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Campaign Strategy And The Uses Of Televised Political Advertising In Michigan And Ontario

Leslie R. Coventry

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CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND THE USES OF
TELEVISION POLITICAL ADVERTISING
IN MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO

by

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Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
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however, some key differences, the most important being that Ontario strategists relied more heavily on comparative television advertising. Such differences are explained by three factors: (1) the "mind-sets" of the respective strategists; (2) specific historical and contextual factors that are present in each election campaign; and (3) the effect of different legal and regulatory regimes on the construction of meta-advertising strategies.

Keywords: televised political advertising -- elections --- campaign strategy --- political strategists --- election laws
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It has been two decades since Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure concluded that televised political advertisements provided the primary source of information for most voters.\(^1\) Since then, televised political advertising has become an important focus of political science research in the United States.\(^2\) In Canada, however, research on televised political advertising is only beginning to gain momentum.\(^3\) As a result, even the most current analyses of Canadian election campaigns pay minimal attention to the televised political advertising of the major political parties. For example, Canadian researchers have said very little about the television advertising used by the three major parties in the 1993 federal election campaign and almost nothing about the role of televised political advertising as a campaign strategy.\(^4\)

Televised political advertising is a key component of campaign strategy in Canadian election campaigns, and for the major parties, it represents their single biggest campaign expenditure.\(^5\) In the 1993 federal election all parties combined allocated 31.7 per cent of their campaign budgets to televised political advertising (by contrast, only 14 per cent of their campaign budgets were allocated to the leaders' tours).\(^6\) In the 1990 Ontario provincial general election, the three major parties allocated approximately 50 per cent of their budgets to televised political advertising\(^7\) and the 1995
Ontario general election produced similar statistics.⁸ (Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of spending on total advertising in the 1990 Ontario provincial general election, and on total political advertising and total television advertising in the 1993 Canadian federal election).

Televised political advertisements are thus the centrepiece of the strategic electoral efforts of parties and candidates in modern election campaigns. This study will examine the uses of televised political advertisements in campaign strategies in the United States and Canada. Two case studies - the Michigan gubernatorial election of 1994 and the Ontario provincial general election of 1995 - will serve as a basis for examining and comparing the uses of televised political advertising in both countries.

Television also has audio-visual capacities which make it more useful than print or radio for communicating "image advertising" - that is, political advertising that refers to a party leader’s or candidate’s "received or projected personality traits and character attributes."⁹ Gina Garramone demonstrates that the presence of audio-visual content reduces viewers’ ability to recall verbal information, especially for "those attending to form a personality impression,"¹⁰ which is the norm for "television reliant voters."¹¹ Audio-visual image content refers to music, crowd sounds, visuals of citizens and announcers, and other such images.¹² Or, audio-visual image content refers to icons, such as flags and
constitutions. Verbal image content refers to positive or negative statements about a party leader's or candidate's leadership ability, trustworthiness, competence, or other claimed characteristics.\textsuperscript{13}

During election campaigns, the main communication of televised image advertising is clear: it is to diminish, reinforce, or construct the image of a particular party leader or candidate. The most famous example of negative image advertising on television in Canadian politics is the Conservative party's advertisement in the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign which drew negative attention to federal Liberal leader Jean Chretien's physical image and by implication, his leadership deficiencies. The advertisement included of a series of unflattering close-up still photographs of Jean Chretien's facial paralysis, which were accompanied by citizen testimonials, such as "Jean Chretien....a Prime Minister?.."

In addition to verbal and audio-visual images, this study explores whether or not images are also constructed by television advertising that is ostensibly focused on issues. Studies of the content of televised political advertisements typically define issues as information on "specific policy stands,"\textsuperscript{14} such as taxes, the deficit or health care. Researchers have tended to consider "issue advertising" separately from image advertising.\textsuperscript{15} Leonard Shyles, for example, makes a distinction between "issue presentation
style" and "image presentation style." indicating that, like images, issues are communicated not only verbally but also audio-visually. In particular, Shyles finds that the most effective audio-visual presentation of issues occurs when the party leader or "candidate speaks for himself, looks directly at the camera and is formally dressed," without background music or the use of surrogates. Conversely, image communication is "associated with stills of candidates, candidates oriented indirectly to the camera, accompanied by famous persons and citizens' testimonials, comparatively fast cutting, music and announcers' voices." 

When research on televised political advertising analyzes image advertising and issue advertising separately, however, coding problems regularly occur in distinguishing between issues and images, since there are remarkably few television advertisements that can be unambiguously labelled as image or issue advertisements. One of Governor John Engler's positive television advertisements in the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial campaign ("Down-Home Values") illustrates this difficulty. It is ostensibly an issue advertisement in that it provides substantial information on Engler's version of welfare reform, taxes and other issues. Yet issues were not the dominant communication in this television advertisement. Although the text is about issues, closer examination reveals that these issues represent a minor part of Engler's campaign agenda, that they are discussed in vague terms, and that they do not
generally reflect his voting record, which is an obvious benchmark for assessing a candidate's actual preferences on particular issues. In addition, the audio-visual content of the advertisement is dominated by images that appear to have been designed to convey the overall impression that Engler is a good leader. This assessment was subsequently confirmed by Engler's Communications Director, Bryan Flood.\(^2\)

So what is the dominant message of "Down-Home Values"? This is difficult to discern because the advertisement contains an inconsistency between its verbal and its audio-visual cues which is a commonly used technique of television advertising. It seems to suggest an intertwining of issues and images, where the primary objective is to create images. Scholars who have recognized such inconsistencies in televised political advertising have attempted to reconcile them through the use of content analysis models that measure, as Doris Graber puts it, "the way people process political information."

Such analyses move beyond measuring the amount of political information in televised political advertisements to measuring how individuals react to political information. Graber, for example, uses a system of "gestalt coding" which "concentrates on the holistic meanings conveyed by audiovisual messages rather than on coding individual verbal and pictorial elements."\(^2\) Montague Kern's research concentrates "not only on issues but also on examination of rhetorical styles"
relating to the use of sound and visual symbols" and is geared
to "decoding the cues in emotional appeals." Some of the
"positive affect-laden appeals" used in her study are
compassion, ambition, nostalgia, reassurance and trust. Some
of the "negative affect-laden appeals" are guilt, fear, anger
and uncertainty."

These approaches attempt to determine the underlying
emotional messages conveyed by televised political
advertisements. They establish that individuals do not view
political information in isolation but rather within a larger
context, such as an entire election campaign. As a result,
the processing of political information is affected by many
contextual factors: specific factors, such as an opponent's
television advertising, and general factors, such as current
economic conditions. The quality of content analysis
therefore depends heavily on coders' knowledge of the context
in which a televised political advertisement is created and
broadcast. This is not the case in most research projects.
Yet without such knowledge it is doubtful that the appropriate
effective emotional effects can be correctly coded.

The problematic nature of these models, however, can be
largely overcome by switching the focus from measuring image
content in televised political advertisements to measuring
issue content. Focusing on issue content to determine the
dominant communication of televised political advertisements
is advantageous since, according to Shyles, "the issue concept
has been viewed in the literature as more stable than the image concept and has therefore been easier to define. In order to determine the dominant communication of television advertising by measuring issue content, the question that must be asked is - what is the purpose of issues in televised political advertisements? Since issues are seldom defined to the extent necessary to debate clear alternatives, it is not, except in rare exceptions, to "educate" voters. Indeed it is rare to find televised political advertisements whose primary (much less sole) purpose is to present issues.

Curiously, television advertising practitioners are remarkably frank about this. In The Responsive Chord, for example, political advertising strategist Tony Schwartz makes the following comment about how he typically addresses issues in his televised political advertising:

in a gubernatorial race we were faced with a large bloc of public school teachers who might vote for the candidate if he promised to increase their pay. At the same time, the general public objected to an increase in teachers' salaries, feeling that the quality of teaching was too low to merit higher wages. One solution to this conflict might involve having the candidate promise to "upgrade teachers." The teachers could interpret upgrade salary, while the general public might hear it as upgrade quality.

In other words, when faced with having to respond to a specific, unavoidable issue in an election campaign, the prudent party or candidate will frame the issue in a way that best reflects his or her image.

Taking this one step further, issues that are initially
raised by party leaders or candidates in their televised political advertisements may be (and almost invariably are) raised for the purpose of enhancing or diminishing the party leader's or candidate's image. Hence, issues may be used positively to allow a party leader or candidate to claim credit for past issue successes, thereby attributing to them superior leadership skills or judgement. Or, issues may be used negatively to lay blame on opponents for alleged past issue failures, thereby attributing to them poor leadership skills or judgement. (A typology of the five distinct purposes served by issues in television advertisements is proposed in the next section of this chapter, pages 12-16).

According to Schwartz, political strategists "are not concerned with getting things across to people as much as out of people...[therefore] the task of a media specialist is not to reveal a candidate's stand on issues, so much as to help communicate those personal qualities of a candidate that are likely to win votes."26 He concludes that television advertising is an important strategic device because it provides "us with direct access to people's minds."27 The objective of televised political advertising is to limit citizen understanding of parties and candidates to perceptions of party and candidate images. This suggests that rather than image advertising and issue advertising, political strategists actually use what is defined by this study as "meta-advertising" - that is, television advertising which
translates issues into symbols in order to build images. Thus, rather than considering issues and images in televised political advertisements, it may be more accurate to consider issues as images.

When used symbolically to project images, issues must be "potent" - that is, relevant to the everyday lives of voters. During the 1994 U.S. mid-term elections, for example, "crime" was consistently identified in public opinion polls as the most important issue for a majority of voters. As a result, crime became "the" issue for most campaigns. In October, 1994, ABC news anchor Peter Jennings commented that "this year, crime pays when it comes to political campaigning," and that this is the "year of the victim." To be "on the wrong side" of the crime issue, he added, was "campaign suicide."

Even incumbents who had not made crime a high priority during their tenure in office were moved during the 1994 election to make crime the number one issue in their campaigns. Although few specifics were offered, the rhetoric of "cracking down on crime" (by advocating, for instance, "punk prisons") was a recurrent theme in almost every campaign. Indeed, almost all candidates scrambled to create the impression that they were the "toughest" on crime. At the same time, candidates attacked their opponents for not being tough enough on crime.
Issue "Modes" and Televised Political Advertising "Types"

Because other research studies do not consider issues as serving a purpose in televised political advertisements other than conveying information, such studies tend to categorize television advertising according to the number of issue references they contain and their degree of specificity. Kathleen Hall-Jamieson, for example, treats issues as current or future issue-positioning statements where there are two identifiable arguments and where facts are used to support one side or the other (i.e., deficit reduction). This relatively narrow concept of issue leads Hall-Jamieson to conclude that televised political advertising could be a powerful force to engage issues. In practice, however, this is rarely the case. Moreover, for her, negative television advertisements are especially problematic in discussing issues since they concentrate on what the opponent does wrong, not what the sponsor does right. In her opinion, this is why the crime issue topped the campaign agenda in the 1994 United States mid-term elections, and why health care reform did not make it onto the agenda at all.

In contrast to Hall-Jamieson, Darrell West more broadly conceptualizes issues either as action statements or as policy mentions. The former refers to specific policy statements, that is, clear statements of past positions or expectations about future actions....The more common approach is the policy mention, in which general problems of the economy, foreign relations, or government performance are discussed, but no specific proposals to deal with the matter are
made..."\textsuperscript{15}

In his study, West concludes that "the most substantive appeals actually came in negative spots." For example, he finds "the most critical prominent commercials during the period from 1952 to 1992 appeared on foreign policy (86 percent of which were negative) and domestic policy (67 percent), followed by international affairs (56 percent), domestic performance (52 percent), personal qualities (45 percent), campaign appeals (35 percent), and party mentions (17 percent)."\textsuperscript{16}

The more broadly that issue is conceptualized, therefore, the more likely it is that researchers will uncover evidence of issue advertising. In his study of television advertisements from a wide array of U.S. elections, Richard Joslyn concludes that

\begin{quote}
[c]andidates do reveal future-oriented policy proposals in televised spot advertisements. Furthermore, occasionally these proposals are quite specific, though not very detailed, given the constraints of a thirty or sixty second presentation.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Thirty-seven per cent of Joslyn's sample reveal references to issues. In a separate study, Joslyn also reports that 57.7 per cent of the television advertisements in the sample contain issues.\textsuperscript{18} In both cases, however, more than half of these are characterized as "vague, ambiguous policy references" which reveal very little or nothing about the candidate's own position on the issue.\textsuperscript{19} For example, in his first study, of the 37 per cent of television
advertisements that contain issues, only 5 per cent are "specific" references to issues; 10 per cent are "fairly specific" and 22 per cent are "vague." In his second study, of the 57.7 per cent of television advertisements that contain issues, 19.9 per cent are specific, while the rest - 37.8 per cent - are vague.40

Yet Joslyn does not address the purposes of making "vague, ambiguous" references to issues. Similarly, Hall-Jamieson does not address why specific information statements are rare; and West does not explain why issues "are discussed, but no specific proposals to deal with the matter are made..." These are, however, important questions and it is the aim of this study to shed further light upon them.

A necessary first step is therefore to distinguish between five distinct purposes of issues (defined by this study as "issue modes") in televised political advertising. These are: (1) assigning blame (issue-blaming); (2) making accusations (issue-accusing); (3) claiming credit (issue-crediting); (4) mentioning the salience of an issue (issue-mentioning); (5) or taking an issue position (issue-positioning). When these issue modes are used in different combinations, three distinct types of televised political advertising may be identified - direct attack, comparative, and positive - each with different intended strategic effects. Table 1-1 summarizes these relationships. (A more detailed explanation of this typology is provided in Chapter 2 of this
TABLE 1-1
ISSUE MODES AND TELEVISED POLITICAL ADVERTISING TYPES

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<tr>
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<td>Direct Attack</td>
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<td><strong>Negative issue modes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Issue-blaming</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Issue-accusing</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive issue modes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Issue-crediting</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Issue-mentioning</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Issue-positioning</td>
<td>X</td>
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**Issue-blaming** is almost always associated with direct attack television advertisements. Its purpose is to criticize specific past issue decisions of an opponent that were particularly controversial or that may be characterized as issue failures. **Issue-accusing** is also negative, but where issue-blaming refers to a specific past incident of wrongdoing, issue-accusing assaults by implication. Its purpose is to plant a seed of doubt about the opponent’s character. Accusation appeals highlight on-going behaviours, biases and pre-dispositions of opponents. **Issue-accusing** is the most common form of comparative television advertising.

In the 1994 Michigan campaign, issue-blaming occurred when Democratic challenger Howard Wolpe blamed Governor John Engler for the Ryan Prison escape which occurred at the start of the gubernatorial campaign. The purpose was to indicate that Engler’s spending cuts on policing (neglect of "public
safety") directly resulted in the prison escape. At the same time, Engler repeatedly accused Wolpe of being "too liberal" to be a good leader.\textsuperscript{41} In the 1995 Ontario general election campaign, the New Democrats blamed the federal Liberal government for Ontario's economic problems and their inability to solve these problems. They also more generally accused the other two parties of making "irresponsible" promises that do not "add up."\textsuperscript{42}

The third issue mode is issue-credit\textsuperscript{ing} which is used to highlight the issue successes of the party leader or candidate. Always positive and normally associated with incumbents, the purpose is to promote confidence in the abilities of the sponsoring party leader or candidate. Further examination of such issues indicates that incumbents frequently use their status to create highly visible "issue benefits" which can later be used for issue-credit\textsuperscript{ing} purposes during an election campaign. For example, a fixed strategy for incumbents is to offer tax cuts or other benefits to targeted groups, or to initiate popular programs - such as youth job creation programs - in their pre-election budgets.

The final two issue modes are issue-mention\textsuperscript{ing} and issue-position\textsuperscript{ing}. Mentioning statements are positive and occur when a party leader or candidate mentions the salience of a particular issue without articulating a course of action or a solution. Issue-mention\textsuperscript{ing} is used to associate the party leader or candidate with core issues, but not in a way which
requires specific actions. For example, party leaders or candidates can claim to be in favour of less crime and lower unemployment, but by mentioning an issue without elaborating on what they intend to do about it, they remain free from responsibility for defending a particular point of view or course of action.

Issue-positioning, in contrast, is used when a party leader or candidate actively formulates an alternative plan to solve a perceived issue problem. The difference between issue-positioning and issue-mentioning is that the former clearly differentiates party leaders or candidates from one another; a position is taken from a set of distinct alternatives, and a fairly precise course of action may be anticipated. For example, stating that longer jail terms for convicted criminals will be forthcoming, or that welfare recipients will be forced to earn their benefits - and how such issues will be implemented - constitutes issue-positioning.

Taking positions is a far less risky endeavour when a party leader or candidate is a challenger and trailing by a wide margin in the polls. As a challenger it is probable that the party leader or candidate will not have a previous track record to defend and therefore is not constrained in the choice of issue positions. Challengers are also less susceptible to retrospective issue-blaming. Moreover, when a party leader or candidate is aware that he or she is unlikely
to win office, taking positions that will not have to be defended after the election is easy.

This typology of issue modes leads to a further typology of television advertising "types." **Direct attack** television advertising uses only the negative issue modes - blaming and accusing - since the intention is to destroy an opponent's image by directly attacking his or her image weaknesses. **Positive** television advertising uses only the positive issue modes - crediting, mentioning and positioning - to reinforce a positive image. **Comparative** television advertising uses all of the issue modes since the intention is to construct the party leader's or candidate's image as an alternative to an opponent's image weaknesses. This is done by first identifying and attacking an opponent's image weaknesses and then comparing the opponent to the party leader or candidate, where the sponsoring party leader or candidate is depicted as the best alternative.

Most research in the field defines only two types of television advertising - negative and positive - and limits the definition of negative television advertising to direct attack advertising. Montague Kern, defines a negative television advertisement as "that which is directed to the failings of the opponent in relation either to character or issues."¹ S.H. Surlin and T.F. Gordon define negative television advertisements as "the direct reference or attacking political advertisement" which targets the other
party leader or candidate personally, or the issues for which the opponent stands. David Taras describes negative - or "black" - television advertisements as "trying to tarnish an opponent through ridicule or straightforward savaging of their character or record in office."

What these definitions overlook is that comparative television advertising, although structured differently, is also a negative strategy. The difference is in their intended effects: direct attack television advertisements stop at attempting to convince voters that the opponent is a poor choice, whereas comparative television advertisements go on to ask voters to support the sponsoring (or sponsored) party leader or candidate on the grounds that he or she is not the opponent.

Comparative television advertisements are considered valuable by strategists for two reasons: they allow challengers to define their candidacies (albeit against the front-runner's weaknesses), and they are generally not perceived as negative. As a result they are less susceptible to a possible "boomerang" effect, which occurs when a television advertisement results in "more negative feelings toward the sponsor, rather than toward the target." Direct attack television advertisements, on the other hand, run a high risk of a boomerang and do nothing to directly promote the sponsoring party leader or candidate as a worthy alternative. In this study, therefore, comparative
advertising is considered a distinct type and a three-fold typology is therefore employed.

**Content Analysis**

The content analysis model used in this study is a modified version of standard content analysis methods. It is used both to examine television advertisements individually - micro analysis - and to analyze television advertising strategies throughout entire election campaigns - macro analysis.

(1) **Micro Analysis: Modifying Shyles's Approach to Analysing Individual Televised Political Advertisements**

The objective of micro analysis is to determine whether there are calculated regularities in the ways that issues and images are used in each television advertising type. Micro content analysis includes analysis of both the verbal and the audio-visual messages contained in televised political advertisements. A modified version of Shyles's model is most useful for this purpose because it incorporates a method for measuring issue and image content in television advertising both verbally and audio-visually. Moreover, Shyles's model examines "reported conventional wisdom and intuitive impressions of campaign workers who assert that some presentational devices are better suited to image creation of the candidate while others are better suited to underscoring campaign issues."
Shyles is one of the few researchers who examines televised political advertising according to how issues and images are depicted through audio-visuals, and who emphasises that "there are measurable regularities in the structure of televised political advertising which uniquely accompany symbolic content in the communication of images of candidates or campaign issues to the electorate." His sample included 140 television advertisements that were used in various campaigns in the 1980 U.S. presidential primaries.

Shyles began by developing a list of 22 audio-visual "methods of presentation" from a literature review of past studies in this area and a review of 25 per cent of the television advertisements used in his study. He then developed 8 verbal image categories and 9 verbal issue categories from a review of 35 of the television advertisements used in his study. Coders viewed the television advertisements for words and phrases that they "judged" to be issue and image references. The composite verbal image score and the composite verbal issue score were then calculated for each advertisement, which reported the total number of references found in the text of each advertisement which matched "words and phrases" from Shyles's lists of image and issue categories. Finally, multiple regressions were performed on the composite image and issue scores and the 22 audio-visual presentation methods, which yielded measurable image and issue presentation styles.
However, Shyles's model does not examine presentation styles in terms of how they are used in different television advertising types, nor does it account for the possibility that issues may be used in television advertising for symbolic, image-building purposes. Three modifications to the model will therefore be made: (1) content analysis will be broken down by television advertisement type and each issue reference will be categorized by issue mode; (2) in each television advertisement, verbal image and issue references will be examined in relation to the audio-visual content of the advertisement to determine whether and how issues and images are intertwined; and (3) the presentation styles will be assessed for each advertisement and each advertising type to determine whether there is a dominant presentation style in each of the advertising types, and in the entire campaign.

(2) Macro Analysis: Meta-advertising Strategies

In nearly all cases, the purposes for which issues are used in televised political advertising can only be determined by taking into account the context of the entire election campaign. This is because televised political advertising strategies are not created in a vacuum, but rather are designed as part of an overall campaign strategy. Macro content analysis examines how a combination of issues and images are used conjunctionally in successive television advertisements over an entire election campaign, offering
insights into the objectives of campaign strategies, how strategists develop their strategies, and how and why they incorporate televised political advertising into their strategies.

More precisely, in interviews conducted for this study, political strategists identified three contextual approaches that account for much of the use of issues and images in televised political advertising: (1) using issues symbolically to either satisfy the need challengers have to position themselves as alternatives to the status quo, or the need incumbents have to reinforce their usual front-runner position; (2) using audio-visual presentation to reinforce a strong public image or to strengthen a weak one; and (3) conducting public opinion polling to determine which issues are "hot-button" issues and how such issues can be intertwined with particular image characteristics to enhance or detract from a party leader's or candidate's image.

**Case Studies**

Chapters 4 and 5 of this study respectively analyze televised political advertisements in the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial election campaign and the 1995 Ontario general election campaign. The reasons why these case studies were selected are as follows. Michigan and Ontario are demographically similar to each other: they are both relatively large in terms of population and geography; both
are industrialized and contain a large blue-collar voter base; and historically, both economies have been marked by gradual shifts from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial and advanced manufacturing-based economy, with concentration in the auto and auto-parts sectors.

Moreover, after a long period of political stability, voters in Michigan and Ontario have begun to change. In Michigan, the Republicans formed the government between 1963 and 1982, losing control to the Democrats between 1982 and 1990. In Ontario, the Conservatives formed the government between 1943 and 1985, but the Liberals formed the government between 1985 and 1990, and were defeated by the New Democrats in 1990. In 1995, the Conservatives re-gained control.

Both Michigan and Ontario have substantial local media bases, with very little additional campaign information introduced by neighbouring states or provinces. Other campaigns which could have been used as case studies in the 1994 to 1995 time period were eliminated for various reasons. In the United States, the 1993 New Jersey campaign was considered a poor choice because New Jersey's media are dominated by New York-based outlets which pay minimal attention to political campaigns in New Jersey. In Canada, the 1994 Quebec campaign was considered a poor choice because of the bias introduced in this campaign's television advertising and media coverage of the campaign by continued attention to the sovereignty issue.
Analysis of the Michigan and Ontario campaigns is based on four sources of data. The first source is the videotaped television advertisements that were broadcast during the campaign. The second source is adlogs constructed by monitoring television advertising broadcasts during the respective advertising periods. For Michigan, WXYZ (Detroit) and WDIV (Detroit) were monitored between September 6 and November 7, 1994. For Ontario, CFPL (London), CTV and CBC were monitored between May 17 and June 6, 1995. The third source of data is interviews with political strategists employed in the Republican and Democratic campaigns in Michigan and in the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic campaigns in Ontario. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of minor political parties and interest groups who were independently active in the Ontario campaign, but who did not use professional strategists. The fourth source of data is newspaper coverage of the respective campaigns in the Detroit Free Press and the Globe and Mail.

Election Laws and the Uses of Televised Political Advertising

Political strategists hold some very specific views about the uses of televised political advertising in modern election campaigns, and these views tend to be remarkably similar. There are, however, factors which place constraints on how the television advertising types may be used by strategists. Election laws are one key source of potential constraint since
they set the parameters of competition and control the behaviour of parties and candidates in election campaigns. They can limit (or, conversely, enhance) the ability of strategists to structure and present issues and images in televised political advertisements.

Previous research of the content of televised political advertising, including research conducted by Shyles, Joslyn and West, has neglected to consider such factors. Therefore, this study seeks to expand the examination of televised political advertising to include the effect that certain election laws have on campaign strategy and the uses of the three types of televised political advertising. The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA), for example, does not restrict television advertising to a fixed period. Moreover, Michigan campaigns are always two party competitions, and strategists are able to combine independent (or so-called "third-party") spending on television advertising with their candidate's television advertising strategies.

In Ontario, however, the television advertising period is fixed at the last twenty-one days immediately preceding polling day, parties face multiple opponents, and parties are normally unable to supplement their television advertising strategies with independent expenditure efforts. These differences clearly affect the uses of television advertising, thereby providing additional insight into the uses of television advertising as campaign strategies in Michigan and
Ontario. Although the examination of the effects of these differences could have been integrated into the macro content analysis sections in chapters 4 and 5, the importance of election law analysis necessitated that it be brought together and separately considered in chapter 6.

Endnotes


2. For example, see Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Karen Johnson-Cartee and Gary Copeland, Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age (Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum...


6. Ibid., pp. xix and 24-25.


13. Ibid., pp. 410.


23. Kern, pp. 71, 74 and 95.


27. *Ibid*.

28. The "meta-campaign" concept was first introduced by John Carey to identify how and why distinct media campaigns exist within election campaigns. See John Carey, "How Media Shape Campaigns," *Journal of Communications* Volume 26, pp. 50-57 (Spring, 1976). The objective of a meta-campaign is to convince both the media and voters that issues are important, while a secondary campaign demonstrates, mostly to the media, that the party or candidate can create and execute a campaign with momentum, superior organization and extensive financial backing. In the 1996 Republican primaries, for example, Phil Gramm focused media attention on the quality of his campaign's organization, and all candidates and the media discussed Steve Forbes's "deep pockets."


32. Although Hall-Jamieson discusses how issues are used in election campaigns, she only loosely defines the concept. See Kathleen Hall-Jamieson, *Dirty Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).


41. For example, see "Wolpe too Liberal," Appendix 2.

42. See "Irresponsible Promises" and "It Doesn't Add Up," Appendix 2.

43. Kern, p. 93.


46. Other studies also employ a three-fold typology of televised political advertising, based primarily on who is attacked or promoted in the advertisement. For example, see Johnson-Carteé and Copeland, pp. 35-48.


48. Ibid.


50. Other research studies include Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson, "Elements of Videostyle: Candidate Presentation through Television Advertising," in Kaid, Nimmo and Sanders, pp. 184-209; and Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices* Second Edition (New York: Praeger, 1983). However, these approaches are limited to a focus on incumbent versus challenger presentation styles.


53. For more detail on Shyles's methodology, see Shyles, *Journal of Broadcasting*, (Fall, 1984), pp. 408-417.

54. Michigan is the twenty-third largest among the fifty states, and ranks eighth in population, with 9,295,297 people. Ontario is the largest Canadian province, with a population of 10,084,885 in 1991. See *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the States*, Third Edition (Gale Research Inc., 1995), pp. 295, 299 and 307; and Statistics Canada Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario - Part A (Ottawa: Ministry of

55. *Ibid.* In Michigan, the largest single employer is the auto industry, which employed 266,700 people in 1991. The auto industry is also a major employer in Ontario, employing 46,615 people in 1991.

56. Personal interviews with political strategists from the Michigan and Ontario campaigns indicated that strategists share many of the same views about the role of television advertising in modern campaigns.

CHAPTER 2

THE ANALYSIS OF TELEVISIONED POLITICAL ADVERTISING

In modern election campaigns, image advertising on television has assumed an all-encompassing importance because strategists tend to believe that it is easier to get parties or candidates elected by promoting images instead of issues,¹ so they design the campaign around this assumption. As a result, while parties and candidates struggle to represent widespread fears, uncertainties and doubts, they rarely grapple in more than a symbolic way with the issues which are the root cause of these emotions.

Ignoring issues altogether, however, is generally a risky strategy because voters normally harbour strong feelings about certain issues during elections and they expect parties and candidates to address these issues in their campaigns. At the same time, linking the party or candidate with particular issues may alienate certain groups of voters. Strategists generally understand, however, that voters normally demand remarkably little information about issues from parties and candidates in election campaigns. As a result, issues are used symbolically in televised political advertising to make it appear as though the party leader or candidate is broadly aligned with voters on the most salient issues in the campaign, without alienating groups of voters with specific issue agendas.

Understanding the symbolic uses of issues is therefore
necessary to understanding image advertising. The aim of this chapter is to explain how and why strategists use issues symbolically to communicate images in televised political advertising. Negative television advertising, for example, is a fundamental campaign strategy in almost every election campaign because it actually "drives people away from the polls in large numbers," and strategists consider such voter apathy to be a key strategic advantage. One of the primary objectives in designing negative television advertisements, therefore, is to identify a narrow range of issues which, according to the public opinion polls, appeal to key segments of the diminished voter audience that continue to vote.

**Symbols as Political Tools**

According to Walter Lippman, "because of its power to siphon emotion out of distinct ideas, the symbol is both a mechanism of solidarity, and a mechanism of exploitation." For parties and candidates who wish to construct political realities and for voters who wish to believe in them, he argues, the cultivation of political symbols is essential. The result is a constructed "common will" and a "phantom public," whose role is that of mere spectator of "political theatre."

The public will arrive in the middle of the third act and will leave before the last curtain, having stayed just long enough perhaps to decide who is the hero and who the villain of the piece. Yet usually the judgement will necessarily be made apart from the intrinsic merits, on the basis of a
sample of behaviour, an aspect of a situation, by very rough external evidence.  

For Lippman, political symbols ultimately "conserve unity." This means that political symbols are effective when parties and candidates use them to focus voters' attention on a common goal and away from the fact that long-term issues, such as poverty and crime (which tend to emerge as key issues during election campaigns), are rarely resolved after the election. The result, according to Lippman, is a "transfer of interest" to those who wish to govern from voters who wish to "align" themselves with a party or candidate who appears to best represent their own values.

Lippman maintains that voter alignment with parties and candidates represents the most practical approach to mass participation in politics because the majority of citizens cannot hold independent opinions on politics: "[i]f all men had to conceive the whole process of government all the time the world's work would obviously never be carried on." Instead, citizens hold "general notions" of politics, which leads Lippman to conclude that elections are not expressions of popular opinion; rather, they are a means by which citizens align themselves with a person or a group who actually governs. Although the act of voting makes citizens "feel" involved in public decision-making, the notion that people govern must be abandoned.

This study goes one step further, however, and argues that in addition to constructing issues, it is often easier,
cheaper and less strategically risky for parties and candidates to mirror issues that voters have already widely accepted as problems. This is because voters tend to define issues broadly, and along moral lines.\textsuperscript{8} The result is that parties and candidates sometimes align with broad public sentiment. The most pertinent question may therefore be - how important are issues to voting decisions? The answer is mixed. On the one hand, studies tend to show that voters view television advertisements which articulate issues as more legitimate than those which avoid issues.\textsuperscript{9} However, these same studies also indicate that voters are more impressed by (and retain content longer from) image advertising. In fact, there is little evidence to support the view that voters wish to receive detailed issue information from televised political advertisements.\textsuperscript{10}

Following and expanding upon Lippman, Murray Edelman maintains that individuals may become symbols - party leaders or candidates and their opponents, for example, may symbolize strength or weakness, right or wrong. Moreover, processes - such as the electoral process - may themselves become symbols, and issues may become symbols.\textsuperscript{11} For example, public opinion polls are a potent political symbol when they are used to provide the illusion of an opinionated public. To the extent that the expression of popular sentiment is thought to be central to the healthy functioning of a democratic process, public opinion polls are an important symbol invoked by party
leaders or candidates to demonstrate, whether real or perceived, that democracy "works."

According to Edelman, public opinion polls help "construct political spectacles" - that is, a series of symbols comprised of constructed "leaders" (i.e., party leaders or candidates), constructed "problems" (i.e., issues) and constructed "enemies" (i.e., opponents). Moreover, other professionals with specialized expertise, such as interest group leaders, senior bureaucrats and lobbyists, may also construct political spectacles. It is clear that Edelman's analysis of leadership borrows heavily from elite theory. Robert Michels, for example, pointed out that "the incompetence of the masses is almost universal throughout the domains of political life, and this constitutes the most solid foundation of the power of the leaders. Their incompetence furnishes the leaders with a practical and to some extent with a moral justification." 12 Gaetano Mosca further argued that these immaturities are consciously developed and fostered by elite leadership. 13

Party leaders or candidates constantly aim to reinvent their image and the image of their opponents to symbolize "competence, evil, nationalism, future promise, and other virtues and vices [which] help introduce meaning to a confusing political world." 14 Edelman argues that "belief in leaders [becomes] a catalyst of conformity and obedience," and tacit consent of government activities is the outcome.
Opponents are essential for the successful construction of a party leader or candidate because they "help give the political spectacle its power to arouse passions, fears, and hopes, the more so because an enemy to some people is an ally or innocent victim to others."\textsuperscript{16} Party leaders and candidates appear innovative when they offer alternatives; constructing opponents serves this purpose, and negative television advertising facilitates it. In these beliefs, Edelman concurs with Machiavelli's more general notion that leaders must maintain the appearance of five qualities: mercy, faith, honesty, humanity and especially religion. Princes - leaders - must appear to possess these qualities as required to maintain power.\textsuperscript{17}

Political spectacles are constructed, according to Edelman, by symbolic political language which "is the key creator of the social worlds people experience."\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, Edelman states that the "critical element in political maneuver for advantage is the creation of meaning,"\textsuperscript{19} and language articulates that meaning. The successful use of language depends on ambiguity; "it is not 'reality' in any testable or observable sense that matters in shaping political consciousness and behaviour, but rather the beliefs that language helps evoke about the causes of discontents and satisfactions, about policies that will bring about a future closer to the heart's desire, and about other unobservables."\textsuperscript{20}
It is the interpretive and narrative power of language that facilitates the construction of political spectacles. Political language can be used positively to mobilize support for particular party leaders or candidates (normally for status quo values and issues), as in the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial election when Democratic candidate Howard Wolpe claimed that he would "fight for you." Or, political language can be used negatively to diminish support for opponents, as in the 1995 Ontario general election campaign when New Democratic Party leader Bob Rae claimed that "Mike Harris and Lyn McLeod say tax cuts are more important than preserving your Ontario." Edelman argues that news reports are the chief means by which positive and negative language is used to construct political spectacles. These "mediated political realities" - that is, filtered perceptions of reality constructed largely by news coverage of election campaigns and public affairs programming - reinforce common perceptions of political reality:

The parade of "news" about political acts reported to us by the mass media and drunk up by the public as drama is the raw material of such symbolization. It has everything: remoteness, the omnipotent state, crises, and detentes. More than that, it has the blurring or absence of any realistic detail that might question or weaken the symbolic meanings we read into it.

News is an especially dramatic spectacle which helps party leaders or candidates to project their own experiences to voters as "universal." Or, to use Lippman's notion, a
constructed "common will" is developed through news. According to George Herbert Mead, the importance of media lies in its ability to spotlight dramatic "characters" to whom ordinary citizens can relate, expressing "through these characters situations which belong to their own time but which carry the individuals beyond the actual fixed walls which have arisen between them, as members of different classes in the community."²⁶

Yet while it is true that news reports contain their own biases, the news-makers themselves may generate another important media filter. The election campaign, for example, is strategically designed by political strategists and fed to the news media by party leaders or candidates in ways which best serve their interests. Press releases, press secretaries, and press briefings are all designed by political strategists to help frame news reports to create a party leader's or candidate's image.

It is also important to draw distinctions between the different forms of news media and the affects or potential affects they may have on their audiences. Mead, Edelman, Lippman and others interested in the affects of political language on public opinion are primarily concerned with verbal communication of events, thoughts and emotions. For television, however, the most dramatic aspect of news is the potential manipulative power of the audio-visual communication. John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and Pierre Trudeau
were keenly aware of the positive power of audio-visual communication. Richard Nixon and Robert Stanfield, in different ways, are examples of leaders who became aware of television's potentially negative audio-visual impact. Marshall McLuhan found that even though the audio-visual aspect of television requires the viewer to participate at a higher level than other mediums, such as radio and the newspaper, the fact that television is pre-disposed to providing less information allows strategists to use television advertising to avoid substantive discussion of issues during election campaigns. As a result, "TV has, some feel, introduced a kind of rigor mortis into the body politic."  

Edelman only indirectly acknowledges the potential of audio-visual communication in television media: he remarks that "[t]he various media attract rather different audiences according to level of education, social class, ideology, age, interests, and other influences." But television's ability to use audio-visual symbols makes it a more potent weapon for constructing political spectacles than images that are constructed solely through verbal mediums.

