recruits from Western Australia and the remainder from South Australia, raised over £900, while the club of the 12th Battalion, which drew half its recruits from Western Australia and half from Tasmania, only raised £79. Other battalion clubs that supported units with no geographical affiliation raised considerably less funds. The Railway Corps’ comforts club only collected £8 in 1917. There was a noticeable correlation between the percentage of Western Australian soldiers serving in a given unit and donations that supported that unit’s comfort’s club. Indeed, the annual report of the Victoria League observed that the “wisdom” of dividing the efforts of the TCF between separate battalion clubs “greatly increased contributions both in cash and goods.” Yet the surge of donations in favour of particular battalion clubs also created disparities between the separate units. Just as New Zealand patriotic funds sent comforts to local battalions and ignored the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, battalions and regiments recruited wholly in Western Australia received the lion’s share of donations while other unit clubs received relatively little support.

101 Report for year ending December 31, 1917. Trench Comforts Fund, Victoria League. PR1663. JSBL.


103 Report for year ending December 31, 1917. Trench Comforts Fund, Victoria League. PR1663. JSBL.

104 Report for year ending December 31, 1917. Ibid.
The State War Council of South Australia took the opposite approach of its Western Australian counterparts by working to centralize comforts clubs. While decentralization of comforts clubs in Western Australia prompted a spike in voluntary contributions, the members of South Australian comforts clubs protested orders to forward their collections to the state TCF. The Bute Branch of the League of Loyal Women, for example, approached the State War Council for permission to raise funds so that it could send comforts to local volunteers serving overseas, but the State War Council replied that such fundraising would only be authorised if comforts were sent through the TCF. Members of battalion or unit clubs were often frustrated by the requirement to work through the TCF because they lost control over who might receive their parcels. The 18th Battery Club tried to break free of the TCF and cooperated instead with the Army & Navy Stores in London because it was found that parcels sent through the TCF were not reaching the men of 18th Battery. The State War Council quickly intervened to patch relations between the 18th Battery Club and the TCF by pointing out that the 18th Battery had been transferred to the Western Front and when the Club’s parcels arrived in Egypt they were distributed among soldiers in the Light Horse rather than shipped again to follow the 18th Battery to Europe. The comforts were allocated in response to operational limitations and an effort to conserve shipping space, not because of malfeasance on the part of the TCF.

The anxiety felt by the members of the 18th Battery Club was shared by other comfort clubs. Miss E. R. Schramm from Little Swamp approached the State War Council requesting permission to raise funds to send comforts to local soldiers, but the Council insisted Schramm work through the TCF. There were doubts in Little Swamp that the TCF reached as many soldiers as was claimed. Mr J.H. Woods wrote a number of letters to members of the State War Council complaining that the TCF had yet to send

105 Meeting minutes, 18 September 1917. GRG32/3/00001. SRSA.
106 Letter from V.H. Ryan to Secretary Central Trench Comforts Club, 4 May 1917. GRG32/1/00004, File 44. SRSA.
107 Meeting minutes, 15 January 1918. GRG32/3/00001. SRSA.
even a single cigarette to soldiers from Little Swamp. The State War Council nevertheless insisted that the people of Little Swamp send comforts through the TCF, while the executives of the fund were asked to provide an explanation to account for Mr Woods’ accusations.\textsuperscript{108} The proliferation of battalion and unit comforts clubs reflected the desire to ensure that parcels and packages could be sent to loved-ones overseas, or at least to benefit the members of locally-raised battalions. Centralized organizations such as the TCF or the ACF strove to send packages to all Australian soldiers, but these efforts were met with suspicion from communities who felt that their own soldiers were ignored by these larger organizations. In preferring to support patriotic efforts that clearly benefited local soldiers or locally-raised units and in trying to resist or contest the centralising measures of the State War Council, Australian donors revealed the terms by which they would contribute to the war overseas. In both collective and individual acts of wartime charity, Australians sought to promote the needs of their local community by steering patriotic donations toward individuals with whom they had a direct personal connection, or at least toward a unit of the AIF with whom they shared a communal identity.

Along with repatriation funds, organizations dedicated to the comfort of Australian soldiers overseas guarded their efforts closely. The tensions between centralized efforts and autonomous battalion comforts clubs reveal that the disputes over the control of voluntary efforts were more than an extension of a rural-urban divide or a simple desire for local autonomy. These disputes reflected the desire to devote voluntary efforts to a specific community. When the Victoria League of Western Australia allowed the TCF to divide into separate battalion clubs, eight of the fifteen clubs were based in Perth.\textsuperscript{109} The 18\textsuperscript{th} Battery Club that quarrelled with the South Australian State War Council over the delivery of their parcels was headquartered in Adelaide.\textsuperscript{110} The friction

\textsuperscript{108} Meeting minutes, 4 March 1918. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{109} Report for year ending December 31, 1917. Trench Comforts Fund, Victoria League. PR1663. JSBL.

\textsuperscript{110} 1st Annual Report of the 18th Battery Club 1916. GRG32/1/00001, File No 44. SRSA.
between battalion clubs based in state capitals and their State War Council reveals that the conflicts which erupted over the centralization of patriotic work were not created solely by the complications of geographical alienation. The conflicts surrounding the coordination of voluntary work were aggravated by a desire to retain control over donations of time, effort, and money. Local committees protested incursions from state authorities that required them to pool their collections into larger initiatives because this kind of collectivization stripped voluntary societies of the ability to determine who would benefit from their efforts.

While state legislation could undermine cooperation between local societies, the increasing authority of the major voluntary societies could also prevent local organizations from fracturing into even smaller efforts. The executives of the Queensland Division of the Red Cross requested that the Cleveland Shire Patriotic Fund and Red Cross Fund remove the words Red Cross from their name, as there was already a branch of the Red Cross raising funds in Cleveland. Elsewhere, state executives were able to resolve disputes between neighbouring branches. The secretary of the Helidon Branch of the Red Cross complained to the executive that members of the branch in nearby Grantham were entering their town to solicit funds. The executive of the Victorian Division was forced to intervene in a dispute between the Watchem Red Cross Society and the United Red Cross Society, also based in Watchem, to ensure that their competing efforts did not undermine the reputation of the Red Cross in the district. The outbreak of war was a catalyst for growth in organization such as the BRCS, but the proliferation of sub-branches could result in undue competition, which had to be reigned-in for the sake of efficiency and social stability. State laws empowered this centralization to reduce waste and spare the Australian public from constant competing patriotic collections.

111 Meeting minutes, 22 October 1918. Executive Committee Minute Book, Red Cross Society Queensland Division, 1915-1917, OM.BH/1/1. JOL.

112 Meeting minutes, 30 July 1917. Ibid.

113 Meeting minutes, 22 November 1915. Divisional Council Minutes 1915. Division and Executive Committee. V09, Box 1. Archives of the Red Cross of Victoria, Melbourne (hereafter ARCV).
The mobilization of the Australian home front through voluntary means was increasingly centralized through an ongoing process of negotiation between local volunteers, the executives of voluntary societies, and State War Councils. State executives of voluntary societies and State War Councils attempted to coordinate voluntary contributions on a scale that promoted an efficient voluntary effort, but local volunteers preferred to coordinate their work to reflect the communal ties that motivated them to participate in the war effort. By enforcing state legislation passed to regulate the chaos of disparate local initiatives, State War Councils and the executives of patriotic societies worked to regulate Australia’s voluntary war effort into a rational, federal organization. State War Councils were formed to promote efficiency of effort and protect the public from duplicate or duplicitous fundraisers, while the executives of voluntary societies, such as the BSRC or the SASF worked to centralize control over their country branches.

The centralization of patriotic funds also interrupted the ties between Australian communities and Britain. Soon after the first Australian casualties were suffered at Gallipoli, the ANA of South Australia forwarded funds to the ANA branch in London for the purposes of supplying comforts to wounded Australian soldiers who were convalescing in England.\(^{114}\) By December 1915, the ANA of South Australia was collecting funds to subsidize the ‘Anzac Buffet’ operated by the London branch of the ANA for the benefit of Australian soldiers in London.\(^{115}\) These early appeals for funds, however, eventually came under the scrutiny of the State War Council, which ruled that the ANA could not conduct public appeals for funds that were not controlled in Australia.\(^{116}\) The executives of the ANA of South Australia approached the Department of Defence, which pressured the State War Council to revise its policy and allow the

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\(^{114}\) Board of Directors Meeting, 19 May 1915. Minutes 1911-1915, Australian Natives Association. SRG 280. Series 1 Vol 5. SLSA.

\(^{115}\) Board of Directors Meeting, 1 Dec 1915. Ibid.

\(^{116}\) Letter from V.H. Ryan to Gen Secty Australian Natives Association, 15 Feb 1917. File No 62, GRG32/1/00004. SRSA.
ANA to continue raising funds for the Anzac Buffet in London, but the members of the State War Council ruled that it was desirable to limit fundraising in the state and suggested that the ANA sustain the Anzac Buffet by soliciting donations from Australians living in Britain. After further correspondence from the Department of Defence highlighting the importance of such work for the welfare of Australian soldiers overseas, the State War Council eventually gave permission for the ANA to collect up to £400 a year through public subscriptions in support of the Anzac Buffet in London.

Though most patriotic societies sought to keep their efforts local, there were certainly examples of societies that sought to contribute directly to national, international, or imperial funds. These attempts by local communities to bypass federal hierarchies challenged the effort to centralize patriotic work under the state governments. The process of centralization reinforced a division of work between the most established voluntary societies, and helped prevent a fracturing of the war effort by curtailing competition between local initiatives. The oversight of the State War Councils and state executives of patriotic societies worked to prevent patriotic efforts from disbursing funds outside of this federal hierarchy, to keep patriotic funds within the state, or at least the nation.

As was the case in Canada and New Zealand, certain voluntary societies in Australia bucked the trend of prioritizing local needs and coordinated their voluntary efforts on a wider, imperial scale that reflected a larger spatial conception of identity. The measures enforced by the State War Councils, however, worked to counter these initiatives. The State War Council of South Australia tried to divert the efforts of the ANA from sending money to Britain for the benefit of the state’s patriotic funds, just as it worked to encourage local patriotic funds to contribute to state-wide collections for the SASF and reinforced a federal structure that flowed from town, to state, to nation. The

117 Letter from V.H. Ryan to T. Trumble, 26 Apr 1917. File No 62, GRG32/1/00004. SRSA.

118 Letter from V.H. Ryan to T. Trumble, 15 June 1917. Ibid.
imposition of a centralized system meant to give order to voluntary work also re-ordered how volunteers could participate in larger communities.

The imposition of order from the top-down, however, was met with no small measure of resistance. As the State War Councils policed and centralized the collection of comforts for Australian soldiers under a few larger organizations, the members of battalion and unit comforts funds opposed collective efforts in order to ensure the needs of local soldiers were met. Public fundraisers were orchestrated between the leading patriotic societies in each state capital, but town and district councils sought to coordinate their efforts according to local considerations such as weather or seasonal work and sought primarily to benefit local soldiers. The rationalization of the Australian voluntary war effort was not a smooth, seamless progression towards order and efficiency. Only by invoking wartime legislation was it possible to focus disparate voluntary efforts away from the needs of their community toward the larger collective efforts of the major voluntary societies, but concessions were still made to pacify volunteers whose fundraisers were thrown into disarray because of scheduling agreements made in state capitals. The friction between volunteers and the State War Councils highlights the difficulties of centralizing voluntary efforts and the position from which volunteers could negotiate to mobilize on their own terms. While the previous chapter has shown that the state could refuse voluntary donations, cases of resistance to centralization in Australia show that volunteers could – to a certain extent – refuse or resist the demands of the state. State War Councils enforced laws to collectivize voluntary efforts at the level of the state, but volunteers were in a relatively strong position to negotiate the scale to which they would organize their efforts.

2.4 Conclusion

A comparative examination of voluntary work by British residents of the dominions reveals the importance of space and scale in defining the limits of their communal identities. The scale to which communities orchestrated their voluntary efforts determined how collections would be counted, to whom the achievements could be attributed, and where funds or comforts were sent. As was demonstrated by numerous chapters of the IODE, limiting the scale of patriotic work to a town or city made the
donors more identifiable and made it easier to identify who would receive their work. This control over voluntary contributions reassured donors that their contributions fulfilled their intentions and encouraged more enthusiastic participation. Discussions over the coordination of patriotic work revealed how communities identified themselves and their members according to spatial boundaries. Determining the scale of these efforts reflected some of the fluidity in spatial boundaries as efforts could shrink or expand to suit the concentric scales of British imagined communities.

The wider coordination of the war effort necessitated some regulation to promote the efficiency of patriotic work and the equity of relief and repatriation. Attempts to regulate patriotic work reflected the importance of defining boundaries and limiting efforts. Disparate patriotic committees around New Zealand negotiated the terms by which they would unite with other districts to form provincial, state, or national efforts. The scale to which a voluntary society would organize their efforts, and the spatial boundary of the community that was mobilized as a result, was the product of debates, disagreements, and negotiations as neighbouring voluntary societies weighed the options of cooperating or competing with one another. Communities could decide to mobilize as a city, a district, a state or province, or as a nation as they contributed to the war effort. The scale of voluntary efforts could also extend to the whole of the British Empire, as recent British migrants, such as the Scottish women of Calgary, identified with larger communities across the seas. Wartime legislation in Australia worked to curtail the flow of patriotic donations to Britain, lest they detracted from state-administered funds, but voluntary societies such as the ANA nevertheless attempted to send funds directly to London. The executives of the Navy League of New Zealand, conversely, made no secret that imperial security, through the strength of the Royal Navy, outweighed the needs of soldiers serving in the NZEF. The question of disbursing voluntary efforts on an imperial scale demonstrated that British residents in the dominions imagined themselves to be active members of the imperial community, but these tensions also raised debates about the needs of the nation versus the empire in wartime.

The debates between prioritizing the needs of the nation over those of the empire reveal an important dimension to the mobilization of settler societies for an imperial war.
Attempts to rationalize and collectivize the voluntary war effort were intended to benefit dominion society by protecting residents from competing appeals and ensuring that donations were not wasted in competing efforts. In Canada and New Zealand national and provincial authorities did little to exert control over patriotic work. Voluntary societies carried out their work enthusiastically but competing efforts raised tensions between neighbouring communities and sometimes left soldiers with no support from patriotic funds. The laissez-faire approach to voluntary patriotism encouraged self-motivated volunteers to pursue their work but did little to ensure these voluntary efforts were not wasted. A de-centralized approach built on volunteers’ enthusiasm and sustained their willingness to contribute but created tensions between competing efforts and left some returned soldiers without support. Domestic stability was sacrificed for a greater outpouring of work for the imperial war effort.

Centralization raised efficiency and reduced waste by preventing duplications of effort, ensured adequate provisions were in place for returned soldiers, and promoted domestic stability by regulating the chaos of voluntary patriotism. This was most evident in Australian states such as South Australia and Queensland, where regulations prevented voluntary societies from sending donations directly overseas, forcing donors to contribute to state collections. The centralization of patriotic work, however, was unpopular among volunteers, who threatened to withdraw their support and reduce the output of the voluntary war effort. Patriotic work constituted an emotional labour that connected donors at home with soldiers overseas, the centralization of the voluntary home front threatened to cut the emotional bond between donor and recipient. Regulating patriotic work promoted domestic stability, but threatened to reduce patriotic contributions for the imperial war effort. Self-motivated efforts produced more for the war effort, but regulating these separate initiatives curtailed this enthusiasm for the public good.

Examining the discussions between voluntary societies reveals some important elements to the construction of identity for British residents of the dominions. The intensity of the debates between different voluntary societies over the scale of collective efforts and the importance of identifying the achievements of voluntary efforts and attributing those patriotic contributions to a specific place, demonstrate the gravity of
spatial boundaries in defining the identity of British communities in the dominions. Yet these boundaries were fluid and the ease with which communities could define themselves according to any of the concentric categories of identity ranging from the local to the imperial. As the dominant demographic of an empire that covered a quarter of the globe in maps and atlases as a contiguous stain of red, British residents of the dominions could identify themselves as part of the whole empire or could wish to distinguish their own corner of the empire through an identifiable contribution to the war effort, offered in the name of their town, district, state, or province.

Most revealing was the power to define the spatial limits of a community in their own terms. The executives of voluntary and patriotic societies negotiated with one another to expand their efforts to a larger scale, but the overwhelming majority of volunteers preferred to keep their work local and to define for themselves the spatial boundaries of their community. Even in Australia, where wartime legislation sought to enforce collectivization, volunteers were able to challenge the authority of State War Councils and keep their efforts local. Wherever they were in the dominions, British settlers identified their community by the space they occupied and could expand that space to define their community to a scale that encompassed anything from their hometown to the whole of the British Empire. Voluntary action allowed those on the home front to feel like active participants in the war effort, so long as they could apply their own initiative in the organization of fund-raising events and maintain their autonomy in choosing how their donations or collections were distributed. Patriotic work connected volunteers and donors to the wider imagined communities of the nation and the empire, but maintaining control over their efforts allowed volunteers to feel like a distinct and important component of a larger whole.

By retaining control over the dispersal of their contributions, the members of voluntary societies could express their identity within any of the concentric scales of the hometown, province, region, nation, and empire and to transcend spatial limits without needing to cross social boundaries. Non-British communities are almost entirely absent from the records of voluntary societies and were usually only mentioned in discussions of philanthropic efforts such as travellers’ aid and educational funds that made non-British
migrants the object of their charity. Communication networks made it possible for British members of voluntary and patriotic societies to connect or compete with other British voluntary societies without interacting with or acknowledging non-British members of their local community. The locations attached to patriotic contributions were attributed to entire towns, cities, provinces or states, but only represented the efforts of British residents. Conflating voluntary contributions with the geographical place that produced it added to the abstraction of space, which homogenized the contributions of a given place as a wholly British effort. The power and privilege associated with shaping spatial categories of identity reveals how ideas of space and place were intertwined with other social categories of race and ethnicity. The following chapter will continue to explore how organizing voluntary efforts according to spatial categories effectively effaced the contributions of non-British communities.
Chapter 3

3 The Contribution of Others

In December of 1916, Captain A.J. Hansen wrote a circular letter to prominent members of the Scandinavian communities in Western Canada asking for their help in raising men for a Scandinavian company to reinforce the CEF. Hansen wrote that “in order to make this unit a real success we must all work together; we must make it OUR unit.”¹ His letter argued that the Department of Militia’s authorization of a Scandinavian company provided Scandinavian diasporans² with “an opportunity to distinguish themselves from the many other nationalities which emigrated to Canada and for who some reason or other cannot show their loyalty as loyalty is understood when one's country is at war.”³ When Hansen spoke of loyalty for “one’s country,” he was certainly referring to Canada, given that Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark nominally maintained their neutrality in the conflict. While imploring Scandinavians to fight for Canada, however, Hansen was raising a Scandinavian company so that Scandinavians could “distinguish themselves.” The attempts to raise a Scandinavian contingent reflected how a communal contribution to the war effort provided the opportunity for a community to project its identity and articulate its relationship to the wider nation and empire. In this case, the contingent was to be identified as Scandinavian, but as a Scandinavian community rooted in Canadian soil.

Many non-British communities attempted to raise their own contingents in order to project their own identity as diasporans living in the dominions. Marginalized communities organized clubs and cultural associations to advocate for their rights


² This chapter uses the terms diaspora and diasporans to denote communities composed of second- or third-generation immigrants who were born in the dominions and qualified as British subjects, but were nevertheless stigmatized and marginalized as migrants.

³ Ibid.
through public activism and the publication of their own newspapers and periodicals. These efforts were extended after the outbreak of war, as community organizers orchestrated their own contribution to the war effort in an attempt to redefine their status in dominion society. As was the case with Captain Hansen, many community leaders believed that mobilizing a unique contingent of soldiers could confirm the place of their fellow diasporans in the national war effort. As non-British communities tried to negotiate the social boundaries that kept them on the margins of society in the British dominions, the responses to these patriotic offers reveal how social boundaries were reinforced to uphold the cultural dominance of British settler society. The imperial war effort necessitated the mobilization of manpower in the dominions, but dominion authorities were reluctant to mobilize their marginalized populations to meet these demands.

The preceding chapters showed that British communities in the dominions readily organized collective voluntary contributions in support of the war effort, but these communal initiatives rarely included non-British residents of the dominions. The remaining chapters of this dissertation will examine voluntary efforts coordinated by non-British communities who rallied to support the imperial war effort. The records relating to these contributions will be examined to illuminate the terms by which non-British communities sought to contribute to the national and imperial war effort, and the reasons why state authorities decided to include or exclude these contributions. A comparative analysis of different communities of diasporans will illuminate the extent to which the social boundaries that marginalized these communities could be re-drawn through voluntary participation in the imperial war effort. The mobilization of non-British diasporans such as French, Scandinavian, Japanese, and African Canadians provided an opportunity to for these minorities to cross social boundaries through military service. The efforts to undermine these transgressions reveal how constructions of race and ethnicity were reinforced in the dominions by categories of space.

Variations in the settlement of the dominions and the policies exercised to encourage or restrict migration created corresponding demographic variations. The presence of French settlements in North America and their inclusion in Confederation left
Canada with a sizeable non-British diaspora whose linguistic distinction had no parallel in Australia or New Zealand. Loyalist emigration following the American Revolution and the Underground Railroad brought African-American communities to parts of Ontario and the Maritimes, which is likewise exceptional among the dominions. Although the demographic compositions of the dominions were unique to each context, the three dominions are comparable because of the shared prejudices in the reception and accommodation of immigrants. British residents of the dominions were particularly distressed by arrivals from Asia. Labour organizations blamed Asian migrants for wage deflation while others feared that Asians and South Asians would never acculturate into settler society. Policies were implemented in the three dominions to restrict Asian migration. Under pressure from imperial authorities who feared that racially-explicit immigration policies could strain British-Japanese relations or aggravate Indian nationalists, the dominions implemented policies that discriminated according to race, but were written in racially-benign language.

Australia and New Zealand applied the “Natal Formula” and subjected immigrants to a literacy exam that required arriving passengers to transcribe a passage dictated in a European language. As a dictation test did not present a sufficient obstacle to a literate, English-speaking South Asian, an Order-in-Council inserted the “continuous journey” regulation into Canada’s Immigration Act in 1908. This measure denied entry to all immigrants who did not arrive directly from their nation of origin and, given that steamship travel from India, China, and Japan necessitated a stopover in Hawaii, effectively excluded Asian and South Asian immigration. The expulsion of the SS Komagata Maru, a merchant ship chartered to transport 376 South Asian migrants directly from Hong Kong to Vancouver that satisfied all the requirements of the

4 On “White Australia” see Lake and Reynolds, The Global Colour Line, Ch.6; on “White Canada” see Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin, Culling the Masses, 147-148; on “White New Zealand” see Belich, Paradise Reforged, 223-224.

5 Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin, Culling the Masses, 152.
“continuous journey” regulation, made plain the racist design of the Order-in-Council. 6

The arrival of Afro-Caribbean immigrants from various British colonies in Latin America was restricted with Section 38 of the 1910 Immigration Act, which excluded anyone “deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.” 7

As Constance Blackhouse shows in her study of racism in Canada’s legal system, an examination of the application and litigation of “raceless” legislation reveals how racialized categories were constructed in Canada without relying on explicitly racist wording. 8

Comparing the efforts to contribute a contingent of soldiers in European, Asian, and African communities reveals that categories of space were invoked to provide a “raceless” rationale for the selective exclusion of racialized communities from the voluntary war effort.

Non-British communities were marked by their differences in language and, in the case of Asian, South Asian, and African diasporans, skin colour. These markers were used to enforce formal social barriers which excluded non-British diasporans from labour unions and, in the worst cases, denied them the right to own property or participate in elections. Recently, scholars have examined how social barriers were turned into spatial barriers that confined minorities according to space, particularly in urban areas.

Designating who could live in which neighbourhoods, for example, reflects hierarchies of race. 9

Legislation was essential in the social construction of spaces in order to confine racialized minorities and exclude them from spaces reserved for white settlers. 10

The physical appropriation of public space was reflected in the ability of a community to

6 Ibid., 153-154.
9 Tracey Banivanua-Mar and Penelope Edmonds, “Introduction,” in Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place and Identity, Tracey Banivanua-Mar and Penelope Edmonds eds., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 4-5.
claim its relationship to a given place. As the previous chapter has shown, voluntary contributions from Anglophone communities were unanimously defined in terms of space and place. Claiming spatial categories as markers of their identity naturalized Britons as dominant in the dominions. If spaces such as towns, provinces, and regions came to define British communities, how were non-British communities represented in these spaces?

The mobilization of non-British diasporans reveals that the opportunity to project a communal identity and gain entry into the mainstream of dominion society was complicated by constructions of space. As British communities defined their contributions in terms of space, contributions from non-British communities were systematically displaced. This chapter will begin with an examination of French-Canadian communities. French Canadians in the province of Quebec, where Francophone settlers secured their place on the continent, mobilized to support the war effort to demonstrate their parallel contribution to British-Canadians. The connection to place, however, was more tenuous for French Canadians outside of Quebec which also attempted to demonstrate their contribution to the war effort but found their attempts to form regional, francophone battalions of the CEF undermined as neighbouring Anglophone recruiters monopolized local efforts. French-Canadian recruits were forced to either serve with a local Anglophone unit or enlist in Quebec. The opportunity to raise distinct battalions to reinforce the CEF prompted Japanese- and African-Canadians to mobilize their communities to participate in the national war effort, but the implications of these efforts on the transgression of social boundaries prompted officers of the Canadian Militia to reinforce boundaries of space as a way to exclude on the basis of race. Local recruiters did not necessarily deny that racialized minorities could serve in the CEF, only that they could not serve in their local unit. Racialized minorities were thus required to enlist away from their place of residence. Diasporans in Australia and New Zealand likewise attempted to provide unique contributions to the war effort, but defence legislation overtly discriminated on the basis of race. Individual diasporans successfully negotiated their entry past exclusive regulations, but the organization of Australian and New Zealand forces around categories of space effectively effaced these exceptions. The policies put in place to legitimize racial exclusion in dominion forces reveal that
categories of space and place were also used to marginalize non-British communities in the dominions.

3.1 French Canada

French Canadians were the most politically-enfranchised of the dominion’s non-British diasporans. By 1914, French Canadians were entitled to the rights and freedoms accorded to all British Subjects in the dominion and French-Canadian representatives in both national political parties were elected to the House of Commons in Ottawa and to the Assemblé nationale in Quebec City. By other measures, however, French Canadians contended with obstacles that were of little consequence to Anglophones. Industry and finance operated in English, placing an artificial ceiling on unilingual francophone employees. English was also the official language of the Canadian state, which raised tensions over the language of education in state schools or the availability of French-language training in the Canadian Militia. Intertwined with debates over language were questions of religion. The majority of French Canadians were Roman Catholic, while the majority of the dominant Anglophone diaspora were members of the various Protestant denominations. The place of religions in state-subsidized education or the presence of Roman Catholic chaplains in the Canadian Militia conflated differences over language and religion into a larger conflict between French and English.

The status of French Canadians is complicated by the geographical boundaries that divided different enclaves of French Canada. Protection of Roman Catholic and French instruction in schools was a provincial responsibility that was relatively well-entrenched in Quebec, where the business of the provincial legislature and provincial courts was conducted in both languages and French Canadians formed the majority of the electorate. The protection of language and religion in primary education was more precarious in provinces such as Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick, where French-Canadian communities were the minority. The restriction of French-language
instruction in Ontario schools in 1912 and 1913 demonstrated the vulnerability of French-
Canadian culture outside of Quebec.  

The Ontario schools controversy helped frame the French-Canadian response to the outbreak of war in 1914. For French-Canadian political and intellectual elites such as Henri Bourassa, the Ontario schools controversy reflected the indifference of British imperial protection for non-British subjects in the dominion, an indifference that justified French-Canadian passivity in the defence of Britain. The isolationist and anti-war rhetoric of Bourassa and other Québécois Nationalistes, particularly during and after the Conscription Crisis of 1917, has received much attention from Canadian historians.  

Many French Canadians, however, rallied to support the war as a means of securing protection against further marginalization. The place of French Canadians in a nation dominated by British language and culture were central to motivating voluntary contributions from French Canada. The need to assert and protect their cultural identity prompted French-Canadian communities to participate in the war effort, but their contributions were often framed to contrast with English-Canadian contributions.

In Montreal, the executive of the Fédération nationale St-Jean-Baptiste held an emergency meeting at the outbreak of war to determine the organization’s role in the coming conflict. The French-Canadian women’s group, formed in 1893 as a Catholic francophone philanthropic association, decided to contribute to Montreal’s newly-formed Patriotic Fund and the Red Cross. In discussing the details at a subsequent meeting, the executive decided that the Fédération would form a separate committee under the Red Cross rather than meet with the English-Canadian committees. Two members of the executive, Mme Béique and Mme Thibaudeau, were reluctant to pursue this separate course, fearing it would “froisser le sentiment anglais” but it was decided that “comme

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les canadiennes françaises préfèrent garder leur autonomie,” a separate French-Canadian committee was the best means of contributing to Red Cross work in Montreal.13

A sub-committee of the Fédération was formed to participate in the work of the Patriotic Fund, but the desire to maintain autonomy over their work strained relations between French and English. To ensure that charity was not wasted on vice, the disbursement of relief or Patriotic Funds was contingent on inspections by the Fund’s officials.14 The members of the Fédération wished to take responsibility for visiting homes in French neighbourhoods, while English members could inspect homes in English neighbourhoods. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory as no neighbourhood in Montreal was exclusively French or English. A compromise was proposed to pair one French member of the Patriotic Fund with an English member to conduct inspections together throughout the city.15 Under this arrangement, it was not necessary to divide the work of the Patriotic Fund between French and English neighbourhoods, and the Fédération’s sub-committee was dissolved.16

The division in Red Cross work between French and English, however, only deepened. The executive of the Fédération reported on the collective contributions of the Red Cross of Montreal, as announced at the Red Cross’ provincial executive meeting held “chez les anglaises,” but emphasized that 10,000 of the 30,000 knitted items collected were produced by members of the Fédération’s French-Canadian committee.17 Early the following year, the executives resolved to petition the provincial executive of


16 Meeting Minutes, 7 November 1914. Ibid.

17 Meeting Minutes, 12 December 1914. Ibid.
the Red Cross to expand its Red Cross committee and form a distinctly French-Canadian section of the Red Cross that would coordinate all of its business in French. This motion was dropped in response to concessions made at a general meeting of the Red Cross, but the desire to maintain a separate French-Canadian effort remained. The Fédération’s executives celebrated the efforts of Mme Huguenin in coordinating and expanding the work of their francophone Red Cross committee, noting that its members had produced over 60,000 knitted comforts.

The Fédération also kept its funds separate from other chapters of the Red Cross. When the Fédération’s Red Cross committee raised $420 from a social event at the Ritz Hotel, it was decided that these funds should be kept by the Fédération rather than be handed over to the Red Cross. The Fédération’s Red Cross committee had incurred a number of expenses in organizing the fundraiser and the executive preferred to reimburse itself and keep the funds because “la section canadienne française … n’aime pas s’adhérer aux anglaises.” Although the executive considered Red Cross work to be a matter of “fierté nationale,” it was decided, on further discussion, that all funds collected by the Fédération’s Red Cross committee should be kept and reinvested in the committee’s work, rather than turned over to the provincial Red Cross accounts. By hanging on to Red Cross funds, the Fédération was able to dispense additional relief for one or two unemployed women, who received a small salary to assist with Red Cross work until better employment could be secured. In keeping their work separate and retaining funds collected, the executive of the Fédération nationale St-Jean-Baptiste made it clear that their “fierté nationale” was defined in opposition to English-Canadian efforts.

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18 Meeting Minutes, 9 January 1915. Ibid.
19 Meeting Minutes, 6 March 1915. Ibid.
20 Meeting Minutes, 1 May 1915. P120. Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Meeting Minutes, 5 February 1916. Ibid.
The Fédération’s Red Cross work was coordinated locally in Montreal, but the executive members also conceived of their efforts on a wider geographical scale. In early 1916, the executives of the Fédération were determined to provide moral, as well as material, support for the war overseas and organized a public rally in support of the war. The sentiment behind the rally, however, was to be more specific than a pro-war assembly. As well as support the war, the rally was also meant to act as a fundraiser to benefit French-Canadian mothers and teachers in Ontario. This additional dimension was a clear acknowledgement of the wartime sacrifices made by French Canadians in Ontario, as well as protest against the education reforms of 1912 and 1913.23

When the Conscription Crisis loomed a year later, the executives of the Fédération maintained their support for the war but made their opposition to conscription known. In a letter sent to Prime Minister Robert Borden, the executive professed their devotion to “la patrie canadienne” but argued that compulsory military service was contrary to the freedoms guaranteed by the British Empire. The executives maintained that French-Canadian women would continue to teach their sons to respect the British flag and to give up those sons for the empire’s defence, should there be a threat to Canadian soil.24 Despite their opposition to conscription, the Fédération continued to support the war by producing works for the Red Cross and several soldiers’ homes were established in 1918 to assist with the repatriation of returned soldiers.25 The members of the Fédération nationale St-Jean-Baptiste proudly projected their francophone identity through their patriotic work. Red Cross work was coordinated explicitly in opposition to English-Canadian efforts, but the executives of the Fédération nevertheless expressed their loyalty to Canada and the Empire when they discussed their opposition to conscription and demonstrated their solidarity with French-Canadian communities in Ontario.

23 Meeting minutes 21 February 1916. Ibid.
24 Meeting Minutes, 31 May 1917. Ibid.
25 Meeting Minutes, 7 September 1918. Ibid.
French Canadians in Quebec also emphasized their francophone identity by supporting the French war effort. The editor of *La Presse* lobbied the mayor of Quebec City to use his benevolent fund to purchase a bed for L’Hôpitale des paroisses canadiennes française in Paris, a military hospital funded by French-Canadian parishes and administered by French military authorities.²⁶ Ferdinand Roy, a *Nationaliste* who in 1917 would write a pamphlet indicting French-Canadian participation in the war, implored the mayor of Quebec City to follow the lead of Montreal and Ottawa by contributing to the France-Amérique committee to provide humanitarian relief in France.²⁷ The city pledged $5,000.²⁸ Beside these appeals were requests for municipal funds in support of local military units, such as the 167e Battalion, or the establishment of clubs to entertain soldiers training in nearby Camp Valcartier.²⁹ Much like the English-Canadian voluntary societies discussed in the previous chapter, French Canadians used their contributions to the war effort to define their identity. In Quebec, organizers of these efforts worked to keep their contributions distinct from the initiatives coordinated by English Canadians, and emphasized their solidarity with other francophone populations.

French-Canadian communities outside of Quebec, minorities in provinces dominated by Anglophones, likewise used the war effort as a means of solidifying their ties to other francophone communities. In St Boniface, Manitoba, the Francophone newspaper *La Liberté* advertised a number of patriotic funds raised by French communities in Manitoba. Subscribers to L’aide à la France were asked to fill out their donation on a tag that described the gift as offered “to a French mother from a French-Canadian mother.”³⁰ The sizeable presence of recent French migrants in Manitoba, many

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²⁷ Letter from Ferdinand Roy to Napoléon Drouin, 1 December 1914. Ibid.

²⁸ Rapport du comités des finances, 10 December 1914. Ibid.

²⁹ Rapport du comités des finances, 14 December 1916; 11 June 1918. Ibid.

of whom returned to France to fulfil their obligation as reservists in the French Army, likely encouraged collections on behalf of French relief. A concert was held on the 14th of July 1915 in St Claude by L'Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-française to raise funds for local members of the community who were serving in the French Army.\(^{31}\) As in Quebec, a number of collections were made to benefit the families of Franco-Ontarians who had enlisted. La ligue des demoiselles de la langue française contributed $10 for wounded Franco-Ontarians who were returning from overseas.\(^{32}\) A concert in Ste Anne des Chênes raised $101 to aid Belgians persecuted by the Prussians, and promised to be equally generous when funds would be raised for “nos frères persécutés par les Boches d’Ontario.”\(^{33}\) French-Canadian communities in Manitoba donated funds to demonstrate their solidarity with French reservists serving overseas, French mothers who were coping with loss, Belgian refugees, and the families of Franco-Ontarian soldiers. Relatively few funds were raised in solidarity with Québécois who were serving overseas. Facing a greater threat of marginalization, French-Canadian communities outside of Quebec used their war work to emphasize their status as beleaguered minorities in Anglophone provinces.

Despite their contributions to patriotic funds, French Canadians were most heavily criticized for their absence in the ranks. The vitriol of Anglophone accusations spurred many French-Canadian elites to mobilize unique French battalions that could provide an undeniable demonstration of their participation and sacrifice for the national war effort. The recruitment of French-Canadian soldiers in Western Canada sheds light on the importance of space and place in comparing the experience of French-Canadian communities in Quebec and the rest of Canada. In March 1916 the Department of Militia and Defence authorized the creation of the 233rd (Canadiens-Français du Nord-Ouest) Battalion to draw its recruits from the Western Canadian provinces. The opportunity for

\(^{31}\) La Liberté, 29 June 1915, p. 6.

\(^{32}\) La Liberté, 23 February 1915, p. 8.

\(^{33}\) La Liberté, 2 March 1915, p. 5.
Western Canadian Francophones to serve in a French-Canadian unit attracted many recruits and prompted a number of transfers from French Canadians who had already enlisted in an Anglophone battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Leprohon, Commanding Officer of the 233rd, complained to Colonel Ruttan, Officer Commanding of No. 10 Militia District, that between 150 and 180 Francophone soldiers in Manitoba were denied requests to transfer to the 233rd. Leprohon pleaded for their transfer, arguing that French-Canadian soldiers would be more effective in his battalion, where they would receive training in their own language and serve with “their kin.” French-Canadian recruits were indeed desirous of serving with a French-Canadian battalion, but preferred to serve with the 233rd because of its Western Canadian origin. The recruiting depot in St Boniface had gathered a pool of 150 French-Canadian recruits who were presented with the choice of serving with the 233rd or transferring to the recruiting depot of the 57th Battalion in Quebec; all but four recruits wished to join the Western Canadian battalion.

