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Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council

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Graduate Program in Political Science

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Andrew Chater

Graduate Program in Political Science

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The Arctic Council is an international institution made up of the eight states that have territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States, as well as six indigenous peoples’ organizations. When states created the Council in 1996, it was a research institution that addressed environmental issues and a loosely defined version of sustainable development. It was a weak institution, without a permanent secretariat. By 2014, it had become a policy-making body, as well as a research body, that addressed a wide range of issues, with the aid of a permanent secretariat. New states and institutions sought to become a part of the Council, which potentially challenged the role of the indigenous peoples’ organizations. This thesis answers the following question: how can we explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? It examines the Council’s evolving mandate, policy-making role, institutional capacity and membership. It addresses this question by analyzing three international relations theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. This thesis concludes that the economic opportunities in the region made possible by climate change best explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. Neoliberal institutionalism best explains the evolution of the Council, while neorealism provides the best explanation for the outcome of that process.

KEYWORDS

Arctic governance, Arctic Council, international institution evolution
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I am solely responsible for any errors or omissions in this work.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIA – Aleut International Association
AAC – Arctic Athabaskan Council
ABA – Arctic Biodiversity Assessment
ACIA – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
ACAP – Arctic Contaminants Action Program
ACMM – Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting
AEC – Arctic Economic Council
AEPS – Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AMEC – Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation
AMAP – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
CAFF – Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
DMM – Deputy Ministers Meeting
D.C. – District of Columbia
EPPR – Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
GIS – Geographic Information Systems
GCI – Gwich’in Council International
IPS – Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat
ICC – Inuit Circumpolar Council
MM – Ministerial Meeting
NEFCO – Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
POP – Persistent Organic Pollutant
PCB – Polychlorinated Biphenyl
PSI – Project Support Instrument
PAME – Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
RAIPON – Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
SAO – Senior Arctic Official
SDWG – Sustainable Development Working Group
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S. – United States
U.S.A. – United States of America
USD – United States Dollar
UV – Ultraviolet
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 1996, many Arctic policy-makers\(^1\) and activists believed the newly created Arctic Council was a weak, informal research institution offering limited opportunities to address issues that are important to people who live in the Arctic region.\(^2\) By 2013, the Council appeared more robust than ever as it created major international agreements that responded to the consequences of climate change in the Arctic. The major research question addressed in this thesis is: how can we explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? The Council is an international institution charged with the promotion of environmental conservation and sustainable development in the Arctic region. It is evolving from a research institution that addresses environmental issues to a forum for policy-making on a wide variety of issues. This institution is worthy of serious scholarly attention because the Council is the premier governance institution for the Arctic region and it addresses profoundly important global issues such as climate change. The evolution of this institution will have consequences for the global community. Thus, the trajectory of its evolution is of interest not only to those who study the region, but also to those concerned with broader global politics. This thesis explains the Council’s evolution by assessing the predictive validity and reliability of three theories of international co-operation: functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. This work argues that the Arctic’s economic potential has created an incentive for states to facilitate governance through the Council, though great powers are the

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\(^1\) In this thesis, “policy-maker” refers to an official who attended Council meetings representing a state, non-governmental organization, international institution or indigenous peoples’ organization. This group includes government officials, political activists, political actors (such as elected representatives) and scientists. I use the term “policy-maker” as a generic term because 1) all of these actors sought to contribute to the development of policy through the Council and 2) they were entrusted to represent the views of their organization in a diplomatic capacity.

\(^2\) Interviews with eleven different Council policy-makers, winter, spring and summer 2013. This group includes a former senior Canadian foreign affairs official, a junior Canadian foreign affairs official, two senior United States Environmental Protection Agency officials, one former senior government of Alaska official, one senior United States State Department official, one former senior United States Department of the Interior official, a senior Norwegian foreign affairs official, two senior Icelandic foreign affairs officials and a Russian scientist who has worked with the Council. The comment arose in response to a discussion that the Council, over time, has become a more professional body.
most influential actors in this process. Chapter 1 outlines the scope and method of this project, as well as an overview of the necessary background information about the Council. It answers nine major questions. First, what is the Arctic Council? Second, what is the history of the Arctic Council and why did it come into being? Third, what is the mandate of the Arctic Council? Fourth, how does the Council operate? Fifth, how is the Arctic Council evolving? Sixth, how have others assessed the Council? Seventh, how is the thesis structured? Eighth, what is the contribution of this thesis? Finally, what methodology is employed? The thesis consists of seven chapters, including this introduction.

1.1 – What is the Arctic Council?

The Arctic Council is an international institution comprising the eight countries that have some territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. It is the only Arctic regional organization that includes all eight Arctic countries. It is also the only international institution that includes indigenous peoples’ organizations as members, albeit second-class members without voting rights. These groups have many of the same rights as states, as they are able, for example, to participate in all Council meetings, set the Council agenda and create Council projects.

Six indigenous peoples’ organizations are members of the Council, although the rules of procedure allow up to seven indigenous members. They are referred to as “permanent participants.” The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) represents 32,000 Athabaskan people who

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4 Ibid., Article 12 and Article 19.
5 Ibid., Article 26.
live mostly in northwestern Canada and Alaska. The group formed in 2000, specifically to participate in the Arctic Council. It is currently the most recent group to join the institution. The Aleut International Association (AIA) represents 18,000 Aleutian people who live in Greenland, Russia and the United States. It formed in 1998, also to participate in the Council. The Gwich’in Council International (GCI) represents 9,000 Gwich’in people who live in the Canada and the United States. The organization formed in 1999 to advocate for Gwich’in people in the Council. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) represents 150,000 Inuit people who live in Canada, Greenland, Russia and the United States. It came together in 1977 as a major international advocacy association. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) represents 300,000 Russian aboriginal peoples. It is an umbrella organization for 41 Russian aboriginal groups that are part of 35 different indigenous peoples’ organizations. The organization formed in 1990, specifically to participate in the precursor of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). RAIPON was originally called the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North. It was renamed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Saami Council, originally called the Nordic Saami Council at the founding of the AEPS in 1991, represents 150,000 people who live in Finland, Norway, Russia and

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Sweden. The group was founded in 1956 and is thus the oldest indigenous peoples’ organization in the Council. Together, these groups represent 659,000 people from all the Council countries, except mainland Denmark and Iceland.

The Council also includes observers. The original observers of the precursor to the Arctic Council, the AEPS, were West Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the International Arctic Science Committee. There are currently 32 permanent observers in the Council. The Council’s rules of procedure officially refer to them as “accredited observers,” although they are often referred to as permanent observers. This group includes twelve states, eight international institutions and twelve non-governmental organizations. China, France and Germany are examples of state observers. International institution observers include the Nordic Council of Ministers and the United Nations Development Program. Examples of non-governmental organizations are the Association of World Reindeer Herders and the World Wildlife Fund. Observers can attend Council meetings, unless uninvited by states, and make comments when states allow. They can propose, sponsor and participate in Council projects with the permission of states. State delegations re-approve all observers every two years, in summative Ministerial Meetings. At this point, states can remove an observer, though this has never happened. In addition, Council meetings typically include “ad hoc observers” that can attend with special permission. They have all the same rights as permanent observers, though

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12 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991).
16 Ibid.
states need to re-approve their participation before every Council meeting.\(^\text{17}\) An example of a high-profile organization or state that frequently acts as an ad-hoc observer is the European Union. Typically, a new observer attends Council meetings for between two and five years before states approve its status as a permanent observer. Observers are typically international entities that have some broad interest in the Arctic region.

Most of the substantive work takes place in the Council’s working groups, of which there are six: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). States formed the ACAP from an AMAP project in 2006. The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR were working groups of the AEPS and so formed in 1991. States established the SDWG in 1996 along with the rest of the Council. The ACAP takes action to research and address contaminants in the Arctic region. The AMAP monitors levels of Arctic pollution. The CAFF researches levels of Arctic flora and fauna and also helps develop conservation strategies by providing baseline information. Studying Arctic marine pollution and developing strategies to combat pollution by providing baseline information is the responsibility of the PAME. The EPPR identifies safety issues in the Arctic and prepares for emergency situations. The SDWG broadly carries out projects to encourage human social, political and economic development in the Arctic region. Government scientists and academics serve in the working groups and usually meet bi-annually. The nature of the work completed by the working groups reveals that the Council exists to facilitate action on environmental issues and sustainable development.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
The official mandates of the working groups show they complete separate yet inter-related work. The ACAP exists to “reduce emissions of pollutants into the environment in order to reduce the identified pollution risks.”\(^{18}\) It prepares proposals and supplies information for technical projects to physically clean up contaminant sites, particularly in Russia. The mandate of the AMAP is to supply “reliable and sufficient information on the status of, and threats to, the Arctic environment, and providing scientific advice on actions to be taken in order to support Arctic governments in their efforts to take remedial and preventive actions relating to contaminants.”\(^ {19}\) Examples of its work include projects to monitor UV radiation, radioactivity and mercury levels in the Arctic.\(^ {20}\) The CAFF exists to “address the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, and to communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources.”\(^ {21}\) An example of its work is the ongoing Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, which is “an international network of scientists, government agencies, indigenous organizations and conservation groups working together to harmonize and integrate efforts to monitor the Arctic’s living resources.”\(^ {22}\) The mandate of the PAME is to “address policy and non-emergency pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine environment from both land and sea-based activities.”\(^ {23}\) An example of this work is the ongoing

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, which is an evaluation of the level of Arctic shipping.  

The mandate of the EPPR is to “exchange information on best practices and conduct projects to include development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, and training.” An example of this work includes its ongoing Behaviour of Oil and Other Hazardous Substances in Arctic Waters project, which studies what would happen to oil should it spill in Arctic waters, thus helping states prepare for that possibility. These mandates all reveal a focus on research rather than policy-making, as their missions seek to “promote,” “exchange” and provide “advice” rather than to develop formal policy. They also emphasize that these groups provide policy recommendations, particularly the mandates of the ACAP and the PAME. The ACAP, AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have mandates that are environmental.

The SDWG has a different type of mandate than those of the other working groups in that it aims to “provide practical knowledge and contribute to building the capacity of indigenous peoples and Arctic communities to respond to the challenges and benefit from the opportunities emerging in the Arctic region.” Its work is broad and encompasses a wide variety of issue areas, all under the rubric of human development and human security. Human security is an understanding of security that emphasizes freedom from deprivation and threats to safety. The group does not limit its work to projects that concern sustainable development in the traditional sense. Sources often define sustainable development as “meeting the needs of today without

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26 Ibid.
In a practical sense, sustainable development typically refers to “any construction that can be maintained over time without damaging the environment.” However, the SDWG carries out the Council’s projects with the most direct human element that need not include a strong environmental element. Its current priorities are socio-economic problems, climate change adaptation, sustainable communities, resource development, human health, cultural survival and language. An example of this work is the 2011 report *Comparative Review of Circumpolar Health Systems*, which provides an overview of the contrasting qualities of health care in the Arctic region. It is a project with a strong human security element but not a strong environmental element. The SDWG carries out more human-centric work than do the other working groups.

The Council employs task forces to carry out research projects outside of the mandate of the working groups. Officially, there are four: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Pollution Prevention, the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane, the Scientific Co-operation Task Force and the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum. Marine pollution prevention, for example, is outside of the mandate of any one working group because it involves the work of the PAME, CAFF and the EPPR. In addition, its work is more policy-centric than those of the working groups. Black carbon and methane involves taking action on a type of air pollution not covered by the other working groups. The AMAP might have been a venue to address these issues, but it provides monitoring rather than policy action, which is a key goal of the task force. A circumpolar business forum is not an environmental issue or a human security

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30 Arctic Council, “Sustainable Development Working Group.”
31 Ibid.
issue and so did not fit within any of the working groups. Three task forces have completed projects and ceased operations, namely the Task Force on Institution Issues (2011-2013), the Task Force on Search and Rescue (2009-2011) and the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (2011-2013).  

The Council also has expert groups, made up of academics and scientists, to execute projects mandated by states on an ongoing basis, in contrast to temporary task forces that cease to exist when its project is completed. Currently, there is one Council expert group, the Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group. Individual working groups have expert groups and task forces to carry out specific projects and provide advice for the broader working groups. Task forces are becoming increasingly common as the Council takes on policy-making work.

In September 2014, a new Council side-line institution came into being, called the Arctic Economic Council. Its goal is to “foster business development in the Arctic,” to “engage in deeper circumpolar co-operation” and “provide a business perspective to the work of the Arctic Council.” Each Council member state and permanent participant sends three business representatives to review Council programs and provide recommendations to the Council. The new institution represents an expansion of the mandate of the Council from an environmental and sustainable development institution to one that facilitates economic development. The new institution does not have an environmental component in that its work is to represent business interests. Chapter 2 discusses this shift in detail.

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37 Ibid.
1.2 – What is the History of the Arctic Council?

It is necessary to understand why the Council came into being in order to understand its evolution. This chapter provides a brief history, with further elaboration provided in subsequent chapters. The Council was established as an environmental organization to facilitate co-operation in the wake of the end of the Cold War. From 1945 until 1989, the two Arctic great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, stood at opposite ends of an ideological divide marked by the ever-present possibility of nuclear war. Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were allies of the United States through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Finland and Sweden officially attempted to maintain neutrality, though these states were closer to the West than the East. Relations between the two superpowers improved throughout the 1970s during the period of détente, after strained relations in the 1960s. For example, the governments of the United States and Soviet Union held various negotiations beginning in 1969 to discuss limits on strategic arms, which resulted in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States government issued an Arctic policy in 1983 indicating its openness to “mutually beneficial international co-operation in the Arctic.”38 Still, tensions and military spending increased throughout the 1980s as a new hawkish United States presidential administration upped its rhetoric. The Arctic states, in particular the government of Finland, hoped that Arctic co-operation would ease Cold War tensions between West and East. In 1985, an article by political scientist Oran Young proposed that the declaration of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” could ease Cold War tensions.39 In October 1987, amid a weakening Soviet economy, the governments of the Soviet Union and United States signed a nuclear stockpile reduction agreement marking the

beginning of the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in Murmansk, Russia, calling for the establishment of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” and new environmental co-operation.\(^40\) At the same time, there was considerable interest among policy-makers in international co-operation to understand the amount of pollution in Russia’s Arctic, which experts in the other Arctic states expected would be very high and would have trans-boundary consequences.\(^41\) The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster raised concerns over Russian environmental standards.\(^42\) The other Arctic governments doubted whether Gorbachev’s proposal for a “zone of peace” was serious.\(^43\) Murmansk is home to a large Russian military base, which Gorbachev did not propose to close as part of his initiative.\(^44\) The government of Finland, which sought to improve relations between the West and Russia, its closest neighbour, attempted to organize a conference in response to Gorbachev’s proposal, which finally occurred in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989. The government of Finland had lobbied the United States and Russia to draft an agreement on nuclear submarines in the Arctic (in 1983) and held a summit on Cold War nuclear issues (in 1987). Three rounds of non-contentious negotiations, slowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in the creation of the AEPS in June 1991.\(^45\)

The AEPS was mandated to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans.”\(^46\) It was a joint research strategy, rather than an international institution. States created four working groups (the AMAP, CAFF, EPPR, PAME) staffed by government scientists and academics from each Arctic country, who would collect information and meet bi-annually to share their conclusions. Indigenous peoples’ organizations were mere observers in the organization, without any

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\(^{41}\) Agence-France-Presse, news brief, September 19, 1996.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 6.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 124.

privileged status. The AEPS was successful in uncovering the dangerous level of pollution in the Russian Arctic, such as the fact that Russia had produced more than 180,000 tonnes of dangerous polychlorinated biphenol coolants in the Arctic region during the Cold War without proper environmental safety procedures. State officials also became aware that there were significant human security challenges in the Arctic. Perhaps most alarmingly, the life expectancy of indigenous peoples in Russia declined by 4.8 years between 1990 and 1995 due to poor economic conditions leading to high stress levels and high alcohol consumption. From 1991 to 1996, indigenous peoples’ organizations lobbied governments to increase their role in Arctic governance and to establish a more robust Arctic international institution to respond to these environmental and social problems. In particular, the ICC lobbied the Government of Canada to push such action. For example, its Canadian president at the time, Mary Simon, had access to the Government of Canada through her work negotiating and implementing the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, which led to the creation of the Canadian northern territory Nunavut. She helped organize a meeting between Canadian foreign affairs officials and advocates to encourage Canada to create the Arctic Council in December 1992. This meeting did not yield immediate results, but, the Arctic Council, in part, emerged from the lobbying work of the ICC.

After years of lobbying by indigenous peoples’ organizations, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and United States President Bill Clinton held a meeting in February 1995, at which Chretien proposed that the AEPS become a formal institution. Clinton agreed to the proposal. The Canadian government brought the other Arctic states on-board and negotiations occurred in

47 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, PCBs in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions (Oslo, Norway: Arctic Council, 2000), 14.
49 Ibid., 158.
50 English, Ice and Water, 172.
51 Ibid., 182.
52 Ibid., 202.
53 Ibid.
1995 around AEPS meetings and through informal communication as well as a meeting in Ottawa in June.\textsuperscript{54} There had been significant informal discussion among policy-makers to formalize the co-operation that had begun in the AEPS and so states at least tentatively undertook discussions to create the Arctic Council. State delegations debated and disagreed about six items: 1) whether security would be a part of the new institution, perhaps signalling a move toward earlier proposals for an Arctic “zone of peace;” 2) the role of human security and sustainable development in the new institution, as the AEPS had increasingly dealt with sustainable development issues; 3) the policy-making role of the institution; 4) whether the institution would have a permanent secretariat; 5) the access of observers to the Council, and; 6) whether the permanent participants would be full members of the Council.\textsuperscript{55} Subsequent chapters elaborate on the process of these negotiations.

Canada and the Nordic delegations favoured a strong yet flexible Arctic Council that could take action on a wide range of Arctic issues, while the United States and Russian delegations favoured a less formal Council that would facilitate targeted action in a small number of priority areas. Some negotiators characterized the United States and Russia as favouring the continuation of the AEPS with a new name.\textsuperscript{56} The 1995 negotiations did not make major headway on issues and gave way to three major formal negotiations in Ottawa in December 1995, as well as April and June 1996. The issue of the permanent participants dominated these negotiations, leaving little time to address the other items. Delegations made major breakthroughs in June, resolving the permanent participants issue and agreeing in principle to resolutions on the other matters, allowing work to move forward on a document finalizing the Council’s structure.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Chester Reimer, Inuit Circumpolar Council consultant and delegation member, February 13, 2013.
The Council’s first meeting occurred in September 1996 in Ottawa, where state
delегations finalized the basic mandate and the structure of the Council. State officials agreed
that: 1) traditional military security would not be part of the new Council’s agenda; 2)
sustainable development would be part of the institution through the creation of the SDWG,
though its exact mandate would be negotiated over the next two years; 3) creating formal policy
would not be an immediate goal of the Council; 4) the institution would not have a permanent
secretariat because the rotating chair country would organize and host a rotating secretariat; 5)
observers would be allowed to attend Council meetings with permission, and; 6) indigenous
peoples’ organizations would be members of the Council but would not be able to vote on
Council matters. Each alignment could claim some success. Nothing prevented the Council from
becoming a robust body in the future, though at its onset it was a small, flexible body in line with
the preferences of the United States and Russian delegations. The Council had not yet developed
formal rules of procedure, which it would do at five Council meetings in 1997 and 1998. In
these years, it would transition the environmental work of the AEPS to the Council and establish
the mandate for the sustainable development program. A key difference between the AEPS and
Arctic Council was that the Arctic states’ environmental departments administered the AEPS and
set state preferences, whereas departments of foreign affairs administered and organized the
Council as well as determined official state positions. The Council emerged as an
environmental research institution with a new emphasis on human development issues through
the sustainable development program.

57 Arctic Council, Joint Communiqué of the Governments of the Arctic Countries (Ottawa, Ontario: Arctic Council
Ministerial Meeting, 1996).
58 Ibid.
59 Terry Fenge, representative for Arctic Athabaskan Council and formerly Inuit Circumpolar Council, February 21,
2013.
1.3 – What is the Arctic Council’s Mandate?

The Council’s mandate is to promote co-operation on environmental issues and sustainable development in the Arctic region. It is found in the 1998 *Iqaluit Declaration*, the summative statement document that closed Canada’s inaugural two-year term as chair. The Council is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States . . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.” As noted, the Council’s work may address any issue except military security. Its mandate allows it to discuss other types of security, such as human security or environmental security, though in practice the Council does not use the language of security to characterize issues. The mandate does not precisely define “sustainable development” although it indicates it will include “areas of Arctic children and youth, health, telemedicine, resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology transfer to improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development strategies.” The document establishes that all projects with a strong “human” element will fall under the rubric of sustainable development. In practice, about 80 per cent of the Council’s work is strongly environmental in nature, as exhibited by the fact that only one of the Council’s six working groups expressly addresses sustainable development. Increasingly, the Council’s work is economic in nature, although until the development of the Arctic Economic Council, all of the Council’s economic work had some environmental element. In some ways, the Council has a broad yet narrow mandate, charged to focus on environment and sustainable development yet open to other issues.

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
1.4 – How Does the Council Operate?

The chair of the Council rotates every two years. The first country to chair was Canada from 1996 until 1998, followed by the United States from 1998 until 2000, Finland from 2000 until 2002, Iceland from 2002 until 2004, Russia from 2004 until 2006, Norway from 2007 until 2009, Denmark from 2009 until 2011 and Sweden from 2011 until 2013. Canada was chair from 2013 until 2015, followed by the United States. The chair is responsible for organizing Council meetings and providing themes for Council work, though the other Council states have a lot of power to shape the agenda. The Council held 42 meetings from 1996 until 2013.\(^6\)

It typically holds three meetings annually, usually in the spring and fall. There are three types of meetings. Senior Arctic Officials Meetings (also known as SAO meetings) usually occur twice a year. States send delegations of typically six to twelve officials, while permanent participants usually send two to six people. The head of the state delegations is referred to as the “Senior Arctic Official.” Ministerial Meetings (also known as MM meetings or ACMM meetings) occur every other year in the spring. At these meetings, ministers of foreign affairs or other high-ranking officials review the Council’s previous two-year term and initiate a new research program. States articulate the results by signing a declaration that sets the Council’s agenda for the next two years. Ministerial Meetings close a country’s turn as chair and pass the chair to another country. Deputy Ministers Meetings (DMM) occur in the years that there is not a Ministerial Meeting. In these meetings, foreign affairs deputies from each Council state review progress, as well as permanent participant representatives. The first DMM was held in 2010. Canada has opted not to hold a DMM, indicating that they may not become permanent fixtures on the Council calendar. Working groups meet roughly two times a year, in between other Council meetings.

The substantive work of the Council occurs through projects. To accomplish goals, states sponsor projects, sometimes co-sponsored by permanent participants or observers. To sponsor a project, the sponsor must conceive of the project, design its contents, fund agreed-upon costs and execute the agenda. Projects might include a scientific assessment or a technical project such as a search and rescue practice exercise or a plan to clean up a contaminant. States and sponsors typically bring these projects to a Council working group for consideration. Other states, observers or permanent participants can join the leadership of a project by co-sponsoring. The working group adopts the project under the leadership of the sponsors, unless another state vetoes the project. The working group then presents the project at a SAO meeting, at which point states have another opportunity to veto the project. States then approve the project at the Ministerial Meeting. At this point, working groups have likely carried out substantial work on the project, though a veto is still possible. After approval at the Ministerial Meeting, the working group completes the project between meetings and gives updates at its own meetings. As noted, the Council may establish a task force to complete a project at Ministerial Meetings or may defer the matter to an expert group.

The Council operates by consensus. This measure, in essence, gives each state a veto over any Council project. In Council meetings, states offer their support for projects, but need not comment. Thus, sometimes a state may oppose a project but not speak on it or exercise its veto. Therefore, we do not know definitely if states that do not directly voice support for a project indeed favour a course of action. Alternatively, once a state vetoes a project, discussion stops. Thus, it is difficult to know if countries that do not speak in this situation truly support a project or would have vetoed it had another state not vetoed it first. Each state has a de-facto veto in the Council as the institution operates according to consensus.
The Council has a robust agenda, sponsoring dozens of projects. It undertook an average of 57 projects at a time from 1998 until 2004. This number tripled between 2004 and 2013, as currently the Council has more than 150 projects ongoing at any one time. About 90 per cent of Council projects proceed without negotiation or real debate. States, observers and permanent participants may provide statements of support for a project or technical suggestions, such as collaboration with a particular research program or employment of a certain database. In about ten per cent of cases, discussion turns into negotiations, with states vetoing projects in Council meetings, negotiating compromises or attempting to alter the intent of a project. An example of a project that proceeded without great political interference is the *Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic*, which was a straightforward survey of Arctic residents. Chapter 6 discusses this project. An example of a project that provoked great debate, negotiation and compromise with threats of vetoes is the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA), with the controversial issue being whether the final assessment would include a policy document. Chapters 2, 3 and 6 discuss this project. Major projects include the ACIA (2004) and the *Arctic Human Development Report* (2004). Other major projects include:

- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (the CAFF)
- Annual AMAP pollution assessments (2005-2013) (the AMAP)
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
- *Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment* (published 2007) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)
- *Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic* (completed 2011) (Task Force)
- *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment* (published 2009) (the PAME)
- *Arctic Biodiversity Assessment* (published 2013) (the CAFF)
- *Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic* (completed 2013) (Task Force)
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)
- *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment* (published 2013) (the AMAP)
- *Arctic Resilience Report* (interim report 2013)

The Council completes a variety of projects in seemingly disparate areas.
Each Council meeting agenda contains about 15 items. In other words, states discuss roughly 15 projects per meeting. In some cases, updates are brief and do not include discussion. In other cases, discussions can drag on for most of a meeting. States do not comment on every agenda item. For example, from 2004 until 2013, based on a sample of 10 meetings, states provided an average of 3.3 comments on 2.6 agenda items.°°°°°° Permanent participants commented on only one agenda item. About 15 observers attended each meeting, but only about five provided comments and those five only commented approximately once.

A good case study to understand the process of a Council project is the assembly of the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), a report synthesizing the state of, and threat to, biodiversity in the Arctic region. It is a project that was not overly contentious as it was a scientific assembly of data about biodiversity in a particular region, but had some small issues in its research design. State officials jointly authored the project between 2007 and 2013. The goal of the project was to “synthesize and assess the status and trends of biological diversity in the Arctic.”°°°°°° As with all Council projects, a state sponsored the assessment. Finland initially sponsored it in 2006, creating the work plan and providing initial funding. The United States, Denmark, Canada and Sweden contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the project and joined as co-sponsors in subsequent years. States organized the project between 2004 and 2007. The idea for the ABA originated from the CAFF in meetings between 2004 and 2006, during Russia’s term as chair, as a means to fulfill obligations under a previously approved project, the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program.°°°°°° It also emerged from a goal of states in the CAFF to initiate a project that would support the work studying the consequences of climate

°°°°°° The ten meetings were selected due to the availability of data.
°°°°°° Arctic Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Ministers to the Fifth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (Salekhard, Russia: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2006).
change commenced under the ACIA.\textsuperscript{67} Finnish representatives in the CAFF initially conceived of the project as a reasonably apolitical environmental scientific assessment responding to these two priorities. The CAFF and Finland announced the idea for the project at the Ministerial Meeting in Salekhard, Russia, in October 2006. Finnish officials then commenced on the project work plan.\textsuperscript{68} There was brief discussion of the project at the April 2007 SAO meeting in Tromsø, Norway, initiated by sponsor Finland.\textsuperscript{69} During this discussion, officials from the AAC and the GCI urged approval of the project work plan, while officials from the RAIPON stated optimism about the project.\textsuperscript{70} There were technical suggestions, as well. ICC officials suggested that the CAFF coordinate the ABA work plan with International Polar Year projects (an international Arctic science program), while Finnish officials stated that the CAFF must ensure that the ABA does not overlap with other projects before approval of the work plan.\textsuperscript{71}

The CAFF presented the work plan and states gave formal approval of the project at the November 2007 SAO meeting in Narvik, Norway.\textsuperscript{72} The CAFF was instructed to deliver the report in four phases, namely: 1) a summary to be delivered in 2010; 2) a scientific report in 2012; 3) a summary for policy-makers in 2013; and finally 4) policy recommendations later in 2013.\textsuperscript{73} This schedule meant that work occurred during Norway, Denmark and Sweden’s terms as chair. At the November 2007 meeting, the United States delegation offered to co-sponsor the project, which the Finnish delegation accepted, eager to obtain funding for it.\textsuperscript{74} United States officials wanted to co-sponsor the project because it was scientific in nature and so presented a

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Tromsø, Norway, 12-13 April 2007} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2007).
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 28-29 November 2007, Narvik, Norway} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2007).
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
good opportunity to fulfill Council obligations. There were no problems getting further consensus on the project. The permanent participants did not protest against the project and the CAFF stated specifically that the project would include traditional indigenous knowledge.\textsuperscript{75} Delegations from Denmark, Canada and Russia all directly stated support for the project.\textsuperscript{76} The delegations from Norway, Iceland and Sweden did not state support or exercise a veto at this meeting. It was unclear whether these countries supported the project, though it was the type of scientific assessment they would likely support. The lack of explicit support could have indicated disapproval but an unwillingness to exercise a veto; however, such a situation was not the case.

Norway’s delegation expressed support for the project at the November 2008 SAO meeting in Kautokeino, Norway.\textsuperscript{77} Delegations from Iceland and Sweden stated support for the project in October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, and contributed data to the project before that point.\textsuperscript{78}

The project proceeded smoothly and no contentious negotiations resulted. A steering committee of eight people directed the project, comprising representatives from Sweden, Iceland, the AAC, Canada, Finland, Denmark, Russia and the U.S.\textsuperscript{79} Sixteen people worked on the steering committee at various points, including representatives from the GCI and the United Nations Environment Program.\textsuperscript{80} There were 35 authors, drawn from every Council country, as well as non-Arctic countries.\textsuperscript{81} The project included contributions from more than 240 authors.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 19-20 October 2010, Torshavn} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2010).
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
Updates on progress were given at nine Council meetings between 2008 and 2012. Council state and permanent participants gave statements of support and offered kudos for the progress made at these meetings, such as providing technical comments on drafts, making financial as well as personnel contributions and suggesting how the CAFF might disseminate the report. For example, at the November 2009 SAO meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, representatives from the RAIPON suggested that some of the information regarding reindeer herding was inaccurate. The CAFF delegates said that they would contact the World Reindeer Herders Association, an international reindeer herding organization, to verify the data. In these meetings, more sponsors emerged as progress proceeded smoothly and the project looked to be of a high quality. The Danish delegation announced Denmark would join the ABA as a co-sponsor at the April 2008 SAO meeting in Svolver, Norway. Canada and Sweden joined as a co-sponsor in October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, after making financial contributions to the project. Funding ultimately came from every Arctic country, except Iceland and Russia, and additional funds came from the Nordic Council of Ministers, to which Iceland contributes.

The report revealed that 21,000 species are found in the Arctic and that climate change threatens the biodiversity of the region. Finland’s policy-makers conceived of the project as a scientific assessment within the existing mandate of the Council that would not create formal policy for states. The report included 17 policy recommendations, most of which are reasonably

83 These were the April 2008 SAO meeting in Svolver, Norway, the November 2008 SAO meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, the April 2009 ACMM in Tromsø, Norway, the November 2009 SAO in Copenhagen, Denmark, the October 2010 SAO in Torshavn, Denmark, the May 2011 ACMM in Nuuk, Greenland, the November 2011 SAO in Lulea, Sweden, the May 2012 DMM in Stockholm, Sweden, and the November 2012 SAO meeting in Haparanda, Sweden.
84 Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 12-13 November 2009, Copenhagen (Tromsø: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2009).
85 Ibid.
87 Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 19-20 October 2010.
88 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, “Acknowledgments.”
89 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, 2.
unspecific, offering directions for further work and research. For example, the report recommends that states “actively support international efforts addressing climate change, both reducing stressors and implementing adaptation measures, as an urgent matter,” to “require the incorporation of biodiversity objectives and provisions into all Arctic Council work and encourage the same for ongoing and future international standards, agreements, plans, operations and/or other tools specific to development in the Arctic” and to “reduce the threat of invasive alien/non-native species to the Arctic by developing and implementing common measures for early detection and reporting, identifying and blocking pathways of introduction, and sharing best practices and techniques for monitoring, eradication and control.” Each of these recommendations is relatively vague. The report does not indicate how states should “support” international climate change policy. The incorporation of “biodiversity measures” into all Council projects is not binding on states or other Council groups. It says states should develop “measures” to “reduce the threat of invasive” species, but does not initiate this process or indicate what these measures should include.

This case illustrates a typical four-stage process in the development of a Council project. First, a state conceives a project in a working group and presents it to other Council states for approval. Second, the sponsor organizes and designs the project. Third, a working group completes the project between meetings by directing a steering committee or a group of researchers. During this stage, the working group or sponsoring nation updates other Council countries about the progress between meetings. Other countries can give comments or co-sponsor the project as it unfolds, pending vetoes and objections. Fourth, once state delegations approve of a project at a ministerial meeting, the project is complete.

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1.5 – How is the Arctic Council Evolving?

This section examines the five ways in which the Council is evolving. First, the Council’s mandate is growing to include economic issues. The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment highlighted that climate change will make the Arctic more accessible to potential resource extraction and shipping. It found that, “The average extent of sea-ice cover in summer has declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.”91 The Arctic has more than 90 billion barrels of oil in reserve as well as trillions of cubic metres of natural gas.92 As a result, after 2004 Arctic states increasingly emphasized emergency preparedness and search and rescue projects, which this dissertation will show are partly economic issues.93 The government of Canada has stated that its priorities are to encourage “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic shipping” and “sustainable communities.”94 As noted, the Council is establishing the Arctic Economic Council, its first overtly economic project without a strong environmental element.95

Second, the policy-making role of the Council is growing. “Policy-making role” refers to action undertaken to facilitate the creation of formal agreements or policy. When states created the Council, there was the hope or expectation among some commentators that the Council would be a strong body that would create policy, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. It became clear that this would not be the case soon after the Council began operations. The United States and Russia, in particular, opposed a policy role for the Council. The Council became a research

93 For example, see Russia’s discussions of search and rescue in the Arctic Council, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, November 22-23, 2004 (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2001).
95 Arctic Council, Vision for the Arctic (Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2013).
institution and a policy-recommendation body but it did not facilitate the creation of policy. Take, for example, the ACIA. It is a research assessment that collected information about climate change. It contains a set of policy recommendations, but it does not impose any obligations on states. States could have created an agreement on climate change in the Council, but did not. In fact, state policy-makers never seriously considered this option. However, in 2009, states began work on the creation of an agreement on Arctic search and rescue, followed by an agreement on response to oil spills in 2011. Earlier, states did not create formal policy in the Council on principle. Today, states are more willing to use the Council as a policy-making forum.

Third, the institutional power of the Council is evolving in that states created a permanent Council secretariat in 2011. The Council did not have a strong bureaucratic structure to organize and implement action for most of its history. The Council secretariat rotated between member countries every two years prior to April 2007, when Norway, Sweden and Denmark announced a temporary secretariat over six years that the three countries would host together in Tromsø, Norway. The Council announced that Norway would host a permanent secretariat when this temporary arrangement ended in 2013. (All of the working groups had permanent secretariats. The permanent participants had the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, formed, funded, at a cost of more than one million dollars a year, and hosted by Denmark since 1994.) This development of a permanent secretariat could give the Council a greater ability to initiate programs and organize action between Council countries. The bureaucratic robustness of the Council is increasing and thus the institutional capacity of the Council is growing.

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Fourth, an increasing number of observers wish to join the Council. The European Union, in particular, is seeking to become a permanent observer, creating controversy about what countries and organizations should be part of the Council and what they should be able to do. This interest in the Council is challenging ideas about which actors can participate in Arctic politics, as well as the power of states and indigenous peoples in the region.

Fifth, it is less clear if the role of permanent participants is evolving. There was optimism among many onlookers that permanent participants would be equal in influence with states when states founded the Council in 1996 with help from these groups. However, the permanent participants have faced numerous obstacles to their full participation, such as states being unwilling to treat them as equals and consider their contributions, and a lack of funds and resources to contribute to Council projects and meetings, as well as a new flood of observers and interest in the Council that demands even greater resources that these groups mostly do not have. The permanent participants are only able to contribute to about 20 per cent of Council projects. Each of the major evolutionary changes are discussed in its own chapter.

1.6 – How Do Others Theorize the Arctic Council?

How do other authors understand the Arctic Council? The Council represents an instance of international co-operation and many theories attempt to understand why states co-operate. Three such theories are functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism.

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100 Chester Reimer, Inuit Circumpolar Council consultant and delegation member, February 13, 2013.
Functionalists argue that states are rational and seek to solve problems. States will co-operate to solve problems automatically, without prompt, especially to address issues that spill over from other instances of co-operation. They will begin to co-operate on areas of low politics, which are issue areas where vital state interest and survival is not at stake. Functionalist scholar David Mitrany writes that part of the explanation for international co-operation is the “general wish for a collective security system . . . after the shock of the two World wars.”

According to Mitrany, co-operation in areas less vital than collective security builds trust between states, which leads to further co-operation in more political issue areas. For example, in the words of noted functionalist scholar Ernst B. Haas, “The [European] Community began life with the collective commitment to change the basic rules of industrial development by widening the market for producers.” The theory first emerged in the 1950s to explain the emergence of the European Union. Haas writes, “Converging practical goals provided the leaven out of which the bread of European unity was baked.” Functionalist Karl W. Deutsch adds that it is possible to “abolish finally national conflict by speeding up economic growth and intercommunication everywhere.” According to functionalists, international institutions will evolve automatically when new problems emerge.

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103 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
Neoliberal institutionalists agree that states are rational, but argue states seek to make absolute gains as opposed to solve problems.\textsuperscript{110} According to neoliberal institutionalists, states could co-operate without attempting to resolve a pressing issue. They argue that when state goals change, so do international institutions, although change can be tempered by three elements: 1) path dependency, 2) norms and 3) the form of negotiation.\textsuperscript{111}

Neorealists argue that rational states seek to maintain independence in international relations above all other goals. Thus, relative gains, rather than absolute gains, motivate and constrain states when they co-operate.\textsuperscript{112} In other words, states co-operate when they stand to gain more than a rival. Neorealists do not rule out the possibility that an absolute gain could motivate a state. In the words of neorealist Kenneth Waltz, “Structurally we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to.”\textsuperscript{113} He goes on, “We cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.”\textsuperscript{114} However, realists such as Joseph Grieco predict “the likely prevalence of the relative gains problem for cooperation.”\textsuperscript{115}

Neorealists assume relative gains considerations will motivate states in most cases, especially in instances where vital interests are at stake.\textsuperscript{116} The theory emerged in the 1970s to explain pattern of international relations during the Cold War in a scientifically rigorous manner. Neorealists affirm

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
that to ensure survival, states must maintain a balance of power, where states “establish a formal alliance and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side.” Great powers should be most influential in this process. Thus, international institutions will evolve in response to changes in the international balance of power and to help states make relative gains. Co-operation will be very difficult in such situations, but may be more possible when the balance of power is not at stake. Each of these three theories is explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say at this point that they clearly disagree about how and why states co-operate.

There is a great deal of empirical literature on the Arctic Council that seeks to understand the role of the institution in international governance. Some scholars see the institution as a non-policy-making research forum with an environmental mandate. This group of authors includes political scientist Oran Young, diplomat Evan T. Bloom and political consultant Terry Fenge. Other scholars see the Council as a soft-law body that helps create international norms within its environmental mandate. This group of authors includes international lawyer Timo Koivurova and political scientists Andrea Charron, Rob Huebert, Leena Heinamaki, Alison Ronsen, Olav Schram Stokke and Monica Tennberg. Still, other authors write

117 Dunne and. Schmidt, “Realism,” 143.
118 Ibid.
120 Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712.
121 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra,” Policy Options, April 2012, 64.
125 Ibid.
outside of this debate. Political scientist Klaus Dodds conceives of the Council as an “actor-network,”129 while historian John English examines the history of the Council and attributes its growth to broad international interests and domestic political concerns.130 The works of authors who write about particular areas of the Council are addressed in the individual chapters relevant to their work.

In terms of the normative literature, many authors argue that the Council should address a wider range of issues and take stronger policy action. They include political scientist Michael Byers,131 lawyer Oded Cedar132 political scientist Franklyn Griffiths,133 historian Whitney Lackenbauer,134 the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program,135 legal scholar David Vanderzwaag136 and consultant Brooks B. Yeager.137 Their works see the Council as a major institution to improve Arctic governance. For example, the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program released a report in 2012 that advocated the Council become a stronger, more robust

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international body. It encouraged Canada to push for a “new funding mechanism” so the Arctic Council can undertake more projects. An example might be a stable budget. It also proposed, “Any candidate for Arctic Council observer status must publicly declare its respect for the sovereignty of Arctic states and the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples.” This measure would increase the influence of indigenous peoples in the organization, as it would recognize their inalienable governance rights. The organization also encouraged Canada to “work to continue the evolution of the Arctic Council from a decision-shaping body into a negotiating forum for new binding agreements.”

1.7 – How is the Thesis Structured?

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the reasons for the evolution and growth of the Council’s mandate. Functionalism would expect the mandate to expand automatically when doing so is in states’ technical interests, while neorealists would credit regional balance of power concerns. Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that state interest, as well as the form of negotiation, explain mandate growth. Chapter 2 argues that the mandate of the Council is growing because climate change is creating economic opportunities states want to exploit. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the growth of the Council’s mandate, although institutional competence as predicted by functionalism also is important.

Chapter 3 explores the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. Functionalism would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand automatically in response to issue

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139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
spillover, whereas neorealists would expect the policy-making role to evolve as the result of regional balance concerns and the desires of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars would expect the policy-making role of the Council to expand when doing so offers potential, absolute gains for states. Chapter 3 argues that the policy-making role of the Council is growing because formal policy helps states make economic gains in the Arctic region. Neoliberal institutionalism explains the reasons states have opted to create policy in the Council, but neorealism explains the types of policy created in the Council.

Chapter 4 discusses the reasons for the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the Arctic Council and the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Functionalism would expect states to have established the secretariat to ensure efficiency and trust between Council countries, whereas neorealism would expect the evolution in terms of power concerns. Neoliberal institutionalism would argue that the evolution took place to enhance state absolute gains and economic interest. Chapter 4 argues that the institutional capacity of the Council is expanding because it helps states make absolute gains, as per the expectations of neoliberal institutionalism. However, states have deliberately designed the secretariat to ensure the Council will not challenge state autonomy in the Arctic, in line with predictions of neorealism.

Chapter 5 examines the evolving role of the observers and explains the reasons for their increased interest in the Council. Functionalism would expect observers to have influence if their participation contributes to the work of the Council, whereas neorealism predicts that regional position concerns explains their participation and influence. Neoliberal institutionalism predicts that observers can be influential in the Council, especially if they can provide compelling information and ideas to states. The chapter argues that economics partly explain the participation of observers. States seek to become observers in the Council to gain influence over
the economic development of the region and environment protection. Arctic members accept new observers when their participation promises to improve the economic prospects of the Arctic region and provide economic opportunities. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on the importance of absolute gains in international relations, provides the best explanation for why observers seek to join the Council.

Chapter 6 addresses the role, evolution and influence of permanent participants in the Arctic Council. Functionalism would predict that the permanent participants could be full and influential members of the Council, in contrast to neorealist theorists who would expect them to be powerless actors. Neoliberal institutionalism would predict that the permanent participants could be influential depending on the effectiveness of their agency, or their ability to persuade states of the merit of their views. Chapter 6 argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of permanent participants. Permanent participants are less influential than states in the Council, but can have influence based on their agency, or their ability to lobby and ally with states to achieve desirable outcomes.

Chapter 7 summarizes the major conclusions of each chapter, and the contributions of this thesis to literature on the Arctic Council as well as international relations theory. It then proposes some directions for further research. It concludes that the economic potential of the Arctic region explains the growth of the Council, tempered by the interests of great powers, and that this evolution is relatively unaffected by the needs of Arctic residents. If the economic potential of the Arctic region were not as strong as it is currently, we would not see the same evolution of the Council. This conclusion is no doubt distressing for commentators and scholars concerned about the environmental future of the Arctic. The Council is evolving from an environmental institution dedicated to studying and preventing environmental damage to a forum
promoting the economic future of the Arctic, possibly at the expense of the environment. This thesis concludes that neoliberal institutionalism is correct in emphasizing state action motivated by absolute gains, but underestimates the importance of great power gains in determining outcomes.

Chapters in this thesis are summarized as follows:

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1.8 – What Are the Contributions of the Thesis?

As a whole, the thesis enhances our understanding of the Arctic Council and its evolution. Each chapter contributes a case study to the empirical literature on the Council and tests the ability of three theories to explain institutional evolution. Chapter 2 provides the first comprehensive understanding of the ongoing, contemporary political debates around the Council’s mandate. As noted, earlier work attempted to understand the Council’s role in regional governance, concluding that it is either a research institution or a soft-law institution. Many authors debate whether the Council’s mandate should expand. This chapter concludes that the Council is increasingly an economic institution and mandate expansion outside of this area is not likely.

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141 Young, “Governing the Arctic” 13-14.
Chapter 3 addresses the debate in literature about the role of the Arctic Council in two ways. First, some writers do not see the Council as a policy-making body, but rather as a research body, while others identify the Council as a “soft-law” body, or an international institution that helps create norms. This thesis examines whether either of these characterizations is accurate and ultimately argues for a new understanding of the Council as a policy-facilitating forum. Second, as noted, a large body of literature argues that the Council’s policy-making role should expand, in that it should make more policy, more often. This thesis helps understand the realities of the Council’s current expansion and finds that the Council’s policy-making role is already growing due to the economic potential of the Arctic region. Policy-making outside of issue areas with a strong economic dimension is unlikely.

Chapter 4 explains a change in the Council that current literature did not expect; namely, the growth in its institutional capacity. Instead, many authors expected the Council to remain a weak institution, with some informal capacity stemming from soft-law or norms; however, institutional growth is ongoing. This thesis argues that the expansion of institutional capacity is occurring because state policy-makers have deemed it is necessary to help the Council carry out its expanded mandate. It lends support to calls for the Council to undertake more work. A greater bureaucratic capability will be necessary to allow such work to take place. Chapter 4 argues that the current bureaucratic arm of the Council will not allow it to become the strong governance body, desired by many scholars.

144 Oran Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 11-12.
147 Schram Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic”; Schram Stokke, “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions,” 10.
Chapter 5 examines a controversy in the literature. Many authors see the observers as relatively non-consequential actors in the Council that contribute relatively little of substance to it.\textsuperscript{149} In contrast, Timo Koivurova argues that the observers’ presence in the Council is changing norms about what actors have the right to participate in Arctic governance.\textsuperscript{150} For Koivurova, the observers make the Council a more international body, in which a variety of actors come together to address environmental issues of global consequence. This thesis examines which of these two perspectives is most accurate in the contemporary Arctic Council by thoroughly examining the history of observers in the institution. It concludes that the observers are relatively minor contributors, but that their interest in the Council demonstrates state enthusiasm for the region’s economic future and environmental importance.

Chapter 6 addresses a debate in literature on the Council permanent participants. Earlier literature debated whether the permanent participants would have “full participation” in the Council,\textsuperscript{151} while later literature saw the permanent participants as minor yet important contributors to a fundamentally state-centric institution,\textsuperscript{152} whose presence grants the Council a certain amount of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{153} The chapter evaluates the merits of these arguments and concludes that the permanent participants are more influential now than ever before, but they still have significantly less influence than do states.

This thesis contributes to international relations theory by testing the assumptions of functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 test predictions about the influence of international institutions, while Chapter 5 assesses assumptions about the

\textsuperscript{149} Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13.
\textsuperscript{150} Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 146.
\textsuperscript{152} Young, “Governing the Arctic” 13.
\textsuperscript{153} Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 151.
composition of international institutions. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also examine predictions as to whether international institutions can influence international politics. Chapter 5 tests whether non-member states are important in this process. Chapter 6 tests assumptions about the composition of international institutions vis-à-vis the permanent participants. It evaluates the assumptions that these theories make about non-state actors in international institutions, as permanent participants are non-state actors with membership in the Council. These theories assume that they are outsiders, lobbying states. Chapter 6 assesses their power as insiders that are seemingly able to compete with states for influence. As such, the thesis provides insights into the validity and reliability of international relations theories. It suggests the relevance of neoliberal institutionalism, if adjusted to include aspects of neorealism and functionalism.

Overall, the thesis tests the following broad theoretical questions of relevance to international relations:

Functionalism
- Are states allowing the Council to evolve automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? Do non-state actors participate fully in the Council?

Neorealism
- Are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? Are non-state actors powerless in the Council?

Neoliberal institutionalism
- Are states allowing the Council to evolve to fulfill absolute gains? Do non-state actors have influence in the Council based on their agency?

By answering these questions in regards to the various ways in which the Arctic Council is evolving, it contributes both an empirical case study and theoretical insights.
1.9 – What Methodology is Employed?

This thesis as a whole presents a case study of international co-operation. Each instance of evolution represents its own case study. The use of a single case study to understand circumstances of international co-operation is advantageous because a narrow study makes it easier to thoroughly and systematically understand complex dynamics, the operation of a phenomenon or a causal mechanism.\textsuperscript{154} A single case study is limiting because conventional methodological wisdom says that it is not possible to generalize from a single case.\textsuperscript{155} Nonetheless, each case study adds to the body of knowledge from which generalizations can be drawn. Single cases also can reveal scientific facts, hypotheses and theoretical propositions to be confirmed through further case work or studies with a large number of cases.\textsuperscript{156} Some scholars, such as economic geographer Bent Flyvbjerg, argue that the type of in-depth understanding gleaned from single case studies is particularly suited to innovative learning.\textsuperscript{157} The single case study also can be of value because one can communicate a level of complexity and contradiction that multiple case study research makes more difficult.\textsuperscript{158} Simple and eloquent theory is still possible while understanding the complexity of events.\textsuperscript{159}

This thesis employs historical process tracing, which is “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in the light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”\textsuperscript{160} It “inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation” and “gives close attention to sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables.”\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 221-222.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 236.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 239.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
Historical process tracing involves mapping and thoroughly understanding the stages and steps in an event, which in this case is the evolution of the Arctic Council. This process unveils causal mechanisms, or the cause of a phenomena or event. A major advantage of process tracing is that understanding the process of an event can help overcome common problems in research, such as “reciprocal causation, spuriousness and selection bias.” Reciprocal causation refers to situations in which multiple factors impact one another, making causation difficult to deduce. Spuriousness refers to situations in which a relationship between two variables is a coincidence, yet mistakenly understood as a causal relationship. Selection bias occurs when an inappropriate variable or piece of data is chosen to study a relationship. Understanding the order of events and process tracing helps untangle these complex relationships.