Election Campaigns and Televised Political Advertising

(1) Elections: The Ultimate Political Spectacle

Elections are revealing examples of the differences between what political institutions are supposed to do and
what they actually do. According to Edelman,

[elections] give people a chance to express discontents and enthusiasms, to enjoy a sense of involvement. This is participation in a ritual act, however; only in a minor degree is it participation in policy formation. Like all rituals, whether in primitive or modern societies, elections draw attention to common social ties and to the importance and apparent reasonableness of accepting the public policies that are adopted.\textsuperscript{32}

The electoral process is a conspicuously democratic institution that makes citizens "feel" involved in the political process. The political discourse and the decisions which result from election campaigns are seldom questioned. As a result, elections can act as legitimizing symbols for constructing political spectacles.

(2) Televised Political Advertising

Edelman points to news reporting as the catalyst to spectacle construction during election campaigns. News is ambiguous, visual and remote. But it is not the only vehicle for spectacle construction. If it were, modern campaign strategy would not rely so heavily on the repetition of thirty-second (or less) television advertisements.\textsuperscript{33}

Televised political advertising is another fundamentally important means of constructing political spectacles; negative television advertising constructs opponents, positive television advertising constructs party leaders or candidates. To the extent that "political language is political reality,"\textsuperscript{34} therefore, televised political advertising is
also political reality. As the application of content analysis will indicate, televised political advertising is certainly ambiguous, visual and remote. Also, because television advertising is largely "unmediated" - that is, perceptions of reality constructed by the parties or candidates themselves (which are not filtered by the news media), the potential for party leaders or candidates to construct their own political spectacles through television advertising campaigns is great. However, with the advent of the "adwatch" system whereby news reporters analyse the truthfulness and accuracy of the content of television advertisements, and the increasing use of news headlines in all three types of television advertising, the line between mediated and unmediated political realities may become increasingly blurred.

Televised political advertising is also an important strategic device in election campaigns because it reaches a segment of society that is not very interested in politics, invests little time in acquiring political information, but does watch a great deal of television. This segment of society is large and growing. David Paletz and Robert Entman, for example, found that while 10 to 15 per cent of American voters have a 'reasonable' level of political information and a coherent means of viewing politics, a full 60 per cent follow politics only to a limited extent and vote sporadically. Although they decide election outcomes, this
group is only marginally aware of politics. The remaining 25 per cent rarely vote and are almost completely detached from any political influences.37

The Canadian voter profile is similar. Clarke et al. report that although most Canadians express some interest in the political process,

only about 15% follow politics "very closely." Similarly, although sizable majorities state that they are "somewhat" or "fairly" interested in a particular election campaign, only about 25% say they are "very interested".38

Television political advertising was a relatively new and almost completely unexplored aspect of election campaign strategy at the time that Edelman began examining the symbolic uses of politics. This may explain why he has not addressed televised political advertising as a fundamental source of spectacle construction during election campaigns. It is now abundantly clear, however, that television advertising is the primary means of spectacle construction in modern election campaigns.

The Role of Issues in Meta-advertising Strategies

(1) Theoretical Justification

Political strategists understand that television viewers are most responsive to emotional appeals.39 Images are emotional, yet most strategists would not conceive of producing purely image advertising - especially negative image advertising - because of the fear of a possible boomerang
effect. Meta-advertising strategies ensure that television advertisements that are otherwise image advertisements are not viewed by voters as overly frivolous, or, if negative, that their content is not perceived as untruthful, undocumented or unwarranted. A strategy of issue-ambiguity keeps the electorate focused on the broader, more symbolic aspect of the voting process.

Thus, although political symbolism generally refers to commonly perceived and emotionally charged language and icons, issues may also be used symbolically. As Edelman recognized more than twenty-five years ago, "the significant 'outputs' of political activities are not particular public policies labelled as political goals, but rather the creation of political followings and supports: i.e., the evocation of arousal or quiescence in mass publics." The objective of election campaigns, therefore, is not to construct support for specific issues but to construct support for specific party leaders or candidates. In this way, issues become the weapons of political struggle in most election campaigns; the symbols "to which members of a culture attach similar meanings."

Not all research views the role of issues in campaigns as meta-campaign strategies. This is because the role one assigns to issues in elections is a reflection of the model one chooses to conceptualize and explain the policy-making process. The approach employed by this study is at odds with most rational choice theories that attempt to explain policy-
making. To Edelman, "[p]olitical actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable substantive demands, but rather by changing the demands and the expectations." Rational actor theories, by contrast, tend to assume that all individuals in society have pre-determined and openly stated preferences, motives and values, and the function of the political process is to "aggregate individual choices based on preferences or privately held values." Although this may be true for consumer or private goods, it is not necessarily true for public goods - including governments.

Structural explanations of policy-making concede that instead of acting as receptors to public demands, "governments reach out into their environments, molding and shaping demands...We are becoming increasingly aware that political parties do not merely aggregate demands; they also mold opinion..." Institutional theories suggest that rules (laws, but also conventions, belief systems and culture) dictate political activity to some extent. Such alternative theories recognize the potential for top-down manipulation of individual voter preferences by party leaders or candidates. Accordingly, Michael Atkinson and Marsha Chandler ask to what or to whom do key state actors respond and how do they generate and structure individual demands? These questions point to the need for a closer examination of the role of issues and meta-campaign advertising strategies. They point
out that attention should be given not only to what the issues of an election campaign are, but how and why these issues get on the campaign agenda.

(2) Past Conceptualizations of Issues

Traditional content analyses of negative advertising have only loosely conceptualized issues, making it difficult to gain an understanding of how they are used in election campaigns. Recent content analyses of "issue preferences," for example, have drawn conclusions which are similar to the following: "the research demonstrated that voters tend to link issue preferences to candidates, and that the linkages influence voting choice above and beyond demographic and partisan variables."47

Defining issue and image is problematic because there is often considerable overlap between issues and images in individual television advertisements. Issues and images can be so intertwined that sorting them out is almost impossible. The question is - why are issues and images so intertwined in television advertising as to make a distinction between them problematic? Is the difficulty a function of the complexities of television advertising, or are there other reasons?

Of course, researchers can simply avoid defining issues and images. This seems to be common practice. For example, Gina Garramone, in her effort to gauge "issue versus image orientation and effects of political advertising," did not
define issues. Instead, she measured "issue knowledge" of individuals who were exposed to statements which included issue positions, and then she garnered their overall impressions of the television advertisements. Specifically, ten true-false issue statements were presented to subjects. Although Garramone does not state where the issue items originated, the following is one example: "The nation should change its approach to solving social problems from a private-sector approach to a governmental approach." However, it is difficult to conceive how a viewer-impressionistic approach to content analysis of television advertisements could be reliable, given the extent to which issues and images are integrated both verbally and audio-visually in the overall affect of most television advertisements.

Lynda Lee Kaid and Keith Sanders define issue and image with some specificity. For them, "issue spots were considered to be those spots which were concerned with specific issues (such as jobs or roads) while image spots were those which were concerned with relating personal characteristics of the party leader or candidate without advocating any specific issue positions." However, when used in content analysis, their definitions could be subject to varying interpretations of what issue and image actually mean. They concluded that candidates can achieve higher evaluation with the presentation of issue information. This result may not only indicate a need for a change in the views of political practitioners, but also should allay some of the fears of political observers that image politics is tainting the democratic process.
In terms of content-recall, however, image-oriented television advertisements were the clear winner. Kaid and Sanders do not explain why "practitioners" would necessarily prefer higher evaluation of issues to lower content-recall of images, especially given the fact that television advertising is especially useful for influencing voters who are not particularly interested in issues. For such voters, image-recall is especially important; in fact, it dominates issue-recall even for those voters who state that they do not like image attacks. Strategists interviewed for this study generally agreed that image recall is their first priority.

Karen Johnson-Cartee and Gary Copeland focus their research exclusively on negative television advertising and define all negative messages as either political issue messages or personal characteristic issue messages. For them, "whether a negative ad uses a negative appeal directed at a traditional political issue such as stands on issues or whether it uses a personal characteristic issue such as religion, the negative appeal ultimately becomes a campaign issue." Not surprisingly, their findings indicate that voters generally view the former issue appeal more favourably than the latter. However, the definition of issues used by Johnson-Cartee and Copeland is so broad as to be essentially the same as image, which makes examination of image and issue content especially problematic.

Montague Kern took a more sophisticated approach to
defining issues by dividing them into two categories based on their ability to inform voters:

The first, platform ads, contain either a commitment by a candidate to a position, or a rationale for taking a position or opposing that of the opponent...ads could be included in it if a rationale is suggested in the ad concerning why a position should be favored or opposed. In slogan ads, by contrast, no prospective policy statement is made, nor is there a why statement or answer.\textsuperscript{57}

According to her study, the majority of issues used in television advertisements are vaguely defined and are not designed primarily to convey information. Seventy-one per cent of the television advertisements used in her study were slogan advertisements while only 29 per cent were platform advertisements.\textsuperscript{58}

Richard Joslyn delineated the most detailed conceptual framework for examining issues in television advertising, identifying four potential "approaches" to election campaigns: the "prospective policy choice approach," the "retrospective policy satisfaction approach," the "benevolent leader approach" and the "elections as ritual approach."\textsuperscript{59} Not surprisingly, the most dominant approach is the benevolent leader approach because it concentrates on creating general images of parties or candidates and pays minimal attention to issues; the least dominant approach is the prospective policy approach, which relies most heavily on issue-positioning. (See Chapter 1 of this study, pages 11-12, for an explanation of Joslyn's findings regarding the prospective policy approach).
Joslyn's analysis recognizes for the first time that issues have fundamentally different characteristics and serve different strategic purposes in election campaigns. He concludes that:

The lack of specific issue position appeals in the ads suggests that public policy positions are less important to campaigners than are the impressions of candidates that policy discussions leave with the voters. The typical issue-related information mentioned in these ads would certainly tell a citizen little about what public policies to expect a candidate to support. Since politicians are supposed to be conversant on issues, however, and policy questions cannot be ignored completely, they are used to communicate something about the candidate as a person.  

Unfortunately, Joslyn does not make a direct connection between issues as symbolic tools which may be used to promote images. Though he does distinguish between problem statements and statements of issue positions, such distinctions neglect to focus on the implications presented by a closer examination of the concept.

Joslyn identifies the lack of detail in discussing issues as resulting from the constraints of a thirty- to sixty-second television advertisement. However, he does not question why campaign strategists limit themselves to creating shorter television advertisements. In the early 1970s, for instance, although McClure and Patterson found that "the contribution of advertising campaigns to voter knowledge is truly impressive," the majority of the television advertisements included in their 1972 were of the 30-minute, 5-minute and 60-second variety. Shortening the average length is the result of a
conscious choice by parties and candidates and political strategists. There are some exceptions, including Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential campaign, and Steve Forbes in the 1996 Republican primaries. In modern campaigns, however, repetition of a few vague issue references is generally preferred by strategists to a more in-depth explanation of issues.

Joslyn also states that "television interferes with seeing elections as a choice between alternative policy futures and prevents election outcomes from representing the electorate’s ‘mandate’ for a particular program of governmental action," indicating that the "constraints" of television preclude detailed discussion of issues. However, as already mentioned, television advertising attempts to influence less-interested voters who get the bulk of their political information from television, and who would not normally view an election as a "choice between alternative policy futures." This is a circumstance that parties and candidates do not seem to mind, given the financial resources that they dedicate to television advertising.

Joslyn explores retrospective appeals separately from prospective appeals. The retrospective policy approach includes "blame-placing" and "credit-claiming" (and a residual category of issue-raising). He concludes that a retrospective appeal has considerable educative potential. Although admakers are not always careful about who is blamed
for or credited with what, retrospective ads can
give voters a policy-oriented information base upon
which to cast a vote. Policy decisions are
presented, defended and explained; causal
explanations are advanced and debated for social
and political phenomena; and public officials are
held accountable for previous promises and
actions.\textsuperscript{63}

However, when viewed in the context of the election
campaign, blame-placing and credit-taking issue appeals
normally deal with relatively minor issues, chosen more for
their controversial or emotional nature than for their
perceived substantive importance. As a result, retrospective
issue appeals are usually highly supportive of image
advertising. In the 1994 Michigan campaign, for example,
Wolpe used blame-placing to discuss a tax loophole for the
tobacco industry that cost schools "millions" in 1993. In
fact the amount was relatively minor given that it was a one-
year deal designed to compensate tobacco companies who were
faced with a permanent tax increase on tobacco products which
equalled many times this amount every year.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover,
according to public opinion polling conducted by the \textit{Detroit
Free Press}, the above-mentioned issue did not show up as
"overriding" for voters who were polled.\textsuperscript{65} The point is that
the tobacco vendors made a dramatic political target for a
televised political advertisement. Such blame-placing was
clearly made to depict opponents - in this case Michigan
Governor John Engler - as untrustworthy; indeed, the \textit{Detroit
Free Press} concluded that Wolpe's "ads reinforce the
impression that Democrats feel Wolpe's greatest attribute is
that he is not John Engler."  

After Wolpe launched his attack, Engler felt compelled to respond, so he stated that a Republican administration would ban tobacco advertising (while knowing, presumably, that it is beyond state authority to legally ban tobacco advertising since it is regulated solely by the federal government). By calling "or such a ban, Engler symbolically linked himself positively to the issue, and protected his image against Wolpe's direct attacks. In this case, the issue itself was secondary to building and diminishing images.

A New Typology of Issue "Modes"

There are two central considerations in working toward a better understanding of the symbolic role of issues in meta-advertising strategies. First, it is necessary to conceptualize issues in a way that allows for identification of not only the number of issue references in each televised advertisement but also their purposes; this requires that issues are categorized according to their relevance and specificity. Second, it is necessary to determine how and why issues are used over the course of a campaign: are one or two primary issues referenced, or are a number of relatively minor issues referenced?

The first step in comprehending the strategic uses of televised political advertising is to develop a typology of issues based on their purposes as campaign strategies. This
study identified five issue "modes" which have distinct strategic purposes: (1) issue-blaming, (2) issue-accusing, (3) issue-crediting, (4) issue-mentioning, and (5) issue-positioning. Issue-neutrality (where no issues are included) and issue-avoidance (where certain key issues are avoided) are separately considered in order to better understand how often and under what circumstances television advertising avoids issues.

**Issue-blaming** highlights specific past issue failures of opponents. Normally targeted at incumbents who lead in the public opinion polls by a significant margin, its objective is to criticize past issue decisions and relate them back to the opponent's image. Issue-blaming is a primary direct attack strategy which relies on image-oriented audio-visuals. It is not normally answered by the opponent who is attacked because the issues highlighted in issue-blaming are normally beyond dispute.

Little substance is normally found in issue-blaming; rather, the issues tend to be of lesser importance. When important issues are addressed, issue-blaming generally focuses on the most controversial aspects of the issues. In the following example, Engler was blamed for the premature death of at least one patient of Lafayette Clinic, a leading mental health facility in Michigan, after he ordered the clinic to be closed as part of an overall reduction in funding to public health care.
[Woman:] My sister went to Lafayette Clinic because no place else could help her. [Announcer:] It was a moment of horror and shame. State Troopers, forced to close down a mental health clinic, evicting dozens of terrified patients. Governor Engler has taken care of powerful special interests, but slashed care for the mentally ill, dumping thousands on our streets. [Woman:] Within months of Governor Engler closing the clinic, she died. [Announcer:] That's Engler's Michigan, not ours. 68

Issue-accusing more indirectly attacks opponents through innuendo, implication or allegation, instead of by relating specific examples of past mistakes. In the 1994 Michigan campaign, for example, the Democrats implied that Engler will tend to "side with corporate backers" instead of citizens on most issues. Engler repeatedly called Wolpe "too liberal." Yet, voters were left to decide for themselves what "too liberal" meant, although it was obviously believed that "too liberal" was a potent negative image.

The intention is to allege dishonesty or lack of integrity on the part of the opponent, or to imply that, because of the opponent's ideological leanings, he or she is incapable of taking equitable issue decisions. In the 1995 Ontario general election campaign, the New Democrats released a television advertisement which accused Liberal leader Lyn McLeod of not representing the interests of Ontarians.

Ontario has 38 per cent of Canada's population but next year we'll be hit with 54 per cent of the [federal] Liberal budget cuts. And Lyn McLeod said it was a fair budget. Who does she represent? 69

Issue-accusing generally lacks the emotional intensity of issue-blaming because it is not as directly attack-oriented.
It also lacks the specificity of issue-blaming, instead it casts doubt on the opponent's character, without necessarily giving concrete reasons. It is thus more common than issue-blaming in comparative advertising. Accusations possess other unique qualities, the most important being that they are future-oriented and, as such, they tend to attack the intentions and dispositions of the opponent. As a result, issue-accusing may elicit responses from the accused. Both issue-blaming and issue-accusing, however, utilize highly ambiguous language and dramatic, image-oriented audio-visuals. Both can also be seen together in the same television advertisement.

**Issue-crediting** represents classic positive television advertising. It is one-dimensional in the sense that only the sponsor of the advertisement is emphasised. For purposes of added legitimacy, issue-crediting often constructs images by using citizen or famous-person testimonials, or the voice of an announcer. Credit-oriented television advertisements are normally only used by incumbents and are the clearest attempt to reinforce a party leader's or candidate's image. For example, issue-crediting is almost universally presented by image-oriented audio-visuals, and it is specifically designed to be upbeat. The intention is to foster confidence in the party leader or candidate for the future. In Michigan, one of Engler's television advertisements, an announcer gave him credit for: "balancing the budget, cutting property taxes,
reforming welfare. Fuelling an economic recovery that leads the nation. Attracting new businesses, and creating more jobs than at any other time in history."71

Issue-mentioning the importance of core issues, such as lowering unemployment or ending poverty or reducing discrimination, without stating a specific course of action, is a convenient way to construct the party leader's or candidate's image since the emphasis is on constructing positive voter sentiment and not on delineating issues with distinct alternatives. While issue-mentioning allows for the appearance of innovation in terms of broader issues, such as the Liberal party's recognition of the need to create "jobs, jobs, jobs" in the 1993 Canadian federal election, it is far less specific and binding on the party leader or candidate than actually stating an issue position (an explanation of which will follow).

The significance of issue-mentioning is that, being prospective, it may be used by either the challenger or the incumbent. In the 1995 Ontario campaign, Conservative leader Mike Harris mentioned the salience of several key issues without elaborating a distinct course of action: "Harris's priorities are preserving our health care, maintaining law and order and providing funding and standards for the classroom."72 This example points to a potential difficulty with issue-mentioning: if a party leader or candidate is not careful, vague issue statements could become the raw material
for future issue-accusing. For example, Harris's opponent's challenged his integrity by calling him "irresponsible" for mentioning these "priorities" in conjunction with explicit promises to balance the budget and provide a 30 per cent reduction in Ontario personal income tax rates.

Issue-positioning usually appears to be the most innovative, the most issue specific and the most party- or candidate-centred. Instead of saying, "such-and-such is important" or "so-and-so did something wrong," positioning appeals say "I will do, or I stand for..." They are the promises made by party leaders or candidates, such as Harris's promise reduce personal income tax rates by 30 per cent, and McLeod's promise to reduce rates by 5 per cent. Issue-positioning is normally included in television advertisements with other issue modes. For example, a useful way to counteract potential boomerangs in comparative advertisements from issue-blaming and issue-accusing is to include issue-positioning. Conversely, issue-blaming may also be included in a television advertisement to offset the potential alienating effect that a concrete position may engender.

Therefore, issue-positioning is still primarily limited to appropriating the issues that resonate with voters and responding to the issues of opponents. As a result, it is limited in its capacity to articulate specific courses of action. Moreover, if the opponent decides to take the same or a similar issue position, the effectiveness of the issue as a
central defining characteristic of the campaign is lessened and the importance of issue considerations generally is weakened. Discussing an issue where party leaders or candidates agree is at best redundant and success of the party leader or candidate will increasingly depend on his or her image. This was the case in the Ontario general election when the Liberal Action Plan (the Liberal Party issue platform) represented a more moderate version of the Common Sense Revolution (the Progressive Conservative Party issue platform).

Issue modes are regularly used in distinct patterns in televised political advertisements which produce different strategic effects. Based on these patterns, the following three types of televised political advertising may be distinguished: direct attack, comparative and positive.

Direct attack advertising is a strategic targeting of an opponent, where the aim is to dismantle the opponent's image. Normally this is done by portraying the opponent as contrary to the "common good." Since it is considered important that direct attacks are phrased in ways which appear non-personally motivated, claims that can be "validated" by on-screen references to newspaper headlines have become popular visual strategies because they suggest rationality and fairness and honesty. Once reasons are given as to why voters should not support the opponent, the remaining alternative should be independently recognized by the voter.
Direct attack advertising is used less often than the other two television advertising types, partly for fear of a possible boomerang effect - which is why the sponsor is never directly referenced - and partly because direct attack advertising is particularly useful as a dependent and a responsive strategy. It depends, for example, on the issue record, values or actions of the opponent (i.e., alleged mistakes or blunders made by the opponent, before or even during the campaign). Direct attack television advertising may also be used as a negative response to such charges, or as a response to other factors, such as a general shift in popular support from the party leader or candidate to an opponent. Once a shift is recognized - especially when it is significant and seems to be gathering momentum - strategists are pressured to respond. A direct attack is usually viewed as the most effective response. In Ontario, for example, the Liberals responded to the Common Sense Revolution with the following advertisement:

The Conservatives and Mike Harris promise to balance the budget and cut income tax by an irresponsible and unrealistic 30 per cent. Do you really believe that Mike Harris can do what he says?...Don't vote for irresponsible promises. Vote for a realistic plan. Vote Liberal."

Direct attack advertising is potentially powerful in attacking opponents because it focuses on the opponent's issues and it relies exclusively on issue-blaming and issue-accusing to portray controversial and emotionally charged issues in a highly dramatic way. It also depends heavily on
image-oriented audio-visuals to support its verbal messages. Consequently, it can be used to construct an especially vivid political spectacle.

Positive advertising is useful when it reinforces a party leader's or candidate's image. Verbal references to issues and images focus on the sponsor of the advertisement, as do audio-visuals which are relatively image-oriented. The following example from the Michigan campaign was designed to portray Engler as a proven leader:

There's a new look to Michigan. A Michigan that's working. Led by a Republican Governor that kept his promises to put taxpayers first, reform welfare, and turn our state around. But the job's not finished. There is more work to do....

As a campaign strategy, therefore, positive advertising is normally reserved for front-runners who use issues and images that link past issues or current issues to future leadership potential, mostly through issue-crediting and issue-mentioning.

Comparative advertising is a negative advertising strategy because it incorporates both negative and positive issues and images. It is used to construct a party leader's or candidate's image by contrasting it to an opponent's weaknesses - whether real or perceived. As Edelman's analysis implies, party leaders or candidates cannot construct their images as superior alternatives in isolation; instead, they require opponents in order to arouse emotions and legitimate their own claims to power. Comparative advertisements are
especially legitimate when they use issue-positioning, which creates a sense that attacks against the opponent are justified on issue grounds. Party leaders or candidates objectify positive symbols, opponents objectify negative symbols.

Comparative advertising is normally more prevalent than the other two advertising types, especially in Canadian election campaigns. In the 1995 Ontario campaign, for example, comparative advertising accounted for 86 per cent of all television advertising conducted during the campaign. The comparable figure was 43 per cent for the 1994 Michigan campaign. Moreover, because comparative advertising usually includes the sponsor of the advertisement, it is normally less overtly attack-oriented than direct attack advertising.

Comparative advertisements normally open by stating something negative about an opponent's agenda (often through accusations) and close by promoting the sponsoring party or candidate as a worthy alternative (often through issue-positioning and issue-mentioning). The advantage of comparative advertising lies in its ability to relate an opponent's issues in a negative manner to the sponsor's alternative, which is always represented as calm, logical and forthright. The following Conservative advertisement attests to this strategy:

On jobs and taxes - Mike Harris knows cutting taxes is the best way to create good jobs. Lyn McLeod and her party brought in the payroll tax and hiked income taxes by hundreds of millions. Mike Harris
will cut income taxes for every ontario family. Lyn McLeod opposes income tax cuts to create jobs. What a difference...75

These patterns of meta-advertising strategies have remained generally unrecognized by observers of the political process, who often take for granted that issues are not constructed symbolic gestures framed by symbolic language. Theories of the political process that do not incorporate such an understanding of the role of symbols in constructing political spectacles contribute in their own way to spectacle construction because they fail to interpret the purposes of televised political advertising. The identification of the five issue modes and the three television advertising types demonstrates that issues do serve measurable, strategic image-building purposes in televised political advertising.

Endnotes

1. For example, see Schwartz; Luntz; and Trent and Friedenberg.

2. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, p. 112.


5. Lippman, Public Opinion, p. 239.

6. Ibid.

8. Personal interview with John Wright, Vice-president, The Angus Reid Group, June, 1995. Wright indicated that this was the trend in the 1995 Ontario general election campaign.


10. For example, see Kern, pp. 23-46 and Luntz, especially pp. 18-23.


15. *Ibid*.


22. See "Use Your Vote," Appendix 2.


26. Ibid.

27. McLuhan, p. 269.

28. Ibid.

29. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, p. 122.


31. Even more than newspapers, the majority of voters consider television to be the most legitimate source of available political information. See the Roper Organization, Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Media in a Time of Change (New York: Television Information, Undated).


34. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, p. 104.

35. For more on the uses of adwatchers, see Ansolabehere and Iyengar, especially pp. 137-142.


38. Clarke, et al., p. 40.


40. Ibid.


46. Ibid., p. 3.


56. Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, p. 11.


59. See Joslyn in Kaid, Nimmo and Sanders.


62. See Appendix 1 for a breakdown of spending on political advertising in the 1990 Ontario general election, and on television advertising in the 1993 federal election.


65. Ibid.


68. See "Lafayette Clinic," Appendix 2.

69. See "Liberal Budget Cuts," Appendix 2.

70. See "Keeping Promises I," Appendix 2.

71. See "Engler Keeping Michigan on Track," Appendix 2.


73. See "Do you Really Believe," Appendix 2.

74. See "Engler and the Republican Team," Appendix 2.

75. See "Jobs and Taxes," Appendix 2.
CHAPTER 3
MICRO AND MACRO CONTENT ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 identified five issues modes (issue-blaming, issue-accusing, issue-crediting, issue-mentioning and issue-positioning) and three television advertising types (direct attack, positive and comparative) that strategists regularly use to facilitate meta-advertising strategies. Based on these concepts, this chapter will develop a model for content analysis of televised political advertisements (outlined in Table 3-1) that accounts for the ways that political strategists structure and present images and issues in televised political advertising.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro Analysis</th>
<th>Macro Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)Image Content:</td>
<td>(1)Party or Candidate Status:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- verbal images</td>
<td>- front-runner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- audio-visual images</td>
<td>- challenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)Issue Content:</td>
<td>(2)Party Leader or Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- verbal issues</td>
<td>- personal style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- audio-visual issues</td>
<td>- opponent style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)Meta-advertising Content:</td>
<td>- incumbency style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dominant pres. style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- issue modes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- television advertising types</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Micro analysis (examination of advertisements individually) is based on a modified version of Shyles's model (see Chapter 1 of this study, pages 18-20). Image content

69
reports the total number of verbal references and the total number of audio-visual references to images for all the television advertisements. Issue content reports the total number of verbal references and the total number of audio-visual references to issues for all the television advertisements. Meta-advertising content reports the total number of television advertisements that are dominated by the image presentation style, the total number that are dominated by the issue presentation style, and the total number that are dominated by both presentation styles. It also identifies how the five issue modes are interknit with images in the three television advertising types.

Macro analysis (examination of the entire television advertising campaign) is used to identify the effects of three sets of variables on the development and the evaluation of the party's or candidate's image and issue messages: (1) party or candidate status is used to identify the effects of being the front-runner or the challenger; (2) party leader or candidate style is used to identify the effects of the party leader's or candidate's ability to communicate via the television medium; and (3) public opinion polling is used to identify the effects of external polling by the news media, and internal polling by strategists.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, an explanation of the three micro content analysis variables outlined in Table 3-1 will be undertaken, followed by a
similar explanation of the macro content analysis variables.

**Micro Content Analysis**

Strategists acknowledge that verbal and audio-visual communication are designed to work together to "align" their party or candidate with voters and influence their voting decisions. Micro analysis will deconstruct and separately analyze image and issue content in individual television advertisements.

(1) **Image Content**

Table 3-2 identifies the verbal and audio-visual variables that, according to Shyles, are the main contents of image advertising on television.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbal image content</th>
<th>Audio-visual image content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td><strong>Primary variables:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Voice of announcer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Motionless visuals of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>any candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Number of transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal character</td>
<td><strong>Secondary variables:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Background music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Motion visuals that do not contain any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>talking persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visuals of speech by citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visuals of speech by famous persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eight categories of verbal image content are regularly
used to construct the party leader’s or candidate’s image.²
An "image evaluation" is made when a particular word or phrase
matches one of the image terms and is used to refer to "an
attribute of a candidate’s role, character or personality."³
As the Democratic challenger in the 1992 U.S. presidential
election, Bill Clinton used television advertising to remind
voters of President George Bush’s 1988 campaign pledge: "read
my lips...you will be better off four years from now than you
are today." Then, an announcer says: "Well, it’s four years
later...how’re ya doing?"⁴ This advertisement was clearly
designed to cast doubt on Bush’s honesty.

Audio-visual image content is designed to catch and hold
viewers’ attention with "active" visuals of people (other than
the candidate) depicted in informal settings. The one audio
variable considered significant is background music, which
supplements the visual communication of television
advertisements. In the "Daisy" advertisement, which was
produced for Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 presidential re-election
campaign, a young girl is shown picking petals off a daisy.
As she counts the petals, she suddenly looks startled. The
visual switches to an atomic bomb mushroom cloud, and a voice
begins a "countdown" - "ten, nine, eight...."⁵ The young girl
is meant to symbolise innocence in contrast to the mushroom
cloud, which symbolises Republican presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater’s perceived penchant for militaristic action.⁶
(2) Issue Content

Table 3-3 identifies the issues that were used in the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial election campaign and the 1995 Ontario general election campaign, and the audio-visual variables that, according to Shyles, are the main contents of issue advertising on television.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbal issue content</th>
<th>Audio-visual issue content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Ontario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Crime                | Budget/deficit            | **Primary variables:**
| Economy              | Crime                     | Any candidate dressed
| Environment          | Economy                   | formally
| Health Care          | Education                 | Voice of any candidate
| Schools              | Employment equity         | Any candidate oriented
taxes                  | Federal government        | directly to camera
| Welfare              | General growth            | **Secondary variables:**
| Health care          | Health care               | Visual of speech by
| Jobs                 | Jobs                      | any candidate
| Taxes                | Taxes                     |
| Welfare              | Welfare                   |

Shyles defined issues as "current topics linked to the national interest," such as "Carter's record as President, domestic issues, and the economy." This study follows a more strict definition of issues as "specific policy stands," and therefore excludes some of Shyles's issue categories, such as "national well-being," which was his most frequently coded issue category. In the 1992 presidential campaign, presidential candidate Ross Perot used 7, 30-minute television advertisements (so-called "infomercials") to make statements such as: "the issue is the economy."
Audio-visual issue content is marked by "inactive" visuals of candidates in speech, directly oriented to the camera, and dressed formally. In his 30-minute television advertisements, Perot was shown seated at a desk, directly facing the television camera, explaining the contents of his numerous charts and graphs to the audience.

(3) Meta-advertising Content

Analysis of meta-advertising content begins by identifying the most dominant presentation style for each of the television advertisements. A presentation style is coded as dominant if at least two of the audio-visual categories are used in the television advertisement for a minimum of five seconds each. With this approach, both presentation styles will dominate in some advertisements. Meta-advertising analysis also reports the total number of issue references used in the campaign, broken down by issue mode and television advertising type.

Macro Content Analysis

(1) Party or Candidate Status

A party's or candidate's status as front-runner (defined in this study as the party or candidate who leads in the public opinion polls, whether incumbent or not) or challenger (defined in this study as the party or candidate who trails in the public opinion polls, whether incumbent or not) is a key
predictor of the way that particular issue modes and television advertising types are used.

Front-runners normally want to "stay the course." They tend to rely heavily on issue-mentioning in positive television advertising as a way to appear innovative, and they make minimal use of direct attack television advertising, which is a fundamental challenger strategy. On the eve of the 1990 Ontario general election campaign, for example, support for the incumbent Liberals hovered at around 50 per cent in public opinion polls. As a result, Liberal strategists used a typical front-runner advertising strategy - that is, largely positive television advertisements which used especially vague references to issues and asked voters to give David Peterson, the party's leader, a second mandate to implement his "vision." At the same time, the New Democrats and the Conservatives ran typical challenger campaigns. The New Democrats used a series of direct attack television advertisements against the Liberals, one of which featured television news reporters who presented pieces of simulated news stories about Liberal scandals and other negative stories about the government.

Front-runners who are also incumbents have the added advantage of using issues symbolically to generate "goodwill." Issue-crediting and issue-mentioning are fixed strategies for front-running incumbents: given their positions in government, incumbents possess the ability to move beyond promises by
implementing popular issues. Sometimes these issues take effect immediately prior to an election and allocate specific benefits to targeted voter audiences. One month before the start of the 1972 presidential campaign, for example, a note was enclosed with social security payments to approximately twenty-five million voters. The note read: "Your social security payment has been increased by 20% starting with this month’s check by a new statute enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Richard Nixon on July 1, 1972." Moreover, once such benefits are bestowed, issue-crediting draws attention to — and sometimes considerably enhances — the benefits or potential benefits of the issue.

Front-runners are also able to surround themselves with potent symbols of incumbency. In Michigan, for example, Engler’s last 5 television advertisements (45 per cent of the total television advertisements created in the campaign) incorporated formal references to Engler as the incumbent Governor; for example, speaking to the voters from the Governor’s Office.

Challengers tend to project the most substantive issue agendas because they must provide justification for a shift in voter support. Judith Trent and Robert Friedenberg found that challengers are particularly vulnerable to possible boomerang effects because they are less familiar to voters, and their campaign thus serves more directly as a symbolic representation of how they will behave upon being elected. If
challengers directly attack the front-runners too frequently, the impression they construct of themselves may be less as an innovator and more as a ruffian. Ontario Conservative Party leader Mike Harris, for example, was nick-named "Mike the Knife" by some journalists. The party's response was to use relatively negative and directly comparative television advertising that did not include Harris, and positive television advertisements which included him only visually (i.e., shaking hands with voters while the announcers delivered the verbal messages).

Directly attacking the issues of front-runners and calling for some form of symbolic change through issues is thus standard practice for challengers. As Murray Edelman points out, successful leaders must appear to challenge the status quo, which is most critical for challengers. Trent and Friedenberg argue that not only must challengers create a need for change, "voters must also be persuaded that the challenger is the candidate most likely to produce more desirable conditions or policies."17 According to them, convincing voters of a need for change is accomplished by: attacking opponents' records, taking the opposite position on the key issues of the campaign, emphasizing optimism for a new future, emphasizing traditional values over value changes (though the issues must be new, they must also reinforce majority values and not create new ones),18 appearing to represent the philosophical centre of the party and delegating personal
image attacks to surrogates. 19

Given these relationships between party or candidate status and television advertising strategy, the implication is that the degree of competition between parties or candidates—that is, close versus one-sided—will shed further light on how issues and television advertising types are used. In particular, the more significant the front-runner's lead in the public opinion polls, the more probable it will be that the challenger will make even more dramatic attempts to differentiate from the front-runner on key issues. In other words, when challengers have little to lose, they will tend to make greater use of direct attack television advertising. At the same time, front-runners will tend to make greater use of positive television advertising.

(2) Party Leader or Candidate Style

Shyles identified separate image and issue presentation styles. However, the issue presentation style is sometimes used to present party leader or candidate images, depending on the particular image-building needs of the party leader or candidate, and the opponent's personal style and image-building needs. Moreover, these two factors are closely related to party or candidate status.

According to Dan Nimmo, there are three interwoven aspects to "personal candidate style" on television: how the party leader or candidate performs on the medium (comfort with
the camera), his or her personal qualities (ability to project feelings and emotions that the voter can sympathize with) and his or her political knowledge (grasp of issues and general astuteness and knowledge).\textsuperscript{20} The first two are more image-related variables, the last one is more issue-related. For example, party leaders or candidates who are publicly perceived as having a good grasp of the issues will tend to personally deliver issues more often than would otherwise be the case, regardless of status or other variables. Bob Rae, the New Democratic Party leader, is a good example of a party leader who was widely perceived as having a good grasp on the issues, regardless of voters' evaluations of his party.\textsuperscript{21}

By contrast, party leaders or candidates who project well on television but who are not widely perceived as strong on the issues will tend to concentrate on highly image-oriented television advertisements which use few issues or avoid issues altogether. Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, for example, was able to "personalize" television and used it to project a range of positive emotions in his face and in his voice which gave the overall impression that he genuinely cared for the audience. As a result, Reagan was the central focus in much of his television advertising. By contrast, Walter Mondale, a former senator and vice president, is an example of a politician who was not able to personally connect with the television camera, and consistently gave the impression of being tense and aloof. As a result, instead of using him in
television advertisements, his strategists used surrogates to construct his image.

An opponent's personal style can also determine whether a party leader's or candidate's own personal style is projected or concealed, and can amplify the deficiencies in a party leader's or candidate's own personal style. In the 1993 Canadian federal election, for example, former Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell appeared cold and unapologetic in explaining her party's rationale for broadcasting the controversial direct attack television advertisements against federal Liberal Party leader Jean Chretien. At the same time, Chretien appeared sincere and vulnerable as he spoke to the media about his life-time "affliction."

