“Soldiers First”: The Evolution of Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, 1956-2000

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Graduate Program in History
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy
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“SOLDIERS FIRST”: THE EVOLUTION OF TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING IN THE CANADIAN FORCES, 1956 - 2000

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Trista L. Grant-Waddell

Graduate Program in History

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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London, Ontario, Canada

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Abstract
This dissertation aims to revise conventional wisdom regarding Canada’s contribution to international peacekeeping through an examination of peacekeeping-specific training in the Canadian Forces from 1945 to 2000. There is a need to study training to understand how Canada’s peacekeepers have been prepared for peacekeeping missions since the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. Peacekeeping training was long neglected, not only in the historiography of Canadian participation in international peacekeeping, but also in the operations of the Department of National Defence and other government bodies. This topic deserves more attention given the important role that peacekeeping has played as a primary task of the Canadian Forces. A survey of historical literature dealing with Canadian peacekeeping shows that the academic interest in peacekeeping over the last thirty-odd years has failed to address the critical issue of training until very recently, and rarely from a historical perspective. Scholars have not examined Canadian peacekeeping at its most basic level to determine how Canada’s soldiers are prepared for peacekeeping.

This dissertation uses scholarly sources, government of Canada documents, and the testimony of Canadian soldiers as its sources of information. An integral part of my research is the testimony of former peacekeepers. The recollection of their experiences prior to, during, and post-deployment can illustrate the impact that the presence or lack of specialized training for peacekeeping had on their experiences as peacekeepers in a multinational force. The objective of this study is to gain a comprehensive picture of the evolution of specialized training for peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces since the 1950s.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Training, Canadian Forces, United Nations, Military, Canada
I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Canadian Forces who gave of their time and experiences in the production of this study. Their voices have enriched this work beyond measure. I am indebted my advisor Jonathan Vance, who provided patient and dedicated guidance through the years it took to complete this dissertation, and gave motivation when I doubted it could ever be done. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Norman Hillmer, my MA advisor, erstwhile employer, mentor, and friend. This work would not have been possible without support from the Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Dr. Ronald Baker Ph.D. Scholarship, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship, and the Doctoral Fellowship program of the University of British Columbia’s Canadian Consortium on Human Security. Invitations extended by the Peace Support Training Centre, and the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, provided research opportunities and the chance to observe peacekeeping training first-hand, and I am thankful to both centres for their willingness to open their doors to me. The assistance of the Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation and the Directorate of Military Employment Policy, Department of National Defence, in the production and interpretation of a survey of Canadian Forces members was critical to this study. Finally, I would like to thank my family. My parents, Christine Grant and Daniel Newman, have unfailingly been my most dedicated supporters. My husband, Erik Waddell, has always seen the value of this endeavour, and has willingly agreed to sacrifices that our family has made. For that, he deserves my deepest and most heart-felt thanks. And lastly to my children, Abigail, Spencer, and Samuel, this work is dedicated to you.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CDN GDS</td>
<td>1 Canadian Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLC</td>
<td>Army Lessons Learned Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACSC</td>
<td>Canadian Army Command and Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADTC</td>
<td>Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFTTG</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARBG</td>
<td>Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSFOR</td>
<td>Canadian Contingent to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFHQ</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Centre of the Canadian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Collective Training Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHRRE</td>
<td>Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCS</td>
<td>International Commission of Control and Supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Commission of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFDM</td>
<td>Land Force Doctrine and Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBCD</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCLI</td>
<td>Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCONDVA</td>
<td>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMST</td>
<td>Theatre and Mission-Specific Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMOG</td>
<td>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations military observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPF</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>UN Temporary Commission on Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>United Nations and Relief Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Introduction

The national Peacekeeping Monument, dedicated in 1992 on Confederation Boulevard in Ottawa, is physical testimony to the significance that Canada’s contribution to international peacekeeping took on in the decades following the Second World War. Titled “Reconciliation,” this statue of three members of the Canadian Forces (CF)¹, two men and a woman, indicates the hopeful conclusion to a peacekeeping mission: that of conflict resolved, and peace restored. Drawing on Canada’s peacekeeping mythology, the monument features a quotation from the “father” of United Nations peacekeeping, Canada’s own Lester B. Pearson: “We need action not only to end the fighting but to make the peace... My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.”² This allusion to the Nobel Prize won by Pearson for his part in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), formed to quell the 1956 Suez Crisis, illuminates the leading role that Canada has played in international peacekeeping from its conception. Built on the foundation of this eminent birth story, Canada’s reputation for being a peacekeeper *par excellence* grew in the decades following the creation of UNEF.

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¹ Canadian military forces were called the “Canadian Armed Forces” (CAF) until the unification of the three armed services (army, navy, and air force) in 1968, at which point the name changed to the “Canadian Forces” (CF).

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Canadian military participated in peacekeeping missions under the authority of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to a degree rivaled by few other nations until the 1990s. From the contribution of a single person for a United Nations observer group to thousands of soldiers for UN-led peacekeeping forces, Canada was part of almost every UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation from 1945 to the turn of the century. With UNEF I, Canada found its enthusiasm for peacekeeping, and the country quickly incorporated the concept into its national image. Peacekeeping, at least initially, provided a low-cost method of exerting Canada’s influence in international relations, gave its military and foreign policy a centerpiece around which to build its reputation, and afforded Canada’s armed forces a way to gain operational experience during peacetime. In tandem with the spread of peacekeeping missions around the globe, a mythology grew up around the Canadian Forces’ fifty-plus years of peacekeeping which engaged Lester B. Pearson’s “creation” of the concept of peacekeeping, Canada’s high level of participation in the various forms of peacekeeping missions that had evolved since the 1950s, and the pride that Canadians take in their peacekeeping heritage. This mythology has been scrutinized by academics, politicians, and journalists, and still it persists in public discourse.

This mythology obscures the critical issue of training in the ability of a soldier to function effectively as a peacekeeper. An examination of the evolution of training in the Canadian Forces since 1956 promises to not only clarify why Canadians were thought to be naturally good peacekeepers, but whether, in fact, Canadian soldiers were well-prepared to do the job tasked to them in international peacekeeping operations. In the
multi-disciplinary and complex world of international peacekeeping, what and how a Canadian soldier is taught would have a significant impact on his or her ability to carry out the specific requirements of a peacekeeping mission, carry out its mandate, and follow its rules of engagement. The difficulty of training soldiers for peacekeeping has been compounded by the fact that peacekeeping itself changed drastically between 1956 and 2000, and peacekeeping operations were far from homogenous in this time period given differing mandates, the critical issue of regulations governing the use of force, and the composition of the peacekeeping forces themselves, to name just a few variables. Additionally, peacekeeping has taken place against a shifting backdrop of geopolitical realities, and these have affected the form and function of peacekeeping missions.

From its inception, peacekeeping has had a causal relationship with world events. As an increasing number of international situations in the late 1950s and 1960s were perceived as posing a threat to international peace and security, peacekeeping operations were often proposed to deal with these problems in the hope that a wider war could be averted, particularly in the context of Cold War superpower tensions. Canada willingly participated in these new missions as excitement for this novel activity gained momentum in the country. By the 1970s, however, some disillusionment had set in as peacekeeping did not always render the quick results expected from international military intervention under the UN, and the pace of new missions slowed. There were no new UN missions mounted between 1978 and 1988, and this status quo suited Canadian governments oriented towards fiscal restraint and a focus on the missions to which Canada was already committed. With the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts arose that threatened to
destabilize entire regions of Europe and Africa. Peacekeeping was seen as a low-cost way to handle these potential powder keg conflicts, thus the number of peacekeeping mission increased accordingly. The Canadian government pledged military support to many of these operations, resulting in an increased operational tempo for Canadian Forces personnel. By 1999, Canada had participated in over forty missions and contributed thousands of troops to peacekeeping operations, at the cost of 100 lives, according to Veterans Affairs Canada.\(^3\) While concrete numbers are difficult to come by, another Canadian estimate indicated that 120,000 Canadians had served on over fifty peacekeeping operations by 2010, and at least 108 had been killed in the service of peace.\(^4\) The UN’s statistics place the death toll at 121 deaths occurring over 16 missions between 1948 and 31 January 2014.\(^5\)

The evolution of peacekeeping missions over time has meant that the nomenclature used to describe the activity has undergone change as well. An explosion of terms used to describe peacekeeping occurred after the Cold War, as the activity became more complex and was no longer adequately described by the term “peacekeeping.” With the transition from classic “Chapter VI” peacekeeping to, more and more often, “Chapter VI ½” or “Chapter VII” peace enforcement missions, new

language had to be developed to describe an activity that sometimes contained an element of coercion or more robust rules of engagement. Where once “peacekeeping” was commonly understood to mean any third-party intervention in a conflict that was sanctioned by the UN, the term “peace support operations” has been adopted to describe peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, election monitoring, and police action, to name a few of the activities now undertaken under that rubric. This signaled the growing complexity of peacekeeping and international security in the 1990s and the alarming rise of violent intra-state conflict around the world. For the purpose of this study, “peacekeeping” will be used in the same loose sense that Harold P. Klepak defined it in his article “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces”: “operations aiming to reduce tensions between two opposing states, or factions within a state, undertaken by a multinational organization and structured to facilitate the growth of confidence between the sides in the dispute.”6 This style of peacekeeping is generally third-party impartial military interventions undertaken by the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Peace support operations” will be used in the context of the broader, multi-disciplinary missions undertaken in the 1990s.

The 1990s was a difficult decade for Canada and peacekeeping. Challenging, and at times disastrous, missions to the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, coupled with force reductions, meant that the Canadian Forces were stretched and their training

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sorely tested. The nadir of Canadian peacekeeping, the mission to Somalia, resulted in embarrassment for the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces, an extensive review and some re-structuring of the Canadian Forces itself as well as the training employed to prepare soldiers to keep the peace, and a questioning of Canada’s long-held reputation, and self-image, as peacekeeper *par excellence*. The self-examination caused by Canada’s role in the 1993 mission to Somalia and the resulting Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, as well as Canada’s part in the missions to the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, resulted in initiatives in the late 1990s to improve Canada’s training system for peacekeeping; however, these efforts were complicated by world events. The terrorist attacks that took place on American soil on 11 September 2001 drew Canada into an international War on Terror that occupied a great deal of the Canadian Forces’ dwindled resources in the new millennium. It was estimated that by the end of 2011 approximately 41,000 Canadian Forces personnel had served in Afghanistan over the ten-year span the mission had been in existence. The dedication of this many people to a single mission reinforced the trend that was already occurring in the Canadian Forces: that of scaling back the commitment to international peacekeeping operations. The CF’s population had been undergoing reductions for some time, culminating with the Force Reduction Plan of the early 1990s which encouraged members to take early retirement, and regular force strength stood at about 61,469 in

2004. Even when the Reserve population was taken into account, for a military of this size to field a large commitment to the War on Terror meant that the decline in contributions to peacekeeping seemed permanent after 2001.

Canada’s ranking among troop-contributing countries had been decreasing, and by 2006 it ranked 55th out of 108 troop-contributing countries, fielding a mere 126 people, only 55 of which were military personnel, to UN peacekeeping operations. As of 31 March 2013 Canada was providing 100 UN police, 10 military experts, and a mere 20 troops to UN peacekeeping operations, at a time when the UN was fielding approximately 92,541 personnel to peacekeeping operations worldwide. Both Canada’s participation in and enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping seemed to wane in the context of a late-1990s military less able to contribute, and an early 2000s world overtly threatened by international acts of terrorism, especially ones that occurred so close to home. This reduction in participation levels and the reality of an uncertain future for Canadian peacekeeping provided a natural end-point for this study. It is still unclear how peacekeeping’s day has past, in particular for Canada, but it is also possible that, with the

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8 This statistic was provided by the Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation, Department of National Defence, to the researcher in 2004.
necessity of rebuilding failed states and addressing humanitarian crises and natural disasters, peacekeeping, and modern peace support operations, will find a niche in which to remain relevant in the new century. Whatever the outcome, Canada’s long-standing contributions to UN and NATO peacekeeping operations from 1956 to 2000 form a significant portion of Canadian Forces history, and the role that training played in the CF’s ability to carry out its peacekeeping role requires study.

Canada’s historic commitment to peacekeeping has been well publicized, and a point that has received significant attention, particularly since the end of the Cold War, is the strain that this level of participation placed on the personnel and resources of the Canadian Forces, and whether peacekeeping duties affected the ability of the CF to fight wars and, if necessary, defend Canada. Canada’s long history of participation has allowed the Canadian Army, as the body primarily responsible for the operational aspect of a peacekeeping mission, to learn from past peacekeeping experiences. Since Canada first embarked upon peacekeeping missions, the nature and scope of those missions has evolved, sometimes in an unpredictable fashion. The Canadian Forces has been accused of failing to change and adapt to new circumstances, of being a stronghold of tradition and bureaucracy that is slow to learn but quick to cover up its own mistakes.\(^{11}\) The nature of peacekeeping, with its rapidly changing and \textit{ad hoc} conditions that are often mission-specific, creates an environment that makes management by large organizations difficult.

\(^{11}\) This opinion is a central theme in Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan’s \textit{Tested Mettle – Canada’s Peacekeepers at War} (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 1998).
One aspect of peacekeeping that the military has directly controlled is the training and preparation of its soldiers and personnel, and the Canadian Forces has consistently held to the belief that the best training to meet the demands of peacekeeping operations is general purpose military training with an emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills. This stance has been somewhat borne out by the CF’s peacekeeping experiences. However, these decades of peacekeeping experience brought the organization to the realization that additional training for peacekeeping must be carried out in the form of extended training periods prior to deployment, and the acquisition of additional skills that were not typically included in military training. This analysis, therefore, aims to document the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping-specific training over time. Training is important to peacekeeping, as it is to other endeavours that employ military forces, because it imparts skills, discipline, leadership abilities and professionalism and plays a role in performance. Through an examination of documentary evidence and secondary sources related to training in the Canadian Forces, as well as the testimony of CF members who have served on peacekeeping operations, it is evident that the CF has maintained a “soldiers first” stance in regard to peacekeeping, but has, over time and with some reluctance, incorporated add-on training for peacekeeping into its pre-deployment training to enhance its soldiers’ abilities in peacekeeping situations. Although Canadians have been instrumental in popularizing the concept of peacekeeping and ensuring the success of many peacekeeping operations, even incorporating the concept into its national image, few attempts have been made to determine why Canadians seemed to wear the blue beret so well. This study aims to demystify that perception through the examination
of the preparation and training received by Canadian military personnel for service in peacekeeping operations.

The central question of peacekeeping-specific training hinges on the idea that there are “soldierly” skills that form the foundation of every CF member’s core training and then there are “peacekeeping” skills that are considered add-on or missions-specific training that may be necessary for deployment on international peacekeeping operations. These concepts are elaborated in “Combat and Contact skills in Peacekeeping: Surveying Recent Canadian Experience in UNPROFOR,” by Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre. Last and Eyre define combat experiences as “those in which basic military skills and physical force predominate.” Contact experiences, on the other hand, are “those in which interpersonal communications and personal contact are dominant.” Historically, the military contingent of a peacekeeping operation was often forced to grapple with unexpected situations that the planners never imagined, and soldiers dealt with these situations by relying on their “soldiers first” or combat training. Refresher training for peacekeeping duties often included driving skills, weapons training, first aid, and a multitude of other topics, but additional skills came into focus in the post-Cold War peacekeeping environment with missions that required personnel to encounter new conditions in-theatre. These new conditions included a large civilian component; the conduct and organization of elections; an information component; a police component; a

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12 Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills in Peacekeeping: Surveying Recent Canadian Experience in UNPROFOR,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 26, No. 4-5 (July/October 1997), 8.
human rights dimension; time limitations; and the fact that many conflicts were intra-state conflicts. Development and post-conflict peace-building also became integrated components of post-Cold War peacekeeping, and as a result peacekeepers encountered humanitarian tasks and interaction with non-governmental organizations at an increasing rate. These new dimensions meant that peacekeepers were often involved more directly with local populations, rather than maintaining distance while manning operation posts or conducting patrols along a demilitarized zone. This necessitated an unprecedented expertise in “contact” skills. The CF is now required to train for such duties as exchange and liaison, interviews and public relations, negotiations, civil-military cooperation, and inter-agency cooperation, as well as training in mission specific-knowledge such as local customs, culture, and language. The expanded menu of training required for peacekeeping complicated the task of military trainers, and none of these requirements abated with the focus on the mission in Afghanistan, which shared some features with post-Cold War peacekeeping.

In an increasingly complex world, peacekeepers need their military and combat skills more than ever before, but additional skills must complement traditional military training. From the 1950s to the 1990s, the Canadian Forces realized that its peacekeepers, in addition to being combat-capable, multi-purpose soldiers, needed “contact skills” in the areas of negotiation and mediation techniques, general knowledge of the workings and mandate of the United Nations (or the equivalent international body),

13 Joseph T. Jockel, Canada & International Peacekeeping (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994), 3.
a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement (ROE), familiarity with civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid issues, as well as mission specific-knowledge such as local customs, culture and language.¹⁴ Both combat and non-combat skills are important, as Canadian peacekeepers have drawn on both in equal measure in past peacekeeping operations.

International peacekeeping has been through many incarnations and has had its share of supporters and detractors since its birth in the aftermath of the Second World War.¹⁵ The challenge for the Canadian Forces since 1956 has been two-fold: to adequately train to meet the rigorous demands of peacekeeping, particularly its mandated limits on use of force, and to maintain its traditional war-fighting stance to ensure that combat skills were not eroded in favour of “contact skills.” An examination of the evolution of the CF’s training doctrine and practices sheds light on the CF’s priorities, its degree of emphasis on peacekeeping versus traditional combat roles, the appropriateness of the training offered to peacekeeping roles, and the level of responsiveness displayed by CF leadership who have dealt with peacekeeping missions that require contact skills but place peacekeepers in theatres of operations that are effectively war zones.

¹⁴ Last and Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills,” 8. The author has slightly broadened the definition of contact skills to include extra-military skills beyond the interpersonal and communication skills that Last and Eyre outline, to include non-combat subject areas the CF has deemed necessary to peacekeeping training.
¹⁵ Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan in association with the International Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990), passim.
There have been a multitude of books and articles published over the past forty years that deal with “international peacekeeping” or peacekeeping from a broad perspective. Canada figures in varying degrees in analyses of this kind, and its training programs figure to an even lesser degree. The secondary sources selected for discussion below are noteworthy because they are significant contributions to the scholarship on international peacekeeping, make key points in regard to Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping, or represent important studies on the issue of peacekeeping training, of which there are few.

Much of the scholarship, at least indirectly, alludes to a central feature of peacekeeping that has persisted over time and confounded the most organized planners: that of the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations. In the 1973 political science work *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads. National Support – Experience and Prospects*, David Wainhouse, Frederick P. Bohannon, James E. Knott and Anne P. Simons provide an early example of the examination of peacekeeping through case studies. Wainhouse *et al* conclude that, while demands for peacekeeping were likely to increase, there were a number of measures to be taken to improve the efficiency and likelihood for success of peacekeeping operations mounted by the United Nations. Wainhouse *et al* asserted that “[m]ost of the problems that peacekeeping operations have encountered in the past will recur and will, as in the past, be handled on a largely ad hoc
basis.” The ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations is a theme that is repeated in peacekeeping literature, and highlights the importance of the training of peacekeepers and the difficulty in knowing how to prepare a peacekeeper for an unpredictable environment. Wainhouse et al point out that to carry out a peacekeeping operation participating countries were asked to provide a wide variety of services, equipment, supplies, and financial support. Probably most crucial, however, is the request that countries provide personnel. After all,

peacekeeping forces require practically the whole panoply of military expertise. The greatest number involved are, of course, the contingents of line troops but there must also be considerable elements of support troops, including air units. There is a great need for skilled staff officers and with few exceptions these have been provided by the same countries that supply the contingents. In recognition of these demands, many countries have developed training, organizational, and residual expertise appropriate for peacekeeping. Wainhouse et al cites Canada as one of these countries, but fails to elaborate.

Journalist Anthony Verrier’s 1981 pro-United Nations International Peacekeeping – United Nations Forces in a Troubled World points out that often the operations themselves give “soldiers and airmen plenty of operational experience in the midst of two heavily-armed nations, who undoubtedly use [the peacekeeping mission] as

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17 Wainhouse et al., International Peacekeeping at a Crossroads, 571.
a large-scale training ground.”\textsuperscript{18} The sentiment that peacekeeping missions are effective training for soldiers stands the problem of operational requirements on its head. Instead of training soldiers for peacekeeping duty, Verrier implies that the missions themselves are the training ground. There is little discussion here, as elsewhere, of any specialized training that soldiers have received or should have received prior to deployment.

*International Peacekeeping* by political scientist Paul F. Diehl focuses on themes in peacekeeping rather than taking the case-by-case approach so popular in peacekeeping literature. He points out that the concept of neutrality in peacekeeping goes beyond the purpose of the operation to the “composition and activity” of the troops.\textsuperscript{19} Non-alignment, the idea that the peacekeepers themselves should have no enemies and be partisan to no belligerent, enhances the reputation of Canadians as “honest brokers” in the peacekeeping process. However, Diehl falls into convention when he discusses the *ad hoc* nature of peacekeeping operations, and mentions in passing Canada’s efforts to identify and train troops specifically for peacekeeping duty. Because operations are organized on an *ad hoc* basis on the voluntary contributions of member states of the UN, the mode of organization changes each time, and this causes discontinuity and improvisation.\textsuperscript{20}

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\textsuperscript{20} Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 108.
One impact that such a process has on the mission itself is the speed with which an operation can get underway. A popular argument for a permanent UN peacekeeping force is the possibility of rapid reaction capabilities. Although under the present organization rapid deployment is possible, such as when the United Nations Force in Cyprus was on the ground within twenty-four hours of approval by the UN, it seldom occurs. By the late 1990s peacekeeping literature had firmly established that there were problems with the United Nations’ ability to plan, execute, and sustain international peacekeeping. The UN itself had sought a solution through a number of studies aimed at smoothing out this process. Training is a notable element in making rapid deployment possible, a factor noted by former UN Under-Secretary General Brian Urquhart in his 1994 article, “Keeping the Peace: The Argument for a United Nations Military Force.” Although Urquhart makes an argument for standing UN peace enforcement units, “trained in the techniques of peacekeeping and negotiation as well as the more bloody business of fighting,” his reasoning can be applied to conventional peacekeeping operations as well. Urquhart argues that the capacity to deploy credible and effective peace enforcement units, at short notice and at an early stage in a crisis, and with the strength and moral support of

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the world community behind them, would be a major step in this direction. Clearly, a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force, willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the international community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis.\textsuperscript{25}

Out of this realization came an ambitious study commissioned by the Canadian government designed to improve the UN’s rapid reaction capability. Former foreign service officer and current academic Louis Delvoie evaluated the resulting 1995 Canadian discussion paper, “Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations,” as a sound piece of work, and its recommendations as judicious. The areas covered included recommendations for the political level; the strategic level; the operational level, “in which there is a virtual vacuum in terms of UN capabilities”; and the tactical level (the operation on the ground).\textsuperscript{26} A survey of historical analysis shows that these recommendations were far from original. In fact they simply drew together, in a single volume, ideas for improvement that had been circulating since the 1970s. In addition to exploring the idea of a standing peacekeeping force, and establishing a permanent UN headquarters for peacekeeping, the discussion paper urged that the UN “encourage greater standardization of peacekeeping training through a system of training visits to enhance understanding of international standards in this area.”\textsuperscript{27} While this was a logical recommendation, Delvoie does not discuss existing peacekeeping training.

\textsuperscript{25} Urquhart, “Keeping the Peace,” 410.
\textsuperscript{26} Delvoie, “Enhancing the UN”s Rapid Reaction Capability,” 227-228.
\textsuperscript{27} Delvoie, “Enhancing the UN”s Rapid Reaction Capability,” 230.
Canada’s contributions to international peacekeeping have attracted the attention of Canadian scholars. Peacekeeping meant more to Canada than a simple donation of soldiers, equipment, funds, and know-how. Peacekeeping has somehow become entwined with the idea of Canadian national identity, and it is accepted wisdom that peacekeeping participation has had ramifications for Canadian national security and foreign and defence policy. In addition, the activity has bred discussion about the role of the Canadian Forces, and the impact peacekeeping has had upon a shrinking force. All of these factors have combined to provide academics with a complex problem, and some historians have responded by pursuing an answer to the question, “What has peacekeeping meant to Canada?”

There are a number of sources that deal exclusively with Canadian peacekeeping from a national perspective. None includes an in-depth analysis of training, but most engage the question of peacekeeping’s impact on Canada’s international reputation and on the Canadian Forces. In his 1968 article “Peacekeeping: The Canadian Experience,” author David Cox outlined the elements of Canadian peacekeeping. He believed that Canada was unlikely to have national interests in areas where it participated in peacekeeping, thus allowing Canadian soldiers to retain their neutrality. He asserted that, in order for a peacekeeping mission to be successful, advance organization and planning

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are required. Because this type of planning was not always possible, UN forces had to rely on the short-notice availability of various kinds of military units with the necessary mobility and logistical support. According to Cox, this was where the Canadians came in because they were better equipped to provide transport and specialized military units than any other power. Chief of the Defence Staff General Paul D. Manson reiterated this claim twenty years later. He cited these abilities as a reason why Canada’s participation in peacekeeping was valued, stating that

Canadian soldiers are trained as “soldiers first”; that means that Canadian contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining units capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies. The determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be, potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada’s unwillingness to put the lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary risk.

Cox adds extra insight into the components of training that make Canadian soldiers more suitable for peacekeeping than those of other nations’ forces. By the 1960s the “soldiers first” attitude towards training meant that troops designated as peacekeeping standby forces received not only conventional military training refresher courses, but also training in counter-insurgency and para-military operations. It can be assumed that extra elements of military training, including police duties, support to law and order, and


31 General Paul D. Manson, “Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 1 (Summer 1989), 8.

counter-guerrilla activities, were designed to combat the presumed *ad hoc* nature of peacekeeping missions. However, Cox does not discuss additional skills outside the scope of general or specialized military training that can be vital to the success of Canada’s peacekeepers.

As previously stated, most literature that deals with Canadian peacekeeping takes two conclusions for granted: first, that peacekeeping is an *ad hoc* operation, and secondly, that Canadian soldiers are well qualified for this aspect of peacekeeping because of their conventional military training. These assumptions are often present in a literature that focuses on peacekeeping in the context of the impact it has on the Canadian military and national security. Historian Jack Granatstein’s 1974 article, “Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality” is one such source. In this critical analysis, Granatstein treated peacekeeping as an entity whose life-span has expired, and whose only worth was to “provide symbols and images for a nation that needed them.”

Cyprus was the last peacekeeping victory for Canada and Granatstein predicted that peacekeeping would stagnate in the future because it was ineffective. He claimed that the popularity of peacekeeping in Canada rose and fell with international trends, and he further attacked peacekeeping by attempting to explode the myth that Canada was often the backbone of peacekeeping operations. As Granatstein stated, “Canada’s role, however creditable, was usually a minor one and one that was mainly confined to the

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military side of the operation.” This statement ignored the fact that the role of military forces was often crucial to peacekeeping operations. The military contingent was the group forced to grapple with unexpected situations that the planners never imagined, and soldiers dealt with these situations by relying on their training, whether combat or otherwise.

Historian R.B. Byers effectively tied together the impact peacekeeping has had on the Canadian Forces with peacekeeping’s role in foreign relations and defence policy in “Defence and Foreign Policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine.” Byers said that the “Pearson government argued that peacekeeping contributed to international stability and gave the CAF a useful role to perform, one in which it developed internationally renowned expertise.” Scholars were thus identifying two elements that would play major roles in Canadian peacekeeping literature and practice: peacekeeping enhanced Canada’s international prestige, and it gave the CF something to do.

Byers also addressed the unpopularity of peacekeeping that Granatstein noted was evident by 1968, the year after UNEF I was summarily dismissed from Egypt by President Gamel Abdel Nasser. Byers concurred, but claimed that by the mid-1970s peacekeeping had been fully resurrected as a major aspect of foreign and defence policy. It is not surprising, then, that by the early 1980s historians and scholars were

predicting that peacekeeping, despite some controversy that still existed over how much of an obligation Canada should assume, was a permanent feature of Canadian foreign policy and would remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, by 1982 scholars were making statements such as: “it does not appear too risky to forecast a general stability in Canada’s underlying defence orientation which is characterized by a multiplicity of roles and the preference for collective undertaking.”37 This preference, according to political scientist Harald von Riekhoff, was bound to include continued participation in peacekeeping, as

[p]eacekeeping has fitted Canadian defence preparations and also has fitted Canada’s aspired role as a responsible, major international actor, operating independently from the US, though generally in harmony with US security interests. The peacekeeping role has found international acclaim; it has been domestically popular.38

Von Riekhoff also identified the cost-effectiveness and general satisfaction with the outcome of peacekeeping missions as factors in Canada’s continued participation.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s many books and articles were published solely to praise Canada’s peacekeeping efforts, while others urged caution and a measured examination of Canada’s past and present commitments before agreeing to any increase in existing missions or participation in future operations.39 The end of the Cold War,

38 von Riekhoff, “Canadian foreign policy in the 1980s,” 34.
39 Many books were unabashed in their admiration for Canada’s peacekeeping efforts. One example is:
with its attendant conflicts, brought new challenges to peacekeeping and forced scholars to re-evaluate the merits and costs of peacekeeping. Historians J.L. Granatstein and David J. Bercuson pinpoint the early 1980s as the turning point in the Canadian military’s opinion of peacekeeping. They claim that “without a believable Soviet threat, it becomes difficult to justify well-equipped armed forces – unless a new role can be found. Peacekeeping fills the bill neatly, and the Canadian Forces have now become peacekeeping’s biggest supporters in Ottawa.”

It is interesting to note, as will be shown later, that training for peacekeeping did not come under close scrutiny by the CF until almost a decade later.

This enthusiasm for peacekeeping was tempered, however, by the realization that capabilities change over time. Granatstein and Bercuson state it best when they argue for “[p]eacekeeping, yes; but peacekeeping only when it has a chance to succeed and when it does not expose our service personnel to unacceptable risks.” This attitude is expressed in a number of recent articles and books which explore the ever more complex and dangerous aspect of peacekeeping in the 1990s.


40 Granatstein and Bercuson, War and Peacekeeping , 251.
41 Granatstein and Bercuson, War and Peacekeeping , 251.
Canadian Studies professor Joseph T. Jockel’s book *Canada & International Peacekeeping* questions whether peacekeeping can retain its former popularity in Canada in the face of mounting fear about the danger level of newer peacekeeping operations. He cites several new elements in peacekeeping as reasons for the increasing complexity of operations: a large civilian component; the conduct and organization of elections; an information component; a police component; a human rights dimension; time limitations; and intra-state conflicts. According to Jockel, these new dimensions, and the increased risk to the safety of peacekeepers, led the federal government to reconsider putting Canadian peacekeepers at risk in UN operations, and to call for improved peacekeeping training.

General Lewis MacKenzie’s “Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder” reflects the attitude explained above, but from a soldier’s perspective. MacKenzie played a major role in the initial organization and deployment of Canadian peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. He discussed many of the same problems with organizing and doing peacekeeping that have been identified by scholars over the last thirty-odd years. As late as 1994, he complained, the United Nations still had no permanent protocol for organizing peacekeeping organizations.

Journalist Ann H. Medina emphasized this problem with leadership and organization by citing the fact that, in peacekeeping situations, leaders (and she pinpoints

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42 Jockel, *Canada & International Peacekeeping*, 3.
diplomats and generals among the offenders) who are often not “plugged in” to the specifics of the theatre of operations and regional conflict are too afraid of appearing ignorant to ask basic questions, compounding the climate of ignorance that can sabotage a peacekeeping mission. Also damaging is the possibility that average soldiers, often the biggest presence in a theatre of operations, are party to this uninformed approach. It is difficult to imagine that one’s nationality or lack of partisanship can take the place of information or training under these circumstances.

General MacKenzie also echoed the popular reasoning that Canadians are good peacekeepers because they are Canadians. He stated that

Canadians are really good at this business, but not for the reason you might think. Not because we’re the best soldiers in the world, we’re probably not…maybe once a month we’re the best, who knows. There are lots of good soldiers around. We’re good at this business because of things that are, for most of us anyways, totally and absolutely out of our control and that’s our nationality. We’re good at it because we’re Canadian…You get a synergistic effect when you mix our national reputation with good soldiers.

In all of this there is scant mention of training or qualifications that Canadian soldiers might possess to enable them to cope in a capable manner with any situation that may arise in a peacekeeping context. Training or qualifications of this kind might be the key to explaining Canada’s self-perceived peacekeeping reputation, or at least to defining better Canada’s role in peacekeeping operations.

Historians’ interest in peacekeeping has not waned, and new studies have emerged in recent years that take a microscope to some of Canada’s most significant contributions to international peacekeeping efforts. Three notable recent works aim to uncover the inner workings of the decision-making process involved in Canada’s deployments to early peacekeeping operations, and the challenges faced in the wake of these decisions. Grant Dawson’s *Here is Hell: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia* is an analysis of the political, diplomatic, and military decision-making involved in the decision to deploy Canadian soldiers to Somalia.\(^{46}\) Michael K. Carroll, in his *Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1967*, provides a detailed account of Canada’s involvement in UNEF I from a political and military perspective. It deftly reveals some of the difficult challenges faced during this first peacekeeping mission.\(^ {47}\) Finally, Kevin A. Spooner, in *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* reveals the misgivings that the Diefenbaker government had about engagement in Africa and the decisions taken to participate in the mission to the Congo.\(^ {48}\) None of these detailed studies address training for these early missions.

Canada has a long history of peacekeeping all over the globe. Historians have changed their evaluation of this history over the past few decades, yet it seems that scholars have finally come to rest on the point that peacekeeping was and is a useful


\(^{48}\) Kevin A. Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
endeavour, but that risks must be assessed for each situation to judge whether the operation is worthy of Canadian participation. What seems to have gone unnoticed, or unremarked upon, is the issue of precisely how Canadian soldiers are trained to be effective peacekeepers. There is a perception that Canadian soldiers are trained in some manner that, when coupled with their distinct national identity, enables them to cope with almost any situation. And, as ever, they are expected to do more with less, by employing their ‘can do’ attitude. Little evidence, however, has been put forth to support these claims. The gap in historiography that exists around the topic of training for peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces is a glaring omission. The question of peacekeeping training is almost always missing from historical discourse.49 Scholars give reasons of national identity, the professionalism of the CF, and the international reputation of Canadians to explain why Canadians are considered good peacekeepers.50 Few, however, mention if Canadians receive special training or have particular qualifications or peacekeeping skills.51 A survey of historical literature that deals with Canadian peacekeeping from the Canadian perspective illuminates the fact that any

49 This gap in historiography can in part be contributed to the lack of documentary sources on training for peacekeeping in the Cold War era. There are now, however, sufficient sources to warrant investigation. As well, the lack of sources is certainly a subject for analysis in itself, when one considers Canada’s vast involvement in peacekeeping operations over the last fifty years.
50 See, for example: Norman Hillmer, “Peacemakers Blessed or Otherwise,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 2 (Summer 1989); Norman Hillmer, “Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth,” Welfare States in Trouble, Sune Akerman and Jack L. Granatstein, eds. (Uppsala, Sweden: Swedish Science Press, 1995); and Norman Hillmer, Peacekeeping and the Moral Superpower (Ottawa: Carleton University, Marston LaFrance Lecture Series, 9 March 1999).
51 Norman Hillmer does touch on training, but he is the exception. He cites the opinions of Clay E. Beattie and J.D. Murray that problems with manpower, command and control, logistical support and training need to be remedied. Beattie even went so far as to suggest that peacekeeping training should extend to formal education in negotiation and mediation.
scholarly treatment of peacekeeping over the last thirty years has failed to address the critical issue of training. Peacekeeping’s role in defence and national security policy has been discussed and debated, as well as the impact that increased peacekeeping obligations have had on Canadian Forces’ capabilities, but academics have not examined Canadian peacekeeping at its most basic level to determine how the preparation of Canada’s soldiers transformed them into peacekeepers.

To address this gap, this study has employed a wide variety of primary sources: interviews and surveys of former peacekeepers, the diary of a peacekeeper, Department of National Defence (DND) documents that address the topic of training for peacekeeping, reports by various Canadian government bodies, pamphlets, curriculum information from Canadian peacekeeping training centres, newspaper articles, UN documents, and a number of secondary sources that place the Canadian peacekeeping experience in context.

Documentary sources are somewhat scarce for the pre-1990s era, but can be found in a few public collections. The most useful for this study was located at the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, which yielded key primary documents on peacekeeping training in the period under examination. Archival searches at the Library and Archives Canada turned up some additional primary documents but few directly related to peacekeeping training that were not already found at the Directorate of History and Heritage. Research at the libraries of the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario, and the now-defunct Lester B.
Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, also yielded some results. Additional primary documents were provided by individuals and found through web searches, with the United Nations website being particularly fruitful.

The very earliest years of peacekeeping proved to be the richest for documentary evidence. Following the inauguration of peacekeeping with the creation of UNEF I in 1956 to respond to the threat posed by the Suez Crisis, there was a burst of interest and activity related to peacekeeping that lasted throughout the 1960s. The United Nations and the UN member states that participated in the earliest missions attempted to work out how to mount these missions effectively, and several UN and Canadian documents related to peacekeeping training were the result. Even non-governmental organizations were studying training, which produced further documentation. During the first decade following Canada’s participation in UNEF I, the Canadian government sought to improve the performance standards of its peacekeepers, and learn lessons from its short history in peacekeeping operations. There seemed to be recognition that peacekeeping would be an evolving practice, which perhaps was perfectible through practice and study. However, by the 1970s this scrutiny seems to have come to an end, in favour of maintaining the status quo in existing missions, and this is reflected in the dearth of documentary evidence into the 1980s.

By 1970, documentary evidence related to peacekeeping training, and Canadian participation in peacekeeping generally, fell off sharply, and there appears to have been
little study of peacekeeping or peacekeeping-related training by the Canadian government in the 1970s and 1980s. This dearth of documentation makes a point: peacekeeping was not the priority in the 1970s and 1980s that it would become in the 1990s. The gap in documentary evidence can be explained by the history of Canadian peacekeeping itself. Following the initial enthusiasm for this new international tool for the maintenance of peace, the number of new missions fell off drastically in the 1970s and 1980s, but was followed by a re-birth of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War, when peacekeeping was used as a way to deal with new intra-state conflicts. Throughout the lull in the 1970s and 1980s, there is evidence that the CF continued to prepare its peacekeepers at the Unit level for peacekeeping duties, and certainly Canadian peacekeeping was discussed at the political level at the UN throughout these decades. However, it does not appear that there was any serious consideration of doctrine or any revision of peacekeeping-related training in this period. For the purposes of this study, this gap in primary evidence was offset by the survey and interview program described below, which provided first-hand testimony of CF soldiers who served on peacekeeping duties from as early as the first Canadian contingent deployed to Suez through to modern peace support operations of the post-9/11 world.

In the late 1980s the operational tempo of the CF began to increase, and this can be attributed to the increase in peace support missions worldwide. Canada, as the “creator” of peacekeeping, was eager to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. The explosion of peacekeeping activity in the 1990s as well as a rise in the danger level for soldiers serving as peacekeepers spurred the Canadian Forces to review
its training methods and standards for peacekeeping. In the period after 1989 the number of documents pertaining to CF training for peacekeeping grew as the activity took on a new importance.\textsuperscript{52}

By 1990, DND officials expressed concern in writing over the complexity of mounting peacekeeping operations, and the sustainability of CF operations at a high operational tempo.\textsuperscript{53} This concern among DND officials resulted in large-scale studies that expressed grave worry over the fate of the CF itself. And in the midst of this examination of peacekeeping’s role in the CF, training took on more significance for those who studied peacekeeping, and those who practiced it. Peacekeeping operations that were initiated in the early 1990s, in particular the missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, were undertaken in violent environments that challenged past conceptions of peacekeeping. This led to a new introspection in peacekeeping circles, and studies began to emerge at the United Nations and the national level that sought to examine these modern, multidisciplinary “peace support operations” and find a way to ensure their success and minimize casualties among peacekeeping forces. Several key documents exist from this period, including reports of Senate Standing Committees, the report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, reviews of peacekeeping at the UN, and

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\textsuperscript{52} This priority shift coincides with an increase in scholarly interest in the history of peacekeeping; one example of the attention paid to research procedures and documentary evidence in peacekeeping research is MacGregor Patterson’s “A Bibliographic Foray into Documents and Publications Relating to Peacekeeping in Cambodia,” \textit{Journal of Government Information} 23, 1 (1996), 13-39, which is a thorough review of the literature and documentary evidence pertaining to this subject.

various CF training documents and instructions. Training was often highlighted in these documents as an area that required attention.

In addition to documentary evidence, this examination of peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces employs the first-hand testimony of Canadian Forces members who have served on peacekeeping missions since 1956 to illuminate the actual state of training for peacekeeping over the past several decades. Gaps in the documentary record of Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping can often be filled by oral history. To this end, the recollections and experiences of CF soldiers who participated in peacekeeping missions between 1956 and 2000 have been used in this study to gather information about the peacekeeping training Canadian Forces members received. Their unique insight has also been used to evaluate these soldiers’ opinions of their training for peacekeeping and what they thought about peacekeeping duties generally.

This evidence was gathered over more than ten years through a series of in-person and telephone interviews, written surveys, and an extensive DND-sponsored survey program that was initiated in 2003 and concluded in the spring of 2005. To the author’s knowledge, this is the most extensive academic survey of CF attitudes towards peacekeeping and peacekeeping training undertaken to date.

Over a ten-year period from 1997 to 2007 the author conducted a series of one-on-one interviews with members of the CF, officials at DND and CF training centres, and
senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). These twenty-four interviews were conducted using a standard questionnaire aimed at discovering training methods for peacekeeping missions. The questionnaire used from 1997 to 2000 contained twenty-one questions, and this document was updated in September 2000 to include twenty-four questions. Of the twenty-four interviewees, twenty-two were current or former CF members of various ranks and representing a wide variety of peacekeeping experience over time, and two were officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Of the two senior officials at DFAIT that were interviewed, one was Head of Peacekeeping in the Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division, and has had direct peacekeeping experience, while Eric Hoskins served in a humanitarian capacity providing medical relief in conflict-torn areas where peacekeepers were present, and was, at the time of the interview, a senior policy advisor to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.

The information obtained through initial interviews with Canadian military personnel led the author to attempt to gather, on a larger scale, the experiences and recollections of Canadian Forces members who had been peacekeepers during the period under investigation. With the assistance of the Department of National Defence, a large-scale mail-out of 750 surveys was accomplished between 2003 and 2005, and a total of

54 The opinions expressed in this paper that are attributed to any of the interview or survey subjects are not those of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and are purely personal in nature. All questionnaires, consent forms, and information sheets used in the production of this study are included in the appendices.

55 All questionnaires, consent forms, and information sheets used in the production of this study are included in the appendices.
108 responses were returned to the investigator. A further six surveys not related to the DND mailing were gathered in the same time period, using the same questionnaire. In total, the oral history component of this dissertation is based on 138 surveys and interviews conducted between 1997 and 2007. These interviews and surveys were carried out under the authority of the University of Ottawa, the University of Western Ontario, and the Department of National Defence. For the purpose of this study, the 108 DND survey responses will be discussed as a distinct result set apart from the interviews and six independent surveys, although the methodology used to elicit these responses were identical.

The questionnaire used in the interviews and surveys asked the respondent to provide some demographic details, however all respondents and interviewees had the option of anonymity, and the survey questionnaires that were mailed out did not request

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56 The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces.

57 The interviews and surveys discussed in this study were carried out under the authority of the University of Ottawa, the University of Western Ontario, and the Department of National Defence. Two of the interviews date from 1997, and were conducted as part of a course requirement at the History Department of the University of Ottawa. The Research Ethics Committee, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, granted an Ethics Certification (“Certification of Institutional Ethics Review”) dated 14 June 1999 that was valid for one year. This certification authorized the researcher to conduct interviews related to MA research, and the questionnaire and consent form that was approved for use is attached in the appendices. The Research Ethics Board for the Review of Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, of the Office of Research Ethics, The University of Western Ontario, granted approval for interviews and surveys to be conducted in conjunction with this study in May 2003 (Review number 9581S). The questionnaire and all other materials used in the survey are also attached in the appendices. In July 2004 the Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation (DHRRE), Department of National Defence, granted approval for the conduct of a survey of currently serving CF personnel who had been deployed on two or more peacekeeping missions. This project was assigned Serial Number 262/03. DHRRE also provided support to gather the sample for the survey, and provided material support such as assembling the address list and providing translation services to the researcher.

58 For a complete list of interviewees and survey respondents, please consult the bibliography.
that respondents give their name. The standard questionnaire used in all cases asked for the details of the missions on which the CF member had served, and qualitative questions related to what specialized training, if any, individuals received prior or during deployment on peacekeeping operations. Further questions touched on subjects related to the use of force, Rules of Engagement, equipment, and stress-management in the context of peacekeeping deployments. It also asked “opinion” questions about whether the respondents thought peacekeeping was a valid use of the resources of the CF, and whether they thought Canadians made good peacekeepers. This information is used throughout this dissertation, and was especially useful in filling in gaps in the documentary record. While memory is subjective, the combined recollections of Canadian Forces personnel, and in many cases the individual anecdotes provided by some, were invaluable in completing the picture of what the nature of peacekeeping training was in the post-Second World War era, and how it changed with the end of the Cold War. These interviews and surveys also shed light on how CF personnel felt about serving on UN and NATO peacekeeping operations, whether they felt prepared for their duties in-theatre, and what support existed for them upon their return.

To conduct a large-scale mail-out of surveys to DND personnel who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations, the assistance of the Department of National Defence was enlisted, with the permission and approval of the Research Ethics Board of the University of Western Ontario. The Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation (DHRRE) of DND assists external researchers wanting to conduct research on CF personnel, and assisted in the distribution of surveys to 750 CF personnel. The initial
work on the surveys began in January 2003. The approval process and assembly of the survey contents for mail-out was lengthy, and involved several directorates of DND. Approval was obtained from the University of Western Ontario’s ethics committee to continue conducting interviews and surveys throughout this period. This project then had to be approved by DHRRE’s approval process for the Conduct of Psychological/Sociological Research in the Canadian Forces/Department of National Defence. The “departmental sponsor” for this work was the Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy. Preliminary approval was received from DHRRE in March 2004 to survey 750 CF members, and the author was authorized to work with the Directorate Human Resources Information Management (DHRIM) to gather the population of CF members from which the sample of 750 survey recipients could be drawn. Final approval to conduct the survey was granted on 5 July 2004.

The Public Service’s human resource management system, Peoplesoft, was used to gather information about the entire population of the CF and was the database from which the survey sample was taken. At the time the relevant population was extracted from Peoplesoft in July/August 2004, the population of the CF was 61,469. A Peoplesoft search was done for then-serving members of the CF who had served on two or more peacekeeping missions. It was decided that narrowing the search to people who had served on two or more missions would make the survey population more manageable

59 This survey project was assigned internal project number 262 by DHRRE, once the survey proposal met DND’s quality control standards for research on CF members.
60 This information was provided by DHRRE.
and provide this inquiry with respondents who might be able to compare training from one mission to another. The result was a list of 14,584 individuals who had between two and thirteen deployments. The vast majority of these people had served on between two and five peacekeeping operations. Using a standard sampling technique, a sample of 750 was taken from the population of 14,584 CF members. DND assisted in distributing the survey packages. The respondents also had the option of returning the survey by e-mail. The surveys were mailed out in batches of 250 between October 2004 and January 2005, and respondents were asked to return the completed surveys within thirty days of receipt. A total of 108 surveys were completed and returned. The demographic profile of the 108 respondents closely matched that of the 750 people who received surveys, which in turn matched the overall population from which the sample was drawn.

Below is a breakdown of some key demographic characteristics for the overall sample of 14,584 CF personnel who had served on two or more peacekeeping deployments in the time period in question. In terms of the breakdown between services, 11,192, or seventy-seven percent, were members of the Army; 2831, or nineteen percent, were members of the Air Force, and 561, or four percent, were members of the Navy. This breakdown is not surprising in light of the fact that until the 1990s it was often the Army that provided the bulk of forces for peacekeeping operations.61

61 In his article “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” Harold P. Klepak argues that, not only did the number and scope of peacekeeping operations increase following the end of the Cold War, but that “all three services are increasingly active as well.” Klepak relates that there was virtually no naval peacekeeping prior to 1990 but that it has “come into its own” with operations in Central America, Cambodia, the Balkans, and Haiti. Air forces that were previously limited to peripheral logistic support
Broken down by gender, 13,883, or ninety-five percent, of the overall population was male, and 701, or five percent, was female. Everyone in this sample was between twenty-one and fifty-eight years of age, and 11,984, or eighty-two percent, were non-commissioned members (NCOs), and the remaining were officers. CF members who listed their first language as English numbered 9452, or sixty-five percent of the sample, and those who listed their first language as French numbered 5132, or thirty-five percent.

To obtain a sample of 750 people to receive the survey out of the original 14,584, random selection was used. Every twentieth person in the list was chosen until a total of 729 people was reached, then every 694th person was chosen to reach a total of 750. The researcher verified that the sample of 750 people closely matched the demographic characteristics of the larger population of 14,584. For example, in the sample of 750, 482 people (sixty-four percent) reported English as their first language, and 268 people (thirty-six percent) reported French as their first language.

When it came time to send out the surveys, a package was assembled for each survey recipient that included an information sheet about the research project being have their role expanded into fighter intercept, patrolling, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other related traditional and peacekeeping-specific roles in the 1990s. Despite this, land forces have historically made up the bulk of peacekeeping personnel and continued to do so throughout the 1990s. In *Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security*, Ernest Gilam and Detlef E. Herold, eds. (Rome: NATO Defense College, 1994), 116-117.
undertaken, a list of health contacts in DND, the survey itself, and a self-addressed and stamped envelope. The survey was sent out in the official language indicated by each person as their first language. Respondents were not required to provide any identifying information and were only asked to provide general demographic characteristics and some information about their occupation. In the sample of 750, there were no addresses available for sixteen people, so surveys were actually sent to 734 people over a period of four months from October 2004 to January 2005. A total of ten survey envelopes were returned to sender, and one empty response envelope was returned to the researcher. In all, 108 surveys were completed and returned, mostly by mail but some by e-mail, for a response rate of 14.4 percent.

The demographic makeup of the survey respondents held some surprises. When broken down by gender, there were 101 men in the group of respondents, six who did not specify gender, and only one respondent who identified herself as a woman. Women only made up five percent of total original population of 14,584 former peacekeepers drawn from Peoplesoft, so it was expected that fewer women than men would return surveys, but the low response rate was still surprising. While it was clear that there were more men than women in the CF, and of those not as many women as men in the CF have been deployed on peacekeeping operations, the lack of response among the women in the sample raised the question of whether the response rate was reflective of a lack of interest.

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62 The questionnaire used was based on the 21 question questionnaire employed in MA work in 1998-1999, and the updated 24-question questionnaire used after September 2000, with the addition of a demographic section.
in peacekeeping on the part of women in the CF. It might also indicate that the survey contained an unintentional bias towards occupations (such as the Infantry) or peacekeeping roles that are usually occupied by men in the CF.

Women have historically been underrepresented in the CF, although this situation has been improving and the Canadian military claims that it has sought to remedy the gender imbalance. At the time the survey was conducted, the most current information available from the Canadian Forces indicated that, as of 1998, the number of women serving in the CF had increased from a 1,500 ceiling in 1971 to about 6,800 women, which represented more than 10.8 percent of the regular force. There were 6,000 women in the reserve component of the CF, representing about 18.7 percent of the reserve strength.63 Those numbers apparently grew slowly over the following decade: as of August 2007 the Regular Force numbered 62,000, and over fifteen percent, or 7900, were women, and the Reserve force numbered 25,000, with 4800, or 19.2 percent of the force, being women.64

The language breakdown of the survey respondents closely matched that of the sample of 750. Of the 108 respondents, sixty-seven, or sixty-two percent, indicated that English was their first language, and thirty-nine respondents, or 36.1 percent, recorded

French as their first language. Two respondents, or 1.9 percent, did not list their language preference.