In spite of Colonel Leprohon’s best efforts, and likely because of the reluctance of other battalion commanders to relinquish Francophone recruits, the 233rd Battalion was unable to recruit to its authorized strength. The six hundred officers and men of the 233rd Battalion were folded into the 178th (Canadien-Français) Battalion which had been headquartered in Victoriaville, in the Eastern Townships of Quebec. Major Malhiot, who was placed in command of the rump of the 233rd that was shipped to New Brunswick to join the 178th, argued that “it would seem unreasonable and unfair to have us give up our identity” through the unit’s absorption into the 178th Battalion. Malhiot was not just speaking about the 233rd Battalion’s regimental identity, as he explained that “a different

35 Ibid.
36 Letter from LCol J. Lightfoot to a/AAG Admin 10 MD, 1 May 1916. Ibid.
spirit prevails between the Western and Eastern French Canadians.” For Malhoit, the amalgamation of his battalion meant losing a visible contribution of soldiers from the French-Canadian communities of Western Canada. Dozens of reinforcement battalions raised in Canada in 1916 and were later disbanded or amalgamated but it is noteworthy that the 233rd Battalion, despite having more men on strength than the 178th Battalion, was broken up to reinforce a French-Canadian battalion raised in Quebec. The decision to break up the Western-Canadian battalion to reinforce a unit in Quebec, rather than break up a Quebec battalion to bring a Western-Canadian unit up to strength, reflected underlying assumptions about the place where a French-Canadian battalion should belong.

The Acadian community in New Brunswick was also eager to form a distinct battalion and permission was granted to raise the 165th (Acadiens) Battalion in late 1915. Many Acadian men had already enlisted, but the correspondence saved by J.A. Blanchard, secretary of the battalion’s recruiting committee, provides a better insight into the popular appeal of an Acadian battalion. P.J. Veniot expressed his concern that the Acadian battalion would not be able to raise its full complement, but not for want of Acadians’ loyalty. Acadians had proven “leurs attachement inébranlable à la couronne britanique” but it was not enough that Acadians had enlisted; this sacrifice was unrecognized because they had enlisted with Anglophone units. Veniot suggested that the recruiting committee secure the transfer of Acadian soldiers already serving in the CEF to bring them into 165th Battalion and ensure the unit could accurately represent the sacrifices of the Acadian community.

The success of the Acadian battalion was crucial because it would secure the place of the Acadian community in New Brunswick, a prospect that was particularly

38 Letter from P.J. Veniot to J.A. Blanchard, 29 November 1915. 506, Fonds Rufus Arsenault. 1.1, Dosier sur le 165e Battalion 'Acadien' (premiere guerre mondiale). Centre d'études Acadiennes, Moncton (hereafter CEA).
poignant given the history of Acadian expulsion during the 18th Century. Paul Michaud, an Acadian barrister practicing in Edmonton, saw the battalion as a way for Acadians to claim their place in the Maritime Provinces and prove that they were equal to Anglophones. Many recognized the future dividends of a distinct Acadian battalion. P.C. Gauthier from St Louis praised the battalion as an excellent idea, whose service would be invaluable “plus tard.” C.M. Leger, Member of the Legislative Assembly, offered his support for the unit that would become “un levier puissant pour notre race pour l'avenir.” C.H. LaBillois, of the Dalhousie Mercantile Company in Dalhousie, New Brunswick, supported the formation of an Acadian battalion “pour le present et pour l'avenir de notre race.” Anxieties about the future of the Acadian community in New Brunswick fanned enthusiasm for a distinct battalion that could produce a recognizable Acadian contribution to the war effort.

The importance of maintaining the Battalion’s Acadian identity was recognized in Quebec. Colonel Arthur Mignault, who was instrumental in organizing the 22nd Battalion as the first Francophone unit in the CEF and financed the recruitment of two other French-Canadian battalions in Quebec, lobbied for the creation of a Francophone brigade, composed of French-Canadian battalions, that could be fielded in France. Mignault wrote to Lieutenant Colonel D’aigle, who was appointed Commanding Officer of the 165th Battalion, asking if D’aigle would object to the unit’s incorporation into a French-Canadian brigade. Mignault understood the importance of visibility for the Acadian battalion and was careful to preface his inquiry with “the promise that you would keep your identity as Acadians.” D’aigle acknowledged Mignault’s letter but expressed no desire for his unit to be part of a French-Canadian brigade, only pledging that the

39 Letter from Paul Michaud, to J Malenfant, 2 Dec 1915. Ibid.
40 Letter from PC Gauthier to Jean Malenfant 1 Dec 1915. Ibid.
41 Letter from CM Leger to J.A. Blanchard, 29 November 1915. Ibid.
42 Letter from CH LaBillois to JA Blanchard, 2 December 1915. Ibid.
Acadian Battalion would comply with its orders and hoped that, “wherever we are the 165th will give a good account of itself.” D’aigle was careful not to sacrifice the identity of his Acadian battalion for the sake of a French-Canadian brigade.

The 165th Battalion suffered a similar fate as the 233rd Battalion and many others when it could not recruit to full strength. Because many of its soldiers were drawn from New Brunswick’s forestry industry, the 165th Battalion was broken up to form the 39th and 40th companies of the Canadian Forestry Corps. D’aigle was able to stay with his men and was placed in command of the 39th Company. One of D’aigle’s obsessions during his command of the 39th Company was the retention of its Acadian title and paraphernalia. Of particular importance was gaining authorization for former officers and men of the 165th Battalion to wear the disbanded unit’s hat badge. The hat badge of the 165th Battalion was reputed as the only badge in the CEF to include the British flag, which D’aigle held as an important symbol that represented the empire for which the Acadians fought, and on whose legal protection the Acadians counted. D’aigle lobbied that the two companies be renamed to reflect their distinct origin and was able to convince the Director of Timber Operations in London to re-designate D’aigle’s unit as the 39th Acadian Company, Canadian Forestry Corps. D’aigle’s immediate superior gave permission for former members of the 165th Battalion to wear their old hat badges, but did not authorize the re-designation of the Acadian companies to differ “in any way from any other Companies operating under this corps.”

44 From L.C. Daigle to A. Mignault, 14 January 1917. Ibid.
45 Letter from L.C. D’aigle to B.C. Gesner, 12 August 1916. 1416, Fonds Maurice Leger, Battalion Acadien. 4, Fanfare du battalion contribution, 1916-1917. CEA. The hat badge of the 165th was not, as D’aigle claimed, the only one in the CEF to include a union flag in its design. The hat badge of the 247th Battalion used a design similar to the 165th Battalion’s badge, with two union flags on either side of the scroll bearing the unit’s name.
46 Letter from L.C. D’ailg to OC Base Depot CFC Sunningdale, 17 May 1917. 1416, Fonds Maurice Leger. Battalion Acadien. 5, Correspondence 165th battalion, 1917-1919. CEA.
47 Letter from B.R. Hepburn to L.C. D’aigle, 23 May 1917. Ibid.
Lieutenant Colonel D’aigle and Major Malhiot fought to maintain the communal identity of their battalions because the visibility of their uniquely Francophone contribution was easily effaced in an army controlled by Anglophone officers. The correspondence alluding to transfers of French soldiers to the 165th or 233rd Battalions reveal that Anglophone officers did not always cooperate in the recruitment of these distinctly Francophone units. In Northern Ontario, another region with a significant Francophone population, Captain H. Denis of the 163rd (Aselin-Desrosier) Battalion, based in Montreal, wrote to Zotique Mageau, Member of Provincial Parliament for Sturgeon Falls, suggesting that Mageau lobby to raise a French-Canadian battalion in Northern Ontario. Denis was in Northern Ontario recruiting for the 163rd Battalion and, observing that battalions were recruited “according to nationality” elsewhere in Canada, believed that a Francophone battalion could be raised in “a very short time” in Northern Ontario.48 Denis’ plan, however, required that the battalions currently recruiting in the region allow Francophone soldiers to transfer to the proposed French-Canadian battalion.

The authorization of a new battalion was left to the discretion of Major-General Logie, General Officer Commanding of No. 2 Militia District. Logie communicated with the officers commanding the 119th, 159th, 227th, and 228th Battalions who were actively recruiting in Sudbury, Nipissing, Sault Ste Marie, and Haileybury to assess the possibility of raising a French-Canadian battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 227th (Sudbury-Manitoulin-Algoma) Battalion responded that “there are a lot of good French Canadians throughout this area” but believed that they should be recruited by local units.49 In discussing the case of three recruits who were on their way to Montreal after speaking with a recruiter from the 163rd Battalion, Jones explained that “when it was discovered that their English was as good as anyone else’s and that outside of their names they were to all intents and purposes English … they were put with the local unit.”50


49 Letter from C.H. Jones to W.A. Logie, 16 April 1916. Ibid.

50 Ibid.
Colonel Rowland, of the 119th (Algoma) Battalion, also argued that the Francophone recruits who enlisted with the 119th were men who made their homes in the region. “This Battalion,” Rowland explained, “is really their battalion.”\textsuperscript{51} Rowland acknowledged that there were other French Canadians in the area, but these were itinerant workers who “did not … stay around the towns here … They got their pay cheque. Then they disappeared from their usual haunts until train time … and left for Quebec.”\textsuperscript{52} For Jones and Rowland, the French-Canadian soldiers who enlisted in their units were members of their community and, because of their fluency in English, were rightfully members of a local Anglophone battalion.

Whether a French-Canadian recruit belonged in an Anglophone battalion was also a matter of local pride. French Canadians should serve with the 227th Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones explained, because he had given the people of Sudbury his assurance that the 227th “would be their own battalion, and they could honestly give their efforts to recruiting and it would be a Sudbury Battalion, the name ‘Sudbury’ appearing on the badge.”\textsuperscript{53} The idea of forming a Francophone battalion, or allowing Francophone units from outside the community to recruit to French-Canadian recruits in Sudbury, constituted a breach of trust between Jones and his community. Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland had previously experienced the friction created in Sault Ste Marie because of the transfer of soldiers out of his battalion. The recent transfer of one hundred men from the 119th to the 224th Forestry Battalion, likely because of their expertise as foresters, prompted two chairmen of the local recruiting committees to resign, while two other members of the recruiting committees refused to provide any further assistance for the recruiting effort.\textsuperscript{54} The recruiting committees has raised and spent approximately $7,000 to bring the 119th Battalion up to strength. “They were persuaded to do this work,”

\textsuperscript{51} Letter from T.P.T. Rowland to W.A. Logie, 17 April 1916. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Letter from C.H. Jones to W.A. Logie, 16 April 1916. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Letter from T.P.T. Rowland to W.A. Logie, 17 April 1916. Ibid.
Rowland explained, “because of the appeal made to their local pride, first to make up an All Algoma Battalion; and then to enlist more men in their locality than would be enlisting in an adjoining locality.”\textsuperscript{55} For Rowland, Jones, and the recruiting committees that raised funds to support the 119\textsuperscript{th} and 227\textsuperscript{th} battalions, these units were expressions of local identity. Whoever enlisted with those units – French or English – belonged to that community. It was not up to the recruits to decide with which unit they belonged; the Anglophone elites who funded and organized those battalions felt “a proprietary right in the recruits they enlisted.”\textsuperscript{56}

The geographic boundaries created by provincial borders reinforced the distinctions between Francophone communities, but Anglophone conceptions of their own community also worked to efface French-Canadian participation in the war. Anglophone battalion commanders held on to their recruits regardless of their ethnicity in order to satisfy the wishes of local donors who funded these recruiting campaigns and secure the success of their efforts. The officers and civilian members of the recruiting committees that drew men into the 119\textsuperscript{th} and 227\textsuperscript{th} Battalions understood their work as a communal effort that projected the identity of their community, as defined by the spatial boundaries of their hometowns. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones’ assertion that the French-Canadian recruits in his battalion were essentially English, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland’s explanation of his recruiting committee’s feelings of ownership over the battalion’s recruits revealed how the seemingly benign spatial category of the hometown was used to efface the different languages and ethnicities present within those boundaries. By recruiting French-Canadian soldiers into their battalions, refusing their transfer to a Francophone battalion, and resenting the incursion of French-Canadian recruiting officers from Quebec into their hometown, Anglophone civil and military authorities in Northern Ontario towns such as Sault Ste Marie and Sudbury imposed the definition of their hometown as a predominantly Anglophone community onto French-Canadian residents. The idea of mobilizing a separate French-Canadian battalion in

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
Northern Ontario presented a significant problem because it would draw recruits away from existing battalions, potentially jeopardizing the success of the community’s efforts, and the matter was duly resolved in correspondence between Anglophone militia officers. In opposing the authorization of a French-Canadian battalion, the Anglophone officers of the 119th and the 227th Battalions argued that their Francophone recruits belonged to those communities and therefore in their battalions.

For French-Canadian communities outside of Quebec, the expression of a distinct communal identity held a particular importance. While French Canadians often chose to support the war to cast off Anglophone accusations of non-participation, it was important for French-Canadian communities such as those in Western Canada or New Brunswick to identify themselves as French-Canadian through the formation of unique infantry battalions. Of equal importance was the distinction from French-Canadian battalions that were raised in Quebec. Expressing a separate and unique identity trumped the expression of French-Canadian solidarity. Projecting a separate and localized communal identity ensured that French-Canadian volunteers outside of Quebec were not made invisible in Anglophone battalions raised in their same province, nor were they lumped into Francophone battalions raised in Quebec. The 165th (Acadiens) Battalion and the 233rd (Canadiens-Français du Nord-Ouest) Battalion were intended to secure recognition for French-Canadian communities in Western Canada and New Brunswick by producing a contribution that was neither Anglophone nor Quebecois. The refusals from commanding officers in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to transfer French-Canadian recruits to the 233rd Battalion, and the experience of French-Canadian recruits in Northern Ontario, demonstrates the ease with which French-Canadian enlistments could be effaced in battalions mobilized outside of the Province of Quebec and the ease with which Anglophone battalion commanders could determine the identity of their soldiers. The more marginalized the community, the more difficult it was to raise and maintain a distinct battalion. Identifying a battalion in terms of both place and culture was essential to retaining its communal identity.
3.2 Separate Battalions

The formation of French-Canadian battalions was part of a wider recruiting strategy employed by the Department of Militia and Defence until the implementation of conscription in 1917. The organization of locally-raised battalions ballooned in late 1915 as growing casualty lists were met with a surge in popular enthusiasm to bolster recruiting efforts. Hoping to harness this enthusiasm, Sir Sam Hughes’ Ministry of Militia and Defence announced in December 1915 that private citizens and community associations could raise their own battalions and bear the cost of recruiting. In the short term, this approach was a success. In three months, over 70,000 men were put in uniform. In the long term, however, this decentralized approach to recruiting initiated an unsustainable proliferation of reinforcement battalions, which competed with each other for recruits, as well as with the rising wages of a wartime labour shortage. Many of these reinforcement battalions adopted a distinct identity to appeal to recruits. There were battalions organized for Sportsmen and Frontiersmen, while the Temperance community of Winnipeg even succeeded in recruiting its own unit: the 203rd Battalion, CEF. The key to this community-driven recruiting scheme was attaching a communal identity to a battalion.57

For the Department of Militia, these unique battalions created both problems and solutions. Authorizing these units created competition and discord between these disparate battalions, but the redeeming quality of this approach was that authorizing a battalion with a unique identity might appeal to recruits who were not attracted to any of the other battalions in the vicinity. In the spring of 1916, Donald Maclean, a local politician from Saskatoon and future leader of the provincial Conservatives, argued that an Irish battalion should be raised in his city. Maclean explained that Irish residents were not enlisting because “there has been authorised a Highland Battalion, Scandinavian Battalion, Methodist Battalion, Orangemens Battalion, Sportsmens Battalion, University Battalion, etc, etc, … No Irish Regiment has been raised in Saskatchewan and

the Irish claim that [they are] due as much consideration as the other Battalions named.”58 John Smyth, president of one of the Irish cultural associations in Saskatoon, wrote to Sir Sam Hughes explaining that the reluctance of Irish enlistments in Saskatchewan “should not be taken as an act of disloyalty,” but only as a sign of their desire for a distinctly Irish battalion in the province.59 Indeed, Smyth argued that he has been given “every encouragement” to expect the authorization of an Irish battalion, “including your [Hughes’] own promise.”60 As was the case for many battalions that took on an ethnic identity, authorization from the Department of Militia and Defence to raise an Irish battalion in Saskatoon was meant to present an incentive to attract recruits from ethnic minorities that were underrepresented in the CEF. The authorization of such a battalion was meant to draw Irish recruits into the armed forces, but the promise of this battalion also attracted the support of Irish associations of Saskatoon which offered to bear the cost of recruiting a unit that projected their own cultural identity.

The prospect of raising another battalion in Saskatoon, however, raised doubts in Ottawa. Brigadier-General R.J. Gwynne, Director General of Mobilization, cautioned to Lieutenant Colonel Norman Edgar, Officer Commanding of No. 12 Militia District, that he did “not think Saskatoon is big enough to produce all it thinks it can, that is, a Battalion of Highlanders, and also an Irish Battalion,” going on to remind Edgar that “as you say there are so many battalions already that require men, roughly 2400 altogether that it seems to me it would be a very questionable policy to ask for another battalion in Saskatoon.”61 Demand for an Irish battalion continued into August, when Mclean reassured defence authorities that an Irish battalion would not compete with the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Keenleyside’s 249th Battalion which was in the midst of its own recruiting drive. McLean argued that “If another Battalion were authorized with its

59 Letter from John P. Smyth to Sam Hughes, October 1916. Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 From BGen R.J. Gwynne to LCol N.S. Edgar, 2 June 1916. Ibid.
Headquarters at Saskatoon under command of Lieut[enant] Col[onel] Acheson, and labelled ‘Irish’ … recruits would be drawn from a totally different source than that which Lieut[enant] Col[onel] Keenleyside will draw.”62

Maclean conceded that if a sufficient number of men were not raised within two months, Saskatchewan’s Irish recruiting committees would transfer its volunteers to fill vacancies in the existing battalions. This was indeed Lieutenant Colonel Edgar’s intention. Writing to the Director General of Mobilization, Edgar stated that “the various cities have very good organizations [but] unless they have a battalion at home to recruit for, they apparently cease in their efforts.”63 With the energy and enthusiasm displayed by the Irish recruiting committee Edgar argued that “it would be better to authorize the establishment of [new] battalions in Saskatchewan from which drafts can be sent to fill the battalions training in camp.” In a more succinct telegram, Lieutenant Colonel Edgar implored Sir Sam Hughes to authorize the Irish battalion because it was “desperately needed to stimulate recruiting.”64 The Irish battalion was never meant to go overseas; its purpose was to attract recruits that would be transferred to other understrength battalions in No. 12 Militia District. Accordingly, 250 recruits gathered by Saskatoon’s Irish recruiting committee were transferred to fill the other battalions raised in Saskatchewan. The Irish community in Saskatoon clamoured for its own battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Edgar was eager to allow it the opportunity, as a way to reinvigorate the local recruiting effort.

Captain Hansen, whose recruiting appeal was quoted at the beginning of this chapter, worked to raise a Scandinavian draft in Saskatchewan at the same time as the Irish community was lobbying for its own battalion. At the time that Hansen presented his request to Col Edgar, however, there were two Scandinavian battalions being recruited in Winnipeg: the 197th (Vikings of Canada) Battalion and the 223rd

62 From Donald McLean to F.B. McCurdy, 7 Aug 1917. Ibid.
63 Letter from LCol N.S. Edgar to BGen R.J. Gwynne, 18 June 1916. Ibid.
64 Telegram from LCol N.S. Edgar to Sam Hughes, 3 July 1916. Ibid.
(Scandinavian) Battalion. Hansen nevertheless believed that the creation of a separate Scandinavian company in Saskatchewan was essential for attracting even more Scandinavian recruits into the ranks of the CEF; such a company “in itself would be a great inducement for the men to enlist.” By March 1917, however, Hansen had only gathered twenty-seven volunteers for his company. On the orders of the Militia Council, Lieutenant Colonel Edgar transferred Hansen’s recruits to the recruiting of the 77th Overseas Depot Battery, while Hansen and his three other recruiting officers were given a month of leave and discharged from the CEF.

While local recruiters successfully prevented the formation of a French-Canadian battalion in Northern Ontario, the Militia Council endorsed efforts to organize an Irish battalion and a Scandinavian draft in Saskatchewan. The authorization of these drafts demonstrated how senior officers of the Canadian Militia encouraged voluntary enlistments by appealing to communal identities. Donald MacLean and Captain Hansen believed that the authorization of a distinct unit would attract members of their cultural community to volunteer for service with the CEF. Lieutenant Colonel Edgar likewise assumed that the authorization of these special units would energize the flagging recruiting effort in his district. The Department of Militia and Defence authorized the formation of battalions to project a particular communal identity in order to encourage a community to mobilize their own members into a battalion of reinforcements for the war effort. This arrangement, however, was not symbiotic. As the examples from No. 10 Militia District reveal, defence authorities such as Lieutenant Colonel Edgar encouraged cultural associations in Saskatchewan to raise recruits for an Irish and a Scandinavian draft with the intention of dismantling these to reinforce other battalions that were struggling to fill their ranks. These disparate battalions, each with their unique communal identity, reinvigorated the recruiting effort and encouraged local communities to produce their own identifiable battalion to underscore their contribution to the war effort. The


66 Letter from LCol N.S. Edgar to Secy Militia Council, 3 Apr 1917. Ibid.
identity of these distinct battalions only served to attract recruits; nearly all of the new battalions formed during this phase of the war were broken up on arrival in England to reinforce existing units in the Canadian Corps. In contrast to the attempts to raise Francophone battalions, the request to form Irish or Scandinavian drafts raised little concern among local recruiters.

3.3 Race, Colour, and Recruitment

Racialized minorities in Canada likewise sought to gain inclusion in the war effort by forming their own distinct military units. In the above examples, the rhetoric of race was employed by Acadians to describe themselves as a unique cultural category. Racialized rhetoric was commonly relied upon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to distinguish different European ethnicities. These categories encouraged racist assumptions about inherent character traits which, in turn, reinforced racial prejudices in dominion society. The most overt and legally-entrenched practices of racism, however, were those that racialized individuals according to the colour of their skin.

Migrants from Asia, South Asia, and the Caribbean provided a source of cheap labour in primary and secondary industries in the dominions but aggravated the anxieties of white settlers who viewed increasing arrivals as a threat to employment, national security, and race purity. Early dominion immigration policies balanced the demand for labour and white cultural cringe by passing legislation to restrict Asian migration. While many migrant workers were “sojourners” who left their family to work abroad and returned to their homeland after earning sufficient wealth, racialized minorities who put down roots were marginalized in dominion society with legislation that denied them the franchise and subjected them to racial segregation by barring workers from certain industries and even required some children to attend separate primary schools.  

by xenophobic chauvinism, these measures ostensibly protected Anglophone workers from wage deflation by excluding migrants from higher paying work while the segregation of school systems denied the opportunity for social uplift to the next generation of migrant diasporans by providing them with a second-class education. The children of racialized immigrants, despite being born in the dominions and thus gaining the status of British subjects, nevertheless faced entrenched social barriers that confined them to the margins of settler society.

While the Australian Defence Act employed explicitly racist language to exclude volunteers, Canadian recruiters upheld a colour bar during the First World War, despite the dominion’s “raceless” defence legislation. Racialized minorities in Canada nevertheless sought to overcome this barrier to military service in the hopes that their loyalty and sacrifice could be leveraged to overcome discriminatory legislation that disenfranchised them based on the colour of their skin. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the regulation of philanthropic patriotic work channeled voluntary efforts into the largest and most established patriotic charities. As Robert Rutherford argues in his history of the Canadian home front, the participation of ethnic or racialized minorities in the voluntary war effort allowed these minorities to participate in fundraisers, but they were generally restricted to contributing to funds organized and administered by Anglophone elites.68 Rarely was it possible for a non-British cultural association to maintain a separate Red Cross effort or patriotic fund, as did the Fédération nationale St-Jean-Baptiste. Contributions made by racialized minorities were often accepted and acknowledged in the press, but these announcements could reinforce racist prejudices. Attempts to solicit Red Cross donations from Chinese migrants in Regina praised the efforts of “alomond eyed citizens” in “washee” shops who gave what they could for the


68 Rutherford, Hometown Horizons, 105-107.
While monetary contributions to patriotic funds only garnered minor – sometimes condescending – praise, the formation of a special contingent offered the possibility of more substantial recognition.

Historians such as James Walker and John G. Armstrong have examined the exclusion of racialized minorities from the CEF and highlighted the role of individual officials in determining the inclusion or exclusion of racialized minorities such as African or Japanese diasporans. Both Walker and Armstrong observe that members of racialized minorities who petitioned the Department of Militia for entry into the CEF were advised that those decisions were left to the discretion of a battalion’s commanding officer.\footnote{James W. St G. Walker, “Race and recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of visible minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” \textit{Canadian Historical Review}, Vol 70, no. 1 (1989): 4; John G. Armstrong, “Unwelcomed Sacrifice: A Black Unit in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1917-1919,” in \textit{Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces from the Time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers}, Nándor F. Dreisziger, ed., (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990), 179.} The exclusion of racialized minorities is explained, not as the Department of Militia’s explicit policy, but rather attributed to a prevailing mindset among senior officers of the Canadian militia who rationalized the inferior fighting capabilities of racialized minorities such as Africans or Asians.\footnote{Walker, “Race and Recruitment,” 5; Armstrong, “Unwelcomed Sacrifice,” 179.} The conclusion, as Walker argues, is that the treatment of racialized minorities in the CEF was a reflection of a “general sense of white superiority [and], in the particular image [of] certain peoples … as militarily incompetent.”\footnote{Walker, “Race and Recruitment,” 25.} This analysis places Canada into the wider application of martial race theory in the recruitment of colonials in imperial armies.\footnote{See for example: David Omissi. “‘Martial Races’: Ethnicity and Security in Colonial India 1858–1939,” \textit{War & Society}, Vol 9, no. 1 (1991):1-27; Heather Streets, \textit{Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914}, (Manchester: UP, 2004).} While there is ample evidence to demonstrate that many Canadians believed in a racialized hierarchy that placed white Western Europeans at its apex, the exclusion of African and Asian diasporans from the CEF also reflected the
construction of Canadian communities in terms that preferred to segregate, exclude, or ignore racialized minorities.

As part of his renewed recruiting drive, Sir Sam Hughes announced in January 1916 that he would raise several “special regiments,” including two battalions of First Nations, one of Japanese Canadians, and one of African Canadians. Captain Robert Colquhoun, an officer with the Canadian Army Service Corps in Vancouver, read this proclamation in the *Daily Province* and contacted the executive of the Canadian Japanese Association with a proposal to form a Japanese-Canadian battalion for the CEF. The executives of the Canadian Japanese Association canvassed the Japanese community across the province and, having received over five hundred positive responses, began organizing volunteers into an unofficial company that was fed and housed by the Association and trained in rudimentary drill by a retired sergeant-major from the British Army. This unofficial training scheme cost the Canadian Japanese Association $3,000 per month, but the possibility of forming their own battalion to join the ranks of the CEF was thought to be worth the sacrifice.

Colquhoun’s letter did not receive a reply from Militia Headquarters, but Yasushi Yamazaki, president of the Canadian Japanese Association, took up the cause in earnest. Yamazaki wired Sir Sam Hughes himself, and wrote to Colonel James Duff Stuart, Officer Commanding of No. 13 Militia District, pleading for the acceptance of Japanese-Canadian recruits. It was promised that all of the volunteers were naturalized Canadians and Yamazaki assured Duff Stuart that the Canadian Japanese Association placed no conditions on this contribution, asking only that “they be treated as Canadian Soldiers and given an opportunity to fight for their adopted Country.” Duff Stuart granted

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74 *Globe and Empire*, 4 January 1916, 9.


76 Ibid.

Yamazaki an audience but did not anticipate that this unit would be authorized and advised Yamazaki to disband his volunteers. On the 21st of April, Yamazaki received a lettergram from Major-General Gwatkin stating that, while Imperial authorities were ready to accept a Japanese-Canadian Battalion, the Militia Council doubted the Canadian Japanese Association was able to raise the nearly one thousand recruits necessary to fill that battalion and even more sceptical that it could be sustained in the field, while the integration of a smaller unit of Japanese recruits, such as a company, into an otherwise white unit was also unacceptable. Within months of authorizing an Irish battalion in Saskatoon, the Department of Militia and Defence was not interested in a Japanese-Canadian formation of any size.

Yamazaki was not ready to dismiss the two hundred volunteers who had spent the past three months training. Unable to form their own unit, Japanese volunteers attempted to enlist as individuals but were turned away from every battalion in British Columbia. Working through Mr. T. Iiayama, of Edmonton, Yamazaki approached Colonel Ernest Alexander Cruikshank, Officer Commanding of the neighbouring No. 12 Militia District. Iiayama wrote to Cruikshank extending the offer of two hundred trained volunteers who were “anxious to come to enlist to any of the Canadian Contingents at once,” eager for a way of “showing their efficiency and loyalty to the adopted country,” and who felt “they must pay their duty by giving their lives when their adopted country is at such a great struggle.” Cruikshank duly informed the Officers Commanding the 187th, 191st, 192nd, and 218th Battalions of the opportunity to receive a draft of two hundred partially-trained volunteers, with the potential for more to follow, and Lieutenant Colonel H.E. Lyon, Officer Commanding of the 192nd Battalion, leapt at the offer, requesting that

79 Lettergram from MGen W. Gwatkin to Yasushi Yamazaki, 21 April 1916. Ibid.
all two hundred Japanese Canadians be transferred under his command.81 After confirming with Militia Headquarters whether the enlistment of the Japanese volunteers was possible, Cruikshank informed Lyon that “the enlistment of Japanese in the Canadian Expeditionary Force cannot be approved.”82 This response was quickly amended to state that the Department of Militia had “no objection to the enlistment of odd men, but large numbers are not to be enlisted.”83 Accordingly, only fifty Japanese volunteers joined the 192nd Battalion. By December 1916, seven different battalions from Alberta’s Militia District accommodated a further 121 Japanese volunteers, in groups varying from a draft of fifty volunteers to handfuls of three or four individuals. The two hundred volunteers that were meant to form the nucleus of an all-Japanese battalion were dispersed among various other units.

The decision not to accept “large numbers” of Japanese volunteers is the most revealing detail of this episode. James Walker’s article on racism in the recruitment of the CEF highlights the experience of Japanese-Canadian volunteers and argues that attempts to form units of Japanese-Canadian, African-Canadian, and other “visible” minorities, were generally turned away while those who entered the ranks of the CEF were individual exceptions.84 The experience of Japanese recruits is certainly exceptional, but in examining the relationship between identity and voluntary service, the stipulation that Japanese recruits should not be enlisted in “large numbers” is of particular importance. While other communities, such as the Irish or Scandinavian communities of Saskatchewan, were encouraged to mobilize a draft of their own kin, even when it was known that neither the Irish nor Scandinavians of Saskatchewan could hope to raise or sustain a full battalion, the Department of Militia forbade the organization of a Japanese battalion, company, or platoon. The restriction on enlisting Japanese Canadians in “large

81 Letter from LCol H.E. Lyons to Col Cruikshank, 15 May 1916. Ibid.
82 Letter from Col Cruikshank to LCol Lyon, 16 May 1916. Ibid.
83 Letter from Col Cruikshank to LCol Lyon, 20 May 1916. Ibid.
numbers” effectively guaranteed that their service could only be recognized as individual exceptions and not as a communal contribution. The rules by which Japanese Canadians could contribute to the war effort were different than those applied to Anglophone, Anglicised, or Francophone communities, which were able to form recognizable drafts of their own recruits.

The policy of prohibiting the recruitment of large drafts of racialized minorities in Canada was extended to other racialized communities. Lieutenant Colonel George McLeod, Officer Commanding of the 63rd Battalion in Edmonton, wrote to Colonel Cruikshank in December 1915 suggesting the organization of a battalion raised by the African community in Edmonton and Northern Alberta.85 On relaying the offer to the Militia Council, Cruikshank was informed that, “although it is not the intention at present to form a separate Battalion of negroes it is the Honourable Minister's instructions that colored men are to be permitted to enlist in any Overseas Battalion.”86 Consistent with its response to the formation of a Japanese battalion, the Department of Militia did not prohibit the enlistment of African Canadians into the CEF, only the formation of a recognizable unit. After reading Sir Sam Hughes’ January 1916 statement announcing the formation of African-Canadian, Japanese-Canadian, and First Nations battalions, J. Robert Butler, an African veteran of the United States Army, offered his services to Cruikshank to assist in the mobilization of African volunteers in Edmonton.87 The leading clergyman of Edmonton’s African diaspora, Archbishop George W. Washington, likewise lobbied for the organization of an African battalion through Henry Munton, the Chief Organizer of the Legion of Frontiersmen in Canada, and through Robert Brett, Member of the Legislative Assembly, both of whom wrote letters to Cruikshank on Washington’s behalf. Major-General William Hodgins replied to Cruikshank’s repeated offers to raise an African battalion in Alberta, informing him that the Militia Council

86 Letter from MGen W.Hodgins to Col Cruikshank, 9 December 1915. Ibid.
87 Letter from J. Robert Butler to Col Cruikshank, 20 January 1916. Ibid.
would “adhere to the policy of enlisting coloured men not as Battalions, but individually in Units of which the Commanding Officer is willing to take them.”88 Receiving the same treatment as the Canadian Japanese Association, the African community in Edmonton was prevented from mobilizing themselves into a recognizable military formation, though their members could enlist individually in the hopes of becoming an exceptional case of African enlistment in the CEF.

Not prohibiting the enlistment of racialized minorities while preventing their formation of whole battalions or companies allowed the Department of Militia to practice an implicitly racist policy of exclusion without issuing any explicitly racist instructions. Major-General Hodgins reassured Colonel Cruikshank that Japanese or African Canadians were free to enlist in the CEF, so long as the commanding officer of a given battalion “was willing to take them.” This was the crux of the matter: few commanding officers were willing to accept racialized minorities into their units. The Canadian Japanese Association was forced to send its volunteers to Alberta because no battalion in British Columbia was willing to accept Japanese recruits. Benjamin Washington, an African-Canadian farmer from High Prairie, travelled to Edmonton to enlist and was found medically fit for military service but was turned away from every battalion in the city.89 Notwithstanding his acceptance of Japanese volunteers, one of the reasons Colonel Cruikshank supported the organization of an African-Canadian battalion in Alberta was his opinion that “it would not be advisable to enlist Negroes or other coloured men in a White Battalion.”90 African Canadians were often turned away by recruiters or commanding officers who believed in maintaining a strict racial segregation in military units. Without a battalion of their own, African Canadians who found their way into the CEF were particularly exceptional.

88 From MGen W. Hodgins to Col Cruikshank, 23 March 1916. Ibid.
89 Letter from George Martin to Col Cruikshank, 17 March 1916. Ibid.
90 Letter from LCol Cruikshank to MGen W. Hodgins, 11 March 1916. Ibid.
The opportunity to contribute a battalion to the CEF was taken up by African-Canadian communities in Ontario and the Maritimes. John T. Richards, of St John, New Brunswick, wrote to Sir Sam Hughes of the poor treatment received by twenty African volunteers who attempted to enlist with the 104th Battalion in Sussex. The volunteers were met by the battalion second-in-command who insulted the volunteers and informed them that a “Colored Battalion was being formed in Ontario and to go there.”91 In response to this attempt, Lieutenant Colonel Beverly Armstrong, Deputy Assistant to the Adjutant and Quartermaster General, wired Sir Sam Hughes reporting that twenty African volunteers were medically fit for service and enquired whether a “colored Battalion” was being formed in “any part of Canada,” where these volunteers could be transferred.92 When asked for an explanation, Armstrong argued that he had secured “a very fine class of recruits” and “did not think it was fair to these men that they should have to mingle with negroes.”93 The military authorities in Sussex and St John may not have wished to prevent African Canadians from performing military service, but they certainly believed that they should serve in a segregated unit.

As African-Canadian volunteers continued to present themselves to recruiting authorities, officials at the Department of Militia vacillated between integration and the formation of a racially segregated battalion. Following the official announcement that there were no racial barriers to enlisting in the CEF, Officers Commanding echoed Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong’s sentiments regarding the assumed impact of African-Canadian recruits on white enlistments. Colonel Duff Stuart reported that it was the “universal opinion” among the Officers Commanding battalions in British Columbia that “white men here will not serve in the same ranks as with negroes or coloured persons.”94 Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Allen, commanding the 106th Battalion in Truro, Nova Scotia,

92 Telegram from B.R. Armstrong to Sam Hughes, 18 November 1915. Ibid.
93 From George W. Fowler to LCol W.E. Thompson, 25 November 1915. Ibid.
94 From LCol J.Duff-Stuart to E.F. Jarvis, 9 December 1915. Ibid.
believed that “coloured men should do their share in the Empire's Defence, and … that some of them would make good soldiers” but confided that neither he nor his men “would care to sleep alongside them, or to eat with them, especially in warm weather.”

In a memorandum on the enlistment of African Canadians, Major-General Gwatkin summarized the prejudices of many as he listed the reasons against racial integration in the CEF. Gwatkin’s arguments ranged from his bigoted view that African Canadians were “vain and imitative; [and] not being impelled to enlist by a high sense of duty”; to his interpretation of martial race theory that reasoned that an African Canadian was “not likely to make a good fighter”; to the segregationist argument that “the average white man will not associate with him on terms of equality”; to the patronizing rationale that racial exclusion was in the best interest of African Canadians because “it would be humiliating to the coloured men themselves to serve in a battalion where they were not wanted.” In lieu of these sentiments, the enlistment of African Canadians was left at the discretion of each battalion’s commanding officer. The persistent anxieties regarding the integration of African-Canadian soldiers into white battalions provided the Militia Council with a convenient excuse not to authorize racially-segregated units because, if these units could not be sustained, they would need to be broken up and integrated. White officers evidently cringed at the thought of racial integration.