Using historical process tracing, the thesis examines Council meetings and studies the significant events outside those meetings. It explains why these events took place and provides a comprehensive history of the Arctic Council. It examines the discussions, agenda items, projects and decisions undertaken by the Council and how these changed over time. It analyzes the key bargaining coalitions and explains the reasons these coalitions emerged. Most of the events in Council meetings are routine and straightforward. The historical process tracing focused on 1) discussions that spurred great controversy, which reveal areas of potential evolution, and 2) events related to debates about the five instances of evolution that this thesis examines.

The results of the historical process tracing form the dependent variables for the analysis. The expectations of the major international relations theories form the independent variables for the analysis. Chapter 2 examines the output of the Council and its discussions on projects. It looks specifically for instances in which states argued for or discussed expanding the mandate of

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162 Ibid., 824.
163 Ibid.
the Arctic Council. These instances form the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 3 examines the output of the Council and its discussions of formal policy. It looks specifically for those instances in which there was controversy over the creation of policy. These instances form the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 4 examines the negotiations to form the Council’s secretariat. The stages in negotiation form the dependent variables. Chapter 5 examines the negotiations to add observers to the Council and their activity once they were in the Council. These two sets of activities form the dependent variables, separate and yet interrelated. Chapter 6 examines the total output and activity of permanent participants in the Arctic Council. This activity is the dependent variable, expressed as a measure of their influence in the Council. The independent variables in Chapters 2 through 6 are the expectations about institutional growth drawn from international relations theory. Table 1.2 provides more details about these variables and how they relate to each chapter in this analysis.

<table>
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<th>Table 1.2: Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable (Chapters 2-5)</td>
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<td>Changes in Council mandate</td>
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<td>Changes in policy-making</td>
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<td>Establishment of secretariat</td>
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<td>Dependent variable (Chapter 6)</td>
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This thesis includes data collected from five sources. First, the history of the Council’s activities and decisions is traced from 5,100 pages of the minutes of Council meetings and other Council documents. These minutes provided an outline of the activities of the Council, as well as its discussions and decisions. Second, to understand why decisions were made, 33 interviews were conducted with policy-makers from all of the Arctic states and representatives of the permanent participant organizations. These were elite interviews, designed to “reconstruct an event or set of events.” In elite interviews, “the aim is not to draw a representative sample of a larger population . . . but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players who have participated in the political events being studied.” Interviewees were selected on the basis of reputation and the number of Council meetings attended. The interviews were semi-structured. They probed events, discussions and decisions, thus building on the knowledge derived from the meeting minutes. The questions specifically asked for insights about internal discussion around decisions. Twenty-one of the interviews took place in person, in Ottawa, Ontario, and Washington, D.C., at a site of the interviewee’s choosing during spring and winter 2013. The rest occurred via Skype or email in the summer of 2013. Follow-up interviews and correspondence occurred in fall 2014. Seventeen interviewees wished to remain anonymous, largely because of conditions imposed by their employer, such as the government of Canada, or fear of negative consequences for revealing sometimes politically sensitive information about Council proceedings. In such cases, quotes are attributed so as not to reveal the person’s identity (for example, “a senior Canadian foreign affairs official and a former Council delegation member”). Fourteen interviewees asked to see and potentially edit quotes before attribution and their wishes were respected. Two interviewees allowed attribution without a review. The questions posed

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165 Ibid.
varied with the interviewee, depending on which meetings they attended. Examples are in appendix one. Third, attending the October 2013 Council meeting in Whitehorse, Yukon, facilitated gaining first-hand experience of the operation of the Council and the policy-making process of meetings. Conversations were held with Council policy-makers and state delegation members who provided insights into the history of the Council. Fourth, the WikiLeaks database provided more than one dozen diplomatic cables relating to Council decisions that explained the reasons behind state action. Fifth, policy-makers made more than a dozen pages of classified documents related to the Council available to the researcher.

In conclusion, this thesis assesses of the evolution of the Arctic Council. It answers the following question: what explains the Council’s evolution? It formed as a weak environmental research forum but has grown into a broad policy-making institution of global governance.
CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING THE EXPANDING MANDATE OF THE COUNCIL

The mandate of the Arctic Council is undergoing great change and evolution. Although the Council emerged to facilitate as well as promote co-operation on environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic region, the mandate does not specifically limit its work to these two areas. The only issue off-limits to the Council is military security. In the past, the Council carried out mostly environmental work as it developed into a research institution that produced scientific reports and technical projects about the Arctic. In recent years, the mandate has functionally expanded in that it addresses more issues, namely economics and public safety, such as business representation, search and rescue and oil spill response. The mandate could expand further as states seek to exploit economic opportunity in the region.

This chapter answers the following question: why is the mandate of the Council evolving? “Mandate” refers to the types of issues states instruct the Council to address. The Council’s formal mandate has not changed. Rather, its informal mandate, or the types of issues it addresses, has expanded. This chapter explains changes in the Council’s mandate using neoliberal institutionalist theory, neorealist theory and functionalist theory. Functionalism would predict that an institution’s mandate would expand automatically due to state interest, issue spillover, institutional pressure or outsider lobbying. Neoliberal institutional theory would predict the institution’s mandate would expand when states stand to gain something through co-operation, particularly when the gain is economic, and also that the form of negotiation impacts outcomes. Neorealist theory would predict that the Council’s mandate would expand when doing so enhances relative gains and regional balance. The chapter concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, complimented with arguments from functionalism, provide the best explanation for the Council’s evolution and that the economic potential of the Arctic explains the mandate’s
growth. If the economic potential of the Arctic were not perceived to be increasing, the Council’s mandate would not expand. The central argument of this chapter is that the Arctic Council’s mandate is undergoing expansion and addressing more issues than ever before because the increasing economic potential of the Arctic region provides an incentive for states to co-operate and increase its work. In addition, the fact that the Council has demonstrated that it is competent to take on a greater range of issues and that interest groups effectively lobbied for mandate expansion contributed to growth. The first section details the theory employed in this chapter. The second section traces the evolution of the Council’s mandate from 1996 until 2013 to establish that the mandate has indeed undergone expansion. The third section explains the mandate’s evolution by reconciling trends in the Council’s history with the hypotheses of neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism.

This chapter contributes to the academic literature in three important ways. First, no existing work systematically examines and seeks to understand the current evolution of the Arctic Council’s mandate. In the study of the Council, a first group of authors focus on why it emerged, as seen in work by political scientist Oran Young,166 political scientist Olav Schram Stokke,167 American diplomat Evan Bloom,168 consultant Terry Fenge,169 political scientist Rob Huebert,170 historian John English171 and political scientist Timo Koivurova.172 These authors

169 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra,” Policy Options, April 2012, 64.
mostly view the institution as a research body that facilitates information sharing on environmental issues, occasionally inspiring action.\textsuperscript{173} A second group of authors, led by Timo Koivurova, disagree and view the Council as a norm-creation body that creates soft-law on environmental issues.\textsuperscript{174} This chapter argues that a new conceptualization of the Council as an economic facilitator is necessary.

Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body of work, especially the work of the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, argues the Council’s mandate should expand further,\textsuperscript{175} while some authors, especially work by Oran Young, argue it should maintain its current structure.\textsuperscript{176} This work largely ignores the political context of the Council. For example, political scientist Michael Byers advocates that the Council should create an oil spill prevention treaty, but does not examine why the Council rejected such a treaty when creating an oil spill response treaty.\textsuperscript{177} Other authors who advocate a greater role for the Council are cited in Chapter 1. This paper argues that subsequent mandate expansion is unlikely into policy areas without a strong economic imperative.


\textsuperscript{173} For example, Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13-14; Schram Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic, 402; Schram Stokke, “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions,” 10; Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712; Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64.

\textsuperscript{174} Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 150.


\textsuperscript{177} Byers, \textit{Circumpolar Challenges}, 22.
Third, this chapter contributes to literature that tests the explanatory reliability and validity of neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism. Case studies, such as this chapter, are necessary to prove the reliability and validity of theory. This chapter suggests the continued validity of neoliberal institutionalism, with some modification drawn from neorealism and functionalism.

2.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council

A series of predictions are necessary to provide a context to explain the evolution of the Council. Functionalism argues that institutions change without prompting and would make six predictions about Council evolution. The first four hypotheses explain state preferences, or why states want to evolve the Council. The fifth and sixth hypotheses predict outcomes of evolution.

**H1:** The Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding because all member states stand to make absolute material gains through automatic expansion.

Functionalists hold that the mandate of an institution will expand naturally when all states stand to gain something in a technical sense, such as a piece of information or capability that they would not otherwise have. According to functionalists, institutions will evolve without state prompting in a “self-sustaining” process. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism predict that states would have to change institutions deliberately and would co-operate for different reasons. According to functionalism, “Driving the alleged self-sustaining integration process was . . . a mechanism called ‘spillover,’ . . . whereby the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ to transfer policy-making in related sectors to the supranational level as

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well.” For example, states may desire to make gains by increasing trade with several countries and so an international institution will create a new free trade agreement. Creating a new free trade agreement means new trade routes might be necessary. Thus, the international institution would develop new trade routes, even though such work might be outside its original mandate. The development of these trade routes would be in the absolute interest of all member states. States will only act together when structural changes create unified preferences.

**H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.**

Functionalists argue that the Council’s mandate will expand because states seek to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal in a less political issue area, such as search and rescue or environmental monitoring. A less political issue area is a non-ideological issue, where actors generally agree on the overall goal. These are policy areas outside of vital state interest. The other theories studied would agree with this hypothesis, though functionalists emphasize this point. Other theories predict that states will be hesitant to co-operate in areas crucial to their interest, such as military security, since non-compliance could threaten state survival. Non-compliance with a search and rescue agreement, for example, would present problems but would not threaten state security. Evolution in response to less political issue areas is automatic. For example, one functionalist interpretation of the formation of the European Union is that, “rational-bureaucratic technocracy” was “a benevolent social driving force” behind the organization. Co-operation on less political issues can build trust that leads to co-operation on more political issues.

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180 Ibid.
182 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
183 Ibid.
H3: *The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without disruption.*

Functionalists would predict that mandate expansion would occur when the organization has a reasonable degree of autonomy from states. In the words of political scientists Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, “There is also a political spillover, whereby supranational institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making autonomy, resulting in a situation in which the supranational executive sets the political agenda and independently carries the integration process forward.” As stated by functionalist David Mitrany, “Every functional link helps to build up a common legal order.” The other two theories examined argue that international institutions cannot become fully independent actors. The process toward gaining independence proceeds in five stages. First, states create international institutions to accomplish technocratic tasks. Second, international institutions automatically address new issues as challenges arise. Third, states grant these institutions a certain degree of independence to ensure they can complete their tasks efficiently. Independent institutions also help ensure co-operation because states will be more likely to work together when no one state can dominate. Fourth, states give up their own ability to dominate in order to ensure co-operation. Independent institutions are more efficient because they can help mediate among states when new problems emerge and generate new ideas. Fifth, independence allows international organizations to set agendas and even demand co-operation or action. Institutions also can encourage co-operation in subtle ways, such as by gathering information and facilitating the emergence of new issues.

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184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid., 16-23.
190 Ibid.
**H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should expand.**

Functionalists would predict that interest groups and epistemic communities of individuals could help lobby states to increase the powers and responsibilities of the organization, as individuals can influence state policy.¹⁹¹ Individuals, epistemic communities and interest groups can bring information forward that impacts how states define their interests. Epistemic communities are groups of experts who share a common perspective on an issue. Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and expectations.”¹⁹² A difference between functionalism and the other theories is that functionalists hold that individuals or groups can influence states at the international level. For example, groups of individuals negatively impacted by climate change would demand institutional action to address the issue in the Arctic Council. Similarly, companies and individuals that can benefit from the economic opportunities of climate change would advocate the Arctic Council expand its mandate into the economic realm.

**H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.**

Functionalists assert “organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional powers”; hence, the fact the Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding indicates that it has proven it can execute its current mandate.¹⁹³ Governments want to entrust tasks to entities that can successfully complete those tasks. This idea contrasts with neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists, who privilege state interest for institutional expansion. For functionalists, mandate expansion is an evolutionary process as long as the institution is an effective one.¹⁹⁴

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¹⁹² Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.

¹⁹³ Imber, “Functionalism,” 293.

¹⁹⁴ Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently.

Functionalists would predict the Council is evolving automatically. As noted, on the international scene, new issues emerge that demand state response, which can create separate issues.¹⁹⁵ For example, climate change presents a challenge to states that the Council will automatically address, given its mandate to work on the Arctic environment. The issue also presents economic opportunities in the region as melting sea ice opens potential trade routes and unlocks resources. The Council will automatically address economic issues because of its other work on climate change, which leads to institutional mandate expansion into economic areas. Functionalists would predict this process should proceed without interruption, in contrast to the other theories studied that predict institutional expansion is a highly political process.

Neoliberal institutionalists would hold four hypotheses about the evolution of the Arctic Council’s mandate, based on their emphasis on the material interests of states. The first three hypotheses explain state preferences to evolve the Council, while the fourth explains outcomes.

H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.

Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states expand the Arctic Council’s mandate “when states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”¹⁹⁶ States define their interests rationally, focusing on material gains. As long as all states gain something through mandate expansion, or make an absolute gain, they will be likely to co-operate.¹⁹⁷ Functionalists expect states would co-operate to make absolute gains while neorealists expect co-operation to result in relative gains, defined later. For neoliberal institutionalists, the great powers of the Arctic (the United States and

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.
Russia) must gain something through co-operation. In addition, the likelihood of co-operation will be high because all of the countries involved face the “shadow of the future.” In other words, all of the states in the Arctic Council interact on a number of issues and are thus likely to need to co-operate in the future. These states will strive to maintain good relations in the present. In the case of the Arctic Council, the likelihood of co-operation will be high.

**H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.**

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that economic gains are a particularly potent motivation for international co-operation and Council evolution. All theories would agree with this point, though neoliberal institutionalists emphasize this type of co-operation to the greatest extent.

**H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal, tempered by path dependence and norms.**

The Council’s mandate should expand to fulfill shared state goals and provide a technical service. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states use international institutions to “provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.” Functionalists and neorealists mostly agree with this hypothesis. However, neoliberal institutionalists would expect that norms and path dependency impact institutional evolution. Norms refer to informal expectations and patterns of behaviour that states follow. Path dependency means that once a state invests resources in a project, it is unlikely to change course, even if it is clear the initial course of action was an unwise one. States will expand the Council’s mandate when it provides gains to states and no norms or path dependence holds evolution in check.

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200 Axelrod and Keohane, Achieving Co-operation under Anarchy,” 229.

**H4**: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that agency, or the form of negotiation (e.g. the type of interaction between states) has an impact on the outcomes of negotiations. Thus, the Council’s mandate is evolving in part due to the form of negotiation. States, non-governmental organizations, interest groups and epistemic communities bring forward information that states may find persuasive. Outcomes may not reflect the interests of great powers, as neorealist scholars would predict. Functionalists would expect automatic evolution. Even small states can exert and impact on negotiations based on the persuasiveness of the information they brings forward, their ability to ally with like-minded states to form coalitions and the effective employment of persuasive negotiation tactics.

Neorealists make three predictions that explain when an institution’s mandate would expand, based on their emphasis on the importance of state security. The first two hypotheses predict preferences while the third predicts outcomes.

**H1**: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate.

Neorealists would predict that relative gains, rather than absolute gains, would influence the evolution of the Council’s mandate. Relative gains refer to the notion that in interactions in which vital interests are a stake, states must gain more than rival states. Neoliberal institutionalists hold that in any interaction, a state will co-operate if it gains something, termed an absolute gain. Functionalists would emphasize absolute gains, as well. For neorealists, great powers would not agree to any change in the Council’s mandate if it had an impact on state security or its power relative to that of a rival. To quote neorealist scholar Robert Gilpin,

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“Realism assumes that national security is and always will be the principle concern of states.”

Participation in the Council needs to enhance states’ ability to survive and self-help in the international system. Thus, the mandate could not negatively impact state survival or security in any way. Economic gains enhance state security, as a good economy is necessary to maintain independence and self-help in the international system. The same is true of environmental considerations, as a healthy environment is likely necessary to maintain independence. Other sorts of considerations can be important to states, though security concerns will underpin any state interaction or instance of institutional evolution. Neorealists would predict that the Council would not exist at all if it negatively influenced state security, even with its work on environmental protection.

_H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region._

Neorealists would argue that states are evolving the mandate of the Council so the institution can maintain regional balance. A “balance” refers to a situation in which various coalitions of states have equal capabilities and thus will find conflict contrary to their interest. The Council could be an attempt to create balance against some external threat to the Arctic region or a coalition of powers in a different region, such as China. Alternatively, small powers could attempt to exert control over a great power within the Arctic. Neorealists argue that three tenets define the international system: statism, survival and self-help. They assert that states are the only important actors in the international system and fundamentally seek protection

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208 Ibid.
from external threats. Neorealists expect that states will expand or evolve the mandate of the Arctic Council to create a balance against an external or internal challenge, potentially environmental or economic, which neoliberal institutionalists and functionalists do not.

**H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers.**

Neorealists argue that great powers would not enter into the Arctic Council or allow its mandate to change unless it met the interests of these actors. Neoliberal institutionalists and functionalists do not make this prediction. The great powers will always be the most important actors in the international system. For instance, in the European Union, “the role of major political players, namely Germany, France and the United Kingdom, is central.” Great powers have greater economic and military power than smaller powers. These powers have less need to co-operate than do other powers and can demand that any co-operation reflect its interests.

We can review each theory by summarizing the question each theoretical lens attempts to answer. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s mandate evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution were not automatic or consistent. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s mandate to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution was in response to relative gains and the form of negotiation was not important. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if absolute gains motivated states, or if great power preference did not prevail in outcomes. Table 2.1 summarizes

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211 Dunne and Schmidt, “Realism,” 143.
the key variables examined in the analysis. Variables highlighted are key unique variables that prove or disprove the explanatory power of a theory.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1: Dependent and Independent Variables</th>
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<td>Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s mandate into economic and other areas</td>
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Necessary and sufficient conditions are highlighted because they are the key variables that will prove or disprove the predictions of the various theories.

2.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council

This section shows that the Council’s mandate expanded between 1996 and 2013. The Arctic Council’s mandate has proceeded to grow in four periods. During the first period, from 1991 until 1996, states co-operated on environmental issues in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). States and governments debated the merits of transforming the AEPS into a stronger institution that would address human security issues and perhaps military security. In the second period, from 1996 until 2004, the Council emerged as an institution to promote environmental protection and sustainable development. States and governments debated the definition of “sustainable development” and the place of military security within this
mandate. In the third period, from 2004 until 2007, Russia committed action to shift emphasis in the Council’s work to emergency preparedness from environmental protection and sustainable development. Environmental research was still a major part of the Council’s work as research revealed the problem of climate change in the Arctic region. In the fourth period, from 2008 until the present, the Council promoted economic growth, in addition to addressing environmental issues and sustainable development issues. The Arctic Council has evolved from an institution that promotes environmental conservation and sustainable development to an institution that also promotes regional economic growth, in response to opportunities created by climate change.

2.2.1 – 1991-1996

From 1991 until 1996, states debated the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and Council mandate. To establish that evolution in the Council’s mandate has taken place, it is necessary to understand the institution’s intended mandate at its founding. This subsection seeks to answer two questions. First, what was the intended mandate of the Council at its founding for each actor? Second, what were the major debates about the Council’s mandate?

In terms of the first question, all of the Arctic states intended and agreed that the Council mandate should have a strong environmental component because it was a successor to the AEPS, an environmental body in which states researched the extent of Arctic pollution. The AEPS emerged partly to encourage co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union following the Cold War, which led to the creation of the Council. As noted in Chapter 1, the United States and its western allies competed for global dominance with the Soviet Union and its eastern comrades from 1945 until 1991. The Arctic, lying between the two adversaries, would have been a theatre of combat in any military conflict. The United States counted four other Arctic countries as allies in its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective defence
regime, namely Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. Another Arctic country, Sweden, was formally neutral but more closely allied with the West than the East. The government of the other Arctic state, Finland, faced difficulty, as relations with its Russian neighbour were historically problematic. Finland was a colony of Russia for 108 years leading up to the First World War. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, which resulted in Finland losing a tenth of its territory after the war. Finland’s governments sought to maintain good relations with its neighbour throughout the Cold War by opting not to join NATO, while working to avoid being drawn behind the Iron Curtain. In the 1980s, the administration of hawkish United States President Ronald Reagan increased military spending and the Soviet economy under Premier Mikhail Gorbachev weakened. The United States increased its annual military spending to $456.5 billion in 1987 from $325.1 billion in 1980.212 The Soviet Union struggled to keep pace, leading to economic problems and contributing to its fall. Nuclear war seemed more likely than at any point since the 1960s as 1970s attempts to create détente faded.

Toward the later 1980s, the AEPS was created as hope increased that an Arctic governance institution could emerge with a collaborative, peace-building mandate. The United States Department of State issued an Arctic policy document in April 1983, the United States Arctic Policy, which indicated it was interested in expanding Arctic co-operation, though it did nothing to follow up on this statement.213 Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States subsequently worsened after the Soviet Union shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 on September 1, 1983. In 1985, political scientist Oran Young authored an article in Foreign Policy

magazine that called on states to proclaim the Arctic a “zone of peace.” On October 1, 1987, in the wake of the negotiation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a general improvement in Soviet-United States relations, a conciliatory Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk, Soviet Union, which echoed Young’s words by advocating making the Arctic a “zone of peace.” The government of Finland was inspired by these words and contacted foreign affairs departments in the Arctic states to convene a conference on this subject. There seemed to be a possibility in the late 1980s that an Arctic institution with a peace-building mandate could emerge, which incidentally led to the creation of the AEPS and Council.

These discussions lead to the AEPS and Council because there was also hope that an Arctic institution with an environmental mandate could emerge. Finnish policy-makers were particularly hopeful that collaboration on environmental protection could ease Cold War tensions. States first became aware of Arctic contamination problems due to observations by pilots flying over the Arctic in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Arctic states and indigenous groups were concerned after it became clear “that sloppy Russian workmanship has led to an increase in nuclear pollution in the environmentally sensitive Arctic Ocean.” The Soviet Union unsafely stored nuclear waste in the Kola Peninsula that borders Finland. The Soviet Union did not have regulations to govern the storage of the cancer causing industrial coolant polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) safely. In bilateral meetings, the government of Finland had difficulty convincing the Soviet Union to take action on this issue. On both issues, states knew the problem existed, but did not understand the extent of the problem. The environment emerged as

215 Gordon Foundation, A Brief History of the Creation of the Arctic Council (Toronto: Gordon Foundation, 2010), 1.
216 John English, Ice and Water, 108.
217 Interview with former United States Council delegation member and current environmental official, spring 2013.
218 Agence-France-Presse, news brief, September 19, 1996.
219 Interview with former United States Council delegation member and current environmental official, spring 2013.
220 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
an issue around which states could collaborate to ease Cold War tensions, which would set the stage for the emphasis on environmental protection in the Arctic Council.

The Council’s intended mandate emphasizes environmental protection because the AEPS emerged as an environmental organization. Relations between Cold War adversaries continued to improve as the Soviet Union began to dissolve after 1989. Finland successfully convened a conference on Arctic governance in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989 after two years of requests and letters sent to Arctic governments. It took so long to convene a conference because many Western policy-makers did not believe the sincerity of Gorbachev’s proposal, since he had not proposed to close the Soviet Union’s military installations in the Arctic, as noted in Chapter 1. International co-operation between East and West of this type was new and so state officials had low expectations for this meeting. Before the meeting, policy-makers mutually decided to work to take “co-operative measures to protect the Arctic environment.” After three further meetings, (April 1990 in Yellowknife, Canada, January 1991 in Kiruna, Sweden and June 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland) states created the AEPS. The AEPS was not an international institution, per se, but rather a research strategy. The meetings were not contentious, amid a spirit of co-operation. In addition, the AEPS was a scientific strategy that did not have the sorts of impacts on vital state interest that create contentious negotiations. States created four working groups, staffed by government scientists and experts from each Arctic country, to meet and compile research on Arctic environmental issues. The AEPS would hold bi-annual meetings of environment department officials to share findings. The four working groups were the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which compiled reports on the extent of Arctic pollution; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), which studied the health of

221 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991), 1.
plants and animals; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR), which prepared for potential emergency situations, such as an oil spill, and; the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), which monitored the extent of Arctic marine pollution. The AEPS came into being because it was not overly ambitious, but it compiled useful scientific information.

The AEPS led to the creation of the Council because within three years, state researchers had done a great deal of work to establish the extent of Arctic pollution, which provided the impetus to continue this work in the Arctic Council. The AEPS found more than 180,000 tonnes of PCB fluids had been produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, without safe storage or disposal facilities.\(^{222}\) The process to create the Council began as state policy-makers informally debated how to continue and formalize this work. The prospect of an Arctic international institution was on the agenda, prompted by Gorbachev’s earlier proposal for an Arctic zone of peace. Canada came to champion a weakened version of a 1991 proposal from the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) that called for the creation of a formal Arctic international organization to promote the region as a zone of peace.\(^{223}\) The ICC’s President, Mary Simon, had some influence in the 1990s Canadian Liberal government, as she had represented the Inuit during the 1982 repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the negotiation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. As detailed by John English, she pressed Canada to establish the Council during her various interactions with the government during the early 1990s and helped organize a conference on the proposal in 1992.\(^{224}\) The process leading to the creation of the Council began in 1995, during a meeting in Ottawa between United States President Bill Clinton


\(^{224}\) English, *Ice and Water*, 172.
and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Chretien proposed the creation of the Arctic Council. Clinton agreed to discuss the issue and so Canadian officials sent communications to the other Arctic state foreign affairs departments, which also agreed to discuss creating a council. Policy-makers in the Nordic countries in particular were enthusiastic about the prospect of an Arctic council. Russian policy-makers were more reluctant, but agreed to discuss the idea. State delegations attempted to negotiate the creation of a formal Arctic international organization outside of AEPS meetings and through teleconferencing during 1995, as well as a round of negotiations in Ottawa during June, with the goal of seeing the AEPS transition from a strategy to an international institution by the end of that year. As is evident in subsequent chapters, contentious issues emerged in these early negotiations, which continue in the Council to this day. This chapter limits its focus to contentions over the mandate.

The Nordic governments strongly intended that the Council’s mandate have a strong environmental component. The major reason these states supported a Council is that their policy-makers sought to force Russia to address environmental issues. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic states had a desire to address pollution in the Russian Arctic, having received troubling information about the unsafe storage of nuclear and other waste materials after the end of the Cold War. However, contaminants and persistent organic pollutants (POP) from Russia affected the Nordic countries more than North America, particularly Finland and Norway, given these countries’ proximity. One policy-maker summarized, “I felt the leading countries

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225 Ibid., 202.
227 Interview with former United States delegation member and current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) official, spring 2013.
228 Christopher Cuddy, PAME contributor and former Canadian delegation member, February 21, 2013.
230 Interview with former United States Council delegation member and current environmental research official, spring 2013.
[in negotiations] were in Scandinavia.” The force of the scientific evidence about environmental problems in Russia gave the Nordic countries, as well as Canada and the United States, a powerful bargaining chip to push for an Arctic council.

Canada, the United States and the Nordic countries also intended that the Council have an environmental mandate because many policy-makers had a concern that Russia did not want to address environmental issues. Arctic environmental policy-makers believed that Russians had the weakest environmental awareness of any Arctic country. Russian officials were “extremely nonchalant,” with the misguided belief that “Russia is a gigantic country” too large to suffer serious environmental damage. The Russian economy went through a depression following the collapse of the Soviet Union as gross domestic product fell by more than fifty per cent during the 1990s. The Russian government closed half its Arctic environmental monitoring stations, amid budget shortfalls. The top priority for Russian policy-makers became the country’s economic recovery.

Policy-makers outside Russia intended a Council with an environmental mandate for fear that many Russian officials opposed environmental action, as environmentalists were at the forefront of the country’s democracy movement. International Russian experts believed, “A lot of the constituency for democratic reform came from the environmental community” because after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster it was clear “that the Russian regime was ignoring Russia’s many environmental problems.” In 1996, as the Council was coming into being, the Russian government “downgraded” its environmental department from a ministry to a less-powerful

231 Interview with former United States Council delegation member and current environmental official, spring 2013.
232 Interview with former United States Council delegation member and current environmental official, spring 2013.
234 Interview with Russian government environmental researcher and former delegation member, summer 2013.
235 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
“state committee.” In 2008, the Russian government combined the committee with the Ministry of Natural Resources to become the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment. A United States expert on Russia and Arctic policy-maker summarized,

There was a growing pressure to tame this environmental beast that had politically been very important when the Soviet Union disappeared. As time went on, they made too many enemies within the power structures and largely industrial corporations . . . Since then, we’ve been watching very closely how Russia tries to manage its environmental policy functions.

Experts within the Arctic governments believed that “major oligarchs and industrial concerns” in Russia did not favour “any kind of strong environmental regulatory body coming out of Moscow.” The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to capitalism led to privatization of natural resources and former state business that created a class of wealthy business people in the country unprecedented in Russian history. Policy-makers outside Russia saw this class as hostile to environmental regulation. Economic concern and the importance of Russia as a regional player could have given it a strong bargaining chip to resist Arctic governance.

Canada intended to create a Council with an environmental mandate, but it also intended that the Council find a way to formally consider the views of Northerners on Arctic governance and include a “human dimension” in the work of the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations also intended that an Arctic council include human security issues. Canada and the indigenous peoples’ organizations, particularly the ICC, became allies in the 1995 Council negotiations.

Indigenous peoples’ organizations first put human security issues on the AEPS agenda, which

236 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
237 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
238 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
239 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
241 Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
242 Russel Shearer, AMAP chair, February 19, 2013; In addition, according to a former high-ranking United States Arctic official and delegation member, during 1995 and 1996 negotiations, Canada proposed calling the Council the Arctic Sustainable Development Program.
243 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and aboriginal affairs official, winter 2013.
led to a question as to the role of such issues in a new Arctic council. The three major indigenous peoples’ organizations that existed in 1991 participated in the AEPS as observers, namely the ICC, Saami Council and Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). These groups and their members believed that it was unacceptable that they shared the same status as non-Arctic states in the AEPS even though they represented northern indigenous peoples. The three indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully organized a private meeting with the Arctic states to argue that they should have a special status in the AEPS. This meeting occurred during the September 1993 AEPS ministerial overview meeting in Nuuk, Greenland. The Arctic states agreed that these groups would have the right to attend every AEPS meeting. Observers could only attend the meetings to which states invited them. At the September 1993 meeting, the permanent participants used the authority granted by the new status to pressure states to address human security in the AEPS. In response, at the same AEPS meeting, states created the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization to address human security under the rubric of sustainable development. This work by indigenous peoples’ organizations put human issues onto the agenda for a new Arctic Council. As one Arctic policy-maker summarized, “Once you started to set up a structure to address sustainable development . . . it starts to take on a life of its own.” Canada championed this cause for two reasons. The first factor was the domestic importance of the ICC. In 1994, as Canada began to consider the notion of an Arctic Council anew, it appointed Mary Simon as its first circumpolar ambassador and subsequently as its chief negotiator to create the new council. Second, much of the Nordic interest in Arctic governance stemmed from European environmental problems. Adding

245 Shadian, The Politics of Arctic Sovereignty, 117.
246 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
sustainable development to the Council could help orient it toward projects of more interest to North America. Canada held a bargaining chip in negotiations: the support of northern residents in the three indigenous peoples’ organizations.

In terms of the second major question about the Council’s mandate, two debates emerged as negotiations to create the Council began in 1995. The first debate concerned the role of human security in the new institution. Two alignments developed, amid differing state intentions for the creation of a new Council. In the first alignment, Russia and the United States did not support the concept. The United States’ policy-makers were leery of the political consequences of an emphasis on sustainable development. The AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization undertook controversial work soon after its founding. In 1995, the ICC brought a project to the task force called *Collapse of the Seal Skin Market*, which discussed the 1972 United States Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products, as well as various economic hardships in Inuit communities.247 Earlier, in a 1985 report, the ICC had slammed the *Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act*, the major United States land claims act, as an act of assimilation by the United States government against the Inuit.248 Further, Canada had appointed the president of the ICC as its lead negotiator to create a Council. Policy-makers in the United States government came to fear a potential Arctic council as a venue to air grievances against the United States’ Arctic activities and challenge its national sovereignty.249 Russia did not strongly support adding sustainable development to the Council’s mandate due to a lack of understanding of the concept.250 During the September 1993 discussions of whether to create a sustainable development task force in the AEPS, Russian policy-makers were unfamiliar with the

247 The report was published under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization.
248 *English, Ice and Water*, 190.
249 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
250 Interview with former United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
meaning of the term and even had trouble translating it into Russian. In the second alignment, as noted, Canada and the indigenous peoples’ organizations supported adding it to the Council mandate, as did the Nordic states. As previously stated, Canada supported the concept in deference to indigenous peoples’ preference and to ensure the work of the Council was not too focused on European issues. The Nordic countries joined Canada’s alignment and supported adding human security and sustainable development to the Council in 1995. The concept of sustainable development in part arose due to the United Nations Commission on the Environment and Development headed by a former Prime Minister of Norway, which resulted in the October 1987 Brundtland Report. Subsequently, all of the Nordic delegations supported work on sustainable development at the 1993 Rio Earth Summit. Sustainable development was part of the mandate of another Arctic governance institution made up of the Nordic countries, the Nordic Council of Ministers. Some policy-makers have explained the Nordic promotion of sustainable development as “ideological imperialism.” Despite uniformly being “very progressive on climate issues,” the Nordic countries have different interests, with different histories, economic systems, resources, access to waterways, international obligations, and interest in Arctic resource development. No doubt important was the fact that, as the ICC and its leader Mary Simon was important in Canada, so too was the Saami Council important in the Nordic states (save Iceland).

The second debate emerged over the role of security in the new mandate of the organization. There were no major military security issues among the Arctic states in the 1990s,
save for some relatively minor disagreements over the legal status of some maritime areas, certainly not issues to spark an arms race or armed conflict. Nonetheless, security had been a factor in the creation of the AEPS, stemming from calls to make the Arctic a “zone of peace” and so a question naturally emerged as to whether it was appropriate to add security to the new mandate. In 1995, Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding military security to the mandate of the new organization, while Russia and the United States did not. Canada and the Nordic countries supported a strong and flexible Council that could respond to a wide variety of Arctic issues as they emerged. The United States and Russia feared the sovereignty ramifications of including military security in the Council mandate and any placing of limits on its sovereignty.

Throughout the 1995 negotiations, which occurred mostly around AEPS meetings held in Canada that year, these mandate debates hampered progress. Officials in Canada and the Nordic countries wanted a Council and so were willing to compromise, despite environmental concern and the force of indigenous activism. The United States’ refusal to compromise became the biggest obstacle to creating a Council. To other state delegations, this opposition was surprising, given that the new Council would adopt the “architecture of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,” which the United States supported. In addition, the United States government supported international action on Russian environmental problems. However, United States policy-makers were leery of a Council for three reasons, beyond questions of including sustainable development in the mandate. First, during preparatory meetings for the 1995 negotiations, some policy-makers in the United States questioned whether a regional

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259 For a description, see Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation: What is Canada For? (Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007).
260 Interview with former United States State Department delegation member and current consultant, spring 2013.
261 Terry Fenge, representative for Arctic Athabaskan Council and formerly Inuit Circumpolar Council, February 21, 2013.
organization would be effective when other international environmental organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, already existed.\textsuperscript{262} Second, some United States officials questioned whether a regional council was necessary because the solutions to environmental issues required a transboundary approach, working in concert with the entire world community.\textsuperscript{263} Third, the Arctic was not a priority area for the United States government during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{264} In the absence of a formal policy on the region, the United States government was “legalistic” in its approach to the Council, concerned with the legal obligations and ramifications of an Arctic international institution.\textsuperscript{265} The United States’ size as a regional actor and its staunch concerns over sovereignty gave it a powerful bargaining chip. Canada and the Nordic countries wanted a Council. The United States was willing to walk away from negotiations.

The Council’s mandate resulted from a compromise over a separate issue in the process of negotiations. Canada had hoped to wrap up negotiations quickly and informally, but this goal proved unrealistic. Canada and the United States organized three major rounds of negotiations in Ottawa throughout 1996 (in April, June and August). As further detailed in Chapter 7, Canada and the Nordic countries wanted the permanent participants to be full members of the Council, which the United States and Russia opposed. This discussion dominated the April meetings. The negotiation process that led to the creation of the Council’s mandate unfolded in three stages. In June, Canada and the United States held one-on-one meetings at the larger negotiations. First, the Canadian delegation proposed a compromise on the issue of indigenous representation that influenced the Council’s mandate, namely to drop military security from the mandate in

\textsuperscript{262} Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013
\textsuperscript{263} Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
\textsuperscript{264} Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{265} Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
exchange for the United States agreeing to add indigenous peoples’ organizations as second-tier “permanent participant” Council members equal to states in all areas except voting rights. In addition, sustainable development would be part of the mandate. The United States delegation agreed to this compromise, content that Canada acceded to its security concerns. Second, Canada brought the proposal to a closed-door meeting with the three indigenous peoples’ organizations. In past international negotiations, some indigenous officials feared that an emphasis on “sustainable development” could create projects that would challenge traditional economies, though in this meeting delegations decided to take that risk to ensure the Council included a “human” emphasis. Third, after indigenous approval, the Nordic officials agreed to the proposal, seeing that without this compromise, the Arctic Council would not come into being. Russian officials agreed to this compromise, as well, somewhat leery at the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Council but enthusiastic over the prohibition on security issues. The inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Council as members assured that human issues would be part of the new organization, as these groups would not allow the exclusion of such issues. The compromise over their inclusion led to an agreement over the Council’s mandate and temporarily settled discussions over the place of sustainable development and military security.

The United States accepted Canada’s compromise for three reasons. First, delegates agreed that the willingness of Canada and the Nordic countries to compromise on the organization’s new mandate created a Council that suited the United States’ interest. It would not address military security issues that could impact United States sovereignty. Second, the United

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267 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and government researcher, winter 2013.
States’ delegates saw that the Council could facilitate useful information sharing between the Arctic countries. Inter-departmental meetings in the lead-up to the 1996 negotiations saw policy-makers realize a benefit to international co-operation. In 1996, it was necessary to share information such as health statistics through international institutions or costly research, a fact that may be difficult to appreciate in the Internet age. Such comparative information is useful in construction of policy. Today, that information is widely available online, but in 1996, it was not. Third, the research conducted by AEPS had raised the profile of the Arctic region. There was a concern among some policy-makers that in the absence of a response to Arctic pollution, other United Nations bodies, such as its environmental program, could increase their attention on the Arctic region. The creation of the Arctic Council was partly to prevent other institutions from gaining a foothold in Arctic governance. Canada proposed a compromise that suited the interest of the United States.

Why did Russia support the Council’s environmental and sustainable development mandate, given that the environment was not a priority area for the Russian government in the 1990s? There were two major reasons. First, Russia faced international pressure to address environmental pollution (as seen in Finland’s lobbying for the AEPS) and the Council was a way to respond to that pressure. As the Council was a relatively weak organization, it would not hamper Russian sovereignty. Second, throughout negotiations, policy-makers realized action on the environment attracted needed international funding and investment in Russia, which it partially re-directed to non-environmental projects. For example, at the September 1996 inaugural Arctic Council meeting, Russia announced a “regional program of action” on

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268 Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
269 Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
270 Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
271 Christopher Cuddy, PAME contributor and former Canadian delegation member, February 21, 2013.
biodiversity, a project under the CAFF working group. The specifics of the project were vague. The project got underway in November 1999, after securing funds from Norway ($45,000) and the United Nations’ Global Environmental Facility funding agency, which would eventually total millions of dollars. Russia updated the Council 11 times in the next 12 years about the project, a particularly long time for an Arctic Council project, yet did not deliver specific, strong results.²⁷³ The United States, in particular, privately had evidence that elements in the Russian government were re-directing some of the funds into other, non-environmental projects.²⁷⁴ Fears over corruption and wasted resources in Russia prompted the United States to help form the ACAP working group in 2006 to deal with contaminants.²⁷⁵ Russia held a similar bargaining chip to the United States as a large regional player, willing to walk away from negotiations. The Council mandate agreed upon suited Russian interests.

States created the Council with a mandate to facilitate co-operation on environmental protection and sustainable development. With the issue of permanent participants settled, states straightforwardly negotiated the structure of the Council in August and September 1996 (its founding meeting).²⁷⁶ The Council was different from the AEPS because the former 1) was to be a permanent institution; 2) was run by the foreign affairs ministries of the Arctic states while the ministries of the environment had run the AEPS, and; 3) was to promote sustainable development as well as environmental protection, through the creation of the new Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).²⁷⁷ Some state officials and permanent participant

²⁷⁴  Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
²⁷⁵  Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
²⁷⁷  Terry Fenge, representative for Arctic Athabaskan Council and formerly Inuit Circumpolar Council, February 21, 2013.
delegates thought the Council was simply “the AEPS with a new name.”

Other policy-makers were optimistic and believed that sustainable development would be a “pillar” of the institution, equal to the environment. One could argue that “sustainable development” suffered a setback due to the creation of the Council, because the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization folded in favour of the new SDWG. The SDWG would start again at a beginning, constructing a new mandate and developing new projects. The work of creating the Council was not fully complete before its official launch in September 1996. At that meeting, the Council set three goals for its first years of existence: 1) to draft rules of procedure, 2) to shut down the AEPS and assume all of its work, and 3) to develop the terms of reference and mandate of the Council’s sustainable development program, under the newly created SDWG.

In review, this subsection sought to answer two major questions: 1) what was the intended mandate of the Arctic Council, and; 2) what were the major issues and alignments pertaining to the Council’s mandate? The Arctic Council’s mandate is to facilitate co-operation on environmental issues and sustainable development. There were two major debates during negotiations to create the Council. First, states debated the extent of human security and sustainable development in the Council’s mandate. Second, states debated whether the Council’s mandate should include military security issues. Canada and the Nordic countries wanted the Council to address security issues and take strong action on sustainable development. The United States and Russia were willing to walk away from the Council if need be, as both opposed these notions. Why did the preferences of some prevail over those of others? Who exerted most

influence? The United States and Russia emerged as the major winners, as these countries were able to ensure that the Council was not an overly strong body, with a limited mandate focused on the environment and the vague notion of sustainable development. The Council would not address security issues, as per their request. The United States exerted the most influence, because it was unwilling to compromise and, as a large regional player, was a leader in negotiations. The Nordic countries also could claim victory. The major goal of these countries was to create a Council focused on the environment, which was the outcome of negotiations. However, the Council was weaker than these countries would have liked, as it did not address military security issues. The Nordic countries exerted less influence than did the United States. Canada exerted less influence because it gave priority to creating the Council and hence it was willing to compromise, in contrast to the hard-line positions taken by the United States and Russia. The Council did not have an overly strong human element and would not take up security issues, as Canada envisioned. The Council ultimately emerged as a reasonably weak environmental body.

Returning to the literature, authors who write about the Arctic Council correctly identify the institution as an environmental research body after its founding, based on states’ decision to carry on the work of the AEPS in the Council. Its mandate does not invest the institution with specific powers beyond this role and it did not obviously emerge as a soft-law body. These authors do not discuss efforts by Canada and the Nordic states to have the Council become more than a research body and the political struggle surrounding the founding and the mandate of the institution. Historian John English’s *Ice and Water* notes political division but questionably gives

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283 For example, Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13-14; Schram Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic, 402; Schram Stokke, “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions,” 10; Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712; Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64; Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 150.
much credit for the founding of the Council to advocacy groups and the leadership of the
government of Canada, underestimating reasons for the creation of the Council favoured by
European countries and the United States, as this section demonstrates.\textsuperscript{284} English’s work posits
that Canada created an Arctic council due to lobbying by interest groups, but does not explain
why Canada found their ideas compelling and why other countries went along with Canada’s
ideas.\textsuperscript{285} English particularly credits the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Canadian Arctic
Resources Committee and the Gordon Foundation with promoting the idea of a council.\textsuperscript{286} This
section demonstrates that the Council came into being for a number of reasons, including a desire
to foster post-Cold War peace, a desire to address problems in the Russian environment and a
need to share information about the Arctic region. It also demonstrates that policy-makers
wanted to formalize the governance that was occurring in the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy. Furthermore, Canada was not the only country that showed leadership in the creation of
the Council. The Nordic states were supportive and influential. The Council emerged as an
environmental body through a political process of contentious negotiations relating to the interest
of all Arctic states.

\textbf{2.2.2 – 1996-2004}

The Council’s mandate appeared settled in 1996, but debates continued from 1996 to
2004. This section seeks to answer two questions. First, what evolution took place in the
Council’s mandate between 1996 and 2004? Second, how did the debate evolve and what
explains this evolution?

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{284} English, \textit{Ice and Water}.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In terms of the first question, little evolution took place after 1996 because states agreed on the Council’s basic mandate following the negotiations to create the institution. In 1998, the Arctic Council articulated its formal mandate in the *Iqaluit Declaration*. Delegations wrote this mandate at Council meetings in Canada in May and August 1998. The policy-making process was straightforward and did not see disagreements over the mandate, as states and permanent participants had agreed in principle to the content in 1996. The declaration states that the Arctic Council’s goal is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States” and emphasizes that this should be “with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”

The mandate does not preclude discussion of any issue except for the vacuous concept of “military security,” indicating that it could discuss other types of security. In places, the declaration emphasizes the advocacy and informational role of the Arctic Council. It says that a goal is to “disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.” From this wording, it is clear that states did not intend that the Council be a policy-making instrument. The mandate is broad because it does not define the contentious concept of “sustainable development,” but says the Council will focus on “areas of Arctic children and youth, health, telemedicine, resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology transfer to improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development strategies.” Its formal mandate is broad, though, as the next paragraph shows, the informal mandate of the Council has become more focused and has changed considerably.

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288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
Most of the Council’s concrete work in 1999 and 2000 was on environmental issues. Action on sustainable development was not as strong as it is today because the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) was constructing its mandate. To give a few examples, on the environmental front, in 1999 Norway promoted the development of a strategy and related projects to clean up pollution in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{291} In 2000, work began on the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA), which is a major scientific report on climate change. At the May 2000 meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group announced several new projects,\textsuperscript{292} while the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group\textsuperscript{293} and the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working groups\textsuperscript{294} were busy executing a pre-set research agenda. The SDWG did not complete any concrete projects as it dealt with institutional organizing. Not every project proceeded smoothly. States worked on an emergency preparedness project to study the threat of oil spills in the Arctic, but the commitment was weak. At the May 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the minutes state, “Norway noted that they are the lead country for the project on a circumpolar map of resources at risk from oil spills in the Arctic, stating that the deadline for countries to contribute information was March 1 and that only Norway had responded to date.”\textsuperscript{295} This project was unambitious, an example of information sharing. States did not respond quickly to even this low-level Council project, a sign the commitment to such issues was weak.


In regards to the second question pertaining to debates about the evolution of the Council’s mandate, two issues emerged. The first concerned the exact meaning of “sustainable development.” At two Council meetings in May and August 1998, Council states negotiated the sustainable development mandate. In this era of the Council, Russian officials singled out the necessity of economic development, while Europeans favoured environmental protection, with North Americans falling somewhere in between. These preferences reflected the interests of Arctic states during the negotiations to create the Council. Russia faced economic problems, while Nordic governments feared environmental pollution from Russia. North America did not face the same consequences of these issues. In the May and August negotiations, the Nordic countries wanted a set of “shared priorities” for sustainable development, while the United States and Russia favoured the creation of a set of technical projects. Russia was largely silent in this debate, allowing the United States delegation to lead the push for a project-based approach. The Canadian delegation advocated for an emphasis on “capacity building,” or the notion that the SDWG should give northerners the ability to be “authors of their own development.” Why did states hold these positions? The United States and Russian preferred to create a weaker working group, which reflects concerns about challenges posed by a sustainable development program. Canada sought to strengthen the influence of the permanent participants in the Council. Delegations did not wish to be acrimonious so early in the history of the Council and so, in these negotiations, worked to accommodate each other’s concerns. The terms of reference states created do not define “sustainable development,” but say the goal of the SDWG is to “foster

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296 Fenge, “The Arctic Council: Past, Present, and Future,” 16. The United States preferences and the debate over the meaning of sustainable development were also emphasized in two interviews with former high-ranking United States foreign affairs delegation members.

297 Interview with current Finnish foreign affairs official and former Council delegation member, summer 2013.


sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being.”

It reflects the United States and Russia’s desire for a project-oriented SDWG, calling on the group “to propose and adopt steps to be taken by the Arctic States to advance sustainable development in the Arctic.” In October 2000, at the Council Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council states articulated a set of priority projects, in fulfilment of the wishes of the Nordic governments. These areas are capacity building, health, education, children and youth, natural living resources and infrastructure development. The inclusion of capacity building reflected Canada’s preferences.

The Canadian government wanted “capacity building” to be a theme for all sustainable development work and undertook two projects to promote it. First, at the October 2000 Ministerial Meeting, Canadian policy-makers authored and presented a report outlining what “capacity building” entails. Examples of projects to enhance sustainable development were to create a summer camp, art projects, information materials, internships and other tangible initiatives for northern residents. Second, Canada and Finland hosted a workshop on capacity building in Helsinki, Finland, in November 2001. In June 2001, at a Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Iceland’s delegation said it would make sustainable development a priority during its term as chair. At the end of 2002, states urged “all subsidiary bodies of the Arctic Council to

301 Arctic Council, Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development Program (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998).
302 Ibid.
306 Arctic Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers (Inari, Finland: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2002). Canada also sponsored a project on The Future of Children and Youth of the Arctic in 2004, creating internships for young people.
take capacity building into account in all their activities,” though this statement did not constitute a formal requirement. “

Some policy-makers felt that the SDWG became a venue for state projects that did not fit elsewhere in the Council, in response to different state interests. Yet, Canada initiated some projects that reflected its desire for a “capacity building” approach.

In total, the Council launched 57 projects from 1998 until 2004, or about 11 projects per working group. About eighty percent of this work was environmental in nature. The Council held 19 meetings between 1996 and 2004. At meetings, states reviewed project proposals by working groups and gave feedback. Working groups and government scientists completed projects between meetings, such as reports, assessments and technical initiatives, such as workshops. The Council completed three major projects from 1998 until 2004, namely: 1) *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, completed in 2004 by the CAFF and the PAME; 2) the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, completed by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which was a technical project that sought to clean up the results of the 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, and; 3) the *Arctic Human Development Report*, completed by the SDWG, which compiled social statistics comparing the Arctic regions. By 2002, even Russia promoted sustainable development and argued, “The work carried out in the SDWG was of utmost importance to the whole Council because of the human aspect.”