Campbell's inept personal style solidified her already weak image, especially after the media scrutinized her handling of the boomerang, and gave her strategists little latitude to alter her image for the better with positive televised advertising. Moreover, Campbell's failures strengthened Chretien's image in light of the inevitable comparison of his and Campbell's responses to the boomerang effect from the advertisement.22 As a result, a new series of Liberal television advertisements featured Chretien using the issue presentation style. Meanwhile, the Conservative's abandoned Campbell in their televised advertisements and turned to issue-blaming, issue-accusing and the image presentation style to try and stop the shift in support to the
Liberals.

Party leader or candidate style will also differ depending on party or candidate status (as outlined in the preceding section). In particular, Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson profile two distinct "videostyles," one for front-runners and one for challengers, which are based on verbal, nonverbal and film/video production techniques of front-runners and challengers.\(^2\)

In general, the [front-runner] (1) uses 'longer commercials; (2) uses more testimonials; (3) uses more candidate-positive focus; (4) uses more slides with print; (5) dresses more formally; (6) is represented by an announcer or other voice; (7) verbally and visually stresses 'competence.' In general, the challenger (1) uses more opposition-negative focus in ads; (2) uses cinema verite style; (3) uses ads where candidate appears 'head-on'; (4) uses more frequent eye contact with camera and audience; (5) dresses more casually; (6) speaks for self more frequently - is not represented by surrogates.\(^3\)

Depending on the party leader's or candidate's personal style, he or she may be more or less able to pursue a particular videostyle. Challengers, for example, are expected to appear more often in their television advertising, and they use the most negative television advertising. However, if a challenger has a weak personal style, conducting comparative television advertising will be problematic. Therefore, the extent to which each party leader or candidate deviates in their campaign from their expected videostyle is a partial reflection of their personal candidate style.
(3) Public Opinion Polling

Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates maintain that the complexity of modern campaigning has necessitated "campaign strategies that unfold in predictable stages, [and] political advertising styles that have become repetitive." They identify four distinct phases of a political advertising campaign: (1) name identification and recognition phase (who is the candidate?); (2) argument phase (what does the candidate stand for?); (3) attack phase (how is the candidate a better alternative to his or her opponents?); and (4) the summary phase (did the candidate come across as sincere?).

However, the dynamics of modern campaigns necessitate a certain degree of departure from this conventional pattern. Evidence suggests, for example, that the choice of issues in televised political advertising and the uses of each of the television advertising types depend on variables that are unique to each campaign, many of which are determined by internal (or private) opinion polling conducted by the parties or candidates for their own strategic uses.

Since both internal and external poll results are viewed by voters as inherently legitimate, constructing political spectacles through them is fairly easy, relatively inexpensive (given the benefits they bestow on campaign strategy) and definitely immediate. Internal polling is in fact employed by strategists at every stage of a campaign as intelligence or raw material for constructing party or candidate images.
As Susan Herbst points out:

Candidates tend to tailor their policy statements not to cohere with their own ideologies, but to fit the most recent poll results. Indeed, consultants encourage this. Some critics believe this to be an ominous development and potentially damaging to democratic campaigning, since polls may discourage candidates from speaking their minds.29

In particular, demographic and psychographic analyses indicate not only which voter audiences vote on a regular basis, but also what characteristics define these voter audiences.

Strategists agree that one of the most important strategic uses for internal polling is to determine the "winning" issues for their campaign.30 Such issues are normally those that tap into voters' emotions; in Michigan and Ontario, these were "angry" issues. The sequencing of television advertisements during the campaign and the length of the broadcast period identify the reasons why certain issues are used in the campaign - i.e., to define a candidate's or opponent's image, or to respond to an opponent's issues, general shifts in the public opinion polls, or other contextual variables.

Sequencing identifies how strategists use the three advertising types to execute these strategies. Direct attack television advertisements, for example, tend to saturate the airwaves, but only for a relatively short period of time. Then, the direct attack - and the issues which form the basis for the attack - disappears in favour of a new direct attack.31 Strategists determine the sequence of new
television advertisements and the duration of their broadcast period by daily tracking of each television advertisement's success in saturating the target market or counteracting the strategies of their opponents.

Internal polling also indicates which issues to avoid in the campaign. In the 1995 Ontario campaign, for example, "same-sex benefits" was expected to become a major campaign issue, yet it remained a peripheral issue throughout the campaign - perhaps being too much of a hot-button issue. Hence, identifying the issues that are ignored by parties and candidates in their campaigns may be equally informative in identifying meta-advertising strategies.

Internal opinion polls may also be selectively leaked to the news media if they can be used to support the party's or candidate's image-building strategies. Dan Nimmo and James Combs refer to this phenomenon as "polltalk." The way questions are worded also makes a difference to poll results; for example, almost three-fourths of respondents in a nationwide poll agreed that "the right of a woman to have an abortion should be left to the woman and her doctor." But, when asked - "Do you support legalized abortion up to three months of pregnancy?" - the response was evenly split. As a result, internal polling may be important not so much because it measures public opinion, but because it can sometimes be used to construct public opinion.
Conclusion

Content analysis of televised political advertising normally examines the content of individual advertisements without taking into account the context within which they are designed. Shyles' examination of individual televised political advertisements points to the existence of an ideal model of issue and image presentation that campaign strategists generally hold, at least in theory. In actual practice, however, these same strategists also report that they regularly deviate from this ideal model because of the necessity to pursue meta-advertising strategies. This is an aspect of campaign strategy that other researchers of televised political advertising and campaign strategy, including Shyles, have not considered.

It is therefore necessary to expand on Shyles' model to include analysis of the logical structure of entire campaigns. Strategists interviewed for this study indicated that a number of macro variables are crucial in accounting for the television advertising strategies that they adopt in their campaigns, and how they use issues and images throughout a campaign. Macro content analysis is thus useful because it calls attention to the reasons behind the choice of issues and how they are presented during the campaign.
Endnotes

1. Evidenced by other studies, such as by Shyles, and by strategists from the Republican Party in Michigan and the Conservative, New Democratic and Liberal parties in Ontario, all of whom were personally interviewed for this study.

2. See Appendix 3 for an explanation of each image category.


4. This advertisement is entitled "Remember 2."

5. The "Daisy" advertisement was sixty seconds long and was broadcast only once, although it was re-broadcast by the news media many times thereafter.


7. See Appendix 3 for an explanation of the issues used in Michigan and Ontario.


9. See chapter 1 of this study, p. 3.


12. Gagnon and Rath, p. 3.
13. "Vision" was a series of positive advertisements which served as the centrepiece of the Liberal advertising campaign.

14. This series of New Democratic television advertisements was called "Send the Liberals a Message."


16. This particular advantage is also discussed by Trent and Friedenberg, pp. 65-68.

17. Ibid., p. 79.

18. Ibid., pp. 82-83

19. Ibid., p. 79.


22. For more on the television advertising strategies used in the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign, see Gosselin and Soderlund, "Advertising Strategies in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election."


24. Ibid., p. 199.


26. Ibid., pp. 302-345.


29. Herbst, p. 121.

30. This sentiment was shared by all of the strategists who were personally interviewed for this study from Michigan and Ontario, and is a key conclusion of Luntz's survey of American pollsters.

31. This is a classic strategy of Michael Murphy, a national American political advertising strategist.

CHAPTER 6

THE 1994 MICHIGAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

The U.S. national mood going into the 1994 mid-term elections was decidedly cynical. In fact, the Detroit Free Press called cynicism the "No. 1 factor in this year's elections."\(^1\) The convenient scapegoat for the country's economic and social ills seemed to be the poor. Getting "tough on crime" and reforming welfare were the key issues of almost every election campaign; they were popular mainly because they were potent symbols of what was "wrong" with American society. Crime and welfare also provided an opportunity for leaders to construct dramatic issues. Every candidate seemed to have an innovative remedy to the crime and welfare "problems." Michigan was no exception.

Even though Michigan did not traditionally lean toward the right side of the political spectrum,\(^2\) Republican Governor John Engler had successfully advocated conservative issues during his first four years in office and during the 1994 election campaign he moved even further to the right - presenting himself as virtually a one man crime-fighting, tax-cutting and union-breaking machine. Engler led in the public opinion polls by a wide margin from the start of the campaign and his popularity grew steadily over the campaign period (see Table 4-8, page 133, for a breakdown of the external poll results reported in the campaign). The first public opinion poll was reported on September 6, 1994 and indicated that 50
per cent of respondents supported Engler and 32 per cent supported Democratic challenger Howard Wolpe.\textsuperscript{3} Engler, therefore, entered the campaign with an 18 per cent lead over Wolpe in the public opinion polls, which peaked at a 30 per cent lead on October 28, 1994.

As a result, on November 8, 1994, Engler won a landslide victory over Wolpe; the final vote was 64 per cent for Engler and 36 per cent for Wolpe. The Republicans also won a slim majority in the state legislature. Throughout the campaign, however, both candidates treated the public opinion polls with suspicion, a result of the upset victory Engler had won in 1990 over Democratic incumbent James Blanchard. In this election, Engler trailed Blanchard for most of the campaign by almost the same amount that Wolpe trailed Engler in the 1994 campaign. Bryan Flood indicated that the Republican campaign was nervous that Michigan voters would be similarly fickle toward Engler. For inspiration during the campaign, Wolpe carried with him a newspaper clipping that proclaimed Engler's imminent defeat and Blanchard's almost certain win. Both Engler and Wolpe truly believed that a second upset was possible, and built their television advertising strategies around this assumption.\textsuperscript{4}

Beginning approximately one year before the election, internal public opinion polling by strategists from both campaigns pointed to similar conclusions. Particularly relevant was Engler's negative image as something of a
"playground bully" as opposed to Wolpe's generally positive image as "nice" and especially decent. These results were expected. Engler was plagued by a poor image throughout most of his first term as Governor. His strength going into the 1994 election was his claim to conservative values, and, because of this, he used a few issues - such as crime and welfare reform - to improve his image and modify his leadership profile from a friend of the rich and an enemy of schoolchildren to a leader who believes in "personal responsibility." In fact, when asked what the primary issue of the campaign was, one Engler strategist said "style's the issue - character's the issue." This being the case, it is no wonder that improving Engler's "style" and "character" image were key campaign themes.

Engler's strategists tackled his image problems (and Wolpe's positive image) on two separate fronts. The first was to "humanize" Engler. Instead of retreating from his conservative values to soften and improve his image, public opinion polls indicated that it was more prudent to actually portray Engler as more unyielding on conservative issues than he actually was, thereby attempting to associate tough issues with Engler's image, thereby constructing his image as tough - but fair. The Detroit Free Press remarked in several articles that Engler had become a crime fighting "zealot" during the 1994 election year. For example, on October 7, 1994, almost mid-campaign, Engler held a press conference to
sign a "zero tolerance" bill. For students caught taking guns and other weapons into schools, the penalty was nothing less than automatic expulsion, with no second chances. The Governor brought a female teacher to the press conference who had been threatened by a gun-wielding student. The teacher praised the governor for his efforts in creating the legislation. Engler also showed the gun to the television camera. At the time it was not known whether the legislation was even constitutional, yet Wolpe did not challenge its constitutionality because of its popularity with voters.

The press conference was a dramatic moment that was also designed to target Wolpe - who was shown disagreeing with certain particulars of the legislation - as weak and indecisive. This marks the second part of Engler's strategy, which was to drub Wolpe as "a 1970s style tax and spend liberal.” Such attacks intertwined Wolpe's image as a conciliator and negotiator negatively with traditional liberal values (i.e., calling Wolpe "weak on crime"), and equated both with ineffective leadership. Moreover, Engler had already laid claim to all of the potent issues; as Bryan Flood, Engler's Communications Director, remarked: "the Governor took the big issues away, there were not a lot of issues left for Wolpe." Crime, taxes, welfare and education were "off the table." This became "reasonably obvious during the campaign as Wolpe began visibly scrambling for issues to which he could attach himself. Even during the 1994 primary, Bill
Ballenger, a noted observer of Michigan politics, remarked that Wolpe "was pounded relentlessly by Engler as an out-of-touch 1970s liberal wimp." This strategy was typical of many Republican campaigns in the 1994 mid-term elections because the sentiments expressed by voters in the Michigan campaign tended to be typical of those expressed by voters across the United States.

In sharp contrast to Engler's image, Howard Wolpe was consistently viewed as so decent that the Detroit Free Press actually said he might be "too nice" to be an effective political leader. In a full-page profile of Wolpe, the newspaper said that Wolpe may actually be "too deferential. Too ready to persuade rather than pummel." Because he was not on side with the issues, he attempted to align voters by personally presenting his issues. Yet Wolpe's strategists focused more attention on Engler's negative image; for example, a sign on the wall of the Wolpe campaign office read "ABE" - Anybody But Engler. And this is how Wolpe ran his campaign, so much so in fact that one journalist commented that Wolpe's "strategy seemed based on an assumption that the governor is so universally loathed that merely reminding voters that Mr. Wolpe is not the governor would inspire them to change the occupant of the executive office."

It became clear by the end of the first half of the campaign that a single strategy of attacking Engler through direct attack and comparative television advertising would not
work. The strategy failed for three reasons. First, internal and external polls showed that Engler's "get tough" message and claim to conservative values was firmly aligned with a majority of voters. Second, Wolpe was "too nice" to personally deliver his campaign's negative messages in a believable fashion, even though his strategists insisted he do so. Third, although opinion polls indicated that Engler was not well liked, the reasons may have had more to do with a feeling by voters that they did not know him, and not—as Wolpe's strategists assumed—that voters simply loathed him.

When it became clear that Wolpe needed an issue agenda of his own, he adopted peripheral issues, such as funding for charter schools and tax loopholes for the tobacco industry. These and other issues used in the Wolpe campaign were "reincarnated" from Engler's record, where Wolpe could use issue-blaming and issue-accusing. Given that Engler dominated the central issues, Wolpe perhaps had little choice. This is because Wolpe could not be seen by voters as agreeing with the Governor; instead, he had to position himself as an alternative to Engler. At the same time, however, Wolpe could not be seen as supporting the opposite issue agenda to Engler because of the conservative backlash sweeping through Michigan.
Micro Content Analysis

(1) Image Content

Tables 4-1 and 4-2 report the verbal and audio-visual image references used by both candidates for each television advertising type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN PER AD</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER TYPE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 21 television advertisements. equals 10.5 minutes; 3 direct attack, 9 positive and nine comparative. The mean is the average number of occurrences per advertisement.

Table 4-1 indicates that experience and leadership were the most salient verbal images, followed by honesty and altruism.
### TABLE 4-2
SECONDS AND RATES OF AUDIO-VISUAL IMAGE PRESENTATION BY TYPE*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Direct seconds</th>
<th>Attack rate**</th>
<th>Positive seconds</th>
<th>Positive rate</th>
<th>Comparative seconds</th>
<th>Comparative rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice Announcer</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still Candidate</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitions (#)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live non-talk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual talking</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual talking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>famous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>192 (64.0)</td>
<td>467 (51.9)</td>
<td>436 (48.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 21 television advertisements, equals 10.5 minutes  
** - rates are in seconds per 30 second advertisement (except for totals) for each television advertising type. Transitions in actual numbers.

Together, tables 4-1 and 4-2 show that even though direct attack advertising did not contain the most verbal images per advertisement, it did contain the most audio-visual images per advertisement. In fact, when rates of audio-visual image referencing for each variable are summed, the total for direct attack advertising is 64.0, which is the most seconds that were devoted to promoting audio-visual images by any of the three television advertising types. Particularly important was the voice of announcers to deflect potential boomerang effects. An announcer was used an average of 26.7 seconds per direct attack advertisement, roughly double the average found in comparative advertising and almost triple that found in positive advertising. Also important in direct attack
advertising was (rather sinister) still photos of the opponent. For example, Wolpe's direct attack advertisements featured a still photo of Engler which prompted the Detroit Free Press to say that "[t]he Democrats, using a picture of Engler that's not flattering, essentially are saying: 'Just look at this guy. You know he's up to no good'."17

The fact that neither candidate actually speaks in their direct attack advertisements creates a news-story effect. Using announcers to deliver negative messages also offers added legitimacy to direct attack advertising because the announcer is a supposed neutral observer - "telling it like it is" - and because announcers are often chosen for their commanding voices.18 Overall, negative narratives, coupled with black and white close-up still photos of the opponent, construct an intense negative visual image. While background music was used sparingly in comparison to the other television advertising types, it was dramatic and foreboding.

Positive advertising relied especially heavily on audio-visuals of the candidate and citizen testimonials to enhance the positive verbal references to images. While comparative and positive advertising both used the voice of an announcer to supplement candidate speech, in comparative advertisements the announcer delivered the negative segment of the advertisement, while in positive advertisements the announcer praised the accomplishments or potential of the candidate.

Background music was intertwined with verbal
communication in positive and comparative advertising. The
tone of the music was upbeat and energizing in positive
advertising. In comparative advertising, the tone of the
music changed dramatically, depending on whether the candidate
or the opponent was the focus of the advertisement.

(2) Issue Content

Tables 4-3 and 4-4 report the verbal and audio-visual
issue references used by both candidates for each television
advertising type.

| TABLE 4-3 |
| FREQUENCY, PROPORTION AND MEANS OF VERBAL ISSUE REFERENCES FOR ALL ADVERTISEMENTS BY TYPE* |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | DIRECT | ATTACK | POSITIVE | COMPARATIVE |
| Crime | 1 | 5 | 9 | 27.8 |
| Education | 1 | 4 | 7 | 22.2 |
| Taxes | 1 | 6 | 2 | 16.7 |
| Welfare | - | 5 | 2 | 13.0 |
| Health care | 1 | 1 | 4 | 11.1 |
| Economic | - | 3 | - | 5.6 |
| Environment | - | - | 2 | 3.7 |
| **TOTAL** | 4 | 24 | 26 | 100.0 |
| **MEAN PER AD** | 1.33 | 2.67 | 2.89 | 2.57^10 |

* - based on 21 television advertisements, equals 10.5
minutes. The mean is the average number of occurrences
per advertisement.

The most dominant issues of the campaign mirrored the
most dominant issues for voters. For example, an EPIC-MRA
poll released on September 6, 1994 indicated that crime was
the number one issue for 31 per cent of the voters who were surveyed, followed by education reform (16 per cent), taxes/government reform (14 per cent) and health care (12 per cent). For campaign purposes, therefore, the candidates adopted the issues that were most important to voters. This was no accident. Even when these issues did not match the candidate's personal issue preferences, the issues became central campaign issues anyway, and the candidate's stand on the issue was framed (or "adjusted," as one strategist put it)\textsuperscript{20} by strategists to fit the most popular line of reasoning.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Seconds and Rates of Audio-Visual Issue Presentation by Type*}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Direct & Attack & Positive & Comparative \\
 & seconds & rate** & seconds & rate & seconds & rate \\
\hline
Formal dress & - & - & 37 & 4.1 & 45 & 5.0 \\
Voice candidate & - & - & 97 & 10.8 & 106 & 11.8 \\
Candidate direct & - & - & 66 & 7.3 & 84 & 9.3 \\
Visual talking & - & - & 104 & 11.6 & 88 & 9.8 \\
candidate & & & & & & \\
\hline
TOTAL*** & - & (-) & 304 & (33.8) & 323 & (35.9) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

* - based on 21 television advertisements, equals 10.5 minutes
\textsuperscript{**} - rates are in seconds per 30 second advertisement for each television advertising type
\textsuperscript{***} - see endnote number 16

The results in Table 4-4 support the findings of image content analysis. While direct attacks used the most audio-visual image references, they used zero audio-visual issue references. This is because, according to Shyles, the issue presentation style is candidate-centred, and direct attack
advertising requires the use of announcers instead of the candidate to distance him or her from a possible boomerang effect. Comparative and positive advertising, however, used a mixture of the issue presentation variables, relying especially heavily on the voice of candidates and visuals of candidates talking.

(3) Meta-advertising Content

Tables 4-1 through 4-4 report similar statistical findings to Shyles's study. However, Table 4-5 highlights the presentation styles that dominated for each television advertising type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-5</th>
<th>PRESENTATION STYLE BY TYPE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue style</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image style</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both styles</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - 21 television advertisements, equals 10.5 minutes

Two of the 3 direct attack advertisements used in the campaign were created by Wolpe, as were 7 of the 9 comparative advertisements. Engler created 8 of the 9 positive advertisements.

Eighteen of the 21 advertisements were either dominated by the image presentation style or were dominated by both presentation styles. The image presentation style was the
exclusive style of direct attack advertising, which coincides with micro analysis of image and issue content. However, the image presentation style also dominated comparative and positive advertising. The significance of this distinction rests in Garramone's understanding that verbal communication is normally overshadowed by audio-visual communication. To the extent that this is true, the vast majority of televised political advertisements, although they included a respectable number of references to issues, were essentially dominated by image advertising.

The issue presentation style was only dominant in three advertisements.²¹ Although one of these included only verbal references to issues (which would be expected), a second advertisement did not include a single verbal reference to issues. This advertisement featured Wolpe, speaking directly to the camera, urging the audience to "take a good look at this face, because John Engler's going to try to bash it in."²² Wolpe went on to say the following:

I'll talk straight, tell you the differences, and while we won't agree on everything, I bet at the end of this campaign, most of you will figure I'll be a governor who looks out for you. Straight talk, in black and white, coming this fall.²³

Wolpe's strategists believed that this message would symbolize Engler's "bull dog" mentality while showing Wolpe as rising above Engler's "tactics."²⁴

Only one advertisement was true to Shyles's definition of the issue presentation style. "Strategy Plan" is a positive
advertisement which features Engler in the Governor's office,
dressed formally and speaking directly to the camera
throughout the advertisement. He speaks about his "strategy
plan," which he holds up to the camera, and claims that "this
plan for a better Michigan is the next promise I'm going to
keep." This advertisement combines symbols of incumbency
(to be discussed in the next section) with issue-mentioning
and to a lesser extent issue-positioning. However, it was
first broadcast on October 28, 1994, which was after the
public opinion polls found that Engler had roughly double
Wolpe's support. This fact, along with the popularity of the
conservative agenda, made "issue advertising" a less risky
strategy for Engler. The motivation in using the
advertisement was to create a clear mandate for his next four
years in office.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of image and issue
presentation styles is the number of advertisements where both
styles are dominant. These advertisements provide some of the
clearest examples of how issues and images are combined for
image-building purposes. In Michigan, "Wolpe and Wife"
attest to this strategy. In this advertisement, Wolpe sits
with his wife and speaks directly to the camera. However, as
he addresses various campaign issues, the camera switches away
from him and visually dramatizes the issue. For example, as
Wolpe begins to speak about education reform, the camera
switches to a scene which shows him teaching a university
class, then the camera switches back to Wolpe.

Although Loth candidates tended to use the image presentation style as their fixed presentation style, the issue modes that were used by each of the candidates in their advertising differed considerably. Table 4-6 profiles the uses of the issue modes by each candidate in each television advertising type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Attack</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Comparative TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engler</td>
<td>Wolpe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 21 television advertisements, equals 10.5 minutes

**Direct Attack Advertising**

All the tables combine to show that direct attack advertising targets a relatively narrow range of controversial issues and presents them exclusively in the image presentation style. Thus, image-oriented audio-visuals reinforce the controversial and emotional nature of direct verbal attacks on an opponent's issues and images and are the foremost way to decry the opponent's image.
Incumbents hesitate to use issue-blaming, so Engler tended to incorporate issue-accusing into his direct attack and comparative advertisements. The two primary reasons for this have already been highlighted. First, because Engler enjoyed a wide lead in the public opinion polls, his strategists were confident that they could therefore avoid the risk of a boomerang effect from a direct attack. Second, because Wolpe's record on issues was somewhat limited, fewer opportunities were created for issue-blaming by Engler. Wolpe did use issue-blaming, although not as often as might be expected, given the extent to which he trailed Engler in the public opinion polls. This indicates that even when challengers trail by a wide margin in the public opinion polls and need to construct a dramatic spectacle in order to shift the campaign momentum, direct attack advertising is considered a risky strategy.

Yet Wolpe did release some direct attacks against Engler. The following example indicates how issues are intertwined with audio-visual images in Wolpe's direct attack advertising. The issue of school reform is used to dichotomize the needs of schoolchildren (a symbol of family) with those of the tobacco industry, which was then expanded to say that Engler consciously subordinated the needs of schoolchildren to those of the wealthy, who are represented in the advertisement as the "far right."

Our children. Can we trust John Engler with their future? In his school tax scheme, Engler allowed a
loophole for the tobacco lobby that cost schools millions. Now Engler's plan will funnel millions more from public to private schools, including a network of home schools, sponsored by the far right, where parents teach a curriculum of creationism and fundamentalist doctrine. Feeding tax dollars to the right — stealing them from our kids. We just can't trust Engler.26

The advertisement also indirectly equates Wolpe's image in a positive way with the symbols of family and the "common man." For example, the advertisement ends by saying that Engler is stealing taxdollars from "our" kids, and, therefore, "we" can't trust Engler.

Positive Advertising

When candidates are satisfied with their image they will tend to reinforce it by using positive advertising27 which incorporates a relatively high frequency of positive verbal issue references (issue-crediting, issue-mentioning, and issue-positioning), and reinforces them with audio-visual issues and images.28 The high rate of verbal issue and image referencing is in keeping with the fact that since there was little chance of a boomerang effect against Engler in his positive advertising, he tended to appear in it, or was referenced in it, as a fixed strategy. The high rate of audio-visual image and issue referencing results from surrogates — announcers and citizens — who were used to praise the candidate both personally and in terms of his issues.

Issues are regularly used in positive advertising to reinforce a candidate's image. In Michigan, this strategy
typically followed three stages: (1) issue-crediting portrayed the candidate as an experienced leader; (2) issue-mentioning of one or more core issues attached the candidate to the important issues in the campaign; and (3) a slogan was used to coalesce issue-crediting and issue-mentioning with the campaign’s more general themes. For example, in "Engler and the Republicans," the announcer begins by crediting Engler with providing "a Michigan that’s working." The announcer then states that "the job’s not finished," and mentions that Engler (and the Republicans) "support lower taxes, less welfare and more jobs." The advertisement ends by reiterating an Engler campaign slogan - "vote to keep Michigan on the right track."

Some Engler advertisements concentrated entirely on issue-crediting. "Engler Keeping Promises" features taxpayers reading letters of thanks that they had sent to Engler for property and pension tax cuts they received under his leadership. Voters make comments such as,

Dear Governor Engler, this is a note of thanks for saving my family over nine hundred dollars...with the reduction of taxes on pensions, you’ve done a lot to help senior citizens like me...now we can afford to stay in our beautiful state, and stay close to our family...thanks for keeping your promises."

A Detroit Free Press adwatch suggested that this advertisement “is the political equivalent of those steamy exercise machine ads that show mostly rippling muscles. Engler’s strength is lower property taxes. Instead of big
Engler's strength is lower property taxes. Instead of big biceps, you're shown happy taxpayers.  

"Down-home Values" is the most blatant example of a positive advertisement which uses issues to promote images. The advertisement incorporates both presentation styles and was specifically designed to improve Engler's image by associating him with popular conservative values.

I grew up right here in Beal City. My parents were farmers. They taught me to work hard, tell the truth, and keep my promises. I believe in personal responsibility. If you break the law, you should pay a heavy price. And welfare is a two-way street, you should work for your benefits. Changing state government to recognize all of this may have gotten me into a few fights in Lansing, but standing up for Michigan values is what I think this job is all about.

The audio-visual communication in this advertisement particularly reaffirms the family values and community theme. For example, Engler is seen and heard speaking directly to the camera. At the same time, however, numerous visuals depict him as the essence of family values: he is dressed in a flannel shirt and casual slacks, he walks around the family farm, through a corn field with his mother and talks with locals in the hardware store. When speaking directly to the camera, he is shown walking down main street, a dirt road with tractors parked on the street and farmers chatting behind him. The music in this advertisement is soothing, and Engler is even shown kissing his young niece.
Comparative Advertising

Comparative advertisements use all of the issue modes to construct a need for "change" and to construct an alternative leader who can deliver such change. To diminish the possibility of a boomerang effect, issue-accusing was used more often than issue-blaming in Michigan’s comparative advertising, especially when the candidate personally delivered the negative message. A common strategy in comparative advertising balances issue-accusing with issue-positioning to diminish the opponent’s image and then to align the candidate with a certain line of reasoning. For example, in "Nuclear Waste," an announcer remarks that

on Michigan shores, the nuclear power industry is storing radioactive waste in faulty containers. Yet John Engler turned his back on the problem and our safety. No hearings, no oversight. Siding with his corporate backers instead of us.

The audio-visual communication in this part of the advertisement is particularly image-oriented, including black and white aerial photos of a nuclear power plant, foreboding music, a still picture of Engler and a slow motion visual of him walking up the steps of the legislature, apparently arm-in-arm with one of his "corporate backers." However, as soon as Wolpe appears in the advertisement, the picture immediately switches to colour and the music becomes markedly upbeat. Wolpe is shown walking down a beach, and, looking straight at the camera, he promises to "fight for tough new laws to end this nonsense...push the EPA...[and] put the safety of people first, not the nuclear industry."
Although an announcer normally delivers the negative component of a comparative message, this is not always the case. On a number of occasions Wolpe personally delivered issue-accusations against Engler, although announcers delivered all of the issue-blaming. Wolpe's strategists suggested that Wolpe was inserted in place of the announcer to "cash in" on his consistently high image ratings in opinion polls. In one advertisement Wolpe is shown walking down a sidewalk holding an assault weapon. Speaking directly to the camera, he says: "[r]ight here, a kid was killed with an assault weapon. John Engler thinks almost anybody should be able to carry these..." The implication is immediately apparent. Wolpe was also forced to present himself to the public on a more consistent basis because he trailed Engler by a wide margin in the public opinion polls.

Even though comparative advertising incorporates negative messages it still seems to most directly satisfy basic liberal democratic notions. This is because it is the most ostensibly issue-oriented television advertising type. In Michigan it contained the highest rates of verbal and audio-visual references to issues and the lowest rates of verbal and audio-visual references to images. The attacks on opponents are also less direct than in direct attack advertising, and the attempt to inflate the sponsoring candidate's image is not as one-sided as in positive advertising.

Yet Engler and Wolpe were both widely criticised for
making misleading and false statements in their comparative advertising; in fact one Detroit television station produced a five-part series of ads which were devoted to "sorting out fact from fiction" in the political advertising of the two candidates. The Detroit Free Press criticised both candidates for citing their own and each other's record selectively in their advertisements. The following advertisement is an example:

Why do 12,000 Michigan cops endorse John Engler as tougher on crime than Howard Wolpe? Engler's good record. Engler wants to abolish parole for rapists and murderers. Wolpe is against mandatory sentencing. Engler double-bunked prisoners and he wants to build a new prison for juvenile criminals. Wolpe is against double-bunking and Wolpe opposes more prisons. Wolpe's liberal plan could give 6,000 prisoners early release. Former Congressman Howard Wolpe. Too Liberal on crime.36

This advertisement uses many half-truths for the sole purpose of creating the appearance of a sharp distinction between Engler and Wolpe on the crime issue. It differentiates the candidates in an overly simplified way, but does little to educate voters. For example, Engler is portrayed as "tougher" than Wolpe on the point of mandatory sentencing. While it is true that as a member of Congress Wolpe opposed mandatory sentencing in 1973, since then he had voted in favour of mandatory sentencing eighty times. Furthermore, on the point of double-bunking, Wolpe had indicated on many occasions that he opposed it only "in situations where you don't have adequate staffing,"37 and had repeatedly expressed his acceptance of double-bunking in
situations where adequate staffing exists.

Summary

Verbal image references tended to either preface or follow - and relate to - verbal issue references in Michigan's television advertising. For example, negative verbal images generally accompanied issue-blaming and issue-accusing and positive verbal images followed or prefaced issue-mentioning, issue-crediting and issue-positioning. For this reason, coding for images proved problematic. However, this is not new. Shyles himself addressed coding problems inherent in his model. He qualified his approach to coding images by stating that "the rigor of the operational definition of what constituted a codable semantic image term was sorely felt at times, but it was decided to keep the criteria rigorous so that there would be less chance for questioning how much was being read into the data that may have been more an artifact of interpretation than content." 38

The problematic nature of coding further indicates that advertising follows a strategy which consciously links issues and images. For example, Shyles's "experience" category includes references to a candidate's "past record, roles, activities, accomplishments and background." 39 Accordingly, references to experience in positive advertising are consistently intertwined with issue-crediting. This makes sense, given that experience is by definition retrospective,
as is issue-crediting. The following positive advertisement, entitled "Keeping Promises II," is an example of this strategy.

I'm a working mom, trying to juggle a career, a family and a household budget. But thanks to Governor Engler, it's a lot easier these days. He's cut property taxes in half and he's gotten Michigan moving again. John Engler's made education a priority and that's good for Connor's future [WOMAN HOLDS UP BABY]. He's helped our family and millions of other families across Michigan. John Engler's improved our lives, and kept his promises.

As Dan Nimmo and James Combs point out, the symbols of family and community are central themes of image advertising. In "Keeping Promises II," these symbols are used for purposes of issue-crediting. Although the overt message may have been related to issues, associating Engler with symbolic references to experience and the family values theme was the motivation behind creating this advertisement.

The most frequently coded categories of verbal images are those directly related to issues: particularly experience, honesty and leadership. In fact, given the association between the former categories with the issues used in both candidates television advertising, it is beneficial to create two categories of references to images: professional images (including experience, honesty, leadership and competence) and personal images (including altruism, personal, strength and other). This differentiation more accurately reflects how issues and image are intertwined.
Macro Content Analysis

(1) Party or Candidate Status

As the incumbent and the front-runner, Engler used issue-crediting extensively. This may represent the biggest difference between his and Wolpe's campaign strategies. For example, approximately one year before the beginning of the Michigan primaries, Engler implemented "visible" property tax cuts which were designed to come into effect in the spring of 1994. Engler initiated the tax cuts in conjunction with largely invisible "fee" increases for many services, such as licenses.

The question is - would such highly visible tax cuts have been forthcoming in a non-election year? Bryan Flood indicated that they probably would not. It was a strategy that voters could feel first-hand: "they [taxpayers] believed it because they had the money in their pocket to prove it." Media paid little attention to the over fifty fee increases that accompanied the tax cuts because they were not especially dramatic, and because they were largely hidden. Flood stated that "people only saw the cuts" and, according to another Republican strategist, "that was what mattered." The tax cuts represented the "positive differences the Governor makes in their lives" and reflected the underlying theme of Engler's campaign - "promises made, promises kept." Moreover, when voters give testimonials in positive television advertisements which depict them benefiting from such issue
changes, there is little opportunity for the challenger to attack the incumbent for initiating such changes. It would have been difficult for Wolpe to argue against property tax decreases to the approximately two million Michigan residents who benefitted from them.

The greatest advantage incumbents have in using issue-crediting is the fact that although the "feeling" of innovation is achieved, as statements of past policy-making they are limited in their capacity to inform. In fact, it is ironic that whereas Wolpe was charged by the Engler strategy team with "reincarnating" old issues, issue-crediting serves the same purpose, although it is normally viewed as innovative and informative.

One particularly dramatic Engler advertisement recreated the scene of a crime where a man was shot and killed in front of a convenience store. Black and white visuals portrayed the scene as the victim's widow described what happened, stating that she began fighting for "truth in sentencing" (legislation that made it mandatory for convicted criminals to serve their full sentences for certain crimes, without the possibility of parole) after it became apparent to her that the perpetrators were aware that they would probably not have to serve their full sentences. At the end of the advertisement she states: "I want you to know, John Engler cares about victims' rights, and is committed to making Michigan a place where criminals do not want to commit a violent crime." Apart from the fact
that Wolpe fully supported this particular piece of legislation, the advertisement was devoid of substantive discussion of how Engler would continue to solve the crime issue.

Incumbents have an added advantage in being able to use the more visible trappings of incumbency to build positive character images. Engler did this well — and often. For example, "Strategy Plan" takes place in the Governor's office, and it gives the feeling of a formal address. In other positive advertisements Engler is regularly seen signing documents in his office, conversing with aides and colleagues in the hallways and corridors of the Legislature, and giving speeches before the Legislature. These symbolic references to power and authority add potency to the verbal messages contained in the advertisement.

Issue-crediting and using the symbolic benefits of incumbency were strategies that were unavailable to Wolpe. In fact, by mid-campaign, the most dominant theme in Wolpe's campaign was his obvious lack of an independent issue agenda. For this reason, Wolpe adopted the issue of education reform, even though an EPIC-MRA opinion poll showed that while the majority of those surveyed thought that education reform was a priority, most respondents believed that schools were no worse off or were even better off since Engler took office. In fact, 29 per cent of the respondents actually believed that Michigan schools got better under Engler's leadership. And of
those who felt that schools were getting worse, more than half of them blamed the teachers themselves. Although Engler privately boasted about how he took the issues away from Wolpe, publicly he criticised Wolpe for his lack of an independent agenda. Without issues, Wolpe's image was damaged beyond repair.

The greater the margin between the front-runner and challenger, the greater will be the tendency for the challenger to use direct attack advertising while the front-runner will tend to pursue positive advertising. Of course this will be especially true when the front-runner is also the incumbent. In Michigan, Engler predictably ended the campaign with mostly positive advertising. This makes sense. Wolpe, however, also ended the campaign with mostly positive advertising. While he made every effort to differentiate himself from Engler during the campaign, he did not use direct attack advertising at the end of the campaign, but instead relied on a mix of comparative and mostly positive advertising. The reasons for this will be addressed in the following section.