With the widespread refusal of individual African-Canadian volunteers, the African-Canadian community in Toronto responded enthusiastically to Sam Hughes’ January 1916 announcement promising the organization of First Nations, Métis, Japanese-Canadian and African-Canadian battalions. The Canadian Observer, the newspaper of the African community of Toronto, announced that a recruiting campaign was taking place to form a nucleus of sixty men around which a full company could be raised, once the Department of Militia’s approval was received. The Canadian


96 Memorandum on the enlistment of negros in Canadian Expeditionary Forces, 13 Apr 1916. Ibid.

97 Canadian Observer, 8 January 1916, p. 1.
Observer’s editor, J.R.B. Whitney, undertook the recruiting effort and met with Major-General Logie, the General Officer Commanding of No. 2 Militia District, to coordinate the details. Whitney had gathered fifteen potential volunteers from the African-Canadian community in Toronto and requested permission to recruit in London, Chatham, and Windsor. Logie agreed to transfer an African-Canadian non-commissioned officer to Whitney’s authority to act as a recruiting sergeant, but Whitney would need to secure permission from the General Officer Commanding No. 1 Militia District before he could recruit in London or Windsor. Whitney interviewed Sergeant Miller Bruce, of the 48th Battery, and Private J.A. Gains, of the 166th Battalion, both of whom agreed to act as recruiters for the potential African platoon. The final hurdle before Whitney could begin recruiting was the authorization of the Militia Council. Logie informed the Secretary of the Militia Council of Whitney’s progress and, in response, was asked whether any battalion currently under his command would actually accept a platoon of African soldiers. Logie was certain that “every Commanding Officer would have very strong objection to accept a coloured platoon” and the Adjutant-General of the Canadian Militia concurred that recruiting for an African platoon should not be authorized.

Undeterred, Whitney appealed to Sam Hughes, pointing out that because the Observer’s unofficial recruiting effort was already underway the refusal of this African platoon would create “a great disappointment with the Race and ill feeling towards the Government.” As a result, Logie received instructions from the Adjutant-General of

98 From J.R.B. Whitney to Sam Hughes, 19 January 1916. RG24-C-8, Vol. 4387, File MD2-34-7-141. Organization Colored Platoons. LAC.
99 From W.A. Logie to J.R.B. Whitney, 18 February 1916. Ibid.
100 Letter from J.R.B. Whitney to Captain Trump, 3 March 1916. Ibid.
101 Letter from W.A. Logie to E.F. Jarvis, 4 March 1916; Letter from MGen W. Hodgins to W.A.Logie, 8 March 1916. Ibid.
102 Letter from W.A. Logie to Col V.A.S. Williams, 10 March 1916; Letter from MGen W. Hodgins to W.A.Logie, 13 March 1916. Ibid.
the Canadian Militia to “give this situation [his] best consideration” in attempting to find a battalion willing to accept the platoon or “to suggest some means by which these, and possibly other coloured men might be employed on Military work.”

Accordingly, Logie circulated an enquiry to the battalion commanders currently recruiting in No. 2 Militia District to confirm whether any would be willing to accept an African-Canadian platoon into their ranks. The reasons battalion commanders declined to accept such a platoon reflected how their own conception of community rationalized the exclusion of racialized minorities from their battalion.

Brigadier Logie wired every battalion commander in his district to confirm whether anyone would be willing to accept a platoon of African-Canadian volunteers. Answers came back from thirty-eight units and the responses were unanimously negative. Few battalion commanders expressed any form of overt racism, yet their sentiments reveal how categories of space were invoked to legitimate racial exclusion. Major Buchanan of the 95th Battalion in Toronto did little to hide his sentiments when he responded “Thank goodness this batt[alio]n is on strength & does not therefore need a ‘colored’ platoon, nor even a colored ‘drum-major’!”

A few responses intimated that the mixing of African soldiers into an otherwise white battalion would upset morale. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Thompson of the 114th Battalion likewise felt that taking in such a platoon “would undoubtedly cause serious friction and discontent.” Lieutenant Colonel Rowland of the 119th Battalion, in Sault Ste Marie, explained that an African-Canadian platoon “would not find themselves at home in this northern climate, nor with the men in this battalion.” These responses indicated that an African platoon was not welcomed by the various battalion commanders, who hinted that their soldiers would not take well to African-Canadian recruits.

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104 Letter from MGen W. Hodgins to W.A.Logie, 31 March 1916. RG24-C-8, Vol. 4387, File MD2-34-7-141. Organization Colored Platoons. LAC.

105 Minute by Maj R.K. Buchanan to W.A.Logie, 4 April 1916. Ibid.

106 Letter from LCol Andrew Thompson to W.A.Logie, 4 April 1916. Ibid.

107 Letter from LCol V.P. Rowland to W.A.Logie, 5 April 1916. Ibid.
Other responses provide a clearer picture of the rationale behind the refusal to accept Whitney’s platoon. Lieutenant John McPhee of the 117th Battalion explained that his battalion was raised in Simcoe County and that if Whitney’s platoon had likewise been raised in Simcoe County, “we would be glad to have them.” Another battalion recruited in Barrie provided a similar response, arguing that “there are no coloured people in the County of Simcoe, and not a single coloured person in the Overseas Simcoe Foresters.” The addition of an African platoon from beyond the boundaries of Simcoe County would intrude on the communal identity of these two battalions. The Commanding Officer of the 173rd (Canadian Highlanders) Battalion from Hamilton justified his continued exclusion of African recruits on the basis that “these men would not look good in kilts.” Whether it was because a battalion was from Simcoe County or because it was composed of Scottish recruits, the African-Canadian platoon was not wanted. The identity of these battalions was a reflection of the community that mobilized them, and their commanders argued that a platoon of African Canadians did not belong in their battalion because African Canadians did not belong in their community.

Facing persistent preference for racial segregation in the CEF, the Militia Council decided to raise an African-Canadian labour unit. The No. 2 Construction Battalion was formed in July 1916 in Truro, Nova Scotia, to accommodate African-Canadian volunteers from across Canada. Some African Canadians who had already managed to enlist in the CEF requested to be transferred to the No. 2, while others were encouraged to transfer by their officers. Like the 165th (Acadiens) Battalion, the No. 2 Construction Battalion was able to retain its cohesion, but lost much of its identity. The battalion was reduced in size and sailed for England as a company. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland, protested this reorganization and complained that his unit could not reach full

108 Letter from LCol J.B. McPhee to W.A.Logie, 5 April 1916. Ibid.
109 Letter from LCol D.H. MacLean to W.A.Logie, 6 April 1916. Ibid.
110 Letter from LCol W.H. Bruce to W.A.Logie, [N.D.]. Ibid.
strength because it was diverted from its recruiting efforts and assigned to perform manual labour.\textsuperscript{112} Once overseas Captain William White, the unit’s chaplain and the only African-Canadian officer in the CEF, was disturbed by rumours that his company would be broken up to reinforce other units and confided to Frank Stanfield, Member of the Provincial Parliament for Truro, Nova Scotia, that his unit might be “absorbed by the Forestry Troops [losing] their identity altogether.”\textsuperscript{113} As it turned out, the dissolution of No. 2 Construction Company and the mixing of soldiers of different races were discouraged by Imperial authorities, which adopted policies that adhered to South Africa’s strict racial segregation so that the dominion’s Afrikaners could abide the deployment of the South African Native Labour Contingent.\textsuperscript{114} The company remained intact, though it was relegated to the marginal work of a forestry unit.

The importance of the No. 2 Construction Company as a symbol of the African-Canadian community’s contribution to the war effort was recognized by its organizers as well as defence authorities. The prestige of the unit was slowly eroded, first by its intended role as a labour, rather than a combat, unit and later by its reduction in size. Sir Edward Kemp, who replaced Sir Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia, mused that “converting [No. 2 Construction Company] into a [combat] battalion … will rouse such enthusiasm among the colored population of Canada as to lead them to flock to the colors.”\textsuperscript{115} Kemp, however, quickly dismissed the idea of forming an African Canadian battalion when he presumed a few lines later that because “America has come into the war, most of these darkies, if they are doing any flocking at all, will flock where the better pay is, namely the American Army.”\textsuperscript{116} The formation of a distinctly African-Canadian combat battalion and its potential on recruiting additional African-Canadians

\textsuperscript{112} Letter from LCol D.H. Sutherland to George Perley, 27 April 1917. RG 9-III. Vol 81. 10-9-40. No. 2 Construction Battalion. LAC.

\textsuperscript{113} Letter from Capt W.A. White to Frank Stanfield, [N.D.]. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Memo from Maj F.W. Miller to Edward Kemp, 20 December 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{115} Letter from Edward Kemp to Major W.R.Creighton. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
was recognized, but the reluctance to mobilize this segment of Canada’s population resulted in the gradual effacement of their unit.

In late 1915, Sir Sam Hughes asked Canadians to redouble their efforts by raising their own battalions in communities all across Canada. Hughes’ rhetoric went so far as to promise the formation of First Nations, Métis, Japanese-Canadian, and African-Canadian battalions. This announcement was later revealed to be nothing more than Hughes’ hubris, but it nevertheless provided a glimmer of hope for racialized communities to make their own identifiable contribution to the war effort by raising their own battalions for service overseas. As James Walker argues, the Department of Militia’s decision not to formally exclude racialized minorities from the CEF while refusing them permission to form their own units effectively barred many volunteers from these communities from enlisting. 117 Though no racialized minority was explicitly prohibited from enlisting, the commanding officer of a battalion retained the right to refuse recruits. The exclusion of volunteers from the Canadian Japanese Association and the refusals to accept the African-Canadian platoon raised in Toronto reveals that many officers in the Canadian militia believed that the CEF should be racially segregated. African-Canadian volunteers in St John, New Brunswick, were told that a segregated battalion was being authorized in Toronto. Benjamin Washington attempted to enlist in Edmonton and was directed to a non-existent African-Canadian battalion in Montreal. Japanese Canadians and African Canadians were not necessarily barred from enlisting, but many commanding officers excluded them on the belief that these minorities should serve in their own separate units. Attempts to form battalions among racialized minorities certainly attracted recruits into the CEF, but these were dispersed among other units while the successful proposal for a distinct unit, the No. 2 Construction Battalion, was reduced to an operationally insignificant forestry company.

3.4 Australia and New Zealand

The formation of battalions with unique cultural identities was a Canadian exception. Neither the Australian nor the New Zealand defence authorities resorted to the cultivation of special battalions to entice recruits of a particular cultural origin to enlist. A number of Scottish and Irish volunteer regiments had existed in Victoria and New South Wales as part of their colonial militias, but most of these lost their ethnic designation and paraphernalia when volunteer units were reorganized during the consolidation of the Commonwealth military forces in 1903 or later with the creation of the Citizen’s Military Force (CMF) in 1912. The Victorian Scottish Regiment, for example, was re-designated as the 52nd (Hobson’s Bay) Infantry of the CMF. The infantry battalions of the AIF, though initially recruited from similar regional districts as the units of the CMF, were identified only by a number. Officers and men of the 52nd Infantry formed the better part of A and B Company at the formation of the 5th Battalion, AIF and the 5th Battalion’s first reinforcement draft, which joined the unit in Egypt, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McVea and recruited among Victoria’s Scottish communities.118 While the former officers of the 52nd Infantry hoped to extend their communal identity to their new battalion by adopting a kilted uniform, the Department of Defence did not officially accord any special distinctions to the 5th Battalion, AIF. The 5th Battalion was able to exhibit a small measure of Scottish identity by maintaining a pipe band at private expense.119

Despite the regional structure of the AIF and NZEF, suggestions from the public advocated for the creation of ethnic battalions to bolster voluntary enlistments. Russell Motherell, of South Australia, petitioned the Governor General for the formation of an

118 A.W. Keown, *Forward with the Fifth: The Story of Five Years’ War Service Fifth Inf. Battalion, AIF*, (Melbourne: Specialty Press Ltd., 1921), 70.

Irish battalion and included drawings of shamrock facings to be worn by the unit.\textsuperscript{120} Reverend J.S. MacPherson of Morphett Vale, South Australia, wrote to the State War Council proposing the formation of “different Battalions representing the National Societies, such as the Caledonian, Hibernian, Welsh and Cornish.”\textsuperscript{121} The proposal was passed on to Thomas Trumble, Secretary to the Minister of Defence, who replied that “a territorial organization has been adopted,” and that it was “not considered advisable, however, to adopt the system of raising national Regiments.”\textsuperscript{122}

Attempts to raise distinctive battalions for the AIF were set aside until the latter half of 1918, when voluntary enlistments were at their lowest ebb. Members of Scottish societies in New South Wales and Victoria renewed their efforts to organize a distinct, kilted battalion for the AIF in May and June 1918. D.L. MacDonald wrote to the \textit{Newcastle Morning Herald} explaining that “there is a magic in the tartan of which other nationalities know nothing.”\textsuperscript{123} To those who opposed such a unit, MacDonald retorted that because conscription was rejected in two referendums, Australians had “lost the right to say any such words [against] volunteers in kilts.” Another article in the \textit{Newcastle Morning Herald} argued, like many recruiters in Canada, that the formation of a distinctly Scottish battalion would “operate in new and so far untouched ground,” by attracting recruits that were “wishing to preserve the traditions of the country from which their forebears sprung.”\textsuperscript{124} The Brisbane Caledonian Society met to discuss their support for a Scottish unit in the AIF and welcomed Corporal Piper J. Barnett, of the 85\textsuperscript{th} (Nova Scotia Highlanders) Battalion, CEF, to share his views on the moral value of a kilted unit. Barnett recalled that the 85\textsuperscript{th} managed to recruit 3,000 volunteers in less than six months

\textsuperscript{120} Governor General. A11803. Governor Generals correspondence relating to the war of 1914-1918. 1918/89/973. Irish Battalions - Suggestion by R Motherell. NAA.
\textsuperscript{121} Letter from Thomas Trumble to V.H. Ryan, 22 December 1915. GRG32/1/00001, File No. 428 Formation of National Battalions, Suggestion. SRSA.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} “The Scottish Brigade,” \textit{Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate}, 13 May 1918, p. 4.
and that every one of these volunteers signed a petition demanding the adoption of a kilt as part of their uniform.\textsuperscript{125} It was not mentioned that the 85\textsuperscript{th} Battalion filled its ranks in mid-1915, a very different recruiting climate than 1918.

The proposals for a Scottish battalion were not well received. An editorial in the *Newcastle Morning Herald* countered the arguments made by D.L. MacDonald and others, stating flatly that “[p]atriotism is not a matter of the style of uniform.”\textsuperscript{126} The argument went on that the “war is not being fought for the defence of any section or for the assertion of any particular sentiment … The refusal to allow them to [wear a kilt] cannot be used as an excuse … to refrain from enlisting. To suggest that such could be the case would be to place the national sentiment of the Scottish people on a very low level.”\textsuperscript{127} Not only was there skepticism that this appeal to identity would be successful, the senior officers of the AIF were opposed to the creation of new units that might replace the traditions and reputations established by existing units of the AIF. Major-General Cyril Brudenell White argued against the introduction of a kilted unit, stating that “[t]he fame of the AIF has been made by the Australian soldier as a man distinctly Australian.” Major-General John Monash, commander of the Australian Corps, argued that a kilted unit would “trespass upon the solidarity of the AIF.”\textsuperscript{128} Even though recruitment had plummeted to its lowest point of the war in 1918, the formation of a kilted battalion was rejected by the AIF’s commanders in France, who felt most keenly the need for reinforcements. Scottish associations were nevertheless encouraged to form a draft of ‘Scottish Reinforcements.’ Volunteers for this draft would wear the standard AIF uniform, but were promised they would train and embark together. More important than attracting recruits was the collective identity of the AIF. The authorization of Scottish

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{126} “Scottish Kilted Battalion,” *Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate*, 22 Jul 1918, p. 4.
\bibitem{127} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
battalions would undermine the impact of the AIF as a truly national force, defined solely by its Australian identity.

Like the units of the AIF, the infantry battalions of the NZEF, with the exception of the numbered battalions in the Rifles Brigade, were named after the four major cities that anchored the dominion’s recruiting districts and did not reflect any identity other than the geographical area from which they were recruited. Scottish societies in New Zealand, however, also sought to raise a Scottish battalion for overseas service. Sir Walter Buchanan, Member of Parliament for Wairarapa South, led a delegation of representatives to propose the formation of a Scottish battalion in New Zealand, arguing that “the Scotsmen in New Zealand wanted an opportunity to go to the front in their national dress”, adding that “[t]he formation of such a regiment would stimulate recruiting.”129 Echoing Sir Sam Hughes’ strategy of relying on civic associations to offset the cost of mobilization, Buchanan explained that “the idea was that the societies should assist in the equipment of the men and thus save the Government considerable expense.”130 Minister of Defence James Allen responded by expressing his concern about the sustainability of such a regiment, but also that if “the precedent was created, he would have to accept similar offers from other bodies.”131 Having already considered a similar offer from the Legion of Frontiersmen, Allen was concerned that “[i]f such offers were accepted the New Zealand Forces would not be a national army, which had been the desire at the back of its formation.”132 With the enactment of conscription in late 1916, the NZEF did not need to rely on special battalions to fill its ranks. The reluctance to form a Scottish battalion did not necessarily suppress the expression of Scottish culture in the NZEF. Like the 5th Battalion AIF, some units of the NZEF were able to maintain pipe bands through private donations. The Caledonian Society of New Zealand, for example,

130 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
purchased instruments to provide one of the companies of the Auckland Regiment with a pipe band.\textsuperscript{133} Lieutenant Colonel Charters, commanding officer of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Otago Battalion, contacted the Dunedin Scottish Societies in August 1918, requesting that its members undertake a collection to purchase instruments for a proposed battalion pipe band.\textsuperscript{134} As in Australia, the decision not to authorize the formation of a distinctly Scottish unit was based on the desire to promote a single national identity in the NZEF.

As in Canada, contributions to patriotic funds offered little recognition for migrant communities. The Chinese community of Melbourne presented £125 to the treasurer of the Victoria Division of the Red Cross, but did not attempt to form their own sub-branch of the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{135} Likewise, the South Australian Chinese Commercial Association donated £25 to the state patriotic fund, but attached no conditions to the offer.\textsuperscript{136} Chinese artisans or entrepreneurs offered their wares for the war effort. Cabinet makers in Melbourne produced tables for local hospital wards. Elsewhere, the Chinese community added to the spectacle of public fundraisers by performing traditional music and dragon dances.\textsuperscript{137} Military service, however, did not offer the same opportunities as in Canada. The \textit{Defence Act} of 1903 prohibited recruits “who are not substantially of European origin or descent” from serving in the Australian forces.\textsuperscript{138} While this wording was crafted to exclude Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, it applied just as well to other non-European residents of the dominions, particularly Asian immigrants. This provision effectively undercut attempts for Asian enlistments in the AIF.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Allan and Forsyth, \textit{Common Cause}, 102.
\item “Bag Pipes and Drums for Otago Battalion.” \textit{Mt Benger Mail}, 28 August 1918, 3.
\item Meeting Minutes, 10 Sept 1914. NO14. 1914 10 1939, ARCS Minutes of Central Council, 1914-1919. ARCV.
\item “Loyal Chinese,” \textit{The Mail}, 31 August 1914, 4.
\item \textit{Defence Act} 1903. Section 61 (h).
\end{enumerate}
When William Hughes’ government ordered a national registration for compulsory service in Australia in December 1915, registration cards returned by Asian residents of Melbourne reflected their perceived relationship with the Commonwealth. In response to the question asking why a person was not willing to enlist, many Chinese migrants simply stated that they were exempt from service on account of their nationality. Arthur Woon Tin responded that he was not intending to enlist because he was of “Chinese origin,” Lew Yeck, Chun Ah Kum, Ah Moury, and Ah Kim, simply stated “I am Chinese” as their reason for not enlisting in the AIF. 139 Francis Eugene Pan Look, an Australian-born man of Chinese descent, received his registration and appeared before an exemption court. Born in Australia, Look was a British subject and should have been liable for compulsory military service in Australia but not being “of sufficient European descent” was excused. 140

Australians of Asian descent nevertheless attempted to volunteer for overseas service. As in Canada, acceptances of minorities into the expeditionary forces were the result of individual circumstance. William Thomas Wong, born in Tasmania, was turned away by recruiters while his brother was allowed to enlist. George Kong Meng, who had served in the pre-war militia, was likewise refused from the AIF while his brother was already serving overseas. 141 The fact that brothers received different consideration under a policy that defined acceptance into military forces according to their parentage reveals the inconsistency of these exceptions. The inclusion of racialized minorities in the AIF was accomplished on an individual basis. Communities that were marginalized on account of their race did not have any opportunity to project their collective identity through their voluntary participation in the war effort. Exemption from military service implied their exclusion.

140 Kennedy, Chinese Anzacs, 20.
141 Ibid., 21.
New Zealand did not explicitly restrict enlistment by race. The dominion did not deviate from a regional recruiting system that produced battalions identified only by their geographical location, while the enactment of conscription in late 1916 allowed New Zealand defence authorities to maintain the strength of its overseas forces without needing to appeal to potential recruits’ cultural identities by organizing battalions that would project a unique cultural identity. Despite growing outcry against the toll of conscription, compulsory service also meant that the NZEF did not have to rely on the voluntary service of racialized minorities and the NZEF could thus maintain its relatively homogenous demographics. Though approximately fifty New Zealanders of Asian descent were able to enlist, many Asian and South Asian residents of New Zealand who were balloted for conscription were given indefinite leave from military service.

Both Australia and New Zealand adopted recruiting structures that were defined strictly by regional boundaries. This regional organization created a rational system that minimized competing recruiting efforts within each district, while also creating military units that were identified only according to their geographical space. Despite calls from the public to authorize the organization of Scottish battalions to stimulate recruiting by appealing to potential volunteers’ cultural identity and offers from Scottish cultural associations to carry the burden of the recruiting costs, defence authorities in Australia and New Zealand declined these initiatives. By retaining strict control over the recruiting system, the ministries of defence in the Pacific dominions ensured that it was the state that mobilized volunteers. Individuals considered to be racialized minorities who passed the scrutiny of recruiting authorities were accepted into the ranks of dominion expeditionary forces, but the practice of scrutinizing the racial composition of individual soldiers meant that racialized communities were not able to mobilize large numbers of recruits or project their cultural identity through the formation of a separate contingent.


As a result, the dominion defence forces retained control over the identity of the units they raised and ensured that the AIF and NZEF were indisputable projections of a cohesive identity defined by place. No expression of the recruits’ race or ethnicity was reflected in a battalion’s outward appearance, other than the implied identity of an Australian or New Zealand soldier.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 2 argued that Anglophone communities in the dominions contributed to the war effort as a means of projecting a particular identity that was defined by space and place. Examining the voluntary mobilization of non-British communities reveals how the ability to articulate a communal identity in terms of space and place through voluntary contributions was carefully controlled to reinforce boundaries of race and ethnicity. The executives of the Fédération nationale St-Jean-Baptiste actively contributed to the war effort, but the records of their meetings reveal persistent efforts to count funds collected and socks knitted separately from English-Canadian contributions to ensure that Red Cross collections in Quebec were not attributed solely to Anglophone volunteers. Asian community organizations contributed to Anglophone voluntary societies but received little recognition. The practice of attributing voluntary contributions defined in terms of space effectively effaced the contributions of most non-British minorities.

The mobilization of military units followed the same principle of attributing identities to place. Distinctions of race or ethnicity are absent in the Australian and New Zealand expeditionary forces because defence legislation effectively excluded racialized minorities from enlisting, while distinctions of ethnicity were effaced because battalions exclusively projected communal identities that reflected place. Military authorities in Australia and New Zealand were presented with proposals from Scottish cultural associations to raise ethnically-distinct battalions for the AIF and NZEF. While these proposed Scottish battalions promised to draw recruits from previously untapped sources of manpower, defence authorities in the Pacific dominions declined these offers in favour of preserving a cohesive national identity in their expeditionary forces. Policies of exclusion were bolstered by a regional recruiting system that effectively homogenized the
members of a battalion into a regional identity that reflected an outwardly British settler identity defined by place.

The Canadian Department of Militia and Defence, at the insistence of Sam Hughes, adopted a system of recruitment that relied on and encouraged the expression of identity through communal self-mobilization. The enthusiastic response from communities across Canada which offered to raise their own battalion revealed that Hughes’ appeal to communal mobilization resonated among many, while his public statements promising that racialized minorities would be able to raise their own battalion presented an opportunity for marginalized communities to project their identities through a unique contribution of their own. On the surface, Hughes’ policy of communal self-mobilization was “raceless.” The implementation of this decentralized scheme, however, revealed an unspoken hierarchy of race and ethnicity in the mobilization of the CEF.

Canadian recruiting policies seemed to rise above the racially-explicit provisions of defence legislation in the Pacific dominions, but local, regional, and even national military authorities exercised their own personal prejudices to contain the mobilization of non-British battalions. Militia Headquarters ratified responses from local recruiters to reveal a consistent, underlying opposition to African or, to a slightly lesser extent, Japanese integration into the war effort. Reinforcement battalions organized after mid-1915 were routinely disbanded to reinforce existing units. Each decision to deny the self-mobilization of an ethnic or racialized minority was rationalized in terms of sustainability, but the Department of Militia had relatively few concerns of sustainability when it authorized the Scandinavian draft or the Irish battalion in Saskatchewan. This incongruent policy led Yasushi Yamazaki to observe that “Scandinavian Battalions are authorized,” and ponder “why not a Japanese Canadian?”144 The dissolution of two Scandinavian battalions did not raise any concerns, but officers such as Major-General Gwatkin were undeniably upset by the possibility of integrating a battalion of African- or Japanese-Canadian soldiers into Anglophone units of the CEF. The promise of raising

their own battalion motivated marginalized communities to drum up men for the war effort. Indeed, the CEF need men in 1916 and 1917, but it did not need them so badly to authorize the formation of a Japanese-Canadian or African-Canadian battalion, or encourage their integration into the CEF.

The mobilization of marginalized communities was curtailed to contain expressions of identity. Much like the Acadian battalion, the successful organization of No. 2 Construction Battalion was downgraded to a company, and later relegated to the inglorious labour of the Forestry Corps. Through an extended process of negotiation, the commanding officer of the battalion gradually surrendered the unit’s identity in order to participate in the war effort. The commanding officer of the 119th Battalion could claim French-Canadian recruits belonged in his “All-Algoma” battalion but declined the offer of an African-Canadian platoon because these soldiers did not. The spatial boundaries around Sault Ste Marie gave the 119th Battalion its name and identity, and also a rationale for who it should include or exclude. The exclusion of an African-Canadian platoon was rationalized because their presence was out-of-place in a community defined implicitly in terms of whiteness. The authorization of the No. 2 Construction Battalion provided African Canadians with their own unit, but just as Franco-Ontarians needed to leave Northern Ontario to serve with a unit of their own cultural identity, African-Canadian recruits from across Canada had to enlist in Truro, Nova Scotia, in order to serve in a distinctly African-Canadian battalion. Like other marginalized communities in Canada, African Canadians were forced to relocate in order to serve in their own unit. Anglophone communities defined their communal identities in terms of space and place. Non-British communities were left placeless and defined only by markers such as their language or the colour of their skin, the same markers that rationalized their marginal status. Military mobilization did not offer everyone a place in the national war effort.
Chapter 4

4 Frenemy Aliens

Josip Skroza was a man caught between two worlds. He migrated from Privic, in the Austro-Hungarian province of Dalmatia, to Australia in 1909 and like tens of thousands of other migrants\(^1\) from the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires, Skroza was interned at the outbreak of the First World War.\(^2\) Australia, Canada, and New Zealand welcomed migrants from continental Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to sustain economic and demographic growth. Upon Britain’s declaration of war in 1914, however, migrants who were subjects of enemy states, such as Skroza, were interned by dominion authorities lest they return home to fulfil their obligation as reservists to fight against the British Empire and its allies.

Skroza’s attachment to Europe yielded further complications, because in 1917 he was given the opportunity to volunteer for an independent contingent formed by the Australian Ministry of Defence to reinforce the Serbian Army. Hoping to rebuild the rump of its army, which had evacuated to Salonika, the Serbian delegation in London pressed the War Office to mobilize communities of South Slavic migrants who had made their homes in the dominions prior to the war. The War Office request turned Skroza from an enemy alien into a friendly ally. Interned as a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Skroza’s Slavic origin made him a potential recruit to fight against his former government for a new pan-Slavic state in the Balkans. Not only did his status as a migrant in Australia compete against his loyalty as an expatriate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Skroza’s South Slavic origins offered the opportunity to reject his ties to the

\(^1\) This chapter will use the term migrant – rather than immigrants – because not all arrivals intended to make the dominions a permanent home, while others could relocate from one dominion to another, such as from Australia to New Zealand, or vice versa, or from Canada to the United States, or vice versa. The deportation or repatriation of immigrants likewise underscores their transitory nature as migrants rather than immigrants.

\(^2\) Australian Federal Police, Western Division, Perth Office. PP14/1, Intelligence reports of internments, repatriations, affiliations and general investigations, multiple number series. 5/11/18, Skroza J. NAA.
Austro-Hungarian Empire in favour of claiming allegiance to an aspirational pan-Slavic kingdom of Jugo-Slavs. While the Commonwealth government identified Skroza as a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Skroza was given the chance to identify himself as a South Slav by volunteering to fight with the Serbian Army. Despite this change in status, Skroza was defined by his attachment to the Old World, rather than his residence in the New World.

In the decades prior to the 1914, migrants arrived from all over Europe and Asia to the dominions, where settler societies were forging these New Worlds into a Neo-Europe or more precisely a “Better Britain,” where British laws, British traditions, and a British language defined the cultural mainstream. Non-British migrants often faced difficulties adapting to mainstream settler societies in the dominions because they spoke a different language and practiced customs that did not always conform to British values. An important element in creating a “Better Britain” in the dominions was maintaining a racially-homogenous settler community. Northern Europeans, such as Germanic or Scandinavian migrants, were generally preferred because of their assumed racial and cultural proximity to Britain, while Southern and Eastern Europeans, such as Italians, Russians, or South Slavs, were eyed askance because of their assumed racial and cultural proximity to Asia. The distinction between Northern European migrants, and those from Southern or Eastern Europe reflected the settler colonial design to create of a “Better Britain.”

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3 This is based on the number of “foreign-born” residents reported in the 1911 censuses of the three dominions, meaning residents who were not born on British territory. Australia and New Zealand counted roughly two percent of their population as foreign-born (107,885 out of a total population of 4,455,005 in Australia and 19,571 out of a total population of 1,008,468 in New Zealand. Canada counted roughly ten percent of its population as foreign-born (752,732 out of a total population of 7,206,643) although nearly half of these foreign-born subjects (303,680) arrived from the United States. See: The First Commonwealth Census, 3rd April, 1911, (Melbourne: J.P. Kemp Government Printer, N.D.) Vol 2, Part 2, Birthplaces, Table 40, “Total Population of the Commonwealth of Australia at the census of 3rd April, 1911, Classified According to Birthplace, Nationality, Length of Residence, Education, Conjugal Condition,” 188-189; The Canada Year Book, 1914, (Ottawa: J.L. De Tache, 1915), Table 18, “Birthplace of the Population, 1901 and 1911,” 63-64; “Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand,” Chapter 42. Table II. “Showing (exclusive of Maoris) the Number of Persons of different Birthplaces living in New Zealand at various Census Periods, with the Numerical and Centesimal Increase or Decrease of each Nationality during the Intervals,” http://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1911-census/1911-results-census.html#d50e186952, (accessed 28 April 2015).
The anxieties aroused by the arrival of Southern and Eastern European migrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are palpable in the tightening restrictions on immigration in the British dominions. Alarmist concerns were raised about the impact of migrant labour on wage deflation, the economic impact of remittances sent back to Europe, and the cultural consequences of migrants whose languages and traditions were believed to be incompatible with assimilation into a British-dominated society. These debates prompted the extension of immigration restrictions designed to deflect Asian migration to apply equally to European migrants who originated from the Asian periphery. Restrictions on immigration were rationalized by racializing Southern and Eastern European migrants as “non-whites” in Anglophone settler colonial states such as the British dominions and the United States. Over the course of the twentieth century,


5 Australia employed a dictation test to exclude undesirable immigrants which were required to transcribe a passage dictated in a European language, choosing a language other than one spoken by the applicant assured their exclusion from the Commonwealth, with the *Contract Immigrants Act* of 1905 added another layer of obstacles by requiring European labourers to secure a written contract of employment prior to arriving in Australia and requiring the employer to prove that this work could not be performed by Australian labourers, Lenore Layman, “‘To Keep up the Australian Standard:’ Regulating Contract Labour Migration 1901-50,” *Labour History*, no 70 (1996): 25-52. New Zealand instituted a dictation test in 1907 but debates on stricter regulations were interrupted by the outbreak of war and a more stringent system that screened immigrants through a postal application process was put in place in 1902 and exercised to restrict immigration from Yugoslavia and Italy during the interwar years; P.S. O’Connor, “Keeping New Zealand White, 1908-1920,” *New Zealand Journal of History*, Vol 2 no 1 (1968), 64. Canada’s *Immigration Act* of 1906 authorized the deportation of any immigrant dependent on public or charitable funds within two years of arrival and empowered the federal cabinet to identify specific classes of immigrants deemed undesirable for entry to Canada, Kelley and Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic*, 97.

6 In Australia, the phrase “servile labour” was used to conflate the cheaper manual labour provided by migrant workers with servility, slavery, and by extension race, Lenore Layman, “‘To Keep up the Australian Standard:’ Regulating Contract Labour Migration 1901-50,” *Labour History*, no 70 (1996): 25-52. This is discussed briefly in the Canadian context in Vic Satzewich, “Whiteness Limited: Racialization and the Social Construction of Peripheral Europeans,” *Histoire sociale/Social History*, Vol 33, no. 66 (2000): 271-289; and even more briefly in New Zealand, In New Zealand, see Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, 148.
migrants from the European periphery were eventually accepted as “white” to contrast with Asian and African migrants who were racialized as “coloured” minorities. Eastern and Southern European migrants left the Old World behind but perceptions of race shaped formal and informal barriers that prevented their acceptance into the settler societies of the New World. The challenges of integrating into a new society pushed migrants away from the Anglophone mainstream while the patterns of chain migration pulled them toward other migrants who shared their own language and customs. Though not enforced with the same legal statutes as the racial segregation of Asian, South Asian, and African migrants and diasporans, the result was a “clustering” of migrant communities into particular occupations and neighbourhoods. These social boundaries emphasized that Eastern and Southern European migrants still belonged to the Old World, despite having taken up residence in the New World.

While the previous chapter examined the experiences of non-British diasporans who offered their services to fight in dominion forces, this chapter will address migrant communities in the British dominions that considered fighting for another nation. Such migrants could see the war either as an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to their adoptive homes in the dominions, or they could view the conflict through their ties to the Old World. Certain communities of Southern and Eastern European migrants, such as Italians or Russians, who originated from nations allied to Great Britain, as well as South Slavs, Poles, Czechs, or Slovaks, who originated from territories that were under German or Austro-Hungarian occupation, could see the British imperial war effort as a complement to their own nationalist aspirations to defend or create an independent homeland. As the previous chapter demonstrates, the process of mobilization provided a


means for dominion authorities to impose identities on communities in the non-British diaspora, or to efface those communities from the national war effort. The mobilization of unnaturalized European migrants presents a similar process in which the policies that regulated the mobilization of these communities likewise regulated the expression of identities.

While their attachments to the Old World raised suspicion, the outbreak of war highlighted the precarious position of European migrants, as suspicion quickly escalated to state surveillance and internment. Historians in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have not ignored this escalation; their works illuminate the practice of wartime surveillance, internment, or public vilification of migrant populations during the First World War. Yet migrant communities also offered a valuable source of manpower that could be mobilized for the war effort. Most European-born migrants who were not naturalized as residents of the dominions were liable for compulsory military service in their homelands. The possibility of mobilizing migrants raised questions about how to incorporate recent arrivals from Europe into the dominion war efforts and whether contributions from these Old World communities would imply their acceptance into settler society.

This chapter will examine how migrant communities negotiated their status with dominion authorities through their voluntary participation in the war effort. Wartime pressure to mobilize people and resources compelled dominion military authorities to enlist European migrants. In each context, unnaturalized migrants were successfully mobilized to contribute to the national and imperial war efforts, but the terms of their participation did not imply their inclusion in the nation. The first section of the chapter

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explores the experiences of migrants who were liable for compulsory service in their homelands and the impact of these obligations on their relationship to the dominions in time of war. As foreign reservists, they presented a potential source of manpower for the allied war effort. Civil and military authorities in the dominions debated how best to mobilize allied reservists, whether by repatriating them to join the armies of their homeland or by integrating them into dominion forces to fight a common enemy. The second section of this chapter delves into the complex identities of migrants who were born within the borders of enemy states but identified themselves as members of burgeoning nations, such as Poles or Yugoslavs, which were fighting for their independence from the belligerent empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The separate mobilization of Southern and Eastern European migrants reinforced tensions over the status of Old World migrants in the New World.

4.1 Allied Reservists

The presence of allied reservists in the dominions created several complications for military authorities. Citizens of allied nations, such as Belgium, France, Russia, and later Italy, who were not naturalized as residents of the dominions were required to fulfil their wartime duties as reservists in their nation of origin. Individual reservists bore the responsibility for returning to Europe to comply with the obligations of compulsory military service, and this burden grew with the tightening restrictions on international travel and the rising demands for shipping. Reservists in Australia and New Zealand faced particularly costly return journeys.

Allied reservists, however, would return to fight the same enemies as the armies of the British Empire and these complementary efforts presented an opportunity for cooperation between Britain, the dominions, and their European allies and build a common cause between migrants and settlers. One solution was for dominion and imperial military authorities to assist in the assembly and transportation of allied reservists residing in the dominions. While these efforts could divert resources from the transportation of dominion expeditionary forces, a bigger complication was the extent to which dominion authorities should compel allied reservists to fulfil their obligation to fight for a separate nation as part of another army. A second solution was to authorize
allied reservists to enlist in dominion forces to fight a common enemy, but enlisting migrants so they could fulfil their obligations to another nation raised difficult questions regarding the cause for which these migrants were fighting and their implied relationship to the dominion. Both methods forced the issue of whether a migrant should be treated as a resident of the dominions or as a citizen of another nation.