The breakdown of the survey respondents according to service was as follows: seventy-seven respondents, or 71.3 percent, were members of the Army; twenty-one respondents, or 19.4 percent, were members of the Air Force; six respondents, or 5.6 percent, were members of the Navy; three respondents did not identify the service they belonged to, and an additional respondent identified himself as belonging to the Army and Air Force, which make up the remaining 3.7 percent. Of the 108 respondents, seventy-nine individuals, or just over seventy-three percent, were non-commissioned members, which is not surprising in light of the fact that eighty-two percent of the sample of 750 were NCMs. Of the NCMs, thirty-seven, or 34.3 percent of the total number of respondents, identified their rank as being in the Private to Master Corporal bracket. There were forty-two respondents, or thirty-nine percent of the total number of respondents, who identified themselves as being in the Sergeant to Chief Warrant Officer bracket. There were no respondents in the Officer Cadet to Second Lieutenant bracket. Of the remaining respondents, four, or 3.7 percent, did not list their rank; six, or 5.6 percent fell into the Lieutenant to Captain bracket, and the remaining nineteen, or 17.6 percent, listed their rank as being in the Major to Colonel bracket at the time they completed the survey.

65 Any survey responses remitted in French have been translated into English to be used in this study.
The respondent demographics break down by age as follows: one respondent, or 0.9%, was in the age range 18-24; four respondents, or 3.7 percent, were aged twenty-five to twenty-nine; and nineteen respondents, or 17.6 percent, were thirty to thirty-five years old. The largest age groups were thirty-six to forty years of age, with twenty-eight respondents, or 25.9 percent, belonging to this group, and thirty-one respondents, or 28.7 percent, falling in the forty-one to forty-five age range. Thirteen respondents, or twelve percent, were aged forty-six to fifty years of age; eight respondents, or 7.4 percent, were fifty-one to fifty-five years of age. There were no respondents in the fifty-six to sixty age bracket, and only four respondents, or 3.7 percent, failed to indicate their age in their survey response.

Overall, the survey respondents were a relatively homogenous group. At least ninety-four percent of them were male, and sixty-two percent of them were English speakers. 71.3 percent were members of the Army, and seventy-three percent were NCMs. Of these NCMs, there was an almost even split in numbers between the rank brackets of Private to Master Corporal and Sergeant to Chief Warrant Officer. Regarding age, 72.2 percent of the respondents were between the age of thirty and forty-five.

The breakdown of missions represented among the survey respondents was likely reflective of the relative young age of most respondents. Their age meant that most had

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66 All demographic information was taken from the survey results. Surveys #1-108. Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations (Ottawa, Ontario: Conducted by Trista Grant-Waddell with the assistance of the Directorate of Human Resource Research and Evaluation, Department of National Defence, under the authority of the University of Western Ontario, 2005).
served on missions that took place in the 1990s. The number of missions represented increased exponentially by decade, with the most recent missions being the most numerous among the results. The lack of diversity in the missions represented in survey responses is somewhat offset for the purposes of this thesis by the missions represented in the interviews and independent surveys, and overall, a wide spectrum of missions are represented in the 138 survey and interview responses collected. The missions represented include the UN police action in Korea and three additional missions in the 1950s; the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and UNEF I in 1960s; UNFICYP, UNEF II, the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the 1970s; UNFICYP, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), Golan Heights, and UNTAG in 1980s; and UNFICYP, missions to the Former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), MFO, missions to Central and South America, and missions to Africa in 1990s. Although a wide range of missions is represented among the first-hand testimony, it remains a fact that there is an uneven distribution of testimony among these missions given that, of the 138 surveys and interviews, four discuss missions in the 1950s; six discuss missions in
the 1960s; ten discuss missions in the 1970s; thirty-three discuss missions in the 1980s; and 126 discussed missions that took place between 1990 and 2000.\textsuperscript{67}

The concentration of survey and interview information on missions from the 1990s is an unintentional result that was created by two conditions: firstly, that the sample to which the DND-sponsored survey was sent was taken from then-serving members of the Canadian Forces, so all survey recipients were under retirement age and therefore likely to have served on fairly recent missions; and secondly, given the probable age of individuals who had served on missions in the 1950s and 1960s, it was more difficult to find living people who had experience on those missions. Despite the uneven results of this research, the surveys and interviews provide a wealth of knowledge and primary evidence related to peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces that is not available anywhere else.

Harold P. Klepak argued that “[a]rmed forces are nothing if not the expressions of the particular experience of their own countries, and no two countries are alike in this regard.”\textsuperscript{68} Canada’s experience, as former British colony with no colonial aspirations, and with a democratic system of government, a good standard of living, and a decent

\textsuperscript{67} It should be noted that a large majority of interview and survey subjects had been deployed on more than one peacekeeping mission, and some had experience spanning decades, which is why the total number of survey respondents in this list totals more than 138 (in other words, if an individual had served on a mission in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, he or she would appear in this list twice). Also, individuals who served on peacekeeping missions in the 1990s were more likely than in previous decades to have been deployed to multiple peacekeeping operations, often within the span of a few years, and often on different rotations to the same mission, so the missions in the 1990s represent the largest segment of survey and interview data.

\textsuperscript{68} Klepak, “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” 111.
record on human rights, produced an armed forces that is voluntary in nature and, if the peacekeeping myth is to be believed, made up of “good guys” who want to do “good” in the world. Canada’s armed forces are apparently a magic mix of individuals who are resourceful, skilled, and competent. These characteristics, combined with the natural friendliness and compassion of Canadians, has, the mythology dictates, bred a Canadian soldier ideally suited to the many tasks of peacekeeping. The perception that Canadian soldiers make ideal peacekeepers has been challenged over time, but the idea persists, along with the altruistic motives ascribed to Canada and its peacekeepers. As Eric Wagner put it, “[t]he peacekeeping myth dominates discussions of Canada’s post-war military past, and continues to confuse debates over Canada’s military future.”

Wagner, in refuting the “historical myth” of peacekeeping, argues that “the peacekeeping myth, in claiming that Canada was motivated to keep the peace primarily by altruism and moral virtue, is false and misleading.” Humanitarian impulses in peacekeeping compete with geopolitical ones, and Wagner believes that, right from the creation of UNEF, “the true reasons behind Canadian involvement in Cold War peacekeeping stemmed, in fact, from pragmatic Cold War strategic interests. Despite the popular conception of peacekeeping cherished by the Canadian public, peacekeeping missions served to advance Canada’s national agenda in a Cold War world,” which, according to Wagner, primarily consisted of preserving and maintaining its alliances.


Despite challenges to the myth, the image of Canadian soldiers as peacekeepers par excellence has persisted in Canada, even among Canadian soldiers who have been deployed on peacekeeping operations. Evidence of this can be seen in the responses of Canadian soldiers to two “opinion” questions in the research survey: Question #22: “In your opinion, is peacekeeping a valid use of the resources and personnel of the Canadian Forces?” and Question #23: “Do Canadian soldiers make good peacekeepers?” These questions relate to the idea of peacekeeping as a “Canadian impulse,” and their purpose was to determine if and how this impulse played out for a CF member, and whether Canadian soldiers thought their national characteristics played a role in their ability to perform as peacekeepers in an international peacekeeping context.

The results of these “opinion” questions often pointed to two pervasive themes: the conjoining of peacekeeping and national identity, and the existence of the “soldiers first” mentality among CF members. The “soldiers first” ethos is based on the argument that any well-trained soldier, professional and well skilled in normal military activities and preparation for warfare, will make a good peacekeeper. A soldier, in this view, has by his very nature (and after the training and education system already in place have done their job with him) the qualities of a peacekeeping soldier as well. That is, he is well disciplined, physically fit, honest, hardworking, inured to hardship, ready for rapid change and constantly new challenges, and accustomed to hierarchy and obedience.

Being ready for the savagely demanding conditions of the modern battlefield, this soldier is thus ideally prepared for the generally less demanding operations required for modern peacekeeping.\(^71\)

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\(^71\) Klepak, “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” 115.
“Soldiers first” is the idea that Canadian soldiers must be combat-ready first and foremost and their training for war must not suffer because of peacekeeping-specific training. Further, there is no need for additional training because the Canadian military training program produced suitable peacekeepers without add-on or mission-specific training. If these ideas contain any truth, it may reside in the indoctrination of Canadian soldiers with Canadian values and priorities that mesh well with the specific demands of peacekeeping operations, but it is a fact that the perception that Canadians make naturally good peacekeepers helps to shore up the “soldiers first” idea and has historically undercut the argument for peacekeeping-specific training in the Canadian military.

The opinions of soldiers who have served on peacekeeping operations have contributed to the development of a “culture of peacekeeping” in Canada that has grown up around the idea that not only should Canadians do peacekeeping, but that, in general, Canadian soldiers have been singularly well-suited to carrying out peacekeeping duties.

To questions #22 and #23, an overwhelming number of respondents responded “yes” to both. Of the 108 DND survey respondents, ninety-six, or eighty-nine percent, responded positively to question #22 and thought peacekeeping was a valid use of the resources and personnel of the Canadian Forces, although many had further comments that qualified this opinion. Only five respondents disagreed, and a further five respondents were undecided, with two surveys containing no response to this question.

To question #23, ninety-nine respondents, or ninety-two percent, thought Canadians made good peacekeepers. Only five respondents thought Canadians did not
make good peacekeepers, three were unsure, and one respondent did not answer this question. Those who responded no to either of these questions did so for varying reasons, but often responded ‘no’ to #22 and ‘yes’ to #23, so even if they thought peacekeeping was not a valid use of the resources of the CF, they still thought Canadians made good peacekeepers.

The positive responses to question #22 about peacekeeping being a valid use of CF resources had several common threads. The answers highlighted such ideas as: “one has a good feeling when one can contribute to world peace,” and “it gives Canada more of a say on the world stage as well as keeping one’s own soldiering skills current. Too bad the big heads in Ottawa don’t treat us with more respect.” Some also noted that the CF aids those in need of help, saves lives, and helps halt genocide when it does peacekeeping. However, some of these positive responses were qualified by the argument that peacekeeping should not be the focus of the CF, and that the CF should do peacekeeping “as long as it does not become our raison d’être. It should be something we do, I don’t know, say 10-20% of the time.” This idea that peacekeeping should not

72 Survey #25, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
73 Survey #42, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
74 Survey #7, 15, 76, 93, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
75 Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
be the primary focus or task of the CF was repeated in several responses. As one respondent noted, “the military trains for and is prepared to fight a high intensity conflict,” and another highlighted the fact that the CF should not stay engaged in peacekeeping operations over a long period of time, such as in Cyprus and SFOR. Also highlighted was the fact that there should be a purpose to the operation.

Of those who thought that peacekeeping was not a valid use of the resources and personnel of the Canadian Forces, some of the reasons given for their negative response were that this evaluation had to be entirely dependent on the situation, mission and mandate; that, even though it was not a valid use of the CF’s resources the Canadian military had no choice given the state of the world; that in some cases it is “best just to let them fight it out till someone wins or they are all dead” rather than intervene; that this is essentially a political decision; and finally, that “most Canadians think of the CF

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76 Survey #2, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
77 Survey #26, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
78 SFOR was the NATO Stabilization Force in the Former Yugoslavia. Survey #24, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
79 Survey #31, 53, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
80 Survey #4, 37, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
81 Survey #91, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
82 Survey #39, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
83 Survey #90, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
as peacekeepers. We are trained to fight. …we should be deployed to fight.”

There was also concern expressed about the “under strength manning levels, aging work force, limited budget, our inability to move our equipment and personnel without the assistance of other nations or leasing of civilian transport.”

The respondents who thought that Canadians make good peacekeepers often responded enthusiastically. Many thought that Canadians made the best peacekeepers, often noting that Canadians were better prepared for peacekeeping than members of other national militaries. As one respondent noted, “we are probably the best peacekeepers, we are well trained and well respected by all nations.” This link between training and success in peacekeeping was explicit in several responses, although the type of training was not always specified. The professionalism of Canadian soldiers was repeatedly mentioned as was the respect they were given by other nations. Several respondents pointed out that Canadians made good peacekeepers because they “still maintain the basic military skills that make us good soldiers.” Challenges to good training were

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84 Survey #40, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
85 Survey #6, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
86 Survey #1, 37, 94, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
87 Survey #28, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
88 Survey #29, 32, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
89 Survey #41, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
identified as low manpower, and being asked “to do more with less.” However, Canadians’ adaptability was seen as an offset to this problem, because “a small group of Canadian soldiers can accomplish the extraordinary,” presumably as a result of their training and professionalism. And although training was often highlighted, challenges in equipment were noted, for example in the following observations: “Yes. We take a back seat to nobody with the quality of training for our troops. It is unfortunate that we don’t have the kit to complement our training”; and “yes, because we’re well trained, but our equipment leaves something to be desired.”

Neutrality, which is a key principle of classical peacekeeping operations, was mentioned by several respondents as an important facet of the Canadian character and as something that played a role in Canadian soldiers’ perceived success as peacekeepers. The frequency of this opinion implies that the respondents think that the neutrality and impartiality gained from being raised in Canadian society and trained by the Canadian military makes them particularly suitable to peacekeeping duties. Canadian soldiers are

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90 Survey #25, 52, 55, 56, 59, 68, 80, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
91 Survey #81, 85, 103, 107, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
92 Survey #87, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
93 Survey #42, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
94 Survey #93, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
“highly trained and in most situations Canadians are neutral.”95 There is a link between this neutrality and training, which rests on the notion that Canadians do not take sides in the disputes they mediate, and have been imbued with a sense of fairness in their military training. As one respondent notes, “[w]e are very neutral and easily understand people’s views without prejudice.”96 And another argues that “we make excellent peacekeepers. We are professionals who focus on accomplishing our mission, we are very well supported, we operate comfortably in English, we are tolerant and generally more at ease with differing cultures.”97 And the idea that Canada is “viewed as a peaceful, tolerant society” is regarded as an asset for peacekeepers.98 Yet, despite the fact that “Canadians are more tolerant than others,” one respondent cautions that “everyone has their breaking point. You cannot expect someone who has had no training or little training to do a good job.”99 Although characteristics derived from being Canadian may play a role, training was seen, by some, as a key way in which these characteristics were positively reinforced.

95 Survey #36, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
96 Survey #24, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
97 Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
98 Survey #39, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
99 Survey #31, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations. Survey #37 also mentions impartiality, but notes the restrictions put in place by mandates that frustrate attempts to remain impartial.
Soldiers have digested the “soldiers first” attitude as well, and expressed concern that the foundation of soldiering skills was being eroded by peacekeeping training. As one respondent noted, Canadians make good peacekeepers because “we are (or at least were) trained as soldiers first. That is being changed, and it is showing in the lower quality of troops and training that we currently have.” But there was continued faith that “because we still maintain the basic military skills that make us good soldiers; [and the] quality of training,” Canadians make good peacekeepers. A common thread running throughout many of the responses was the idea that soldiers object to soldiering being equated with peacekeeping, and that this is an idea promoted by the Canadian government and bought into by the Canadian public. The primary objection to the question about whether Canadians make good peacekeepers centred around the concern that members of the Canadian Forces were viewed by the general public as “peacekeepers first,” instead of “soldiers first.” There was clearly a concern among respondents at the time about the CF becoming a peacekeeping-only military, and an opinion that CF personnel are effective peacekeepers because of their combat training.

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100 Survey #35, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations*. The same sentiment is expressed in Survey #8.
101 Survey #41, 42, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations*.
102 Survey #1, 4, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations*.
103 General survey results, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations*. 
The pride that CF members took in their peacekeeping duty, and their roles as Canadians soldiers, was evident in several responses. As one respondent asserted,

Canadian soldiers in peacekeeping roles were

[t]he best. Attitude, professionalism, training, integrity, dedication. We adapt to our environment (not create a little piece of America in some other country), improvise to overcome obstacles instead of giving excuses, and then swear and complain the whole way along to ourselves. (complaining in this context while true, is to be taken in jest). 104

Another thorough answer claimed that

Canadian soldiers generally make excellent peacekeepers for a number of reasons:
1. Training. They are well trained soldiers. 2. Reputation. Canada’s non-colonial past and international reputation. 3. Attitude. Canadian soldiers tend to reflect Canadian values & temperament, & they tend to be more mature & better educated than soldiers from many countries. 4. Experience. Canadian soldiers have had lots of experience at this sort of thing. 105

And finally, one respondent wanted to make his point clear: “Canadian soldiers make the best peacekeepers. I’ll repeat myself. We are proud, professional and willing.” 106

The pride that many soldiers who served on peacekeeping duties possessed was sometimes tempered by frustration over the restrictions under which they were required to operate. One respondent related that

Canadian soldiers are among the best in the world because as peacekeepers we are impartial…But impartial or not we are only as good as the mandate we are given. If our orders are to observe and take notes while the people around us are murdered, if we receive orders not to feed a starving family because it might upset

104 Survey #3, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
105 Survey #4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
106 Survey #5, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
the bastards who burned their home to the ground or if your friends are being shot at and your ordered to hold your fire because we don’t want to be seen as taking sides…then you tell me…how good are we?

This NCO served in Bosnia and clearly stated that he hoped he never works for the UN again.¹⁰⁷

Of those who thought that Canadians do not make good peacekeepers, they listed reasons such as not being provided with adequate rules of engagement¹⁰⁸ and that the equipment is not always appropriate to the mission.¹⁰⁹ One respondent expressed the belief that “[t]o be a good peacekeeper, you must be respected in the countries in crisis. In countries in crisis, they respect force. Canada is not strong enough to be respected.”¹¹⁰ Another related the idea that “Canadian soldiers have become bureaucrats in uniform. The Canadian Forces are an employer and the soldiers are employees.”¹¹¹ One respondent expressed concern that “[o]ur personnel are near the end of their ropes. Many have 2 to 5 missions in 15 years of service while others have no missions in 20 years of

¹⁰⁷ Survey #37, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
¹⁰⁸ Survey #91, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
¹⁰⁹ Survey #92, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
¹¹⁰ Survey #89, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
¹¹¹ Survey #88, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
service. The quality of personnel will diminish because certain people do not want to deploy.”

When given the opportunity to make any additional comments, the respondents provided a wide variety of opinions and information related to their experiences with peacekeeping, and echoed many of the ideas running through the responses to guided questions in this survey. Some comments were exceptionally positive, such as the respondent who claimed that “peacekeeping was the highlight of my 36 year career.” And some respondents acknowledged that “[a]ny operational experience for a soldier is valuable to his effectiveness and his professional development with combat experience being the most value. Those with that experience are the trainers who ensure that mistakes are not repeated.” One respondent was extremely concerned about the perception of peacekeeping among the Canadian public. He stated that he would just like to emphasize my point about what peacekeeping is. The “Peacekeeping Myth” is rampant in Canada (my own family and civilian friends included) and is potentially dangerous. The government perpetuates this myth because it believes (perhaps correctly) that it is what Canadians want to hear. There is a big difference between what many people think happens on many of these missions and the reality. Afghanistan seems to be slowly changing this. Peacekeeping today is usually very different from the traditional UN Chapter 6 Blue Beret mission. For the most part the CF has always recognized this and thus ensured the proper training for the troops regardless of what people “think” we are getting into. If we were to fundamentally change our approach to basic

112 Survey #86, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
113 Survey #25, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
114 Survey #26, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
soldier training based on the idea of a kinder, gentler world and the predominance of “soft power” I firmly believe we would be doing our soldiers a grave injustice and be putting their lives in jeopardy needlessly.\textsuperscript{115}

Another respondent echoed similar concerns, and bristled at the term “peacekeepers.” He wished to relate a few thoughts: “1) peacekeeping is one subset of soldiering – not something different or separate; 2) we hate it when we are referred to as peacekeepers, we are soldiers; 3) the UN sucks, they should never, ever, ever, get involved in running military operations again.”\textsuperscript{116}

Overall, these survey responses agree with the interview responses to similar questions, and highlighted a number of common ideas. There were concerns among members of the military that the CF was becoming a peacekeeping-only military, or that military skills would erode as a result of peacekeeping duties. Canadian soldiers, overall, believed that they were good at peacekeeping because of two main factors: the character traits they were imbued with as a result of being Canadian, and the solid foundation of combat training with which the Canadian military had provided them.

There seems to be a general consensus of opinion among survey respondents that answer some of these questions: respondents believe that the Canadian military is well-trained; peacekeepers are and should be soldiers first; Canadian soldiers are good at peacekeeping and should continue to do it but not as its primary task; and there is

\textsuperscript{115} Survey #4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
\textsuperscript{116} Survey #8, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
something in the Canadian national character that makes Canadian soldiers particularly suitable for peacekeeping duties. The survey responses illuminated the fact that this belief was based upon perceived national character traits such as neutrality, impartiality, and peacefulness. Finally, there was a conviction among these soldiers that Canada should be an actor on the world stage, doing what it can to improve the conditions of people living in remote areas of the world. These themes will be explored further in later chapters.

In Chapter 1, the founding of the United Nations is discussed to provide context for the birth of classical UN peacekeeping and Canada’s role in international relations in the period following the Second World War. This origin story furnished key elements to Canada’s “peacekeeping mythology,” and enabled Canada to solidify its middle power status. The UN’s first peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Emergency Force, as well as earlier UN-led military observer missions, are discussed in Chapter 2. These early missions, as well as the UN’s role in the Korean War, were the UN’s first attempts at conflict resolution on an international scale, and Canada was present and willing to assist in these initial efforts. This time period was also crucial for setting out the basic elements and guidelines for a UN peacekeeping operation, and it was apparent that at this early stage there was an emphasis on financing, logistics and political arrangements, with little focus on training. Chapter 3 details the efforts in the 1960s to systematize UN peacekeeping, which had become an important activity for the UN and its contributing member states. Governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations were issuing documents and hosting conferences to grapple with emerging issues in
peacekeeping, and Canada was often at the forefront of this burst of activity. Training emerged as a critical element in the preparation of soldiers for peacekeeping, although at the national level little credence was given to preparation beyond that in the realm of combat and occupational training for military personnel. Initial discussion and arrangements for a UN Standby Force are also discussed in this chapter. The UN peacekeeping operations that took place in the 1960s, at the same time a degree of introspection about peacekeeping was occurring in Canada and elsewhere, are discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter also outlines developments in Canada’s peacekeeping commitments during the largely status quo decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter 5 starts by explaining the significance of the end of the Cold War to international peacekeeping, and the changes that were wrought in the activity as a result of a significantly changed geopolitical climate. This chapter focuses on three key missions, those to the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, as key post-Cold War missions for Canada. As with earlier chapters, an examination of these operations takes a three-pronged approach: a provision of some key details of each mission; the use of testimony of peacekeepers themselves about their experiences and training for each mission; and a dissection of government documents related to these missions. The Conclusion reiterates key points made in the body of this work: that Canadian soldiers were always trained as “soldiers first”; that Canadian soldiers were often required to be “soldiers plus” in a peacekeeping operation, employing both their traditional military training and add-on skills; that the often ad hoc nature of UN peacekeeping made it difficult to prepare for every eventuality in peacekeeping; and that, although a number of peacekeeping missions
that took place after the Cold War conformed to the mold of classical peacekeeping, the three key missions that took place in the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia were game-changers for the way in which the Canadian military prepared its soldiers for peacekeeping duties.

Canada’s contribution to international peacekeeping has been significant. A role in its birth, decades of peacekeeping experience, the dedication of human, material, and financial resources, and the cost of dozens of lives support the idea that peacekeeping was an important feature of Canadian defence and foreign policy for many decades following the Second World War. Successive Canadian governments sought, to varying degrees, to ensure that Canada remained engaged in international conflict resolution through the operations of the UN. Conversely, the impact of peacekeeping deployments on the Canadian Forces as an institution, and its members as individuals, cannot be overlooked. *Ad hoc* arrangements, speedy deployments, a high operational tempo, and missions that took place under unfamiliar Rules of Engagement were only some of the stressors encountered by CF personnel who served on peacekeeping missions between 1956 and 2000. While nothing can fully inoculate a person to every situation, the role of training in this context is an important consideration. By casting a critical eye on the history of training for peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, the myth of the Canadian peacekeeper *par excellence* can be replaced by something more realistic, and something more representative of the experiences had by men and women who fulfilled their duties on behalf of the Canadian military on peacekeeping missions throughout the world.
Chapter 1

“The League is dead, long live the United Nations.”¹

Since the late-1940s Canadian governments have contributed to UN and non-UN peacekeeping in various ways. The government’s decades-long commitment to peacekeeping, at least in principle, meant that the Canadian military spent a great deal of time either doing the job of peacekeeping or preparing for it, and as a result the training aspect of peacekeeping warrants examination. Additionally, time spent in-theatre during a peacekeeping mission was often the only operational experience a soldier gained during his or her career. To understand why successive Canadian governments would, to varying degrees, make commitments to international conflict resolution efforts that drew on precious Canadian military resources, the benefits that resulted from these commitments must be understood. One of the benefits to be reaped from involvement in the international community was the bestowing of the status of “middle power” on Canada. Throughout its evolution as a “middle power,”² Canada has understood the utility and strength of acting in concert with allies, particularly through international organizations. The history of Canada’s role in the international system and international

organizations is essential background to Canada’s role in peacekeeping, and the importance that training holds for that activity.

Many scholars date the rise of international organizations and the solidification of the notion of collective security to the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, when representatives of the victorious powers of the First World War assembled to write a peace treaty. They did so alongside representatives of national interest groups and international non-governmental organizations that advocated on behalf of public health, the condition of workers, the cause of peace, and the laws of war. Drawing on almost a century of pre-First World War peacetime cooperation between European states, the victors created the League of Nations to deal with the problems of peace, security, and economic and social questions. Clive Archer argues that the League of Nations was fashioned by the immediate and recent experience of wartime cooperation rather than idealistic notions of the equality of nations and fraternity of peoples. The devastation of the war provided compelling evidence that the affected nations had no desire to repeat such large-scale destruction, and their leaders searched for a way to avert future tragedy.

Discussion of the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security began long before the hostilities of the First World War ended. Official and unofficial drafts for the future organization were circulated in

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Great Britain, France, and the United States, and a League of Nations Society was formed in England in 1915. By 1919 countless questions faced the leaders who gathered at Versailles in 1919. US President Woodrow Wilson, that “great optimist and moralist,” believed he had the answers. The last of the Fourteen Points Wilson presented to Congress in January 1918 asserted that “[a] general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”

Wilson is considered to be the chief architect of the League, although ultimately the United States did not participate in the organization. The main support for the League came from the victims of German aggression, who wanted to ensure that peace would never again be threatened so boldly. Wilson’s objectives for the League of Nations, which were embodied in “its biblical ‘Covenant’,” included proposals for collective security, arms control, and an end to secret diplomatic arrangements.

Although the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and the Covenant of the League of Nations it contained, the League came into existence on January 10, 1920, with a headquarters in Geneva and Sir Eric Drummond acting as its

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first Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{9} Echoing Wilson, “the democratic internationalists favouring international cooperation and the power brokers of Europe”\textsuperscript{10} who came together to form the League identified several key concerns:

- the maintenance of international peace and security through the reduction of armaments and the free flow of information on such matters;
- the settlement of disputes through the conciliatory offices of the League or the use of military or economic sanctions in defence of the articles of the League Covenant should peaceful means fail;
- the promotion of international cooperation in fields including commerce, labour, public health and welfare, communications, and transportation;
- just treatment of native inhabitants of territories under the control of members of the League, and the conclusion of general agreements to these ends; and
- respect for justice and international obligations through an observance by its members of mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and political independence, and through a restriction on secret diplomacy to be achieved by the registration of treaties with the League.\textsuperscript{11}

It was, as one author states, “the ultimate purpose of the League of Nations to establish the rule of law in the community of nations.”\textsuperscript{12} The primary aim of the League was to keep the peace, but it has often been judged a failure in this regard, particularly in light of the events leading up to the Second World War. Still, whatever the shortcomings of the institution, the principles outlined above were judged sound by the international community and many were included in the Charter of the United Nations.

The League achieved some success in non-political fields, and continued to perform social and economic functions for a time after it was deemed incapable of preventing international conflict. However, the lack of wholehearted support of the major powers, and most specifically the US, seemed to doom it to irrelevancy in the field of armament regulation and political matters.\textsuperscript{13}

The League experienced limited success during the 1920s in international diplomacy. The failure of the United States to join the League proved a major stumbling block,\textsuperscript{14} and in the 1930s the League was unable to resolve the crises in Manchuria and Ethiopia. Germany’s withdrawal from the League in 1933 signaled the beginning of a series of aggressive measures on the part of Germany that the League was powerless to stop. The League is often judged an abysmal failure, and its inability to impose sanctions against Italy in 1936 signified its demise that year as a collective security organization. Yet scholars have argued that, given the period in which it operated and the climate of uncertainty, isolationism, and economic protectionism, it is hardly surprising that international institutions created to further international cooperation faced severe challenges in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} Ralph Stone’s 1970 book, \textit{The Irreconcilables. The Fight Against the League of Nations} (Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1970), recounts the fight against the Treaty of Versailles in the United States and its surprising defeat in the Senate in November 1919. Stone’s book particularly focuses on the group of sixteen senators, known as the bitter-enders, who opposed the Treaty and fought to have it defeated.

\textsuperscript{15} Archer, \textit{International Organizations}, 23.
The Council, General Assembly, and the social and economic functions of the League of Nations continued to operate until December of 1939, when the Assembly met to expel the Soviet Union. The Assembly met once more, in April 1946, to dissolve the organization formally.\textsuperscript{16} Yet even before the League’s demise, and in spite of being judged a failure, world leaders began to consider the creation of a new international organization that would avoid the mistakes of the League and be able to prevent war and foster international cooperation.

Out of the ashes of the League of Nations rose the United Nations, the post-Second World War effort at international cooperation in the name of peace and stability, and arguably the most recognized and universal international organization ever to exist. H. Hume Wrong, the Canadian First Delegate at the final Assembly of the League of Nations in April 1946, outlined the similarities and differences between the new United Nations and the defunct League:

The United Nations starts with an enormous advantage that the League never had: there is no powerful State left outside...All the countries possessing substantial power to-day are Members of the United Nations. But the question remains which, with greater justification, haunted the meeting-rooms and corridors of Geneva: Have they the will to use their power to support the principles and procedures of the Charter?

The troubles of the world are not, and never have been, at bottom a question of the nature of the existing international machinery, of the processes whereby issues are brought forward for discussion and settlement, of the Covenant or the Charter, of the rule of unanimity or the veto power. What the League of Nations could do, was and is what the States Members agree should be done. The League of itself could accomplish nothing. The United Nations of

itself can accomplish nothing. Both are instruments for collective action of their States Members.\textsuperscript{17}

The oblique reference to the absence of the United States in the League pointed to the belief that, in 1946, no organization that hoped to be truly international, and capable of preventing war, could expect to succeed without the participation of all of the world’s great powers.

Wrong’s statement also illustrates Inis Claude’s contention that international organizations are agencies designed by and for their member states, and therefore they can only accomplish what those states agree to do. “Educated expectations” are arrived at, according to Claude, by considering what international organizations are supposed to be or to do [and] should be determined not by our wishes as to what they might be or do, but by our understanding of the possibilities that appear in the situation in which they are embedded and of the probabilities that are revealed by the patterns of utilization established by states, their ultimate owners and operators.\textsuperscript{18}

The United Nations has been challenged by the lack of political will among its member states, yet has managed to survive when the League did not. In light of the failure of the League, it is relevant to examine briefly how closely the United Nations, from Charter to Council, resembles the League, and what key alterations were made to the grand design in the hope of fortifying the new organization against the weaknesses that plagued the League.

\textsuperscript{17} Veatch, \textit{Canada and the League}, 178-180.
In the case of both the League and the United Nations, they were political institutions founded by victorious powers for their own peace and security. The main objective of the founders of both organizations was to avoid another world war and furnish nations with the tools to settle disputes without recourse to war.

The League of Nations’ principles and structure were used as a model for the United Nations organization, with some changes to correct weaknesses detected in the League’s Covenant. Both organizations aimed to achieve international peace and support international law as the rule of conduct among governments. The United Nations, like the League, has an assembly, council, and secretariat headed by a Secretary-General. The Security Council, like the League Council, is primarily concerned with crisis situations, and generally gives the great powers the largest voice. In the case of the UN, the five permanent members of the Security Council are the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia, and the ten non-permanent Security Council seats rotate among the rest of the Member States. Member nations of the UN each have one vote in the General Assembly, and the Secretariat is essentially the bureaucratic arm charged with organization and arrangements for meetings.

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19 Critics of the League of Nations often identify its major shortcoming as its ability to “intervene usefully only in issues concerning medium-sized and small countries, and only to the extent that the large countries agreed among themselves to maintain the existing situation and avoid local conflicts which might deteriorate.” Some argue that another inheritance the UN received from the League was this same inability to cope with problems among the major powers, especially in the context of the Security Council. Maurice Bertrand, *The Third Generation World Organization* (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 20.

20 The Security Council initially had six non-permanent members, but in 1965 that number was expanded to ten.
The International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council were both orphans of the League that were adopted by the UN. The idea for a body to deal with social and economic affairs had been circulated before the Second World War; it was brought to life as one of the UN’s major organs, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In addition to the General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, and the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations was created with a number of specialized agencies which are independent but loosely connected to the central organization. The original specialized agencies were concerned with education, science, and culture (UNESCO), health (World Health Organization), labour (International Labour Organization), and agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization), among other issues.

The flaws of the League were made horrifically apparent by the Second World War, so the creators of the United Nations, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill among them, sought to resolve these problems to give the UN the chance the League never had. The League required unanimity in its voting procedures, which the UN abandoned. A key difference is also the UN’s focus on respect for human rights irrespective of race, sex, language, or religion, and its activism in this area. According to one author, the key difference between the League and the UN is that the UN is fundamentally a political institution and has available to it more flexible responses for settling disputes or containing a war than the League did. After some preliminary steps, recourse to war was virtually the only weapon in the League’s

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arsenal of dispute resolution techniques. The UN, on the other hand, is well equipped with a variety of alternatives, which will be discussed further below.\textsuperscript{23}

The foundations of the UN as a collective security organization were laid by the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, which foretold of the eventual “establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.”\textsuperscript{24} The United Nations Declaration, signed on 1 January 1942 by twenty-six states, reaffirmed this intention. Three years later the signatories of the Charter of the United Nations, which grew out of the work done by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and later China, at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, hoped that the weaknesses of the League of Nations in settling international disputes would be remedied by the new international organization. The Charter of the United Nations\textsuperscript{25} was signed on 26 June 1945 at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Preamble to the Charter states:

\begin{quote}
We, the Peoples of the United Nations
Determined
\begin{itemize}
\item to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
\item to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
\item to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{24} Tung, \textit{International Organization under the United Nations System}, 27.
\textsuperscript{25} In this study “United Nations” refers to the United Nations proper and its specialized agencies, unless otherwise indicated.
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And for these ends
• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these Aims.\textsuperscript{26}

These were lofty aims, but the formation of the United Nations did not create a world government. Although the community of nations has been in a continuous process of integration, especially since the First World War, the United Nations is still a phenomenon of the multi-state system.\textsuperscript{27} International cooperation needed an institutional framework that incorporated as many state actors as possible because “high-minded purposes and effective processes depend ultimately upon institutions through which states confer, debate, negotiate, reach agreement, and have that agreement implemented through administrative action.”\textsuperscript{28} The United Nations can be interpreted as an institutionalization and universalization of the tradition of diplomacy between states

by giving all states an equal forum to air grievances,\(^\text{29}\) and an attempt to improve upon
the League of Nations. Yet the question remains as to how effective the UN has been in
meeting its stated objectives, and what it realistically could be expected to achieve, given
changing political climates, the cooperation or intransigence of its members, and its
resources, to name a few limitations.

In trying to describe the UN’s creation in the wake of the League, academics have
produced differing accounts of its early years, its most influential members, whether it
has met its original objectives, and what those objectives actually were. Stephen C.
Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies, and Enemies and Their Quest for a Peaceful
World*, describes what he views as the pivotal role played by American diplomats and
politicians in the founding of the UN. His explanation of where the UN came from, and
why it should be maintained, champions the role of the US. He believes that its role,
without putting too much of a gloss on it, was the most important. For it was the
Americans who designed the body, writing the U.N. Charter within the State
Department, using as their inspiration President Woodrow Wilson’s League of
Nations, the U.S. offering to the international community in 1918.\(^\text{30}\)

\(^{29}\) The obvious exception to the “equality of states” principle is the five permanent members of the Security Council.

He lauds the “heroic” efforts of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman, as well as the “unusual intellect and honest idealism” of other Americans involved. The mini-biographies of key but lesser-known figures in the founding of the UN, the painstaking reconstruction of the San Francisco Conference, and the description of the extreme lengths to which some delegations went to gather intelligence, are woven into a narrative that sustains glowing praise of the American contribution throughout. Schlesinger argues that this is “the story of thoughtful and courageous representation by the United States, living up to and embodying its country’s ideals. Whatever the flaws of the United Nations, it measures up well with the values of that American heritage.” Given his emphasis on the role of the US, Schlesinger seems to lose focus on his stated objective of demonstrating why the UN matters.

In his concluding remarks Schlesinger asserts that, in part due to the Security Council deadlock caused by the Cold War, by 1989 the UN had become primarily a “service organization” with ninety percent of its resources dedicated to social issues as opposed to security issues. Post-Cold War, the UN acted as a countervailing force to US dominance through the power of the Security Council veto, and through it being “the only global body that could give the imprimatur of legitimacy to the use of armed force” by forcing “big powers like the United States planning military operations to seek its

approval first or otherwise risk having to act outside international law.”\textsuperscript{34} This, according to Schlesinger, slowed down decision-making and created an increased space for discussion, but he seems to struggle to identify a significant role for the UN post-Cold War as it “has no independent authority and is not a world government. It remains, in many ways, an undemocratic body.”\textsuperscript{35} In matters of international security, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, under the peace and security provisions of the Charter, “carved out a whole new range of military options not foreseen in the original document, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, cease-fires, disarmament, nuclear proliferation bans, preventive diplomacy, arms inspections, and military training.”\textsuperscript{36} Particularly after the Cold War, the UN was able to mount “military operations of all sorts on an ad hoc basis through U.N. resolutions” and moved away from its restricted definition of aggression comprising only cross-border transgressions to include civil wars, “overcoming the previously sacrosanct presumption in favor of national sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{37} The issue of respect for national sovereignty is a key theme, and is further explored by another scholar in his work on the founding of the UN that provides a neat counterpoint to Schlesinger’s analysis.

\textsuperscript{34} Schlesinger, \textit{Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations}, 285.

\textsuperscript{35} Schlesinger, \textit{Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations}, 286.


\textsuperscript{37} Schlesinger, \textit{Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations}, 286.
The contention that the founding of the UN was “an American affair” is disputed by Mark Mazower in *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Like Schlesinger, Mazower explains the UN’s contemporary situation in the international system through an examination of its past. Mazower does not, however, ascribe such pure motives or American origins to its founders, and takes issue with those who contend that the UN “rose - like Aphrodite – from the Second World War, pure and uncontaminated by any significant association with that prewar failure, the League of Nations.” His central argument is that the UN was “inaugurated by the League and linked through that to the question of empire and the visions of global order that emerged out of the British Empire in particular in its final decades.” Mazower calls the UN a “warmed-up League” and defines the main difference between the two organizations as the importance of keeping the war-time alliance of the US, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union through the UN. From this trio of allies, Mazower identifies the United Kingdom as the one with the most influence over the UN’s founding principles. As he argues,

[t]he UN’s later embrace of anticolonialism … has tended to obscure the awkward fact that like the League it was a product of empire and indeed, at least at the outset, regarded by those with colonies to keep as a more than adequate mechanism for its defence. The UN, in short, was a product of evolution not revolution, and it grew out of existing ideas and institutions, their successes and

failures as revealed by the challenge of war itself – the Second World War, the First, and further back still, the Boer War at the turn of the twentieth century. To understand how the UN started out, then, we need to begin not in Washington, and certainly not in the early 1940s, but with the debates about international order, community, and nation that were taking place at the start of the century in the heart of the world’s leading power, the British Empire.\(^4^1\)

Mazower argues that one of the underpinnings of the original UN was a great respect for nationality at the expense of collective rights, and as a result the UN became a fierce defender of national sovereignty. The consequence, according to Mazower, was that “t]reating national self-determination as a right was not only liberating it was also a doctrine that trampled over the rights of others.”\(^4^2\) More damningly, the UN “promised more about rights than the League, but did less about them.”\(^4^3\) As Schlesinger touched upon, there was a shift in the UN, precipitated by the intra-state conflicts so prevalent post-Cold War, from classifying breaches of the peace as only those that crossed international boundaries, to include those that occurred within states. This shift, as well as the introduction in the mid-1990s of the UN doctrine of “responsibility to protect,” which included the responsibility of states to protect their own populations, was critical in expanding the scope of peacekeeping and the criteria for peacekeeping-style interventions.

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\(^4^1\) Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 17-18. Samuel Moyn, in *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History*, concurs with Mazower, arguing that the UN arose as a “concert of great powers that refused to break in principle with either sovereignty or empire.” He asserts that the 1940s was not the “crucial era of breakthrough” for individual or collective human rights, and situates that breakthrough in the 1970s, in the wake of international civil rights movements. Moyn, *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 8.

\(^4^2\) Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 25.

\(^4^3\) Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 194.
Mazower, like Schlesinger, struggles with defining a legacy, thus far, for the UN. He believes the UN “has turned into a global club of nation states, devoid of any substantial strategic purpose beyond the almost forgotten one of preventing another world war. Freezing intact the power configuration of the last one, it looks – so far in vain – for a political raison d’être more suited to the needs of the present.”

He identifies peacekeeping as the way in which the UN has inserted itself into international life, and while this may not qualify as a sufficient raison d’être to justify the UN’s continued existence, it can be judged a significant factor in the UN’s continuing relevance in the international peace and security environment.

Given the UN’s multi-faceted activities and evolution over time, it can be difficult to identify markers of success and failure. Identifying the UN’s stated objectives at the time of its establishment can lead to the formulation of “educated expectations” that can be applied to the historical record of achievement. William L. Tung set out a number of “principles and purposes” of the UN in his 1969 analysis of the organization, and the main objectives are the primary goals stated in the UN Charter. The first and foremost principle and purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security. Emerging from the carnage of the Second World War, Allied nations were desperate to find a mechanism for pacific settlement of international disputes that would help avoid future wars. Members of the United Nations are required to resolve disputes by peaceful means, and to “prevent or suppress threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression,”

44 Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 27.
using force only in collective measures against a recalcitrant state.\textsuperscript{45} Although the UN is
not authorized to intervene in matters falling explicitly within the jurisdiction of a state,
the principle of non-intervention does not apply, and a grey-area is effectively created, if
international peace is endangered, and requires the application of enforcement
measures.\textsuperscript{46} Although the objective of international peace and security has been the
stated priority of the UN since its inception, the organization cannot be judged a failure
simply because armed conflict has occurred in various parts of the world since 1945. An
“educated expectation” in this case would be that the UN would intervene to prevent
conflict where it possessed the authorization and capabilities to have a real effect on the
situation. Whether this has occurred over the past fifty-odd years is debatable.

Michael Howard writes that the concept of international security “implies a
common interest in security transcending the particular interests of sovereign states. The
recognition of that common interest carries with it the aspiration to create a communal
framework to replace the need for unilateral national security measures.”\textsuperscript{47} This common
interest led to the creation of the League of Nations, and the determination, once the
League had failed, not to abandon the concept but to try again. The United Nations
therefore was founded with the idea of international security achieved through collective
action firmly in mind. In the evaluation of scholars, its results have been mixed.

\textsuperscript{46} Tung, \textit{International Organization and the United Nations}, 35.
Raimo Vayrynen asserts that “the UN is primarily a functional organization on which the Cold War and the resurgence of power politics in the postwar world have left…a strong imprint. In security issues the world organization has, with few exceptions, been an arena that has not been capable of contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes as effectively as its intellectual forefathers envisaged.”

He sees the UN as a hegemonic organization in which the permanent members of the Security Council benefit from an unequal distribution of power and resources, and lesser states view the UN as an arena for conflict manifestation. In other words, smaller states are led de facto by more powerful and influential states, and the organization serves as a venue for the subordinate states to air grievances but one in which they are powerless to resolve them. This author maps the history of the UN “from the concert run by the winners of World War II through the US hegemony towards a gradual fragmentation.”

This hardly sounds like an effective organization to maintain international peace and security, yet other scholars argue that the UN has done just that. The key difference is that the United Nations Charter, unlike the documents of the League, has “teeth.”

The practical ability of the United Nations to enforce its principles among its member states is one of the biggest challenges it has faced throughout its history. The United Nations was endowed with enforcement provisions, mainly in Chapter VI,

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“Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” but there are other means by which parties to a conflict could be brought to a peaceful resolution:

The agencies of the United Nations system exercise substantial influence and control – in short, power – over the behavior of states through the exploitation of a variety of methods: consultation and advice; inquiry, debate, and criticism of both public and private varieties; examination of reports and conduct of inspections; granting and withdrawal of subsidies and other forms of assistance; and recommendation followed by evaluation of response to this sort of pressure and possibly by insistent reiteration…International institutions provide, above all, opportunities for states, singly and collectively, to influence each other.\(^\text{50}\)

Despite these mechanisms, peaceful methods of enforcement do not always prevent or halt an armed conflict. Should these methods fail, Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” allows for the use of force in Article 42, providing that measures not involving the use of force have not been successful.\(^\text{51}\) The use of force has manifested itself mainly in the form of peacekeeping, which has come to be known as a “Chapter 6 ½” action because, although it is interventionist in nature and sanctions the use of force in specific circumstances, such as self-defence, it does not usually apply direct military pressure against the combatants. Key exceptions to this have taken place in Korea, where the US-led, UN-sponsored military intervention was termed a “police action,” and Somalia, which experienced a Chapter VII US-led enforcement action, with disastrous results.

In his article “The Warrior United Nations,” Stephen Schlesinger argues that the founders of the UN had the singular goal of ending aggression and that “the warrior

\(^{50}\) Claude, *Swords into Ploughshares*, 435.
mentality was at the core of the 1945 conclave.”\footnote{Stephen Schlesinger, “The Warrior United Nations,” \textit{American Foreign Policy Interests} 35 (2013), 204.} Despite this, and perhaps due to Cold War conditions, the UN never “acted in its warrior capacity” with the notable exceptions of Korea in 1950, the Gulf War, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Instead, the UN sought to resolve conflict through non-military means, which included “peacekeeping, policing missions, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, troubleshooting, fact-finding, weapons interdiction, drug control, disarmament, observer missions, arms inspections, and other sundry means to work toward bringing about peace.”\footnote{Schlesinger, “The Warrior United Nations,” 206.} The characterization of peacekeeping as “non-military” is particularly interesting given that the composition of most peacekeeping forces has traditionally been military in nature. Schlesinger’s assertion that these three instances of the UN adopting a “warrior” stance signified a departure from “the UN’s practice of solely patrolling borders” undercuts the complexity of peacekeeping missions, particularly those of the post-Cold War era. Many would argue, in fact, that peacekeeping has never been as simple as “solely patrolling borders” to keep the peace.

The first real test of the UN’s ability to maintain peace came in 1956, during the Suez Crisis. The British and French invasion of Egypt in response to Gamel Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal prompted the United Nations to call for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal, to which both countries eventually acquiesced. It has been argued, however, that they did so “less out of any respect for or fear of the
united strength of the United Nations than because of the effective economic muscle of the United States.”\textsuperscript{54} The Suez Crisis precipitated the creation of UN peacekeeping, which involved the insertion of an impartial third party, generally a combat-ready force made up of the combined personnel of UN member states, to separate combatants and stabilize a problem area.\textsuperscript{55} This proved to be a method of conflict resolution that would be persistently applied and sorely tested over the succeeding decades.

With the end of the Cold War and its Security Council-imposed inertia, it was hoped that increased cooperation on the Security Council would lead to capacity- and confidence-building at the UN. Yet many of the same problems that plagued the UN during the Cold War persisted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In scholar Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon’s estimation, the UN decision to intervene to preserve peace, whether through economic or military sanctions or the establishment of peacekeeping operations, must be based on objective criteria, namely “the needs of the peoples embroiled in a conflict and on the ability of the United Nations to ameliorate the situation in some significant way and in line with both its long-term and short-term objectives.” Further, “it must be recognized that the United Nations cannot respond to all situations and must

\textsuperscript{54} Michael Howard, “The Historical Development of the UN’s Role in International Security,” 67.

\textsuperscript{55} It should be noted here that there were conceptual antecedents to the United Nations intervention in Egypt, namely the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, which laid the foundation for this “first” peacekeeping mission. These observer missions are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
target its scarce resources to those situations in which they can do most good.” In other words, the United Nations needs, and has always needed, to develop a set of “educated expectations” for itself in the issue-area of international peace and security, and direct its effort and resources toward realizing these expectations. Anything more would be asking the impossible, which is what many argue has historically and is presently expected of the UN.

One criticism that has been levied against the United Nations is that, in its quest to pursue world peace, it has not allowed mechanisms like economic sanctions the time to take effect before upgrading action to include military measures. An example of this can be seen in the case of the Gulf War, which was the UN’s first post-Cold War era opportunity to implement its collective security measures. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon points out that concern has been raised over the UN’s “willingness to resort to force without assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of non-violent measures.” The UN Charter allows force as a last resort, but in this case little time was allowed to evaluate whether economic sanctions would have been effective in getting Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Riddell-Dixon asserts that, in this case, the UN was in breach of Article 42 of its own Charter. The multitude of other problems that arose from the Gulf War, including the perception that the UN’s policies were an extension of United States foreign policy, contributed significantly to a loss of credibility for the UN. It created doubt that the UN

action did anything besides extend the principle of humanitarian intervention so that it took precedence over national sovereignty, and in so doing worried many member states while exacerbating a grave humanitarian crisis.

Another major criticism of the UN itself is that the democratic principles it espouses do not apply to the organization itself. The United Nations is notoriously reluctant to reform its infrastructure, and this is nowhere more evident than in the unequal distribution of power and influence represented by the five permanent members of the Security Council and especially obvious in the marginalization of the General Assembly since the end of the Cold War. Riddell-Dixon asks whether it is “justifiable to retain vetoes and permanent seats for those states which are already among the most privileged and powerful in the world in a post-Cold War era in which the rhetorical concern, especially among the countries of the North, for democratization and justice is all-pervasive?”

This question, which alludes to the growing North-South divide among nations in the UN, could have been asked with equal sincerity during the Cold War. Security Council reform has been sought by many nations since the UN’s inception, and this desire has increased in recent years as the policies pursued by the Security Council become more and more closely identified with the foreign policies of its permanent members, and its decision-making processes are becoming less transparent. Developed countries of the North that sit on the Security Council are unlikely to give up their seats of power and allow nations of the South a larger voice in decision-making. Southern

nations make up seventy-five per cent of the world’s population but have been relegated
to voicing opinions in the General Assembly which carry little weight. The UN as an
organ for democratic international decision-making and cooperation is a failure in that it
does not provide the equal representation for all nations promised in its founding
principles.

The United Nations is not a straightforward organization to evaluate; it is a multi-
faceted monster with many arms. Its basic objectives are fairly simple: international
peace and security, international cooperation, and respect for justice, human rights, and
international obligations. Yet the means to attain these ends are many and complicated,
and the UN, either due to a lack of resources or political will, is not always up to the task
of meeting the expectations it set for itself in 1945. This poses a very difficult task for
scholars who seek to evaluate the successes and failures of the UN. In setting some
“educated expectations” for the UN in the broad areas listed above, it has been shown
that the UN has had mixed success in achieving its goals, and it does not approach every
problem in the same way, armed with the same tools. Claude argues for a dispassionate
examination of the United Nations, to get away from “Are you for the UN or against it?”
in scholarship, because an ideological dichotomy does not serve an academic purpose.
He argues that

[w]hat the United Nations needs most is not to attract a larger array of avid
supporters, but to begin to be taken for granted – to be regarded not as an
idealistic scheme on trial, but as a political institution within which everyone
expects to suffer defeats as well as to win victories and which no one can
conceive as a dispensable part of the machinery for the management of international affairs.\textsuperscript{59}

In other words, the United Nations should not be condemned for its inability to achieve success every time, but be evaluated according to reasonable standards and expectations, taking into account specific circumstances that might affect outcomes. This rational approach to international organizations is likely the approach that will produce the most fruitful results. The same criteria could be useful in evaluating the contributions of its member states, as well as successes and failures in international peacekeeping.

Canada was thrust into the international spotlight a decade after the creation of the UN with the advent of the Suez Crisis, but had been cultivating its role in international organizations since the end of the Second World War. At the close of the Second World War populations around the world were hopeful that the end of hostilities would mean a period of peace and restoration for their battered nations. To capitalize on this possibility, and to provide countries with mechanisms to handle conflict through diplomatic means rather than resorting to armed conflict, a number of international and regional organizations were created in the post-war period. Canada was an eager founding member of some of these organizations, including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And when war loomed in the Middle East a mere ten years after the end of the Second World War, challenging the short-lived possibility of peaceable international relations, Canada and other nations developed the concept of peacekeeping as a way to forestall a regional war that had the potential to ensnare larger

\textsuperscript{59} Claude, \textit{Swords Into Ploughshares}, 5.
allies. The UN and NATO, although set up for different purposes, have been the institutions through which Canada has made its most recognizable contributions to international relations and the maintenance of peace and stability in the international context.