(2) Party Leader or Candidate Style

Presentation strategy is highly dependent on the candidates personal style. Personal candidate styles may restrict candidates from using certain presentation style variables, as outlined by Shyles, or enhance such
opportunities. Wolpe, for example, consistently gave the impression that he was uncomfortable with the direct attacks he delivered. They seemed half-hearted and certainly lacked the intensity of direct attacks in other negative campaigns in 1994 - including Engler's.\(^5\) Part of the reason for this was Wolpe's personal style as a somewhat deferential peacemaker who believes in negotiation, rather than confrontation. A friend and former campaign strategist to Wolpe maintains that Wolpe "doesn't want to tear things down. He wants to bring folks from opposing sides together."\(^5\) For this reason his attempts at direct attack advertising were fewer, and when they did appear they seemed out of character and unconvincing.

This also partially explains Wolpe's reliance on comparative advertising, which definitely was the more convincing approach, given his personal style. Also, during the campaign Wolpe's attempts at constructing issues failed. At the end of the campaign he turned to positive advertising, which reinforced the character differences between himself and Engler, while abandoning issues altogether. Engler clearly had the advantage. Although his image was uncertain at best, his sole claim to the issues that resonated with voters compensated for his lack of a personal style and improved his image.

Part of the reason for Wolpe's failure to go negative may also have been more pragmatically related to a lack of funds which would be necessary to generate a negative blitz against
Engler. Strategists from both parties commented that because of Engler's lead in the public opinion polls, state party funding was being diverted from Wolpe to other Democratic candidates.\textsuperscript{52}

Macro analysis also reveals that, in Michigan, the candidates were willing and able to appropriate one another's presentation styles. At the beginning of the campaign it seemed as though the candidates dressed typically as front-runner and challenger - for the most part Engler dressed formally and Wolpe dressed casually. However, their dress styles changed during the campaign, seemingly in opposite directions. For example, Wolpe appeared in most of his advertising informally dressed, even when the issue presentation style dominated the advertisement. This was in sharp contrast to the formal dress style he maintained outside of his television advertising, such as when he was interviewed by the news media or shown on the campaign trail.

A Democratic strategist explained that the reasons for dressing Wolpe casually in his television advertising campaign were two-fold: to take advantage of his "nice guy" image and to contrast with Engler's image as "a conniving politico who conspired with rich businessmen."\textsuperscript{53} In conjunction with this strategy, all of Wolpe's advertisements which included the Governor incorporated the same still photo of Engler, dressed formally and appearing rather sinister. The contrast was designed to crystallize Wolpe's campaign theme of a "clear
choice."\textsuperscript{54}

For his part, Engler began the campaign by dressing formally. However, as internal polling indicated that his image was weak (especially in relation to Wolpe), his style of dress began to change and included both formal and increasingly informal dress. For example, the message was clear in "Down-Home Values" that Michigan values are basically conservative and Engler, dressed casually and preaching down-home values of personal responsibility and hard work, is the man to represent those values. Dan Pero, Engler's Campaign Manager, said that the advertisement gave voters insight into "what motivated John Engler, how he makes decisions." Such advertisements had the additional benefit of usurping Wolpe's edge in terms of being seen as "the" nice guy in the campaign. For example, when still photos of Wolpe were used in Engler's advertisements, he was deliberately shown in formal dress. This was in contrast to the image that the Wolpe strategy team was attempting to build for their candidate.

The remaining issue presentation variables are directly related to audio-visuals of candidates speaking: the voice of a candidate, the direct orientation of a candidate to the camera and visual images of any candidate speaking. These variables are analyzed together because they attempt to build and entrench and legitimize the candidate's image through the discussion of issues. For example, given the context of the Michigan election, where Engler's image was weak compared to
Wolpe's, it is logical to expect that Engler would use audio-visual references to images even more than the average identified by Kaid and Davidson, and that Wolpe would depend on them even less. In fact, this is exactly what happened. For every audio-visual reference to images presented by Engler, Wolpe displayed only .70 references. In contrast, for every audio-visual reference to issues presented by Engler, Wolpe presented 1.54 references. Thus, although Engler and Wolpe generally conformed to expectations of "videostyle" as outlined by Kaid and Davidson, they deviated regularly from these ideal videostyles and there seemed to be an exaggerated attempt to divert attention from Engler personally, while the opposite strategy was followed by Wolpe.

Kaid and Davidson found that challengers are the dominant speaker in 47 per cent of their advertising, compared to 21 per cent for front-runners. While this was almost exactly the case for the two Michigan candidates (Wolpe spoke 47 per cent of the time in his advertisements and Engler spoke 22 per cent of the time in his advertisements), Engler was a dominant speaker in only 2 of his 11 advertisements, where he spoke for almost the entire thirty seconds. Also, these instances were well spaced - one was released September 26, 1994, the other on October 28, 1994. In contrast, Wolpe was a dominant speaker in 6 of his 10 advertisements. He also directly faced the camera almost three times as often as Engler.
Moreover, Kaid and Davidson also state that front-runners share the spotlight equally with announcers 31 per cent of the time. The comparable figure for challengers was only 4 per cent.\textsuperscript{57} Except for the advertisements where Engler's voice dominated, he spoke only once, saying - "my friends, together we'll make Michigan the best place in the world to live, to work, to raise a family."\textsuperscript{58} Wolpe, on the other hand, equally dominated the verbal portion of his advertisements in 3 of his 10 advertisements. Engler relied more heavily on the last variable - visual image of a candidate speaking - where he was shown addressing cheering audiences while an announcer's voice-over speaks of how Engler "kept his promises." In conjunction with this, Kaid and Davidson suggest that announcers are the only dominant speaker an average of 28 per cent of the time in the front-runner's advertising. For Engler, however, announcers were the dominant speaker in 9 of his 11 advertisements. For Wolpe, announcers were normally integrated with (and subordinate to) his speech. The exceptions were his direct attack advertisements.

The variances in the Michigan campaign from Kaid and Davidson's findings result from two key considerations. The first is the demands of comparative advertising. Wolpe produced the bulk of the comparative advertising. These advertisements generally require that the accuser face the accused, which Wolpe did on 6 of 7 occasions. Wolpe's strategists also felt that he was their best asset and
advantage over the Governor. The result was that Wolpe seemed to be the focal point of most of his television advertising throughout the campaign, whereas Engler was visibly absent for most of his television advertising campaign. Although it is true that incumbents like to be seen as above the fray of political wrangling, Engler was used especially sparingly and only at key junctures in the campaign since he was not personally popular, had a weak personal style, and produced only 2 comparative advertisements in the campaign.

(3) Public Opinion Polling

Examination of the television advertising strategies used in the Michigan campaign indicates that instead of Diamond and Bates' typology of advertising phases, there is evidence that television advertisements are developed and released in response to the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates and their opponents, and other contextual factors. Internal polling is used to assess the importance of these contextual factors and to choose issues that would best suit them; for example, strategists suggest that they regularly use internal polling to test the effectiveness of opponents' television advertising and to determine whether and what "reply" is needed.

Each of the campaigns routinely focus group tested the general attitudes of undecided voters toward all candidates and key issues; Wolpe, for example, used internal polling to
gauge how best to combat Engler's stranglehold on the key issues. While neither campaign would reveal exact details of the extent and substance of their internal polling, all strategists indicated that internal polling was instrumental, or, at a minimum, that it "confirmed" their advertising strategies. Mike Murphy, a national U.S. strategist and a key advertising strategist for the Engler campaign, used internal polls to indicate "what attacks have carried, how far, when it's time to switch: in other words how you're doing." Although Murphy's polling is known to be particularly data or "poll driven," he is influential enough that many of his techniques have been adopted by the other mainstream strategists. The result is that issues are adopted for their ability to evoke emotional responses in viewers, and, after additional internal polling has shown them to have reached saturation levels - that is, when 75 per cent or more of the people have got the message - it is time to move on to the next issue.

Table 4-7 presents the sequence of advertisements as they were first broadcast, and suggests that issues had a "life" during the Michigan campaign which was both short and dependent on public opinion poll results which indicated what the most important issues were, how they should be presented, and when they had penetrated their target market. Moreover, Wolpe began the campaign with a distinct strategic disadvantage: he had no practical choice except to appoint
Debbie Stabenow as his running mate. The Democratic primary, however, had been particularly antagonistic and Stabenow had been Wolpe's key rival, followed by Larry Owen. Both had launched direct attacks against Wolpe.

**TABLE 4-7**

**RELEASE DATE AND DURATION OF TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS BY CANDIDATE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Engler</th>
<th>Wolpe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S 6*</td>
<td>Wolpe Record (-9)</td>
<td>Lafayette Clinic (-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear Waste (-12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 12</td>
<td>Wolpe Too Liberal (-23)</td>
<td>Straight Talk (-26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Engler Distorts (-0 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 23</td>
<td>Down-Home Values (-0 11)</td>
<td>Clear Choice I (-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 5</td>
<td>Keeping Promises I (-11)</td>
<td>Can't Trust Engler (-14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>W/S: Clear Choice (-19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 11</td>
<td>Engler Trustworthy (-20)</td>
<td>W/S: Abortion (-28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>W/S: Weapons (-28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 19</td>
<td>Keeping Promises II (-19)</td>
<td>Milliken for Wolpe (-N 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 19</td>
<td>Moving Forward (-N 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 21</td>
<td>Keeping on Track (-N 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O 28</td>
<td>Strategy Plan (-N 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wolpe and Wife (-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 3</td>
<td>Engler and Republicans (-4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 7</td>
<td>Engler as a Leader (-7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - tracking began September 6, 1994;
  S= September, O= October, N= November.

It was announced on September 8, 1994 that Stabenow would serve as Wolpe's running mate. In anticipation of the announcement, Engler's strategists released "Wolpe Record" on September 6, 1994. The advertisement attacked Wolpe's credibility by using issues that were used by Stabenow in opposing Wolpe during the Democratic primary, and was particularly damaging because it directly quoted Stabenow's
own televised television advertising, which asked - "...what have leading Democrats said about Howard Wolpe? Plenty." The advertisement then went on to explain who these "leading Democrats" were and to quote the negative comments they had made about Wolpe. In fact, 2 of 3 negative advertisements produced by the Engler team (one direct attack and one comparative) finished broadcasting by September 26, 1994. Both repeated negative comments made by Wolpe's opponents during the primary. After September 26, no negative advertisements were released from the Engler campaign until October 20, 1994, when a negative comparative advertisement with a similar message to the earlier one appeared and ended only days before the election. Engler's strategists indicated that this was necessary in order to "bury" Wolpe. Even though Engler led by a wide margin, he and his strategists were not taking any chances.

Damage control was needed in the opening week of Wolpe's campaign to combat the negativity of the Stabenow charges against him in the primary. But, instead of positive advertising to build name and issue recognition, Wolpe began the campaign by trying to exploit Engler's weak image. Accordingly, he released his direct attack advertisements immediately, which targeted Lafayette Clinic (cuts to public health care) and nuclear waste (neglect of the environment in favour of corporate interests). Table 4-7 also indicates that Wolpe's direct attack advertisements dominated the airwaves,
but only for a short period of time - one ending September 7, 1994 and the other September 12, 1994.

Bryan Flood remarked that, for Engler's campaign, welfare reform dominated August, September was "crime month," and October more generally reinforced a theme which had been successful throughout their campaign - "promises made, promises kept." Engler was uncontested during the primary but still spent his full allotment of $990,000 in public matching funds on positive advertisements which featured "welfare and Michelle" - Michelle being Engler's wife. Internal polling indicated that the welfare reform issue constituted "the" issue shown by public opinion polling to particularly resonate with focus groups.

Engler's strategists realized, however, that their candidate would be vulnerable on the crime issue because of the Ryan prison break in early September. They anticipated that Wolpe would use the prison escape - which Wolpe termed "Engler's jail break" - as a central campaign issue, so they countered the strategy by producing and immediately releasing "Wolpe too Liberal" on September 12, 1994, directly comparing Engler's and Wolpe's records on crime and concludes that Wolpe is "too liberal on crime."

On September 19, 1994, Wolpe was featured in "Straight Talk," which, as outlined earlier, cautioned the viewer that John Engler was going to try to "bash [his] face in." In anticipation of this approach by the Wolpe campaign,
Republican strategists launched a series of positive advertisements which ignored Wolpe altogether and concentrated instead on Engler's tax cuts and other visible issue-crediting measures. Wolpe's strategists followed up "Straight Talk" with "Engler Distorts Crime Issue," which directly replied to "Wolpe Too Liberal." Wolpe tried to set the record straight in "Engler Distorts Crime Issue" by saying: "...that's John Engler, who's running TV ads claiming he's tough on crime, and falsely attacking Howard Wolpe, who backed mandatory sentencing and other anti-crime measures." The advertisement ends by stating that "it's hard to know whose record Engler's ad distorts the most, Wolpe's, or his own."68

Three days later and only a week following Wolpe's charge that Engler was going to try to "bash [his] face in," Engler's "Down-Home Values" broadcast for the first time. The advertisement completely ignored Wolpe. Moreover, on the heels of "Down-Home Values" came three testimonial advertisements designed to highlight the positive sentiments created by "Down-Home Values." With one exception, the remainder of the new advertisements that were released by the Engler campaign were especially forward-looking and upbeat. They emphasised that Michigan was "on the right track" because it was "led by a governor that kept his promises to put taxpayers first, reform welfare and turn our state around." Finally, Engler is portrayed as the "leader who has kept his promises."69
As meta-advertising analysis showed, the one exception was "Strategy Plan," which was launched in the midst of a set of upbeat advertisements. This advertisement makes it clear that there are two good reasons for issue-positioning. One reason is because the challenger is behind and needs to find some means to break the momentum of an incumbent who is ahead in the polls. Wolpe attempted this strategy and failed. Another reason for issue-positioning is because the incumbent is so far ahead that taking an issue position will probably not alienate enough voters to cost him or her the election. The advantage of issue-positioning under these circumstances is that the potential problems of an "absent mandate" are at least partially mitigated, making the candidate appear to have "come clean" with voters; the candidate can point to issue-positioning statements taken during the election to justify policy-making efforts after the election.

At the time that Engler switched to positive advertising, Wolpe was searching for an agenda to break Engler's momentum. He finally turned to issues, but only as a last-ditch effort since he knew that he was not generally on the "right side" of the issues. In October, Wolpe produced comparative advertisements on an array of issues, such as abortion, weapons and school reform. These issues were chosen to define a "clear choice" between himself and Engler. One strategist stated that the issues were designed explicitly to highlight Engler's neglect of middle-class interests. None of these
advertisements proved to be particularly useful (in terms of shifting support) because the issues they raised were effectively non-issues in the minds of voters. In Edelman's terms, none of the issues were "potent." All of them had been debated and left essentially unresolved in the past. In effect there was nothing innovative about them, nor did they reassure voters. For example, on October 12, 1994, approximately half-way through the election, Wolpe tried to construct the election as a "referendum on one issue" - spending public money for charter schools and associating this practice with parochial school funding. A Wolpe strategist indicated that this was going to be "the" issue for Wolpe's campaign. Wolpe held a press conference and announced the following:

I'm challenging Governor Engler to agree to make this election a referendum on his agenda, the taking of public education tax dollars and the diversion of those tax dollars to non-public schools.73

The statement followed the release of "Can't Trust Engler," which was discussed earlier as an example of how issues are used symbolically in direct attack advertising to diminish an opponent's image.74

In reply, on October 14, 1994 Governor Engler made the following comment to the media:

I'm disappointed in Congressman Wolpe. You know, he's supposed to be a professor and he should take a look at the Constitution. I don't support pouring public funds into religious schools. We can't do it, we're not trying to do it, aren't going to be doing it, and its unconstitutional to
do so. It's a bogus issue...\textsuperscript{75}

In making this comment, Engler took the issue away from Wolpe who spent the remainder of the campaign groping for an issue that was both substantive enough to be credible and emotional enough to move the poll numbers. He failed to find one.

In Michigan, therefore, direct attack advertisements featuring issue-blaming were far more prevalent in the first half of the campaign than in the second half; in fact, all of the direct attack advertisements finished broadcasting by October 14, 1994.\textsuperscript{76} In addition, a Wolpe strategist suggested that the reason for going so negative at the beginning was to take advantage of the fact that the public did not like the Governor.\textsuperscript{77} Engler strategist Bryan Flood, however, believes that "the Wolpe team's hatred of Engler blinded their political instincts."

In the second half of the campaign there was a trend toward greater use of issue-positioning in the positive advertising. However, this trend is partially dampened by at least two factors which have been consistently highlighted by this chapter. First, the issues highlighted in the final set of advertisements were all repeats of issues contained in earlier television advertisements. They were repeated by surrogates or by the original issue-taker, but under a different audio-visual setting, giving the appearance of being new issues. Second, there was no marked increase in the use of the issue presentation style in the second half of the
campaign (although there were more advertisements which used both styles). This means that although more of the new advertisements were oriented toward issues, the audio-visual component of these advertisements did not support this trend. This is because the intention of issue-positioning in these instances was not to emphasize the issues themselves, but to use the issues to construct or reinforce images.

Not yet addressed are the issues that candidates felt strongly about but that were avoided because they were not considered strategically appropriate issues to use in the election campaign. For example, in the twenty years that Wolpe was a member of Congress, he was consistently top-ranked by the League of Conservation Voters, a Washington-based environmental group that scores political leaders on the way they voted on environmental bills. Wolpe never scored below 88 per cent; in 1990 he scored 100 per cent. Not only did he co-author the National Energy Act, he also authored the Pollution Prevention Act. As far back as 1973, Wolpe co-sponsored a bill which became law that required licensing of hazardous product manufacturers. Yet during the election the subject of hazardous waste came up in only one advertisement and was quickly abandoned. The advertisement was one of the least used in the election, playing for only one week and broadcasting only 19 times. The reasons for this are that voters could not be “touched,” to use Schwartz’s term, by environmental issues, and Engler’s record was
actually respectable with regard to environmental issues. As a result, the issue quickly faded away.

The number of times and the span of time over which television advertisements are broadcast is another indicator of campaign strategy. The single most frequently broadcast advertisement in the Michigan campaign was a Wolpe/Stabenow advertisement entitled "Wolpe/Stabenow: Abortion and Weapons" that broadcast 46 times between October 19, 1994 and October 28, 1994." This was a directly comparative advertisement which featured two core issues from Engler's past. It targeted Engler's trustworthiness and support of middle-class values, and implied that conservative values do not represent middle-class values after all. The next most frequently broadcast advertisement was "Down-Home Values" by Engler, at 34 repetitions between September 26, 1994 and October 12, 1994. This advertisement was discussed earlier as the campaign's clearest example of blatant image advertising; in this case, conservative values were directly equated with middle-class values. Other, more issue-oriented advertisements, were broadcasted less frequently; "Strategy Plan," which was broadcast 18 times, stands out as the most obvious example.

External public opinion polling can be extremely damaging to a candidate who is trailing by a wide margin. In Michigan, the media message reinforced Engler's candidacy throughout the campaign. This is because all of the external public opinion
polls indicated practically certain victory for Engler and—
even more damaging for Wolpe—very few undecided voters. 
These poll results prompted a WXYZ newscaster to say on 
October 6, 1994 that Wolpe is "losing ground and losing it 
fast...Wolpe should panic, if the fat lady isn't singing, she 
may be warming up."81

Table 4-8 shows that although the fact that Wolpe trailed 
Engler continued to be a central topic in the media, minimal 
public opinion polling was released in the final few weeks of 
the campaign.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Engler</th>
<th>Wolpe</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>September 6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>September 20</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was primarily because Engler's support was not shifting 
and the low number of undecided voters indicated that voters 
had made up their minds rather early. As a result, media's 
polling efforts turned to the hotly contested Senate seat 
between Bob Carr and Spencer Abraham. The media's public 
opinion polling effectively reinforced the conclusion that 
Wolpe had lost the election long before polling day.

As a result, Wolpe was under additional pressure 
throughout the campaign to respond to the media's message that
he was basically a non-starter. In circumstances such as these, the candidate's options are extremely limited. Knowing the poll results will indicate what the candidate needs to do (i.e., that he or she needs to shift voter support), and which issues may help strengthen the candidate's image or weaken the opponent's image, but they do not guarantee that the candidate or the candidate's strategists can or will act on the poll results.

Conclusion

Engler was clearly comfortable with reinforcing his leadership, while Wolpe tried to construct himself as a leader, mostly by emphasising how he represented an alternative to Engler's negative image. Therefore, Engler and Wolpe did more than simply lay their issues before voters - they followed meta-advertising strategies. By examining advertisements in the context of the campaign, the issue content is explained and accounted for in terms of its image-building functions. "Strategy Plan," for example, was not broadcast often, and then only after Engler firmly controlled the lead in the polls. Wolpe, on the other hand, turned to issues as a last-ditch effort to salvage his candidacy.

Direct attack advertising fundamentally differed from comparative or positive advertising; instead of saying - "I oppose my opponent on the issue of..." - direct attack advertisements focused on the opponent's record exclusively,
emphasizing mistakes and blunders allegedly made by the opponent before and even during the campaign. Direct attack advertising was also the only television advertising type that relied exclusively on image-oriented audio-visuals.

Moreover, Wolpe's uses of issue-mentioning and issue-positioning (two positive issue modes) were primarily a response to Engler's issues and public opinion poll results, and were framed in the most emotional way possible. The intention was to indicate not what Wolpe would do but that he would do it differently than Engler. The strategy did not work because Wolpe failed to portray himself as a viable alternative; simply saying - "I'm not him" - is not enough; an alternate vision, even a constructed one, is crucial.

Although there were certain regularities in the way that candidates used issues and images in the three types of advertising, the extent to which they were used, and the motivations for using them, were not always the same. The style of audio-visual presentation, for example, depended on the perceived image-building needs of individual candidates. Engler relied heavily on verbal and visual strategies that focused viewer attention on almost everything about his candidacy except himself. Wolpe did the opposite, speaking for himself in most of his advertisements.

Regardless of the ideal uses of particular presentation styles, therefore, the circumstances of each election campaign dictated that certain strategies be used. This is most
readily the case in the adoption or avoidance of particular issues by candidates. Engler effectively excluded Wolpe from using issues in his television advertising by claiming the most important issues early in the campaign. As a result, Wolpe drew on minor issues of less immediate relevance to voters, and attacked Engler's issue record.

Macro analysis points to the fact that certain macro variables account for much of the campaign's advertising strategy. For example, there was some evidence that, when possible, candidates appropriated the presentation style of their opponent. Because of the length of the Michigan campaign, there was an opportunity for both candidates to pursue this strategy.

Internal public opinion polling identifies the issues that are most important to voters. These issues invariably become central to the candidate's campaign. The public opinion polls also determine the "life" that issues have during the campaign. If the candidate can dominate the issues with credibility - as Engler could - then they are used regularly in the campaign. If the candidate can not identify with the dominant issues - as Wolpe could not - then issues are generally avoided as much as possible by the campaign. Wolpe, for example, was forced to design his campaign advertising with little access to the most important issues, and failed spectacularly. His failure attests to the importance of issues in defining the candidate and bringing
interest to the candidacy. Moreover, the candidates did not define issues that they felt strongly about if there was little popular support for them with voters. Internal polling indicates which images the candidate should emphasize, and which ones need to be de-emphasized. Engler's perceived inability to function in front of the camera meant that he was absent from much of his campaign advertising. Wolpe, on the other hand, functioned well in front of the camera, and he dominated his television advertising campaign.

Issues were therefore used by the candidates in a multitude of ways which generally supported image-building campaign strategies. The strategists were fixated on public opinion polling which determined the dominant issues with voters, and the issue and image strengths and weaknesses of Engler and Wolpe.

Negative advertising was a particularly fundamental strategy for Wolpe. As the challenger, he used negative advertising strategies to focus on and attempt to diminish Engler's image, and reply to Engler's strategies. Conversely, positive advertising was a fixed strategy for Engler, who, as a front-running incumbent, used it to solidify his lead in the public opinion polls.

Engler won handily, even though he used relatively little negative advertising, and even though he and Wolpe advertised in almost equal amounts. These results demonstrate that television advertising campaigns which are predominantly
negative - no matter how well designed and executed - do not necessarily ensure victory. Moreover, Wolpe’s campaign further demonstrated that if the candidate’s overall campaign strategy is flawed, television advertising can actually damage a candidate’s chances of winning. In Michigan, therefore, television advertising supported the success or the failure of the overall campaign strategies. Though television advertising can reinforce a successful campaign message, as it did for Engler, it is of limited benefit to candidates who improperly align with the central issues of the campaign.

Endnotes


4. Confirmed by Bryan Flood, Republican Party strategist, and confidential personal interviews conducted during and after the election with Democratic Party strategists.


6. Strategists from both campaigns confirmed the trends found in their internal poll’ng, although neither would provide specifics. In personal interviews conducted for this study, it was clearly stated that voters appeared to view Engler as
too rigid and lacking compassion for and understanding of the "common man". Wolpe, on the other hand, was viewed as genuinely decent and compassionate.


8. The press conference and EPIC-MRA poll results were both reported on WXYZ (Channel 7) television, evening newscast, October 7 and 11, 1994, respectively.


10. Ibid.


15. The overall mean number of verbal image references in the Michigan study was similar to that of Shyles's study, at 2.51 per advertisement in Shyles's study). The distribution of references between different categories of images - such as competence or honesty etc. - is also roughly similar to Shyles's findings.

16. These totals are artificially derived by adding the seconds used under each of the categories and are valid for comparative purposes only.


19. The overall mean of 2.57 issues per advertisement is significantly less than Shyles's finding of 4.10 per advertisement in his study. The variance is at least partially explained by a more stringent definition of issue in the Michigan case study.


23. Ibid.


27. Other studies have also indicated that positive advertising is most often used to reinforce a positive image. See, for example, Trent and Friedenberg, pp. 63-78.

28. Although issue-crediting was used in comparative advertising, it was the least frequently used issue mode in this type of advertising.


34. See "Weapons", Appendix 2.

35. WXYZ (Channel 7) television, evening newscast, October 17 - 21, 1994.


37. Wolpe made this comment on August 24, 1994, the day following the Ryan prison break.


43. "Competence," which refers to candidates' abilities, skills and knowledge, is included as a professional image category because it is clearly related to issues.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. Flood also indicated that the extensive use of issue-crediting was deemed necessary in view of Engler's weak public image.

47. For example, see "Engler Keeping Promises II," Appendix 2.


49. EPIC-MRA poll, in conjunction with the Detroit Free Press and WXYZ (Channel 7), released October 12, 1994.

50. The media were calling the 1994 election year one of the most negative on record in the United States, led most visibly by Oliver North and Michael Huffington. The mood was not as negative in Michigan.


55. See Kaid and Davidson in Kaid, Nimmo and Sanders, p. 196-197.
56. In Engler's television advertisements, the remaining 78 percent of total time speaking is broken down as follows: 57 percent announcer and 21 percent talking citizens. For Wolpe, the remaining 53 percent of total time spent speaking is broken down as follows: 39 percent announcer, 4 percent talking citizen and 10 percent talking famous person.

57. See Kaid and Davidson in Kaid, Nimmo and Sanders, p. 197.

58. See "Engler as a Leader," Appendix 2.

59. For example, television advertisements were all focus group tested at the story board stage before they were produced and they were re-tested after they were produced but before they were released.

60. Kern, p. 28.

61. Ibid., p. 42.

62. Ibid., p. 28.

63. See "Wolpe Record," Appendix 2.

64. See "Wolpe too Liberal," and "Wolpe Record," Appendix 2.

65. Michigan Secretary of State, Public Funding Applications with Resubmissions (Michigan: Department of State), p. 9.


70. This reason has been pointed to by other researchers of political advertising. In particular, see Johnson-Cartee and Copeland.

71. See Clarke et al.


73. WXYZ (Channel 7) television, evening newscast, October 12, 1994.

74. See "Can't Trust Engler," Appendix 2.

75. WXYZ (Channel 7) television, evening newscast, October 14, 1994.

76. The first direct attack advertisement - "Engler Distorts Crime Issue" - was broadcast 36 times between September 23 - October 7, 1994. The second - "Can't Trust Engler" - was broadcasted 15 times between October 6 - 14, 1994.


79. The number of times that particular advertisements broadcast is stated in terms of samples taken from WXYZ (Channel 7) and WDIV (Channel 4), 6:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., subject to occasional local black-outs.

80. As per the sample used in this case study.
81. WXYZ (Channel 7) television, evening newscast, October 6, 1994.

82. Polls were taken from various sources including EPIC-MRA, WJBK-TV, WXYZ-TV, Bill Ballenger of Inside Michigan Politics, WJR-AM, Michigan State University.
CHAPTER 5

THE 1995 ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTION

The "politics of anger" that fed the 1994 U.S. mid-term elections was also evident in the Ontario provincial general election campaign of 1995. After more than four years of New Democratic government, voters swung to the right and elected the Progressive Conservative Party. The party's platform ("The Common Sense Revolution") was designed to appeal to voters' sense of "personal responsibility" - symbolised by promises to reform welfare, abolish employment equity quotas and lower taxes. This agenda was a potent symbol of the failures of the previous government, and it caught the attention and the imagination of Ontario voters, apparently convincing many of them to align with the party's "remedy" for Ontario's economic difficulties. The Conservative's dramatized potent issues that stood in sharp contrast to the values of the governing New Democrats, whose support hovered at or below the 20 per cent mark going into the campaign.

John Wright, pollster for The Angus Reid Group, maintains that the New Democrats were destined to lose the 1995 Ontario provincial election probably two years in advance of election day (see Table 5-8, page 179, for a breakdown of the external poll results reported in the campaign). Internal polling by the major parties indicated similar results, which set the stage for the Conservatives, who saw themselves as having everything to gain and nothing to lose, to begin a long pre-
campaign to educate voters about how they represented a sharp departure from the two previous governments. As it turned out, on June 8, 1995, the New Democrats received 20 per cent of the vote and 17 seats. The Conservatives won the election with 45 per cent of the vote and 82 seats. The Liberals took 31 per cent of the vote and 30 seats. One independent candidate was also elected.

The New Democrats had come to power at the outset of a deep and prolonged recession in September, 1990. Over the party's term as a majority government, early effects of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States aggravated an already difficult economic climate and imposition of the "social contract" (legislation which obligated public servants to take twelve days of unpaid leave in each of three years) alienated the party's traditional base of support. Their only electoral asset seemed to be Bob Rae, the party's leader; in fact, public opinion polls showed that Rae was the only leader who was a net asset to his or her party. For this reason the New Democrats de-emphasised their record and concentrated instead on positively associating Rae with the health care issue, which was the only issue that gave Rae an avenue for issue-crediting because it was the only issue that the New Democrats were deemed by voters to be "most capable of dealing with."

Over the final two years of Rae's term as Premier, the Liberals seemed destined to form the next government; they
entered the election with roughly 50 per cent support in the public opinion polls, and as late as May 22, 1995, one opinion poll put them as high as 64 per cent in popular support. In contrast to Rae's strong image, however, Ontario Liberal leader Lyn McLeod suffered from a weak image and was the most unpopular of the major party leaders; in fact, she was considered by only 19 per cent of respondents to an Angus Reid poll to be the best potential Premier for Ontario. Pollsters also found that at least 20 per cent of the Liberals' support was fluid and could quickly shift to the other two major parties should the Liberals make any mistakes. It was their election to lose.

As a result, the party implemented a typical front-runner strategy - nothing too dramatic or potentially alienating. Because McLeod's image was weak, strategists relied heavily on issues contained in the party's platform ("The Liberal Action Plan") to differentiate the party from the Conservatives. It was the existence of an "action plan" that was stressed, not its contents. For although the Liberal Action Plan appeared to represent substantive alternatives, in reality it offered very little that was dramatically new or different.

The party unwisely sought the middle ground in terms of packaging issues because the Common Sense Revolution, which was established more than one year before the election, did not seem to be "working." The Liberals deliberately adopted the Conservative platform, but in a softer and apparently more
palatable form. Where the Liberal Action Plan promised a 5 per cent tax cut, for example, the Common Sense Revolution promised 30 per cent. The Liberals’ front-runner approach prompted Rosemarie Bahr, Communications Director for the New Democratic campaign, to comment that “fighting the Liberals is like fighting marshmallows, there’s nothing to rail against.”

The fact that the Liberal campaign lacked drama only served to alienate voters in a political climate where voters wanted something — anything — that appeared dramatically different. The Liberal slogan — “yes, there is a difference” — failed to convince voters that there really was a difference. As a result of their fundamental failure to understand what voters wanted, the fluid Liberal support had begun to trickle and then to gush to the Conservatives. By May 23, 1995, the Liberals had slipped approximately 10 per cent from the support they had when they entered the campaign, and were effectively tied with the Conservatives in the opinion polls. It was only at this point that they realized they had mis-read the public’s desire for distinct issues.

By contrast, the Conservatives had run an aggressive pre-campaign. Their intention was to offer a clear alternative to the Liberals — not the incumbent New Democrats. Until the second half of the campaign, however, they had trailed the Liberals in popular support. Conservative strategists knew that if they were to win the election their middle-of-the-pack status would have to change. But what were the campaign
issues that would symbolize the differences between the Conservative and Liberal agendas and catapult the Conservatives and their leader, Mike Harris, into the lead?

Tom Long, Co-chair for the Conservative campaign, had determined at least fifteen months before the election that "work for welfare" and abolishing employment equity "quotas" were straightforward issues that clearly resonated with voters and could be used if necessary to differentiate the Conservatives from the Liberals who held more moderate views on these issues. The issues were also a means to present McLeod as indecisive since she had been publicly seen to change her position on both of these issues prior to the election. As a result, a key departure in strategy for the Conservative campaign in contrast to the Liberal and New Democratic campaigns was that, when asked, voters knew what the Conservatives ostensibly stood for. Voters could "align" with the Conservatives, whereas the other two parties gave voters little reason to align with them.

Conservative television advertising also gave assurances to voters that spending cuts would not be applied to health care, which was the only core social program where most voters agreed that funding should not be reduced. The Conservatives were particularly successful at intertwining these issues with Harris's leadership abilities; for example, they constantly reminded voters in their television advertisements that a Conservative vote equalled
"leadership...for a change." 12

The Conservatives also galvanized the perception that the election was a two-way contest between themselves and the Liberals, quelling any potential resurgence of the New Democrats when Tom Long declared Bob Rae "irrelevant" while introducing the first wave of Conservative television advertisements to the media in a press conference on May 16, 1995. 13 This explains why none of the Conservative advertisements take direct aim at the New Democrats. From a strategic point of view, however, Rae and his party were anything but irrelevant. For in declaring Rae irrelevant, the Conservatives actually further demarcated their own position in the campaign, which was essentially the opposite to everything that the unpopular New Democrats represented.

Micro Content Analysis

(1) Image Content

Tables 5-1 and 5-2 report the verbal and audio-visual image references used by the three major parties for each television advertising type.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Direct</th>
<th>Attack</th>
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<th>Comparative</th>
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* - based on 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes; including 4 direct attack (equals 1 minute, 30 seconds), 14 comparative (equals 15 minutes, 30 seconds) and 2 positive (equals 1 minute)

** - mean per 30 second advertisement equivalent and per television advertising type. Mean is the average number of occurrences per advertisement.

Table 5-1 indicates that leadership and honesty were the most salient verbal images in Ontario, followed by competence. The fact that the experience category was only coded once reflects the fact that Harris and McLeod had very little experience to boast about or to criticise, while Rae's experience did not seem to be worthy of boasting about and was essentially ignored by the other party leaders. Moreover, the "professional" image categories - honesty, leadership, competence and experience - were used almost exclusively (comprising 91.6 per cent of the total verbal image references).
TABLE 5-2
SECONDS AND RATES OF AUDIO-VISUAL IMAGE PRESENTATION BY TYPE*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Direct Attack seconds</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visual talking</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>famous</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>90 (30.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>104 (52.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>844 (27.2)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes
** - rates are in seconds per 30 second advertisement equivalent (except for totals) and for each television advertising type. Transitions are in actual numbers.

Table 5-2 indicates that Ontario's direct attack advertisements made minimal use of audio-visual imagery. Instead, all four cases of direct attack advertising featured visual "roll-ups" which presented a rolling visual depiction of words against a black screen as they were spoken by an announcer. These advertisements did not include sinister still photos of the opponent or visual re-enactments of scandals, as are typically found in direct attack advertisements.\(^{15}\) The dramatic impact of the advertisements was supposed to be felt in the stark contrast of the words against the screen and the ominous voice of announcers (without background music), who were the main feature of these advertisements.\(^{16}\)
Positive advertising used the most audio-visual images, especially the voice of an announcer to praise the party leader and his or her party. One Conservative advertisement particularly personifies positive advertising. The advertisement, entitled "Mike Harris," features the voice of an announcer, numerous transitions, upbeat music, and numerous visuals of Harris in conversation with "ordinary" citizens.¹⁷ By contrast, comparative advertising used the least audio-visual images since the New Democrats, who created half of them, featured Rae almost exclusively. As a result, these advertisements relied minimally on the voice of announcers, background music and visuals of citizens and the party leaders.

(2) Issue Content

Tables 5-3 and 5-4 report the verbal and audio-visual issue references used by the three major parties in each television advertising type. Table 5-3 found that the most salient issues in the Ontario campaign were health care, taxes, jobs and the budget/deficit. These issues reflect internal public opinion polls conducted by all three major parties, as well as external public opinion polls. According to an Environics poll released June 3, 1995, for example, when asked what was the single most important issue in the election, 22 per cent of respondents said unemployment/job creation, 13 per cent said debt/deficit, 12 per cent said
health care and 10 per cent said taxes.\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Attack</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Comparative</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget/Def.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp.Equity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEAN</strong></td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes;
** - mean per 30 second advertisement equivalent and per television advertising type. Mean is the average number of occurrences per advertisement.