### 4.1.1 Repatriating Reservists

Migrants who were not naturalized as residents of the dominions maintained the obligations of citizenship in their homeland. These formal ties to the Old World provided legal grounds to maintain a division between migrants and settlers. Universal military service was a common rite of citizenship among continental European armies, which conscripted young men upon reaching the age of majority. Compulsory military service often required men to serve on active duty for a set number of years. Upon completion of their time on active duty, conscripts were released as reservists who were liable to be called up to perform annual training and to return to the colours in time of war, even if they emigrated.9 Enlisting a migrant into dominion forces while he was still liable to perform military service in his homeland could create diplomatic tensions between the dominions and the allied nations to whom that migrant was obli
ged. Migrants who enlisted in dominion militaries while still liable for service at home could also face imprisonment if they ever returned to their homeland. Comparing the experiences of Italian reservists, who were obliged to return to Italy, and Russian reservists, who were authorized to fulfil their obligation to Russia by enlisting in dominion forces, reveals how in both cases the mobilization of allied reservists did little to integrate these migrants into mainstream dominion society.

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9 In 1912, Austro-Hungarian subjects were required to serve two years in the standing army and two years with the reserves; in 1875, Italy reduced its requirements to three years in the standing army and nine years with the reserves; in 1906, Russia requires three years of service with the standing army and fifteen years in the reserves; in 1905, France required two years of service with the standing army and increased this to three years in 1913; in 1896, Germany required two years of service in the standing army and retained men as reservists until age 39. See Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 108.
Legally barred from enlisting in dominion forces, Italian reservists in the dominions were called up after Italy’s entry into the war in May 1915. Each dominion supported the repatriation of Italian reservists to Italy, but the variations in the treatment of reservists revealed differing attitudes toward the place of migrants in dominion society. Italian reservists in Canada were mobilized amid fanfare and celebrations staged by various Italian cultural associations in Canada. A special train, “il treno degli italiani,” made its way from Vancouver to Montreal with tricolour flags flying from its windows collecting reservists at major cities along the way. At each stop, the local Italian associations held farewell banquets and staged parades to accompany the volunteers and reservists as they marched to the train station.\(^\text{10}\) The departure of Italian reservists raised questions among existing patriotic funds regarding the eligibility of Italian-Canadian families. While Herbert Ames dismissed Italian reservists as “sojourners” to prevent their families from drawing on the support of the Canadian Patriotic Fund, separate patriotic societies, such as the Italian Soldiers’ Aid Society, were formed to provide financial assistance to the families of Italian reservists.\(^\text{11}\) Enthusiasm was not universal, however, as Italian-Canadians who belonged to radical or socialist organizations criticized Italy’s entry into a capitalist war and discouraged reservists from reporting for duty.\(^\text{12}\) While these detractors were monitored and prosecuted as part of the Canadian government’s vigilance against Bolshevik agitation, dominion authorities were generally supportive of the Italian-Canadian community’s mobilization in support of the Italian war effort.

Parsimony discouraged the Department of Militia and Defence from mobilizing other allied reservists without financial assistance from reservists’ nation of origin or from Britain. Both the French and Italian government had petitioned the dominion of

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\(^\text{10}\) Angelo Principe, “The Concept of Italy in Canada and in Italian Canadian Writings from the Eve of Confederation to the Second World War,” PhD Dissertation: University of Toronto, 1989, 175.


\(^\text{12}\) Principe, “The Concept of Italy in Canada,” 181.
Canada to arrest and detain *insoumis* who had not returned to Europe to report for duty. Charles Doherty, the Minister of Justice, replied to these demands by pointing out that allied reservists would only be rounded up by Canadian authorities if the costs of the detention and transportation of reservists was born by their country of origin. The French government proposed to undertake such arrangements beginning in December 1918, but the matter was rendered moot with the signing of the Armistice. Canadian military authorities were reluctant to subsidize the transportation of European reservists in Canada, who were left to mobilize their own contingents and arrange their own repatriation. The string of festivals that followed Italian reservists as they departed for overseas, however, reveals that this self-mobilization provided Italian Canadians an opportunity to celebrate their communal contribution to the war effort.

Defence officials in New Zealand were relatively slow in turning their attention to allied reservists in the dominions. The implementation of conscription in New Zealand in 1916 required all male British subjects in New Zealand who were of military age, with the exception of Maori, to register for balloted conscription. The act sought to provide a centralized, equitable, and transparent method of conscription, but did not extend to migrants who were not naturalized residents of New Zealand. Indeed, enquiries regarding the enlistment of reservists were only made in the middle of 1917, when Colonel Charles Lamb, the British military attaché in Italy, conferred with Italian authorities and informed New Zealand’s defence staff that Italian citizens would face imprisonment if they enlisted in the NZEF while still liable for compulsory service in Italy. In September 1917 Colonel Charles Gibbon, New Zealand’s Chief of Defence Staff, informed Italy’s consular agent in Wellington that space was allotted on New Zealand transport ships to repatriate fifty Italian reservists, leaving the nearly four hundred other Italian-born residents of New Zealand with no means of fulfilling their civic obligation to their


14 Letter from C.A. Lamb, 17 April 1917, AAYS 8638 AD1 831 / 29/272. Establishments and Recruitment - Enlistment of Italians in NZEF. ANZ.
homeland.\textsuperscript{15} A small number of Italian migrants in New Zealand were given the opportunity to return home and fulfil their civic obligations, but few resources were diverted from the needs of the NZEF. As in Canada, the needs of the national war effort took priority over the assembly and transportation of allied reservists.

Like the Dominion of Canada, the New Zealand government made no effort to police European reservists.\textsuperscript{16} The implementation of universal military service in New Zealand, however, attracted public outrage against Italian reservists who were accused of shirking their duties. A mother from Ponsonby whose two sons were serving in the NZEF wrote an anonymous letter to James Allen, Minister of Defence, providing the names and addresses of two Italian migrants who were making no effort to report to the Italian consul and return to Italy. The mother denounced the “great injustice” as these two reservists were allowed “to live in peace and security while our own men … are continually suffering and sacrificing daily.”\textsuperscript{17} Market gardeners met in Nelson in February 1918 to discuss the “unfair advantage” that their Italian competitors were enjoying while British subjects were conscripted for overseas service.\textsuperscript{18} A letter to the editor of the \textit{Nelson Evening Mail} criticized the “monstrous” irony that Italian migrants “are enjoying the freedom of this country [while] our own British soldiers are fighting in their country, presumably for them, and our own boys are fighting in France.”\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{15} Letter from CM Gibbon to L.H. Tripps, 6 September 1917, AAYS 8638 AD1 831 / 29/272. Establishments and Recruitment - Enlistment of Italians in NZEF. ANZ. The New Zealand Census of 1911 counted 391 Italian-born residents of New Zealand, see “Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand,” Chapter 43. Table III. “Showing (exclusive of Maoris) the Number of Persons (Males and Females) in New Zealand of various Birthplaces according to the Census taken for 2nd April, 1911, with the Increase or Decrease in the Numbers for each Nationality since 1906,” http://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1911-census/1911-results-census.html#d50e186952, (accessed 28 April 2015).

\textsuperscript{16} In October 1918, James Allen communicated with the Italian Consul to Australia, petitioning the Italian government to extend permission to Italian reservists in New Zealand to serve in the NZEF, thus allowing the dominion to extend compulsory service to non-naturalized Italian migrants. With the armistice signed only a month later, these last efforts were of no consequence for the legal status of Italian reservists in New Zealand. See letter from Royal Italian Consul for Australasia to Allen, 11 October 1918. AAYS 8638 AD1 831 / 29/272. Establishments and Recruitment - Enlistment of Italians in NZEF. ANZ.

\textsuperscript{17} Anonymous letter to James Allen, 20 August 1918. Ibid.


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increasing toll of compulsory service in New Zealand drew criticisms on those exempt from the Military Service Act. Allied reservists, Italians in particular, were singled out for not contributing to the national sacrifice. Without the means to return to Italy, Italian reservists were denounced as truants and shirkers. Unable to participate in the national war effort, Italians in New Zealand were subject to derogatory attacks that reinforced their marginal status.

Italian migrants in Australia faced similar circumstances as their compatriots in New Zealand. As Italian reservists, they were ineligible for service in the AIF until they were released from their obligations by the Italian government, but without the assistance of Australian authorities, few Italian migrants were able to bear the cost of a return passage to Italy. At least 137 Italian migrants presented themselves to AIF recruiting offices but were turned away because the Italian consul in Melbourne did not grant them leave from their military obligations to Italy. Over the course of 1915 and 1916, the departments of defence and external affairs haggled with the Italian Consul in successive attempts to authorize the enlistment of Italian reservists in the AIF. The Italian government, however, was unrelenting in its refusal to allow its reservists to enlist in foreign armies.

Unable to serve either with Australian or Italian forces, Italian migrants were left in a difficult position as their exemption from military service highlighted their exclusion from the national war effort. As in New Zealand, Italian migrants attracted criticism for not fighting. Because conscription was not introduced in Australia, Italian reservists were blamed for discouraging others from volunteering. E. Blackmore, Member of Parliament for Halifax, Queensland, reported to Frederick Bamford, Minister for Home Affairs, that the refusal of Italian reservists to return voluntarily to Italy was having a detrimental impact on AIF recruiting. Bamford argued that British-Australians suspected “these men are waiting to jump in their billets,” playing on anxieties over foreign intrusions into the

labour force.\textsuperscript{21} State legislators in Western Australia resolved to petition the Minister of Defence, George Pearce, to force a solution to either allow Italian migrants to enlist or to facilitate their return to Italy; the Australian Labor Federation in Perth drafted a similar resolution.\textsuperscript{22} These petitions led Senator Pearce to concur that it was time to approach the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enlist the help of the Imperial government in concocting an agreement with the Italian government over the status of Italians in Australia. The Italian government, however, did not deviate from its position that Italian reservists who enlisted with foreign military forces would be liable for imprisonment on their return to Italy.\textsuperscript{23} While Serbian and Russian reservists in Australia were granted permission to enlist in the AIF, Italian migrants stood out as shirkers. Their reluctance to return to Italy at their own expense turned Italian migrants into scapegoats who were blamed for decreasing enlistments in mining communities where Italians had a stronger presence.\textsuperscript{24}

The remaining option for Australian defence authorities was to facilitate the transportation of Italian reservists to Italy. Authorities agreed that if Australian ships could carry Italian reservists to Britain, the Imperial government would facilitate their subsequent passage to Italy.\textsuperscript{25} The Attorney General confirmed that under the Alien Restriction Order, 1915, the Commonwealth government had the authority to detain and deport any non-naturalized migrant and could apply this legislation to enforce Italian reservists’ return to Italy.\textsuperscript{26} In reviewing the proposal, George Pearce approved the suggestion that the Commonwealth government would provide Italian reservists leaving Australia with separation allowances and benefits on the same scale as those received by soldiers of the AIF. With the approval of the Italian government and the Italian Consul in

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. See also Agutter, “Belligerent Broken Hill,” 53.

\textsuperscript{22} Department of Defence Precis, Italians – enlistment in the AIF. MP367/1 592/4/1145. NAA.

\textsuperscript{23} Cable from British Embassy, Rome to Australian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 July 1916. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Minute by G. Pearce, 27 February 1917 on letter from E. Peploe to W.M. Hughes, 4 May 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Telegram from T. Trumble to Secty of State for External Affairs, 23 June 1917; Telegram from Secty State for External Affairs to T. Trumble, 11 July 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Department of Defence Precis, Italians – enlistment in the AIF. Ibid.
Melbourne, notices were published in Australian newspapers in early February 1918 ordering Italian reservists to report for medical examinations as a first step toward their repatriation to Italy for compulsory military service. In consultation with the Italian Consul in Melbourne, the Ministry of Defence notified Italian reservists, arranged medical screenings, and transported those who were medically fit to embarkation points for their return to Italy.27

The attempt to assemble the first draft of Italian reservists in May 1918 was met with a mix of cooperation, ambivalence, and resistance. Lieutenant Colonel James Walker oversaw the medical examination of Italian reservists and reported that the initial response was limited. Turnout was low in Melbourne and almost non-existent in Broken Hill, New South Wales, where labour leaders organized public meetings to discourage reservists from responding to the call-up. The Italian community in Port Pirie, South Australia, responded more positively with sixty-nine of seventy fit men presenting themselves for embarkation. The Port Pirie contingent of volunteers marched to the train station led by a band and flag party.28 From a total of about three hundred reservists called up in this first attempt, only 142 presented themselves for embarkation in Melbourne.29 In the following months, warrants were issued for the arrest of anyone who resisted and raids were organized by police forces throughout Australia to forcibly bring reservists to Melbourne for medical examination and embarkation.30

A number of Italian reservists resisted the call-up. Colonel Walker’s report complained that many of the reservists who did not report for duty had fled to Queensland or Western Australia to evade police.31 One of the more prominent members of the Italian community who challenged the legality of the call-up was Giovanni

27 Letter from T.Trumble to Consul General Italy, Melbourne, 22 November 1917. Ibid.
29 Confidential Interim Report on First Italian Draft. Italian Reservists - Giovanni Ferrando. MP367/1 592/4/1145. NAA.
31 Confidential Interim Report on First Italian Draft. Italian Reservists - Giovanni Ferrando. MP367/1 592/4/1145. NAA.
Ferrando, a former Italian consul who had been knighted by the Italian crown for his military service.\textsuperscript{32} Seeing the injustice of compulsory repatriation while enemy aliens remained in Australia in internment camps, some Italians evaded service by altering their nationality and registering under the \textit{Alien Registration Act} to be interned as Austrians rather than conscripted to fight for Italy.\textsuperscript{33} Though a number of reservists came forward voluntarily, the terms by which the Commonwealth conducted the call-up meant that these willing reservists were only complying with a compulsory and coercive system of conscription imposed by the dominion government. While their compatriots in Canada celebrated their repatriation as a communal initiative, Italian reservists in Australia were forced to comply with the decisions of the Commonwealth government.

Migration from Europe to the dominions offered migrants a temporary reprieve from compulsory military service in their homelands. The outbreak of war in 1914 placed allied reservists in an ambiguous position that needed to be categorized as either residents of their dominion or expatriates of their homeland. In every case, the mobilization of European reservists was subject to the needs of the dominion. The means by which they were mobilized emphasized the status of European reservists as members of a separate nation in the Old World. Whether their mobilization was a voluntary expression of communal identity, as celebrated by Italian Canadians, or their separate identity was imposed upon them, as was the case for Italian reservists in New Zealand and Australia, the repatriation of reservists reinforced negative perceptions of European migrants as objects of suspicion in dominion society. The repatriation of European reservists was orchestrated according to the priorities of the dominion governments.

4.1.2 Allied Reservists in Dominion Forces

The logistical difficulties of assembling and transporting reservists to fight in their homelands led some European powers, such as the Russian Empire, to allow their reservists to enlist with allied military forces in their country of residence. While

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} Agutter, “Belligerent Broken Hill,” 63.} \textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 10.
repatriating reservists in separate contingents – or refusing to assist in that process – could deepen the divides between migrants and British Settlers, the induction of European reservists into dominion forces offered the promise of integrating migrants into the national war effort, perhaps even into the nation. Trying to convince the Italian government to authorize Italian reservists to enlist in the AIF, the Department of External Affairs argued that it would be “advantageous … if [Italian reservists] were permitted to identify themselves with their fellow citizens of Australia.” While legal barriers prevented the enlistment of Italian reservists in dominion forces, the experience of allied reservists who were granted permission to enlist in dominion forces reveals that informal cultural barriers, such as language, maintained a chasm between recent migrants and settlers in the dominions.

The Czarist government initially barred its reservists from enlisting in foreign militaries, but by mid-1915 an Imperial decree authorized Russian reservists overseas to enlist in allied military forces as a more convenient method to bring them into the allied war effort. As Elena Govor reveals in her study of Russian migrants in the AIF, Russian reservists in Australia who were not naturalized residents could enlist in the AIF by presenting a certificate from the Russian consul to prove their nationality. Acceptance into the AIF, however, did not mean that Russian migrants embraced their membership in the Australian nation or that Australian military authorities accepted Russian migrants as their own. Moyesey Dossoeff, a Russian reservist who enlisted in the AIF, struggled with English while training as a machine-gunner. Dossoeff requested a transfer to Light Horse, citing both his difficulty with technical terminology and his experience fighting with a Cossack regiment during the Russo-Japanese War. His Officer Commanding supported Dossoeff’s request, stating that he was “one of my best men but handicapped in MG work because of poor knowledge of language.” After arriving in England, however, Dossoeff was likewise repatriated to Australian and released from the AIF, for reason of “deficient

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34 Department of Defence Precis, Italians – enlistment in the AIF. MP367/1 592/4/1145. NAA.
35 Elena Govor, Russian Anzac in Australian History, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), 85.
36 Letter from M. Dossoeff to R. Wood, 8 September 1916. B2455, Dossoeff, Moyesey. NAA.
mentality.” While Russian reservists leveraged their status as expatriates to join Russian forces when they grew frustrated with serving in the AIF, Australian officers dismissed these linguistic challenges as symptoms of lesser intelligence.

A number of Russian migrants, as Govor shows, struggled with English and attempted to transfer from the AIF into a Russian force. Alexis Kopin enlisted in Melbourne in 1917 but found that his limited knowledge of English was making service difficult. Kopin petitioned his Commanding Officer at the Machine Gun Depot, Seymour Camp, “to be discharged that I may go to Russia” to “enlist in my counymens [sic] forces.” Oskar Yurak and Jostin Glowacki likewise requested to be released from the AIF to join the Russian Army. Yurak claimed that he enlisted in the AIF on the understanding that he would eventually be able to transfer to Russian forces and stated in his request that he believed it was best for “every soldier to be amongst his own people.” Yurak was returned to Australia to be discharged from the AIF. Kopin was still training in Australia when he made his request and was likewise discharged. In his report to the Adjutant General, the Commanding Officer of the Machine Gun Depot asked whether “something cannot be done to stop these foreigners enlisting in Australian Forces, particularly in Technical Units like Machine Gunners where a man has to have a far more intelligent mind than for other branches of service.” The experience did little to integrate Russian migrants into the collective experience of Australia’s national war effort.

41 Copy of letter from Oscar Yurak to OC 8th Bn AIF. B2455, Yurak, Oscar. NAA.
42 Statement of Service of No 2668, Yurak Oscar. B2455, Yurak, Oscar. NAA.
43 Minute from R.A.M. Smith, to AAG, 25 August 1917. B2455, Kopin, Alexis. NAA.
Even before the Czarist government authorized Russian reservists to join the CEF in June 1915, recruiters in Canada were unintentionally accepting non-naturalized Russian migrants into their units. In November 1914 Brigadier Hodgins, Adjutant General of the Canadian Militia, issued a circular reminding all officers commanding of the twelve militia districts that European reservists who did not have the consent of their home governments were not to be accepted in the CEF. Hodgins’ reminder prompted an investigation that led to the realization that dozens, if not hundreds, of unnaturalized migrants and enemy aliens had been enlisted in the CEF by inattentive recruiters.

Lieutenant Colonel E.S. Wigle, Commanding Officer of the 18th Battalion, disobeyed orders to discharge Private Serge Donik when it was discovered that he was not a naturalized resident of the dominion. Wigle argued that Donik was “one of the best men in the whole Battalion” and that “it would break his heart to be discharged.”

Many non-naturalized migrants and enemy aliens were discharged as a result of these enquiries but exceptions were made, while others evaded detection and remained in the CEF.

Mirroring the effort to organize a Scandinavian battalion, leading Russian expatriates encouraged collective enlistments in the CEF. Identifying himself as Russian, Mr. M. Gordon of Winnipeg wrote to the Department of Militia and Defence for permission to form a Russian regiment to recruit and train Russian reservists to prepare their entry into the CEF. Gordon argued that “There is only one thing that keeps away a lot of Russians to join the army [it] is that they do not know the English language.” Gordon’s proposal was rejected because Russian reservists were not yet free from their obligations to their homeland. When the Czar dropped the legal barriers keeping Russian reservists from


45 One volunteer, for example, answered truthfully that he was born in Prague, but disguised the fact he was a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by stating that Prague was in Romania. See letter from E Wright to LCol H.M. Elliot, 5 Aug 1916. RG24-C-8 Vol 4331 File Part 1. File MD2-34-2-18. Foreigners Enlisting for Active Service. LAC.


47 Letter from M. Gordon to Military Headquarters, 25 April 1915. Ibid.
joining the CEF in June 1915, Colonel Ruttan, Officer Commanding of No. 10 Militia District, confirmed Gordon’s assertions that the absence of Russian-speaking recruiters or Russian-speaking officers dissuaded many from entering the CEF.48

The barrier of communication was unrelenting. Russian soldiers whose language skills were not suited to service at the front were weeded out on their arrival in England. At least one thousand Russian-Canadian soldiers were held at the Canadian training camp in Shorncliffe because it was deemed they could not speak English well enough to be sent to the front.49 A draft of one hundred volunteers was dispatched to reinforce the Russian Imperial Army and the remainder of Russian-speaking soldiers were folded into labour units, where it was deemed their language skills would cause fewer difficulties.50 Russian reservists serving in the CEF were not necessarily released because they could not speak English, but they were nevertheless isolated and grouped with other soldiers who struggled with their grasp of English. When the formal barriers preventing the enlistment of allied reservists in dominion forces were dropped, the informal barriers of language and culture interrupted the integration of Eastern and Southern European migrants into the dominion war efforts.

The experiences of allied reservists in the dominions revealed how wartime mobilization did little to reconcile migrant and settler identities. Whether their service can be called voluntary is debatable because these expatriates were bound by law to perform compulsory military service, but allied reservists in the dominions were well beyond the legal jurisdictions that could compel them to fulfill their military obligations and authorities in Canada and New Zealand did not prosecute insoumis. European reservists who were accepted into dominion forces faced the challenges of integrating into an Anglophone army and many struggled to understand commands or instructions delivered in English. The inclusion of allied reservists in the dominion armies did not

49 Statement by LCol Yourkevitch. RG 9-III. Vol 81. 10-12-31. Alien Subjects in the OMFC. LAC.
50 Ibid.
necessarily imply their inclusion into the nation-in-arms. Formal ties to their nations of origin, such as legal prohibition on enlisting in dominion forces, as well as informal cultural ties, such as language differences, presented convenient grounds to reaffirm the separate status of European migrants as members of an Old World that did not belong in the “Better Britain” of the dominions.

The process of mobilizing European reservists also reveals that immigrants in the dominions remained very much attached to their European identities. Enlisting in dominion forces offered little to acknowledge or express the complexity of migrant identities as both expatriates of the Old World and residents the New World. As the previous chapter illustrated, Scottish, Irish, and even Scandinavian communities could affirm their attachment to the dominions by raising – or attempting to raise – their own battalions. There was no accommodation for this kind of duality for Eastern or Southern Europeans in the battalions of the AIF or CEF. Unable to express the duality of their identity through military service, many Italian and Russian immigrants chose to define themselves as wholly Italian or Russian. Italian clubs across Canada, for instance, celebrated their contribution to the Italian, rather than the Canadian, war effort. Russian reservists who were frustrated with their superiors in the CEF and AIF requested transfers to the Russian army. Whether mobilized into separate contingents or integrated into dominion armies, the legal and cultural barriers separating migrants from settlers persisted.

4.2 Enemy Aliens or Friendly Allies?

Britain’s declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1914 cast new suspicion on migrants who originated from these belligerent empires. While allied reservists wrestled with the duality of their identity as expatriates of another nation and residents of the dominions, migrants from belligerent empires were faced with the added challenge of contesting their status as enemy aliens. The mobilization of Southern and Eastern European migrants, such as Josip Skroza, for military service in Serbia and elsewhere provides another side to this story, where anti-imperial movements in Europe turned enemy aliens into friendly allies. The dichotomy between enemy alien and friendly ally added a layer of complexity to the duality of migrant identities. While migrant
communities worked to affirm dual identities, the added task of casting off suspicion directed at enemy aliens weighed heavily on this balancing act.

The official status of German and Austro-Hungarian migrants as enemy aliens encouraged xenophobic attacks from British residents of the dominions who resented the foreign incursion into their labour force. Nationalist agitations among South Slavic communities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire provided Eastern and Southern European migrants with a cause to ally themselves to the dominion war efforts. By finding this common cause, Southern and Eastern Europeans attempted to align expressions of their own separate national identity with their dominion’s effort in the war against the Central Powers. The creation of independent contingents to fight with the Serbian, Czechoslovakian, or Polish Army provided an ideal opportunity for South and Eastern European communities in the dominions to make a visible contribution to the Allied war effort. Branded as enemy aliens, however, migrant communities were required to balance their nationalist aspirations while also demonstrating their loyalty to their adoptive dominion to avoid official or public suspicion. Much as the status of allied reservists provided formal and informal boundaries between migrants and settlers, the status of enemy aliens provided formal and informal grounds to mobilize or further marginalize migrant communities.

4.2.1 Canada

As in the other dominions, the presence of ‘enemy aliens’ in Canada was judged a threat to security. Orders-in-Council passed during the first weeks of August 1914 reassured migrants from enemy territories that if their actions did not overtly raise suspicion, they would have nothing to fear. Rising unemployment in the Prairie Provinces combined

51 Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War, 16; See also “War with Austria Hungary - Immigrants who live quietly not to be disturbed - Officers and reservists who attempt to return to be arrested”, 13 August 1914, Order-in-Council 1914-2128. RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a. LAC; War with Germany and with Austria Hungary - Authority to Police and Militia to arrest and intern all German and Austrian subjects suspecting of joining armed forces of the enemy or intending to give aid to release under certain conditions those who sign engagement not to serve, etc”, 14 August 1914, Order-in-Council 1914-2150. RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a. LAC.
with the onset of winter, however, raised doubts regarding the passivity of non-British migrants, particularly those wishing to cross the border to look for work in the United States. Obliged not to allow enemy reservists to leave Canadian soil on the chance they return to their homelands to fight against the British Empire, the federal government passed an Order-in-Council on October 28, 1914. The Cabinet required the monthly registration of enemy aliens, restricted their international travel, forbade their presence near railways, bridges, and other vital infrastructure, and facilitated their arrest and internment if found in violation of any of these provisions. Sir William Otter was appointed director of internment, and local and national police received extraordinary powers to arrest and detain approximately 8,200 suspected enemy aliens by the end of November 1914. Though some were released on parole, 8,579 people were interned by Canadian authorities over the course of the war.

Despite the vigorous internment of suspected enemy aliens and legal restrictions explicitly stating otherwise, men who originated from enemy states still found their way into the CEF. While there were certainly many cases of Eastern European migrants who were prevented from enlisting in the CEF, the de-centralized structure of the Canadian recruiting effort left the enforcement of recruiting policy up to the commanders of reinforcement battalions. On occasion, battalion commanders advocated on behalf of enemy aliens who were serving in their units. Exceptions were made for Privates A. Filiac, a Romanian, and Thomas Hecker, a German-born Russian who anglicised his name from Echenberg, both of whom were vouched for by their commanding officers.

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53 Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War, 32.

54 Ibid., 36.


56 From Capt EFM Williams (217th Bn) to DOC MD 12, 17 Oct 1916; From Adjt Gen Canada to GOC Valcartier Camp, 18 Aug 1916. RG 24 Vol 1206 HQ 297-1-29. Enlistment of Naturalized Aliens in the CEF. LAC.
In some cases, men born in enemy states whose national ambitions made them sympathetic to the Allied cause were enticed into the CEF with a promise to be transferred to a contingent of their own nationality. A group of eight Armenian soldiers at the CEF camp in Sunningdale, England, claimed they had enlisted on the understanding they would be transferred to British forces in the Levant to fight Ottoman forces and were dismayed to find themselves destined for the Canadian Forestry Corps.57 In response to these eight soldiers’ grievances, a memo was forwarded to the Deputy Minister for the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) advising that “men of enemy alien nationality should [not] be recruited on any such promise.”58 The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s haphazard recruiting system, which relied on an unsustainable proliferation of battalions, saw neighbouring units compete for a dwindling number of qualified and willing recruits. Unscrupulous recruiters bent rules, such as those excluding men of enemy origin, in order to fill the ranks of their battalion.59 The result was a greater proportion of enemy aliens in the CEF than could be found in the AIF or the NZEF.

The Canadian Department of Militia and Defence assisted with the organization, training, and transportation of independent contingents of soldiers for service with foreign armies, which promised to reimburse the Dominion for expenses incurred. These contingents raised expectations among migrant communities, which hoped to advance the independence of their homelands by fighting under their own flag. The diversity of Canada’s migrant population was mirrored by the quantity of separate contingents the dominion government assisted in raising. Among these efforts was a contingent of at least 120 Jewish Canadians who enlisted to fight as part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

57 Letter from Dpty Minister OMFC to Secretary War Office 16 Jan 18. RG 9-III. Vol 81. 10-12-31. Alien Subjects in the OMFC. LAC.
58 Memo ’Armenians’ to Depty Minister OMFC from Inteligence Dept, [N.D.] Ibid.
in the Levant, assembled and trained by Canadian officers at Windsor, Nova Scotia. A total of 5,605 South Slav migrants passed through Serbian Mobilization Camps at Lévis, Quebec, and Sussex, New Brunswick, to join the Serbian Army in Salonika. Approximately two hundred officers and men of the Canadian Forces were assigned to the Polish Army Camp at Niagara to train 22,395 volunteers destined for the Polish Legion in France. The formation and transportation of these contingents diverted considerable resources from the CEF, such as instructors and camp staff. Though their costs were borne by foreign governments and the majority of the recruits were drawn from the United States, the organization of these contingents by the Department of Militia and Defence tacitly encouraged the expression of separate national identities amongst migrant communities in Canada.

The unintentional enlistment of enemy aliens in the CEF had a significant impact on the expressions of identity among non-British migrants in Canada. Soldiers who originated from within the German, Austro-Hungarian, or Ottoman Empire and enlisted in the CEF seized the opportunity presented by the formation of an independent contingent of their nationality. August Fibiger, for example, successfully negotiated the inclusion of a Bohemian contingent in the 223rd (Canadian Scandinavians) Battalion. Fibiger recruited most of his 130 volunteers from the Bohemian Gymnastics Association the United States, and brought them to Portage la Prairie to enlist in this unique contingent. Before the 223rd Battalion departed Winnipeg, the executive of the

60 Depot Orders, 13 Apr 1918; 25 Apr 1918, RG24 Vol 23187, LAC.
62 Report from the Commandant Polish Army Camp to the Chief of the General Staff 10 March 1919. MG 30, LePan, Arthur D fonds, LAC.
63 For instance, only 1% of Polish trainees at Niagara resided in Canada. Ibid.
64 Letter from August Fibiger LCol Ruttan, 7 May 1917, RG24-C-8 Vol 4599 File Part 1. File MD10-20-10-48. Offers to Raise Units. LAC.
Bohemian National Alliance of America visited the contingent in Portage la Prairie to present a national flag, donated by Bohemian women in Chicago.⁶⁵

Fibiger was not content to have raised his contingent to help reinforce the CEF. In his letter to Colonel Ruttan, Officer Commanding of No. 10 Militia District, Fibiger stated his expectation that “on arrival to England, the Bohemians will be attached to another Bohemian unit there.”⁶⁶ While training at the CEF camp in Sunningdale, Fibiger petitioned Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of the Overseas Military Forces, for permission to return to North America to raise an independent Czech-Slovak contingent that would eventually fight as part of the French Army.⁶⁷ Fibiger argued on the grounds that he and his compatriots joined the CEF “for the express purpose of being able to serve the cause of the Allies,” thus placing the Czech-Slovak Contingent on equal footing with the CEF and effacing his obligations to Canada or the Empire.⁶⁸ Once the Canadian government endorsed the formation of national contingents, non-British migrants in the ranks of the Canadian army boldly articulated their allegiance to Canada in much different terms. By requesting to be transferred from the CEF to a contingent of their own nationality, soldiers renegotiated their relationship with the Dominion of Canada to become allies, rather than subjects, and highlight their identity as members of a separate nation rather than as residents of Canada.

The cooperation of Canadian authorities in the organization of independent national contingents encouraged leaders of various migrant communities in Canada to actively recruit men for these contingents. The recruitment of Russian reservists in Canada ceased after the October Revolution, but the creation of a Polish Army in France provided a new opportunity for former subjects of the Russian Empire to fight for their

⁶⁵ Ibid.
⁶⁶ Ibid.
⁶⁷ Letter from August Fibiger to Edward Kemp, May 1917. RG 9-III. Vol 81. 10-12-31. Alien Subjects in the OMFC. LAC.
⁶⁸ Ibid.
homeland. One Winnipeg-based recruiting officer for the Polish contingent approached the staff of No. 10 Militia District for permission to interview any men of Polish origin who had been conscripted into the CEF, hoping to facilitate their transfer into the Polish Army. The recruiter argued that “As long as they fight for the same cause as the Canadian Army they are serving a good purpose, and therefore should be no objection on your part to have these men transferred to the Polish Army in France.” In the same manner as August Fibiger described the relationship between Czech-Slovak migrants and the Dominion of Canada, the members of the Polish Army Recruiting Committee framed their relationship with Dominion authorities in terms of a partnership between two nations facing a common enemy. When negotiations with the Officer Commanding of No 10 Military District did not progress, the members of the recruiting committee intensified their rhetoric, claiming that while their recruits had migrated to North America, they “are fighting not as Canadians or Americans but as Poles.” The Polish Army Recruiting Committee in Winnipeg made public displays to assert their independent Polish identity by hanging recruiting posters for the Polish Army and organizing a parade of Polish recruits during a Polish national festival. By supporting recruiting efforts for the Polish Army in Canada, Canadian authorities endorsed a cause for which Polish-Canadians could fight that was separate from the war effort of the Dominion of Canada.

The enactment of conscription in Canada in late 1917 even pushed some Southern and Eastern European migrants to transfer to national contingents. Two men of Serbian descent, for example, requested a transfer to the Serbian contingent after they were conscripted into the CEF. With the encouragement of the Polish Recruiting Committee in Winnipeg, seven men who were conscripted under the Military Service Act requested

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69 Letter from unsigned Recruiting Officer Polish Army in France to LCol William Grassie, 1 June 1918. RG 24. Vol 4606. 20-10-91. Recruits for the Polish Army in France. LAC.

70 Letter from S.P. Kaminski and Stan Sielski to H.D.B. Ketchen, 11 June 1918. Ibid.

71 Letter from SP Kaminski and Stan Sielski to Gen William Hughes, 15 May 1918. Ibid.

to be transferred to the Polish Army. When dominion military authorities in Canada supported the organization of independent national contingents, it presented Eastern European migrants an alternative to serving in the CEF.

Eastern European migrants who found their way into the CEF were assigned to labour units on account of language difficulties, and their dissatisfaction with this type of work motivated requests to transfer to a contingent of their own nationality. Identifying himself as Polish, Sapper Naskidoff assured his superiors that he “enlisted to fight for Canada because [he] earned [his] bread there and considered it [his] duty,” but requested a transfer to the Polish Army in France because he was dissatisfied with serving in the Canadian Forestry Corps and wished to serve in a combat unit. A request signed by Privates Bizek, Debech, Bender, and Bello argued that the four had enlisted in the CEF “to fight our common enemy, the Germans,” but after finding themselves first in the Canadian Railway Corps and later in the Canadian Forestry Corps, the four asked to be transferred either to the Polish Army or to a combat unit in the CEF. Because Naskidoff, Bizek, Debech, Bender, and Bello based their requests in terms of their dissatisfaction with life in a labour unit, they were only transferred to combat units in the CEF. Unsuccessful in effecting a transfer to a contingent of their own nationality, these men nevertheless argued for a transfer by invoking their status as foreign nationals who enlisted in the CEF to fight for a cause that was common to both the Dominion of Canada and their beleaguered homeland. These four individuals understood their relationship to the CEF based on their dual identity as Poles and residents of Canada, but this duality quickly evaporated when the conditions of their enlistment did not match expectations. Just as Russian reservists in the CEF and AIF requested transfers to the Russian Army,


74 Letter from Spr G. Naskidoff to OC 71st Coy Cdn Forestry Corps, 22 June 1918. RG 9, III. Vol 1235. File D-36-5, vol 1, Discharges for Re-enlistment in Polish Army. LAC

75 Transcript of letter from A Bizek, J Debech, John Bender, and Joseph Bello to The Polish National Committee in Paris, 2 June 1918. Ibid.

76 Letter from LCol Jones to DAG 3rd Ech, GHQ, 11 July 1918. Ibid.
Southern and Eastern European migrants serving in the CEF leveraged their European identity to redress grievances with their commanders.

The signing of the armistice in November 1918 presented the OMFC with an incentive to encourage the transfer of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks to their own national armies. An internal memo addressed to Sir Edward Kemp opined that the transfer of Polish or Czech-Slovak soldiers out of the CEF would “relieve the Canadian Government from any further claims, such as free repatriation, pensions, etc.”77 Accordingly, instructions were issued to units of the OMFC and the Canadian Corps advertising the opportunity for Poles and Czechs to transfer out of the CEF, though each was required to sign a statement acknowledging that a transfer meant waiving their right to repatriation to Canada and the three months of paid leave awarded to soldiers upon their discharge.78 After a survey of the records, staff at the OMFC estimated that 336 Poles and 100 Czech-Slovaks were serving in Canadian units overseas.79 Twelve soldiers were discharged from the CEF and transferred to the Czecho-Slovak Army in France before the force departed to fight in the Russian Civil War.80 A few dozen Polish soldiers requested to be transferred to the Polish army in France, many of them encouraged by officers of the Polish legation in Paris.81

While European reservists in Canada could either fulfill their duty as reservists and fight for a foreign army or enlist with the CEF, European migrants who originated from belligerent empires attempted to join proto-national armies such as the Czech or Polish Legions. The unintentional inclusion of these enemy aliens into the CEF implicitly

78 From Capt LB Yule to All Units, 23 November 1918. RG 9 III-C-3 Vol 4060 File Part 3.13 Folder 3, file 13. Demobilization - Discharge of Czecho-Slovak soldiers from the Canadian Forces for the purpose of permitting them to re-enlist into the Polish and Czecho- Slovak Force. LAC.
80 Note from BGen E.L. Spears to Gen Covisar, 6 Oct 1918. RG 9 III-B-1 Vol 1325 File Part 1 File P-77-5 Poles & Czecho Slovaks, Corres. re. Volume 1, LAC.
81 Ibid.
validated the cause for which they enlisted, and thus provided an opportunity to leverage their own national cause to join a contingent of their own nationality. The organization of independent national contingents by Canadian military authorities provided an opportunity for European communities in Canada to make a visible contribution to the war effort while also legitimizing their expression of a separate national identity. These separate contingents validated the nationalist aspirations of new nations such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and provided a rallying point for Eastern European communities to frame their actions as allies of the Canadian war effort and affirm their new national identities. Because these nations did not yet exist, Eastern European migrants in Canada were able to exercise considerable agency in defining their own identity as members of these still imaginary nations.

4.2.2 Australia

Australia was quick to investigate and intern suspected enemy aliens at the outbreak of war. The *War Precautions Act* passed at the end of October 1914 empowered the commanders of the Commonwealth’s military districts to intern enemy subjects whose conduct aroused suspicion, while naturalized migrants could be interned if they were deemed “disaffected or disloyal.” These wartime powers were expanded in 1915 to allow the detention of natural born British subjects of enemy descent. A total of 6,890 people were interned by Australian authorities over the course of the war, the vast majority of whom were of German or Austrian parentage, but approximately seven hundred of these internees were “Jugoslavians.” Australian authorities were much more rigorous than their Canadian counterparts in policing subjects from the peripheries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. While military intelligence interviewed and interned potential enemy aliens, British Australians were complicit in further marginalizing European migrants. The Goldfields Miners’ Union in Kalgoorlie, for example, voted to suspend the membership of all enemy aliens for the duration of the war, leaving many of the South

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83 Ibid., 77.
Slavs in Western Australia who had not been interned in difficult financial circumstances.  

South Slavs attempted to cast off the harsh gaze of public paranoia by aligning themselves with the Allied war effort. John Scaddan, the Premier of Western Australia, wrote to the commandant of the internment camp on Rottnest Island on behalf of the President of the Croatian Slavonic Society in Boulder City, appealing for the release of South Slavic internees. Scaddan argued that South Slavs were loyal subjects of the British Empire who had contributed generously to the Goldfields Patriotic Fund, and whose band had participated in patriotic concerts with spirited renditions of ‘God Save the Queen’ and ‘Rule Britannia.’ South Slavic migrants sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Australia and the Empire through public displays of British sentiment. The Premier’s appeal was denied, however, because it was deemed that South Slavic internees were still liable to be called up for service in the armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  

As in New Zealand, the South Slav community in Western Australia responded to suspicions of disloyalty by disassociating themselves from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, proclaiming their desire for an independent nation state, and professing their loyalty to Britain and the Empire.

The Croatian Slavonic Society in Western Australia, where most South Slavic migrants in Australia gravitated, attempted to raise a contingent to reinforce the Serbian Army. A committee was formed in Boulder City in August 1915 to organize volunteers to join the Serbian Army. Thirty men offered to serve in such a contingent, but this initiative was ignored by the Commonwealth government, whose permission was

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86 Letter from Premier’s Secretary to Mayor Boulder, 10 Nov 1914. Ibid.
required before volunteers could leave Australia.\textsuperscript{87} It was only after a formal request from the British War Office in late 1916 that Australia’s Ministry of Defence became involved in the effort to raise a special contingent for Serbia. By 1917, however, the majority of South Slavs in Australia were already under the control or surveillance of state authorities, having been interned or at least investigated by military intelligence officers and required to register regularly with local police. The pool of potential volunteers for a Serbian contingent was already known to government agents. A quick inquiry to the senior Military Intelligence officers of each district found that approximately one thousand ‘Jugoslav’ males of military age resided in Australia, but three-quarters of these were already interned. Only 250 to 300 South Slavic males of military age remained at large in Australia.\textsuperscript{88} Indeed, Colonel Richard Edmond Courtney, Acting Commandant of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Military District, opined that more suitable volunteers could be found in the internment camp at Holsworthy near Liverpool, New South Wales, than in his district of Western Australia.\textsuperscript{89} Lieutenant Colonel James Walker, who would be tasked with assembling Italian reservists the following year, was appointed to oversee the organization and transport of the contingent and estimated that three to four hundred internees at Holsworthy would volunteer for service with the special contingent. Only thirty-six came forward after the first round of interviews, and most of these volunteers had been previously transferred to a separate compound because of ongoing conflicts with German and Austrian internees.\textsuperscript{90}

Recruiting was only slightly more successful outside of the internment camps. The largest number of potential volunteers was found, not surprisingly, in Western

\textsuperscript{87} Letter from LCol J.H. Bruche to T. Trumble, 19 August 1915. Department of Defence. MP367/1 General correspondence files. 448/6/4947. Yugo Slav (Yugoslav) Contingent from Australia for Serbian Army. NAA.

\textsuperscript{88} Letter from T Trumble to Malcolm Shepherd, 8 March 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} Letter from Col R.E. Courtney to T. Trumble, 19 December 1916. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90} Memo to Secretary: Re nomination of Officers for Jugo Slav Contingent 14 May 1917; Report by LCol Walker to BGen E.T. Wallack, 6 June 1917. Ibid.
Australia. Walker suggested that an open call for volunteers be placed in major newspapers and that Joe Redulich, his interpreter and internee-turned-volunteer for the Special Service Battalion, be sent to Western Australia to approach suitable candidates and recruit them for overseas service. Both initiatives were deemed “unsuitable” by the Ministry of Defence; recruiting was to be carried out by military intelligence officers. Captain Ainsworth, from the intelligence section of the 2nd Military District in Brisbane, reported that of the fifty suitable recruits in Queensland, all had declined to volunteer for service with the Serbian Army. Ainsworth attributed the lack of enthusiasm to the disparity between the rate of pay offered by the Serbian Army and the high wages of wartime work, and shared his suspicion that the men he approached only “assert to be Jugo-Slavs when their liberty is at stake.” In the end, forty-six internees from Holsworthy volunteered for the Serbian contingent, thirty-eight came from various mining towns in Western Australia, and four had enlisted with the AIF and were training at Blackboy Hill before they were discharged in order to serve in the Serbian contingent.

Australian military authorities retained a firm grip on the recruiting process, but the final count of men enlisted for service with the Serbian Army was less than a third of Colonel Walker’s conservative estimate of three hundred volunteers. Though three-quarters of eligible volunteers were interned, only half of the Serbian contingent’s ranks were drawn from the camps. The disappointing results of the recruiting drive for the Serbian contingent are more likely a reflection of the Ministry of Defence’s recruiting methods than of South Slavs’ ambivalence towards military service or their aspirations for a unified South Slav state. Military intelligence officers had little success approaching

91 Letter from LCol J.K. Forsyth to BGen V.C. Sellheim 20 June 1917. Ibid.
92 Letter from BGen E.T. Wallack to BGen V.C. Sellheim, 20 June 1917. Ibid.
93 Letter from LCol J.K. Forsyth to Col G.L. Lee, 3 July 1917. Ibid.
94 Letter from Capt A. Ainsworth to Col G.L. Lee, 31 July 1917. Ibid.
95 Special Service Battalion – Particulars of men, dependents, addresses, etc etc. Ibid.
potential recruits in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia. Recruits were only forthcoming from Western Australia, where the Croatian Slavonic Society had already attempted to raise a contingent of volunteers in 1915.

South Slav volunteers who enlisted without being approached by Australian military authorities were still subjected to official scrutiny. Colonel Victor Sellheim, the Adjutant General of the Australian Army, was ready to endorse the contingent, but he stipulated it was necessary to verify the “bona fides” of each volunteer’s nation of origin. The consul general of Russia agreed to assist Australian military authorities to verify the documents of potential volunteers and seconded a member of the consular delegation, Captain Serennikoff, to interview “men claiming to be Jugoslavs” who did not possess documents to confirm their nationality.96 The Australian government’s insistence on confirming the national origin of volunteers for the Serbian contingent effectively undercut the ability for volunteers to identify their own nationality. The official categories of national origin used by Commonwealth authorities did not always reflect the identity South Slav volunteers wished to project through their voluntary enlistment. The inability to self-identify as members of a pan-Yugoslavian nation was another factor that undercut the effort to entice South Slavs to enlist in the Serbian Contingent.

The effect of Australian military authorities’ insistence on verifying the “bona fides” of their recruits is evident in an earlier attempt by members of the Croatian Slavonic Society to enlist its members in the AIF in December 1915. Vjencleslav Scubat, one of the eleven members of the Croatian Slavonic Society who enlisted in the AIF in 1915, wrote a letter encouraging other members of the society to enlist, advising his compatriots of their eligibility to serve if they presented themselves at a recruiting office claiming to have been born in Serbia.97 The letter was intercepted by Australian military

96 Letter from BGen V.C. Sellheim to LCol J.L. Bruche, 6 December 1916, Ibid.

97 Copy of letter from Vjencelsav Subat to Croatian Slavonic Society of Western Australia, 30 December 1915. Australian Federal Police, Western Division, Perth Office. PP14/1, Intelligence reports of internments, repatriations, affiliations and general investigations, multiple number series. 4/7/128. 5thMD Intelligence Reports - Enemy Subjects in AIF. NAA.
intelligence and, after subsequent investigation, it was discovered that Scubat and nine other members of the Croatian Slavonic Society actually originated from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and lied about their Serbian origin. Revealed as enemy aliens, Scubat and his compatriots were discharged from the AIF in March and April 1916 “in consequence of nationality.”98 Questioning the identity, and thus the authenticity, of their cause dampened the volunteers’ zeal. Ten of these South Slav volunteers were discharged from the AIF because they were discovered as enemy aliens, but the formation of the Serbian contingent a year later provided them with a new opportunity to serve overseas. Though they were prepared to fight overseas in 1916, after enquiries into their nationality and their subsequent discharge from the AIF, five of the ten volunteers declined to join the Serbian contingent in 1917. Strict controls on their recruits’ nationality may have minimized the security risks of enemy aliens infiltrating the AIF, but these precautions also kept a number of willing volunteers from the fight overseas.

The Australian government supported the formation of a separate contingent of South Slavs to join the Serbian Army, but these efforts were secondary to concerns about internal security. The Commonwealth government exercised close control over suspected enemy aliens, such as military-aged male South Slavs, the majority of who were interned while the remainder were required to register regularly with local authorities. The formation of an independent contingent of South Slavs in Australia reflected this emphasis on domestic security. Recruiting was conducted primarily in the internment camp at Holsworthy and when these efforts failed, the task was delegated to military intelligence officers. Suggestions to rely on prominent members of the South Slav community to rally their compatriots were rejected, though the largest number of recruits was raised in Boulder and Kalgoorlie where members of the Croatian Slavonic Society had tried to raise volunteers for an independent contingent since 1915. Certainly the community-driven efforts in Boulder and Kalgoorlie were more successful than the efforts of Australian intelligence officers. State security was the primary concern in the mobilization of the Serbian contingent and the same state apparatus that had interrogated,

interned and intimidated South Slavs at the outbreak was charged with recruiting these migrants for the war effort. Though South Slav migrants in Australia were given the opportunity to fight against Austro-Hungarian rule, they were not granted the ability to identify their own nationality, nor could they participate actively in the recruiting process. While the Polish and Serbian communities in Canada recruited their own contingents and delivered tens of thousands of soldiers to the imperial war effort, concerns over domestic security prevented the South Slavic community in Australia from mobilizing itself for the war effort. When the Special Service Battalion sailed in September 1917 it was comprised of only eighty-eight men, well below the anticipated strength of three hundred volunteers.

4.2.3 New Zealand

As a result of chain migration during the 1890s and 1900s, a substantial Croatian community settled in New Zealand to make their fortunes in the gum fields north of Auckland.99 Migrants from the Austro-Hungarian Empire formed the third largest Continental European population in New Zealand in 1911, after Germans and Danes.100 As with every other dominion, one of the responses to the outbreak of war was to classify subjects of enemy states as enemy aliens. The New Zealand government placed heavy restrictions on enemy aliens’ mobility and property rights, while over six hundred enemy aliens liable for military service in their country of origin were interned at the quarantine station on Somes Island.101 Though they originated from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatian migrants could identify themselves as unwilling subjects of an enemy state, and thus declare themselves completely sympathetic to the Allied war effort. The government of New Zealand was quick to distinguish Croats or Dalmatians as


sympathetic to the allied cause, while Germanic subjects of Austria-Hungary were
deemed more hostile. British residents, however, were slower to avert their suspicions.

At the outbreak of war, leaders of the Croatian community in New Zealand were ready to offer volunteers for the NZEF. One week after the declaration of war, Geaorge Leno Scansie, president of The Croatian Slavonian League of Independence, wrote to Prime Minister William Massey asking the government to allow Croatian volunteers to join the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.¹⁰² About two thousand male South Slavic migrants were of military age in 1914, but most were designated as enemy aliens because unnaturalized migrants maintained their status as subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were barred from enlisting in the armed forces of the British Empire.¹⁰³ In response to Scansie’s request, officers commanding the dominion’s military districts were instructed to accept unnaturalized members of the Croatian Slavonian League of Independence into the ranks of the NZEF.¹⁰⁴ Scansie produced certificates to vouch for the loyalty of Croatians who were not naturalized residents of New Zealand so they could enlist. About one hundred Croatians enlisted in the NZEF before this scheme was terminated in 1916, when instructions were received from the Colonial Secretary to cease accepting enemy aliens into Imperial forces.¹⁰⁵

The Croatian community’s enthusiastic support for the New Zealand war effort was driven by a desire to demonstrate their loyalty as residents of New Zealand, but enlistments were likewise motivated by Croatian nationalist aspirations to rid the Balkans of Austro-Hungarian rule. When Scansie lobbied Prime Minister William Massey and Defence Minister James Allen to allow Croatians to serve in the NZEF, he stated that his


¹⁰⁵ Baker, King and Country Call, 222; Telegram from Bonar Law to Lord Liverpool, 24 Jan 1916. Ibid.
fellow Croats were “very anxious to fight for the British Empire and her Allies against the Germanic nations” and thus “more than eager to join with the New Zealand Forces to assist the Empire.” John Totich, a Croatian entrepreneur who settled in Dargaville, wrote to his Member of Parliament asking him to support Croats migrants’ enlistment into the NZEF, arguing that these volunteers wanted to “join our brother Servians [sic] to help them to free our fatherland of Austro-German despotism.” Totich also mentioned that the Croatian community in Dargaville raised £500 for the war effort; half of the funds raised were allocated to Serbian relief while the rest was donated to the New Zealand Patriotic Fund in a gesture of loyalty to their adoptive dominion. In the early months of the war, leaders of the Croatian community in New Zealand worked to encourage their members’ enlistment in the NZEF while lobbying the government to accept Croatian recruits. In their letters to New Zealand authorities, George Scansie and John Totich were careful to balance sentiments of British and imperial loyalty with nationalist ambitions against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Balancing South Slavic nationalism with loyalty to Britain and New Zealand became increasingly difficult as proposals circulated to form a contingent of South Slav expatriates to reinforce the Serbian Army. Leaders of the Croatian community in New Zealand balanced their nationalist ambitions with imperial loyalty by encouraging their members to enlist in the NZEF to support the British imperial war effort against their common enemy: the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This balance, however, was upset by the Allied effort to reconstitute the Serbian Army at Salonika and the Colonial Office’s request to recruit volunteers in the dominions. The renewed promise of an independent contingent offered opportunity to fight for an independent pan-Yugoslavian nation and combat Austro-Hungarian forces directly. Barthul Mihailjevitch, a member of the Southern Slavs Committee and former editor of Zora, a South Slavic newspaper published in New Zealand, wrote to James Allen with a list of forty-six volunteers ready.


107 Telegram from J. Tolich to J.G. Coates, 28 August 1914. Ibid.
to serve with the Serbian Army. George Scansie was quick to support Mihailjevitch’s letter and explained that the small number of Croatians who enlisted in the NZEF was due to language difficulties, which made them unsuitable recruits for an English-speaking force. Authorizing the formation of a “Jugoslavian” contingent to join the Serbian Army, Scansie argued, would allow Croatian migrants in New Zealand to make a larger contribution to the Allied war effort. These efforts were to no avail in late 1915, as Sir Alfred Robin, General Officer Commanding of New Zealand military forces, advised that he could not afford to divert equipment, instructors, or transport space away from the NZEF.

The implementation of conscription in November of 1916 heightened tensions for the Croatian community in New Zealand. The systematic selection of conscripts, the stringent criteria for exemptions, and the harsh penalties imposed on those who resisted compulsory service drew increasing public outrage toward Croatians and other migrants who were exempted from the draft because they were not naturalized residents of New Zealand, yet benefitted from the inflated wages of a shrinking male workforce. While Italian reservists were denounced as shirkers, migrants from the Austro-Hungarian Empire were vilified by alarmists who suspected migrants as spies or saboteurs, and reported their activities to police and state authorities, particularly in Auckland’s provincial districts where Croatians formed a majority in the sparsely populated gum fields. William Steed wrote to James Allen warning that Austro-Hungarian migrants in his district spoke openly in support of German victory. Mr E. Trounson of Kaihu wrote to his Member of Parliament of his suspicion that “these aliens” were being secretly supplied with arms and munitions. With conscription looming, Trounson feared for his district as young British men were forced into service leaving their women and children

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109 Letter from A. Robin to J. Allen, 27 September 1915. Ibid.

to the “menace” of alien subversion. The exemption of unnaturalized Croatians from military service was not the source of Anglophone residents’ outrage; a number of communities in Waikato circulated petitions to continue the exemption of enemy aliens because they constituted a security threat that endangered the soldiers of the NZEF. British residents in Auckland were not seeking to extend conscription to Croatians, but rather their internment.

Croatian community leaders were keenly aware of the growing hostility directed at them by British New Zealanders and did their best to disassociate themselves from Austrian migrants by declaring their antipathy toward the Austro-Hungarian Empire and emphasizing their loyalty to New Zealand and the British Empire. Stanislav Borovich wrote to James Allen warning that “there are some Austrian Slavs amongst us in Auckland province who are disloyal to the Allies, and [we] beg you to remove them from us before it is too late.” After naming the supposed ringleaders, all of whom had already registered with Auckland Police, Borovich assured the Minister that he and his compatriots were as “loyal to the British as any British born.” G.M. Erceg, secretary of the New Zealand Branch of the Southern Slavs Committee, reminded his Member of Parliament, Joseph Ward, that “it is not very long ago since our people attended at Mr Languth, the Austrian Consul's Office in Auckland, and publicly destroyed the Austrian Flag in the Consul's presence.” In response to growing agitation by British residents, the dominion government launched a commission headed by J.W. Poynton and George Elliot to investigate suspicions of sedition among Croatians in the gum fields. The


112 Petitions were circulated by the following residents communities: Petition, Mr A.R. Beatson, Port Charles, Coromandel, 13 signatures, 11 Nov 1916; Petition, Mrs Ellen G. Cory-Wright, Tairua, East Coast, 37 signatures, 23 Oct 1916; Petition, Mr R.W. Watt. Whangamata, East Coast, 30 signatures, Oct 1916; Petition, Mr James Meredith, Cabbage Bay, 52 signatures, 10 Oct 1916; Petition, Mr D. Hamilton, Whenuakite, Mercury Bay, 8 Nov 1916. AAYS 8638 AD1 826/29/44. Establishments and Recruitment—Enlistment of aliens in NZEF [New Zealand Expeditionary Force] 1915–1917. ANZ.


114 Letter from G.M. Erceg to J.G. Ward Bart, 2 June 1916. Ibid.
resulting report found no credible evidence of disloyalty and recorded numerous statements from British residents in the region praising the work ethic and trustworthiness of Croatian gum diggers.\textsuperscript{115} Xenophobic sentiment nevertheless prevailed.

With hateful rhetoric circulating in the popular press\textsuperscript{116} and proposals of raising an independent contingent side-lined by New Zealand military authorities, South Slav migrants were careful to maintain a balance between projecting their own national identity and expressing their loyalty to Britain and the Empire. Joseph Kukalj, another member of the Croatian-Slavonian League, wrote to James Allen offering the services of a small contingent of Balkan stone-masons who could build and repair bridges behind “your Anglo-French front in France and Belgium.”\textsuperscript{117} Rather than seek to form a national contingent, Kukalj framed his appeal in terms that explicitly placed himself and his compatriots at the service of the imperial war effort and effaced aspirations of Yugoslav nationalism. Unlike many of his countrymen, Scansie was undeterred and continued to lobby the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence for a Yugoslavian contingent, but his unflinching nationalism set him against Croatians who feared Scansie’s actions would attract further resentment from British New Zealanders. P.M. Sulenta had written to William Massey in late 1915 requesting the assistance of the dominion government in sending Croatian volunteers to reinforce the Serbian Army, but Sulenta later wrote the Prime Minister to denounce Scansie as a “wolf in sheepskins” for actively discouraging Croatians from enlisting in the NZEF so they could serve with a Jugoslavian contingent, if one were authorized.\textsuperscript{118} The paradox between advocating for an independent Yugoslavian contingent and contributing to the dominion and imperial war effort placed


\textsuperscript{116} Andrew Francis, “To Be Truly British We Must Be Anti-German” New Zealand, Enemy Aliens, and the Great War Experience, 1914-1919, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012).

\textsuperscript{117} Letter from J. Kukalj to J. Allen, 3 November 1915. AAYS 8638 AD1 709/9/86. Expeditionary Force—Expeditionary Force Jugo Slav contingent 1914–1916. ANZ.

\textsuperscript{118} Letter from P.M. Sulenta to W.F. Massey, 30 January 1916. AAYS 8638 AD1 709/9/86/1. Expeditionary Force—Jugo Slavs [Yugoslavs] in New Zealand—Correspondence re 1917–1919. ANZ.
Croatian migrants in a difficult position. Against growing public agitation demanding the internment and even deportation of enemy aliens, most Croatian community leaders chose to emphasize their loyalty to New Zealand and the British Empire and abandoned their ambitions to form an independent contingent to assist the Serbian Army.

The National Efficiency Board was established in early 1917 to make recommendations for the centralization of human and natural resources in New Zealand, but South Slavic community leaders were likewise anxious to find a place for their constituents in the national war effort. Representing the Croatian community in Auckland, J.A. Petrie and G.M. Erceg met with then Acting Prime Minister James Allen and the Chief of the General Staff to discuss the conditions of enlistment for an independent contingent in February 1917; it was estimated that five hundred to one thousand volunteers could be raised.\footnote{Deputation to the Acting Prime Minister (Hon Sir James Allen) and the Hon WH Herries, Wellington, 10th February 1917. AAYS 8667 AD38, 2. Correspondence and Memoranda concerning Government Policy towards Yugoslavs. ANZ.} After speaking to members of the Croatian community, Petrie and Erceg found that most were unwilling to serve in the Serbian Army knowing that they would receive a lower rate of pay than New Zealand soldiers.\footnote{Letter from J.A. Petrie to CM Gibbon, 27 March 1917. Ibid.} With the conditions of service for the Serbian contingent in doubt, compulsory labour was suggested as an alternative for mobilizing Croatian men who were not eligible for the draft. M.A. Ferri, a Croatian interpreter based in Auckland, wrote to James Henry Gunson, the chairman of the National Efficiency Board, promising that if unnaturalized Croatians could not be accepted into the NZEF they would certainly be willing to serve as “conscripted workers or labourers in place of conscripted fighters.”\footnote{Letter from M.A. Ferri to J.H. Gunson, 17 April 1917. Ibid.}

By late 1917, the majority of eligible single New Zealand men had been called up. With married men facing the draft, public resentment for the exemptions enjoyed by unnaturalized migrants intensified. Facing this outrage, leaders of the Croatian community were split about whether to form an independent contingent or submit to some form of
compulsory labour in New Zealand. A meeting of ninety delegates from various South Slavic communities in Auckland passed a resolution, which recommended the New Zealand government allow unnaturalized Croatians to enlist in the NZEF, authorize the formation of a Serbian contingent, and establish a form of compulsory labour to mobilize Croatians who did not volunteer for military service.\textsuperscript{122} J.A. Petrie wrote to the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Gibbon, to report on the outcome of the meeting in Auckland and concluded that most Croatians are “anxious to assist and feel it is their duty to do so” but Petrie confided his belief that the majority of Croatians will opt for home service.\textsuperscript{123} George Scanise, on the other hand, wrote to Defence Minister James Allen re-affirming his demand for an independent contingent and provided telegrams from volunteers who were ready to join their countrymen at Salonika to fight under their own flag.\textsuperscript{124}

On November 9\textsuperscript{th} 1917, the chairman of the National Efficiency Board forwarded its recommendations for the integration of South Slavs into the war effort to Prime Minister Massey. The Board recommended that un-naturalized South Slavs remain barred from the NZEF but should be allowed to form an independent contingent to reinforce the Serbian Army. Those who did not volunteer for the independent contingent were liable for compulsory labour.\textsuperscript{125} The recommendations of the National Efficiency Board effectively made wartime service compulsory for unnaturalized Croatians, though they could choose between joining the Serbian Army and compulsory labour. Given the option of working on the home front at a wage equivalent to soldiers in the NZEF and joining the Serbian Army for a considerably lower rate of pay, the overwhelming majority of Croatians chose compulsory labour over serving in the Serbian Army. The few who refused either form of compulsory service were interned and deported after the war’s

\textsuperscript{122} Letter from J.A. Petrie to C.M. Gibbon, 1 November 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} Letter from G.L. Scansie to J. Allen, 19 November 1917. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Meeting Minutes, 28 May 1917. qMS-1528. New Zealand National Efficiency Board : Minutes, Vol. 1. NLNZ.
The Croatian community of New Zealand never fulfilled its goal of mobilizing an independent contingent to fight for the establishment of a pan-Yugoslavian state.

Croatians in New Zealand received the support of Defence Minister, James Allen, who recognized them as friendly aliens early in the war, supported their enlistment in the NZEF, and worked to facilitate the formation of an independent contingent. The support received from Allen and other sympathetic officials was offset by the social pressure exerted by British residents, particularly in the districts around Auckland. British New Zealanders decried Croatians’ exemption from conscription, but likewise denounced them as a security threat and unsuitable for military service. The popular mood did not wish for Croatians to take part in the war overseas but sought instead to see them interned or subjected to a program of compulsory labour. The National Efficiency Board allowed Croatians to choose between forming their own national contingent and participating in a scheme of compulsory home service. In terms of monetary reward and the prospective return to peacetime life, home service held the greatest appeal. The terms set by the National Efficiency Board ensured that the formation of an independent contingent would be achieved at a steep price, or at least a heavier risk, than home service. Representatives of the Croatian community may have resolved to accept the terms of compulsory labour at their meeting in Auckland, but this was only a consensual submission to the wishes of British residents of New Zealand who sought to exclude and marginalize Croatians for the duration of the war. Public suspicion branded South Slavs in New Zealand as enemy aliens and prompted leaders of the Croatian community, such as Kukalj, Erceg, and Petrie, to abandon efforts to form a contingent to fight for a new Yugoslavian nation and subject themselves to internment and compulsory labour in service of the New Zealand war effort.

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4.3 Conclusion

Wartime mobilization made it difficult for European migrants to express a dual or hybrid identity that could reconcile their status as expatriates of the Old World, living in the New World. The resentment and suspicion heaped upon those who originated from enemy states made the expression of dual identities particularly difficult. Throughout the war, European migrants in the dominions were confronted with questions of loyalty, identity, and belonging. The coordination of patriotic work among British voluntary societies in the dominions reveals a confluence or fluidity between dominion and national identities, as local organizations contributed to both their local and transnational community.\textsuperscript{127} This continuity was reflected as British residents of the three dominions moved with ease from the dominion armies to pursue more prestigious positions in the imperial army, or enlisted in British units such as King Edward’s Horse (The King’s Overseas Dominions Regiment), and were likewise welcomed back into dominion armies when convenient.\textsuperscript{128} The fluidity between the Old and New Worlds was contingent on ideas of race and integration. Britons and “Better Britons” navigated this boundary freely while European migrants, who could sometimes negotiate a transfer from one national army to another, grappled with much more restrictive bureaucracies that controlled their movements.

The mobilization of Southern and Eastern Europeans emphasized the selective acceptance of Old World migrants into New World settler societies. The ability of a European migrant to participate in the dominion war effort depended on their status as unnaturalized residents, which legally bound migrants to their nation of origin. In many cases, military-aged European migrants were reservists, and dominion governments went to great lengths to encourage allied reservists to return and fight for their homelands, yet

\textsuperscript{127} See Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{128} John Connor compares the Australian policy of preventing Australian-born residents of Britain from enlisting in the AIF with the policies of Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, which welcomed dominion expatriates living in Britain into their expeditionary forces in “Home and Away: The Enlistment of Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and South African Men in Dominion Expeditionary Forces in the United Kingdom during the Great War,” \textit{Itinerario}, Vol 38, no 3 (2014): 45-58.
their methods varied. The Canadian Department of Militia and Defence assisted in the mobilization of Italian and Montenegrin reservists, while Australian authorities invoked wartime measures to forcibly detain and deport Italian reservists. The experience of Russian reservists in the AIF and CEF reveals the difficulty of integrating migrants into dominion armies, where Russians were rejected for not speaking English fluently, transferred to the Russian Imperial Army, discharged, or isolated in labour units. These barriers curtailed the integration of Eastern and Southern European migrants into dominion forces.

At the request of the War Office, dominion governments supported the formation of independent national contingents as a means of mobilizing allied reservists and enemy aliens who were disqualified from military service. The sharp contrast between the sizeable Italian, Polish, and Serbian contingents organized in Canada and the disappointing results of the independent contingent raised in Australia reveals an important consideration in the mobilization of these communities. The key difference is that the Canadian Department of Militia allowed migrant communities to recruit for their own contingents. These recruiting drives gave community leaders the opportunity to make public displays of their separate national identity and advertised their unique contribution to the war. The proposed formation of independent contingents to reinforce the Serbian Army at Salonika provided a means to mobilize South Slavs for the imperial war effort, but the government of New Zealand found a way to mobilize the Croatian community without contributing a military contingent. Compelling Croatian migrants to cooperate with a system of compulsory labour satisfied domestic concerns for security and provided cheap labour for national infrastructure projects, which allowed Croatians to affirm their loyalty to New Zealand and contribute directly to the dominion war effort. The Commonwealth of Australia, through more coercive methods, likewise suborned the mobilization of South Slavs to concerns for domestic security and thus produced a small contingent of less than a hundred men. The Dominion of Canada succeeded in mobilizing close to thirty-thousand European migrants for service with foreign contingents. These contingents did not just provide disenfranchised enemy aliens with an opportunity to fight overseas; they also afforded enemy aliens who had succeeded in enlisting in the CEF with a means of renegotiating the terms of their enlistment to seek a transfer to a
contingent of their own nationality. The recruiting drives for special contingents also provided migrant communities in Canada with a cause to celebrate their nationality and redefine their status as allies – rather than subjects or residents – of Canada.

By identifying themselves as allies of Canada and the empire, Eastern and Southern European migrants were able to contest British cultural dominance in the dominion. By authorizing and assisting their mobilization, dominion authorities acknowledged the willing participation of these communities in the allied war effort. Migrant communities in Canada celebrated their contributions and established local support networks to provide for the dependents reservists left behind. Mobilizing these communities to fight for another nation did not necessarily include them into dominion settler society, but the process implied that these communities enjoyed a measure of autonomy within Canada. Though it weakened British dominance in the dominion, the expression of communal identity and autonomy among migrant communities successfully recruited tens of thousands of men for the Allied and imperial war effort. Dominion authorities in Australia and New Zealand were far more reluctant to encourage such expressions of identity for the benefit of the imperial war effort. In both Pacific dominions security and surveillance, both formal and informal, were prioritized over the quantity of European migrants mobilized for overseas service. The rigorous policing of volunteers for the Serbian contingent in Australia produced less than a hundred volunteers while the pressure of public suspicion compelled Croatians in New Zealand to perform compulsory labour rather than fight overseas. While contributing fewer volunteers for the Allied and imperial war efforts, the emphasis on domestic security and stability reinforced the marginalized status of Southern and Eastern European migrants in the Pacific dominions.

Being members of one nation and living in another, the duality of migrant identities was pulled apart as belligerent nations mobilized their manpower and resources for war. In cases where a migrant’s nation of origin was fighting for the same cause as their nation of residence, common alliances or enmities did not produce a common communal identity. The opportunity to mobilize their own contingents provided migrant communities with the chance to project their collective identity through their contribution
to the war effort, but self-expressions of identity could be easily contained by dominion authorities. Whether sent to fight overseas or confined to the dominions, Eastern and Southern European migrants were mobilized to meet the needs of dominion or imperial war aims, but rarely did their mobilization imply that their service made them a part of the nation. Migrants were mobilized as communities apart.
Chapter 5

5 Raising Recruits and Uplifting Indigenous Peoples

Thus, the war will have hastened that day, the millennium of those engaged in Indian work, when all the quaint old customs, the weird and picturesque ceremonies, the sun dance and the potlatch and even the musical and poetic native languages shall be as obsolete as the buffalo and the tomahawk, and the last teepee of the Northern wild will give place to a model farmhouse. In other words, the Indian shall become one with his neighbours in his speech, life and habits, thus conforming to that world wide tendency towards universal standardization which would appear to be the essential underlying purport of all modern social evolution.

-Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 1919

Writing after the armistice, Duncan Campbell Scott reflected on what he believed to be the positive impact of the First World War on the First Nations people of Canada. Scott believed that First Nations’ people’s participation and sacrifice, in human and financial contributions, served as an unprecedented vehicle of social uplift that accelerated the assimilation of First Nations peoples into modern Canadian settler society. Indeed, Scott actively encouraged indigenous Canadians to contribute to the Canadian war effort as part of his work as a senior civil servant in the Department of Indian Affairs. Previous chapters demonstrate that immigrants and racialized minorities, such as Asians, South Asians, and Africans, were systematically excluded from the war effort. The active encouragement of Indigenous peoples, who were likewise racialized as a minority in the

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2 This chapter will refer to the experiences of First Nations peoples, rather than Canadian Aboriginals more broadly. The dominion government adopted different relationships with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit. This chapter does not presume that its arguments speak effectively to the experiences of Métis and Inuit.
dominions, to participate in the national war effort seems at odds with the conclusions drawn in the other chapters of this dissertation. While the history of settler-Indigenous relations differs between the three dominions, all three contexts share a common history of deliberate designs to assimilate and efface Indigenous communities. The mobilization of Indigenous peoples in the three dominions reveals that contemporary perceptions of race in settler societies are not sufficient to explain this inconsistent exercise of racial exclusion. The policies of selective mobilization which favoured Indigenous soldiers but excluded African, Asian, or South Asian volunteers is not sufficiently explained by considering race as a single category, but necessitates a distinction between the constructed categories of race and indigeneity.

Race remains the primary mode of analysis to explain Indigenous participation in the First World War. A growing literature on Indigenous wartime service examines the experience of Indigenous soldiers recruited by the European powers from their imperial colonies. In the context of the First World War, a number of historians have studied South Asian and East African soldiers serving in the British Expeditionary Force, and West and North African soldiers serving in the French Army. Indigenous subjects were often compelled to enlist in colonial forces through some form of conscription, but some chose to serve their colonizers in exchange for tangible benefits, such as money or the cultural prestige won from military service or on the promise that military service could be leveraged for enfranchisement.³ In all cases racial discourse shaped how Indigenous soldiers could serve in colonial contingents. European powers hedged the costs of arming and empowering Indigenous subjects by cataloguing the racialized qualities of their Indigenous subjects, preferring to recruit among cultures deemed to project martial

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qualities of strength, loyalty, and obedience, rather than among cultures that supposedly valued potentially problematic qualities such as artistic, intellectual, or political dissent.4

The comfortable distance separating colony and metropole mitigated the risks incurred from the rough calculus between empowering Indigenous subjects and controlling subject populations. The distance between colony and metropole, however, shrank suddenly when colonial soldiers were mobilized to defend the imperial metropole during the First World War. Anxieties rose as the distance that separated Indigenous subjects from the metropolitan populace shrank, particularly in regard to the increased contact between Indigenous soldiers and metropolitan women. Indeed, a number of studies examine the racial tensions of colonial contacts that resulted from the interactions between colonial soldiers and metropolitan women.5 Analyzing the politics of race and gender between colonizers and colonized is essential to understanding colonial contingents during the First World War.

Imperial colonies operate under a different framework than settler colonies, however, and the study of Indigenous peoples in the dominions must take this into account.6 By the early twentieth century, the displacement of Indigenous peoples onto reserves provided white settlers with a comfortable distance between themselves and Indigenous communities. Because Indigenous and settler spaces were contiguous, however, the physical boundaries between the two were vastly more permeable than those separating the imperial metropole from its overseas colonies. The enactment of


racially-explicit laws in settler colonies, where the distance between white settler and Indigenous was reduced, constructed race into an imaginary boundary to push Indigenous communities to the margins of settler society.

The historiography of Indigenous military service in the dominions has emphasized that boundaries of race were reflected in the mobilization of Indigenous soldiers. Timothy Winegard’s landmark study *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War* argues that the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in the dominion war efforts was only a pragmatic wartime measure adopted at the request of the Imperial government, which temporarily relaxed the racialized policies that excluded Indigenous subjects of the dominions from settler society.7 In the dominions, as with European powers, the mobilizations of Indigenous peoples is studied primarily through the framework of race, yet by focusing on constructions of race in military recruitment these studies overlook the unique logic exercised in settler societies to construct indigeneity in terms which are distinct from the construction of other racial categories. As Patrick Wolfe argues, the regimes of exclusion practiced in settler colonies require indigeneity to be constructed in much different terms than in the context of imperial colonies.8 This distinction can be recognized when studying the enlistment of Indigenous peoples in dominion forces.

By examining the voluntary enlistment of Indigenous peoples, with consideration for the mobilization of other racialized minorities, this chapter will argue that the recruitment of Indigenous soldiers differed significantly from the recruitment of other racialized minorities in the dominions, and that this difference reflects the underlying process of settler colonialism. Civil and military authorities in each of the settler states encouraged wartime contributions from Indigenous communities while ignoring or eschewing contributions from racialized diasporas, such as Asians, South Asians, or


As with other non-British populations in the dominions, Indigenous communities hoped that their active and visible participation in the war effort could advance their enfranchisement in dominion society. While the previous chapter demonstrated that barriers were put in place to prevent racialized diasporas from taking an active role in the war effort, the selective mobilization of Indigenous peoples received more support and reveals that indigeneity was different from other categories of race.

The creation of a racially-cohesive Anglophone settler society necessitated the exclusion of racialized immigrants and the effacement of Indigenous peoples through eradication or assimilation. Indigenous peoples and communities contributed voluntarily to the war effort, in the hopes that their contributions could be leveraged for greater autonomy. The correspondence generated by civil and military authorities reveals that wartime contributions from Indigenous peoples was encouraged not because of what Indigenous communities offered to the war effort, but because of what the war offered Indigenous peoples. While race was constructed as a fixed category to exclude racialized immigrants such as Asians, South Asians, and Africans, indigeneity was constructed as a malleable category to rationalize the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into settler society. Wartime service was supposed to provide an uplifting influence to Indigenous peoples. This narrative of social uplift through military service rationalized the enlistment of Indigenous peoples, who were otherwise restricted from participating in other forms of citizenship, while advancing the process of assimilation.

5.1 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders

The history of Australian settlement presents the widest social disparity between white settlers and Indigenous peoples. The lengthy series of massacres that punctuated the gradual displacement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are collectively referred to as the Frontier Wars, but this conflict is not officially recognized by the Commonwealth government in the way the North-West Rebellion or the Maori Wars are recorded in Canadian or New Zealand histories. The legal convention of *Terra Nullius* legitimated the confiscation of Aboriginal land without requiring the negotiation of treaties. Until the success of the 1967 referendum, the Australian Constitution deprived the Commonwealth Government of power to govern Aboriginal Australians, thus excluding them from nearly
all aspects of Australian citizenship. Without federal legislation, Aboriginal Australians came under the authority of Aboriginal Protection Boards, as legislated by state governments.

European settlement and the division of land through property titles and fencing disrupted Aboriginal foraging, farming, fishing, and hunting habits. Alongside campaigns of resistance, Aboriginal communities adjusted to European encroachment by adapting their lifestyle. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Aboriginal communities took up sedentary farming by establishing collective settlements on Crown land, which they cleared, fenced, and farmed. Aboriginal communities solidified claims to these settlements through the creation of Aboriginal Protection Boards, which held the title to the land and appointed missionaries to act as managers who advised and supervised activity on these reserves. By the 1880s, large communities such as Coranderrk and Lake Tyers flourished into self-sustaining, even profitable, communities that were admired for their agricultural output.9

The increasing demand for land by settlers and the influence of social Darwinism and eugenics on perceptions of race transformed state policy toward Aboriginals. Victoria was the first state to adopt a new, aggressive approach to its administration of Aboriginals with the passage of the Aborigines Act of 1886. The Act placed Aboriginals under tighter control of the Board for the Protection of Aborigines with the intention of dispersing the Aboriginal population to induce cultural and genetic assimilation. Combined with the confiscation and sale of many Aboriginal reserves, the Act controlled Aboriginals by placing them in relationships of dependence. Sixty-four of the ninety-seven reserves in Victoria were sold or leased to white settlers by 1913, concentrating Aboriginal communities onto smaller parcels of land. The remaining reserves could not produce enough food for their increased populations and self-sustaining communities turned into distribution centres for government rations. The Act restricted residency on reserves to full-blooded Aboriginals younger than eight and older than thirty-four. These

9 Richard Broome, Aboriginal Australians: A History Since 1788, 4th ed., (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2010), 82-83
restrictions were meant to push working-aged Aboriginals to find work off reserves, though they could live on reserves with the permission of the Protection Board, as a last resort. Aboriginals living away from the reserves needed the Board’s permission to work and the Board negotiated the wage and conditions under which Aboriginals were employed. Aboriginal males received jobs in primary industry or on the railways while Aboriginal women worked as domestics; all were paid a fraction of what a white employee received for equivalent labour. These intentionally low wages kept Aboriginals dependent on their employers for subsistence while those on reserves depended on station managers for rations.10

The Act also regulated miscegenation among the Aboriginal population. In response to growing anxiety driven by dysgenic race theory purporting the genetic weakness of individuals of mixed-race, the Protection Board policed miscegenation among Aboriginal peoples. The Protection Board kept rigorous records on the blood quantum of its wards and used its powers to forcibly segregate “mixed-race” Aboriginals from “full-blooded” Aboriginals. Annual reports catalogued the births of “full-bloods” and “half-castes” on each station. Children of mixed-ancestry were taken from their parents and placed in abusive industrial schools to be immersed in European culture or placed in white settler homes to be trained as domestics. Aboriginals of mixed race were banished from reserves, while Protectors, who held the power to approve or nullify Aboriginal marriages, refused to authorize marriages between “full-bloods” and “half-castes” to accelerate the genetic assimilation of Aboriginal people. The imposition of these categories was rejected by both white settlers and Aboriginals. White settlers maintained their prejudices against Aboriginals of mixed ancestry, while Aboriginals of mixed-ancestry maintained their kinship networks despite their physical segregation.11

The control and surveillance of miscegenation by the Protection Boards lay a foundation for more aggressive policies of “breeding out the colour,” adopted during the interwar


years. These measures were intended to encourage marriage between white settlers and Aboriginals of mixed-race to dilute Aboriginal blood quantum over successive generations and ultimately eradicate the Aboriginal population through genetic assimilation.\textsuperscript{12}

New South Wales passed its own \textit{Aborigines Act} in 1909, almost identical to the legislation in Victoria, while Western Australia (1886), Queensland (1901), and South Australia (1910) enacted similar policies.\textsuperscript{13} State legislatures enacted these policies a generation before the First World War broke out, and the tight controls exercised by the bureaucrats of the Aborigines Protection Boards played an important role in mediating the means by which Aboriginal Australians could contribute to the war. Regulations over personal finances made it difficult for Aboriginal Australians to donate to local patriotic funds. The Protection Boards’ control over individual movement complicated the enlistment process by preventing Aboriginal volunteers from reaching recruiting stations without the permission of their Protectors. Obsession with blood quantum placed another barrier in the way of Aboriginal enlistments, as recruiting policy restricted enlistment according to race. Despite these exclusionary measures, some of which applied equally to other racialized minorities in Australian, the participation of Aboriginal Australians in the war effort was actually encouraged. The ways in which Aboriginal Australians could participate, however, reveals why Indigenous Australians were treated differently than other racialized peoples in the mobilization of the Australian war effort.

Under the strict regulation of personal movement, finance, and family structure, Aboriginal Australians found it difficult to organize sizeable communal contributions of voluntary labour or personal wealth to the war effort because there was so little of either to spare. Schoolchildren on the Lake Tyers Mission Station, where nearly half of all

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\textsuperscript{12} Broome, \textit{Aboriginal Australians}, 106-107, 119-120; in South Australia see Mattingley and Hampton, \textit{Survival in our Own Land}, 45-47; For a brief overview of inter-war policies on genetic assimilation see Nadine Attewell, \textit{Better Britons: Reproduction, National Identity, and The Afterlife of Empire}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), Ch. 2.
\textsuperscript{13} Broome, \textit{Aboriginal Australians}, 118.
\end{flushright}
Aboriginals in Victoria were concentrated, could draw on their relatively large community to organize concerts to raise money for the state School Patriotic Fund. By October 1918, patriotic concerts at Lake Tyers managed to raise £103. A single concert at the Lake Condah Station raised £10. Without much disposable income, Aboriginals used their artistic abilities to support the war effort by selling crafts to settlers with more disposable income. Aboriginal men at the Brungle Mission Station in New South Wales crafted traditional Aboriginal weapons to sell in Sydney and donated the profits to the Allies Day Fund. The 1916 annual report written by Queensland’s Chief Protector of Aboriginals made a special mention of a crayon map of the Dardanelles drawn by two “half-caste” students at the Thursday Island Aboriginal School. Though offering little financial support for the war, the children’s map was praised as “a very creditable piece of work.”

Aboriginals were encouraged to participate in the patriotic war effort, but in most cases they were sought as performers. Alfred Langley Simmons, Pentecostal pastor and secretary for the Queensland Patriotic Fund Entertainment Committee, wrote to the Chief Protector of Aboriginals requesting the participation of Indigenous Australians in staging a night-time corroboree (see fig. 3) as part of a large patriotic carnival in Brisbane. Simmons believed that the performance would be “so exceedingly interesting [it] would

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14 From Bruce Ferguson to Secty Board for the Protection of Aborigines, 8 October 1918. VPRS 1694/P0000. Board for the Protection of Aborigines. Correspondence Files. Unit 5. General Correspondence. Bundle 3. PROV.
15 Letter no. 56, 18 January 1915. VPRS 10768/P0000/06. Board for the Protection of Aborigines, Register of Inward Correspondence. 1915. PROV.
18 Corroboree is a generic anglicized term used to describe traditional Australian Aboriginal performances.
bring thousands of people to the grounds.”19 Organizers in the town of Mossman, Queensland, likewise requested that Aboriginals from Port Douglas perform a corroboree as part of their own patriotic entertainment.20 A patriotic carnival in Sydney featured a demonstration of boomerang throwing by a man identified only as “Aboriginal Wandy,”21 while a parade in Frankston, Victoria, featured living tableaux, staged on the back of lorries, depicting such scenes as the landing of Captain Cook, Burke and Wills at Cooper Creek, the ward of a field hospital, and an “Aboriginal Group with Pickanninies.”22 The preference for restricting Aboriginal participation in patriotic appeals to typical performances of dances and ceremonies or the sale of traditional weapons and crafts reflected and reinforced popular perceptions of Aboriginals as culturally detached from settler society, confined to a prehistoric past. These performances and artworks were commodified for the benefit of patriotic funds.

Figure 3: Shapcott, L.E. (Louis Edward), 1877-1950 1918, Twelve Aboriginals in ceremonial dress, one holds a boomerang. Aborigines from various parts of Western Australia who performed at a corroboree at Guildford Recreation Ground for a visiting French delegation in 1918. State Library of Western Australia, BA1104/106.

19 From A Langley Simmons to JW Bleakley, 13 Jul 1915. File 2176. Chief Protector of Aboriginals Office. Correspondence, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. Applications – Miscellaneous. Queensland State Archives Item ID336061. QSA.

20 From T. Cains to J.W. Bleakley, 6 Aug 1915. File 2545. Ibid.

21 “Patriotic Carnival,” Sunday Times, 6 September 1914, 3.

Australian writers who condemned German atrocities in Europe often relied on the trope of the uncivilized Aboriginal. A correspondent for the *Omeo Standard Mining Gazette* celebrated the accomplishments of a patriotic carnival in Enway, Victoria, by reminding his readers of the morality of the Allied war effort in combating the “Hun with the fair skin” which “sinks to acts that would never be dreamed of by an Australian Aboriginal; where culture has been interpreted to consist of more vile savagery than was ever practiced by the lowest order of cannibals the world has ever discovered.”23 A writer for the *Farmer and Settler* praised recruiting efforts in Sydney as part of the battle to uphold society. The writer vilified Germany because it “abolished all treaties of ink” in pursuit of its war aims, and argued that even if one were to “go back to the very beginning … you will find the darkest aboriginal sunk in ignorance and savagery, yet obeying certain laws.”24 While ignoring that Aboriginal Australians never received the benefit of signing a treaty to formalize the transfer of their land to settlers, the writer portrayed Germans as barbaric in comparison to Aboriginals because of their violation of international laws. The *Tamworth Daily Observer* reported the sentiments expressed by the French Consul-General who, speaking at an appeal for Belgian Relief, admitted that “before coming to Australia [the Consul-General] believed that the Australian aboriginal was lowest on the scale of civilisation (laughter).” The diplomat went on to explain that “Since the war broke out, he had much pleasure in saying that the Australian aboriginal, the African nigger, the greatest savages were a hundred times more civilised than cultivated Germans.”25 Racialized depictions of Aboriginals made convenient rhetorical devices to condemn German atrocities in Europe while also reinforcing the perception of Aboriginals as perpetually primitive. This construction of indigeneity reinforced the perception that “full-blooded” Aboriginals were unassimilable.

The symbolic inclusion of Australian Aboriginals in patriotic appeals matched the rhetoric advocating the inclusion of Aboriginals in military forces. As mentioned in previous chapters, Section 138 of the *Defence Act* released anyone “not substantially of European origin” from serving in the military forces and thus excluded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Even those calling for the enlistment of Aboriginal soldiers echoed the construction of Aboriginals as essentially uncivilized. A letter written to the *Adelaide Advertiser* advocated for Aboriginal enlistment, welcoming service from members of “a dying race,” and argued that if the enlistment of Aboriginals would “have the effect of awakening their white brothers to a thorough sense of their duty it will not be in vain.” Just as the trope of the uncivilized Aboriginal provided a benchmark that could shame German atrocities by comparison, the writer valued the enlistment of Aboriginal men in the AIF as a means of shaming white Australians to volunteer. In the same way that Aboriginal artefacts were displayed at imperial exhibitions to contrast with the progress of the settler economy, this wartime discourse reveals that imaginary racial boundaries were constructed between settler and Indigenous to confine Aboriginals to a different era.

Despite legislation implying otherwise, individual Aboriginal men successfully enlisted in the Australian army. Exceptional cases of Aboriginal servicemen can be found in the peacetime nominal rolls of various Volunteer and Citizens Military Force regiments and a handful of Aboriginals even served overseas during the Boer War. After the outbreak of war in 1914, Aboriginal men likewise tried to make their way into the AIF. A number of Aboriginal volunteers enlisted in Victoria. In November 1915, the Chief Protector in Victoria cancelled rations for David Mullett because Mullett was

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reported to have enlisted. Later in March 1916, the manager at Lake Condah inquired if rations should be discontinued for the Arden family, given that the head of the family, James Arden, enlisted, and his family received a portion of his pay from the Ministry of Defence. While a few Aboriginal men successfully enlisted, the correspondence also reveals that many volunteers were turned away. Only a month after cutting off rations to the Arden family, the manager at Lake Tyers reported that Cornelius Evans and J. O’Rourke had attempted to enlist but were turned away for “Insufficient European origin.”

In some states, the Chief Protectors and their subordinate Protectors and Supervisors encouraged Aboriginal men to enlist. Francis Garnett South, Superintendent of the Point Pierce Mission wrote to the Chief Protector for South Australia regarding seven Aboriginal men on the mission who hoped to enlist. South explained that the volunteers have had “no regular work for a long time” and that the mission could not provide them with gainful employment. Nor was the mission able to provide boots or clothes to make the volunteers “decent” for traveling to Adelaide. South inquired if the Department of Aborigines would reimburse the cost of clothing and transporting the volunteers to Adelaide, as well as a return trip if any were turned down by recruiters. While a recruiting officer told South that Aboriginal men – or at least one particular Aboriginal man – could enlist, South was later informed that the volunteers from Point Pierce and Point McLeay were not acceptable because “white men object to share tents

29 Letter No. 1200 from C.A. Robarts to W.J. Ditchburn, 22 November 1915. VPRS 10768/P0000/06. Board for the Protection of Aborigines Register of Inward Correspondence. 1915. PROV.

30 Letter No. 466 from J.H. Stahle to W.J. Ditchburn, 22 April 1916. VPRS 10768/P0000/07. Board for the Protection of Aborigines Register of Inward Correspondence. 1916. PROV.

31 Letter No. 554 from R.W. Howe to W.J. Ditchburn, 23 May 1916. Ibid.

32 Letter 42/325/11. Letter from Francis W.G. South to W. Shegog, 11 January 1915. GRG52. Aborigines’ Office, and successor agencies. 1 Correspondence files 0/19/ File 1/1915 Letter listing Aboriginal people wishing to join the expeditionary force. SRSA.

33 Correspondence from Hardie referenced a letter from South dated 16 December 1914, stating that “relative to the enlistment of an aboriginal … this man may be enlisted.” Letter AD 1/5, From J.L. Hardie to W.G. South, 19 December 1914. Ibid.
with Blacks.”34 Even when living off the reserves, Aboriginal men needed authorization from the Protectors to enlist. Sandy Murphy petitioned the Chief Protector of Queensland for permission to enlist in the AIF, assuring the Chief Protector that he had received permission from his employer.35 Life on the station could be so destitute as to require the subsidized purchase of shoes and clothing to enable Aboriginal men to travel to a recruiting depot, but travel off the reserve also required the permission of the Protection Board. The Chief Protector replied that, if recruiting authorities would accept him, the Protection Board “will arrange the necessary permissions” for Murphy to travel to a recruiting depot.36

The bureaucratic communication necessary to authorize Aboriginal men to enlist was onerous, but the administrators of the Protection Boards willingly took these steps because military service complemented their mission to encourage cultural assimilation into settler society. The Superintendent of Point McLeay, J.B. Steer, wrote to the Chief Protector on behalf of four Aboriginal men who hoped to enlist. Steer believed in the uplifting benefit of military service when he observed “Would it not be well if we could get some of these fellows under military or Naval discipline.”37 In other cases, protectors assumed that military discipline offered an alternative form of social control. The Superintendent at Coranderrk, C.A. Robarts, wrote to the secretary of Victoria’s Protection Board, William Ditchburn, about the case of Campbell Johnson, a fifteen-year-old who tried to enlist twice. Describing Johnson as “restless, disregarding instructions, 


36 Letter from J.W. Bleakley to Sandy Murphy, 3 February 1915. Ibid.

37 Letter 42/325/3. From J.B. Steer to W. Shegog, 3 February 1915. GRG52. Aborigines’ Office, and successor agencies. 1 Correspondence files 0/19/ File 1/1915 Letter listing Aboriginal people wishing to join the expeditionary force. SRSA.
and constantly running away from his work,” Robarts inquired whether Johnson could enlist in the navy, arguing that “good discipline is what he needs.” Too young for the navy, Robarts recommended the teen be sent to a reformatory school instead.

The reformatory school equalled the military as a means of disciplining young Aboriginal men in the minds of Australian protectors. Malcolm Rivers evaded the authority of the Protection Board of Victoria a number of times before March 1916, when Ditchburn secured a warrant for Rivers’ arrest so that he could be delivered to the Salvation Army Boy’s Industrial Home in Bayswater. Rivers eluded the police by enlisting in Geelong but found he was unsuited to military life and, upon his discharge, made his way to stay with a relative at Coranderrk. Ditchburn arranged for Rivers’ arrest and detention at the industrial school in Bayswater. After only a few months at Bayswater, Rivers wrote to Ditchburn asking for another opportunity to enlist. The Superintendent of the industrial school, J.R. Stephen, appended his own comments to the bottom of the letter, informing Ditchburn that Rivers was “doing fairly well” at the school but cautioned that “I don’t know if he would do any better in camp that he did before.” In March 1918, Rivers escaped the industrial school and re-enlisted under the alias Ernest McRivers. Stephen informed Ditchburn of Rivers’ escape, yet did not press for his return. Staff at the industrial school kept an eye on Rivers while he was training and Stephen reported that “altho [sic] he does not seem entirely satisfactory, he may do

38 Letter from C.A. Robarts to W.J. Ditchburn, 10 August 1917. VPRS 1694/P0000. Board for the Protection of Aborigines. Correspondence Files. Unit 000006. General Correspondence. PROV. Bundle 4. PROV.

39 Letter from W.J. Ditchburn to C.A. Robarts, 5 November 1917. Ibid.


41 Copy of letter from Malcolm Rivers to OC Geelong Camp, 10 May 1916; from J.A. Roberts to W. J. Ditchburn, 19 June 1916. Ibid.

42 Minute by W.J. Ditchburn, 23 June 1916. Ibid.

43 Letter from Malcolm Rivers to W.J. Ditchburn, with minute by J.R. Stephen, 11 Dec 1916. Ibid.

44 Scarlett, *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Volunteers*, 138.
alright when he gets away at the front." Rivers was not doing alright, because he faced
discrimination from white soldiers. When a number of other recruits harassed him, Rivers
stood up to his tormenters, brandishing an entrenching tool until a Non-Commissioned
Officer wrestled him to the ground. Arrested and placed in detention barracks, camp
authorities discovered Rivers’ previous discharge and struck him off strength for lying in
his attestation. Camp authorities offered to transfer Rivers to the industrial school to serve
his sentence but the superintendent at Bayswater was content to see Rivers remain in
detention barracks. Whether Rivers spent his time in the AIF, the industrial school, or
detention barracks made little difference to the administrators of the Protection Board and
the industrial school at Bayswater. For Ditchburn and Stephen, the rigorous discipline
common to these institutions provided exactly what they believed Rivers needed.

Like the discipline encountered in the military and reformatories, protection
boards also exercised control over the personal finances of Aboriginals to advance the
process of assimilation. The Protection Boards held the power to negotiate the wages of
Aboriginals who worked off reserves to keep Aboriginal workers underpaid, but in the
AIF an Aboriginal received the same pay as every other soldier. The temporary financial
egalitarianism of military service, however, was quickly seized by Protection Boards. In
the case of James Arden, mentioned above, the Protection Board cut off rations to ensure
that Arden’s family did not profit excessively from his military pay. In Queensland, the
Aborigines Department received pay and benefits on behalf of Aboriginal soldiers, and
Protectors distributed these funds at their own discretion. In 1917 the Aborigines
Department in Queensland collected £1,018/0/7 in wages on behalf of eighteen
Aboriginal soldiers, but only disbursed £238/3/7 to the soldiers’ dependents. The
Protection Boards justified their control over Aboriginal soldiers’ wages as a method of

45 Letter from JR Stephen to W.J. Ditchburn, 29 March 1918. B337, 635. NAA.
47 Report by Detective Sergeant L.T. Potter, 19 May 1918. B337, 635. Aboriginal Case Files. RIVERS,
Malcolm. NAA.
encouraging responsibility and sobriety. John William Bleakley, Chief Protector of Aborigines for Queensland from 1914 to 1942, congratulated himself on his policy of fiscal prudence in his memoirs. Bleakley recalled an Aboriginal veteran describing him as “the best friend I ever had” because “when I came back from the war [Bleakley] wouldn't let me waste my money in booze. If he had, we wouldn't have been able to buy that little banana farm we are now after [sic].” Bleakley never doubted that taking charge of this Aboriginal veteran’s pay set this man on the fiscal straight and narrow. From the iron discipline of the army to the financial discipline of the pay book, military service provided Protection Boards with additional tools to reform Aboriginal men and their families.

Rising casualty figures and sagging enlistments led the Ministry of Defence to revise its interpretation of Section 138 of the Defence Act. In March 1917, a memorandum informed recruiters that Aboriginal men were eligible to enlist in the AIF, provided that a recruit had one European parent and thus qualified as “substantially” European. In keeping with the wording of Section 138, medical authorities conducting a volunteer’s initial medical examination were responsible for determining the substance of a recruit’s European origin. This new interpretation of recruiting policy reflected the racist assumptions that underlined Aboriginal governance by classifying degrees of indigeneity according to blood-quantum. The relaxation of recruiting policy produced a measurable increase in Aboriginal enlistments in 1917, yet the administration of these regulations was anything but consistent. Bleakley’s memoirs provide an oft-quoted anecdote about a bemused Medical Officer who, while scrutinizing the European origins of Aboriginal recruits, observed wryly that these men were “the blackest half-castes I’ve

50 Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions, 161.
ever seen.” The amendment to the AIF recruiting policy was not necessarily carried out
to the letter, but it nevertheless tied the eligibility of Aboriginal volunteers to their blood
quantum.

As with the Meng and Wong brothers, one Aboriginal man was turned down while his brother of identical parentage was accepted. Philippa Scarlett’s research on the Darug people’s contribution to the First World War reveals that at least thirty Aboriginal men from the traditional lands of the Darug successfully enlisted in the AIF. Even with such a sizeable contribution, this Aboriginal community could not mobilize itself to offer a draft of volunteers for the war effort, as each volunteer negotiated his own way past the scrutiny of the medical officer. While most of the Darug volunteers slipped past the colour bar, medical boards discharged Alfred, Arthur, and Richard Everingham on account of their Aboriginal ancestry. The case of William Wallace Chatfield best illustrates the inconsistency of determining “European origin” through medical examinations. Chatfield volunteered for the AIF at Mudgee, New South Wales, in March 1918 but the medical board in Sydney turned him away because of his “unsuitable physique – colour.” Chatfield attempted to enlist again three months later in Coonabarabran, where the Medical Officer found him fit for service, allowing Chatfield to serve overseas until the end of the war. The difficulties of identifying individuals of mixed-race may have created a permeable barrier for Aboriginal men to enlist in the AIF, but the policy of acceptance based on a medical officer’s interpretation of an individual’s

54 See Chapter 3.
56 From G.R. Rhodes to Supervising Enrolling Officer, 14 March 1918; Proceedings of Medical Board Assembled at Victoria Barracks on the 15th March 1918; B2455, Chatfield, WW. NAA.
57 Certificate of Medical Examination 12 June 1918; B2455, Chatfield, WW. NAA; See also, Scarlett, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Volunteers, 11n.
blood quantum effectively disrupted collective enlistment among Aboriginal men. Whether or not an Aboriginal could pass the AIF’s colour bar was always a matter of individual circumstance. The inconsistency of Medical Officers’ assessments of Aboriginal recruits reveals the inherent flaws of measuring constructed categories such as “full-blood” and “half-caste,” yet at the same time this selective screening further disrupted Aboriginal kinships by allowing one brother to enlist while rejecting his sibling.

Policies that controlled and assimilated Aboriginals into settler society determined how Aboriginals could contribute to the Australian war effort. The administrators of the Protection Boards often encouraged Aboriginal participation in the war effort while public displays and the popular press regularly invoked the image of the Aboriginal in support of the war, but the extent to which an Aboriginal could participate voluntarily in the war effort was often determined by blood quantum. The spectacle of “full-blooded” Aboriginals performing a corroboree or the seemingly favourable comparison of the uncivilized Aboriginal against the German ‘Hun’ reinforced the popular perception of Aboriginals as perpetually primitive and out of place in modern society. The “half-caste,” however, showed some promise for transformation.58 The industrial schools provided the Protection Boards with a powerful instrument to assimilate Aboriginals into settler society, and half-caste children attending these schools were encouraged to organize fundraisers to contribute to patriotic funds in the same manner as settler children. The rigid structure and unbending discipline of the industrial school could also be found in the AIF. For this reason, protectors encouraged Aboriginals to enlist and imposed further control on the finances of Aboriginal soldiers and their families by seizing military pay. Aboriginals could participate in the war effort, but their contributions were heavily mediated by institutions designed to break apart communities and families, leaving Australian Aboriginals few opportunities to mobilize as a community. The channels through which Aboriginals could participate in the war effort steered “full-blooded”

58 For a detailed overview of the discourse surrounding biopolitics of Aboriginal administration, see Gregory D. Smithers, *Science, Sexuality, and Race in the United States and Australia, 1780s-1890s*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 84-95.
Aboriginals toward forms of contributions such as typified performances that reinforced a narrative that predicted their obsolescence and extinction. Aboriginals of mixed-ancestry, or who could pass as having mixed-ancestry had the opportunity to enlist in the AIF, but bureaucrats on the Protection Boards monitored and approved everything from their trip to the recruiting station to the disbursement of their pension.

Protection Boards supported the enlistment of biracial Aboriginal men because it suited the cultural and genetic assimilation of Aboriginals into settler society. The reforming influence of military service, however, was meant to build on a process of genetic assimilation. The rigid regimens of the industrial school and the military were applied to Aboriginals of mixed-race, or to Aboriginals who could convince a medical board of their mixed ancestry. Over the course of the war, an estimated 834 Aboriginal men made their way into the ranks of the AIF, but the ability to serve was determined by a medical officer’s assessment of an Aboriginals’ blood quantum. The preoccupation with blood quantum reflected a wider policy to divide the Aboriginal population between “full-blooded” Aboriginals, constructed as backward and doomed to extinction, and “half-castes,” whose genetic composition suggested the potential for cultural integration into settler society. The enlistment of Aboriginals thus extended the existing system of assimilation meant to transform Aboriginals through cultural indoctrination and genetic manipulation.

## 5.2 First Nations

First Nations peoples in Canada share a longer history of contact with European settlers than the other dominions. The military and economic alliances struck by First Nations peoples during conflicts between opposing settler communities formed a significant foundation of that shared history. First Nations peoples fought alongside the French and

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59 Relying on official estimates compiled by the Ministry of Defence and the Australian War Memorial, Timothy Winegard reports that 580 Indigenous Australian soldiers served during the First World War. Through meticulous research reviewing individual service files at the National Archives of Australia, Philippa Scarlett has demonstrated that at least 834 Indigenous servicemen served in the AIF. See: Scarlett, *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Volunteers*, 5; Winegard, *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions*, 234.
British in the series of colonial wars that culminated in the fall of New France in 1763, then again alongside the British and Americans in 1776 and 1812. The value of First Nations peoples as military allies curtailed settler designs for their displacement, lest such policies weaken their “Indian allies,” and certain First Nations communities drew on this position of strength to leverage their alliances for concessions or guarantees for land rights. The status of First Nations peoples as allies of the crown was formalized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. In regions isolated from war, such as when the Maritime Provinces remained neutral during the War of 1812, settlers displaced the Maliseet, Penobscot, and Mi’kmaq with impunity. With the cessation of inter-settler warfare in North America, First Nations peoples’ strategic position as military allies declined but the threat of violent resistance necessitated the negotiation of treaties to facilitate westward settlement.60

In the United Province of Canada, merged in 1840, the colonial administration approached relations with First Nations peoples with a policy of assimilation through social control. First Nations communities were increasingly governed as subjects of colonial authorities, rather than as allies of the crown. The Indian Department set out to offset the disruption of settlement on First Nations peoples’ sustenance and economy by converting them to sedentary agriculture. Experimental reserves were not immediately successful, but First Nations communities ultimately acquiesced with these programs in the hopes of gaining the skills and knowledge necessary to survive in the face of sustained settlement. Missionaries and religious or philanthropic organizations influenced the Indian Department’s policy of assimilation, which incorporated religious education into its program of social and cultural reform. Following the model set out by the New England Company on the Six Nations reserve, the Bagot Commission of 1842 recommended the establishment of residential schools to indoctrinate First Nations youth because they offered advantages over the costly system of scattered day schools on

various communities, which pupils easily evaded. The *Gradual Civilization Act* of 1857 formalized the benchmarks of social uplift by defining the status of an “Indian” and setting a standard of education, morality, and fiscal prudence necessary for an Indigenous Person to qualify as a British subject. The framework of securing tracts of settlement by signing treaties, displacing First Nations communities onto reservations, converting them to sedentary agriculture, and imposing moral uplift through compulsory schooling became established practice by the time of Confederation.61

The *British North America Act* formally gave the Dominion of Canada authority over all matters relating to First Nations peoples and their land and the dominion government built its policies on the assimilative framework established by the Indian Department. With the purchase of Rupert’s Land, westward settlement was paved with a series of numbered treaties signed between the 1860s and 1880s to spare the dominion government the expense of pacifying First Nations peoples through violent means, as demonstrated by the costly “Indian Wars” of the United States.62 With food scarce from the depletion of the buffalo, seasonal drought, and oncoming waves of European settlers, the Department of Indian Affairs withheld rations to starve First Nations peoples onto reserves.63 The careful and callous management of finances and resources kept First Nations communities on reserves, as purchases of agricultural machinery were denied in order to keep farming yields near the point of subsistence. Reserves that persevered to raise excess crops of wheat remained dependent on government rations because the Department withheld milling equipment necessary to convert their wheat into edible flour.64 Governance on reserves was placed in the hands of an elected band council, though the jurisdiction of these councils was restricted to municipal affairs. The authority of band councils was further eroded as all resolutions required the approval of the

61 Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, 126-129; 132-134; 139-142.
62 Ibid., 210.
64 Ibid., 133, 147.
Department, while elders serving on these councils could be removed by agents of the Department.65

With most Indigenous people in Canada confined to reserves, residential schools became the Department of Indian Affairs’ instrument for First Nations peoples’ salvation and enfranchisement. While not policed to the same extent as in Australia, federal legislation isolated First Nations people of mixed-ancestry into their own racialized category, but did not enforce their removal from reserves.66 Residential schools purposefully separated pupils from their community for lengthy periods to ensure that parents would not interfere with their children’s complete immersion in settler schooling. Practical skills and technical training formed only part of the curriculum, which sought to impose Christian morals of thrift, self-denial, and industry – lessons often reinforced with abusive discipline. By 1914, the mechanisms employed by the Dominion of Canada to confine First Nations communities to reserves and assimilate them into settler society through transformative education were in place across Canada. The integration of First Nations communities into the war effort became an extension of this policy of reform and uplift.67

The voluntary mobilization of Canadian First Nations communities was shaped by their already established dependence on settler bureaucracies for their survival. A significant point of contention was whether First Nations peoples were subjects of the dominion or the crown. As Katherine McGowan demonstrates, many First Nations bands responded quickly and enthusiastically to support the Canadian Patriotic Fund and donated generously to other wartime charities such as the Red Cross or local patriotic

65 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 198.


The Department of Indian Affairs, however, regulated all financial contributions from First Nations communities for the war effort. Under the *Indian Act*, an Indian agent exercised stewardship over each First Nations band and approved all their expenditures, including patriotic donations. In October 1918, the Garden River Council, near Sault Ste Marie, voted to make a $200 donation to the Algoma War Chest Fund. The band’s Indian agent, A.D. McNably, was not present at the meeting, however, and required the council to repeat the vote in his presence before reporting the contribution to his superiors. When a community of First Nations offered funds to support the war effort, the Indian agent relayed their contribution to Ottawa. The Department even provided the wording for this patriotic correspondence by supplying formatted letters that band elders could just sign and return through their Indian agent. As a last hurdle, all expenditures made by First Nations bands had to be approved by the Department of Indian Affairs. When J.A. Renaud, Indian agent for the band at North Temiskaming, wrote to Ottawa to report the band’s contribution of $1,000 to the war effort, he was in fact writing “to obtain from the Department the authority to contribute to the Patriotic Fund.” Over $44,545 in patriotic funds was donated by First Nations communities over the course of the war but bureaucrats halted a total of $8,750 in donations, out of concern that certain bands could not afford to make such generous gifts.

The patriotic response of First Nations peoples met with approval from officials in the Department of Indian Affairs and beyond. J.D. McLean, Acting Deputy Secretary of

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68 Katherine McGowan, “‘We are wards of the Crown and cannot be regarded as full citizens of Canada’: Native Peoples, the Indian Act and Canada’s War Effort,” (PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2011), Ch 1.

69 Letter from A.D. McNably to J.D. McLean, 26 October 1918. RG 10. Vol 6763. 452-5. Patriotic Funds contributions to war funds from Indians. LAC.


Indian Affairs, wrote to S.L. Macdonald, Indian agent in The Pas, Manitoba, to acknowledge the contributions from bands in Macdonald’s agency. McLean complemented “the way in which the Indians have responded,” and reported that these efforts “have been very favourably commented on throughout the country.”\(^{73}\) Praise also came from outside official channels. The Honourary Secretary of the Canadian Red Cross Society, D. Hossack, wrote a letter of thanks to the band council at Norway House, Manitoba, for its contribution of $72.\(^{74}\) More than thanking donors, the contribution of First Nations communities was widely publicized. A famous propaganda poster celebrated a $150 donation to the Canadian Patriotic Fund from Moocheweines, a Cree man from Onion Lake First Nation, encouraging other Canadians to follow his example.\(^{75}\) While celebrating and promoting wartime contributions from First Nations communities, this chapter’s opening excerpt from Duncan Campbell Scott makes it clear that these donations were lauded because the participation of First Nations in the war effort hastened “the millennium” of First Nations peoples’ assimilation into settler society.

As Robert Talbot demonstrates, many First Nations bands were reluctant to support the war effort of a state that actively marginalized their culture and enforced their assimilation into settler society. Charles Cooke, an Iroquois from the Six Nations who worked for the Department of Indian Affairs as a clerk, recruited First Nations men in Northern and Western Ontario in the spring of 1916, but the response he received revealed ambivalence, and sometimes hostility, toward military service among First Nations communities. In Quebec, Cooke even found that the Kahnawake and Kanesatake

\(^{73}\) Letter from J.D. Maclean to S.L. Macdonald, 27 September 1918. RG 10. Vol. 6762. 452-2. Pt 1. Patriotic Funds contributions to war funds from Indians. LAC.

\(^{74}\) From D. Hossack to Band of Indians Norway House, 4 September 1918. Ibid.

bands offered to harbour deserters. First Nations bands in British Columbia also responded with hostility to recruiters. The Indian agent for Salish, near Lyton, reported that a Chief threatened open rebellion if further recruiting missions intruded on their land. In recruiting a draft for the Forestry Corps among First Nations communities in British Columbia, a young Captain Tyson found that many potential First Nations recruits only offered to enlist in exchange for the right to vote, while others raised “the land question.” While the Department of Indian Affairs pressed First Nations communities for voluntary contributions as an extension of its mandate of assimilation, First Nations communities responded with ambivalence or resistance that stemmed from their grievances with the dominion government, while others leveraged military service for greater autonomy.