The end of the Cold War did not erase the need for international organizations as the UN still performs key functions in political, social, cultural, and economic realms. It still attempts to fulfill the role of peacemaker at the political level, and failing that, it acts as peacekeeper on behalf of its member states.

The United Nations’ mixed record in international peace and security is mirrored by the development of its best-known undertaking, peacekeeping. An evaluation of UN peacekeeping often bestows blessings or indictments on the United Nations itself. And given that the United Nations, like the League before it, is no more or less than a sum of its Member States, and cannot act or intervene without their willingness and participation, an evaluation of the fortunes of peacekeeping reveal the political machinations behind every effort to manage conflict at an international level. Canada has played an integral role in this effort, either directly at the United Nations or by committing its military to the activity of peacekeeping, whether mounted by the United Nations or later NATO with the endorsement of the UN. Canada’s diplomatic and political participation in the birth of peacekeeping as a tool in the UN’s conflict management kit has led to the commitment of Canadian troops to dozens of peacekeeping operations since the Second World War. This activity has had a significant impact on how Canada’s soldiers are trained.
However, the focus initially was not on the impact it would have on Canada’s military, but rather how participation in the UN would allow Canada to play a significant and noteworthy role on the international stage. This was Canada’s attempt to “punch above its weight” in matters of international relations and collective security.
Chapter 2

Duty and Opportunity:

Early “peacekeeping” and the Creation of UNEF

Canadian officials at the UN, in particular Lester B. Pearson, played a key role in the creation of peacekeeping as a method of mediating international disputes and also had a role in defining its formative guiding principles. This early input and subsequent military contribution to peacekeeping operations over successive decades gave Canada a presence on the global stage that it might not have otherwise attained. Canada ascended to the status of “middle power” in part due to its role in international peacekeeping in the 1950s and 1960s.

Peacekeeping, the activity for which the UN arguably would become best known, was not addressed in the UN’s Charter, but was rather conceptualized in the mid-1950s as a response to a crisis that threatened international security. “Classical” United Nations peacekeeping was created in the 1950s to quell conflict in the Middle East and allow the time and space for a peace agreement to be negotiated between combating nations.

The Charter of the United Nations does not explicitly describe peacekeeping. Collective security concerns and obligations for member states of the UN are addressed
in Chapter VI of the Charter, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” and Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”\footnote{1} Article 33 of Chapter VI dictates that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice,” and specifies that the UN can call upon member states to avail themselves of these options. Under the remaining articles of Chapter VI, the UN has the power to investigate any situation which it deems a threat to international peace and security, and can refer such matters to the Security Council for a recommended settlement. There is a provision for the Security Council to take “action,” but the emphasis is firmly that recommendations and solutions taken by the UN be peaceful in nature.\footnote{2} Chapter VI contains no provisions of any kind for the use of force in the resolution of international disputes.

Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council to call upon the parties to a conflict to comply with its recommendations to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” It specifies that “[s]uch provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council

\footnote{1}{United Nations Organization, \textit{Charter of the United Nations}, Chapter VI and Chapter VII.}

\footnote{2}{United Nations Organization, \textit{Charter of the United Nations}, Chapter VI.}
shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.”³ Should there be a failure to comply, the Security Council can call upon member states to apply such measures against the combatants as “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Should these measures not work, only then, as stated in Article 42, may member states be called upon to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Member states are requested to “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”⁴ However, in a situation that threatened international peace and security several steps were to be taken to defuse the situation before the UN would resort to force.

The November 1950 United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 377 V, known as the “Uniting For Peace” resolution, reiterated this intention. It reaffirmed that “it remains the primary duty of all Members of the UN, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the

³ United Nations Organization, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII.
⁴ United Nations Organization, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII.
procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter.” But, mindful of existing threats to the peace, the UN affirmed that any collective action taken should be prompt. The UN was likely also considering the increasingly problematic veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which often voted or used their veto according to lines drawn by the intensifying Cold War. Therefore, Section A of the “Uniting For Peace” resolution resolved that, should a lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council prevent it from exercising its obligations in regard to maintaining peace and security, any matter before it relating to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression could be referred to the General Assembly. The General Assembly could then recommend collective measures, up to and including the use of armed force when necessary.

Section C of this resolution also “invites” each member state to survey its resources to determine the type and amount of assistance it could offer the Security Council or General Assembly in the execution of its recommendations for the restoration of international peace and security. Also key to this discussion was the recommendation that a member state “maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with

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its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly.”

Thus two notable ideas took root early in United Nations-led international dispute resolution and shaped the activity for over fifty years: first, it was assumed that military forces of UN member states would compose the bulk of a UN force used to keep the peace; and second, there was an assumption that these forces’ national training was sufficient for the task that they were given by the United Nations. Canadian diplomats at the UN and bureaucrats and military planners in Canada agreed with this assessment. These practices, which were initially unquestioned, would impact the participation of Canada in peacekeeping operations far beyond the 1950s, and play an important role in the ever-evolving definition of peacekeeping.

Although it was another six years before the arrangements outlined in the Uniting for Peace resolution were put into practice on a large scale, two modest UN military observer (UNMO) missions were created in the late 1940s: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The UN considers UNTSO, created in May 1948

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7 United Nations General Assembly, “Uniting For Peace,” in The Functioning of Ad Hoc United Nations Emergency Forces, 41-42. This recommendation was the genesis for later national Standby arrangements, which will be discussed in later chapters.

8 The International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), which was set up in 1954 following the signing of the Geneva Accords on 20-21 July to end the war between France and the Viet Minh in Indo China, was not created under the auspices of the United Nations, although Canada did contribute civilians from External Affairs and military observers to help ensure that the ceasefire was observed, among other
following the 1947 partition of Palestine to create separate Arab and Jewish states, to be its first “peacekeeping” mission. UNTSO was tasked to manage hostilities between Israel, Palestine, and, later, other Arab countries in the area. According to the UN, its job has been to act “as go-betweens for the hostile parties and as the means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts.”

UNTSO military observers have always been unarmed. Canada’s involvement began in 1954 and Canadian Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns was Chief of Staff for UNTSO from August 1954 to November 1956. The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ statistics indicate that as of 31 January 2013 UNTSO employed 153 military observers, 94 international civilian personnel, and 139 local staff, and Canada continues tasks. By 1972 the Canadian delegation to the Commission consisted of only 20 people, and in 1974 the Commission ended. Gardam, *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, 19-20.

In addition to these early observer missions, the United Nations was providing humanitarian assistance to refugees in the Middle East through one of its agencies, the United Nations and Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). Hundreds of thousands of people had been uprooted by the Palestinian conflict of 1948-1949, many of whom had registered for food rations in the nearby countries of Jordan, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. This crisis, and the draw it made on the UN humanitarian aid system, was likely a consideration in devising a novel approach to conflict resolution in the Middle East, which would eventually lead to the creation of the first large-scale UN peacekeeping mission. The UNRWA was supposed to be a temporary solution when it began operating in 1950. It provided refugees with food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, and welfare services, and later had its mandate renewed throughout the 1950 and 1960s. UNRWA’s statistics state that by 30 June 1962 1,174,760 refugees were registered with their organization, 877,888 of them having registered to receive rations in one of the four host countries. Earlier statistics are not available. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “A Brief History of UNRWA, 1950-1962,” *UNWRA Reviews: A Background Information Series*, Information Paper No. 1 (Beirut: United Nations, September 1962), 1, 5-6.


Gardam, *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, 14. Burns’ presence and experience in the area positioned him as a natural choice to lead the United Nations Emergency Force when it was created in late 1956.
to contribute to this mission. UNTSO has played a pivotal role in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East for decades, as its trained UNMOs have, at short notice, formed “the nucleus of some other peacekeeping operations worldwide. The availability of UNTSO’s military observers for almost immediate deployment after the Security Council has acted to create a new mission has been an enormous contributory factor to the early deployment and success of those operations.”

Certainly in Burns’ case his experience with UNTSO, as well as his leadership experience during the Second World War, provided him with expertise in leading a multinational effort that was easily applicable to his leadership role during the Suez Crisis.

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was created in January 1949 to observe the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 Kashmir chose to accede to India instead of Pakistan, which caused fighting to break out in the area. The original military observers who were deployed with UNMOGIP in January 1948 were tasked to assist the Military Adviser to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). They were to observe, gather information, and report on threats to or breaches of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. UNCIP was eventually terminated, and on 30 March 1951 the Security Council decided to continue UNMOGIP through Resolution 91 (1951),

which affirmed the military observers’ role in the area. UNMOGIP’s task was to continue to supervise the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir, observe and report, investigate complaints of ceasefire violations, and submit its findings to each party to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the UN. The situation was stable until 1965 when hostilities broke out along the ceasefire line, resulting in the creation of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) to stabilize the situation.\textsuperscript{14} Following a resumption of hostilities in 1971, a ceasefire came into effect on 17 December 1971. An agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir was reached in July 1972; this Line of Control was, for the most part, the same as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Line in 1949.\textsuperscript{15} Canada withdrew its observers in 1949 but continued to contribute the services of a C130 Hercules.\textsuperscript{16} As of November 2009 UNMOGIP continued to operate with the participation of forty-four military observers from eight countries, supported by local and international civilian staff.\textsuperscript{17}

The UN’s next foray into international problem-solving came at the behest of the United States. When the Japanese occupation of Korea ended at the close of the Second World War, Korea was separated into two zones at the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel. The United States

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\item \textsuperscript{14} Gardam, \textit{The Canadian Peacekeeper}, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Gardam, \textit{The Canadian Peacekeeper}, 16.
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occupied South Korean territory, leaving the area north of the 39th parallel to the Soviets. As Niall Ferguson argues, “as in Europe, the end of the war in Asia meant an improvised partition of contested territory.”

United Nations involvement in Korea began in 1947 with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), of which Canada was a member. UNTCOK was created to facilitate free and secret elections and oversee the withdrawal of American and Soviet occupation forces. Successful UN-sponsored elections were held in the South in 1948 and the Republic of Korea was created (ROK), but North Korea refused to participate in the UN process. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was created in the North under the leadership of the communist and autocratic Kim Il Sung, who became leader in 1948. By 1950 UNTCOK was warning of impending civil war, which ultimately broke out on 25 June 1950 when North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea.

Two days after war broke out, in a statement on 27 June 1950, American President Harry S Truman explained his order to send US air and naval forces under the auspices of the UN to help defend the Republic of Korea (South Korea) against North Korea’s full-scale invasion. In Security Council Resolution 82 [S/1501] of 1950, North Korea was called upon to withdraw its forces above the 38th parallel. When it failed to do so, the Security Council determined, in Resolution 83 [S/1511], that North Korea’s

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continued aggression constituted a breach of the peace, and called upon its member states to offer assistance to the Republic of Korea to “repel the armed attack and restore peace and security to the area.” 21 Truman ordered American air and sea forces to give South Korean government troops cover and support for very specific reasons. Primarily he was concerned that “Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” 22 The North Korean defiance of Security Council Resolution 82 [S/1501], coupled with the fear that a Communist occupation of the island of Formosa would threaten the Pacific area and US interests in that region, led Truman to act decisively in response to the call for assistance.

On 27 June Truman laid out the several steps he was directing American forces to take to assist South Korean forces and restore stability in the area, and expressed his hope that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law. 23

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The UN was already being touted as a vehicle for the rule of law and justice in international affairs. UN Command was established in Tokyo under American General Douglas MacArthur on 30 June, and American leadership was formalized in Security Council Resolution 84 [S/1588] of 7 July 1950, in which the Security Council recommended that all member states providing assistance to South Korea “make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America.” This resolution called upon the United States to designate a commander of these forces, authorized the force to use the UN flag in operations against North Korea, and requested that the United States report to the Security Council on actions taken under the newly created Unified Command. This Resolution was adopted by seven votes to none, with three abstentions. By the end of July the Unified Command had also been put in charge of determining the humanitarian requirements of the Korean population and coordinating relief donations among member states. Although characterized as a “police action,” the UN’s role in the Korean War bore many similarities to later peacekeeping.

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During June and July 1950 Canadian naval and air elements were dispatched to the UN mission, and on August 7 the Canadian government authorized the creation of the Canadian Army Special Force (CASF), which recruited on a volunteer basis for a brigade group to be trained as part of the regular army. Parliament was told that these soldiers could be used for any UN operation, not only Korea.\textsuperscript{28} On 25 November 1950 the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) sailed for Korea, arriving in Pusan in December. 2 PPCLI finally entered battle in mid-February 1951 under the command of the 27\textsuperscript{th} Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, in time to participate in the second general UN advance towards the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel.\textsuperscript{29} By the time Canadians entered battle, North Korean forces had been able to penetrate far into South Korea so that the remnant of South Korean forces, Americans, and a British brigade were pinned down near Pusan\textsuperscript{30}, barely holding on when UN contingents from sixteen nations began to arrive. Canada provided the third largest contingent. Led by 2PPCLI, the rest of the Canadian Light Infantry Brigade arrived in Pusan in May 1951. During the war, a total of three different Canadian brigade-sized formations served under UN command. When the war ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement,

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\item[28] Desmond Morton, \textit{A Military History of Canada, From Champlain to Kosovo} (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 234.
\item[29] Veterans Affairs Canada, “Chronology of the Canadian Advance in Korea,” \url{http://vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/KoreaWar/chronology}.
\end{footnotes}
approximately 26,000 Canadians had served in Korea, 500 of whom died as a result of the fighting or due to sickness.  

Although the action in Korea was an UN-sanctioned “police action” led by the US and not a peacekeeping mission, this was the first large-scale deployment of troops under the UN banner, and Canada was a willing participant. Canadian soldiers volunteered to be part of the CASF for many reasons. One soldier who joined the Canadian military in 1950 to be part of the CASF discovered that it would be two long years before he was actually deployed to Korea, long after the CASF had been replaced by standard units of the Canadian military. This retired Chief Warrant Officer applied in 1950 at the age of 20 to be part of the overseas contingent but had to do basic training before being deployed. He had joined out of a spirit of youth and adventure and intended to be part of the UN force from the beginning: “we joined and we had to go through our training, because we thought after our couple weeks training we’d be over there but this was not true – we had to go through the basics.” While in training he was put on “special courses” such as the junior and senior NCO courses and advanced trade-related technical courses, which he was told were important for deployment to Korea. When he was finally deployed in January 1952 as a replacement, he was a trained Artillery technician with the rank of Bombardier (the equivalent of a Lance Corporal). In the course of this training he received little information about Korea, its political situation, or the nature of

32 Anonymous Chief Warrant Officer of the Canadian Forces, retired, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, 29 July 1999), tape recording. This person served with the Canadian Contingent in Korea, January 1952 – January 1953.
the conflict. When he enlisted he did not know where Korea was or why Canadians were fighting alongside South Koreans, but there was no confusion about the fact that the UN force he wished to participate in was fighting a war overseas. He was “going over there to do whatever had to be necessary to stop what was going on. As far as we were concerned it was a war.”\textsuperscript{33}

In this soldier’s estimation the Canadian contingent was not particularly well equipped for survival, and they had to “scrounge” for items like sleeping bags from the Americans, often in exchange for Canadian whisky. He returned to Canada as a Sergeant in January 1953, and in reflecting on his experiences years later he highlighted the value of “learning on site.” Veterans from the Second World War who were fighting in Korea were invaluable, he said, as they “taught us how to survive and how to survive in a hostile environment like that. They helped us a lot.” As part of a force that was often ill-equipped for the environment, it was considered “lucky” to have these veterans present.\textsuperscript{34} This is an early, informal, example of the Canadian military’s use of veterans to conduct pre-deployment or in-theatre training and to give briefings about their experiences to benefit inexperienced soldiers.

The Korean War lasted three years, and while the fighting was still raging the commitment of soldiers to the conflict was having far-reaching, long-lasting effects on the regulations that governed the use of the armed forces in the United States. Early in

\textsuperscript{33} Anonymous Chief Warrant Officer of the Canadian Forces, retired. Interview by author.

\textsuperscript{34} Anonymous Chief Warrant Officer of the Canadian Forces, retired. Interview by author.
1951 Truman issued Executive Order 10206, “Providing for support of United Nations’ activities directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes.” In this Order Truman directed the Secretary of State,

upon request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, is authorized, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to request the Secretary of Defense to detail personnel of the armed forces to the United Nations, and to furnish facilities, services, or other assistance and to loan supplies and equipment to the United Nations in an agreed fair share of the United States.  

Although this Order had a provision excluding actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter it clearly set out a standard operating procedure for the contribution of armed forces personnel, facilities, services, supplies, and equipment to a UN force that was acting to settle international disputes peacefully. The prominent American role in the UN-authorized Korean intervention, and the US provisions for contributions to future UN forces, indicated a willing participation in international organizations that was lacking during the existence of the League of Nations. This better positioned the UN for success and set an example for other member states, including Canada.

US leadership in the Korean War highlighted what Lester B. Pearson believed to be the two greatest factors today bearing on the danger of aggression in all parts of the world…first the nature and conduct of United States policy because of its position

of power and leadership, and second the strength of United States arms…United States strength, military and economic, has been of decisive importance during the past decade in maintaining peace in Europe, and hence the world. It will be so, I believe, in the years ahead.  

Despite this belief in the importance of the US role in maintaining peace, when speaking of the UN Pearson asserted that “[s]olid unity … is as much a part of our strength as bombs.” Pearson believed that collective security could only be guaranteed through a willingness to act collectively, with force if necessary:

While our policy should, of course, be designed and carried out to make the use of force unnecessary; while tactics should be followed that are neither provocative nor rash, nevertheless, the maintenance of force in this unhappy world of today and the clear resolve to use it as a final necessity against aggression is an indisputable obligation on us all at the present time. The deterrent value of such force, as I see it, should neither be squandered by bluff not made impotent by loss of nerve in a genuine crisis.

Our purpose and our policy must be to avoid crises and to solve international problems. … It is important…that the communist bloc, which we fear and which we still have cause to fear, should not get the impression that free peoples in their passion for peace and their desire to secure it by negotiation and the resolving of differences would, under no circumstances, make use of the deterrent strength they have built up for the security and defence in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.  

While the UN needed to avail itself of all diplomatic and peaceful means at its disposal to resolve conflict, it also needed to be willing to act as a whole to stop aggression with force.

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The UN’s strength, “being collective, should be used collectively if it is to be effective.” The sturdiness of that collective strength was tested by the Suez Crisis, which required a more robust response than the situations that gave rise to the UN military observer missions of the 1940s, and had to be handled differently than the Korean War due to the involvement of two Security Council members and the possibility of a wider war. It also put Canada at the forefront of discussions about the exercise of collective security through the UN, and led to the birth of UN peacekeeping operations. The Suez Crisis was also the genesis for Canada’s reputation as peacekeeper extraordinaire, and Lester B. Pearson’s christening as the “inventor” of peacekeeping.

Although the peacekeeping response to the Suez Crisis was mainly focused on the logistics of personnel and deployment it gave rise to the first questions about the preparation and training that soldiers assigned to UN peacekeeping duty should receive and the suitability of Canadian soldiers for this “unmilitary” task. The Korean War had been a test of collective security for the Canadian government, and just a few short years after its conclusion Pearson, as Canada’s foreign minister, was given the opportunity to call nations into action to protect international peace and security through a wholly new type of military activity.

According to the United Nations’ official account of the Suez Crisis, when the UN-supervised 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel collapsed following Egypt’s July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal, and Britain and France,
along with Israel, occupied portions of Egypt, the UN “reacted with speed and firmness
and, to overcome it, conceived a new form of peacekeeping and set up its first
peacekeeping force.” The UN attributes this development, and the avoidance of large-
scale war, to the vision, resourcefulness, and determination of then-Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjöld, and Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B.
Pearson.  

Throughout 1956 members of the Canadian government issued statements and
gave speeches situating Canada in international relations and identifying its priorities and
willingness to act. The primary concern of Western leaders was the USSR, for they had
learned that “Soviet words differed from Soviet deeds, and that Soviet tactics were not
the same as Soviet policy,” and that they were likely entering a more fluid period of
relations with the Soviets, one of “smiles and scowls, of kicks and carrots” on the part of
the Soviets. As a result of this preoccupation with Cold War tensions, Pearson believed
in January 1956 that Canada should pay close attention to the foreign policy of the United
States and make Canada’s views known to the US, as it was leading the way in the “great
combined effort to maintain peace and freedom.” Pearson cited the US role in the Korean
War as having “saved collective security and probably the United Nations itself.” This
flattery was a reminder that the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, was

40 United Nations, “Background,” Middle East – UNEF I (New York: United Nations Department of
vulnerable and had to be shored up by its members, but the UN, unlike the League, had the endorsement of the US.

By the summer of 1956 Egypt and Israel had been engaged in an arms race for over a year, with the east and west supplying weapons and equipment to opposing sides. This was a symptom of a larger rift in relations between the two countries. One week after the withdrawal of American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and stated his intention to use Canal dues to pay for the project. By August, the dispute between Egypt and Israel had resulted in border skirmishes but had not broken out into war. The UN, through visits to the area by the Secretary-General, had been making efforts to lessen the tension. In a foreign policy statement to the House of Commons on 1 August 1956, Lester B. Pearson commended the efforts being made by the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine and addressed the deepening Suez Crisis. At that time UNTSO was led by Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns and had ten Canadian military observers at its disposal. Pearson argued that UNTSO was operating under the objective, patient and very effective leadership of a Canadian, General Burns, whose work, I think, deserves the highest commendation on the part of all those who are genuinely interested in establishing security and a just peace in that part of the world. Certainly there is no peace there yet, for there has been no political settlement made between the contending parties. That must come if there is to be peace, because in the long run such a political settlement

under the United Nations, rather than arms, will be the foundation of security for Israel and the Arab states.\(^{44}\)

Regarding the specific question of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, he argued that the canal was an “essential international artery of trade and communications, a waterway which was constructed by international agreement and with international cooperation and is now operated and maintained internationally,” and that the use of it for all nations, without “arbitrary or unnecessary interference,” was at stake. His preferred solution was for control of the canal to rest with those countries that had the largest stake in its operation, perhaps under the umbrella of the UN. For Pearson there could be no peace without a political settlement, and he believed this settlement should involve the UN.\(^{45}\)

Scholar Michael Fry argues that Canada did not have a Middle East policy in 1956, but that a concern over refugee and relief matters, the armistice agreements, and a willingness to play a “modest, stabilizing role in arms transfers … complemented a belief that incremental, confidence-building measures, both political and economic (the mirage of functionalism) would help bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.”\(^{46}\) That settlement would provide Canada not only the opportunity to articulate a Middle East policy, but would position Canada as a “helpful-fixer” on the world stage.

\(^{44}\) Lester B. Pearson, “Some Aspects of Foreign Policy,” *Statements and Speeches*, No. 56/18 (Ottawa, Ontario: Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada, 1 August 1956), 1-2.


By September 1956 the question of Nasser’s actions, and the end of the international operation of the Canal, had been brought before the UN by Great Britain and France. Soon after, Egypt requested that the Security Council also consider the actions of some powers, including Great Britain and France, “which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter.”\textsuperscript{47} The Security Council passed a resolution taking into account all sides to the disagreement, and set out the requirements for the settlement of the Suez situation in Resolution 118 of 1956. However, the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt in late October 1956 changed the situation dramatically. The 1949 UN-supervised General Armistice between Egypt and Israel collapsed during that month when Great Britain, France, and Israel occupied large portions of Egypt.

After Israeli forces crossed into Egypt on 29 October 1956, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Burns, called for a ceasefire and for Israel to remove its forces to its side of the border. Britain and France requested that both sides cease hostilities and withdraw forces to ten miles on each side of the Suez Canal, and that Egypt allow Anglo-French forces to be stationed temporarily on the Canal to separate the two sides and ensure the safety of shipping lines. This ultimatum was accepted by Israel but not surprisingly rejected by Egypt, and an attack on Egypt by France and the UK followed soon after on 31 October.\textsuperscript{48} The matter was put before the General Assembly under its

\textsuperscript{47} United Nations, “Background,” \textit{Middle East – UNEF I}, 1.
\textsuperscript{48} United Nations, “Background,” \textit{Middle East – UNEF I}, 2.
“Uniting For Peace” resolution, and the first emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened on 1 November 1956.

On 2 November UNGA adopted Resolution 997 (ES-I), which expressed grave concern over the disregard of the parties involved for the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1949, the penetration of Israeli forces deep into Egyptian territory, and the military operations being conducted on Egyptian territory by the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom. The resolution noted that traffic through the Suez Canal was disrupted to the detriment of many nations. It called for an immediate cease-fire by all parties and a halt to the movement of military forces and arms into the area; that all parties halt moving military goods into the area and generally “refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution”; that freedom of navigation of the Canal be restored once the cease-fire was in place; and that the Secretary-General report to the General Assembly and Security Council on compliance to these measures. The UNGA would remain in emergency session until the involved parties complied with the resolution.49

Resolution 997 (ES-I) was adopted sixty-four votes to five, with six abstentions. Canada was among the abstainers. Lester B. Pearson, as Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, explained Canada’s vote on the resolution, which the Canadian delegation

believed was insufficient to achieve the purpose of creating peace in the area; far more than a ceasefire was required. In a statement to UNGA on 2 November, Pearson argued that the resolution had one great omission: it did not set out any steps to be taken by the UN for a peace settlement, and did not link the ceasefire with a political settlement for Suez and Palestine. Once forces withdrew to the demarcation line, he asked, “then what?” Something needed to be done to resolve the underlying issues of the crisis. He stated that he therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution … authorising the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration on this matter. My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.

Pearson believed that the nations of the UN “have a duty here. We also – or, should I say, we had – an opportunity.” Because of the lack of time afforded for debate of this resolution, and to seize the opportunity to have “brought some real peace and a decent existence, or hope for such, to the people of that part of this world,” Canada had no choice but to abstain. However, Pearson did not stray from his conviction that the UN could be the instrument for peace. As he had stated in the summer of 1956, “the UN, with all its disappointments and its weaknesses as well as with all its accomplishments

51  Pearson, “Middle East,” No. 56/22, 3.
52  Pearson, “Middle East,” No. 56/22, 3-4.
and its strengths, remains the basis of our general international policy.”\textsuperscript{53} Before the emergency session of UNGA opened, Pearson had spoken to UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld about the possibility of a type of “UN police force” to resolve the crisis. In the days following Canada’s abstention from 997 (ES-I), Pearson put this plan into action.

Pearson spoke before the emergency session of UNGA on 3 November 1956, asserting that “because we have left them unsolved over the years,” the problems underlying the Suez Crisis needed to be dealt with. In addition to the immediate cease-fire and other measures called for in resolution 997 (ES-I), he suggested that

the Secretary-General be given another and supplementary – not conflicting, but supplementary – responsibility: to work out at once a plan for an international force to bring about and supervise the cease-fire visualized in the Assembly resolution which has already been passed.\textsuperscript{54}

The purpose of the international force would be to supervise the cease-fire and create a physical and diplomatic space for further political settlements to be worked out. It would create the conditions for the question “Then what?” to be answered.

The Canadian delegation submitted a draft resolution on the UN international force to the emergency session of UNGA. It read, in part:

The General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with the Resolution…of November 2, requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international

\textsuperscript{53} Pearson, “Some Aspects of Foreign Policy,” \textit{Statements and Speeches}, No. 56/18, 8.
\textsuperscript{54} Lester Pearson, “Middle East,” \textit{Statements and Speeches}, No. 56/23 (Ottawa, Ontario: Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada, 3 November 1956), 2.
United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the above resolution.55

The “Canadian proposal” was adopted by UNGA the same day it was submitted, with a vote of fifty-seven to none with nineteen abstentions, and became Resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956. The wording of the resolution that created the first UN peacekeeping force was surprisingly short, encompassing little more than the draft paragraph quoted above.56 The intention of this resolution was to allow for the creation of an international force that could provide international supervision of compliance to the ceasefire and other measures embodied in resolution 997 (ES-I). Resolution 997 (ES-I) was reaffirmed and elaborated upon in Resolution 999 (ES-I), with the immediate objective of bringing about an end to the fighting and bloodshed and creating conditions that would allow a negotiated, lasting peace. Resolution 999 (ES-I) also requested that the Secretary-General and the members of UNTSO “obtain compliance” from parties to the hostilities to the directive that they withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines.57 This provision drew Major-General Burns into an active role in the Suez Crisis, which presaged his later involvement.

55 Pearson, “Middle East,” Statements and Speeches, No. 56/23, 2.
At this point in the crisis, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent gave an address on the international situation outlining what Canada was doing to contribute to the restoration of peace. Canada’s position on the Middle East was that Israel should be allowed to live and prosper but not at the expense of its Arab neighbours, and to this end Canada was working to secure a fair settlement. Due to the Communist support of Egypt in the form of offensive weapons, Canada agreed to export twenty-four F-86 jet fighter planes to Israel.  

However, in light of Israel’s attack on Egypt while the Security Council was deliberating the matter, Canada suspended the shipment of jet interceptors to Israel. Canada’s aim was to have a settlement that guaranteed the sovereign rights of Egypt while safeguarding the right of vessels of all nations to pass through the Canal and maintain the Canal’s character as an international waterway. Canada’s leaders realized that only a permanent settlement worked out by the UN would produce long-term peace, particularly given the Cold War implications of this conflict. St-Laurent also stressed that “[t]he present crisis has strained both the Western Alliance and the bonds of the Commonwealth more than any other event since the Second World War.” Because of the serious nature of the situation, St-Laurent reiterated Pearson’s promise that Canada was ready to recommend Canadian participation in this UN force if it was established, as it was thought that Canada could play a useful role.

Resolution 998 (ES-I), while brief, created conditions that allowed the Secretary-General to begin work immediately on the mechanisms and arrangements necessary to deploy a UN international force to the Suez area as soon as possible. The Secretary-General’s first report included some basic recommendations for the force, and all of these were included in Resolution 1000 (ES-I) adopted on 5 November 1956 by fifty-seven votes to none with nineteen abstentions.\footnote{United Nations. “Background,” \textit{Middle East – UNEF I}, 3.} This resolution established a UN Command for the emergency international force, appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Burns, as Chief of Command, and authorized the Chief of Command to immediately recruit from UNTSO a limited number of officers “who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council.” He could also undertake recruitment directly from member states, and the Secretary-General was authorized to “take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.”\footnote{United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 1000 (ES-I),” \textit{Resolutions Adopted Without Reference to a Committee: Questions considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings, held on 30 October 1956} (New York: United Nations, 30 October 1956), 565 plenary meeting, 5 November 1956, \url{http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/ares1000e.pdf}, 1-2.}

Hammarskjöld’s “Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force” was provided to the UN within the forty-eight-hour time frame requested, and gave some insight into the form the UN international force would take. Although three models were considered, the General Assembly chose to develop the emergency international UN force on the basis of the
principles reflected in the constitution of the UN itself. This meant that its chief responsible officer would be appointed by the UN and was responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or the Security Council; that his relationship to the Secretary-General should be the same as that of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO; and that the force would be fully independent of the policies of any one nation. The General Assembly wanted the force to be set up on an “emergency” and temporary basis, with the length of its duration being determined by the course of events.\textsuperscript{63} Hammarskjöld made it clear from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.\textsuperscript{64}

Further, because it would be functioning under the terms of the “Uniting For Peace” resolution, the Force would be limited in its operations by the consent of the concerned parties and international law. Although the force would be para-military in nature, it would have no military objectives.\textsuperscript{65}

The provisions of Resolution 997 (ES-I) dictated that the objectives of the Force, once a cease-fire had been established, were to enter Egyptian territory with the consent

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of the Egyptian government, help maintain peace during and after the withdrawal of all non-Egyptian troops, and secure compliance with the other terms of the 2 November resolution. Further defining the nature of the UN Force, Hammarskjöld explained that it would be

more than an observers’ corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.  

Technical studies would be required to determine the size and organization of the force, and Hammarskjöld called upon Major-General Burns to present his views on these matters. Hammarskjöld thought that it would be desirable for participating countries to provide self-contained units, and that a nation providing a unit be responsible for all costs related to equipment and salaries, with any additional costs paid outside the normal budget of the UN. He hoped that once the plan was approved, offers of assistance would come from a variety of member states. He also wanted the General Assembly to vote a general authorization for the cost of the Force on the basis of the principles he suggested.

Following consideration of the Secretary-General’s report, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1001 (ES-I) on 7 November by a vote of sixty-four to none with twelve abstentions. This vote signaled approval for Hammarskjöld’s guiding principles

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for the establishment of a UN Force. This resolution, together with Resolution 998 (ES-I) and Resolution 1000 (ES-I), provided the foundation for the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. Resolution 1001 (ES-I) reaffirmed previous resolutions that pertained to the Suez Crisis and concurred with the Secretary-General’s report on the creation of an emergency force. It invited the Secretary-General to continue discussions with the governments of member states concerning participation in the Force, and requested that the Chief of Command proceed with the organization of the force. Hammarskjöld’s suggestion for the financing of the Force’s operations was provisionally adopted and an Advisory Committee with the Secretary-General as its chairman was established to deal with any aspects of planning or operations that did not fall under the purview of the Chief of Command or Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was also authorized to issue any instructions or regulations that might be essential to the functioning of the force.69

In this time period Canada sent three military planners to New York to sit on the Secretary-General’s Military Advisor’s Group, which had been created in response to the

68 This committee was composed of representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan.
crisis and the creation of UNEF.\textsuperscript{70} They assisted in working out answers to the following practical questions:

How would troops get to the Middle East? What would they eat and how would food reach them? How could they communicate with New York and their home countries? What facilities were needed for transport, for supply, for maintenance? Could the United States be asked to assist in getting UNEF under way?\textsuperscript{71}

Historians J.L. Granatstein and David Bercuson argued in a 1988 article “that the Canadians [in this group] stood out because of their experience; they were accustomed to sending troops abroad, they had unusually balanced forces, and they were scrupulous in their administration and staff work. Thus they were taken seriously.”\textsuperscript{72} Canadians were involved in the creation of UNEF not only at the diplomatic level, but at the ground level when basic arrangements and minutiae were being worked out.

On 7 November 1956 Resolution 1002 (ES-I) was adopted calling for Israel to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines and for Great Britain and France to withdraw all forces from Egyptian territory.\textsuperscript{73} The first emergency session of UNGA came to a close after the passing of Resolution 1003 (ES-I), referring the Suez Crisis for consideration during the 11\textsuperscript{th} regular session of the General Assembly, which was about

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\textsuperscript{70} The Military Staff Committee envisioned in Articles 45 to 47, Chapter VII, of the UN Charter was never created on a permanent basis. United Nations Organization, \textit{Charter of the United Nations} (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1945), Chapter VII.


\textsuperscript{72} Granatstein and Bercuson, “Peacekeeping: The Mid-East and Indo-China,” 337.

\textsuperscript{73} United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 1002 (ES-I),” \textit{Resolutions Adopted Without Reference to a Committee: Questions considered by the Security Council at its 749\textsuperscript{th} and 750\textsuperscript{th} meetings, held on 30 October 1956} (New York: United Nations, 30 October 1956), 567\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting, 7 November 1956, \url{http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/ares1001e.pdf}, 2.
Now that the procedural and authorizing arrangements had been made, it was time to get to the work of organizing and deploying the first United Nations Emergency Force.

A priority of the Secretary-General was to assemble the UN Force and land it in Egypt as rapidly as possible, but since this concept had no real precedent it was an exceedingly complex task. The Secretary-General began making arrangements with UN member states to contribute personnel to the Force, and negotiated with the Egyptian government to secure the required consent for the presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil and to work out a Status of Force agreement to set the parameters for UNEF’s work. The consent of the host nation would become a guiding principle in UN peacekeeping operations. On the ground, Major-General Burns selected a group of UNTSO military observers and began to organize the new Force. Burns’ original estimate put manpower requirements at two combat brigades, or approximately 6000 men. It was decided that any national contingents contributed to the force should be large enough to be self-contained and that the Force should have adequate support and air units at its disposal. The Secretary-General accepted contingents from ten countries, including Canada.

On 7 November 1956 Canada announced that it would provide a battalion-strength contribution with a mobile base and full facilities to operate as a self-contained

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74 United Nations, “Background,” Middle East – UNEF, 6.
75 The reopening of the Suez Canal was treated separately from the functions of UNEF. United Nations, “Background,” Middle East – UNEF, 6-7.
unit. Canada supplied units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals, medical needs, responsibility for the ordnance depot and workshop, the base post office, dental unit, movement control, and air support, and later, a fully-equipped, light armoured squadron for mobile reconnaissance. As the immediate need was for infantry, the 1st Battalion of the Queen’s Own Rifles was made ready, but ultimately could not be sent due to Egypt’s objections to its British-sounding name and British-looking uniforms. Canada sent a transport squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and administrative elements of the army instead, and when the HMCS Magnificent arrived in Egypt on 12 January 1957 the Canadian contribution of over a thousand men represented more than one-sixth of UNEF’s total size.

Burns and his military observers were the first to arrive in Cairo on 12 November 1956 and in February 1957 UNEF reached its target strength of 6000 personnel, a level it kept until the end of that year. After 1957, force size was gradually reduced due to financial constraints and because the theatre of operations remained relatively peaceful. The force was withdrawn completely in 1967, when its strength was at about 3378.

The Canadian attitude towards UNEF participation was made clear in a statement by Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent on 15 November 1956. He acknowledged that

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79 United Nations, “Background,” Middle East – UNEF, 9-10. UNEF II was established in October 1973 following the resumption of hostilities in the area, and this second Suez mission ended in July 1979.
“independent nationhood bears with it the responsibility of making our own decisions in international affairs,” and that the request for Canadians to participate in UNEF, as the fifth time that Canadians had been called on to “take to the field” in the pursuit of peace, underlined the idea that “we, as an adult nation, have not only been willing to make but, even more important, have also generally become recognized as capable of making, a valuable contribution to the cause of peace and moderation in the world community.”

Canada intended to prove that it had come of age by playing an important role in peacekeeping. St-Laurent thought that “through this method, the means have been found whereby we can all make an active and positive contribution to the cause of peace together with all our Allies in NATO and so many other members of the United Nations.”

Canada could not shirk this responsibility, nor did it want to.

As Pearson stated, “[i]t was understood that if the Canadian delegation put forward a resolution for a United Nations emergency force, we would contribute to it.”

Canada did not, however, intend to field a fighting force. As St-Laurent made clear, the “force which we have offered to contribute in the present crisis is not primarily a fighting force but a police force. As such it is not expected to operate as a military force in armed combat against the forces of some other state.” And overall St-Laurent was right, as

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80 Right Honourable Louis St-Laurent, “Recent Developments in International Affairs,” Statements and Speeches, No. 56/26 (Ottawa, Ontario: Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada, 15 November 1956), 1-3.
81 St-Laurent, “Recent Developments in International Affairs,” 4.
82 Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike, Volume II, 287.
83 St-Laurent, “Recent Developments in International Affairs,” 3.
peacekeepers with UNEF did not face large-scale fighting in the 1950s. Since the intention of UNEF was to maintain a peaceful backdrop against which a lasting peace could be negotiated, Canada entered into UNEF believing that it would be “of a temporary nature…more than an observer corps but it is in no way to be a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it will be stationed,” and that it would not influence the military or political balance of power in the area. 84 St-Laurent was clear on what the force was not, but the United Nations struggled with what the force would be.

Pearson hoped that the new peacekeeping force would be only a stop-gap until a peace accord could be signed. Pearson asserted in the fall of 1956 that

the establishment of the UN force should be linked with an effort to reach political settlements in the area. It was very necessary to keep this two stage approach in mind because it had a very direct bearing on the contribution which States might make to the UN force. Canada, for example, would be very reluctant to participate in the emergency force if we thought it would develop into a long-term commitment which did little more than maintain the unsatisfactory status quo, perhaps until another explosive situation developed in the future. For this reason it was most desirable to see that action, linking the political settlement with the emergency steps we were now contemplating, was initiated quickly. 85

Pearson’s remarks reveal his own ideas for what peacekeeping should be, and foreshadowed the insidious problem of “mission creep” that so many peacekeeping missions have faced.

84 St-Laurent, “Recent Developments in International Affairs,” 3-4.
The operation of UNEF was determined on an *ad hoc* basis. Other than the much smaller military observer missions of the 1940s, the United Nations had never undertaken an endeavour like UNEF. To manage this new undertaking the Secretary-General issued “Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force” on 20 February 1957, and these took effect on 1 March 1957. These regulations were largely intended to formalize and continue orders, instructions, and practices that were already in use by the UN and UNEF, and were developed in consultation with the Advisory Committee set up by Resolution 1001 (ES-I) of November 1956.

These regulations addressed six main areas: general provisions; international character, uniform, insignia, and privileges and immunities; authority of the commander of the UN Emergency Force; general administrative, executive, and financial arrangements; rights and duties of members of the force; and the applicability of international conventions. In addition to setting out administrative arrangements such as the provision of uniforms, pay, and the food, accommodations, and amenities required by the Force, this document defined roles and responsibilities within the command structure of UNEF. These regulations were the template for UN operations for decades to come. The Secretary-General’s regulations explained that UNEF was a subsidiary

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87 It was during UNEF I that peacekeepers began wearing the blue berets and blue helmets designed by Dag Hammarskjöld. These regulations also put into place the practice of having all UN vehicles bear a distinctive UN mark and license.
organ of the UN that consisted of UN Command and all the military personnel placed under UN Command by member states. The Secretary-General had responsibility for all administrative, executive, and financial matters affecting the Force, and for negotiating agreements with governments concerning the Force. The Force Commander had full command authority over the Force, and direct authority for the operation of the Force and arrangements for the provision of facilities, supplies, and auxiliary services as well as the establishment of UN headquarters and other operational centres as necessary. The Commander was to designate the chain of command for the Force, using officers of the UN command and commanders and other personnel supplied by national contingents. The Commander could also recruit local personnel as required.  

Members of the Force remained in their national service but were, during the period of their assignment to the Force, international personnel under the authority of the UN and subject to the instructions of the Commander through the chain of command. The Force enjoyed the privileges and immunities afforded by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which protected them and their baggage from arrest, seizure, or legal process in host nations while on UN duty. Members of the Force were to be regarded as “agents of the United Nations” for the purpose of providing them with the legal protection of the UN. Although UN personnel were afforded these privileges and immunities, they were subject to the criminal and military jurisdiction of

their respective national states “in accordance with the laws and regulations of those States.” They were also subject to arrest by the UN military police (MP) attached to the Force, although perhaps the MPs were not actually used that often.\(^90\) As a Canadian soldier wrote from Suez in 1959, “Members of UNEF are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national state to which they belong in respect of any offence they commit while in Egypt. … The Military Police cells have been used only once in three years.”\(^91\)

Apart from legal and jurisdictional considerations, a standard of good conduct was expected of UN personnel. As Hammarskjöld’s regulations stated,

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[i]t is the duty of members of the Force to respect the laws and regulations of a Host State and to refrain from any activity of a political character in a Host State or other action incompatible with the international nature of their duties. They shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner befitting their status as members of the United Nations Emergency Force.\(^92\)
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This point was further underlined when it was reiterated that “the functions of the Force are exclusively international and members of the Force shall discharge these functions and regulate their conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view.”\(^93\)

Members of UNEF were required, or at least requested, to behave as responsible international citizens when posted abroad with the UN.


Although the UN forces deployed with UNEF were provided with regulations that made provision for legal, administrative, and financial arrangements, there was no mention of training in this early document. A certain standard of conduct was expected of forces deployed with UNEF, but there was no indication given of how personnel in Egypt were meant to know about local customs or laws, or how to function in a multinational peacekeeping force. The *ad hoc* nature of UNEF, and its reliance on conventional national military forces to supply the bulk of its force, meant that no training beyond that conducted for national military service was initially given to soldiers serving in-theatre on UN operations. It was believed that, given the nature of the tasks required on the ground, military training would be sufficient to carry out the job required of UN multinational forces. For Canadian troops, this meant a reliance on their “soldiers first” training for peacekeeping duties. But what exactly did this training entail? An examination of the foundational training arrangements for the post-Second World War Canadian military could shed light on the level of preparedness, and nature of skills, possessed by Canadian soldiers deployed to early peacekeeping operations.

With the reorganization of the Canadian military after the Second World War, changes were made to the training program of the newly professional Canadian Armed Forces. The training of Regular Army troops, Reserve Army, and militia improved after 1945 because of the continuation (and presumed improvement) of pre-war summer training camps, new educational opportunities for officers of the Regular and Reserve Armies, and the re-opening of the Royal Military College, which had closed during the Second World War. The Department of National Defence introduced the Regular
Officers Training Plan, and put emphasis on officer training at all levels to provide leadership skills to personnel.\footnote{George F.G. Stanley, \textit{Canada’s Soldiers. The Military History of an Unmilitary People} (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1974), 387-391.} The staff training effort culminated in the opening of a National Defence College in January of 1949 for the advanced study of war in relation to government, politics, and economics. As historian George F.G. Stanley stated,

\begin{quote}
[t]he object of this institution was to bring together specially selected senior officers of the three services and officials of the Civil Service for the purpose of studying the multifarious aspects of defence policy, in order to facilitate better understanding both by the services and the government of the problems and role of each in war.\footnote{Stanley, 391-392.}
\end{quote}

Institutionalized academic training was implemented to better acquaint leadership elements within the military establishment with the tenets of defence policy, but for the rank and file it meant that little changed.

General military training in the immediate post-Second World War Canadian armed forces aimed at producing combat-capable, self-sufficient, and competent soldiers who were comfortable with leadership roles and decision-making, even at junior levels. The assumption was that this training was sufficient for duty with UNEF and other early peacekeeping operations, as many, although not all, of the tasks required of members of the UN Force were ones for which they were trained by the Canadian military.

Typical UNEF duties throughout its ten-year lifespan included patrolling buffer zones between combatants; investigating, reporting, and protesting violations of buffer zones and ceasefires; maintaining law and order in some areas, in cooperation with local...
authorities; guard duties for “vulnerable installations during transition periods; administrative tasks during the withdrawal of forces periods (for example, security and protection of public and private property), administrative functions with respect to public services, utilities, provisioning of local populations with food; limited powers of detention; mine-clearing; arranging for and supervising exchanges of prisoners and detainees; and generally maintaining the cease-fire.” While some of these tasks, such as patrolling, reporting, guarding, prisoner exchange, and mine-clearing, are typical military duties and it can be expected that members of the Canadian contingent would have been trained to carry them out, some fall outside of the military purview, and may have been unusual tasks for military forces to undertake. Nonetheless, Canadian soldiers were typically deployed without additional training for these tasks. In particular, the lack of cultural sensitivity training or language training was likely a handicap during the tenure of UNEF in the Middle East.

This approach to training for early missions in the Middle East persisted over time, and the belief that Canadian military training met the requirements of early peacekeeping was prevalent among Canadian soldiers deployed to these operations. Retired Major George Mitchell recalled that other than one briefing at UN headquarters in New York he received no special training for his deployment as a Military Observer with UNTSO in October 1957. He mainly relied on the experience he had gained during six years of service during the Second World War. Mitchell served as a Military

Observer with UNTSO until June 1958, when he became an Operations Officer with the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)\textsuperscript{97} until September 1958. He then returned to UNTSO to serve as an Operations Officer until January 1959. Mitchell pointed out that his job was to observe and report, and that although the military observers rarely carried their pistols while carrying out their duties, he felt no conflict in regard to his role as a peacekeeper and believed that his training as a soldier was an asset to peacekeeping. He did not, however, feel fully prepared for the living conditions in-theatre. Mitchell did feel prepared to fulfill his duties and did not experience a period of re-adjustment on his return to Canada.\textsuperscript{98}

The experience of a Canadian soldier in UNEF was much the same. Retired Master Warrant Officer Tom Deloughery served as a driver and mechanic in UNEF from January 1959 to February 1960. Deloughery did not receive any specialized training prior to joining the peacekeeping mission other than some weapons refresher training, but, as he pointed out, his cohort contained personnel who had served with UNEF in 1956 and were able to explain the situation that existed in-theatre, and how to deal with the climate.\textsuperscript{99} Deloughery felt that the rules of engagement were appropriate for his role as an observer. He described these rules as: “you couldn’t use a weapon unless fired

\begin{itemize}
\item[97] UNOGIL operated from June to December 1958.
\item[98] Major George Mitchell, retired, completed survey returned to author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 2 July 2003).
\item[99] This type of informal, incidental instruction was common to the Canadian peacekeeping experience. It would be formalized in the 1990s when it was incorporated in new types of peacekeeping training, as will be discussed in a later chapter.
\end{itemize}
upon; if anybody in the area was threatened you were allowed to use force. It was a UN policy, not a Canadian policy.” 100 The only time he observed force being used was when UNEF soldiers were preventing people “such as the Bedouins” from crossing the border into Israel. He also knew of one skirmish involving an ambush of UNEF troops by Egyptian soldiers, but he was not personally involved. Despite the restrictions on the use of force, Deloughery believed that a military presence was necessary to quell the Suez Crisis because “we stopped a lot of maybe trouble or little brush fires that could have happened…besides, we did a lot of really, really good humanitarian things.” 101 These humanitarian tasks often focused around the medical care of those injured by landmines, as there were “mines all over the place, and the Bedouins, locals, desert people, especially the children, they had a habit of playing with mines, or getting in the minefields, and they’d come to us … you could see them coming for miles, they’d come in and we’d carry the medic with us on every patrol and we did a lot of good, we saved a lot of lives actually.” 102

From Deloughery’s description of his day-to-day activities, it is clear that his military training was likely sufficient for the types of tasks that were required in early peacekeeping missions. It was hard, manual work, which involved patrolling long stretches of desert, driving between two outposts, and spending a week or ten days at

100 Master Warrant Officer Tom Deloughery, retired, interview by author (Petawawa, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 23 June 2003), tape recording.
101 Deloughery, interview by author.
102 Deloughery, interview with author.
each site. Everything had to be done by hand, including maintenance and cleanup, with only five days at base camp between patrols. The rough living involved in early peacekeeping, which included being outfitted with Second World War-era Bren guns, eating hard rations, dealing with ancient vehicles that constantly broke down, and the lack of sleeping bags, meant that peacekeepers needed to rely on their military training to survive. They also, where basic necessities were concerned, sometimes had to be self-sufficient. According to Deloughery, most Canadians bought their own sleeping bags with them because the nights got cold and the Canadian military only supplied blankets and a poncho. Deloughery was convinced that civilians could not have been sent to do this job because “we weren’t observers, we were peacekeepers and we had to respond,” and that the peacekeepers in UNEF made a difference in the larger conflict and to the local population. Yet many years later he regarded his peacekeeping experience as “a waste of a year of my life” in that “it was gone and we just lived in the desert, it was hard, it was really hard, just it being so long being away from Canada.”

Upon his return to Canada, Deloughery was provided with ninety days of leave and no other support to re-integrate into Canadian society. Although he recalled that “nobody [in his rotation] had any trouble” coping with the emotional impact of peacekeeping duty, he also alluded to the fact that he struggled with the death of one colleague and the serious wounding of another by a landmine while in the Suez Canal.

103 Deloughery, interview with author.
The lack of support for repatriated peacekeeping veterans highlighted the status of peacekeeping as a new activity that was being treated as no different from war-fighting. No additional training, equipment, or support was provided to those deployed with peacekeeping forces in the 1950s.

In recalling their peacekeeping experiences, Mitchell and Deloughery agreed that Canadians made good peacekeepers because, they asserted, Canadians do not pre-judge people and Canadians are compassionate. If there is a mythology of Canadian peacekeeping, this is the heart of it. It is a mythology that seemingly has been internalized by many Canadian peacekeepers, as well as civilians, over the duration of Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping. Mitchell and Deloughery believed that their military training served them well, and that any shortfall in training was made up for by their characters as Canadians.

Canadians wanted to believe that peacekeeping was a particularly Canadian endeavour, invented by Lester B. Pearson, initially carried out by General Burns, and adopted by Canadians as their internationalist activity of choice. As Norman Hillmer wrote, Pearson’s 1957 Nobel Peace Prize became a national talisman, contributing to a peacekeeping momentum which no politician could or wanted to ignore. Peacekeeping was impossible to resist, fitting the government’s internationalist objectives and appealing to a public anxious to believe that Canada could be the

104 Deloughery, interview with author.
world’s conscience, untainted by power politics and considerations of narrow self-interests.\textsuperscript{105}

Canadian participation in peacekeeping seemed inevitable, and accumulated experience over decades made Canadians peacekeepers \textit{par excellence}, at least in their own estimation. But Canadian soldiers were not always naturals in the role, any more than a soldier of any other nation was, and Canadian soldiers faced the same challenges of adapting his or her training and experience to fit the rigours of the ill-defined task of peacekeeping. The first stirrings of interest in peacekeeping did not come about because it was thought that Canadian soldiers would be particularly good at it, but rather because it suited the aspirations of the Canadian politicians and bureaucrats who mapped out Canada’s place in the international community that re-constituted itself in the post-Second World War era.