As a brief aside, the resulting mandate for the SDWG is quite broad, especially compared to the other working groups that have a clear set of activities. The notion of “sustainable development” is open to multiple interpretations, while other working groups have a clearer set

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309 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
310 Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Inari, Finland, October 7-8, 2002* (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2002).
of priorities. The AMAPs activities focus on monitoring Arctic pollution. The AMAP is arguably the most active working group. It has completed major projects on PCBs, radioactivity, climate change, acidification, Arctic haze, mercury and others, many of which have policy recommendations. The CAFF focuses on monitoring biodiversity in the Arctic, as seen in such projects as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment. In the past, it has completed work on an Arctic species trend index, various assessments on Arctic seabirds and flora, among other projects. It contributed to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment along with the AMAP and the SDWG. The EPPR focuses on Arctic emergencies. It has produced numerous reports about risks and trends in shipping, the potential for oil spills and search and rescue capabilities. It has organized various “tabletop” exercises to plan for Arctic emergencies. The PAME focuses on trends in Arctic shipping and marine pollution. It is responsible for the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, a major initiative that the Council adopted in 2004. This project has spawned numerous follow-up reports and subsequent work to assess the present and future of Arctic shipping. The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have had a contained set of activities.

Meanwhile, even today, the SDWG’s activities fall into four broad categories. First, some of its projects focus on social issues faced by Arctic residents, such as information on suicide prevention and the status of women. Second, some of its projects concern traditional northerner and aboriginal lifestyles, such as projects on compiling information about the threat to

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311 Russel Shearer, AMAP chair, February 19, 2013.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
traditional knowledge from climate change and the preservation of traditional languages.\textsuperscript{321} Third, some focus on indigenous health, such as projects on the state of circumpolar health, circumpolar nutrition, a survey of living conditions in the Arctic, a project on controlling infectious disease and attempts to implement telemedicine programs.\textsuperscript{322} Fourth, some of its projects are about general Arctic economic issues, such as a summit on Arctic energy, reports on the state of the northern economy and reports on issues in traditional economies such as reindeer herding.\textsuperscript{323} Each of these broad sets of activities could warrant a working group in itself. There is more focus in the group today, as much of its activity focuses on understanding the threats and opportunities from climate change on Northerners, though certainly there are projects outside of this theme.\textsuperscript{324} According to policy-makers within the group, the general approach of the SDWG has been to take on a variety of projects that could be of value to northern residents.\textsuperscript{325} The group has tried to avoid discussions of the definition of sustainable development, as well as the group’s mandate, and focused on achieving outcomes.\textsuperscript{326} The SDWG has had a broad set of activities that reflect the fact that states have had a difficult time defining and understanding what constitutes sustainable development.

The second debate over the Council’s mandate occurred at the November 1999 Arctic Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska. It concerned the flexibility of the Council’s mandate. At this meeting, the United States delegation included a representative from the United States military to give a presentation on a joint project with Russia called the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Group.\textsuperscript{327} The presentation was strictly for information and it would not result in

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{325} Russel Shearer, AMAP chair, February 19, 2013.
\textsuperscript{326} Russel Shearer, AMAP chair, February 19, 2013.
\textsuperscript{327} Arctic Council, \textit{Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Highlights, November 17-19, 1999}. 
Council action. When the agenda item came up, the Canadian delegation immediately vetoed discussion of the matter, before other countries could comment, because the program concerned military security. Why would Canada block the discussion of security issues when it, along with the Nordic countries, had pressed the United States and Russia to discuss military issues in the new Arctic Council? United States policy-makers did not intend to add military security to the Council’s mandate, but the presentation could have set a precedent to do so in the future. This precedent could have one day suited Canada’s interests. The Canadian delegation decided to block the United States’ presentation in retribution for what it perceived as a disruptive use of the rules of procedure by United States delegations. Canadian policy-makers perceived that United States officials were strictly interpreting the mandate. For example, the United States had insisted that the Council fully develop its rules of procedure before the institution undertook any substantive work, against Canada’s preference to move forward with substantive work. As noted, the United States was “legalistic” early in the Council. The delegation from Canada wanted to signal that it too could strictly interpret the Council mandate and subvert the will of the United States’ policy-makers. Canadian policy-makers determined that sending this message was more important than a precedent to add security to the agenda. Canadian policy-makers believed the Council had a significant mandate without considering traditional security. Security was not a priority for countries in the Council as there were no pressing issues and it was a small, inexperienced international body. Even though the presentation was strictly for information purposes, Canadian policy-makers believed the Council should avoid discussions of security.

328 Ibid.
329 Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
330 Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
331 Interview with former senior United States State Department official, winter 2013.
332 Eight former government officials from the United States and Canada made this comment during interviews in winter and spring 2013, namely officials in respective foreign affairs and environment departments.
In sum, this section explained the evolution of debates around the Council’s mandate during the period from 2004 until 2007. The Council successfully completed its environmental mandate, completing more than 40 research and technical projects dealing with the environment. Two debates emerged over the Council’s mandate. First, states debated the content of the Council’s sustainable development program, with the United States and Russia favouring a series of technical projects, the Nordic countries favouring a set of shared priorities and Canada pushing for a capacity-building approach. The result was a mandate that attempted to incorporate every country’s viewpoint. The second was over the role of military security in the Council, with Canada vetoing a discussion of military security to ensure the institution maintained a workable mandate. These findings support the conclusions of authors, such as Oran Young, who classify the Council as a research institution from 1996 until 2004.

2.2.3 – 2004-2007

From 2004 until 2007, the Council’s mandate shifted significantly as the Council began to address emergency preparedness issues. This section seeks to answer two questions: 1) at what point did changes in the mandate of the Council take place, and; 2) what explains these key changes? The Council’s mandate shifted in 2004 after the release of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, which made states aware of the new economic opportunities resulting from climate change in the Arctic region. All of the Arctic states and even the permanent participants supported this shift in the Council’s mandate, though Russia strongly proposed the new emphasis on economic issues through its promotion of co-operation on emergency preparedness. Nonetheless, the Council’s shift was not as profound as it may appear, as the majority of the Council’s work continued to focus on environmental issues.
In 2004, the Council released the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA), which changed the Council and its mandate. The report argued that climate change would present profound challenges for the Arctic. The United States proposed the project at the 2000 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, which won the enthusiastic backing of all of the Council countries.\textsuperscript{333} The United States delegation proposed the project due to a general desire to know more about climate change, especially given the interest in Alaska, as well as in fulfillment of its perceived obligations to the international community and Council to be a leader on issues of global consequence.\textsuperscript{334} Scientists and academics from all Council members wrote the text of the report over the next four years, with annual updates to the Council on progress.\textsuperscript{335} The United States provided core funding for the project and an American researcher, Robert Corell, organized the research. Funding continued even as Republican George W. Bush succeeded the Democrat Bill Clinton as president, although the former was not reputed to be a supporter of work on climate change. The United States under the Bush Administration still wanted to obtain information on climate change and to appear to fulfill international obligations to address it.\textsuperscript{336} Another reason the report moved forward is that there was also pressure to continue its funding among Alaskan policy-makers, a state with a strong Republican character.\textsuperscript{337} It was a landmark report that changed the Council.\textsuperscript{338}

The ACIA made states and permanent participants aware of a variety of environmental issues in the Arctic. It found that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost

\textsuperscript{333} Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska.*
\textsuperscript{334} Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{335} For example, see Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Meeting, Espoo, Finland, November 6-7, 2001: Minutes* (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2001); Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, April 9-10, 2003: Minutes.* (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2003).
\textsuperscript{336} Interview with former United States delegation member and current EPA official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{337} Interview with former United States delegation member and government of Alaska official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{338} For example, five former Canadian delegation members expressed this view during interviews during winter 2013, including two foreign affairs officials, two environment officials and one aboriginal affairs official.
twice the rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with “Arctic warming of about 4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.” It also found that, “Permafrost has warmed by up to 2 degrees C in recent decades.” The report concluded, “Arctic precipitation has increased by about eight per cent on average over the past century.” In addition, “The average extent of sea-ice cover in summer has declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.” Due to climate change in the Arctic, “global and Arctic sea level has risen 10-20 centimetres in the past 100 years” while “about an additional half metre of sea-level rise (with a range of 10 to 90 centimetres) is projected to occur during this century.” It concluded that, “For Inuit, warming is likely to disrupt or even destroy their hunting and food-sharing culture as reduced sea ice causes the animals on which they rely to decline, become less accessible, and possibly become extinct.” This report also made states aware of economic opportunities relating to climate change. Ice melt would make Arctic shipping lanes more accessible to vessels. The Arctic region contains more than 90 billion barrels of oil that will be more accessible due to climate change. Further, as Russia holds 80 per cent of Arctic resources, it stands to gain the most from climate change in the Arctic. The ACIA made states aware of the region’s economic potential.

In response to the first question, regarding when the Council’s mandate shifted, it shifted toward economic issues and emergency preparedness after the release of the ACIA report at the November 2004 Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, held in Reykjavik, Iceland, “Russia

340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid., 14.
345 Igor Alexeev, “Russia’s Arctic, NATO and Norway: A Post-Kirkenes Political Landscape,” *Barents Observer*, June 20, 2013.
introduced the Arctic Rescue initiative, a mechanism for the coordination of international activities on prevention and response as regards the consequences of emergencies in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{346} This initiative was a statement of support by Russia for the Council to shift to a greater emphasis on emergency preparedness. The policy process unfolded in two stages. First, Russian officials pushed the Council to take more action on emergency preparedness by stating its importance at nine Council meetings between 2004 and 2009 (November 2004, April 2005, October 2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and November 2009). Russian officials sought to develop guidelines on the clean up of hazardous materials as well as a search and rescue plan.\textsuperscript{347} Next, two projects came from this work. First, in April 2005, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group began to author a report on Arctic shipping at its biannual meetings, which later resulted in the 2009 \textit{Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment}, sponsored by the United States. Second, the government of Russia organized an October 2008 “accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, with the participation of the other Arctic states.\textsuperscript{348} Russia placed a greater emphasis on emergency preparedness work after the ACIA made it clear that climate change created economic opportunities in the Arctic. In response to the second question, as to reasons for the shift, none of the Arctic delegations opposed this work in any other Council meeting, nor did any of the permanent participants. As each state holds a veto on Council activities, each could have blocked any project that did not meet with its approval. Delegations supported this work because emergency infrastructures encourage economic development in the Arctic region. Information on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[	extsuperscript{346}] Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, November 22-23, 2004} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2004).
\item[	extsuperscript{347}] Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).
\item[	extsuperscript{348}] Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Final Report, 28-29 November 2007, Narvik, Norway} (Narvik, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2007).
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shipping and preparation for search and rescue emergencies increases the potential for investment in the region because companies have the knowledge that states are prepared when emergencies arise. These measures reduce corporate liability and make them more confident to invest in the Arctic region.

This new emphasis does not indicate that the Council turned away from environmental work. The Council completed an average of 159 projects between 2004 and 2007, or 26.5 projects per working group. Each state sponsored an average of 15.25 projects, while permanent participants sponsored an average of two projects each. Only two of these projects concerned emergency preparedness as a primary focus, namely the aforementioned projects by Russia. The Council undertook twelve major projects, all of which had a strong environmental character:

- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)
- Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (AMAP) working group pollution assessments (2005-2013) (the AMAP)
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the Sustainable Development Working Group)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (initiated 2009) (Task Force)
- Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the PAME)
- Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (completed 2013) (Task Force)
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)
- Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)

Thus the Council still completed environmental work between 2004 and 2008.

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In summary, this section identified the point at which changes in the mandate of the Council took place and the positions of various actors. Change took place after the publication of the ACIA report. Russia sought to encourage work on emergency preparedness to encourage economic development in the Arctic region, which all of the Arctic states supported. Academic literature characterizing the Council as a research institution is no longer completely valid; the Council is no longer merely an environmental organization. It is also an economic facilitator.

2.2.4 – 2007-2014

More recent Council work has focused on emergency preparedness and economic issues, showing an evolution in the Council’s mandate. This section shows that the Council’s mandate is now economic in nature as well as environmental, which all of the Arctic members support. Between 2009 and 2011, the creation of an Arctic Search and Rescue agreement occupied much of the Council’s time. From 2011 until 2013, the major project of the Council was a formal agreement on oil spill response. The United States delegation surprised many observers when it proposed the search and rescue treaty in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, which Russia asked to co-sponsor to support its earlier emphasis on emergency preparedness.\(^{350}\) The treaty aims to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.”\(^{351}\) State representatives easily negotiated the treaty at only five meetings (Washington, December 2009, Moscow, February 2010, Oslo, June 2010, Helsinki, October 2010 and Reykjavik, December 2010).\(^{352}\) At the May 2011 meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, the delegations of the United States, Russia and Norway took many by surprise and


sponsored a similar agreement on oil spill response.\textsuperscript{353} States again easily negotiated the treaty at five meetings (Oslo, October 2011, St. Petersburg, December 2011, Girdwood, Alaska, March 2012, Helsinki, June 2012 and Reykjavik, October 2012).\textsuperscript{354} Chapter 3 elaborates on the negotiation process that led to these treaties. The other states and the permanent participants supported this work and contributed to the task forces that created the agreements.

There are three pertinent questions about these treaties. First, do they have substantial economic elements? They provide safety and emergency response infrastructure in the Arctic. This work has an economic element because it provides infrastructure that states and companies need to operate in the Arctic region. These treaties will potentially result in increased investment in the Arctic region. Second, why did the United States suggest these treaties and why did other states support them? According to policy-makers familiar with the process, both treaties resulted primarily from requests from the insurance and resource sectors for measures to increase emergency response.\textsuperscript{355} Officials from the business community asked policy-makers for measures to increase safety when operating in the Arctic region.\textsuperscript{356} Third, does the creation of these treaties represent a sea change in the way that the Council operates? The Council still completed environmental work from 2007 until the present, as these projects constituted only two out of the Council’s average 159 ongoing projects. Yet, these treaties are very significant as they represent the first clear work beyond the initial mandate of the Council. The institution addresses more economic issues than in the past.

\textsuperscript{355} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Yukon government employee, winter 2013.
\textsuperscript{356} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Yukon government employee, winter 2013.
After the development of these treaties, the government of Canada, in preparations to become Council chair, emphasized the economic work of the Council, indicating a change in its mandate. The government stated that it planned to use the Council to achieve economic aspirations, which constituted the first time that a Council state had been so direct in stating this intent. A Government of Canada report obtained by media sources said, “Canada will use its two years as leader of the circumpolar world to promote development and defend its policies.” Media outlets reported, “A discussion paper circulated at meetings held across the North to gather input suggests that Canada's top priority will be development.” The paper indicated an interest that economic development should benefit the North and said, “The development of natural resources in a sustainable manner, in which northerners participate and benefit, is central to the economic future of the circumpolar region.” It also said, “Arctic Council initiatives could be built around and support Canada's priorities to increase investment and development in the northern resource sector.” Leona Aglukkaq, Canadian Minister Responsible for the Arctic Council, held “meetings with private sector representatives across the North to help to plug a gap in the Arctic Council’s work.” The discussion of development provided by the government of Canada does not stress the need for environmental protection. Policy-makers see economics as increasingly important in the Council’s work. As one policy-maker summarized, “It seems now the Council’s focus is on development” whereas “before, the focus was on environmental protection.”

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358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
361 This comment came up consistently in the interviews completed for this project.
protection. In 2013, the government of Canada released a report that says its priorities in its turn as chair are to establish “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic shipping” and “sustainable communities.”

The Council issued a document called A Vision for the Arctic, which included what could be an updated Council mandate. It said, “We have many accomplishments to celebrate since the signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, and it is timely for us to set out a vision for the future of our region.” Its pillars are “a peaceful Arctic,” “the Arctic home,” “a prosperous Arctic,” “a safe Arctic,” “a healthy Arctic environment,” “Arctic knowledge” and “a strong Arctic Council.” Most of that is within the existing mandate of the Council. However, it also pointed to a potential growth in the Council as a body to address conflict resolution and political issues. It said, “The further development of the Arctic region as a zone of peace and stability is at the heart of our efforts” and “We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot solve together through our co-operative relationships on the basis of existing international law and good will.” There is also a greater acknowledgement of the economic potential of the region. The report says, “The economic potential of the Arctic is enormous and its sustainable development is key to the region’s resilience and prosperity.” Again, the Council still undertakes environmental work and most of its activities are environmental in nature. The Council still has an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given time, roughly 80 per cent of which are environmental in nature.

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362 Interview with Finnish foreign affairs official and former Council delegation member, summer 2013.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
The new emphasis on economics is due to requests from insurance and other companies to Arctic governments for more Arctic infrastructure. Many fear that the difficulty of operating in the Arctic will neutralize profits and discourage growth. In 2012, major insurance firm Lloyds of London released a report that argued, “The Arctic is likely to attract substantial investment over the coming decade, potentially reaching $100 [billion] or more,” however “given the high risk/potentially high reward nature of Arctic investment, this figure could be significantly higher or lower.” Emergency preparedness reduces the economic risk of operating in the Arctic.

An outcome of Canada’s emphasis on economic development is the establishment of a new semi-autonomous institution, the Arctic Economic Council. States negotiated the structure of the organization at Council meetings held in Canada during 2013 and 2014. Swedish officials conceived of the body during its term as chair as a business council focused on corporate social responsibility and the environment, but Canada shifted the emphasis based on its stated priorities, a move all states supported. The 42-member Arctic Economic Council consists of three business representatives appointed by each Council state and the permanent participants. The organization holds meetings separate from the Council but is part of the organization. The Arctic Council reports that, “The overall aim of the AEC is to foster sustainable development, including economic growth, environmental protection and social development in the Arctic region.” The creation of the body is significant because it is the first outcome of the Arctic Council that did not have some strong environmental component. The Arctic Council says that the body will do environmental work, but it is first and foremost an “economic” body.

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369 Economic development refers to overall efforts to improve national and regional economic conditions.
370 This shift occurred during Council meetings in 2013.
372 Ibid.
In conclusion, the Council’s mandate is undergoing change. It has a broad mandate, but in practice states intended that it take action on the environment and sustainable development. The working groups have undertaken many environmental projects. States had difficulty defining sustainable development and as a result, its projects are broad and often ad-hoc. The Council has increased the number of projects that promote emergency preparedness as time has gone on. The *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* changed the direction and intensity of Council work, making states aware of the economic opportunities in the region. The United States supported that report, even though action on climate change appears contrary to its interest. Russia in particular wanted the Council to take action to improve emergency preparedness in the region. Canada, the current chair of the Council, has emphasized that it will use the Council to pursue and promote economic opportunities in the Northern region. Earlier work by authors such as Oran Young, Olav Schram Stokke and Evan Bloom viewed the Council as an environmental institution whose goal was to research the Arctic so that states could subsequently take action to reduce and prevent pollution in the region.\(^{373}\) John English agrees that the Council was intended as an environmental institution but emphasizes that some states had broader goals for the institution to build the region as a zone of peace; economic development and the similar goals were not among the broad goals states had for the Council.\(^{374}\) The Council’s mandate is now environmental and economic. Its initial mandate was to facilitate environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic region. Its informal mandate at the current time is to facilitate co-operation on environmental research, to initiate projects to encourage human development in the region and to improve the prospects for investment in Arctic resources.

\(^{373}\) For example, Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13-14; Schram Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic,” 402; Schram Stokke, “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions,” 10; Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712; Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64.

\(^{374}\) English, *Ice and Water*. 
2.3 – Analysis of the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Mandate

Functionalism provides a somewhat compelling account of Council expansion.

*H1: The mandate of the Arctic Council is expanding because all members stand to gain something through automatic expansion.*

Overall, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. All states gain something through participation in the Council and its expansion into economic areas, though the gains are not equally distributed. As noted, Russia benefits the most from economic gains in the Arctic region as it controls 80 per cent of Arctic resources. However, all states gain information through participation in the Council and its reports. States sought to gain information about Arctic pollution, but moved to acquire information about climate change as the issue emerged, constituting automatic expansion from issue spillover.

This hypothesis has limited explanatory value because expansion occurred selectively, rather than automatically. The turn to economic work occurred after the 2004 *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA) report. This work revealed economic opportunity stemming from climate change, in the form of opportunities for increased Arctic resource exploitation and shipping. Functionalism assumes states will respond rationally to problems. The hypothesis would have support if Council states automatically took strong action to combat exogenous climate change in the Arctic because the information about it in the ACIA is alarming. Yet, Council action has focused on adaptation, rather than mitigation. All states moved to maximize the benefits of climate change. Nordic countries have taken good action to combat climate change, but the response of Canada, Russia and the United States has been inadequate. The Council’s mandate is evolving due to political reasons and not solely due to issue spillover.

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375 Alexeev, “Russia’s Arctic, NATO and Norway.”
376 For example, Robert C. Paehlke argues Canada and the United States’ climate change policy is woefully inadequate in *Some Like It Cold: The Politics of Climate Change in Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2008).
**H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.**

There is support for the hypothesis because it appears to provide some explanation of Council behaviour. The mandate expansion is around less political policy areas, namely search and rescue co-operation. Oil spill response is more political, but it is less political than it could have been because it is a response agreement and not a prevention agreement. Search and rescue could become political, but the agreement that resulted is quite limited in scope, as discussed in Chapter 4. The hypothesis is very similar to the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism, which this paper discusses later.

**H3: The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without disruption.**

This hypothesis does not appear valid because the Council does not have great power to direct states. This hypothesis would have support if the Council had the bureaucratic ability to make requests of Council states. However, this situation is not the case. The Council is only now in the process of setting up a permanent secretariat and previously states firmly controlled the working group secretariats. It is possible that the new permanent secretariat could make demands of states and affect the operation of the Council. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there is every indication it will be a purely administrative secretariat. Many policy-makers argue that the precise reason that it took so long to create a secretariat (and the reason why the secretariat is to perform purely administrative work) is to stop it from making demands of states. The working groups are as strong as they have ever been and their ability to shape the Council’s agenda is not strong. The reports they create might put pressure on states, but they do not create action in themselves and states often ignore their findings. Some policy-makers expressed the belief that

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377 This comment came up in several interviews, including one with a former United States Department of State official, one with a senior Canadian foreign affairs official and one with a junior Canadian foreign affairs official.
some groups operate better than in the past, but otherwise the structure of the Council has stayed the same. The Council’s mandate has expanded in tandem with the increased economic interest in the Arctic region. It is difficult to argue that current mandate expansion is because of the Council itself.

**H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should expand.**

This hypothesis is not accurate. Epistemic communities, such as the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program in Toronto, Canada, or the Rideau Institute in Ottawa, Canada, try to influence the Council. This hypothesis does not have support because the Arctic Council only changed once economic issues emerged. There is evidence that epistemic communities have had an effect on the Council in the past. As noted, states partially added a “human dimension” to the Council because of the demands of permanent participants, particularly in Canada. This lobbying partly resulted in the Council’s sustainable development program. Yet, it is the Council’s weakest working group, meaning that epistemic community demands did not result in strong action. In addition, epistemic communities impacted the ACIA. Arctic Council policy-makers partly credit the work of ACIA lead author Bob Corell for ensuring the project came to fruition. Alaska Senator Ted Stevens worked in the United States Senate to ensure the project had crucial funding. Yet, there are reasons that the Council states created the report aside from the lobbying of individuals, such as the need for information about climate change. The hypothesis does not have support because the Council has ignored lobbying by some groups that demonstrate pressing problems in need of action, instead focusing on the lobbying efforts of economic actors and the region’s economic potential.

378 This comment came up in several interviews, including two interviews with Canadian environment officials.
379 Interview with former United States State Department official and Council delegation member, spring 2013.
380 Interview with former United States delegation member and Alaskan official, spring 2013.
**H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.**

This hypothesis has support. Through various environmental impact assessments, the Arctic Council has proven itself a competent international organization. The ACIA, for example, is a very good report that has helped prove that climate change is occurring in the Arctic and worldwide. Nonetheless, this hypothesis does not fully explain Council evolution. The Council has been producing high quality reports for many years, yet evolution has only occurred once economic objectives became clear. Neoliberal institutionalism and functionalism together can provide a likely explanation for why states have expanded the workload of the Council rather than create a new institution. It explains why states entrust reports to the Council rather than creating the reports in other ways, or independent of the Council. In contrast, as demonstrated later, neoliberal institutionalism would predict that path dependence would stunt Council evolution. The fact that the Council is a competent body explains why path dependence did not stall Council expansion. In accordance with functionalism, states partially expand the Council’s mandate because it has proven that it can do what states want it to do. The Council had elements in place that made expanding the Council more efficient than developing a new organization.

**H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently.**

This hypothesis does not have support because, as noted, the expansion of the Council’s mandate occurred in response to selective state interests, rather than as an automatic process. This hypothesis would have support if the Council’s mandate expanded when new issues emerged without prompt. If the Council worked aggressively to combat climate change as information became available, the hypothesis would have support. However, mandate expansion did not begin until economic considerations became important. It is not clear how smoothly the expansion of the Council’s mandate will progress. Thus far, it appears to be progressing
consistently. Canada has said that it will continue to promote economic development in the Council. The institution seeks to increase the role of business within the Council. Nonetheless, it is too soon to tell if this trend will continue. The Council does not have any projects on its agenda at the current time that will tangibly continue to increase the mandate of the Council. The Council is not negotiating a treaty at present, for example. Yet, the Council could take up such work in the future.

In conclusion, functionalism’s explanation for Council mandate expansion is not compelling. It predicts that expansion should have occurred earlier than it did, but states did not respond to pressing environmental issues presented in the ACIA report. Expansion did not occur until economic considerations became important. Functionalism is correct in predicting that expansion is occurring around a less-political issue area. However, functionalism is wrong in predicting that the Council can compete for power with states. It is difficult to argue that the Council is powerful beyond the control of states. It is not clear if the change that is occurring will be consistent over time. It is somewhat correct in predicting that individuals can influence the Council because individuals have had some influence over the Council’s agenda, though there are many other considerations that explain state behaviour. However, individuals are not responsible for the growth of the Council’s mandate. Most importantly, the growth of the Council has not occurred automatically. States have been selective in expanding the mandate of the Council, ignoring information about the need for climate change mitigation, instead focusing on economic gains and the potential that climate change can benefit states in certain sectors. They correctly predict evolution occurred once the Council proved itself competent, which explains why states opted to use it to address economic issues rather than create a new institution.
Neoliberal institutionalism explains the growth of the mandate of the Arctic Council and its hypotheses mostly have support.

*H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.*

This hypothesis has validity because all states stand to gain through co-operation in the Council and expansion did not occur automatically. The Council emerged to address Arctic pollution and promote co-operation between Russia and the West. According to neoliberal institutionalism, this is a low-level goal because it does not concern military security or economics. All states stood to gain, so states decided to form the Council. Under this scenario, the Council should not have been very strong, and it was not. There are few states involved (eight) and they face the “shadow of the future” (i.e. they will likely need to work together again), so there was an incentive for co-operation. States excluded security because they did not stand to gain much by adding it. It is clear that states were not able to accomplish much in terms of sustainable development. However, states stood to gain something by adding sustainable development to the mandate. The fact that states could not agree on a definition, and the working group’s agenda is very broad, reflects the fact that Arctic states have different development needs. Historical process tracing shows that most of the Council’s work has been on environmental monitoring, which demands relatively low-level commitment. Environmental monitoring can create problems for states if it highlights costly issues that demand resolution. The Council has provided funding for research on climate change, calling for a change in the way states operate, for example. Yet, environmental reports do not necessarily result in policy action. The ACIA has not inspired strong state action on climate change. Rather, it has ignited interest in the economic potential of the Arctic region. Emergency preparedness has become a focus on the Council at a time when it can help states. States stand to gain through the Arctic Council and so continue to aid evolution.
H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.

This hypothesis has support in that the mandate of the Council has expanded because it increasingly emphasizes emergency preparedness and the North’s economic potential. States have aspirations of economic growth in the Arctic. There is no shortage of reports extolling the economic potential of the Arctic in the wake of climate change. The Arctic contains extensive oil and gas deposits and Arctic shipping lanes promise to reduce travel distances substantially. Canada has directly stated that it will use the Council to fulfill an economic agenda. Part of this growth will benefit Northern Canada, but it also will benefit Canada as a whole. Whom the development benefits most is not yet clear. Almost every Arctic Council policy-maker interviewed believed that economics were an important explanatory variable in the Council’s expansion. States have economic aspirations for the Arctic.

H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal, tempered by norms and path dependence.

This hypothesis mostly has credence because states are using the Arctic Council to fulfill a technocratic goal. All states stand to gain through the expansion of the Council. Search and rescue, as well as oil spill prevention, are less political areas for co-operation. States are collaborating on technical matters without risking state sovereignty. Neoliberal institutionalism predicts that there are three reasons the Arctic Council would have been unable to evolve. First, path dependency should have made new action harder to undertake in the Arctic Council. The Council’s environmental orientation should have pushed states away from pursuing non-environmental issues in the Council. Counter to this, some institutional elements to deal with search and rescue were in place through the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response

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(EPPR) working group, which may have provided a framework to break such path dependence. Nonetheless, the fact that the Council has not evolved more is likely due to path dependence. However, these factors may explain away a fundamental fact that neoliberal institutionalists do not believe that international institutions will evolve in many circumstances. Second, institutional norms should have made it harder to take new action. Once the Council begins to do work to protect the environment, it could develop norms to continue such work. Still, there was always some interest in carrying out action on emergency preparedness and development through the EPPR and the Sustainable Development Working Group. Norms were not strong enough to prevent work in these areas. Third, the Arctic Council countries have taken action in the face of Arctic issues outside of the Arctic Council. Nonetheless, the countries all stood to gain something from co-operation in the Council. Through environmental reports and monitoring, the Council provides information and reduces costs for countries carrying out research. Through the facilitation of international action and agreements, the Council makes commitments more credible and predictable. States have a technocratic goal they want to achieve in the Council. 

H4: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.

The form of negotiation impacts the evolution of the Council’s mandate and thus this hypothesis has predictive power. We can see that the Council emerged from negotiation. States debated the Council’s mandate, with Canada and the Nordic countries failing to win United States and Russian support for its initiatives. Coalitions were not as important in an institution in which any country has a veto on any action. Yet, the major change in the mandate occurred due to research conducted by the Council. Russia first proposed increasing the profile of emergency preparedness issues in response to information about climate change, which won the support of all of the Council countries. Information was important in the evolution of the Council.
Neoliberal institutionalism mostly provides a good explanation of Council behaviour. The Council’s mandate is expanding because it is in the interest of member states. All member states gain something through participation in the Council, even if it is a low-level goal. It is expanding to take on economic issues, which neoliberal institutionalists say are a particularly potent motivator for state behaviour. The Council is evolving to perform technical functions, helping states collaborate on emergency preparedness. The theory does not predict that individuals can be important in the Council. However, it is clear that they might be important in some way. Neoliberal institutionalism correctly predicts that the Council would not have the power to compete with states. Still, the theory emphasizes that international institutions are subject to path dependence. Information was important in the evolution of the Council, as was the form of negotiation, as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. This dynamic does not account for the fact that the Council’s mandate has shifted to include environmental issues, sustainable development and economic issues.

Neorealism provides a poor explanation for Arctic Council mandate expansion.

**H1: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate.**

This hypothesis does not have support because it is clear that neither relative gains nor security was important in state decision making about the Council. This hypothesis would have support if states attempted to gain more than rivals through their work in the Council or if the Council’s work improved state security. However, states co-operated in the Council to expand its mandate even though gains were uneven. Russia stands to gain the most from the economic growth of the Arctic region, yet its main regional rival the United States continues to collaborate to strengthen the Council’s mandate. Further, security was not a pressing consideration of states at the onset of the Arctic Council. There is little reason to believe that states now have security aspirations for
the Council. The potential for conflict in the Arctic is virtually nonexistent.\textsuperscript{382} Survival is not at issue. Further, several Council policy-makers argue that there is little chance that states have security-minded motivation for participation in the Council. Council policy-makers do not believe security was important in the founding of the Council.\textsuperscript{383} There were other organizations that states could use to address Arctic traditional security as states formed the Council in 1996,\textsuperscript{384} such as NATO or the United Nations. One could argue that a strong economy supports state security and self-help, in line with neorealist predictions. Neoliberal institutionalism better explains the Council’s economic expansion, with its predictions about the importance of absolute, economic gains. Relative gains were not important for states in the founding of the Council.

\textit{H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region.}

This hypothesis does not have support because the states are not responding to a military threat or regional re-balancing. They are collaborating on technical economic issues. In a way, states wanted to form the Council to ensure regional balance against Russia, but such considerations are no longer important. Despite some alarmist headlines and academic articles in Canada, there are currently no military threats to any of the Arctic countries’ legal status in the Arctic. In the unlikely event of a threat, NATO would protect member Arctic regions, because Canada, the United States, Denmark, Iceland and Norway are part the alliance and it has relations with the other Council countries. Even if one removes security considerations from state motivations, the hypothesis has limited support. Aside from security, smaller states could be

\textsuperscript{382} For an example of any author who presents a case study on an area of Arctic security, the delineation of the outer continental shelf, see, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” \textit{Ocean Development and International Law} 42, no. 4 (2011): 368-382.

\textsuperscript{383} Former United States delegation member involved in creating the Council, spring 2013.

\textsuperscript{384} Former United States delegation member involved in creating the Council, spring 2013.
using the Council to balance economic power in the region and prevent U.S. dominance. States want to make gains through Council mandate expansion, rather than ensuring regional balance. 

*H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers.*

The hypothesis does not have support because all of the states support the direction of evolution in the Council, representing a neoliberal institutionalist absolute gain. In addition, sustainable development is part of the Council even though the United States resisted the concept.\(^{385}\) The form of negotiation led them to accept the Council. One could point out that Russia stands to gain the most from the expansion of the Council’s mandate into economic areas. However, it seems likely that the Council’s mandate would have expanded even if this situation were not the case. Overall, it is difficult to test the validity of the influence of the influence of great powers based on this case. States all agreed to expand the mandate of the Council and the preferences of great powers and other powers aligned.

In conclusion, neorealism does not provide a good explanation for Council behaviour. States do not have major security concerns in the Arctic. These actors have economic concerns, but neoliberal institutionalism better explains this interest. Neorealism would predict that the United States would have to gain more than Russian does in Council mandate expansion for expansion to move forward. It is difficult to argue this is the case because Russia has greater Arctic territory, resources and shipping routes than does the United States. It is difficult to argue that “balance” considerations motivate states in the Arctic. The states are not focused on defending themselves against an internal or external threat. Smaller states might be trying to balance economic power against the larger states. These states would include Russia and the United States. Neoliberal institutionalism does a better job explaining this situation with its emphasis on economic motivations for state behaviour.

\(^{385}\) Former United States delegation member involved in creating the Council, spring 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Number</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Accepted/Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 1</td>
<td>The mandate of the Council is expanding because they all stand to gain something through automatic expansion.</td>
<td>Not supported – expansion into environmental areas is not automatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 2</td>
<td>States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.</td>
<td>Supported – expansion is in less-political areas, such as search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 3</td>
<td>The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without disruption.</td>
<td>Not supported – no evidence of strong institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 4</td>
<td>The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should expand.</td>
<td>Not supported – no evidence of epistemic community impact on mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 5</td>
<td>The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent, tempered by norms and path dependence.</td>
<td>Supported – ACIA established competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 6</td>
<td>The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently.</td>
<td>Not supported – expansion into environmental areas is not automatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal Institutionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 1</td>
<td>States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.</td>
<td>Supported – all gain by expansion into economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 2</td>
<td>The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.</td>
<td>Supported – expansion clearly economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 3</td>
<td>States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal.</td>
<td>Supported – expansion clearly economic, technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 4</td>
<td>The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.</td>
<td>Supported – Council’s mandate evolved throughout negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neorealism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealist 1</td>
<td>Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate.</td>
<td>Not supported – absolute gains key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealist 2</td>
<td>States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to balance power in the region.</td>
<td>Not supported – absolute gains sought, not balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealist 3</td>
<td>The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers.</td>
<td>Not supported – all states gain absolute gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomena</td>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>Neoliberal Institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1996/founding of the Council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental rationale for Council formation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military concerns in Council formation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian interest in environmental Council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC influence over Canada vis-a-vis human security</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States resistance to security in Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia resistance to environmental work</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States resistance to Council (duplication/utility)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Russian resistance to security versus Canadian and Nordic interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Russian resistance to human security versus Canadian and Nordic interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire for information sharing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functionalism Continued</td>
<td>Neoliberal Institutionalism Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia interest in Council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement over sustainable development</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement over security</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift toward emergency preparedness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued environmental work</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency preparedness work</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued environmental work</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift toward economic work</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is necessary to review the major questions posed at the onset of this chapter. The predictions of functionalism are not realized because the Council’s evolution is not automatic and consistent. The predictions of neoliberalism are valid because absolute gains motivate states to expand the Council’s mandate and the form of negotiation is important. The predictions of neorealism are unsubstantiated because relative gains are not important in determining state preferences and great power preference does not always prevail in Council decision-making. Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s mandate into economic and other areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common ind. variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism ind. variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue spillover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group or epistemic community lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution has proven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal ind. variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neoliberal ind. variables</th>
<th>Relative gains (e.g. states gain something)</th>
<th>N&amp;S</th>
<th>$\n$</th>
<th>All states gain through economic expansion, though not all states gain equally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shadow of the future</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>All states are allies; though relations with Russia are strained, future work likely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of path dependence</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>Council evolved despite history of environmental work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of contrary norms</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>Council had roots in areas of expansion (i.e. EPRR and SDWG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of negotiation (e.g. information, coalitions)</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>Compromise in negotiations led to initial mandate of Council; information responsible for expansion into economic areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neorealist ind. variables</th>
<th>Relative gains (e.g. states gain more than rivals)</th>
<th>N&amp;S</th>
<th>$\n$</th>
<th>No evidence of concern for relative gains; no importance of security issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No security ramifications</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>Security not an important issue for states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Balance” motivations</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>States attempting to make absolute, economic gains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great power preference reigns supreme</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>$\n$</td>
<td>All states supported Council; sustainable development part of Council despite United States and Russian resistance; all states gain in current expansion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This chapter explained the evolution of the Arctic Council’s mandate to take on economic and related public safety issues. Initially, states and permanent participants intended that the Arctic Council promote environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic region. Although it has done a lot of work on environmental protection, its work on sustainable development has faced problems of focus. Only the Council’s informal mandate has changed. Functionalists would explain this evolution with reference to a combination of institutional capacity, technocratic interest, automatic spillover and institutional competence. Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that economic issues, negotiation tactics and absolute gains are responsible for mandate expansion. Neorealism would expect that regional balance concerns are responsible for the expansion. Neoliberal institutionalists are the most correct in that states are expanding the Council’s mandate to exploit the economic potential of the Arctic.

Functionalism also can contribute to our understanding the Council. Neoliberal institutionalism would predict that the Council would not evolve due to norms. The Council broke path dependence in that there were some elements and working groups whose broad activities allowed it to move beyond environmental monitoring, namely the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response group. This fact is in line with the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism. Nonetheless, the institution showed that it is competent through excellent reports, which also contributed to its growth. This fact is in line with the predictions of functionalism, which sees individuals within the council being able to shape the agenda of the Council indirectly by pushing for action on climate change. Neoliberal institutionalism would not make this prediction. The Council’s mandate has expanded mainly due to the economic importance of the Arctic, but also due to its good work and the individuals within the Council.
This chapter contributes to academic literature in that it is the first study to explain the current expansion of the Arctic Council. Those who argue that the Council should expand for normative or more altruistic reasons must pay heed to the power of economics. Many scholars prescribe what the Council should do to address issues of profound importance in the Arctic region. Scholars need to pay more attention to what the Council can do. That is, scholars need to take into account the factors that motivate Council action when they provide their prescriptions for Council action. As economic arguments are responsible for mandate expansion, scholars who seek to influence the Council would be wise to make their arguments in these terms. Scientists within the Council in the past have shaped the mandate of the Council, as seen in the case of securing the funding of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* report. In the Arctic Council, environmental and social problems in the Arctic motivate research but not necessarily action. More elaboration about what changes are possible in the Arctic Council in this context is a direction for more research.

Authors such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke may be correct that the Arctic Council emerged due to an interest in scientific knowledge about the Arctic, but that explanation does not explain the Council’s evolution. There is some evidence that geopolitical concerns and concerns about human security also motivated states to form the Arctic Council, but there is no doubt that concern about Arctic pollution from Russia mainly inspired states to create the institution. These scholars did not anticipate the changes that are taking place in the Council and that economics would inspire change in the Council. The motivations and interests of states within the Arctic Council have shifted considerably since scholars first examined the Council’s formation. As the Council is now dealing with important economic issue areas, it may continue to expand.
CHAPTER 3: EXPLAINING THE POLICY-MAKING ROLE OF THE COUNCIL

The policy-making role of the Arctic Council is expanding. In 1996, shortly after the founding of the Council, commentators anticipated it would be an institution that governments used to create formal policy. It quickly became clear that it would instead be a weak policy-recommendation body. The institution emerged as a forum to research environmental issues and complete small-scale sustainable development projects. States and permanent participants created scientific reports in the institution, often with policy recommendations, but they did not create formal policies or treaties. The role of the Council changed in 2009, when it announced it would create a formal agreement on Arctic search and rescue. This chapter explains the reasons for the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. The term “policy-making role” refers to actions by the Council to facilitate the creation of formal international agreements. The Council’s “policy-recommendation role” refers to research creating policy options, which states can decide to adopt or ignore.

This chapter analyzes the policy-making role of the Council using functionalist theory, neorealist theory and neoliberal institutionalist theory, proceeding in three sections. The first section describes each theory’s expected reasons for the expanding policy-making role of the Council. Functionalism would hypothesize that the Council’s policy-making role would expand automatically in response to clear issues that states and the Council itself need to address. Neorealism would expect the policy-making role should expand when doing so helps states achieve relative gains and fulfills the preferences of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalism

386 Expansion in this case refers to increased frequency of the creation of formal policy, such as treaties.
would hypothesize that the policy-making role would expand because it is in the absolute interest of all member states, tempered by the form of negotiation. The second section undertakes historical process tracing to demonstrate how the Council’s policy-making role has expanded over time. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on absolute gains, explains state preferences in the Council’s policy-making role; however, neorealism, with its emphasis on great power influence, provides the best explanation for outcomes in the Council. Economics provide the catalyst for the evolution of the Council’s policy role, which all of the theories examined would expect. We would not see the same expansion of the policy-making power of the Council if the Arctic’s economic potential were not as strong as it is today. The central argument of this chapter is that the Council’s policy-making role is expanding primarily because the increasing potential to exploit the North’s economic resources means that expansion is in the absolute interest of member states, most importantly the United States and Russia. The North’s economic potential provides an incentive for states to create policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region.

This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, existing literature does not agree on the policy-making role of the Council. Several authors, such as diplomat Evan T. Bloom, consultant Terry Fenge and political scientist Oran Young argue that the Council developed as a research institution rather than a policy institution. These authors emphasize that the Council creates good quality research that states use to create policy in other forums. For these authors, the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role is an unexpected event. A

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389 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra,” *Policy Options*, April 2012, 64.
Second group of authors argue that the Council is a norm creating, “soft law” international institution. This group includes such political scientists as Timo Koivurova, Peter Stenlund and Alison Ronson. A shortcoming of this literature is that the authors do not provide strong examples to establish that the Council indeed creates soft-law. This paper evaluates both sides of this debate and concludes that neither is currently accurate because the Council now creates “hard-law,” or formal international policy. It contributes to literature that seeks to explain why the Council operates as it does, as well as literature that seeks to understand the dynamics of international institutional decision-making.

Second, this chapter contributes to literature that debates whether the Council’s policy-making role should expand further. Some authors, such as political scientist Oded Cedar, call on the Council to increase its policy-making role to address pressing challenges in the Arctic region. This group includes research institutes and think tanks. Their work ignores the political context of current Council decision-making, as well as whether the type of policy role they envision for the Council is possible in the near future. Existing work, for example, does not examine whether the current instances of policy-making in the Council are temporary, successful or wanted by all member states. This thesis shows that further policy-making expansion is unlikely outside of economic issue areas.

Third, this thesis contributes a case study that demonstrates the explanatory validity and reliability of neoliberal institutionalism when modified with predictions of neorealism.

395 For example, see Michael Byers, Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Agenda for the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Ontario: Rideau Institute, 2012).
3.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role

Theory provides a frame for analysis to explain the reasons for the evolution of an international institution. Functionalists would expect an institution would evolve automatically and would thus propose six hypotheses to explain expansion of the Council’s policy-making ability. The first hypothesis relates to state preferences and outcomes. The second through fifth hypotheses relate to state preferences while the sixth relates to outcomes.

\[ H1: \text{Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.} \]

Functionalists would expect that changes in the policy-making role of the Arctic Council are occurring automatically due to clear, external issues demanding a co-operative policy response. Other theories argue institutional evolution is more political. Functionalists argue that states respond to external challenges “automatically.” Political scientists Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner summarize that in functionalism, international co-operation “propels itself forward.” Functionalist David Mitrany writes that there is “promise in working arrangements as a way of building up an international community.” Formal agreements emerge to help states achieve their goals and do something that would not otherwise be possible. For example, functionalists would expect climate change to elicit automatic co-operation. It is a challenge external to any state and no one state is responsible. It poses clear challenges that governments must address together and thus states will not hesitate to respond. Thus, climate change co-operation will emerge automatically in the Council.

\[ 397 \text{Ibid.} \]
**H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the same preferences that create evolution**

According to functionalists, instances of international co-operation in the Council must serve a clear function and be in the absolute interest of all states. Neorealists do not believe gains must be absolute. International institutions, as summarized by political scientists Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared goals: producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner’s dilemma settings, solving coordination problems, and the like.” States should have the same goal in any instance of international co-operation and thus the evolution of the policy-making role of the Council is a response to common goals.

**H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual technocratic goals around a less-political issue area.**

For functionalists, co-operation in the Council is likely to emerge around less-political issues. These are issues usually associated with “low politics,” or issues that do not involve vital state interest and impact state survival. Other theories would agree, but functionalists emphasize this point. For example, military security would be a highly political issue area, but ecosystem management would be a less political issue area. If all states face an environmental threat, the solution to the problem should not be contentious. In the words of political scientist Mark Imber, functionalists “advocated using the ‘low politics’ of functional, technical and economic co-operation as more suitable for promoting [international] integration.” Thus, the Council will create formal policies and treaties to serve a technical purpose, such as the creation of a new trade route or a mechanism to reduce pollution with transboundary consequences.

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401 Ibid., 5.
H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring automatically because of “spillovers” that create opportunities for further co-operation.

Functionalists would predict that “spillover” would increase Council policy-making. States may grant international institutions a degree of autonomy, after which institutions may end up “leading the individual member states.” The other theories argue international institutions will never “lead” states. States grant international institutions authority to complete tasks efficiently. In some cases, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ to transfer policy-making in related sectors.” Functionalists call this process “spillover.” For example, if states created an institution to negotiate an economic agreement, it might next discuss the infrastructure necessary in response to new economic activity, which would expand their policy-making role. Functionalists argue this process should proceed consistently. According to functionalists, evolution in the Arctic Council would occur in response to issue “spillover.”

H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in the Council.

Functionalists would predict that an epistemic community and/or an interest group is likely convincing states that Council policy-making evolution is necessary and providing information that makes evolution more likely. Functionalists argue that interest groups or epistemic communities can convince states to undertake action by providing information or making compelling arguments. In contrast, other theories, such as neorealism, do not believe such groups can influence state foreign policy. Epistemic communities are groups of experts who share a common perspective on an issue. Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and

403 Ibid.
405 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
406 Ibid.
For example, business groups may push for new roles and responsibilities for the Arctic Council as climate change creates new opportunities for business in the Arctic. These groups may provide information about the business activity that would result if the Council undertook certain action, such as creating an agreement on search and rescue. They may bring forward beliefs and values about the necessity of economic development ahead of all else. In contrast, the epistemic community of climate scientists may convince states that action on climate change is necessary by providing information about the harmful consequences of inaction. They also may bring forward beliefs and values about the importance of protecting the environment ahead of economic activity. However, states will not allow an international institution to take on an issue that is outside of its interest or that is not within its desired range of preferences, despite the lobbying of epistemic communities or interest groups.

**H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven competent.**

For functionalists, the Arctic Council will only evolve when it is clearly competent.\(^{409}\) In the words of Imber, “Organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional powers, those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy task expansion.”\(^{410}\) In contrast, the other two theories maintain that institutional expansion relates to state interests rather than institutional performance. If a new issue emerges, states only will co-operate in existing international institutions if it can execute state goals. If an institution does not have a record of success, states may opt to create a new international institution. Thus, states will allow the evolution of the Arctic Council when it shows that it is an international institution capable of doing more than it currently does.

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408 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
409 Imber, “Functionalism,” 293.
410 Ibid.
Neorealists argue that concerns over relative position drive state ambitions and would make three predictions to explain the growing policy-making role of the Arctic Council. The first two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third explains outcomes.

H1: States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.

Neorealists argue that the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role should serve state relative gains. As noted, functionalists assume that states will co-operate to achieve any gain. Neoliberal institutionalists assume that states are “atomistic” in that in any transaction, their motivation is to gain something, regardless of the gains of other states (i.e. absolute gains). Neorealists, in contrast, assume that states are “positional,” in that in transactions these actors seek to maintain or improve their position relative to rival powers (i.e. relative gains). Rival powers are states that can challenge the position of a given state and so states seek relative gains.

H2: Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region.

Neorealists argue great powers would need to gain more than rival powers to ensure relative gains in Council evolution. Namely, the United States and Russia must gain more than rival powers, such as China, in international co-operation. Russian and United States gains also must be equal. Neorealists argue that self-help and survival are the most important goals in international relations. Great powers would be unlikely to co-operate in areas of vital interest, but may support co-operation in less important issue areas, such as environmental protection.

Neorealists would argue that smaller states co-operate to “balance” against rival powers in the Council.  

Through the Arctic Council, states might be attempting to strike a balance against a rival outside the region. Small states in the Council might use the institution to balance against the great powers in the region. For example, the Arctic states could use the Council to respond to increased Arctic interest from a rival power such as China. Alternatively, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden might be attempting to balance the power of Russia and the United States. A country such as Finland, for example, has few advantages in bilateral relations with Russia, yet it is better able to achieve its objectives when it works in concert with the other Scandinavian countries in the Council; hence, regional balance is an important consideration. Neither functionalism nor neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes great power relative gains or “balance” concerns as determining state co-operation, as do neorealists.

H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great powers.

According to neorealist scholars, great powers would not enter into arrangements that are contrary to their preferences and so the structure of the Council should reflect their interests. This scenario is possible in functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism. Great powers have greater economic and military power than smaller powers. Thus, these powers have less need to co-operate and can dictate the terms of collaboration. Smaller powers in the Arctic Council have fewer alternatives to accomplish their policy goals. These states are less able to exploit their economic power or coerce other states. In many cases, these actors require co-operation more so than great powers. Thus, middle powers and small powers may co-operate through the Arctic Council even when the form of co-operation does not match their foremost preferences.

\[\text{References}\]

416 Ibid.
Neoliberal institutionalism would make five predictions about the reasons that an international institution’s policy-making role would expand. The first three hypotheses predict state preferences in Council evolution while the fourth and fifth predict outcomes.

**H1: States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through treaty making.**

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states must gain something by evolving the Arctic Council’s policy-making role. They assert that a state creates a treaty when it is in its interest to do so and it stands to gain something material.\(^{418}\) States will co-operate if they make any gain, in contrast to neorealists who argue states will likely respond to relative gains.