The opportunity to make a collective voluntary contribution to the war effort presented First Nations communities with a conundrum. While some First Nations communities understandably resisted invitations to contribute to the war, others saw voluntary mobilization as an opportunity to remind the Dominion of their status as allies or subjects of the Crown, rather than wards of the state. Just as First Nations peoples in British Columbia offered to enlist in exchange for the vote, many First Nations communities attempted to leverage wartime contributions to gain concessions from the state. The correspondence exchanged while orchestrating patriotic contributions initiated a dialogue that allowed First Nations communities to contest their relationship with the state. As a representative of Queen Victoria countersigned the majority of treaties signed by First Nations, the administration of First Nation communities by the dominion of Canada through the Department of Indian Affairs was perceived as a breach of these treaties. Band councillors often registered their contempt for the Department of Indian Affairs by prefacing patriotic contributions as support for the Crown, rather than the

76 Talbot, “‘It Would be Best to Leave us alone,’” 105.
77 Talbot, “‘It Would be Best to Leave us alone,’” 105.
dominion. Writing on behalf of the Grand Council of the Chippewa, near Sarnia, Ontario, Indian agent F.W. Jacobs reported that the band’s “loyalty was created by the noblest Queen that ever lived Queen Victoria.”79 Other bands traced their relationship further back to older military alliances with Britain. Chief Charles Obatassaway, speaking for the Ojibways of Sucker Creek, offered $500 of band funds for the war effort to honour their continued allegiance to the Crown, citing Ojibway support of the British during the War of 1812 and the participation of Sucker Creek band members on the side of dominion forces during the Red River Expedition of 1870.80

In presenting the terms by which they would contribute to the war effort, First Nations communities hoped that their self-organized mobilization would acknowledge their right to self-governance and thus greater autonomy from the dominion of Canada. J. Edward Rendle, a Methodist Missionary in Quathiaski Cove, British Columbia, petitioned the Minister of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Kwakiutl Council. Like many communities across Canada, the council wished to raise a company of soldiers in “service of our King.” The proposal was rejected and without the authorization of this distinct company, few recruits were forthcoming from Kwakiutl.81 In the same way that the contribution of a Japanese battalion was turned down, all suggestions forwarded by First Nations bands to contribute a contingent of soldiers were rejected by the Department of Militia. Contributions of patriotic funds were acceptable, but the self-mobilization of First Nations communities to raise their own contingents of soldiers acknowledged that First Nations peoples could exercise more autonomy than was desired by the Department of Militia and the Department of Indian Affairs. Unable to raise their own contingents, First Nations communities were left to enlist in other battalions.


80 Letter from William McLeod, Indian Agent for Sucker Creek, written on behalf of Chief Charles Obatassaway of Sucker Creek Reservation (Little Current PO), 26 August 1914. Ibid.

The enlistment of First Nations volunteers in the CEF was generally encouraged after 1915, though British Columbia presents a regional exception where the restrictions against First Nations recruits remained rigid. Colonel Duff Stewart, commanding No. 11 Militia District, consistently rejected proposals for recruiting missions aimed specifically at First Nations peoples. Duff Stewart twice rebuffed suggestions from the Militia Council calling for a more concerted attempt to enlist First Nations soldiers in British Columbia, arguing that “the Indian would not make a good soldier” on account of his character traits, nor did he believe it feasible for First Nations men to serve in mixed units alongside white men. 82 In 1917 the Department of Militia dispatched a special recruiting mission to British Columbia to find men for the Forestry Corps and hoped to bolster their numbers by including a draft of First Nations foresters. Major J. Reynolds Tite, in command of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, reported serious tensions on the arrival of fourteen First Nations volunteers to the recruiting depot in Vancouver, and quickly transferred them to a different depot in New Westminster. 83 While praising their skill as loggers and their potential value to the war effort, Tite nevertheless recommended that, unless the full draft of 125 First Nations lumberjacks was recruited, these volunteers should be discharged before their presence in mixed company caused further trouble. 84 Under the recommendation of Duff Stewart, the Adjutant General authorized the disbandment of the First Nations forestry draft. 85 Where racial tensions were most entrenched, regional military authorities effectively used their influence to block the recruitment of First Nations soldiers.

Elsewhere in Canada, the commanders of militia districts encouraged the enlistment of First Nations men, yet the degree to which First Nations communities could participate in their recruitment remained a point of contention. The contribution of the

82 From Col J. Duff-Stewart to Secty Militia Council, 23 March 1916. Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Telegram from MGen W. Hodgins to Col J. Duff-Stewart, 16 June 1917. Ibid.
Six Nations in Southwestern Ontario demonstrated the tension between negotiating with the state and making a visible contribution to the dominion’s war effort. The Six Nations was the largest and most established reserve in Canada and its members were praised by the Department of Indian Affairs for working off the reserve and integrating themselves into the social and commercial networks of neighbouring Brantford. Six Nations men also participated actively in the Canadian Militia. A parade in 1908 recorded two hundred members of the Six Nations formed-up with the 37th Haldimand Rifles, including Captain J.S. Johnson who served as a company commander. Based on the Six Nations’ strong participation in Canada’s pre-war Militia, Lieutenant Colonel William Hamilton Merritt offered £5,000 of his own funds to raise two companies of Six Nations for overseas service. The Six Nations chiefs, however, declined Merritt’s offer because to voluntarily mobilize a unit of the CEF would acknowledge the sovereignty of the dominion of Canada over the Six Nations. The Council, seeking to maintain the status of the Six Nations as allies of the Crown rather than wards of the dominion, ruled that it would only mobilize the community at the request of the Crown. Merritt approached the Department of Militia to arrange such a request, but the Governor General’s Military Secretary, Lieutenant Colonel E.A. Stanton, informed Merritt that the Dominion of Canada would not approach its wards in such terms nor would the dominion beseech the Crown to make such a request.86 Unable to raise their own battalion, members of the Six Nations had to enlist with units raised in the neighbouring communities to serve overseas.

As the Six Nations could not form their own unit, local recruiters did their best to entice volunteers from the Six Nations to enlist in their battalion. In November 1915, Lieutenant Colonel Edwy Sutherland Baxter, Commanding Officer of the 37th Haldimand Rifles, began recruiting for the 114th Battalion, CEF in Haldimand County. From the outset, Baxter hoped to capitalize on his relationship with the Six Nations and draw recruits from the reserve to form two companies in his battalion. The Six Nations presence in the 114th Battalion gained the First Nations community a certain degree of visible recognition. The Officer Commanding lobbied the Department of Militia to add two crossed tomahawks at the bottom of the cap badge of the 114th Battalion and secured the designation ‘Brock’s Rangers’ to acknowledge the Six Nations historic participation.
in Sir Isaac Brock’s defence of Queenston Heights during the War of 1812.87 On parade, the battalion flew a flag sewn by the Six Nations Women’s Patriotic League (see fig. 4) embroidered with the title “Six Nations Indians of the 114th Battalion,” along with the clan symbols of the Six Nations: the wolf, the eagle, the heron, the turtle, the bear, and the white hare; as well as six interlocking arrows for the Six Nations: Mohawk, Cayuga, Seneca, Tuscarora, Oneida, and Onondaga. Above a wreath of oak leaves stand a lion and a dragon, symbolizing the British Crown.88 These badges, titles, and flags acknowledged the two companies of the 114th Battalion composed of the First Nations recruits. The accoutrements of the two First Nations companies of the 114th visibly acknowledged the contribution of the Six Nations, but this acknowledgement was not accompanied with permission for the Council of the Six Nations to mobilize its own contingent.

The relationship between Baxter and the Six Nations caused some friction, as members of the Six Nations continued to debate if and how they would support the war effort. Certain chiefs of the Six Nations believed that members of the band should only serve overseas under terms that respected the status of the Six Nations as allies of the crown and worked to undermine the 114th’s recruiting effort.89 Nor did the members of the Six Nations enlist exclusively with the 114th. Baxter became increasingly frustrated and possessive of the Six Nations as an important pool of recruits for his battalion. At the outset of recruiting in November 1915, Baxter protested to Major-General Logie, commander of the militia district, when neighbouring battalions from Hamilton and Brantford were found recruiting among the Six Nations. Baxter resented that other units could “take from me men who have justly belonged to my regimental area for so very


many years. “90 In the same way that Anglophone recruiters in Northern Ontario wished to keep local French Canadians from enlisting in Quebec, 91 Baxter demonstrated a similar sense of ownership over the Six Nations reserve as his own recruiting territory and was anxious that incursions from other units might undermine the success of his battalion.

In March 1916 Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Thompson replaced Baxter, who fell terminally ill, and continued to petition Logie to keep other recruiters away from the Six Nations. Thompson demanded the transfer of nineteen Six Nations men who had been recruited into neighboring battalions, arguing that he was “entitled to these Indians” who should serve in the First Nations companies of the 114th because they “are properly ours.” 92 The recruiting practices of Lieutenant Colonel Cockshutt of the 215th Battalion, based in neighbouring Dundas, aggravated Thompson because Cockshutt was drawing away recruits with the promise of a five-dollar signing bonus and recruiting “IN MY TERRITORY,” as Thompson put it. 93 Many officers commanding CEF battalions competed amongst each other for recruits, but Baxter, and later Thompson, invoked the established relationship between his militia unit – the 37th Haldimand Rifles – with the Six Nations in order to make the case that these volunteers “belonged” to his battalion and that other officers should be barred from recruiting among the Six Nations. The relationship between the 114th Battalion and the Six Nations reflected conflicts over control of the reservation, as a recruiting territory, and its residents, as potential recruits.

With recruiting among the First Nations communities lagging, the 114th Battalion attempted to secure its right to all First Nations recruits by establishing itself as the only battalion allowed to recruit First Nations soldiers in Ontario. Thompson petitioned

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90 Emphasis in original. From LCol ES Baxter to AAG 2nd Div, 10 November 1915. RG24 C-8. Vol 4380 File Part 1. MD2-34-7-89, WWI Organization – 114th Battalion Haldimand County. LAC.

91 See Chapter 3.


93 Ibid.
unsuccessfully for the transfer of all First Nations recruits to the 114th, but Major-General Logie authorized the 114th to recruit First Nations volunteers throughout No. 2 Militia District. On this authority, Charles Cooke was dispatched to Manitoulin Island to recruit for Brock’s Rangers.

Cooke’s recruiting mission conflicted with officers commanding local battalions who resented the 114th encroaching on their recruiting territory. The Commanding Officer of the 227th Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, complained to Logie that the 114th’s exclusive authority to recruit First Nations men throughout the Militia District undermined his plan to raise a company on Manitoulin Island, which relied on recruiting a number of “good Indians.” Jones further argued that the First Nations men on Manitoulin Island preferred to enlist with “their white friends from Manitoulin” and were reluctant to serve with the Mohawks of the Six Nations. When Lieutenant-Colonel D.M. Grant, commanding the 122nd Battalion, suspected that he might be ordered to transfer the few First Nations volunteers in his unit, he wrote to Logie claiming that these recruits were “quite content here” and being residents of Muskoka, where the 122nd was raised, these soldiers were serving “with their friends” and “would not have enlisted in any other Battalion.” In the same way that he applied the logic of community to lay claim to “good French Canadians” of Algoma, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones likewise claimed the “good Indians” on Manitoulin Island. Like Baxter and Thompson, other officers commanding battalions of the CEF claimed possession of nearby First Nations communities as their own recruiting pools. The 114th Battalion had the largest proportion of First Nations soldiers in Ontario but – facing stiff competition for able-bodied recruits – other units in the Militia District were keen to attract First Nations soldiers. While training at Camp Borden, the 129th, 159th, 177th, and 228th Battalion each reported about a

94 Letter from LCol C.H. Jones to MGen W.A. Logie, 12 April 1916. Ibid.
95 Letter from LCol C.H. Jones to MGen W.A. Logie, 4 May 1916. Ibid.
96 Letter from LCol D.M. Grant to MGen W.A. Logie, 9 August 1916. Ibid.
97 See Chapter 3.
dozen First Nations soldiers on their strength, while the 135th Battalion, recruited in Middlesex County, claimed seventy-eight First Nations soldiers in its ranks.\(^98\)

The quantity of battalions in No. 2 Militia District that recruited among First Nations communities, and the conflicts that erupted between these battalion commanders over their entitlement to First Nations recruits, presents a stark contrast to the reluctance or refusal to recruit racialized minorities such as African-Canadians. These battalions recruited and then argued to retain First Nations soldiers, but at least five of these units, the 122nd, 129th, 177th, 227th, and 228th, had explicitly rejected the offer of an African-Canadian platoon in April 1916.\(^99\) Even Colonel Thompson felt that an African platoon “would undoubtedly cause serious friction and discontent” if incorporated into the 114th Battalion.\(^100\) First Nations men and African-Canadian men were both racialized within their own constructed categories, but the reception of First Nations recruits by officers who rejected African Canadians reveals the motives behind the recruitment of racialized minorities was not applied consistently to all racial categories.

A wider view of recruiting reveals that the underlying motivation for recruiters and Indian Agents to encourage the enlistment of First Nations soldiers was their belief that military service was a positive influence on Indigenous men. With the exception of British Columbia, most Canadian military authorities supported the enlistment of First Nations soldiers. A number of suggestions came forward in Manitoba and Saskatchewan to raise a First Nations battalion, if not a company or platoon. Each proposal promised that First Nations volunteers would make excellent soldiers, but also emphasized the special expertise required to look after First Nations men. Colonel Henry Norlande Ruttan, commanding No. 10 Militia District, supported the offer of S.J. Jackson, Indian agent for Lake Manitoba and veteran of the 1885 Rebellion, to raise a company of First Nations men.

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\(^99\) RG24 C-8. Vol. 4387 File MD2-34-7-141. Organization Colored Platoons. LAC.

\(^100\) Letter from LCol Andrew Thompson to AAG MD2, 4 April 1916. Ibid.
Nations soldiers. Ruttan believed Jackson was “well-fitted” for the task because “the Indians will require special care.”  

When advocating for the formation of a Métis battalion in Alberta, Colonel Cruickshank advised that special quarters were necessary to separate the recruits from their home communities so they could be “subject to discipline from the first.”  

The Militia Council turned down suggestions for separate First Nations drafts with its familiar rationale that it would be difficult to maintain ethnically- or racially-distinct units overseas.  

Indeed, the 107th (Timberwolves) Battalion was raised in Winnipeg and, like the 114th, attracted a significant proportion of First Nations recruits and faced disbandment following heavy losses at Hill 70 in August 1917.  

Arguing to keep the 107th together, Lieutenant-Colonel Glen Campbell, the unit’s Commanding Officer and erstwhile Chief Inspector of Indian Agencies in Manitoba, stated that if First Nations soldiers were “scattered … under officers whom they do not know … They will get lonesome and homesick, and Indians will die of that, as you know.”  

The enlistment of First Nations men in the CEF was widely encouraged, but it was also understood that experience in administering First Nations recruits was necessary to produce effective soldiers.  

Despite requiring additional expertise, advocates for the wider recruitment of First Nations men justified the extra effort because of the positive influence of military service in ameliorating the condition of First Nations communities. W.E. Read, owned a general store in Fort Qu’Appelle and believed himself to be in good standing with local Métis
and First Nations peoples, offered to deliver one thousand First Nations recruits, arguing that military service would “build them up physically, mentally and morally and on their return to the reserves, they would never again be content to drift along as they are now doing.”106 Much like the proposals to raise a Japanese-Canadian or African-Canadian battalion, the Militia Council rejected proposals to raise a battalion of First Nations volunteers, preferring to disperse First Nations recruits among other units. The internal correspondence at Militia Headquarters surrounding an African- or Japanese-Canadian draft reflected deep concerns over the necessity to segregate racialized recruits, yet no concerns were raised about segregating First Nations soldiers. The Secretary of the Militia Council confided to Ruttan that he “quite agree[d]” that the enlistment of First Nations men could provide them with an important civilizing influence.107 While the Militia Council fretted over whether Japanese- or African-Canadian soldiers should serve in segregated units, there were few objections to mixing First Nations soldiers with whites and commanding officers, such as Colonels Grant and Jones of the 122nd and 227th Battalions, who eagerly recruited among First Nations communities. Segregation was a point of contention for the enlistment of racialized minorities but – with the exception of British Columbia – the integration of First Nations men into the CEF was generally encouraged because of the supposed benefit of integrated military service to First Nations soldiers.

The war effort offered First Nations communities in Canada an opportunity to remind the Department of Indian Affairs of treaty terms and obligations that had been ignored and to renegotiate their relationship with the state. The self-mobilization of First Nations communities offered a measure of autonomy and an acknowledgment of self-government by allowing bands to organize their resources to raise funds or recruit soldiers and produce their own contribution to the war effort. While Indigenous communities attempted to leverage wartime contributions to gain autonomy from the Department of Indian Affairs, neither the Department of Indian Affairs nor the

106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
Department of Militia was willing to allow First Nations communities to mobilize their resources in a manner that could redefine their relationship with the state. Financial contributions were submitted to an Indian agent for approval while offers to raise soldiers independently were turned down by the Department of Militia. As the successive attempts to raise a contingent among the Six Nations revealed, the self-mobilization of First Nations communities held strong implications that could reaffirm the status of First Nations communities as military allies of the Crown, rather than wards of the state. Unwilling to endorse such actions, the Department of Militia declined offers to form a distinct First Nations draft, but encouraged the enlistment of First Nations soldiers into other battalions of the CEF. Rather than mobilize on their own initiative, First Nations communities became contested recruiting grounds for battalion commanders of the CEF who claimed First Nations soldiers as part of their white settler communities.

First Nations communities could not mobilize independently, but the efforts and contributions of First Nations bands were nevertheless welcomed when a white Canadian settler was placed in charge of their mobilization. Unlike offers from the Japanese- or African-Canadian community, where leaders of those communities communicated their contributions directly with civil and military authorities, an intermediary almost always spoke on behalf of First Nations communities wishing to contribute to the war effort. Indian agents, former Indian agents serving in the militia, missionaries, even the owner of a general store, such as W.E. Read, corresponded with the Department of Militia on behalf of First Nations communities. These intermediaries advocated for the inclusion of First Nations men into the national war effort, but also cautioned that their own skills were necessary to properly instruct First Nations recruits into the modes of dress and deportment necessary to function in a modern military. First Nations communities that chose to participate in the war effort contributed a significant portion of their wealth and a much higher proportion of their adult male population, but these efforts were mobilized by settler intermediaries who believed military service provided a

transformative influence that could aid in the efforts to assimilate First Nations communities into settler society. While First Nations communities attempted to use their contributions to the war effort in order to leverage concessions from the state, the structures of the Canadian recruiting system were adjusted to ensure that First Nations communities did not mobilize on their own initiative but were mobilized under the command of white settlers.

5.3 Maori and Pacific Islanders

Maori were not governed under the strict or patronizing measures employed in Australia or Canada. New Zealand’s small geographical size, rugged topography, and distance from Britain made it considerably more difficult for colonial authorities to project military power over the islands, and the Maori offered more entrenched resistance to British dominance. The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 provided concise terms for the future of Maori-Pakeha relations in New Zealand. Article One of the treaty conceded the Crown’s sovereignty over New Zealand, but Article Two guaranteed Maori the right to exercise rangatiratanga\textsuperscript{109} (chieftainship) over their own lands and offered protection against non-consensual seizures or sales of Maori land. Article Three guaranteed that Maori would enjoy the rights and protections of British subjects.\textsuperscript{110}

Disputes over purchases of Maori land around New Zealand led to a succession of armed rebellions between 1843 and the 1870s, particularly in Waikato, the East Cape, and Taranaki. Collectively known as the Maori Wars, these conflicts reflected the sustained animosity between Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand, although a number of iwi (tribes or peoples), known collectively as kupapa, supported the Crown in these clashes. Armed conflicts subsided in the late nineteenth century, but the underlying tensions over state authority and Maori autonomy continued into the twentieth century, while the

\textsuperscript{109} In keeping with the style guide of the \textit{New Zealand Journal of History}, Maori words are not italicized.

confiscation of three million acres of Maori land in districts that rebelled, particularly Waikato, left deep resentment among the affected Maori communities.¹¹¹

In the aftermath of the Maori Wars, retaining control over Maori land became an important struggle for Maori autonomy. As with Indigenous communities in the other dominions, a number of Maori communities adopted settler practices and thrived by turning traditional agriculture into a commercial venture. Communities in Waikato supplied most of Auckland’s flour and vegetables, while Chatham Island Maori exported hundreds of tons of potatoes to California at a tidy profit.¹¹² To maintain rangatiratanga, Maori communities established komiti to govern land under their possession. Essentially establishing their own separate local government, colonial authorities generally tolerated these komiti as long as they did not contradict the laws of the colony. This relatively benign approach to Maori governance was adopted partly because of the relative strength of Maori communities and partly because of widespread belief among Pakeha (settlers) of the impending extinction of the Maori. Maori susceptibility to European diseases caused an alarming decline in Maori population in the last decades of the nineteenth century. This demographic atrophy and the steady arrival of settlers, combined with beliefs of social Darwinism, convinced many Pakeha that the Maori were a dying race.¹¹³

By 1900, Maori population had rebounded from its decline, and the struggle for autonomy intensified. Two important Maori unitary movements took up competing approaches to Maori-Pakeha relations. The Kingitanga movement had taken root during the Maori Wars to contest the Crown’s authority. Originating in Waikato, the Kingitanga withdrew south to the Western Uplands of Manawatu-Wanganui and established ‘King Country’ as a Maori state governed by an invented crown that was relatively secure from

the reach of colonial authority. A very different movement grew out of Te Aute College, a secondary school established by Anglican missionaries at Hawke’s Bay in 1854. Later known as the Young Maori Party, this group of Pakeha-educated Maori students gained support among kupapa iwi as they advocated for a more cooperative approach to Pakeha relations. While the Kingatanga movement tied its claims to rangatiratanga, the Young Maori hoped to secure Maori autonomy by convincing Pakeha of their suitability for self-governance. Both movements shared the same goal of achieving Maori autonomy, but the Young Maori hoped to gain equal status with Pakeha by adopting elements of Pakeha culture.114

Led by energetic Maori parliamentarians, such as Sir James Carroll, Sir Apirana Ngata, Sir Peter Buck, and Sir Maui Pomare, the Young Maori lamented the forecasted demise of the Maori, but dedicated their life’s work to reversing these predictions. Fiercely proud of their Maori ancestry, the Young Maori believed that salvation could be achieved through a controlled adoption of Pakeha culture. Foremost was the adoption of European medicine, as reflected in the education of the Young Maori; Ngata, Hiroa, and Pomare all trained and worked as medical doctors before moving into politics. While working to preserve traditional elements of Maori culture, such as art and language, the Young Maori hoped to secure autonomy from the dominion government by demonstrating that Maori were capable of mastering European education and morality. More than adopting Pakeha ways, the Young Maori set out to prove that Maori could stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Pakeha. Carrol and Buck, for example, championed Pakeha theorists who hypothesized about the Aryan origins of Maori because, at a time when race theory influenced public opinion and government policy, the Aryan Maori provided a racialized rationale for Maori equality.115 Sport and warfare offered important avenues for Maori acceptance and the Young Maori lobbied successfully for the inclusion


of Maori teams in the Rugby Union.\textsuperscript{116} Given their progressive views on health and education, and their affinity for British culture, the Young Maori were important – but problematic\textsuperscript{117} – actors that mediated Maori-Pakeha relations during the first half of the twentieth century. During the First World War, the Young Maori were well-positioned to negotiate a collective Maori contribution to the war effort to further raise the esteem of Maori in the eyes of Pakeha.

The experience of Maori contrasts with case studies from Australia and Canada because the New Zealand government authorized the formation of a Maori contingent, recruited by Maori Parliamentarians. The mobilization of the Maori contingent raised questions regarding the qualifiers of Maori identity. The question of rangatiratanga remained a pressing concern in the mobilization of an independent contingent to symbolize Maori autonomy within a Pakeha state and the status of Maori as British subjects, equal with Pakeha. As Alison Fletcher argues, the mobilization of the Maori contingent homogenized Maori identity, yet the terms that defined Maori identity in this context remain vague.\textsuperscript{118} The influence of the Young Maori in the mobilization of Maori communities during the First World War helped reinforce a construction of Maori identity that reflected the goals and values of the Young Maori.

The outbreak of war prompted a variety of responses from Maori communities in New Zealand. Northern communities in Waikato and Taupo were quick to offer their services to the dominion government but, reflecting their history of confrontation with the Crown, made clear that their contributions would be for the purposes of home defence. Erueti to Poko wrote to Prime Minister William Massey, on behalf of his hapu

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, 212-213.
\item \textsuperscript{117} See, for example, Ranginui Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End}, (Auckland: Hamondsworth, 1990), 173; See also Angela Ballara, \textit{Iwi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from c.1769 to 1945}, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998), 102–3; Raeburn Lange, \textit{May the People Live: A History of Maori Health Development 1900–1920}, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999) 92-98, 156, 166.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Alison Fletcher, “Recruitment and Service of Māori Soldiers in World War One.” \textit{Itinerario} 38, no. 03 (December 2014): 59–78.
\end{itemize}
(subtribe or clan) in Oranui, requesting thirty-four rifles to train and equip the men of his hapu in case the war came to New Zealand’s shores.119 Nau Kawiti, of Whangarei, likewise wrote to Massey offering a company of Maori to defend the nearby wireless station.120 Ihaia Pare Hare of Matangirau sent a simple telegram to Defence Minister James Allen offering the “military service” of his community “when & where required for home defence.”121

Kupapa iwi were more forthcoming with offers for overseas service and built on their history of cooperation with New Zealand forces. The Defence Act of 1909 imposed compulsory training for Pakeha, but Maori were exempt from obligatory military service. Maori were by no means excluded from the defence forces, however, and many enlisted voluntarily. The Wairarapa Mounted Rifles, formed in 1899, provide a notable example of an all-Maori formation in the New Zealand defence forces.122 At the outbreak of war, Captain Rimene of Masterton wrote to the Prime Minister asking to form a Maori Regiment “to help England in her hour of need.”123 Andrew Wiapo and Perauike Wi Karaka wrote to the Prime Minister from Otamatea, in Whanganui, offering to form a volunteer company “to defend our homes, or to be in readiness to serve the Empire.”124 Whether seeking to integrate with Pakeha forces or maintain rangatiratanga by mobilizing only for home defence, Maori communities, much like First Nations bands in Canada, worded their contributions to the war effort in terms that reflected a relationship between Maori and the Crown, as stated in the Treaty of Waitangi.

119 Translation of letter from Erueiti to Poko to W.F. Massey, 24 September 1914. Army Department (AAYS) Inwards letters and registered files (8638) Record Group AD1.Box 725. Record Number 10/155/47. Territorial Force - Home defence - Oranui Maoris offer. ANZ.
120 Telegram for Nau P. Kawiti to W.F. Massey, 15 August 1914. Ibid.
121 Telegram from Ihaia Pare Hare, Matangirau, Manga to J Allen, 12 September 1914. Ibid.
123 Telegram from Capt Rimene, Masterton, to WF Massey, 4 August 1914. AAYS 8638 AD1 725 / 10/155/47. Territorial Force - Home defence - Oranui Maoris offer. ANZ.
124 Letter from Andrew Wiapo and Perauike Wi Karaka to W.F. Massey, 12 August 1914. Ibid.
The dominion government was open to the idea of mobilizing a Maori contingent based on Maori and Pakeha’s shared status as British subjects. On September 2nd 1914, William Massey declared in Parliament that Maori shared “all the privileges and benefits of British citizenship” and “should not be denied the opportunity of fighting with the Empire.”125 Apirana Ngata, Member of Parliament for Eastern Maori, followed Massey’s speech by confirming the Maori desire “to stand shoulder to shoulder with their British fellow citizens.”126 James Allen confided to Major-General William Birdwood, who commanded the Australian New Zealand Army Corps at Gallipoli, that his support for the recruitment of Indigenous peoples was driven by his intention of “making them feel that they were all part of the Empire.”127 For all this rhetoric of equality, the underlying implication was that the status of Maori as British subjects would be affirmed by their participation in the imperial war effort.

The dominion’s offer of a Maori contingent for overseas service was formally accepted by the Colonial Office in September 1914, but the contingent’s recruitment and deployment was without precedent. James Allen and Major-General Alexander Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand Forces, agreed that the recruitment and organization of the Maori contingent should be left in the hands of Maori parliamentarians so that Allen and Godley would not be “mixed up in their tribal jealousies.”128 The five Maori Members of Parliament, Carroll, Ngata, Buck, Pomare and Taare Paarata, formed the Maori Contingent Committee, though Buck was unseated as Member of Parliament for Northern Maori by Taurekareka Henare in the election of December 1914. Buck nevertheless maintained his involvement in the Maori Contingent

126 Ibid.
128 Memo from Godley to Allen, 18 September 1914. AAYS 8638 AD1 707 /9/32/1. Expeditionary Force - Maori Contingents N.Z.E.F. ANZ. See also ; Winegard, *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions*, 81; Fletcher 63.
by taking a commission as their Medical Officer. The committee was chaired by Pomare and exercised extensive powers over the organization of the contingent after Godley advised Allen that recruiting as well as the selection of officers should be left entirely to the committee in order to produce a scheme that was “satisfactory to the Maori.”

In their mission to achieve Maori recognition from Pakeha society, the Maori Contingent Committee balanced its desire to produce a visible and cohesive Maori effort against the heterogeneity of Maori communities in New Zealand. To raise a contingent of five hundred volunteers, the committee set proportional quotas of volunteers from each Maori constituency to ensure the contingent represented all iwi. The Eastern and Western Maori were each expected to raise 180 men, the Northern Maori would contribute one hundred men, and the less-populous South Island Maori would contribute forty men.

The assembly of the contingent in October 1914 at Avondale Racecourse, near Auckland, revealed the difficulties of combining these differently-sized contingents from disparate iwi into a single unit, particularly because the original quotas were not reflected in the final assembly of the contingent. Ngata reported the difficulties to Allen. The contingent’s chaplain noticed that the division of iwi and hapu among different companies “caused some bitterness of heart.” Reverend H. Wepika was asked by his elders to look after the other men from his community while in camp and pointed out the difficulty of keeping this promise after the volunteers from his iwi were dispersed among different companies. Some men wrote home to complain about the division of iwi or

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129 Memo from Godley to Allen, 21 September 1914. Ibid. See also; Winegard, *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions*, 81; Fletcher, “Recruitment and Service of Māori Soldiers in World War One,” 63.


131 Ngata stated that 224 Eastern Maori reported to Avondale, rather than the original quota of 180. Letter from Ngata to Allen, 28 October 1914. AAYS 8638 AD1 707 /9/32/1. Expeditionary Force - Maori Contingents N.Z.E.F. ANZ.

132 Ibid.
hapu among different companies, while others threatened to leave the contingent if they were kept in a company that did not reflect their communal identity. 133

The members of the committee were torn about how to address the division of iwi and hapu in the Maori Contingent. Paarata felt that the contingent should deliberately mix communities to create a cohesive unit, while Carroll, Hiroa, and Ngata believed in preserving communal identities as much as possible. The committee’s reliance on communal recruiting necessitated a promise that communities would stay together in the contingent, while the appointment of local leaders to positions of prominence among their own batches of volunteers also encouraged communal recruiting and added to the committee’s decision to respect tribal lines when dividing the men. 134 Ngata prevailed in arguing the benefits of keeping men from the same iwi and hapu together in companies and platoons. The inclusion of South Island Maori, however, complicated the matter because their relatively small contingent made the mixing of iwi and hapu inevitable. The large contingents from the East, West, and North were divided into platoons that roughly matched tribal lines, but South Island Maori were dispersed among these to fill the ranks as necessary. 135

The mobilization of a heterogeneous culture into a homogenous military contingent raised further tensions after the Maori Contingent suffered its first casualties. After some time training in Egypt and doing garrison duty in Malta, the Maori Contingent reinforced the New Zealand battalions at Gallipoli in preparation for the offensives of August 1915. This combat role pleased the members of the Maori Contingent Committee because it provided a more important military contribution than garrison duty. The contingent, however, sustained more losses at Gallipoli than the Maori Contingent Committee had recruits to replace. The reorganization of the Maori Contingent into a half-Maori, half-Pakeha New Zealand Pioneer Battalion in early 1916

133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
mitigated the demand for replacements, but the loss of a distinctly Maori contingent in the NZEF raised the stakes for the members of the Maori Contingent Committee who redoubled their efforts to fill the entirety of the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion with Maori recruits. By 1917, enough Maori replacements had reached France to displace the Pakeha half of the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion. The Maori Contingent Committee had, once again, a distinct Maori unit in action, but attrition continued to put pressure on the recruiting effort.

The paradox between communal recruiting and the projection of a cohesive Maori effort persisted. Hoping to give a good send-off, J.H. Mitchell, of the Ngati Kahungunu recruiting committee in Wairoa, asked Allen to keep his volunteers in Wairoa a little longer. Writing at the end of August 1916, Mitchell believed that sending handfuls of volunteers to the Maori camp, which had relocated to Narrow Neck, did nothing to stimulate recruiting and requested to hold all recruits until the end of the shearing season in January 1917 so that his iwi could send a full draft of sixty to a hundred men.136 Mitchell hoped that sending one “great flood of strong fighting men” rather than “dribbling drops” of monthly reinforcements would provide a better show of his iwi’s achievements and invigorate the local recruiting effort.137 Pomare supported Mitchell’s request, but Allen, keenly aware of the need to keep a steady stream of reinforcements, politely beseeched Mitchell to send recruits forward monthly and forgo the celebration of communal achievement.138

The continuing enlistment of Maori into Pakeha units of the NZEF added another source of aggravation for the Maori Contingent Committee and forced the question of Maori identity onto recruits of the NZEF. Faced with this “disheartening” situation, Pomare requested the transfer of all Maori and Maori of mixed-race serving in the NZEF

137 Ibid.
138 From C.M. Gibbon to M. Pomare, 30 August 1916; From J. Allen to J.H. Mitchell, 4 September 1916. Ibid.
to the Pioneer Battalion or, if still in New Zealand, to a Maori reinforcement draft. Samuel Ngaru Hodge, who was training with the 5th Reinforcements when the Maori Contingent was raised, petitioned his commanding officer for a transfer on account of “the natural desire to be with my own race.” Twenty-nine other soldiers training in New Zealand in November 1915 were identified as Maori and presented with the opportunity to transfer to Avondale, but twenty-five decided to stay with their current unit. In 1917, thirty-two Maori soldiers were offered the opportunity to transfer to the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, but only eight elected to transfer. The process of self-identification was most difficult for Maori of mixed race, who could identify themselves as either Pakeha or Maori. Two brothers, unable to speak any Maori dialect and identifying themselves as “quarter-caste,” refused to serve with the Maori contingent and were sent to Trentham to train with a Pakeha reinforcement draft. Much like French-Canadian volunteers mobilized outside of the Province of Quebec, the request to transfer Maori recruits to the Maori Pioneer Battalion forced individual recruits to choose whether to belong to a unit defined by racial or ethnic composition, or to enlist with a unit that reflected the community in which they lived. Maori identity was not constructed in terms of blood quantum as in Australia. Buck and Pomare, for example, both had one British parent but self-identified as Maori. The question of serving with the Maori contingent became a litmus test for self-identifying as Maori, particularly in the absence of legislation or a colonial bureaucracy to impose and regulate categories of race and indigeneity in New Zealand.

139 Memo from M. Pomare to C.M. Gibbon, 15 July 1916. Ibid.
140 From S. Ngaru Hodge to OC A Coy 5th, 31 May 1915. AAYS 8638 AD1 719 / 9/276 1. Expeditionary Force – Maori contingent active service – 1915. ANZ.
141 Fletcher, “Recruitment and Service of Māori Soldiers,” 68.
142 Telegram from CGS to M. Pomare, 5 April 1915; Telegram from CGS to M. Pomare, 7 April 1915. AAYS 8638 AD1 828 / 29/108. Establishments and Recruitment - Recruiting for NZEF - (Maori). ANZ.
143 See Chapter 3.
Another factor unique to New Zealand was the dominion’s administration over Pacific Islanders. Along with New Zealand’s colony of Niue, the dominion administered German Samoa after New Zealand forces occupied the colony in 1914. The British colony of Fiji mobilized a contingent of its white settlers to reinforce the British army, while smaller, subsequent drafts of white Fijian joined the NZEF. The three Pacific islands, as well as Tonga, looked to New Zealand as a staging ground to contribute to the war in Europe. While European residents who were British subjects were integrated into the NZEF without question, the intrusion of Pacific Islanders into the NZEF threatened to dilute the impact of the Maori contingent as a visible and unique Maori contribution to the war effort. Franchesca Walker argues that ideas of Maori martial prowess motivated both Maori and Pakeha proponents of the Maori contingent and framed much of the public discourse surrounding the exploits of the contingent overseas.\textsuperscript{144} Theories of the Aryan Maori also constructed Maori as a racial anomaly in the South Pacific, which legitimized their claim to equal status in New Zealand. As Toon Van Meijl demonstrates, the historical relationship between Maori and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand is fraught with tension.\textsuperscript{145} The reluctance among Maori to include other Pacific Islanders in the Maori contingent reflected contemporary narratives such as the “Aryan Maori” which offered a rationale for racial equality in New Zealand, but this idealized racialization of Maori as white also distinguished New Zealand from other settler colonies by promoting an illusion of racial harmony and effacing the violence of the Maori Wars, as well as its legacy.\textsuperscript{146} These narratives relied on the idea that Maori were exceptional among other Pacific Islanders.


Suggestions by various colonial and dominion administrators to integrate Pacific Islanders into the Maori contingent were received with suspicion. The Governor of Fiji, Sir Ernest Bickham Sweet-Escott, inquired whether mixed-race Fijians might enlist with the Maori contingent, but the response was unequivocally negative. The commandant at Narrow Neck warned Allen that “Maori resent mixing with these men.”\(^{147}\) Pomare agreed that he did “not believe it is a wise policy to include Fijians in our Maori Contingent.”\(^{148}\) A contingent of Samoans and Tongans arrived at Narrow Neck to train with the Maori reinforcement drafts, but a report observed that “Island natives do not mix well with the Maoris who are inclined to resent their presence.”\(^{149}\) These prejudices cut both ways. German administrators of Western Samoa, in accordance with German citizenship laws conferring citizenship by virtue of birth, granted German citizenship to children of mixed-ancestry and cultivated a distinction between Samoans and Samoans of mixed-ancestry by providing the latter with a European education.\(^{150}\) After New Zealand’s occupation of the German colony, a small draft of Samoans of mixed-ancestry sailed to New Zealand to enlist with the NZEF but the volunteers were dismayed to hear they were being sent to Narrow Neck to train alongside Maori. Reflecting the higher status conferred on account of their European citizenship, S.H. Meredith, a prominent merchant on the island, explained to New Zealand’s appointed administrator that the Samoans volunteered on the understanding that they “would never be encamped together with Native soldiers of the different Islands.”\(^{151}\)

\(^{147}\) Telegram from “Defence in Auckland” to J. Allen, 16 August 1916. AAYS 8638 AD1/829 29/153. Establishments and Recruitment - Fijian Contingent NZEF. ANZ.