Nevertheless, there were some important exceptions, such as the focus by the Conservatives on welfare reform, which was identified by only 5 per cent of the opinion poll respondents as the single most important issue in the election.\textsuperscript{19} The Conservative’s internal polling found, however, that relating “work for welfare” and employment equity “quotas” to the number one issue of “jobs” could invoke a particularly strong negative emotional response in voters toward the party’s opponents. As a result, one of the Conservative’s television advertisements suggested that able-bodied welfare recipients
"should work for their benefits." The suggestion was that welfare reform and employment equity were inextricably tied to a healthier economy, which would include more jobs. Although the issues were not the most central in the campaign for voters, they became the most central issues in the Conservative advertising campaign.

### TABLE 5-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Attack</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Comparative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>seconds rate**</td>
<td>seconds</td>
<td>seconds rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal dress</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice candidate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate direct</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual talking candidate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(13.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes  
** - rates are in seconds per 30 second advertisement equivalent for each television advertising type.  
*** - see note number 13

Table 5-4 shows a complete dependence on image presentation in Ontario’s direct attack advertisements. This comes as no surprise, since announcers are used as substitutes for party leaders to avoid the risk of a possible boomerang effect from the direct attacks. Comparative advertisements, on the other hand, relied the most heavily on issue presentation variables and the least heavily on image presentation variables, primarily because the New Democrats used Rae to deliver issue messages in their comparative
advertisements. The Liberals used a mix of issue and image audio-visuals and the Conservatives used the image presentation style as a fixed strategy in their comparative advertisements.

Positive advertising used the fewest issue-oriented audio-visuals. The two positive advertisements relied predominantly on background visuals of the party leaders as an announcer praised the party’s issue platform.

(3) Meta-advertising Content

Table 5-5 highlights the presentation styles that dominated for each of the television advertising types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direct Attack</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Comparative</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue style</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image style</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both styles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes

The four direct attack advertisements were split equally between the New Democrats and the Liberals. The 2 positive advertisements were split equally between the Liberals and the Conservatives. Of the 14 comparative advertisements, 7 were released by the New Democrats, 3 by the Liberals and 4 by the Conservatives.

Table 5-5 indicates that although Ontario’s television
advertising was dominated by the image presentation style, the issue presentation style was a fixed strategy for comparative advertising. The use of the issue presentation style for comparative advertising is a result of the fact that the comparative advertisements were generally mild and indirect (with the exception of the Conservatives' comparative advertising), which meant that the party leaders could be used instead of announcers on a regular basis. For example, Rae makes the following comparative comments between his party and the federal Liberals:

Your family and mine depend on our health care system. But the Liberals in Ottawa say we better get ready for cuts to health care. They're slashing the amount of money we get for health and other services. I believe you and your family should get the health care you need, not just the health care you can afford...²¹

There were only two advertisements that were dominated by both presentation styles: one was the "Liberal Free Time Advertisement," where McLeod speaks in conjunction with an announcer who introduces the themes that McLeod then addresses, and the second was a Conservative advertisement which, although it was dominated by the voice of an announcer, also included certain issue presentation variables, such as Harris in numerous motion visuals, and Harris speaking directly to the camera.²²

The low frequency of combination advertisements means that television advertising in Ontario generally relies less heavily on audio-visual communication than on verbal
communication. As a result, the verbal communication of the advertisements dominated, even though it was mostly vague and ambiguous. This was the result of a lack of available visual images - since McLeod and Harris did not have track records to dramatize - and a mind-set among Ontario strategists which precluded them from using extensive negative visual imagery. (Both of these factors will be discussed under Direct Attack Advertising in the next section).  

Table 5-6 profiles the uses of the issue modes by each party for each television advertising type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Mode</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>LIB</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blame</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - based on 20 television advertisements, equals 18 minutes

Direct Attack Advertising

The Ontario campaign featured 3.33 issues per direct attack advertisement, which means that opponents are constructed in Ontario by more directly attacking their issue platforms. This would seem to support Darrell West’s contention that some of the most substantive verbal issue references are actually placed in negative television
However, Table 5-1 indicates that along with the higher number of verbal issue references in direct attacks came a relatively high frequency of verbal image references (compared to the frequency of verbal image references used in the other two television advertising types) and a total reliance on the image presentation style.

The relatively heavy reliance on verbal issue references in direct attack advertising can be at least partially explained by a number of contextual factors: (1) the tight two-way race between the Liberals and Conservatives; (2) the multi-party Ontario system which makes the prospect of a minority government a genuine strategic consideration; (3) the detailed Liberal and Conservative "plans" that were used as raw material for policy-accusing; and (4) the belief by Ontario strategists that personal attacks such as those seen in most American campaigns "simply don't work up here." 

First, the internal and external public opinion polls indicated that the contest was close between the Liberals and the Conservatives. At the outset of the campaign, polling indicated that support for the Liberals was fluid, and, beginning around the mid-point of the campaign, the parties were virtually tied for first place in the polls. Taking a chance on a boomerang effect from overt image attacks was not a risk worth taking for either of these two parties.

Second, the New Democrats had to be cautious in their use of direct attack advertising on the off-chance that they would
be in a position to form a minority government partner with either the Liberals or Conservatives; it is very difficult to directly attack a party during the election and then coalesce with them after the election. Targeting the federal Liberals for negative advertisements and clearly laying out where the New Democrats stood on essential issues such as tax cuts and protecting health care was important to establishing the party's priorities as a potential coalition partner. Moreover, the other parties were careful in their direct attacks of the New Democrats at least partly as a response to the threat of a minority government which might have required them to court the New Democrats after the election.

Third, the Liberals and the Conservatives used detailed issue platforms to promote the appearance that they were proposing something unique and concrete. As has already been evidenced, however, few details of issues were offered in either party's television advertising.

Fourth, there was a shared belief by almost every Ontario strategist that image attacks do not work in Canada. This belief made blatant attempts at image advertising—especially visual image attacks—particularly problematic. According to one strategist, the boomerang against the Chretien "Face" advertisement during the 1993 federal election "changed the dynamic up here." This may have been especially true for the Conservatives who were particularly sensitive to using visual images of their opponents in their television
advertising. For them, comparative advertising was the best alternative.

Even with these factors clearly changing the way in which issues were used in direct attack advertising, it is used in Ontario in a similar way to other campaigns: to intertwine issues and images in an attempt to diminish an opponent's image. In the following advertisement, Rae uses his opponents' issue agendas to cast doubt on their honesty:

Both Lyn McLeod and Mike Harris say they can cut taxes, balance the budget and not hurt health care. How are they going to do that? It just doesn't add up.  

Conservative strategists readily admitted that their key issues were contradictory. Leslie Noble, Co-chair and Communications Director for the Conservative campaign, agreed that her party told voters essentially what focus groups indicated they "wanted to hear," which Noble indicated was justified because it increased Harris's trust and competence ratings. Conservative strategists essentially gave voters an emotional twist on standard issues; i.e., it was indicated earlier that welfare reform was used to symbolize a whole range of economic issues. Moreover, portraying issues in a comparative format is particularly helpful in not only defining the party as a viable alternative, but in defining the party as the only alternative.

The opportunity to co-ordinate negative audio-visual messages with negative verbal messages was also lessened in Ontario by the fact that issue-accusing was used more than
issue-blaming, and accusations do not lend themselves as well as blames to audio-visual presentation. During the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial campaign, for example, Democratic party leader Howard Wolpe attacked Governor John Engler for closing a mental health facility that may have cost the lives of several patients. The visuals showed patients being forcibly removed by state troopers in the middle of the night, some patients openly weeping as they clung to wire fences. The sister of one "victim" was interviewed. To associate Engler with the event, the visuals also included still pictures of him which seemed to suggest that he had been personally present to oversee the closing of the facility.29

Direct attack strategies were also made difficult because internal and external opinion polling indicated that a majority of voters supported the Common Sense Revolution. The New Democrats could not win by appealing to emotional audio-visuals depicting welfare recipients as "victims" - the appeal would not have resonated with voters. Instead, the New Democrats used a comparative advertisement to link Harris and the Conservatives to a common Canadian fear that Canada could be taken over by the United States. "Flag"30 was reminiscent of "erasing the border," a federal Liberal Party television advertisement created for the 1988 federal election which depicted the border separating Canada and the United States being erased while free trade negotiators discussed the terms of the agreement. By using the visual symbol of the Canadian
flag disappearing in favour of an American flag with one maple leaf among the stars, the New Democrats were essentially telling voters - "if you vote Conservative you'll lose your country."

This strategy completely ignored specific issues in favour of cuing negative emotional responses. The argument was essentially that a vote for a Conservative government was a vote for a U.S. style political system that is uncaring in its treatment of all but the wealthy. This was the only New Democratic comparative advertisement that did not use Rae to personally deliver the message.

Positive Advertising

Positive advertising is effective when it can be used to reinforce the front-runner's image with the positive issue modes - issue-crediting, issue-mentioning and issue-positioning. As a fixed strategy of front-running incumbents, issue-crediting was used sparingly in Ontario because the New Democrats trailed the other two parties by a wide margin in the opinion polls. Although they conducted some issue-crediting in their comparative advertisements, it was modest and did not match the obvious use of this issue mode by incumbents in other campaigns, such as Engler in Michigan.

Only two positive advertisements were released during the campaign, which reflected the struggle between the Liberals and the Conservatives for front-runner status, and the
unpopularity of the New Democrats. The advertisements were designed to strengthen the front-running party's lead and provide a "comfort zone" for voters. However, the parties took opposite strategic approaches in designing their positive advertisements. In the Liberal's positive advertisement, pages were depicted from the Liberal Action Plan. An announcer makes the following comments:

This is the Liberal Action Plan. It outlines how we'll balance the budget in four years, protect health care and foster job creation and economic growth. It has a timetable...Business leaders and economists call it realistic and achievable...12

The Conservative's positive advertisement took a very different approach. Visually, it focused on Harris almost entirely. Verbally, the announcer portrayed Harris as "the" agent of change in Ontario: "real change has a name. Mike Harris."33 The announcer goes on to indicate how Harris represents change:

Mike Harris will eliminate unfair hiring quotas to guarantee equal opportunity for all. Only Harris has a serious plan that will cut income taxes to create good jobs. And only Harris will require able-bodied welfare recipients to work for their benefits.34

The advertisement ends with Harris speaking his only words of the television advertising campaign: he says - "join us, together we'll bring opportunity to Ontario."35

Comparative Advertising

Comparative advertising dominated the Ontario campaign. It was used by all three parties which indicates that none
felt especially comfortable with their position during the campaign. This was particularly true of the New Democrats, who produced almost half of the comparative advertisements used in the campaign; their messages were varied and suggested a struggle to defend the government's term in office, targeting whichever opponent led in the public opinion polls.

All three parties used issue-mentioning consistently in their comparative advertising, while the Conservatives used issue-positioning with more regularity than the other two parties. The following Conservative advertisement literally pits Harris against McLeod both visually and verbally, where Harris is depicted as the clear winner:

On welfare and quotas - compare. Mike Harris will require able-bodied welfare recipients to work for their benefits. Lyn McLeod opposes mandatory workfare. You will not hear Lyn McLeod talking about mandatory workfare - says McLeod. Harris will repeal Ontario's quota law and make hiring fair. McLeod opposes repealing the quota law. What a difference. Mike Harris. Work for welfare. End quotas. Common sense, for a change.36

The audio-visual portion of this advertisement especially reinforces the comparative nature of the advertisement by using a tabular, grid-like pattern to display the Liberal positions on each issue as they are outlined by the announcer, and then the alternative Conservative view on the other side of the screen. The Liberal positions are highlighted in red and the Conservative positions are highlighted in blue. In making the comparisons on the issues of welfare and quotas, the announcer suggests that McLeod is out of touch with voters
and that her positions on these - and invariably other - issues do not make "common sense." To further contrast Harris with McLeod's apparent indecisiveness, another advertisement likened McLeod to a weather vane, changing directions as the winds changed.37

The Conservative strategy in using comparative advertising was to blitz a few, narrowly defined issues in a way which diminished the opponent's image at the same time as it positively associated Harris with the popular issues. The voice of an announcer was heard almost exclusively because the advertisements were especially direct and negative. In fact, the total amount of comparative advertising released by the Conservatives equalled 4 minutes and 20 seconds, of which Harris was visually or verbally featured for a total of only 21 seconds (in contrast to Rae, who was featured for 6 minutes and 26 seconds of 7 minutes and 20 seconds of comparative advertising, and McLeod, who was featured for 1 minute and 57 seconds of 3 minutes and 50 seconds of comparative advertising).

The Liberals and New Democrats were more subtle in their comparative advertising because they realized that they were not as well aligned with the most potent issues. In contrast to the Conservative's comparative advertising, the following Liberal advertisement compares the Liberal Action Plan and the Common Sense Revolution:

ontario's economy is on a tightrope and the key to growth and jobs is balance, the careful balance
between tax cuts and a balanced budget. The Liberal Action Plan of Lyn McLeod promises a well thought out 5 per cent tax cut and a balanced budget. The Conservatives and Mike Harris promise an unrealistic 30 per cent income tax cut. Thirty per cent. You know how risky that could be. Vote for high return, not high risk. Vote Liberal.  

The visual component of this advertisement was especially ambiguous, showing a tightrope walker trying to keep his balance as portions of his balancing rod are randomly clipped away at the ends. Although such visuals were supposed to symbolise the contradictions of the Common Sense Revolution, internal polling by the Liberals showed that voters "didn't make the connection - they didn't get the meaning of the ad."  

Macro Content Analysis

1. Party or Candidate Status

The New Democrats faced a "strategic bind." Although they were incumbent, they trailed their major opponents in the public opinion polls. As a result, they had to defend their record and appear innovative at the same time. Moreover, their issue-crediting opportunities were limited to subtle statements about their successes on the core issue of health care in their comparative advertisements. For example, Rae made the following statements in a two minute television advertisement entitled "Health Care":

we've worked hard to get health care spending under control...We expanded in-home care so thousands of seniors get the services they need in their homes. We now have a program to make sure families can
afford the drugs they need when someone suffers a serious illness... We put breast cancer detection labs on the road - 60,000 women are being checked every year, compared to just 500 a year a short time ago. And we're making sure that people aren't waiting for cancer care by increasing our investment in treatment by over 30 per cent...\[41\]

Rae goes on in the advertisement to try and instill fear in middle class voters about possible cuts to health care spending as a result of a Liberal or Conservative government, casting doubt on the integrity of his opponents: "[t]he federal government has shown in its budget that it's prepared to accept one health care system for the rich and something else for everyone else, and I haven't heard Lyn McLeod or Mike Harris really disagree with that."\[42\] In this advertisement, symbols of family and community are used to create fear in middle class voters about their personal security.

However, the message evidently did not resonate with voters; the issue-crediting was not highly visible and it was probably too little, too late. Generating goodwill through issue-crediting is only successful on a big and highly visible scale. When the incumbent is a distant third in the public opinion polls, as the New Democrats were, constructing highly visible goodwill is a risky strategy because it is normally seen as both desperate and wasteful. It may also serve as fodder for direct attacks by opponents who are more popular. Positive advertising featuring issue-crediting is a strategy best reserved for incumbents who are at least on a par with their opponents in terms of popular support. Also, Rae
resisted using any of the symbolic lures of incumbency (i.e., speaking to voters from the Premier's Office). New Democratic strategists believed that attaching Rae to such symbols of government would only remind voters of the negative aspects of his term as Premier and further alienate voters. 43

In the first half of the campaign the Liberals were the front-runners and they did not produce a single direct attack advertisement; they produced one positive advertisement, and their comparative advertising was mild and indirect. Their campaign was uninspired but relatively safe - or so they thought. The only modification to their television advertising strategy came when internal and external opinion polls began to show a dramatic shift in support away from them and to the Conservatives. The Liberals finally turned to articulation of specific issues, but only as an attempt to break the momentum of the Conservatives. They targeted the Conservatives with two direct attack advertisements on May 30, 199544 which completely ignored the New Democrats and featured language that was previously heard in the first half of the campaign by the New Democrats. In the following advertisement, for example, an announcer casts doubt on the honesty and competence of Harris and his party:

The Conservatives and Mike Harris tell you he will cut income tax by an irresponsible and unrealistic 30 per cent. He isn't telling you their plan could threaten your health care. He isn't telling you about his hefty new health tax on the middle class. If he isn't telling you all of that, what else isn't Mike Harris telling you. On June 8th, vote "NO" to the Harris health tax...45
Because the Liberals were poorly aligned with voters on the issues, their efforts to address issues - even when they negatively pointed out the inconsistencies of the Conservative platform - merely resulted in their highlighting their own lack of innovation and reinforcing the Conservative's claim to the issues. For example, Conservative polling showed that most voters did not believe that personal income taxes could be reduced by 30 per cent, but they positively associated the promise with trying to help the middle class. By calling the Conservative promise "irresponsible" and "unrealistic," the Liberals may have appeared unsympathetic to high levels of taxation against the middle class.

Conservative strategists assumed the role of challenger at the outset of the campaign. Although they were not the incumbent party, they associated themselves with symbols of incumbency: their free-time broadcast included background visuals of Queen's Park and the Canadian flag, while the announcer discussed Harris's leadership qualities and reiterated promises contained in the Common Sense Revolution. The fact that the Liberals and the New Democrats used almost no symbols of incumbency may have legitimized the Conservatives' claim to frontrunner status and portrayed them as the government party.

(2) Party Leader or Candidate Style

Presentation style is a poor indicator of campaign
strategy in Ontario because television advertising campaigns are generally split into only two "waves" in Ontario with little flexibility for re-designing strategy once the advertising period begins. The New Democrats, for example, exemplified the issue presentation style and did not alter their approach during the campaign. For them, Rae "was" their advertising strategy; he is shown in formal dress, in front of a neutral back-drop, and speaking directly to the camera. He talks about the importance of preserving health care and other social programs. He explains his issue record - for example, "Rae Days" - and makes statements such as "governing isn't a popularity contest. It's doing what's right and what's fair."

Rae was the only party leader who had a strong personal style. In fact Rae was comfortable with all three aspects of personal style: he was at home in front of the television camera, he consistently projected a strong character image over television and he was deemed by voters to be especially proficient in terms of his knowledge of the issues. Rosemarie Bahr commented that Rae’s ease with the camera and his ability to project emotion made him the "best person to deliver his own messages." A competing party strategist even commented that "Rae almost - but not quite - had me believing that ‘Rae Days’ made sense." Accordingly, Rae was the dominant speaker in 7 of his party’s 9 television advertisements, which is far more than the average specified
by Lynda Lee Kaid and Dorothy Davidson for party leaders who are effectively challengers.

By contrast, party leaders with weak personal styles will tend to use surrogates to deliver their messages. The Liberals and the Conservatives both assumed a more image-oriented presentation style than the New Democrats, and used surrogates (always the voice of an announcer) almost universally. Again, their styles, once chosen, were marked by how little they changed.

As was indicated earlier, McLeod was used by strategists essentially as an appendage to the Liberal Action Plan which in many ways acted as a non-human surrogate for her personal unpopularity and publicly perceived incompetence. The strategy was to construct her public image by associating her with the Liberal Action Plan. Liberal strategists down-played specific issues for much of the campaign because they felt that McLeod could not "carry off an issue campaign." They clearly did not feel comfortable enough with McLeod's "presence" to let her speak without the aid of announcers or the Liberal Action Plan, which is why the television advertisements stressed that the Liberal Action Plan had the support of prominent business leaders and economists.

McLeod shared the spotlight with an announcer or was completely absent in all but one of her party's television advertisements. When she did speak, it was directly to the camera, reiterating positions contained in the Liberal Action
Plan, with an announcer regularly interjecting to introduce major themes and emphasise their importance. However, the attempt to hide McLeod behind the party’s platform seemed so blatant that it drew negative attention (aided by media commentaries) to her credibility and further damaged her public image.

The fixed time period for television advertising makes it difficult for party leader’s to respond to an opponent’s issue-blaming and issue-accusing, or to appropriate certain aspects of an opponent’s personal style or presentation style. Nevertheless, appropriation of presentation styles was clearly present in the Liberal’s use of roll-up visual depictions in their direct attack advertisements in the final week of the campaign. The visual presentation style of these advertisements was identical to earlier direct attack advertisements produced by the New Democrats, so much so that New Democratic strategist Rosemarie Bahr maintains that until she saw the sponsor of one of the Liberal direct attack advertisements she was certain that it was one of her party’s own advertisements. The New Democrats used their direct attack advertisements to question the credibility of McLeod and Harris for promising to cut taxes, balance the budget and not "hurt" health care; the Liberals used their direct attack advertisements to question the credibility of Harris and his party on the same issues. Liberal strategists may have hoped to associate their direct attack advertisements with the
New Democrats, but they would not confirm that this was a strategic consideration.

Leslie Noble indicated that the Conservative party's television "advertising was about simplicity, consistency and repetition." She and other Conservative strategists were confident from the start that their party "owned" the issues. Because their support continued to increase throughout the campaign, there was no perceived need to alter their strategic presentation style or the issues they chose to emphasise. As a result, throughout the campaign the attempt was made to contrast Harris's tough issues with his compassionate side. Conservative advertisements showed Harris talking to people in numerous casual situations, such as talking to store owners outside of their businesses, while announcers discussed how the Common Sense Revolution would improve their standard of living.

The Conservative strategy was to use direct comparative advertisements to strengthen the party's stranglehold on the issues. These simple and often repeated messages were also designed to solidify Harris's image as a leader. This resulted in issues - such as "work for welfare" - being used as campaign slogans that were directly equated with Harris's leadership skills - and McLeod's apparent lack of leadership skills.

Two less dominant image factors in Ontario were the use of background music and number of visual transitions.
Background music was deeply hidden so as not to detract from the verbal message. Although a high number of transitions were evident, they were normally the result of changing angles on the same visual; for example, when Rae wanted to signal a shift in the tone of his voice. Hence, although both of these variables appear prominent in terms of numbers and seconds per advertisement, they served a supplemental purpose in this campaign.

(3) Public Opinion Polling

Ontario strategists generally used internal polling to target issues that represented the opponent's weak points and the party leader's strong points in reaction to popular public sentiment. It would appear, however, that once the campaign began, internal polling was less valuable to Ontario strategists because there was less opportunity to alter television advertising strategy during the advertising period. To the minimal extent that television advertising strategies were altered during the campaign, strategists relied more on issue attacks to shift support or break a competitor's momentum than on appropriating from opponents or altering their party leader's style.

Modifications to campaign strategy were reflected less in the party's television advertising and more in its news media strategies. In fact there was a deliberate effort by all three major parties to integrate news media coverage of their
campaigns into their campaign strategies; party leaders especially sought to lead the evening news. For example, a primary Conservative strategy was to ensure that Harris always appropriated the lead on the evening newscasts: "we had a message - [Harris] sold it on the news, we sold it on the ads."  

Table 5-7 outlines the sequence of new television advertisements and their broadcast duration over the campaign.

**TABLE 5-7**

**RELEASE DATE AND DURATION OF TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS BY PARTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date*</th>
<th>Party and Title of Advertisement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - June 6</td>
<td>NDP: Free Time Political Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 30</td>
<td>NDP: Liberal Budget Cuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 18</td>
<td>NDP: Health Care (long)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 23</td>
<td>NDP: Rae Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - June 5</td>
<td>NDP: It Doesn't Add Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - June 6</td>
<td>PC: Free time Political Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 31</td>
<td>PC: Welfare and Quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 24</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Liberal Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - May 25</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Reality of Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17 - June 6</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Free Time Political Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24 - May 31</td>
<td>NDP: Tax Cut Promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24 - May 31</td>
<td>NDP: Health Care (short)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26 - June 1</td>
<td>PC: Jobs and Taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26 - May 29</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Tightrope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31 - June 2</td>
<td>PC: Where Does McLeod Stand?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30 - June 6</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Irresponsible Promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30 - June 6</td>
<td>LIBERAL: Do You Really Believe?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31 - June 6</td>
<td>NDP: Flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31 - June 6</td>
<td>NDP: Use Your Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5 - June 6</td>
<td>PC: Mike Harris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - dates based on first broadcasting on CTV television; trend confirmed by CFPL London (local BBS affiliate).

Half of all the new advertisements were released on May 17, 1995, the first day that advertisements could legally be broadcast. The other half broadcast between May 24 and May
31, 1995, with the one exception of "Mike Harris," which broadcast June 5 and 6, 1995.

There was little overlap in the broadcasting of different television advertisements. This was especially true for the Conservatives, who would blitz one particular advertisement and then abandoned it in favour of a new advertisement. For example, "Welfare and Quotas" - the Conservative's most dominant advertisement - broadcast 53 times on CTV (Toronto) between May 17 and 31, 1995. By contrast, the most repetitions of a Liberal or New Democratic advertisement was "Rae Days" at 15. The fact that "Welfare and Quotas" was such a dominant advertisement further reveals the priorities of the Conservative party in using specific, emotional issues, rather than broader issues, such as Ontario's accumulated deficit. Also, using the deficit as a key issue was not an option for the Conservatives since they could only use it to directly attack the New Democrats, who were widely viewed as responsible for the deficit. This would have been contrary to the Conservative strategy to deliberately ignore the New Democrats.

Table 5-8 highlights the external public opinion polls that were released by the news media during the campaign. Popularity of party leaders is given where reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NDP/Rae</th>
<th>LIBERAL/McLeod</th>
<th>PC/Harris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15</td>
<td>17 (28)</td>
<td>52 (18)</td>
<td>28 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;mid&quot;</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3</td>
<td>20 (33)</td>
<td>34 (19)</td>
<td>44 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the entire campaign, external polls showed the New Democrats stagnating, the Conservatives building momentum and the Liberals losing momentum. The polls damaged the New Democratic campaign and made it even more difficult for them to generate any campaign momentum. However, the polls were critical to the success of the Conservatives since they showed the Conservatives with the campaign momentum clearly in their favour. In fact the net momentum gain over the campaign period for the Conservatives was plus 23, compared with minus 24 for the Liberals. Conservative strategists were able to use positive advertising more effectively in the final week of the campaign to solidify their front-runner position, partially as a result of the reinforcement received from media who regularly repeated the poll results which emphasised their success in the polls.

The New Democrats released one of their own internal leader popularity polls to the media on May 26, 1995. The poll showed the party’s support in the "mid-twenties" compared
to the Liberals at 33 per cent and the Conservatives in the lead at 37 per cent. One of the reasons for releasing this internal poll was to highlight the fact that it showed Rae to be the most qualified leader - with about 35 per cent of voters offering that opinion. The poll may also have been meant to frighten working-class voters into backing the New Democratic Party, since it suggested that the Conservatives, not the more moderate Liberals, had assumed the lead.

**Conclusion**

Macro analysis addresses a potential problem associated with lumping party leaders' campaigns together: each party may have different strategy objectives. For example, the New Democrats ran the most issue-oriented campaign. They did not use extensive direct attack advertising, especially at the end, as would be expected for a party in third position. Instead, Rae continued to defend his record, all the while knowing that he could not win with this strategy. As such, their use of televised political advertising - and therefore issues and images - was different from the other parties in this campaign.

Direct attack advertising is effective for telling voters who not to vote for, which is why Rae, the incumbent leader of a party in third place, was not directly targeted for direct attack advertisements by the Liberals or the Conservatives. Positive advertising is effective for reinforcing positive
sentiments and shoring up support that already exists. Since it is mainly used by front-runners with a significant lead in public opinion polls, it was used sparingly in the Ontario campaign. Comparative advertising is a particularly important strategy in Ontario because comparisons enable the parties to portray themselves as distinct from an opponent.

Ontario's televised political advertising did not rely heavily on personal symbols - such as family and community - although some use of this strategy was evident. Instead, strategists relied on professional image symbols to construct their leader's image - such as Harris talking to a number of small business owners, instead of family members, or the Liberals using economists and business leaders to support the Action Plan. In both cases, the emphasis was on constructing an image of the party leader as a professional leader, rather than as a leader who is a nice person.

The campaign also confirms that voters tend to align with political parties rather than with party leaders. Very little shift occurred in which leader voters thought would make the best premier, although support for which party would make the best government shifted dramatically. "The decision to switch from Liberal to Conservative, therefore, had less to do with individual leader support and more to do with support for the party. Moreover, the high-definition nature of a few potent issues helped the Conservatives to convince voters that they were the only viable alternative to the New Democrats."
Endnotes


3. An Angus Reid poll released June 3, 1995 indicated that although 44 per cent of decided voters planned to vote for the Progressive Conservatives, a smaller margin of 33 per cent believed that Mike Harris would make the best Premier of Ontario. Conversely, although only 20 per cent of respondents planned to vote for the New Democratic Party, 33 per cent believed that Bob Rae would make the best Premier. The Angus Reid Group, Ontario Party Standings, pp. 2 and 6.

4. Thirty-five per cent of respondents believed that the New Democrats would be "most capable" of dealing with the issue, compared to 24 per cent for the Liberals and 18 per cent for the Conservatives. The Angus Reid Group, Ontario Election Issues, June 5, 1995, p. 2.


6. Although 30 per cent of voters believed that the Liberals would make the "best" government for Ontario in early June, only 19 per cent of respondents felt that McLeod would make the best Premier. The Angus Reid Group, Ontario Party Standings, p. 6 and Ontario Election Issues, p. 5.


9. Angus Reid polling indicated that support was shifting directly from the Liberals and to the Conservatives. The Angus Reid Group, Ontario Party Standings, pp. 2 and 5.
10. This does not indicate that any of the three party leaders enjoyed particularly large doses of credibility with voters. In fact they did not. Angus Reid pollsters asked respondents which party they believed would do the best job in terms of providing honest and trustworthy government. Twenty per cent answered "none." When asked which party would keep their promises, 26 per cent answered "none." The Angus Reid Group, *Ontario Election Issues*, p. 3.

11. Strategists from all three major parties agreed that stating any intentions to cut health care funding would have been equivalent to campaign suicide. The Angus Reid Group, *Ontario Election Issues*, p. 2.

12. See, for example, "Where Does Lyn McLeod Really Stand?," and "Mike Harris," Appendix 2.

13. The television advertisements were unveiled to all of the major media on May 16, 1995, one day before the advertising period officially began.

14. These totals are artificially derived for comparison purposes only.

15. For example, see "Lafayette Clinic," Appendix 2, which was used in the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial campaign.


17. See "Mike Harris," Appendix 2.

18. William Walker, "Jobs top concern of voters, poll finds", *Toronto Star*, June 3, 1995, p. A8. The poll was taken between May 29–31, 1995. These figures concur with a poll conducted by Angus Reid, which indicated that 23 per cent of their respondents believed unemployment was the most important issue in the campaign, followed by deficit (16 per cent), health care (10 per cent), taxes (9 per cent), the economy (8 per cent) and welfare (6 per cent). The Angus Reid Group, *Ontario Election Issues*, p. 2.


22. See "Liberal Free Time Advertisement" and "Mike Harris," Appendix 2.

23. Strategists from all three major parties generally agreed with this assessment, as per personal interviews in July and August, 1995.

24. See West, pp. 36-37.


28. See "It doesn't add up," Appendix 2.

29. See "Lafayette Clinic," Appendix 2.


33. See "Mike Harris," Appendix 2.
34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


37. See "Where Does Lyn McLeod Really Stand?," Appendix 2.

38. See "Tightrope," Appendix 2.


41. See "Health Care" (long), Appendix 2.

42. Ibid.


44. See "Irresponsible Promises" and "Do You Really Believe," Appendix 2.

45. See "Irresponsible Promises," Appendix 2.


47. See "Rae Days," Appendix 2.

48. Reflected in the polls which found that Rae was ranked as the "most capable" of dealing with certain issues, especially health care, the environment, and social issues more generally, even though voters did not support the New Democratic Party. The Angus Reid Group, Ontario Election Issues, pp. 2-3, and Ontario Party Standings, p. 6.


52. See the Liberal's "Free Time Political Advertisement," Appendix 2.

53. Media attacks against McLeod for relying too heavily on the Liberal Action Plan began with media evaluation and analysis of the leaders' performance in the leaders' debate, and continued for the remainder of the campaign.

54. Spending limits are also a potentially important concern for Ontario strategists, since, if an original television advertising strategy is found to be faulty, the ability to alter strategy and create new advertisements may be severely restricted by spending limits.


56. See "It Doesn't Add Up" and "Do You Really Believe?," Appendix 2.


58. For example, see "Where Does McLeod Really Stand?," Appendix 2.

60. As per adlog samples taken from CTV and BBS stations between May 17 and June 6, 1995.

61. Polls were taken from The Angus Reid Group, Compass and Environics at various points in the campaign.

62. The "net momentum factor" measures the difference between the number of respondents who believe that the candidate/party has "improved" over the campaign, minus the number of respondents who believe that the candidate/party has "gotten worse." The Angus Reid Group, *Ontario Party Standings*, p. 5.


CHAPTER 6

ELECTION LAW AND THE USES OF TELEVISED POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO

Several studies, such as those conducted by Luntz,¹ Kern,² and Sabato,³ find remarkable similarities in the attitudes and beliefs of most political strategists about the potential uses of televised political advertising. In Chapters 4 and 5 of this study it was found that political strategists in Michigan and Ontario regularly constructed similar meta-advertising strategies.

Yet content analysis also revealed certain differences in the uses of televised political advertising between Michigan and Ontario. Some of these variances are explained by general differences in the campaign contexts; for example, there was less opportunity to use visual imagery in Ontario because direct visual attacks depend on the availability of visuals which feature the opponent in compromising positions, such as when Michigan Governor John Engler had patients forcibly removed from Lafayette Clinic in Michigan.⁴ This was a dramatic moment and it was caught on videotape. In Ontario, the two main targets of direct attack advertising were Conservative leader Mike Harris and Liberal leader Lyn McLeod, neither of whom had generated similar damaging visual spectacles.

Some of the differences are also explained by specific contextual approaches that are used by strategists to design their campaign strategies, such as the party leader's or
candidate's style. Analysis of Democratic gubernatorial candidate Howard Wolpe's personal style showed that he was "too nice" to engage in extensive mud-slinging. Instead, he used more comparative advertising than perhaps would be the case for other candidates, including Engler.

Yet there are additional, although less immediately obvious, variables which affect the uses of televised political advertising, many of which have been neglected by researchers who study the content of televised political advertising. This chapter attempts to analyze one such variable: the legal and regulatory regimes in Michigan and Ontario. Specifically, the objective of this chapter is to analyze how differences in specific election laws effect the uses of televised political advertising in Michigan and Ontario. First, a background examination of Michigan election law will be undertaken. Then, election laws will be analyzed with a view to determining their effects on campaign strategy in the 1994 gubernatorial campaign. A similar analysis will follow of Ontario provincial election law and the 1995 Ontario provincial general election. A concluding section will then assess the differences in the uses of televised political advertising as campaign strategies between Michigan and Ontario which can be traced to these factors. (Appendix 4 provides a comparative summary of election laws for Michigan in 1994 and Ontario in 1995).

Three aspects of election law must particularly be taken
into account in a comparative analysis of political advertising in Michigan and Ontario: (1) whether or not here are legally fixed limits on the time period over which political advertising may take place during election campaigns; (2) the legal definition of "minor" and "major" parties; and (3) whether "independent" expenditures may be legally combined with party campaign spending in developing advertising strategies.

Election Law in Michigan Gubernatorial Elections

General Provisions

Under the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA), candidates have the option of accepting partial public funding (with overall expenditure limits) or foregoing public funding in favour of unlimited private spending. Every candidate has chosen the public financing option since the inception of public funding provisions in 1976. Only one qualified candidate has ever failed to receive public financing; during the 1986 primary one of the Democratic candidates did not file the appropriate documentation required by the public funding provisions under the MCFA.5 In 1994, public funding provisions fixed the overall campaign expenditure limit at $1,500,000 per general election campaign. The maximum public subsidy is 75 per cent of this limit. Qualified primary candidates also receive matching funds on a two-for-one basis - up to a maximum of $990,000 in 1994.6
A "candidate committee" must be established by each registered candidate to act as his or her administrative organization, mostly for purposes of disclosure, fundraising and accepting contributions. The maximum that a candidate committee can accept on behalf of a publicly funded candidate is 25 per cent of the expenditure limit, or $375,000 in 1994. Candidates may also contribute up to $50,000 toward their own campaign. Section 66 of the MCFA sets out the conditions under which candidate committees may make expenditures and gives substantial latitude in expenditure decision-making to candidates and their committees. Under Section 66, a qualified expenditure is any "expenditure for services, materials, facilities, or other things of value by the candidate committee to further the candidate's nomination or election to office during the year in which the primary or general election in which the candidate seeks nomination or election is held."  

Regardless of whether contributions are made to publicly or privately funded candidates, each contributor is designated in one of six ways: (1) an individual (including unions); (2) a corporation; (3) a "political committee"; (4) an "independent committee"; (5) a "party committee"; or (6) a "state central party committee." Contributions are made on an "election cycle" basis, which is "the period beginning the day following the last general election in which the office of governor appeared on the ballot and ending on the day of the
next general election in which the office appears on the ballot."

Individuals include any person who is not a member of a political, independent or party committee. Individual contributions are limited to $3,400 (1994 level) per election cycle. Under Sections 54 and 55 of the MCFA, corporations who wish to participate in any state election must establish a single "separate segregated fund." Contributions to segregated funds are restricted to stockholders, officers and directors and employees of the corporation who have policy-making, managerial or other professional responsibilities. Once established, separate segregated funds must register under the MCFA as either a political committee or an independent committee.