Yet, as historian Michael K. Carroll argued, this pragmatic reality does not detract from the fact that “the myth bolstered by politics is not based entirely on a lie.”\textsuperscript{106} He asserts that

\textsuperscript{105} Norman Hillmer, “Peacekeeping: The Inevitability of Canada’s Role,” in Michael A. Hennessy and B.J.C. McKercher, eds., \textit{War in the Twentieth Century: Reflections at Century’s End} (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2003), 145. Hillmer also argues that post-Cold War developments in thinking on peacekeeping and recommendations for change were largely in line with Pearson’s original conception of peacekeeping, and that the creation of UNEF I involved the compromise of many key principles that Pearson thought were essential to successful United Nations peacekeeping. This argument is also put forward in an earlier work, “Mike Was Right: The Pearson Impulse in Canadian Peacekeeping,” Public Fora on “Peacekeeping and the Canadian Future: A Canadian Commitment,” (Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, and Victoria: The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Training Centre, September-October 2000). Hillmer argues that Pearson was only able to bring about the creation of UNEF I by compromising “firmly-held convictions” including a tough mandate for UNEF and a direct link between peacekeeping and negotiations for a political settlement. Hillmer, “Mike was Right,” 3.

\textsuperscript{106} Carroll, \textit{Pearson’s Peacekeepers}, 182.
Canada’s role in the creation and execution of UNEF was essential. Only a handful of nations were capable of providing troops with the professionalism and technical expertise to manage the mission on the ground. Fewer still were willing to take the necessary leap of faith with the UN. Pearson had that faith in the UN, and he dragged the rest of the country along with him. As a result of UNEF’s initial success, and Pearson’s Nobel Prize, Canadians came to view peacekeeping as their national role.\footnote{Carroll, \textit{Pearson’s Peacekeepers}, 182.}

In Carroll’s view, the competence, even in the absence of specialized training, of Canadian soldiers in the peacekeeping role dovetailed nicely with Pearson’s conviction that international cooperation, with peacekeeping as its by-product, was the proper path for Canada to pursue.

After the Second World War Canadian defence and foreign policy turned from preparation to wage war to an orientation in the direction of international cooperation as a guarantee of collective security through organizations like the UN, NATO, and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The emphasis clearly shifted from war to international cooperation as a guarantee of security. The first principles of peacekeeping were based on this idea of cooperation, but the provision that UNEF could only enter and operate from Egyptian territory with Egypt’s consent had serious consequences. UNEF was unceremoniously forced to withdraw at President Nasser’s bidding in the spring of 1967, and all troops were gone from Egyptian soil by mid-June of that year. Despite the fact that UNEF would be re-created with UNEF II in the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, ejection from Egyptian soil in June 1967 cast doubt on
UNEF as a successful peacekeeping endeavour, and raised the question of what constitutes a “success” in peacekeeping terms.

Flight Lieutenant Michael Belcher, who was present when the “RCAF at 115 ATU El Arish and the Canadian Army at Raffa were given 48 hours to leave Egypt by Col. Nasser,” recalls the chaos and uncertainty that led up to the evacuation of peacekeeping forces and the start of the Six Day War. As Belcher busied himself with the destruction of files, papers, code and cipher books, and classified documents, Egyptians were pouring into the areas formerly occupied by peacekeeping forces, “Picking the bones of our once spotless little camp clean,” as he recalled. “The word was out! The Canadians are leaving – fast!”

Looting and fighting broke out in the areas that the Canadian contingent had called home for ten years, leaving an ignominious legacy in their wake.

UNEF had exposed some of peacekeeping’s most fatal flaws, including the accuracy of Pearson’s requirement that peacekeeping be complemented by effective peacemaking, and pointed the way to improvements. As one UN assessment puts it, UNEF is a telling example of the importance of United Nations peacekeeping forces and their limitations. Its establishment in October 1956 put an end to a destructive war, and, for more than 10 years, it effectively maintained peace in one of the most sensitive areas of the middle east [sic]. But in the absence of a complementary peacemaking effort, the root cause of the conflict between Egypt and Israel remained unresolved.

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Hillmer has argued that “the glow of the Nobel Peace Prize Pearson won for his Suez initiative has tended to obscure his ideas about the way peacekeeping must operate if it was to be successful.”\textsuperscript{110} Compromises were made in the creation of UNEF in order to ensure that the force existed at all. Where peacekeeping was concerned, the 1950s were spent trying to “improvise in haste,”\textsuperscript{111} as Lester Pearson wrote. In the final chapter of his memoirs, he concludes that

\begin{quote}
[n]othing, I suppose, could better demonstrate than the Suez crisis the extent to which the United Nations had remained a central factor in our foreign policy. Our problem was, and is, one of long standing, how to bring about a creative peace and a security which will have a strong foundation. It remained my conviction that there could never be more than a second-best substitute for the UN in preserving the peace. Organizations such as NATO were necessary and desirable only because the UN was not effective as a security agency. UNEF was a step in the right direction in putting international force behind international decision.
The birth of that force had been sudden and had been surgical. The arrangements for the reception of the infant were rudimentary, and the midwives had no precedents or genuine experience to guide them.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The United Nations was firmly embedded as a feature of Canadian foreign policy by the close of the 1950s, and peacekeeping was designated as the vehicle through which Canada could have a say in UN matters. The termination of the first major UN peacekeeping operation and the creation of Canada’s longest mission, UNFICYP, in the 1960s meant that the next decade would be a decade of examination for international peacekeeping. This occurred at both an operational and strategic level among Canadian

\textsuperscript{110} Norman Hillmer, “Mike Was Right: The Pearson Impulse in Canadian Peacekeeping,” Public Fora on “Peacekeeping and the Canadian Future: A Canadian Commitment,” 2.
\textsuperscript{112} Munro and Inglis, eds., \textit{Mike, Volume II}, 310-311.
and international officials, and the role of preparation and training would come to the forefront.
Chapter 3

Honest Brokers and Helpful Fixers

From 1957 to the end of the 1960s, significant peacekeeping experience was accumulated, and troop-contributing nations like Canada began to think critically about how to improve and standardize their contributions to UN peacekeeping. This exercise resulted in a series of reports and conferences that took place throughout the 1960s with the aim of examining the strengths and weaknesses of peacekeeping, developing standard operating procedures and integrated practices to guide national governments, and improving coordination in peacekeeping ventures on an international level.

Shortly on the heels of peacekeeping’s first use, the Canadian government sought a way to stop going “from crisis to crisis improvising in haste.” The “haste” is arguably a critical component of peacekeeping because peacekeeping forces, to be their most effective, are often required to be on the scene of a crisis on short notice, but it was thought that the improvisational nature of these operations could be minimized through effective planning. By the end of the 1960s, according to DND information, Canada had participated in almost a dozen UN operations, if observer missions and the “police

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action” in Korea are counted. This level of activity demonstrates Canada’s early commitment to UN efforts in the name of international stability, and the studies and conferences that took place in the 1960s show that Canadians were interested in improving the country’s capability and that of the UN to mount peacekeeping operations in an effective, cost-efficient manner. Although Canada pursued solutions to peacekeeping problems throughout its first decade of practice, the focus tended to be put on purely military problems such as transportation, communications, equipment, and logistics, particularly in the area of training. A primary emphasis was placed on pre-deployment standby arrangements, with little attention given to in-theatre concerns beyond the military and administrative. Canada attempted to improve the chance of success in peacekeeping operations by focusing on its capabilities to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions while urging other nations and the UN itself to improve their planning and organization.

The first ten years of peacekeeping was the time period during which peacekeeping was initially popularized as a means of international conflict management. For Canada, it had a special place in defence and external affairs because peacekeeping’s glow emanated from Lester B. Pearson. Norman Hillmer argues that, following Pearson’s role in the Suez Crisis and the Nobel Prize that resulted from it, Canada forged an indelible attachment to peacekeeping that solidified over years of “practice in the

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art.” ³ John English, in his biography of Pearson, argued that the UN peace force proposed by Pearson in response to the Suez Crisis was the result of “a vision of a system of international rules and organizations that would restrain the bandits and bullies of the world more effectively than British gunboats ever had.” ⁴ Canadians placed themselves prominently in this new international system, and cultivated their reputation as peacekeepers.

Canada seized upon peacekeeping as its emblematic international activity. In a 1974 article, Jack Granatstein argued that peacekeeping was the perfect middle-sized responsibility for a middle power like Canada in the 1950s and 1960s, and that this responsibility suited the desire of Canadians to distinguish themselves in the post-Second World War world. In this “golden age” of peacekeeping, “Canadians were middlemen, honest brokers, helpful fixers in a world where these qualities were rare. Peacekeeping made us different and somehow better.” ⁵ Writing in 1989, then-Chief of Defence Staff General Paul D. Manson elaborated on Canada’s suitability to its peacekeeping role, and he could have easily been writing about Canada in the 1960s. He argued that Canada’s “outstanding reputation” in international peacekeeping was a function of many factors. Manson thought that Canada was well-suited to the role, as it was a middle power “striving to bring about effective multilateral cooperation,” and an industrialized,

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³ Hillmer, “Peacekeeping: The Inevitability of Canada’s Role,” 150.
Western nation with a high standard of living and modern self-sustaining forces that could field specialists in communications, logistics, and aviation on short notice. He also noted that Canada was perceived as being sympathetic to the situation of the developing world as a result of having no reputation for intervention abroad. These factors were appealing to United Nations planners very early in peacekeeping’s history, and Canadian officials realized that peacekeeping was an area where Canada could make a recognizable contribution on the international stage.

No matter how brightly the enthusiasm for peacekeeping burned in the immediate post-war period, it began to dim with the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force from Egypt in 1967, and, as Granatstein asserted, continued to fade as the decades wore on. As a result of the perceived failure of the United Nations to follow-up peacekeeping with peacemaking, Granatstein argued, Canadians realized that “peacekeeping was just a dirty and thankless job,” and one that strained precious military resources.

Granatstein was not alone in his characterization of the 1960s as the heyday of UN peacekeeping, followed by a period of decline. Dennis C. Jett, in Why Peacekeeping Fails, categorizes the years 1957-1967 as the assertive period, and 1967 to 1973 as the dormant period of peacekeeping. According to Jett, UN peacekeeping has gone through

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6 Manson, “Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” 8.
7 Manson, “Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” 8.
a number of ebbs and flows since. The “golden era” was not without its problems, and a pall was cast over Canada’s peacekeeping activities by the criticism facing the UN over the controversial mission in the Congo, the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt, the high cost of peacekeeping, and domestic concerns such as growing Quebec nationalism which demanded that the attention of the Canadian government be focused at home. These domestic and international concerns were part of the reason for the early evaluation of Canada’s peacekeeping activities, and cast doubt on the characterization of the 1960s as the “golden era” of Canadian peacekeeping.

By the close of the 1960s, more than a full decade of peacekeeping experience provided ample cases to study, and peacekeeping’s reputation did not prevent a thorough examination of these experiences from taking place. In the 1960s there were a series of reports and conferences initiated by academics, the military and foreign establishments, and private citizens that aimed to analyze Canada’s peacekeeping commitments, glean “lessons learned” from its experiences to date, and determine how to better organize Canada’s involvement in what is, by its very nature, an ad hoc activity. These studies and discussions were aimed at devising ways to improve the United Nations’ capacity to mount peacekeeping operations through changes in the way the Canadian Forces responded to requests from the UN for peacekeepers. This was mainly done through revised training standards, the creation of a UN Standby Battalion, and by urging the

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United Nations to improve its organizational capacity to streamline peacekeeping operations in the name of efficiency.

Dating from the creation of UNEF, basic principles govern classical peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are required to behave in an impartial and non-threatening manner, and should not rely on the threat of force but on the cooperation of the parties. The peacekeeping force is present only at the invitation of the host country, and should remember that it is a guest on someone else’s soil.\textsuperscript{11} Beyond these basic principles, few things are certain in every peacekeeping operation. The geographic location, type of conflict, size and composition of the force, and its mandate are only a few of the features that change from mission to mission. The large number of variables in each mission is the stuff of nightmares for national military planners. To counteract the \textit{ad hoc} nature of peacekeeping, “Canada has focused attention on three aspects of the potential UN contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes – national preparations for peacekeeping, improvement of such international arrangements as existed, and the link between peacekeeping and peaceful settlement.”\textsuperscript{12} Two of these factors, national preparations and the improvement of international arrangements, were very much on the minds of Canadian planners in the 1960s.

The impetus for the Canadian reports and conferences on peacekeeping in the 1960s came from a variety of sources, both internal and external. In some cases, Canada was responding to a request from another troop-contributing country or an international organization to share its expertise, and in other cases it was a Canadian government department or university that pushed the study. In all cases, the root cause was the desire to study Canada’s peacekeeping contribution with an eye to improving its participation. It was thought that this could be done by making it a cost-efficient and effective international practice, and by ensuring that the troops Canada was providing were qualified for the task at hand, whatever that would prove to be in-theatre.

Non-governmental organizations concerned with military affairs were studying training, and the product of one such study was the 1963 World Veterans Federation Report *The Functioning of Ad Hoc United Nations Emergency Forces*. This report sought answers to basic questions about technical and operational aspects of UN peacekeeping activities, and was notable for the input of Canadian General E.L.M. Burns, the former commander of UNEF. The report, which was prepared by a group of military experts who met in Paris in May 1961, sought to address issues of planning, organization, and information-sharing, which were becoming obstacles to effective peacekeeping. The report posed questions such as: “how well technically prepared are [United Nations

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13 It should be noted that other countries and organizations were examining peacekeeping from a critical perspective in the 1960s. The United Nations published *The United Nations and the Congo. Some Salient Facts* (New York: United Nations, February 1963) in an attempt to answer some basic questions about the operation and clear up confusion regarding the intent and objectives of the peacekeepers, and to respond to the criticism produced by anti-UN factions in the Congo and perennial detractors of UN activities.
emergency forces] to perform the role for which they are formed? What does their past experience tell us? What are the views of their Commanders?" The military experts were mainly concerned with finding answers to technical problems, although they recognized that doctrinal questions regarding the purpose and intent of peacekeeping forces carry significant weight in a crisis situation. The importance of reaching a political settlement was also acknowledged, but the report focused on problems to which the military advisors could provide answers.

The military experts were asked to comment on questions about the planning arrangements, structure, recruiting, training, and administration of United Nations emergency forces. The report fails to summarize the replies to these questions, so it is difficult to draw overall conclusions based on the individual responses. For the purpose of this study, the comments of General Burns will be examined as he is the sole Canadian voice in this report.

General Burns’ response to the question “What types of troops are best suited for UN emergency forces?” illustrates the common and persistent belief in Canadian military circles that the best trained peacekeepers were multi-purpose soldiers. He supported

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15 The “military experts” surveyed for this report were “senior military personalities” from a variety of countries who had either held senior positions in their national militaries or occupied high-level operational or advisory posts in UN operations.
16 My own work on peacekeeping training details the insistence of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence that the best trained peacekeeper is a well-trained, multi-purpose soldier.
the notion that “well-trained, well-disciplined infantry will be the basic element of the
force,” and he put special emphasis on the need for the force to have sufficient
transportation and communications capabilities. He was not alone in this view, for, as
Major-General Carl C. van Horn, a former Commander of the UN operation in the
Congo, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), and Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East (UNTSO) said, “a force that
is blind is shackled.” General Burns also thought that a force that could not use force,
or project force, except in self-defence, was fundamentally fettered. Burns advocated
giving UN forces “teeth” by allowing them to be constituted so as to have superior force
in all situations. He stated that

if the UN is sending a force to keep the peace, it should be armed and equipped,
and be sufficiently strong to do so, in spite of the opposition likely to be met. It is
of no use to send a military force unless it is allowed to use its weapons, for
specific and strictly defined purposes, of course … As police forces must be
armed and organized so as to be capable of suppressing those who would commit
criminal acts, a UN police force must be capable of deploying superior force,
sufficient to control those who would disturb the peace, with a minimum of actual
use of force.  

with up-to-date combat skills. This view was predominant until peacekeeping disasters in the early 1990s
led to the recognition of the need for additional skill sets in peacekeeping. (“Combat and Contact
Readiness: The Evolution of Peacekeeping Training in the Canadian Forces, 1956 – 1999,” was produced
to fulfill the requirements of the MA program in History at the University of Ottawa (1999), and was
partially reproduced in Canadian Military History Since the 17th Century. Proceedings of the Canadian
Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000, Yves Tremblay, ed. (Ottawa: National Defence, 2001)
as “The History of Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, 1956 – 1998.”

The issue of the use of force and its impact on a peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness is one that has been debated, without resolution, throughout peacekeeping’s history. It is generally recognized that to lift restrictions on peacekeepers’ use of force would limit the willingness of host countries to accept UN peacekeeping missions as a means of conflict management.

The principle of use of force only in self-defence has always been contentious, but one aspect that most of the military experts polled agreed upon was the need for standardization in peacekeeping operations. This need for standardization was most keenly felt in the logistical arrangements involved in moving the force from its home base to the theatre of operations, but was also necessary for such things as equipment, ammunition, vehicles, administration, personnel selection, and training. Standardization would be of great benefit to advance planning, but the military experts of the World Veterans Federation report believed this was sorely lacking. The concerns about peacekeeping that were circulating in international forums like the United Nations and the World Veterans Federation were especially relevant for Canada, which had already established itself as a significant player in international peacekeeping. However, the World Veterans Federation report proved to be a portent of future studies that focused on the military problems of peacekeeping, at the expense of the activity as an organic whole.

In April 1964, the Central Command of the Canadian Army issued Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group, a

document designed to provide Canadian military contingents with instructions for any aspect of deployment to operations in a UN force. This 6 part document covers 110 topics and includes several appendices and annexes, and is a useful example of the type of directives being distributed to units of the Canadian Army. Central Command’s intent was to provide guidance to maintain the designated UN Standby Battalion (at that time 1 Canadian Guards and a Supporting Increment), in recognition of the fact that the “employment of Canadian troops as part of a United Nations Military Force demands a constant state of readiness by the units designated.”

*Operation Instruction 64/1* set out instructions for the General Staff Branch, the Adjutant General Branch, and the Quartermaster General, detailing their responsibilities in the three phases of readiness: the Standby Phase, the Warning Phase, and the Movement Phase. The Standby Phase was the period of time from the point of notification that a battalion was the designated UN Standby Battalion to the time that the Battalion Group was officially warned for duty with the Canadian Army Standby Contingent under the UN. The Warning Phase was from the date the official warning was received until the movement of the Main Body of the contingent began. The Movement Phase was the period during which movement of the Main Body to the theatre of operations took place.

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22 Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*. General Staff Branch Instructions, Part 1.1.
The aim of this document was to lay down the arrangements to maintain 1 Canadian Guards (1 CDN GDS) Battalion Group in a high state of readiness during the Standby period; to describe the procedures for the final preparations of the Battalion Group after it has been warned for duty; and to outline the basic air movement plan for the despatch of the Battalion Group to the theatre of operation.\(^23\) The document operated on the assumption that duty as part of a UN Military Force required a constant state of readiness, and that this readiness could only be maintained through “continual appraisal of the time factor involved, periodic checks and rehearsals, and the proper attitude towards such a requirement.”\(^24\) It was also assumed that the role of a battalion group would be to perform “police type duties”; that the likely remoteness of the theatre of operations would make air transportability a necessity for the Canadian Contingent; that it was necessary that an Advance Party precede the Main Body to the theatre of operations by approximately seven days; and finally that, after an initial period of seven days, the United Nations would assume responsibility for re-supply of rations, replacement of equipment, and the provision of spare parts.\(^25\) Although coordination with the United Nations was required in regard to the last point, the Central Command instruction was aimed specifically at putting Canada’s house in order. It was acknowledged that, from the time the Warning Phase began to the actual operation itself,

\(^{23}\) Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*, Introduction, 1.

\(^{24}\) Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*, Remarks by Major-General G. Kitching, General Officer Commanding, Introduction, 2.

\(^{25}\) Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*, General Staff Branch Instructions, Part 1, 1-2.
there would be eventualities in peacekeeping that could not be predicted and no amount of logistical planning could ameliorate.

One way to combat the unpredictable nature of peacekeeping was to build-in pre-deployment briefings and training that addressed mission-specific issues. Although this type of preparation was not often implemented with any type of regularity, it was explicitly stated in the *Operation Instruction 64/1* that,

in addition to operation orders or instructions, and the necessary intelligence material required for the operation, other briefings by any advisor from the Department of External Affairs may be given to all ranks. Such a briefing may include:

a. Local Customs, climate, terrain and health hazards,
b. Up to date political intelligence,
c. Relevant economic factors such as currency in use, rate of exchange, etc.,
d. Welfare and recreational facilities,
e. Other known points of interest.\(^{(26)}\)

A noteworthy word in this section is “may.” It appears that mission-specific training was not carried out in a uniform fashion, but only if the commanding officers thought it was necessary or useful. The same attitude is taken in regard to pre-deployment and in-theatre training. There are provisions for pre-deployment Battalion Group level training using supplies held in stock for the UN Standby Commitment, but only if it does not compromise the battalion’s state of readiness. This may seem contradictory, but Central Command’s main concern seemed to be that the Canadian contingent be ready to enter the Movement Phase no later than one week after receiving its warning order. The

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\(^{(26)}\) Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*, General Staff Branch Instructions, Part 1, 13-14.
Advance Party was expected to be ready to deploy within ninety-six hours, so the time available for refresher training was limited.

The main focus of pre-deployment training was the Movement Phase; in other words getting the troops to the airport with all their gear.\(^{27}\) In reality, this probably meant that most individuals in the UN Standby Battalion were well-trained in the procedures for the Standby, Warning and Movement Phases, and it was expected that their traditional military training would be sufficient for the actual peacekeeping operation. In-theatre training was allowed, but was left up to the discretion of the area commander. Another difficulty would be encountered if the UN asked Canada to make a commitment beyond its Standby Battalion, which was presumably the only battalion to get any training for UN operations. If Canada’s commitment stretched beyond this one battalion, it would be drawing on units that had no previous training for this type of duty.\(^{28}\)

Although instructions and standard operating procedures for peacekeeping such as those discussed above were developed by the early 1960s, Canadian defence planners and peacekeeping practitioners began to realize the need for guidelines that went beyond the basic principles of peacekeeping and basic military requirements. Peacekeeping was

\(^{27}\) Central Command of the Canadian Army, *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1*, General Staff Branch Instructions, Part 1, 15-16.

\(^{28}\) In “Reluctant Heroes. Assembling the United Nations Force in Cyprus, 1964,” *International Journal* LIII, 4 (Autumn 1998): 733-752, Alan James discusses the unpopularity of the UN Standby Battalion in the Canadian Forces and, by extension, the unpopularity of peacekeeping in the military. This likely accounts for the lack of specialized instructions beyond this document, and the narrow focus of the standby instructions.
being analyzed from all angles, and it was recognized that, if the activity were to be continued, it would need careful examination and improvements in planning for peacekeeping would have to be devised. In a speech before the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations, on 19 September 1963, Lester Pearson addressed the General Assembly as Prime Minister of Canada. He applauded the work of the UN to date, but highlighted problems in peacekeeping that ranged from political control, executive direction, financial means, and administrative coordination.²⁹ He stated that

[we] felt that intervention in the Congo was a response which this organization had to make, a duty which it could not shirk. We believe that this kind of important, if limited, peace-keeping activity has now moved beyond the stage of first experiment. It has become a practical necessity in the conduct of international affairs, and should be provided for as such. A main task of our organization, therefore, should be to strengthen and improve its capacity in this field, learning from failures and successes of the past and seeking more effective ways to perform this function in the future … There are tasks which are undesirable or impossible for the UN. But there will be other situations where its intervention will be important, and even essential, for keeping the peace, for preventing small conflicts developing into big ones. For these, there should be the advance international planning and preparation without which no national government would think of acting.³⁰

Pearson was right. By 1964 peacekeeping was firmly entrenched in Canada’s defence policy, whether the military liked it or not.

Early peacekeeping experience spurred national governments to analyze their role in peacekeeping, and peacekeeping’s role in the world, and Canada was no exception.

The year 1964 was a watershed for Canadian peacekeeping. The policy dimension of

peacekeeping in Canadian defence and external affairs was elaborated and articulated, perhaps to make up for the lack of clear-cut policies for peacekeeping at the international level. Historian George Stanley argues that the early 1960s marked a change in Canadian defence orientation and attitude. Despite Canada’s acceptance of NORAD and its continued commitment to NATO, Canada shifted from an emphasis on its two military alliance systems towards the United Nations as the more acceptable agency for Canadian participation in collective security in the 1960s. \(^{31}\)

Certainly the 1964 *White Paper on Defence*, produced by the new Pearson government, put a greater emphasis on peacekeeping. It ranked peacekeeping high in the list of defence priorities, and projected Canada’s peacekeeping’s activities as likely to grow. Further, it stated that the nation’s diplomacy should be backed up by a flexible military force to permit participation in collective security and peacekeeping. \(^{32}\) Rod Byers argues that the 1964 *White Paper* marked the high water mark of declared government policy on peacekeeping because it acknowledged the need to integrate foreign and defence policies, and it also set out a framework within which the Department of National defence could undertake planning, training, equipment acquisition, and budgetary allocations for peacekeeping. \(^{33}\) This policy did not necessarily present a departure in practice, but merely stated how Canada was going to

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deal with its peacekeeping commitment from that point into the future. The formal statement of policy was important, because it was a first attempt to institutionalize Canada’s approach to peacekeeping operations. The *White Paper*, coupled with the unification of the armed forces in 1968, which instituted a simplified command structure, tried to address the lag between Canadian involvement in peacekeeping operations and the precise articulation of how peacekeeping fit into broader Canadian foreign and defence policies.  

It was also an attempt to give Canada the means to participate effectively in peacekeeping by giving it the tools to organize its armed forces into the flexible force that peacekeeping required.

By the early 1960s, Canada was already producing standard operating procedures for UN missions, lessons learned documents, and operational instructions for the UN Standby Battalion. The *White Paper* was a statement of policy supporting practices that had been established years before. Like other nations, and like the UN itself, Canada was taking steps to make peacekeeping a practical and organized venture, and had been doing so since the creation of UNEF. However, Canadian planners were realizing that they had a long way to go before Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping missions were backed by a systematic, efficient process.

In an article published in *Maclean’s* in May 1964, Lester B. Pearson reiterated his concern for the “folly” of not organizing for UN peacekeeping missions in advance. He believed that “the initiative for advance planning should come – as it has come in the past
– from a country like Canada, not a great power.”\(^{35}\) He argued for the identification of basic principles of action and organization, to be used for advance planning so the “United Nations will not have to scramble and improvise” but would have contingents “equipped, and ready to go.” Pearson further stated that a “United Nations force sent into a danger area to keep the peace should know in advance what its responsibilities are; what it can and cannot do, and how it should operate.”\(^{36}\) Finally, he recommended that a number of “middle powers” like Canada work out standby arrangements consistent with the UN Charter among themselves, essentially to be an “international peace force,” with its “contingents trained and equipped for the purpose, and operating under principles agreed upon in advance.”\(^{37}\) This force could then be used by the United Nations, should the UN not have a force ready to carry out its decisions. To date, most arrangements for UN peacekeeping had been done in a bilateral fashion between individual countries and the UN. This proposal for a system outside of the UN, but at the UN’s disposal, was novel, and would represent a marked departure from arrangements for previous missions like that used for the operation in the Congo, which was over by 1964, and the brand-new United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It was against this backdrop, outside the

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purview of the UN, that military experts met in Ottawa to discuss the technical aspects of peacekeeping.

With Pearson, the “founder” of peacekeeping, at its helm as Prime Minister, Canada hosted a conference titled “The Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” also known as the Ottawa Conference, in November 1964. In his opening remarks of the conference, Pearson welcomed the international participants and expressed his pleasure that this meeting, based on a proposal he had put forward the year before at the UN General Assembly, had come to fruition. 38 A large background document was distributed to the meeting’s participants. 39

Pearson was not alone in his concern for advance planning at the level of national governments in order to improve international coordination, but the Ottawa Conference almost did not happen. In an unpublished paper, Lieutenant-Commander Doug Boot details the complex negotiations for an international conference that grew out of Pearson’s desire to achieve outside of the UN what apparently could not be achieved under its auspices, and out of a casual suggestion by General Burns that there be an


informal conference consisting of countries intending to create a standby force for UN
duty to share information and experience.  

The idea of earmarking standby forces for UN use had been circulating for some
time, and efforts to create standby forces seemed to coalesce in early 1964. The
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland) were key players due
to their April 1964 proposal for a “Scandinavian Emergency Force for UN Peace
Keeping Operations,” which would entail the following national contributions:

- **Sweden:** 1600 all ranks, 2 battalions, 1 technical unit;
- **Denmark:** 950 all ranks, infantry battalion, signal company, medical company,
military police unit, staff personnel;
- **Norway:** 1250 all ranks, infantry battalion, air detachment, frigate; and
- **Finland:** no definite undertaking yet, but probably will be about 700 all ranks,
infantry battalion, 10 observers.

In June 1964 Norway confirmed that it would share in the setting up of the Scandinavian
force, and that it would contribute about 1300 men recruited on a voluntary basis. The
defence minister of Norway expressed his satisfaction that Finland had also decided to

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40 Lietentant-Commander Doug Boot, “Canada and United Nations Peacekeeping – The Meeting of
Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations of 1964,”
(Ottawa: Unpublished paper prepared for Dr. Norman Hillmer, Carleton University, courtesy of author,
2002), 9.

41 Colonel H. Tellier, Director of Military Operations & Plans, “Letter to A.R. Menzies, Department of
Permanent & Standby Forces,” 13 September 1963 to 30 June 1964. Library and Archives Canada, RG 25,
Volume 10135, File 21-14-5-1, part 1.
establish a UN force and referred to similar plans in Canada, the Netherlands, Ireland and India.  

The Swedish government provided the Canadian government with further information about its standby forces, indicating in June 1964 that it would receive training in the tasks which a UN force was “likely to undertake.” Its standby force would be “trained and equipped to fulfill patrol and guard functions in connection with the general task of maintaining law and order.” By March 1965 it had developed curricula for a training course to commence the following spring that was intended to train “observers” for United Nations service. The purpose of this training was to prepare Swedish military personnel for duty as UN observers, and would address the following topics:

1) knowledge of organization and activity of the UN;
2) knowledge of the character, terrain, and climate in which duty may be performed, and the demands these may make up on the observer;
3) knowledge of political, social, religious and other questions within the countries in which the duties may be performed;
4) knowledge of how to manage in English for staff, liaison, and intelligence purposes; and
5) adequate proficiency in other respects to fulfil tasks within the scope of the UN.

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44 From this topic it may be assumed that these training courses were to be run for specific missions, not as general-purpose training for any assignment as a UN military observer.
This training would span fourteen days, and cover additional areas such as the history, organization, goals, and authority of the UN; previous UN engagements; branch agencies of the UN, and the UN department of Swedish army staff; maintenance; liaison; staffing; intelligence; cash office; combat; physical training; and general instructions.\textsuperscript{45}

Countries without the will or capacity to field standby forces made other offers to assist UN peacekeeping. In June 1964 the Italian government offered thirty officers with technical training for use in UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{46} That same month, the South Korean government made a $10,000\textsuperscript{47} contribution to UNFICYP and expressed an interest in earmarking a standby force for the UN.\textsuperscript{48}

Other countries with the means to earmark a standby force were not always willing, or welcome to do so. Canadian diplomats in the UK related the content of a debate the British parliament in June 1964 about the possibility of the UK earmarking a standby force for UN peacekeeping. The British prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-


\textsuperscript{47}It is unclear whether this was in US dollars or Canadian dollars.

Home, observed that British troops were “always earmarked in that they are trained and at short notice … ready to be moved to any part of the world … Should we agree that the purpose of the UN is one that we would wish to see fulfilled, we can immediately supply the Secretary General with troops on any occasion.” When asked what objection he would have to following the example set by Canadian and other governments of making a certain number of troops available on call for UN service, he replied that there would not be any difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of British troops to answer the UN’s call but was doubtful that earmarking a British standby contingent was a “good thing.” The British government seemed reluctant to dedicate its soldiers to UN peacekeeping in advance of knowing the particulars of any mission to which they might be sent.

Also in June 1964 the Shah of Iran announced that Iran was prepared to earmark a detachment for UN standby service. After a testy reminder on 18 June from the Canadian Ambassador in Tehran, Paul Malone, that his telegrams regarding this offer had gone unanswered, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa issued a message for the Iranian foreign minister on 24 June. This message expressed the Canadian government’s satisfaction and pleasure at the announcement and the fact that Iran has decided to “join

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with other countries in this common endeavour.”51 Despite the eventual warm response, Malone felt compelled to question whether “the lack of response to the … messages should be interpreted as disinterest in Iran’s possible participation in a United Nations peace force or simply indifference to our efforts to promote closer co-operation by Iran with Canada within the United Nations. Your comments will be studied with interest.”52 Clearly the Ambassador in Tehran interpreted the delay as a rebuff of Iran’s offer. While the offer appears to have been accepted, it may have been that the delay was caused by Canadian and UN diplomats weighing the benefits of such a contribution.

When communicating his government’s offer of a standby battalion for UN peacekeeping, the Iranian ambassador to the UN had also requested information from Canada on the training and operating procedures of the Canadian Standby Battalion from the Canadian permanent mission in New York. Other countries, such as Jamaica, Argentina, and Italy, had also requested details of Canada’s UN standby arrangements to help inform their own work. Personnel of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations believed that having documented SOPs and prepared information about the Canadian Standby Battalion, and participation in UN peacekeeping generally, would


be beneficial to other nations and would be useful to have when approaching other
governments for contributions to a standby force. The desire to produce some technical
directions for nations seeking to contribute to UN peacekeeping was another driving
factor in the creation of the Ottawa Conference.

Finland had dedicated a military unit as a UN standby force in late 1963, and
turned to Canada for advice and assistance in the establishment of this organization.
Burns, a knowledgeable and respected expert in this field, was a part of the Canadian
delegation to the UN at that time and available to the Finns for consultation. It was
probably a meeting of military experts like the one involved in producing the World
Veterans Federation report discussed above that General Burns had in mind when he
suggested a similar meeting be hosted by Canada to facilitate information-sharing
between countries which intended to, or had already, established standby UN forces.
General Burns’ desire for a more aggressive program of information-sharing among
nations that were peacekeeping practitioners was one of the catalysts for the 1964
conference, as was Pearson’s desire to circumvent the ineffectiveness of the UN in the
area of peacekeeping. The resulting conference was not what either man had envisioned,
but it was only the second of its kind to take place (the first having occurred in Oslo a

PERMISNY to External Affairs (12 June 1964).
54 It is not clear whether this standby force was part of the Scandinavian Standing Emergency Force for
Peace Keeping Operations, but it is likely.
short while before), and therefore can be viewed as a step forward in peacekeeping planning and organization.

Intense negotiations lasted nearly a year and almost resulted in the cancellation of the conference more than once, in part due to attempts by the Soviet Union to jettison the meeting. Despite these difficulties, 62 military officers and 34 civilians from 22 countries met from 2 to 6 November 1964 to discuss the technical aspects of UN peacekeeping.  Although it was not technically a United Nations conference, the Ottawa Conference did have the blessing of the Secretary-General, who sent his representative, Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, to attend. The delegates were provided with a backgrounder package that emphasized the goals of the conference and Canadian experience in peacekeeping. The Canadian experience and advice regarding peacekeeping once again focused on the need for a UN standby battalion that had superior transportability and communications capabilities, but it must be kept in mind that this meeting was a meeting of military experts to discuss military problems associated with peacekeeping, so the discussion was fairly strictly confined.  The participants were divided into three working groups to discuss a wide array of issues in peacekeeping. Working Group 1 dealt with Operations and Training, Working Group 2 dealt with Composition, Command and Control and Liaison and Training and Operational Problems; Working Group 2 addressed Environmental Operational

56 Boot, “Canada and United Nations Peacekeeping,” 44.
57 Department of National Defence, Meeting of Military Experts, Background Material to Conference, Chapter II, “Canadian Forces in Peacekeeping Operations,” 8-12.
Information and Logistical Support; and Working Group 3 addressed Personnel Administration, Public Relations, Accounting Procedures, and Legal Status and Problems.  

In September of 1964, Pearson suggested that the aim of the proposed meeting should be to review the experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations to see what might be done to strengthen the United Nations capacity for engaging in these operations and to enable individual member states to prepare on a national basis for participation in such operations. Particular emphasis would be placed on the need for a frank and confidential discussion of the special military problems encountered in peace-keeping operations. The exchange of views would be informal, confidential and without commitment. 

The intent that the conference be informal in nature was thwarted by the fact that most military representatives were senior officers and many of the civilian attendees had ambassadorial status. While the conference resulted in many reports on specific aspects of United Nations peacekeeping, it failed to produce a clear set of recommendations. In fact, the final report consisted of a compilation of the reports of the working groups and the text of the presentations from the conference. Countries like Ghana, the Netherlands, and the United Arab Republic presented detailed proposals to the conference, which were taken under advisement with little follow-up action. The proceedings of the working groups detail the items discussed, but do not give a clear picture of the nature of the discussions or what conclusions, if any, were drawn. Working Group 1, which focused

on operational and training aspects of peacekeeping, reiterated the need for national
governments to have detailed standby arrangements in place in order to facilitate
coordination at the international level. The group expressed broad support for the need
for Standard Operating Procedures that transgressed national boundaries and perhaps
originated at the United Nations.  

International participants were given a demonstration of how Canada organized
its forces and how it moved its forces overseas. The presentation by Colonel W.A.
Milroy, Director of Military Training, Canadian Forces Headquarters, on “The
Organization and Role of the Canadian Army to Support Peacekeeping Operations,” bore
much resemblance to Operation Instruction 64/1. It also emphasized the necessity for the
UN standby battalion to be a formed unit with superior transportation and
communications skills. In most operations, command and control of a unit was
maintained through radio communication, so emphasis on this capability, as well as other
military skills, makes sense. However, it is the lack of attention paid to extra-military
skills and capabilities that is worth noting. Colonel Milroy detailed the various stages of
pre-deployment, yet he did not discuss what happened after a unit arrived in-theatre. 

The assumption that military training would be enough to see a soldier through his duties
on a peacekeeping operation denied the fact that peacekeeping operations could be very

61 Department of National Defence, Meeting of Military Experts, Working Group 1, “Informal Summary
Record of Proceedings.”
62 Department of National Defence, Meeting of Military Experts, Final Report, “The Organization and Role
of the Canadian Army to Support Peacekeeping Operations,” by Colonel W.A. Milroy, Director of Military
Training, Canadian Forces Headquarters.
different from war-fighting operations, and could require training in areas like negotiation, mediation, indoctrination in the restrained use of force and Rules of Engagement, thorough knowledge of the operation’s mandate and the Charter of the United Nations, and knowledge of the chain of command and standard operating procedures in a multinational force, to cite a few examples.

The most important conclusion of the conference was that the United Nations itself needed to improve its planning process to set an example for national governments, and the need for a permanent UN planning staff for peacekeeping operations was seen as critical.63 This was not a new idea, and the paucity of organizational capability at the UN level had been remarked upon for several years. The lack of a military planning staff at the UN was seen as a grave oversight by many.

In the wake of the Ottawa Conference, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the Committee of 22) was established by the UN General Assembly on 18 February 1965 to attempt to reach agreement on guidelines for the establishment, control, and financing of operations, and on measures that governments might take to prepare for such operations. Canada, as a member of the committee, had hoped that it would approve measures of advance planning and training, but this was not to be, and the need for an exchange of information and to organize cooperation between states about the practical

63 Department of National Defence, Meeting of Military Experts, Working Group 1, Informal Summary Record of Proceedings.
techniques of peacekeeping remained. The Committee’s success in these areas was limited.\textsuperscript{64}

The Ottawa Conference, coupled with the general interest in UN standby arrangements, succeeded in generating some guiding information for troop-contributing nations. In December 1964 DND provided a response to an Argentinian request for information about Canada’s standby arrangements. The information provided to the Argentinians included the following details: in addition to an Infantry Battalion Group, it was proposed that other units such as a Reconnaissance Squadron, Engineer Troop, Signals Troop, and Service Company be put on standby; the composition of the Special Service Force that these units would compose was subject, at the time, of a staff study to determine terms of reference, location, training, and other details. There was one infantry battalion, 650 all ranks, assigned to the standby role with a supporting increment of 70 all ranks, including signals, engineering, and administrative personnel, as well as a contingent headquarters of 15 personnel. Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force personnel were not held in standby, but were assigned as part of a UN force as agreed by the Government of Canada. Because standby units were selected from components of the Regular Force, no special recruiting methods were employed. However, in addition to the “normal” training given to Canadian Armed Forces members, those assigned to the standby role were to receive specialized training that emphasized:

1) movement procedures, by air and sea;

2) peacekeeping operations; and
3) exercises involving long moves by air and conduct of peacekeeping operations under conditions simulating those faced by UN forces.

Training in movement procedures included:
1) Courses for unit key personnel;
2) Joint local training in loading and unloading procedures; and
3) Small-scale joint local exercises.

Exercises involving standby forces as a whole with RCN and/or RCAF support were to be held annually, or as required, to test all aspects of training under conditions simulating as closely as possible those which would likely be encountered on UN operations. No further details were provided of the type of training in “peacekeeping operations” that the standby battalion received, although the point was made that “[t]raining in peacekeeping operations includes practice in the individual skills and collective methods required in aid to the civil power.”

It appears that the information provided to the government of Argentina was a general description of Canada’s standby arrangements, and given the volume of requests it is not surprising that a more detailed document was produced in response.

In November 1965 the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs requested that the Department of National Defence Headquarters produce a paper on the organization and training of forces earmarked for UN peacekeeping operations to fulfill a request received from the Jamaican representative at the UN. Discussions of a Jamaican

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standby force had begun the year before, and guiding documents were likely considered necessary for this contingent as it was recognized during negotiations that any force fielded by Jamaica would depend heavily on support from other participating units, as it would not be self-sustaining. 66 The paper that resulted, Canadian Operations in Support of the United Nations: Organization and Training of Canadian Military Forces Earmarked for Service with the United Nations, was distributed in the spring of 1966 to all those who had attended the Ottawa Conference. It was intended only as a “general background paper on peacekeeping operations” and was not expected to take the place of standard armed forces training manuals. 67 This twelve-page paper drew on the Canadian experience to discuss the organization and training of UN observers, formed units for peacekeeping, and the administrative and logistic problems inherent in UN operations. The bulk of its focus, however, was on training for peacekeeping, and that training was firmly situated in standard military training, which was not surprising given that it was produced by the headquarters of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The study acknowledged that the needs of peacekeeping operations “cover a very wide spectrum with all the variety provided by commitments to observer groups, limited


war action and peace-keeping tasks.” The recognized frequency of combat situations in peacekeeping was highlighted by the paper’s argument that

the UN representative must have the military training that will equip him to act calmly and efficiently under the warlike conditions that sometimes prevail in such operations. Further, military units have a recognized degree of self-sufficiency that enables them to exist under the most adverse living conditions … Moreover, it is easier to train military units in the role of aid to civil authority or police duties, than it is to make combat units out of police groups. For this reason, it is Canadian policy to earmark for peace-keeping duties only personnel from our Armed Forces.

This was a realization of the need for flexibility and adaptability in peacekeeping situations, as well as an early statement of the conviction of the armed forces that, in peacekeeping situations, military training was necessary. In fact, it was the single most crucial ingredient, as this study conveyed the message that peacekeeping is a job only a soldier can do, but peacekeeping is not the soldier’s only job. This paper did not mark a great divergence from the Canadian approach to peacekeeping since 1956.

This document outlined a number of features that persisted in peacekeeping training requirements and practices for the two decades following its release. In discussing the standards of training for the Army (the service most frequently employed in peacekeeping missions), Canadian Forces Headquarters asserted that

Army participation in the past on UN Operations has required a degree of reorganization and training for the units earmarked for UN duty. However, Canadian experience has confirmed that any regular Army combat type unit, whether artillery, armour or infantry, has the degree of discipline, flexibility and

know-how to be deployed on peace-keeping duty with very little additional organization and training being required.\textsuperscript{70}

This statement could equally apply to the readiness of any unit in the air force or navy.

To train national units for UN service in 1966, it was standard practice to rely on the sixteen weeks of basic training required of all armed forces personnel as a minimum requirement. The Standby Battalion, which was the battalion put on notice to be ready to deploy to a United Nations mission on short notice, needed between two and six months of pre-deployment training. During this training these soldiers would receive refresher courses aimed at brushing up on military skills such as signals, unarmed combat, military engineering, security, first aid, battlecraft and fieldcraft, hygiene and sanitation, map and compass work, and air transportability.\textsuperscript{71} The only training recommendations discussed in this paper were vague requirements for “peace-keeping or security operations,” and more specific courses on theatre indoctrination, which “includes lectures as varied as those covering UN organization and responsibilities to lectures on customs and other background information on the countries to which the soldiers were likely to be deployed.”\textsuperscript{72}


\textsuperscript{71} A meeting was held between the Defence Research Board and Force Mobile Command at the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment in November of 1966 at which a number of technical aspects of peacekeeping were discussed. See Defence Research Board / Force Mobile Command, \textit{Memorandum for Record: DRB / FMC Meeting at CARDE, 14-16 November 1966} (Canada: Department of National Defence, 1966), for a technical discussion of the role of transportation, equipment, communications, surveillance / reconnaissance, etc. in peacekeeping.

The way out of the two to six month requirement was revealed in the statement that “any unit of our Regular Army forces can be readied for UN service on relatively short notice. However, it was emphasized that the degree of specialized or technical training to be undertaken at any given time in the units of our regular forces does vary.”

Although the designated Standby Battalion was likely to meet the training requirements for peacekeeping duty, any other battalion selected for duty and not given the same time to train and prepare would only have had its particular “degree of specialized or technical training” to fall back on. These battalions would not have met the Armed Forces’ own suggested levels of training for peacekeeping duty.

Given the technical and operational focus of the Department of National Defence, it was the role of non-governmental bodies to address the more philosophical aspects of Canada’s role in United Nations peacekeeping. In early 1967 a conference on peacekeeping was planned by Queen’s University and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. This conference, which took place in February 1967 in Kingston, Ontario, assembled a group of academics and military and diplomatic personnel who considered questions about Canada’s role in international affairs, and peacekeeping’s place as an important aspect of defence policy and a consumer of the resources of

74 The “suggested levels” refers to the 2 to 6 month training period which was to include refresher courses on basic military skills, coupled with mission-specific training.
Canada’s service organizations. These issues would come under intense scrutiny with the expulsion of UNEF in May 1967, and would be heatedly debated in the interim before the 1968 publication of *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, which was partially an account of the proceedings of the conference in Kingston.

There is no verbatim record of the proceedings of the Kingston Conference, but David Cox provided an interpretive account of the major points of the meeting. He summarizes the proposals for the improvement of international peacekeeping that resulted, and here again there are few surprises. The group concluded that more effort was required to brief military personnel on the political problems of specific peacekeeping actions as they develop and conversely, more needed to be known about the political situations faced by personnel in the field. Suggestions for a United Nations staff college that would train officers from nations with interest in peacekeeping for a period of six months were also brought forth. The debate over the use of civilian police in peacekeeping operations concluded that the role of policemen could be expanded to assist in the maintenance of peace because, “in situations where action in support of civil order is required, it appears that the policemen may have superior training to the soldier. He is more skillful at detection and search, for example, at interrogation, and possibly at


crowd control.”\textsuperscript{77} This is in contrast to the conclusions of the 1964 Ottawa Conference, during which the role of civilian police and their duties in peacekeeping operations were debated by the Operations and Training Working Group. The Working Group concluded that, while civilian police would be useful to act as liaison between UN forces and local law enforcement, their main role should be as a complement to UN troops, not as a substitute.\textsuperscript{78} The Kingston Conference did not suggest that civilian police replace troops, but envisioned a broader definition of peacekeeping that incorporated the skill set of well-trained police officers.

The Kingston Conference also drew some conclusions about the need for advance preparations. Cox stated that, in the past,

\begin{quote}
the improvised manner in which peacekeeping forces have been thrown together, and the inability to cope with logistic problems on the part of an overworked and understaffed Secretariat, have placed military personnel in situations where it has been impossible for them to perform their duties adequately, or even at all.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Recommendations for improvement of this situation included the earmarking of equipment for UN service, rather than personnel, and the compilation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) accompanied by general approval for these SOPs from participating states. The conference participants noted that “while there are problems involved in devising SOP’s able to accommodate the variety of military styles likely to be found in any international force, the development of SOP’s is a practical move that could

\begin{footnotes}
\item[77] Cox, “Issues and Opinions,” 86-87.
\item[78] Department of National Defence, \textit{Meeting of Military Experts}, Working Group 1, Agenda Item No. (b) (iv).
\item[79] Cox, “Issues and Opinions,” 84.
\end{footnotes}
be accomplished quickly and without undue difficulty.”80 The development of standard operating procedures at the national level was well underway by then, but the process of integrating these procedures to the point that they could be applied at the international level and used as a blueprint for peacekeeping missions by the UN and its member states was in its infancy.

The expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force from Egypt in the spring of 1967 was thought by the conference to be significant because “nothing could have brought home to Canadians more forcefully the difficult and delicate diplomacy required of a well-qualified peacekeeper.”81 The golden era of peacekeeping was not so perfect as to obscure the need for intense examination of Canada’s peacekeeping practices, and the problem of how to prepare soldiers to practice this “difficult and delicate diplomacy” had by that time been an object of study for years. As the 1960s waned, the defence establishment in Canada was still attempting to tackle problems of organization, training, financing, and international cooperation in peacekeeping.

Technical and research divisions of the Department of National Defence took up the issue of preparation for peacekeeping duty. A meeting of the Defence Research Board and the Force Mobile Command of Army Headquarters in November 1966, which took place at the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment, was the second in a series of meetings that year designed to consider problems associated with

80 Cox, “Issues and Opinions,” 84.
peacekeeping and peace restoration. The following year in November 1967 the Defence Research Board held its Nineteenth Annual Symposium and hosted a special half-day session on peacekeeping for its Canadian, British, and American attendees. The intent of this session was to consider the nature of possible future UN operations and the problems that could arise as well as the research that would be required by the scientific and military components of the Department of National Defence to solve them. The report that resulted from the symposium reiterated the crucial importance of a speedy deployment for peacekeeping forces to be effective, and concluded that peacekeeping operations are likely to be required of Canada during the foreseeable future. They will continue to be multi-national in nature and likely pursued under the control of a senior civilian agent of the United Nations. They will probably be lengthy and conducted amidst strange cultures and in unfamiliar environments, where the conflict may be against the minds of men, women and even children as well as against fighting units using the more traditional weapons of warfare.

These features were present in most peacekeeping missions since the beginning of UNEF. Ten years of study had produced little in the way of solutions, and these points were restated to underscore the need for “continuing thought to obtaining a better understanding of the nature of possible UN-type operations, [and] the problems that can

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be expected to arise and the research required to help solve them.”

The Defence Research Board’s symposium consisted of the presentation of four papers on specific aspects of peacekeeping, each of which attempted a new way of thinking about problems in peacekeeping, including the force structure, command and control problems, culture conflict in peacekeeping operations, and war-gaming in peacekeeping training.

One of these themes was picked up by R.J. Hill in his April 1968 report *Command and Control Problems of UN and Similar Peacekeeping Forces*, which studied command and control problems of observer and emergency forces for the Operational Research Division, Directorate of Strategic Operational Research, Department of National Defence. The report was produced with the hope that it might lead to improvements in the performance of Canadian peacekeeping forces. Hill’s conclusions reiterated that past peacekeeping operations should be studied to “determine the true functions of the various kinds of Peacekeeping Force, [to] see where the greatest command and control problems lie, and thereby determine how similar Forces might be improved in the future.” He concluded that Observer Missions are in need of the best organizational structures if they are to fulfill a true observer function, but that Emergency Forces also need

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Terms of Reference, in particular, [which are] adequate to serve the needs of the Force, giving it the power to defend its own positions and enforce the UN’s rights when necessary. Organizational structures, information services, supply facilities, operational doctrines, and training procedures, need to be planned in advance, at least in broad basic terms, to give each new Emergency Force a chance of effective and rapid reaction in each dangerous new environment.  

Even a detailed study like Hill’s draws the conclusion that further study is necessary and that organization and cooperation is needed at the national and international levels. Few of the studies discussed above go beyond these general recommendations to more specific suggestions as to how problems can be remedied. Perhaps it was felt that the larger issues had to be addressed first, but whatever the reason, it resulted in a decade of near-stalemate in the area of improving the systems associated with peacekeeping.