\(^{148}\) Minute by M. Pomare, 14 December 1916 on Letter from J. Allen to Ernest Bickham Sweet-Escott, 19 August 1916. Ibid.

\(^{149}\) Training Report on the Native Reinforcement leaving with the 12th Reinforcements. 28 April 1916. Ibid.


\(^{151}\) From S.H. Meredith to R. Logan 17 January 1916. AAYS 8638 AD1 828 / 29/120. Establishments and Recruitment - Enlistment - Samoan natives and half-castes NZEF. ANZ.
The recruitment of Maori and Pacific Islanders by New Zealand authorities exacerbated the cultural friction between the two groups of Indigenous peoples. Pacific Islanders were mobilized at Narrow Neck, partly because it was the northernmost training camp, which provided an accommodating climate for Pacific Islanders, and partly because of lingering insistence that Indigenous peoples should be quartered separately in order to quarantine them as carriers of typhoid and other contagions. 152 Three contingents of Rarotongans and one contingent of Nieue Islanders were also raised at Narrow Neck. Owing to perceptions of their weaker constitution in relation to Maori and the high incidence of pneumonia among Nieue Islanders who were sent to Europe, Pacific Islanders were dispatched to work as boatmen and labourers unloading Allied supplies in Egypt, rather than serve alongside the NZEF in Europe or the New Zealand Mounted Brigade in Palestine. 153 The members of the Maori Contingent Committee played up the myth of the Aryan Maori to distinguish themselves as more robust soldiers, superior to other Pacific Islanders who, as a result, were mobilized into their own smaller separate contingents. The division between Maori and Pacific Islanders in their military mobilization and the preferential treatment received by Maori effectively secured the preeminence of Maori among New Zealand’s Indigenous peoples.

Most significantly, military mobilization aggravated political divisions between Maori unitary movements. Communities from such regions as ‘King Country’ and Waikato demonstrated their opposition to the Maori Contingent by discouraging enlistments. The Kingitanga movement took a deeply pacifist stance after King Tāwhiao ended his resistance to the Crown in 1881 with the proclamation that “The killing of men must stop ... I shall bury my patu in the earth and it shall not rise again ... Waikato, lie

152 Telegram to Defence Auckland, 6 January 1916. AAYS 8638 AD1 707 /9/32/11. Expeditionary Force - Maoris Relieving Section of Troops in Samoa. ANZ. Five Maori who volunteered with the first draft were diagnosed with typhoid, one of whom never recovered. Fletcher, “Recruitment and Service of Māori Soldiers,” 63.

153 Letter from Col Gibbon to Dist HQ Auckland, 12 March 1918. AAYS 8638 AD1 717 /9/219/1. Expeditionary Force - Cook Islanders for overseas. ANZ.
down. Do not allow blood to flow from this time on." For Maori communities that identified with the Kingatanga movement, this decree was interpreted as a lasting command never to take up arms. The memory of Tāwhiao’s proclamation, combined with deep-seated resentment for land confiscations after the Maori Wars, discouraged enlistments in regions traditionally aligned against the Crown.

Hoori Tane took up the task of recruiting for the Maori Contingent in Oromahoe, in Northland, but wrote to Pomare in dismay describing the lack of enthusiasm among the young Maori men in his community. Tane explained that the elders of the community took no active role in dissuading enlistments; indeed a number of young men from the community had answered the initial call for volunteers, but no more volunteers were forthcoming from Oromahoe. The komiti for Ngāti Maniapoto, in Waikato, made a stronger stand against Maori enlistment by passing a resolution, signed by sixty-two members of the iwi, that “this meeting sees no way to accept any native to serve or join the reinforcement.” Corporal Jury Martin Hopa was one of the few Waikato Maori who volunteered for the contingent, but soon changed his mind and deserted. Hopa decided to desert at the urging of his parents but also received encouragement from King Te Rata Mahuta, who arranged for Hopa’s escape and welcomed him to his Pa (fortified village). Te Rata made no secret of Hopa’s presence in the Pa and warned Hopa that he would not resist any police or military authority sent to arrest him. Hopa was duly arrested and court-martialed. Rua Kenana Hepetipa, a self-proclaimed Christian prophet who founded a ‘New Jerusalem’ at Maungapohatu, actively discouraged Maori enlistments and made brash statements conveying his sympathy for the German Kaiser, based on their shared enmity towards the British Crown. A sizeable party was dispatched


155 Translation of letter from Hoori Tane to Pomare, 5 July 1915. AAYS 8638 AD1 719 / 9/276 2. Expeditionary Force - Maori contingent active service 1915. ANZ.

156 From Te Moerua Natauahira, Te Kuiti, to Allen, 14 June 1915. Ibid.

157 Letter from J. Hume to J. Allen, 7 October 1915; Statement of Corporal J. Hopa, 28 September 1915. Ibid.
to arrest Rua for sedition, though he was only found guilty of resisting arrest.\textsuperscript{158} The organization and recruitment of the Maori Contingent drove a wedge into Maori politics and deepened the rift between the Young Maori and other Maori unity movements.

The rising demands for reinforcements necessary to maintain an all-Maori pioneer battalion came to a head in 1917, when Pomare advocated for the extension of conscription to Maori in New Zealand. New Zealand implemented conscription in 1916 with the passage of the \textit{Military Service Act}, which exempted Maori from the draft. When the bill was debated, Pomare and Ngata argued against Maori exemption on the basis of equality of sacrifice, but Pakeha Members of Parliament were convinced it was immoral to conscript the youth of a dying race.\textsuperscript{159} Even before the implementation of conscription, Pakeha criticized Maori publicly for not sharing in the nation’s sacrifice. Nested among obituaries for New Zealand soldiers killed in action, a cartoon in the \textit{New Zealand Observer} lampooned a Maori mourning the “catastrophe” of two Maori deaths (see fig. 3). Henry J.H. Okey, Member of Parliament for New Plymouth whose son was killed in action in August 1915, wrote to Allen complaining about “a large number of young natives” whose “idling about while so many of our boys are away is causing a good deal of comment,” and asked whether “something cannot be done to make use of these men.”\textsuperscript{160} Pakeha comments on Maori shirkers struck a sensitive nerve for Ngata and Pomare, who hoped to dispel such stigma through Maori participation in the war effort.

\textsuperscript{159} Baker, \textit{King and Country Call}, 217.
\textsuperscript{160} Letter from H.J.H. Okey to J. Allen, 19 January 1918. AAYS 8638 AD1 828 / 29/108. Establishments and Recruitment - Recruiting for NZEF - (Maori). ANZ.
So long as the Maori Contingent maintained its strength by voluntary means, kupapa iwi provided a disproportionate number of recruits. Pomare informed Allen of the growing resentment among iwi that had contributed recruits, as well as their rising animosity towards those iwi which had not. When Maori from the North travelled southward to take up work left untended by Maori who had left to fight overseas, the outrage reached new heights. Pomare succeeded in convincing Allen to extend conscription to Maori but, in order to maintain good relations with iwi that had supported Maori recruiting, conscription was only imposed on those iwi of Waikato that discouraged Maori enlistment. Without the cooperation of local Maori authorities, the

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Department of Defence experienced considerable difficulty assembling a complete roll of 552 eligible Maori from Waikato iwi. Maori resistance to compulsion was vocal, with many draftees openly declaring their sympathy with the Germans. Police arrested one hundred draftees for not reporting for duty, leaving a further one hundred arrest warrants outstanding; 139 Maori draftees were never even located. Roughly one hundred Maori conscripts arrived at Narrow Neck, but the war ended before any of them completed basic training.\(^{162}\) Divisive and ultimately unnecessary, the extension of conscription to Maori revealed the determination of the Young Maori to sustain an all-Maori battalion on behalf of the New Zealand war effort.

Relative to Indigenous communities in the other dominions, Maori exercised considerable autonomy within their own lands, but were nevertheless romanticized as a dying race and pressured to assimilate into Pakeha society as their only hope of survival. The Kingatanga Movement and the Young Maori Party represented two opposing approaches to Maori-Pakeha relations, one championing traditional Maori authority the other encouraging a form of limited assimilation as a means of earning autonomy. The Young Maori used their prestige among Pakeha to disprove the projected eradication of Maori from disease and neglect by improving public health in Maori communities while also working to prove that Maori were the racial and cultural equals of Pakeha. The voluntary mobilization of Maori during the First World War under the direction of a committee of Young Maori parliamentarians certainly provided Maori with the opportunity to share in the nation’s wartime sacrifice. From the outset, the rhetoric advocating Maori participation in the New Zealand war effort rested on the premise that Maori could not achieve equal status as British subjects without contributing to the imperial war effort. While this argument revealed persistent inequality between Maori and Pakeha, it also ignored that Maori had already fought for and won the rights of British subjects under Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi.

\(^{162}\) Baker, *King and Country Call*, 220.
While the Maori Contingent Committee walked a careful line in creating a unit with a homogenous Maori identity from a heterogeneous culture, the mobilization of the Maori contingent nevertheless essentialized Maori in the eyes of Pakeha. The recruitment of the Maori Contingent also necessitated a deeper distinction between Maori and Pacific Islanders who also fell under the authority of the dominion. While Nieuwe Islanders were mobilized as part of the original Maori Contingent, these and other Pacific Islanders were portrayed as unsatisfactory by highlighting perceptions of their comparatively weaker constitution and the supposed animosity between Indigenous peoples of different ethnographies. The Maori contingent was also subjected to its own racial stigmas. The reorganization of the contingent into a pioneer battalion suited theories that classified Indigenous peoples as unfit for modern warfare, while the comparatively light losses suffered as a result were derided by some in Pakeha society. The Maori training camp at Narrow Neck was segregated from the rest of the NZEF camps in Trentham and Featherston for fears of contagion caused by poor hygiene. Most significantly, the voluntary mobilization of Maori deepened the division between different Maori political movements and between the iwi affiliated with each movement. Disparities in enlistments raised resentment among kupapa iwi that believed Waikato Maori should be made to share in the sacrifice, while the selective extension of conscription to Maori in Waikato was met with widespread resistance. The recruiting effort that sustained the Maori contingent certainly demonstrated Maori commitment to the national war effort, but the zeal that drove the Young Maori to prove Maori suitability for self-government left many unresolved issues in Maori-Pakeha relations and strained relations between New Zealand’s Indigenous peoples.

New Zealand provides a unique and challenging study for settler-Indigenous relations because of the relative autonomy exercised by Maori. For the Young Maori, the First World War presented an opportunity to advance the cause of Maori autonomy by demonstrating their active participation in Pakeha society and imperial defence. The paradox of achieving Maori autonomy through the selective adoption of Pakeha culture was not lost on the Young Maori. Ngata is famously quoted describing this approach as keeping “One foot on the Pakeha brake, the other on the Maori accelerator,” and
pondering ominously “how will the car stand it?” 163 Whatever the intentions and whatever the gains, the motivation that drove the Young Maori to make such an energetic effort, even to the extent of conscripting their own people, was the desire to prove Maori were equal to Pakeha and fit to take on the responsibility of their own self-government. The Maori Contingent certainly achieved recognition for Maori in New Zealand, but these gains were measured with a Pakeha yardstick.

5.4 Conclusion

The enlistment and mobilization of Indigenous peoples in the dominions shared some similarities with the experience of racialized diasporans. The wording of Australia’s Defence Act excluded Aboriginals with the provision that recruits must be of “sufficiently European descent.” Aboriginals needed to pass as “sufficiently European,” as did Asian and South Asian volunteers, before enlisting in the AIF. First Nations communities in Canada attempted to mobilize their members into distinct battalions of the CEF and, like attempts to form Japanese-Canadian and African-Canadian battalions, these proposals were rejected and First Nations soldiers were restricted to enlist in Anglophone units. The Maori Contingent Committee in New Zealand successfully formed a distinctly Maori battalion but, like French Canadians outside of the Province of Quebec, Maori who wished to serve overseas were forced to choose between serving in a Pakeha battalion that reflected the geographic community in which they lived or joining the Maori contingent to project a homogenized Maori identity. Race was certainly constructed as a barrier that limited and segregated the mobilization of Indigenous peoples, as it was for Asian, South Asian, and African diasporas.

Despite these similarities, the recruitment of Indigenous peoples reveals that the barriers placed to obstruct the mobilization of racialized minorities were partially lifted for Indigenous soldiers. White settler Australians advocating in favour of Aboriginals enlistments combined with the shortage of volunteers in 1917 pushed the Ministry of Defence to lower the AIF colour bar and allow Aboriginals of mixed-race to enlist, while

163 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 201.
policies excluding Asian and South Asian volunteers remained in place. Recruiters in rural Canadian communities worked to entice First Nations enlistments, even in battalions that explicitly refused a platoon of African-Canadian recruits. While the Maori Contingent Committee balanced the heterogeneity of Maori Culture against the projection of a homogenous Maori identity, other racialized minorities in New Zealand, such as Asians or South Asians, remained excluded from the war effort or enlisted in such small numbers as to remain almost invisible. The disparities between the mobilization of racialized diasporans and Indigenous peoples in the dominions reveals that race and indigeneity were conceived as separate demographic categories.

Indigenous peoples’ participation in the dominion war efforts was accepted because of the assumption that service, particularly military service, could mould Indigenous peoples to conform to settler society. The Department of Indian Affairs actively encouraged First Nations communities in Canada to contribute to the war effort because patriotic contributions emphasized the values of charity and thrift, while overseas service would subject young First Nations men to the civilizing rigour of military discipline. The promise of military discipline also encouraged Protectors of Aborigines to support enlistments, but the acceptance of Aboriginal recruits was contingent on their blood quantum. In Australia, the transformative effect of military service was to be preceded by a genetic transformation. Before the outbreak of war, the Young Maori had accomplished much to demonstrate that Maori were conforming to Pakeha values. Fighting for the empire, however, offered the ultimate demonstration to substantiate Maori equality as British subjects. Indigenous contributions were included in the dominion war effort when the form of their contribution accelerated their assimilation into settler society.

The disparity in dominion policies toward the mobilization of Indigenous peoples and racialized diaspora reflected the underlying assumptions that Indigenous peoples could be assimilated into settler society while racialized immigrants and diaspora were to be excluded and marginalized. Racially-restrictive entry policies could curtail the arrival of racialized migrants from Asia, Africa, or the Caribbean, while their marginalization in settler society perpetuated their exploitation as underpaid labour. This marginalization
necessitated the construction of these racialized minorities into rigid categories that could maintain policies of exclusion. Indigenous populations, however, could not be kept from the shores of the dominions. Settlement was facilitated by the decimation of Indigenous peoples through warfare, disease, and malnutrition, but by 1914 these violent means were no longer acceptable methods for the elimination of Indigeneity in the dominions. Elimination turned to effacement through assimilation, and assimilation was only possible if indigeneity was constructed as a malleable category. The policies of mobilization excluded the participation of racialized diasporas but included and encouraged the participation of Indigenous peoples, because of the accepted assumption that indigeneity was malleable and that military service was a mechanism through which Indigenous peoples could be moulded to conform to the norms of settler society until Indigenous peoples “become one with his neighbours in his speech, life and habits.” Assimilation was not merely inclusion, but part of the continuing logic of elimination.

Indigenous participation in the war effort was championed by white settlers in order to accelerate assimilation, but the reliance on their self-mobilization provided Indigenous peoples with the opportunity to subvert these designs. In Canada, mobilizing for the war effort gave First Nations bands an opportunity to frame their contributions in terms that reminded the dominion government of their status as allies of the Crown, or of their sovereignty as signatories of a treaty held with the Crown. Wartime service was used by the Young Maori as a means of celebrating a Maori military tradition while also proving to Pakeha that they were deserving of autonomy and equal status as British subjects. The Maori Contingent Committee wielded enough influence to achieve this recognition by ensuring Maori were kept in a cohesive unit, distinct from Pakeha and Pacific Islanders. The opportunity to make a visible contribution to the war effort provided a strong incentive for First Nations men and Maori to enlist voluntarily. Australian Aboriginals were given relatively little opportunity to orchestrate a collective contribution to the war effort, as Aboriginal recruits were screened individually by medical officers. Those who could pass the colour bar nevertheless received a reprieve from the patronizing bureaucracy of the Protection Boards as it was replaced with the authoritarian bureaucracy of the AIF. The AIF, however, afforded Aboriginal soldiers with some freedom to move beyond the confines of the Protection Boards and receive a
wage equal with settler soldiers. Equal pay and the opportunity to travel abroad attracted hundreds of Aboriginals to enlist, but without the opportunity or the incentive of offering a visible collective contribution. Aboriginal communities could not – and therefore did not – mobilize separate initiatives to support the war effort. Extending Indigenous peoples the opportunity to organize themselves into contingents for the war effort correlated with a greater collective contribution. The ability to raise their own contingent encouraged five percent of all Maori to serve overseas, while the opportunity to mobilize companies encouraged four percent of First Nations’ total population to enlist. In Australia, where Aboriginal enlistments were negotiated individually, only one percent of Aboriginals served overseas in the AIF.164

The opportunity to express an indigenous identity through military service correlated with higher enlistments, but the mobilization of Indigenous peoples for the war effort was carefully managed to ensure that this participation did not reach a scale that allowed Indigenous communities to leverage their contributions for greater autonomy from the settler state. By working within these parameters, the inclusion of Indigenous peoples into the imperial war effort extended dominion policies of assimilation. The projection of Indigenous identities through military service confirmed that the process of assimilation was not complete and that Indigenous soldiers had not completed their assimilation and disappeared into settler society. On their return to their homes on reserves or missions, Aboriginal, First Nations peoples, and Maori veterans retained enough of their Indigenous identities to justify the continuation of patronizing policies that assumed control of their property and finances and denied them the benefits afforded to other veterans.165

164 Winegard, Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions, 234.

Conclusion

Communal identities were a significant force in motivating and mediating voluntary participation in the dominion war efforts. For the duration of the war, voluntary contributions in the dominions produced funding, equipment, morale, and manpower to contribute to the overall success of the imperial and Allied war efforts. Yet the records generated by these patriotic donations reveal that in most cases, donors were motivated by their emotional attachment to a much smaller, limited community. Whether it was Welsh women in Calgary providing comforts to Welsh soldiers in the British Army, Croatians in New Zealand splitting their profits of their fundraising campaign between the New Zealand Patriotic fund and Serbian Relief, or Scottish cultural associations in Victoria and New South Wales trying to raise their own battalion of the AIF, these contributions to the wider war effort were framed in terms that solidified the bonds within a specific, limited community. Because these donations contributed to the wider war effort, these acts of voluntary work connected the local with the national and imperial. Through their collective contribution, a community demonstrated that it was an active, but distinct, component of wider imagined communities such as the nation or the empire.

The ability to transcend scales and conjoin the local with the national, or any other combination of social or spatial categories, through patriotic work held the promise of power. In the small Saskatchewan town of Moosomin, Mrs McCrae, an eighty-year-old member of the IODE, knitted over one hundred pairs of socks as part of her local chapter’s knitting circle.\(^1\) Unable to fight, Mrs McCrae was empowered to support her male relatives and others soldiers from her local community who were at the front by joining in the collective effort of knitting socks, an act that also made a small contribution to Britain’s imperial might in this moment of need. The empowering quality of voluntary contributions also appealed to communities that hoped to overcome the social barriers that confined them to the margins of society by likewise conjoining their collective

\(^1\) Annual meeting, 24 April 1918. GR 427. IODE fonds. IV Provincial Chapter. 8. Minutes. a) 1914-1925. SAB.
efforts with those of the wider nation. The Japanese-Canadian community in Vancouver, Chinese cabinet makers in Melbourne, and the Young Maori in New Zealand all provided their own distinct contributions to the dominion war efforts to gain recognition for communities’ participation in national mobilization.

Just as communal identities are constructed as limited, voluntary mobilization was intended to be of limited scope. A motorcycle shop owner hoped to donate a motorcycle to the Wanganui Company, rather than the Wellington Regiment. Miss E.R. Schramm wished to raise funds for soldiers from Little Swamp, rather than for the South Australian Soldiers Fund. The Mayor of Toronto was irritated when the cookies sent overseas by the city were received by a soldier in the British Army rather than soldiers from Toronto. Ironically, the more a community could define itself as limited and unique through its voluntary efforts, the more enthusiastically it mobilized itself for the war overseas. The desire to maintain limited efforts and to direct contributions to specific communities fractured the war effort into separate, competing initiatives that created endless complications for the defence authorities charged with turning these disparate donations into a cohesive, responsive, and efficient war effort.

The crux of regulating the chaos of the voluntary war effort was balancing the benefits of separate self-motivated initiatives with the demands of armies at the front. Compulsion presented an alternative and conscription was enacted in New Zealand and Canada to regulate the fits, bursts, and overall decline of voluntary enlistments, but the remainder of the war effort remained largely voluntary. Not all of the demands attached to the many competing voluntary efforts, however, could be fulfilled. Often simple pragmatism or military policy was sufficient to explain why the donation of a motor vehicle was not sufficient to secure Victor Florance a commission in the AIF, or why the wood-burning stoves offered by the Home Workers of Quebec City would not make a suitable donation because soldiers would not be able to carry the stoves in and out of the trenches. Defence authorities needed to be selective in their acceptance of private donations.
As in other contexts, wartime mobilization prompted state-building. Dominion governments established efficiency boards to take stock of their resources, but the continued reliance on voluntary work complicated the regulation of the war effort. The Canadian Patriotic Fund and the New Zealand Patriotic Federation both lacked the power to coordinate the patchwork of patriotic societies into a contiguous, national fund to care for soldiers and their families. Australian states such as South Australia and Queensland, where State War Councils were more aggressive in their attempts to centralize and collectivize the voluntary war effort, encountered resistance from local volunteers who threatened to withhold their contributions and successfully negotiated concessions to coordinate local efforts according to volunteers’ own designs. The trade-off was clear: a centrally-regulated war effort promoted efficiency and equitable distribution of care and benefits to soldiers and their family, but a decentralized voluntary system provided more motivation and encouraged more generous contributions as volunteers determined for themselves how to coordinate their efforts and who would benefit from their work.

In Canada, decentralization was encouraged because it produced greater contributions to the national, imperial, and Allied war effort. The IODE collected four million dollars by 1918, the Red Cross nine million dollars, and the CFP over thirty-eight million dollars.² The various branches of the Red Cross, the IOE, and the CPF quarrelled and competed as they made their collections, and there were whole swaths of rural Ontario and Quebec where the CPF afforded little assistance to families because urban organizers were uninterested in extending their efforts into the countryside, but the sums raised under this decentralized system were nevertheless substantial. Scottish, Irish, even Welsh communities in Canada continued to cherish their ties to the Old World by sending comforts to Scottish, Irish, and Welsh, rather than Canadian soldiers. The Department of Militia allowed and even encouraged the formation of Scottish, Irish, even Scandinavian battalions, knowing these efforts would draw in more recruits. Officers and

men of the CEF recruited and trained contingents of Poles, Jews, Montenegrins, and Serbians to fight for their own imagined homelands, rather than their host nation. These contingents encouraged communities in Canada to celebrate their identity as émigrés, rather than as residents of Canada. Even migrants who enlisted in the CEF requested transfers to fight in these national contingents, while the OMFC encouraged the transfer of migrants to spare the Canadian government the cost of repatriation and resettlement. These measures placed tens of thousands of additional soldiers into the Allied armies, but the causes for which they mobilized were disparate.

More than a question of centralization or decentralization, the regulation of voluntary work required donors and volunteers to adhere to communal identities rather than project their own. Insisting that Miss Shramm contribute to the SASF rather than collect only for the soldiers of Little Swamp subordinated a local identity to the larger imagined community of South Australia. Refusing offers from Scottish communities in Victoria and New South Wales to raise a Scottish battalion subordinated the expression of Old World identities to the effort to forge a new national identity through an Australian army, composed of battalions identified by Australian place-names. The same process was evident in New Zealand as Scottish communities in Auckland and Otago were likewise turned down. Local identities nevertheless persisted. When a national designation was given to a unit such as the battalions of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, patriotic societies preferred to support soldiers in their own local units.

Government authorities in the Pacific dominions also worked to disrupt the ties beyond the nation. Migrants wishing to fight for other armies met with little success in Australia. Soldiers who requested transfers to the Russian Army, for example, were discharged and repatriated to Australia. The Ministry of Defence assisted in the dispatch of a contingent to reinforce the Serbian Army, but the recruitment process was tightly controlled by defence authorities. In New Zealand, the attempt to raise a Serbian contingent was wholly subordinated to the national war effort as Croatians opted for compulsory labour over military service. Disrupting these disparate efforts may have detracted from the overall contributions to the imperial war effort, but the net gain was the growth of a more robust regulatory state. Though neither of the Pacific dominions
succeeded in displacing local or transnational identities, these contexts displayed more of a centralizing tendency than was evident in Canada. Regulating the voluntary war effort did not just contribute to state-building; this coordination of the Australian and New Zealand home front attempted to weld competing efforts and identities together to adhere to the needs of a single imagined community: the nation.

The extent to which wartime mobilization complemented the evolution of state bureaucracy in the dominions is debatable, but the resounding impact of these regulations most certainly contributed to the process of settler colonialism in the dominions. The selective mobilization of dominion society and the emphasis on communal mobilization confirmed British settler society’s dominance over the colony, while also loosening ties to the imperial metropole. Recognizing the dominions as settler colonies, which reflected the process of settler colonialism, provides a new perspective on the impact of the First World War on imperial relations. Traditionally, the historiography of the British Empire has emphasized that Canada was first to assert national control over its expeditionary forces, while Robert Borden played a leading role in tabling Resolution IX at the Imperial War Cabinet and raising Canada’s status as signatories to the Treaty of Versailles. In terms of the dominions’ relationship to Britain, Canada stands as the strongest advocate of its own autonomy and made the boldest assertions for a national policy, while Australian and New Zealand statesmen advocated for closer imperial integration to promote trade and collective security.3 Stuart Ward challenges the dichotomy between Canada’s push for autonomy and the Australasian attachment to empire by arguing that Australian participation in imperial trade and defence served national rather than imperial ends.4 Considering the dominion governments’ assertion of authority over their own territory, rather than their assertions of autonomy from Britain, reveals that Canada was

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more prepared to sacrifice its internal stability to contribute to the empire, while in most cases, Australia and New Zealand prioritized domestic matters over the needs of the imperial war effort. Considering the domestic affairs of the dominions alongside foreign – or imperial – affairs provides a new perspective from which to assess the impact of the First World War on the relationship between Britain and the dominions.

Comparisons of state- or nation-building in the dominions aside, the selective mobilization of the dominions during the First World War reveals a common pattern as British settler societies entrenched their dominance in all three dominions. This dominance of British settler societies in the dominions can be discussed in terms of social structures, cultural productions, ethnographies or theories of racial hierarchies. All of these tensions were reflected in the process of wartime mobilization, but the deliberations and debates among dominion and defence authorities who decided how marginalized communities were able to contribute to the war effort reveal a preoccupation with the production of settler spaces. The mobilization of British communities reflected the importance of space and place in defining settler communities, as donors and volunteers quarrelled over the geographical scale of their efforts and identified their contributions with place names. By grounding their communal identities in space and place, British settler communities reinforced their claim on the territory of the dominions.

The incorporation of space and place into the identity of settler communities naturalized Britishness as the normative culture of dominion society. Popular discourse was rife with the rhetoric of cultural ties to Britain and of aspiring Australian, Canadian, or New Zealand nations, yet these nationalities were rarely invoked when communities identified themselves through their patriotic contributions. When the members of British settler communities such as the St Kilda Patriotic Committee and Victorian Artists Society donated an ambulance, the plaque affixed to the ambulance did not state that the vehicle was donated by British or even Australian donors. Instead, the plaque emphasized the donors’ identity as artists and stressed their place of origin. Their Britishness was

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implied by their power to invoke the place names of St Kilda and Victoria. It seemed only natural for British settlers to identify themselves by the places on which they had settled.

As British settlers monopolized space as a component of identity, non-British communities in the dominions were left to identify themselves by other traits. Defence forces in Australia and New Zealand rarely deviated from the practice of identifying military units only by place-names. In Canada, battalions could take on cultural – rather than spatial – designations, and this practice revealed the power of place-names in imposing identities. The Scandinavian community raised two battalions in Winnipeg, but to identify these units as a Winnipeg battalion was unthinkable. Eleven battalions of the CEF incorporated the name Winnipeg into their title, but the Scandinavian units were christened the 197th (Vikings of Canada) Battalion and the 223rd (Canadian Scandinavian) Battalion. While there were certainly Scandinavians and other non-British volunteers who served in the eleven Winnipeg Battalions, those Scandinavians and non-British soldiers showed that they could belong to the city of Winnipeg by joining a Winnipeg battalion. But the city of Winnipeg did not belong to the Scandinavians, who could not take the name of Winnipeg when they raised their two battalions in that city. French-Canadian volunteers in Northern Ontario also struggled with the question of belonging, where local commanding officers and recruiting committees blocked the organization of a French-Canadian battalion in the region, in order to hold on to their francophone recruits. Franco-Ontarian volunteers could either serve in an Anglophone battalion raised


where they lived or enlist with a French-Canadian battalion in the Province of Quebec. The practice of assigning territorial designations to units of the CEF reflected the unspoken rules for who could claim a place as a defining aspect of their identity. Non-British diasporans could either choose to belong to an implicitly British place or uproot to enlist in a segregated battalion.

For other communities, the choice of belonging was not theirs to make. African and Japanese Canadians attempted to raise their own units, but these offers were rebuffed. Recruiters even barred individual recruits, as commanding officers in British Columbia turned away Japanese volunteers, and recruiters across Canada rejected African Canadians. In both case, race was constructed as a boundary that was reinforced by space. Japanese Canadians crossed into Alberta to enlist, while recruiters referred African-Canadian volunteers to a non-existent all-African battalion organized elsewhere. Battalion commanders in Ontario refused the addition of an all-African platoon, arguing flatly that African-Canadian soldiers did not belong in their community. The formation of the No. 2 Construction Battalion in Pictou, Nova Scotia, gave African Canadians a unit to enlist with, but the recruits were required to uproot from where they lived to join a battalion where they belonged. Recent migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were likewise denied the opportunity to choose to belong to a community in the dominions. Allied reservists were mobilized – forcibly, in the case of Italian reservists in Australia – to return to fight for their homelands. In New Zealand, defence authorities declined to assist in the repatriation of Italian reservists, who were maligned for sitting out the war while naturalized New Zealand residents faced the draft. Croatian migrants in New Zealand were likewise castigated for being ineligible to enlist. Public suspicion even prompted a Commission of Inquiry into allegations of Croatian subversion, and military-aged Croatian males eventually submitted to internment and compulsory labour. The selective exclusion of non-British communities from the war effort reinforced boundaries defined by race with the rhetoric that such communities did not belong, should therefore be mobilized elsewhere.

The patterns of selective voluntary mobilization reinforced ideas of belonging. The dominant British settler community embodied the normative communities in the
dominions. Northern European diasporans, such as French Canadians or Scandinavians, could choose to belong to implicitly British communities by joining in their communal efforts, or organize their own efforts. Southern and Eastern European, African, and Asian migrants and diasporans were seldom given the choice of belonging. These patterns of selective mobilization reflected constructed hierarchies of race, but were most often rationalized in terms of space. British communities defined themselves as normative by attaching their identity to space, thus claiming that a place belonged to them, while displacing non-British communities which did not belong. The relationship between space, place, and wartime mobilization reflected an important process of settler colonialism, in which the settler society naturalizes its ownership over the territory to legitimize the displacement of Indigenous peoples.

The striking contrast between the exclusion of racialized minorities, such as Southern and Eastern Europeans, Asians, and Africans, from the dominion war efforts and the deliberate efforts to include Indigenous peoples likewise highlights the continuity between wartime mobilization and process of settler colonialism. This differential exclusion reflected conceptions of space and belonging. The extraterritoriality of migrants and diasporans could easily be invoked to substantiate their exclusion from the war effort, but such logic was impossible to apply to Indigenous peoples. Yet in the same manner that Canadian settlers laid claim to the land, Canadian recruiters laid claim to First Nations land as their own recruiting territory and First Nations men as their own recruits. More important was the rhetoric of cultural transformation and social uplift that rationalized the enlistment of Indigenous men into the armed forces. Military discipline was equated with the rigours of the industrial or residential school as an implement of social reform, Indian Agents and others legitimized their role as intermediaries capable of turning First Nations men into effective soldiers, just as Chief Protectors used the war to extend their policies of fiscal control over military pay and benefits. Restrictions on Indigenous contributions likewise mirrored the settler state’s administration of Indigenous peoples. Aboriginal volunteers were only acceptable with sufficient blood quantum; First Nations could enlist into Anglophone battalions but not raise their own; while the mobilization of Maori was placed in the hands of Young Maori Parliamentarians who worked to integrate Maori into Pakeha society. The inclusion of
Indigenous volunteers into the dominion war efforts was encouraged because the process of wartime mobilization was believed to accelerate the ongoing process of assimilation. Military discipline reinforced with the violence of industrialized warfare was the ultimate extension of the residential or industrial school.

In the wider historiography of the First World War, the dominions’ reliance on selective voluntary patriotism defies the broader pattern of a “totalizing logic” evident in other belligerent nations. Yet the preference for volunteerism over compulsion and the tendency to be selective, rather than totalizing, in mobilizing resources for the war effort follows closely with the logic of settler colonialism. The overall coordination of the dominion war efforts was the responsibility of the settler state, but state authorities worked in concert with British settler society. Settler state and settler society often quarrelled over the coordination of voluntary patriotic work, but the two were sympathetic in their selective interventions that secured the pre-eminence of British settler society in the process of national mobilization. The mobilization of South Slavs in Australia was contained by dominion authorities, while British residents in New Zealand agitated successfully for the internment of Croatian migrants. Defence policy in Australia excluded Aboriginals from enlisting until 1917 but Chief Protectors, Station Managers, and members of the general public supported the recruitment of Aboriginals as a method of assimilation. The Department of Militia and Defence enforced no regulation to prevent enlistment based on race, but local recruiters routinely turned away African- and Japanese-Canadian recruits because of their own prejudices. Settler state and settler society worked in concert to rationalize the exclusion of Non-British communities. Unable to participate in the war effort, these communities were left out of the national narratives built on the experience of the First World War.

The national narratives of dominion achievements during the First World War celebrate the forging of a singular dominion identity through the crucible of battles such as the Gallipoli Landings or Vimy Ridge. These myths affirmed the “essential Britishness
of dominionism,” but rooted this British identity in the frontiers of empire. Australian soldiers, like their Canadian and New Zealand compatriots, were idolized “as the product of a distinctive society and value system – a society in which the bush shaped the cultural imagination and social mores; in which men learned independence of spirit and thus natural and resourceful fighters.” Each dominion celebrated their soldiers as their unique blend of British blood and their own distinct geographical environment. The war, like the environment, promised to press all men into this new national mould. As Jonathan Vance concludes, the myth of the war gave “ethnic minorities the opportunity to surrender their own identities in exchange for membership in an imagined community that was homogenous in belief and outlook.” Joan Beaumont likewise observes that in contemporary Australian society “the mantle of the Anzac spirit can now be claimed by any citizen who subordinates the individual desires to the needs of the collective.” The memory of the First World War promised a new national identity that affirmed the settler colonial model of creating an assimilative “better Britain,” firmly rooted in the soil of a New World.

An examination of the voluntary mobilization of the dominions challenges these myths of new identities forged in battle by undermining the narrative of combat as a catalyst for transformation. The selective mobilization of the dominions during First World War ensured that the experience of battle was more often an affirmation of settler colonial identities than a transformation. Highlighting the selective nature of dominion mobilization reveals that the spontaneity of the voluntary war efforts was carefully

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managed to ensure that British communities were represented, while non-British communities were effaced, excluded from, or assimilated into the national war efforts. The result of this selective mobilization of the dominions was an outwardly British appearance in war efforts of the three dominions. For all the chaos and irregularity of voluntary patriotism, the result in each of the dominions was both reliable and consistent: the production of a war effort that projected and protected a singular collective British settler identity.
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Curriculum Vitae

Steve Marti
Department of History, Western University

Education

2015  PhD, History
Western University, Canada
Supervisors: Prof. Jonathan Vance and Prof. Francine McKenzie
Dissertation: “Embattled Communities: Voluntary Mobilization and Identity in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 1914-1918”

2010  Master of Arts, History
Western University, Canada
Supervisor: Prof. Jonathan Vance

2009  Bachelor of Arts (First-class Honours), Major in History
University of Calgary, Canada
Supervisor: Prof. John Ferris

Refereed Publications


Book Reviews


**Honours and Awards**

2014  
**Elata Britton Graduate Scholarship in History**, Department of History, Western University, (C$4000).

2013  
**AHA / CAL Writing and Travel Bursary**, Australian Historical Association and Copyright Agency Limited (A$700).

2013  
**NAA / AHA Postgraduate Scholarship**, National Archives of Australia and the Australian Historical Association (A$500).

2012  
**Bourse Gerda Henkel**, Centre International de Recherche, Historial de la Grande Guerre (€2500).

2011, 2013  
**Ley and Lois Smith Military History Fund**, Department of History, Western University (C$1500, awarded twice).

2011-2012  
**Ontario Graduate Scholarship**, Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities (C$15,000).

2009-2013  
**Western Graduate Research Scholarship**, School of Graduate Studies, Western University (C$10,000, each year).

2006  
**Dean’s List**, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Calgary (C$1500).

**Editorial Experience**