Political committees and independent committees are both Political Action Committees (PACs); the difference lies in their size and the scope of their intended influence. Political committees are formed to support or oppose up to two candidates in a specific geographic area of Michigan, or to support or oppose a single ballot question. The contribution limit for political committees is equal to that of individuals. Some political committees may qualify as independent committees, the advantage of which is a contribution limit that is ten times the contribution limit fixed for regular political committees - in 1994, the limit was $34,000. To qualify, independent committees must support
or oppose more than two candidates must receive contributions from at least twenty-five different contributors, and must be organized on a state-wide basis.

Political party committees are designated for the same purpose as candidate committees, although they represent the party (on a per county basis), rather than a candidate. Political party committees may contribute to candidate committees at a rate that is ten times the individual rate. Each party is also allowed to form one state central party committee which may contribute up to one half of the expenditure limit under public funding provisions. Under private funding arrangements, the state central party committee is limited to contributions of up to $68,000 per election cycle. This represents the only difference in contribution limits between public and private funding arrangements.

For purposes of public disclosure, financial reports must be filed at two different times: eleven days prior to the start of the general election period and by thirty days after polling day. Contributions from any source in excess of $20.01 per election cycle must be recorded, including each contributors name, address and date of contribution. For contributions in excess of $200.01, the occupation, employer and principle place of business of the contributor must be submitted to the Michigan Bureau of Elections. Although the MCFA requires gubernatorial candidates to file disclosure
reports within 30 days of polling day, the reports must be audited. They are rarely publicly available until one year or more following polling day.\textsuperscript{13}

**Limits on Televised Political Advertising**

Televised political advertising is an almost wholly unregulated aspect of Michigan election law. The only reference to it in the MCFA is the disclosure requirement that all radio or television advertisements must include the name of the person sponsoring and paying for the advertisement. Section 47(2) of the MCFA states that

\begin{quote}
the Federal Communications Commission shall require the name of the person paying for the advertisement...
\end{quote}

Every advertisement must bear the disclaimer - "Authorized by... (name of candidate or candidate committee)."\textsuperscript{15}

Reluctance to directly regulate televised political advertising stems primarily from the 1975 *Buckley v. Valeo* Supreme Court decision.\textsuperscript{16} Republican Senator James Buckley had successfully argued that all limits on campaign spending, whether for television advertising or other campaign strategies, constituted an undue constraint on free speech, especially for challengers trying to foster name recognition. The Supreme Court agreed and struck down spending limits. The decision therefore had the effect of equating free speech with spending money. As a result, today there are no fixed limits
on the amount of money that may be spent by candidates on televised political advertising (except that advertising expenditures must be kept within overall spending limits for publicly funded candidates) or the time period over which televised advertising takes place in the campaign.

Table 6-1 indicates that television advertising was used consistently throughout the campaign, although its use systematically increased during the campaign. Hence, when election law is essentially neutral on televised political advertising, strategists use it as a fundamental campaign strategy throughout the entire campaign period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AVERAGE BROADCASTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 6 - September 26</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27 - October 17</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18 - November 7</td>
<td>8.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - figures represent an average of two Detroit television stations, Monday - Friday

Both candidates used a mix of direct attack, comparative and positive advertising during the campaign to develop their overall campaign message.

The most important effect of an unlimited television advertising period - coupled with no fixed spending limits on advertising - is that the use of televised political advertising is not a one-shot or random affair; rather, it follows a multi-staged strategy. It is fluid and dynamic,
changing constantly during the campaign. This is why each issue in the Michigan campaign seemed to have a "life." With an unlimited advertising period, issues came and went during the campaign, depending on their ability to define and differentiate candidate images. In fact one important way in which strategists shifted strategy during the campaign was through their choice of issues.

Micro and macro content analysis of the 1994 Michigan campaign also indicates that two distinct television advertising strategies were used in the campaign: an independent strategy and a dependent strategy. First, strategists set out to build their candidate's image as a leader. This represents an independent strategy and is most directly facilitated through positive advertising. For example, Governor John Engler was uncontested during the 1994 Michigan gubernatorial primaries and used positive advertising strategies to build name recognition and to enhance his image. The issue modes used most often to serve these purposes included issue-crediting and issue-mentioning.

Second, strategists set out to define their opponent negatively. This represents a dependent strategy -dependent, that is, upon the actions, issues and beliefs of their opponent. In Michigan, dependent strategies were largely facilitated through direct attack and (directly) comparative television advertising which largely used issue-blaming and issue-accusing. Sometimes the opportunities for direct
attacks derived from the opponent's record - "Lafayette Clinic" and "Nuclear Waste" are examples of this strategy.\textsuperscript{17} Television advertisements created from these opportunities represent an initial stage of negative advertising because they draw on the opponent's past experiences and record.

Sometimes, however, the raw material for issue-blaming and issue-accusing is presented during the campaign. Table 4-7 suggests that some television advertisements during the Michigan campaign were created and released as responses to direct attacks from the opponent - "Engler Distorts Crime Issue" attests to this strategy. Material for responsive direct attacks may even evolve during the primaries, as evidenced when Engler's strategists tapped into the negativity emanating from the bitter Democratic primary in the 1994 Michigan elections between Howard Wolpe and Debbie Stabenow. Analysis also indicates that Michigan candidates responded to the opponent's strategies by appropriating certain aspects of their presentation style.

\textbf{Party System}

Michigan is essentially a two-party system because election law specifically designates political parties as either "major" or "minor":

'major political party' means a political party qualified to have its name on the general election ballot whose candidate for governor received 25% of the popular vote cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. If only 1 political party received 25% or more of the popular vote cast for
governor in the preceding gubernatorial election, then the political party with the second highest vote shall be deemed a major party.\(^{18}\)

"Minor" parties are those which received less than 25 per cent voter support in the preceding election, or "the second highest vote." Effectively, therefore, the MCFA designates a maximum of two major parties. Not surprisingly, the Democratic and Republican parties have maintained major party status to the exclusion of all other parties since the designation was initiated in 1976.

Designating parties as major or minor is significant not only because formal distinctions between party candidates marginalize smaller parties in the minds of voters and potential contributors,\(^{19}\) but also because public funding for major parties is far more generous than for minor parties. As already mentioned, since public funding provisions were initiated, no major party candidate has ever opted for private funding. This is primarily because major party candidates in gubernatorial elections receive up-front grants, which, for the 1994 election, were received by both candidates on August 24, 1994.\(^{20}\)

Two public funding programs exist for minor parties, although no minor party candidate has ever come close to qualifying under either program. Under Section 65(2) of the MCFA, minor party candidates may receive up-front subsidies if they received at least 5 per cent of the popular vote in the immediately preceding election. The formula takes the maximum
grant for major candidates and multiplies this amount by the number of votes received by the minor party in the preceding general election. This result is then divided by the average number of votes received by the major parties in that election. A second scheme, outlined under Section 65(3) of the MCFA, states that if a minor party candidate receives at least 5 per cent of the popular vote in the current election, the candidate may qualify for a partial public reimbursement. The amount is calculated in the same way as above except it uses the actual votes in the current election.

A third public funding option is offered to both major and minor party candidates. Under Section 65(5) of the MCFA, a one-to-one matching of funds is available up to a maximum of $750,000. The only stipulation is that the candidate must receive qualifying contributions of at least $75,000. Candidates who exercise this option are precluded from any other public funding provisions. No major or minor party candidate has ever exercised this option.

Hence, although minor party candidates are not prohibited from participating, and some do participate, it is clear that without the financial advantage given to major party candidates, their chance of crossing the threshold to major party status is practically non-existent. In fact, since 1976 the highest vote total of any minor party was for the Tisch Citizens Party in 1982, which received 80,288 votes in the general election or about 2.6 per cent of the total vote.
All six minor parties combined received 109,135 votes during the election, representing only 3.6 per cent of the total vote. Other elections generated even less participation by minor parties; in 1978, for example, minor party participation represented only .0005 per cent of total popular vote, and in 1986 and 1990, minor parties received only .4 per cent and 1.17 per cent of popular support respectively. As a result, Michigan gubernatorial elections have effectively been two-candidate races, dominated by the Democrats and Republicans who, although they exchange power between themselves, have never been threatened with having to relinquish it to minor parties.

As a result, Michigan election campaigns effectively represent an all-or-nothing proposition, normally with one winner and one loser. The significance of essentially two-candidate campaigns is that candidates can use direct attack advertising often and aggressively because they do not have to personally present the direct attack and are not personally referenced in the attack. Although the sponsor of the direct attack may not be obvious, the alternative should be obvious, once voters are convinced of the opponent’s shortcomings. Therefore, strategists in Michigan did not target a particular issue unless the opponent was weak on the issue and their candidate was strong. Also, because the candidates themselves were not directly involved, they could use direct attack advertising aggressively with less risk of a possible
boomerang effect.

The benefits of this use of negative television advertising in Michigan were derived especially by Wolpe who, as the challenger, was the most systematic user of direct attack advertising. His two direct attack advertisements were particularly aggressive, and he was never personally mentioned; instead, the announcer said - "that's Engler's Michigan, not ours."25 The alternative, to all but totally uninformed voters, was obviously Wolpe. Engler also used this strategy in his direct attacks: in "Wolpe Record," for example, the announcer says - "Howard Wolpe. If Debbie Stabenow and the Democrats don't trust him, how can we." 26

Positive advertising is a strategy which reinforces a candidate's image. Hence, it is a luxury that is only afforded to candidates who are comfortably in the lead - which is more likely in two-candidate races where fewer choices exist and where popular support is probably more stable. Analysis of the Michigan campaign showed that Engler began the campaign with an 18 per cent lead over Wolpe in the public opinion polls, and finished with a 28 per cent margin of victory. For this reason, his strategists produced 8 positive advertisements, compared to 1 by Wolpe. Strategists for Wolpe and Engler agreed that had they faced multiple opponents their ability to respond to or appropriate the strategies of other candidates would have been lessened by the need to pay attention to more than one opponent.27 Constructing multiple
enemies would have been a more difficult strategy to implement, even with an unregulated advertising period.

**Independent Expenditures**

Deflecting possible boomerang effects was easier in Michigan because direct attack advertisements may be (and always are) independently sponsored. As part of the Buckley decision the Supreme Court held that imposed expenditure limits on "independent" spending violated the First Amendment. Independent expenditures under the MCFA are defined as

expenditures made on behalf of a candidate or a ballot question without the consent of the candidate's committee or a committee supporting or opposing the ballot question. Independent expenditures are never made under the control of or at the direction of another person or committee. Independent expenditures can be made in any amount and do not count toward the total contribution amount given to a candidate.²⁸

Even party committees can sponsor advertisements independently under this definition of independent expenditure. By removing restrictions on independent spending, the Supreme Court opened the door to unlimited and unregulated spending by independent sources.²⁹ Now, PACs form not only to promote particular candidates and parties by contributing to their campaigns, they may also "spend unlimited amounts on communications advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates."³⁰

Thus, not only can strategists avoid attaching their candidates either verbally or audio-visually to direct
attacks, they do not even have to take responsibility for creating the direct attacks. Michigan strategists believed that the most valuable independent spending on behalf of candidates came in the form of independent sponsorship of candidates' direct attack advertisements. This is because the only stipulation under the MCFA in making independent expenditures on televised advertising is that advertisements must bear the disclaimer - "Not authorized by any candidate." Strategicists for the Wolpe and Engler campaigns generally agreed that sponsoring advertisements independently is strategically important for two reasons: because they provide an avenue for additional expenditures on television advertising beyond spending limits set by the MCFA, and because they provide an outlet for further deflecting possible boomerang effects from direct attack advertising.

When strategists in Michigan wished to distance their candidate from a verbal or visual direct attack, they invariably used independent sponsorship. For example, all direct attack advertisements were independently sponsored. However, of the 9 comparative advertisements, only 2 were independently sponsored. The same was true of the 9 positive advertisements. In total, 3 of Engler's non-direct attack advertisements (2 positive and 1 comparative) and 1 of Wolpe's non-direct attack advertisements (comparative) were independently sponsored.

Wolpe's independently sponsored comparative advertisement
was particularly negative and could have produced a boomerang effect. Engler's independently sponsored comparative advertisement was generally positive, and, although it had a comparative element, it was clearly designed to credit Engler with Michigan's economic recovery. The two positive advertisements that were independently sponsored concentrated wholly on issue-crediting for Engler's accomplishments. In this case, independent sponsorship deflected a different kind of boomerang in the sense that "ordinary citizens" praised Engler in testimonials and his strategists wanted him to be seen as deserving of non-partisan credit.

By contrast, all television advertisements where the candidate personally addresses the audience were sponsored by the candidate committee. For example, in "Nuclear Waste," Wolpe addresses the audience after the announcer makes a negative statement about Engler. The candidate would also directly lay claim to a negative advertisement that featured a popular alignment issue - such as when Engler endorsed the sentiment that Wolpe is "too liberal on crime."

**Election Law in Ontario Provincial General Elections**

**General Provisions**

Prior to the Ontario Election Finances Reform Act of 1975 (EFRA), there was no comprehensive legislation for regulating the finances of candidates or parties. The EFRA grew out of the Ontario Commission on the Legislature (the Camp
Commission) which reported in September, 1974. The Commission recommended contribution limits, (along with restrictions on advertising expenditures, small public subsidies, and disclosure of contributions and expenses), but it did not advocate overall spending limits for fear that parties might become too dependent on media discretion for exposure.37

In 1995, the yearly contribution limit for individuals, corporations and trade unions was $4,000 to parties and $750 to each constituency association (to a yearly maximum aggregate of $3,000 to all constituency associations). In non-election years, therefore, the overall maximum contribution allowed by any one individual, corporation or trade union equals $7,000. Contribution limits double in election years, which makes the maximum contribution in an election year $14,000.38

Apart from the provisions on contribution limits, much of the early regulatory framework was fundamentally amended in 1985. This is the year that Ontario voters elected the first non-Conservative government since 1943. Although the Conservatives won the most seats in 1985 (52 versus 48 for the Liberals and 28 for the New Democrats), no one party held a majority of seats. In the popular vote, the Liberals led by a slight margin of 1 per cent.39

The balance of power was held by the New Democrats. After negotiating with both the Liberals and Conservatives, the New Democrats decided to support the Liberals in an
"accord" signed on May 28, 1985, where the Liberals pledged not to call an election for two years and the New Democrats pledged not to defeat the government for two years. Reform would now be set in motion. The New Democrats had campaigned on the pledge that electoral reform—primarily to curb spending abuses—would be forthcoming. According to Donald MacDonald, Chair of the Commission on Election Finances between 1986 and 1994,

[the commission has always been obligated by the Act to recommend amendments in each of its annual reports. It did so, regularly, from 1975 to 1985, but the Government did not respond. In the Liberal/New Democratic Accord, which brought the Peterson Government into office in 1985, electoral reform was given a high priority.]

The major difference between the Election Finances Act (EFA) of 1986 and the EFRA was the inclusion of comprehensive campaign spending limits on parties and individual candidates. These limits were deemed necessary to restrain conspicuously excessive campaign spending after the 1985 campaign:

The 1986 amendment imposing campaign spending limits has significantly reduced the escalation of election budgets. Candidate campaign expenditures ranged as high as $150,000 in the 1985 election. With the limits imposed a year later, expenditures for an average-sized constituency association were in the range of $45,000...Interestingly, this significant restriction on spending has not resulted in any apparent inhibition of the electoral process.

Today, spending ceilings are fixed in tandem with the number of eligible voters. For parties, the aggregate spending limit is determined by multiplying $.40 by the number of electors entitled to vote. Aggregate candidate spending
limits are determined by multiplying $2 for each of the first 15,000 electors entitled to vote in the candidate's electoral district, $1 for the number of electors in excess of 15,000 but not exceeding 25,000, and $.25 for each of the number of such electors in excess of 25,000.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition to imposing overall spending limits, the 1986 amendment to the EFA changed the level of public subsidies of campaign expenses. Specifically, Sub-section 44(1) states that "every registered candidate in an electoral district who receives at least 15 per cent of the popular vote in such electoral district is entitled to be reimbursed by the Commission for the lesser of campaign expenses for the campaign period...or an amount equal to 20 per cent of the maximum expenditure limit in accordance with subsection 38(2).\textsuperscript{43} Prior to this amendment the level of popular vote needed to secure reimbursement was 20 per cent.\textsuperscript{44} Under Sub-section 44(6), "every registered party that receives at least 15 per cent of the popular vote in any electoral district...is entitled to be reimbursed by the Commission for the aggregate amount determined by multiplying 5 cents by the number of electors entitled to vote."\textsuperscript{45}

The fact that public funding in Ontario is based on a system of reimbursements - rather than flat grants at the outset of the campaign - represents a fundamental difference in public financing between Michigan and Ontario. Even so, both systems favour the major parties and their candidates.
Also, reimbursements ensure that major parties are normally the only ones in a position to raise initial financing by borrowing against their practically guaranteed public reimbursements.44

Public disclosure is a fundamental element of campaign finance law in Ontario. As the Ontario Commission on Election Finances states, "disclosure fosters public confidence in the political system and has had the effect of broadening the base of partisan support."45 The Commission requires that single or aggregate contributions from one source in excess of $25 must be recorded. All single or aggregate contributions in excess of $100 must be recorded, including the name and address of the contributor. Political parties do not have to file reports with the commission until six months after the election. This means that by the time the returns are audited and released for public inspection, it is at least one year after the election before public disclosure begins.46

Limits on Televised Political Advertising

The 1975 EFRA limited televised political advertising in two specific ways: by fixing the advertising period at the twenty-one days immediately preceding the day before polling day and by initiating a spending limit on political advertising. The Camp Commission argued that the three week advertising period was equitable because it would act to reduce overall spending but would not impose undue constraints
on the activities of candidates and parties. The 1986 EFA did not change the twenty-one day time limit, but the spending restrictions on political advertising were considered redundant and were repealed.

Expenditures on political advertising include those made by political parties, constituency associations and candidates, as well as by individuals, corporations and trade unions when they act with the knowledge and consent of a political party. Given that the intent of spending restrictions is to curb spending "abuses" and the largest single expense incurred during elections is for televised political advertising, removing spending restrictions on television advertising during campaigns seems somewhat at odds with the intent of reform. But, as Khayyam Paltiel has pointed out, the truth is that the 1975 EFRA spending limits on advertising were "so generous for parties and candidates, and the working definition of advertising so narrow that the control was scarcely worthy of the name; in fact, the former Ontario limits permitted spending at roughly three times the federal average."

Even with the 1986 round of reforms, strategists interviewed for this study agree that spending limits are not a major deterrent to implementing their campaign strategies and all indicate that as long as the three major parties are subject to similar constraints and spend about the same amount, limits are a "non-issue" (although they remain the
most important determinant of participation for minor parties). In the 1995 Ontario election, the one exception may have been the Liberal Party, who mis-managed their television advertising budget by producing too many advertisements on the same theme - depicting their "plan" - before the campaign began, thereby leaving them with less funding should a responsive and dependent strategy be necessary once the campaign began.

The biggest stumbling block identified by strategists was the twenty-one day time period restriction. In 1995, the average number of advertisements broadcast in Ontario was 15.5 advertisements per day - almost double the average of the last fifteen days of the Michigan campaign. However, even though there were three major parties competing for votes in the Ontario campaign versus two in the Michigan gubernatorial campaign, overall there was still one less new advertisement released during the Ontario campaign.

Strategists in Ontario are thus limited to a two-stage television advertising strategy. In 1995, in the first stage of television advertising, half of all the new television advertisements were released on May 17, 1995 the first day of the advertising campaign. The second stage began May 24, 1995. Although some shifting of strategy was evident in this second stage (primarily as a response to internal and external opinion polling), strategists had minimal opportunity to appropriate from or respond to their opponents' strategies.
In Ontario, therefore, dependent strategy was essentially limited to the first stage of the campaign; for example, the New Democrats began their campaign with two advertisements which targeted the Liberals. Conservative strategists began their advertising campaign with a single directly comparative advertisement that targeted the Liberals and Liberal party leader Lyn McLeod. Time (and financial) constraints precluded a well constructed response by the Liberals in the second advertising stage. By the time Liberal strategists agreed on what strategic response was appropriate, it was too late.

Complicating matters was the fact that Liberal strategists were at odds with one another over the merits of negative advertising, and whether they should use it at all. With only twenty-one days to advertise, it is vital that strategists see eye-to-eye on key questions of strategy - including whether they are averse to using negative advertising to respond to direct attacks by an opponent or to a dramatic shift in polling numbers. Because the Liberals did not have any direct attack responses (or "war games") planned out in advance, their negative advertisements had to be designed and produced too quickly to be truly effective.

One important loophole in the Ontario time limits is that government advertising is not regulated during election campaigns. Although this is also the case in Michigan, the net effect is potentially greater in Ontario because of the fixed advertising period. Before the beginning of the
election advertising period, the incumbent party is able to use public money to effectively launch its advertising campaign by using government advertising opportunities to promote the party or party leader. The New Democratic government indulged in this practice during March and April of 1995 when television advertisements (which looked very similar to their campaign advertisements) featured Bob Rae, the party's leader, speaking directly to the viewer and claiming many issue successes for his party's government. The advertisement also attempted to reconcile the government's issue failures. Although the Conservatives also conducted some television advertising prior to the election call, it was never disguised as anything but a pre-election strategy.

Party System

No formal distinction exists between major and minor party status under the EFA. Accordingly, all registered parties may seek to raise money and qualify for public reimbursements of election expenses. However, even though Ontario election law makes it easier for minor parties to mount election campaigns, they certainly do not compete equally with major parties. This is primarily because minimum qualifying thresholds favour established parties in that reimbursement of expenses is only given after 10 per cent of the spending ceiling is reached in a riding and 15 per cent of the vote is received. This makes it difficult for parties
other than the Liberals, Conservatives and New Democrats to qualify. In 1995, for example, the three major parties combined to receive approximately 96.5 per cent of the popular vote, whereas minor party and independent candidates together received only approximately 3.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{54}

The effect of a multi-party system on televised political advertising strategies is highlighted by Romanow, Soderlund and Price:

In a campaign where more than two parties are competing, purely negative ads are not enough. It is necessary to offer positive alternatives that will cause voters disaffected by negative advertising to be attracted to the sponsoring party, not to an opposition party.\textsuperscript{55}

Their conclusion is supported by a comparison of Michigan and Ontario strategies. Ontario’s multi-party campaigns provide the best explanation of why comparative advertising was used twice as often in Ontario than in Michigan. Ontario strategists confirmed that the use of comparative advertising was deliberately designed to protect their party against displacement of votes to a competing party. Drawing comparisons between candidates or parties is a powerful tool in multi-party campaigns because it indicates an ability to bring the viewer back to the party sponsoring the advertisement (or sponsored by the advertisement). In contrast, direct attack advertisements leave it to viewers’ imaginations to decide for themselves which alternative is most appropriate. Although this seems to work well in two-candidate races, strategists in multi-candidate races run the
risk of shifting votes from one competitor to another, by-passing themselves altogether.

Positive advertising is used for two reasons. As suggested by Romanow, Soderlund and Price, it acts as a buffer to negative advertising. The second reason for using positive advertising is because it permits parties an opportunity to reinforce their positive images. It is most useful when parties are the front-runner - and when they hold a wide margin of support. This is the only time that Ontario strategists could afford to indulge in it. As a result, positive advertising was rare in Ontario.

For minor parties, however, whose objective is not to compare themselves to their opponents but to establish name recognition for themselves with voters, positive advertising is the only logical choice. Minor parties are normally formed for specific issue purposes, such as the Green Party, or for ideological purposes, such as the Communist Party. These parties generally recognize that they have no real chance - at least in the foreseeable future - to win seats. As a result, they do not directly compete with major parties for votes; in fact, directly competing with the major parties is generally seen by minor parties as counterproductive. Instead, their objective is to foster greater public awareness and understanding of their own agenda. For example, Robert Metz, President of the Freedom Party, stated that his party's goal was to get more votes in the 1995 election than in the 1990
election; and competing directly with any of the major parties or attacking them in negative advertisements would not have accomplished this goal.56

Because minor parties are effectively excluded from public funding, however, the high cost of television advertising precludes them from developing comprehensive advertising strategies. The only minor party to use television advertising was the Family Coalition Party, which broadcast one in the last week of the campaign. It was a positive advertisement designed primarily for name recognition. These problems are compounded by the fact that established parties receive the bulk of media exposure during the election campaign. During the 1995 campaign there were only sporadic references to the activities and platforms of minor parties. In contrast, the three established parties were referred to in almost every evening broadcast in the last three weeks of the campaign. As was indicated by the Ontario campaign, media exposure is important for relaying direct attack messages in a shorter, and multi-party, campaign.

Independent Expenditures

In Michigan, spending by non-candidate groups and individuals has been at least partially institutionalized by PACs, organized as political committees, independent committees and ballot committees. In Ontario, instead of institutionalizing independent spending, repeated attempts
have been made to eliminate it. Interest groups and other organized groups are conspicuous by their absence under Sections 16 through 36 of the EFA, which deal with contributions to candidates and parties. Under these sections, contributions "may be made only by persons individually, corporations and trade unions." However, under Sections 38 through 43, total expenditures include those "incurred by a registered party and any person, corporation, trade union, unincorporated association or organization acting on behalf of that party during any campaign period." Moreover, limits on the television advertising period extend only to persons, corporations and trade unions acting with the knowledge and consent of a party, candidate or constituency association.

Federal and Ontario election law has thus attempted to stifle organized interests during campaigns by fixing severe restrictions on the amount they may spend during elections, but these attempts have been rendered inoperative by the courts. In 1984, the National Citizens' Coalition (NCC) successfully challenged Bill C-169, the federal government's attempt to eliminate independent spending, under Sub-section 2(b) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* which guarantees "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication." Using the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Lortie
Commission) that independent spending should be limited to $1,000 in Canadian elections, the federal government tried again in 1993 to impose limits on independent spending, but again the proposed legislation was struck down. The outcome of the NCC challenge, although rendered in Alberta under Justice Medhurst, has been accepted in Ontario.

Therefore, whereas participation by individuals and organized groups had been at least somewhat integrated into campaign strategy in Michigan, it has not been similarly integrated by Ontario strategists. The result is that the ability that Michigan strategists have to deflect potential boomerang effects through independent spending is not given to Ontario strategists. It is clear that in 1995 unregulated third party expenditures were substantial. For example, the NCC launched a direct attack campaign against the New Democrats in the 1995 Ontario election. Gerry Nichols, the NCC’s Communications Director, maintained that their number one priority was to “wipe the NDP off the electoral map”59 in Ontario. The Coalition launched "The Campaign to Defeat Bob Rae" through Ontarians for Responsible Government (ORG), which was established in 1991 as the "Ontario project" of the NCC.60 The ORG budgeted $250,000 for the 1995 Campaign to defeat Bob Rae: $100,000 for television, $60,000 for radio, $50,000 for billboards and $40,000 for newspaper advertisements.61 Using an unflattering still photo of Rae with a line drawn through it on every page of their written
literature, the group maintains that

[s]ince our founding in 1991, we have spent nearly $750,000 to inform Ontarians of the destructive policies of the NDP by utilizing billboards, radio, television and newspaper advertising. Our goal, finances permitting, is to blanket 90 percent of Ontario’s population with advertising urging Ontarians to get out and vote on June 8 to ensure not only the defeat, but the obliteration of Bob Rae and the NDP.\textsuperscript{42}

Between June 5 and June 7 of the Ontario election campaign (which includes the final day of the campaign when parties can not legally advertise), the NCC broadcast "Good News, Bad News" - and the bad news was of course Rae.\textsuperscript{41} The secondary effect of this spending was to indirectly supplement the television advertising efforts of the other two parties, even though there was no direct co-operation or consultation between the NCC and the Liberal or Conservative parties.

Conclusion

There are important differences in how parties and candidates in Ontario and Michigan use television advertising within their respective regulatory frameworks. The broad implication of election laws in Michigan has been to decrease the risk of a boomerang effect, allowing strategists greater latitude to create and execute television advertising strategies which deliver harsher attacks in their negative advertising. Moreover, Michigan’s positive advertisements are more elaborate in their praise of the sponsoring candidate. When positive advertising is used to praise the candidate
through citizen testimonials, it can boomerang against their candidate if the advertisement appears excessively frivolous or self-serving. Sponsoring these advertisements independently was a strategy used in Michigan to deflect this possibility.

Ontario strategists, by contrast, must design their television advertising strategies in a riskier climate. They face more opposition from each other and from interest groups who may spend independently, and they have a maximum of two stages by which to design and execute their television advertising strategies. Nevertheless, Ontario strategists have made television advertising a focal point of their campaigns; when introducing his party's televised political advertisements to the media on May 16, 1995, for example, Tom Long, Co-chair of the Conservative campaign for the 1995 Ontario election, stated that the party's television advertising would be the cornerstone of their campaign. He was not alone, as statistics on spending on political advertising indicate in Appendix 1. This being the case, the level of risk assumed by Ontario strategists, although greater than by Michigan strategists, apparently permits them to use television advertising in ways which they feel provide net benefits to their campaign.

Endnotes

1. See Luntz.
2. See Kern.


6. In 1994, Wolpe received $700,536 matching funds, and Engler received $890,999.98. Not only was Engler able to raise more funds, but he was uncontested in the primary. Also, Debbie Stabenow received $716,483.94 and Larry Owen received $550,916.04. See Michigan Department of State, *Public Funding Applications With Resubmissions* (Michigan: Secretary of State, March 10, 1995), pp. 7, 9 and 11.

7. MCFA, Section 66.


12. MCFA, Sections 41(2) and 42(2).

13. At the time of writing, reports required to be filed from the November 8, 1994 election have not been made publicly available.
14. MCFA, Section 47(2).

15. MCFA, section 47(2)(b).

16. *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), p. 28. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court held for the first time that unlimited campaign spending was protected by the First Amendment; expenditure limits were ruled to be a "substantial" restraint on free speech that could prevent the use of the "most effective modes of communication." See *Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance*, Volume 4 of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, p. 12.


18. MCFA, Section 10 (1).

19. One Democratic fundraiser indicated that he found a distinct and significant advantage in raising funds as one of the two major parties. Personal interview, December, 1995.

20. See, *Public Funding Applications With Resubmissions*, p. 11.

21. For example, if the minor party received 100,000 votes in the 1990 election and the average number of votes for the two major parties was 2,000,000 votes, the maximum flat grant would be approximately $56,000.

22. This is in contrast to the Democrats who received 1,561,291 votes and the Republicans who received 1,369,582 votes in the same election.


27. Based on interviews with Bryan Flood and two personal interviews with Wolpe strategists, November and December, 1994.


31. MCFA, section 47(2)(a).


33. The two positive advertisements are "Engler Keeping Promises I," and "Engler Keeping Promises II," Appendix 2.


39. The 1985 election yielded 38 per cent popular vote to the Liberal Party, 37 per cent to the Progressive Conservative Party and 24 per cent to the New Democratic Party.


42. EFA, Sections 38(1) and 38(2).

43. EFA, Section 44(1).

44. Support for the New Democratic Party decreased from 19 per cent to 16 per cent between 1951 and 1963, even though it stayed above 20 per cent for every election between 1963 and 1985.

45. EFA, Section 44(6).

46. However, having received reimbursement for only 146 of the 295 seats the Conservatives contested in the 1993 federal election, the party's inability to repay some of its accumulated debt may cause potential lenders to reconsider their practice of lending campaign funds based on a supposed guarantee of public subsidy.


48. EFA, Section 42.


50. EFA, Section 22.

52. Monitoring took place between Monday and Friday, over the twenty-one day broadcasting period. CTV was monitored. CFPL (London) adlogs generally confirmed trends indicated by the CTV adlogs.


54. The three major parties fielded candidates in all 130 ridings; the Liberals received 31.1 per cent of the vote, the Progressive Conservatives received 44.8 per cent of the vote and the New Democrats received 20.6 per cent of the vote. Of the minor parties, the Libertarian Party fielded 18 candidates and received 0.2 per cent of the vote, the Communist Party fielded 5 candidates and received less than 0.1 per cent of the vote, the Green Party fielded 39 candidates and received 0.4 per cent of the vote, the Freedom Party fielded 12 candidates and received 0.1 per cent of the vote, the Family Coalition Party fielded 57 candidates and received 1.5 per cent of the vote, the COR Party fielded 5 candidates and received 0.1 per cent of the vote, the Natural Law Party fielded 70 candidates and received 0.4 per cent of the vote, and 62 independents together received 0.8 per cent of the vote. The total number of valid ballots was 4,158,370. Numbers of votes and percentages received from the Commission on Election Finances and the number of candidates fielded came from Elections Ontario.

55. Romanow, Soderlund and Price, p. 82.


57. EFA, Sections 16 - 36.

58. EFA, Sections 38 - 43.


63. CFPL television broadcast "Good News, Bad News" during their evening news broadcasts on June 5 and June 6, 1995. As per records obtained from Sharon Clark, CFPL television.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The uses of televised political advertising in the 1994 Michigan and the 1995 Ontario election campaigns displayed a high degree of similarity. In both, political strategists shared an essentially common approach to the construction of meta-advertising strategies; they tended to use similar, and in some cases identical, images and issues, and they tended to combine issues and images in the same way.¹

The Similarities

"Professional" image categories, as defined by this study - namely, experience, honesty, leadership and competence - were the most popular image categories in both campaigns. These images were then directly linked to the party leader's or candidate's issue platforms, which basically mirrored the issues that were polled as the most potent with voters; hence, "crime," "health care," and "taxes" were prominent issues in both campaigns. Despite their seeming specificity, these issue references were vague and ambiguous in both campaigns, and were related to the symbols of community and family, which were then related back to the leader's or candidate's image.

Strategists also adopted issues that were not named by voters as particularly salient. Welfare reform, for example, was a central issue in both the Engler (Michigan) and the Progressive Conservative (Ontario) campaigns, even though it
was polled as a relatively minor issue in both Michigan and Ontario. Welfare reform, however, was a "hot-button" issue that could be tied to the popular theme of "personal responsibility," in the expectation (which proved to be correct) that the anger generated by it would allow the user to tap into voters' "responsive chord." The fact that this strategy was pursued in both campaigns, even to the point where both used an almost identical television advertisement to depict the issue, attests to the similarity of the basic assumptions about voters, and the basic strategic approaches of strategists in Michigan and Ontario.

The Differences

There were also, however, some significant differences, as the following table indicates.
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Ontario strategists used less than half the number of verbal image references in their television advertisements than were used in Michigan. Audio-visual imagery was also used at a lower rate than in Michigan, and was dominated by the voices of announcers in all three advertising types, with announcers being used almost exclusively in direct attack advertisements. Frequent transitions and background music were regularly used in both Ontario and Michigan's television advertisements, but in Ontario the transitions normally took
the form of merely changing the camera angle on the same visual, while the background music was deeply hidden. Although the image presentation style dominated in both campaigns, the issue presentation style was more of a fixed strategy in Ontario than in Michigan. Other audio-visual images, such as visuals of candidates in conversation with citizens, were used with greater frequency in Michigan than in Ontario.

The three most dominant issue modes in Ontario were issue-mentioning, issue-positioning and issue-accusing. Because these three modes are prospective, they can rarely be linked effectively to dramatic audio-visuals. Conversely, issue-crediting, which was one of the two most popular issue modes in Michigan (along with issue-mentioning), lends itself to audio-visual presentation - for example, by depicting dramatic moments where "ordinary citizens" can be seen benefiting from a particular policy issue. Thus, in Michigan citizens were shown sitting at their kitchen tables writing letters of thanks to Governor Engler for tax cuts.²

Both campaigns used the same combinations of issue modes in each advertising type, but the relative use of each mode varied for each type. In direct attack advertising, issue-blaming was dominant in Michigan, but included some issue-accusing. In Ontario, the opposite trend was found: direct attack advertising was dominated by issue-accusing, but included some issue-blaming. In positive advertising,
strategists for both campaigns used only the positive issue modes, but, as already mentioned, Ontario strategists did not use blatant attempts at issue-crediting. Ontario’s comparative advertising was dominated by issue-mentioning, but issue-accusing was dominant in Michigan.

During the Ontario campaign, there were few instances where parties altered their presentation styles or their issue platforms, or responded to or appropriated the presentation strategies or issues of opponents. This was true for challengers as well as incumbents, even though challengers normally adjust their presentation strategies frequently during a campaign. The Liberals, for example, altered their strategic approach very little over the course of the campaign, even after significant levels of their support had begun to shift to the Conservatives.

In Michigan, by contrast, Democratic candidate Howard Wolpe clearly had greater leeway than party leaders in Ontario to search for an "answer" to Engler’s stranglehold on almost every aspect of the campaign. Although he was unsuccessful, his campaign was marked by several different attempts to modulate his meta-advertising strategies. In fact, there were numerous instances in Michigan where both candidates attempted to use their television advertising to adjust their own presentation styles, or to dampen the effects of their opponent’s presentation style; "Engler Keeping Michigan on Track" and "Can’t Trust Engler" are examples of this
Although public opinion polling was conducted regularly in both Ontario and Michigan to determine the "hot-button" issues and the image strengths and weaknesses of each party leader or candidate and their opponents, its value in Ontario was largely as a pre-campaign tool. It set the stage for the parties and formulated the initial campaign strategies - such as determining the content of the Common Sense Revolution for the Conservatives. In Michigan, polling was used continually during the campaign to develop, evaluate, and if necessary, revise image and issue strategies. Polling was especially significant for Wolpe, who used it to search for a "winning" issue agenda throughout the campaign. Therefore, polling was used by Wolpe's strategists to develop and present new issues in an attempt to re-position him in relation to Engler.