Canada employed standard operating procedures for its own UN Standby Battalion Group, and encouraged other nations to do the same. By hosting conferences and producing reports for international audiences, it argued that thorough standby arrangements were needed to allow a UN force to be constituted quickly and effectively. Canada’s approach to concrete problem-solving was limited, however, to a concern with technical and operational problems. Logistics, communications, and transportation were the primary issues for those responsible for Canada’s standby battalion in the 1960s, despite the explicit acknowledgement that Canadian soldiers might require skills that went beyond their military training, and the recognition that personnel like civilian police might have a useful part to play in peacekeeping.

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89 Hill, Command and Control Problems, 33.
Canadian officials had even less success when it came to urging reform at the UN level, and integrating practices among nations to facilitate international cooperation. In 1967, Lester Pearson complimented the United Nations as “a masterpiece of effective improvisation and organization.” Almost from the birth of UNEF it was apparent that peacekeeping, if improvisational, was not a masterpiece of effectiveness. As peacekeeping took on increasing importance in defence and foreign affairs circles, some quarters thought that standard military training might not be enough for the practice of peacekeeping, but certainly a foundation of military skills was a solid bedrock upon which to build peacekeepers. Peacekeeping was treated as an offshoot of war, and was prepared for as such, although there were attempts to marshal any accumulated peacekeeping experience and use this knowledge to the benefit of future Canadian deployments. In the 1960s, not long after its first deployment to UNEF during the Suez Crisis, Canada began to think critically about how to improve its contributions to UN peacekeeping and participated in a flurry of conferences and reports that addressed the issue of the disorganized preparation for peacekeeping. The Canadian organizations that spent the 1960s trying to counteract the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping by studying its past and producing recommendations for national and international planning had mixed results.

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Chapter 4

The Golden Age of Peacekeeping?

Running concurrently with efforts to systematize UN peacekeeping at the national and international levels was an increase in the operational tempo of peacekeeping missions themselves. The period from 1956 to 1974 has been identified as the “golden age” of UN peacekeeping. Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding has argued that this eighteen-year golden age gave birth to ten of the thirteen peacekeeping operations established before the late 1980s, and that, “[o]n the whole, [these missions] succeeded well in helping to control regional conflicts, especially in the Near East, at a time when the Cold War made it difficult for the Security Council to take effective action to resolve them.”¹ The late 1950s was a period of intense activity and ad hoc arrangements that surrounded the creation and first use of UN peacekeeping, and the decade that epitomized the “golden age” of peacekeeping, the 1960s, would provide more of the same. However, there was an effort during the 1960s to learn from accumulated peacekeeping experience and create a standard approach to mounting peacekeeping operations in the Canadian and UN contexts, as well as to introduce limited specialized training for peacekeeping duties.

The 1960s was a hopeful time for United Nations peacekeeping. For many countries, this new concept was seen as a promising way to manage international squabbles. It was also a way to employ national militaries in peaceful pursuits and it provided the United Nations with an activity that showed many countries how useful it could be during the Cold War. Yet, even in this early period and despite its promising beginnings, peacekeeping was not without its detractors and even its proponents recognized that the UN and its member states had a long way to go before the concept of peacekeeping was perfected and its practice ran smoothly. During the 1960s, existing and new missions provided ample practical experience in peacekeeping for the UN and its member states to build upon, and more importantly, gave soldiers of national militaries field experience that employed their soldierly training but required that they operate under rules different than those that governed war-fighting. In this decade Canadians took part in UN operations at an unprecedented rate and mainly relied on their military training, while incorporating rules and guiding principles that must have been novel to armed forces more accustomed to preparation for combat.

By 1960, a few years of peacekeeping experience had been accumulated and the UN had established some basic guiding principles for peacekeeping operations. These principles were mainly determined during UNEF, and were developed in the vacuum left by “constitutional and operational ambiguity” in the UN Charter as it relates to peacekeeping. The first of these principles was the principle of consent. In the case of UNEF, UNGA could not
legally force the parties to that dispute to accept UNEF, nor could it authorize the peacekeepers to use force to achieve a settlement. Instead, the General Assembly relied on the disputants to consent to the force’s presence, without powers of enforcement. Later, when the Security Council approved subsequent UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, it typically followed this precedent with passive, consensual operations.²

In addition to the principle of consent, by 1960 the principle of neutrality had been established, which dictated that “peacekeeping forces not intervene in the domestic affairs of disputants or influence the outcome of a conflict.”³ Peacekeeping also, in principle and practice, was meant to manage hostilities between states. The United Nations was prohibited by its own Charter from intervening in the domestic affairs of a state. The structure of the UN and the framing of its Charter meant that early peacekeeping was modeled on the principles that neutral peacekeepers, likely from countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council, could only intervene in international (not national) disputes with the consent of the parties to that dispute.

In early Cold War Canada, the Canadian military and political leadership held fast to the belief that the best peacekeeping force was furnished with combat-capable, multi-purpose soldiers culled from the existing ranks of the Canadian armed forces. These forces had received general purpose military training with an emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills, and had the added advantage of requiring no revision in training standards or practices before deployment aside from cursory pre-deployment refresher training in military skills and perhaps some mission-specific information such as basic

² Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 4.
³ Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 4.
geographic information about the host country. This “soldiers first” approach gradually changed over the succeeding decades, but the tempo was slow and the implementation was uneven. Specialized training for peacekeeping was an anomaly in the 1960s, with few exceptions, although there is some limited evidence that the Canadian military was starting to concern itself with peacekeeping-specific training in the early 1960s. Ray St. Louis recalls participating in a base-wide training exercise during his preparation for deployment to UNEF in 1964. During this exercise each unit was called upon to role-play as peacekeepers. Parts of the base were set up to represent different geographical regions (for example, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel) and participants would act as peacekeepers and belligerents. Soldiers acting as “belligerents” would agitate the peacekeepers as much as possible, to produce the conditions frequently faced in a peacekeeping situation.\(^4\) St. Louis’ experiences show that the Canadian armed forces did practice some measure of training for peacekeeping, but it is difficult to determine how widespread this was in light of the lack of documentary evidence.

UNEF became a fixture in the Middle East over the course of more than ten years of peacekeeping. Historian Michael Carroll writes, “[c]reating camps, patrolling daily a border fraught with land mines, planning their next leave – these were the peacekeepers’ priorities. Political questions…were inconsequential in the middle of the Sinai desert.”\(^5\) While political questions may have seemed irrelevant to the peacekeepers of UNEF during day to day tasks, the international political situation inevitably intruded into the

\(^4\) Ray St. Louis, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, 29 July 1999), tape recording.
\(^5\) Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers, 160.
operations of UNEF. Early in its lifespan UNEF operated with a strength of approximately 6000 soldiers in early 1957, but by the spring of 1967 this number had dwindled to less than 3400. From its first commander, Canadian General Burns, to its last, Indian Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, UNEF’s troop strength and budget were gradually reduced so that both were at an all-time low when news came in May 1967 that the United Arab Republic was requesting the immediate withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai.\(^6\)

The withdrawal of UNEF in the lead-up to the Six Day War between Egypt and Israel raised many questions about the success of UNEF. As a measure of success, the fact that there had been no large-scale conflict during the existence of UNEF seemed to indicate that Pearson’s strategy for an international emergency force had worked. As Carroll concludes, “[w]ithin the terms of its mandate, UNEF was able to achieve great success in maintaining peace in the region for over a decade. The inescapable reality, however, was that when confronted by determined belligerents, there was nothing the UN force could do to stop the war.”\(^7\) When the Canadian contingent withdrew from UNEF on 31 May 1967, they took with them UNEF’s capacity for communications, vehicle repair, supply distribution, ground transportation, and airlift capabilities.\(^8\) The accumulation of a decade’s worth of peacekeeping expertise was achieved on the backbone of Canadian competency in several areas. The skills and capabilities that

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\(^6\) Carroll, *Pearson’s Peacekeepers*, 160-161.
\(^7\) Carroll, *Pearson’s Peacekeepers*, 181.
\(^8\) Carroll, *Pearson’s Peacekeepers*, 177.
proved so crucial to UNEF’s operation had a clear grounding in traditional military skills and training. While UNEF was a testing ground for the concept of peacekeeping, it was the missions initiated in the 1960s that would begin to usher in an age of reconsideration for military training for peacekeeping in Canada, as was seen in the previous chapter. But first, there would be missions that would highlight the highly prized caliber of Canadian military training, while providing Canadian soldiers with a taste of non-traditional scenarios that would, at times, strain their conventional military training to the limit.

While UNEF was operating in the Middle East, two operations were mounted in Africa that highlighted the value placed on Canadian military training by other nations. The first new operation of the decade, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), and the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana (CAFTTG) drew upon Canadian military expertise to re-train national armies, but the situation in each case was very different. ONUC, in particular, “was significant primarily because it challenged most of these formative [peacekeeping] principles … ONUC broke all of these early rules.” When the UN created ONUC with Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) to respond to the request from the government of the Republic of the Congo for military

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9 There were no respondents among the survey and interview subjects who had served on either of these missions.

10 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 4-5.
assistance from the UN\textsuperscript{11}, it created an “essentially domestic” operation that contravened the UN’s prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of a state. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld justified such interference by claiming that international peace and security would be served by the prevention of a proxy Cold War, in the form of a Soviet-American confrontation, from breaking out in the Congo.\textsuperscript{12} At the heart of the issue, as one scholar put it, was the fact that with the dispatch of ONUC, the UN entered uncharted territory. As the crisis wore on and it seemed as though the secessionist movement in the province of Katanga might jeopardize the territorial integrity and viability of the new country, the UN abandoned a passive approach to peacekeeping in favour of a more forceful one. Through their efforts to expel foreign mercenaries from Katanga and to prevent civil war, the peacekeepers became a party to the conflict, compromising the neutrality principle.\textsuperscript{13}

ONUC “stretched not only the definition of peacekeeping but the UN itself” in terms of budget, size, scope, and mandate.\textsuperscript{14} This operation may have borne similarities to later, more robust post-Cold War peacekeeping, but it diverged from the early standard in many ways.

ONUC received authorization on 14 July 1960 and ceased operation on 30 June 1964. The mission cost the UN over US $400 million by its end. Its function was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo; to assist the Congolese government in maintaining law and order; to maintain the territorial integrity and political

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] Spooner, \textit{Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping}, 1960-64, 5.
\item[13] Spooner, \textit{Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping}, 1960-64, 5.
\item[14] Spooner, \textit{Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping}, 1960-64, 5.
\end{footnotes}
independence of the Congo; and to prevent civil war and remove foreign military and paramilitary forces not under UN command. This mission was the first time UN forces were used entirely within a sovereign nation, and although it was not part of its mandate, questions of independence and sovereignty arose. The desire of the mineral-rich province of Katanga to secede became a focal point of the peacekeeping operation, as did the attempted removal of all Belgian nationals in February 1961. Belgian mercenaries stayed, which complicated matters for the UN at headquarters and in the field.

The unprecedented nature of ONUC, as well years of peacekeeping experience in UNEF, led the UN to propose a training course for UN personnel in the field. On 1 September 1961, shortly before his death in a plane crash in the Congo, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld shared a paper titled “Proposed United Nations Field Operations Training” with his military advisor Major General Indar Jit Rikhye. This paper sought approval to organize the first such training to commence on 1 December 1961. According to this paper, there was widespread belief that due to rotations, variations in experience and differing United Nations practices, some special training for selected civilian and military personnel would be a desirable measure of improving the staff work at the Headquarters for both UNEF and ONUC. This would also provide a pool of trained personnel for the United Nations Field Operations to meet any future requirement of similar operations.”

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This two month-long training was to take place in New York, and would train chiefs, deputies, and heads of sections at a cost of USD $64,000 per course for twenty people to attend each course. UN Headquarters concurred that special training for civilians and military staff was needed, as “some special grooming for duties in the field would be helpful … It is hoped that some prior training would improve efficiency and the overall standards of the United Nations Field Operations.”

The following areas of study were identified for this course: the role of the UN; the organization and function of the UN; the history and geography of the country where officers will serve; background on the specific operation to which officers will be assigned; the UN system of operations; staff training and organization; staff procedure; writing of memos, orders, estimates, letters and cables; communications, and liaison work. This course seemed aimed at training leadership elements mainly in administrative and organizational matters, but given the relative newness of UN peacekeeping it is not surprising that this type of training was seen as necessary to assist in producing a smooth-running mission.

The UN was focusing on ONUC in other areas as well. ONUC was controversial enough that the United Nations felt it necessary to issue a report, The United Nations and the Congo: Some Salient Facts, in February 1963 to counter some of the serious and

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harsh criticism that had been leveled at the mission. The introduction to this document stated that

[n]o major activity of the United Nations has apparently encountered so much misunderstanding and confusion in the public mind as the United Nations Operation in the Congo … the Operation is unique in United Nations experience as to its purpose, size and cost. Various political cross currents have added to its inherent complications. Beyond doubt, however, much of the misunderstandings and confusion results … from the deliberate, planned, and well-financed activities of the Katanga propaganda machinery, ably abetted by certain habitual detractors of the United Nations, disseminating falsehood and distortion about the Operation.20

The UN sought to answer detractors who questioned why the organization was in the Congo in the first place, how this meshed with the principle of self-determination, how the use of force was sanctioned for a peacekeeping operation, and the all-important question of results, among other questions. The document explained that the UN had gone into the Congo in response to an urgent appeal from the government of the Congo, after the Congolese army mutinied a week after the country gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, and Belgian paratroopers were deployed to protect Belgian nationals against the wishes of the Congolese government. This situation, combined with tribal conflicts, threats of secession, and politically and financially motivated interference from outside of the country, meant that the country was threatened with a “complete breakdown of authority and resultant chaos.”21 The view that this situation constituted a

threat to peace and security, combined with Cold War concerns, spurred the UN into action.

The UN assembled a large team of military and civilian personnel to respond to the complex task, and at its peak, ONUC numbered more than 20 000 military and 1300 civilian personnel. The complex scope of this operation was outlined in UN Security Council resolutions, and it included assisting the government in the restoration and maintenance of the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congo; assisting the government in the restoration and maintenance of law and order and protection of life and property; protecting the country from civil war; and helping the government control and pacify tribal conflicts. Additionally, the SC resolutions tasked ONUC with protecting the country from external interference in internal affairs, especially through the elimination of mercenaries; assisting the government in the development and maintenance of essential public services; assisting the government in social and economic issues through a wide, long-term program of training and technical assistance; the encouragement of discussion and negotiation; avoidance of interference in internal affairs; and only using force in self-defence. According to the UN document, ONUC was able to carry out these tasks and the overall cost of the mission was relatively low.

Within days of the creation of ONUC in mid-July 1960, five to six thousand peacekeepers had arrived in the Congo. It was not an entirely smooth process. The

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commander of ONUC, General Carl von Horn, had little notice of when peacekeepers were due to arrive, the equipment they would be bringing with them, or how the units were organized. Historian Kevin Spooner argues that “the sheer size of the Congo operation meant that the initial chaos and confusion inherent in any multinational military operation was multiplied.”

Canada had decided to send a maximum of 200 signalers from the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, so two units, Canadian HQ and No. 57 Canadian Signals Squadron, were formed and were being readied for deployment with immunizations and the acquisition of necessary equipment, but it was taking time to prepare them for deployment.

A reconnaissance party was deployed from Canada to determine personnel and equipment requirements, among other tasks, and it was able to clarify UN requirements. Consultations with the ONUC commander revealed the level of disorganization and differing expectations that existed:

ONUC required the signal squadron to provide communications between ten mostly stationary positions throughout the Congo, instead of the eight cipher detachments and twelve mobile wireless detachments initially approved by Cabinet. It appeared that ground-to-air communication links were also no longer required, as the Canadians could not discover who had made the initial request; those concerned disclaimed any knowledge of it. This pointed to the level of disorganization at ONUC HQ. The Canadians reported, “We are working in a vacuum here. Info very difficult to obtain and when obtained is almost invariably conflicting. No coordination anywhere. In summary can only say that pers should be sent over ASP as they can certainly be used in many capacities.”

Soldiers continued to arrive at Camp Barriefield (now McNaughton Barracks) in Kingston, Ontario, to be processed, immunized, and trained before deployment to the

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24 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 63.
25 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 65.
26 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 65.
Congo. Soldiers received “training in small arms, attended lectures in tropical disease, and were briefed on conditions in the Congo.” They were armed with weapons for self-defence only. The first group of Canadian peacekeepers destined for the Congo left Trenton airbase on 8 August 1960.

The main task of the Canadian contingent was to provide communications and officers to liaise with the various headquarters of the infantry battalions that made up ONUC. In the end over 200 signalers were employed in small detachments throughout the Congo. Canadians also provided a Food Services section and a Canadian Provost Corps detachment. Commanding officers were often drawn from outside of the signals service, in particular from the Royal 22e Regiment and “became important links between district Congolese commanders, UN troops, and ONUC HQ.” The ability of some Canadian peacekeepers to operate in French was invaluable during ONUC, which may have contributed to the fact that “for the duration of ONUC, there were almost always more Canadians serving as officers at headquarters than there were of any other nationality.” However, most Canadian peacekeepers were white, and several spoke French, which created tension with the Congolese who presumed that these white French-speakers were Belgians. This led to some tense confrontations between the peacekeepers and Congolese agitators, police, and military despite the fact that Canadians were not in a

27 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 65.
29 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 75.
30 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 75.
combat role in the Congo. This was just one of the challenges faced by Canadian peacekeepers in the Congo.

According to Sean M. Maloney, ONUC forces were “generally employed as a peacemaking force, not a peacekeeping force, though the terminology of the day did not distinguish the differences between the two. The tasks that Maloney identifies as falling into a “peacemaking” category include

counter-insurgency activities of a low intensity nature against various factions opposed to centralized control from Leopoldville, while at the same time trying to moderate the excesses of central government forces. … Multinational UN forces used signals intelligence, Canberra light bombers, close air support, and mobile light armoured columns to bring order in areas which could not be controlled by central government forces.\(^{31}\)

In addition, Maloney points out those Congolese forces, minus their Belgian officers, were “relatively untrained” and poorly equipped.\(^{32}\) The lack of training that the Congolese military displayed was seen as a major impediment to returning law and order to the Congo.

The requirement that the UN undertake a massive program of economic and technical assistance, once law and order had been restored, included a plan to train the national army.\(^{33}\) This idea, which included possible Canadian involvement in the training of Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) officers, had been circulating since the


\(^{32}\) Maloney, “‘Mad Jimmy’ Dextraze,” 306.


Amidst increasing political chaos in the Congo, Resolution 161 expressed “deep regret” at the killing of Congolese leaders and deep concern “at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security.” This resolution responded to a 12 February report of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative that alerted the UN to a “serious civil war situation” in the Congo by urging the UN to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.”

This resolution was a game-changer on many levels: it sanctioned UN intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation using direct language that was new for resolutions related to the Congo. It also authorized the use of force, albeit as a last resort.

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Resolution 161 again called for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under UN command as well as all mercenaries. It expressed a fundamental belief that the only way to repair the general absence of rule of law and respect for human rights in the Congo was to locate a solution “in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from the outside.”37 One way to do this was to remove foreign military, paramilitary, and mercenary elements and address problems of professionalism within the ANC and its interference with the political life of the Congo. To that end, the resolution urged that:

Conolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo.38

Joseph Mobutu, as Chief of Staff of the ANC, and Mekki Abbas, the Secretary-General’s acting special representative, were able to come to an agreement for ONUC to organize the training of ANC officers. Mobutu had one condition – the instructors would have to speak French and be either French or Canadian. Although no formal request had yet come from the UN, Canadian planners engaged in “preliminary planning for a retraining scheme.” This was partly to respond to the warning that the UN was incapable of coming up with a rational plan for the retraining of the ANC, and if the Canadians did not come

up with a plan themselves they might find themselves involved in a scheme that was poorly arranged and dangerously executed. Two months later Mobutu indicated to Canadian consul general Michel Gauvin that he was still waiting for Canadian trainers. Ottawa was still waiting for a request from the UN, and the matter was not discussed again until September 1961.39

On 12 September the official request from the UN came, asking Canada to supply “Canadian officers for training and advising duties,” specifically “qualified French-speaking personnel to fill some of the eighteen officer and eleven NCO positions required as part of its plans to reorganize the ANC.”40 The plan to reorganize and re-train the ANC hit several snags. DND determined that the only staff available were seven officers already serving with ONUC, and these would have to be removed from their current duties to provide training assistance. The opening of a training school to be located in Kamina, Katanga, was pushed back due to the hostilities in secessionist Katanga and Hammarskjöld’s death. In November the senior military adviser to the Congolese government, General Iyassu, threatened to resign if the school did not open and made an appeal to Gauvin for eleven officers, nine to staff the training school and two advisors for the ANC. Yet again Canada expressed its inability to provide French-speaking officers to ONUC, citing operational requirements. The question of training was yet again postponed until 23 December, when Secretary-General U Thant made a direct request of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker for fifteen French-speaking officers for the training of

39 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 160.
40 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 172.
the Congolese army. The Canadian military was not enthusiastic about providing numbers beyond the 38 mostly French-speaking officers already in the Congo. In late January 1962 Cabinet debated the merits of sending additional French-speaking soldiers and, despite the support of External Affairs for the idea, the position of DND won out and Canada decided not to send additional officers to the Congo.  

U Thant renewed his appeal to Diefenbaker shortly after Cabinet’s decision, which revived talks in Canada of training support throughout February and March of 1962. The Secretary-General’s request indicated that, should Canada not provide French-speaking officers, he would have no choice but to abandon the project and be forced to inform the Congolese government that the UN could not provide its military with any training support. The UN was now willing to take any number of Canadians available, whether retired, inactive, or reserve, and so DND started to consider the possibility of providing seven retired French-speaking officers to ONUC. The UN, meanwhile, acceded to the proposition that the training school could be run by officers from a mixture of contingents, not Canadians alone. This position was objected to by the Congolese, who believed that Canadians were best suited due to their status as a country that had never been a colonial power, did not have any economic or political interest in Africa, and possessed good quality military schools. Canada agreed in late 1962 to send a Canadian to serve as the liaison and training officer with an ANC battalion,

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41 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 172, 181-182.  
42 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 186-188.
bringing the number of Canadians serving at ONUC HQ to fifteen.43 DND also agreed to send an officer at the rank of lieutenant colonel or major to be chief instructor for movement control courses in the Congo, which was a compromise over DND’s unwillingness to send an officer to be a military assistant to the chief of staff out of fears that he would be used as an “office boy.”44 It was felt that Canadians in ONUC HQ were over-used and under-compensated, given their training and experience.

Training and reorganization of the ANC remained a priority, particularly once the UN began to prepare for ONUC’s eventual withdrawal. In early 1963 the Greene Plan, a proposal created by an American colonel who was sent to assess the ANC’s training requirements, “called for a series of bilateral aid programs to train the various services within the Congolese military, coordinated under the aegis of the United Nations. Canada, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Israel were asked to participate.”45 Canada was specifically requested to provide training for officers and communications units, and to provide senior officers to oversee the entire training mission. Canada’s official response was that it would only entertain requests for training assistance that came directly from the secretary-general and that were supported by the Congolese government.46 The Canadians were not in favour of a direct bi-lateral relationship with the Congo for training purposes.

43 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 197.
44 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 197.
45 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 201.
46 Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64, 201-202.
The UN faced limitations due to Resolution 1474 which disallowed the provision of military assistance to the Congo except at the request of the secretary-general, and some interpreted this to mean that the Congo could not seek bilateral relationships with other countries for military assistance as long as ONUC was present in the country. The heart of the problem was that the “ANC needed to be retrained and reorganized in order for ONUC to be able to complete its withdrawal, but political realities ruled out both direct, bilateral military aid and aid provided under the umbrella of the United Nations.”

In the fall of 1963 the new Liberal government finally decided not to take part in any retraining scheme. The extension of the ONUC mission to mid-1964, in which Canada was still taking part, and a commitment of a chief of staff were given as reasons why Canada could not contribute further resources. On 29 June 1964 DND confirmed that, of the 109 members of the Canadian contingent left in the Congo at the end of June, approximately half had departed three days earlier and the remaining element was to leave the following day. DND denied the Department of External Affairs’ request to leave a few token personnel in the Congo, and Canada assisted with the airlift to evacuate other national contingents.

Upon the Canadians’ departure, Secretary-General U Thant relayed the following message to the Government of Canada:

“In performing their unusual and demanding duties in the Congo they have been pioneers in international peace-keeping and have written a new and most important chapter in the

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47 Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64*, 203.
history of this art.” Despite this praise, and the uncontestable fact that ONUC challenged previous peacekeeping assumptions, the mission was not an unqualified success.

For the duration of ONUC, the Canadian contingent was not effectual in the key area that was identified by the UN as needing their help the most: the training of the ANC. Major General Rikhye was military advisor to the UN Secretary General for the Congo operations beginning in July 1960, following a two-year stint as chief of staff with UNEF I. Rikhye, reflecting in 1990 on his experiences with ONUC, believed that the operation was flawed from the start because it operated on several assumptions that proved to be inaccurate. Rikhye pointed out that there was an assumption in the resolution that the UN troops were going out there to assist the Congolese Government. This was an assumption which included that there would be the Congolese army, there would be the Congolese police. It was true that they had mutinied. But there was a hope and expectation that there would be a semblance of command and control by the Congolese Government over their security forces and that the role of the UN would be to provide technical assistance for them to use to be able to carry out the basic functions. Rikhye also believed that the “single major factor which contributed to the lawlessness in the country from the day we arrived until we left in June 1964 were Congolese security forces.” Rikhye argued that if not for the presence of the UN in the Congo there would


have been a terrible tragedy. Yet the absence of functioning Congolese security forces, combined with ill-defined UN rules of engagement that were the product of a lack of clarification of the “right of self-defence” that governed the actions of UN peacekeepers, meant that definitions and rules had to be “redefined and honed and redefined time after time in order to meet new situations that we had not expected.”52 For example, he recollects that the UN peacekeepers had to escalate the nature of the weapons they carried to keep pace with the escalation of weaponry used against UN troops. Initially UN troops carried only personal weapons but once ONUC leadership was made aware that armoured units were being employed by Colonel Mobutu’s forces, UN forces that were stationed near Leopoldville were allowed to be equipped with anti-tank weapons. The increasing firepower of the gendarmerie in Katanga also prompted the UN to allow UN forces to use heavier weapons.53 The increase in armaments did not negate the need to use force only in self-defence, however.

Rikhye also addressed the seminal issue of training the ANC. A Moroccan General, Deputy Force Commander Kittani, was chosen as the military advisor to the Congolese government, and collaborated with the chief of staff of the Congolese army, General Mobutu. With Mobutu’s cooperation, Kittani was able to instill some discipline in the Congolese forces through training. He trained the first gendarmerie unit and the first parachute unit. The “major part of the training that was done was largely under the

weight of General Kittani.”

The fact that the training of Congolese forces came down, in large part, to the work of a single person highlights the lack of importance that retraining military forces took within the scheme of ONUC’s priorities. Canada’s reticence to become too embroiled in a retraining scheme through the dedication of skilled French-speaking military trainers spoke to an underlying ambivalence toward successive UN Security Resolutions like Resolution 169 of 24 November 1961 that reaffirmed the UN member states’ commitment to assisting the Central Government of the Congo “in the restoration and maintenance of law and order.” Presumably lawfulness could not be restored while roving bands of gendarmerie and foreign mercenaries were patrolling the streets of the Congo, but the larger problem was that the country had no indigenous, functioning military or security forces to keep the people of the Congo safe. Mobutu’s ruthless seizure of power in 1965, and the maintenance of his dictatorship for thirty-two years, painfully underlines this absence.

In 1963 the UN stated that ONUC was a “unique venture by a community of nations and has taken place in a unique series of circumstances,” and that it had “provided a very large body of experience and precedent both to the Member States and to the Secretariat of the United Nations and to the soldiers of the national contingents

who have served in the United Nations Force in the Congo.”

Although it acknowledged that such an action could only be taken by the Member States of the UN acting through the Security Council or General Assembly, it did assert that the “United Nations, of course, if it is to live up to its maximum potential for service, must be ever willing and prepared to do whatever needs to be done in the preservation of peace, wherever and whenever the need arises.”

ONUC not only abandoned many past precedents, but introduced a new type of peacekeeping – one that dealt with a country’s internal conflict, had a wide and complex mandate, and was more flexible about the use of force – that would serve as the model for the multi-dimensional missions of the post-Cold War period. The human cost of ONUC included the deaths of Hammarskjöld, seven members of the UN Secretariat, and eight others in a plane crash; 127 officers and men who died in action; 50 who were killed in accidents; and 133 who were wounded. Despite the casualties and heavy price tag, ONUC, in early 1963 and later, was judged a successful peacekeeping mission because there was no wider war over the Congo. The question of the training of the ANC highlights two aspects of Canadian military intervention worldwide in the 1960s: the reputed strength of the Canadian military, based on a firm foundation of military training, and the perception of the impartiality of Canadians as the product of a non-colonial power, which would become a hallmark of Canada’s peacekeeping brand.

Almost simultaneously with ONUC, Canada was pursuing a “dynamic Canadian policy which involved maintaining a Western presence in Africa and seeking to convince the developing countries that their best prospects for the future lay with the West.” In light of Canada’s reluctance to bear responsibility for re-training the ANC, this policy curiously included providing training assistance to the national armies of African nations, including the scheme known as the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana. There are many gaps in the story of the training teams sent to Africa in the early 1960s, and it may seem odd that Canada undertook the training of foreign national armies at a time when it was still getting its footing in multinational, UN-sponsored activities. However, the “decision to establish the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana was indicative of Canada’s willingness to accept a responsibility to both the Commonwealth and the Western World.” This willingness to offer military training assistance to Ghana while largely withholding it in the Congo is puzzling. Canada’s offer of training assistance was given by then-Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in response to a request from the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, at the Commonwealth Conference of 1961. It was also offered to act as an alternative to the influence of communist countries like the Soviet Union and China that were trying to make inroads in the recently de-colonized countries of Africa in the 1960s.

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59 Hunt, “Recollections,” 43-44.
Lieutenant-Colonel G.D. Hunt, in his “Recollections of the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana, 1961-1968,” argues that the reasons Cabinet approved the provision of a military training team to Ghana must have included the following: Canada was a leading proponent of the need to maintain international peace and stability, and one way to do this was to offer newly independent African nations an alternative to Russian or Chinese influence; the benefits to meeting the modest Ghanaian request would outweigh the commitment involved; the mission would benefit the Canadian forces by broadening the range of experience for officers involved and bring them into contact with areas in which new military doctrine and tactics were being developed; Canada could contribute to the peace, order, and good government in Ghana by providing training assistance via Canadian officers in the Military Academy and various training schools who would emphasize a disciplined and loyal force under competent leadership; and the possibility that Canadians would be involved directly in operations was ruled out, although this proved difficult to ensure.\(^6^0\) From the Ghanaian side, Nkrumah may have seen the Canadian training mission as an inexpensive way to maintain and improve the standards of his Army without invoking the spectre of neo-colonialism. These points may explain why the Canadian government was reluctant to provide training assistance in the Congo, as it was already involved in some measure in operations on Congolese soil and training the ANC may have muddied the waters for peacekeepers meant to be impartial; additionally, the misidentification of French-speaking Canadians as Belgians

\(^6^0\) Hunt, “Recollections,” 44.
was a major stigma in the Congo, a factor that did not seem to apply to the presence of English-speaking Canadians in the former English colony of Ghana.

The lack of information provided to the trainers deployed to Ghana, as well as their accompanying families, highlights the lack of information and training provided to Canadian military members deployed to foreign posts. As former infantry officer Bill McAndrew related, “no one in Canada knew very much about Ghana, and those who might have had some knowledge, such as the African desk at External Affairs, either were not asked, or did not wish to enlighten the soldiery.”\(^6^1\) The climate and culture were often a shock to the Canadians. Hunt’s article largely represents the viewpoint of officers at the rank of captain, and their experiences echo the sentiment heard elsewhere that Canadian soldiers were valued for their willingness to lead by example, and required little direction and managing to get a job done.

If the training efforts of the team were successful, and by any criteria they were, it was because the Ghanaian army, from top to bottom, knew they could trust most of us to always give them our best. … The single most important ability which a Canadian needed to serve in Ghana if he was to gain respect and hence the attention of the Ghanaians, was leadership by example. No one, quite correctly in my opinion, had felt it necessary to give us any special instructions on how to act in our capacity as trainers of Ghana’s future officers and soldiers, hence we all behaved as we would have in our own regiments.\(^6^2\)

There was a desire among the Canadian trainers to see the Ghanaian soldiers succeed and be as good as any soldier trained in Canada, and with a shortage of specialists in-country Canadian soldiers were called upon to do it all. “No doubt Ghanaian cadets were

\(^{61}\) Hunt, “Recollections,” 44.
\(^{62}\) Hunt, “Recollections,” 47.
surprised at first to see their platoon commander down on the monsoon slick earth
demonstrating the leopard crawl, but they soon got the idea what we could do, they could
do, and must, do.”63 The ultimate objective was to train the Ghanaian soldiers to take
over positions of leadership. After 1965 it was Canadian policy to have Canadian
soldiers cease to hold training positions and assume staff positions, mainly at Army
Headquarters, instead. In this way the Canadians were to assist the Ghanaians in the
development of managerial, administrative, and financial expertise.64 Arguably this shift
allowed Canadians to exert maximum influence over the entire structure of the Ghanaian
military, from field operations and the comportment of its soldiers to its structure and
administrative arrangements, but it was seen by some as the start of the decline of
Canadian influence on the Ghanaian officer corps.

Several factors brought about the end of the CAFTTG. Providing training in
Canada, instead of in a host country, was thought to be more cost-effective and less
politically-charged by the government of the time and officials at the Department of
National Defence. They believed that “the conduct of training in Canada exerts no
significant influence on the development of the assisted nation, where provision of a
training team can. The deployment of a training team is, inherently, a political act and
should be recognized as such, while offering training in Canada is not.”65 Several
factors, including reduced budgets, the stresses of the unification of the armed forces in

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63 Hunt, “Recollections,”47.
64 Hunt, “Recollections,”49.
65 Hunt, “Recollections,”49.
the 1960s, and the high visibility of a training program that was coming to be seen as a diversion of resources and a potential political minefield, led to the 1969 Cabinet decision to phase out all military assistance to developing countries.\textsuperscript{66} This was later reconsidered, and the training mission in Ghana was allowed to limp along until its last deployed Canadian was called back in 1982.\textsuperscript{67} As Hunt states, “its very success in accomplishing its missions to help keep Ghana western-oriented and to help develop the Army as a source of internal stability has to have been one reason for downplaying the Training Team’s very existence.”\textsuperscript{68}

In addition to UNEF, ONUC, and the training mission in Ghana, Canada participated in other missions during the 1960s that contributed to its peacekeeping experience. The most significant mission for Canada was The United Nations Force in Cyprus, which was created in 1964. Four years after Cyprus gained independence from Britain the UN intervened to put a stop to the inter-communal violence that was taking place between the island’s majority Greek and minority Turkish populations. Canadians

\textsuperscript{66} Hunt, “Recollections,” 50.

\textsuperscript{67} Canada would return to training militaries in Africa in the post-Cold War period. In his 2010 article, “Canada in Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Training in Africa,” H. Peter Langille argues that, after the mid-1990s, “the interest in providing training assistance arose with a parallel interest in minimising Canadian troop contributions.” As a result, providing training assistance to African nations became a priority by 2005. H. Peter Langille, “Canada in Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Training in Africa,” AISA Policy Brief, No. 16 (Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, June 2010), 2, 3. At the same time, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, as part of the international War on Terror that began after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, turned its attention to training the fledgling Afghan National Army (Levon Sevunts, “Can-do Training in Kabul,” Toronto Star (19 June 2005), A14). The NATO-led training mission will come to an end in early 2014, and with it Canada’s remaining presence in Afghanistan, that of trainers of the Afghan National Security Forces. Canada’s military training system, lauded from its earliest days of peacekeeping, became a popular export in the post-Cold War world.

\textsuperscript{68} Hunt, “Recollections,” 50.
were among the first rotation into Cyprus, and although Canada removed the bulk of its personnel in 1993 it still, according to DND information, contributes one Canadian Forces member to UNFICYP headquarters.\textsuperscript{69} This mission is among the most significant of Canada’s peacekeeping contributions, if only for its longevity. Its duration and overall stability provides an example of “classical peacekeeping.” Even though “the idea of peacekeeping, so shinily attractive a short while before, had become deeply tarnished” by ONUC, by March 1964 the UN was proposing to send a force to “another volatile internal conflict” and Canada was willing, if not exactly determined, to be part of it. But Canada did have certain conditions for participation, including Pearson’s hopes for a political settlement and the desire that the force be multinational so as to prevent the perception that Canada was Britain’s assistant in a colonial affair.\textsuperscript{70}

Once a multilateral force acceptable to all sides had been composed, Canada sent peacekeepers to Cyprus in early 1964. In UNFICYP’s first year, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, in conjunction with the UN, produced standard operating procedures to govern the activities of the Canadian contingent in-theatre. A confidential telegram sent on 9 April 1964 from the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York to the Canadian Department of External Affairs detailed the Standard Operating Procedures for the United Nations Force in Cyprus. Clearly outlined were the aims of the


\textsuperscript{70}Alan James, “Reluctant Heroes,” 734.
operation, peacekeeping duties, the carriage of weapons, principles of self defence, and the procedures to follow after firing a weapon.⁷¹

The aim of the mission was to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions, in the name of preserving international peace and security.⁷² To do this, UNFICYP personnel were to avoid any action designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus, and to follow orders as delivered through the chain of command. Canadian soldiers on UN peacekeeping duty remained directly under a Canadian commander; therefore, the orders they received, even if they came from higher-level UN command, were funneled through a Canadian authority. These orders had to comply with the principles upon which peacekeeping duties were to be based, which were set out in the telegram from the Permanent Mission. They were as follows:

A. Only the minimum force necessary to achieve the objective is to be used.
B. Incidents are to be prevented and if necessary stopped by negotiation and persuasion rather than force. The decision as to what course of action to take normally rests at battalion commander level.
C. The Commander must act as he feels justified, at the time and under the circumstances, always following principles A and B.
D. All members of UNFICYP must act with restraint and at all times act with impartiality towards Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides.⁷³

The mission in Cyprus was governed by well-established peacekeeping principles, yet there was no mention in the Canadian Army’s April 1964 *Central Command Operation*

Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group, discussed in Chapter 3, of the need for negotiation training or indoctrination in the rules of engagement. Given the emphasis in the telegram, and in practice, of the necessity of restraint in peacekeeping, and that “[t]he principle of minimum force will always be applied and fire will be opened only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed,” the fact that there is no mention of negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and stress management training in the Operation Instruction 64/1 that governed the UN Standby Battalion is noteworthy.

From the telegram discussed above, it is clear that a peacekeeper serving with UNFICYP was expected to have superior negotiating skills and possess a measure of self-restraint, whether naturally or through training.

The recollections of retired Lieutenant-General Philip Neatby give insight into the early training of peacekeepers for UNFICYP. Neatby recalled that this training actually took up very little time, and it focused on junior leadership skills because of the added responsibilities of UNFICYP duties. Mission-specific subjects such as the geography and military organizations of Cyprus were also taught. The key to being a good peacekeeper, according to Neatby, was to be a responsive, disciplined soldier. He highlighted the fact that military personnel often regarded peacekeeping as part of regular military duties and belonging in the same category as filling sandbags, conducting drills, fighting forest fires, and fighting wars.75

74 Canadian Permanent Mission at the United Nations, New York, UNFICYP, 310.
75 Lieutenant-General Philip Neatby, retired, of the Canadian Forces, Interview by Norman Hillmer (Ottawa: Carleton University, 30 August 1999).
In 1966, former Lance Corporal John O’Neil was posted to Cyprus on his first UN tour with the fourth regiment to be deployed from Canada with UNFICYP. As a member of the infantry, he was a section commander in charge of outposts and areas of responsibility. In terms of pre-deployment training for this peacekeeping duty, O’Neil recalls that he was basically…trained for war, and I was on my first UN tour and we ended up doing a lot of training for riot control and to control and secure different areas…We had a lot of talk sessions, not training *per se*, but social sessions where we could ask questions and … we had training in socializing with [the Greek and Turkish Cypriots]…I had been trained for war…confrontations where you would shoot first and ask questions later. Well, on UN peacekeeping we were taught to negotiate long before the shooting ever started …we learned how to speak to people and talk to people and get their confidence.

From this evidence, it appears that the Canadian aims and principles of peacekeeping were indeed communicated to the troops. O’Neil says he understood the Rules of Engagement and those governing the use of force and the use of his weapon, and he regarded the instructions regarding all of these factors as reasonable. The fact that he never had to discharge his weapon, and indicated that he was only ordered by a senior officer to load his normally unloaded weapon on two occasions, is evidence supporting the idea that the instructions were appropriate to the situation.

Retired Major D.J. (Bud) Dion served on four UN tours in Cyprus between 1966 and 1986. His opinions echo those of O’Neil, in that he believed that “you require all the skills of a soldier to be on peacekeeping duties” and that the instructions he received regarding the use of force and the use of his weapons were reasonable given the

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76 John O’Neil, Interview by author (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 19 July 1999), tape recording.
circumstances of each of his peacekeeping missions. “They all boiled down to, in essence, you cannot use force of any kind unless force is actively being employed against you.” While most peacekeepers surveyed seemed to have a clear understanding of the Rules of Engagement and the use of force, their pre-deployment training was often another matter. Dion remarked upon the “extensive training [and] background research” that was conducted prior to his deployment to Cyprus, in each of the four cases. This does not seem to have been the norm, judging from the testimony of other interview subjects, and it highlights the uneven and sporadic nature of peacekeeping training. The amount of training received and the subjects covered was often left up to the commanding officer.

Upon return from his peacekeeping duties, Dion received de-briefings that were for the purposes of gleaning “lessons learned” from the tour so that they could be passed on to the next batch of Canadian peacekeepers. This is reminiscent of a comment made by a Korean War veteran, who recalled being grateful for the presence of Second World War veterans in Korea because they could instruct new soldiers on the ways of war. The theme of passing on lessons from one generation of soldiers to the next is important. Learning from one’s predecessors can combat the ad hoc nature of any situation, and it obviously made a crucial contribution to the soldiers’ preparedness. In recent years, the armed forces have employed this idea of “lessons learned” to collect information about

77 Major D.J. (Bud) Dion, retired, Interview by author (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 21 July 1999), tape recording.
78 Dion, Interview by author.
79 Anonymous Chief Warrant Officer of the Canadian Forces, retired, Interview by author.
peacekeeping missions, using this informal method to supplement and inform formal
peacekeeping-specific training guides.\textsuperscript{80}

Less than a year after UNFICYP was established, a paper was produced
reviewing the early “lessons learned” in UNFICYP. Major-General B.F. Macdonald
authored \textit{United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and Principal
Lessons Learned}, with the intent of recording the lessons learned by the UN Force in
Cyprus “which might be of value to future operations.”\textsuperscript{81} Macdonald’s work was based
on interviews and discussions with Zone and District Commanders and various staff
officers and advisors in Cyprus, and he pointed out that his work was somewhat
unfinished because he received notice in late September 1965 that he was to become
Chief Officer of the UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission, a post he held from September
1965 to March 1966. Macdonald’s report became a foreshortened version of what he
intended due to one of the vagaries of peacekeeping: a short notice deployment.
Nonetheless, his report provides valuable insight into the state of peacekeeping in 1965,
and the views of members of a multinational force and their recommendations for
improvement.

Writing from Nicosia in September 1965, he indicated his intent to “record briefly
the principal lessons learned by the UN Force in Cyprus in respect of Command, Tactical

\textsuperscript{80} The Canadian Forces also has an Army Centre for Lessons Learned, located in Kingston, Ontario.
\textsuperscript{81} Major-General B.F. Macdonald, \textit{United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and
Principal Lessons Learned} (Nicosia, Cyprus: 25 September 1965), 5. Directorate of History and Heritage,
Department of National Defence, file 82/193.
Operations and Administration, which might be of value for future UN Operations.”

His work on this “complex, evolving art” was limited to the study of military problems, and to this end he identified four objectives for his paper: to provide a summary of the problems which were encountered in the UNFICYP operation with an indication of the tactics or techniques evolved to surmount these problems; to provide examples to the “military man being assigned to peace-keeping operations for the first time” of the type of problems which may be encountered in peace-keeping operations at the Contingent (battalion) level and below; to provide assistance to the military planner charged with forecasting requirements for future UN operations; and, finally, for the diplomat, politician or civilian planner at the national or UN level, an insight into the problems which arise for the military and an indication of areas needing improvement in overall powers and terms of reference if UN military operations are to be viable and effective.

Macdonald’s study argued that there needed to be early and detailed planning, co-ordination, and cooperation between competent staffs in order to successfully mount a peacekeeping operation. He identified several key areas for detailed examination in his study, and most areas focus on issues like the use of force (which Macdonald argued was the most difficult and complex aspect of peacekeeping, tied as it was to UNFICYP’s mandate), freedom of movement and ability to gather information, techniques for handling incidents, negotiation, understanding agreements, the handover process,

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82 Macdonald, United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and Principal Lessons Learned, Author’s Note.
83 Macdonald, United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and Principal Lessons Learned, Author’s Note and Preface.
command and control, staffing issues, the employment of reserves, the need for interpreters, measures during Cypriot National Guard exercises, the UN image, searches, incidents affecting commerce, and miscellaneous subjects that had arisen.  

Macdonald’s practical review of problems encountered in peacekeeping highlighted the odd mix of traditional and non-traditional military elements that were being dealt with in-theatre during the early years of UNFICYP. Peacekeepers had to function in a quasi-military structure that required them to carry out tasks largely military in nature (patrols, reporting, etc.) but that also asked that they work out how to function in a large, multi-national force that was operating under a strict mandate implemented at an international level. Macdonald identified the use of force as particularly tricky to manage in UNFICYP, and thought this problem was likely to extend to any future missions: “As a rule, peace-keeping missions can be more effectively performed and the international morality and law better served without meeting force with force. However, in the long term it is difficult to see how a UN Force can effectively perform its mission unless there is a clear realization of the Force’s willingness and ability to stand its ground.” This conundrum would plague generations of peacekeepers to come, as peacekeeping became more and more volatile and individual soldiers had to make tough decisions in the face of morally repugnant acts, all the while being required to show

84 Macdonald, United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and Principal Lessons Learned, iii-iv.
restraint in the face of situations they found unacceptable. Overall, Macdonald’s study identifies several key areas in which problems had arisen during the early stages of UNFICYP, and he discusses the standing orders that apply to each. It is more a descriptive document than a prescriptive one, as there are few explicit “lessons” identified. However, it is a useful snapshot of things as they were in Cyprus in the mid-1960s.

A 1989 article by Major-General J.A. MacInnis, who had just finished a stint as the Chief of Staff/Canadian Contingent Commander of UNFICYP in June 1988, reviewed lessons learned from his recent experiences as well as the formative 1964-1965 time period. Canada’s ability to deploy quickly was highlighted by MacInnis as key to the early role of Canadians in Cyprus, as well as to the mission itself. In reviewing documents related to the 1964-1965 period, he drew the following lessons learned during UNFICYP’s earliest phase:

- Peacekeeping operations are not particularly pleasant or rewarding from the soldier’s point of view. The work is boring and repetitive, and yet very demanding on the soldier.
- In a situation where men must stand between highly armed, trigger-happy fighters, a soldier’s training and a strict military discipline are essential.
- The practice of using a brigade headquarters to form a Zone Headquarters is sound.
- Training for war is the best training for peace. What is required in peacekeeping is well-trained, well-disciplined soldiers, and intelligent and flexible officers, all accustomed to working together.

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• There are no major equipment items needed (exclusively) for peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{87}

The messaging is clear, a decade after Canada first wet its toes in peacekeeping’s waters: soldiers trained for military purposes are the best fit for peacekeeping duties, and in fact military organization meshed well with the structure required for a UN peacekeeping mission.

Canada’s military organization changed fundamentally in the 1960s with the directives of the 1964 White Paper, which decreed the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces into the Canadian Forces under a single Chief of Defence Staff. This change took effect on 1 February 1968. Arguing that the White Paper positioned Canada as the world’s “helpful fixer” by emphasizing the country’s diplomatic role, historian George Stanley saw this change as necessary “if Canada was to play a truly effective role as peace-keeper, [because] it would require a highly specialized force, with a centralized command from which competition and inter-service rivalry were absent.”\textsuperscript{88} The solution for Canada, and one the armed forces could live with, was to treat peacekeeping as an offshoot of traditional preparation for war, keeping the emphasis firmly on the production of highly disciplined, general-purpose, combat-capable soldiers. This rationale avoided additional questions about the financing of peacekeeping, and allowed the Canadian Forces to maintain the status quo in the area of training and preparation. It also kept the Canadian military combat-ready, as befitted a Western nation during the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{88} Stanley, \textit{Canada’s Soldiers}, 422-423.
In the late 1960s and 1970s the defence establishment in Canada aimed to improve the training of individuals and units in the Canadian Forces, and to increase the capacity of DND’s training sections to administer this training. A reorganization of the armed forces’ training branch occurred in 1967, with the transfer of responsibility for training functions of the Directorate of Training going to Training Command Headquarters. The types of training mentioned in this transfer of responsibility included language, command and staff, academic and out-service, flying, navigation, junior officer, junior and senior NCO, NBCW\(^{89}\), combat and support, technical and trades, and common training.\(^{90}\) The *Report on the Study of Individual Training Organization and Responsibilities for Men of the Canadian Armed Forces*, also known as the “Dare Report” for its Chairman, Major-General M.R. Dare, was released later in 1967 and aimed to “examine the present situation and make such recommendations as are necessary for the establishment of a unified individual training system for men of the Canadian Forces.”\(^{91}\) The Dare Report concluded that a central agency to coordinate training was needed, and responsibility for training should remain in Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). Although it pointed out that “[i]nternational training commitments, arising from NATO, military assistance or equipment sales, are of benefit

\(^{89}\) NBCW to nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.


to the Canadian Forces,” it did not discuss training for peacekeeping, as either an
obligation or benefit for the Canadian military. 92 A document from spring 1968
underlined the focus on training individual members of the forces, and reiterated that it
should be the Canadian Forces Headquarters staff that was

responsible for the effectiveness of individual training of officers and men in the
Regular Forces by ensuring that appropriate staff action is taken at CFHQ to
create policies on matters affecting individual training. Staff action implies
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling individual training
activities in consultation with TCHQ 93 for the Chief of Defence Staff. 94

There is mention of training for new equipment, “non-military training and education” at
Canadian military colleges and universities, physical education and recreation, the
coordination of training taking place outside of the Canadian Forces, trades, and
language, but no mention of training for UN duties.

Military training was coming under scrutiny, and a further measure to improve
training for members of the military was the creation of an Operational Research section
under Training Command Headquarters in 1968. According to its Terms of Reference,
the primary purpose of this section was to conduct research and development aimed at
improving the capability of Training Command to carry out individual training for

92 Dare, “Report on the Study of Individual Training Organization and Responsibilities for Men Of the
Canadian Armed Forces,” part 1.04.
93 Training Command Headquarters.
94 Director General, Individual Training Policy, DND, “Annex A: Statement of Organizational Objectives
For CFHQ Individual Training Staffs,” DND, F1901-4203/60 (DO) (2 April 1968), 1. Library and
Archives Canada, RG 24, Volume 22424, File 4500-1, Volume 1, 16 April 1966 to 9 April 1970.
personnel of the CF. The section was to fulfill a research and advisory role, and to keep track of research done outside of the section that could be used by Training Command. Its job was to survey training operations, identify possibilities for improvement through research, and study problems which did not fall within the purview of other research sections. The section was rather small, with only five people assigned to its staff under the Chief, Dr. J.E. Mayhood, by April 1969.