**H2: States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic issue.**

Neoliberal institutionalists view economics as a potent motivator for state action and thus the Council’s policy-making evolution. Other theories agree that economics motivate state behaviour, but it is particularly important to neoliberal institutionalists.\(^{419}\) In the words of political scientist David Baldwin, in neoliberal institutionalist theory, “states are assumed to be trying to maximize their economic welfare in a world where military force is a possibility.”\(^{420}\)

**H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.**

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states are likely to co-operate if all of the countries are likely to have to co-operate in the future, which should be true in the Council. Scholars refer to the fact that states will need to co-operate in the future as “the shadow of the future.”\(^{421}\)


\(^{420}\) Ibid.

Neoliberal institutionalists also argue that international norms can restrict state behaviour (in contrast to functionalists and neorealists), which should have an impact on the Council. Political scientists Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.” In other words, a norm in international relations is an informal rule or expected behaviour to which states adhere. In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms about the institution’s operations may dictate state action and can even overcome state interest, thus leading to compromise by great powers.

H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the interaction between states and the content of negotiations can explain outcomes of co-operation in the Council, in contrast to functionalists. They also argue that non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities and small states can bring forward information that impacts international co-operation. This fact explains why outcomes may differ from the desired outcomes of great powers, in contrast to neorealists.

H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence.

Neoliberal institutionalists would expect the Council to evolve in order to make the region more predictable, though tempered by path dependence. They argue that treaties formalize the sharing of information and codify how states interact. Treaties help ensure commitments are legitimate. This situation can create path dependence. Functionalists and neorealists do not believe this phenomenon will be a problem. Path dependence refers to the notion that norms and established practices within international organizations can mean they are difficult to evolve.

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424 Ibid., 229.
425 Ibid., 238-239.
Table 3.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy-making role evolution according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making role evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution was not consistent or automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute gains or the form of negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains motivated states, or if the preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1: Dependent and Independent Variables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common ind. variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic gains</td>
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<td>Functionalism ind. variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue spillover</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest group or epistemic community lobbying</td>
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<td>Automatic response</td>
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<td>Lack of path dependence</td>
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<td>Lack of contrary norms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)</td>
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<td>Neorealist ind. variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>No security ramifications</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Balance” motivations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great power preference reigns supreme</td>
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</table>
3.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council’s Policy-Making Role

This section provides an overview of four periods of Council policy-making. In the first period, from 1991 until 1996, states debated the policy-making role of the Council, with the United States and Russia strongly opposing defining the Council as a policy-making body, and Canada and the Nordic states strongly supporting such a role. In the second period, from 1996 to 2003, the United States, Russia and even Canada blocked attempts to create formal policy in the Council. In this period, policy-making in the Council did not occur because state interests did not align in areas requiring a policy response. The third period, from 2004 until 2007, was a transitional period. Russia increasingly supported using the Council to create policy because it was in its economic interest to do so. In the fourth period, from 2007 until present, the Council created formal policies on issues of circumpolar concern, namely emergency response.

3.2.1 – 1991-1996

To show that evolution has taken place, it is necessary to understand the intention of states regarding the Council’s policy-making role. From 1991 until 1996, states debated the policy-making role of the Arctic Council. There are four key questions. First, how did the question of the Council’s policy-making role emerge? Second, what were key debates regarding the Council’s policy-making role? Third, what were the positions of the various actors prior to the creation of the Council regarding its policy-making role? Fourth, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence? In regards to the first question, the eight Arctic states envisioned that the Council would be an organization to research important Arctic environmental issues. The key question that naturally emerged was whether the Council would be the venue in which states would address these key issues. The Council emerged as a successor to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).
In regards to the first question, a question about the Council’s policy-making role emerged because the AEPS had identified several issues demanding a policy response. The strategy stemmed from a desire by policy-makers in Arctic states to co-operate in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and to address severe environmental issues in the Russian Arctic that demanded a response. Governments generally knew that there were large amounts of the poisonous industrial coolant polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) unsafely stored in the Russian Arctic. These states, including Russia, did not know the extent of the problem.\(^{426}\) It was important to understand the issue because exposure to PCBs causes cancer. In addition, the government of the former Soviet Union openly acknowledged that it had dumped radionuclides in the Arctic, namely in the Kara and White Seas.\(^{427}\) The AEPS came together in 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland, after negotiations beginning in September 1989 at the government of Finland’s suggestion. The program was to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans” as well as to “review regularly the state of the Arctic environment.”\(^{428}\) The strategy established that there were 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War.\(^{429}\) A 2000 report summarized, “Within the Russian Federation, there is no collection of PCB waste, and no disposal facilities; PCB contaminated wastes are usually stored on site.”\(^{430}\) It also found, “Storage may be in the open air or in storage rooms or warehouses,”\(^{431}\) in many cases near populations of indigenous peoples. States began to consider the role of policy in the Arctic Council because the AEPS identified Arctic environmental problems as potentially demanding a policy response.

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\(^{426}\) Interview with former United States delegation member and environmental department employee, spring 2013.


\(^{428}\) Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712.


\(^{430}\) Ibid.

\(^{431}\) Ibid.
After 1991, the question of an Arctic council’s policy-making role continued because policy-makers became aware of the poor living conditions in some parts of the Arctic requiring a policy response. Indicators showed the living standard of Russia’s Arctic residents was declining after the fall of the Iron Curtain. During the 1990s, the life expectancy of Russia’s northern indigenous peoples decreased by almost five years. The AEPS took on human development projects, such as the creation in 1994 of the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization. It conducted studies of domestic policy and its impact on indigenous peoples. AEPS research about the declining human security situation in the Russian Arctic begged questions about the policy role of an Arctic Council.

In terms of the second question, as to the key debates around the Council’s policy-making role, the main issue concerned whether the Council would be an institution in which states created formal policy, which news commentary expected. In 1994, Toronto Star columnist Gordon Barthos wrote, “An Arctic Council should be used to tackle a broader range of international issues such as demilitarizing the North and creating a free-trade zone,” as well as such issues as “boosting scientific exploration, mining, tourism, pollution control, and wildlife protection.” Historian John English, in his history of the formation of the Arctic Council, confirms that many commentators expected that the Council would be a policy-making body. The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, for example, had called for policy creating a “zone of peace” in the Arctic since 1984. Many commentators debated the Council’s policy role.

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In terms of the third question, regarding the positions of the various actors on the Council’s policy-making role, two alignments emerged: Canada and the Nordic countries, with delegations supporting a robust, policy-making Council; and the United States and Russia, whose delegations stood opposed. Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in 1995 as it sought a more robust international institution to succeed the AEPS and faced demands from indigenous peoples. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien proposed to United States President Bill Clinton that states create a new Arctic institution during a meeting in Ottawa in February 1995, which the rest of the Arctic states accepted when contacted by Canadian officials. The Canadian government intended the Council to be a policy-making body, which was not accepted by United States and Russian officials. The process to create the Council proceeded in two major stages. Discussions of the Council’s policy-making role were a relatively minor issue. First, informal negotiations between states occurred throughout 1995 as well as in one formal negotiation session during June. The goal of states was to transition the AEPS into an institution informally and quickly by the end of 1995. However, state representatives could not agree on the role of indigenous peoples’ organizations, discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Second, Canadian officials saw that informal negotiations would not be adequate and so organized three rounds of negotiations between state department officials in 1996. These took place in Ottawa in April, June and August. The issue of whether indigenous peoples’ organizations would be full Council members dominated the April and June meetings, with the resolution that these groups become second-tier members, or “permanent participants,” without voting power. June and August 1996 saw state delegations prepare the declaration founding the

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439 Winnipeg Free Press, news brief, August 15, 1996.
440 English, Ice and Water, 226-229.
Council, signed in a September 1996 meeting in Ottawa. Delegations discussed the policy-making role of the Council during the June meeting.

In these negotiations, delegations from the first United States and Russia made two arguments opposing a policy-making role. The United States led this alignment and so the arguments reflected its preferences. First, the United States generally opposes international organizations with a strong policy-making role for fears that it could compromise its international autonomy.\(^{441}\) One Environmental Protection Agency official illustrated the fear that the Council could affect sovereignty in an anecdote about the negotiations to create the Council:

We [the Environmental Protection Agency] had some inter-agency meetings that were bloody because we had some Neanderthals from the then Bureau of Mines and various other elements. They were almost shouting, ‘No way in hell are we going to let anybody else come in and tell us whether or not we can go and mine in Alaska.’ There were parallel kinds of message coming from certain other camps. At the end of the day, the State Department and the White House said, ‘There’s some good that can come out of this, so we are going to do it [and join the Council].’\(^{442}\)

Second, the United States opposed the creation of policy in the Arctic Council to avoid duplicating the efforts and roles of other international forums that create formal agreements, such as the International Maritime Organization or United Nations.\(^{443}\) There were two other reasons the United States and Russia opposed a strong policy-making role for the Council. The nature of the United States’ policy-making system makes it difficult for the country to accept and implement formal policy, which resulted in a reluctance to involve itself in institutions that could create legal obligations.\(^{444}\) Furthermore, environmental issues were a fairly low priority for the Russian government in the 1990s.\(^{445}\) Russian delegations have stated in Council meetings that Russia feels unfairly singled out as a problematic polluter, when the other Arctic states have

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\(^{441}\) Interview with five different United States foreign affairs officials and former delegation members, spring 2013.
\(^{442}\) Interview with former United States delegation member and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employee, spring 2013.
\(^{443}\) Interview with two different United States foreign affairs officials, spring 2013, and Sauli Rouhinen, former Finnish chair of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), May 30, 2013.
\(^{444}\) Interview with one Finnish environmental official and one Finnish foreign affairs official, spring 2013.
\(^{445}\) Interview with former United States delegation member and EPA employee, spring 2013.
environmental issues as well.\textsuperscript{446} Russia and the United States opposed a policy-making role for the Council out of concern for the obligations it would create, which the other Council states had to accept.

The second alignment (the Nordic countries and Canada) sought a strong policy-making role for the Council. In the June negotiations, these delegations argued that a policy-making Council could be an effective means to address environmental and other Arctic issues. The Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, supported using the Council to create formal policies as a way to force Russia to address its Arctic contaminant problem.\textsuperscript{447} As noted, there was a significant contaminant problem in the Arctic impacting human health. It is easier to create common policy positions in Nordic countries due to the structure of their governments.\textsuperscript{448} In Finland, for example, Arctic stakeholders meet ahead of Council meetings to develop common Finnish policy positions. (Such meetings do not always happen in North American countries.) These stakeholders include government ministries, experts, interest groups, the administration, regional governments, non-governmental organizations and industry, as well as Saami representatives.\textsuperscript{449} Nordic countries in general develop top-down strategies, followed by an action plan, implementation, follow-up and monitoring.\textsuperscript{450} The United States, in contrast, does not always develop common multi-stakeholder policy positions, which makes accepting formal policy more difficult.\textsuperscript{451} Canada supported policy-making as a means to develop the Council as a strong, robust international body. Canada, in the early days of the Council, supported bottom-up decision-making and policy

\textsuperscript{446} For example, see Russia’s discussion of the PAME Regional Program of Action in 2000: Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Notes From The Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska, U.S.A, October 12-13, 2000} (Barrow, Alaska: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2000).

\textsuperscript{447} Interview with former United States delegation member and EPA employee, spring 2013.

\textsuperscript{448} Finnish foreign affairs official, spring 2013 and Sauli Rouhinen, former Finnish SDWG chair, May 30, 2013.

\textsuperscript{449} Interview with Finnish foreign affairs official and former delegation member, spring 2013.

\textsuperscript{450} Sauli Rouhinen, former Finnish SDWG chair, May 30, 2013.

\textsuperscript{451} Sauli Rouhinen, former Finnish SDWG chair, May 30, 2013.
in the Council. Permanent participants also were part of this alignment, though these groups were not a strong part of discussions and were preoccupied securing their participation in the Council, discussed in Chapter 6. Government officials from the Nordic states and Canada believed that good outcomes could come from the Arctic Council. What emerged from the June 1996 discussions was not a formal prohibition on policy, but an understanding that the Council was an international forum, rather than an international institution with law-making capability.

In regards to the fourth question, as to which states’ preferences prevailed, the first alignment’s preferences prevailed as Russia and the United States created the expectation that the Council would not be a venue to create formal policy. These two countries yielded more powerful bargaining positions than the Nordic countries and Canada, namely their relative importance and the fact that they were much less willing to compromise in the key June 1996 negotiations as to the Council’s policy-making role. The United States delegation, in particular, demanded a Council that met its state interests and would not threaten the country’s international autonomy. It became clear that the Arctic Council would not be a treaty-making body shortly after the creation of the organization, but rather an institution that states would use to research important policy options. As a 1996 news report noted,

The group will not, for example, be able to tell the United States whether to develop its most northern Alaskan oil reserves, or counsel Russia about how aggressively to mine for minerals in Siberia. But it may recommend methods for minimizing the effect of such projects and spreading the work and benefits among native communities.

The great regional powers emerged mostly victorious in negotiations.

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Still, the second alignment could also claim some success, as the United States and Russian officials did not demand a general prohibition on the creation of policy. The second alignment did not suggest any policies that the Council might create at the onset of the institution. The United States and Russian official’s concerns were more about the future than the present, which negated the need for a stronger prohibition. States understood after the June 1996 Council negotiations in Ottawa that the Council would not rush to create policy, but did not include language in the Council’s founding documents precluding work on policy.455 The press release announcing the Council, for example, says that the Council provided “a mechanism for addressing the common concerns and challenges faced by their governments and the people of the Arctic.”456 In the media, there was some confusion as to the ultimate policy-making role of the Council. For example, a September 1996 Associated Press article created the impression that the Council would create policy, identifying the Council as a body “to protect the fragile polar environment while encouraging long-term development.”457 The language in the Council’s founding documents leaves open the possibility that the Council could be a policy-making body in the future. The Nordic countries and Canada accepted the policy-making powers of the Council as prescribed by the United States and Russia, confident that the Council could be a policy-making institution if circumstances dictated. Overall, the first alignment emerged victorious, as there was an understanding that the Council, as an international forum, would not create any policy in the short-term. The second alignment could claim some victory, as policy-making was available to the Council as a tool of governance. States relatively settled the question

456 Ibid.
457 Crary, “Eight Arctic Nations Band Together to Combat Pollution.” See also: Canadian Press, “Eight Nations Form Council to Protect, Develop Arctic.” and Palmer, “Arctic States Join to Try to Protect Environment.”
regarding the policy-making role of the Council as the Council began operations in 1996, even though the question did not remain settled for long.

Returning to the literature, several authors explain that the Council was a research institution upon its creation. This chapter confirms that analysis. The AEPS was an institution that created good quality research about little understood environmental issues. In 1996, it appeared that the Council would continue with this work, as predicted and described by Evan Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young. At the founding of the institution, the Council did not appear poised to develop norms, or “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors.” This analysis suggests that authors such as Timo Koivurova, Peter Stenlund and Alison Ronson over-emphasize the Council role as a soft law institution, based on the legal powers given at its onset. The creation of research and reports does not necessarily result in soft-law. Soft law must see research lead to a consistent change in state behaviour. In addition, those authors advocating that the Council expand could deepen their research agenda by acknowledge that the Council was designed deliberately as a limited research institution.

3.2.2 – 1996-2004

There are two key questions pertinent to the period of Council policy-making from 1996 until 2004. First, how did the debate over the policy-making role of the Council evolve from 1996 until 2004? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over the preferences of others?

In regards to the first question, the debate around the policy-making role settled to an extent as it became clear that the United States and Russia would not allow the Council to be a strong policy-making body. In creating the Arctic Council rules of procedure, the United States

and Russia sought to ensure the Council had a weak policy-making role and that it could ensure that such a role could not emerge without consent. The 1996 *Ottawa Declaration* set out three goals for the Council to complete from 1996 until 1998: 1) to develop rules of procedure for the Council; 2) to create terms of reference for the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the AEPS to the Arctic Council. There were five Council meetings from 1997 until 1998, four of which Canada hosted in the spring and fall of each year. The creation of the rules of procedure dominated the first four of these meetings, from the spring of 1997 until August 1998. In these meetings, the United States sought to ensure that the rules of procedure authorize the Council only to undertake projects having the consent of all Council members, in essence giving each state a veto on all Council matters. The rest of the Council members sought to create a “short and simple” set of “procedural rules” that would make the Council a flexible body and ensure the task of creating rules of procedure did not take up too much time. The United States, which was again unwilling to compromise, was successful, as the rules of procedure establish that each Council state has a veto on any Council matter and that the institution operates according to consensus. This veto allows the United States to ensure that no policy can occur in the Council without the consent of all states, a high burden of agreement that could stifle policy. The Council’s policy-making role appeared settled as the Council began undertaking substantive work in 1998.

Nonetheless, nothing in the rules of procedure precludes policy work in the Council, reflecting the general understanding of the Council’s policy-making role achieved in 1996.

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459 The Council had two meetings in 1997. The May 1998 meeting was in Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada. The September 1998 meeting was in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada. The only meeting not held in Canada occurred in London, England, in August 1998. For further details, see Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 771.


462 Ibid.
negotiations. States and permanent participants set the Council agenda,\textsuperscript{463} decide on delegation sizes,\textsuperscript{464} schedule meetings and participate in meetings.\textsuperscript{465} All states and permanent participants “may make proposals for co-operative activities.”\textsuperscript{466} States make all of these decisions by consensus. Thus, every state has a veto on any Council matter. They decide what observers can attend each meeting and what they can do in those meetings.\textsuperscript{467} States typically hold between two and four annual meetings in which they receive updates on projects in progress, present proposals for new projects and approve of projects presented by other countries. One state acts as the chair country to facilitate communication for two-year rotating terms.\textsuperscript{468}

Between 1996 and 2004, the Arctic Council emerged as a policy-recommendation body because of the United States, Russia and to a lesser extent Canada. The Council held 18 institutional meetings from 1998 until 2004. Research defined the Council’s work during this period. In a typical meeting, Arctic Council working groups of government scientists would bring forward research proposals, which states would sponsor, approve and provide comment. Permanent participants and occasionally observers also would sponsor projects and provide comment. Most projects moved forward with little interference from state delegations. From 1998 until 2004, the Council initiated 57 projects, including three major projects (the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}, the \textit{Arctic Human Development Report} and the \textit{Arctic Contaminants Action Program}).\textsuperscript{469}

\textsuperscript{464} Ibid., Article 13.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid., Article 30.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid., Article 26.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid., Annex 2, Articles 1-4.
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid., Article 46.
Research, rather than disagreements over policy, defines the Council’s first era of existence. The Council undertook research projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil-spill preparedness and human security, among others.\textsuperscript{470} Specific examples of research projects include the Arctic Sea Birds project,\textsuperscript{471} sponsored by Norway and Canada (2000), the Russian Regional Program of Action on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, sponsored by Russia (2000) and the Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Technique Manual Project\textsuperscript{472} sponsored by Canada (2004). Technical projects include a 2000 project by Canada in the SDWG entitled “Children and Youth in the Arctic” that sought to facilitate “data collection and analysis of health indicators” for children living in the circumpolar Arctic.\textsuperscript{473} It also sought to support internships, “a summer camp for young people, a learning materials exchange, and an art competition for young people.”\textsuperscript{474} A 2002 project by Norway in the Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group sought to produce “a series of GIS-based circumpolar maps showing the areas of highest risk of an oil spill and those areas with sensitive natural resources or subsistence communities,”\textsuperscript{475} a useful tool for Arctic shippers.\textsuperscript{476} At the onset of the Council, the Arctic Council was a collegial “science club,” in which it was possible to create non-binding research around environmental issues of concern to all Council states.\textsuperscript{477} This research, while valuable, does not represent significantly ambitious work for an international institution, as universities or research institutions could have completed this work.

\textsuperscript{470} Arctic Council, \textit{Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999.}
\textsuperscript{471} By the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF.
\textsuperscript{472} By the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group, or the EPPR.
\textsuperscript{473} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers: Barrow.}
\textsuperscript{474} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{475} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers} (Inari, Finland).
\textsuperscript{476} Other examples can be found in: Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting}.
\textsuperscript{477} Interviews with one former Canadian delegation member and two former American delegations members who had involvement with foreign affairs, winter and spring 2013.
The debate over the Council’s policy-making role re-ignited in 1999 when a Council member proposed the creation of a formal policy in the Council. At the November 1999 Arctic Council meeting in Washington, D.C., states discussed research on Arctic contaminants, among 15 agenda items, including reports from the working groups and briefs on relevant environmental work occurring outside of the Council. The Swedish and Norwegian delegations, armed with scientific evidence about the severity of the problem of PCB contamination, proposed the creation of formal, coordinated state reduction targets for Arctic contaminants in the *Arctic Contaminant Action Plan* (ACAP).\(^{478}\) The meeting minutes say, “Norway reported that delegates should be prepared to negotiate final text for the strategy component of the [Arctic Contaminants Action] plan at the next meeting.”\(^{479}\) The Norwegian delegation intended that all states commit to the action plan and that Arctic states put forward a common policy on contaminants in other “international fora.”\(^{480}\) After this suggestion, delegations from Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark expressed support for the plan.\(^{481}\) Sweden, for example, announced it would contribute two specific projects to clean up PCBs in the Russian Arctic.\(^{482}\) However, the Canadian delegation then stated it was vetoing the proposal to use the Council to create international obligations, citing sovereignty concerns, before Norway or Sweden could discuss what either envisioned.\(^{483}\) The meeting minutes report, “As far as using the ACAP as a coordinated approach in international fora, Canada stated that the Council must continue to rely on individual states to take action” and “Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.”\(^{484}\)


\(^{479}\) Ibid.

\(^{480}\) Ibid.

\(^{481}\) Ibid.

\(^{482}\) Ibid.

\(^{483}\) Ibid.

\(^{484}\) Ibid.
In this case, Canada exercised a veto to block the first-ever suggestion of formal policy creation in the Arctic Council. The United States and Russian delegations did not state outright rejection of a coordinated Arctic Contaminants Action Program in 1999, but did not express support either. Permanent participants supported creating a policy, but did not convince Canada to reverse its veto. Following the Canadian veto, the Inuit Circumpolar Council said that a policy response to contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of indigenous people in the Arctic.” The Nordic countries supported policy on contaminants because contaminants from Russia posed environmental and health risks for these countries, as previously noted. A formal agreement would keep Russia accountable in the face of resistance to environmental action. The United States and Russia did not state support or opposition to the proposal, but given either’s earlier resistance to policy-making in the Council, support seems unlikely. Russia had little interest in such environmental issues. Canada did not support formal policy due to disagreements over the necessity of such measures. The debate over the policy-making role of the Council shifted as the Nordic countries attempted to convince the Council to create formal policy, which Canada rejected, citing concerns over sovereignty.

In the aftermath of this shift, the debate over the Council’s policy-making role further ignited as the United States took action to ensure that formal policy would not be forthcoming in the Council. In 1993, at the AEPS meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, the Council’s future EPPR working group, at the request of Canada, began to review the “adequacy and effectiveness” of emergency preparedness “arrangements” in the Arctic. At the October 2000 Arctic Council

485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
488 Interview with Canadian government environmental official and delegation member, winter 2013.
489 Arctic Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers: Barrow, Alaska and Arctic Council, Activities (Fairbanks, Alaska: April Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, 2000).
Ministerial Meeting, the project announced it had “concluded that agreements in force are currently adequate.”\(^{490}\) Formal treaties or policies could have resulted had the EPPR concluded that existing agreements were not adequate. A decade later, the Council created an agreement on oil spill prevention. Does this indicate that the agreements in place in 2000 were not adequate and the EPPR report was incorrect, or that the environmental and economic conditions in the Arctic changed over the course of 10 years? According to policy-makers involved, Russia and the United States, then chair of the EPPR working group, pressured the EPPR to ensure the report concluded current policies were adequate for fear its report could affect existing nuclear pollution regulations.\(^{491}\) Other Council actors were not active in this debate but would have likely allowed formal policy, though United States and Russian interests reigned supreme.

Further work demonstrates that in this period, the Council sometimes acted like an advocacy group. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, the Arctic states and permanent participants discussed strategies for its members to ratify the 1998 *Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Protocols on Persistent Organic Pollutants and Heavy Metals*, an international convention to limit the use of contaminants. Canada was the only Arctic Council member to ratify the protocols and so states discussed the prospects of other Council countries ratifying.\(^{492}\) The Inuit Circumpolar Council urged states to ratify the protocols, and Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland expressed intent to ratify.\(^{493}\) The delegation from Canada suggested releasing a statement urging “early ratification,” which the United States and Russia allowed.\(^{494}\) The Council acted like an advocacy group rather than a policy-making organization.

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\(^{491}\) Interview with former Canadian government Northern development official and delegation member, winter 2013.


\(^{493}\) Ibid.

\(^{494}\) Ibid.
In response to the second question, as to why the preferences of some actors prevailed over the preferences of others, the Nordic countries could not initiate policy because there was no consensus on Council action. At the 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, during a discussion of contaminants, Denmark renewed calls for a formal policy on contaminants, following up on the 1999 discussion, as its delegation asked, “Why is it so difficult for some countries to make a commitment?” Denmark asserted, “Contaminants can only be reduced through international co-operation.” In 2002, Finland circulated a draft of the upcoming *Inari Declaration* to Arctic states and permanent participants that had the Council declare itself the “mouthpiece” of the Arctic region. However, the delegations from Canada and Iceland said that they “are not in favour of using the word ‘mouthpiece’ in the declaration,” vetoing the idea. It is not clear where the other Council states stood on this issue. It is not clear what affect the declaration that the Council is “mouthpiece” of the Arctic region would have, but certainly, it would invest the organization with greater importance. The Council did not create policy because the United States and Russia, and to a lesser extent Canada, did not support the creation of formal policy in the Council on the issues favoured by the Nordics and permanent participants. Decision-making by consensus gave these countries a tool to prevent the adoption of policy.

As Oran Young and others have asserted, the Council was a research institution from 1996 until 2004. In addition, the Council did not necessarily create soft-law and fulfill the potential role identified by such scholars as Timo Koivurova, although its research often contained policy recommendations.

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495 Arctic Council, *Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting*.
496 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
3.2.3 – 2004-2007

From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Arctic Council as a policy-making body as Russia began emphasizing the importance of taking action on Arctic search and rescue. This section seeks to answer the following question: at what point did changes in the policy-making role of the Council take place and what explains this evolution? Changes began to take place in 2004 as Russia stated its support for formal policy on search and rescue, which all Council members generally supported. However, the United States stood alone blocking formal policy on climate change, to the disappointment of all Council states and permanent participants.

The policy-making role of the Council changed in 2004, when Russia shifted its position toward that of the Nordic/Canadian alignment and away from the United States’ opposition to policy-making. The *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA) had made clear that climate change would increase the Northern Sea Route shipping season, a lane 40 per cent shorter than the Suez Canal when travelling from China to Europe. The Russian delegation stated, at the November 2004 Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, at which states released the ACIA report, that emergency response and Arctic search and rescue would be a priority for the Russian government and proposed to “establish a network of international base points, stationing equipment and resources for monitoring and rescuing through an agreement among the Arctic states.” Russia supported taking action on search and rescue in the Arctic because a formal agreement would strengthen its economic position in the Arctic. Many reports indicate that the economic future of the Arctic is strong because it is a region with billions of barrels of oil and an

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abundance of natural gas.\textsuperscript{501} As noted earlier, Russia controls roughly 80 per cent of the Arctic’s resources.\textsuperscript{502} Insurance companies have cautioned against Arctic investment due to lack of safety infrastructure.\textsuperscript{503} Strong work on search and rescue reassures potential investors that resources are available in case of emergency, which is part of the reason that Russia proposed policy to increase economic potential.

Despite the Russian invitation to begin developing policy on emergency preparedness, work did not begin immediately. Russia did not come forward with a clear treaty on emergency preparedness. From 2004 until 2013, the Council had on average 159 projects ongoing at a given time. The Council completed four major projects from 2004 until 2007, namely: 1) the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program;\textsuperscript{504} 2) Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme pollution assessments;\textsuperscript{505} 3) the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks project,\textsuperscript{506} and; 4) the \textit{Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment}.\textsuperscript{507} Russia emphasized its commitment to search and rescue at nine Council meetings over the next five years (November 2004, April 2005, October 2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and November 2009). The major focus during the Russian chair was on the clean up of hazardous materials in the Arctic as well as the development of an Arctic search and rescue plan.\textsuperscript{508} As noted, there were two significant outcomes of Russia’s emphasis on emergency preparedness and its search and rescue plan. First, the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group


\textsuperscript{502} I. Alexeev, “Russia’s Arctic, NATO and Norway: A Post-Kirkenes Political Landscape,” \textit{Barents Observer}, June 20, 2013.

\textsuperscript{503} Emmerson et. al. \textit{Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North}.

\textsuperscript{504} Initiated in 2006 under the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group.

\textsuperscript{505} Completed annually from 2005 until 2013 by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program working group.

\textsuperscript{506} Completed from 2006 until 2008 by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program working group.

\textsuperscript{507} Published in 2007 by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program working group.

\textsuperscript{508} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).
began to create a scientific assessment on the extent of Arctic shipping. Work began on the
*Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment* (sponsored by the United States) in April 2005, with updates
on progress at every Council meeting until 2011. Second, the government of Russia organized an
“accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, Russia, during October 2008, in which circumpolar
states came together to share strategies to avoid accidents in the Arctic. The *Arctic Oil and
Gas Assessment* also helped support Russia’s emergency preparedness initiative, though it was
more economic in scope. The Russia search and rescue initiative inspired the subsequent
agreement on search and rescue, discussed later.

Nonetheless, Russian openness to an international agreement did not signal great change
in the Council. There was a second event in which the debate over the Council’s policy-making
role came to the forefront as the United States signalled that it did not support the creation of
formal policy through controversy over the ACIA. States decided to create the ACIA at the 2000
Ministerial Meeting as an assessment of climate change in the Arctic in the wake of information
about a potential threat from global warming to the environment and livelihoods around the
world. Government scientists, led by the researchers from the United States, completed the
assessment over four years. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, Iceland
proposed the creation of a policy document to accompany the ACIA, which all states approved at
this meeting. Scientists updated the Council about its progress creating a policy document in
April 2003, at the Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. The scientists reported, “The policy
document will be at least 30 pages, containing three major chapters.” The plan was to deliver
the first draft on June 15, 2003, followed by a second on October 31, 2003 and a third on

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510 Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Meeting, Espoo, Finland*  
511 Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, April 9-10, 2003*.  

February 9, 2004. At every point, states would provide comments, technical in nature. The final draft would be finished on April 4, 2004. There would be a special Council meeting from August 5-7, 2003 in Svalbard, hosted by Norway. The purpose would be to “create a link between the scientific work of ACIA and the policy document.” It appeared that the Council would create a robust policy document on climate change, which could have inspired some policy action.

However, the ACIA policy document was not strong. The United States proposed a policy document of only one page at the August 2003 meeting. After states did not accept this proposal, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of an ACIA policy document. The United States changed its earlier support for fear of the document’s impact on the 2004 presidential election as the Republican Party under President George W. Bush sought to avoid commitments to action on climate change. The Inuit Circumpolar Council was instrumental in seeing that a policy document survived. As discussed further in Chapter 6, Sheila Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council went before United States Senate Commerce Committee on March 3, 2004 to testify that the United States was blocking policy on climate change. This testimony embarrassed the United States, and it allowed the report to move forward in November 2004 at the next Council meeting. It considered vetoing the report at this

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512 Ibid.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid.
516 English, Ice and Water, 277.
517 Ibid.
518 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current consultant, winter 2013.
520 Terry Fenge, representative for Arctic Athabaskan Council and formerly Inuit Circumpolar Council, February 21, 2013.
meeting, but decided the optics of doing so would be too controversial. The United States did allow a policy document, but only after external pressure.

The United States’ resistance to Council policy is reflected in the policy report that emerged from the ACIA, which is modest and the result of compromise. While the ACIA is 140 pages, the policy document is only eight pages. The report came out on November 24, 2004, after the United States election took place on November 2. The actual policy recommendations are weak and contain no specific strategies. Nonetheless, the ACIA changed the way the Council operates and increased awareness about the dangers of climate change in the Arctic region. It showed that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost twice the rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with likely “additional Arctic warming of about 4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.” The United States could not block the creation of an ACIA policy document, but blocked it from being a strong document.

We can conclude that from 2004 until 2007, the policy-making role of the Council began to shift as Russia joined the Nordic/Canadian alignment, generally becoming open to policy-making in the Council, specifically to action on Arctic search and rescue. Oran Young’s characterization of the Arctic Council as a research institution accurately describes its role from 2004 until 2007, although a policy-making role was evolving. The Council undertook some work beyond research, such as the ACIA policy document or the Russian search and rescue collaboration exercise. However, we cannot point to any norms created by these projects, in contrast to the predictions made by Timo Koivurova and others.

523 Ibid.
524 This comment came up in several interviews with Canadian/United States foreign affairs officials, 2013.
3.2.4 – 2008-2013

The Council became a policy-making body, as well as a research institution, from 2008 until 2013, evolving its approach to governance. The key question is thus: what change in the Council’s policy-making role took place and what explains this evolution? The major change that took place was that the Council became a body that states use to negotiate formal policy, through the creation of the Arctic search and rescue agreement, as well as the agreement on oil spill response. All states supported the move to create formal policy in the Council, although the support of the United States and Russia was the major factor leading to the creation of formal policy.

The major change in the Council’s policy-making role took place in 2008. At the November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, the United States delegation proposed the creation of an Arctic Council agreement on search and rescue to coordinate the response to emergency situations, to the surprise of many observers and former Council policy-makers who did not think the Council would ever create policy. Russia said that it supported the proposal and none of the other Arctic Council members stated opposition. The United States and Russia served as co-chairs of the task force that created the agreement. Overall, the Council continued to devote much of its activities to research. As of 2013, each state sponsors an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsor an average of two projects. Observers have sponsored seven projects. Negotiating legally binding agreements comprised a small portion of the Council’s overall agenda, namely two projects.

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527 Ibid
528 Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 12-13 November 2009, Copenhagen (Tromsø: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2009).
The search and rescue agreement’s goal is to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue co-operation and coordination in the Arctic.” The agreement was negotiated in five meetings in Washington (December 2009), Moscow (February 2010), Oslo (June 2010), Helsinki (October 2010) and Reykjavik (December 2010). The process to negotiate the agreement was quite straightforward, with few disagreements among states. The agreement does five things. First, it says that countries will abide by existing international law in the Arctic. Second, it divides the Arctic into zones of responsibility for search and rescue issues. Third, it provides a list of departments to contact in the event of a search and rescue emergency. Fourth, it says that a state can ask for assistance and carry out joint search and rescue missions if appropriate. Fifth, the agreement requires states to exchange information about search and rescue. The search and rescue agreement is not ambitious in terms of the obligations it imposes on states, but it sets the stage for good quality co-operation and the sharing of useful information. It is significant that states chose to create an international agreement at all. States could have accomplished everything in the agreement with an informal policy or action plan. Policy-makers believe that the agreement is very useful, if not particularly exciting or ambitious as an international legal instrument. The agreement sets up communication and coordination that could have happened in the absence of an agreement through existing Council meetings. However, it is possible that this coordination would not have occurred without the agreement. International agreements are a new tool that the Council uses to accomplish goals.

529 Arctic Council, Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Nuuk, Greenland: Arctic Council, 2011), preamble and Article 7.
531 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Department of Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.
532 Ibid., appendix, Article 8, Article 3.
533 Ibid., appendix.
534 Ibid., Article 11 and Article 12.
535 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Department of Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.
States supported a search and rescue agreement for two reasons. First, an agreement emerged because it was in the interest of all state members. Co-operation was necessary due to increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic, which had been established through research by Russia in the Council. 537 Three officials privy to details of negotiations reported that the agreement came together quickly and that there were few disagreements or roadblocks in its creation. 538 There was a disagreement about the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in search and rescue, but this disagreement was minor and easily overcome. 539 Finnish officials wanted the agreement to acknowledge that the military is a key provider of search and rescue in the Arctic. Russia rejected this acknowledgement, as it believed it might justify a NATO presence in the Arctic, a position supported by Canada as well. 540 As noted, Russia stands to gain financially from increased economic activity in the Arctic. 541 The rest of the Arctic Council countries supported the agreement to “ensure that it was not going to have a negative impact” on their own initiatives and interests. 542 In other words, states supported an agreement on search and rescue to ensure that whatever inevitable regime emerged met their interests. Second, states supported an agreement on search and rescue because of pressure from industry. An official who is familiar with emergency response in the Arctic said that the resource industry requested more safety infrastructure in the Arctic. 543 Such infrastructure is very costly and fundamental to operations. 544 The Search and Rescue agreement could be a way for states to respond to pressures to do something about emergency response without undertaking large expenditures.

The search and rescue agreement won support because it enhanced the economic prospects of

537 This comment emerged in interviews with seven separate foreign affairs government officials, 2013.
538 This comment emerged in interviews with three separate foreign affairs government officials, 2013.
539 Interview with Finnish foreign affairs official, summer 2013.
540 Interview with Finnish foreign affairs official, summer 2013.
541 Interview with former Canadian government defence consultant and delegation member, winter 2013.
542 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
543 Interview with former Canadian government defence consultant and delegation member, winter 2013.
544 Interview with former Canadian government defence consultant and delegation member, winter 2013.
several Council countries and did not run contrary to any other state interest, though it had little tangible impact on search and rescue capabilities.

The process to ratify the agreement began in 2011 and was complete in 2013. The United States accepted the agreement through executive order, overcoming its historical opposition to international treaties dealing with the Arctic because it meant the agreement would not need to be ratified in the United States Senate, often a difficult prospect. A situation has not yet emerged in which provisions of the agreement were enacted, though preparations are ongoing within Arctic state authorities. On January 19, 2013, all the countries ratified the agreement and thus it legally came into force. The permanent participants or observers did not contribute significantly to the search and rescue agreement, though they generally supported it or at least did not strongly oppose it. Due to a lack of funds, permanent participants have to concentrate their scarce resources on areas vital to their interests, as discussed in Chapter 6. The agreement represented a move into policy-making by the Arctic Council.

In 2011, at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, Council state delegations announced they would work to negotiate an agreement on oil spill response through the creation of a new task force. This agreement represents the Council’s second attempt to negotiate a formal agreement. Much like the search and rescue agreement, it came into being because state interests aligned to create it. Norway, Russia and the United States co-chaired the task force and led the negotiation of the agreement. States negotiated the agreement at five collegial and straightforward meetings, held in Oslo (October 2011), St. Petersburg (December

\[^{546}\text{Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Department of Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.}\]
\[^{547}\text{Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Department of Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.}\]
\[^{548}\text{Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Stockholm, 28-29 March 2012: Final Report (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2012).}\]
2011), Girdwood, Alaska (March 2012), Helsinki (June 2012) and Reykjavik (October 2012). States signed the agreement during the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting and hailed it as a “huge agreement.” Several critics, such as international lawyer Michael Byers, criticized the agreement for failing to address oil spill prevention, focusing instead on only on the response to oil spills. Permanent participants were more critical of this agreement. The Arctic Athabaskan Council sent two letters to the government of Canada requesting that the agreement address prevention as well as response, which were ultimately ignored. It is possible that states will negotiate an Arctic treaty on oil-spill prevention in the future, though it remains uncertain.

The result of this process is not ambitious, though it shows that the Council has rethought its role in regional policy-making. The agreement excludes security by excluding military vehicles. It accomplishes five similar objectives to the search and rescue agreement. First, it establishes that states will follow existing international law when addressing oil spills in the Arctic. Second, it establishes zones of responsibility for oil spill clean up. States are responsible to clean up oil spills in their domestic waters. Third, the agreement on oil spill response establishes a list of departments responsible for oil spill clean up. Fourth, the

552 Byers, Circumpolar Challenges, 22. See also, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Multilateral Code to Govern Arctic Offshore Resource Development (Toronto, Ontario: Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, Trinity College, University of Toronto, 2014).
554 United States government official, spring 2013.
555 Arctic Council. Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2003), Article 3.
556 Ibid., preamble and Article 6.
557 Ibid., Article 3
558 Ibid., Appendix.
agreement establishes that states can carry out joint clean ups if appropriate. Fifth, it establishes that states have to share information about oil spills and techniques to combat oil spills. The oil spill agreement places legal obligations on state parties. Article 4 requires states to clean up oil spills and Article 6 obliges states to inform other countries if there is an oil spill. The agreement says that states cannot refuse a request for help cleaning up an oil spill. States opted to create an agreement on oil spill response for two reasons. First, co-operation to address an oil spill is in state interest. Second, states initiated the agreement because the oil industry asked for more resources to deal with spills. States created the agreement for similar reasons to the search and rescue agreement.

To reiterate, what change in the Council’s policy-making role took place and what were the positions of the various actors in the Council? All states are now open to the creation of formal policy in the Arctic Council. The United States was alone resisting changes in the policy-making role in the Council, from 2004 until 2007. This shift is not a sea change. The Council created two formal agreements. However, the rest of its average 159 projects were research intensive, policy-recommendation work that did not involve formal policy.

3.2.5 – 2013: The Future of Policy-Making in the Council

Before concluding, it is necessary to review the policy-making role through three questions. First, what is the policy-making role of the Arctic Council today? Second, what is the likely trajectory of the policy-making role in the future? Third, why did the Arctic Council move from being a body that conducts studies to one that both conducts studies and engages in some

559 Ibid., Article 8, Article 10 and Article 13.
560 Ibid., Article 12.
561 Ibid., Article 4.
562 Ibid., Article 6.
563 Ibid., Article 8.
564 This comment emerged in eight separate interviews with foreign affairs officials, 2013.
565 Interview with former Canadian government defence consultant and delegation member, winter 2013.
policy-making work? The answer to the first question is straightforward, whereas the second is less clear. The Council is a research body that can facilitate the creation of formal agreements if state officials so desire. In regards to the second question, the future of treaty making in the Council is unclear. The 2012 Kiruna Declaration Council work plan contained much that may lead to policy, such as an “arrangement on improved scientific research co-operation among the eight Arctic States” although there is no guarantee that any law-making documents will result.  

The Council will take “action to prevent oil pollution,” though it is unclear if this action will result in policy. The Council is completing a project on short-lived climate forcers, and some policy-makers believe a treaty could be on the horizon. Nonetheless, some policy-makers still resist the notion that the Council is a policy-making body. It is not apparent whether the Council will continue to develop its policy role, or if it will slow the pace of change. Nonetheless, the change toward a policy-making Council has already occurred.

In response to the third question, the policy-making role of the Council is growing because formal policy is increasingly in the interest of all Council states. From 1991 until 1996, states debated the role of the Arctic Council. Before the Council held its first meeting, commentators expected the Council to be a policy-making body. This expectation was not initially realized, as the Council emerged as a research and policy-recommendation forum. The Nordic countries wanted the Council to create policy to address pollution in Russia, while the United States and Russia wanted to maintain sovereignty. Canada supported policy-making, but preferred bottom-up approaches. From 1996 until 2004, the United States, Russia and to a lesser

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567 Government of Canada, Development for the People of the North.
568 Ibid.
569 Interview with Canadian delegation member and environment official, winter 2013.
570 This comment emerged in interviews with a Canadian government foreign affairs official, winter 2013, and two United States government foreign affairs officials, spring 2013.
extent Canada blocked the creation of formal policy. States supported creating policy that was within their interest and opposed policy that was not within their interest.

From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Council as a policy-making forum. Russia introduced emergency response, as well as search and rescue, as priority issues and proposed the creation of a search and rescue agreement. Meanwhile, the United States blocked the creation of a strong policy document to accompany the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA). From 2008 until 2013, the nature of policy-making in the Council changed when the Council negotiated a formal search and rescue agreement, led by the United States and Russia. This issue was of particular interest to the United States, Canada and Russia, although all of the Council countries supported the agreement. This agreement also led to the negotiation of an agreement on oil spill response, similarly supported by all of the Council states but led by the United States, Russia and Norway. The agreements are not particularly ambitious, but they do indicate that the Council has moved from being purely a research institution to being a policy-making body, as well. The treaties that exist support the economic development of the Arctic region by giving industry assurances that safety protocols exist. The future of policy-making in the Council is unclear.

How do these findings contrast with the characterizations found in Arctic Council literature? A new understanding of the Council is necessary. Evan T. Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young argue that the Council is a research institution that provides good quality information to states. This characterization of the Council’s work is accurate. However, the Council’s role evolved in 2009, when states mutually decided to create formal policy in the Council through two international agreements. It is also clear that states had many disagreements

572 Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64.
573 Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 11-12.
about the policy-making role of the Council, exhibited in 1999 in the dispute about whether to create a formal policy on pollutants in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, or in 2004 in the dispute over the ACIA policy document. States never permanently agreed on the policy-making role of the Council. It is possible that the Council could create soft-law in the Council, as noted by Timo Koivurova,574 Peter Stenlund575 and Alison Ronson.576 Yet, it is difficult to identify the creation of any specific soft law, or international norms, in the Council from 1996 until 2008. When the Council’s policy-making role evolved, it became the venue to create international Arctic agreements. The Council is beginning a new phase in its international governance. Contrary to the characterization by Oran Young and others, the Council has moved beyond its role as a research institution to become a policy-making body in addition. Contrary to the characterization by Timo Koivurova and others, the Council has become more than merely a soft-law organization by creating formal agreements and standards of practice. Furthermore, authors, such as Michael Byers, who argue that the Council should do more, could deepen their research agenda by expanding on the Council’s policy-making process.577 States create formal policy when it is in in their mutual interest and can gain economically, rather than in response to environmental and other issues that demand action. The Council has not become an all-encompassing body to address all issues demanding governance. The contentious debate over the Council’s policy-making role is over. The Council can be a venue to create formal policy, though whether this role will expand is unclear.

575 Peter Stenlund, “Lessons in Regional Co-operation from the Arctic,” 839.  
576 Alison Ronson, “Political Climate Change,” 100.  
577 Byers, Circumpolar Challenges.
3.3 - Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role

Functionalism provides some limited insights that explain the evolution of policy-making in the Arctic Council.

H1: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.

This hypothesis has limited support. It would have support if the evolution occurred automatically due to external structural changes. This situation was more or less the case for search and rescue as well as response to oil spills. These issues presented significant issues for Arctic states that states could best meet co-operatively. There were relatively few disagreements in the creation of these treaties. However, this hypothesis does not have support for two reasons. First, the response to these issues was not always automatic. States did not take action because action was necessary, but rather once they received demands from industry for regulation, promising economic benefit. One could interpret this as automatic expansion. However, the United States and Russia blocked earlier attempts to address these issues by limiting the Analysis of the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Existing Arrangements and Agreements report due to concerns over its effect on nuclear security. Second, the Council has rejected opportunities for policy work on other pressing co-operative issues. The United States, Russia and Canada earlier rejected strong policy work on Arctic contaminants, another external policy issue demanding co-operation. The United States blocked a policy response to climate change, an exogenous issue that demands co-operation. United States policy-makers were well aware of the devastating consequences of climate change, as it had funded a major research report on climate change in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). The evolution of the Council’s policy-making role has not consistently proceeded automatically in response to external structural changes.
H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the same preferences that create evolution.

This hypothesis does not have support, even though the policy-making role of the Council changed when state preferences aligned. The Scandinavian countries supported a strong policy-making role for the Council since at least 1999, as seen in its support for action on Arctic contaminants. Canada has wavered in its support for policy-making. It supported potential action on emergency preparedness in 2000, but earlier blocked action on contaminants. The United States blocked policy-making in the Council until action on search and rescue in 2009. Russia did not support policy-making until it introduced its initiative on emergency preparedness in 2004. The Nordic countries supported the emergency preparedness initiative enough to allow it to proceed, though gained less than Russia and the United States. States do not have the same preferences and so the hypothesis does not have support.

H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill shared technocratic goals around a less political issue area.

This hypothesis has some support because Council policy-making has been in areas that are technical in nature and less political, as discussed in Chapter 2. The Arctic Council states can create greater certainty in the region by pooling resources on search and rescue and oil spills. The treaties that states have created are largely technical in nature: they commit states to follow international law, conduct joint operations if necessary, create zones of responsibility, exchange information and coordinate contacts in case of emergency. One could argue that these are less political (i.e., less contentious) issues based on the ease with which the treaties came together. There were some minor disagreements in drafting the treaties, but for the most part the treaties came together quickly. They help states improve their emergency preparedness and support industry operating in the Arctic region.
One could counter this argument and argue emergency preparedness is still a highly contentious issue. The United States and Russia had earlier blocked action on emergency preparedness because they feared it would have implications for their nuclear activities in the Arctic region, demonstrating a political dimension. However, this point does not indicate that emergency preparedness was a political issue in itself. The implications of action in this area made it a political issue. The United States and Russia likely supported action on emergency preparedness in 2009 in part because they were able to ensure that treaties did not impact state security. The United States and Russia were in a better place to ensure that action would not have unintended consequences. It is clear that overall, emergency preparedness is a less-political issue area than such issues as national economic health and military security.

*H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of “spillovers” that create opportunities for further co-operation.*

The hypothesis has little support because emergency preparedness did not come to the Council’s agenda due to issue spillover. The United States and Russia brought the initiative to develop the treaties to the Council. It did not emerge due to earlier work that the Council accomplished, but rather from demands from outside actors. One could argue that the treaties spilled over from work completed by the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group about emergency preparedness. However, emergency preparedness emerged separate from the EPPR, in unique task forces. The United States and Russia chose to create the agreements in task forces rather than entrusting the task to the EPPR, which may have seemed like a natural venue to create an international agreement on emergency response based on its mandate to take action in this area. They did not want to cloud the role of EPPR by entrusting it with policy-making. Policy-making did not evolve in the Council due to spillover. Rather, it came to the Council due to the will of the United States and Russia.
H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in the Council.

This hypothesis has some support because industry had effectively pushed for new forms of co-operation in the Arctic Council. Industry is similar to an interest group and so fits under functionalist theory. Industry convinced states that agreements on emergency response were necessary. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, epistemic communities pushed the United States to support the ACIA. This same epistemic community was not able to convince Council countries to create a strong, supporting policy document. Nonetheless, the Council opted to create the emergency preparedness treaties due to the demands of industries, namely the tourism, shipping and resource industries in the Arctic, demonstrating the potential affect those interest groups and epistemic communities can have on international institutions.

H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven competent.

This hypothesis has some support, but is not fully valid. While the Council has demonstrated competence, it does not fully explain the evolution of the Council’s decision-making role. The Council has proven itself competent in that it has produced quality reports. The Council created the 2004 ACIA, which demonstrated the abilities of the Council. Yet, states did not create policy in the Council for some time after the report. The United States stifled the attempts by the Council to create policy in the ACIA. Part of United States opposition was for political reasons, connected to the United States’ presidential election. The policy document ultimately did not make useful, substantive policy recommendations. The United States resisted a policy-making role for the Council even after the latter proved it is a competent body. It is significant that the Council’s policy-making role evolved after proving itself competent. It shows that competence is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for international institution evolution.
Neorealism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making in the Council.

**H1:** *States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.*

This hypothesis has limited support because states in the Arctic Council seem more interested in absolute gains than relative gains. Concern for relative gains can make co-operation more difficult. It is possible that the United States and Russia rejected action on Arctic contaminants and emergency preparedness because they stood to gain less than other countries. It is also possible that relative gains motivate concerns about climate change action. Yet, the United States supported action on emergency preparedness despite the fact that Russia likely stood to gain more from increased Arctic economic activity than did the United States. Russia has the greatest potential to increase Arctic shipping of any Arctic Council country.578 Russia also has the most developed Arctic offshore oil industry.579 The United States supported these treaties because it stood to gain something in doing so, even if it was not as much as Russia. Absolute gains, rather than relative gains, motivate states in the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.

**H2:** *Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region.*

This hypothesis has support because the great powers have opposed policy-making in areas that affect zero-sum power distribution, namely security. They rejected action on emergency preparedness when it was possible that such action would impact security interests. They supported treaties on emergency preparedness after ensuring that the treaties would not affect their security interests. It is clear that great powers oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of zero-sum power distribution.


579 Ibid.
Smaller states support policy-making as a way to ‘balance’ against larger-countries. The Nordic countries supported strong action against contaminants due to their proximity to Russia. Contamination is greatest in Russia and the Nordic countries faced environmental affects because of that contamination. Canada and the United States had less interest in this issue. The Council was a means to leverage power against Russia and the United States, though ultimately this leverage did not prove successful. The United States is the second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world and it is the most prominent country that is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, an international emissions reduction agreement. The Nordic countries have been more aggressive and the ACIA policy document could have provided them with an advantage. Smaller countries use the Arctic Council as a means to “balance” against the United States.

**H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great powers.**

This hypothesis has support because the form of evolution of the Council’s policy-making role reflects the preferences of the United States and Russia. Nordic countries have pushed for a policy-making role for the Council. Finland advocated making the Council the “mouthpiece” of the Arctic region. Denmark in the past has expressed exasperation that the Council does not take stronger action. The Council has created treaties that are in the interest of the United States and Russia. Certainly, European states have supported the agreements that the Council has created. Norway in particular supported the oil-spill agreement and co-chaired the task force that created the agreement with Russia and the United States. Still, all of Europe and Canada’s attempts to create policy in the Council without the support of Russia and the United States have failed. The form of the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role has reflected the interests of the great powers, namely the United States and Russia.

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580 The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, *PCB in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions*. 
Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making in the Council.

**H1:** *States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through treaty making.*

This hypothesis has support because the Council’s policy-making role grew due to issues in which all states stand to make an absolute gain. All states stood to gain from the creation of treaties on emergency preparedness. Some states stand to gain more than do other states. Russia stands to gain a great deal by expanding the economic base of the Arctic region, as it possesses the largest share of Arctic resources. The emergency preparedness increases safety in the Arctic for all countries. In contrast, the treaty on contaminants faltered because the issues that it dealt with were not as significant an issue for the United States and Canada as they were for European countries. Action on emergency preparedness in 2000 faltered because the United States and Russia saw that it might lose something, namely autonomy over its Arctic nuclear activities. Action on climate change failed because the United States, as a large international polluter, stood to lose economically in the short term. States supported policy-making in the Council when it was in their interest.

**H2:** *States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic issue.*

This hypothesis has significant support because the issues that inspired states to create formal policy in the Arctic are largely economic issues. Many reports indicate that there are economic opportunities to expand Arctic emergency and transportation resources. However, industry indicates that safety issues may prevent them from investing in the Arctic. Emergency preparedness is an economic issue because the creation of agreements increases the potential for economic activity.

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581 Emmerson et. al. *Arctic Opening.*
It is important that states agreed to create an agreement to address oil spill response, but not oil spill prevention. Work on oil spill prevention implies that regulations in the Arctic will increase. Oil spill prevention necessitates a well-regulated energy industry. Increasing regulations could discourage industry from investing heavily in the Arctic. Even the threat of new regulations could stifle economic activity in the short term. Oil spill response, on the other hand, reassures companies that government has a plan to make sure that the cost of oil spills, including public relations and liability, is relatively low. States sought to create an agreement after the high cost and public relations difficulty resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

_H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role._

This hypothesis has limited support because great power influence has determined the course of Arctic policy-making, rather than the “shadow of the future.” It is true that the Arctic states likely will need to interact in the future and so it is in their interest to maintain good relations in the present. That may explain why the Nordic countries supported the search and rescue agreement even though it was not in their immediate interest. However, it does not explain why Canada rejected action on Arctic contaminants. Addressing Arctic contaminants from Russia was a major concern of the Nordic countries. It made it the major theme of its activity of the early years of the Council. The Council has done a lot to address Arctic contaminants. If Canada truly had a concern for the shadow of the future, it would have supported action that the Nordics wanted. The same also is true of the United States’ rejection of action on climate change. States have an interest in the “shadow of the future” in the Arctic region but it does not appear to influence the evolution of the Arctic Council.
H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.

This hypothesis does not have support because we have not seen that coalitions can overcome the opposition of great powers in the Arctic Council. We have seen coalitions emerge in that the Nordic countries frequently work together. They acted together to push the creation of policy on Arctic contaminants. Canada has not acted in coalitions and it tried to push action on emergency preparedness in isolation, to no avail. The permanent participants tried to create a strong policy document in the ACIA, but did not succeed. Their victory was that a policy document exists at all. The treaties that exist came into being because they are in the interest of the great powers. The great powers led the Council in the creation of these emergency response treaties. Coalitions were not able to overcome the wishes of the great powers in the Council.

H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence.

This hypothesis has little support because path dependence has not stifled the Council’s evolution. The Council has historically not been a policy-making body, conducting great amounts of research and making policy recommendations. Path dependence is not responsible for this situation, as demonstrated by great powers stifling attempts to create policy in the Council. Absolute gains for all Council members led to the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role, which indicates a lack of path dependence. The Council is not creating formal policy at the current time; however it is possible that the Council will create new treaties in the future. The Council has several projects that could result in policy. The creation of formal policy has established that the Council can be an institution to create policy.

However, path dependence is a useful concept because it explains why states opted to expand the Council rather than create a new institution to create policy. The Council has
emerged as the pre-eminent forum for Arctic governance. States opted to allow the evolution of the Council rather than create a new institution to develop international Arctic agreements.

In summary, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism provide insights that explain the evolution of the policy-making role of the Arctic Council. Functionalism provides limited insight as it correctly predicts that evolution will occur when states’ policy-making preferences align. It is correct that the Council’s policy-making role will evolve around less-political, technical issues. Functionalis are correct in saying that policy-making evolution will occur when the Council establishes its competence; however, this element is a necessary but not sufficient condition. They are partially correct that interest groups can influence the Council. They can influence in some cases, but their influence is not consistent. Functionalis are incorrect in arguing that policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states. They also are incorrect that evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of “spillovers.” Neorealism provides some insights into the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. Proponents are incorrect that states’ primary concern is relative gains, but correct in the assertion great powers can dictate the form of Council evolution. Neoliberal institutionalism is correct in predicting that states’ primary concern is absolute gains and economics are a particularly potent motivator for state activity. These theorists are incorrect that the “shadow of the future” and negotiation tactics can overcome the opposition of great powers to evolution. The evolution of the Council’s decision-making occurred due to four factors: it was in the interest of all member states, it had the support of great powers, at that point the Arctic Council had proven to be competent, and economic gains were at stake.
The question is thus, what factor is most important? A competent international institution will only expand if there is a reason for it to do so. Thus, state interest is important. Institutions evolve when it is in state interest. However, why exactly is expansion in state interest? Economics emerge as the most important factor in the evolution of the Arctic Council. Economic gains made institutional expansion the interest of all member states, especially the great powers. Permanent participants have had a small role in the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. Smaller powers cannot overcome the opposition of great powers, but great powers must have the support of small powers. No theory explains the affect of domestic politics on state decision making in the Arctic Council. Policy-makers believe that the structure of government decision-making between the United States and Europe was an important factor. If neorealism emphasized absolute gains rather than relative gains, it would be the most useful theory.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Number</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Accepted/Rejected</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functionalist 1</td>
<td><em>Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.</em></td>
<td>Not supported – co-operation was not automatic, but rather the result of great power interest and preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 2</td>
<td><em>Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the same preferences that create evolution.</em></td>
<td>Not supported – Russia gained more than Canada and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 3</td>
<td><em>States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual technocratic goals around a less political issue area.</em></td>
<td>Supported – areas of co-operation are less political but are not apolitical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 4</td>
<td><em>Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of “spillovers” that create opportunities for further co-operation.</em></td>
<td>Not supported – United States and Russia supported policy-making role expansion, not spillover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalist 5</td>
<td>The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in the Council.</td>
<td>Partially Supported – industry party responsible for evolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functionalist 6</td>
<td>States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has proven itself competent.</td>
<td>Supported – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment has proven competence</td>
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</table>

**Neorealism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neorealist 1</th>
<th>States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.</th>
<th>Not Supported – states seek to make absolute gains; Russia gains more than United States</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neorealist 2</td>
<td>Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance power in the region.</td>
<td>Supported – Russia and United States avoid policy affecting security; other states seek to use Council to compel Russia to take environmental action, among other areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealist 3</td>
<td>The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great powers.</td>
<td>Supported – policy-making occurs when desired by Russia and United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Neoliberal Institutionalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neoliberal 1</th>
<th>States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through treaty making.</th>
<th>Supported – states seek to make absolute gain, or gain something</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 2</td>
<td>States are evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic issue.</td>
<td>Supported – policy-making supports economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 3</td>
<td>In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.</td>
<td>Not Supported – states did not always support policy-making or attempt to compromise despite the shadow of the future; norms did not appear to have impact on Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neoliberal 4</td>
<td>The form of agency matters in international negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus co-operation will not always reflect the interests of great powers</td>
<td>Not Supported – coalitions did not shift preferences of United States and Russia; persuasion did not seem to be important</td>
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<td>Neoliberal 5</td>
<td>The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence.</td>
<td>Not supported – great power preference key</td>
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<td>Event</td>
<td>Functionalism</td>
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<td>1991-1996</td>
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<td>United States and Russian resistance to policy-making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nordic/Canadian interest in policy-making</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nordic interest in contaminants issue</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian resistance to contaminates policy</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. and Russian resistance to EPPR review</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy work of Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian embrace of search and rescue collaboration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States resistance to ACIA policy document</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation of search and rescue treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation of oil spill treaty</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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Table 3.4 demonstrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making role evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The Council’s policy-making role is not automatic and thus the theory’s predictions are falsified. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? The policy-making role evolution related to absolute gains but not the form of negotiation. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The policy-making role evolution was not in response to relative gains but balance concerns and great power preference were important.

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<th>Table 3.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Necessary (n) / sufficient (s)</td>
<td>Fulfilled (Y/N)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common ind. variables</td>
<td>Likely less political issue area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic gains</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functionalism ind. variables</td>
<td>Absolute gains (i.e. gains mostly equal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue spillover</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent institution</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group or epistemic community lobbying</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution has proven competence</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automatic response</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal ind. variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shadow of the future</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of path dependence</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of contrary norms</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neorealist ind. variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals)</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No security ramifications</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Balance” motivations</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great power preference reigns supreme</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This chapter explored why the policy-making role of the Arctic Council is undergoing expansion. Functionalist theory would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand due to state interest, technical need, institutional competence, interest group influence and issue spillover. Neoliberal institutionalism would credit state interest, the importance of economic goals and adequate bargaining strategies. Neorealism would expect evolution would occur due to the interest of great powers and the desire by small powers to balance power. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism provide insights into Council evolution. The Council’s policy-making role evolved when states stood to make absolute gains (as per the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism) and in line with the interests of great powers (as per the predictions of neorealism). This chapter argues that the Council’s policy-making role is expanding because the increasing potential to exploit the North’s economic resources provides an incentive to create policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region.

This chapter has two implications for research. First, it contributes a case study that tests the validity of dominant theories. It re-enforces the importance of absolute gains as well as great power rivalry in the current context. The explanatory validity of neorealism with an assumption of the importance of absolute gains (rather than relative gains) is a direction of further research. Second, this work emphasizes the importance of economics in state decision-making. The Arctic Council’s policy-making role evolved when state economic interests aligned.

Scholars such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke do not explicitly examine the importance of economics as a driver of state behaviour. Groups and individuals who seek to influence state decision-making, particularly on the environment, would be wise to present their arguments in economic terms.
This chapter contributes to academic literature because it proposes a new understanding of the Council. The Council is now a research institution that states can use to create policy. It creates policy to support economic growth in areas that must benefit all states but specifically the United States and Russia. Overall, a new conception of the Council’s policy-making role must emphasize the highly political nature of decision-making in the Council.
CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING THE EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

The institutional capacity of the Arctic Council is expanding. Institutional capacity refers to “the ability [of institutions] to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives.”\textsuperscript{582} In 1996, the institution had weak institutional capacity, since it lacked a permanent secretariat to perform functions or a stable budget to achieve objectives. Its ability to carry out functions or achieve objectives depended on state willingness to support the Council, and this support ebbed and flowed as government priorities shifted. An institution has strong institutional capacity if its bureaucracy is able to provide direction and carry out projects without state approval. It has weak institutional capacity if it cannot take any action without state approval, or if the institution were merely an extension of a group of states. The institutional capacity of the Council is changing. In 2011, the Council announced that it would establish a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. In 2014, it established a “project support instrument,” similar in many ways to a stable budget.

This chapter answers the following question: why is the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council expanding? It proceeds in three sections. The first section describes the theoretical expectations of three major international relations theories vis-à-vis institutional capacity. Functionalism would predict that institutional capacity is expanding automatically to help the Council carry out its expanded mandate and operate more efficiently. Neorealism would expect that the institutional capacity is expanding to create a balance in the region, but that great power interest ensures expansion in no way challenges the authority of states or their ability to control the Council. In essence, neorealists predict that, although it may appear that the

institutional capacity of the Council is expanding, bureaucratic growth does not indicate capacity expansion. Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that states are expanding the institutional capacity of the Council to help achieve absolute gains, tempered by norms, path dependence and the negotiation tactics of states. The second section undertakes historical process tracing to demonstrate how the debate over the institutional capacity of the Council has changed over time. Initially, Nordic policy-makers argued that the Council was an institution worthy of a stable budget and strong bureaucracy. Officials from Canada, Russia and the United States did not share this view. The debate shifted as the Nordic governments argued for the necessity of a targeted Council trust fund and demonstrated the utility of a permanent secretariat in the face of the Council’s growing workload. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on absolute gains and negotiation tactics, explains the reasons for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. However, neorealism also provides insights, with its emphasis on great power interest and the importance of maintaining regional balance. The central argument is that the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it helps the institution carry out its expanded mandate; however, states have increased institutional capacity in such a way as to ensure the institution will not become too powerful. In addition, the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity may not have occurred had it not been for tactful negotiation tactics by the Nordic governments, which demonstrated that a secretariat would enhance the Council.

This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, it tests competing expectations for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. Most research examining the Council characterizes it as an institution with a weak bureaucratic structure, as exemplified
by the writings of political scientists Oran Young, Rob Huebert, Timo Koivurova and Olav Schram Stokke, as well as American diplomat Evan Bloom and consultant Terry Fenge. International law researcher Belen Sanchez Ramos argues that the Council’s institutional capacity is expanding “to face the rapidly changing circumstances in the Arctic that have increased the challenges and opportunities in both volume and complexity,” echoing reasons for the establishment of the permanent secretariat given by the Council itself. The author does not cite any particular examples of the “volume and complexity” to which the secretariat responds, nor type of challenges the new secretariat might address. She does not analyze the negotiations that led to creation of the secretariat. This chapter argues that Ramos’ explanation is inadequate to explain the current evolution of the Council. Instead a more nuanced explanation of institutional capacity growth in the Council is necessary, namely that institutional capacity is expanding to help it fulfill its growing mandate. However, the negotiation process has also shaped evolution.

Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body of work advocates that the Council should do more than it currently does. The implementation of the recommendations of these authors will require a larger Council bureaucracy than currently

588 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra,” Policy Options, April 2012, 64.
exists. For example, some work advocates that the Council create more formal policies and treaties, which require bureaucracy for enforcement and implementation. Some work assumes the Council is powerful enough to take action independent of states, such as new regulations to protect the environment or the creation of a new agreement. This work largely ignores the political situation in the Council today and the type of action it is capable of taking. This chapter argues that the type of Council reforms authors advocate are not possible given the current institutional power of the Council. Ramos does not address this question. She evaluates the changes in the institutional capacity of the Council that have taken place and concludes that currently it is not possible to explain whether the changes are adequate to respond to the shifts taking place in the Arctic region. She argues, “The creation of an international organization is the best way to improve the global governance of the Arctic.” A critical evaluation of Council capacity is necessary.

Third, this chapter provides a case study that tests the explanatory reliability and validity of contrasting functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism. It contributes to the body of cases that prove or disprove the predictions of various theories. It ultimately shows the explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism, tempered with elements of neorealism such as the goal of states to protect sovereignty.

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591 See Byers, *Circumpolar Challenges*.


594 Ibid.
4.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity

Functionalists would make three predictions about the growth of the Council’s institutional capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve automatically so that states can make absolute gains. The first two hypotheses anticipate state preferences in Council expansion while the third anticipates the outcomes of institutional evolution.

\textit{H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they all stand to gain something through expansion.}

Functionalists would predict that the institutional capacity of the Council is automatically expanding so states can make an absolute gain. Functionalists argue that international cooperation “is a self-sustaining process that propels itself forward.”\textsuperscript{595} States respond to issues that demand action automatically, without the need for political posturing and negotiation.\textsuperscript{596} Sometimes, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ to transfer policy making in related sectors.”\textsuperscript{597} Demands from interest groups or epistemic communities also could create a need for evolution.\textsuperscript{598} Thus, increasing the institutional capacity of the Council would occur in response to new responsibilities of the institution in order to help states carry out necessary action. States would mutually benefit from the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism reject that institutional evolution occurs automatically. For example, the expanded mandate of the Council into economic areas makes its job more complex and increases its total number of projects.

Functionalists would thus explain that the increased institutional capacity could be a means to respond to this complexity.

\textsuperscript{596} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{598} Ibid.
H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.

Functionalists argue that states would evolve the institutional capacity of the Council to fulfill state interest and accomplish goals, most likely around less political issue areas in which states can collaborate without concerns of vital state interest and survival.599 States create international institutions “to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms and expectations.”600 International institutions also help states “to carry out and encourage specific activities,” “to legitimate . . . particular ideas and practices” and “enhance their capacities and power.” Centralization and independence, such as the creation of a secretariat, can “enhance efficiency” and the legitimacy of international institutions.601 Creating independent organizations allows states to trust one another because the institution ensures accountability and that no individual state can dominate the agenda. Neoliberal institutionalists and neorealist theorists would agree that states evolve international institutions in response to less political issues but would reject that states desire to make international institutions independent. States could allow the institutional capacity of the Council to expand to ensure that it can complete new tasks that emerge as its mandate and policy-making role expand.

H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.

States are more likely to expand the institutional capacity of the Council once it has proven that it is competent. According to political scientist Mark Imber, “Organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional powers, those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy

601 Ibid., 9.
States create independent international institutions to ensure efficiency and trust between states. However, creating independent international institutions allows them to take actions independent of states, such as gathering new information, creating new policy, initiating international negotiations and more. International institutions with strong institutional capacity can become independent actors that can challenge states for international power. Thus, the Council may propel its own evolution forward, assuming it is competent, owing to the independence that states have given the institution. Neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists would not argue that institutional competence is important. Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that path dependence means that international institutions are relatively unlikely to evolve, though some evolution is possible. Functionalists would predict that competence is a pre-condition for Council evolution.

Neorealists would make three predictions about the evolution of the Arctic Council, based on their explanation that international institutions evolve in response to relative gains. The first two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third anticipates outcomes.

**H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not impact on state autonomy.**

Neorealists would argue that states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Council unless it did not largely influence the autonomy of states. Neorealists explain, “The central concerns of the state are its national interests, as defined principally in terms of military security and political independence.” They seek survival in an international system, which is anarchic and without a higher authority than individual states to enforce laws. Thus, states seek to

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602 Imber, “Functionalism,” 293.  
604 Ibid., 16.  
maintain autonomy in any interaction and improve their position relative to other actors.\textsuperscript{606} Autonomous states need not rely on other states for security and survival, which enhances its security. Thus, states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to create an institution that can compete with states for power or take action independent of states, in contrast to the predictions of functionalists. Neoliberal institutionalists would agree with this hypothesis, though they emphasize security less than neorealists. Thus, despite the growth of the institutional capacity of the Council, the institution would remain a weak international body.

\textit{H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the region.}

Neorealists argue that small and middle powers co-operate in international institutions to “balance” against larger great powers. States operate under the premise that “collaboration produces ‘balanced’ or ‘equitable’ achievements.”\textsuperscript{607} Small powers may band together and form an alliance to compete with a great power. Alternatively, small powers may band with great powers to create balance against a rival great power. International institutions are a manifestation of this balancing process. States sacrifice a small amount of autonomy but gain something relative to a rival. The six Arctic states other than the United States and Russia will seek to expand the institutional capacity of the Council to create balance against the United States and Russia. States also could be attempting to balance against a rival state outside of the Arctic region, such as China. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists, in contrast, do not hold that a major concern for states is the maintenance of a global balance. Enhancing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council creates a stronger institution that small and middle powers can use to exert influence and maintain security, as well as autonomy, against great powers.


\footnote{607}{Ibid., 501; see also Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 71.}
\( H3: \) The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences of great powers.

Neorealists believe that in any interaction, such as the expansion of Council institutional capacity, great powers must benefit more than rival powers.\(^{608}\) Great powers are strong enough to act independently from other states and thus have less need for co-operation than small or middle powers. Great powers in the Arctic, namely the United States and Russia, will thus have great power to achieve their goals in negotiation. These states will seek a weak institution that cannot challenge the international autonomy of states. International institutions also could be another means for great powers to exert power and influence on the world stage, as they are likely to dominate such institutions owing to their size and importance. Small and middle powers are more likely to favour a strong Council that can control great powers, even though such an institution could place some small restrictions on their autonomy, as well. Neoliberal institutionalists, in contrast, argue that there are means for smaller powers to overcome the preference of great powers, while functionalists predict automatic evolution. Neorealists anticipate that the Council will reflect the will of great powers.

Neoliberal institutionalists would make three predictions about the Council’s institutional capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve in response to absolute gains. The first hypothesis explains preferences, while the third explains outcomes.

\( H1: \) States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.

Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states are increasing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council “when states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”\(^{609}\) They would expect that


states want the Arctic Council to be able to take on more tasks and thus states must increase the institution’s capacity. These gains are likely, though not necessarily, economic. This prediction is similar to predictions made by functionalists, though neoliberal institutionalists would expect that evolution of the Council would emerge due to a desire for material gains, whereas functionalists would expect that evolution occurs to deal with pressing issues. Both theories agree that states will co-operate as long as they gain something in absolute terms. In contrast, neorealists argue that gains should help states increase their abilities relative to a rival, which can make co-operation difficult. For neoliberal institutionalists, states expand the institutional capacity of the Council to make an absolute gain.

**H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the development of Council institutional capacity.**

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the “context within which interaction takes place,” or the strategies and tactics actors employ in negotiations (such as those to create greater Council capacity), influence outcomes. For example, the type of information that states bring forward can sway negotiations. States can also form effective alliances or coalitions that influence negotiations. States can develop very persuasive tactics that influence negotiations. Thus, small or middle powers can influence negotiations and outcomes can reflect their preferences. This prediction stands in contrast to neorealists who predict that outcomes will reflect great power preference. It also stands in contrast to functionalism that predicts that outcomes will be rational and reflect the best possible decision. Thus, it is possible that the development of the institutional capacity of the Council will reflect the interest and gains of small or middle powers that were able to negotiate with states successfully.

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H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.

Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the evolution of the institutional capacity of the Council will be shaped by path dependence or norms. Norms are “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.” Path dependence refers to the idea that once actors establish standard practices, it can be difficult to move toward new ideas. Neoliberal institutionalists would thus predict that the institutional capacity of the Council would be unlikely to shift greatly because norms and path dependence make evolution difficult. Norms may develop that favour informal co-operation without strong institutional capacity. In essence, states have established practices for how the Council should operate. This idea is not to argue that institutions cannot evolve. The presence of evolution indicates that norms or path dependence do not exist in a given case. Functionalists and neorealists do not foresee that path dependence or norms should be significant problems. Neoliberal institutionalists could argue that despite gains in institutional capacity, the overall capacity of the Council should remain weak.

Table 4.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the growth of the Council’s institutional capacity according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s institutional capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear problems demanding a policy response? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was not consistent or automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute gains or the form of negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing

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the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate
great power interest? These predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains
motivated states, or if the preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.

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<th>Table 4.1: Dependent and Independent Variables</th>
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<td>Common ind. variables</td>
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<td>Functionalism ind. variables</td>
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4.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Institutional Capacity

There have been three eras in the debate over the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council. From 1991 until 1998, states created the Council and debated whether the institution should have a secretariat and stable budget. From 1998 until 2007, states continued to debate the merits of a permanent secretariat and stable budget, though the discussion began to shift. From 2007 until the present, states actively supported increasing the institutional capacity of the Council, largely due to actions by the Nordic countries. In general, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have urged the Council to develop strong institutional capacity, which Canada, Russia and the United States resisted.
4.2.1 – 1991-1998

From 1991 until 1998, states debated whether the Council should have a stable budget and a permanent secretariat. This section addresses four key questions. First, how did the question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerge? Second, what were the major debates regarding the Council’s institutional capacity? Third, what were the positions of the various actors prior to the creation of the Council regarding its institutional capacity? Fourth, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?

First, the question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerged because of the informal nature of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). When creating any new institution, questions of its powers quickly arise. To review, momentum for creating the Arctic Council started in the 1980s as states became interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union and addressing pollution in the Russian Arctic. States knew there was extensive pollution in the Soviet Arctic, but the extent of that pollution was relatively unknown.\textsuperscript{614} Finland organized negotiations to create the AEPS, which came into being in 1991. The AEPS was a strategy rather than an institution or an organization and it did not have a permanent secretariat. Rather, states set priorities at annual meetings and four working groups, staffed by government scientists and researchers, completed the work between meetings. It was a strategy for information synthesis and sharing. Through the work of the AEPS, by 1995, states and indigenous peoples’ organizations learned that there was extensive pollution due to unsafe storage of polychlorinated biphenyls in the Russian Arctic, some 180,000 tonnes produced during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{615} As noted in previous chapters, there was increasing pressure to expand the work of the AEPS to address human issues, particularly from Canada seeking to expand the Strategy’s work to include

\textsuperscript{614} Former United States delegation member and environment official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{615} The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, \textit{PCB in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions} (Oslo, Norway: Arctic Council, 2000), 6.
work more relevant to North America, as well as the indigenous peoples’ organizations that sought a greater role in Arctic governance. In particular, the well-being of Russian indigenous peoples declined during the 1990s and indigenous peoples’ organizations wanted action.\(^{616}\) As noted, the seven Arctic states other than Russia wanted to ensure that Russia would be accountable amid reports of corruption following the collapse of the Soviet Union. States naturally had to address whether the Council would have bureaucratic powers similar to the AEPS, or whether the creation of an institution, as opposed to a “strategy,” warranted new bureaucratic arrangements.

In regards to the second question, the main debate over the Council’s policy-making role concerned whether the new institution would have a stable budget and permanent secretariat. To briefly review, the government of Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in a meeting with the United States administration in February 1995, adopting a proposal for an international Arctic organization promoted by think tanks, academics and indigenous peoples’ organizations for a decade.\(^{617}\) After informal negotiations throughout 1995, as well as a formal meeting in June, policy-makers from the other Arctic states agreed that an institution would be beneficial and formal negotiations took place in 1996. At the third major round of negotiations in June 1996, states finalized a proposal championed by Canada and the Nordic states that the Arctic Council would have a broader mandate than the AEPS by including sustainable development, after compromise by the United States and Russia.\(^{618}\) The question of the bureaucratic mechanism necessary for this institution emerged as the new body would have a larger, more complex job than the AEPS.


\(^{618}\) Ibid., 228.
As to the third question, two alignments emerged during the negotiations in June, each with different positions about the necessary institutional capacity of the Council. Canada, the United States and Russia opposed creating a Council with a stable budget and secretariat. In contrast, the Nordic states argued that the institution should have a permanent secretariat and stable budget. The permanent participants were amenable to a permanent secretariat and budget, although their main concern was securing their own participation in the Council. Canadian policy-makers opposed a permanent secretariat and budget on the grounds that these measures would make the Council Europe-centric. By virtue of their numbers, the Nordic countries would provide most of the budget for the Council and secretariat, which, according to Canadian officials, would ensure the Council focused on European projects.\(^{619}\) The alternative would be for Canada or the United States to provide the bulk of the Council’s budget, which would create an unsustainable financial burden. Meanwhile, United States and Russian policy-makers opposed a permanent secretariat and budget because they sought a weak organization that would rely on voluntary contributions from states. United States and Russian policy-makers feared that a strong Council would challenge autonomy to act in the Arctic region.\(^{620}\) In the summer 1996 negotiations, United States policy-makers led the charge against the secretariat and stable budget by arguing that a strong Council would inappropriately act as a “regional voice.”\(^{621}\) Additionally, United States policy-makers were leery that, as a great power, the United States would be called on to provide most of the Council funding.\(^{622}\) Policy-makers were aware that a permanent

\(^{619}\) Interview with former Canadian delegation member and foreign affairs official, as well as a former United States delegation member and State Department official, winter and spring 2013.


\(^{621}\) Interview with former delegation member and Yukon government employee, winter 2013.

\(^{622}\) For example, four former Canadian delegation members made this claim during interviews in winter 2013 including a senior Canadian foreign affairs official, a junior Canadian foreign affairs official, a senior United States State Department official and a junior United States State Department official. Canadian officials also emphasized that Canada was leery of burdens resulting from contributions.
secretariat with a stable budget could challenge state autonomy.\textsuperscript{623} As one Canadian policy-maker stated, “Permanent secretariats become their own gods.”\textsuperscript{624} Canada likely would have compromised on this issue if the Nordic countries presented a proposal to address Canada’s concerns, which was not true of the United States and Russia. These two countries would not tolerate strong bureaucratic elements. Two alignments emerged in negotiations, with Canada, the United States and Russia united in opposition to a permanent secretariat and budget for different though complimentary reasons.

The Nordic countries wanted a permanent secretariat and budget for two reasons. First, they argued that a permanent secretariat and stable budget would make the Council a more legitimate institution. The Nordic countries are used to organizations with strong bureaucratic elements.\textsuperscript{625} Some policy-makers believe the Nordic preference for strong bureaucracies is cultural.\textsuperscript{626} In the later 2000s, Norway and Iceland supported a secretariat as both wanted to host the organization to increase their legitimacy as an Arctic power.\textsuperscript{627} Second, policy-makers were keenly aware that there was a strategic interest in a strong Council bureaucracy for the Nordic countries. Such institutions could help keep Russia accountable addressing environmental issues, as there was a fear that corruption in Russia would thwart efforts to protect the environment.\textsuperscript{628} The secretariat could serve as a body to monitor the implementation of policy and funds in Russia, which would thus ensure that Russia lived up to its international obligations. The Nordic states favoured the creation of a strong Arctic Council institution and so favoured the creation of a strong Council bureaucracy.

\textsuperscript{623} Christopher Cuddy, contributor to the PAME and former Canadian delegation member, February 21, 2013.  
\textsuperscript{624} Christopher Cuddy, contributor to the PAME and former Canadian delegation member, February 21, 2013.  
\textsuperscript{625} Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013  
\textsuperscript{626} Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.  
\textsuperscript{627} Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.  
\textsuperscript{628} Former United States delegation member and environment department official, spring 2013.
As to the fourth question, the preferences of Canada, Russia and the United States prevailed over the preferences of the Nordic states because the governments of the United States and Russia would not compromise. United States and Russian policy-makers would simply not accept a Council with a strong bureaucracy and budget. The Nordic governments were more willing to compromise to ensure the creation of a Council, which was seen as a key tool to ensure co-operation with Russia. During the beginnings of the Council, the understanding emerged that host countries would provide secretariat services and organize meetings. In summary, the question of the appropriate institutional capacity of the Council emerged naturally as state delegations discussed whether to create a new institution. A major question was whether the Council should have a permanent secretariat and stable budget, or whether the Council should adopt the more flexible approach seen in the AEPS. The Nordic countries favoured a strong Council and thus a strong institutional capacity, while Canada, Russia and the United States saw that a Europe-centric institution could threaten state autonomy. Ultimately, the position of Canada, Russia and the United States prevailed, as Russia and the United States were unwilling to compromise. The Nordic countries did not provide compelling evidence that a secretariat was necessary.

4.2.2 – 1998-2007

From 1998 until 2007, the Nordic countries unsuccessfully pressed for a secretariat and states debated the merits of establishing systemized financial support for the Council. This section answers three key questions. First, what were key debates regarding the Council’s institutional capacity? Second, what were the positions of the various actors? Third, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?

629 Former high-ranking United States negotiator, State Department official and delegation member, spring 2013.
In regards to the first question, the first major debate in this era was whether the Council should have a permanent secretariat. The Council rules of procedure, finalized in 1998 negotiations, established that “an Arctic state may volunteer to provide secretariat functions” for any working group. In addition, the permanent participants would have a permanent secretariat, as the secretariat created in 1993 by Denmark to aid indigenous participation in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy would continue. The “host country” or chair of each Council term was to provide “secretariat functions.” Denmark provided the bulk of Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) funding, about $110,000 a year, with additional support from Canada and Norway. The United States Department of Oceans Affairs provided secretariat functions for the Council from 1998 until 2000. Iceland hosted the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group as well as the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group while Norway hosted Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (and the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, or ACAP) and Canada hosted the Sustainable Development Working Group as well as the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group. Finland, Russia and Sweden did not host any secretariats. In 2000, the United States began hosting a temporary secretariat to facilitate the creation of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Each secretariat had between two and six employees. The question lingered as to whether this arrangement would be workable.

631 Ibid., Article 33.
632 Ibid., Article 32.
636 Ibid.
In 1999, the Nordic countries wanted the Council to institute a stable budget and a permanent secretariat to improve the functionality of the Council. Their views had not changed since the negotiations to found the Council. Norway first raised the issue and made a statement advocating a permanent secretariat at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. At this meeting, in discussions concerning the Council’s secretariat functions, Denmark’s delegation raised the point that the country gave the IPS $110,000 in 1999 and that other states should contribute greater funds. In response, the Canadian delegation suggested that the indigenous peoples’ secretariat “pursue funding sources from the private sector.” The delegation from Norway then “reiterated its belief that the Council needs a common budget and that the members should share all the costs.” The United States’ objection to such capacity had not changed and its delegation vetoed further discussion of a permanent secretariat or stable funding as it immediately “repeated its position that it could not support mandatory funding for the secretariat or make the Council a formal ‘international organization’ but that it was currently trying to solicit funds from the private sector,” such as the MacArthur Foundation. Other delegations did not state their views. Discussion continued at two other Council meetings. First, at the October 2000 Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Norwegian delegation again argued “the need for a permanent secretariat.” It called for a “more balanced sharing of financial responsibility for the working group secretariats.” It also indicated that states should discuss the Council’s structure. Other states did not address the Norwegian statement. States drafted

639 Ibid.
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid.
642 Ibid.
643 Ibid.
644 Ibid.
645 Ibid.
and released a statement at the close of this meeting to restate their support for the Council. The resulting Barrow Declaration did not indicate interest in a secretariat but stated “strong support for achieving reliable funding for all Arctic Council activities.” Second, further discussion of the structure of the Arctic Council occurred in June 2001 at the Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, during an agenda item reviewing the Council’s administration. To open these discussions, the Danish delegation indicated its support for a permanent secretariat. Delegations from Norway and Sweden echoed Denmark’s support for a permanent secretariat, along with “more standing financial arrangements.” Before other states could state their opinions, the United States and Russia both opposed such “drastic changes” in the Council, vetoing a permanent secretariat or standing contributions. The United States and Russia next indicated some willingness to entertain changes in the composition of the working groups, a small concession in response to the calls for a permanent secretariat and stable funding. Nordic delegations advocated that the Council needed greater institutional capacity, which the United States and Russia vetoed.

A problem with Nordic lobbying for greater institutional capacity is that they failed to demonstrate why a secretariat and stable budget were necessary. The statements above suggest these countries sought institutional capacity for its own sake. This failure reversed in 2001, after Finland became Council chair. Its government commissioned an independent consultant report that advocated states expand Council institutional capacity. It recommended a re-organization of Council working groups and identified that a permanent secretariat and stable funding could

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646 Arctic Council, The Barrow Declaration.
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
650 Ibid.
solve long-term problems of institutional memory, capacity to fulfill instructions and outreach/communication.651 States responded that they recognized “the need to reinforce efforts to finance circumpolar co-operation due to Russia and the United States’ clear opposition to discussing the structure of the Council” in the 2001 Inari Declaration.652

The debate changed in 2003 as the Nordic countries abandoned the lobbying of states for a secretariat and stable budget and a second debate emerged over a new idea, a “project support instrument,” to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In early 2003, ahead of the April Council meeting in Reykjavik, policy-makers from the chair country, Iceland, sought to develop new proposals to improve the institutional capacity of the Council. They asked the chairperson of the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO), Harro Pitkanen, to give a presentation to the Council about the potential for the corporation to fund Council projects or manage a “trust fund” for Council projects.653 The presentation occurred in April and state delegations, unsure about the utility of the idea, mutually agreed to hear more about the proposal after the preparation of a detailed proposal.654 The NEFCO is an international environmental granting agency consisting of the five Nordic countries. We can view the NEFCO as an extension of Nordic interests and policy rather than as an autonomous body. The next step in the policy-making process occurred in October 2003 at the Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland. At this meeting, the NEFCO gave a presentation and formally proposed that states establish a Council trust fund. The NEFCO proposed a simple system in which states would contribute to a NEFCO fund and administer that fund as an “assembly of contributors.”655

652 Arctic Council, The Inari Declaration.
654 Ibid.
655 Ibid.
The proposal theoretically had the support of the Nordic states, as NEFCO members, but lacked the support of Canada, Russia and the United States. Immediately following the presentation, the United States expressed opposition to this system, because it would “potentially change the way the Arctic Council was organized as a consensus forum, since not all the member states were likely to become contributors.” Canada echoed this concern and Russia held back its opinions, as a veto had already occurred.\(^656\) In response, Pitkanen promised more details but rejected the United States’ assertion that a trust fund would change the nature of the Council.\(^658\) The NEFCO proposed that it set up an expert group to develop the proposal further, which no state rejected.\(^659\) The prospect of a trust fund did not look particularly promising.

The policy-making process to construct the trust fund continued in 2004 and 2005. At the May 2004 Council meeting, Iceland announced an “ad-hoc expert group” led by Pitkanen and the NEFCO.\(^660\) Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States appointed representatives to the group.\(^661\) The United States participated, although it opposed changes to the Council’s structure, which at first glance seems curious. United States policy-makers likely participated to ensure they influenced the process and protected state interests. The group developed the proposal during the summer of 2004, with United States policy-makers warming to a project-oriented fund. It updated the Council about its progress at the November 2004 Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, and emphasized that the fund would be “action-oriented,” “complimentary” and “voluntary.” States then mutually agreed to set up a trust fund pilot project specifically to fund Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) projects. The NEFCO would hold the fund

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\(^656\) Ibid.
\(^657\) Ibid.
\(^658\) Ibid.
\(^659\) Ibid.
\(^661\) Ibid.
\(^662\) Ibid.
and contributors would allot the fund by consensus. The fund would be a “voluntary, non-exclusive mechanism for financing specific priority projects that have already been approved by the Arctic Council.”\footnote{Ibid.} The Council would not use the fund for operating costs but rather specific projects.\footnote{Ibid.} A Council trust fund appeared in the offing. However, states did not agree on the importance of a trust fund and so the project ran into obstacles. To become operational, states agreed the fund would require 3 million euros.\footnote{Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).} Three major events took place at the April 2005 Council meeting in Yakutsk, Russia.\footnote{Ibid.} First, delegations from Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Russia announced contributions to the fund, though Russia did not specify how much it would contribute.\footnote{Ibid.} Second, delegations from Denmark and Canada stated that they would not contribute.\footnote{Ibid.} Third, the United States delegation did not offer contributions. The trust fund had trouble obtaining necessary funds and so was not operational by October 2006.\footnote{Arctic Council, \textit{The Salekhard Declaration} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council 2006).}

In regards to the second question, as to the positions of various actors, we can see earlier divisions over Council institutional capacity reflected in this era. In the first debate, Canada, Russia and the United States opposed a permanent secretariat and stable budget, leery that these institutions would compromise state autonomy and ensure the Council reflected European interests. The Nordic states desired a strong Council to hold Russia to account in the Arctic. As to the second debate, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway strongly supported a Council trust fund as a means to accomplish some of the goals of a stable budget. It would provide some stable funding needed to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In addition, it would be a way to hold Russia accountable for environmental issues, as most funding would go to the
ACAP projects concerning Russia. The United States was hesitant amid typical concerns over autonomy, sovereignty and financial burden. The fund could increase the power of the European countries in the Council, which seemed eager to contribute to the fund. Canada and Denmark opposed a trust fund in which only contributors could allot funds fearing a shift in Council power dynamics. In order to participate in the trust fund, states would need to provide funds. This change could have impacted power dynamics in the Council. All states would have an equal say in the allotment of funds, even though states would give different amounts of money. If a given country could not make a financial contribution for any reason, it would not have a say in a key area of Council decision-making. Denmark also was leery about the trust fund’s impacts on its Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat support. It already contributed money to the secretariat for indigenous peoples’ organizations and did not want to contribute money to a new body. Denmark opposed the project support instrument even though it was a member of the NEFCO. Russia supported a trust fund if its officials could gear it to fulfill national interest and use it to support projects in Russia. The fund would provide resources for the ACAP projects, which mostly focused on Russia. However, it withheld information on its contribution because the Russian government wanted clear guarantees that the funds would support Russian projects.670

In regards to the third question, as to which preferences prevailed, the United States proved to be the most important country in the negotiations as its policy-makers blocked efforts to give the Council greater institutional capacity. Yet, the Nordic countries, except Denmark, also exerted influence. They were able to set up a trust fund pilot project despite resistance from the United States and Canada. Denmark proved less influential, as the trust fund did not reflect its preferences, despite its NEFCO membership. The trust fund was a step toward increasing the capacity of the Council.

670 Ibid.
What about the permanent participants? These groups had relatively little involvement in discussions of a permanent secretariat and stable budget. They generally supported increasing the capacity of the Council, but had to prioritize their involvement in Council projects due to lack of funds, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. These groups simply cannot participate strongly in every Council project. The establishment of a permanent secretariat was not a top priority, whereas stable funding for their own participation and projects important to human development were.

4.2.3 – 2007-Present

From 2007 onward, the Nordic countries successfully negotiated to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. States opted to create a permanent secretariat to deal with the increasing workload of the Council, confident that such an institution could be tailored to suit state interests. This section answers two questions. First, when did the debate around the Council’s institutional capacity change and what were the positions of the various actors regarding institutional capacity? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?

In regards to the first question, the debate around the Council’s institutional capacity shifted in 2007 when three Nordic states opted to host a joint secretariat. At the April 2007 Council meeting, without much warning, the delegation from Norway proposed that it would host a “joint secretariat” on behalf of Norway, Denmark and Sweden for six years.671 Denmark and Sweden accepted the proposal. Other member countries were not able to veto this action, as it was not a Council decision. The rules of procedure gave the host country the right to organize the secretariat and to establish a joint secretariat. The rules of procedure did not prohibit a joint secretariat and did not specify how states must host the secretariat.

As a result, at the May 2012 deputy ministers’ Council meeting, Sweden initiated a discussion of the effectiveness of the temporary secretariat and all of the assembled ministers mutually agreed this secretariat could become a permanent one.\footnote{Arctic Council, \textit{Deputy Ministers Meeting, May 2012} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council. 2012).} Despite earlier opposition to a secretariat, the new institution came together smoothly. The negotiation process took place in 2011 and 2012 outside of Council meetings. States did not discuss the matter openly in Council meetings. The main disagreement in these negotiations was the location of the secretariat as the governments of both Iceland and Norway sought to host the new body. In negotiations, policy-makers from the United States and Canada made it known they wanted it in Iceland, because it was about halfway between Europe and North America and thus an appropriate location.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} Norway, however, promised to invest more resources in the secretariat.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} Russian policy-makers supported Norway’s proposal because Norway was closer to Russia than was Iceland.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} Ultimately, in early 2012, the government of Norway sent communications to the government of Iceland and convinced the country to withdraw its bid by promising that the chair of the secretariat would be Icelandic.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} There was a strong Russian candidate who many policy-makers believed would make a good chair, but United States officials did not want a Russian in the position, amid lingering distrust between the countries.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} The government of Norway wanted to host the secretariat to establish Tromsø as the “capital of the Arctic” and a base for companies (as well as researchers) that operate in the Arctic region.\footnote{Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.} It is already the home to several Arctic institutions. The Barents Council, for example, is already located in Tromsø. The government of Iceland wanted to host the secretariat because many policy-makers believe its
economic future is in the Arctic. Icelandic policy-makers believed the secretariat would give Iceland prestige and power. Iceland wants Reykjavik to be the “Arctic capital.” Ultimately, Iceland gave up its bid for the secretariat because it gained an acceptable compromise. The secretariat became operational in 2013.

Why did states come to accept the utility for a permanent secretariat? Support for a permanent secretariat among Nordic countries has been consistent, stemming from the preference for the Council to be a robust international body. The reason that policy-makers from Norway, Denmark and Sweden wanted to create the temporary secretariat was to demonstrate the utility of a more permanent body. Why did the United States, Canada and Russia reverse earlier opposition to a permanent secretariat? There were two major reasons. First, United States, Canadian and Russian policy-makers had experiences in other organizations that led them to realize that states could control secretariats and that they could be useful, such as the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. Some Council policy-makers became convinced that a secretariat would benefit the Council, as secretariats had been useful in other contexts. Second, policy-makers realized the Council’s work was becoming more complex and had to accept the benefits of a permanent secretariat, based on experience working with the temporary secretariat. As previously noted, the Council had 57 projects ongoing at a time from 1998 until 2004, which increased to 159 projects from 2005 until 2013, including 12 major projects. A permanent

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679 Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs official, spring 2013.
680 Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs department official, spring 2013.
682 Former Icelandic delegation member and current foreign affairs department official, spring 2013.
683 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013. The reasoning behind Norway’s stand was reiterated in an interview with a former United States delegation member, spring 2013.
684 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Yukon government employee, winter 2013.
685 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Yukon government employee, winter 2013.
686 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
secretariat increased institutional memory and eliminated the “learning curve” that a host country must address.\textsuperscript{687} The Council formed a secretariat when the mutual value of such an institution became apparent.

The debate around the Council’s institutional capacity further changed when Council states began creating the project support instrument (PSI), which came into being in 2014. Progress to create a trust fund had stalled in 2006 and so states renamed the fund to emphasize that it would not be a tool to fund general Council operations. States first began to refer to the fund as the PSI in 2007. The implementation of the PSI proceeded in five rounds of negotiations. In November 2007 at the Council Senior Arctic Officials’ meeting in Narvik, Norway, Russia announced it would provide funds to the PSI, but that it had “decided to focus on 1-3 projects beneficial to the [Russian Federation] to make the PSI operational.”\textsuperscript{688} In response, the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) said that this was not acceptable and that countries would need to raise three million euros to make the project support instrument operational.\textsuperscript{689} Russia’s proposal would alter the intent of the PSI to support its interests. As of November 2007, the fund had collected only 340,000 euros, from Norway with the Saami Council.\textsuperscript{690} The rest of the donors said they would not donate until Russia made its contribution clear.\textsuperscript{691} Russian delegates said it would need to know other contributions before making its contribution known.\textsuperscript{692} At the conclusion of the Council’s 2007 meetings, a Council project support fund did not seem to be a promising prospect.

\textsuperscript{687} Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
\textsuperscript{688} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 28-29 November 2007, Narvik, Norway} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2007).
\textsuperscript{689} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{690} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{691} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{692} Ibid.
Following these failed negotiations, Russian policy-makers realized no trust fund would move forward until it announced its contribution and so at the next Council meeting, Russia pledged to contribute 2 million euros a year to the PSI for five years (2009-2013), but only for projects in Russia and only if other countries would contribute as well.\textsuperscript{693} Finland had pledged 200,000 euros, Norway 237,000 euros, Sweden 200,000 euros and Saami Council 100,000 Norwegian krones.\textsuperscript{694} Discussion subsequently turned to how the NEFCO would administer the money if all of the projects were in Russia.\textsuperscript{695} After Russia’s statement of intent, Norway said it would increase its contribution and Iceland announced it would contribute.\textsuperscript{696} The project support instrument still did not have the minimum funding needed to proceed. The process to bring the PSI into operation was far from complete.

Negotiations continued in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway. Russia stated it was ready to move forward with the PSI and had terms of reference ready for approval. The United States then stalled negotiations by asking,

Given that all [Arctic Council] funding is voluntary and that project steering groups are subsidiary to the [working group secretariat] why the PSI committee should be limited only to those who financially contribute and suggested that no member of the [Arctic Council] should be prevented from participating in the PSI.\textsuperscript{697}

The United States delegation stated it would need more time to review the project support instrument (PSI), leery of potential corruption in Russia. In response, all states agreed to postpone approval of the PSI until December, to give the United States time to complete an internal review.\textsuperscript{698}

\textsuperscript{694} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{695} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{696} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{697} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{698} Ibid.
This deadline passed as the PSI hit new roadblocks in Russia. The PSI was not operational because Russia had not finalized “its inter-agency process”\textsuperscript{699} to determine how it would administer the funds from the NEFCO within the complex structures of its government. After two years, in November 2011 at the Council meeting in Lulea, Sweden, the NEFCO said Russia had completed the inter-agency process.\textsuperscript{700} Russia was to be transparent with money provided by the trust fund. The United States delegation supported the Arctic Contaminants Action Program working group and hosted its secretariat. The NEFCO would ensure that the money would not be wasted by the Russian government or lost to corruption. With this, after the NEFCO’s assurance of Russian accountability, the United States delegation said it would donate $1 million USD by the end of 2011, even though the trust fund would allot funds by consensus.\textsuperscript{701} Its contribution assured it would have involvement in the PSI. The trust fund now had the money it needed to continue.

States contributions increased and the PSI became operational in 2014, with 16 million euros at its disposal.\textsuperscript{702} The fund is not for any Council project. It is for “action-oriented Arctic Council projects focusing on pollution prevention in the Arctic.”\textsuperscript{703} Russia is contributing a total of 10 million euros. The remaining contributors are Finland, Iceland, the NEFCO, Norway, the Sámi Parliament, Sweden and the United States.\textsuperscript{704} According to the NEFCO, “The PSI will be financing project preparation activities, such as project identification and concept development,\textsuperscript{705}

\textsuperscript{699} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 12-13 November 2009, Copenhagen} (Tromsø: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2009).
\textsuperscript{700} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Lulea, 8-9 November 2011, Final Report} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2011).
\textsuperscript{701} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{703} Ibid.
feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments, business and financing plans, preliminary design, preparation of tender documents, tendering and evaluation.”

In addition, “The main focus of the fund is to finance initiatives that can mitigate climate change and reduce releases of hazardous substances.”

The PSI is similar to a stable budget as it provides money states can rely on to fund projects, regardless of the whims of individual countries.

In regards to the second question as to which state was the most influential in negotiations, Norway became most influential, as it was a leader in the movement to increase the Council’s institutional capacity. The United States exerted influence in ensuring that the Council is not a more powerful body. It led the case for a weak secretariat. It appears unlikely the secretariat will become extremely powerful because each state only contributes $125,000 annually.

Norwegian policy-makers wanted the institution to be more powerful; however, with its small budget, it will not have the ability to hire a large research staff or policy-makers to influence states. Norway found a means to reduce the influence of the United States by using the Council’s terms of reference to create a situation that demonstrated the utility of a permanent secretariat. It also created a tool similar to a stable budget, but which won approval from all states. The fact that a stronger fund or a stable budget did not result from efforts to better fund the Council reflects the preferences and interest of the United States. Overall, Norway led the cause to create a permanent secretariat, while the United States became a leader against the secretariat.

705 Ibid.
706 Ibid.
707 Former Canadian delegation member and current Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013. Norway contributes more as a secretariat host. The total budget is $1.7 million annually.
708 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and foreign affairs official, winter 2013.
Returning to the literature, a new understanding of the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity is necessary. In contrast to work by authors such as Oran Young, the Council is a stronger institution than ever before. Belen Sanchez Ramos is correct in arguing that new “challenges and opportunities” in the Arctic as well as increasing “complexity” is partly the cause of the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, as seen in the increase in the volume of Council projects. The Council secretariat arose partly due to the Council’s more complex mandate. However, the Council’s secretariat and project support instrument did not arise automatically and rationally. Rather, resistant countries only agreed to a stronger institutional capacity when it became clear they could control the institution. In addition, the Nordic policy-makers desired increased institutional capacity in order to have a means to control Russia and increase the credibility of the Council. This chapter contributes a new understanding of the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.

Scholars that advocate that the Council carry out more work than it does now would be wise to address the deficiencies in the institutional capacity of the Council. The Council lacks the capacity either to compel states to undertake any action or to enforce international agreements. Currently, the secretariat has less than one dozen employees. States have deliberately structured the Council secretariat and PSI to ensure it will remain a weak institution that states can control. These authors should examine what projects the Council can add to its workload given the current political situation.

709 Oran Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13-14.
4.3 – Analyzing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity

The hypotheses of functionalism do not explain the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.

H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they all stand to gain something through expansion.

This hypothesis has support as all states gain through institutional capacity expansion. Further, these gains are absolute. The Council’s work is more complex than in the past and the expansion of the institutional capacity is a response.

H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.

This hypothesis has limited support as some states have different, political goals in institutional expansion. It is not an automatic process. The United States is expanding the institutional capacity of the Council to fulfill technocratic goals. It wants the secretariat to help transmit information and make the Council more efficient. The project support instrument (PSI) enhances legitimacy because states structured it in such a way that accountability is guaranteed as states transfer money to Russia to address contaminants issues. The United States, Canada and Russia do not want the Council to become an organization that has independence from state control. The Nordic countries favour institutional expansion as many policy-makers hope that the Council can become an independently powerful institution, a political goal contrasting with the predictions of functionalism.

The expansion was not automatic. Norway and the Nordic countries lobbied for years to expand the institutional capacity of the Council. The United States resisted this expansion until it was sure a secretariat could be contained. Norway has ambitions that the secretariat and project support instrument might make the Council into a powerful regional actor.
H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.

This hypothesis has support. The Council has proven itself a reasonably competent institution. States are investing more resources in the Council because it has proven that it can use those resources effectively. Policy-makers are investing new money and capabilities with the Council so that it can become a stronger organization that is even more competent. The temporary secretariat demonstrated the utility of such an institution. There are political processes that explain the reasons for the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. The Nordic countries want the Council to be a powerful international actor. Canada, Russia and the United States do not share this goal but have determined that a stronger Council is necessary and states can structure it so as not to threaten the power of states. Russia initially resisted calls for a stable budget, but supported the notion of an Arctic trust fund when it was clear the money would benefit Russia. Yet, states would not invest resources into an institution that did not work.

Neorealism provides insights into the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity.

H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not have an impact on state autonomy.

This hypothesis has some support because states constructed the secretariat and the PSI to protect state autonomy. The United States and Russia clearly sought to maintain autonomy and feared that a secretariat, as well as a stable budget, could threaten their international autonomy. Canada saw that a stronger Council could be European-centric, which could make it harder for Canada to accomplish its international goals. However, the Nordic countries advocated a stronger Council even though the secretariat and budget their policy-makers envisioned would threaten their regional autonomy. The end result was the construction of a secretariat and the PSI that states could control, which would not develop the powers to challenge the autonomy of states.
**H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the region.**

This hypothesis has support. Maintaining a “balance” is clearly a goal of the Nordic countries in enhancing the power of the Arctic Council. The Nordic countries sought that a secretariat could keep Russia accountable and ensure it addressed the contaminants issue in its environment. The same is true of the project support instrument. The Nordic countries were to administer the fund and ensure that Russia addressed its contaminants issue. In spite of a weakening economy, Russia, in the 1990s, was stronger internationally than the Nordic states and there was little these countries could do to ensure that it addressed trans-boundary pollution issues. Other countries did not share these goals. Russia could see a secretariat as a direct threat to its power. The United States had less concern for these issues and for maintaining regional balance so it did not support a strong Council. The same is true of Canada. The evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity is partly intended to create regional balance, for some countries.

**H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences of great powers.**

This hypothesis has support because the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity reflects the preferences of great powers, despite Nordic influence. The United States and Russia resisted a powerful Council for more than a decade. They could have vetoed the creation of a permanent secretariat. Russia supported a Council trust fund when it became clear that it would provide funds for Russia. The Nordic countries sought a strong Arctic Council bolstered by a strong secretariat. The secretariat that emerged is weak, in keeping with the preferences of the United States. Canada opposed a secretariat, but had a limited impact on the process. Canada did not oppose the notion of a permanent secretariat, but rather it was concerned that the secretariat could make the Council European-centric. Outcomes clearly reflect the desires of great powers.
Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights into the growth of the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity.

**H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.**

This hypothesis has support because all states stand to make absolute gains in the evolution of the Council’s bureaucracy. The Council’s work is more complex as the institution’s mandate and policy-making role expands. A permanent secretariat and stable funding create smoother transitions between chairs and ensure institutional memory. For the Nordic countries, increased institutional capacity could be a first step to make the Council the type of strong institution they seek. For Canada, Russia and the United States, the bureaucracy of the Council is set up in such a way that it is possible for states to control. All of the states gained something by increasing the institutional capacity of the Council although their goals were somewhat different.

**H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the development of Council institutional capacity.**

This hypothesis has support because the form of negotiation was important in the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Norway and the Nordic countries successfully negotiated to ensure that the Council developed a permanent secretariat. Norway cleverly established a temporary secretariat. The United States, Canada and Russia could not veto that proposal. The utility of this secretariat led to the creation of a permanent secretariat. When discussions over a stable budget floundered, the Nordic states organized “project support instrument” that would operate in a similar way to a stable budget. Nonetheless, other countries were able to ensure that the Council is not an overly strong body due to their successful negotiation tactics. The secretariat is an administrative body and a true stable budget does not appear to be in the offing.
**H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.**

This hypothesis does not have support. Path dependence and norms did not hinder the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity, although they may have affected its evolution. Today, the Council is a stronger international body than ever before. States found that the status quo, a weak Council, did not serve their interests; hence, they chose to increase its institutional capacity. Momentum had been building toward this development since the birth of the Council. It is possible that path dependence or norms will stop the secretariat and other bureaucratic elements from becoming too powerful, in that the understanding that the Council is to be a weak body will become entrenched. The Council has evolved as a weak institution with a limited bureaucracy. It is possible that path dependence or norms did not exist in the Council’s case. Yet, it seems probable that these factors existed.

In summary, the Council’s institutional capacity has evolved. Functionalism is correct in predicting that institutional capacity is evolving due to absolute gains and institutional competence. Neorealism is correct predicting that the evolution is occurring in response to “balance” concerns and great power interest, but somewhat incorrect in the prediction that the maintenance of international autonomy was a concern for all states. Neoliberal institutionalism is correct in predicting that absolute gains inspired states to increase the Council’s policy-making goal and that the form of negotiation was important to this process, but incorrect in predicting that path dependence and norms impacted the process. No theory explains the contention by some interviewees that policy-makers in the Nordic countries have less apprehension toward bureaucratic bodies than their counterparts in Russia and North America. None of the theories examined allows that culture could impact state decision making at the international level, as each assumes that states are rational entities influenced by interests and material gains.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results and shows that each of the theories examined provides some insights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they all stand to gain something through expansion.</td>
<td>Supported – Council is expanding in response to expanding Council workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal around a less political issue area.</td>
<td>Not supported – Nordic support for institutional expansion highly political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.</td>
<td>Supported – Council has demonstrated competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not have an impact on state autonomy.</td>
<td>Not supported – secretariat and budget could threaten autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the region.</td>
<td>Supported – grew from Nordic interest in controlling Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences of great powers.</td>
<td>Supported – secretariat weak, reflecting United States and Russia interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal institutionalism</td>
<td>H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through expansion.</td>
<td>Supported – Council is expanding in response to expanding Council workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal institutionalism</td>
<td>H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the development of Council institutional capacity.</td>
<td>Supported – Nordic manoeuvring (i.e. temporary secretariat) convinced states of usefulness of secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal institutionalism</td>
<td>H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.</td>
<td>Not supported – little evidence of path dependence or norms at play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>Neorealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic interest in permanent secretariat/stable budget</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic “cultural” interest in bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States /Russia/Canadian resistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic interest in permanent secretariat/stable budget</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States /Russia/Canadian resistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic innovation of trust fund</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to trust fund</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic temporary secretariat</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of permanent secretariat</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of project support instrument</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4 reviews the necessary and sufficient conditions for the institutional capacity of the Council according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s institutional capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity has not been automatic, falsifying this hypothesis. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? States are responding to absolute gains and the form of negotiation is very important. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? Relative gains were not important, but “balance” and great power interest were key variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common ind. variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism ind. variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue spillover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest group or epistemic community lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution has proven competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Neoliberal ind. variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)</th>
<th>N&amp;S</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>All states gain from establishment of project support instrument and secretariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shadow of the future</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>All states must work together in the future due to regional proximity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of path dependence</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Council is evolving, which indicates lack of path dependence; perhaps should have been present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of contrary norms</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Council is evolving, which indicates lack of contrary norms; perhaps should have been present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Evolution came as a result of political process between Nordic countries and Canada/Russia/United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Neorealistic ind. variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals)</th>
<th>N&amp;S</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>All states gain from establishment of project support instrument and secretariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No security ramifications</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Secretariat and project support instrument are purposely weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Balance” motivations</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Nordic countries seek to exert influence on Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great power preference reigns supreme</td>
<td>N&amp;S</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Secretariat and project support instrument are purposely weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter showed that the institutional capacity of the Council is growing as it establishes a permanent secretariat and project support instrument. The first section examined theoretical predictions by functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism. The second section analyzed the negotiations pertaining to the Council’s institutional capacity. The third section analyzed the results. It concludes that neoliberal institutionalism explains the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, because it was a result of protracted and highly political negotiations. However, neorealism provides insights in that great power interest was an important factor in negotiations and the Nordic countries sought to increase the institution’s capacity to exert control against Russia. Overall, the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it supports the region’s economic potential by helping it carry out its expanded mandate. However, states are increasing the institutional capacity to ensure that the Council will not be an overly powerful actor. The Nordic countries and their political manoeuvring proved to be a key factor, as well.

This chapter contributes to literature as it proposes a new understanding about the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity as a highly political process inspired by power concerns. Earlier work by Belen Sanchez Ramos saw the expansion as a simpler process. This case study shows the explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism. It demonstrates that states have a greater concern for absolute compared to relative or mutual goals internationally. However, neoliberal institutionalism argues that institutions will be relatively unlikely to evolve. Neorealism provides insights that explain that “balancing” concerns also are important, as well as the interest of great powers. Functionalism provides the insight that states appear likely to invest new powers in institutions that show they are competent.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

International institutions and non-state actors can become observers in the Arctic Council, which are able to attend Council meetings and participate only with the consent of member state delegations. Why would a non-Arctic state seek to be an observer in an Arctic regional institution? Would it not be like Canada seeking membership in the African Union? The Council is a regional institution, but it addresses important issues for the entire world community. The melting of Arctic ice will raise sea levels around the world and cause coastal flooding. At the same time, the melting of ice will make the Arctic more accessible for potential economic development. In 2013, China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea sought to become observers in the Arctic Council. Media outlets reported that these countries cared mainly about the “trade and the energy potential of the planet’s Far North.” A large number of new observers primarily motivated by economic gains could shift the Council’s priorities away from the environment and change the dynamics within its meetings.

This chapter answers three related questions: 1) why do actors seek to join the Arctic Council; 2) why would member states agree to admit new observers, and; 3) once admitted, how influential are observers? It answers the research question by testing the hypotheses of three theories (functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism) on why and how states cooperate. For functionalists, an actor would want to become an observer if the Council is working on problems it has an interest in solving. Functionalists would predict that member states allow

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new observers in the Council if these actors can contribute to the work of the institution. Observer influence should be equal to member states because members will accept all information and perspectives necessary to solve international problems. Neoliberal institutionalists would expect actors seek to become part of the Council to gain something. States would allow new observers to make a gain, as well. For these theorists, observers can be as influential as member states based on agency. Neorealists would expect that actors seek to become part of the Council to enhance their position. Member states would allow a new observer for the same reason. For neorealists, the influence of observers should be less than Council members.

This chapter concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on the importance of absolute gains, best explains the interest of observers in becoming part of the institution and the reason states admit these new actors. However, neorealists, with their tempered expectations of observer influence, best explain the actual influence of observers in the Council. The chapter argues that observers are weak actors in the Council. Despite this weakness, actors seek to become observers for two reasons. First, they want to contribute to the governance of environmental issues of global importance. Second, actors seek to benefit from the economic potential of the Arctic region. Existing literature overemphasizes the importance of observers in the Council and their interest in Arctic economics to explain Council participation, as is discussed later in the chapter.

The chapter contributes to literature on the Arctic Council in two ways. First, it helps settle a debate on the impact of observers in the Council. Most work sees observers as the weakest actors in the Council, whose contributions hinge on the will of member states. Authors, such as Evan Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young, see observers as practically inconsequential
actors.\textsuperscript{714} In contrast, political scientist Timo Koivurova argues that Council observers are influential because they are re-defining the region as a global concern.\textsuperscript{715} This chapter confirms that observers are weak actors in the Council and that these actors strive to gain expanded influence; thus, we can consider these actors relevant in the Council’s affairs because their participation impacts Council dynamics. Second, this chapter helps settle a debate in literature about the reasons actors seek to become Council observers. Koivurova argues that actors are interested in becoming observers because of the importance of Arctic environmental issues, namely climate change.\textsuperscript{716} However, news reports\textsuperscript{717} as well some academic work by political scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer,\textsuperscript{718} argue economics (namely resources such as oil, gas and trade routes) are more important than environmental protection as a consideration of potential observers, particularly China. This chapter argues that neither of these perspectives adequately explains increased interest in the Council. It argues that environment and economic gains are equally important in explaining this increased interest.

The first section of this chapter discusses the contribution of this research to academic. The second section reviews the history of observers in the Council, while the third section analyzes the utility of the three theories in explaining outcomes.


\textsuperscript{716} Ibid., 149-150.


5.1 – Theory on International Co-operation and Observers

Functionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.

*H1:* *Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve problems.*

Functionalists argue that the goal of any international actor is to solve problems and thus would seek to join an international institution to address a pressing issue and make an absolute gain,\(^{719}\) likely in a less political area.\(^{720}\) An example would be climate change, which is an exogenous issue that changes states’ interest vis-à-vis the Arctic. Admission should be automatic,\(^ {721}\) as soon as a contribution is clear.

*H2:* *Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and contributions.*

Functionalists assume that observers’ influence in an institution is based on their ability to contribute to problem solving and to provide quality information,\(^ {722}\) acting as (or similar to) an interest group.\(^ {723}\) It is likely that other states would be unable to stop observers from contributing, as functionalists predict that institutions “attain ever-higher levels of policy-making autonomy.”\(^ {724}\) For functionalists, petty politics will not stop state contributions to solve problems. The theory would be disproven if states did not add observers that can help solve a problem automatically.


\(^{721}\) Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.

\(^{722}\) Ibid.


\(^{724}\) Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
Neoliberal institutionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.

**H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain.**

Neoliberal institutionalists argue that primary goal of international actors is to make gains and predict that actors would want to join an international institution to “jointly benefit from co-operation.” Actors seek to join the Council due to path dependence, namely that it is the recognized forum to participate in Arctic governance. Functionalists, in contrast, argue states seek to solve problems, which may or may not result in immediate gains. States accept these new observers to make gains in a recognized forum with strong rules. According to neoliberal institutionalism, states will accept observers with whom co-operation will be necessary in the future. Governments might not accept an observer if relations are strained over other issues.

**H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency.**

Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that any actor could be influential in an international institution based on its agency. Agency (which is the ability to ally with states, employ successful negotiation tactics and draw on useful information) can be limited by institutional rules that limit the influence of some actors. Functionalists argue that influence should be automatic for any actor that can help solve problems. In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists argue actors must successfully employ tactics to meet their desired ends. The theory would be disproven if the gains from the addition of observers were not absolute. The theory also would be disproven if agency and the form of negotiation were not important to explain outcomes.

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727 Ibid., 238-239.
Neorealism would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.

**H1:** States want to become part of the Council to enhance their position; current states accept other states to enhance their position, as well.

Neorealists argue that the goal of a state at the international level is to protect its position and thus a small power would seek to join an international institution to increase its influence\(^{728}\) and ensure regional balance.\(^{729}\) Great powers would seek to join to dominate the organization.\(^{730}\) Member states would admit new observers to dilute the influence of a great power or enhance their own position. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists explain that states co-operate to make gains and solve problems. For neorealists, states seek power and to enhance their position.

**H2:** Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members.

Neorealists argue that observers would be less influential than member states in an international institution. Great power preference will reign supreme in any interaction and that states are concerned with their position relative to other states.\(^{731}\) Member states will structure rules and act to thwart potential observer influence. A great power observer could challenge other states, but for neorealists, it is unlikely member states would allow such a situation to unfold. The other two theories explain that states can overcome such concerns by providing information or exercising agency. Neorealists would not believe that non-member states or non-state actors could exercise influence as observers in an international institution, present mostly to respond to domestic pressures and democratic expectations. Such assumptions would be disproven if balance motivations were not important or great power preference did not reign supreme in outcomes.


\(^{730}\) Ibid.

5.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Observers

The evolution of the role and interest of observers in the Arctic Council has proceeded in three periods. From 1991 to 1996, state policy-makers created the Council to address environmental issues and promote Arctic co-operation. The question of which actors could participate in this process naturally emerged. In the second period, from 1996 to 2004, state policy-makers debated the role of observers and these actors emerged as weak Council contributors, able to participate with the consent of member states. In the third period, from 2005 until the present, observers became more assertive in the Council as the severity of the problem of climate change became clear. A greater number of actors, especially non-Arctic states, sought to become Council observers.

5.2.1 – 1991-1996

In the first period of Council history, from 1991 to 1996, the question of whether the institution would have observers emerged. This section answers three major questions. First, why did observers seek to be part of the Council and how did the question of their participation emerge? Second, why did state policy-makers allow actors to become Council observers? Third, what were the major debates about observer participation? In regards to the first question, at some level, states and non-state actors sought to become observers in the Council because it was clear the institution would promote co-operation around issues that were of global consequence when states founded the institution. Examples of such issues include the establishment of ties with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the improvement of relations between former Cold War rivals and the betterment of the poor state of the Russian environment. The Council was to address issues that had transboundary consequences.
In regards to the second question, as to why policy-makers allowed Council observers, non-Arctic actors became part of the institution because these entities could make a contribution to Arctic science. After the Rovaniemi conference in September 1989, states created the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in three rounds of fairly straightforward negotiations.\textsuperscript{732} The AEPS was to be a research strategy in which state scientists came together to share information about the environment. In negotiations, representatives from several states and organizations asked to be involved. The AEPS included eight observers, three of which were indigenous peoples’ organizations (namely the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami Council and the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North).\textsuperscript{733} The other observers included three European states (Britain, Poland and West Germany), two international institutional bodies (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the United Nations Environment Programme) and one non-governmental organization (the International Arctic Science Committee).\textsuperscript{734} Actors other than the indigenous peoples’ organizations sought to become observers for one reason: to contribute to Arctic science. The states outside the Arctic included in the AEPS have engaged in Arctic exploration and science for centuries. It made sense for other actors with an interest in Arctic science to participate in the AEPS. There is no evidence non-Arctic actors had an expectation of becoming full members. The AEPS rules of procedure make it clear that observers have limited power. These groups can attend and participate in meetings only with state permission.\textsuperscript{735} Observer status in the AEPS presented an opportunity to contribute to Arctic science.

\textsuperscript{732} Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, \textit{Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment}, 1.
\textsuperscript{733} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{734} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{735} Ibid., 42.
By 1996, the AEPS had found out much information about the poor state of the Arctic environment and human security and so policy-makers began discussing whether the AEPS should be formalized into an international institution. That the AEPS observers would have a similar role in the Arctic Council was never in question. The *Ottawa Declaration*, the document establishing the Arctic Council, grants observers the same powers as they had with the AEPS. Observer status was open to all states and non-state actors “that the Council determines can contribute to its work.”\(^{736}\) The *Ottawa Declaration* creates two categories of observers. Accredited observers (often called permanent observers) can attend all Council meetings unless a member state excludes them.\(^{737}\) Ad-hoc observers must apply to attend each Council meeting in advance. A key difference between the AEPS and Arctic Council is that indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied for an enhanced role, greater than observers but less than member states, termed permanent participant status.\(^{738}\) Chapter 6 examines this process in detail. For non-Arctic states and non-state actors, participation in the Arctic Council was a means to contribute to Arctic science, as these actors had in the AEPS.

In regards to the third question, there was one minor debate around observers in the 1996 negotiations to create the Council. Policy-makers from Denmark, Iceland and Norway were against allowing environmental groups opposed to whaling to participate in the Council, which the other Arctic state policy-makers supported.\(^{739}\) For example, Greenpeace would criticize Norway and Iceland for allowing whaling during Council meetings.\(^{740}\) There also was a more

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740 Interview with former United States high-ranking Department of State official, spring 2013.
general concern that observers such as Greenpeace would be disruptive.\textsuperscript{741} The ultimate result of these negotiations was a compromise: organizations such as Greenpeace would not be part of the Council, while more moderate organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund would have a role. There was some debate about whether to allow institutions such as the Red Cross to become an observer, based on whether it carried out enough activity in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{742} That organization did not become an observer in 1996, but received the status later. Overall, the negotiations to include observers proceeded with little controversy.

\textbf{5.2.2 – 1996-2004}

This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council? Second, what were the major debates around observers? In regards to the first question, observers were not overly influential in the Council from 1996 to 2004. After its founding, the Council became an environmental research institution that held two meetings a year, similar to the AEPS, with member states, permanent participants and observers sending delegations to share the results of research projects and plan new activities. The Council instituted 57 projects from 1998 to 2004, such as research on climate change, Arctic contaminants and the state of Arctic human security, one of which was co-sponsored by an observer. The observer project was a report co-authored by the United Nations Environment Programme, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and the European Environmental Agency “about the relationship between the Arctic and Europe.”\textsuperscript{743} Observers did not frequently take on leadership roles during the early history of the Council.

\textsuperscript{741} Interview with former high-ranking Canadian foreign affairs official, winter 2013.
\textsuperscript{742} Interview with former United States Department of State official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{743} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 12-13, 2001} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, 2001).
Whereas state delegations made on average 3.3 comments per meeting on 2.6 agenda items, observer delegations made an average of one comment on one agenda item. Further, only about a third of observers made comments at all. Not all observers commented equally. The most frequent commenters were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife Fund. Observer comments fall into three categories. First, observer delegations provided updates on their general Arctic activities to help coordinate research action. Second, observers provided suggestions about Council projects, sometimes verging on small criticisms. For example, at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, the delegation from the Netherlands suggested that the Council include “something” “that dealt with socio-economic development of indigenous people in the North,” advice Council states did not heed. Third, observers provided technical suggestions. For example, at the November 1999 Arctic Council meeting in Washington, D.C., the delegation from the United Nations Environment Programme provided advice about applying to the Global Environmental Facility to obtain project funding. Observers had little impact on Council activities.

In regards to the second question, about the major debates around observers, the question of European Union observer status presented some controversy. Denmark and Finland called for “closer co-operation” between the European Union and Arctic Council at the October 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska. However, other Council states were less interested in close co-operation. It would become a more controversial issue later in the Council.

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745 For an example, see Arctic Council, Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999 (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1999).
746 Ibid.
Despite a lack of influence, we can see increasing interest in the Council by some non-Arctic states and non-governmental organizations from 1996 to 2004. At the October 2000 ministerial meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council accepted one state, France, as a new observer.\textsuperscript{749} The number of observers that attended meetings doubled between 1998 and 2004. Fifteen additional international organizations and non-governmental organizations became permanent observers, all of which engaged in significant Arctic activity. More actors sought to be a part of the Council as its profile increased due to its good quality work advancing Arctic science. Economic motivations were not important before 2005.

\textbf{5.2.3 – 2005-Present}

From 2005 until the present, the role of observers in the Council presented controversy. This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council and at what point did their influence change? Second, what were the major debates around observers and how has their role evolved?

The role of observers expanded slightly in 2005 at the April Council meeting in Yakutsk, Russia. Three important events took place. First, observers made eleven statements, which marked an increase.\textsuperscript{750} Second, the European Union announced that it would be a lead sponsor on a project for the first time. The project was the Large Marine Ecosystem research project, sponsored by the European Union, Norway, Denmark and United States.\textsuperscript{751} It was a project to research “pertinent assessment strategies for assessing and improving ecosystem conditions.”\textsuperscript{752} Third, the United Kingdom stated opposition to the creation of a project support instrument to

\textsuperscript{749} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{750} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).

\textsuperscript{751} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{752} Ibid.
ensure stable council funding, the first time an observer had made an overt statement on Council reform.\textsuperscript{753} The influence of observers began to shift as state and international institution observers started to act more assertively in the Council by generally increasing their level of participation. Why did observers increase their activism at the April 2005 meeting? This change took place after the release the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment} in 2004, the Council’s major four-year report that identified climate change as a global issue. It found, for example, “The area of the Greenland Ice Sheet that experiences some melting has increased about 16 per cent from 1979 to 2002,” which will lead to a rise in global sea levels.\textsuperscript{754} The Council also has become a stronger policy-making body, creating agreements on search and rescue in 2011 and oil spill response in 2013. The observers became assertive after it was clear the Council dealt with key issues.

This new activism and participation did not constitute a sea change in the Council. On average, each observer made 1.375 comments, an increase from the previous era but not a large one. Observers began to sponsor projects more frequently. For example, the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation co-sponsored five projects under the Council \textit{Arctic Contaminants Action Program}.\textsuperscript{755} The amount of sponsorship is not large, since the Council has an average of 159 projects ongoing at a time.\textsuperscript{756} The observers were more assertive in demanding a role in the Council. At the November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway,

\textsuperscript{753} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{754} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: Impacts of a Warming Climate} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13.
\textsuperscript{755} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Tromsø, Norway, 12-13 April 2007} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2007).
and the Netherlands stated that “observers wish to co-operate not only on science but also decision-making.” It went on, “The possibility of observers to co-fund Arctic Council projects is more likely if observers are involved early at the project development phase.”

In regards to the second question, there were two major debates around observers after 2005. First, the question of whether the European Union should become an observer in the Council was particularly controversial. European Union leaders have long made it a priority to address climate change. In 2001, European Union officials, as part of their activities to address climate change, began research on the Arctic environment and work on an “action plan” to mitigate the effects of climate change in the Arctic. They provided updates to the Council on the European Union’s progress in the ensuing years. The action plan was finally completed in 2008, the same year the European Parliament voted to ban the import of seal products, save those harvested by indigenous peoples. In 2009, European Union policy-makers sought permanent observer status, to compliment its program to address Arctic pollution. The negotiating process unfolded in two steps. First, in February 2009, the United States Mission to the European Union organized a private meeting with all the Council states to discuss the possibility of accredited observer status for the European Union. At this meeting, all of the Council country officials supported the notion, though Denmark and Russian officials both stated some reservations. However, all state policy-makers knew that the Inuit would oppose permanent observer status because of the seal ban. Seal harvesting is an important part of the Inuit economy and culture. Despite an exemption for seal products harvested by Inuit peoples, many leaders believed that

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758 Ibid.
760 Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSELS261_a.
761 Ibid.
the ban eliminated the demand for their products in Europe, which is the where most of the fashion industry is headquartered. They believed the ban greatly decreased the possibility that fashion designers would incorporate seal fur into their designs. Even outside Europe, knowledge of the ban can stigmatize possessing seal furs, which hurts domestic demand. The United States has a similar ban in effect in its 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act. Inuit leaders are critical of this ban, but do not oppose it with as much vigour as the European Union ban. Inuit leaders emphasize that they strongly oppose the European ban because it has eliminated a crucial market for their products.

The European Union officials responded that they were sure they could overcome such opposition. Norwegian officials had previously called for an enhanced European Union role. Nordic policy-makers wanted the European Union included because “they would be able to contribute a lot of funding to the various scientific projects that were being undertaken.” The second stage in the negotiation process to include the European Union in the Council occurred after the February meeting, in September 2009, as Finnish policy-makers sent communications to all of the Arctic governments, and in particular the United States Department of State, emphasizing that the European Union should be a permanent observer. Meanwhile, Canada challenged the European Union seal product ban in the World Trade Organization by

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765 Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSELS261_a.
766 Diplomatic Cable, October 21, 2008, 08STATE111997_a
767 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
768 Diplomatic Cable, September 10, 2009, 09HELSINKI337_a
arguing the ban constituted a discriminatory trade practice. The United States, Russia and even Canada did not oppose European Union observer status, as it was to be a weak actor.

Inuit opposition to European Union observer status, due to its seal ban, has delayed accreditation. The issue of observer status for the European Union came to the Council table in 2013, four years after the discussion began, typical for a Council decision of this type. The Inuit Circumpolar Council led the charge against granting the European Union observer status, privately demanding and convincing Canada to block its permanent status in preparations for the May 2013 Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden. Other permanent participants were more open to its membership, optimistic about the opportunities partnerships might afford. Canada supported the Inuit group due to domestic pressure and the economic impact of the seal ban. The issue was further deferred at the Council Ministerial Meeting in April, 2015.

The second controversy was whether to allow non-Arctic, non-European states, particularly China to become permanent Council observers. The Council’s profile had increased, as up to 22 observers were attending Council meetings. For example, after 2005, Spain became a Council observer. After 2007, states such as China, South Korea, India, Italy, Japan and Singapore began to attend Council meetings and demanded to become accredited observers. It took longer for states to accredit non-European observers (for example, seven years to accredit China, South Korea and Japan, whereas France became an observer after attending meetings for two years). Policy-makers from all states wondered whether increasing the number of observers in the Council would make the institution less workable.

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771 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and former representative for ICC, February 21, 2013.
772 Two former Canadian delegation members and foreign affairs officials, winter 2013, and a former Canadian delegation member/Government of Yukon representative, February 20, 2013.
There was a particularly large amount over concern over the status of China, which began attending Council meetings in 2008. A lot of news coverage argues that China’s Arctic interest stems from its interest in exploiting Arctic energy resources. If its interest is mostly economic, it follows that Chinese officials will have limited interest in environmental protection. China is energy-hungry and the Arctic region contains 90 billion barrels of oil and more than 1,600 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Yet, Chinese officials sought to be part of the Council for both economic and environmental reasons. China has a history of polar research and is home to a polar institute and icebreakers. China’s production of maze, rice and wheat will fall by more than 35 per cent in the next 50 years because of Arctic climate change. Coastal flooding, due in large part to the melting of Arctic ice and the resulting rising sea levels, will impact more than 20 million people in China during the next century. Similar concerns explain why other states, such as Japan and Singapore, sought observer status after 2008.

For policy-makers from all Council states, three concerns hung over the decision whether these states should become observers. First, there was concern that permanent participant power “could be diluted in a growing sea of observers.” Second, Russian policy-makers had concerns that China could present an economic rival in the Arctic region. Third, there was a concern among some policy-makers that more observers would make it difficult to organize meetings.

773 The introduction cited several examples.
778 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 65.
779 Interview with Finnish foreign affairs official and Council representative, summer 2013.
780 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
Ultimately, state policy-makers knew that it would not be politically possible to deny accredited status to China and the other non-European states without a clear reason, such as a diplomatic tiff with China over a key policy or a key concern. There was general agreement that it would be good to include these countries as part of the Council. By 2010, state policy-makers knew that there was an expectation that a decision on whether to accredit the non-European states would be forthcoming. The process of deciding how to admit China proceeded in two stages. At the 2010 Deputy Ministers Meeting in Copenhagen, Canada proposed that the Council work on articulating an appropriate role for observers, which Russia and the ICC supported.781 Second, in 2011, at the Nuuk Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states resolved to set out criteria for observer status in the Council.782 States created this document during the five Council meetings held between 2011 and 2013.

The end result was an observer manual. It is not a complex or contentious document, re-emphasizing the existing rules of procedure.783 Observers must re-assert their interest in being an observer in the Council every four years by making a submission to the chair.784 Observers must agree to recognize the “Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.”785 They also must agree to respect “the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants” and support their work.786 All of the Council states showed unity and agreed on the role of the observers. Why, then, did states create the manual and delay the decision to accredit China and the other non-European observers? China, for example, had not indicated it would use the Council to challenge the role of the permanent

785 Ibid., Annex 2, Article 6.
786 Ibid.
participants or the sovereignty of states. Nonetheless, the document allowed time for states to assess the impact of these new observers. It allowed time see if their participation would hurt the participation of indigenous peoples, challenge the Council states or make the Council too unwieldy. State policy-makers wanted China to be a part of the Council. Yet, there was a level of mistrust toward China that led state policy-makers to proceed with caution.

Why were state policy-makers interested in granting China and the other non-European states observer status? Policy-makers reported the allure of potential investment was too great for all Arctic states. Russian policy-makers decided it was in their country’s interest to co-operate with China as its companies have undertaken numerous projects in Russia’s Arctic. China is the second-largest trading partner for both Canada and the United States. It is the biggest Asian trading partner for both Sweden and Finland. Policy-makers in Denmark have long held hopes that Chinese investment in Greenland’s offshore oil would lead to that country’s independence and end the annual $586-million payment from the mainland. The governments of Iceland, Norway and Russia have each deliberately stated they hope to expand China’s already hefty investments in their various resource industries. Including China as part of the Council helps foster international relationships and potentially expands economic activities.

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787 Interview with United States Environmental Protection Agency official and Council representative, spring 2013.
Has the increased number and greater diversity of observers had an impact on the Council? The observers continue to make fewer comments than permanent participants and states. This pattern applies to both state and non-state observers. They sponsor relatively few projects, and participate in meetings respectfully. Increasingly, there are special meetings with observers (as sideline events) at Council meetings, which have not had an appreciable impact on the institution. The arguments against their inclusion all ultimately seem ill founded. The observers participate more in the Council than they did prior to 2005, but it is difficult to point to a case in which observer had a great impact on a Council decision or action.

The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife Fund continue to be the most frequent commenters at Council meetings. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are both countries with strong histories of Arctic exploration. Its policy-makers believe that these countries can make strong contributions to Arctic science, climate change and the governance of the Arctic region. The World Wildlife Fund is an activist organization with members that expect a certain level of action. Its comments are respectful, mainly consisting of technical suggestions and a general urging of stronger action. It has sponsored some events around Council meetings, intended to raise awareness on issues. For example, during the Whitehorse Council meeting in October 2013, the World Wildlife Fund co-sponsored a daylong conference on corporate social responsibility in the Arctic. The first day of Council meetings are closed-door with top delegation officials. The Council holds Sustainable Development Working Group meetings before Senior Arctic Officials meetings, and so there are a reasonable number of policy-makers with a day off between meetings. Events such as the one in Whitehorse provide an activity for these policy-makers and give the World Wildlife Fund an important venue to showcase its ideas and research.
In sum, the power of observers in the Arctic Council has evolved over time. From 1991 to 1996, Arctic governments sought to improve Arctic governance and non-Arctic states sought to contribute. From 1996 until 2004, observers exerted little influence. After the release of the 2004 *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment*, Council observers became more assertive. Seven non-Arctic actors sought observer status, creating controversy. These actors sought to participate in the Council to help protect the environment and make economic gains. Six new observer states joined the Council in 2013, accepted due to potential new Arctic investment. Table 5.1 summarizes the current Council observers.

**Table 5.1: Council Observers as of 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, South Korean, Spain, United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
This work contributes to literature because it confirms that Council observers are weak actors, a contested assessment in Council literature. Observers seek influence by making comments and contributing to Council projects. Observer weakness does not indicate they are irrelevant. For example, as demonstrated, officials from the Netherlands have used the Council as a venue to advocate for action on issues it considers important, which impacts Council discourse. This work contributes because it shows that Council actors are interested in Council participation to address environmental issues and make economic gains, in contrast to arguments by authors such as Whitney Lackenbauer and James Manicom that emphasize non-economic motivations. Media reports and academic literature need not be so alarmist about the prospect of non-Arctic states joining the Council. In some ways, Council observer states show greater concern for the Arctic environment than member states. The states that have sought to become Council observers thus far have a significant interest in protecting the Arctic environment.

5.3 – Analysis Using International Relations Theory

Functionalism does not provide a useful account of Council observers.

H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve the problem.

This hypothesis does not have support because the addition of new observers has not been automatic. States such as Britain sought to become Council observers to contribute to Arctic science and to benefit by helping to solve problems. However, other states did not automatically allow contributions. In 2008, Council member states resisted adding countries, such as China, on the grounds that they would complicate the execution of the agreed-upon agenda. The amount of time required to admit observers increased by five years due to uncertainties over the emergence of potential rivals and mistrust.
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and contributions.

This hypothesis does not have explanatory power because the influence of observers is very limited. It is difficult to point to any strong outcomes observers have achieved, aside from the sponsorship of a few projects. Various observers have sponsored Council projects and have sought to express positions, but this action has not resulted in strong outcomes.

Neoliberal institutionalism gives a somewhat useful explanation for Council observers.

H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain.

This hypothesis has support because states add observers to the Council to make an absolute gain. States accept observers when it is clear that these actors can contribute to the Council. In China’s case, it became an observer because it had promised to invest in the Arctic region. The main reason that China sought to become an observer is to make economic gains and improve the Arctic environment in the preeminent Arctic forum. There are other possible motivations, but these two are foremost. Organizations that oppose whaling have been blocked from Council membership by Denmark, Iceland and Norway, as they will criticize these countries.

H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency.

This hypothesis has limited validity because agency does not seem to help observers achieve outcomes in the Council. The influence of observers in the Council has been small. Council rules allow observer influence, as they can participate in most of the institution’s work. Actors have tried to use agency by providing information and contributing to Council projects. Agency has not helped observers influence the Council. It is possible that observers have not utilized agency to its full potential. It is likely the influence of new observers will be similar to observers in previous eras as their legal rights and responsibilities have not changed.
Neorealism provides a somewhat useful explanation of Council observers.

**H1:** States want to become part of the Council to enhance its position; current states accept other states to enhance its position, as well.

This hypothesis does not have strong explanatory power because positional concerns are not overly important. Russia demonstrated concern about adding China to the Council as an observer, which does indicate some concern for balance in the region. The prospect of absolute gains proved more important as Russia eventually decided to accept China as an observer.

**H2:** Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members.

This hypothesis has support because it explains the limited power of observers. Member states have structured the Council so that observers have far fewer formal rights and privileges than they do and they have ignored the observers’ requests for action. They have been apprehensive about adding new members, seeking to protect their own autonomy and interests and only admitting new observers once the gains of so doing are clear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2: Results</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism One</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism Two</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal Institutionalism One</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neoliberal Institutionalism Two</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neorealism One</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neorealism Two</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

This chapter discussed the evolution of observers in the Arctic Council. It argued that observers are weak Council actors that seek influence to help solve Arctic environmental issues and make economic gains. Member states see the acceptance of observers as being conducive to furthering the formers’ economic gains. Neorealism provides the best explanation for observer influence in the Council, while neoliberal institutionalism explains the interest of states in Council participation. Neorealists are wrong to emphasize the importance of relative gains for motivating state behaviour as absolute gains prove to be the more potent motivator in this case. In a way, non-Arctic states are more interested in protecting the environment than Arctic states in this case. New observers want to help address climate change in the Arctic. Member states are more interested in their own economic interests than in helping these new observers to fight global warming.

What are the major implications of this research? The Arctic Council is changing from being a strictly regional organization to being a body with a more global outlook as the relevance of the region becomes more widely recognized. More states seek to participate in Arctic governance, reconstituting its invisible boundaries. Commentaries that emphasize the economic interests of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic are overly alarmist. The presence of non-Arctic states in Arctic Council will not necessarily further shift the Council from an environmental body to an economic body. If anything, non-Arctic observers, that have demonstrated an interest in the Arctic environment and climate change, will slow the evolution of the Council from an environmental body to a body with strong economic interests.
CHAPTER 6: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL PERMANENT PARTICIPANT’S STATUS, RIGHTS AND INFLUENCE

When states created the Council, there was debate about whether indigenous peoples’ organizations should be equal in status and rights to states.\(^{793}\) The Arctic Council that emerged is the only international institution that grants indigenous peoples’ organizations a second-tier role that is comparable to states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations, termed permanent participants in the Council, have quite similar rights to states, but importantly cannot vote on Council decisions. The institution is important to these groups because it is charged with promoting co-operation on environmental and sustainable development issues that are vital to indigenous peoples.

Indigenous peoples’ organizations are important to the Council because they provide a conduit between Arctic communities, the Council and governments. Arctic governments serve a wider constituency than Arctic residents. As noted in Chapter 1, there are six indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Arctic Council: the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council. All together, these groups represent approximately 659,000 indigenous peoples from every Arctic country,\(^{794}\) with the exception of Iceland.\(^{795}\)

\(^{793}\) Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013.
What is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? How has their role and influence evolved over time? When are the permanent participants successful (or unsuccessful) in exerting influence on the Council? The major goal of this chapter is to answer these questions. Influence refers to the ability to sway or direct outcomes. The first section discusses expectations of functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism about the influence of non-state actors. We can consider the permanent participants non-state actors. The second section of this chapter traces the role, influence and evolution of the permanent participants and shows that these groups have had influence in many cases. The third section concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its tempered expectations of non-state actors in international institutions, provides the best explanation for the influence of the permanent participants. Permanent participants have less role and influence than states in the Council, but nonetheless have significant influence based on their evolving agency.

This chapter contributes to academic literature because it examines which of three perspectives on permanent participant influence best explains the current situation in the Council. Several news articles from the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996 anticipated that permanent participants would be roughly equal in influence to states.796 In 2010, political

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795 Chapter 1 overviews the six major groups. To review, the AAC represents 32,000 Athabaskan natives in Canada and the United States. The AIA represents 18,000 Aleutians mainly in the United States, but also Russia and Greenland. The GCI represents advocates for the 9,000 Gwich’in in the United States and Canada. The ICC actively represents 150,000 Inuit people in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Russia. RAIPON is a group of 35 different Russian indigenous organizations representing 41 indigenous groups and 300,000 people. The Saami Council represents all of the 150,000 Saami people in Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. The Saami Council is the oldest organization, founded in 1956; the newest are the AAC, AIA and GCI, which developed after 1998 specifically to participate in the Council. The founding of the ICC occurred in 1977 and the RAIPON came together in 1990. The AAC united in 2000, while the AIA formed in 1998 and the GCI formed in 1999.

796 One such article is Lisa Rosborou, “Arctic Council a Lifesaver,” Winnipeg Free Press, September 23, 1996. She reports, “Many national governments, from Australia and India to Botswana and Brazil, have domestic policies to protect the culture of their aboriginal peoples, but nowhere are they admitted into mainstream international organizations. Until now. In the Arctic Council, said Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, ‘they will be full participants. The only difference is that when it comes down to the final decision-making process, the governments have to be the ones that express their yes and no’s.’ Natives are natives, and sovereignty is sacred.” She goes on, “So to put native peoples in a position where, as permanent participants, they can block consensus, is
scientist Timo Koivurova rated their influence very highly, writing, “The fact that the Council has accorded a unique role for the region’s original occupants has certainly served its legitimacy and also contributed to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy making.” In contrast, in 1997, lawyer Jennifer McIver disagreed with the view that permanent participants could be influential actors and argued that the rights and status that states invested with these groups do not enable them to be influential in the Council. She argues, “Excluding indigenous peoples from holding equal status in the Arctic Council is a short-sighted approach to environmental management of the Northern region, rendering the structure of the Council obsolete before it even begins.”

Beyond these perspectives, most authors, including political scientists Terry Fenge, Olav Schram Stokke and Oran Young, argue that the Council is a state-centric institution that provides an important role for permanent participants in dialogue. In 1999, United States State Department policy-maker Evan Bloom agreed and wrote that indigenous groups “participate in all aspects of the Council's work.” Historian John English argues the institution is state-centric, though he says the “lobbying and
“pressure” of indigenous peoples’ organizations has “had an impact” on Arctic governance.\(^{804}\)

None of the existing literature systematically explains the role and influence of the permanent participants, or its implications for our understanding of non-state actors in international relations, a task this chapter undertakes. It argues that none of the existing perspectives adequately explains permanent participant influence, though the third, state-centric perspective of Fenge and others comes closest. Beyond their legal rights and status, the permanent participants have influence in the Council, though less influence than states. They demonstrate most influence when they convince a state to veto an undesirable policy, or to reverse an earlier veto, but demonstrate less influence when it is required to convince a number of states to undertake a desired course of action.

This chapter contributes a case that assesses the reliability and validity of the predictions that functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism make about the influence of non-state actors. Functionalists would expect that non-state actors could influence international institutions, while neorealists would argue it is not possible. Neoliberal institutionalists would provide an explanation between the two theories, as they would argue that non-state actors could have influence that stems from their agency. Agency refers to the ability to effectively research, organize, communicate, lobby and ally with states. Major international relations theories do not anticipate that non-state actors will be influential global actors. In the post-Soviet world, that possibility seems greater than ever before. This chapter reinforces the predictive power of neoliberal institutionalism due to its emphasis on the importance of agency.

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6.1 – Theoretical Predictions on the Influence of Non-State Actors

Functionalists hold that permanent participants can influence the Council by providing information and perspectives states and the institution itself find compelling.

H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality of the information they provide.

Functionalists argue that states automatically and rationally respond to issues, including external international issues that demand co-operation where state interests intersect. Thus, functionalists conclude that non-state actors become part of international institutions when they provide information that makes states aware of issues, “interests, beliefs and expectations.”

According to functionalists, “international institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making autonomy.” Functionalists stress “the role of interest groups (especially organized business and trade unions) in this self-expansive integration process.” Non-state actors can form an interest group that can pressure the Council to undertake certain action. Functionalists argue that states create institutions independent of states to promote efficiency; these institutions can then make decisions automatically, independent of the will of any particular state. Thus, for these theorists, the demands of non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations, influence international institutions even when their arguments conflict with state interest. These groups contribute local knowledge to solve problems. According to functionalists, the influence of non-state actors evolves when they provide new information to states.

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806 Ibid.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809 Ibid.
811 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.
Neorealists argue that the influence of permanent participants will not evolve because states will never grant them rights and status that will allow competition with states.

*H1: The permanent participants will not be a strong actor in the Arctic Council and their influence will not evolve.*

Neorealists would argue that the permanent participants have not influenced states to do anything they would not have otherwise done. This argument stems from the fact they assume that states are the pre-eminent actor in the international system. In an anarchic world system, states are the most important actor, following their rational material, positional self-interest. In this system, no actor can force states to undertake action without the threat of force. Neorealists contend that, “States are the only actors that really ‘count.’” According to neorealists, non-state actors do not have the means to impact how states operate. Neorealists argue that permanent participants can give states credibility and information, but cannot impact states’ material self-interest. They do not process territory or sovereignty so they cannot use force against a state. The question is thus, why would states allow the permanent participants to be part of the Council in the first place? Neorealists would expect that states did not see non-state actors as a challenge to their interests, prosperity or security. Including permanent participants may have addressed domestic political concerns that do not impact vital state interest. For small powers, permanent participants help dilute the influence of great powers. States could use non-state actors to promote their interest. Thus, it could appear that non-state actors are influential, though in fact this would not be the case. Neorealists would not expect that permanent participants would be able to influence states in the Arctic Council.

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813 Ibid.
814 Ibid.
815 Ibid., 94.
816 Ibid.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the permanent participants can have some influence, but their influence will never be equal to states.

**H1**: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization, communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).

Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that non-state actors are more influential than neorealists predict, but less influential than functionalists predict. For neoliberal institutionalists, the modern world order includes “increasing linkages among states and non-state actors.” Including permanent participants also ensures institutional legitimacy. Neoliberal institutionalists, like neorealists and functionalists, believe states co-operate when it is in their interest to do so. Unlike neorealists, they argue that norms and the form of negotiation impact state behaviour. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that non-state actors can convince states that a given action is in their interest, if they can overcome any norms and path dependence that inhibit their contributions. They can use agency to influence states, or a keen ability to research, organize, communicate, lobby and build coalitions. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states will undertake action as long as they secure an absolute gain. This prediction stands in contrast to functionalism, which argues that in independent institutions non-state actors can rival states for influence. Neoliberal institutionalists argue the influence of permanent participants can evolve as they gain new strategies to convince states a action is in their interest.

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821 Ibid., 229.
822 Lamy, 121.
Table 6.1 summarizes theory on non-state actors in international institutions.

Functionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in international institutions will evolve when they obtain new information that makes international institutions or states aware of important issues. Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in international institutions will evolve when they use their agency to convince states of the utility of a desired action. Neorealists do not believe the influence of non-state actors in international institutions will evolve because states will not invest non-state actors with influence to challenge states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Can non-state actors influence international institutions?</th>
<th>When will non-state actors influence international institutions?</th>
<th>When will their influence evolve?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>When they provide compelling information about an important issue to states</td>
<td>When they obtain compelling information about an important issue for states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>They will not, as states are the important actors in the international system</td>
<td>They will not, as states will never give them rights and status that challenges the power of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal institutionalism</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>When they use their agency to convince states of the utility of their position</td>
<td>When they develop new or better agency to lobby states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 – The Evolution of the Permanent Participants

There are four eras of permanent participant involvement in the Arctic Council. In the first period, from 1991 to 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied governments to be included in the Arctic Council. They accomplished this goal by winning the support of countries because states did not perceive them a threat to state influence. In the second period, from 1998 to 2004, permanent participants participated in the Council significantly less than states and were able to initiate only limited Council projects. The third period comprises one year, 2004, when the participants successfully allied with like-minded nations to force the Council, and particularly the United States, to increase its action on climate change, which created new promise that they might be influential Council actors. In the fourth period, from 2005 to 2013, the permanent participants were able to influence the Council significantly in two cases. However, overall, states continued to limit the influence of permanent participants and their ability to achieve desired outcomes appeared weaker than ever. Authors that argue that the permanent participants are “full participants” in the Council overestimate their influence. Likewise, authors who predict they will have little to no influence in the Council, such as Jennifer McIver, underestimate their influence. The Council is a state-centric institution, confirming the assessments of authors such as Oran Young. However, the permanent participants are important actors in the Council, which contrasts some predictions made by state-centric theories.

6.2.1 – 1991 to 1998

It is necessary to understand how states constructed the role, status and rights of the permanent participants to understand how their role has evolved. Permanent participants had a limited role and influence during the founding of the Arctic Council, from 1991 until 1998. Why
did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become permanent participants? States had to consider two key questions. First, would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the Arctic Council? Second, what would be their role in the Council, as well as their influence on Council decision-making? In regards to the first question, there was no debate that indigenous peoples’ organizations would at least be observers. The three existing indigenous peoples’ organizations, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) the Saami Council and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), participated in the precursor organization to the Arctic Council, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), although only as observers. This participation in the AEPS secured their role in the Arctic Council.

As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the AEPS allowed observers and so indigenous peoples’ organizations found an avenue to participate in that status. The AEPS’s 1991 founding document lists the ICC, USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North (later renamed RAIPON), and the Nordic Saami Council (later renamed the Saami Council) as observers, along with Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the International Arctic Science Committee. The document, in a clearly symbolic gesture, lists the indigenous peoples’ organizations before the other observers. However, these groups could only comment on matters in the AEPS or participate in meetings with the consent of states. The AEPS was a state-centric scientific strategy and non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations, had little input or role in the process to create it.

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824 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991).
Indigenous peoples’ organizations increased their role in the AEPS by successfully lobbying states. This lobbying created an expectation that indigenous peoples’ organizations should have greater status and rights than other observers did when states opted to create the Arctic Council. It was unacceptable to indigenous peoples that their organizations, which represented Arctic residents, had the same status as non-Arctic countries in the AEPS. The negotiation process occurred during the fall of 1993 when states held a meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, to overview the activities of the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations could attend the plenary meeting, but could not attend closed-door negotiations among the eight Arctic countries. Leaders of the three indigenous peoples’ organizations demanded a side meeting, conducted in private, with representatives of Arctic states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations presented a united front and leveraged the fact that their groups together comprised significant numbers of northern residents, particularly indigenous peoples. They jointly “characterized their exclusion as unwarranted and contrary to the spirit of co-operation in the circumpolar world.”

These arguments proved persuasive. The eight Arctic states agreed and “these organizations were thereafter permitted to attend and intervene in all meetings of the AEPS,” although they were still technically observers. In 1994, Denmark created the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat to help all of the permanent participants participate in the AEPS, at a cost of more than $2.5 million U.S. dollars per year. The Indigenous Peoples Secretariat was to “assist and provide secretariat support functions to the permanent participants.” Its website says, “The role of the secretariat has always been to facilitate contributions from the [permanent participants] to the co-operation

826 Ibid.
of the eight Arctic states and to assist the [permanent participants] in performing 
communicational tasks.  As shall be revealed, the permanent participants secured a role in the 
Arctic Council based on their successful negotiation of a privileged role in the AEPS. The role of 
indigenous peoples’ organizations proved to be the major difference between the Arctic Council 
and its predecessor.

Indigenous peoples’ organizations did not enjoy greater status in the AEPS because states 
created it to increase engagement with Russia, rather than as a forum to address issues important 
to Arctic residents. There are numerous social issues in indigenous communities stemming from 
unprecedented cultural change since first contact with Europeans during the 16\textsuperscript{th} century. In 
the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, this cultural change continued as the rate of urbanization of indigenous peoples 
increased. Meanwhile, traditional lifestyles and languages declined across the circumpolar 
world. These changes have led to increasing activism among indigenous peoples in the latter 
half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as they sought the right to self-determination. Examples include the 
rise of indigenous advocacy organizations, such as Canada’s Assembly of First Nations, the 
United States’ Association on American Indian Affairs or the aforementioned Nordic Saami 
Council. Further, there were significant human security issues in the Arctic in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, Russia saw a decline in life expectancy of 
indigenous peoples in its North. Rates of suicide are higher than the national average in every 

831  Ibid. 
832  Ibid. 
833  Ibid., 158. The life expectancy of Russian indigenous peoples declined 4.8 years between 1990 and 1995 due to high alcohol consumption, a poor economic climate and high levels of stress.}
part of the circumpolar north. Despite these issues, as other chapters make clear, the AEPS emerged because of a growing willingness by the Arctic states to engage with Russia, rather than indigenous peoples’ issues or activism. All of the Arctic states had an interest in scientific co-operation to deal with under-researched, yet very pressing Russian Arctic environmental issues. Although there is a human element to these problems, the AEPS did not emerge due to indigenous activism.

Regarding the second question, the role and influence of indigenous peoples’ organizations was a key point of debate and disagreement in the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council. During informal 1995 negotiations, two major alignments emerged. The first alignment supported making indigenous peoples’ organizations full Council members. Canada led this alignment of indigenous allies, which also included Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Indigenous peoples’ organizations should have the same status, rights and influence as states. The second alignment, led by the United States and including Russia, favoured a second-tier status for indigenous peoples’ organizations similar in status and rights to observers. States sought to complete their negotiations on the creation of the Arctic Council by the end of 1995. The status and rights of indigenous groups was the major obstacle that delayed the creation of the Council until a founding meeting in Ottawa in September 1996.

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834 Ibid., 147. In some parts of the Arctic, as of 2004, the rate of suicide is only slightly higher than the national average, while in other areas, the suicide is 10 times the national average.
839 Ibid.
840 Ibid.
841 Ibid.
842 Winnipeg Free Press, news brief, August 15, 1996.
843 Ibid.
The negotiating process on the rights and status of the permanent participants unfolded during 1996 and 1997. During the June 1996 negotiations to create the Arctic Council, the United States offered a compromise: it would support either adding security to the Arctic Council’s mandate or making the aboriginal groups second-tier members. Lloyd Axworthy, then Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, later said that Canada chose to include the permanent participants in the Council. Russia and the Nordic countries accepted this compromise. Traditional military security was not a central concern in the negotiations that led to the Council, so it seems like a plausible compromise. Thus indigenous peoples’ organizations received a second-tier status as permanent participants, lacking a vote on Council matters.

Ultimately, the role and status of the permanent participants would be similar to states, certainly with fewer legal rights but able to have an impact on Council outcomes. The permanent participants argued that they should be full members of the Council. The ICC and its president Mary Simon, in particular, pressured Canada to support their full participation in the Council. At the June 1996 negotiations, after finding out about Canada’s compromise, some indigenous group representatives present were not happy the groups were not to be full members of the Council. Simon, the leader of Canada’s delegation, told the indigenous peoples’ representatives that if the groups could not accept permanent participant status, Canada would walk away from the talks. Ultimately, the groups decided that the Council could accomplish good work with indigenous peoples’ organizations groups as second-tier members and decided to accept permanent participant status.

845 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current consultant, winter 2014.
846 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and former representative for ICC, February 21, 2013.
847 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and former representative for ICC, February 21, 2013.
States had not yet defined the precise rights of permanent participants.\textsuperscript{848} The permanent participant issue dominated December 1995 and April 1996 negotiations, which left two meetings in June and August to negotiate the declaration creating the Council. At the first Arctic Council meeting, in September 1996 in Ottawa, states set three goals for the next two years: 1) to develop rules of procedure; 2) to develop terms of reference for the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) to the Arctic Council.\textsuperscript{849} The third task was straightforward; the first and second tasks were more contentious.

On the first matter, the permanent participants sought to establish the strongest legal rights possible for themselves in the rules or procedure. The 1995 and 1996 negotiations established that permanent participants would not be able to vote on Council matters. States negotiated the rules of procedure at five meetings, mostly held in Canada, throughout 1997 and 1998.\textsuperscript{850} Articles 4 and 5 of the Council rules or procedure state that permanent participants may participate “in all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council.”\textsuperscript{851} It also says, “The category of permanent participants is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.”\textsuperscript{852} The permanent participants can help set the Council agenda,\textsuperscript{853} vote on delegation sizes\textsuperscript{854} and propose Council projects.\textsuperscript{855} The rules of procedure protect some rights for permanent participants.

\textsuperscript{848} Arctic Council, \textit{Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries} (Ottawa, Ontario: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1996).

\textsuperscript{849} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{850} The Council had two meetings in 1997. The May 1998 meeting was in Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada. The September 1998 meeting was in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada. The only meeting not held in Canada occurred in London, England, in August 1998. For further details, see Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 771.

\textsuperscript{851} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Rules of Procedure} (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998), Article 4 and Article 5. The quote is from Article 4.

\textsuperscript{852} Ibid., Article 5.

\textsuperscript{853} Ibid., Article 12 and Article 19.

\textsuperscript{854} Ibid., Article 13.
Still, the rules privilege the rights of states in other ways. The Arctic states have the prerogative to meet in private without the permanent participants.\textsuperscript{856} Only Arctic states can set working group meeting agendas.\textsuperscript{857} Article 7 says, “All decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies . . . shall be by a consensus of the eight Arctic states.”\textsuperscript{858} In the words of Terry Fenge, “They are not listed as founding members of the Council, do not have a vote, did not sign the declaration and are not considered ‘peoples.’”\textsuperscript{859} Most importantly, the \textit{Ottawa Declaration} caps the number of permanent participants at seven.\textsuperscript{860} The Arctic states can veto permanent participant projects, as all must receive approval by Arctic Council ministers.\textsuperscript{861} In essence, every Council state has a veto over any Council action because the forum operates by consensus. The permanent participants had fewer rights in the Council than they would have preferred.

On the second matter, creating terms of reference for the SDWG, the permanent participants sought the right to help set the agenda. The permanent participants sought a SDWG in which indigenous peoples’ organizations would identify “shared priorities.” In general, the other Arctic states supported this proposal. The United States, weary of an overly broad Council agenda, opposed this approach, favouring an ad-hoc mandate that would see the working group adopt specific projects as states saw fit. Ultimately, the Council that emerged from this process was a Council that placed a greater influence on science and the environment than on human security. Government and academic scientists dominated the Council during the period from 1998 until 2004, creating the majority of the Council’s projects.\textsuperscript{862}

\textsuperscript{855} Ibid., Article 26.
\textsuperscript{856} Ibid., Article 6
\textsuperscript{857} Ibid., Article 19.
\textsuperscript{858} Ibid., Article 7.
\textsuperscript{860} Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 771.
\textsuperscript{862} Two Canadian policy-makers and one American policy-maker expressed the view that scientists dominated the Council in its early years during interviews in the winter and spring of 2013.
What were the positions of the alignments in negotiations? Canada led the first alignment and made five key arguments to demand full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations. First, some policy-makers referred to a norm to include Aboriginals as full members. In the words of one government official, “You can’t speak of the North without involving Aboriginal folk.” Second, there was some sense that it was logical to give indigenous peoples’ organizations, which represented northern residents, a special status above that of observers, such as the Red Cross. Third, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied for their own inclusion. These groups wanted to be members of the Arctic Council. They each increasingly viewed international co-operation and interaction as necessary to accomplish their goals. Fourth, and most importantly, there was a strategic advantage for the small powers to include indigenous peoples’ organizations apart from states in the Council. If indigenous peoples were mere observers in the Council, states would be responsible for including their views in their international positions at the Arctic Council, because indigenous peoples’ organizations are significant domestic actors. Giving these groups membership in the Council allows them to express their views, themselves. It means that states do not need to do so in official positions. Fifth, applying only to Canada, some Canadian decision-makers believed that Canada’s constitution created an obligation to include the indigenous groups in the Council. Section 35 of the Canadian constitution protects the responsibility to consult with Aboriginal peoples about

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863 Interview with former United States delegation member and policy official, spring 2013.
864 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
865 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
866 Interview with former United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
867 English, Ice and Water, 202.
issues vital to their interest.\textsuperscript{868} In the words of one Canadian policy-maker, Canada is “conscious of involving our Aboriginal people” because there is an expectation to do so in the Constitution.\textsuperscript{869} To quote a permanent participant representative, Canada had a “pious hope that indigenous peoples had the same status as states.”\textsuperscript{870}

In these informal negotiations, the second alignment (the United States and Russia) made four arguments opposing full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations. First, United States policy-makers worried about the legal ramifications of their inclusion. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was under negotiation at the time of Council negotiations.\textsuperscript{871} The United States argued that “granting Aboriginals full voting rights” in the Council could create a legal precedent for “their right to have their own country.”\textsuperscript{872} The United States sought to draft “neutral language” in all Council documents and avoid references to “aboriginal peoples.”\textsuperscript{873} Part of the negotiation process in the United Nation was a question whether to grant the right of self-determination to indigenous “peoples” and so the United States sought to avoid this wording in all contexts, as well as any action that could support the indigenous right to self-determination. The eventual Article 3 of the resulting declaration grants this right of self-determination.\textsuperscript{874} One representative of an indigenous peoples’ organization recounted that in 1996 Council negotiations, United States negotiators argued that recognizing indigenous peoples would encourage the rise of “liberation fronts” and embolden aboriginal leaders with radical politics.\textsuperscript{875} Russian policy-makers shared this concern as indigenous peoples

\textsuperscript{868} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Aboriginal Affairs official, winter 2013.
\textsuperscript{869} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and Aboriginal Affairs official, winter 2013
\textsuperscript{870} Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and former representative for ICC, February 21, 2013.
\textsuperscript{872} Interview with former high-ranking United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{873} Interview with former high-ranking United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\textsuperscript{874} United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 3.
\textsuperscript{875} Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and ICC, February 21, 2013.
in Russia mobilized interest groups to confront the government about worsening living conditions in the Russian Arctic; this activism was new in the recently post-Soviet Russia. For example, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North came into existence in 1990. United States and Russian policy-makers feared legal issues if permanent participants had too many rights.

The secondary reason that the United States and Russia were reluctant to add indigenous peoples’ organizations to the Arctic Council was a concern that they would have too much influence. United States officials believed that indigenous peoples’ organizations would use their domestic influence to impact their home country’s vote and then cast a vote themselves, which would in essence give them two votes. Russia shared the United States’ concern. For example, the Saami Council, based in Norway, could influence Norway to support its view on Council matters. If the Saami Council also could vote, United States and Russian officials believed it would have two votes. In this scenario, the United States or Russia could be out-voted. These countries operated under the assumption that Arctic Council states likely would support the views of their domestic aboriginal groups. This assumption is paradoxical, in light of the efforts by the first coalition to have indigenous groups speak for themselves, expressly so they would not have to do so. The permanent participants in general relied on states in the first alignment to represent their interests against the second alignment and so communication was not always face-to-face. More importantly, United States policy-makers believed it was inappropriate to grant indigenous peoples the same influence as states.

877 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013, and former United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
878 Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
Third, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that if permanent participants received a vote in the Council, Alaska would demand a vote.\textsuperscript{879} The United States policy-makers supported a role for indigenous peoples in the Council because the “input of the community’s needs” was important in the Council.\textsuperscript{880} One former United States delegation member summarized, "It may have looked like it was the United States against the indigenous communities, but we were working for a Council that met our objectives, including our legal requirements," such as avoiding strong language about indigenous rights to avoid previously mentioned issues in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{881} The United States took the lead in opposing full membership for the permanent participants; hence Russia did not need to make its opinions clear.\textsuperscript{882} Russia supported the United States’ view, opposing indigenous group membership.

Fourth, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that indigenous peoples’ organizations would voice opinions contrary to United States interests. John English, in his book \textit{Ice and Water}, writes that the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) had been critical of the \textit{Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act}, which transferred various land rights to indigenous peoples. In a 1985 report, the ICC said the act sought to assimilate Alaskan natives into Western culture.\textsuperscript{883} Several Alaskan politicians mistrusted the ICC and its support for an Arctic council.\textsuperscript{884} In 1995, the ICC published a report called \textit{Collapse of the Seal Skin Market}, critical of the United States’ 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products into the United States.\textsuperscript{885} These criticisms raised suspicion of the ICC among United States policy-makers.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{879} Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{880} Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{881} Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{882} Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{883} English, \textit{Ice and Water}, 190.
\item \textsuperscript{884} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{885} Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013. The report was published under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization.
\end{itemize}
It also is worth noting that the lead negotiator for Canada during the creation of the Arctic Council was Mary Simon, an Inuit leader. She was president of the ICC from 1980 until 1994 and had worked to negotiate the creation of the territory of Nunavut. In 1994, she became Canada’s first (and so far only) circumpolar ambassador. The government of Canada appointed her due to her northern experience, credibility and diplomatic experience. Her appointment to lead negotiations no doubt annoyed many Alaskan politicians suspicious of the ICC.

In the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, the United States and Russia emerged as the winners because they sought a lesser role for indigenous peoples’ organizations. They wanted representation from indigenous peoples, but could not support the notion that indigenous groups would have the same legal rights as states.886 Policy-makers in these countries believed that it would be “inappropriate” to grant aboriginal groups equal legal rights.887 Canada and the Nordic states lost in the negotiations because indigenous peoples’ organizations did not receive full membership. The United States and Russia did not seriously consider the option of granting full membership to indigenous peoples’ organizations.888 A United States government official present in the negotiations said, “I don’t remember that there ever was a trade-off between permanent participants and security.”889 This indicates that Canada did not present the permanent participant position as vigorously as sometimes indicated. The indigenous peoples’ organizations were somewhat successful in negotiations. The ICC, RAIPON and the Saami Council worked together and presented a united front in negotiations. These groups have different domestic situations and interests, but all shared the goal to gain influence in the Council. They have fewer rights than states in the institution and are not “full members,” but they have a privileged status.

886 Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
887 Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
888 Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
889 Former United States high-ranking delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.
In summary, from 1991 until 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations secured a place in the Arctic Council. Why did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become permanent participants? Would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the Arctic Council at all? States allowed the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations as permanent participants because they had an elevated role in the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations were mere observers at the onset of that largely environmental organization, but successfully lobbied states to increase their role in 1993. What would be their role in the Council, as well as their influence on Council decision-making? During negotiations to create the Arctic Council, Canada and the Nordic states pushed to include indigenous peoples’ organizations as full members due to perceived norms, recognitions and lobbying efforts, as well as for strategic bargaining reasons. The United States and Russia opposed full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations for fear of the legal implications of their inclusion and concerns over potential challenges to state power. A compromise emerged in which the status of the permanent participants is similar to states, but without a vote on Council matters. They are members of the Council, although they are second-tier members, below states. They can attend all Council meetings, contribute comments, help set the Council’s agenda, vote on small matters and sponsor Council projects. States have the ability to meet without the permanent participants and any permanent participant comment, idea or project is subject to a state veto. This veto is the only major right that states possess which permanent participants do not.

To return to the literature, overall, the influence of the permanent participants disappointed some commentators, such as Jennifer McIver, leery that the Council was a state-centric institution. Others believed that the compromise meant they would be full members.
6.2.2 – 1998 to 2004

To assess the growth of permanent participant influence on the Council, it is necessary to establish a baseline by describing their level of influence at the beginning of the institution’s operations. From 1998 until 2004, the permanent participants exerted influence on the Arctic Council, though less than did states. This section provides less of a historical trace and more of an overall assessment of influence. Actors can influence the Council in several ways. Council members can initiate projects, such as a treaty, environmental assessment or technical project. They also can provide comments to shape project content. States have a clear advantage in this regard, because they can veto any Council project they do not support. Permanent participants sought to actualize their influence outlined in the Arctic Council rules of procedure. Toward this end, they sought: 1) to attend all Council meetings and participate in those meetings; 2) to add new permanent participants to the Council through the creation of new indigenous peoples’ organizations, 3) to sponsor projects in the Council, and; 4) to provide significant content-shaping comments on projects. This section describes the ability of the permanent participants to fulfill these goals and explains the reason for their success, or lack thereof.

In terms of the first goal, the permanent participants were successful attending and participating in Council meetings, although they participated less than did states. As indicated in earlier chapters, the Council holds between two and four meetings annually in which states approve projects commissioned in previous meetings. Government bureaucrats and permanent participant employees complete those projects between meetings. From 1998 until 2004, the

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890 As noted in the introduction, influence refers to the ability to sway or direct outcomes.
891 To measure participation, the researcher coded instances in which Arctic Council meeting minutes record comments by a permanent participant. This measure is the best available, but is imperfect. In certain instances, the minutes record comments by “delegations,” without specifying which delegation made the comments. In addition, according to the Arctic Council rules of procedure, states have the right to expunge comments from the meeting minutes; thus, the meeting minutes for any one meeting may not be completely accurate. Meeting minutes for the May 2004 SAO meeting in Selfoss, Iceland, are not available and so were not included in calculations.
Arctic Council held 18 meetings, hosted by four different countries, depending on which was its chair. Five of the six permanent participant groups sent representatives to all 18 meetings. The exception was the Aleut International Association (AIA), which missed two meetings in 2001, but overall attended 16 of 18 Council meetings. A measure of participation is the number of comments made by delegations at Council meetings. States decide on initiatives at Council meetings. To participate fully, delegations must be able and willing to comment at Council meetings. As a whole, the permanent participants provided comments an average of 11.72 times per meeting, making their voices heard. Individually, on average, they provided fewer comments than did states. United States delegates, for example, made remarks an average of 11.4 times per meeting from 1998 until 2004. Counted individually, the most any one permanent participant group spoke at a meeting was seven times. The more established groups, namely the ICC and the RAIPON, make more comments than other permanent participants. At eight different Council meetings, a permanent participant group did not make any comment, according to meeting minutes. For example, at the November 1999 Council meeting, representatives from neither the AIA nor the Saami Council made any comments, while the other permanent participant groups provided several comments. On 18 occasions at these eight meetings, a permanent participant group did not provide any comments.

Another measure of participation to consider is the size of permanent participant delegations, an important factor in a group’s ability to achieve outcomes. Permanent participant

892 This calculation includes Arctic Council ministerial meetings, also known as ACMM meetings, and senior official meetings, also known as SAO meetings. It does not include working group or project meetings.
893 Arctic Council, Participant List, Arctic Council’s SAO Meeting, 12-13 June 2001, Rovaniemi, Finland (Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000); Arctic Council, Participant List, Arctic Council’s SDWG and SAO Meeting, 13-16 May 2002, Oulu, Finland (Oulu, Finland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000).
894 These were: the ICC, April 2000 SAO and the RAIPON, May 2002 SAO.
895 The AIA and Saami Council at November 1999 SAO, the AIA at June 2001 SAO, the AAC and the AIA at November 2001 SAO, the AIA at May 2002 SAO, the AIA at October 2002 SAO, the RAIPON, GCI, Saami Council, AAC and AIA at April 2003 SAO, the ICC at October 2003 SAO, the Saami Council, ICC, AAC, AIA and GCI at November 2004 SAO.
delegations at these meetings were smaller than those of states. For example, states sent an average of 7.1 representatives to the June 2001 Arctic Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, whereas permanent participants sent an average of 3.8 representatives. Each group sent around the same number of representatives. We can conclude that the permanent participants attended and participated in Council meetings, though individually they commented half as much as did states.

In terms of the second goal, permanent participants were successful adding new indigenous peoples’ organizations to the Council. In 1996, at the first Council meeting in Ottawa, the Council included three permanent participants: the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council. These three groups helped form three new indigenous peoples’ organizations, which emerged specifically to participate in the Council. Permanent participants sought to introduce groups to represent the three major indigenous groups that did not have representation in the Council. All of the Council states were receptive to including additional permanent participants in the Council because the current groups did not represent every indigenous group. Existing permanent participants contacted the major tribal councils that did not have representation to ask them to form groups for the Arctic Council throughout 1996 until 1998. They shared information about the Council and its objectives, arguments why a presence in the Council would be in an indigenous person’s interest and expertise about how to organize appropriate groups. The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) formed from the 18 Athabaskan tribal councils in Canada and Alaska.\footnote{Arctic Athabaskan Council, “About Us,” About Us, 2014, http://www.arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/?q=about (accessed June 16, 2014).}

The Aleutian/Pribilof Islands Association, an Alaska native land claim corporation,
formed the Aleut International Association (AIA). The Gwich’in Council International (GCI) formed out of a union between six Gwich’in communities in Alaska and the two major Gwich’in tribal councils in Canada. The AIA first participated in the Council in 1998, whereas the AAC and the GCI began attending in 2000. There are now permanent participants representing most major Arctic indigenous groups. The rules of procedure allow up to seven permanent participants, as noted earlier. Indigenous groups successfully doubled their membership in the Council between 1996 and 2000, content with six permanent participants.

Apropos the third goal, the permanent participants were somewhat successful sponsoring Council projects. As noted, sponsoring a project entails conceiving of an initiative, designing the specifics, funding all of the necessary costs and executing the agenda. Sponsoring a project allows an actor to lead a Council initiative and direct outcomes. The Council initiated 57 significant projects from 1998 until 2004. Permanent participants initiated only five of these projects, summarized in the next paragraph. The permanent participants were successful executing all of the projects they sought to bring the Council as they pursued small-scale projects states had no reason to veto. The three largest Council projects stemmed from the interest of the Arctic states in understanding Arctic pollution. These were the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, a major climate change assessment, the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, which sought to the address the aftermath of 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, and the Arctic Human Development Report, which collected statistics and

900 States did not veto any permanent participant project between 1998 and 2004.
information about human security in the Arctic region. The permanent participants did not sponsor any of these large, ambitious projects.

The permanent participants were able to sponsor five projects that were small in scale. First, in 2000, the ICC, the RAIPON and Russia sponsored a project to “assess pollution impacts on the health of indigenous people of Arctic Russia, and to ascertain the level of ‘country’ food contamination as a result of pollution from global and local sources.”\textsuperscript{901} The project was completed in 2004 and created an assessment under the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme working group entitled \textit{Toxic Substances, Food Security and Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North}.\textsuperscript{902} The RAIPON and the ICC updated the Council about its progress at the Council’s meetings between 2000 and 2004. The process to execute this project was straightforward. States limited their comments to small technical suggestions and notes of support. Second, in 2000, the RAIPON and Denmark sponsored a project in the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group entitled \textit{Biological Significance of Sacred Sites of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic: A Study in Northern Russia}, which sought to identify biologically and culturally important sites in Russia for possible protection by collecting traditional knowledge in communities.\textsuperscript{903} Again, the RAIPON briefed the Council about its progress at the Council meetings between 2000 and 2004. States allowed the RAIPON to carry out the project without interference. This project was completed in 2004 and led to follow-up projects in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{904} The Saami Council initiated the third and fourth projects. One compared coastal fishery management systems in Norway, Greenland and Canada.\textsuperscript{905} The other

\textsuperscript{901} Arctic Council, \textit{Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1999).

\textsuperscript{902} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting}.

\textsuperscript{903} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials} (2002).

\textsuperscript{904} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting}.

\textsuperscript{905} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials} (2002).
was a “networking programme” that compiled a “compendium of best practices for teaching and learning about sustainable development in the Arctic.” Both projects were completed in 2002. However, both projects largely occurred outside of the Arctic Council, without major status updates or discussion at Council meetings. It is possible that if the Council did not exist, the group would have been able to complete these projects in other forums. A fifth project was initiated in 2000 by Denmark (with the Saami Council, the ICC, and the RAIPON), and resulted in the *Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic.* This project consisted of “comparative investigations of the living conditions of the Inuit and Saami populations in the Arctic and the indigenous people of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula” in Russia. Permanent participants briefed states about their progress between 2000 and 2004 and the report proceeded without disruptive comments or vetoes. The scope of the survey expanded in subsequent years. These five projects are small in scale compared to a project such as the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,* involving hundreds of scientists and a secretariat.

Overall, the permanent participants sponsored less than 10 per cent of the Council’s projects between 1998 and 2004. Of the five projects they initiated, three had states as co-sponsors and providers of the major funding. Permanent participants were successful sponsoring projects when they secured funds from a like-minded, supportive state co-sponsor. It is likely that permanent participants would have sponsored more projects if they secured greater funding from states for staff and logistics. Additional funds for these projects came from the Global Environmental Facility, a World Bank funding agency affiliated with the United Nations, as was

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906 Ibid.
907 Ibid.
908 Ibid.
909 Ibid.
the case of the ICC/RAIPON toxic substances project.\textsuperscript{910} These projects focused on specific areas of human development in the Arctic and were limited in ambition, as well as scope.

The permanent participants were somewhat successful in achieving their fourth goal to provide comments on Council projects. The permanent participants provided comments on projects at Council meetings, as seen in the number of agenda items on which they spoke. As a point of comparison, the United States spoke an average of 11.4 times per meeting on an average of 7.2 agenda items, or roughly half of the Council’s agenda.\textsuperscript{911} The permanent participants spoke on seven or more agenda items only one time.\textsuperscript{912} The permanent participants made significant contributions to two of the three major Council projects from 1998 until 2004: namely, the \textit{Arctic Human Development Report} and \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}. The former received state approval at the five Council meetings from April 2003 until November 2004. The permanent participants served on the project steering committee and contributed community perspectives as well as traditional knowledge to the project.\textsuperscript{913} The next section discusses the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}.

The permanent participants attempted on two occasions to change the course of action decided upon by a state, on a project they had not sponsored. In one case, this intervention was successful. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was successful intervening in a project introduced at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. State delegations discussed a project led by the United States National Science Foundation entitled the \textit{Inventory of Arctic Research}, which was a synthesis of the state of Arctic science. The project won quick support from all states as delegations stated they would provide information to support the project. The

\textsuperscript{910} Arctic Council, \textit{Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999.}  
\textsuperscript{911} The Council discussed an average of 15.54 agenda items per meeting in this era.  
\textsuperscript{912} In this case, the RAIPON spoke seven times at the May 2002 Arctic Council meeting.  
\textsuperscript{913} Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Svartsengi, Iceland, 22-24 October, 2004: Draft Minutes} (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2004).
ICC “intervened to stress the necessity of including local observations and traditional knowledge in research and inventories.”914 The goal of the United States was to create a useful tool for scientists. There was no reason to exclude the information requested by the ICC. The United States delegation then stated that it agreed with the ICC’s request and pledged to involve permanent participants in the collection of information to include in the inventory.915 This intervention was successful because the leading state did not veto the change, because the suggested alternation was relatively small and did not alter the purpose of the project.

At the next Arctic Council meeting, in November 1999, the ICC was unsuccessful in its attempt to convince a state to reverse a course of action. In the plenary meeting, states heard an overview of efforts in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program to understand the extent of the unsafe storage of PCBs in the Russian Arctic. Norway and the Nordic countries, armed with scientific information confirming the danger to human health from PCBs, proposed that the Council create a formal policy to address Arctic contaminants.916 The United States’ response was somewhat ambiguous. Canada vetoed a formal policy on contaminants, before Russia indicated whether it supported the action and Norway detailed what sort of policy it envisioned.917 The Canadian delegation was leery of the obligations that a formal policy would create. It believed that it could achieve desirable outcomes without a policy.918 The ICC wanted firm commitments from states and tried to convince Canada not to block attempts to create a formal policy on the Arctic Contaminants Action Program. Its delegation stated that action on contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of indigenous people in the

914 Arctic Council, Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A. May 5-6, 1999.
915 Ibid.
917 Ibid.
918 Former Canadian delegation member and Aboriginal Affairs official, winter 2013.
This intervention was not successful because the ICC lacked the ability to compel Canada to consider its view and the ICC did not address Canada’s concerns about sovereignty. The Council did not undertake further discussion about the contents of a policy on contaminants.

The permanent participants also supported two minor Council initiatives. First, the permanent participants jointly helped states write the Arctic Council’s submission to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. The goal of the summit was to negotiate an international policy on sustainable development. At its May 2002 meeting in Oulu, Finland, the Arctic states prepared a statement to contribute to the summit and pledged action on the reduction of contaminants, as well as defining the “Arctic as an indicator region of global environmental health.” The ICC, in particular, contributed language to the draft and urged language to “encourage further comprehensive environmental monitoring in this region.” States stated they could not add the language to the submission for logistical timeline reasons. The summit was not successful in creating international policy. Nonetheless, the permanent participants contributed a lot to the Council’s submission to the summit.

Second, the permanent participants supported an attempt by Canada to encourage “capacity building” projects in the Council, which were to promote bottom-up decision-making. Capacity building is the notion that “development” must give communities skills and knowledge to be “authors of their own development.” Communities were to generate their own projects for the Council under this approach. Canada encouraged this approach by co-

920 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Oulu, Finland, May 15-16, 2002: Minutes (Oulu, Finland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2002).
921 Ibid.
922 Ibid.
923 Oran Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 14.
924 Ibid.
hosting a workshop with Finland in November 2001. Indigenous groups participated in this workshop, held in Helsinki, Finland.\textsuperscript{926} Canada sought to have “capacity building” identified as an overall theme for all sustainable development projects, although it did not seek to introduce this requirement into the Council formally. The permanent participants supported this notion, although today in the Council capacity building is not an over-arching theme. In total, the permanent participants made significant contributions to six projects they did not sponsor.

Returning to the major debate about the influence of the permanent participants in the academic literature, neither accurately predicts the level of participation by the permanent participants from 1998 until 2004. Jennifer McIver predicts that the permanent participants will have little influence in the Council,\textsuperscript{927} while Evan Bloom predicts they will be “full participants.”\textsuperscript{928} McIver underestimates their participation, while Bloom overestimates their participation. The permanent participants were not “full participants” alongside states because they contribute to only about one-fifth of the Council’s projects. Yet, they had greater influence than observers, since observers did not sponsor Council projects or convince any member states to take any particular course of action. Permanent participants have demonstrated the ability to achieve some desirable outcomes.

Why did the permanent participants contribute to the Council less than many authors and media reports predicted? The permanent participants contributed to 20 per cent of Council projects and initiatives (or 11 projects out of 57). Why were they able to influence the Council only to this extent? Indigenous peoples’ organizations blamed the lack of adequate funding from states for their inability to send larger delegations to meetings and participate in or create more

\textsuperscript{926} Arctic Council, \textit{Report of Senior Arctic Officials} (2002). Canada also sponsored a project on \textit{The Future of Children and Youth of the Arctic} in 2004, creating internships for children.
\textsuperscript{927} McIver, “Environmental Protection, Indigenous Rights and the Arctic Council,” 147.
\textsuperscript{928} Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712.
projects. Most groups lacked funds to attend every working group meeting. These groups rely on state funding to participate in the Council, which amounts to $250,000 to $300,000 a year, depending on the size of the group.\textsuperscript{929} Though travel and administration funds differ between groups, the permanent participants work together on this issue. States provide money for their domestic indigenous peoples’ organizations to attend meetings and hire experts to represent them. For example, Canada provides funds for the Canadian branches of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI) and Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) to attend meetings, while Norway provides funds for the Saami Council. These groups also can receive funds from the Global Environmental Facility, although these funds are unreliable, project-specific and difficult to obtain.\textsuperscript{930} Permanent participants are too small to rely on membership fees or other donations. Funding that comes from states is often unreliable and fluctuates year-to-year. Overall, 14 of 18 Council meetings held between 1998 and 2004 were in northern cities, which are usually more expensive to travel to than southern locales. The financial needs of the permanent participants vary. The Saami Council, for example, frequently possesses adequate funds to attend meetings but seeks funds to hire more staff for its delegations. The ICC, in contrast, seeks travel funds as well as funds for staff. Nonetheless, all of the groups require additional funding and so work as a bloc to obtain additional funds.

Permanent participants raised the issue of funding eight times at Council meetings between May 1999 and October 2004. For example, at a May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage Alaska, “The Saami Council stated that this may be the last Council meeting it would be able to attend, and requested the chair to formally ask member countries to answer in writing

\textsuperscript{929} For an example of such a discussion, see Arctic Council, \textit{Arctic Council Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska, U.S.A., October 12-13, 2000} (Barrow, Alaska: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2000).

\textsuperscript{930} For example, the RAIPON and the ICC received GEF funds for their project on food contamination. See Arctic Council, \textit{Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999}.
what they were doing to help permanent participants participate in the Council.”931 The Aleut International Association (AIA) raised the issue of funding at the October 2000 meeting in Barrow, Alaska. The United States responded, “Financing for participation in international meetings is a big problem, even for the United States.”932 Permanent participants impressed upon states the need to increase their funding.

The major negotiations over permanent participant funding occurred at the October 2004 Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland. Canada, a financial supporter of the permanent participants, proposed that all Arctic states contribute $300,000 a year to facilitate permanent participant access to the Council, in response to the permanent participant request for more funding.933 Sweden, strongly opposing the proposal, immediately vetoed this model before other states could make their support known and stated its preference for a system of “assessed contributions” that differed by state.934 The United States, seeking a compromise that would not create a financial burden, offered that permanent participant funding would be “in the budget of projects and other Arctic Council initiatives.”935 The Saami Council, the GCI and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) stated that the United States’ solution would not solve financial problems.936 The chair said that the indigenous peoples’ secretariat was to draft a paper on the two proposals to present to the Council for consideration.937 States did not implement either proposal, instead pledging that working groups and states would consult with permanent participants about funding before undertaking Council projects at the next Council

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934 Ibid.
935 Ibid.
936 Ibid.
937 Ibid.
meeting. States did not genuinely support increasing funding for the permanent participants in these negotiations because their current level of participation suited state interests. Delegates of the permanent participants did not believe that states genuinely intended to reform the Council funding model, despite what appeared to be progress in pushing for solutions. The permanent participants had not threatened state power but their involvement has provided some benefits to member states. Their presence lends a degree of legitimacy to the Council and frees states from having to include the positions of indigenous peoples in their Arctic Council policy. Increasing the funding to groups other than states could present a challenge to state influence in the Council. The influence of the permanent participants was further curtailed by the fact that states could veto Council action. States did not need to address the views of permanent participants on vetoed matters, as seen in the aforementioned Arctic Contaminants Action Program policy example. These groups attended meetings, provided comments and contributions to Council projects, created other projects and increased their membership in the Council.

Permanent participants were not satisfied with their influence as 2004 ended. In line with most writers about the Council, such as Oran Young, the Council was a fairly state-centric institution from 1998 until 2004 to which permanent participants contributed. It was necessary for these groups to find ways to influence the Council that did not require additional funding. Permanent participants developed a strategy to exploit domestic politics and increase their influence in their response to the development of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, which the next section describes.

938 Arctic Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting.
939 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013.
940 For further examples, see the RAIPON’s comments on the state of the Council in: Arctic Council, Arctic Council Notes From The Second Ministerial Meeting.
6.2.3 – 2004: The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment

The permanent participants increased their role in the Arctic Council through their influence on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). They used domestic politics to embarrass a state to reverse a veto. At the 2000 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states decided to create the ACIA climate change report. Government scientists and academics from every Arctic country wrote the document outside of Council meetings. The document took four years to assemble. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Finland, states decided that along with a scientific assessment, they would create a policy document, proposed by Iceland. Denmark, Canada, Norway and Finland expressed enthusiasm for an ACIA policy document. Russia, the United States and Sweden did not exercise a veto. At the April 2003 Council meeting, the scientists creating the ACIA predicted that the policy document would be “at least 30 pages,” addressing “about eight different subject areas.” They also reported that the fourth and final draft of the document would be ready by April 2004. The Arctic states stated that the permanent participants would be part of the drafting committee. The first draft of the policy was circulated on June 15, 2003, ahead of a set of negotiations to create a policy document in Svalbard, Norway, during August 2003. The United States, in those negotiations, proposed a policy document that was only one page, which the other seven Arctic states rejected. At this point, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of a policy document.

941 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Notes From the Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska.
943 Ibid.
944 Ibid.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid.
947 English, Ice and Water, 277.
948 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013.
The permanent participants had previously contributed to the ACIA. It included information from permanent participants and the inclusion of traditional knowledge. For example, in 2000, representatives from the ICC travelled to Banks Island, Northwest Territories, to collect observations about climate change; they presented a video of the observations to the Council in October 2000.\(^949\) Contributors to the report believe that the traditional knowledge improved the quality of the scientific information within the ACIA. For example, Aboriginal groups collected observations about climate change that conventional science did not confirm for several years.\(^950\) The permanent participants helped ensure the project included a chapter about the “human and economic aspects” of climate change.\(^951\)

The permanent participants promoted the addition of a policy document and did not accept the veto by the United States. Sheila Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council opted to go before the United States Senate Commerce Committee and tell of the United States’ attempts to stifle the policy document on March 3, 2004.\(^952\) This testimony was embarrassing enough for the United States that it reversed its veto in November 2004, at the next Arctic Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.\(^953\) All of the Council states initially supported the inclusion of a policy document in the report, but the United States changed its view in 2004 for fear of its implications ahead of its upcoming Presidential election.\(^954\) The policy document ultimately came out three weeks after the election. The document that resulted from that meeting is not strong, comprising only eight pages of vague platitudes about the need for action on

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\(^949\) Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska.*

\(^950\) Several examples are contained in the ACIA report.

\(^951\) Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Meeting, Espoo, Finland, November 6-7, 2001.*


\(^953\) Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013.

\(^954\) Interview with former Canadian delegation member and consultant, February 19, 2013.
climate change. Nonetheless, the permanent participants had demonstrated for the first time that, acting alone, they could persuade the powerful United States to reverse its veto. The other Arctic Council states did not play a role in this process. They could not go before the United States Senate. The permanent participants supported a policy document because it highlighted the threat that climate change poses to indigenous livelihoods. They were successful because they found a tool of influence that did not require a veto or extensive funding and that worked within the Council’s rule of procedure. They used domestic politics to force a state to reverse a veto.

To return to the literature, the permanent participants did not act as full participants, and sometimes they were forced to act outside the Council to achieve their objectives. However, they found ways to work around those legal limits on their influence highlighted by Jennifer McIver. This case represents an instance in which permanent participants increased their influence because it was the first time that they convinced a state to reverse a veto on a major project.

Table 6.2 summarizes the activities of the permanent participants from 1998 until 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.2: Permanent Participant Participation, 1998-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average comments per meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average delegation size (example)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects sponsored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major project contributions (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Arctic Contaminants Action Program, Arctic Human Development Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total project contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed interventions (Arctic Contaminants Action Program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful interventions (Inventory of Arctic Research, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6.2.4 – 2005 to 2013

The influence of the permanent participants increased between 2005 and 2013. They had goals similar to those of the previous era. These groups sought to: 1) attend Council meetings and comment at these meetings; 2) initiate Council projects important to their membership, and; 3) contribute to other Council projects. They added a fourth goal, based on their experience influencing the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Permanent participants sought to intervene in Council projects that proposed action contrary to the interest of indigenous peoples and their membership. They did not actively seek to add new permanent participants to the Arctic Council because there was a member representing every major indigenous group in the Arctic. Overall, permanent participants continued to contribute to the Council less than did states.

In terms of the first goal, permanent participants attended Council meetings and made remarks at those meetings, though they made fewer remarks than did states. State delegations spoke an average of 3.3 times per meeting on an average of 2.6 agenda items between 2005 and 2013.957 Permanent participant delegations spoke an average of one time per meeting on one agenda item. Their level of commenting was similar to observers. An average of 4.7 observers provided comments per meeting, out of the roughly 15 observers who attended each Council meeting. Observers who provided comments interjected the same average number of times per meeting as permanent participants; namely, one comment on one agenda item.958 Based on a sample of five meetings, states send an average of 7.4 representatives to each Council meeting; permanent participants send only 3.5 representatives per meeting. An average of 15 observers

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957 These statistics are based on a sample of 10 meetings, for which information was available.
attends each meeting, sending an average of 1.5 people per meeting. Permanent participants provided fewer comments at Council meetings than did states, indicating that they did not participate in the Council as “full participants,” to use terminology from academic literature.

Permanent participants attended all of the major Council meetings held between 2005 and 2013. However, in 2008 and 2010, states excluded permanent participants from major events pertinent to Arctic governance. In 2008, Denmark sent diplomatic cables proposing a conference to discuss Arctic oceans policy. Denmark volunteered to host proceedings due to an interest in countering the perception that there was potential conflict in the Arctic. The United States and Denmark wanted to limit participation to the five Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) while Canada and Norway sought to include the other Arctic states (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden), as well as permanent participants. Denmark and the United States argued in diplomatic cables that the other actors did not have the same set of interests as the five Arctic Ocean states, while Canada and Norway sent cables arguing that these groups and states still had significant interests. Russia was ambivalent about the meeting and its composition. Norway suggested that the Arctic Council would be the appropriate venue to have the meeting, which the United States resisted, informing Denmark that, “We have at times considered the [Arctic Council] as unwieldy for political discussions.” In May 2008, Denmark hosted the Arctic Oceans Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, with the other four Arctic Ocean states. This conference was significant because it was the first instance of international Arctic governance to exclude indigenous group

959 The following SAO meetings are included in these calculations: May 1999, June 2001, April 2003, April 2007 and October 2013.
960 Tormjørn Pedersen, “Debates Over the Role of the Arctic Council,” 151.
961 Ibid., 150-151.
962 Ibid.
963 Ibid.
964 Ibid., 151.
contributions since 1996. In March 2010, Canada held a second conference in Ottawa. The 2010 meeting was again controversial because Canada did not invite the permanent participants or the non-Arctic Ocean states, despite arguing that the permanent participants should be part of the 2008 conference. According to media reports, United States Secretary of State Hilary Clinton “skipped the closing news conference scheduled for the daylong session of five foreign ministers” after indicating that aboriginal groups had contacted her and made her aware that they did not receive invitations to the meeting. Some commentators, namely Mike Blanchfield of the Canadian Press, questioned Clinton’s motivations for skipping the meeting since it was not “clear why Clinton showed up for a meeting that in her view lacked key participants.”

Why did the United States change its view on including permanent participants? According to political scientist Tornbjorn Perdersen, the United States had re-evaluated its Arctic policy under the Obama Administration and decided that it was necessary to avoid controversy in the execution of its Arctic policy. Between 2005 and 2013, states excluded the permanent participants from some Arctic governance. Timo Koivurova writes that permanent participants have “contributed to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy making.” In these instances, states broke the principle of automatic participation by indigenous peoples in Arctic governance.

In terms of the second goal, the permanent participants sponsored 12 Council projects between 2005 and 2013. However, the proportion of Council projects they sponsored was similar to the period from 1998 to 2004. The Council had an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given time. Some of these projects took place without a state sponsor. Rather, working groups

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966 Ibid.
967 Ibid.
968 Perdersen, “Debates Over the Role of the Arctic Council,” 155.
sponsored projects with universities or carry out projects within their general mandate. States may fund a project without formally sponsoring it, especially in the case of small projects, such as a factsheet about a particular bird in danger. States organize the majority of Council projects by proposing the goal, structure, execution, personnel and funding. In 2013, for example, states each sponsored an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsored 12 of the Council’s projects from 2005 until 2013, or two projects per group. Observers sponsored or co-sponsored seven projects in the same timeframe.970

Table 6.3 summarizes permanent participant-sponsored projects. The projects sponsored by permanent participants are small in scope, focused on local outcomes and human security. States did not interfere in most permanent participant projects. These groups created the projects, organized the funding and updated the Council about their progress. States limited their comments to notes of support and technical suggestions for improvements. The exception was a 2007 project by the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Improving and Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council.971 The AAC presented a plan at the April 2007 Council meeting in Tromsø, Norway, that the Council initiate a task force to reform the structure of the Arctic Council and improve the standing of permanent participants. Russia, Iceland, the United States and Sweden each vetoed the proposal, content with the current structure of the Council.972 States were not interested in revising the basic structure of the Council, which lead to the only veto of a proposed permanent participant project in the history of the Arctic Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>RAIPON/GCI</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Contaminants Action Program</td>
<td>Training, education, removal and storage of pesticides and contaminants in Arctic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>RAIPON</td>
<td>Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North</td>
<td>To research and provide education about development in Russia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>AIA/CAFF</td>
<td>Traditional Use and Conservation of Plants from the Aleutian, Pribilof and Commander Islands</td>
<td>Assessment on conservation status of plant life on Aleutian Islands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>RAIPON</td>
<td>Sacred Sites Workshop</td>
<td>Organize workshop to promote conservation of culturally significant areas in Russia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Saami Council</td>
<td>Community-Based Flora and Fauna Monitoring</td>
<td>Encourage/enable local monitoring of flora and fauna in Saami lands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>AIA/U.S.A</td>
<td>Bering Sea Sub-Network</td>
<td>Collection of traditional knowledge about environment in Bering Sea area to assist PAME</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>AAC/GCI</td>
<td>Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic</td>
<td>Project to monitor caribou populations in Athabaskan/Gwich’in lands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Improving and Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council</td>
<td>Proposed approach to Council reform</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>RAIPON/ Russia/ Norway/ UNEP</td>
<td>Integrated Ecosystems Management Approach</td>
<td>Strategies for ecosystem management in Arctic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>AIA/Saami Council</td>
<td>Survey of Arctic Indigenous Marine Use</td>
<td>Understand marine use in Aleutian/Saami lands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>“A Circumpolar-Wide Inuit Response to The AMSA”</td>
<td>Inuit response to previous Council report, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment</td>
<td>Yes (not complete)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the third goal, the permanent participants provided contributions to Council projects that they did not sponsor, but they had less success than they had from 1998 to 2004. They contributed to five Council projects they did not sponsor, compared to six such projects from 1998 to 2004. First, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) co-chaired the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) with Norway from 2005 to 2007. The RAIPON chaired the SDWG meetings and organized the agenda for each meeting. Second, the RAIPON organized a series of community workshops in Russia to communicate the outcomes of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and the Arctic Contaminants Action Program’s persistent organic pollutants program from 2004 until 2005. Third, the Saami Council organized a series of workshops in Saami territory to collect traditional knowledge for the *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment* in 2006 and 2007. Fourth, all of the permanent participants helped states carry out the surveys necessary to complete the *Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic*, especially in 2010.