Comparative advertising was the centrepiece of the television advertising strategies for each party in Ontario, accounting for 86 per cent of all television advertising, compared to 43 per cent in Michigan. It tended to be relatively indirect, normally with a strong positive undertone. In Michigan, it tended to be strong and pointed, with a negative or direct attack undertone. When Ontario strategists used direct attack advertising, they used it as a supplement to their comparative advertisements. Thus, the two direct attack advertisements released by the New Democrats in their first wave of television advertising were thereafter
broadcast infrequently, and were invariably overlapped with the comparative or positive advertisements. In Michigan, by contrast, direct attack advertising was used as an independent strategy. It was used exclusively for the first week, then shared the airwaves with highly negative comparative advertisements in the second week.

**Explaining the Differences**

The differences between television advertising strategies in Ontario and Michigan may be explained by three factors. The first consists of subtle differences in the perspectives or "mind-sets" of the respective strategists. While these may to some extent reflect underlying differences of political culture between Michigan and Ontario, they appear to be more immediately reflective of recent experience. The second consists of specific historical and contextual factors that are present in each election campaign and bestow unique advantages and opportunities upon some leaders or parties, and handicap others. The third, and by far the most important - though astonishingly little systematic attention has been paid to it in other studies of televised political advertising - is the effect of different legal and regulatory regimes on the construction of meta-advertising strategies.

(1) "Mind-sets" of political strategists

American campaign practices were echoed to a particularly
striking extent in the 1995 Ontario campaign by Conservative strategists who enthusiastically embraced the latest campaign techniques. Leading up to the Ontario election, for example, Conservative strategists attended political consulting seminars sponsored by *Campaigns & Elections* in Washington and *Inside Michigan Politics* in Michigan. Michael Murphy, who was the advertising strategist for Governor Engler’s re-election campaign in Michigan, also advised the Conservatives during their 1995 general election campaign.⁴

The result of this shared strategic approach was immediately discernible in the style and tone of the direct comparative advertisements used in the Conservative campaign; for example, the audio-visual style of "Welfare and Quotas" and "Jobs and Taxes" was identical to "Wolpe too Liberal," which was produced by the Engler campaign in Michigan.⁵ Both campaigns featured "work for welfare" as the centrepiece of their issue agendas. In fact, the Conservative’s approach to welfare reform was so similar to Engler’s approach that it drew Ontario media attention to Michigan and to several examinations of Engler’s approach to welfare reform. However, there were some fundamental differences in the television advertising strategies of the Engler and Conservative campaigns, the most apparent being that the Conservatives only once used positive advertising, which was the mainstay of the Engler campaign, and Engler only twice used comparative advertising, which was the mainstay of the Conservative
campaign. The Engler campaign also used verbal and audio-visual imagery to a greater extent than the Conservatives.

Ontario strategists were particularly fearful that their negative television advertising would boomerang against their party leader as it had against Kim Campbell, Prime Minister and leader of the Progressive Conservative Party in the 1993 federal election, because of the direct attacks her party launched against federal Liberal leader Jean Chretien's visage. As a result, they were particularly reluctant to use negative audio-visual imagery. All of the Ontario strategists interviewed for this study expressed a high degree of concern over the severity of the boomerang against the federal Conservatives, and reported that they feared a similar outcome in their campaigns if they used negative advertising incorrectly.

Indeed, their belief was so strong that it defied comparative internal public opinion polling which concluded that direct attack advertisements yield similar responses from voters in the United States and Canada. In other words, what the polls appeared to show was that although Canadian voters say that they "don't like" direct attack advertisements, they nevertheless respond to them. If this finding remains consistent, it may eventually lead to a lessening of fears on the part of Ontario strategists about using negative advertising strategies. Most did indicate that they are ever-bit as willing as their Michigan counterparts to pursue so-
called "opposition research," which is essentially collecting "dirt" on their opponents, and the most likely use for such material is in direct attack advertising.

(2) Historical and Contextual Factors

Different campaign contexts also accounted for some of the observed differences between Michigan and Ontario. In Michigan, Engler was the incumbent governor and front-runner by a wide margin. As a result, he was able to take credit for Michigan's apparent economic recovery, and he gained momentum when he successfully aligned himself with the issues that were key to voters in Michigan. The incumbent New Democratic government in Ontario, by contrast, had been unpopular for at least two years before the election and was at no point in the campaign a front-runner. Not only had the economic recovery in Ontario lagged behind recoveries in Michigan and in other provinces (for which the government received most of the blame), the New Democrats were clearly in the worst possible position to align with public sentiment in Ontario.

This explains why experience was the most frequently coded verbal image category in Michigan and not in Ontario. Engler could combine references to experience with issue-crediting, but this was not an option for Bob Rae, leader of the New Democratic Party, because there was an apparent unwillingness on the part of most voters to give Rae and his party credit. Positive advertising is considered to be most
useful when the front-runner is maintaining a consistent lead in the polls. This was never the case in Ontario for any party; the New Democrats were never in the lead, the Liberals failed to maintain their early lead, and the Conservatives only managed to solidify their lead in the late stages of the campaign.

There were also concrete avenues for launching direct attacks against Wolpe, such as the particularly confrontational Democratic primary which saw Debbie Stabenow, Wolpe’s eventual running mate in the gubernatorial campaign, directly attack his image and issues. Similar avenues did not exist in Ontario because the Liberals and Conservatives, who were the main focus of most of the direct attack and comparative advertisements, had limited records in office which could become the substance of negative advertising.

(3) Differences in Election Laws

The third and most systematic explanation for the differences in the uses of televised political advertising in Michigan and Ontario stems from differences in election laws. In particular, three aspects of the legal framework of elections, which are examined by Chapter 6, provide a key explanation of why television advertising in Ontario differed from that in Michigan in the ways in which it did. These aspects, which were comparatively examined to determine their effects on television advertising strategies, are as follows:
(i) the legal time period over which parties or candidates may use political advertising; (ii) funding rules and reimbursement provisions which largely determine whether campaigns are two-party or multi-party affairs; and (iii) the legality of parties or candidates combining "independent" expenditures with their own campaign spending to develop advertising strategies. These "regulatory regime" aspects are especially significant because they transcend contextual factors, which clearly can and will vary between elections.

(i) **Time restrictions**

Legally, the time allowed for advertising is much longer in Michigan - in 1994, it was 75 days long, compared to 21 days in Ontario. In Michigan, this enhances the opportunities for creating a multi-staged television advertising strategy, where candidates can respond to or even appropriate the issues or style of their opponent. Television advertising can also be used in a long campaign to respond to changing opinion polls. The uses of direct attack advertising were particularly enhanced because it is a dependent and responsive strategy. Direct attack advertising particularly depends on the mistakes made by opponents and responds to them - and some mistakes present themselves only during the course of a long campaign.

For challengers, separating and defining themselves as distinct alternatives to the front-runner is crucial. The
sequencing of Wolpe's television advertisements showed that he shifted the focus of campaign fundamentally, beginning his campaign with direct attacks against Engler, and then shifting to constructing his own image, primarily through issues such as abortion and crime, and ending with education reform.

The shorter Ontario campaign was basically divided into two halves, or "waves," with fully half of all new television advertisements being broadcast on the first day. Hence, a party's television advertising strategy must be fixed early in the campaign, and there is little subsequent opportunity to alter it. The only party to modulate their strategy in any significant fashion was the Liberals. They were acutely aware, however, that if their second wave of television advertising turned out to be flawed, they had virtually no chance of creating a third wave. As a result, when they were forced to respond to the emerging Conservatives, they did so tentatively, by using indirect comparative advertising and direct attacks which were reminiscent of the New Democratic party's direct attack advertisements. To make matters worse for the Liberals, they apparently failed to anticipate the potential for a shift in their support to the Conservatives, and, after it occurred, they could not agree on how to cope with it. Together, these factors amplified the effects of the shorter advertising period in Ontario and provided an even smaller window of opportunity for the party to use television advertising to rectify its weak initial strategic approach.
For strategists who are subject to time constraints, one-dimensional television advertising - that is, positive and direct attack - is time consuming and a luxury they cannot generally afford. This is a primary reason why comparative advertising is considered by strategists to be the most efficient television advertising strategy in Ontario, and why it was dominant in each of the Ontario campaigns. For Engler, an extended campaign period allowed him to aim direct attacks against Wolpe, while still having an opportunity to reinforce his own image through positive advertising.

In Engler's case, however, it is possible that a longer advertising period could have been a disadvantage. Engler's weak personal style kept his involvement in televised advertising to a minimum. His strategists were constantly concerned about the fact that he was overweight and looked "bloated," and that his rather abrupt speaking style would "turn voters off." Although he was used sparingly in his television advertisements (he was the dominant speaker far less than the norm for a front-runner), he could not altogether avoid appearing in them. The opposite was true of Wolpe and Rae, each of whom had a strong personal style and were fixtures of their televised political advertising.

To combat the strategic disadvantages of Ontario's shorter advertising period, strategists systematically molded their messages to coalesce with media coverage of the election. To lessen the disadvantages of the pre-advertising
blackout, strategists "unveiled" for the benefit of the media their first wave of television advertising on the eve of the scheduled advertising period. Strategists also used such occasions to set the stage for the campaign by focusing the media's attention on the party's broad approach to the campaign. They also deliberately concentrated the majority of their attention in the press conferences to previewing the most negative aspects of their television advertising campaigns. By doing so, they hoped to garner even more media attention. For example, Tom Long, Co-chair of the Conservative campaign, drew the media's attention to his party's comparative advertisements which contrasted Conservative leader Mike Harris's and Liberal leader Lyn McLeod's leadership skills. He used the occasion of the press conference to make the emphatic (and newsworthy) claim that "confusion is [McLeod's] ally."\(^{10}\)

These approaches are generally reinforced by a willing and co-operative media. In discussing the television advertising strategies of the three major parties on May 16, 1995, Guy Lepage, reporter for CKCO television, noted that two of three Conservative advertisements compared McLeod's and Harris's stand on "important issues."\(^{11}\) He then went on to state that it was "not surprising" that the Liberals concentrated the bulk of their attention on the contents of the "red book" because McLeod was "consistently" rated as the least popular party leader in a number of public opinion
polls. Echoing Long, he concluded that "outlining the plan alone is not enough."¹²

Appropriating the lead on the evening news is a key campaign strategy in Ontario. Party leaders thus endeavour to use highly image-oriented positive visual imagery of themselves, and make deliberately provocative statements about their opponents. Rae used these tactics in news clips far more aggressively than he was willing or able to do in his negative advertising. It was in a news clip, not in his television advertisements, that Rae urged voters to "think through what Mr. Harris is saying - he wants to give the rich people in this province the biggest present that they have ever had in the history of Ontario."¹³

The Conservatives chose to use potent symbolic backdrops as settings for their media occasions. For example, Harris used his tour of an electronics firm, where employment equity legislation had had no impact, as a backdrop to discuss his plans to "scrap equity quotas."¹⁴ He also used an empty Skydome as the backdrop to symbolize the need for welfare reform when he remarked that the stadium could be filled 25 times by the 1.3 million Ontarians currently on welfare.¹⁵

While the media's coverage of election campaigns focuses largely on the "horse race" aspect in both Michigan and Ontario, the parties in Ontario co-operate by providing the media with "horse race" material - which is cast in a form that is designed to supplement their television advertising.
Similar efforts were made in Michigan, but not as systematically or elaborately. Michigan strategists previewed new television advertisements with the media the night before the advertisements started broadcasting, but otherwise did not attempt to integrate the party's message with media coverage of the campaign - and in fact the candidates normally did not lead off news broadcasts during the campaign. Instead, they gave formal interviews with media which were longer than the Ontario lead items, and focused more on issues. As a result, the media provided more substantive discussion of issues in Michigan than was the case in Ontario.

(ii) Funding and reimbursement provisions

Further enhancing and simplifying the uses of negative advertising strategies in Michigan was the fact that the campaign was between two candidates, whereas in Ontario the campaign was effectively between three parties. While funding provisions are not the only determinants of party systems, they do exert a significant influence on the competitiveness of parties, and their ability to use television advertising. Strategists use television advertising to perform two functions: to convince voters of the reasons why they should vote for their candidate and the reasons why they should not vote for their candidate's opponent. Comparative advertising is best suited to multi-party campaigns because it can achieve both of these objectives simultaneously. It brings attention
back to the sponsoring candidate, which is a distinct advantage when the party leader must be distinguished from multiple opponents, and in a short period of time.

In the 1990 Ontario election campaign, for example, the Conservatives ran advertisements urging voters - "if you're thinking of voting Liberal, think again." Voters did "think again," but many of them voted for the New Democrats. The Conservatives took no chances in 1995. Not only did they rely almost exclusively on comparative advertisements, they combined this strategy with their statement that the New Democrats were "irrelevant." In doing so they effectively redrew the playing field as a two-party race, although they could not obviously prevent the New Democrats from attacking Conservative promises, which, under different circumstances, could have inflicted damage on the Conservatives.

In Michigan, where there was only one incumbent and one challenger, strategists could respond to and appropriate from their opponent more easily than if they had to respond to or appropriate from multiple opponents. Moreover, it was clear that direct attack advertising was more useful in Michigan because the candidates could avoid personally being referenced in the television advertisement. As the only challenger, Wolpe was able to use particularly hard-hitting direct attacks, such as "Lafayette Clinic" and "Can't Trust Engler,"¹⁷ without directly attaching himself to the advertisements. Direct attack advertising was less useful in
Ontario because the parties could hardly do so without identifying themselves.

However, one advantage of a multi-party campaign is the potential to use one of the opponents to deflect possible boomerang effects. In the last week of the Ontario campaign, the Liberals used the same audio-visual and verbal format as earlier New Democratic television advertisements in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to deflect a possible boomerang away from their party and toward the New Democrats.

(iii) The legality of combining party or candidate and independent expenditures

In Michigan, unlike in Ontario, legal independent spending was used to deflect possible boomerangs from direct attacks that might have compromised the candidate’s public image, and from issue-crediting citizen testimonials that might have appeared partisan. Independent sponsorship was also used to associate the candidate with positive images—such as Wolpe’s highlighting of the fact that he had Helen Milliken’s support.¹⁸

In Ontario, independent spending would have been a preferred method for the Liberals to combat the rising Conservative tide, but this option was not legally available to their strategists. Instead, all the Ontario parties were forced to compete with certain groups’ independent spending.

The Ontario Commission on Election Finances has proposed electoral reforms to eliminate this form of electoral
participation by independent groups. Donald C. MacDonald, former leader of the New Democratic Party and Chair of the Ontario Commission, argues that "[i]t is patently unfair that registered parties should be subjected to increasingly comprehensive legislation while so-called third parties remain totally unregulated." He praises a Quebec court's judgement that "what is at stake is not freedom of speech but the financial capacity to skewer the legislative effort to establish more equal opportunity among candidates," and predicts that

[i]f third parties remain unregulated, the integrity of the election financing system will be undermined. Registered parties and candidates will have no alternative but to set up competing third parties to counter the unregulated expenditures. Indeed, if third parties remain unregulated, their different treatment will become grounds for regulated candidates and/or parties to launch a constitutional challenge of the election finances legislation as being discriminatory."

No such challenge has as yet been launched. Third-party spending remains a contentious issue for established parties in Ontario, especially the New Democrats, who have been consistent targets of the National Citizens' Coalition.

The Design of Meta-advertising Strategies

Together, the three aspects of election law fundamentally affect the design and execution of meta-advertising strategies. In Michigan, the opportunities to deflect possible boomerangs were greater: for television advertisements that incorporated a contentious issue or image,
either the sponsor was not directly specified or they were independently sponsored. This results in enhanced opportunities for using direct attack advertising to respond to or appropriate from an opponent. One-dimensional advertising strategies were also more popular in Michigan because of the extended time period and the fact that there was only one opponent.

Even with these advantages, however, the Michigan campaign did not rely heavily on direct attacks, some of the reasons for which were explained by contextual factors. In fact, direct attack advertising represented only 14 per cent of total television advertising in Michigan, and only 8 per cent in Ontario. Hence, direct attack advertisements such as "Revolving Door" in the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign,²² or the direct attack against Chretien by the Conservatives in the 1993 Canadian federal election, may be less common than is generally thought, in spite of the impression given by researchers and the media that campaigns are saturated with direct attack advertisements.²³ The concerns expressed by many observers over the implications of negative advertising - for example, that they distort the issues and manipulate voters - might usefully be re-directed to examining the short-term and long-term implications of comparative advertising, which strategists tend to favour and which they commonly use in conjunction with direct attack advertising.

In Ontario, comparative advertising was the most logical
television advertising choice. It addresses the limitations of the campaign period since it simultaneously constructs the party leader and diminishes one or both of the opponents. It addresses the unique challenges associated with a multi-party campaign because it allows candidates to specify that they are the best alternative to the opponent who is being diminished by the advertisement. Finally, comparative advertising addresses the fact that independent spending is not an option in Ontario, which means that both direct attack and positive advertising are less likely to be used.

Endnotes

1. While it is not the aim of this study to give advice to political strategists, there are nevertheless some practical lessons that could be drawn from this study, including: (1) issues should be linked to images in negative advertising strategies to reduce the risk of a boomerang effect; (2) the candidate who is sponsored by or is sponsoring a direct attack advertisement should not be directly referenced in the advertisement; and (3) "incumbent" strategies should be used not only by incumbents but also by front-running non-incumbents who lead in the public opinion polls by a significant margin.


12. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., June 2, 1995.


17. See "Lafayette Clinic" and "Can't Trust Engler," Appendix 2.
18. Helen Milliken is the wife of former Republican Governor William Milliken, who won the 1974 gubernatorial election despite the fact that the Democrats controlled both houses of the Legislature. William Milliken's popularity continues today.


22. "Revolving Door" is a series of direct attack advertisements used in the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign by Vice-president George Bush's campaign against Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, which suggested that Massachusetts criminals were released from prison almost as quickly as they entered.

23. The most recent example of the tendency to lump direct attack and comparative advertising together under the umbrella of negative advertising is the approach taken by Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Sink and Polarize the Electorate* (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
# APPENDIX 1

## 1990 ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTION

EXPENSES FOR POLITICAL ADVERTISING*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Total Advertising**</th>
<th>Brochures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($)</td>
<td>(%)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1,463,496</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>987,874</td>
<td>63.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Democratic</td>
<td>854,581</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Coalition</td>
<td>29,434</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confederation Of Regions</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>2,984</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** - Total advertising includes spending on all forms of political advertising, less spending on "brochures."

***- per cent of total spending for that political party in the 1990 election.
## 1993 CANADIAN FEDERAL ELECTION EXPENSES
### FOR TELEVISION ADVERTISING*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Total Advertising ($)</th>
<th>(%)*</th>
<th>Television Advertising ($)</th>
<th>(%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1,887,313</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>3,128,401</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>704,199</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4,623,381</td>
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<td>New Democratic</td>
<td>245,403</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2,973,146</td>
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<td>Natural Law</td>
<td>2,024,938</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>706,595</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>1,318,702</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>103,674</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Quebeceois</td>
<td>625,214</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>258,235</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>325,327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green</td>
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<td>Abolitionist</td>
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<td>Christian Heritage</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Libertarian</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** - per cent of total spending for that political party in the 1993 election.
ENGLER AD: "Wolpe Record" (Tuesday, September 6)

Tag Reads:
"PAID FOR BY THE MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE. NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANY CANDIDATE."

Placard of Wolpe on one side of screen with words beside it:
"DEBBIE STABENOW CRITICIZED WOLPE FOR:
VOTING FOR 40% PAY RAISE --
BOUNCING CHECKS AT CONGRESSIONAL BANK --
VOTING TO COVER UP THE SCANDAL."

Another placard comes up:
"LARRY OWEN SAID:
LEGISLATIVE RECORD IS WEAK ON CRIME."

A third placard comes up:
"MEA UNION BOSSES:
WOLPE IS TOO LIBERAL."

(underlining in red)

At the end of the ad, the words "HOWARD WOLPE. IF DEMOCRATS DON'T TRUST HIM...HOW CAN WE?" appear on the screen.

NARRATOR:

DEMOCRATS ARE MEETING THIS WEEKEND, AND WHAT HAVE LEADING DEMOCRATS SAID ABOUT HOWARD WOLPE? PLENTY. DEMOCRAT DEBBIE STABENOW CRITICIZED HIM FOR VOTING FOR A 40% PAY RAISE, BOUNCING CHEQUES IN CONGRESS, AND THEN VOTING TO COVER UP THE SCANDAL. DEMOCRAT LARRY OWEN SAID WOLPE'S RECORD IS WEAK ON CRIME AND EVEN THE TEACHER'S UNION SAYS HE'S TOO LIBERAL FOR THEM. HOWARD WOLPE. IF DEBBIE STABENOW AND THE DEMOCRATS DON'T TRUST HIM, HOW CAN WE.
WOLPE AD: "Lafayette Clinic" (Tuesday, September 6)

Name flashes in black and white to identify woman speaking: "LORI STOKES-PATE, TAYLER, MICHIGAN."

Black and white video of state troopers taking confused patients out of Lafayette during the night. Cuts to sobbing patients behind a fence to symbolize their fear of being trapped and helpless. Banner across the screen reads: "LAFAYETTE CLINIC, DETROIT, MICHIGAN, OCT.16, 1992.

Newspaper headlines flash across the screen reading: "LAFAYETTE CLINIC IS SHUT AMID TEARS, FEAR", "COLD-HEARTED CUTS", "ENGLER TAKES HIS TOLL ON MICHIGAN."

Picture of a smiling Engler appears on screen over a video of sobbing female patient behind fence at Lafayette.

Tag Reads: "PAID FOR BY MICHIGAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY: NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANY CANDIDATE."

WOMAN: MY SISTER WENT TO LAFAYETTE CLINIC BECAUSE NO PLACE ELSE COULD HELP HER.

NARRATOR: IT WAS A MOMENT OF HORROR AND SHAME; STATE TROOPERS, FORCED TO CLOSE DOWN A MENTAL HEALTH CLINIC, EVICTING DOZENS OF TERRIFIED PATIENTS. GOVERNOR ENGLER HAS TAKEN CARE OF POWERFUL SPECIAL INTERESTS, BUT SLASHED CARE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, DUMPING THOUSANDS ON OUR STREETS.

WOMAN: WITHIN MONTHS OF GOVERNOR ENGLER CLOSING THE CLINIC, SHE DIED.

NARRATOR: THAT'S ENGLER'S MICHIGAN, NOT OURS.
Deliberately grainy picture, black and white and in slow motion. Shows an aerial view of nuclear power plant on shore; fades to portrait of smiling Engler. Fades to a video of Engler walking up steps of Congress with "corporate backers."

the following words appear:
"NO" HEARINGS
"NO" OVERSIGHT ("NO" underlined in red).

Picture clears and is now in colour. Wolpe, dressed casually, walking down the beach in front of nuclear plant.
Children playing
Wolpe talks directly to the camera.

Wolpe walks with various supporters who represent a cross-section of minority voters; young white woman, older black man, older white man.
At the end,
"HOWARD WOLPE: THIS TIME A GOVERNOR WHO FIGHTS FOR PEOPLE."

Tag Reads:
"PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR, 1994."
Black background, words appear on screen:
"WHY DO 12,000 MICHIGAN COPS ENDORSE JOHN ENGLER AS TOUGHER ON CRIME THAN HOWARD WOLPE?"

Cuts to shot of Engler conversing with 3 police officers. All of the narrative appears on the screen in pro and con format, as if keeping a tabular score.

Grid-like tabular comparison of Engler and Wolpe on crime issue.

In background, in black and white, prison door opens with loud clinking sound and the words:
"WOLPE: TOO LIBERAL ON CRIME."

Tag Reads:
"PAID FOR BY ENGLER FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE."
WOLPE AD: "Straight Talk" (Monday, September 19)

Tag reads:
"PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR, 1994."

WOLPE:

Black and white screen;

Take a good look at this face.
Because John Engler's going to try
to bash it in. He wants to make
the bad guy, but I'm not. I'm
Howard Wolpe. I hope you'll make
me Governor Wolpe. But I'm not
going to play the political game to
get there. I'll talk straight, tell
you the differences, and while we
won't agree on everything, I bet at
the end of this campaign, most of
you will figure that I'll be a
Governor who looks out for you.
Straight talk, in black and white.
Coming this fall.

At the end, the words
"HOWARD WOLPE" appear on the
screen (black letters on white
background); after this, the words
"A CLEAR CHOICE" appear on the
screen (white letters on a black
background).
Black and white screen; pieces of a puzzle come together to eventually uncover Engler’s face (villainous smile the Wolpe strategists use to associate Engler with excess). At the same time, banners move across the screen: “CUT FUNDS FOR 911” “CUT STATE POLICE” “ALLOWED KILLERS TO ESCAPE.”

Then, newspaper headlines cross the screen: “COPS SCOUR STATE FOR 8 ESCAPED PRISONERS” “ENGLER BEARS BLAME FOR PRISON BREAK.”

off-angle view of a television running the Engler advertisement.

Ends showing Wolpe with shirt-sleeves rolled up, talking sincerely to supporters; a good cross-section of American society is represented.

Tag Reads:

“PAID FOR BY MICHIGAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANY CANDIDATE.”
Engler is shown standing in front of a sign that reads: "ENGLER FARM." Stands in front of the sign talking to citizens, key demographic groups visibly represented.

Walks with mother in front of a corn field and is seen with father in local store; cuts again to Engler shaking hands with local farmer.

Cuts to Engler walking down the street with tractor and local citizens behind him, speaks to camera.

I GROW UP RIGHT HERE, IN REAL CITY. MY PARENTS WERE FARMERS. THEY TAUGHT ME TO WORK HARD, TELL THE TRUTH, AND KEEP MY PROMISES. I BELIEVE IN PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. IF YOU BREAK THE LAW, YOU SHOULD PAY A HEAVY PRICE. AND WELFARE IS A TWO WAY STREET, YOU SHOULD WORK FOR YOUR BENEFITS. CHANGING STATE GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE ALL OF THIS MAY HAVE GOTTEN ME INTO A FEW FIGHTS IN LANSING, BUT STANDING UP FOR MICHIGAN VALUES IS WHAT I THINK THIS JOB IS ALL ABOUT.

Ends with Engler picking up a small child. He kisses the child and "ENGLER" (encased in blue-blocked background) appears on the screen.
Engler Ad: "Engler Moving Michigan Forward"
(Thursday, October 20)

Narrator:

John Engler is moving Michigan forward, by cutting taxes and reforming welfare. Liberal Howard Wolpe wants to turn back the clock, and undo all that John Engler has done. Wolpe supports more welfare spending, more bureaucracy, even paying teachers to strike. Howard Wolpe. In Congress he bounced checks, and voted to raise his own pay. Don't let liberal Howard Wolpe turn back the clock. Keep Michigan moving. John Engler, for governor.

Ends with Engler walking down hall of Congress with aides.

"Engler"
"Governor"
Visual references to Engler are blue-blocked; visual references to Wolpe are black-blocked or red-blocked.

Tag reads:

"Paid for by Engler for Governor."
"$38 MILLION DOLLARS" appears on the screen against black screen, as narrator speaks the words.

Picture of Engler and a cigarette factory appear, with newspaper article clipping which reads: "TAX LOSS ON CIGARETTES STUNS THE STATE."

Fades to picture of classroom of kids.

Fades to a black and white screen with Wolpe speaking to the camera. As he speaks, camera cuts to kids working on computers in a classroom setting. Cuts again to adult training facility, cuts back to Wolpe speaking to the camera.

Cuts to white screen, black letters "STRAIGHT TALK", then "WOLPE/STABENOW."

Tag r 'ds:

"PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR 1994."
In slow motion, university graduates proceed to convocation "CAN WE TRUST ENGLER WITH THEIR FUTURE?" appears on bottom of screen.

Cuts to excerpts from newspapers, with lit cigarettes burning in an ashtray and headlines across the screen read: "CIGARETTE LOophole costs State $42.6 Million" "TAX LOSS ON CIGARETTES STUNs STATE."

Cuts to picture of Engler smiling at the camera; In front of his face, newspaper articles appear read: "Conservative charter school to go online" "State is asked to pay for kids taught by parents, some using religious curricula" "Charter school's curriculum provokes ire."

Cuts back to picture of Engler with procession of graduating students behind his picture. Close up of Engler's face appears with the words: "WE JUST CAN'T TRUST ENGLER" stamped across the screen.

Narrator:

OUR CHILDREN. CAN WE TRUST JOHN ENGLER WITH THEIR FUTURE?

IN HIS SCHOOL TAX SCHEME, ENGLER ALLOWED A LOOHOLE FOR THE TOBACCO LOBBY THAT COST SCHOOLS MILLIONS. NOW ENGLER'S PLAN WILL FUBNEL MILLIONS MORE FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS, INCLUDING A NETWORK OF HOME SCHOOLS, SPONSORED BY THE FAR RIGHT, WHERE PARENTS TEACH A CURRICULUM OF CREATIONISM AND FUNDAMENTALIST DOCTRINE, FEEDING TAX DOLLARS TO THE FAR RIGHT; STEALING THEM FROM OUR KIDS. WE JUST CAN'T TRUST ENGLER.

Wolpe never appears in the advertisement.

Tag reads:

"PAID FOR BY THE MICH DEMOCRATIC PARTY. NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANY CANDIDATE."
ENGLER AD: "Engler Trustworthy on Crime" (Tuesday, October 11)

WOMAN:

Dramatization in black and white of victim being shot and killed.

Victim's wife speaks to camera from her living room:
"LINDA CLARK, FLINT MICHIGAN" appears on bottom of screen.

MY HUSBAND WAS ON HIS WAY HOME FROM WORK, AND THERE WAS A ROBBERY TAKING PLACE AT A STORE. AS KEVIN STEPPED OUT OF HIS TRUCK, THEY FIRED THAT FATAL SHOT. AT THE SENTENCING THE MEN WHO KILLED MY HUSBAND WERE LAUGHING. I KNEW THEY WOULDN'T SERVE THEIR WHOLE SENTENCES, SO I STARTED TO FIGHT FOR TRUTH IN SENTENCING AND I WENT TO JOHN ENGLER FOR HELP. I'M MAKING THIS AD BECAUSE I WANT YOU TO KNOW, JOHN ENGLER CARES ABOUT VICTIMS' RIGHTS, AND IS COMMITTED TO MAKING MICHIGAN A PLACE WHERE CRIMINALS DO NOT WANT TO COMMIT A VIOLENT CRIME.

Cuts to black screen with words: "TRUTH IN SENTENCING IS NOW MICHIGAN LAW" appearing on the screen.

Cuts back to woman who continues to speak to camera.

Ends with Engler shown talking to supporters.

Tag reads:
"PAID FOR BY ENGLER FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE."
WOLFE AD: "Wolpe/Stabenow: Clear Choice" (Friday, October 14)

On black and white screen reads: "HOWARD WOLPE."

The entire ad is black and white and opens with Wolpe speaking directly to camera.

Cuts to a shot of students using computers and at bottom of the screen reads: "HIGHER STANDARDS FOR STUDENTS."

Cuts to Wolpe teaching in a classroom; screen reads: "CAP ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS."

Cuts again to adult students receiving job re-training.

Cuts to Wolpe and Stabenow, sitting side-by-side, Stabenow speaks, bottom of screen reads: "DIBBIE STABENOW."

Black background with white words: "STRAIGHT TALK."
White background with black words: "WOLPE/STABENOW" and "A CLEAR CHOICE."

Tag reads: "PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR 1994."
WOLPE AD: "Wolpe/Stabenow: Abortion" (Wednesday, October 19)

Tag reads:
"PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR 1994."

WOLPE:

Black and white advertisement. Shows a group of women standing and looking directly at the camera.

Wolpe and Stabenow step in front of the group of women, face the camera, and Wolpe begins to speak, followed by Stabenow.

STABENOW:

If you believe abortion should be illegal, even in cases of rape or incest, vote for John Engler.

WOLPE:

It's a clear choice.

"WOLPE/STABENOW" appears on the screen in black writing on a white background.
Black and white advertisement shows a sidewalk in a suburban area.

Wolpe, walking down the sidewalk and holding a weapon, speaks directly to the camera.

Cuts to view of a number of weapons scattered on the curb.

Ends with "WOLPE/STABENOW" in white letters appearing on a black background.

WOLPE:

RIGHT HERE, A KID WAS KILLED WITH AN ASSAULT WEAPON. JOHN ENGELER THINKS ALMOST ANYBODY SHOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY THESE. AND IF YOU AGREE, VOTE FOR HIM. BUT, IF YOU THINK ASSAULT WEAPONS SHOULD BE BANNED, THEN I'M YOUR GUY. IT'S A CLEAR CHOICE.

No tag since treated as part of the ad which always comes before it, entitled "Wolpe/Stabenow: Abortion".
ENGLER AD: "Engler Keeping Promises II" (Wednesday, October 19)

Tag reads:
"PAID FOR BY THE MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE. NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANY CANDIDATE."

The words:
"KAREN TREPTON LAINSBURG" appear at bottom of the screen as a woman, in a business suit, carries her baby out of the house and to a car.

She speaks to the camera.

Cuts to slow motion view of Engler shaking hands with supporters; the words "JOHN ENGLER" appear in blue-blocked background.
The ad ends with the words: "PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT."

YOUNG WOMAN:
I'M A WORKING MOM, TRYING TO JUGGLE A CAREER, A FAMILY, AND A HOUSEHOLD BUDGET. BUT THANKS TO GOVERNOR ENGLER, IT'S A LOT EASIER THESE DAYS. HE'S CUT PROPERTY TAXES IN HALF AND HE'S GOTTEN MICHIGAN MOVING AGAIN. JOHN ENGLER'S MADE EDUCATION A PRIORITY AND THAT'S GOOD FOR CONNOR'S FUTURE. HE'S HELPED OUR FAMILY, AND MILLIONS OF OTHER FAMILIES ACROSS MICHIGAN.

NARRATOR:
GOVERNOR JOHN ENGLER. PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT.
ENGLER AD: "Engler Moving Michigan Forward"
(Thursday, October 20)

NARRATOR:

Pans across the Governor's Office, showing Engler sitting at his desk, formal.

Appearing across the bottom of the screen:
"CUTTING TAXES"
"REFORMING WELFARE."

Cuts to picture of Wolpe, with calender moving backwards behind him and an image of a pendulum to suggest backward thinking. Appearing beside Wolpe's picture:
"MORE WELFARE"
"MORE BUREAUCRACY"
"PAY TEACHERS TO STRIKE."

All images of Wolpe appear in black and white.

In red letters, beside the black and white image of Wolpe:
"IN CONGRESS HE BOUNCED CHECKS, VOTED TO RAISE PAY."

Cuts to picture of Wolpe with clock ticking backwards superimposed over his face.

Ends with Engler walking down hall of Congress with aides.

"ENGLER"
"GOVERNOR"

Visual references to Engler are blue-blocked; visual references to Wolpe are black-blocked or red-blocked.

Tag reads:
"PAID FOR BY ENGLER FOR GOVERNOR."
A blue film covers screen. Headline on screen reads: "STATE HEADED TOWARD RECESSION" followed by picture of Engler being sworn into office; followed by various images of Engler in Congress, shaking hands with citizens etc. Headlines appear on screen: "STATE PUMP'S NATION'S JOBS" "MICHIGAN NO.1 - IN NEW BUSINESS GROWTH" "STATE'S ECONOMY ON A ROLL."

Cuts to black and white picture of Wolpe with red-blocked background: "MORE TAXES, MORE SPENDING, MORE WELFARE."

Cuts to slow motion view of Engler and Binsfeld, surrounded by campaign supporters, and ends with "ENGLER AND BINSFELD, KEEPING MICHIGAN ON THE RIGHT TRACK."
Helen Milliken is shown sitting in a chair, talking directly to the camera.
"HELEN MILLIKEN"
"FORMER FIRST LADY OF MICHIGAN" appears on the screen below her image.

Gradually the camera closes in on her face, as she continues to speak directly to the camera throughout the advertisement.

White and black-blocked background:
"WOLPE"
"STABENOW"
appears on the screen at the end, in the bottom, left-hand side of the screen.

HELEN MILLIKEN:
I'M HELEN MILLIKEN, AND
I'M A REPUBLICAN. BUT
THIS YEAR I'M VOTING FOR
HOWARD WOLPE BECAUSE HE'S
FOUGHT AGAINST ASSAULT
WEAPONS, AND HE'LL MAKE
SURE WE USE PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS. BUT
THE ISSUE OF CHOICE IS
WHERE I AGREE WITH HIM
THE MOST. THERE'S NOTHING
MORE BASIC THAN A WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO CHOOSE. FOR ME,
JOHN ENGELER'S OPPOSITION
TO ABORTION, EVEN IN
CASES OF RAPE AND INCEST,
IS JUST TOO FAR OUT OF
THE MAINSTREAM. HOWARD
WOLPE IS DIFFERENT. HE
FIGHTS FOR ALL OF US. AND
THAT'S A CLEAR CHOICE.
Shows Engler dressed formally, standing by his desk in the Governor's Office. As he speaks, he begins to walk forward, around the desk, talking directly to the camera.

Engler holds his plan in his hand. As he refers to it, he holds it to the camera. As he details the plan, the following appears at the bottom of the screen in blue-blocked letters:
"WELFARE REFORM"
"BETTER PAYING JOBS"
"ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION."

I BELIEVE THAT WHEN YOU RUN FOR OFFICE YOU OUGHTA TELL PEOPLE WHAT YOU WANT TO DO, THEN KEEP YOUR PROMISES. I HAVE A LOT OF GOOD IDEAS FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. TOGETHER WE CAN MAKE GREAT THINGS HAPPEN IN MICHIGAN. HERE IS MY PLAN, YOU CAN CHECK IT OUT AT YOUR LOCAL LIBRARY. IT HAS 80 NEW IDEAS, LIKE MORE WELFARE REFORM, ABOLISHING PAROLE, STRATEGIES TO BRING IN BETTER PAYING JOBS, AND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION. THIS PLAN FOR A BETTER MICHIGAN IS THE NEXT PROMISE I'M GOING TO KEEP.
WOLPE: "Wolpe and Wife" (Wednesday, November 2)

Wolpe, sitting with his wife, talks directly to the camera.