A review of Canadian Forces Headquarters’ forecasted training requirements for a ten-year period from 1968 to 1978 paints a picture of the CF’s training priorities in this time period. According to *CFHQ Instruction VCDS 8/68, Field Force Operational Training Fiscal Year 1969-70*, CFHQ’s training aims for 1968 were to “prepare and maintain combat ready land and tactical airforces required to meet Canada’s defence commitments ... [and] to have all units achieve the highest standards of combat readiness at the battalion group level.” This Instruction set out a number of training priorities and their preferred sequence, indicating that Mobile Command should place emphasis on the following: aid to civil authority with its attendant problems of crowd control, communications and protection of property; surveillance and patrolling in close country

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for mounted and dismounted forces; training designed to develop a high degree of efficiency between light aircraft surveillance and ground forces; battle craft and field leadership; realistic tactical employment of weapons systems; training of combat group and task force headquarters; and field administrative and logistics units to prepare these elements for exercises above the battalion group level in 1970-71.\textsuperscript{99} The subsequent CFHQ training directive, \textit{CFHQ Instruction VCDS 10/69 Operational Training Directive 1970/71 (Revised)} set out the missions, in order of priority, of Mobile Command:

a) National Security;
b) Joint Canada/US Defence of North America;
c) Other Collective Security Arrangements, e.g. NATO; and
d) International Peacekeeping Commitments.\textsuperscript{100}

In support of these mission priorities, Mobile Command's operational training priorities were to be a) Unit Readiness, including Northern Operations; aid to civil power; airportability; tactical air support procedures; night operations; environmental indoctrination training, as appropriate for designated units; and b) Individual Readiness, including physical fitness; weapons handling; environmental skill; and chemical warfare defence.\textsuperscript{101} The following year's Operational Training Directive was intended to "promulgate general policy direction for conduct of Field Force training during Fiscal

\textsuperscript{99} Canadian Forces Headquarters, DND, \textit{CFHQ Instruction VCDS 8/68}, 1.
Year 1971/2.” Its Training Objective was “[t]o obtain and maintain the highest possible level of operational readiness at the unit level. To achieve this, major exercises should be regarded as rehearsals for related operational tasks.” For example, exercises were to be held to practice Aid of the Civil Power. Peacekeeping is discussed briefly, with the directive that Mobile Command “shall deploy one battalion to Jamaica for environmental training” and, in addition, “Mobile Command is authorized to conduct sub-unit training in desert and jungle environments in the U.S.A.” This environmental training clearly anticipated deployments to hot climates such as the Middle East and Africa, and was likely intended to prepare the armed forces for deployment to Cyprus, among other missions.

Subsequent training forecasts and directives contained similar information to those discussed above. The Operational Training Directive for Fiscal Year 1972/1973 emphasized training for NATO operations and the training of individual replacements for “4 CMBG,” or 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canada’s contribution to NATO forces in Europe. Again, the only mention of peacekeeping training was environmental

familiarization training. Mobile Command Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 to 31 Mar 77, dated 28 February 1973, provided an expanded list of training priorities:

a) training for operations in support of national sovereignty, including Internal Security (IS) Operations, Control and Reconnaissance Operations, Direct Defence Operations (DDO);
b) training for conventional operations under the threat of nuclear war;
c) training of reinforcements for CFE, including an Airfield Defence Battery;
d) Training for International Stability Operations;
e) Training an administrative support group to support ATC during worldwide relief or rescue tasks; and
f) Training for other commitments.

There is no explicit mention of peacekeeping training although it could obviously fall under “other commitments.” The 19 March 1974 Forecast of Training issued by Mobile Command covered the period from 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1978. It outlined a proposed program of operational training for Mobile Command formations and units that recommended annual formation-level Command Post Exercises (CPX), with a particular focus on land/air operations such as helicopter, close-air-support, and air-transported operations. It also mandated that each Combat Group would conduct two Collective Training Periods (CTP) annually “designed to correct weaknesses in individual skills and collective field operations.” These CTPs would focus on the sub-unit level and basic

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106 This is likely Canadian Forces in Europe.
107 This is likely Air Transport Command.
110 Mobile Command, Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 – 31 Mar 77, 2.
battlecraft. In addition, each Combat Group would conduct a battalion-level Field Training Exercise each year. More specifically, this Forecast of Training set out requirements that all units would train in winter; conduct exercises involving Control and Surveillance Operations; hold a major study group or training war game; conduct special-to-branch training (for example, training specifically for armour, artillery, infantry, engineers, communications, medical, logistics, and so on); and training was to be held in Canada by other NATO countries.\textsuperscript{111} These training forecasts and directives attempted to anticipate the training that would be needed to prepare the Canadian Forces for operations in the 1970s. Their emphasis seemed to be on NATO operations and domestic security in the form of aid to the civil power, with scant mention of peacekeeping apart from environmental training.\textsuperscript{112} This reflected the reality that few new missions were created during this time period, and it was still thought among military planners that traditional combat training would adequately prepare Canadian soldiers for service in peacekeeping theatres like Cyprus and, once again, Egypt.

Cold War considerations played a significant role in the creation of one of the few “new” peacekeeping missions of the 1970s. The Second United Nations Emergency Force was created in October 1973 to manage a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Russia backed Egypt and Syria in the conflict, and the United States sided with Israel. A ceasefire was reached and, through the intervention of

\textsuperscript{111} Mobile Command, \textit{Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 – 31 Mar 77}, 3-4, 9.

\textsuperscript{112} The 1971 \textit{White Paper on Defence} placed peacekeeping fourth in the list of defence priorities.
the UN, it was agreed that a UN force would be placed between the separated sides. Canadian Brigadier General Clayton Beattie, who was then serving as Deputy Chief of Staff at Headquarters UNFICYP and Canadian Contingent Commander, indicated to UN headquarters that the closest peacekeeping forces could be found in Cyprus, and that they could be sent into immediate action for UNEF II. This was the first time that peacekeepers from an existing mission were deployed directly to another mission in significant numbers. Beattie was charged with getting UNFICYP contingents (numbering 600 soldiers) on the ground for UNEF II, explaining the level of support UNEF II could expect from UNFICYP, and obtaining a list of requirements for UNEF II. Beattie had only 24 hours to make arrangements to move the contingents and reassign his duties with UNFICYP in the short-term, but as he pointed out, “[p]rompt action in UNFICYP and at every level in the peacekeeping community brought about the establishment of the Force and Canada as a prime player.” Canada’s operation in UNEF II was codenamed OP DANACA, and it quickly reached a strength of 1100 personnel in five units, including headquarters staff and members of service, signals, air transport, and administrative units.

UNEF II reached maximum strength in February 1974 when it reached 6973 personnel, with Canada providing the largest contingent of 1097 personnel. When UNEF

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II withdrew in July 1979 its strength was at 4031 personnel, with Canada contributing the second-largest contingent of 844 people.\textsuperscript{115} For Canadian personnel deployed from UNFICYP or from Canada, service in UNEF II followed a familiar pattern. One former peacekeeper who served in UNEF II from May to November 1975 explained that the mission was “traditional” peacekeeping and that the training consisted of just over 6 weeks at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa ensuring that his skills as a Weapons Technician were sufficient for the mission. As he asserted, “there was almost no peacekeeping training other than the normal confirmation of basic soldiering skills.”\textsuperscript{116} This soldier felt that the rules of engagement and preparation were appropriate to his tasks, as in the case of UNEF II and his later duty with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, he was placed with a force that was essentially there to exist between warring factions and maintain a ceasefire line. Another Canadian soldier who served with UNEF II Headquarters in 1977 indicated that he received no pre-deployment training of any kind, but felt that his military training was sufficient because the force was “acting as a buffer between belligerents.”\textsuperscript{117} It seems that, when the task was a straightforward separation of conflicting factions, these Canadian soldiers believed that their foundation in Canadian military training was more than sufficient to the task.

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\textsuperscript{116} Survey #2, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations} (Ottawa, Ontario: Conducted by Trista Grant-Waddell with the assistance of the Directorate of Human Resource Research and Evaluation, Department of National Defence, under the authority of the University of Western Ontario, 2005).
\textsuperscript{117} Survey #43, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations}.
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UNEF II existed against the fixed backdrop of UNFICYP, which faced challenges of its own in the 1970s. On 15 July 1974 the Cypriot National Guard, with guidance from the Greek military, staged a coup d’état against the government of Cyprus, and in retaliation against the threat of unification with mainland Greece, Turkey launched a military operation against the island on 20 July. The UN, faced with a destabilized NATO alliance and what it perceived as a threat to international peace and security, enacted Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) which called on the parties to “respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,” and to agree to a ceasefire, end foreign military intervention, enter negotiations for the restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus, and to cooperate with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate.\textsuperscript{118} Resolution 354 (1974) of 23 July reiterated the call for a ceasefire in the face of continued fighting.\textsuperscript{119}

Canadian Brigadier General Clay Beattie, serving as Canadian Contingent Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff, had a front-line view of the events surrounding the coup d’état against the Cyprus government and the subsequent invasion. His previous experience in UNFICYP throughout the 1960s had prepared him for the “complexities of the Cyprus problem” and the “pursuit of a mandate in a relatively unchanged political and military environment.”\textsuperscript{120} This relative stability was shattered by the events of July 1974,

\textsuperscript{120} Beattie, \textit{The Bulletproof Flag}, 14.
and the peacekeepers of UNFICYP found themselves indirectly under fire once the invasions started. Beattie recalled visiting the headquarters of the Cypriot National Guard during the worst of the invasion, and being relieved that his driver, whom had remained in the car outside, narrowly missed being hit by a falling Turkish bomb.  

Many years later he recalled his service in UNFICYP as “exciting, sometimes frustrating,” and one can only imagine that he was recalling incidents like these, which occurred while the UN force was “negotiating cease-fires while in the middle of a war zone and under fire.” According to Beattie, the reactions of the peacekeepers on the ground during the invasion, which at this point in time included a contingent of 950 Canadians, were threefold: they focused on survival; they focused on the cease-fire violations; and they tried at all times to uphold the mandate of UNFICYP. 

While the scope of UNFICYP responsibilities had always been broad and incorporated diverse tasks ranging from administrative work related to the operations of UNFICYP headquarters to patrolling the “Green Line,” or zone of separation along the 1964 cease-fire line that separated Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions, and employing confrontation tactics to maintain buffer zones between factions, Beattie observed that, “we at UNFICYP would be fully committed to trying to manage a full-scale war. This was one task that had never been foreseen and was not within the Forces mandate.

Manpower, weapons and equipment were hardly suited to the circumstances. These

\[121\] Brigadier General Clay Beattie, retired, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario: The University of Western Ontario, 8 February 2007), tape recording.  
\[122\] Beattie, The Bulletproof Flag, 40.  
\[123\] Beattie, Interview by author.
deficiencies would have to be remedied.” Beattie and his soldiers were encouraged to “play it by ear and do our best … I cannot think of a single soldier under my command who thought of it as anything more than doing his job.” Beattie further reflected that the point must be made that UNFICYP found itself in a situation with which its mandate was never intended to deal. In one day we had made the transition from a peacekeeping force in an inter-communal situation to the role of referee and humanitarian aid agency in the middle of a war. The speed with which this multi-national organization reacted has surprised many observers and it must be admitted that had it not been present the loss of life and property would have been far, far greater than it was.

The challenges in this situation were great, not the least of which was the ability to do force protection for UNFICYP personnel in the face of insufficient numbers of armoured vehicles and observation posts that lacked significant defences.

The cease-fire was eventually brokered by Beattie with the Turkish Force, and the “Green Line” zone of separation was solidified but remained hotly contested for decades. As one Canadian peacekeeper stated, “[n]obody gives up a bloody inch of ground on the cease-fire line. They all cheat to move a bloody inch and it’s our job to keep them honest.” Given that the buffer zone was only ten feet wide at some points, it is easy to see how every inch could count. The war officially ended on 16 August 1974, although cease-fire violations and conflict on a lesser scale continued throughout the remainder of Beattie’s tenure in UNFICYP. Beattie left Cyprus in October 1976, having witnessed

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“death, destruction and displacement of people on a massive scale.”  

When he reflected upon the Canadian legacy in UNFICYP, he mused “[h]ow much carnage we helped prevent I am not certain, but I am sure that without our presence it would have been much greater. In many cases it was the training of the Canadians and their capacity to stay cool under fire that won the day.”

His experiences led him to reflect upon any “lessons learned” from UNFICYP, and to become an advocate for peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces. He asserted that “we were always training” in theatre, and thought that there was significant room for improvement in training standards for peacekeeping and the transmission of lessons learned from one mission to another.

As he wrote of his work in the peacekeeping field after his return from deployment,

The most difficult situation I faced was associated with my feelings for the requirement of a peacekeeping training centre for Canada. There were those who argued that no special training was required for forces entering the field of peacekeeping. My view was then and is today that we need to ensure that our Forces are combat ready, physically and psychologically, and that they then be given additional training to prepare them as peacekeeping forces.

Given the more than 25,000 Canadians who rotated through UNFICYP between 1962 and when Canada withdrew its contingent in 1993, UNFICYP was a key mission in the Cold War development of the Canadian Forces, and provided ample opportunities to identify successes and areas in need of improvement when matching the military’s skill

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129 Beattie, Interview by author.
130 Beattie, *The Bulletproof Flag*, 17.
sets to the demands of peacekeeping. Additionally, throughout Canada’s commitment to UNFICYP, the Canadian Contingent “carried responsibility for the most volatile areas.” At times Canadian soldiers were greatly tested in this peacekeeping role, and many had opinions on how suitable their training was to the task.

A Canadian Forces member deployed to UNFICYP in 1967 as a Transportation Operator, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps with the rank of Private, noted that he was deployed as an individual tradesman and received no special pre-deployment training, but only a few short years later, as an Infantry Private with the PPCLI he received at least three months of pre-deployment training when deployed as part of a formed unit in 1971. One of the difficulties of providing bodies to UN operations has been that it has not always been possible to deploy complete, formed units, and in those cases where an individual is sent on his or her own because their expertise is needed in-theatre or another person had to be replaced, their pre-deployment training may suffer.

This individual also explained that the training he received in preparation for his 1971 deployment was

not much different than the normal training we did to become good soldiers. The only difference I recall was the importance that was placed on certain aspects such as searching prisoners, checking ID’s, cordon and searches of areas, convoy duties, making reports, ROE’s and passage of information. All of these are important to regular soldiering but are more important when on peacekeeping duties.”

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132 Anonymous Chief Warrant Officer of the Canadian Forces, Completed survey returned to author from Winnipeg, Manitoba (London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 11 August 2001).
He also noted that the Rules of Engagement governing the use of force for his 1971 deployment to UNFICYP required that ammunition be carried in the pocket and that orders allowing return fire were carried inside a sealed envelope that had to be opened before taking action. He believed that “[w]hile I didn’t think much of [the ROEs] at the time, the fact that you had to carry your ammo in your pocket and tear open an envelope gave you the time to consider what the proper action should be before you did something stupid like shoot someone when it wasn’t necessary. On all the other tours I seldom even had a weapon.”\footnote{ROEs in peacekeeping are often contentious, particularly during missions with high civilian casualties and those involving war crimes, but it seems that in the case of UNFICYP, for the most part, the ROEs were suitable to the mandate of the mission, and the mandate itself was reasonable with the possible exception of the time period covering the Turkish invasion.}

By the 1980s there had been several Canadian rotations into Cyprus, and training packages for the mission were better developed. One CF member who served on four peacekeeping operations over the course of fourteen years and had begun his peacekeeping experience as a Private deployed to UNFICYP in 1988 recalled that the training “got incrementally more detailed with every mission. Each had at least 3-4 weeks …and even Cyprus had some peace support operations training prior.”\footnote{This member of the Canadian Forces also served peacekeeping tours in UNEF II, UNDOF, Op Deliverance, and Op Air Bridge between 1976 and 1993. Survey A, anonymous respondent, survey returned 11 August 2000 from Winnipeg.}

\footnote{Survey #26, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.}
Deployed to UNFICYP as a Platoon Commander in 1986, another CF member reflected that his peacekeeping training “differed, but did not really involve learning new skills. I think it could be said that what was different was the application of the basic soldiering skills.” This same soldier highlighted the differing Rules of Engagement governing the use of force in peacekeeping versus war-fighting as a key example of this, but also thought the ROEs were appropriate for the situation.

Major General Andrew Leslie, who served as the Civil Affairs/Humanitarian Officer in UNFICYP in 1984, indicated that he received six weeks of pre-deployment training including aid to civil power training for his specific tasks, but little mission-specific training, and little training that was applicable to the tasks he and others performed in Cyprus such as cordon and search. In regard to the ROEs, he found them “complicated and nonsensical.” In addition to training and ROE challenges he identified a significant lack of appropriate equipment, in that they were “missing everything” including a sufficient number of radios and heavy weapons. He also offered a variation on a peacekeeping trope: that peacekeeping is something soldiers are not always good at, but is something only soldiers can do, because “you don’t know when the bullets start flying.”

One sergeant who served in UNFICYP in 1987 observed that “Canadian soldiers benefit from good basic training when compared to other participating

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135 Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
136 General Andrew Leslie, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 14 March 2005), tape recording.
countries.” The content of that basic training has changed over time, but has generally comprised of 12 to 16 weeks of training that covers topics including drill; first aid; weapons handling; physical training; topography; field training; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence (CBRN); force protection; Canadian Forces regulations and orders; communication; military history; and, in the case of Officer training, leadership and military planning. During the 1970s and 1980s, when peacekeeping had seemingly hit its stride but there was little appetite for much expansion of peacekeeping operations at the national or international level, soldiers themselves seemed satisfied to conduct peacekeeping duties largely through relying on their basic military training.

Another important factor that came to light through the testimony of former peacekeepers was the fact that the level and duration of training seems to have been dependent on several factors beyond prescribed training standards, and that this endured throughout UNFICYP’s lifespan. One Radio Technician recollected that he received no extra training before deploying to UNFICYP in 1991. He cited his several years of service with the CF as an asset that somewhat compensated for his lack of pre-deployment training. A Captain deployed as a Movements Officer to UNFICYP in

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137 Survey #95, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.


139 Survey #21, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
1988 indicated that he had “zero” pre-deployment training; neither refresher military skills training nor mission-specific training. Another Captain deployed to UNFICYP in 1983 indicated that his training before deployment consisted of training where the “focus was on application of basic skills to the theatre. Material on local culture was cursory … Training for Cyprus focused on probable tasks associated with manning Ops, patrols and civil unrest. These build on basic skills with theatre specific application.”

His ROEs governing use of force seemed appropriate to him, as they stated that they “emphasized self-defence in situations involving threat-to-life. Both seemed appropriate in “classic” peacekeeping.”

If any conclusions can be drawn from these observations from Canadian Forces members deployed to UNFICYP in the 1970s and 1980s, it was that generally most felt that their military skills were well-suited to the UN mission, and that any additional training for peacekeeping had to be built on top of the foundation of standard training that included weapons handling, vehicles training, first aid, how to man an observation post, and so on. For those who had peacekeeping experience in later missions, there was a general consensus that training improved, particularly in the area of mission-specific training, in both quality and duration. A few thought that UNFICYP could be described as fulfilling more police that military duties, due to the emphasis on patrolling and reporting. Several indicated that their military training on how to deal with combatants

\[140\] Survey #53, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
\[141\] Survey #53, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
was a key asset. Interestingly, most thought that the ROEs were reasonable for the situation, particularly later in the 1980s. Given that the rules governing the use of force is one of the key differences between a war-fighting and peacekeeping situation, the indication from former CF members that they adjusted to restrictions placed on their use of force, especially in the face of armed combatants, is noteworthy.

UNFICYP was one of the Canada’s longest peacekeeping commitments, and the mission helped to secure the place of peacekeeping among the duties considered to be the domain of the Canadian Forces. The lessons learned from Cyprus had implications for the training of future peacekeepers. As Major-General MacInnis in his 1989 article, “Cyprus – Canada’s Perpetual Vigil” put it, “Cyprus is now therefore embedded in the Canadian military psyche, as is our view that maintenance of peace is an appropriate role for professional soldiers.”142 This willingness to accept peacekeeping duty as a task that does not detract from the Canadian Forces’ status as a professional, combat-ready military is remarkable in light of the differing philosophies that govern peacekeeping and war. This might be because of the armed forces’ considerable efforts to stress its military capabilities, or perhaps it is a testament to the flexibility and superiority of Canadian training that its soldiers can adapt so well to new circumstances.

Peacekeeping training faced intense scrutiny in the 1960s, but by the 1970s and throughout the 1980s the enthusiasm for a peacekeeping-specific training program for the Canadian Forces, or at least its UN Standby Battalion, had waned in the face of fiscal

restraint. A reliance on traditional military training was largely thought to be enough. When peacekeeping training did occur, it was sporadic and varied from unit to unit, and could include refresher training in traditional military skills, the teaching of police-type duties, conducting role-playing activities, and the conveyance of mission-specific information, but there was no uniformity in the application of this training.

Soldiers themselves held differing views about how peacekeeping duty fit into their chosen profession, and what type and amount of additional training they thought was required. As stated earlier in this chapter, Retired Major Bud Dion, in describing the training he went through in preparation for four missions to Cyprus between the 1960s and 1980s, said that he received extensive training in all four cases. This training included background research and information on the changing Rules of Engagement. He also received refresher training in standard military skills such as driving, equipment familiarity and riot control. Retired Sergeant Ray St. Louis similarly remembered being involved in training exercises for peacekeeping in the early 1960s in preparation for deployment to UNEF. He recalled a base-wide exercise in which soldiers role-played as peacekeepers and combatants in various geographical locations. Yet, of the former peacekeepers interviewed who served in UN operations prior to 1990, few recalled any type of in-depth training for peacekeeping before the late 1980s. Although many received some basic information about the geography and population of peacekeeping destinations, that information was often the extent of their pre-deployment training. The

143 St. Louis, Interview by author.
1970s and 1980s represented something of a wasteland for documentary research on peacekeeping training; it seems that the status quo prevailed in this area, and directions and policies that originated in the 1960s held sway until the early 1990s.

During the Cold War, the Canadian Forces maintained the belief that the best training to meet the demands of peacekeeping was general purpose military training with an emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills, and that the forces should not be trained solely for peacekeeping. The unpredictable nature of peacekeeping operations led CF leadership to believe that soldiers could best deal with these situations by relying on their “soldiers first” training. This posture is aptly summarized by then Chief of Defence Staff Paul Manson, commenting in 1989:

Canadian soldiers are trained as “soldiers first”; that means that Canadian contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining units capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies. The determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be, potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada’s unwillingness to put the lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary risk.¹⁴⁴ Perhaps to allow that additional, specialized peacekeeping training was required would undermine the Canadian military’s view of itself as a combat-capable, multi-purpose force. The drastic international changes that took place in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in particular the dramatic events that unfolded in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda in the early 1990s, would put this “soldiers first” ethos to the test like never before.

¹⁴⁴ Manson, “Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” 8.
Chapter 5

Re-evaluation and Revolution

Traditional peacekeeping, or Cold War-era peacekeeping, emerged as “a low-level conflict management tool” that employed “non-threatening military activity, involving the use of unarmed or lightly armed personnel for the purposes of truce observation or interposition between parties to a cease-fire.” ¹ While this may represent an overly-simplified version of what Cold War peacekeeping was, in general it was true that most UN peacekeeping operations took place under these conditions until 1989. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the context of international peacekeeping changed. Cold War considerations and the fear of proxy Cold Wars diminished, but intra-state civil conflict in areas formerly governed by the Soviet bloc and emerging strife in developing nations came to present such challenges to international peace and security that the UN believed it necessary to respond with military and humanitarian intervention on an unprecedented scale.

Eighteen UN peacekeeping operations were created between 1948 and 1989, according to the UN publication The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. By contrast, there were twenty-three new UN operations initiated in the

six years between 1990 and 1996. This number does not take into account “peace support operations” undertaken under the auspices of other multinational organizations such as NATO. With the rapid growth in the number of peacekeeping missions worldwide, the international community began to realize that modern, multi-dimensional peace support operations encompass the monitoring or administration of elections; preventive deployments; implementation of peace settlements; humanitarian, human rights and information functions; enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions; and nation-building mandates, which can include activities such as the training of police.

As peacekeeping duties became numerous and multi-faceted, there was growing concern over the qualifications and safety of Canadian soldiers put in perilous peacekeeping situations.

The Canadian Forces were exposed to the potential dangers of post-Cold War peacekeeping through three key missions in the early 1990s. The experiences of Canadian soldiers on missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda sparked debate on a national and international level about international peacekeeping, the soldiers charged with carrying it out, and the training those soldiers received to perform their duties.

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2 The United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (United Nations, Department of Public Information: New York, 1996). This volume includes all operations that the UN considers “peacekeeping,” including peacekeeping missions, observer groups, emergency forces, elections verification missions, assistance missions, and preventive deployments. In each case the mission involved the deployment of a multi-national force under the auspices of the UN, and was comprised at least in part of military personnel.

Much of the scholarly work that addresses the differences between the roles of a soldier and a peacekeeper comes from the discipline of sociology. In “Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia,” Laura L. Miller found that, of the eight former peacekeepers she interviewed, all agreed that peacekeeping was an appropriate role for the military, and that the duties of a peacekeeper did not detract from their status as professional soldiers. However, her subjects questioned the wisdom of placing peacekeepers in ever-more hostile situations, armed only with basic military skills that in many cases, due to the ROE, could not be fully employed.

Similarly, a 1995 Ottawa Citizen article charged that the “[f]ocus on combat training ignores other crucial skills.” Defence analyst Peter Langille accused the Canadian Forces of endangering its own personnel, because “we expect a lot from our soldiers in increasingly complex and dangerous United Nations peace-support operations. Their tough job is made all the more difficult by military institutions that aren’t very adept at initiating quick, albeit necessary, adjustments in a period of transition and rapid

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4 Most of these sociological studies are based on the American military, and are therefore difficult to integrate into this study of the Canadian Forces. A selection of these studies are: Fabrizio Battistelli, “Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier,” Armed Forces & Society 23, No.3 (Spring 1997), 467-484; Laura L. Miller, “Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping?” The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia,” Armed Forces & Society 23, No. 3 (Spring 1997), 415-450; and David R. Segal and Barbara Foley Meeker, “Peacekeeping, Warfighting, and Professionalism: Attitude Organization and Change Among Combat Soldiers on Constabulary Duty,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 13, No. 2 (Fall 1985), 167-181.

5 Miller, “Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping?” 446.

6 Peter Langille, “Focus on combat training ignores other crucial skills,” The Ottawa Citizen (12 February 1995).
change.” This resistance could have disastrous results for peacekeepers who did not have the benefit of training Langille identified as crucial to post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. He concluded that

the requirements of peacekeeping have changed. Our officers, professional soldiers and reserves need advance training for increasingly sophisticated UN missions; general training in how to manage and defuse a crisis; courses in how to conduct themselves with new partners in larger multi-dimensional missions, as well as specialized training in their assigned roles and responsibilities … Moreover, it can’t come as any real surprise to some military leaders that soldiers who have been trained to react with force and to pursue victory aggressively have, on occasion, found it difficult to adjust to the equally demanding requirements of peaceful third-party intervention.  

In the wake of peacekeeping scandals, these are some of the areas that the Canadian Forces focused on for improvement in peacekeeping training.

As discussed in the Introduction, Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre define combat experiences as “those in which basic military skills and physical force predominate.” Contact experiences, on the other hand, are “those in which interpersonal communications and personal contact are dominant.” The conclusion of their study is that both skill sets are important, as Canadian peacekeepers have drawn on both in equal measure in past peacekeeping operations. The authors state that “[t]he importance of contact skills for peacekeepers is evident from the Canadian experiences in two very different missions in the former Yugoslavia. This should not eclipse the importance of

7 Langille, “Focus on combat training.”
8 Langille, “Focus on combat training.”
9 Last and Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills,” 8.
basic combat skills.”10 The Canadian Forces gradually came to realize the need for both skill sets and in the 1990s began to adapt training accordingly, particularly in light of CF experiences in early post-Cold War peacekeeping.

The collapse of the Former Yugoslavia and the resulting civil war created a whole new dilemma for the Canadian Forces, as CF resources were stretched to the breaking point and Canadian soldiers were in demand and being tested as never before in their role as Blue Berets. A major factor in this dilemma was that, as the United Nations’ Brian Urquhart stated, the ideal peacekeeper would have to be “trained in the techniques of peacekeeping and negotiation as well as the more bloody business of fighting.”11 These requirements were not new, but it was finally becoming apparent to policy makers, and the CF, that peacekeepers required training tailored to the challenges of both classical peacekeeping and the new multi-faceted peace support operations. In the 1990s the peacekeeping ethic of the Canadian Forces evolved and as peacekeeping took over a larger part of the CF resources and peacekeeping missions themselves seemingly became more dangerous and demanding, the CF put more emphasis on peacekeeping training. There is much evidence that skills beyond basic military and occupational skills have always been required in peacekeeping situations, but the CF only attempted to institutionalize the learning of such skills since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

10 Last and Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills,” 9.
With Security Council resolution 743 (1992) the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) came into being to manage a carefully brokered cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia and protect its civilians. UNPROFOR’s original mandate covered only a twelve-month period, and its elements were initially deployed to Croatia, with its mandate later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Slovenia. Its headquarters were established in Sarajevo, Bosnia, but later moved to Zagreb, Croatia. UNPROFOR included military, civil affairs, civilian police, UN military observers, public information, and administrative components and as of 20 March 1995 its strength numbered 38,599 personnel from thirty-nine countries.12

In December 1995 UNPROFOR was replaced by the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR, later the Stabilization Force, or SFOR) in the wake of the signing of the General Framework Agreements for Peace, or as it is also known the Dayton Accords. The Dayton Accords called for the adoption of a Security Council resolution that would request UN Member States or regional organizations to establish a military implementation force to reinforce compliance with the provisions of the peace agreement.13 Canada contributed to both UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR. The CF’s Operation HARMONY was created in February 1992 to protect and demilitarize three “UN Protected Areas” in Croatia, but its mandate was soon expanded to encompass more

area and a wide variety of duties. According to DND’s statistics, “more than 2000 Canadian Forces personnel served in the Balkan region with UNPROFOR and one of its major successor missions, the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF).”

The Canadian contribution to the NATO-led peace enforcement mission that replaced UNPROFOR was known as Operation PALLADIUM. In total, over 40,000 CF personnel served in the former Yugoslavia as part of UN or NATO-led operations between 1992 and 2004. The operations in the former Yugoslavia represented a significant increase in operational tempo, and caused some CF soldiers to have grave misgivings about their roles in light of the situations they faced in theatre.

An issue that emerged as a key concern for CF members participating in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, and one that was a potential stressor during missions that involved a dire humanitarian component, was the Rules of Engagement. Restrictions on the use of force were commonplace in peacekeeping missions dating back to UNEF, but the increasingly dangerous missions of the 1990s – ones in which peacekeepers had to confront heavily armed belligerents or stand idly by in the face of gross human rights violations – caused many CF members to chafe under restrictions on use of force as never before, and highlighted the conflict that is sometimes inherent in adapting soldierly skills to the task of peacekeeping.

The issue of ROEs engages the debate over which qualifications or skills (if any) separate a soldier from a peacekeeper, the way in which force is employed often being cited as a key difference. That a trained soldier cannot use force as he or she is instructed in military training has caused some to believe that the preparation of peacekeepers must mean the “untraining” of soldiers. With the Canadian Forces’ consistent emphasis on general military training as the best core training for peacekeeping, it is difficult to reconcile the principle of self-defence governing the use of force with the utility of combat training for peacekeeping missions.

On peacekeeping operations, ROEs are a soldier’s guiding principles for the use of force. Given that mission mandates often exercise a restraining hand on the use of force by military forces deployed for peacekeeping duties, the clarity of ROEs is extremely important, as is a national contingent’s comfort level with and understanding of them. Ambivalence about the ROEs was often expressed by the DND survey respondents who were deployed to the Former Yugoslavia, in particular those who served in UNPROFOR. One observed that the ROEs were unsuitable because “as a UN peacekeeper you have to wait to get shot at before you can do anything.”\(^{16}\) The ROEs, like the mission itself, evolved over time, and some peacekeepers thought that the later NATO ROEs, which allowed “deadly force when faced with perceived “real threat,”” to be more relevant for the conditions in which they served. A CF member who had been to the Middle East on three different peacekeeping operations in the 1980s thought that the

\(^{16}\) Survey #15, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.*
“keep your bullets in your pockets” limitations on the use of force was not effective, and that later ROEs such as those encountered under NATO in the Former Yugoslavia were more realistic.  

One former UN peacekeeper related that the ROEs governing the use of force during his deployment to Bosnia Herzegovina in 1992-1993 were “too restrictive. No clear mandate for the UN mission.” Despite this feeling, he “had no choice” but to obey the ROEs because each soldier was personally accountable for their actions. As a result, he and his fellow soldiers “had to stand by while the Serbs ethnically cleansed the village nearby. Could not intervene. … I felt useless. If I had my way I would never wear a blue beret again.”18 There were divergent opinions among survey respondents as to the appropriateness of ROEs for specific situations, but the consensus was that ROEs need to be permissive enough to allow not only self-defence, but the protection of civilians, particularly those facing extreme violence or human rights violations. ROEs also needed to be flexible to reflect changing situations.

The experiences of one soldier in the former Yugoslavia furnishes evidence that Canadian peacekeepers needed both contact and combat skills in the “new” variety of peacekeeping operations, where little in the theatre was predictable and the limits of one’s training were often put to the test under the most dangerous conditions. Major Dan Drew of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) served in Croatia with

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17 Survey #55, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
18 Survey #40, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
UNPROFOR from March to October of 1993. For his rotation into Croatia, his unit took reservists (the force was seventy-eight percent militia); therefore, they spent three months prior to deployment “beat[ing] the guts out of [the reservists]” in order to toughen them mentally and physically. It was important to “harden both their feet and their minds.”

He explained that, “[f]irst off, soldiers are war-fighters first and foremost. The fact that we’re excellent war-fighters makes us excellent peacekeepers.” Despite this, Bosnia was “totally a new picture for all of us” because there was no established peace or cease-fire to manage, as was often the case in traditional peacekeeping. In this new environment, combat skills were highlighted, but Drew emphasized that additional skills such as negotiation and mediation were an invaluable asset. The restraint required by Canadian soldiers in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the necessity of combat skills in a civil war-torn area, meant that the training requirements for peacekeepers had grown in proportion to the difficulty and complexity of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.

The requirement for mental and physical toughness in peacekeeping reinforced the need for strong combat skills. Colonel Gordon Grant, in commenting about the peace enforcement role NATO undertook in Bosnia, stated that the aims of the peacekeepers were to “go there and stop the atrocities, stop the ethnic cleansing and establish some stability, however apprehensive the people were, however tenuous – NATO was to go

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20 Drew, Interview by author.
there with all possible force and ability to re-establish some stability in the country.” 21

This is obviously a departure from “classical peacekeeping” as practiced by the UN. As one scholar writes, “[e]ver since the UN effectively invented armed peacekeeping in 1956, blue helmets have relied on a trinity of principles as their conceptual body armour. The consent of the parties, the neutrality/impartiality of the peacekeepers, and their minimum or non-use of force, was meant to keep them above the conflicts that they were despatched to ameliorate or end.” 22 The advent of post-Cold War peace support operations and the involvement of other multi-national organizations like NATO in the realm of peacekeeping challenged these traditional principles of peacekeeping.

In addition to questions about new roles for peacekeepers, the issue of success in peacekeeping and the related problem of mission creep were becoming areas of concern for planners. Canada’s thirty-year role in Cyprus is a good example of this, as it has been accused of being the ultimate case of “mission creep.” Was a mission successful when the shooting stopped and a peace was maintained, or was state building also a job for peacekeepers, as it seemed to become in the former Yugoslavia? Some, like Colonel Kevin McLeod, who served in Cyprus in 1993 and 1994 and in Bosnia in 1995, believed

21 Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Grant, Interview by author (Petawawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, 23 November 1997), tape recording.
that democracy answered this question, thus putting “election supervision” on the roster of combat and contact skills required by peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{23}

New peacekeeping operations represented a widening scope of responsibility for UN peacekeepers. The CF, as a professional military, believed its troops could meet the challenge, and when speaking about the conduct of Canadian peacekeepers in their interaction with belligerents in Bosnia, Major Drew asserted that “Canadian soldiers reacted extremely professionally to any situation; less seasoned soldiers would have caused an international incident.”\textsuperscript{24} Yet international incidents have occurred, often when intra-state conflicts with few clear-cut boundaries between combatants have muddied the purpose of international peacekeeping, and soldiers have found themselves less and less prepared for the realities of peace support operations. Two UN peacekeeping operations in Africa served to underline this point to the CF, at great cost to the organization and some of its members.

In the aftermath of the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991, civil war raged in Somalia as the country descended into conflict spurred on by Somalia’s clan-based warlords. The situation was worsened by a deepening humanitarian crisis brought on by serious drought in 1992. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was created in April 1992 to monitor a cease-fire in Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, as

\textsuperscript{23} Colonel Kevin McLeod, Interview by author (Petawawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, 23 November 1997), tape recording.

\textsuperscript{24} Drew, Interview by author.
well as provide protection to UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and 
airports in Mogadishu, and to escort deliveries of humanitarian aid to distribution centres.
In August 1992 UNOSOM I’s mandate was widened to include the protection of
humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. The humanitarian
situation was thought to be so grave that it was estimated that millions of people were at
risk of starving to death, so in response to an appeal by the UN’s World Food Programme
(WFP) and the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), Canada agreed to
mount a humanitarian aid mission to provide assistance to the suffering country as
Operation RELIEF. According to historian Grant Dawson, the decision to use
peacekeepers as escorts for aid was “controversial, but the famine was so serious that it
had to proceed.” Issues arose from the “prominence of the Somalia mission’s
mandated responsibility to escort aid [which] prevented it from remaining impartial. This
prompted hostility in Somalia because the control of food was vital to the disputants’
survival and power.” From the outset, the mission in Somalia was distanced from
classical peacekeeping by the tasks it set for its peacekeepers in an extremely hostile
environment.

York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 21 March 1997),
26 Grant Dawson, “Here is Hell”: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 55.
27 Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 55.
The Canadian contribution to UNOSOM I, Operation CORDON, was debated by Canadian military leadership during this period because of a perceived weak mandate and the existence of a very fragile security situation in Somalia for what was supposed to be a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{28} The Mulroney government announced in August 1992 that it intended to send 750 soldiers to UNOSOM I for Operation CORDON.\textsuperscript{29} Dawson argues that, fairly early in the negotiations for this mission, the “UN and Canada encountered difficulty in Somalia because the situation was extremely complex and could not be resolved quickly. Decision makers’ problems were worsened because they had energetically committed to the operation without a full understanding of the risks associated with peacekeeping in the midst of a civil war, [and] of the Canadian Forces’ roles.”\textsuperscript{30} The Canadian Airborne Regiment, as the UN Standby Battalion\textsuperscript{31}, was readied for deployment in September 1992. Before it could deploy, however, the UN mission in Somalia collapsed in December 1992 and was replaced by the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF, also known as Operation Restore Hope).\textsuperscript{32} Consequently, plans were changed so that only a few Canadian staff officers would work directly with UNOSOM I and the


\textsuperscript{29} David Bercuson, \textit{Significant Incident. Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), 222.

\textsuperscript{30} Dawson, \textit{“Here is Hell”}, 110.

\textsuperscript{31} Dawson, \textit{“Here is Hell”}, 109.

\textsuperscript{32} Dawson, \textit{“Here is Hell”}, 108.
Canadian Airborne Regiment, under the name Operation DELIVERANCE, would instead be deployed to Belet Huen to work with UNITAF.  

Although the mandate of UNITAF was somewhat different from that of UNOSOM I, Dawson convincingly argues that the Mulroney government had compelling reasons to support the mission to Somalia, in whatever form it took. With UNOSOM I the government was committed to sending troops to shore up the UN mission in Somalia and show Canadians their humanitarian values in action, and once UNITAF took over the mission the government’s priority was “the management of Canada-US relations through personal diplomacy.”

Canada also wanted to exert its middle power influence by ensuring that the UN remained relevant and was not “crowded out by US unilaterism” in the coalition. Dawson, like many before him, believes that the Mulroney government and the Canadian Forces should have asked more questions about the UN’s strategy when the mission changed.

UNITAF, as a Chapter VII mission and coalition of twenty-four nations, arrived in Somalia on 9 December 1992. The expanded Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) that had been preparing for deployment with UNOSOM I began their UNITAF deployment in Belet Huen in late December 1992, numbering about 900 soldiers. Of this 900, the majority were from the Canadian Airborne Regiment,

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34 Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 96, 112.
supplemented by 130 personnel from the Royal Canadian Dragoons and smaller numbers from four additional regiments, and air-supported by eighty-nine personnel from the Tactical Helicopter Squadron from CFB Petawawa in February 1993. Combined Canadian air, sea, land and joint task force headquarters personnel constituted a total Canadian contribution of 1250 personnel.

The CARBG understood that UNITAF would incorporate robust enforcement practices in its operations, but its assignment to the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector reinforced the perception that it was being deployed to Somalia on a largely humanitarian assistance mission. The understanding was that the “Unified Task Force was a humanitarian intervention. The United States engaged because the severity of the mass starvation was so troubling and international assistance continued to be frustrated.” The purpose of the CARBG’s activities such as securing airport, seaport, key installations, and major distribution sites were all seen as contributing to the underlying goal of delivering humanitarian aid to the starving population and re-establishing the social structure of the area. Further contributing to the re-establishment of order was the CARBG’s goals of undermining the influence of local warlords, limiting

37 Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 123.
banditry, and demilitarizing local militias, again with the objective of safe delivery of aid and increasing the security of local populations to facilitate a return to normalcy.  

The training that CARBG had received in preparation for UNOSOM I, which was understood to be a typical Chapter VI mission, would prove inappropriate to the violent mission in which the Canadian contingent found itself embroiled. The unpreparedness of the CARBG and the inappropriateness of its training is highlighted by an example given by David Bercuson in his book *Significant Incident. Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*. Bercuson describes a four-day exercise mounted in October 1992, prior to the CARBG’s deployment to Somalia, to test the battle group’s preparation for the UN mission and its “newly acquired capability as a mechanized unit.” This exercise, Exercise Stalwart Providence, was run by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and the Dragoons “found that the Airborne’s security procedures were lax; it was weak on intelligence gathering; its soldiers were not yet proficient in the operation of their vehicles; its chain of command did not function properly, especially in passing information about operational procedures to the lowest ranks.” Additionally, there were other findings that suggested the Canadian Airborne Regiment was too much influenced by Ramboism for a peacekeeping mission. Airborne soldiers seemed too ready to use physical force on unarmed “Somali demonstrators”; they were too quick to charge their weapons; they often lost their temper with

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demonstrators, they seemed confused about procedures for dealing with armed versus unarmed Somalis; they were still too aggressive for the mission. This exercise took place only two months before the CARBG was deployed to Somalia and pointed to weaknesses in basic combat skills as well as a lack of understanding of the skills required for UN peacekeeping operations. These shortcomings were disastrous for the Canadian contingent in Somalia.

ROEs were also a problem for the CARBG. ROEs are provided to soldiers on aide-mémoire cards which are supposed to distill their ROEs into usable, practical guidance. The deployment of the CARBG was complicated by the fact that the aide-mémoire cards drawn up by DND, which were apparently more precise and less permissive in the use of force than those drawn up by the Airborne Regiment, were not ready in time for deployment. The battle group deployed with the Airborne cards, intending to use the DND cards once they were provided. As a result there was likely more than one version of the Canadian ROEs circulating in Somalia, with different interpretations or wording for the use of force.

Four significant incidents in 1993 tarnished the reputation of the CARBG and ultimately resulted in the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. On 17 February 1993, following attempts to deter a crowd of approximately 300 rioting Somalis

40 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 225-6.
41 Dawson, “Here is Hell”, 125-6.
at the Bailey Bridge outside of Belet Huen, Canadian soldiers shot two of the rioters, one fatally. A subsequent investigation found that the soldiers involved acted within the Canadian rules of engagement and no charges were laid. On the night of 4 March 1993, two Somali civilians tried to find a way through the fence into the Canadian compound and were shot after attempts to apprehend them failed. One intruder was wounded and the other was killed. In this case charges were laid but ultimately resulted in acquittals.

A third incident occurred on 17 March 1993 when members of the CARBG were escorting a convoy of ICRC vehicles from the Belet Huen airfield to the Red Cross compound. Upon arrival at the compound the CARBG soldiers were fired at by a Somali gunman, and the Canadians fatally shot one Somali. Again, the actions of the Canadians were judged to fall within their rules of engagement, and no charges were laid.  

The most infamous incident was the arrest and subsequent murder of a 16-year-old Somali youth, Shidane Arone. On 16 March 1993 Arone was apprehended inside the Canadian compound and placed under arrest. He was then tortured and beaten, found unconscious later that night, and ultimately pronounced dead. Seven Canadian soldiers were charged in relation to this incident; two were acquitted, one was found mentally unfit to stand trial and attempted suicide while in custody. The only person charged with second-degree murder and torture, Private Kyle Brown, was found guilty of manslaughter and torture and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and dismissal from the Canadian Forces. In the wake of these events, the CARBG, and the Canadian Forces generally,

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came under public and political scrutiny, spawning a commission of inquiry that would have far-reaching influence on the future of the CF.

These events serve to highlight the type of violent situations that Canadian soldiers faced in Somalia, and reinforced the idea that the mandates of UNOSOM I and UNITAF may not have been equal to the task of calming and rebuilding a fractured, starving Somalia. Recognizing the need for a more robust security environment, a Chapter VII mission named UNOSOM II was authorized by the Secretary General of the UN to be a successor mission to both UNITAF and UNOSOM I.

UNOSOM II was created as a multinational force, led by the United States, to take over from the temporary expedient of UNITAF in March 1993 via Security Council Resolution 814 (1993). This resolution explicitly designed UNOSOM II as a mission with an expanded force size and mandate, under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. UNOSOM II began operations on 4 May 1993 with the purpose of completing UNITAF’s task of securing an environment for delivery of humanitarian aid, achieving disarmament and reconciliation, and restoring peace, stability, law and order. Its mandate included enforcement measures, as it was tasked with activities such as monitoring the cessation of hostilities, seizing unauthorized small arms, maintaining the security of ports, airports, and lines of communications, mine-clearing, repatriating Somali refugees, assisting the Somali people to rebuild their

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economic, social and political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance, and rebuilding the infrastructure.45

UNOSOM II’s mandate was revised in February 1994 to exclude the use of coercive methods after several violent incidents and attacks on UN soldiers. The mission was withdrawn in March 1995 after its peacemaking efforts were deemed a failure by the UN, but Canada had already withdrawn its contingent in May and June 1993 in light of the incidents described above. Violent confrontation was not unknown in peacekeeping operations, but the high-profile and well-publicized actions of the CARBG drew attention to the problem of modern peace support operations as never before.

One soldier who served on UNITAF and UNOSOM II as the second-in-command of 2 Commando from December 1992 to June 1993 recalled that the contingent training for the mission included little peace support operations training, but that pre-deployment training lasted three months in the period immediately leading up to deployment. He believed that the rules of engagement, and UNOSOM II’s operation under Chapter VII, were appropriate to the situation as “anything less than a Chapter 7 mission would only put people at risk needlessly.” He felt that the instructions regarding the use of force were appropriate to the mission, as they “afforded a sense of confidence

Another Canadian soldier who participated in Operation DELIVERANCE for 6 months in 1992 as a supply technician and driver at the rank of Corporal thought that pre-deployment training could have been improved to help deal with the climate and way of life in hot countries. He believed that the orders received before leaving on the mission were clear, but “once we had arrived decisions and reactions varied depending on the situation.” In the course of his duties in Somalia he had to aim his rifle and was prepared to use it, but upon reflection thought the rules of engagement needed to be better elaborated. He also believed that there were few resources to deal with combat-related stress during his time in Somalia, and wrote that “nothing existed to deal with this.”

The triad of difficult post-Cold War missions was rounded out by a peacekeeping commitment to Rwanda that began in 1993. Fighting had broken out in October 1990 along the Uganda-Rwanda border between the Armed Forces of the Hutu government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Arusha cease-fire agreement, brokered on 22 July 1992, called for the presence of UN military observers to be provided by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Hostilities broke out again in February 1993, and Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of UN military observers. The United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was

46 Survey #49, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
47 Survey #91, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
created to monitor the border between the two countries to prevent Uganda from providing Rwanda with military assistance, and ran from June 1993 to September 1994.

The Arusha talks resumed in March 1993 and a comprehensive peace agreement was reached. Another appeal was made to the United Nations for assistance in its implementation and to restore the countries to normalcy. Security Council Resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 created the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).\(^\text{48}\) Its mandate included establishing a weapons-secure area in Kigali to ensure the capital city’s security; monitoring cease-fire agreements and the establishment of cease-fire zones; monitoring the security situation during the final stage of the transitional government’s mandate leading up to the elections; assisting with mine clearance, particularly through training programs; investigating instances of non-compliance with the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to integration of the armed forces; monitoring the repatriation of Rwandan refugees; assisting with humanitarian activities; and investigating incidents involving the gendarmerie and police.\(^\text{49}\) Canadian Brigadier-General Roméo Dallaire served as Chief Military Observer in UNOMUR from June to October 1993, when he became Force Commander with UNAMIR, the United Nations


Mission for Rwanda. Dallaire held this post until he departed Africa on 20 August 1994, and UNAMIR was officially withdrawn on 29 February 1996.

In the midst of this fraught political situation, ethnic-based conflict between the minority ruling class Tutsis and majority Hutus boiled over with the April 1994 airplane crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. This event lit a fuse in the powder keg; killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutus began shortly after word of the crash near Kigali spread. In the ensuing months UN peacekeepers witnessed genocide and atrocities carried out mainly by Rwanda’s Armed Forces, the presidential guard, and the ruling party’s youth militia. The RPF advanced from the north and east of Rwanda and government authority disappeared. When Dallaire became Force Commander of UNAMIR it had a small force of 450 members, but expanded to 5500 personnel at its height, including 300 Canadians. On 21 April 1994, after the killings had begun, the Security Council authorized a force reduction from 2548 to 270 personnel. UNAMIR personnel still protected thousands of Rwandese that sought shelter at UNAMIR sites, at great risk to themselves. By May 1994 the UN authorized an increase in troop strength to 5500, but it did not reach these levels until October. The civil war ended in July 1994 when the RPF took control of Rwanda and established a government. The new government signaled its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement and cooperation with

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UNAMIR on the return of refugees.\textsuperscript{52} The final death toll, as of October 1994, was estimated by the UN to be at least half a million people, and according to some sources was as high as 800,000 people, with approximately 2 million internally displaced persons and a further 2 million Rwandans as refugees outside the country.\textsuperscript{53}

Romeo Dallaire was Force Commander during a crucial eleven-month period from October 1993 to August 1994. He arrived in Kigali from UNOMUR on 22 October 1993 and was soon followed by an advance party of twenty-one military personnel.\textsuperscript{54} In the Introduction to his 2003 book about his time in Rwanda, Dallaire writes that

[i]t is the story of a commander who, faced with a challenge that didn’t fit the classic Cold War-era peacekeeper’s rule book, failed to find an effective solution and witnessed, as if in punishment, the loss of some of his own troops, the attempted annihilation of an ethnicity, the butchery of children barely out of the womb, the stacking of severed limbs like cordwood, the mounds of decomposing bodies being eaten by the sun. This book is nothing more nor less than the account of a few humans who were entrusted with the role of helping others taste the fruits of peace. Instead, we watched as the devil took control of paradise on earth and fed on the blood of the people we were supposed to protect.\textsuperscript{55}

Dallaire relates how, as commander of the 5ième Group Brigade Mechanisé du Canada at Valcartier, he witnessed the deployment of more than 4000 troops on peacekeeping duties around the world between 1991 and 1993, and observed that [w]e were sending our soldiers, who were ready for classic chapter-six peacekeeping missions, into a world

\textsuperscript{52} United Nations, \textit{The Blue Helmets}, 351-353.
\textsuperscript{54} United Nations, \textit{The Blue Helmets}, 344.
\textsuperscript{55} Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil}, 7.
that seemed increasingly less amenable to such interventions." Like the missions in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, UNAMIR was initiated as a classic UN peacekeeping operation whose personnel quickly encountered situations outside their mandate.

Dallaire soon encountered what he would consider one of the biggest challenges of the mission: United Nations bureaucracy. His plans for a reconnaissance mission were foiled when he was asked by the UN to fit the mission to the resources available, rather than determine what resources were necessary to fulfill the duties set out for UNAMIR. Funding was also an issue, and the mission’s early days “introduced me to begging and borrowing to a degree I’d never dreamed of.” He argued with UN headquarters over every detail of running the force, while encountering little clear direction. He haggled with UN officials over everything from “toilet paper to the form of official communiques” and, because the mission funding was not yet secure, was apparently forced to pay phone bills to New York with his personal line of credit.  