Fifth, the permanent participants made a small contribution to the drafting of the Arctic Council search and rescue agreement. At the May 2009 Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Tromsø, Norway, Russia and the United States proposed that states create an agreement to cooperate on search and rescue in the Arctic, which won support from all member states. The Council negotiated the agreement in a special task force at five meetings between 2009 and 2010. The drafting of the treaty produced few disagreements between states. Permanent

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973 Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005* (Yakutsk, Russia: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).
974 Ibid.
975 Arctic Council, *Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Draft Minutes, 12-13 April 2007*.
977 The meetings were as follows: December 2009 in Washington, D.C.; February 2010 in Moscow, Russia; June 2010 in Oslo, Norway; October 2010 in Helsinki, Finland, and; December 2010 in Reykjavik, Iceland.
978 Interview with Canadian Foreign Affairs official and former delegation member, winter 2013.
participants did not have funding to send personnel to meetings. However, they sent some information to the task force about the Canadian Rangers and their response to emergencies.

The Canadian Rangers are a component of the Canadian Army that conducts patrols along Canada’s northernmost frontier. It largely comprises First Nations. From reviewing the provisions of the treaty, this information appears to have had little impact, but it nonetheless constitutes a contribution to a Council project.

The permanent participants were less successful contributing to major, crosscutting Council projects. The major Council projects from 2005 to 2013 were as follows:

- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)
- Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (the AMAP) working group pollution assessments (2005-2013) (the AMAP)
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (initiated 2009) (Task Force)
- Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group)
- Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (completed 2013) (Task Force)
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)
- Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)

As previously indicated, the permanent participants only contributed to two of these projects, namely the search and rescue agreement as well as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.

These are two of the Council’s most important reports. However, it is significant that they made only a small contribution to the most pressing work of the Council in this era. Due to lack of resources, the permanent participants had to prioritize their involvement and they chose to place

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979 Interview with Canadian Foreign Affairs official and former delegation member, winter 2013.
980 Interview with Canadian Foreign Affairs official and former delegation member, winter 2013.
a greater focus on vital development and environmental issues in communities.\textsuperscript{981} Thus, the permanent participants determined that the major Council projects of the era did not contain a strong enough human security element to consider within their vital interest.

An exception was one major project, the \textit{Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment} (SWIPA), in which states blocked contributions from the permanent participants. Norway proposed a follow up to the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment} (ACIA) at the October 2005 Council meeting in northern Russia.\textsuperscript{982} There was consensus among all of the Arctic states, until the United States exercised its veto, citing opposition to “a second ACIA.”\textsuperscript{983} Norway proposed a smaller-scale project at the November 2007 Council meeting in Navik, Norway, which became the SWIPA.\textsuperscript{984} The SWIPA is an environmental assessment that is similar to the ACIA, which tracks levels of snow cover, ice cover and permafrost in the Arctic. It is more limited in scope and impact than the ACIA. Discussions about the SWIPA continued at nine Council meetings between 2007 and 2012, with government scientists briefing the Council about the progress of scientific research and synthesis.\textsuperscript{985} The permanent participants indicated that they wanted to contribute traditional knowledge to the report on two occasions. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) offered to contribute at the April 2008 Council meeting in Svolvær, Norway, while the ICC and the Saami Council said they would like to contribute at the November 2008 Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway. It perhaps seemed natural that since the permanent participants contributed to the ACIA, they would contribute to the SWIPA as well.

\textsuperscript{981} Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
\textsuperscript{982} Arctic Council, \textit{Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia, October 12-14, 2005} (Khanty-Mansiysk, Russia: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).
\textsuperscript{983} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{985} These meetings occurred during the following months: April 2008, November 2008, February 2009, April 2009, November 2009, October 2010, May 2011 meetings (two meetings) and May 2012.
In the end, the permanent participants did not contribute to the SWIPA. Governments instructed researchers on the SWIPA to use only peer-reviewed academic material in the assessment. Thus, they did not seek information from aboriginal peoples and they did not draw on traditional knowledge.986 This move is surprising, since the ACIA included aboriginal traditional knowledge. Some policy-makers say that traditional knowledge can enhance scientific knowledge and even provide information where gaps exist.987 The Arctic Council ignored traditional knowledge because certain individuals within state governments were suspicious of the use of traditional knowledge. The permanent participants often rely on non-indigenous consultants to carry out negotiations,988 which states do not trust to deliver honest traditional knowledge. The permanent participants failed to convince all Council states that their input on Arctic matters is essential.

Funding again explains why the permanent participants could only participate in the Council as much as they did from 2005 until 2013. Canada is the only country that consistently funds the permanent participants, as it has never denied a funding request from its domestic aboriginal group (the ICC) and has pressured other countries to contribute more.989 Yet, even its contributions to indigenous peoples’ organizations are below expectations.990 Discussions on whether to increase permanent participant funding continued at every Council meeting, either formally or informally.991 For example, at the Council meeting in November 2008, the Saami Council stated that the Arctic Council states have an obligation to include permanent participants

986 Interview with Danish government official who worked on the SWIPA, summer, 2013.
987 Interview with former United States delegation member and current environmental official, spring 2013.
988 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.
989 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current Foreign Affairs official, winter 2013.
990 For example, Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 23-24 April 2008, Svolvær, Norway (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2008).
991 Ibid.
in the Council under the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*.\(^{992}\) At the May 2009 ministers meeting in Tromsø, Norway, states pledged to increase the capability of permanent participants to attend meetings.\(^ {993}\) Nothing significant emerged from these efforts, which led to questions about whether states genuinely wanted to increase permanent participant funding.\(^ {994}\) Why did states fail to support these groups consistently after 2004? The lack of support corresponds with the 2004 demonstration by permanent participants of their potential influence in their influence over the ACIA. States did not support these groups after they demonstrated that they could challenge state power in the Council.

Can we argue that the influence of permanent participants increased from 2005 to 2013? Table 6.4 summarizes the participation by permanent participants across the Council’s history.

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<tr>
<th>Table 6.4: Permanent Participant Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comments per meeting</td>
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<td>Delegation size (example)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Projects sponsored</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project contributions</td>
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<td>Major project contributions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failed agency</td>
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<td>Successful agency</td>
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Table 6.4 demonstrates that the influence of permanent participants has actually decreased both in absolute terms and most especially in relative terms in six of the eight categories. They commented less in meetings, sent smaller delegations, sponsored a lesser proportion of Council projects and contributed to a smaller proportion of Council projects. Yet, their influence increased in one category: the permanent participants intervened in Council affairs to block action contrary to their interest in three cases. This situation was apparent in the *Arctic Climate*

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\(^{992}\) Ibid.


\(^{994}\) Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013.
Impact Assessment case cited earlier, as well as two cases discussed in the following paragraphs. In this one category, they have gained state-like abilities in the Council, even though the Arctic Council rules of procedure purposely deny them a voice in consensus. Do these situations represent a trend? They are important because these cases represent significant, public actions on controversial issues. If the permanent participants had not successfully intervened, the outcome of three major Council decisions would be different. The earlier intervention was minor, namely including traditional knowledge in a relatively minor Council project. It is important not to overstate their influence; the influence of the permanent participants has increased according to one measure of influence.

They successfully blocked the European Union’s bid to become a permanent observer in the Council. There are two categories of observers in the Council: accredited observers, which have a standing invitation to meetings, and ad hoc observers, whose attendance states must approve before every meeting. The European Union has been an ad hoc observer since 2001. AMAP has collaborated on projects with the European Environmental Agency. The European Union has given many presentations at Council meetings promoting its northern policy. In September 2009, Finland informed the United States Department of State that the European Union should be an observer due to its longstanding contribution to Arctic science. Norway expressed interest in a greater role for observers, with a greater ability to speak in working groups and at meetings. The United States’ Mission to the European Union held a meeting to discuss European Union membership in the Arctic Council during February 2009. According to diplomatic cables, all of the Nordic countries supported European Union observer status,

996 For example, Arctic Council, Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 23-24 April 2008, Svolvær, Norway.
997 Diplomatic Cable, September 10, 2009, 09HELSINKI337_a
998 Diplomatic Cable, October 21, 2008, 08STATE111997_a
including the two states that are not part of the European Union (Iceland and Norway). Denmark had been “difficult” but was supportive. Canada, the United States and Russia also supported the notion, though Russia “was most concerned.” The main obstacle in this meeting was opposition among the Inuit, though the European Union was sure it could overcome this problem. Canada exercised its veto and blocked the European Union from becoming a permanent observer at the May 2013 Council meeting in Sweden, due to the urging of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in private consultations during this meeting. The other permanent participants did not oppose EU observer status, but supported the ICC. The ICC had made its opposition publically known prior to 2013.

The ICC’s position resulted from the EU’s ban on the import of seal products. The EU has a ban against the import of seal products, but has an exemption for products harvested by Inuit peoples. The ICC nonetheless opposed the EU ban because it hurt demand for seal products. As noted in Chapter 5, Europe is a major fashion centre and designers were not willing to incorporate seal fur into their designs as a result the stigma that a ban created. Canada allowed the ICC to block EU entry into the Council as part of a pattern not to publically rebuke positions strongly held by permanent participants. The permanent participants can block Council decisions if they oppose them strongly enough. A former Canadian Senior Arctic Official said, “I can never recall a situation at the table where the Canadian representative contradicted what the permanent participant said.” The Arctic Council operates by consensus, which can sometimes be an advantage to permanent participants because they only need to convince one Arctic state to

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999 Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSEL261_a
1000 Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSEL261_a
1001 The result is present in the 2013 The Kiruna Declaration.
1003 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
1004 Adele Dion, former Canadian Senior Arctic Official, March 13, 2013.
delay or prevent a decision.\textsuperscript{1005} In these cases, states and permanent participants generally undertake further discussions “in an attempt to find a consensus position.”\textsuperscript{1006} The ICC convinced Canada not to support European Union entry into the Arctic Council as a permanent observer, even though the other member states were interested in an enhanced role for the European Union. Would Canada have blocked European Union membership if the ICC had not intervened? It is likely that Canada would have accepted permanent observer status for the EU, due to limited legal rights that observers have in the Council.

Second, in 2012, permanent participants demonstrated their influence by overcoming an attempt by Russia to ban its Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) group from the Arctic Council. The other Council states reaffirmed the importance of permanent participants in the Council, regardless of the wants of any state. In November 2012, the Russian Department of Justice deregistered the RAIPON. In Russia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must register with the government to operate; Russia can choose which non-governmental organizations can operate. Commentators suggested that Russia deregistered the RAIPON due to fears over its power,\textsuperscript{1007} foreign influence\textsuperscript{1008} and links to separatist movements.\textsuperscript{1009} In addition, commentator Ron Wallace argues that Russia attempted to ban the RAIPON due to its opposition to “oil production on the Arctic continental shelf in areas of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1005} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current consultant, winter 2013.
\textsuperscript{1006} Interview with former Canadian delegation member and current consultant, winter 2013.
\end{flushleft}
Russia has a history of making sure that its non-governmental organizations (NGOs) align with the overall goals of the state. In the past, the Russian government has asked NGOs, including the RAIPON, to re-register under new and often more onerous regulations, a difficult task for the RAIPON. It is likely that Russian policy-makers were suspicious of the RAIPON because they received support from United States and Canadian governments (as well as Aboriginal groups) and developed some policy positions based on that influence. The RAIPON, for example, adopted calls for co-management of indigenous peoples’ lands based on the influence of North American aboriginal groups. The influence of the permanent participants appeared weak, as it seemed that Russia could unilaterally block any permanent participant from attending Council meetings. In preparations for the next Council meeting in November 2012, the permanent participants privately urged states to take a stand against Russia.

In preparatory meetings, permanent participants insisted that states re-affirm the importance of the RAIPON. States responded to Russia’s deregistration of the RAIPON from the Council by asserting the group’s membership in the Council, under the rules of procedure, and calling for its reinstatement at the domestic level. States simply refused to accept that the RAIPON could not be part of the Council. Senior Arctic Council officials, including Russia’s own Senior Arctic Official, issued a statement of support for the RAIPON at its November 2012

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1011 Four interviewees expressed this view. Two were former Canadian delegation members, expressed during winter 2013. One was Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013. One was Terry Fenge, AAC representative and former ICC representative, February 21, 2013.
1012 Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
1014 Interview with former Canadian delegation member and environment official, winter 2013.
meeting. Following this international rebuke, the RAIPON received registration in April 2013 after adjusting its leadership slightly. This example is significant for two reasons. First, it forced states to reaffirm the importance of permanent participants in the Arctic Council, through a letter of protest. Second, it forced states to acknowledge that indigenous peoples’ organizations are Council members, regardless of the views of one state. The permanent participants successfully intervened to support the membership of the RAIPON in the Council and reaffirmed the importance of its membership.

In summary, from 2004 to 2013, permanent participants were increasingly able to achieve desirable outcomes, though they remained weaker than states. In some cases, they appeared strong, drawing on the influence they demonstrated in 2004 when they successfully intervened to create an *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA) policy document. A permanent participant, the ICC, blocked the European Union from becoming a permanent observer in the Council due to positions that conflicted with Inuit interests. In 2012, states re-affirmed the importance and independence of permanent participants when Russia tried to block the RAIPON from attending Council functions. They accomplished this influence by convincing states of the validity of their position. In other cases, they appeared weak, as they lacked funds to participate in the Council fully. In 2010, Canada failed to invite aboriginal groups to important international meetings. In 2012, the Council decided to publish the SWIPA without aboriginal input or traditional knowledge in the final document. States limited permanent participants challenging state influence. The Council is state-centric, as per the assessment of authors such as Oran Young. Yet, the permanent participants have more influence than predicted by Jennifer McIver.

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1016 Former Russian delegation member and government official, summer 2013.
6.2.5 – 2014: The Future Influence of Permanent Participants

The influence of permanent participants could increase because states increasingly recognize them as legitimate Council actors, along with states. Several policy-makers have expressed respect for the permanent participants and their contributions to the Council.\textsuperscript{1017} Representatives for the permanent participants said they feel a greater level of respect from states in the Council. Earlier, they reported treatment similar to observers in Council meetings or working group meetings.\textsuperscript{1018} Such instances are becoming less frequent as permanent participants are increasingly treated with the same courtesy as states.\textsuperscript{1019} For example, earlier in the Council, states seated the permanent participants with the observers in some meetings, separated from state delegations. Today, permanent participants always sit at the same table as states. These facts indicate that states have recognized the importance of the involvement of aboriginal groups. States recognize that the permanent participants have a privileged place in the Council that observers do not have.

Yet, the permanent participants will not become as influential as states in the Council for at least two reasons, aside from the fact that the legal rights of the permanent participants have not changed. First, all of the permanent participants face some ongoing financial problems.\textsuperscript{1020} By the estimate of one representative, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) does not have resources to become involved in 80 per cent of Council priorities, which this thesis confirms.\textsuperscript{1021} One permanent participant representative said in interviews, “We often are there to listen and

\textsuperscript{1017} For example, former Canadian delegation member, winter 2013; Christopher Cuddy, PAME contribution and former Canadian delegation member, February 21, 2013; Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
\textsuperscript{1018} Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
\textsuperscript{1019} Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
\textsuperscript{1020} Two former Canadian delegation members expressed this view during winter 2013.
\textsuperscript{1021} Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
perhaps give very general comments.”  

Second, they face human resource problems in that states have larger delegations than permanent participants can afford. At Arctic Council meetings, Canada and the United States may bring up to 15 delegates, while aboriginal groups contend with four or five. The ICC, for example, has less than 20 full-time employees in the entire world; with this staff, states expect them to represent people in communities spread across more territory than in all of Europe. The permanent participants sometimes employ outside, non-aboriginal consultants to conduct their business in the Council. One former high-ranking official with the government of Canada reported that these consultants are sometimes “not quite on the same agenda as the people” for which they work, in that they express positions contrary to the permanent participant groups. As seen in this chapter, the lack of human resources forces permanent participants to work together as one block. It makes sense for the permanent participants to work together to achieve desirable ends, though the permanent participants are not a monolithic group. Many Inuit have historically relied on access to water to obtain their livelihood, while the Athabaskan people historically live inland; as a result, these groups developed different cultural traditions. They jointly lobby for more funds, even though the financial needs of each group differ greatly. Overall, it is important for the permanent participants to be able to send representatives to meetings. There are policy makers in the Council who do not share same goals as permanent participants. Some policy-makers have condemned the morality of Aboriginals who engage in subsistence hunting or doubted whether it was necessary to gather the input of aboriginals on every Council project. One remedy to the

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1023 Chester Reimer, ICC Representative, February 13, 2013.
1024 Former high-ranking Canadian foreign affairs official, winter 2013.
1025 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and former representative for ICC, February 21, 2013.
1027 Interview with United States environmental official and former Council delegation member, spring 2013.
situation of the permanent participants might be to work together to develop a solid agenda for reform of their role and resources. They should do so in such a way to attract media attention. Representatives from states have reported that they sometimes feel that the permanent participants do not give clear, workable answers when states consult about means to increase their role.\(^{1028}\) If the permanent participants constructed a clear plan and made that plan public, it likely would be difficult for states to ignore their requests to play a greater role in regional governance.

In conclusion, the influence of the permanent participants has evolved throughout the history of the Arctic Council. From 1991 to 1998, aboriginal groups successfully lobbied to become members of the Arctic Council. Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding aboriginal groups to the Council as full members, to buttress bargaining power. The United States and Russia opposed giving such rights for fear of having their influence reduced. From 1998 to 2004, the aboriginal groups participated in the Council to a lesser extent than states. This situation resulted from a lack of finances to attend and participate in Council meetings. The financial needs of the permanent participants differed, but all required additional funds. In 2004, the permanent participants demonstrated influence by successfully convincing the United States to adopt an *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* policy document. From 2004 to 2013, the permanent participants demonstrated influence to achieve desirable ends in the Council when they only needed to convince one state to support their action, as seen in the European Union observer status example. They had less success when it was necessary to influence multiple states to change a chosen action, as seen in the *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost* example. The permanent participants did not have enough money to contribute to all Council activities. Several examples show their influence, such as the success of the ICC blocking European Union

\(^{1028}\) Interview with United States environmental official and former Council delegation member, spring 2013.
membership in the Arctic Council. As of 2015, it is possible that the influence of the permanent participants will continue to increase. Permanent participants have demonstrated an ability to exert influence on major Council decisions, despite the restrictions on their legal rights in the Council. States recognize their privileged place in the Council. With limited resources and without voting rights, they will remain less influential than states. The influence of the permanent participants in the Arctic Council has evolved in two ways. First, at the onset of the Council, the permanent participants had little influence over outcomes. Today, they are better able to influence the Council when they use their agency. Second, at the onset of the Council, there was great debate and controversy as to whether aboriginal groups should be allowed to participate. Today, there is widespread acceptance of their role in the Council.

6.3 – Analysis Using Theories of International Relations

Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for permanent participant influence.

\textit{H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality of the information they provide.}

Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of permanent participants in the Arctic Council because the process is more political than functionalists anticipate. They are not merely providers of information. They influence the operation of the Council using agency. States do not respond to the problems presented by permanent participants automatically. State delegations have rejected quality information provided by permanent participants for political reasons, as seen when the Council rejected including traditional knowledge in the \textit{Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost} assessment. They have achieved desired ends by convincing one or more Arctic Council countries of their position, sometimes contrary to the wishes of other states.
Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of permanent participants.

H1: The permanent participants will not have influence in the Arctic Council and their influence will not evolve.

Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of the permanent participants because it does not anticipate that the permanent participants could have any real influence over great powers in the Council. In fact, the permanent participants have convinced the Council to undertake action contrary to the desired outcomes of the United States, such as the adoption of the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA) policy document. Neorealists would not anticipate that the permanent participants would achieve rights to challenge great powers in the Council. Neorealists would predict that states would work to limit the influence of the permanent participants. Certainly, at various times, states have resisted the permanent participants. In addition, neorealists cannot explain why the United States agreed to add permanent participants to the Council.

Neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of permanent participants in the Arctic Council.

H1: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization, communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).

States have usually resisted the influence of permanent participants. Canada supported adding permanent participants to the Council to improve its relative bargaining position, freeing delegations from having to represent the wishes of indigenous peoples and adding another voice to compete with the United States, as well as Russia. The United States resisted the permanent participants for fear of a challenge to their influence. It supported some role based on the existence of a possible norm. States have denied the permanent participants adequate funding
and challenged their role numerous times. However, the permanent participants exercised influence over the Council by winning support for an ACIA policy document and blocking European Union membership in the Council. The permanent participants were able to do so by using their agency and convincing Arctic Council member states of the validity of their position, as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. Functionalists would predict that states would respond to quality information provided by permanent participants automatically. In fact, the agency of permanent participants is of key importance. States have demonstrated their vulnerability to the power of persuasion. The permanent participants are more influential in the Council than neorealists would anticipate. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism does not anticipate the importance of domestic politics. The permanent participants won support for their position in the 2004 ACIA policy document controversy by appealing to the United States to overrule the Presidential Administration. However, overall, neoliberal institutionalism does the best job illuminating the reasons for the influence of the permanent participants.

The permanent participants have less of a role in the Council than states, but they have influence based on their agency. Agency refers to their ability to research, organize, communicate, lobby and ally with states. The goal of this chapter was to answer three questions. First, what is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? The permanent participants are members that have a privileged role in the Council, but they cannot vote on decisions. They have influence, but must exercise that influence through states. These groups must convince state policy-makers to adopt their desired position. Second, how has their role and influence evolved over time? They have grown more influential over time. They are increasingly able to block action contrary to their interests. Third, when are the permanent participants successful in exerting their influence? The permanent participants are most successful when one
state is blocking a desired action. Permanent participants can use their agency to convince that state to reverse its action. They have done so in multiple major cases. This scenario is clear when permanent participants convinced the United States to adopt an ACIA policy document, or Russia’s attempt to block the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North from the Council. They also are successful when they must convince one state to veto a policy action they do not desire. This scenario was made clear when the permanent participants convinced Canada to block European Union permanent observer status. They are less successful when they must convince multiple states to adopt their view. This scenario is clear in that permanent participants have been unable to build a coalition to increase their funding. It also is clear that states somewhat resist the growing influence of the permanent participants. None of the perspectives in academic literature adequately explains the influence of the permanent participants, such as Oran Young,1029 Olav Schram Stokke,1030 Evan T. Bloom1031 and Jennifer McIver.1032

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<th>Table 6.5: Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Neorealism</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Neoliberal Institutionalism</strong></td>
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1029 Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 11-12.
1030 Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic,” 402-408; Stokke, “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions,” 10.
Conclusion

This chapter assessed the influence and role of the permanent participants in the Arctic Council. The first section examined the predictions of three dominant international relations theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Functionalists would predict permanent participants could be influential if they provide the Council with good quality information; neorealists would predict they could have no influence. Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the permanent participants could have influence by persuading states of the utility of their views, even though states will generally resist their influence. The second section discussed their evolution from a weak Council actor to somewhat influential actor. The third section concluded that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of permanent participants. The permanent participants have less influence in the Council than states, but they can exercise influence based on their agency.

This research has two important implications for international relations theory. First, there is debate about the potential influence of non-state actors. This research shows that non-state actors can exert influence in international relations if they can exercise effective agency. Second, it demonstrates that states are susceptible to the power of persuasion, rather than basing their decisions purely on rational conceptions of state interests. This finding stands in contrast with the expectations of rationalist theories such as functionalism. This research also has implications for those interested in the workings of the Council. The permanent participants are a crucial link between Arctic communities and the Arctic Council. This work finds that they are not as influential as no doubt many would like. The Council operates according to state interest, dominated by people who are not from the North and central governments located far away from northern frontiers.
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that the Arctic’s economic potential has created an incentive for states to enhance governance through the Arctic Council. In this process, the great powers are the most influential actors. The goal of this concluding chapter is threefold. First, it provides a brief recap of the history of the Council to demonstrate the contribution of this work to the literature through an understanding of how the institution operates. It recasts the Council as an institutionally-strong, international, policy-making, research body that takes action on environmental and economic issues. Second, it reviews the theoretical contribution of each preceding chapter and demonstrates the overall theoretical contribution of this thesis. It concludes that neoliberal institutionalism best explains state interests in international co-operation, but neorealism best explains outcomes. Third, this chapter points to directions for further research.

7.1 – The History of the Arctic Council

This thesis presents a new understanding of the Arctic Council. Currently, the literature understands the Council as a policy-recommendation body focused on environmental conservation research. Authors describe it as an institutionally weak, state-centric, low-profile, technocratic body. This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making body as well as a research body focused on environmental issues and economic issues. It is becoming an institutionally strong, international body. It is a venue in which complex politics and state interests intersect. The Council also is notable because indigenous peoples organizations have the significant capacity to influence the institution.
The Council emerged as a weak institution stemming from grand ambitions. It was founded as a modest institution to encourage co-operation between two former Cold War rivals. The capitalist and democratic United States stood in conflict with the communist Soviet Union. Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were on the United States’ side of the ideological divide, while Finland and Sweden struggled to maintain neutrality.\textsuperscript{1033} Finland’s government desperately wanted to improve relations between Russia and the United States, but it also had great concerns about pollution in Russia’s Arctic. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic countries shared this concern. Co-operation in an Arctic environmental institution would not only be a means to encourage greater co-operation between West and East, it also would present an opportunity to share information and take action to protect the Arctic environment.\textsuperscript{1034} The government of Finland hosted meetings between relevant officials in September 1989 in Rovaniemi, which led to three additional rounds of discussions.\textsuperscript{1035}

The ultimate result of these talks was the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in June 1991.\textsuperscript{1036} The group was a venue for scientists to share information on Arctic environmental protection. It was not a robust institution. The AEPS led to the creation of the Council. Government scientists met twice each year in four working groups to share information and research.\textsuperscript{1037} Through these meetings, scientists learned of environmental and human security problems in Russia that led many policy-makers to wonder aloud whether an Arctic international institution was necessary.\textsuperscript{1038} Their work showed that there were large quantities of cancer-causing coolants stored in the Russian Arctic region and that the life

\textsuperscript{1033} Chapter 1. \textsuperscript{1034} Chapter 1. \textsuperscript{1035} Chapter 1. \textsuperscript{1036} Chapter 1. \textsuperscript{1037} Chapter 1. \textsuperscript{1038} Chapter 1.
expectancy of Russian indigenous peoples was on the decline. Indigenous peoples’ organizations, particularly the Inuit Circumpolar Council under the leadership of Mary Simon, lobbied governments for an Arctic international institution. This work led to the genesis of the Council.

The process to create the Council was sometimes highly political. As detailed by historian John English in his book, *Ice and Water*, the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, proposed an Arctic council to United States President Bill Clinton during a meeting in Ottawa in February 1995. Canadian officials brought aboard the other Arctic states and organized four rounds of negotiations in Ottawa during 1995 and 1996. The Canadian and Nordic delegations wanted the new Council to be a strong institution able to facilitate co-operation on security, include a new emphasis on sustainable development and create policy, which policy-makers from Russia and the United States resisted greatly. The Nordic state delegations wanted the new institution to have a permanent secretariat, which the delegations from Canada, Russia and the United States could not agree to amid sovereignty concerns. The Canadian and Nordic delegations sought equal membership in the institution for indigenous peoples’ organizations, which raised concerns over sovereignty among policy-makers from Russia and the United States. All of the governments involved sought to create an Arctic forum. Nordic and Canadian policy-makers sought a strong Council, while officials from the United States and Russia did not.

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1039 Chapter 1.
1040 Chapter 1.
1042 Chapter 1.
1043 The Nordic states are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
1044 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
1045 Chapter 4.
The structure of the Council was the result of compromise. In June 1996 meetings, Canadian and United States policy-makers held side negotiations. The Canadians proposed a compromise that security would not be part of the Council’s mandate, but in exchange sustainable development would be and indigenous peoples’ organizations would be second-tier “permanent participants.” The United States officials accepted, as did the other countries. The understanding emerged that the Council would not be a policy-making body and the secretariat would rotate between countries. United States officials favoured a Council to share information and ensure that other international bodies did not try to interfere in regional politics. Russian officials sought funding for projects it could funnel into other higher priority projects. Canada and the Nordic governments mainly sought to compel Russia to face its environmental issues. The Canadian government also faced pressure from its indigenous peoples’ organizations to create more robust international Arctic governance to improve human security. The Arctic Council was intended to be a weak, environmental research body. It is accurate to characterize the Council as a weak body in the early history of the institution. The Council negotiated its rules of procedure and formal mandate in 1997 and 1998, with the mission emerging that it would,

Provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states . . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

1046 Chapter 2
1047 Chapter 1.
1048 Chapter 2.
1049 Chapter 2.
1050 Chapter 2.
1051 Chapter 6.
There was some debate as to the meaning of sustainable development, with states opting to avoid formally defining the term.\textsuperscript{1053} Media reports anticipated that the Council would be a robust, strong governance body.\textsuperscript{1054} Scholars who wrote during this period, such as political scientists Oran Young\textsuperscript{1055} and Rob Huebert,\textsuperscript{1056} disagreed with the media and understood the Council as a small-scale environmental research institution. Some experts, such as diplomat Evan Bloom, believed the permanent participants would be full participants,\textsuperscript{1057} which other scholars, such as lawyer Jennifer McIver, doubted.\textsuperscript{1058}

The Council carried out environmental and sustainable development work within its mandate, launching 57 research projects.\textsuperscript{1059} Examples include the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, the \textit{Arctic Human Development Report} and the beginnings of the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}. This situation does not indicate that matters were totally settled, as seen in three major instances. First, at a meeting in May 1999, security came to the forefront as the United States delegation suggested one of its officials brief the Council on its and Russia’s efforts to reduce the environmental impact of its military vehicles.\textsuperscript{1060} Canada’s delegation ultimately resisted, fed up with obstructionism by the United States and eager to get on with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1053} Chapter 2.
\item \textsuperscript{1055} Oran Young, “Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Co-operation,” \textit{Global Governance} 11, no. 1 (2005): 13-14.
\item \textsuperscript{1056} Rob Huebert, “New Directions in Circumpolar Co-operation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council,” \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy} 5, no. 2 (1998): 56.
\item \textsuperscript{1057} Evan T. Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” \textit{The American Journal of International Law} 93, no. 3 (1999): 712.
\item \textsuperscript{1059} Chapter 2.
\item \textsuperscript{1060} Chapter 3.
\end{itemize}
work of the main Council mandate.\textsuperscript{1061} Second, at a meeting in November 1999, the Nordic delegations tried to begin creating a Council policy to reduce Arctic contaminants.\textsuperscript{1062} Delegations from Canada, the United States and Russia resisted, citing sovereignty concerns and unconvinced such action was within state interests.\textsuperscript{1063} Third, in October 2000, officials from Russia and the United States worked to quash a report that might have called for policies to deal with emergency situations, concerned about the implications for its sovereignty.\textsuperscript{1064}

The Council began to shift in 2004 due to new research that brought Arctic environmental issues to the forefront. In November 2004, the Council released its \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}, which showed that climate change caused by humans was profoundly endangering the Arctic region.\textsuperscript{1065} The United States government tried to quash a policy document, concerned that it might have an impact on the upcoming United States presidential election.\textsuperscript{1066} Sheila Watt-Cloutier, from the Inuit Circumpolar Council, testified in March 2004 before the United States Senate Commerce Committee about the United States’ actions, embarrassing its policy-makers into allowing a policy document after some further uncertainty.\textsuperscript{1067} The Council began to change. Russian delegations began to advocate that the Council increase its work on emergency preparedness.\textsuperscript{1068} The number of Council projects increased, from an average of 57 in 1998 to an average of 159 in 2005.\textsuperscript{1069} The number of major projects the Council undertook quadrupled, as well.\textsuperscript{1070} Nordic officials began to construct a pilot project to provide more funds to the Council, which could increase the power and robustness of
the institution. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment had highlighted that climate change would make Arctic resources easier to exploit. Authors, namely political scientist Olav Schram Stokke, began to see the Council as a soft-law body, or a research institution creating international norms.

After 2008, the policy-making role and mandate of the Council increased. The United States and Russia sponsored an Arctic search and rescue treaty in November 2008, negotiated quickly in five rounds of negotiations. In May 2011, Norway, the United States and Russia sponsored a similar agreement on response to oil spills, also negotiated in five rounds of non-contentious talks. For the first time, the Council was acting as a policy-making body as it created its first formal agreements. Policy-makers agreed to create these treaties because co-operation and formal policy would benefit all states. These treaties would make the Arctic region safer for investment. They arose due to requests from industry for increased regulations to encourage regional investment amid warnings from the insurance industry that Arctic investment was too risky. For the first time, the Council was working deliberately to increase the economic potential of the Arctic region. We see the expansion of the Council’s mandate into economic areas.

1071 Chapter 4.
1073 Chapter 2.
1074 Chapter 3.
1075 Chapter 3.
After 2008, the Council became stronger institutionally. In 2007, officials from Norway, Denmark and Sweden created a temporary common secretariat between the three countries for the six consecutive years they would be chair. In May 2012, policy-makers decided to create a permanent secretariat. Nordic policy-makers wanted a permanent secretariat so that the Council would be a strong international body that could hold Russia accountable for its environmental issues. Canadian, Russian and the United States officials were leery such a body would be too powerful. Authors explained that the new secretariat emerged “to face the rapidly changing circumstances in the Arctic that have increased the challenges and opportunities in both volume and complexity.” This work finds there is more to the story. By 2012, state policy-makers became convinced they could control such an institution, assured it was necessary.

In 2014, the transition of the Council from an environmental body to a more encompassing body was furthered. The Council saw the first-ever meeting of the Arctic Economic Council, a new body independent of the Council designed specifically to allow business an opportunity to address the Council. It was the first time the Council had taken such deliberate economic action, or a project without a strong environmental component. Also in 2014, a project support instrument became operational, after years of political haggling and delay. The Council is now institutionally stronger than ever before.

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1076 Chapter 4.
1077 Chapter 4.
1079 Chapter 4.
1080 Chapter 2.
1081 Chapter 2.
1082 Chapter 2.
Scholars who wrote after 2008 understood the Council to be a soft-law body that makes the Arctic a more international, global region. Examples include such as political scientists Timo Koivurova, Leena Heinamkai and David L. Vanderzwaag. This work cannot identify any soft law that has resulted because of work by the Arctic Council. Other work portrayed the Council as an environmental research body, consistent with earlier conceptions, such as work by Terry Fenge. This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making body as well as a research body focused on environmental and economic issues, both as separate and interrelated functions. It is becoming an institutionally strong, policy-making, robust, international body.

Also notable after 2008 is that more actors are interested in participating in the Council. In 2008, six new non-Arctic states sought to become observers in the Council, such as China and India, creating controversy and suspicion. The European Union was a controversial applicant, whose bid to become a permanent observer was blocked by Canada. The latter’s position was in response to successful lobbying by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which convinced Canada that European Union membership was unacceptable in light of the latter’s ban on importing seal products. Political scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer argue that the interest among non-Arctic states in the Council is largely economic. This work finds that

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1086 Terry Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra,” Policy Options, April 2012, 64.
1087 Chapter 5.
1088 Chapter 5.
economics partly motivate the Arctic interests of these countries, but environmental motivations also are important.\textsuperscript{1090} It is clear that the Council has become an international body of global consequence.

A body of work emerged after 2008 that saw the Council as the antidote to every problem of Arctic governance.\textsuperscript{1091} This work finds that this literature does not fully acknowledge the political realities of the Council. The Council is not necessarily evolving to become an all around governance institution for the Arctic region to address every issue area. It is becoming a body to research environmental issues and encourage economic investment in the Arctic.

One notable finding of this work is information about levels of participation by permanent participants. As noted, earlier work by authors such as Evan Bloom and Jennifer McIver debated whether they would be full participants in the Council. Clearly, there are instances in which the permanent participants have used agency to achieve objectives and thwart the will of states, an impressive feat for non-state actors. An example is the adoption of a policy document as part of the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}. Yet, the permanent participants only are able to contribute to about one-fifth of Council projects due to lack of funds and personnel.\textsuperscript{1092} There does not appear to be tremendous political will to fix these financial problems.\textsuperscript{1093}

\textsuperscript{1090} Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{1092} Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{1093} Chapter 6.
7.2 – Contributions to Theory

The thesis argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the evolution of the Arctic Council, though modifications are necessary. Chapter 2 examines the reason that the Council’s mandate is evolving. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism best explains the evolution of the Council’s mandate, with its emphasis on the form of negotiation and economic interest; however, institutional competence, as predicted by functionalists, also is important. State policy-makers are undertaking economic work in the Council because they all stand to gain by doing so. All states benefit by improving the Arctic economy, even though Russia likely will gain more than other states. The form of negotiation was important, as seen in the fact that prompting by Russian officials to increase the Council’s emphasis on emergency preparedness led to the growth in the institution’s mandate. Russia discussed emergency preparedness at several Council meetings and made the topic a theme of its turn as chair, which led to new work on the topic.

Chapter 3 examines reasons for the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism’s focus on absolute gains explains why states want to create policy in the Council, but neorealist balance politics and great power predominance explains outcomes. All states stand to gain through the creation of agreements on search and rescue, as well as oil spill prevention. These treaties improve Arctic economies. However, the United States and Russian governments resisted all policy that would not directly benefit their economies, as seen, for example, in resistance to an Arctic contaminants treaty in 1999.

Chapter 4 examines reasons for the growth in the Council’s institutional capacity, such as the development of the new Council secretariat and the project support instrument. It argues that neoliberal institutionalist absolute gains explain why states wanted to create a permanent
secretariat, but neorealism explains state hesitation. The Council’s institutional capacity has grown as it became clear that it was necessary to deal with the increasing complexity of the Council’s work. It did not occur sooner because some state governments, most importantly Russia and the United States, had concerns a strong Council would challenge state sovereignty.

Chapter 5 explains reasons for the increased interest of observers in the Council and examines their influence in the institution. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism explains the interest of observers in the Council and neorealism explains their influence. These actors are not as powerful as states, but aspire to influence the institution. Governments and other actors seek to become part of the Council to make absolute gains, such as increased economic investment. However, state policy-makers carefully covet power and deny it to the observers.

Chapter 6 probes the influence of permanent participants in the Council and argues they are not as influential as states, but still reasonably influential. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism explains the role of permanent participants in the Council. Indigenous peoples’ organizations can exercise influence by exercising agency.

Overall, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the evolution of the Arctic Council. In every case, an absolute gain motivated states. There is little evidence that states had great concern for relative gains. Evolution of the institution has not been automatic, but rather the result of highly political processes. Economics proved to be the major catalyst for evolution of the institution. Agency is important, in that it explains the influence of non-state actors in the Council. Three tweaks to neoliberal institutionalist theory are needed. First, state policy-makers are likely to want to evolve competent institutions. Thus, functionalist institutional competence partly explains the evolution of international institutions. This tenet explains why path dependence did not stifle Council evolution as neoliberal institutionalists
predict. Second, great power preference is more important than the interests of other states. The great powers demonstrated a concern for protection of their autonomy. They led evolution, such as was the case when Russia and the United States sponsored efforts to create an Arctic search and rescue treaty. This tenet of neorealism explains the outcomes of negotiations in international institutions, in this case. Third, state officials pay attention to regional balance in making decisions at the international level. Thus, balance is an important consideration for states. States demonstrated concern for autonomy and sovereignty in the controversy over creating the Council secretariat. This tenet of neorealism also explains outcomes in international decision-making, in this case.

How does this fit in with other assessments of the theory? Political scientist Michael Mastanduno finds that relative gain concerns are most important in explaining outcomes in military matters, while absolute gain concerns are more important on economic matters.\(^\text{1094}\) Furthermore, political scientist Duncan Snidal finds that relative gain concerns are important in situations with few actors, while absolute gain concerns are important in situations with many actors.\(^\text{1095}\) This work finds absolute gain concerns explain state preferences and partly explain outcomes, while neorealist great power preference dynamics and balance concerns partly explain outcomes. Meanwhile, functionalist questions about institutional competence partly explain preferences and outcomes.

### 7.3 – Directions for Future Research

There are at least six directions for further research stemming from this work. First, does the evolution of the Arctic Council proceed in a way that is similar to the way that other forums


evolve? To confirm the explanatory validity of neoliberal institutionalism, as demonstrated in this analysis, new research could examine two questions. First, do the prospect of economic gains and absolute gains inspire states to make institutions stronger in cases other than the Council? Secondly, can agency overcome the resistance by great powers and balance considerations in cases other than the Council? It could be fruitful to determine if the version of neoliberal institutionalism advocated in this paper is applicable in higher-profile institutions that deal with more difficult issues.

Second, new research could answer three questions to confirm the theoretical assertions made in this chapter. Do international institutions evolve only when their competence is established? Do great power preferences most frequently influence outcomes in the evolution of international institutions? Thirdly, do states demonstrate consideration of maintaining regional or global balance in patterns of international co-operation? An affirmative answer to these questions would strengthen the theoretical arguments made in this thesis.

Third, new research could answer the following question: what is the impact of domestic politics on the process of Council evolution? There is some evidence that domestic politics influenced Council evolution. The United States government resisted the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* out of concern it would impact the 2004 United States presidential election. It allowed a policy document after representatives from the Inuit Circumpolar Council embarrassed the United States. The role of the Inuit Circumpolar Council in the Canadian government during the 1990s in part convinced Canada that an Arctic council was necessary. There are other examples in this work, as well. The theories examined do not argue that domestic politics can greatly influence international relations and state foreign policy.
Fourth, research could ask the following question: where did the information about the economic potential of the Arctic come from and is it valid? State policy-makers are acting as though the economic future of the Arctic region is strong. This thesis did not probe whether these claims were true. There are signs that indicate this situation might not be the case. There is a lot of optimism about the prospect of shipping. The International Maritime Organization is developing new Arctic shipping regulations, anticipating a bright future for Arctic shipping.\textsuperscript{1096} Still, studies from the Arctic Institute, a research think tank, find that only a few dozen ships utilize Arctic passages each year, namely the Northern Sea Route, considered the most promising sea route available.\textsuperscript{1097} There is a lot of interest in Arctic oil and gas resources. However, at the current time, Russia is the only country that produces oil from platforms in the Arctic Ocean. Attempts by Shell Oil to develop new offshore resources in the United States’ Arctic region have thus far been unsuccessful and costly.\textsuperscript{1098}

Fifth, further research could address the question: what is the value and worth of the Council? The Council is in many ways a disappointment. It has not developed strong policy to safeguard the Arctic environment. It was supposed to facilitate environmental action, but politics, interests, power concerns and economics often stifle its work. Can an institution motivated at least in part by economic gains be counted on to safeguard the environment? Do trends spell trouble ahead for Arctic environmentalists? The Council has produced good research, such as the \textit{Arctic Climate Impact Assessment}. Is this work adequate for an

international institution? Further, what impact has this work had on international policy outside of the Council? As noted, work by Terry Fenge has highlighted how other international forums have used Council work to create policy.\textsuperscript{1099} Is this contribution widespread, or are instances isolated?

Finally, this work could help answer the following questions: what should the Council do? How should it evolve in the future? Chapter 3 of this thesis concludes that a new conception of the Council’s policy-making role must recognize the highly political nature of decision-making in the Council. What might this conception entail? It is clear that potential economic gains motivate action in the Council, such as growth in the institution’s mandate, growth in its policy-making role and institutional power. Thus, it seems that the safest course of action for those who advocate a role for the Council should be to emphasize the economic benefits of suggested evolution. Would such an approach work in reality? Environmental concerns do not appear to greatly motivate policy-makers in Arctic governance, nor the very real human security concerns of Arctic residents. The original concerns that led to the creation of the Council are not motivating its evolution. Is it reasonable that advocates avoid such arguments?

**Conclusion**

This dissertation has sought to explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. At a time when climate change threatens the future of the planet, the Council is evolving to help states make economic gains and exploit Arctic resources. The Council still provides good quality environmental research and policy recommendations. This situation is explained in that states seek to make gains through international co-operation and economic growth is something on which all Arctic policy-makers can agree. Further, states seek to protect their position in the

\textsuperscript{1099} Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64.
international order and exploit their power position. For those who work in the resource industry, it is a good time to have an Arctic portfolio. For those who care about the Arctic environment and for Arctic residents, this situation could spell trouble.
APPENDIX A

Sample Questions

General

How, if at all, has the Council evolved and changed during your time working for the Council?

Mandate

There is a case in 1999 in which Canada worked to stop discussion about a program called AMEC. It was a program in which the United States and Russia wanted to increase the environmental efficiency of their military vehicles in the Arctic. The two countries wanted to make a presentation about the program. Canada stopped the presentation, saying that it was a military matter and thus outside the prevue of the Council. Why do you think Canada would do that?

Policy-Making

The European countries seemed particularly anxious to create an Arctic contaminants treaty early in the Arctic Council, but Canada opposed such action. In fact, in 1999, Canada said, “Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.” Why do you think the European countries favoured strong action while Canada opposed such action?

In 2000, EPPR wrote, “We have finalized the analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of agreements; we concluded that agreements in force are currently adequate.” Yet, less than a decade later, the Council negotiated a new protocol on oil spills. What do you think changed in regards to search and rescue and oil?

In 2008, the United States proposed the creation of a search/rescue treaty. Were other countries surprised? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What obstacles did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty?

We see work underway to create an “oil spill response issue.” How did states come to decide such a treaty was necessary? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What obstacles did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty?

Institutional Capacity

In the meeting notes, every country at one point or another acknowledged that the Council needed more stable funding. Norway, in particular, has pushed for more stable funding and has given a considerable amount of money to the Council. If everyone agrees the Council needs more stable funding, why have countries not achieved stable funding?

In 2007, the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish delegations announced they would create a temporary permanent secretariat in Norway to be in effect during their six years as chairs. Why do you think they did this?
In 2011, why did the Council decide to create a permanent secretariat after so long without one?

**Observers**

Why do Council states seem reluctant to add China to the Council as a permanent observer?  
Why do certain Council states seem reluctant to add the European Union to the Council as a permanent observer?

**Permanent Participants**

I saw Lloyd Axworthy give a talk about the Arctic Council and he said that Canada really wanted the Aboriginal groups to have full membership in the Arctic Council. He said that the United States allowed the Aboriginal groups to be less powerful permanent participants in exchange that security not be an issue on the Council. Is Axworthy’s account true? Why did Canada want the Aboriginal groups to be full members of the Council?

RAIPON was recently banished from the Council by Russia. Why do you think this happened? Some say it is due to a general Russian crackdown on NGOs, others say they want a more streamlined foreign policy or accepting foreign funding or support for Ivan Moseyev, supporter of Pomor brotherhood.

Has the involvement of the permanent participants been beneficial for the Arctic Council? Has the involvement been beneficial for the organizations themselves?

What are the major accomplishments of the permanent participants?
APPENDIX B

The following interviewees agreed to have quotes and facts attributed to them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country/Organization</th>
<th>Department/Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mikael Anzén</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Armstrong</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Global Change Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ray Arnaudo</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>State Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steven Bigras</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Canadian Polar Commission</td>
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<td>Christopher Cuddy</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Aboriginal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben DeAngelo</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adele Dion</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry Fenge</td>
<td>ICC and AAC</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Funston</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Northern Canada Consulting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chester Reimer</td>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauli Rouhinen</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marideth Sandler</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Government of Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker Scully</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russel Shearer</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Aboriginal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harley Trudeau</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Government of the Yukon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews took place with 18 people who did not want to be identified or have quotes attributed to them:

- A Canadian environment official
- Two Canadian foreign affairs officials
- A Canadian Aboriginal affairs official
- A Danish environmental official
- A Finnish foreign affairs official
- Two Icelandic foreign affairs officials
- A Norwegian foreign affairs official
- A Norwegian environment official
- A Russian government official
- A Russian scientist
- A United States State Department Official
- A United States Department of the Interior official
- Four United States environmental official
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Osthagen, Andreas. “In or Out Symbolism of the EU in the Arctic.” *The Arctic Institute*, 2013.  


Research Examples


CURRICULUM VITAE

ANDREW CHATER

EDUCATION

- Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, 2015, University of Western Ontario
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    - Supervisor: Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon
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  - Comprehensive exam fields: international relations, global governance, Canadian regional politics
- Master of Arts in Political Science, 2010, University of Waterloo
- Honours Bachelor Degree of Arts with Distinction, 2009, University of Western Ontario
  - Honours Specialization in Political Science, Minor in Sociology

PUBLICATIONS


ACADEMIC HONOURS AND AWARDS

- 2014-2015, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Graduate Scholarship (value $20,000)
- 2014-2015, Rotman Institute of Philosophy Resident Member (value $0)
- 2014-2015, Ontario Graduate Scholarship (value $15,000) (declined)
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- 2013, Northern Scientific Training Program Grant (value $2,400) (declined)
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- 2012, Nominee, Graduate Student Teaching Assistant Award (value $0)
- 2011-2012, Ontario Graduate Scholarship (value $15,000)
- 2010-2014, University of Western Ontario Annual Research Fellowship (value $44,800)
- 2009-2010, University of Waterloo Entrance Scholarship (value $5,000)
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CONFERENCE AND COLLOQUIUM PRESENTATIONS

- 2013 International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco Hilton Union Square, San Francisco, California, April 3, 2013: “Explaining the Expanding Role of the Arctic Council”
- 2011 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, May 18, 2011: “Tardy Explorers: Academics and the ‘Problem’ of Canadian Arctic Sovereignty”
- 2010 Sharing Discovery: Graduate Student Research Conference, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, April 27, 2010: “Cultural Security in the Writings of Osama Bin Laden”
- Eighth Annual Centre for International Peace and Security Studies Graduate Student Conference, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 27, 2010: “Needing a Tweak: The Global Governance of Illegal Drugs”
ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE

- 2010-Present, research assistant, Bishops University, Trinity College, University of Western Ontario and Bishops University (six projects)
  - The Political Causes and Consequences of National Identity: An Experimental Study with Dr. Cameron Anderson and Dr. Michael McGregor (2015-present, Bishops University)
  - Multilateral Code to Govern Arctic Offshore Resource Development with Dr. Elizabeth Riddell Dixon (2013-present, Trinity College)
  - “Making Electoral Democracy Work” with Dr. Laura Stephenson (2013-2015, University of Western Ontario)
  - Electoral studies with Dr. Laura Stephenson (2012, University of Western Ontario)
  - Arctic governance with Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon (2010-2012, University of Western Ontario)
  - Former leaders as diplomats with Dr. Andrew Cooper (2010, University of Waterloo)

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  - Canadian Politics with Dr. Cameron Anderson (Political Science 2230) (2010, University of Western Ontario)
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  - Introduction to Politics with Dr. Richard Nutbrown (Political Science 101) 2009, University of Waterloo)
GUEST LECTURES

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- Political Science 3333, University of Western Ontario, March 5, 2012
  - Presentation – The Issue of Climate Change in Canada’s Arctic
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INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS

- Arctic Athabaskan Council delegation member at Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, October 18-20, 2013, Whitehorse, Yukon
- Arctic Athabaskan Council delegation member at Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group Meeting, October 21-23, 2013, Whitehorse, Yukon

STUDENT GOVERNMENT

- 2014-2015, Rotman Institute of Philosophy Events Planning and Outreach Committee
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- 2012-2014, PSAC Local 610 representative, University of Western Ontario
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- 2011-2012, PSAC Local 610 Political Action/Social Justice Committee, University of Western Ontario
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ADDITIONAL TRAINING

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- University of Western Ontario’s Teaching Support Centre Future Professor Series, September 2010-December 2012
- University of Western Ontario “Introduction to Quantitative Methods,” winter 2012
- University of Western Ontario’s Teaching Support Centre Teaching Assistant Training Program, August 27-August 29, 2010