Camera pulls out as Wolpe talks about education, cuts to scene of Wolpe in front of classroom. The following words appear: "RE-OPENING MICHIGAN EDUCATION TRUST."

Cuts back to Wolpe talking to camera. "USE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS" (public underlined in red), appears on screen. As he talks about pro-choice, cuts to a group of women looking at the camera with "RIGHT TO CHOOSE" written beneath them.

As he talks about assault weapons, cuts to him holding a weapon on a street corner, with "GET ASSAULT WEAPONS OFF OUR STREETS", written at bottom of screen.

Cuts back to Wolpe talking directly to camera.

"WOLPE"
"STABENOW," words on right hand corner of screen.

Tag Reads:

"PAID FOR BY WOLPE FOR GOVERNOR."
ENGLER AD: "Engler and the Republican Team"
(Thursday, November 3)

The word "MICHIGAN" appears across the screen with a backdrop of scenes depicting prosperity throughout the state:
  i.e. farmers fields, people hard at work in factories.

Cuts to various images of Engler at rallies, shaking hands with voters, always dressed casually.

Newspaper headlines drift across the screen:
"CUT TAXES, NOW: ENGLER'S MESSAGE TO MICHIGAN..."
"MICHIGAN NO. 1 -- IN NEW BUSINESS GROWTH."

As the narrator discusses Engler's plan, the following words appear on the screen with a blue-blocked background:
"LOWER TAXES"
"LESS WELFARE"
"MORE JOBS."

"VOTE REPUBLICAN" appears on the screen underneath Engler and Binsfeld, who are shown standing together, addressing a cheering crowd.

Tag Reads: "PAID FOR BY ENGLER FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE."
ENGLER AD: "Engler as a Leader" (Monday, November 7)

Tag Reads:

"PAID FOR BY ENGLER FOR GOVERNOR COMMITTEE."

Numerous feel good shots of economic recovery and Engler and his wife on the campaign trail. Engler is shown kissing children, shaking hands, talking to voters, cheered by voters etc.

NARRATOR:

JOHN ENGLER WANTS TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT TO TURN OUR STATE AROUND, TO GET OUR ECONOMY MOVING AGAIN, TO CUT OUR TAXES AND REFORM WELFARE. HE VISITS EVERY COUNTY EVERY YEAR, LISTENING. JOHN ENGLER. A LEADER WHO HAS KEPT HIS PROMISES. NOW MICHIGAN IS ON THE COMEBACK TRACK.

ENGLE:
MY FRIENDS, TOGETHER, WE'LL MAKE MICHIGAN THE BEST PLACE IN THE WORLD TO LIVE, TO WORK, TO RAISE A FAMILY.

NARRATOR:
JOIN THE ENGEL TEAM. LET'S MAKE MICHIGAN NUMBER ONE.

Shows an excerpt of Engler giving a speech to supporters who wildly cheer him.
RAE:
WHEN I STOOD UP FOR ONTARIO AND SPOKE OUT
AGAINST THE LIBERAL BUDGET, LYN MCLEOD FIRST
SAID I WAS WHINING. TWO WEEKS LATER SHE SAID
THAT ONTARIO IN FACT WOULD NEED MORE FROM
OTTAWA. MIKE HARRIS SAID THE BUDGET WASN'T
TOUGH ENOUGH. I DON'T BELIEVE THEY'VE
REALIZED JUST HOW BIG THOSE CUTS ARE. 3.6
BILLION DOLLARS - THAT'S ENOUGH TO RUN OUR
30 BIGGEST HOSPITALS FOR A FULL YEAR. I
INTEND TO KEEP FIGHTING FOR ONTARIO'S FAIR
SHARE. I DON'T EXPECT US TO RECEIVE ANY
SPECIAL TREATMENT, BUT I DO EXPECT AND I'LL
DEMAND THAT ONTARIO GETS FAIR TREATMENT.

DURING THE RECESSION WE CHOSE TO HELP PEOPLE,
AND TO PROTECT SERVICES LIKE HEALTH CARE. WE
PUT MONEY INTO JOBS AND TRAINING AND VITAL
SERVICES. SIX & THEN WE'VE WORKED HARD TO
CONTROL SPENDING AND WE'VE TRIED TO DO IT IN
WAYS THAT ARE FAIR TO EVERYONE. AS THE
ECONOMY RECOVERS IT MAKES SENSE TO BRING THE
DEFICIT DOWN, BUT THAT'S LED TO SOME HARD
CHOICES. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WAS ONE OF THE
MOST DIFFICULT DECISIONS THAT I'VE EVER HAD
TO MAKE. BUT WE HAD TO CUT 2 BILLION DOLLARS
FROM THE PUBLIC PAYROLL. I COULD HAVE LAID OFF 40,000 PEOPLE LIKE THE FEDERAL LIBERAL GOVERNMENT IS DOING BUT THAT IS NOT THE WAY WE WORK. BY ASKING ALL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO TAKE A FEW DAYS OFF, WE SAVED THOSE 40,000 JOBS AND THAT'S ALLOWED US TO IMPROVE NEEDED SERVICES AND LOWER THE COST OF RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT.

LYN MCLEOD HAS PROMISED A 5 PER CENT TAX CUT, MIKE HARRIS PROMISES 30 PER CENT. WELL THEY CAN PROMISE YOU ANYTHING, BUT I KNOW FOR A FACT AND SO DO YOU, THAT YOU CAN'T CUT TAXES, ABSORB THE FEDERAL BUDGET CUTS TO ONTARIO, PROTECT SERVICES LIKE MEDICARE AND BALANCE THE BUDGET ALL AT THE SAME TIME - IT JUST DOESN'T ADD UP. THE REALISTIC APPROACH IS TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR MEDICARE SYSTEM IS SECURE AND GETTING BETTER ALL THE TIME, TO KEEP ON WORKING TO CREATE MORE JOBS, TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF ONTARIO AND AS A GOVERNMENT, TO SPEND SMART AND TO LIVE WITHIN OUR MEANS. YOU CAN BE PROUD ABOUT WHAT WE'VE ACHIEVED TOGETHER IN ONTARIO. WE'VE COME A LONG WAY BY MAKING TOUGH AND REALISTIC DECISIONS THAT THE TIMES DEMAND. AND WE'VE STUCK TO THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS AND COMMUNITY THAT ARE
THE HEART OF ONTARIO. EVERYONE HAS
CONTRIBUTED AND NOW THAT THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY IS UNDERWAY, I BELIEVE THAT EVERYONE
WILL BENEFIT.

Words appear on screen:
"RE-ELECT BOB RAE...AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS."

Tag Reads:
"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
Black screen with white lettering. Words scroll as they are spoken by the narrator.

**FEMALE NARRATOR:**

ONTARIO HAS 38 PER CENT OF CANADA'S POPULATION BUT NEXT YEAR WE'LL BE HIT WITH 54 PER CENT OF THE LIBERAL BUDGET CUTS. AND LYN MCLEOD SAID IT WAS A FAIR BUDGET. WHO DOES SHE REPRESENT?

A MESSAGE FROM THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
RAE:

Suit and tie. Indoor locale.

SAVING OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IS RIGHT AT THE TOP OF THE LIST FOR MOST PEOPLE. FEDERAL LIBERAL BUDGET CUTS ARE A VERY REAL THREAT TO MEDICARE. YOU'RE FAMILY, MY FAMILY, WE ALL DEPEND ON THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM. WE'VE GOT TO PROTECT IT, AND KEEP MAKING IT BETTER. THAT'S WHY WE'VE WORKED HARD TO GET HEALTH CARE SPENDING UNDER CONTROL. WE HAD TO MAKE DIFFICULT CHOICES. WE HAD TO ASK SOME GROUPS TO TAKE LESS. AND WE USED THE MONEY WE SAVED TO IMPROVE THE SERVICES THAT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY NEED. WE EXPANDED IN-HOME CARE SO THOUSANDS OF SENIORS GET THE SERVICES THEY NEED IN THEIR HOMES. WE NOW HAVE A PROGRAM TO MAKE SURE FAMILIES CAN AFFORD THE DRUGS THEY NEED WHEN SOMEONE SUFFERS A SERIOUS ILLNESS. WE PUT BREAST CANCER DETECTION LABS ON THE ROAD; 60,000 WOMEN ARE BEING CHECKED EVERY YEAR, COMPARED TO JUST 500 A YEAR A SHORT TIME AGO. AND WE'RE MAKING SURE THAT PEOPLE AREN'T WAITING FOR CANCER CARE BY INCREASING OUR INVESTMENT IN TREATMENT BY OVER 30 PER CENT.
DR. ROSANA PELLIZZARIO:

BOB RAE'S GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A LOOK AT THE WHOLE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM WITH A VIEW TO MAKING IT BETTER, NOT JUST CONTROLLING COSTS.

RAE:

THE FEDERAL LIBERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN IN IT'S BUDGET THAT IT'S PREPARED TO ACCEPT ONE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM FOR THE RICH AND SOMETHING LESS FOR EVERYONE ELSE. AND I HAVEN'T HEARD LYN MCLEOD OR MIKE HARRIS REALLY DISAGREE WITH THAT. AS I SAID, MY CAMPAIGN ISN'T ABOUT PROMISES, EXCEPT FOR THIS ONE - AS LONG AS I'M PREMIER, ONTARIO WILL NOT HAVE A 2-TIERED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM. EVERYONE WILL RECEIVE THE CARE THEY NEED, NOT JUST THE CARE THEY CAN AFFORD.

Words appear: "RE-ELECT BOB RAE... AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS."

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
RAE:

IF I'M REMEMBERED AS THE GUY WHO
INVENTED RAE DAYS, THAT'S FINE. WE HAD
TO CUT 2 BILLION DOLLARS FROM THE
PAYROLL. WE COULD HAVE JUST LAID OFF
40,000 PEOPLE LIKE THE LIBERALS ARE
DOING, BUT THAT'S NOT THE WAY WE WORK.
BY GETTING ALL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO TAKE
A FEW DAYS OFF, WE SAVED THOSE 40,000
JOBS. SOME PEOPLE GOT MAD. GOVERNING
ISN'T A POPULARITY CONTEST. IT'S DOING
WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S FAIR.

FEMALE NARRATOR:

RE-ELECT BOB RAE, AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
NDP AD: "It Doesn’t Add Up” (15 SECONDS)
Wednesday, May 17, 1995

Black screen with white letters. Words scroll as they are spoken by the narrator.

FEMALE NARRATOR:

Both Lyn McLeod and Mike Harris say they can cut taxes, balance the budget and not hurt health care. How are they going to do that? It just doesn’t add up.

A message from the Ontario New Democrats.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
CONSERVATIVE AD: "Free Time Political Ad" (2 MINUTES, 50 SECONDS) Friday, May 19, 1995

NARRATOR:

THIS ELECTION, WE CAN BRING REAL CHANGE TO ONTARIO AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS TO OUR PROBLEMS. THIS ELECTION, COMMON SENSE HAS A NAME - MIKE HARRIS. OVER A YEAR AGO, MIKE LAUNCHED THE COMMON SENSE REVOLUTION, A PLAN FOR JOB CREATION AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE TO GOVERNMENT. HARRIS KNOWS THAT HIGH TAXES KILL JOBS AND THAT THE ONLY WAY WE CAN CUT TAXES IS TO LOWER GOVERNMENT SPENDING.

FIRST, THE HARRIS PLAN STIMULATES THE ECONOMY BY GIVING ONTARIO TAXPAYERS A 4 BILLION DOLLAR TAX REBATE. FOR THE AVERAGE FAMILY, THAT MEANS ABOUT 170 DOLLARS EXTRA EVERY MONTH IN YOUR POCKET INSTEAD OF THE GOVERNMENTS. ONTARIO'S 4 BILLION TAX REBATE WILL HELP BOOST CONSUMER SPENDING, ACCELERATE BUSINESS EXPANSION AND CREATE JOBS THROUGH A CONSUMER LED RECOVERY. CUTTING TAXES ALSO MEANS CUTTING SPENDING AND SETTING PRIORITIES. HARRIS'S PRIORITIES ARE PRESERVING OUR HEALTH CARE, MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER AND PROVIDING FUNDING AND STANDARDS FOR THE CLASSROOM. WITH FUNDING GUARANTEED FOR THESE PRIORITIES, OTHER GOVERNMENT
SPENDING WILL BE CUT BY 20 PER CENT. THE HARRIS PLAN WILL CUT 6 BILLION DOLLARS IN SPENDING AND RETURN 4 BILLION DOLLARS TO YOU THROUGH THE TAX REBATE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE'LL CUT A DOLLAR FIFTY IN SPENDING FOR EVERY DOLLAR OF TAX CUTS. THIS LEAVES ROUGHLY 2 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR TO FULLY BALANCE THE ONTARIO BUDGET.

OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, LIBERAL AND NDP GOVERNMENTS HAVE HIJKED TAXES 65 TIMES. THIS HAS HAD A DEVASTATING AFFECT ON JOB CREATION. POINT NUMBER 3 OPENS THE DOOR FOR NEW JOBS BY REMOVING BARRIERS TO GROWTH FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES. THAT'S IMPORTANT BECAUSE SMALL BUSINESSES ARE TODAY'S BIGGEST JOB CREATORS. POINT NUMBER 4 IS DOING BETTER FOR LESS. THE HARRIS PLAN ELIMINATES WASTE AND INVOLVES THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHICH MEANS SAVINGS TO TAXPAYERS AND BETTER SERVICE. POINT NUMBER 5 - THE HARRIS PLAN WILL FULLY BALANCE THE ONTARIO BUDGET. AS ANYONE WHOSE EVER MANAGED A HOUSEHOLD BUDGET KNOWS, YOU CAN'T RUN A HOME ON ENDLESS CREDIT. WELL, YOU CAN'T RUN A PROVINCE THAT WAY EITHER.
CONTROLLING THE DEFICIT WILL BOOST THE ECONOMY AND THAT MEANS CREATING JOBS. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON SENSE REVOLUTION SHOWS IT WILL HELP CREATE 725,000 NEW JOBS. THE COMMON SENSE REVOLUTION WILL PRESERVE OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, PROVIDE A FIRST CLASS EDUCATION SYSTEM THAT WILL HELP OUR YOUNG PEOPLE COMPETE IN THE WORLD AND A JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT WILL MAKE OUR COMMUNITIES SAFE.

For hope, opportunity and jobs, we need common sense for a change. We need Mike Harris.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE P.C. ONTARIO PARTY."
CONSERVATIVE AD: "Welfare and Quotas" Wed., May 17, 1995

NARRATOR:

ON WELFARE AND QUOTAS - COMPARE. MIKE HARRIS WILL REQUIRE ABLE-BODIED WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK FOR THEIR BENEFITS. LYN MCLEOD OPPOSES MANDATORY WORKFARE. YOU WILL NOT HEAR LYN MCLEOD TALKING ABOUT MANDATORY WORKFARE - SAYS MCLEOD. HARRIS WILL REPEAL ONTARIO'S QUOTA LAW AND MAKE HIRING FAIR. MCLEOD OPPOSES REPEALING THE QUOTA LAW. WHAT A DIFFERENCE. MIKE HARRIS. WORK FOR WELFARE - END QUOTAS. COMMON SENSE, FOR A CHANGE.

Words appear: "WHAT A DIFFERENCE."
Visual of Harris appears.

Words appear: "MIKE HARRIS: COMMON SENSE FOR A CHANGE."

Tag Reads: "AUTHORIZED BY THE P.C. ONTARIO PARTY."
LIBERAL AD: "Liberal Action Plan"  Wednesday, May 17, 1995

Close up visuals of the "Liberal Action Plan."

NARRATOR:

THIS IS THE ONTARIO LIBERAL ACTION PLAN.

IT OUTLINES HOW WE'LL BALANCE THE BUDGET IN FOUR YEARS, PROTECT HEALTH CARE AND FOSTER JOB CREATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.

IT HAS A TIMETABLE THAT TELLS YOU WHAT WE'LL DO WITHIN 30 DAYS, 90 DAYS AND ONE YEAR. BUSINESS LEADERS AND ECONOMISTS CALL IT REALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLE. WE WORKED ON THE ACTION PLAN FOR OVER A YEAR. PLEASE TAKE A FEW MOMENTS TO READ IT. FOR YOUR COPY, CALL 1-800-743-0901.

Word appears:

"LIBERAL."

Tag Reads:

"THIS IS A PAID POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PARTY."
LIBERAL AD: "Reality of Jobs" Wednesday, May 18, 1995

Black backdrop and white letters: "THE REALITY OF JOBS IN ONTARIO."

Various newspaper clipping headlines detailing high unemployment—especially youth.

Cuts to McLeod sitting on a chair, talking directly to the camera.

Camera gradually moves to a close-up of her face.

MCLLEOD:

THE REALITY IS THAT IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS 200,000 PEOPLE HAVE JOINED THE RANKS OF THE UNEMPLOYED. WITHOUT A PLAN TO STIMULATE BUSINESS GROWTH, THEY WILL NOT FIND JOBS. WITHIN 90 DAYS OF TAKING OFFICE, WE'LL KICK-START SMALL BUSINESS GROWTH BY CUTTING TAXES. WE'LL INTRODUCE OPERATION JOB-CHECK TO ENSURE REGULATIONS DON'T KILL JOBS. IT'S THE LIBERAL ACTION PLAN. THE NEED FOR JOBS IS REAL, SO ARE OUR SOLUTIONS.

Tag Reads: (comes about half way through the advertisement)

"THIS IS A PAID POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PARTY."
LIBERAL AD: "Free Time Political Ad" (2 MINUTES. 50 SECONDS)
Thursday, May 18, 1995

NARRATOR:

THIS IS THE ONTARIO LIBERAL ACTION PLAN. IT OUTLINES HOW WE'LL CREATE A CLIMATE FOR JOBS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, BALANCE THE BUDGET IN 4 YEARS, PROTECT HEALTH CARE AND GET TOUGH ON CRIME. IT TELLS YOU WHAT A LIBERAL GOVERNMENT WILL DO, WHEN WE'LL DO IT AND HOW WE'LL PAY FOR IT. INDEPENDENT ECONOMISTS, BUSINESS LEADERS, HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS HAVE CALLED THE POLICIES IN THIS PLAN REALISTIC, TOUGH AND PRAGMATIC. IT DEALS WITH THE REAL ISSUES FACING THE PEOPLE OF ONTARIO TODAY.

MCLEOD:

THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY IN THE ONTARIO LIBERAL ACTION PLAN IS JOBS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.

NARRATOR:

THE REALITY IS THAT IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS, 200,000 PEOPLE WILL HAVE JOINED THE RANKS OF THE UNEMPLOYED. WITHOUT A PLAN TO STIMULATE BUSINESS GROWTH, THEY WILL NOT FIND JOBS.
MCLEOD:

I CANNOT ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE SHOULD BE 500,000 PEOPLE OUT OF WORK IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO. I DON’T THINK ANYBODY CAN ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE REAL UNEMPLOYMENT FOR OUR YOUNG PEOPLE SHOULD BE AS HIGH AS 25 PER CENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO, WHICH HAS ALWAYS LED THIS COUNTRY’S ECONOMY, SHOULD BE TRAILING THE RECOVERY. THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT THING THAT WE MUST DO TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT IN JOBS IS TO GET OUR FINANCIAL HOUSE IN ORDER. THAT’S WHY THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PLAN MAKES THE COMMITMENT TO BALANCING THE BUDGET OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO AND TO DOING IT WITHIN 4 YEARS. WE ARE THE ONLY PARTY THAT IS MAKING THAT COMMITMENT.

Words appear: "THE REALITY OF HEALTH CARE."

NARRATOR:

NO MATTER WHERE YOU LIVE OR HOW MUCH MONEY YOU MAKE, YOU DESERVE QUALITY, ACCESSIBLE HEALTH CARE.

Close-ups of the "Liberal Action Plan."

MCLEOD:

HEALTH CARE IS A CORE VALUE FOR THE PEOPLE OF ONTARIO. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CORE VALUE FOR LIBERALS AND IT IS A CORE COMMITMENT IN THE
ONTARIO LIBERAL PLAN. WE WILL PROTECT OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM. WE WILL ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF THIS PROVINCE HAVE ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH CARE, WHEN AND WHERE THEY NEED IT.

NARRATOR:

IN RECENT YEARS, ONTARIO HAS SEEN AN ALARMING RISE IN VIOLENT CRIME AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN.

MCLEOD:

ONTARIO LIBERALS ARE COMMITTED TO ENSURING PEOPLE CAN FEEL SAFE - IN THEIR STREETS, IN THEIR HOMES, IN THEIR SCHOOLS.

MCLEOD:

THE CRIMES ARE REAL, SO ARE OUR SOLUTIONS. THAT’S WHY WITHIN 30 DAYS OF TAKING OFFICE, WE WILL TOUGHEN THE PROSECUTION FOR GUN-RELATED CRIMES. WITHIN 90 DAYS OF TAKING OFFICE, WE WILL BRING IN LEGISLATION TO KEEP SEXUAL PREDATORS OFF THE STREETS.

NARRATOR:

AT THE HEART OF THE ONTARIO LIBERAL ACTION PLAN IS A TIMETABLE WHICH SPELLS OUT WHAT WE’LL DO WITHIN 30 DAYS, 90 DAYS AND 1 YEAR.
WE WORKED ON THE PLAN FOR OVER A YEAR. PLEASE TAKE A FEW MOMENTS TO READ IT. FOR YOUR COPY CALL 1-860-743-0901, AND ON JUNE 8, VOTE LIBERAL.

Word appears: "LIBERAL."

Tag Reads: "AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. FOR THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PARTY."
RAE:

WHY AREN'T I OFFERING ANY TAX CUTS. LYNN MCLEOD IS PROMISING THEM. MIKE HARRIS IS PROMISING THEM. THE REALITY IS THERE JUST ISN'T ENOUGH MONEY FOR THAT. WE HAVE TO PROTECT HEALTH CARE, CREATE JOBS AND NEXT YEAR WE START BEING HIT WITH FEDERAL BUDGET CUTS OF 3.6 BILLION DOLLARS. RIGHT NOW, TAX CUTS ARE NOT REALISTIC, NO MATTER WHAT ANYONE PROMISES.

FEMALE NARRATOR:

RE-ELECT BOB RAE AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
RAE:

YOUR FAMILY AND MINE DEPEND ON OUR
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM. BUT THE LIBERALS
IN OTTAWA SAY WE BETTER GET READY FOR
CUTS TO HEALTH CARE. THEIR SLASHING THE
AMOUNT OF MONEY WE GET FOR HEALTH AND
OTHER SERVICES. I BELIEVE YOU AND YOUR
FAMILY SHOULD GET THE HEALTH CARE YOU
NEED, NOT JUST THE HEALTH CARE YOU CAN
AFFORD, AND AS LONG AS I'M PREMIER THERE
WILL BE NO 2-TIER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN
ONTARIO.

FEMALE NARRATOR:
RE-ELECT BOB RAE AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS.
CONSERVATIVE AD: "Jobs and Taxes"  Friday, May 26, 1995

NARRATOR:

ON JOBS AND TAXES - MIKE HARRIS KNOWS CUTTING TAXES IS THE BEST WAY TO CREATE GOOD JOBS. LYN MCLEOD AND HER PARTY BROUGHT IN THE PAYROLL TAX AND HIRED INCOME TAXES BY HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS.

MIKE HARRIS WILL CUT INCOME TAXES FOR EVERY ONTARIO FAMILY. LYN MCLEOD OPPOSES INCOME TAX CUTS TO CREATE JOBS. WHAT A DIFFERENCE. MIKE HARRIS. POWERFUL TAX CUTS TO CREATE JOBS. COMMON SENSE FOR A CHANGE.

Words appear: "WHAT A DIFFERENCE."

Colour still of Harris

Words appear: "MIKE HARRIS; COMMON SENSE FOR A CHANGE."

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY P.C. ONTARIO PARTY."
LIBERAL AD: "Tightrope"  Friday, May 26, 1995

Tag Reads: "AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. FOR THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PARTY."

NARRATOR:

Black and white. Shows a person walking on a tightrope. Balancing rod is slowly cut away and tightrope walker eventually loses balance.

ONTARIO'S ECONOMY IS ON A TIGHTROPE AND THE KEY TO GROWTH AND JOBS IS BALANCE, THE CAREFUL BALANCE BETWEEN TAX CUTS AND A BALANCED BUDGET. THE LIBERAL ACTION PLAN OF LYN MCLEOD PROMISES A WELL THOUGHT OUT 5 PER CENT TAX CUT AND A BALANCED BUDGET. THE CONSERVATIVES AND MIKE HARRIS PROMISE AN UNREALISTIC 30 PER CENT INCOME TAX CUT. 30 PER CENT. YOU KNOW HOW RISKY THAT COULD BE. VOTE FOR HIGH RETURN, NOT HIGH RISK. VOTE LIBERAL.

Words appear: "LIBERAL: YES, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE."
CONSERVATIVE AD: "Where Does Lyn McLeod Really Stand?"
Monday, May 29, 1995

Tag Reads: "AUTHORIZED BY THE ONTARIO P.C. PARTY."

FEMALE NARRATOR:

WHERE DOES LYN MCLEOD REALLY STAND?

MCLEOD SUPPORTED BILLIONS IN HIGHER TAXES; NOW SHE OPPOSES INCOME TAX CUTS.

MCLEOD TALKS ABOUT FAIR HIRING, McLEOD OPPOSES REPEALING THE QUOTA LAW. SHE TALKS ABOUT FIXING WELFARE, BUT McLEOD OPPOSES REQUIRING WORK FOR WELFARE.

POLITICIAN LYN MCLEOD. WHO KNOWS WHERE SHE'S GOING. MIKE HARRIS. WORK FOR WELFARE. REPEAL THE QUOTA LAW. TAX CUTS FOR JOBS. HARRIS. LEADERSHIP FOR A CHANGE.

Black and white still picture of McLeod. Words appear: "WHERE DOES LYN MCLEOD REALLY STAND?"

Picture of McLeod and arrow turning back and forth underneath her like a weathervane. Captions underline the points raised verbally.

Cloud-like background.

Still picture of Harris dressed formally.

Words appear: "HARRIS" "WORK FOR WELFARE" "REPEAL QUOTA LAW" "TAX CUTS FOR JOBS." "HARRIS: LEADERSHIP FOR A CHANGE."
LIBERAL AD: "Irresponsible Promise." Tuesday, May 30, 1995

NARRATOR:

THE CONSERVATIVES AND MIKE HARRIS TELL YOU HE WILL CUT INCOME TAX BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNREALISTIC 30 PER CENT. HE ISN'T TELLING YOU THEIR PLAN COULD THREATEN YOUR HEALTH CARE. HE ISN'T TELLING YOU ABOUT HIS HEFTY NEW HEALTH TAX ON THE MIDDLE CLASS. IF HE ISN'T TELLING YOU ALL OF THAT, WHAT ELSE ISN'T MIKE HARRIS TELLING YOU. ON JUNE 8TH, VOTE "NO" TO THE HARRIS HEALTH TAX, VOTE TO PROTECT YOUR HEALTH CARE. VOTE LIBERAL.

"LIBERAL: YES, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE."
LIBERAL AD: "Do You Really Believe?"  Tuesday, May 30, 1995

NARRATOR:

THE CONSERVATIVES AND MIKE HARRIS

PROMISE TO BALANCE THE BUDGET AND CUT
INCOME TAX BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE AND
UNREALISTIC 30 PER CENT. DO YOU REALLY
BELIEVE THAT MIKE HARRIS CAN DO WHAT HE
SAYS? THAT HE CAN BALANCE THE BUDGET
AND CUT INCOME TAXES BY A WHOPPING 30
PER CENT? MORE IMPORTANTLY, DOES MIKE
HARRIS REALLY BELIEVE HE CAN DO IT?
ON JUNE 8TH, DON'T VOTE FOR
IRRESPONSIBLE PROMISES. VOTE FOR A
REALISTIC PLAN. VOTE LIBERAL.

"LIBERAL: YES, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE."
NDP AD: "Flag"

Tuesday, May 30, 1995

MALE NARRATOR:

MIKE HARRIS SAYS IT'S TIME FOR A CHANGE.
A CHANGE FROM CREATING JOBS TO PUNISHING
PEOPLE WHO WANT JOBS. A CHANGE FROM
HEALTH CARE FOR ALL TO HEALTH CARE YOU
PAY FOR. A CHANGE FROM FIGHTING POVERTY
TO CREATING POVERTY. IF YOU DON'T WANT
TO LIVE IN A MIKE HARRIS ONTARIO YOU'VE
GOT ONE CLEAR CHOICE: MAKE YOUR VOTE
VOTE COUNT AND RE-ELECT THE NEW
DEMOCRATS.

RAE:

I NEED YOUR VOTE TO PROTECT WHAT'S
IMPORTANT TO YOU.

Tag Reads:

"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS."
RAE:  
I BELIEVE IN AN ONTARIO WHERE WE HELP  
PEOPLE FIND WORK, NOT PUNISH THEM WHEN THEY CAN'T. AN ONTARIO WHERE YOU GET  
THE HEALTH CARE YOU NEED, NOT JUST THE  
HEALTH CARE YOU CAN AFFORD. AN ONTARIO  
THAT BUILDS FOR OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE.  
MIKE HARRIS AND LYN MCLEOD SAY TAX CUTS  
ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN PRESERVING YOUR  
ONTARIO. THEY'RE WRONG. USE YOUR VOTE  
TO PROTECT WHAT'S IMPORTANT TO YOU AND  
your family.  

FEMALE NARRATOR:  
RE-ELECT BOB RAE AND THE NEW DEMOCRATS.  

Words appear:  
"RE-ELECT BOB RAE  
...AND THE NEW  
DEMOCRATS."  

Tag Reads:  
"AUTHORIZED BY THE C.F.O. OF THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATS".

CONSERVATIVE AD: "Mike Harris"  Monday, June 5, 1995

Tag Reads: "AUTHORIZED BY THE P.C. ONTARIO PARTY."

NARRATOR:

IN ONTARIO, REAL CHANGE HAS A NAME.

MIKE HARRIS. MIKE HARRIS WILL ELIMINATE UNFAIR HIRING QUOTAS TO GUARANTEE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL. ONLY HARRIS HAS A SERIOUS PLAN THAT WILL CUT INCOME TAXES TO CREATE GOOD JOBS. AND ONLY HARRIS WILL REQUIRE ABLE-BODIED WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK FOR THEIR BENEFITS.

HARRIS:

JOIN US. TOGETHER, WE’LL BRING OPPORTUNITY TO ONTARIO.

Harris walks down the street, talking directly to the camera.

Words appear: "HARRIS -- LEADERSHIP FOR A CHANGE."
APPENDIX 3
IMAGE AND ISSUE CATEGORIES USED IN
THE 1994 MICHIGAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
AND THE 1995 ONTARIO PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTION

Image Categories

Altruism: including references to candidates' concern with
the needs of others, moral purpose, selflessness, benevolence,
generosity, or lack of same.

Competence: referring to candidates' abilities, skills,
knowledge, efficiency, or lack of same.

Experience: including references to candidates' background,
past record, accomplishments, roles, jobs, activities, or lack
of same.

Honesty: including candidates' dignity, veracity, sincerity,
uprightness, candour, frankness, or lack of same.

Leadership: including references to candidates' superintendence,
chieftainship, stewardship, guidance, direction, forward-looking tendencies, readiness, or lack of same.

Personal Characteristics: including references to candidates'
individual personality traits, adaptableness, tenderness
humour, sagacity, constancy, faith, humanity, cheerfulness, or
lack of same.

Strength: including reference to candidates' rigor,
robustness, vitality, will, resoluteness, sustenance,
firmness, resilience, or lack of same.

Other Special Qualities: including references to candidates' 
"charisma," "niceness," "newness," or lack of same.

**Issue Categories**

**Michigan:**

**Crime:** cutting state police forces, prison break-outs due to putting murderers in minimum security prisons, mandatory sentencing, banning assault weapons, abolishing parole for certain crimes, prisons for juvenile criminals.

**Taxes:** cutting taxes to the middle class (property taxes, school tax scheme) and balancing the budget.

**Welfare:** working for benefits, general reform.

**Health Care:** cuts to care for mentally ill, abortion rights (even in cases of rape or incest).

**School Funding:** school reform in the form of caps on administrative costs, private/parochial school funding, higher standards for students.

**Economy:** attracting new business, balancing the budget.

**Environment:** nuclear power industry standards which allow radioactive waste in faulty containers, and the EPA.

**Ontario:**

**Budget/deficit:** both federal and provincial, associating the provincial parties with the federal debt problems.

**Crime:** maintaining law and order, prosecution for gun-related crimes and legislation to keep sexual predators off the streets.

**Economy:** specific economic problems and ways of stimulating the economy.

**Education:** improving standards in schools.
Employment Equity: repealing "quotas" under employment equity legislation.

Federal Government: cuts to Ontario provincial transfer payments.

General Growth: creating a climate conducive to general economic growth.

Health Care: cuts to health care, the importance of reforming and preserving health care and improvements made to health care.

Jobs: job creation through general economic growth.

Taxes: tax cut promises and criticisms that tax cuts are unrealistic.

Welfare: reform of the welfare system, "work for welfare".
### APPENDIX 4
### SUMMARY OF ELECTION LAWS IN MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO

#### ELECTION LAWS IN MICHIGAN AND ONTARIO

<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Party ($)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>independent committee (PAC)</td>
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<td>state central party committee</td>
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#### EXPENDITURE LIMITS:

|                      |                 |                 |                 |
| Privately Funded:    | no limit        | n.a.            | n.a.            |
| Publicly Funded:     |                 |                 |                 |
| overall expenditure limit | 1500000   | .40 per elector based on # of electors |
| maximum public funding | 1125000    | .05 per elector expenses |
| payment of public funds | up-front reimburse grant | reimburse grant |
| qualification for public funding | major party vote | 15% of vote |

#### DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS:

|                      |                 |                 |                 |
| advertising period   | no limit        | 21 days         | 21 days'        |
| expenditure limit    | no limit        | within          | within          |
| overall limit        | overall         | overall         | overall         |

#### POLITICAL ADVERTISING:

|                      |                 |                 |                 |
|                      |                 |                 |                 |

\[\text{Note 1:} \text{ mà©nì 34000} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]

\[\text{Note 2:} \text{ mà©nì 3400} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]

\[\text{Note 3:} \text{ mà©nì 3400} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]

\[\text{Note 4:} \text{ mà©nì 34000} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]

\[\text{Note 5:} \text{ mà©nì 50000} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]

\[\text{Note 6:} \text{ mà©nì 750000} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \text{ mà©nì n.a.} \]
Notes to Appendix 4

1. Sections 54 and 55 of the MCFA specify that corporations must establish "separate segregated funds." No corporate monies may be placed in the fund and contributions may only be solicited from stockholders, officers and directors of the corporation and certain (non-clerical) employees of the corporation. Separate segregated funds must register as either independent committees or political committees and are subject to contribution limits of the committee.

2. For individuals, corporations and unions, contribution limits are $750 per constituency association to a maximum of $3,000. Contribution limits to both parties and constituency associations double during election years.

3. Expenditure limits for each candidate and constituency association in any one electoral district cannot exceed the aggregate of $2 each for the first 15,000 electors entitled to vote, $1 per elector between 15,000 and 25,000 electors, and $0.25 for each elector in excess of 25,000.

4. Every registered candidate who receives at least 15% of the vote is reimbursed for the lesser of total campaign expenses or 20% of campaign expenses.

5. For both parties and candidates, the 21 day advertising period ends the day immediately preceding the day before polling day.
APPENDIX 5

ETHICS APPROVAL
# DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

## RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

**NOTE:** PLEASE COMMENT AND RETURN TO DENISE WRIGHT.

## ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH PROPOSAL

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Leslie Coventry</th>
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<td>Research Project:</td>
<td>Campaign Strategy and the Uses of Negative Political Advertising</td>
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<tr>
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<td>December 1, 1994 (REVISED LETTERS ATTACHED)</td>
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<td>Thesis Advisor:</td>
<td>S. Noel</td>
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### COMMITTEE

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<tr>
<td>M. Keating</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. McDougall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Vernon</td>
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--- *Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective* (Volume 12).

--- *Voter Turnout in Canada* (Volume 15).

--- *Making Representative Democracy Work* (Volume 17).

--- *Media and Voters In Canadian Election Campaign* (Volume 18).

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--- *Election Broadcasting In Canada* (Volume 21).


McDowall, Duncan, Editor. *Advocacy Advertising: Propaganda or Democratic Right?* Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 1982.


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NEWSPAPER, MAGAZINE AND OTHER ARTICLES


----"Four more years of Governor Engler?" September 21, 1994, p. A10.


INTERVIEWS


Wright, John, The Angus Reid Group, June, 1995.

In addition, two confidential personal interviews were conducted with Michigan Democratic Party campaign strategists in November and December, 1994, and four confidential personal interviews were conducted with Progressive Conservative, New Democratic and Liberal campaign strategists in June, July and August, 1995.

**GOVERNMENT SOURCES**


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**TELEVISION SOURCES**


Kathleen Hall-Jamieson, Good Morning America, October, 1994.

WDIV (NBC), Detroit. September 6 - November 8, 1994.

WXYZ (ABC), Detroit. September 6 - November 8, 1994.