An additional challenge in Kigali was of course the presence of armed belligerents, and to deal with this factor he proposed that the mission ROEs allow “us to use force up to and including deadly force to prevent ‘crimes against humanity.’ We were breaking new ground, though we didn’t really understand it at the time. We were moving toward what would later be called “Chapter six and a half,” a whole new

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56 Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 41.
57 Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 56, 102.
approach to conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{58} Robust ROEs aside, when Dallaire tried to address the controversial presence of the Belgian contingent, who were judged to be overly-aggressive and unruly and part of the military of the former colonial presence in Rwanda, he was confronted with the very “boys will be boys” mentality he was working against in the Canadian Forces.\textsuperscript{59}

Dallaire’s interaction with the Belgian contingent was not the only challenge when managing a force composed of representatives of different nations. He extolled the professionalism of the Tunisian contingent and came to place high value on their soldiers. By contrast, he felt that the attitude of the Bangladeshi contingent, expressed by their national commander’s assertion that the protection of his soldiers should take priority over the success of the mission, was anathema to Dallaire’s training as a soldier, or as he put it, “[p]utting the safety of his soldiers above the mission was heresy in my professional ethos.”\textsuperscript{60} Forced to work with these limited resources, Dallaire did what he could to bolster the authority of UNAMIR. On April 11\textsuperscript{th}, the fifth day of the slaughter, UNAMIR was ordered to participate in the evacuation of foreign nationals, so Dallaire signed new ROEs that permitted UNAMIR troops to disarm belligerents and to intervene with force after issuing warning shots, and allowed local commanders to decide on the level of force they needed to use. He later reflected that the “question remains as to whether I had the authority to change my own ROE for the duration of an evacuation

\textsuperscript{58} Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil}, 72.
\textsuperscript{59} Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil}, 185.
\textsuperscript{60} Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil}, 152-153, 204-205.
mission. I was on the ground, I was in command, I had been given the mission and I took the decision.” 61 The evacuation of the foreign nationals acted as a signal to the génocidaires to step up their activities. In Dallaire’s view, the UN, and its Member States, bear the responsibility for what happened in Rwanda, as they made a collective decision not to prevent the genocide despite his, and others’, dire warnings.

Dallaire eloquently expressed his feelings of guilt at not being able to prevent this continued slaughter: “My own mea culpa is this: as the person charged with the military leadership of UNAMIR, I was unable to persuade the international community that this tiny, poor, overpopulated country and its people were worth saving from the horror of genocide – even then the measures needed for success were relatively small.” 62 These experiences took their toll on him, and he began to manifest the signs of combat-related stress.

By July 1994 Dallaire began to see signs of stress in himself, such as not being able to sleep, being moody, and being overtaken with daydreaming, and his subordinates recognized his deteriorating health as well. He observed that “[w]hen close subordinates realize that their commander is becoming a liability, the act of passing such information to the chain of command is not disloyal, but the epitome of loyalty. To have subordinates with the courage to act in such a way is a reward in itself.” 63 Dallaire knew he needed to

61 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 290.
62 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 515.
63 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 501.
leave Rwanda, but felt guilt over the decision. However it is difficult to judge him in light of the catalogue of horrific experiences he endured in Rwanda: he and his officers forded streams full of bodies, passed over bridges in swamps that had been lifted by the force of the bodies piling up on the struts, and walked vehicles through desperate mobs screaming for food and protection. His “courageous men had been wading through scenes such as this for weeks in order to save expatriates and members of religious orders. No wonder some of them had fallen off the face of the world and had entered a hell in their minds. We had absolutely no medication to help them.”

To make matters worse, decisions taken by UNAMIR’s peacekeepers, or ones that were taken out of their hands due to UN delays, sometimes resulted in the deaths of people that Dallaire’s peacekeepers were trying to save. They had to address the question of who to save when so many needed it: “was a VIP more important than nuns? … As men, we do not play God well, but the situation demanded that in some cases we had to choose who lived and who died.”

The nightmares did not end upon his return to Canada, and Dallaire became well-known for his struggle with PTSD, mainly due to his openness about his own experience. He vividly described how his mission in Rwanda had long-lasting effects on him personally. For example, much later back in Canada, Dallaire was taking a vacation with his family, and was

   driving down a narrow road on the way to a beach. Road workers had cut a lot of trees down on either side of the road and piled the branches up to be picked up

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64 Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 325-326.
later. The cut trees had turned brown, and the sawn ends of the trunks, white and of a fair size, were stacked facing the road. Without being able to stop myself, I described to my wife in great detail a trip I had had to make to the RPF zone, where the route had taken me through the middle of a village. The sides of the road were littered with piles upon piles of Rwandan bodies drying in the sun, white bones jutting out. I was so sorry that my children had no choice but to listen to me. When we got to the beach, my kids swam and Beth read a book while I sat for more than two hours reliving the events reawakened in my mind. What terrible vulnerability we have all had to live with since Rwanda.  

This vulnerability perhaps ran counter to the “soldiers first” ethos in that it undercut the idea that military training could prepare a soldier to deal with anything he or she encountered in theatre. However, it did reflect the reality of post-Cold War peacekeeping, in that there were situations for which no amount of training could prepare a human being.

The growing awareness that the horrors of modern peacekeeping were not so different from the horrors of war led the Canadian Forces to undertake a “stress management and awareness” program. The Canadian Forces have studied the problem of peacekeeping-related stress, and implemented programs to reduce and treat “stress casualties.” A number of factors in theatre can cause this stress, but “experts agree that the effects of stress, particularly in military situations, can be lessened by good training, cohesive units, trustworthy leaders and stable family life.”  

Actions taken by DND included understanding and measuring peacekeeping stress; screening members for their military readiness before sending them on a mission; continuing military training that

“can effectively inoculate soldiers against peacekeeping stress”; and initiating pre-deployment stress training, among other measures.68

The Canadian soldiers surveyed for this study who served in UN or NATO theatre of operations in the 1990s expressed a variety of opinions about the issue of stress management. Some indicated that they received no pre-deployment stress management training (often due to short warning periods for their deployment overseas, which indicated a short training period overall), and others said that they did receive some training and briefings on this subject, which they found useful since “coping skills are important.”69 Most indicated that, although they did not seek it out, they believed there were resources available to them in-theatre and upon return for help with combat-related stress or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).70 Interestingly, when asked the subjective question, “Were you emotionally prepared for the things you saw and did on your peacekeeping tour? Was there a period of adjustment for you upon your return? If so, how long was it?” thirty-seven of the 108 respondents (thirty-four percent) indicated that they were not emotionally prepared and required some period of adjustment, with several more indicating that although they thought they were emotionally prepared for

One tangible result is the production of training and information multimedia like the Canadian Forces-produced Witness the Evil. This documentary uses the case of Rwanda to show the possible effects of peacekeeping duties on peacekeepers. Through a combination of graphic pictures from Rwanda and the testimony of peacekeepers who served there, a feeling of the immense sense of responsibility and pressure felt by peacekeepers is communicated to the viewer. The content of videos like this one are accurate and honest about the conditions peacekeepers face in theatre and the impact of such conditions. They also transmit the idea that there is no shame in the inability to cope on one’s own with the psychological consequences of peacekeeping duties.
69 Survey #1, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
70 Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations, passim.
their peacekeeping tours, they required a period of reintegration upon return to Canada. Respondents cited having to stand by while civilians were slaughtered, viewing mass graves, and being amongst crushing poverty as stressors in peacekeeping missions.\footnote{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations, passim.}

Tellingly, one person pointed out that “It’s not always what we see and do in these places that is hard to accept. Sometimes it’s why they won’t let us do anything about what we see.”\footnote{Survey #37, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.} As one survey respondent stated, “I was not prepared for the PTSD. It took me about 1 year to get back to almost normal. In some ways I am still not back to normal.”\footnote{Survey #65, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.}

When asked about reintegration briefings, a majority indicated that there were no formal “briefings” but often informal meetings. A Captain who had served on the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a year from 1992 to 1993 recalled thinking it was strange that he had no reintegration briefing: “I returned from spending 12 months in the Sahara Desert and no one wanted to debrief me!”\footnote{Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.} Another soldier who served on four peacekeeping missions between 1975 and 1999 wrote sarcastically “what reintegration briefings?” but noted that “[w]e all had to see the Doc, Padre, and collectively the Commanding Officer spoke to us.” By contrast, for his service during Op Apollo in support of US military operations in Afghanistan,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[71] Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations, passim.
\item[72] Survey #37, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
\item[73] Survey #65, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
\item[74] Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
\end{footnotes}
“[t]here were 5 formal briefings for the … soldiers. They hated them. Too much.”\textsuperscript{75}

Another respondent indicated that there were no reintegration briefings for his missions prior to 1990, but that he did receive counseling sessions in theatre and was asked if “everything was okay” after returning from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in late 1999. He felt that he “had more than enough help to return to normal life and duty.”\textsuperscript{76}

Both of these survey respondents, despite witnessing mass graves, plane crashes, and refugee exoduses, felt that they were prepared for their time on peacekeeping tours and did not experience any reintegration stress or experienced PTSD as a result of their peacekeeping experiences. One advantage mentioned was that those who had pre-deployment stress management training were trained to recognize signs of stress in others as well as themselves. One soldier in a leadership role between 1996 and 1999 related that “I found these resources useful … [p]re-deployment briefings were in place and useful in helping watch my soldiers for signs of problems and be able to ensure proper support as required.”\textsuperscript{77} That meant that, although many of the survey respondents relayed the stoic attitude of “nothing I have seen or experienced has ever bothered me”\textsuperscript{78} when discussing stress and combat-related trauma, the possibility existed that soldiers would be aware of warning signs in others deployed alongside them.

\textsuperscript{75} Survey #1, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations}.
\textsuperscript{76} Survey #2, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations}.
\textsuperscript{77} Survey #4, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations}.
\textsuperscript{78} Survey #41, \textit{Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations}.
In some cases, however, soldiers did reveal that they experienced signs of stress during and upon return from peacekeeping operations, even if they were subtle. After serving in the Canadian Contingent to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia (CCSFOR) in 1997 and 1999-2000, a soldier described how he received reintegration briefings related to family and home life to help reintegrate with his family and friends in an environment that may have changed while he was away: “a small thing, like the furniture in the living room might be rearranged. This process aids you and your family in that you do not upset the balance of your family life during your absence.”79 Both the home life and the soldier himself may have changed during a deployment. The same individual believed it was impossible to be prepared to deal with everything while on tour in a foreign country.

It all depends on what you are exposed to and how you handle the situation. In Bosnia, you think about landmines because there were so many due to the civil war, all along the side of the road and throughout the countryside. So when you leave the base (which I had to do on almost a daily basis) you don’t step on to any surface that is not solid, for a while when you get back to Canada you think of stuff like that, you can walk in a field or even on grass and not have to worry. You don’t pick anything up on tour, for fear of booby trapping, you think of this stuff for a while.80

There is anecdotal evidence that the evolving system of stress-management training was helping to recognize and treat signs of stress among CF members who served on peacekeeping missions post-Cold War. One CF member who was deployed to Bosnia in 1992, 1994, and 1997, and to Kosovo in 1999, was skeptical about the utility of

79 Survey #7, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
80 Survey #7, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
reintegration briefings, specifying that they were useful from an administrative standpoint but

I don’t know how much the return program has helped me … emotionally, it only covers [the cases] who are so obviously troubled they can’t be missed. Later, if the guy hasn’t lied to the system, he or she may get noticed for problems. I don’t know of any person who has had the system catch a potential problem. … there is an accumulative stress that cannot be overcome by preparation. … in the latter tours they had [PTSD] experts to assist us. In the beginning, no. I felt that we were well briefed to do what was needed to get ourselves squared away after tour. The special help channels were in place. Initially, we saw a lot of guys who fell apart because of two factors, the tour and the way their life was structured to fail due to personal problems such as alcohol or marriage or personality traits. Now, we see fewer disasters after tour.\textsuperscript{81}

The increase in rotations, particularly in the case of the mission in Bosnia, meant that CF members were accumulating peacekeeping experience faster than ever. But keeping pace with this increased activity was a recognition that resources needed to be in place to address the “accumulative stress” that frequent deployments put on an individual. It seems that, while not a perfect record, CF personnel were aware that resources were available and perhaps having some impact on the lives of returning soldiers.

Three Canadian Forces members who served in Rwanda have interesting observations about the immediate and long-term effects of their time with UNAMIR, and whether their training adequately prepared them for events that occurred during their deployment. A Captain who served in Somalia for six months (date unspecified) and Rwanda for six months (date unspecified) indicated that in both cases he received a few

\textsuperscript{81} Survey #62, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
weeks’ training on customs and culture, the mandate, mine awareness, and first aid refresher with an emphasis on sickness to be met in theatre, and thought that this training complemented basic training. He indicated that the ROEs for Somalia were modified a “few times” during his tour. While he thought that the rules governing the use of force were appropriate to the situations he encountered in Rwanda because “they conformed to Canadian and to Red Cross values,” he felt that those governing the use of force in Somalia were not appropriate as they did not always conform to these same values. He also indicated that “[i]n Somalia, I disobeyed the orders of the ROE that did not conform and I modified the orders for my platoon.” He thought that it was impossible to prepare for everything seen in theater, such as “mass graves, children,” and shared that he was diagnosed with PTSD ten years after Somalia and seven years after his return from Rwanda.  

A female medical technician who served in Rwanda for three months in 1994 as a Private indicated that she received two weeks of training on general information related to the country and climate. She thought the ROEs governing the use of force were not appropriate for Rwanda, as “with the genocide, there was much hostility with the army and civilians.” She did not feel that she was prepared for conditions in the host country, particularly because, as a medical technician given just two weeks’ preparation, there was no time to practice medical scenarios that might occur in theatre. Upon her return, there was no reintegration briefing, and she “had just my close family to confide in.” Finally,

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82 Survey #83, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
she asserted that “you are never prepared as a soldier for what happens during a genocide.

Yes, I talked very much with my family. Several months. 83 She alluded to the fact that
her reintegration took a long period of time, which indicates that she was not simply able
to shed her experiences upon her return to Canada.

Another Canadian Forces member deployed to Rwanda from November 1994 to
February 1995 was employed as a driver and one of his tasks was to transport refugees in
refugee camps. He stated that “I received no training. I was called to replace someone
else on very short notice (one week) … I never even had the chance to know the
difference between a Hutu and a Tutsi.” In reference to the ROEs, he explained that there
was a lot of insistence on the rules of engagement. We had the impression that
we would have to have a death in our camps before we would defend ourselves
with force … and we knew that if we were to use our weapons there was a good
chance we would end up at a court martial… best not to use our weapons. … In
Rwanda, the earth was still red with blood, and the local armies made sure we
knew that. 84

This combination of a severe restriction on the use of force and the presence of armed
belligerents meant that “the local Rwandan army knew very well that we were not
permitted to use our weapons. When we went into town (Kigali), our security diminished
significantly.” Fearing for their own safety no doubt made it difficult for UNAMIR
peacekeepers to carry out the mission’s mandate. This soldier concluded that

83 Survey #68, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
84 Survey #86, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
no one could ever truly be ready for what is in these countries. It took me a certain time to readjust to the culture at home. ... For Rwanda, I was the only one in my unit during that period (North Bay). My deployment was rapid and, at my return, I had one month of vacation as well as a few visits to the hospital in Ottawa. Once I was back in North Bay, it was as if nothing had happened.  

The intersection of ROEs, restrictive guidelines on the use of force, and the expectation that a soldier be stoic in the face of indescribable horror has grave implications for the soldiers expected to keep the peace in far-flung nations, and for the success of the peacekeeping missions on which they serve. This was cast in sharp relief in the immediate post-Cold War era, and personified by the actions of two generals in the middle of peacekeeping war zones.

Carol Off, in her book *The Lion, The Fox & The Eagle. A story of generals and justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia*, argues that the Lion of the story, Dallaire, was heroic in his attempts to stop the slaughter in Rwanda, as “Dallaire saw horror coming down the rails like a speeding train, and he tried to recruit the UN in a bid to stop it.” By contrast, the Fox, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who was a sector commander at the start of UNPROFOR, is harshly judged by Off for discouraging more robust UN intervention to stop the ethnic cleansing taking place in the Former Yugoslavia. These two generals, plucked from the same Canadian military system and, as Off points out, the

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85 Survey #86, *Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations*.
same peacekeeping tradition, hold very divergent views of the role of a commander, and of peacekeeping and the need for peacekeeping training for military forces.

Dallaire has been publicly vocal, both in his book and other mediums, about the need for realistic pre-deployment training for peacekeeping and advocated strongly for additional stress-management and PTSD resources to be put into place for Canadian Forces members after his experiences in Rwanda. MacKenzie, in a survey he completed for this study, related his contrasting opinion that “there was very little training needed” for his time on peacekeeping missions throughout his career, which included tours in UNEF I, the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam, UNEF II, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), and UNPROFOR, and multiple tours in UNFICYP. He believed that his training as a soldier adequately prepared him, and in commenting about the lack of reintegration briefings available to him he stated: “None requested and none needed – the experts I respect say revisiting the chaos is the worst thing one can do. Suck it up and get on with the rest of your life!” He concluded that there was “no need to emphasize “peacekeeping” training as the task is a sideline activity. Train as soldiers first – other activities when required.”

The “soldiers first” ethos is evident here, as MacKenzie clearly argues for the maintenance of military skills above any mission-specific training that might be required. He asserts that the missions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War are erroneously termed “peacekeeping” as they are far more complex than classical

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peacekeeping, with few exceptions, yet he denies any real need for training beyond standard military training to cope with the demands of these missions.

The contrast between the two Generals could not be more stark, and one wonders what Dallaire would make of MacKenzie’s assertion that it is a bad idea to “revisit the chaos” when it seems that, in Dallaire’s case, the chaos was ever-present for him. Another Canadian General, Major General Andrew Leslie, felt he was prepared for the events he witnessed on peacekeeping tours to varying degrees. As he stated in March 2005, his experience in UNFICYP in 1986 was “fine,” his experience in Croatia in 1995 was “bad, lots of dead people,” whereas his deployment to Bosnia also in 1995 was fine in comparison. His later experiences fighting the war in Afghanistan were “not fine but by then [he] had seen much worse.” He reflected that there was always a period of adjustment upon return from deployment, and that after a period of frenzied activity it felt like a return to nothing. He also indicated a more thorough level of training than that indicated by Dallaire, perhaps suggesting that, although each mission had its challenges, he was better inoculated against the horrors of modern peacekeeping operations.

The missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda constituted a new type of peacekeeping in which humanitarian concerns ranked as high as maintaining

89 MacKenzie’s book, Peacekeeper. Road to Sarajevo, discusses the point that his experiences in the Former Yugoslavia were often complicated by the presence of a multi-national force in a region wracked by political, national, and ethnic rivalries, in the middle of a situation that was not peaceful in the least. Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper. Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & MacIntyre, 1993).
90 General Andrew Leslie, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 14 March 2005), Tape recording.
cease-fire lines, and peacekeepers were confronted with gross human rights violations, genocide, and a lack of respect for international law. Given its decades of accumulated peacekeeping experience, and with intra-state conflicts looming on the horizon, the UN sought to provide the countries that furnished its peacekeeping contingents with general guidelines for the preparation of peacekeepers. In February 1991 the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations disseminated the UN document *Training Guidelines for National or Regional Training Programmes* to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and the Department of External Affairs for feedback.  

This document was designed to provide high-level guidance on how to prepare national soldiers for peacekeeping duty under the auspices of the UN, and was produced as a result of the 8 December 1989 General Assembly Resolution 44/49 on the “Comprehensive Review on the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.” Topics covered in this manual were background to UN peacekeeping, including the UN Charter, ROEs, geopolitical briefings, the study of the mandate and mission, and administrative matters; weapon training and familiarity with theatre weapons, vehicles, and equipment; general military training areas such as physical training, map reading, communications, first aid, hygiene, and sanitation; training in UN operating techniques such as positions and observation posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and searches, patrolling, investigation, negotiations/liaison; use of force, and leadership; safety measures and precautions; and

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92 *The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Training Guidelines for National or Regional Training Programs*, 4.
specialized training in areas such as driving, helicopter, training, language training, and explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal.\footnote{The Secretary-General of the United Nations, \textit{Training Guidelines for National or Regional Training Programs}, 1-3.} The communication between the Permanent Mission in New York, NDHQ, and the Department of External Affairs on the matter of peacekeeping training underscored its emerging importance and demonstrated that there was an attempt to synchronize national training guidelines with international ones.

Another example of consultation between Canada and the UN on matters related to peacekeeping was the 14 April 1992 Report of the Secretary General titled \textit{Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects} of 14 April 1992, which includes a submission from Canada.\footnote{Report of the Secretary General, \textit{Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects} (Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly of the United Nations: 14 April 1992), Report \# A/AC.121/39/Rev. 1.} As part of this review process, the Chief Review Services of DND scheduled a military review in 1989/1990 of the Canadian Forces’ participation in peacekeeping operations. The ensuing report included scant few details about training, because, as it stated,

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there are no published guidelines or standards for training in preparation for peacekeeping operations. DPKO has developed a six day course for United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and a 10 day training and orientation course is conducted at Base Montreal for personnel selected for service with UNDOF. It is a popular view of NDHQ and Command staffs that general military training is sufficient for personnel preparing for peacekeeping operations. Experience has shown that there is a requirement for specialist training in such areas as Military Observer methods, supply, finance and reorientation training for the soldier who is to be deployed in the Cyprus type situation. There is also the
\end{quote}
need for a thorough orientation training program for officers which deals with their specific mission and mandate. These training requirements should be recorded and published in the form of training guidance and standards.\textsuperscript{95}

The only specific instance of training that was evaluated in this review was UNMO training for service with ONUCA, with the exception of specialist training for groups such as aircrew and groundcrew for helicopter squadrons. The UNMO training for ONUCA was “less than adequate. UNMOs were briefed based on the experiences of UNMOs deployed in the Middle East. While this training covered the basic principles and method of operation of UNMOs, it did little to prepare the officers for service in the Central American situation.”\textsuperscript{96} At the time of the training ONUCA had not yet commenced operation, so UNMOs were briefed on a possible concept of operations that was not fully developed, with insufficient background information on the mandate. The review concluded that “consequently, the UNMOs arrived in Central America with little knowledge of the mandate and what was expected of them in support of the mandate and concept of operations.”\textsuperscript{97} Training for peacekeeping, when it occurred in the Canadian Forces, was still a sporadic, \textit{ad hoc} affair.

Scrutiny of peacekeeping and peacekeeping training on the part of the defence establishment was matched by attention from other sectors of government. Concern over

\textsuperscript{95} Chief Review Services, Department of National Defence, \textit{Military Review 1/90 Peacekeeping Operations Final Report, 1850-1/90 (CRS)} (Ottawa: 15 April 1992), v/x.


“new” peacekeeping requirements manifested itself in two reports generated by Senate Standing Committees, and a third commissioned by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. All drew attention to the fact that, although Canadian peacekeepers had performed reasonably well in peace support operations by relying on their basic military training and occupational skills, additional skills and training reform were needed in the wake of events in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

The first of these reports, the March 1993 Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*, asserted that “a major theme which has emerged in recent UN discussions on peacekeeping operations has been the need for training for peacekeeping.”98 The report stated clearly that peacekeeping was a derived task of the Canadian Forces, not a primary role, yet the “armed forces have stated that they are able to provide highly trained, experienced, and self-sustaining forces – trained as “soldiers first” – capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military activities.”99 The report, citing the conclusions of the internal DND study on peacekeeping that “the best peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor or airman, one who knows his or her trade,” agreed with the “Canadian Forces’ contention that well-trained peacekeepers require general purpose


combat capabilities and believes that this type of training is of primary importance.” 100

*Meeting New Challenges* concluded that peacekeeping was a derivative task of the military, and agreed that military training was the best core training for peacekeepers.

Nevertheless, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs identified several areas in which training could be improved or implemented for peacekeeping purposes, including: mediation and conflict resolution techniques; an introduction to the UN system and the UN Charter; UN command and control structures; an overview of peacekeeping activities; mission security and defence; emergency procedures; the proper conduct of a Canadian soldier in a multinational force; the importance of the roles of civilians in “peacebuilding” initiatives; humanitarian aid; neutrality; impartiality; and cultural sensitivity and mission-specific topics such as the history, tradition, and culture of the country to which they are being sent. 101 Also on that list was a recommendation for the establishment of a Canadian peacekeeping centre to contribute to the standardization of the quality and duration of training for peacekeeping. This would be a huge task for any organization to undertake, but the Standing Committee was firm in its argument that, if Canada was to continue to participate in peacekeeping and maintain its exemplary record, it would have to reconsider the way its armed forces were trained.

With regard to the provision of mission-specific training such as cultural sensitivity and basic language instruction, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs

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100 The Senate of Canada, *Meeting New Challenges*, 11.
was alarmed at the “*ad hoc*, last-minute approach to something as fundamental as the ability to act effectively within a political/cultural milieu entirely different from Canada’s.”¹⁰² There is evidence of this last-minute approach to peacekeeping in the January 1992 deployment of Andrew Chaplin to Operation MATCH as part of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) as a United Nations Military Observer. Having first heard that he may have been going to El Salvador ten days earlier, he found himself on a plane bound for that country on 25 January 1992. In the intervening time, he encountered confusion over whether he was actually going or not, mix-ups in his inoculation orders, and difficulties in obtaining the proper kit and documentation.¹⁰³ There is no reference to training anywhere in the diary he kept during this time. It seems that the *ad hoc* feature persisted, making the ensuing debate over the nature of mission-specific training relevant.

A flurry of studies was produced following the *Meeting New Challenges* report. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) issued its own report in June 1993, titled *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping*. This report devoted an entire chapter to training and cemented several ideas circulating at the time, including the notions that existing training needed to be formalized and the creation of a permanent peacekeeping training facility would benefit the Canadian Forces. The underlying argument, however, was that

traditional military training was the best foundation for peacekeeping, and these skills should be supplemented by peacekeeping-specific skills, not supplanted by them. This “soldiers first” stance that persisted throughout the 1990s has roots in the earliest peacekeeping missions.

The SCONDVA report reiterated the “soldiers first” ethos in a quote from Admiral John Anderson, then Chief of Defence Staff. Anderson claimed that “[t]he best trained peacekeeper is still a well-trained and well-equipped member of the military.” Yet the SCONDVA report expressed impatience with the CF’s insistence on that notion. While it was acknowledged as basically true, the denial on the part of military planners of the need of any additional skills outside the scope of traditional military training was starting to infuriate those who read headlines about the war-like situations into which Canadian soldiers were being sent under the banner of peacekeeping. After hearing testimony from military officials that the ability to efficiently perform peacekeeping duties stemmed pre-eminently from basic military training, the Standing Committee issued a testy retort:

Thus, according to the Department of National Defence, if general purpose forces can properly perform their duties in peacekeeping operations and conventional military operations which may still be required, there is no need to change the forces’ orientation and transform them into exclusively peacekeeping specialists. Further, if general purpose military training is enough to enable Canadian military personnel to carry out duties as Blue Berets, specialized peacekeeping training,


apart from periodic training in general operations or the next operation in particular, would, in their view, be superfluous.\textsuperscript{106}

While agreeing that there was still an operational need for versatile military forces to take part in the heaviest combat or most pacific peacekeeping operations on limited notice, SCONDVA felt that there was room for improvement in a training system they judged to be of high quality, and that this could be done without robbing the Canadian Forces of their military capabilities.\textsuperscript{107}

SCONDVA agreed with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on many points. It also saw a need for a permanent peacekeeping training centre, and for the training to be systematic, not \textit{ad hoc} or given on an uneven basis.\textsuperscript{108} SCONDVA recognized the “tradition within the Canadian Forces whereby personnel with peacekeeping experience pass on lessons learned in previous operations by word of mouth.”\textsuperscript{109} This was standard operating procedure in the past, but it was no longer enough. SCONDVA was suggesting the institutionalization of the processes by which peacekeeping knowledge and experience was transmitted.

Those who argued for the need to implement peacekeeping-specific training in the Canadian Forces received qualified support from the 1994 \textit{White Paper on Defence}. The Chrétien government’s \textit{White Paper} solidified the decision to remain active in

\textsuperscript{106} The Senate of Canada, \textit{The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper}, 22.
\textsuperscript{107} The Senate of Canada, \textit{The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper}, 25.
\textsuperscript{108} The Senate of Canada, \textit{The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper}, 24-25.
\textsuperscript{109} The Senate of Canada, \textit{The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper}, 25.
peacekeeping missions throughout the 1990s, and this commitment would likely require
Canadian soldiers to possess both contact and combat skills. The White Paper reiterated
that
the Government believes that combat training – undertaken on a national basis as well as with allies – remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions. In situations short of war, such training equips Canadian Forces personnel with the complete range of skills that may be needed to meet the varied demands of the unexpected situations they will encounter.110

In promising that “Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of
peacekeeping training,” DND acknowledged the value of cultural sensitivity training,
instruction in international humanitarian law, and dispute resolution training prior to
deployment, but gave them little attention in favour of combat skills.

The continuing deficiencies of the Canadian peacekeeping training program were
highlighted in Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations, a late 1993 Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff study that met the question of the effectiveness of CF
peacekeeping training head on, and attempted to provide solutions.111 This document
was given to environment Command Headquarters with the instruction to implement its
directives upon receipt. Because “the effectiveness of CF peacekeeping training has been
questioned,” specifically by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans
Affairs, one recommendation resulting from this brief was that a review should be done

of peacekeeping training requirements.\textsuperscript{112} This review was commissioned, and the results appeared in \textit{A Report on a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Study to Determine Training Requirements for Canadian Forces Peacekeepers}, authored by M.K. Bitten and published on 29 March 1996. This study made its recommendations based on the results of focus group discussions and 250 responses to a questionnaire. The overall conclusion of the study was that

> there is a clear requirement for peacekeeping and mission specific training over and above normal combat and occupational training...[also] common standards have not been developed and the quality, comprehensiveness and availability of current training is inconsistent and, in specific areas, inadequate.\textsuperscript{113}

Yet the Canadian Forces still maintained its viewpoint that “the best core trainer for [peacekeeping duties] is general purpose military training, with emphasis on basic combat and specific-to-occupation skills.”\textsuperscript{114} This, coupled with annual and pre-deployment refresher training, fulfilled most of the training requirement for UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, there was recognition of the need for additional training in UN peacekeeping and mission-specific subjects.

The Bitten study identified a list of thirteen objectives that should be met by additional training for peacekeeping, among which were thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement and the skills of mediation and negotiation. In addition, post-deployment debriefing sessions for returning personnel needed to be consistent in quality

\textsuperscript{112} Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, \textit{Training for Peacekeeping Operations} (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 29 December 1993). This document was simply the order to conduct the study.

\textsuperscript{113} M.K. Bitten, \textit{A Report on a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Study to Determine Training Requirements for Canadian Peacekeepers} (Canada: Prepared for the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, 29 March 1996), Executive Summary.

\textsuperscript{114} Bitten, \textit{Training Requirements for Canadian Peacekeepers}, Executive Summary.
and availability. Bitten also argued that “although opinion is divided on the severity of
the problems caused by stress, training in stress awareness and management is an
essential requirement.”

Making stress awareness a training requirement implicitly
made the point that, in hostile theatres of operations, the old peacekeeping ethic could no
longer hold sway. In the days of classic peacekeeping before the end of the Cold War,
vigor and stress were not unknown, but they were usually sporadic and short-lived.
More recent peacekeeping theatres exposed peacekeepers to horrors and prolonged
stressful situations that required them to be equipped with coping mechanisms.

Responding to this “new peacekeeping,” the CF started putting its new
peacekeeping ethic into writing in the mid-1990s, through a series of DCDS
“Instructions” issued by National Defence Headquarters on the training and screening
processes for peacekeepers. While still agreeing that core military training was the best
preparation for peacekeepers, these new directives decided it was better to err on the side
of caution and recommended additional training in areas like mediation and conflict
resolution techniques; an introduction to the UN system and the UN Charter; UN
command and control structures; an overview of peacekeeping activities; mission security
and defence; emergency procedures; the proper conduct of a Canadian soldier in a
multinational force; the importance of the roles of civilians in “peacebuilding” initiatives;
humanitarian aid; impartiality; and cultural sensitivity and mission-specific topics such as
the history, tradition and culture of the country to which they were being sent.

115 Bitten, Training Requirements for Canadian Peacekeepers, 6.
In May of 1996 the training of peacekeepers once again came under scrutiny, in the *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons – Peacekeeping*. This report concluded that pre-deployment training was indeed improving, but that an adequate system to standardize this training was still needed.\(^\text{116}\) To achieve some measure of consistency in training for peacekeeping, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, in December of 1996, issued two DCDS “Instructions” on the training and screening processes for peacekeepers. These were *NDHQ Instruction DCDS 4/96, Screening, Preparation and Training of Individuals for Peace Support Operations* and *NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96, Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations*, followed two years later by *DCDS Direction to Commanders of Operational Deployments*, dated June 1998.\(^\text{117}\) These represent a comprehensive attempt on the part of the Department of National Defence to implement the recommendations made by the various parliamentary Committees and internal departmental studies. They also went a long way to integrating the combat and contact skills into a single skill set that, at that point in time, seemed appropriate for peacekeeping duty.


The section of DCDS 4/96 that deals with pre-deployment training begins with a familiar refrain, but with a new twist:

The best core training for peace support operations is general purpose military training with emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills. Prior to deployment, refresher training may be required to ensure currency and proficiency in these skills. There is also a requirement to augment them with additional, mission-specific knowledge and to ensure that deploying personnel are thoroughly briefed on operational and administrative aspects.\textsuperscript{118}

This Instruction carefully sets out the criteria for prerequisite training and qualifications, as well as the required mission-specific training. Mandatory refresher or prerequisite training for any UN peace support operations posting must include: weapons handling; NBCD (nuclear, biological, and chemical defence); first aid; physical fitness; and driving. The entire scope of pre-deployment training must also encompass the following mission specific subjects, if they are applicable to the peace support operation: mine awareness; routine personal survival skills; enhanced first aid; preventive medicine measures; operation and maintenance of equipment; intervention between hostile factions; equipment recognition; conduct of investigations; monitoring for violations; operation of communications equipment; navigation; media relations; relationships with governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in peace support operations; stress management; and use of force.\textsuperscript{119} These categories are repeated in DCDS 5/96. The articulation of a decisive agenda for peace support operations training was an important step in beginning the standardization of this training. Equally important were the

\textsuperscript{118} Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96, 3.
\textsuperscript{119} Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, NDHQ Instruction DCDS 4/96, 3-7.
initiatives to begin addressing relatively new issues in peacekeeping, such as civil-military cooperation, stress-awareness training, the ever-concerning ROEs, and peacekeeping training centres.

The studies and reports discussed above resulted in some concrete changes to the way in which Canadian soldiers were prepared to keep the peace. The CF and the Department of National Defence undertook the implementation of a number of the recommendations made by the studies and reports outlined above. A key example was the creation of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPC) and the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). Two permanent centres were established in the 1990s under the authority of the CF to implement recommended changes to peacekeeping training and to direct its development. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (which became known as the Pearson Centre in 2012) grew out of a request from the UN that member states establish regional and national peacekeeping training centres and the SCONDVA recommendation for a permanent peacekeeping training centre. The proposal A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre detailed a plan for the cost-effective conversion of CFB Cornwallis in Clementsport, Nova Scotia into this centre, with the intent to train Canadian and international civilians and military personnel for peacekeeping duties. The proposed curriculum specified the form and content, in

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general terms, that courses at the centre would take. The peacekeeping training program, which would include briefings, lectures, and field training and simulations, would cover topics such as UN and peacekeeping operations; political and security considerations; information on the responsibilities and tasks of a UN peacekeeper; briefings on the conditions under which UN service is performed; and training for the role likely to be assigned, and would emphasize lessons learned from previous operations; techniques and requirements of current operations; survival and first-aid; and conflict resolution skills in mediation, negotiation and de-escalation. Additional topics would include how to function as part of a multinational force and how to respect the customs and habits of the local population, and mission-specific or role-specific courses would also be offered.  

The centre was established by the Government of Canada in 1994 to “support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability.” It was responsible for initiating the “New Peacekeeping Partnership,” a term it applied to organizations and individuals who worked together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. It included the military; civil police; government and non-government agencies dealing with human rights and humanitarian assistance; politicians and diplomats; the media; and organizations sponsoring development and  

The PPC, as it became known, offered two foundational courses, the “Basic Course” which was classroom-based and introduced students to the basic tenets of peacekeeping and the New Peacekeeping Partnership; and the “Advanced Course,” which was a four-week long course of study that took a multifaceted approach to peacekeeping training. Among other methods, it delved into conceptual issues in peacekeeping in a classroom setting, examined case studies of missions, held class exercises in conflict mediation, hosted expert guest lecturers, and had the participants conduct a field study through travel to UN headquarters in New York and to an active UN mission. This author attended the Basic Course and Advanced Course in 1999, and traveled to the NATO mission in Bosnia as part of the field work. The coursework was rigorous, and covered a great breadth of topics, as indicated by the list above. The 1994 Blueprint emphasized the desirability of attracting foreign participation, and in that the PPC appears to have been a success as there were far more international students on these courses than Canadian attendees.

Over the course of its lifespan, the PPC trained 18,000 civilians, police, and military from more than 150 countries. In 2011, its operations were moved from CFB

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Cornwallis and continued on a smaller scale from offices in Ottawa. In 2012 it lost its $4 million core funding from the federal government, and shut its doors in the fall of 2013.

126 Alex Morrison, President of the PPC from 1994 to 2001, believes it was a mistake to move the centre from Cornwallis. As he said in October 2013, “[t]he government has seen fit to reduce Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping. However, simply because we’re not contributing thousands of peacekeepers around the world as we used to is no reason not to continue to pass on the Canadian experience and expertise to other countries.”

127 While Canada has lost this capacity, it has retained the ability to pass on peacekeeping expertise among its own military personnel.

The Peace Support Training Centre was a member of the New Peacekeeping Partnership, and is a component of the broader education and training program encompassed by the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC), which was the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) until its renaming in 2013. 128 Established in 1996 at Canadian Forces Base Kingston, the Peace Support Training Centre provides operational training for Canadian Forces and other personnel prior to


128 The CADTC is comprised of its Headquarters, the PSTC, the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (CACSC), the Army’s Combat Training Centre (CTC), and the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC). CADTC Headquarters is tasked with providing strategic staff support to the Commander of the Canadian Army and staff support to the Formation Commander. The strategic staff includes the Directorate of Army Doctrine; the Directorate of Army Training; the Army Lessons Learned Centre; the Directorate of Land Synthetic Environment; and the Army Digitization Office Kingston. Canadian Army, “Doctrine and Training,” (Canada: Government of Canada, 13 December 2013), http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/doctrine-training/index.page.
deployment to peace support operations, and is a place to “train the trainers.”

The PSTC was highlighted by more than one DND survey respondent in this study as a centre of excellence for peacekeeping training, while the PPC was not mentioned at all in the 108 survey responses. In one respondent’s opinion, “the people working at the PSTC in Kingston are awesome, this is a really good idea, and I’m very happy that the DCDS has mandated that everyone will attend prior to deployment.”

Major Luiz Araujo, Chief Instructor at the PSTC in 1999, said that the centre aimed to teach personnel non-traditional military subjects, but that the best basis for good peacekeepers is a soldier properly trained in military skills. In his view, peace support operations training coupled with basic military training resulted in the best peacekeeper. There was a growing consensus in the 1990s among military personnel and in military establishments in Canada that this was indeed the best formula for a peacekeeper, and it was reflected in training policy. Major Araujo did, however, have a word of caution for those who believed it was possible to train a peacekeeper to be prepared for any situation. He believed that “you can never be prepared for what you’re going to face in theatre; … you are not prepared to deal with the horrors of war until you physically are there [and] you can’t ever be emotionally prepared for what you will

129 Peace Support Training Centre, Information Pamphlet and 1999 Course Calendar; Military Observer Course and Basic Peace Support Operations Course (Kingston: Peace Support Training Centre, 1999).
130 Survey #4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
131 Major Luiz Araujo, “Chief Instructor at the Canadian Armed Forces Peace Support Training Centre,” Interview by author (Ottawa/Kingston Ontario: University of Ottawa, 5 August 1999), transcript of telephone interview.
see.” Despite this challenge, the PSTC aimed to provide non-traditional and mission-specific training “to provide a nucleus of expertise within the CF responsible for the development of peace support techniques based on lessons learned, training methodology, training standards and the provision of training and training support.”

On a visit to the PSTC in 2004, the author was able to observe the facilities used to run the Basic and Military Observer resident courses at the PSTC, and learn about their programs. PSTC curriculum covers the following areas: Peace Support Operations, general; mission and mission area information; Military Observer duties; mine awareness; risks and threats; negotiation and mediation skills; preventive medicine; stress management; media awareness; code of conduct/Law of Armed Conflict; application of force and ROEs; and administration, benefits, and allowances. The PSTC also focused on providing training assistance to DND, other government departments, and in some cases other countries, as well as further developing the curricula for pre-deployment training.

Major Serge Boissoneault, a Chief Trainer at the PSTC in 2004 and veteran of several peacekeeping operations with thirty years of service, observed that when he first joined the CF he would go on occasional courses and refresher training for combat capabilities, but this was all the training he received for peacekeeping duties. This

132 Araujo, Interview by author.
134 Peace Support Training Centre, “Canadian Forces Pre-Deployment Training.”
changed in the 1990s when the DCDS saw the need for mission-specific training, and once the PSTC was stood up in 1996, it was determined that every member of the CF would receive peace support training in the form of the seven-day basic course from the PSTC. The training was only valid for one year after deployment with the exception of the military observer course, which is valid for life except for any mission-specific details it included. The PSTC employed a group of core trainers as well as guest speakers for course delivery. It has outdoor training areas that include two observation posts, a mine awareness training area with a “minefield,” a trip wire area in a forest, booby-trapped houses, and a sandbox for wintertime mine probing. The PSTC also has a collection of foreign weapons for familiarization purposes. The main difference between the PPC and the PSTC was that the PPC operated at the operational and strategic level, while the PSTC tends to focus on the tactical level.  

The PPC and the PSTC were created in an environment of scrutiny of the Canadian Forces and its training and indoctrination systems. Following the shocking revelations of the actions of Canadian soldiers in Somalia in early 1993, the Canadian public as well as members of the government of Canada erupted in debate over the state of the CF. In the House of Commons, the opposition parties challenged the abilities of the Mulroney government and its Defence Minister, Kim Campbell, to effectively deal with the crisis and reform a military that was seen as badly damaged by some. Debates

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from April 1993 that occurred shortly after the Somalia Affair became public knowledge, illuminate the environment of accusation and concern that this debacle caused in government circles. Lloyd Axworthy, at that time Liberal MP for Winnipeg South Centre, accused the government of a cover-up and expressed his conviction that the inquiry being set up to investigate the Airborne’s actions in Somalia would not have all the information available to it that it would need. Axworthy worried that the “Canadian peacekeeping reputation [was] at risk and at jeopardy,” and believed that “the department and the minister have also clearly failed to train and prepare our forces for that very difficult assignment.”

The question of training came to the fore in these debates, as did the CF’s “soldier’s first” stance. Axworthy was skeptical of witnesses such as General Lewis Mackenzie who appeared before the House to argue against the need for training beyond combat training. The Member of Parliament was critical of the position in DND “that we do not need any changes in peacekeeping training, that we have these wonderful peacekeepers who have done a good job for the last 40 years and we do not have to change and try to understand in a new way what training should be.” He was clearly swayed by witnesses like Retired Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie, who argued for a new approach to training that went beyond basic combat training.

Axworthy went on to point out that, when senior officers testified before the House, they did not seem to have a good grasp of training requirements, and in the

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136 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1993, p. 1175.
137 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1993, p. 1176.
context of the mission to Somalia, “[t]hey did not understand the idea of working with the development assistance workers who have been in the field to give them some serious idea of what needs to meet.” Given that the mission to Somalia, in all its iterations, was supposed to be primarily a humanitarian mission, the prospect of working with aid workers and non-governmental organizations in-theatre is a prospect for which peacekeepers should have been prepared.

The broadening scope of peacekeeping is seen in increased civil-military cooperation, and a rise in the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in peacekeeping missions. Responsibility for ensuring human rights and the safety of civilians in peacekeeping missions is not a new concept but the extent to which peacekeeping missions became humanitarian relief missions signified a new role for the military and required a greater degree of interaction between the CF and NGOs. The roots of this new role may lie in the idea that Western nations had a responsibility to maintain peace and stability in other areas of the world. As Dallaire, then deputy commander of the Canadian Army, stated in 1995, “we have a human, legal and moral obligation to prevent murder, crimes against humanity and certainly genocide,” as well as to respond to humanitarian disasters.

Canadian peacekeepers had to learn to cooperate with NGOs in-theatre. The training for this role had been virtually non-existent, as Colonel Gordon Grant explains,

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139 The Canadian Press, “Peacekeeping: The UN must give troops freedom to take action, Canadian says,” *The Ottawa Citizen* (27 January 1995).
one of my roles as an area commander [in the Velika Kladusa section of Bosnia] was that I was ultimately responsible for all liaison with the twenty-nine non-government agencies and offices that operated within my area…When we entered Bosnia there were a number of agencies that we had never dealt with before…There were the United Church agencies, the Medecins Sans Frontiers, and a number of others. Our relation to the NGOs was to first and foremost provide protection to them. Secondly to facilitate the good work, the humanitarian work that they were doing as long as it was not in conflict with our own priorities, which was largely to ensure that the Dayton Accords were being adhered to…I had no training of how to deal with NGOs [so] I had weekly meetings with them and they were an interesting group because when you have twenty-nine agencies you find first and foremost that there are whole areas of humanitarian aid that none of them are addressing, and then there are other areas where they’re all addressing it. They have their own mandates, their own visions, they have their own views and just like a family they have their own rivalries.140

Eric Hoskins, a former Senior Policy Advisor to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, was able to give the non-governmental organization (NGO) perspective, having served for many years providing emergency medical relief in war-torn areas. He pointed out that there was often reciprocal suspicion in NGOs and the military, and that closer cooperation brought benefits and risks. Cooperation often facilitated the completion of the task at hand. One problem identified by Hoskins was that, although NGO workers could benefit from the protection offered by the presence of a UN force, taking advantage of the UN military presence could be dangerous for aid workers. Their impartial status could be jeopardized if they were too closely identified with peacekeeping forces, and they could then face the same risks that threaten the safety of peacekeepers.141 Peacekeepers have often performed humanitarian acts, but the

140 Grant, Interview by author.
implementation of humanitarian aid as a part of the responsibilities of peacekeeping clearly carried with it new dangers and difficulties for peacekeepers. They needed to be trained to possess the “extra” skills to function successfully in multi-faceted peace support operations.

Other MPs echoed Axworthy’s alarm at the changing nature of peacekeeping and the resistance to conduct peacekeeping training. NDP MP Dan Heap argued that “events in Bosnia and Somalia in particular have changed the need. Peacekeeping is not what it used to be. The question arises particularly because of attempts to deal with situations that peacekeeping did not have to deal with on previous occasions and which do not seem to have been envisaged by the late Prime Minister Pearson, who initiated this. … We do not have the clear boundary line between peacekeeping and war that we thought we had for several decades.” The Conservative response, provided by Ken James, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, refuted what he saw as the “false impression … that we can simply walk in off the street and become peacekeepers by donning berets. Of course this is not possible.” But if it was not possible, then how was it done? James went on to state that the training of the CF was appropriate to the task, and his evidence was that, during the over forty years that Canada

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142 Major Daniel R. Drew recounted how the soldiers in his unit performed humanitarian relief on their own time and of their own accord, often after working long hours. For example, his unit adopted an orphanage in Croatia, and soldiers rotating in and out of Canada would bring clothes that had been collected in clothing drives back home.

143 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1993, p. 1225.

144 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1993, pp. 1226-1229.
had been peacekeeping, over 90,000 CF members had been involved in peacekeeping but only ninety had lost their lives.145

What James did not consider, however, was other lives lost during peacekeeping missions. Sherene Razack argues, in her book *Dark Threats and White Nights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, that “the official story that emerged from the spectacle of the Somalia Affair – a spectacle that began with photos of the violent death of a Black man in custody and Black children bound and humiliated – was that of a gentle, peacekeeping nation betrayed by a few unscrupulous men. Violence transformed into gold.” Razack’s excellent exploration of racism, the Somalia Affair, modern peacekeeping, and the Canadian peacekeeping mythology undermines the idea that the events in Somalia were caused by a “few bad apples” in the Airborne Regiment. There is no doubt that, as with previous peacekeeping and peace support operations, situations change in-theatre, and even the best training can be found wanting. However, the failings of the CARBG pointed to systemic problems within the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Canadian Forces more generally, a failure of leadership, the existence of a ‘rogue’ culture of aggressiveness within the Regiment, and ultimately, a training failure of catastrophic proportions. The identification of these problems led to the creation of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to

145 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1993, p. 1227.
Somalia, which was tasked with reviewing the mission itself and its context, and providing recommendations for the future. Certainly the public inquiry, which operated from April 1995 to April 1997, determined that the Regiment had contained “rogue soldiers, weak junior officers, and apathetic senior NCOs,” but it went further and identified systemic problems in the CF and made far-reaching recommendations for change.

It is difficult to dismiss the need for “extra” training for peacekeeping duty above and beyond traditional military training in light of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry. In *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada. A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, Allen G. Sens reached several conclusions about the changing nature of UN peacekeeping and its implications for Canada, and in regard to training, concluded that, “although military training provides the essential foundation, or prerequisite, for effective peacekeepers, the expanding range of threats and tasks and the localized nature of contemporary conflicts require that peacekeeping training and mission-specific training be enhanced.”

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The Commission’s 1997 report, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, highlighted pre-deployment and in-theatre training as key aspects of preparing CF personnel for peacekeeping. Several of its preparatory documents, such as the *Report and Recommendations on Non-Traditional Training for Canadian Military in Preparation for Peacekeeping*, which was prepared in December 1995 specifically for the Commission, provided thorough information about the state of training in the 1990s and suggestions for improvement. The Somalia Commission of Inquiry’s final conclusion on the matter of the training that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group received in the change from Operation CORDON (a fairly typical UN Charter Chapter VI peacekeeping mission) to Operation DELIVERANCE (a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission with new use-of-force policies) was that

there was no plan developed for in-theatre training, notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings during pre-deployment preparations – most notably on the ROE – which had been, or should have been, identified. There was a failure to provide training – as opposed to instructions or orders – in theatre on ROE, on new SOPs, and on local customs, traditions, politics and security. Insufficient measures were taken to ensure an understanding on the part of soldiers of the meaning and importance of issues related to the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural differences, and use of force. This amounts to an inexcusable failure of leadership.

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This statement is evidence of the “black eye” the Canadian Forces received over the Somalia incident. The Commission of Inquiry thought training would have made a difference to the behaviour of the Airborne Regiment in Somalia, serving to underline the perception that adequate training is vitally important to the success of peacekeeping missions and to the ability of soldiers to be good peacekeepers.

In its section on “Training,” the 1997 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry states that “fundamental to a unit’s operational readiness are troops well trained to perform all aspects of the mission to which the unit is being committed.”151 The Commission was created to investigate the chain of command system, the leadership, discipline, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces, and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence, in relation to the Canadian Forces’ participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-93,152 and it was deeply critical of the state of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s.

The report expressed surprise that, prior to 1992, “there was no formalized or standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40 years of intensive Canadian participation in international peace operations. No comprehensive training policy, based on changing requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of

units deploying on peace operations.” As this study shows, even a superficial survey of Canadian Forces training policy and practices throughout the Cold War period reveals an almost complete lack of standardized training for peacekeeping. It is not that mission-specific or peacekeeping-specific training was never done, but rather it was not implemented from the top down in a CF-wide approach, but on an ad hoc basis as commanders saw fit.

Policies can be written, but whether or not they are carried out is often difficult to determine. The responses of the 108 survey respondents to questions about their peacekeeping training can be useful in determining if mission-specific training was carried out, as a majority of them served on peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. To the question “If you participated in more than one peacekeeping mission, did the type and/or quality of peacekeeping training change over the course of your career?” only nine responded “no.” The rest of the respondents indicated that training for the peacekeeping missions on which they had served changed over time. Several indicated that the duration and depth of training was different from one mission to another. As one respondent stated, “For the mission in Rwanda, I received no training. I was called to replace someone else on very short notice (one week). For the mission in Bosnia, it was the other extreme! 7 months of training. There ought to be a middle ground because 7

months training for a 6 month mission is more than a year away from your family.”

There was certainly no peacekeeping doctrine in the CF as it existed by the turn of the century, and any suggestion that Canadian soldiers deployed on peacekeeping missions required skills or knowledge beyond general-purpose combat training was often met with open skepticism. This general-purpose combat training was often supplemented with mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase, but not in a truly standardized manner.

It seemed that, with the report of the Commission of Inquiry and the earlier establishment of the PPC and PSTC, specialized training for peacekeeping had finally come into its own. A little over a year after the Commission released its report, a 1998 DCDS “Instruction” that discussed training for peacekeeping, the DCDS Direction to Commanders of Operational Deployments, was disseminated. It reiterated the necessity of pre-deployment training which includes refresher training for general-purpose military training and mission-specific training. In addition, it addressed the need for pre-deployment stress training and post-deployment debriefings. This Instruction specifies categories that are almost identical to the ones listed in 1996. Refresher Training consisted of weapons handling, NBCD, first aid, physical fitness, driving, and the added category of communications. The mission-specific topics were basically the same, except that this Direction included four annexes that detailed the requirements for varying

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154 Survey #86, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
levels of specifications for peace support operations, and the mission-specific criteria for each one was listed. This organization reflected the efforts of the Peace Support Training Centre, which organizes and controls the requirements for certification in peace support operations.

While the CF worked to incorporate peacekeeping training into its standard training procedures, the UN continued its work to standardize the training of national contingents for its peacekeeping and peace support operations. In 2003 it published a *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, a primer on the many facets of peacekeeping in the new millennia. It contained sections on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Information, the Military, Mine Action Assistance, Police, Judiciary and Corrections Aspects of the Rule of Law; Human Rights; Gender Mainstreaming; Administration and Support; Security and Safety of Staff; Electoral Assistance; Humanitarian Assistance; Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; the World Bank and Post-Conflict Reconstruction; and Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace. The section on the military’s role repeats what had, by 2003, become conventional wisdom; namely that the tasks of the UN military components have become increasingly complex because conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national armies alone.

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156 I received this Instruction from Major Boissonneault and Major Yakimenko at J3 Training (Peacekeeping), while it was still in the draft stage.

but irregular forces, guerilla factions and even armed criminal gangs. Consequently, the military capability under UN command has also changed and is no longer the lightly armed intervention that was typical during the Organization’s first 40 years of peacekeeping.158

The handbook focused on two key areas in regard to the military: basic principles for military activity, and military tasks in peacekeeping operations. The basic principles that were to guide military forces in peacekeeping were impartiality and even-handedness in the execution of the mandate; consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict; the appropriate use of force, usually only in self-defence, which the UN defined as “the right to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN protection; unity and international character, which was defined as “reflecting the will and presence of the international community as a whole”; respect for the principles of international humanitarian law; and respect for local law and customs.159 Military tasks in peacekeeping included support to peacemaking and political negotiations; providing a secure environment; observation and monitoring; interposition between conflicting parties; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), at least for the disarmament and demobilization stage for former combatants; demining; enforcement of sanctions; security sector reform and training; restoration of the maintenance of law and order; human rights monitoring; support to humanitarian activities; and protection of


civilians. The protection of civilians, which was such a sensitive topic in relation to the missions in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was qualified by the need for inclusion of this responsibility in the mandate of the mission, and only in the case of “imminent attack,” and if the military has the “capacity” to do so.

In discussing the issue of timely deployment, the handbook outlined that the General Assembly had endorsed a requirement that traditional peacekeeping operations should be established within thirty days, and more complex missions within ninety days of the authorization of their mandates. To this end, the UN created the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) in 1994 to track conditional pledges of military units, equipment and individuals by Member States. “UNSAS allows DPKO to know ahead of time what types of contributions countries are willing to make on short notice.” It was a measure meant to mitigate what Lester B. Pearson called “improvising in haste.”

Complementing the creation of UNSAS was the formation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1996. The desire to create a pool of standby, rapid reaction forces for UN operations grew out of a recognition that the only feasible alternative to time-consuming and inefficient ad-hoc mechanisms of assembling peacekeeping forces from scratch from mission to

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161 Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 64.
mission, is the option of a pre-pledged and pre-earmarked pool of troops on ‘standby’ and on a level of ‘high readiness’, deployable at a short notice request by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{163}

The SHIRBRIG concept, first introduced at the Ottawa Conference in 1964, was only realized in 1996, and the organization itself lasted a mere thirteen years. Growing out of a Danish initiative, SHIRBRIG came into being in 1995 with eleven members, including Canada. SHIRBRIG was operational by January 2000, and deployed to Ethiopia/Eritrea in November 2000 as part of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). It provided ninety-five officers to the force headquarters as well as a Canadian-Dutch infantry battalion and a Danish headquarters company.\textsuperscript{164} SHIRBRIG continued to be “heavily involved” in operations in Africa until it closed down in 2009. The \textit{SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report}, commissioned when the decision to end SHIRBRIG was taken in 2008, blamed its “cumbersome decision-making process as well as the persistent absence of resources and political will” for undermining its effectiveness and causing its demise.\textsuperscript{165} Although it did not survive, SHIRBRIG is another example of Canada’s long-term commitment to improving the conditions under which its soldiers serve international organizations on peacekeeping missions.

Canada’s army, as the branch of the armed forces most commonly tasked with peacekeeping duty, experienced a comparatively high operational tempo in the 1990s. In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Planning Element, Standby High Readiness Brigade, \textit{SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report} (Denmark: 1 June 2009), 3.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Planning Element, Standby High Readiness Brigade, \textit{SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report}, 3, 6-8.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Planning Element, Standby High Readiness Brigade, \textit{SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report}, 8.
\end{itemize}
the 2001 document *Training Canada’s Army*\textsuperscript{166}, DND sought to “state the philosophy, principles and processes that guide the new approach to Army training.” It asserted that “[a]part from operations, training is the most important activity of an army. Success or failure in operations is largely dependent upon the way an army plans and conducts its training.”\textsuperscript{167} It judged that, at the time, the Canadian military was training for two distinct requirements: ongoing operations and future wars. It provided this assessment of the current state of training in the Canadian Army:

> Over the course of the 1990s the training focus of Canada’s Army has narrowed steadily toward current operations. Skills at brigade and combined arms battle group level have eroded, and collective training as a whole has centred around pre-deployment training events. There have been no commonly applied standards, and few training events have caused the Army to reconsider or change its doctrine. The Army has failed to make maximum use of training to facilitate learning. At the same time, our individual training system – while delivering excellent training – has become very inefficient and unstable.\textsuperscript{168}

It appeared that the high operational tempo of the 1990s resulted in a focus, at least by 2001, on pre-deployment training at the expense of routinely scheduled military training. Two major themes of this document were that training is command-driven, and training must be systematic. These issues were challenging for an Army still in the shadow of the Somalia Affair, which was judged to be in part a failure of leadership, and one that had by this time a great deal of experience with *ad hoc* pre-deployment training.

\textsuperscript{166} This document was issued in August 2001, just before the events of 9/11.

\textsuperscript{167} Chief of the Land Staff, *Training Canada’s Army, B-GL-300-008/FP-001* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), preface.

\textsuperscript{168} Chief of the Land Staff, *Training Canada’s Army*, preface.
The challenge for the turn-of-the-century Canadian army was that it was required to be prepared for operations that spanned the “Spectrum of Conflict” from operations other than war (OOTW) such as UN or NATO peacekeeping, to war fighting, but “violence and the requirements for combat capabilities are real throughout the Spectrum.”

Training Canada’s Army puts forth the argument that, [i]f the Army lacks the capability to operate throughout the Spectrum of Conflict, it will not be able to satisfy the demands of national policy. Hence, the Army must be multi-purpose. Also, if Canadian soldiers are not trained and equipped to engage in combat, they will have limited operational utility. … Therefore Canadian units must be combat capable. … Consequently, the Army trains Canadian soldiers, leaders and units for … multi-purpose, war-fighting skills, and adds to this training the theatre and mission-specific training (TMST).

This document outlines the varying levels of capabilities, training, and operational readiness based on core competencies. Theater and mission-specific training is specific mission requirements not covered as part of training for war-fighting. Areas that are included are combat tasks such as ROEs, environmental survival skills and non-combat skills such as negotiation techniques and languages. “The mission and the environment dictate the TMST.”

This training may take place before deployment, in-theatre or both. TMST will normally focus upon acclimatization, tasks prevalent in a particular theatre of operations (including inter-agency work) and cultural familiarization to enhance understanding of the environmental, political and social conditions there. TMST

169 Chief of the Land Staff, Training Canada’s Army, 13.
170 Chief of the Land Staff, Training Canada’s Army, 14.
171 Chief of the Land Staff, Training Canada’s Army, 40.
is conducted after general-purpose, war-fighting BTS [battle task standard] training occurs to the assigned level.172

Although the foundation in combat training has not changed, the approach to mission-specific training is a significant departure for a military that, for many years, decried the need for any mission-specific, and particularly peacekeeping-mission specific, training.

The 1990s was a period of drastic change in the way governments and international organizations approached the job of preparing for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping training centres were created, guidelines for peacekeeping training were developed, and systems to manage standby forces for UN operations were stood-up. These efforts were undertaken by individuals, government bodies, and the Canadian Forces in the expectation that an operational training standard could be established that would allow a Canadian peacekeeper to enter a theatre of operations fully confident that he or she was capable of performing assigned duties. Possessing a strong basis in general military training made up a good deal of this requirement, but as recent history had shown, it was no longer enough, and perhaps it never was.

172 Chief of the Land Staff, Training Canada’s Army, 40.
In Conclusion

Since Canada made its first peacekeeping commitment, the nature of the obligations and demands that peacekeeping places on Canadian military personnel have changed drastically. The Canadian Forces has held fast to its conviction that the soundest foundation for peacekeeping duties is general military training with an emphasis on combat and occupational skills, and that the forces should not be trained solely for peacekeeping.¹ In the post-Cold War era, the CF has gradually developed a program of specific training levels that must be met by soldiers before they can be deployed on a peacekeeping mission. These additional skills include negotiation and mediation techniques, general knowledge of the workings and mandate of the United Nations, a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement, civil-military cooperation, humanitarian aid issues, stress management training and mission-specific training in local customs, culture, and language.² These training standards have been created following

¹ Others feel differently. Michael Harbottle, in his study, New Roles for the Military. Humanitarian and Environmental Security, identifies three specific roles for the armed forces, one of which is that of peacemaker/peacebuilder. He believes that “the armed forces have a unique non-violent role to play; a role which could help bridge the divide between the military forces of neighbouring states and in doing so create security patterns and models which are founded on co-operation, not confrontation.” Harbottle’s idea is interesting, especially given his emphasis on training requirements that focus on cultural awareness. Yet Harbottle’s ideas effectively neutralize the armed forces; there is no defensive aspect left, and military skills, aside from when they can be used for the purposes of the civilian population, are dismissed as virtually unnecessary. With the advent of peacekeeping operations that are exceedingly dangerous, military and combat skills have a definite place in the training of any peacekeeper.

² An article in the New York Times titled “War Colleges Now Training Soldiers in the Art of Peace” discusses the initiatives undertaken by American military colleges to teach skills other than traditional military skills to achieve the goal of “ hav[ing] trained forces who can fight if necessary but who are also skilled at working with the local population, international organizations, aid groups and the former warring armies. They end up knowing not only how to set up and operate road blocks but also how to act like
decades of practice in the art of peacekeeping, and Canada has had a long history in international peacekeeping from which to glean lessons learned. The first forty years of peacekeeping, however, were marked with a reluctance to adapt training to meet the specific needs of peacekeeping, and led to the creation of a national myth of the Canadian peacekeeper that likely hampered progress in the area of peacekeeping training.

Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping has been mythologized in literature and public perception for decades. A Canadian, Lester B. Pearson, is considered the father of United Nations peacekeeping and won the Nobel Prize for his efforts. During the Cold War, Canada earned a reputation as a troop-contributing nation of unequalled consistency and dedication. The creation of the Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal in 1988, the dedication of the Peacekeeping Monument in Ottawa in 1992, and the prominent featuring of Pearson’s image and words in teachings related to peacekeeping, such as the instruction that takes place at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the information promulgated by the United Nations Association in Canada, all served to cement peacekeeping’s place in Canadian national identity well past the end of the Cold War. For decades this reputation went largely unchallenged and persisted despite disasters in Canada’s peacekeeping

This multiplicity of roles aptly describes the range of hats peacekeepers have been asked to put on when they wear the blue beret. Elizabeth Becker, “War Colleges Now Training Soldiers in the Art of Peace,” The New York Times (6 August 1999).
record, but little explanation can be found in scholarship to explain how Canadian military personnel seemingly filled the role of peacekeeper so well.

National character was often cited as one feature that made Canadian soldiers eminently suitable to wear the blue beret. Canadians were neutral, diplomatic by nature, and did not hail from a former colonial power. They embodied a ‘can do’ attitude that was well-suited to the unpredictable and *ad hoc* nature of peacekeeping operations. This essential argument can be distilled as “Canadians make good peacekeepers because they are Canadian,” and former peacekeepers themselves, in some cases, internalized this rationale. However, this optimistic line of thinking glossed over the real challenges faced by Canadian soldiers deployed to peacekeeping operations, and did not address the specific preparation received by those soldiers to carry out their duties in international theatres of operation. Consideration of this problem revealed that, at the heart of preparation and suitability for peacekeeping operations, was the issue of training. The Canadian Forces has long placed an emphasis on its training program to ensure that its soldiers have a solid foundation of combat and occupational skills. If training for military personnel was central to war-fighting, then it must also have been central to peacekeeping. However, there is little treatment of training in the literature about the Canadian role in international peacekeeping, and any attempt to address how Canadian soldiers have been trained for peacekeeping duty since the 1950s often falls back on the issue of national identity.
An examination of the evolution of training in the Canadian Forces promised to address these questions and possibly clarify not only why Canadians were thought to be good peacekeepers, but whether, in fact, they were well-prepared to do the job tasked to them at various times in the history of Canadian peacekeeping. Through an examination of documentary evidence and secondary sources related to peacekeeping-specific training in the Canadian Forces, as well as the testimony of CF members who have served on peacekeeping operations, it has been demonstrated that the CF maintained its “soldiers first” stance in regard to peacekeeping, but has, over time, incorporated add-on training for peacekeeping into its pre-deployment training to enhance its soldiers’ abilities in peacekeeping situations.

Early, active participation in the UN positioned Canada to take advantage of its “middle power” status to play a key role in the birth of peacekeeping, an activity that provided the country with a high profile on the international stage that it would not have had otherwise. Participation in the UN’s earliest military observer missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP, positioned Canada to play a significant role in the creation of the UNEF. Canada’s leading role in UNEF, both politically and militarily, led to a sustained commitment to peacekeeping throughout the 1960s with Canada participating in every mission created in these decades, including noteworthy commitments to ONUC and UNFICYP. For these early missions of the late 1950s and 1960s, soldiers relied on their combat and occupations skills to carry out their duties, and for the most part these skill sets seemed appropriate to the military-style operations they undertook. By the 1960s, however, Canadian planners started to think about how to effectively train armed forces
for peacekeeping as UN peacekeeping presented planners and practitioners with some challenges outside the normal purview of military activity.

The central problem that arose was that peacekeeping was an ‘unmilitary task’ that could only be carried out by military forces, or, according to a popular saying, it was “not a soldier’s job but one only a soldier can do.” The *ad hoc* nature of peacekeeping was also problematic, and so studies were commissioned and national and international meetings held to try to find a sensible way to counteract this influence. For example, the 1963 World Veterans Federation Report *The Functioning of Ad Hoc United Nations Emergency Forces*, which included the opinions of Canadian General E.L.M. Burns, sought to address planning, organization, and information-sharing, which were believed to be obstacles to effective peacekeeping. With the inclusion of peacekeeping as a priority in the 1964 *White Paper on Defence*, peacekeeping was cemented as a touchstone of Canada’s defence policy. Concurrently, the Canadian Army issued the April 1964 *Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group*, an instruction aimed to set out clear guidelines for a Canadian military contingent being deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force, and particularly to ensure that the designated UN Standby Battalion was maintained in a state of readiness for short-notice deployments. Training in matters such as local customs, culture, and language were mentioned, but it was left up to commanders whether such training would be carried out, as the emphasis was on the phases of deployment that got the contingent to the theatre of operations with all their necessary equipment in a reasonable amount of time. A number of Canadian initiatives in the 1960s signaled a growing interest in the standardization of
pre-deployment arrangements and a growing unease with the *ad hoc* nature of the preparation and training for peacekeeping. These initiatives included the November 1964 conference “The Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” which was held in Ottawa; the 1966 document *Canadian Operations in Support of the United Nations: Organization and Training of Canadian Military Forces Earmarked for Service with the United Nations*; the 1967 Kingston Conference that resulted in the 1968 publication of *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*; a series of Defence Research Board meetings; and finally R.J. Hill’s April 1968 report *Command and Control Problems of UN and Similar Peacekeeping Forces*.

The result of this interest was some revision of Canadian training standards, the creation of clear instructions for the UN Standby Battalion, and an effort to have the UN improve its own standby arrangements and organizational capacity for peacekeeping operations. Yet, if peacekeeping training did occur during the Cold War, it remained sporadic and varied from unit to unit. Problematically, this introspection took place at a time when operational tempo was increasing at such a pace that it was difficult to implement change while committed to deployments in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. And even when this tempo slowed, this approach to peacekeeping persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, during a time when few new missions were created and the status quo was maintained. Canadian military personnel sometimes received peacekeeping-specific training but mainly relied on their “soldiers first” training to carry them through Cold War-era peacekeeping deployments.
The end of Cold War re-wrote Canada’s, and the world’s, peacekeeping playbook. The emergence of intra-state conflict in Africa and Europe, in the absence of Cold War superpowers to control them, meant that the UN was busier than ever sending multi-national forces to war-torn countries. Missions quickly became increasingly multifaceted and more dangerous, and often involved engagement an intra-state conflict, a large humanitarian component, and more challenging ROEs. Traditional peacekeeping definitions quickly became outdated, and national militaries struggled to adapt to new demands for international intervention in scenarios that too often included gross human rights violations and ongoing violence. Operational tempo was a concern as never before, as twenty-three new operations were created between 1990 and 1996 alone.

In the post-1990 era of peacekeeping, the peacekeeping ethic of the Canadian Forces changed, and as peacekeeping missions became ever-more demanding, the forces put more emphasis on peacekeeping training. This seems to have stemmed in part from concern about the strain that these post-Cold War, multi-dimensional peace support operations were putting on the personnel of the Canadian Forces, and in part from the public scrutiny that the Canadian Forces endured in this decade. Two Senate Committee reports, the March 1993 Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*, and the June 1993 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs *The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping*, raised difficult questions about the nature of Canada’s peacekeeping commitment. They both also expressed frustration with the “soldiers first” attitude among military leadership
when it came to the preparation of Canadian military personnel for deployment on peacekeeping operations. The Chief of Defence Staff also commissioned studies in the mid-1990s to address training for peacekeeping, and more attention began to be paid to the opinions of soldiers who had served on peacekeeping operations by academics.

Additionally, the Canadian Forces instituted a program to standardize the transmission of lessons learned with the creation of the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario, the creation of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, and the implementation of training standards as part of peacekeeping doctrine and DCDS directions. This training was different from basic military training, although the CF has never wavered in its conviction that the general-purpose combat-capable soldier is the best material with which to make a peacekeeper, and the best method through which to achieve this was to adhere to a “soldiers first” approach to training. However there was finally a recognition that additional skills such as negotiation and mediation techniques as well as education in

3 There is also a Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) whose job it is to “collect observations and actionable lessons from operations at the tactical level,” but its activities are not restricted to peacekeeping operations. Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, “Mission, Mandate and Responsibilities” (Kingston: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 24 May 2012), [http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ALLC-CLRA/mnr-eng.asp](http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ALLC-CLRA/mnr-eng.asp). The ALLC produces a publication, *Dispatches*, that engages thematic topics of relevance to CF members, such as expeditionary operations, human intelligence (HUMINT) during peace support operations, the law of armed conflict, and negotiation, for example. Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches: Operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia*, Volume 4, No 1 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, September 1996); Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches: The Law of Armed Conflict. Peace Support Operations and You*, Volume 4, No 2 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, March 1997); Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers. Humint During Peace Support Operations*, Volume 8, No 1 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, June 2001); and Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers. Negotiations During Peace Support Operations*, Volume 8, No 2 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, October 2001).
humanitarian relief and civil-military cooperation would be useful, and in some cases critical to safety, on peacekeeping operations.

Ironically, the decade that saw the greatest improvement in standards for peacekeeping-specific training also held the largest challenges for Canadian personnel with UN operations. Missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda tested the mettle of Canadian soldiers to the breaking point. Ongoing violence and human rights violations in these countries meant that UN peacekeepers were faced with professional and personal dilemmas on a frequent basis, and this was compounded in many cases by unclear ROEs, bureaucratic problems with the UN, funding and equipment issues, and a local population that was not always supportive of the UN’s presence. As one CF soldier in Somalia wrote, “[w]e settled down to wait out the night, peering into the darkness and the crowd. We watched for the kid with the grenade instead of a rock, or the sniper in the shadows. You never know when it will happen. You must always be on guard.” Amidst these challenges, Canadian military personnel displayed their best and worst behaviour. The worst was undoubtedly the actions of the CARB in Somalia, and this resulted in the damning report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry.

The report of the Commission of Inquiry was a condemnation of past practices that went far beyond the mission in Somalia, and a warning for the future of the CF.

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The conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda are the missions that seem to have had the greatest impact on peacekeeping training in the CF. The report’s conclusion stated that:

Training is the bedrock of discipline and the foundation for the professional image of the armed forces. Fundamental to the operational readiness of a unit is the question of whether troops are well trained to perform all aspects of the specific mission for which the unit was being deployed. In this report, we have striven to answer the question of whether the soldiers who were deployed to Somalia were properly trained for their mission. This involved an assessment of the nature and adequacy of the actual training received and the policies underlying the training, together with an examination of whether the performance of our soldiers could have been improved or enhanced if they had been exposed to additional, more focused and sophisticated training. Our conclusion regarding mission-specific training is that on almost every count the Somalia mission must rate as a significant failure.\(^5\)

The rhetoric of shame was employed throughout this report, and it made several recommendations for improvement. The CF has adapted to these recommendations for change by further underlining the “soldiers first” attitude, while also stressing the need for peacekeeping- and mission-specific skills.

In 1994, retired Brigadier General Clay Beattie wrote that, in view of Canada’s leading contribution to international peacekeeping,

as the UN is calling for greater international inter-operability, including cooperative training between military and civilian elements, our Government is responding with a token approach which will not ensure the required coordination and cooperation. Ideally forces and agencies that plan to work together as peacekeepers should train together as much as possible, outside theatres of

operations, and at all levels of responsibility from that of the private soldier to the civilian election-monitor and aid worker to the military commander.  

He argued that, the “unfortunate incidents in Somalia confirm the need for specialized and comprehensive peacekeeping training which goes beyond advanced combat training,” and, contrary to the beliefs of some government officials, peacekeeping was not the “flavour of the month.”  Beattie believed that peacekeeping “is an enduring diet or regimen for peace which Canada has adhered to since Lester Pearson launched the concept during the 1956 Suez Crisis.” This variety of peacekeeping includes participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, civilian, military, and police components, and the integration of peacekeeping and peacemaking actions into an overall “3D” strategy that integrates diplomacy, development, and defence into an over-arching approach to international conflict resolution and long-term, sustained post-conflict peacebuilding.  “We can readily endorse the need for combat-capable forces,” Beattie claimed, “not only because they are essential for national security but because such forces, when trained in special techniques of peacekeeping, complement our goals in the realm of international peace and security.” The security environment demanded that Canada’s soldiers maintain their combat skills to a high state of readiness, but the

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peacekeeping expertise that has been built up needs to be nurtured and maintained, so as not to squander the lessons of the previous half-century.

The examination of peacekeeping by the Canadian government did not slow at the turn of the century. In 2000, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs tabled a study titled *The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada*, which examined all aspects of peacekeeping carried out under NATO, including training. The key emphasis here was on the divergence between the “old” and “new” NATO, and the significance of “new peacekeeping” and the human security agenda championed by former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy as early as 1990. The Department of National Defence also sought to improve all aspects of training through the dissemination of *Training Canada’s Army*, which recognized the strain that the high operational tempo of the 1990s had put on the core training of the Canadian Army. In addition, various United Nations documents and peacekeeping-training related documents published by nations involved in peacekeeping were promulgated. The Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi Panel Report, which was the result of a widespread re-evaluation of peacekeeping at the UN level, is an important pre-September 11, 2001 document that summarizes the condition of UN Peacekeeping at the turn of the twenty-first century, and highlights areas

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10 The Human Security Agenda significantly broadened the scope of responsibility of Canada’s foreign interventions, at a time when the Canadian Forces was facing significant budget and personnel reductions.

11 For example, the Italian Defence General Staff’s *Joint Handbook for Peace Operations*, Document No. SMD-G-015 (Rome: Italian Defence General Staff, 1994).
that needed improvement. With the Brahimi Panel Report, the reinvention of peacekeeping and peacekeeping training that had begun in the 1990s promised to continue into the new century, but this process was somewhat cut short by the events of 11 September 2001. The War on Terror caused the CF to rededicate a great deal of its resources to the mission in Afghanistan, which only came to an end in March 2014. With the end of this mission, it is uncertain whether the government of Canada will choose to reinvest in its peacekeeping heritage. It can be argued in any case that the peacekeeping experience accumulated by the Canadian Forces, the lessons it learned, and any peacekeeping-specific training its personnel received, has been useful in maintaining combat readiness and instilling a sense of flexibility in a military corps that has had to fight a “War on Terror” against a sometimes amorphous enemy in an unfamiliar terrain.

The line between peacekeeping, peace-making and war-fighting became increasingly blurred in the 1990s, and the following recollections of one Canadian soldier demonstrates this blurring, and its aftermath, rather vividly: “My first week in Rwanda was spent sleeping in an abandoned building in downtown Kigali amongst hundreds of Rwandan refugees, injured people, corpses, dead rats and across the street from where the battle for Kigali was taking place.”

When asked for help by a local Rwandan man he

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knew, he followed the man into a yard to assist with the removal of the body of a boy who had been killed by a landmine.

I then realized that he had brought both of us into a heavily mined field. We screamed for help but no one came. After standing still for what seemed like 15 to 20 minutes, I decided to simply walk out of the minefield. Later that day, I returned to the scene with Canadian engineers. ... The engineers uncovered a dozen TS-50 antipersonnel land mines in the 50-metre-long trail I had walked earlier that day.  

He also recounted how he began to experience symptoms of PTSD upon return to Canada such as nightmares, an inability to concentrate, flashbacks, impatience, and anger, and how, after contemplating suicide, he tried to get help. “I met twice with a psychiatrist, but did not feel like he understood or believed the stories I was telling him.” It took him over five years to get help, and

I have now lived with my condition for over four years. Living with PTSD is not as obvious as living with a missing arm or another part of one’s body. PTSD affects one’s soul, it drains you, it prevents you from enjoying life the way you used to enjoy it and in my opinion cannot be measured in an accurate, quantifiable way. ... It also feels like you have lost your taste buds for life. You know how you should feel and how life should taste, but there is no flavour any more. ... One thing is certain, I am not the same person who departed for Rwanda in 1994.  

The unexpected conditions encountered on peacekeeping operations, and the increased incidence of PTSD in the 1990s was a by-product of a high operational tempo, increasingly challenging missions, and at times insufficient mission-specific training. Circumstances aligned in the decade after the Cold War to throw in sharp relief the shortcomings of the Canadian way of preparing its soldiers to be peacekeepers.

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Peacekeeping as conceptualized by Lester B. Pearson involved a military intervention force composed of multi-national forces, designed to separate combatants until a diplomatic solution could be arrived at. The members of such a force would be mainly required to carry out soldierly duties. Peacekeeping, as it very soon was practiced, was a new hybrid activity that was not soldiering but required a firm foundation in military skills, something that was not a soldier’s job but one only a soldier could do. As peacekeeping and the warfare it was intended to quell evolved in response to developments on the international level, it became clear that peacekeepers must be “soldiers plus.” When dealing with belligerents and local populations in a peacekeeping theatre they must separate and negotiate, defend and engage, adhere to their ROEs, carry out their mandate, and often work on the “hearts and minds” of local populations by carrying out humanitarian work. This resulted in a reorientation in the Canadian Forces’ training program to include peacekeeping, and in the process raised much concern but little chance that the Canadian Forces would abandon traditional military training in favour of creating an exclusive “peacekeeping force” that dealt exclusively with peace support operations and humanitarian interventions. The results of the DND survey conducted for this study revealed a concern among the CF personnel surveyed that this would happen. Several responses relayed the idea that, although they believed peacekeeping should be done and they were glad to do it, it should not become the sole task of the CF. 16 This concern over the possible erosion of war-fighting skills stemmed from a desire to preserve the CF’s traditional purpose as a force dedicated to defending

16 Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations, passim.
Canada, working with the US to protect North America, honour its international security commitments, and only fourthly participate in international missions to preserve peace on a global scale, as twentieth century defence *White Papers* indicated. Yet there was an incorporation of peacekeeping into the CF’s military ethos, and perhaps this acceptance grew out of a belief that Canada’s soldiers should be out in the world engaging in activities that preserve peace, or the more pragmatic view that peacekeeping afforded the CF operational experience they would otherwise lack.

The implication of this study, which was carried out using secondary, documentary, and oral history sources, is that the pre-deployment training offered by the Canadian Forces for peacekeeping operations was insufficient to deal with many aspects of peacekeeping for many years, and the acceptance that additional training was necessary for peacekeeping only came after the challenging missions in the early 1990s. Since its first foray into peacekeeping in the Suez in 1956, the Canadian Forces have displayed a reluctant willingness to adapt and change in response to new demands placed upon the organization for more and better peacekeepers. Several decades of experience and lessons learned, and the critical changes to the peacekeeping training scheme that took place in the 1990s, will continue to contribute to the professionalism and state of readiness of the Canadian Forces. At the heart of training in the Canadian Forces is the intention to produce capable, professional soldiers who will be protected from harm, both physical and psychological, by that training, and whom can therefore carry out their mandate, whether it is to protect civilians, monitor a cease-fire, or hunt down terrorists. While this process has not always been perfect, the evolution of peacekeeping training in
the Canadian Forces has contributed to this process and made a certain degree of flexibility possible, by shoring up “soldiers first” training with add-on skills to produce combat-capable, multi-purpose armed forces for Canada.
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Appendix A: UWO Ethics Review

Office of Research Ethics
The University of Western Ontario

Trista Grant
September 2005

Re: Ethics Review # 9581S, project title “Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.”

To Whom It May Concern:

I received full approval from the Office of Ethics Research to conduct interviews and distribute surveys as part of my Ph.D. dissertation research in May 2003, and am now submitting this letter to confirm that the survey and interview portion of my dissertation research has been concluded. In total, I interviewed 11 people and collected 112 survey responses. They have been analyzed and the results are being incorporated into my dissertation. This work has been carried out in full accordance with the guidelines and regulations set out by the Ethics Committee and the process outlined in my proposal to the Committee.

Should you require any further information, do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you,

Trista Grant
Appendix B: DHRRE Approval

Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation
National Defence Headquarters

DHRRE RESEARCH REVIEW BOARD DECISION

Serial Number: 262/03

Title: Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.

Researcher: Trista Grant

Organization: University of Western Ontario

Review and Discussion:

1. The general idea of any research on individuals is to provide a product respecting the rules of the scientific approach and following the deontological code of behavioural sciences. Your research proposal satisfies these two requirements and is therefore approved.

2. Your project is assigned survey coordination number: 262/03. The following text shall be displayed on the front page of your survey(s) and consent form(s):

   DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Authorization number: 262/03.

   DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord avec CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro d’autorisation : 262/03.

3. You are reminded that any changes to the approved protocol or any untoward incidents or injuries arising as a result of any subject’s participation in the study shall be brought to the attention of the Committee Chairperson in writing immediately.

4. This approval is valid for the period of 18 months from the date of this meeting. Subject involvement must be complete by this date; otherwise, the protocol will require further review.
5. To ensure that the survey co-ordination function primarily serves practical rather than research interests, DHRRE requires an electronic copy of any research reports arising out of this request/project.

6. The following disclaimer shall be presented as the first page of the research report.

“The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces”

7. You are required to contact the Level 1 authorities prior to the administration of your survey in order to coordinate appropriate timings and locations. Failure to do so will result in revocation of this authorization.

8. Please accept our acknowledgements for your contribution to research within the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

(Original signed by)

Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation

(Forwarded 5 July 2004)
Appendix C: Survey Cover Letter (English)

Trista L. Grant
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Sir or Madam,

Enclosed is a 24-question survey on your experience as a Canadian peacekeeper, and more specifically the training you received for your peacekeeping duties. This study is being conducted as part of my research for the Ph.D. program in History at the University of Western Ontario. The results of this study will be used in my doctoral thesis, which is currently titled “Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.” The purpose of my research is to study the history of training for peacekeeping operations conducted by the Canadian Forces from 1956 to the present.

DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Authorization number: 262/03. This survey was approved by departmental staff before the Department of National Defence provided your name for my survey sample, and a final copy of my dissertation will be provided to the Department, however DND will not have access to individual questionnaires, and this work is not being done on the Department’s behalf. While some serving members may feel that they will be placed in a difficult position if they express negative opinions about their employer (the Canadian Forces), participation in this survey is purely voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time. You are not asked for identifying information (i.e. your name or service number) on the survey, but you will be asked for some demographic information (age, gender, rank, etc.). The researcher will make every effort to safeguard your identity.

A possible risk in completing this questionnaire would be the recollection of experiences that incur psychological or emotional discomfort. Should you choose to fill out the survey, you may refuse to answer any individual question, without prejudice, due to the sensitive nature of some of the information addressed on the questionnaire. You should not participate if it is likely that the discussion of memories of past events will induce stress, fear, anxiety, or cause you other significant risk. A list of health contacts is enclosed for your use. No compensation will be given for participation in this project.

If you participate in this study, please complete the survey and return your handwritten or typed responses to the address below. Feel free to attach additional pages, should you require additional space for your responses. Should you prefer to receive this survey by e-mail, please contact me and I would be happy to send you an electronic copy, which can be returned to the same e-mail address. The length of time it takes to complete
the survey will be determined by the length of your responses to the questions, but will likely take approximately one hour.

Completion and return of the questionnaire indicates your consent to participate in the study. This means that your responses can be used by the principal investigator (Trista Grant) in a thesis or any other resulting academic work. The investigator may quote from the survey or use the information provided in the survey in other accepted forms in historical research. The surveys will be kept by the researcher, under lock, during the course of this study, as well as after the completion of the dissertation. The retention of these documents is for the purpose of preserving this testimony, as well as to make it available to the researcher for future scholarly work that may result from the production of the dissertation (for example, an article in a scholarly journal). Only the investigator and the thesis advisor will have access to the survey responses.

The survey asks questions concerning your experiences with peacekeeping, whether it be first-hand (in the field) or at an administrative level. If you have participated in peacekeeping missions, you will be asked directly about the training you received for said missions, and your opinions about the adequacy of such training to prepare you for situations experienced in the field. Please be as detailed and specific as you can, and, if possible, avoid “yes” and “no” answers.

If you have any questions about the conduct of this study or your rights as a research subject you may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics, The University of Western Ontario.

Should you wish to verify the details of this project, you can contact my thesis advisor, Dr. Jonathan Vance, at the History Department of the University of Western Ontario. If you have any other questions about this study, you may contact Trista Grant. Should you choose to participate in this study, please complete and return the survey to the researcher within thirty days of receiving it. This letter is yours to keep. The survey should be returned to the following address:

Ms. Trista Grant,
c/o Professor Jonathan Vance
Department of History, The University of Western Ontario

Thank you for your time,
Trista L. Grant
CCHS Fellow, CSDS Research Fellow
Ph.D. Candidate, History Department
The University of Western Ontario
Appendix D – Survey Health Contacts (English)

Should you experience any psychological or emotional discomfort as a result of your participation in this study, there are a number of organizations that can provide you with information and direction in managing these responses. Please note that these resources are not a substitute for medical care. Please consult your physician if you have any concerns about your mental health.

**Department of National Defence**
*Canadian Forces Health Services*
[http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_e.asp](http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_e.asp)
*Stress Management*

This webpage contains information on stress management, including definitions of stressors, methods of identifying stress, and methods of managing stress related to deployments. It also discusses Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Acute Stress Disorder (ASD). Contact information for resource persons is provided, and reading material is recommended.

The Subject Matter Expert for “Stress Management” is the Deputy Chief of Staff Forces Health Protection (DCOS FHP).

The staff-level contact at NDHQ for “Stress Management” is:

**Social Wellness Policy/Programs/Education**
Office of the Ombudsman
[http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca](http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca)

**Veterans Affairs Canada**

This site is dedicated to promoting the health and well-being of Canadian veterans, to providing information on programs and services for those veterans, Canadian Forces members, qualified civilians and their families.

**Canadian Health Network**

This site is a clearinghouse for health information. It is a useful resource in searching for information, resources, and contacts on specific health-related issues.

http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/1mental_health.html

**Health Canada Online**

**Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety Treatments**

**Canadian Psychiatric Association**

**Canadian Mental Health Association**
[http://www.cmha.ca](http://www.cmha.ca)
Appendix E: Survey Questionnaire

DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Authorization number: 262/03.

**Questionnaire on Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces**

Demographic Section

*Current Rank:*
- Pte-MCpl
- Sgt-CWO
- Officer Cadet – 2 Lt
- Lt-Capt
- Maj-Col
- General Officer

*Age:*
- 18-24
- 25-29
- 30-35
- 36-40
- 41-45
- 46-50
- 51-55
- 56-60

*MOC:*

*Element:*

*First Language:*

*Gender:*

1. Describe the peacekeeping mission(s) in which you participated as a member of the Canadian Forces (CF), the time period of that mission, and your military rank and military occupation classification (MOC) at that time. Please detail your specific duties for each mission.

2. If you participated in more than one peacekeeping mission, did the type and/or quality of peacekeeping training change over the course of your career?
3. What type of training, if any, did you receive prior to deployment on a peacekeeping mission? What topics did this training cover, and did it include mission-specific training, such as training in local customs and culture?

4. If you did receive extra training for peacekeeping duty, did this training differ from basic military training? If so, in your opinion did it differ from training to be a “soldier”? Be specific if you can.

5. How long was your pre-deployment training? Was there a long delay between pre-deployment training and your actual deployment?

6. Did you receive instructions regarding the use of force or the use of your weapons that was different from a typical combat situation?

7. In your opinion, were your orders regarding the use of force appropriate to the situation? Why or why not?

8. Were you able to obey these orders at all times?

9. Did you at any time have to discharge your weapon or engage in direct confrontation with one or more of the belligerents? If so, please discuss.

10. Did you feel any personal conflict regarding your dual roles as a member of the Canadian Forces, and therefore a soldier, and your designation as a peacekeeper under the authority of an international organization? Why or why not?

11. Do you feel that your role in the peacekeeping mission could be described as having fulfilled military or police duties? Was a military presence necessary in the host country? Why or why not?

12. Was your military training an asset in peacekeeping duties, and if so, why? If not, why not?

13. Were you provided with all the necessary equipment for your peacekeeping tour? (Ex. your personal kit, as well as the appropriate vehicles, equipment, tools, etc. to fulfill your duties).

14. Were you trained in the use of this equipment prior to deployment?

15. Do you feel that you were adequately prepared for the conditions in the host country (climatic, geographic, social, living) prior to your arrival? Was the additional training for peacekeeping what prepared you for these conditions? If not, how could your preparation been improved?
16. Did you have any interaction with non-governmental organizations (ex. humanitarian aid organizations)?

17. Did peacekeepers have any obligations regarding the personnel of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and if any, was this an expected obligation?

18. Discuss the challenges of working in a multinational force. Were there common standards among the militaries of different nations to allow for smoother operation in-theatre? Did problems arise from the presence of international military personnel who were required to work together to achieve mission objectives? Were there obvious differences in the types of training the personnel of other militaries received for peacekeeping duty, compared to yours?

19. Upon your return from peacekeeping duty, what topics were covered in your re-integration briefings? Did this help you resume your daily life in Canadian society?

20. Were you emotionally prepared for the things you saw and did on your peacekeeping tour? Was there a period of adjustment for you upon your return? If so, how long was it?

21. If you experienced any duty-related or combat-related stress, did you feel that the Canadian Forces had resources in place to help you cope with this? Did you receive pre-deployment training in stress management and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder? Did you find it useful? Why or why not?

22. In your opinion, is peacekeeping a valid use of the resources and personnel of the Canadian Forces?

23. Do Canadian soldiers make good peacekeepers? Why or why not?

24. Are there any additional comments you would like to make in regard to your experience as a peacekeeper, and specifically about the training you received to prepare you for deployment to a peacekeeping mission?
Appendix F: Survey Cover Letter (French)

Trista L. Grant
Ottawa (Ontario)

Madame, Monsieur,

Vous trouverez ci-joint un sondage de 24 questions portant sur votre expérience en qualité de Casque bleu canadien, et plus précisément sur l’entraînement que vous avez reçu en vue de vos fonctions de maintien de la paix. Cette étude s’inscrit dans mes recherches dans le cadre du programme de doctorat en histoire, à l’Université de Western Ontario. Les conclusions de l’étude serviront à ma thèse de doctorat, laquelle s’intitule « Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo » (Politique, entraînement et rendement – Les Casques bleus canadiens de Suez à Sarajevo). Le but de mes recherches est d’étudier l’histoire de l’entraînement en vue d’opérations de maintien de la paix chez les Forces canadiennes, de 1956 à aujourd’hui.

DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord avec CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro d’autorisation : 262/03. Le sondage a été approuvé par la haute direction du ministère de la Défense nationale avant qu’on me donne votre nom afin que je vous inclue dans mon échantillonnage. Une copie de mon mémoire sera transmise au Ministère. Cependant, le MDN n’aura pas accès aux questionnaires comme tels. Vu que certains militaires pourraient avoir l’impression qu’ils seront dans une position hasardeuse s’ils expriment des opinions négatives par rapport à leur employeur (les Forces canadiennes), la participation au sondage est entièrement libre. Vous pouvez refuser d’y prendre part, refuser de répondre à certaines questions ou choisir de vous retirer de l’étude à n’importe quel moment. Vous n’avez pas à inscrire de renseignements permettant de vous identifier (c.-à-d. votre nom ou votre numéro matricule), mais l’on vous demandera certains renseignements de nature démographique (âge, sexe, grade, etc.). La chercheuse prendra soin de protéger votre identité.

Il est possible que vous courriez le risque, en remplissant le questionnaire, de vous souvenir d’expériences qui entraîneraient une gêne psychologique ou affective. Si vous choisissez de remplir le sondage, vous pouvez refuser de répondre à n’importe quelle question, sans préjudice, en raison de la nature délicate de certains renseignements abordés par le questionnaire. Vous ne devriez pas participer s’il est probable que les souvenirs d’événements passés provoquent du stress, de la peur, de l’anxiété ou vous fassent courir un risque important. Une liste de personnes-ressources est jointe à votre usage personnel. Aucune rémunération ne vous sera accordée par suite de votre participation au projet.
Si vous prenez part à l’étude, veuillez remplir le sondage et retourner vos réponses écrites à la main ou à l’ordinateur à l’adresse indiquée plus loin. Si vous préférez recevoir le sondage par courriel, veuillez communiquer avec moi et je me ferai un plaisir de vous envoyer une version électronique que vous pourrez renvoyer à la même adresse. Le temps qu’il faudra pour remplir le sondage dépendra de la longueur de vos réponses, mais vous pouvez compter environ une heure.

Le fait de remplir le questionnaire et de le retourner indique votre consentement à participer à l’étude. Cela signifie que vos réponses peuvent être utilisées par la chercheuse (Trista Grant) dans le cadre d’une thèse ou de tout autre travail universitaire qui en découle. La chercheuse peut tirer des citations du sondage ou utiliser l’information fournie aux fins du sondage sous d’autres formes acceptées en recherche historique. Les questionnaires seront conservés par la chercheuse, dans un endroit verrouillé, pendant la durée de l’étude, de même qu’après l’achèvement du mémoire. Ces documents sont conservés aux fins de témoignage et pour servir à la chercheuse dans le cadre d’autres travaux universitaires pouvant découler du mémoire (par exemple, la publication d’un article dans une revue spécialisée). Seule la chercheuse et son directeur de thèse auront accès aux réponses du sondage.

On vous posera des questions concernant vos expériences en matière de maintien de la paix, que ce soit de première main (en campagne) ou au niveau administratif. Si vous avez participé à des missions de maintien de la paix, l’on vous posera des questions directes sur l’entraînement reçu en vue de ces missions et l’on vous demandera votre opinion sur la pertinence de cet entraînement relativement aux situations vécues sur le terrain. Veuillez fournir le plus de détails et de précisions que vous pouvez et, dans la mesure du possible, évitez de répondre par un simple « oui » ou « non ».

Si vous avez des questions concernant le déroulement de l’étude ou vos droits à titre de sujet de recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec le Directeur du bureau des recherches en éthique (Office of Research Ethics) de l’Université de Western Ontario.

Si vous souhaitez vérifier les détails du projet, vous pouvez communiquer avec mon directeur de thèse, M. Jonathan Vance, au département d’histoire de l’Université de Western Ontario.

Si vous avez des questions concernant l’étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec moi-même, Trista Grant.

Si vous choisissez de participer à l’étude, veuillez remplir le questionnaire et le retourner à la chercheuse dans les trente jours suivant la réception. Le sondage devra être posté à l’adresse suivante :

Mme Trista Grant,
A/S Professeur Jonathan Vance
Department of History, The University of Western Ontario

Vous pouvez conserver la présente lettre.

Je vous remercie du temps que vous m’avez accordé et vous prie de recevoir, Madame ou Monsieur, l’expression de mes meilleurs sentiments.

Trista L. Grant
Boursière CCSH, Boursière CSDS
Candidate au doctorat
Département d’histoire
Université Western Ontario
Appendix G : Survey Health Contacts (French)

Si vous éprouvez un inconfort psychologique ou émotif par suite de votre participation à cette étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec certaines organisations qui peuvent vous fournir des renseignements et des conseils sur la gestion de ces réactions. À noter que ces ressources ne remplacent pas les soins médicaux. Veuillez consulter votre médecin si vous avez des inquiétudes à propos de votre santé mentale.

**Ministère de la Défense nationale**
*Services de santé des Forces canadiennes*
[http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_f.asp](http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_f.asp)
- *Gestion du stress*


L’expert en la matière pour la « gestion du stress » est le Sous-chef d’état-major – Protection de la santé de la Force (SCEM PSF).

L’officier d’état-major qui, au QGDN, s’occupe du dossier « Gestion du stress » à titre de personne-ressource est :
Titre de poste : Politiques et programmes – Mieux-être social
Bureau de l’Ombudsman
[http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca](http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca)

**Anciens Combattants Canada**

Ce site vise à promouvoir la santé et le mieux-être des anciens combattants canadiens ainsi qu’à fournir des renseignements sur les programmes et services offerts à ces derniers, aux membres des Forces canadiennes, aux employés civils admissibles et à leurs familles.

**Réseau canadien de la santé**

Ce site est un carrefour d’information sur la santé. Il s’agit d’un outil efficace qui permet de trouver des renseignements, des ressources et des personnes-ressources concernant certaines questions relatives à la santé.

- La page Santé mentale
[http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/1mental_health.html](http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/1mental_health.html)

**Santé Canada En direct**
[http://www.he-sc.gc.ca/](http://www.he-sc.gc.ca/)

**Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety Treatments**
Association des psychiatres du Canada
http://www.cpa-apc.org/

Association canadienne pour la santé mentale
http://www.cmha.ca
Appendix H: Survey Questionnaire (French)

DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord avec CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro d’autorisation : 262/03.

**Questionnaire sur la formation en maintien de la paix au sein des Forces canadiennes**

**Section démographique**

*Grade actuel*
- Sdt - cplc
- Sgt - adjuc
- Élof – slt
- Lt - capt
- Maj - col
- Officier général

*Âge*
- 18-24
- 25-29
- 30-35
- 36-40
- 41-45
- 46-50
- 51-55
- 56-60

*GPM :

*Élément :

*Langue maternelle :

*Sexe :

1. Décrivez les missions de maintien de la paix auxquelles vous avez participé à titre de membre des Forces canadiennes (FC) et indiquez la durée de ces missions ainsi que votre grade et votre groupe professionnel militaire (GPM) à l’époque. Veuillez décrire en détail les fonctions que vous avez remplies dans le cadre de chaque mission.

2. Si vous avez pris part à plus d’une mission de maintien de la paix, avez-vous remarqué un changement en ce qui concerne le type et/ou la qualité de la formation en la matière que vous avez reçue tout au long de votre carrière?
3. Quel genre de formation, le cas échéant, avez-vous reçue avant votre déploiement dans le cadre d’une mission de maintien de la paix? Quels étaient les sujets abordés durant l’instruction? Avez-vous reçu une formation propre à la mission, par exemple, une formation sur les coutumes et la culture locales?

4. Si vous avez reçu une formation supplémentaire en vue de vos fonctions de maintien de la paix, celle-ci était-elle différente de l’instruction militaire de base? Si oui, était-elle différente de la formation de « soldat »? Soyez précis, si vous le pouvez.

5. Combien de temps votre formation préalable au déploiement a-t-elle duré? La période entre la formation préalable au déploiement et le déploiement était-elle longue?

6. Avez-vous reçu, concernant l’emploi de la force ou l’emploi de vos armes, des instructions qui étaient différentes d’une situation de combat typique?

7. Selon vous, les ordres que vous avez reçus concernant l’emploi de la force étaient-ils adaptés à la situation? Si oui pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

8. Étiez-vous en mesure d’y obéir en tout temps?

9. Avez-vous eu, à quelque moment que ce soit, à utiliser votre arme ou à vous engager dans une confrontation directe avec au moins un des belligérants? Si oui, veuillez élaborer.

10. Vous êtes-vous senti en situation de conflit personnel concernant votre double rôle de membre des Forces canadiennes, et donc de soldat, et de casque bleu relevant d’une organisation internationale? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

11. D’après vous, votre rôle dans la mission de maintien de la paix consistait-il à remplir des fonctions militaires ou policières? Une présence militaire était-elle nécessaire dans le pays hôte? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

12. Votre instruction militaire représentait-elle un atout pour les fonctions de maintien de la paix? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

13. Vous a-t-on fourni tout l’équipement nécessaire pour votre mission de maintien de la paix (p. ex., votre trousse personnelle ainsi que les véhicules, l’équipement et les outils dont vous avez besoin pour remplir vos fonctions) ?

14. Avez-vous reçu la formation voulue, avant le déploiement, pour utiliser cet équipement?
15. D’après vous, avez-vous été bien préparé, avant le départ, à faire face aux conditions qui prévalaient dans le pays hôte (conditions climatiques, géographiques, sociales et conditions de vie)? Est-ce la formation supplémentaire en maintien de la paix qui vous a permis de vous y préparer? Sinon, comment auriez-vous pu être mieux préparé?

16. Avez-vous eu des contacts avec des organisations non gouvernementales (p. ex., des organisations d’aide humanitaire)?

17. Les casques bleus avaient-ils des obligations à l’égard du personnel d’organisations non gouvernementales (ONG)? Si oui, ces obligations étaient-elles prévues?

18. Parlez-nous des défis que présente le travail au sein d’une force multinationale. Les militaires de différents pays étaient-ils assujettis à des normes communes de façon à faciliter les opérations dans le théâtre? La présence de membres du personnel militaire international, qui sont tenus de collaborer pour atteindre les objectifs de la mission, a-t-elle posé des problèmes? Y avait-il des différences évidentes entre l’instruction que les autres militaires ont reçue en vue des fonctions de maintien de la paix et la vôtre?

19. À votre retour de la mission de maintien de la paix, quels sujets ont-ils été abordés dans vos séances d’information sur la réintégration? Ces séances vous ont-elles aidé à reprendre votre vie dans la société canadienne?

20. Étiez-vous prêt, sur le plan émotif, à faire face aux choses que vous avez vues ou faites durant votre mission de maintien de la paix? Avez-vous eu besoin d’une période d’ajustement quand vous êtes revenu au pays? Si oui, combien de temps cette période a-t-elle duré?

21. Si vous avez subi un stress lié au service ou au combat, selon vous, les Forces canadiennes avaient-elles les ressources nécessaires pour vous aider à composer avec cette situation? Avant votre déploiement, avez-vous reçu une formation sur la gestion du stress ou le syndrome de stress post-traumatique? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

22. Selon vous, le maintien de la paix constitue-t-il un usage valable des ressources et du personnel des Forces canadiennes?

23. Les soldats canadiens sont-ils des casques bleus compétents? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?

24. Avez-vous d’autres observations à formuler concernant votre expérience en tant que casque bleu, et tout particulièrement au sujet de la formation que vous avez reçue en prévision de votre déploiement dans le cadre d’une mission de maintien de la paix?
Curriculum Vitae
Trista L. Grant-Waddell

Post-secondary Education and Degrees:

**PhD – History**
University of Western Ontario (2014)

**MA – History**
University of Ottawa (1999)

**BA (Honours) – History and English**
University of Ottawa, (1998)

Honours and Awards:

Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Ph.D. Scholarship
2001-2002

Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Dr. Ronald Baker PhD Scholarship
2002-2003, 2004-2005

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship
2003-2004

Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Security & Defence Studies, Carleton University
2004-2007

Doctoral Fellow, Canadian Consortium on Human Security, Center for International Relations, Liu Institute for the Study of Global Issues, The University of British Columbia
2004-2005

Related work experience:

Assistant Professor of History, Division of Continuing Studies, Royal Military College of Canada, 2002 – 2006

Courses Taught:
POE 206: The Canadian Forces and Modern Society – Civics, Politics and International Relations
HIE 208: Canadian Military History: A Study of War and Military History, 1867 to the Present

Teaching / Marking Assistant, University of Western Ontario, 2000-2004

Publications:

