February 2014

Rooted Cosmopolitanism

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Graduate Program in Political Science

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

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Abstract

This thesis considers the relationship between global obligations and particular duties. I argue that there is a core tension in our moral thought that both cosmopolitans and particularists must confront. This tension is between our ability to fulfill obligations to particular others with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship (e.g. family, friends, co-nationals) and our global obligations. It is argued in the literature that strong moral cosmopolitanism is neither tenable nor desirable, as it requires us to forgo these special duties. This is seen as problematic as it does not resonate with our lived moral experience – we desire meaningful relationships that, by their nature, generate special duties. The task for a successful theory of cosmopolitanism, then, is to account for special duties in some manner. Cosmopolitan theory, I contend, needs to be reformed so as to make it consistent with special duties in such a way that does not reduce their structure or content. In the alternative, however, we may have obligations to associates that are, by their nature, inconsistent with our global obligations. In this thesis, I explore three attempts at reconciling these sets of obligations; I consider each of these to be attempts at ‘rooting’ cosmopolitanism. My goal, then, is to determine whether we can interpret cosmopolitanism in such a way that adequately responds to the claims of both particularists and universalists. I conclude the thesis with an alternative argument for rooted cosmopolitanism. I argue that if the moral ends of cosmopolitanism are to be met without undermining our particular moral duties, we may need to adjust the institutional structures that generate obligations to provide a more efficient way to fulfill both sets of duties without thereby reducing their content.

Keywords

Cosmopolitanism, General Duties, Associative Duties, Particularism, Nationalism, Egalitarianism, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, Embedded Cosmopolitanism, Moderate Cosmopolitanism
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge Professor Charles Jones for his direct supervision of this project and Professor Richard Vernon for his helpful advice and suggestions throughout the project. Earlier versions of several chapters were aided by feedback from conference participants at the Canadian Political Science Association meeting in Victoria, BC in June 2013 and the IV Meetings on Ethics & Political Philosophy, Braga, Portugal, in May 2013. I would like to specifically thank Neil Hibbert, Erin Hannah, and Samantha Brennan for their helpful comments. I would also like to acknowledge Tamara Maciel, David Hoogenboom, Cameron Harrington, Timothy E.M. Vine, John Nator, Zachary Spicer, Michael Laurence, Joseph Lyons, Peter Scapillato, and Andy Chater for their help throughout the writing of the project.
Preface

This thesis is motivated by what I take to be a fundamental issue of contemporary moral thought. The cosmopolitan ideal – that all humans are equal – is a very attractive thesis, and one that obtains intuitive support. At the same time, we generally desire to dedicate resources and energy to those with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship. Yet, these two sets of obligations are generally seen to be at odds with one another. As such, the goals of cosmopolitanism may be seen to be at odds with partiality. Both theses, nonetheless, are worth consideration. My goal in this project, then, is to establish whether or not there is a coherent theory that can account for both our partial and our cosmopolitan duties. This theory is entitled rooted cosmopolitanism; it is a form of cosmopolitanism that takes our partiality seriously. In this thesis I begin by providing the framework for analysis and then move to assessing three different versions of rooted cosmopolitanism. I conclude with an alternative approach to the theory.

The thesis begins by exploring cosmopolitanism more generally. In the first chapter I attempt to attain some conceptual clarity. In doing so, I establish that all cosmopolitan claims can be separated into three different categories: claims about morality, politics, or culture. By distinguishing the claims in this way, I am better able to assess what cosmopolitanism requires. Although I distinguish between three forms of cosmopolitan claims, it is important to note that most arguments do not follow this strict distinction. In fact, most of the arguments that I discuss here overlap between two or all of the different forms. It is nonetheless useful to distinguish here to gain some clarity about the concept. I conclude the chapter by providing some frames of reference for my analysis of rooted forms of cosmopolitanism.

In the second chapter I continue by describing what I call ‘Scheffler’s tension’. Samuel Scheffler argues that our commitments to particularism and globalism are in tension with one another. I take this to be the central issue for theories of rooted cosmopolitanism. In the chapter I describe the tension in two ways. First, I show it as a tension between general and associative duties. This version helps to show how it is an issue of obligations and our ability to fulfill both sets simultaneously. Second, I
describe it as a tension between egalitarianism and nationalism. This version I take to be providing an example of how our particularist duties can come into conflict with a commitment to global equality. Both versions of the tension represent a theme that runs throughout the project. In subsequent chapters I describe various versions of rooted cosmopolitanism in the language of Scheffler’s tension.

In the third, fourth, and fifth chapters I explore three versions of rooted cosmopolitanism against Scheffler’s tension. The third chapter focuses on Kwame Anthony Appiah’s rooted cultural cosmopolitanism. Appiah’s theory is explored here as it represents one of the earliest accounts of rooted cosmopolitanism. He contends that we cannot separate arguments for cosmopolitanism from our cultural identities. I conclude that Appiah’s cosmopolitanism helpfully highlights the need for intercultural dialogue, but he does not fully account for the political implications of cultural cosmopolitanism. His argument implies a political cosmopolitanism that can account for intercultural power dynamics and ensure basic universal rights. Given this, I conclude that Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism begins to put us on the right path but is insufficient to resolve Scheffler’s tension.

In the fourth chapter I explore David Miller’s nationalist-minimalist cosmopolitan position. He advocates national responsibility, which limits cosmopolitan obligations. His argument gives space for minimalist cosmopolitanism, but rejects any stronger globalist positions. I argue that Miller’s nationalism misconstrues international politics and his minimalist position is insufficient. Given my rejection of his nationalism, I contend that a stronger form of moral and political cosmopolitanism is required, but his own framework appears to imply a stronger argument than he defends. In the end, his focus on nationalism helps to highlight the importance of nationalist ties, but it does not resolve Scheffler’s tension.

In the fifth chapter I discuss the work of Kok-Chor Tan. In particular, I address his global luck egalitarianism. Although Tan’s position is very helpful, and his focus on the background context of international interaction can help us discover principles of global justice, I find his position to be unsatisfactory. Tan’s global distributivist focus
is questionable, and we need to reconcile global distributive justice with what I call the ‘shared values thesis’. I argue that the goods that are susceptible to distribution are dependent upon shared values. Although there are goods that are susceptible to global distribution, we need to assess how we can effectively distribute across contexts. Additionally, the way in which Tan prioritizes global obligations above particular ones is problematic. Certainly, some of our global obligations ought to take priority, but it is not categorical priority. I conclude that Tan’s argument allows us to more effectively discover principles of global justice once we incorporate an analysis of the shared-values thesis.

The final chapter explores an alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. I argue that if rooted cosmopolitanism is to be a successful theory it should be conceived of as complex and open-ended. It is complex in the sense that it incorporates moral, political, and cultural variants of cosmopolitanism, and it is open-ended in the sense that it is subject to continual re-negotiation over time. I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism depends upon changing current norms around state sovereignty and establishing global governance. I contend that this is necessary as our national obligations are institutionally separated from our global ones. If we augment state sovereignty and develop stronger forms of global governance then our two spheres of obligations may not necessarily be separated. At the same time, establishing global forms of governance will rely on successful intercultural dialogue. In order to establish principles of global justice that are universal and sensitive to context we need to engage in dialogue with others that recognizes who others are and where they come from.

I see my approach as an initial step in establishing a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. I see the theory as a potential response to Scheffler’s tension, but one that requires much political and theoretical work. Rooted cosmopolitanism has the potential to allow us to recognize and fulfill our particular and global duties. Achieving global justice is possible, but it depends upon on our ability to elaborate principles of justice that recognize the strength and role of our particular obligations. I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism may be able to achieve this.
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Chapter 1

1 Varieties of Cosmopolitanism

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter I aim to address the varieties of cosmopolitanism. My goal here is to demonstrate that all cosmopolitan claims can be described in terms of a claim about morality, politics, or culture. Additionally, for my argument here, political and cultural cosmopolitan claims attain strength through a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. This suggests that there is significant overlap between the three forms. Throughout this thesis I defend a version of moral cosmopolitanism that implies claims about political institutions and about culture. More importantly, I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism – as a sub-type of cosmopolitanism – can be described in terms of a tension within our moral thought. As such, the central task of this thesis is to attain conceptual clarity on the intersection between global and local moral obligations. I argue throughout that understanding these obligations will have an impact on both political and cultural claims as well. I argue, then, that in order for a cosmopolitan argument to carry weight, it must necessarily first be a claim about moral obligations that then impacts politics or culture. This is not to suggest that all cosmopolitan arguments are based on a claim about morality, but the ones I focus on throughout this project can be described in this way.

As well, this chapter will help set the terms of reference for the discussions of rooted cosmopolitanism that are at the heart of this project. Rooted cosmopolitanism cannot be fully understood without first providing some background on the larger theory. I begin the chapter by exploring a brief history of the concept, detailing its generation in
Cynic thought through to 20th century liberalism. I then explore the different varieties of the theory. Here I divide it into claims about morality, political institutions, and culture. First, I offer some preliminary thoughts on a key distinction between strong and weak moral cosmopolitanism: this discussion includes an analysis of global justice. Second, I explore political cosmopolitanism, which looks at the role of institutions and governance. And, finally, I address cosmopolitanism about culture, which questions the role of cultural membership and identity. I end the chapter with a discussion of rooted versions of cosmopolitanism. I argue that this distinction – between moral, political, and cultural cosmopolitanism – is a useful way of categorizing the theory when we look at rooted cosmopolitanisms. The distinction between the three types is not absolute, however. It is worth mentioning here that as I conceive of the theory, there is significant overlap between the types, and as I mention above, we need to give priority to moral claims. Nonetheless, by offering them as distinct types I am better able to conceptualize the debate before showing how the types are importantly linked.

The term *cosmopolitanism* derives from the Greek *kosmopolitēs*, or world citizen. Early versions of the theory questioned the limitations placed upon citizenship and emphasized a world community. More modern versions of cosmopolitanism are not necessarily focused on the civic component, but citizenship, nonetheless, remains an important aspect of the theory.¹ Simon Caney helpfully lists what he takes to be the central tenets of a cosmopolitan position, as derived from Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, and Brian Barry: “They all argue that cosmopolitanism contains (and derives its

plausibility from) the following intuitively appealing claims: (a) individuals have equal moral worth, (b) they have this equally, and (c) people’s equal moral worth generates moral reasons that are binding on everyone.”² He continues by claiming that these claims are fairly non-controversial and they imply tacit support for a claim about global justice.³ That is, however, a much more controversial claim than simply claiming universal equal moral worth. As I discuss below, some question whether or not obligations that arise out of universal equality are obligations of justice. Nonetheless, the term cosmopolitan can refer to one or more of a variety of things, all of which relate to the status of our relationship to distant strangers. I now move to exploring the historical origins before looking at the varieties much more closely.

1.2 Historical Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism was first articulated by the Greek Cynic Diogenes (c.412-323). He reportedly remarked, “I am a citizen of the world.” when asked what country he was from.⁴ This is the first known account of someone claiming to be a cosmopolitan. For Diogenes, cosmopolitanism and 'being' cosmopolitan were represented in purely negative

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³ Caney, 977.

terms. He was known for rejecting all local custom and culture. By claiming to be a citizen of the world, and not a citizen of Sinope or Athens or any other polis, Diogenes questioned the role and strength of co-citizen obligations.

Cosmopolitanism as we understand it began to get its more contemporary form when it was articulated by Chrysippus. Most notably, the work of Chrysippus demonstrates early versions of what we term the cosmopolitan ideal. In his *On Lives* it is clear that we have obligations to humanity writ large, but that we may be serving humanity best by dispensing our obligations through political engagement.⁵ Here we also begin to see new developments in the way citizenship is conceived. Citizenship for the Greeks (specifically Aristotle) was limited to one's polis. There was a strong ethnic component to citizenship, and for reasons of practicality one could only really participate within one's own polis.⁶ The Stoics argued, however, that people should not be treated differently because of where they come from – all people have the capacity for reason and should be treated as such. Our obligations, then, can be extended beyond our local polis.

We also see several advances in political technology and machinery of government that allow for this to occur. Roman citizenship was notably different from Athenian/Greek citizenship and was supplanted by a large bureaucracy. One of the key differences between Rome and Greece was the removal of the ethnic component of citizenship that was replaced by a legal component. Due to a strong bureaucracy and a

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⁶ Aristotle's view of citizenship was quite limited. He presumed that only propertied ethnically Athenian males could be citizens due to the requirements of proper governance. One needed the ability to deliberate on political matters and thus needed the resources (i.e. leisure time) to be able to do this. See: Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair, (London: Penguin Books, 1983), esp. book III.
subdivided government that extended to all reaches of the Roman republic (and empire),
citizenship could be afforded beyond the city of Rome itself. Roman citizenship was
divided into several classes and sub-classes, but there was still the element of slavery, the
denial of citizenship for women, and various other aspects that would be considered non-
cosmopolitan by contemporary standards. Nonetheless, we can see early vestiges of a
form of cosmopolitan citizenship: one need not claim to be ethnically Roman in order to
enjoy the benefits of citizenship. The largely legalistic version of citizenship, and the
existence of a substantial bureaucracy that could be expanded, relieved people of the
burdens of political office and allowed for the vestiges of the state to be far reaching
enough to govern a large citizenry not bound by ethnicity.

Contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be influenced by more modern thinkers.
Although there are some prominent thinkers who derive their theory from Aristotelian,
Cynic, or Stoic roots, most cosmopolitans refer to contemporary liberalism or Kantianism
(or some combination). Kant had an interesting relationship with cosmopolitanism. The
most prominent example of his cosmopolitan thought is the argument found in his
Perpetual Peace. In it he describes what would be needed to institute world peace. The
central idea is that treaties and agreements are needed to foster peace. For example, he
argues for a duty of non-interference and calls for the abolition of standing armies.\(^7\) He
contends that these types of policies can be achieved when state economies are
interdependent.

Although Kant can be seen as a major influence for some contemporary thinkers,

\(^7\) Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in The Global Justice Reader, ed. Thom Brooks, (Malden: Blackwell
modern cosmopolitanism need not be Kantian. With some thinkers there is a clear influence of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Stoicism, with others their cosmopolitanism is distinctly Kantian, Utilitarian, and some even Hegelian. As in much of contemporary political philosophy it is easy to identify the historical influences at play.

Cosmopolitanism as a modern set of theories, at least for my purposes, really gathers strength in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thinkers like Barry, Pogge, and Beitz, writing in the aftermath of Rawls’s seminal A Theory of Justice, composed cosmopolitan arguments that were direct extensions of Rawls’s theory of domestic liberal justice. Although Barry, Pogge, and Beitz call for a ‘cosmopolitanized Rawls’ built from a global difference principle and global original position, they later refine their claims and distinguish themselves further from Rawls. Importantly, Rawls did not see A Theory of Justice as cosmopolitan in nature; instead he issued his formal response and his view of international relations theory much later in his Law of Peoples. Although this should not be taken to be the official starting point of contemporary cosmopolitan thought, I will use this, effectively, as a marker. This is primarily due to the fact that Pogge’s, Barry’s, and Beitz’s responses are three of the most well known early attempts at formalizing a

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9 Nussbaum is very clear about her ancient influences and Benhabib expresses cosmopolitanism in Kantian terms, for example. Mervyn Frost offers a Hegelian inspired cosmopolitan argument. See: Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom & International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2008).


cosmopolitan position, and to the fact that their work has spawned an immense literature in the field. Moreover, for my purposes here, I do not rely on historical cosmopolitanism to provide the framework for a rooted version of the theory.

In the remainder of the chapter I consider several distinctions in cosmopolitanism as a way to sort through these complex and often overlapping arguments. The distinctions I offer follow the traditional understanding of cosmopolitanism, however I wish to challenge the compartmentalization of the theory as it misconstrues the full implications of the argument. Thus, following Simon Caney, in what follows I distinguish between moral, cultural, and political cosmopolitanism. Though I distinguish three separate forms, it should be noted here that most cosmopolitan arguments overlap between the three spheres. Importantly, I argue that moral cosmopolitanism must necessarily act as the base of all cosmopolitan claims. Political and cultural claims are toothless without a description of the universal nature of our moral obligations. Thus, those political and cultural arguments that are not based on moral cosmopolitanism are unconvincing. Prioritizing moral claims in this way is necessary as it allows me to develop a more successful rooted cosmopolitan theory in chapter six. I argue that moral cosmopolitanism must act as the base of all political and cultural claims, we cannot defend either the extension of the scope of political institutions or make claims about the nature and relationships between cultural groups without first making a claim about the nature and scope of our obligations. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the relation of the varieties discussed here to the rooted forms of the theory discussed in the succeeding

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1.3 Moral Cosmopolitanism and Claims About Justice

The first form of cosmopolitanism I discuss is at the same time the most universally accepted and contested form. How it earns both such a great amount of acceptance and derision becomes clear once we look at the basic claims of moral cosmopolitanism and then the implications of those claims. Put in its most simple terms, moral cosmopolitanism claims that we are in an important moral relationship with all people and all people are ‘universally equal’. That is, our ‘sphere of moral concern’ is global and we ought to consider our relations with distant others a moral one. However, moral cosmopolitans tend to disagree about what universal equality means and requires. It takes on a variety of forms and I briefly would like to explore several of them. Here I distinguish between strong, weak, and moderate moral cosmopolitanism.

The distinction between strong, weak, and moderate forms is perhaps best explicated by Pogge and David Miller. Miller rejects strong cosmopolitanism as a viable position. He contends that it “…requires that as agents we should acknowledge equal duties or equal responsibilities to everyone in the world without exception.” He claims that it only makes sense under the framework of a world government. At the same time, however, moral cosmopolitanism, at least under Beitz’s definition, need not require a defence of world government. The way Beitz defines cosmopolitanism appears to make it

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13 This is the term used by Toni Erskine, I explore it in much greater detail later. See: Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).


15 Ibid.
compatible with the state system: “Indeed, cosmopolitanism is consistent with a
conception of the world in which states constitute the principle forms of human social
and political organization.” Miller claims, however, that the type of cosmopolitanism
that Beitz is referring to here is only a ‘weak ethical’ formulation with which almost
everyone would agree. He claims that weak moral cosmopolitanism is “…formulated in
terms of a principle of equal moral worth or equal moral concern…[that would be
accepted by] almost anybody barring a few racists and other bigots.” Weak moral
cosmopolitanism, formulated in this way, is platitudinous; and strong moral
cosmopolitanism, understood as requiring equal moral treatment, is highly controversial.
Miller goes so far as to connect strong moral cosmopolitanism with imperialism as it
ignores salient differences (be they moral, cultural, or political) that impact how we
should interact with others. Eduardo Mendieta suggests that this form of
cosmopolitanism (which he links to Kant) implies ‘imperial material foundations’ and
‘hubristic epistemic orientations’ due to the assumptions of norms implied by strong
moral cosmopolitanism. It would appear that these scholars are concerned with a
perceived assumption that equal treatment would be determined by what liberal justice
requires. Despite his wariness surrounding strong moral cosmopolitanism, Miller does
not reject all global duties, but merely attempts to differentiate them from our local

17 Miller, 84.
18 Ibid.
19 Eduardo Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism?”, Ethics & Global Politics 2 (2009): 244.
duties. In his words: “…we owe more to some than to others.”

Miller’s rejection of strong moral cosmopolitanism is similar to one that I would defend. If global equality requires equal treatment, as implied by strong moral cosmopolitanism, then it cannot be defended. The notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, as described in §1.6, relies on a defence of differentiated treatment (or on the ability to incorporate partiality into cosmopolitanism). Strong moral cosmopolitanism is best described as rejecting all forms of partiality (in its strongest form) or supporting a claim about universal equal treatment, but this position is untenable. Describing moral obligations in this way would leave us unable to account for our most basic partial obligations – family and friends. In our everyday moral experience, we give partial consideration to those with whom we stand in a significant relationship. Most important out of these relationships would be our family and friends. As a parent, spouse, or child, we want to be able to devote more moral consideration to our family members than we would to others. Bernard Williams claimed that when considering how we treat our significant others we should avoid making impartial claims or unnecessarily moral calculi. This suggests that when we make moral priorities to our closest associates, we do not (or should not) consciously consider them on the same moral plane as others with whom we do not have a significant relationship. Moral cosmopolitanism must account, in some way, for partiality. My rejection of strong moral claims does not require me to defend all forms of partiality. Rather, I argue throughout the thesis that some forms of partiality are self-evident (such as partiality to family members) and others require

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20 Miller, 83.
21 This is in reference to Williams’ famed ‘one thought too many’ claim. See: Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-20.
justification. In chapters four and five I assess the viability of nationalist partiality to determine whether or not nationalism undermines the goals of moral cosmopolitanism. Partial treatment in relationships such as these require justification primarily because the type of relationship may not appear to generate overriding moral obligations in the same way that ones to family would. Indeed as I describe in the second chapter, the strength of our obligations comes (in part) from the nature of the relationship and what maintenance of it demands of us. However, I argue in chapters four, five, and six that partiality to co-nationals requires justification in ways that partiality to family members does not. Nonetheless, partiality in some form is part of our lived moral experience and must be accounted for by cosmopolitans. Strong moral cosmopolitanism is untenable as it is unable to account for partiality in a meaningful way.

Pogge agrees with David Miller that strong cosmopolitanism is untenable. Miller claims that the strong position is untenable as it does not allow for any differentiated treatment, even to those who we would necessarily prioritize (e.g. family and friends). Pogge argues that “[Miller’s] example suffices to refute strong cosmopolitanism: we do not all have equal responsibilities to everyone.” Pogge helpfully breaks Miller’s argument down into three specific claims, which he (as a cosmopolitan) accepts: “1. Weak cosmopolitanism does not entail strong cosmopolitanism; 2. Strong cosmopolitanism is false; 3. Weak cosmopolitanism is undistinctive in the sense that almost anyone…accepts it.” Thus, Pogge has to offer an alternative, which he terms ‘intermediate cosmopolitanism’ that I take to be akin to moderate cosmopolitanism. He shifts the focus

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23 Ibid., 86.
of global duties from positive to negative: “…compatriotism makes no difference to our most important negative duties.”

Put in other words, the duty to not murder someone is not affected by whether or not a person is a fellow citizen. Pogge claims that moderate cosmopolitanism “…asserts the fundamental negative duty of justice as one that every human being owes to every other…We have a negative duty not to impose an unjust institutional order upon any human beings – compatriots or foreigners.”

His moderate cosmopolitanism is thus seen as sufficiently stronger than weak cosmopolitanism, to the point where it is not platitudinous, and sufficiently weaker than strong cosmopolitanism to avoid the controversial ‘equal worth, equal treatment’ claim that Pogge asserts is ‘righteous idiocy’.

This is a form of moderate cosmopolitanism that focuses on institutional arrangements. Though my discussion of special responsibilities comes later, it is worth mentioning briefly that Pogge’s cosmopolitanism is consistent with special responsibilities if understood as increasing our overall share of moral responsibility: “…special relationships can increase what we owe our associates, but they cannot decrease what we owe everyone else.”

His version of moral cosmopolitanism recognizes that even though we may owe foreigners less than we owe compatriots, we still have duties to them.

Pogge’s cosmopolitanism may not be the version of moderate cosmopolitanism that I defend, but it helpfully sets out three moral claims. Moderate cosmopolitanism, as an intermediary between strong and weak, is the position I defend as

24 Ibid., 87; For a more specific discussion on the role of negative duties see also: Thomas Pogge, “‘Assisting’ the Global Poor”, in Global Ethics: Seminal Essays, ed. Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton, 531-564, (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008).
25 Ibid., 89.
26 Ibid., 89.
27 Ibid., 90-91.
28 Ibid., 91.
most plausible throughout the thesis. There are thus three forms of moral cosmopolitanism:

1. Weak Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts that all people are of equal moral worth
2. Strong Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts that the equal worth of all persons requires that each person be treated equally
3. Moderate Moral Cosmopolitanism: asserts the equal moral worth of all persons but allows for differentiated treatment insofar as it does not come into conflict with universal equality.

With the three forms of moral cosmopolitanism defined, I now move to exploring strong and moderate moral cosmopolitanism in more detail.

Despite the repudiation of strong moral cosmopolitanism offered thus far, it is worth noting that several key thinkers defend a variant of the position. Strong cosmopolitanism as described by Miller is untenable, but in the literature we find positions that allow for partiality but can be described as strong. Hence, almost all defendable versions of the theory allow for partiality in some way. As an example, Robert Goodin’s argument in his “What is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?” finds that any partial treatment to fellow nationals is only justified insofar as it is an expedient way of fulfilling global obligations. \(^{29}\) My analysis in chapter two focuses much more closely on partiality and the distinction between general and special obligations, but it is worth saying here that the ‘expediency thesis’ does not satisfactorily respond to the claims of nationalists or other partialists who claim that special obligations have a value separate from universal equality. Equal treatment here requires that we do not make moral distinctions based on nationality or really any other factor. For Goodin, we owe

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something to humanity but are best suited to direct our actions locally. There are several reasons why we may be best suited to adopt the ‘think globally, act locally’ idea implied by Goodin’s thesis. Primarily, it appears as though directing our actions locally is more efficient and, due to institutional impediments, more effective. This suggests that if we consider our moral obligations to be owed to humanity, and not to a variety of categories, we would not need to distinguish what is owed in different categories. Partialists generally argue that we have differentiated obligations that can be distinguished along the lines of category of association – I owe something to my wife that would be different than what I owe to a co-worker, for example. If we did not differentiate what we owe, then we simply have to look to how we can fulfil our obligations. So, if we define our obligation as X, then we need to look at the most efficient and effective ways at fulfilling X. Under the current global institutional arrangement we are best suited to fulfil obligations more locally. This is due both to geographic (i.e. I am better able to help those closer to me) and institutional reasons (i.e. I am a participant in a redistributive structure that allows me to impact others under the same set of institutions).

Conceiving of our partial obligations as ‘efficient global obligations’ fundamentally misconstrues their nature and our impetus for fulfilling them. We do not (to use a famous example) provide for our children because it is good for children to be provided for and these ones happen to be ours, rather we do so because we care for these particular children in a way that we do not and can not care for others. When we act in a certain way towards our children, then, we are not doing so as a way to fulfil an obligation owed to children around the world, but we are doing so because we care about these particular children. Indeed, engaging in this type of moral calculus can lead us quite
quickly to one thought too many. Again, this argument may carry intellectual purchase, but it does not resonate with our actual experience of fulfilling obligations to our loved ones. I provide a much more detailed rejection of Goodin’s thesis in chapter three, §3.3.

Peter Singer famously advocates a strong moral cosmopolitan position from a utilitarian perspective. He contends that we ought to do what we can (in terms of shifting resources) to alleviate poverty around the world. He goes so far as to say that we should give up our wealth to such a degree that giving more would either not seriously improve the lives of others or significantly worsen our lives. Unlike most of the cosmopolitan thinkers focused on here, Singer does not distinguish between the value of socioeconomic goods in different cultural contexts. As opposed to concerning himself with discovering who is responsible for the plight of the world’s poorest, Singer simply sees the world in the categories of harm and happiness. Peter Unger arrives at a similar conclusion in his *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*; he concludes that we are morally obligated to make sacrifices to mitigate human suffering. Much in the same way that I reject Goodin’s argument, the Singer/Unger claims fail to adequately account for differentiated treatment. Though they are both correct that much needs to be done to account for global poverty, and that global redistribution will likely factor into it, their conclusion does not distinguish between our obligations. Singer and Unger’s consequentialist views (i.e. moral priorities are determined by the consequences of actions) fails to account for other motivations in our actions. That is, by focusing on consequences, they miss other (possibly more convincing) sources of moral motivation or

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ways to judge the rightness of an act. Consequentialists are unable to account for partiality as the value of a relationship or association with others cannot factor into our moral calculus. It is clear, then, that these positions are untenable, but in describing another reason why I reject this brand of moral cosmopolitanism, I can help clarify the connections between political and moral variants.

In addition to the discussion of responsibility (one I address in §4.4), there is the issue of understanding the role of social context in determining the meaning and value of particular goods (also explored in §5.3, 5.4, 5.5). Simply put, while there may be space for distributive justice at the global level, we need to understand what we are distributing and how the value and meaning of distributable goods is subject to context. Moreover, before we can effectively implement distributive justice on this scale, we need to develop an institutional structure that can effectively govern and implement distribution. This helpfully demonstrates the complexity of cosmopolitan arguments. Here I am effectively making two claims: 1. As a matter of moral obligation, we ought to redistribute across borders; and 2. This redistribution requires substantial political institutions to make it effective. The argument does not work without both of these claims. That is, I cannot make the moral cosmopolitan argument that global justice is distributive without recognizing the impact on political institutions. In the inverse, I cannot defend the expansion of political institutions beyond the state without justifying it with a claim about moral obligation or duties of justice.

To briefly reiterate, strong moral cosmopolitanism is problematic for several reasons. Of primary importance to my analysis here is the fact that it does not adequately account for partiality. Instead, most strong cosmopolitans appear to be motivated by the
extreme poverty and gross inequalities they see around the world, things that certainly
need to be addressed. However, this motivation leads into an argument that collapses
political memberships into one category, usually either a notion of a global political
community (i.e. a cosmopolis) or a reference to shared humanity to justify their position.
The notion of shared humanity is one commonly referred to in the work of Martha
Nussbaum, another strong moral cosmopolitan. She contends that we all belong to the
same human community, and as such we should recognize our responsibilities to others.32
Nussbaum adopts a position similar to Goodin that is equally untenable. She does,
however, offer much more to the debate that I consider later in the thesis (specifically in
§4.5 and 4.6). I therefore reject strong moral cosmopolitanism as a tenable position.

Moderate moral cosmopolitanism maintains a claim for universal equal worth, but
does not require equal treatment, at least to the same degree that strong cosmopolitans
would defend. Samuel Scheffler’s seminal text, Boundaries and Allegiances, helpfully
distinguishes between strong and moderate positions.33 Moderate positions are those that
claim that the cosmopolitan ideal does not necessarily require relinquishing other
obligations or loyalties we may have. It would appear, then, that moderate moral
cosmopolitanism might be compatible with partiality.

These cosmopolitans tend not to deny that we are members of a human
community, but that membership there must be understood alongside membership in
other communities. Pogge argues for a weak cosmopolitan position when he contends
that moral cosmopolitanism need not commit us to the rootless life that some have argued

32 Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, in The Cosmopolitan Reader, eds. Garrett
it does. This rootless life is the one described by strong cosmopolitans and is devoid of the deep connections to family, friends, and local community members. He claims that moral cosmopolitanism need not be understood strictly as seeing ourselves as belonging to one moral community, but rather as belonging to many morally relevant communities. His cosmopolitanism relies on a schema of negative rights that are based on a claim that all humans are of moral concern. Contained within these negative rights is a ‘duty to not impose unjust social institutions’ on others.\textsuperscript{34} This is a defensible claim, but one that appears to be problematic upon closer examination. Specifically, Pogge’s schema of negative rights implies institutional change. Using the ‘non-imposition duty’ as an example we can see that the negative rights have significant implications for how we understand the scope and role of statist and international political institutions. Given the current nature of international politics and the ways in which global capitalist institutions (e.g. corporations, markets, trade organizations, trade law) impose unjust social institutions on others, we could say that we are currently failing to fulfil the non-imposition duty. If we were to begin to meet our global obligation, then it would require substantial restructuring of international infrastructure. We would need to remove the institutions that negatively impose on others, which would require significant positive action. The negative duty, then, implies positive action: in fulfilling a duty of non-imposition, we would be required to actively restructure global capitalism to be consistent with his schema of negative duties. Pogge recognizes the implication of positive duties, but may not agree with me on the degree of change and action that is required.\textsuperscript{35} To be

\textsuperscript{34} Pogge, 87.
\textsuperscript{35} For an example of Pogge’s view on the positive implication of negative duties see: Thomas Pogge,
fair to his position, he is not necessarily attempting to elaborate on what moderate moral cosmopolitanism implies or entails, merely that it exists as a plausible moral claim between strong and weak.36

We can identify a moderate moral cosmopolitanism in the way that distinguishes between different levels of moral obligation. While the strong cosmopolitan position claims that our global obligations are most pressing, the moderate moral cosmopolitan position does not necessarily rely on the priority of global obligations over more local ones. Lenard and Moore helpfully illustrate the importance of prioritizing our moral obligations without abandoning a cosmopolitan stance.37 For Lenard and Moore, this means that certain global duties may trump our associative ones, but we have to carefully elaborate which ones, “…since it appears implausible to suggest that all possible [general] duties, especially on a fairly expansive view of what these might be, trump all possible associative duties.”38 This position is marked by an attempt to make a compromise between local and global obligations and an understanding that we are part of a global moral community alongside other communities. Put in other words, moderate forms of moral cosmopolitanism attempt to account for partiality.

When we claim that we are part of a universal moral community, we can see that as one of the many moral communities of which we are members. Moreover, we need not

38 Ibid., 405.
claim that cosmopolitan duties necessarily take priority over local duties. Thus, Robert Goodin’s attempt to dilute local moral commitments by claiming that obligations to family, friends, and citizens are fulfilled only as a way of efficiently fulfilling cosmopolitan duties fails to convince most moderate moral cosmopolitans. As opposed to seeing our local moral commitments as being derivative from our global ones, we tend to want to put independent weight on the strength of our local obligations. In almost all of the subsequent chapters, the scholars I address espouse some variety of moderate moral cosmopolitanism. Samuel Scheffler, the focus of the second chapter, helpfully distinguishes between what he takes to be an apparent tension in our moral thought - that between fulfilling particular obligations and universal ones. For Scheffler, universal obligations born out of a moral cosmopolitanism are legitimate and ought to be considered alongside our particular ones. In this way, then, it could be claimed that he supports a moderate moral cosmopolitan position. This matter is explored in much more detail in the second chapter. David Miller’s liberal nationalist argument does not necessarily preclude moral cosmopolitanism. Miller’s substantively weaker cosmopolitanism supports a schema of human rights: “I shall suggest, in other words, that when basic human rights go unprotected, any agent, individual or collective, who is able to help protect them may in principle bear remedial responsibilities.” Though I contend that moral cosmopolitanism requires more than just support for a ‘moral minimum’ (in this case as elaborated in the language of human rights), Miller advocates a moderate moral position. Kok-Chor Tan presents a political argument, but it is worth noting that it

39 Goodin, 678.
is premised upon a stronger version of moral cosmopolitanism. In particular, he argues for a globalized form of egalitarianism. Tan’s global egalitarianism, while controversial, is borne out of a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. Further, he provides a great example of how most cosmopolitans are not concerned solely with moral, cultural, or political/institutional claims. His political cosmopolitanism only works insofar as it is premised on the cosmopolitan ideal - i.e. universal equal moral worth.

As it is likely becoming clear at this point, I feel I should state this plainly: most cosmopolitans defend some form of universal moral equality, the controversy arises when we discuss what equality requires. Hence, although I go to great effort to distinguish between moral, political, and cultural forms of cosmopolitanism there is significant overlap between the forms. Additionally, I argue that political and cultural cosmopolitan claims must necessarily be generated or derived from a concern for moral cosmopolitanism. A concern for global governance or international institutions tends to be derived from a notion of a global moral community. Additionally, acknowledgement of and concern for the role and value of culture in one’s life and culture as part of the diversity of the human community, is usually paired with acknowledgement that all people are part of a moral community and due some consideration. I explain this in more detail below.

So far I have explored claims of strong and moderate moral cosmopolitanism, however it is important at this point to distinguish moral cosmopolitanism from claims about global justice. Moral cosmopolitanism simply claims that all people are morally equal; exactly what equality requires varies between cosmopolitans. Global justice typically emerges out of a moral cosmopolitan argument, but the two are not
synonymous. That is, not all moral cosmopolitans make an argument for global justice. Miller, for example, makes a moderate moral claim when he defends human rights – i.e. the justification for human rights is bound in the notion that all people are due moral consideration. However, he also rejects claims of justice beyond state borders. ‘Justice’ requires very particular social relations that are not exhibited on the international or global scale according to these theorists. Thomas Nagel similarly rejects the idea of ‘global justice’ due to the fact that relations of justice can only be established under social-institutional conditions that do not exist at the global level. For Nagel, there is an inextricable link between justice and sovereignty. Both Miller and Nagel contend that all people are due some ethical consideration, and in this way they are both defending a (substantively) weak moral cosmopolitan position. Hence, it is helpful to distinguish between what moral cosmopolitanism implies, and what a claim about the scope of justice implies. Relations of justice exist under the conditions of social and institutional interaction. Rawls’s theory of justice, for example, is a theory of social justice – “For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” On this reading, principles of justice “…regulate the relations of people living in the same society, specifying their duties to one another and society’s duties to them.” Although any defence of global justice is necessarily cosmopolitan, a defence of cosmopolitanism need not imply a claim

41 Ibid.
about global justice. One may contend that we have cosmopolitan duties of humanitarian assistance, following Miller, but these do not include duties of justice. Tan, on the other hand, contends that our cosmopolitan duties do extend into duties of justice. To distinguish the two more clearly, a duty of humanitarian assistance is a moral commitment with a definable end-point (i.e. once the duty has been fulfilled), and a duty of justice regulates interaction without a particular end-point in mind.

Moral cosmopolitanism, thus, refers to a wide-ranging diverse set of claims centred around the belief that all people are of equal moral worth and are due consideration regardless of their citizenship. As I have shown, what consideration they are due will vary. Some have claimed that they are due equal treatment by way of a strict global egalitarian framework, as demonstrated by Singer and Unger. Others contend that moral cosmopolitanism requires moral consideration that develops into a framework of negative rights, as seen in Pogge’s response to Miller’s scepticism surrounding the cosmopolitan ideal. Additionally I have tried to distinguish between moral claims and claims about global justice. We can therefore distinguish between three forms of moral cosmopolitanism each premised on universal equality but separated by what equality requires: 1. Strong moral cosmopolitanism requires equal treatment; 2. Weak moral cosmopolitanism requires a belief in universal equal worth that does not necessarily impact treatment or outcome; 3. Moderate moral cosmopolitanism requires equal worth that can lead to (or require) differentiated treatment.

47 Ibid., 23.
1.4 Political Cosmopolitanism

The next form of cosmopolitanism I wish to address here is political cosmopolitanism. For my purposes I will use the term ‘political cosmopolitanism’ to represent a variety of positions that address the role and scope of governing institutions. Political cosmopolitans argue for a diverse set of globalized and international institutions of governance that augment or otherwise move authority above the state. Many political cosmopolitans are motivated by a claim about justice or moral cosmopolitanism that leads to a dissatisfaction with contemporary forms of governance. Although there are some arguments for world government, and those would be political cosmopolitan arguments, political cosmopolitanism does not necessarily imply a claim about world government. Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, for example, highlights the fact that world government would have the propensity to descend into global tyranny. Thus, my focus here is on looking at a variety of positions that support global governance.

Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* is one of the foremost political cosmopolitan arguments. He argues that the only way to attain peace among nations is to intertwine national institutions. As opposed to many of the other political cosmopolitans under study here, Kant does not advocate for changing state sovereignty, but rather establishing a situation in which the costs of war with other states far outweigh the benefits.\(^{48}\) Much of his argument is fairly radical and includes calls to remove all standing armies, demands that no state can interfere with another, and demand that all states ought to be republican. Although many of these proclamations may not be currently attainable, Kant’s argument

\(^{48}\) Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 326-328.
is still relevant today for the reasons discussed above. Nonetheless, we should recall that he is anti-world government due to the tendency towards tyranny; a federation of states economically intertwined is preferable as they can act as a check on each other.

The question of democratic governance seems to be of central importance to political cosmopolitans, and David Held provides substantial arguments for global democracy.49 As political cosmopolitans are concerned with governing institutions at the international and global level, the question of democratic global governance is often debated. Many argue that legitimate global governance must necessarily be democratic, but attaining the necessary legitimacy beyond the nation-state is highly problematic. Additionally, political cosmopolitanism is not represented by one set of arguments, or by defence of a particular set of institutions. Daniele Archibugi, for example, looks at the possibilities for increasing the legitimacy and political strength of already existing institutions, such as the United Nations.50 Instead of having to establish a new set of governing institutions, we could benefit from a highly reformed version of existing ones. This would greatly reduce cost and could be done much more quickly than having to rely on developing entirely new governing bodies. There is a significant drawback, however, in that the problem of institutional history could not be removed, even from highly reformed institutions. The United Nations, despite many of the benefits it has as a governing body, carries with it significant historical baggage. Finally, Daniel Bray in his *Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism* is fundamentally concerned with the issues of democratic


governance and representation at the global level. His focus is on ensuring adequate levels of representation in global democratic forums. As such, the question of global democracy is of central concern for some political cosmopolitans. Yet, the impetus for expanding political institutions has not yet been discussed.

We must justify political cosmopolitanism, as it requires the creation or strengthening of political institutions that are coercively imposed and thereby need to be justified. That is, individuals are subject to the rules of their state and if political cosmopolitans wish to augment the rules or interactions, or otherwise change the way individuals and groups are governed; they need to offer good reasons for doing so. This is especially true, as the institutions envisioned by political cosmopolitans will necessarily limit the liberty of individuals and groups (e.g. States) to act in particular ways. Returning briefly to the discussion of negative rights from Pogge, we can make the argument that negative duties imply a claim about political institutions. In order to fulfil our negative duties we may need stronger global governance that can limit the ability for others to negatively impose social institutions. This will, quite apparently, limit the ways in which certain groups and institutions can act. Presumably, this would require governing institutions that limit the ways corporations act, change international trade law, or possibly even redistribute between states. Under this arrangement some groups will be positively impacted, while others will be forced to change their practices. If these institutions are to be democratic, which I argue they ought to be, then the impositions and limitations they create need to be justified to the affected groups.

52 I focus on the role of coercive institutions in §6.5 and 6.6.
As I argued in the previous section, I conceive of political cosmopolitanism as emerging out of moral claims. Utilizing a claim about moral equality or the scope of moral obligation can thereby justify the impositions and restrictions generated by governing institutions. Certainly, a political cosmopolitan argument that is independent of moral claims can be made. However, I argue that these types of claims are ultimately unsatisfactory as they lack a justificatory mechanism that accounts for the restrictions and limitations of individual liberty and state sovereignty.

As mentioned above, Tan presents a political-moral cosmopolitan argument; it is useful to refer to Tan’s argument here as it overlaps between moral and political cosmopolitanism. Tan argues for the development of international governing institutions that can properly and effectively distribute socioeconomic resources to better fulfil the principles of global justice as he conceives of them. Although Tan’s position is controversial, it brings forward the important idea that he conceives of the international sphere as generating socioeconomic relations between individuals and between groups. His moral position helps to support his political cosmopolitanism.

Though political cosmopolitanism occupies less space here than moral forms, I see an important link between it and moral forms. In addition to acting as a justificatory measure, moral cosmopolitanism can also provide the impetus or act as a source of political will. Outside of the issues I explore in subsequent chapters, cosmopolitanism faces an issue of motivation. That is, once we recognize our global moral obligations we may be more inclined to act. This helps to further explain the important overlaps

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53 Tan, Justice Without Borders, 107-134.
54 Andrew Dobson’s “Thick Cosmopolitanism” explores this issue directly. He argues that conceiving of
between the different types of cosmopolitanism. Moral and cultural cosmopolitanism, as I conceive of them, fail without being implemented politically and enforced by governing institutions. Political cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen to be a diverse set of positions that explore the possibilities for global governance or institutional arrangements above the state. My conception of political cosmopolitanism narrows the field substantially. By classifying political cosmopolitanism as such I can help to focus the discussion onto formal institutions of governance.

1.5 Cultural Cosmopolitanism

The final form of cosmopolitanism I will explore focuses on culture. Unlike moral cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism does not necessarily concern itself with the question of rights or duties to others. Rather, here scholars are concerned with the relationships between cultural groups and on the relationship between cultural groups and the self. I begin by looking at Samuel Scheffler’s account of cultural cosmopolitanism, which claims that individual identity is not dependent upon fixed cultural membership. My exploration then looks at Jeremy Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitanism that focuses more on hybridity and our ability to draw and learn from a variety of cultural sources. Cultural cosmopolitanism plays a much more minor role in this project than either moral or political forms. It is, nonetheless, important to the overall analysis. The conclusions of Scheffler and Waldron helpfully illustrate the nature of cultural identities that informs my moral cosmopolitanism in terms of a ‘shared humanity’ is insufficient and does not fill the motivational gap. He opts, rather, for a strategy that implicates individuals in a causal chain.
position in the sixth chapter. I argue that the more fluid approach to group identity that Scheffler and Waldron take can be reconciled with more conservative stances such as those adopted by Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor.

Scheffler’s cultural cosmopolitanism is directly “…opposed to any suggestion that individuals’ well-being or their identity or their capacity for effective human agency normally depends on their membership in a determinate cultural group whose boundaries are reasonably clear and whose stability and cohesion are reasonably secure.”

Scheffler’s cultural argument focuses on two related claims about cultural identity: 1. Cultures are constantly in flux; 2. Individual identity is fluid. Scheffler later builds on the notion of fluid cultural identities in his “Immigration and the Significance of Culture” where he contends that cultures must change in order to stay relevant in people’s lives.

On his reading here, cultural groups ought to be open to change, which he sees as an inevitable process: new membership brings new identities and experiences into the group. This ethic of cultural change, which he terms ‘Heraclitean pluralism’, does not imply that cultural groups have no continuity between generations. Cultural change may be rapid or it may be gradual, with new interpretations on the meaning of central beliefs slowly changing over a period of several generations.

The second aspect of his cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on the fluidity of individual identity. He claims that cultural cosmopolitanism insists on our “…remarkable capacity to forge new identities using

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56 Ibid., 257.
58 Scheffler “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism”: 257; Scheffler, “Immigration and the Significance of Culture”: 108.
59 Scheffler, “Immigration and the Significance of Culture”: 105.
60 Ibid., 106.
materials from diverse cultural sources, and to flourish while so doing.”⁶¹ This should be seen in direct opposition to any claim that humans require deep immersion within a single cultural group to develop an identity. Scheffler goes so far as to suggest that our individual ability to adapt to new social circumstances and adopt new cultural practices and identities “…demonstrate[s] the very capacities that make it possible for human beings to create culture in the first place…”⁶² Inherent in cultural cosmopolitan claims, then, is a defence of cultural hybridity.

Cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on a cultural hybridity or ‘mongrelisation’. We should not conceive of cultures as fixed groups with fixed membership. Rather, on Scheffler’s conception, cultural groups should be open to change, which he sees as an inevitable process. The central concern of cultural conservatives is the preservation of particular cultural identities. However, Scheffler contends that the best way to preserve a cultural identity is to resist stagnation and adopt changes. Cultural protectionism, the kind of which Appiah is critical, is problematic for several reasons.⁶³ As I devote a considerable amount of space in chapters two and six to exploring Appiah’s critique of protectionism, I’ll reserve my comments here to other aspects of the issues. Protectionism does not work as it forces individuals to adopt an identity that may not resonate with the way they understand themselves. That is to suggest that, if it is claimed that a particular cultural identity has a set meaning, individuals who do not identify with it may be either forced into adopting that aspect into their identity or forgo identifying with that cultural group. Hence, Scheffler argues that cultures need to accept change. Cultural identities

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⁶¹ Scheffler, “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism”: 257.
⁶² Ibid.
have to stay relevant and meaningful in people’s lives if they are to be relevant identities. Cultural cosmopolitans claim that as opposed to protecting cultures from change we should embrace hybridity as an inevitable - and good - process that occurs. With globalisation, people from all sorts of cultural backgrounds come into contact and cultural learning occurs. New sources of cultural identity emerge over time. For example, in Britain, chicken tikka masala is now considered a national dish, at least according to a national survey and former foreign minister Robin Cook.64 While it’s still questionable, it could be argued that traditional Indian cuisine is now a central part of British (epicurean) identity. Cultural cosmopolitans argue that we ought to embrace this change and resist cultural protectionism.

Finally, Jeremy Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitanism is similar to Scheffler’s – individuals need not be immersed in a single culture to develop a rich identity. He calls the cosmopolitan life one “…lived in a kaleidoscope of cultures…” and such a life, he claims, is both “…possible and fulfilling.” 65 In a similar fashion to both Scheffler and Appiah, Waldron claims that the idea of ‘cultural purity’ is an historical anomaly. If we were to take a sample of all the world’s cultures, those that have been able to avoid any cross-cultural contamination would have done so only by “…historical contingency and extraordinary geographical isolation.”66 Waldron’s analysis of cultural cosmopolitanism here emerges from his questioning of what it means to be cosmopolitan. In this analysis he determines that most people already live a sufficiently cosmopolitan life:

A person who grows up in Manhattan, for example, cannot but be aware of a diversity of cultures, a diversity of human practices and experiences, indeed a diversity of languages clamouring for his attention. They are there on the streets, in Greenwich Village or on the Upper West Side. It is another matter whether we call this a single culture - ‘New York culture’ - a culture of diversity, or whether we say (as I think) that it is just many fragments that happen to be available at a given place and time and that that does not amount to the existence of a single culture in any socially or philosophically interesting sense of ‘singularity.’

Although the example used here focuses on Manhattan, the same could be said for life in any major urban centre; this is particularly true (though not exclusively) of the cosmopolitan cities that attract significant numbers of tourists and immigrants - New York, Paris, London, Toronto, San Francisco, Vancouver, and Bombay. This, for Waldron, is the case for many. He claims “[I]n this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually is going on in the world.” On this reading, submerging oneself in a ‘pure’ culture appears disingenuous – Waldron compares it to being at a cultural Disneyland “…and thinking that one’s surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture really to exist.” Waldron’s cultural cosmopolitan stands in direct opposition to the figure of the ‘lone cosmopolitan’ who lives a rootless life in isolation.

This form of cultural cosmopolitanism is very similar to Scheffler’s: we ought to avoid considering cultural groups as fixed and stagnant. Our cultural identity will draw from a variety of intercultural sources to the point where it is very tough to distinguish between a single identity and the many cultural sources that compose it. The example of

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67 Ibid., 231.
68 Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”: 763.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 766.
Canadian cultural identity readily comes to mind, as multiculturalism is a central tenet of Canadian identity. As opposed to seeing Canadian cultural identity as homogeneous, it is a mishmash of many different cultural groups each borrowing from one another and blending in different ways.

Waldron is also concerned with diversity. His main concern here is a tendency to focus on what makes cultural groups distinct and unique, as opposed to looking at how we are similar or borrow traditions from one another. He states:

When children in the United States have Guatemala Day at school, we do not want them all to make a special ceremony of wearing Levi jeans and drinking Coca-Cola, even if that is what Guatemalans in fact like to wear and drink. In that context, we have reason to highlight the differences between culture in Guatemala and Norteamericano culture. But the general view that it is distinctiveness that counts may be seriously mistaken if it is intended as a description of the consciousness of those who live in the communities in question or as a prescription about what respect for another culture ought essentially to involve.\textsuperscript{71}

For Waldron, it makes sense to focus on distinctiveness in certain contexts, but in others we may be wrongfully ascribing characteristics to a group that we think are representative of constitutive of their cultural identity. Moreover, he helpfully illustrates a central question: what does respect for another group require? Though I address this issue in the final chapter, it is worth mentioning that it likely does not require complete tolerance or respect for all practices.

Conceiving of cosmopolitanism as a claim about culture allows us to recognize the ever-changing nature of cultural identities. Scheffler is likely correct that cultures need to change over time in order to stay relevant. It is also likely the case that this is an unconscious process that naturally happens as the world around the group changes, new

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 232-233.
ideas and interpretations are brought in, and a new generation begins to shape the
direction of the group. Waldron’s claim, however, that all of the cultural resources that
individuals need are already provided to them is more controversial. Although the idea of
‘wading in the pool’ of cultural resources brings romantic imagery to mind, it may be
misconstruing the relationship that individuals have to their group identities. In many
large metropolitan cities we can describe a sort of cosmopolitan culture existing. In these
types of cities, it is possible to wade through a variety of groups that all help create a
unique identity for the city. This type of life may be sufficient for some; however there
are many groups that are put at some form of risk and their identities are insecure. It is
much simpler for a Cypriot living in Toronto to express his cultural identity than the same
individual living in Athens, for example. In both contexts they are expressing a cultural
identity, but in Toronto they need not worry about backlash or ostracization. It is very
simple to presume that cultural identities are fluid or one of many different group
identities when we consider them in secure contexts. However, once we move to a case
where a cultural identity is insecure, or being actively dismantled, the conversation shifts.
Throughout the thesis I consider the fluidity of identities against more conservative
approaches (such as those adopted by Walzer and Taylor). I argue that both views offer
important insights and can help inform the discussion.

While I disagree with Waldron’s position, his acknowledgement of a need to
recognize an identity is very important. Recognition of the value of a group identity, of
what that group can offer, of what they believe, and of what is valuable to them is
necessary once we begin to look at the principles of global justice or how we are going to
frame political institutions. I argue that through a recognition-based approach (such as
that defended by Taylor and discussed by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth) may be able to provide us with the resources to engage in effective dialogue. By taking others’ group identities seriously, we can develop a cosmopolitan position that is more inclusive and avoids becoming imperial or naïve.

In sum, cultural cosmopolitanism is a form of cosmopolitan thought that looks at the way our cultural identities are cosmopolitan. Cultural cosmopolitans tend to argue against claims made by multiculturalists and others who argue for fixed notions of cultural identity. Additionally, as Appiah and Waldron demonstrate, cultural cosmopolitanism rejects claims for protection or celebration of diversity for diversity’s sake. Cultural diversity necessarily exists, but our celebrations should not focus on distinctions between groups, except in particular contexts, but should rather be focused on what individuals within the group can offer to the human experience and how they can conceive of and attain the good life. This is not to say that we should not celebrate other cultural groups, but we should avoid ascribing essential characteristics to them that are not reflective of their way of life. Cultural cosmopolitanism is also concerned with the ability for cultural identities to maintain relevance in our lives. In order to ensure the survival of cultural identities, authorities within the group should resist conservatism and embrace the type of fluid ‘Heraclitean’ pluralism that Scheffler defends.

Cosmopolitanism, I argue, can be described as a claim about morality, politics, or culture. I have sought to illustrate the theory as separated into these three branches as a way to show what all cosmopolitan claims are describing. I have also tried to show that despite this important distinction, there is much overlap between the three types. More importantly, the position that I develop throughout the thesis relies on connecting these
different claims. While there are positions that are strictly based on claims about morality, politics, or culture, I argue that these stances are unpersuasive. Cosmopolitanism, as I conceive of it, can only be successful if it accounts for morality, politics, and culture in some way. This is not to suggest that every cosmopolitan argument must defend equal treatment that is institutionalized under a world state founded on the principles of Heraclitean Pluralism. Rather, I argue that some cosmopolitan arguments emphasize different aspects. For example, while Seyla Benhabib could be said to be a political cosmopolitan, her argument is clearly influenced by a conception of global justice derived from a claim about morality.\(^7^2\) Much in the same way, some scholars contend that justice-based cosmopolitanism is empty without political commitments attached to it.\(^7^3\) The positions are, therefore, not mutually exclusive. Again, the claims do not necessarily imply one another. There are perfectly coherent and legitimate moral claims, as well as cultural and political claims that are all independent of one another; they are nonetheless unpersuasive unless they are linked to each other in some way. Therefore, for the purposes of this project, I describe cosmopolitanism as a theory that refers to our relationship to distant strangers morally, politically, and/or culturally. The position that I develop, called rooted cosmopolitanism, emphasizes different aspects of these claims but incorporates all three.

### 1.6 Rooting Cosmopolitanism


\(^7^3\) Andrew Dobson, for example, makes this type of claim. See: Andrew Dobson, “Thick Cosmopolitanism,” *Political Studies* 54 (2006): 165-184.
So far, in this chapter I have attempted to briefly introduce and classify cosmopolitanism as a broad concept. Here I have distinguished between three forms of cosmopolitanism - moral, political, and cultural. I have argued that though they are separated in the initial discussion, there is much overlap between them. Most of the cosmopolitan arguments I address throughout the rest of the project overlap between these forms. Nonetheless, it is important to classify and show that cosmopolitanism represents a diverse set of ideas and principles. The taxonomy I adopt here should not be considered the only way to conceive of cosmopolitanism, but rather the one I adopt for the purposes of this project. I use the moral, cultural, and political classification here, as I believe it incorporates a large majority of cosmopolitan arguments. Moreover, the three forms I use here are a more coherent way of conceiving of cosmopolitanism than some alternative notions. Other ways of classifying cosmopolitanism, such as Kleingeld’s six varieties, and Vertovec and Cohen’s conceptions, unnecessarily subdivide types. By classifying cosmopolitanism in terms of moral, cultural, and political forms, I am able to thereby highlight key distinctions between the types and demonstrate how they are interconnected. Nonetheless, the cosmopolitanism that I defend can be described as ‘rooted’. This form of cosmopolitanism can account for partiality and partial treatment. This raises the question of why we need to account for partiality that I have briefly discussed already.

Cosmopolitanism has been criticized in the past for being imperial and naïve for

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ignoring cultural differences and the importance of roots.\textsuperscript{75} Craig Calhoun has suggested that certain types of cosmopolitanism – the types I describe as strong cosmopolitanism - leaves us “…lacking the old sources of solidarity without adequate new ones.”\textsuperscript{76} In other words, cosmopolitanism has been decried for bring \textit{rootless} and for missing something essential about the human experience. This rootless form of cosmopolitanism, what Ethan Leib terms ‘cosmopolitanism with fangs’, is, understandably, very difficult to accept.\textsuperscript{77} Leib claims that it ignores salient differences between groups and leads us away from the rich experiences that local attachments offer. A theory of moral obligations that cannot account for partiality to family, friends, and perhaps even conationalists, will be unable to withstand much criticism or garner support. It is worth acknowledging that the nationalist and communitarian responses to ‘naïve cosmopolitanism’ have some merit. They contend that we have to account for our particular attachments in some way. At the same time, however, focusing on the local (or even categorically prioritizing it) over the global is problematic. My focus in this project is on Samuel Scheffler’s interpretation of a tension in our moral framework, but it is one that Onora O’Neill has described in similar language – “Since antiquity justice has been thought of as a political or civic virtue, more recently as belonging to a ‘bounded society’, or as a primary task of states…Yet the view that justice is intrinsically bounded sits ill with the many claims that it is cosmopolitan, owed to all…[this is a] tension between moral cosmopolitanism and institutional anti-\textsuperscript{75}\textsuperscript{76}\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} Eduardo Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism”, \textit{Ethics & Global Politics} 2 (2009): 242-243.

\textsuperscript{76} Craig Calhoun, “Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism”, \textit{The South Atlantic Quarterly} 101 (2002): 873.

Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen as a way to establish a position that is substantively cosmopolitan while also sensitive to local attachment. Moreover, the rooted cosmopolitanism I describe, as O’Neill highlights, focuses on global justice. The cosmopolitan position I defend in the sixth chapter is based on a conception of global justice. Fulfilment of global justice, however, cannot require that we ignore our local duties (which may also be conceived of as duties of justice). Rooted cosmopolitanism requires, in Lenard and Moore’s words, that we provide theoretical space for both our global and special duties.

Rooted cosmopolitanism can be understood as any of the forms of cosmopolitanism discussed above, but my particular concern is with the ability for cosmopolitans to fulfil both particular and global obligations. The focus throughout the project will be on determining the ways in which cosmopolitanism is rooted and if that provides us with a theoretical position that allows us to fulfil both our local and our global obligations. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, is necessarily a form of moderate moral cosmopolitanism – one that recognizes that we have global and local moral obligations that ought to be fulfilled. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be seen as seeking to address a tension between cosmopolitan universalism and particularism. Particularism in this project is taken to be represented by claims that our moral obligations are rooted in local and particular relationships that we hold. Although I attempt to show throughout the project that much of the particularist argument can be

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incorporated into a cosmopolitan position, cosmopolitanism cannot simply be made to fit within the particularist’s perspective, and this is why they are in tension with one another. Thus, my goal is to determine the ways in which different forms of cosmopolitanism – be they moral, cultural, or political – mediate this tension.

Most cosmopolitans would agree that we do have very important local obligations, hence the strength of moderate moral cosmopolitanism. However, these obligations should not necessarily outweigh or change the strength of our obligations to distant others. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, emerges as a subset of cosmopolitanism that seeks a way to address the tension between cosmopolitan universalism and different forms of particularism.

Much in the same way as there is disagreement on how to understand cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitans disagree on what ought to be rooted, what we are rooted in, or what rootedness contains. Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker highlight the internal diversity of the theory in their recent volume *Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World*. On their view, the weakest form of rootedness “…merely argues that rooted attachments (to local self-government and cultural diversity) are not inherently inconsistent with global responsibilities.”⁸¹ This eliminates the possibility, then, of rooted cosmopolitanism containing strong moral cosmopolitan claims which may ignore our rooted attachments (especially on Mendieta’s reading). Contained in *weak rooted cosmopolitanism*, then, is there is meaningful space for the goals of both particularism and cosmopolitanism. Though, in its weakest form we need not say much about the

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content of either the particularist or cosmopolitan positions, just simply that they overlap a moral or cultural space. Kymlicka and Walker then point to *strong rooted cosmopolitanism*, a strong position contends that rooted attachments are necessary to fulfil cosmopolitan goals.\(^82\) This can be taken to mean several things. First, we can see rootedness as providing a cohesive, manageable, and efficient outlet for cosmopolitan goals. Second, this can be taken to mean that our rooted attachments – say to our nation-state – provide the moral source of our cosmopolitan goals. Kymlicka and Walker highlight this as an epistemological rootedness: “…particularist attachments are epistemologically required even to understand cosmopolitan goals. In this view, we can come to understand the moral significance of “the other” only because we have first been immersed in our own particular communities and ways of life…”\(^83\) The epistemological form of strong rootedness is one favoured by thinkers like Michael Walzer\(^84\) and Charles Taylor,\(^85\) which I address later in the project. The third form of strong rooted cosmopolitanism that Kymlicka and Walker highlight the ‘moral seedbed’ form of rootedness: “…[particularist attachments] may contain within them the seeds of moral universalistic commitments, such that we can appeal to people’s sense of rooted attachments to help motivate cosmopolitan commitments.”\(^86\) Importantly, on this view, our cosmopolitan goals are pursued only as they are *required by* our particularist attachments. Following their example, what it means to be a ‘good Canadian’ means

\(^{82}\) Ibid.
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
\(^{86}\) Kymlicka and Walker, 4.
being a good global citizen.\textsuperscript{87} This final version of rootedness is perhaps the most controversial.

Rooted cosmopolitanism in its weakest form is the most defensible, but it becomes problematic once we start to look at the content of our particular obligations (derived from our attachments). Weak rootedness presumes, on a basic level, that our particular obligations will not override our commitment to cosmopolitan egalitarianism. At this point I am assuming that within all forms of cosmopolitanism is a commitment to moral equality, but not necessarily equal treatment. According to Toni Erskine cosmopolitan equality may simply require that we have an inclusive ‘sphere of moral concern’, or that we include all in our moral deliberations.\textsuperscript{88} This type of cosmopolitanism is consistent with our particularist attachments and could be said to be rooted if our local attachments do not necessarily (i.e. \textit{in themselves}) conflict with cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Immediately, we should see that nationalism – understood as “The ideological counterpart of the nation-state…”\textsuperscript{89} – might be necessarily in conflict with cosmopolitan egalitarianism. Stronger forms of nationalism require that we put our national attachments above or prior to our cosmopolitan goals. Even if our nationalism is a more defensible one (such as the liberal nationalism of Miller I address in the fourth chapter) it will require a priority in allocating our resources that will necessarily impact global egalitarianism. Thus, from a cosmopolitan egalitarian perspective, nationalism is problematic as it prioritizes our moral concerns or where our resources go. Hence on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Toni Erskine, \textit{Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 40.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Barney Warf, “Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Geographical Imaginations”, \textit{The Geographical Review} 102 (2012): 273.
\end{itemize}
either reading of equality (as moral concern or as treatment), nationalism is problematic. Nationalism could be seen as consistent with cosmopolitan goals if we take on the moral seedbed form of rootedness mentioned above. If part of being a good national requires us to be good global citizens then it may be viable. However, as Kymlicka and Walker point out: “…but can we really say that these strong national identifications and patriotisms motivate cosmopolitanism? Does not history tell us that the most serious obstacle to cosmopolitanism in the modern world is precisely the moral blinders and national egoism associated with nationalism?” This suggests that cosmopolitanism can contain space for some forms of nationalism, but that cosmopolitanism is not derived from nationalism, as I discuss later.

Weak rooted cosmopolitanism appears to be a viable theory, but we need to look more closely at the content of both particularism and cosmopolitanism. Throughout the project I explore several weaker forms of rooted cosmopolitanism that see our rootedness within our culture as vital to cosmopolitanism (Appiah) or rootedness within our political associations as providing the necessary moral conditions for securing cosmopolitan goals (Miller). In exploring the content of these forms of rooted cosmopolitanism I find that neither is successful in developing a viable theory that accounts for the strength of both particularist attachments and cosmopolitan obligations.

The three stronger forms of rootedness are explored throughout the project as well. The first strong form of rootedness claims that we express our cosmopolitanism locally – our particular affiliations are the efficient outlet for our global obligations. This

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90 Kymlicka and Walker, 5.
is also termed the instrumental approach to rooted cosmopolitanism, and the one favoured by Robert Goodin. On this account, our particular obligations are fulfilled as instruments to fulfilling our global obligations. To give an example, I would fulfil obligations to my conational out of a commitment to equality, but the institutional apparatuses of the state allow me to efficiently effect change locally. Second, rootedness provides us with the ability to understand ourselves and others. On this view, only through participation in local cultures can we come to understand and know otherness. Moreover, participation in local culture provides us with the ‘thick’ morality that we can then abstract from to see our global obligations (‘thin’ moral obligations). Finally, the third strong form of rootedness sees cosmopolitan goals as inherently part of or motivated by our local attachments. In Kymlicka and Walker’s example, Canadian nationalism includes a claim about individuals acting as good global citizens. On this reading, part of Canadian identity (i.e. what it means to be Canadian) incorporates a claim about being cosmopolitan. This variety of rooted cosmopolitanism is beyond my analysis here.

In the project I am primarily concerned with assessing rooted cosmopolitanism as a theory that can account for the relationship between the global and the particular. In this project I attempt to place rootedness within the typology of cosmopolitanism I adopt above. This means that I see rootedness as being expressed as cultural rootedness, political rootedness, and moral rootedness. These forms of rootedness contain elements of the forms distinguished by Kymlicka and Taylor, but I should briefly describe what I

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93 Walzer, Thick and Thin.
mean by rootedness in these senses.

This raises the question of what it would mean to be morally, politically, or culturally rooted. On my account, moral rooted cosmopolitanism describes the relationship between the particularist origins of our moral obligations and their global scope. While our original source of moral knowledge and understanding is particular in nature, we need to recognize that this does not necessarily limit our moral scope. Cultural rooted cosmopolitanism is described as attachment to a cultural identity that then informs our global outlook and interactions with others. This form of rooted cosmopolitanism is best described by Appiah in chapter three. Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of political rooted cosmopolitanism. However, we could see it as part of the ‘think globally, act locally’ mentality described earlier. Participation within local political institutions is done with a cosmopolitan frame of reference. In this case, individuals would advocate for cosmopolitan initiatives at more local levels. As discussed throughout the chapter, dividing cosmopolitan claims into these three types is useful only in trying to clarify the theory. Once we begin to look at specific arguments there is significant overlap between the three types. Indeed, I go so far as to argue that we cannot make sense of rooted cosmopolitanism unless it incorporates all three elements.

In my argument I prioritize moral cosmopolitanism. Given this, it should not be a surprise that I conceive of the core problem of rooted cosmopolitanism as a moral one: assessing the tension between our global and particular obligations. However, I argue that to successfully navigate the tension, political and cultural arguments will be incorporated. As such, my main concern is a moral tension, but one that incorporates important claims about political institutions and cultural identities. I conclude in chapter six that in order to
find a way to make our moral obligations compatible with one another (or at least not antithetical), then we may be required to alter our political institutions to provide an effective route for fulfilling global obligations alongside particular ones. In determining the shape and structure of global institutions, I argue that we can look to the lessons offered by cultural cosmopolitans: recognition-based dialogue that can allow us to find areas of consensus to develop fair principles of governance that are inclusive.

The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter addresses the seminal work of Samuel Scheffler; through an exploration of his work I lay the foundation for the subsequent chapters. Through Scheffler, I develop the benchmark against which theories of rooted cosmopolitanism are judged - that is, their ability to resolve or otherwise address the tension between global and particular obligations.

Chapters three through six thematically explore the work of a chosen scholar who has attempted to resolve the tension. The arguments presented by others are first explored and I follow that with a brief commentary on the ability of each to resolve the tension. In each chapter I find that their arguments offer much to a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, but none are entirely convincing. In the final chapter I present the framework for an alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. As it would be beyond the scope, as well as the spirit, of the project to offer a fully formed theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, I limit my comments here to only offering a framework of how we can conceive of rooted cosmopolitanism in a way that successfully addresses Scheffler’s tension. Though, it may not be a fully resolvable tension under current institutional arrangements, it is something that can be realized in the future.
Chapter 2

2. Defining the Tension: Samuel Scheffler’s Boundaries and Allegiances

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I explore Samuel Scheffler’s Boundaries and Allegiances. In this seminal work, Scheffler offers a very careful and complex analysis of several key tensions in moral thought. I focus on Scheffler in this chapter as he has carefully studied what I take to be a fundamental issue in rooted cosmopolitan theory. Moreover, he helps identify the core tension that rooted cosmopolitanism must navigate. Thus, I focus on describing what I call ‘Scheffler’s tension’ in this chapter. My main goal here is to present Scheffler’s work in such a way as to establish the criteria for determining the success of rooted cosmopolitanism. He contends that our desire to fulfill global obligations alongside our need to cultivate meaningful (and obligation-generating) social relationships leads to a tension in our moral thinking. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I understand it, relies on analyzing why these two aspects of moral obligation are in tension and how it can be resolved. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I describe Scheffler’s tension in two different ways: as a tension between general and associative duties, and as a tension between nationalism and egalitarianism. I then move on to exploring this tension as a dilemma for rooted cosmopolitanism and term it ‘Scheffler’s Tension’. Finally, I move to addressing several criteria that Scheffler offers us to evaluate a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. This chapter acts as a way to set the terms for exploration and evaluation of rooted cosmopolitanism in the subsequent chapters.
Though in Scheffler’s work he identifies several other variations of the tension, these versions represent themes that emerge throughout the rest of the project. In particular, the tension between general and associative duties acts as the centre of most of my analysis. In chapters four and five I focus much more closely on the tension between nationalism and egalitarianism, but I conceive of it as a particular instance of the general vs. associative tension. By focusing on these variants I can both narrow the focus of the chapter and avoid repetition, as the central core of each version is the same: the inability to simultaneously fulfill universal and particular obligations. In each of these instances of the tension Scheffler describes how contemporary philosophy is challenged by ‘common-sense moral thinking’ when it comes to these issues. For example, some forms of nationalism are at odds with a global egalitarianism, but nationalism occupies an important space for some, and it can be seen to be a vital force in fostering a healthy political atmosphere and vibrant citizenship. Thus, as it appears, liberal theory must find a way to accommodate the particularist challenge presented here. In the very least, cosmopolitanism may need to recognize the legitimacy of these claims.

Rooted cosmopolitanism is the central focus of my project and Scheffler’s tension raises a very intriguing problem for the theory. If he is correct, then a ‘rooted’ theory of cosmopolitanism that attempts to account for particular as well as universal obligations may be impossible. For Scheffler, the ends that rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to attain may not be possible. There may be a trade-off between global and particular obligations in some instances that makes a theory such as rooted cosmopolitanism unattainable.

2.2 Defining the Tension

As mentioned above, Scheffler offers many different examples of how the tension manifests itself. In this section of the chapter my aim is to offer some preliminary comments on this as well as present the tension in its various forms. Despite the fact that my project is directly focused on cosmopolitanism, Scheffler does not limit his discussion to cosmopolitanism. Rather, his collection of essays explores a variety of areas of political philosophy to show how the tension emerges and must be confronted by contemporary philosophers. Moreover, he argues that the tension sets out a very clear challenge to cosmopolitan thinkers who attempt to offer a viable account of rooted cosmopolitanism. Although Scheffler is not only discussing the problem in relation to cosmopolitanism, the tension ultimately manifests itself as a central issue of contemporary moral thought. Further, despite the fact that Scheffler offers no fewer than five different versions of the tension I limit my discussion to two of these. I begin by exploring the tension between general and associative duties and the tension between nationalism and egalitarianism. After offering the tension in these two versions, in the next section I move to redefining it as a problem for cosmopolitanism. Ultimately, Scheffler seems to concede that there may not be a solution to this problem. That is, he brings to light the idea that the tension is something that shows the irreconcilability of

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95 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 130. What he terms `moderate cosmopolitanism` must confront this challenge, but I show how his moderate cosmopolitanism, while not synonymous with rooted cosmopolitanism, must account for this problem in the same way any rooted cosmopolitanism will.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
these ends. Nonetheless, the different manifestations of the tension helps to illuminate that there is more at stake here than understanding how we parse moral obligations. Scheffler describes the tension as an issue with contemporary understandings of moral agency, responsibility, and obligation. However, in this chapter I aim to demonstrate how it can be described in terms of general and associative duties on the one hand and in terms of nationalism and egalitarianism on the other.

2.2.1 General and Associative Duties

The first variation of the tension I wish to explore is the tension between general and associative duties. It is argued that we see ourselves as holding special duties to particular individuals and groups that may come into conflict with our general duties to others. In some instances, we may see ourselves as holding special duties that may not conflict with our general duties, and in others we may see ourselves as not having general duties. This exploration aims to show the intricacies of this tension – to show that this tension exists and cannot be dismissed by nationalists or cosmopolitans. Importantly, this aspect of the tension can be seen as building on the previous section. Scheffler claims that the tension between nationalism and universalism helps illustrate a tension between common-sense morality and philosophical reasoning. Ultimately, Scheffler argues that we may be able to arrive at a non-reductionist view of special (or associative) duties that may be compatible with our general duties.

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98 Ibid., 49.
General duties can be understood as those duties that we “...have to people as such...”\textsuperscript{99} as opposed to special duties that we have “...only to those particular people with whom we have had certain significant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in certain significant sorts of relationships.”\textsuperscript{100} There are various sorts of special duties – contractual, reparative, duties of gratitude, etc.\textsuperscript{101} – however, my focus (as well as Scheffler’s) is one type of special duty: associative duties. He defines associative duties as “...[those] duties that the members of significant social groups and the participants in close personal relationships are often thought to have toward one another.”\textsuperscript{102} My focus in this work is primarily on associative duties and their ability to generate particular obligations. This is not to say that associative duties are without controversy or universally accepted. Indeed the idea has been subject to much criticism lately.\textsuperscript{103} One of the largest issues with this theory is that the content or moral fairness of the association is

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.; Scheffler points to H.L.A. Hart for a deeper discussion on this distinction. Hart, importantly, shows how this can be seen as a distinction between an account of natural rights and a voluntarist account. He states “...a natural rights...is one which all men have if they are capable of choice; they have it qua men and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some special relation to each other...[and] This right is not created or conferred by men’s voluntary action;” H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, \textit{Philosophical Review} 64 (1955): 175.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 4.
not necessarily called into question.\textsuperscript{104} On Richard Dagger’s reading, membership in and of itself is not sufficient to give rise to obligation.\textsuperscript{105} Given the scope of this project, it would be difficult to present a robust defense of associative obligations here. However, it is worth pointing out that the issue of the content of associative obligation that Dagger highlights is not necessarily specific to associative obligations. The question of content is as applicable to voluntarist accounts of obligation.\textsuperscript{106} While I am unable to provide a specific defence of associative obligations here, it is worth noting that the legitimacy of the content of the obligation will be determined in relation to general principles.\textsuperscript{107} Focusing specifically on associative obligations, I contend, allows us to consider Scheffler’s tension at its strongest – how do we respond when the content of a particular (associative) obligation is at odds with a general principle? Answering this question is the central focus of the project. I should, however, more specifically define what I mean by associative obligation. Following A. John Simmons’ definition, which is helpfully summarized by John Horton, associative obligations have five key characteristics: “antivoluntarism, the authority of shared moral experience, particularity, the analogy with the family, and the normative power of local practice.”\textsuperscript{108} As my overall concern here is with the role of particular obligations, I will not be exploring every aspect of associative obligations. To put it more clearly, the authority of shared moral experience and of particularity will be focused on much more so than, say, the analogy to the family.

\textsuperscript{104} Dagger, 110.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
There are many associative duties that we can hold, and the content and strength of the duty on us will vary depending on the nature of the relationship we have with the individual or group. There are obvious examples of associative duties that we can have: to our family, friends, coworkers, or classmates; but there is also the possibility of associative duties to our nation, clan, race, or ethnic group. While most people would be quick to recognize our associative duties to the first group (family, friends, or coworkers), some would be skeptical of the legitimacy of our duties to the second group (nation, clan, or race). The content of such duties is also said to vary considerably, thus it is difficult to make generalizable claims about associative duties due to their inherent diversity. Nonetheless, I focus on more on the institutionalized associative duties (such as citizenship duties) as they represent the more controversial case for cosmopolitans. Recognizing and prioritizing duties to family is rather platitudinous, but some cosmopolitans rightly question how shared nationality or shared citizenship can legitimately generate moral obligations that are stronger than or come prior to general duties. In my analysis in chapters four five and six I argue that there is an institutional relationship that generates national duties, but that this institutional relationship either currently exists or ought to exist in a different form at the global level, which would therefore generate similar obligations. I use this as the basis for developing a successful resolution to Scheffler’s tension and as a guide for rooted cosmopolitanism.

What we owe an associate (i.e. the content of an associative duty) will depend on the nature of that relationship. That is, we may owe family members something that we

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would not owe coworkers, or we might owe our conationals something that we would not owe teammates. Nonetheless, Scheffler contends that philosophers tend to characterize associative duties as “…duties to provide positive benefits for one’s associates…duties that go beyond whatever positive duties we may already have toward people in general.” But, as he claims, this may be an oversimplification of the nature of associative duties, as these duties are not exclusively positive in character – individuals take on the burden of fulfilling obligations to others who they otherwise may not have to consider since they are associates. Additionally, there is the possibility that associative duties may override our general duties. Returning briefly to the (problematic) negative general vs. positive particular distinction, our positive duties to our associates may cause us to lower the threshold at which we would violate or override a negative duty to a stranger. This means duties owed to an associate may outweigh our general duties. Scheffler contends, then, that one way we can conceive of associative duties is as those duties that require us to place the interests of our associates above the interests of others (with whom we do not have a significant relationship). This is obviously problematic for the strong global egalitarian who contends that equality requires equal treatment, but it is equally troubling for the moderate cosmopolitans. At some level, moral cosmopolitanism requires a robust framework of global duties. Though the content will vary between theorists, all moral cosmopolitan positions rely on some formulation of global obligations. If nationalist and civic associative duties cause us to override or

\[\text{\cite{110}}\text{ Ibid., 51.}\]
\[\text{\cite{111}}\text{ Ibid., 52.}\]
\[\text{\cite{112}}\text{ Hence why Scheffler states that “it may be thought that one’s negative duties to one’s associates are less easily nullified or overridden than one’s negative duties to others by considerations of cost to oneself.”; Ibid., 53.}\]
\[\text{\cite{113}}\text{ Ibid.}\]
violate (or otherwise ignore) our general moral duties, then the goals of cosmopolitanism are put at risk.

There are two objections to associative duties (apart from a strict universalist objection\textsuperscript{114}): the voluntarist objection and the distributive objection. The voluntarist objection claims that obligations are created \textit{only} in voluntarily entered relationships. “In other words, mere participation in a relationship or membership in a group is not sufficient to generate any special responsibilities whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{115} The obligations are generated from one’s voluntary act – an explicit acceptance of the relationship, or voluntary entry into the group in question, for example.\textsuperscript{116} Voluntarist accounts of obligation tend to be contractual in nature. This is due to the fact that an account of obligation, for a voluntarist, must show that an individual agent has freely chosen to accept the relationship and created the obligation. The obligation is itself created if, and only if, the agent freely accepts the relationship. Another account of obligation would contend that the nature of the relationship with an associate is one that generates duties if we value the relationship. The obligation is generated by the relationship itself, not one’s voluntary participation in the relationship. Associative duties present a problem to voluntarists as they unduly constrain individual autonomy – they remove the “consensual

\textsuperscript{114} A strict universalist objection could be formulated as follows: We have duties to people \textit{as such} – we owe people certain things on the basis of shared humanity. All claims of obligation can be rooted in this notion: I owe something to you on the basis that we are both humans capable of reasoned thought and (thusly) due respect. To a strict universalist, claims of relationship cannot impact a moral decision. I cannot have an obligation to someone on the basis of a relationship I have with them. As seen by others, Martha Nussbaum gives an interesting account of this position that supposes that the best way to fulfill our universalist obligations is to fulfill them locally, thus (in a roundabout way) fulfilling what can also be seen as an associative duty.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 54.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
Voluntarism is not in itself hostile towards associative duties. Rather, voluntarists are concerned with the undue burden that these duties can place on individuals who have not voluntarily incurred them. Nonetheless, a voluntarist can provide a reductionist account of associative duties. A non-reductionist could claim that I owe my wife particular things because I value my relationship with her; this would be incompatible with voluntarism, however. A voluntarist might contend that I owe things to my wife because of the commitment I voluntarily made and the promises I freely entered into with marriage – the act of freely marrying my wife, and the signing of a pact between two individuals (in this case both symbolically and literally) has generated the responsibilities, not the relationship with a particular person in itself.

While the voluntarist objection may hold some merit from some perspectives, it fails to capture our lived moral experience. That is to suggest that some types of obligation can be voluntarily incurred. For example, if I join a social club or a union, I then gain duties to other members of the group. The voluntarist approach, however, does not adequately explain obligations that I have to family, friends, or even conationalists. In each of these cases I have associative duties that have not necessarily been gained voluntarily. Moreover, it would seem as though these types of duties are the ones that hold the most strength in our moral framework. We treat our loved ones in a particular way simply because they are our loved ones, and, generally speaking, we’d be willing to go much farther for a family member or friend than we would for a fellow union member.

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117 Ibid., 56.
118 Ibid., 98-99.
119 See: Ibid., 98.
120 Most notably, seeing obligations as voluntarily incurred would appeal to libertarians.
Therefore, although voluntarism captures part of the associative story, it fails to adequately explain our strongest forms of special duties.

The second objection to associative duties is the distributive objection. Unlike the voluntarist objection, which sees these duties as placing undue burdens on the individual, the distributive objection sees associative duties with providing undue benefits on in-group members.\footnote{121}{Ibid., 56.} Associative duties require us to give preference to the interests of those with whom we stand a particular relationship, whom I will call ‘in-group’. This preference means that we may be failing to fulfill duties to those with whom we do not have a relationship, whom I will call ‘out-group’. In-group members gain (undue) benefits on at least two levels. First, they get to enjoy the benefits of group membership – the rewards of being able to have fulfilling and meaningful relationships with others. Second, they enjoy the benefit of \textit{strengthened claims} that they can make on other in-group members. This means, in essence, that their interests will gain preference from other in-group members over the interests of out-group members. So, on one account of the distributive objection, in-group members receive morally arbitrary benefits that then cause out-group members to be unduly burdened.\footnote{122}{Ibid., 57.} This suggests that resources that could be distributed to help needier individuals will not go to them, as they will be used to benefit in-group members first. Essentially, if persons A and B are in-group members, and person C is an out-group member, the interests of person A will be preferred to C by B, even if person C presents a greater need. As Scheffler states:
...the distributive objection sees associative duties as providing additional advantages to people who have already benefited from participation in rewarding groups and relationships, and it views this as unjustifiable whenever the provision of these additional advantages works to the detriment of people who are needier…\textsuperscript{123}

Defenders of associative duties can claim that rewarding relationships themselves give rise to duties. Scheffler claims that the prioritization of interests in these types of relationships is an implicit precondition for enjoying meaningful social existence.\textsuperscript{124}
Therefore, individuals cannot hold socially meaningful relationships – the kinds of which humans have a strong desire to hold – without generating such duties.

The problem with this kind of defence of associative duties is that it can be reduced to another form of voluntarism. Associative duties (on this account) are morally permissible as they come out of relationships that we desire to have with others. We can argue from this that these types of duties would be incurred quasi-voluntarily. If associative duties are those that we have to people we have meaningful relationships with, then they are desirable obligations insofar as they are necessary to maintain important relationships. Yet, there are many important associations that we have not voluntarily incurred, associations we are born into, for example. We could, however, describe the \textit{maintenance} of these obligations as voluntarist in nature – if we maintain that we have an obligation to individuals or groups that we deem important based on a meaningful relationship then we are voluntarily maintaining these relationships. On this understanding of associative obligation, we maintain the strength of the duty on the basis

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 59.
that the duty generating relationship is desirable. I think this understanding of associative
duty, however, overly simplifies our relationships and both the benefits and burdens of
maintaining them.

To move away from voluntarism we can simply question the effect that
associative duties have on outsiders. Distributivists claim that the permissibility of our
associative duties must be constrained by the effects that they have on our duties to out-
group members.\textsuperscript{125} They argue that these meaningful relationships that in-group members
have the opportunity to participate in are a luxury. When one claims that these
relationships confer duties and responsibilities to other in-group members, this is seen as
giving in-group members an unfair advantage over the (possibly) needier out-group
members. This, in essence, will not only confer advantage on in-group members, but it
may also work to reinforce inequalities between in and out-group members. This
objection points to the fact that there is a tension between the moral egalitarianism that is
sacred to most formulations of liberalism and the attractiveness of associative duties.\textsuperscript{126}

I will now briefly consider four other responses to the distributive objection. First,
It could be argued that the distributive objection misunderstands the way that associative
duties interact with our general duties. A distributivist may suppose that duties I owe to
in-group members means that I \textit{therefore} lose duties to out-group members. In some
ways this is correct, I have an associative duty to my wife, which requires me to devote
resources to her that then cannot be applied elsewhere. However, one could respond that
associative duties do not cause us to drop general duties, but rather give us additional

\begin{footnotes}
\item[125] Ibid., 61.
\item[126] Ibid., 75.
\end{footnotes}
duties. One example of this could be how Pogge attempts to show how our positive local duties (particular duties) do not come into conflict with our negative duties (general duties) that we owe to everyone. On this line of thought, special responsibilities (including those created by association) are only permissable in so far as they do not decrease our general (universal) duties.¹²⁷ This line of reasoning may appear as attractive at first, but is ultimately untenable.¹²⁸ There will be times when our associative duties do not dilute our general duties, especially our general negative duties. However, associative duties are controversial for the simple reason that they establish a conflict with our general duties: the important part of having an associative duty is that I give priority to my associate’s interests above the interests of non-associates when the two conflict. To put it simply, individuals and groups have finite resources and must prioritize between commitments.

The second response to the distributive objection operates on two levels. First, it claims that the objection focuses too much on the positive aspects of in-group association, presuming that in-group members will only receive benefits. However, in reality if one is taking on more duties, this can represent a substantial burden to an individual. According to this response, one is not necessarily gaining advantage by being an in-group member; rather one is gaining a share of total responsibility.¹²⁹ The second aspect of this response is the complement to the first – out-group members do not necessarily become worse off by being out-group. What this response does, in effect, is show how the existence of associative duties does not necessarily confer a net advantage

¹²⁸ Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 86.
¹²⁹ Ibid.
or disadvantage upon in or out-group members. The relationship between associative duties and in/out-group members is much more complex and can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The increasing reliance of in-group members on each other also means that out-group members are free to pursue their own interests, unhindered by the needs of in-group members, with whom they have no association or obligation. However, this freedom from in-group interest could hardly be of solace to the world’s worst off.130 Indeed, the prioritization of in-group members in affluent states (where group membership is demarcated by citizenship) significantly worsens the already desperate conditions of the world’s poorest.

The third response to the distributive objection supposes that it is not objecting to associative duties as such, but rather to the increasing inequalities that these duties will create in already unjust situations.131 This means that if there were no underlying distributive injustice, special responsibilities would not be problematic. This may be the strongest of all of the responses to the objection. This response, despite its claim to defend associative duties, is still vulnerable to cosmopolitan claims of an unjust global order.132 Special responsibilities are only justified, in this response, where a just distribution already exists. This may require, if Rawls is correct, a just institutional arrangement in society. This is, quite obviously, currently not the case in the international realm, and therefore this response cannot really offer any compelling vindication for associative duties from a cosmopolitan perspective. This is especially the case as

130 Ibid., 89.
131 Ibid., 91.
132 Ibid., 92.
“…[associative duties are] unfair if…[they] work to the detriment of people who already have less, whether or not their already having less is also unfair.” 133

This leads to the fourth, and final, response to the distributive objection: associative duties are a precondition for stable and rewarding social relationships. If we are to assume that these types of relationships are desirable then it must also be considered that they necessitate these types of duties. 134 A distributivist would simply reply that there must be constraints placed on the legitimacy of associative duties in three ways:

1. The effect on out-group members constrains the “…capacity of commitments to generate such responsibilities…”

2. It brings into question the legitimacy of making commitments that necessitate these duties.

3. It questions the content of the duties. 135

The distributive objection presents a problem for defenders of special responsibilities, but defenders of associative duties may have a foothold here. If we understand associative duties to be those obligations incurred on the basis of meaningful association with others, then the distributive objection may not be as problematic as it appears to be. Certainly, objectors are correct when they question the content of an associative obligation. We cannot argue that all of our associative obligations are legitimate simply because they are based on meaningful association, we have to explore the content of the obligation. Though the distributivists are primarily concerned with the

133 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, 92.
134 Ibid., 93.
135 Ibid.
impact that associative duties will have on distributive outcomes, we can also extend our concern to obligations what would lead to (or exacerbate) direct harm of out-group members. Hence, particularists who wish to defend associative duties (such as the theorists explored in the rest of the thesis) need to qualify the content of the duties and how they relate to outsiders. Indeed, defining the content of our particular duties in relation to our global ones is the central task of rooted cosmopolitanism. As such, we need to avoid understanding the relationship as ‘either/or’ and attempt to define it in terms of compatibility – in what ways are our particular duties compatible with cosmopolitanism? Or, in the inverse, in what ways are cosmopolitan duties compatible with particularism?

Scheffler summarizes the tension between general and associative duties as follows. Within liberal society one of the fundamental virtues that we hold is that of freedom or autonomy. Associative duties can be seen as placing restraints on our freedom that may be perceived as undue. Hence, the voluntarist objection may hold great sway within liberal society. On the other hand, liberals hold the value of equality to be of central importance, which helps give weight to the distributive objection. Nonetheless, associative duties are seen to be centrally important to our social lives, and most people generally understand themselves to hold these duties. Most people would make the claim that they owe their family members more than they owe strangers. The objections to associative duties help to illustrate the tension that we have between general and associative duties and that this is beyond a philosophical issue, and a tension within common-sense morality. Ultimately, the values of liberty and equality, values essential to liberal society, will take us to different positions on the question of responsibility. So far I
have described the tension in an abstract form, as one between general and associative
duties. In the next section I discuss an application of this tension in the context of a
specific case.

2.2.2. Nationalism and Egalitarianism

In the second exploration of the tension I briefly look at the tension between
nationalism and egalitarianism. As expressed above, this tension is fundamental to
liberalism, and one that must be confronted by contemporary philosophers. This tension
is taken to represent a specific version of a larger and more fundamental issue in
contemporary moral thought: the tension between moral universalism and
particularism.136 In this section I very briefly consider the relationship between liberal
nationalism and egalitarianism. It is supposed that these are mutually exclusive positions
in the sense that fulfilling obligations to one requires shirking obligations to the other.

In liberal society, as mentioned above, there exists a tension between two
governing values: those of equality and communal solidarity. Communal solidarity is
expressed through the political obligations that we are often said to hold to our fellow
citizens. These obligations can be seen to represent one form of associative duty. These

136 Scheffler describes it as between universalism and particularism; between liberalism and
communitarianism; between thick and thin ethics; between Kantianism and virtue-based ethics; between
Enlightenment morality and the morality of patriotism; “Each of these contrasts encourages the belief
that the values of justice and equality, on the one hand, and the values of personal friendship and
communal solidarity, on the other hand, derive from mutually exclusive and fundamentally opposed
systems of ethical thought.” Ibid., 94.
obligations are seen to be at odds with a universalist egalitarian perspective.\textsuperscript{137} Political obligations are owed to particular individuals with whom we share a special relationship, and not to the world in general. Hence these duties can be classified as associative duties in so far as they arise out of a particular association we have with other individuals. Our political obligations arise from the institutional arrangement that makes cooperation necessary. Further, a trend exists within liberal thought to suppose that this arrangement is required to fulfill the requirements of justice. A state organizes individuals and creates the institutions needed to fulfill the principles of justice. According to Rawls, the nation and the state tend to align and form a state with a common national culture, which helps to reinforce principles of justice.\textsuperscript{138} The existence of these political obligations, which (arguably) a state cannot exist without, brings into question the liberal rejection of associative duties (i.e. the explicit egalitarianism inherent to liberalism).\textsuperscript{139} Yet, the rejection of associative duties in favor of egalitarianism presents a serious problem to any form of liberal nationalism that justifies the (much needed) political obligations that bind a state.

There are two possible ways to make these political obligations compatible with liberal egalitarianism. The first is a move I have already made: make them into associative duties that can resist the voluntarist objection. Although I presented these obligations as associative duties, they need not be described as such. Rather, in describing them as associative duties I have already presented a justification for them as well as laid

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 69.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 70 n.4; Rawls’s notion of a common culture in a state gets its most forceful reading in \textit{Political Liberalism}. See: John Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
\item \textsuperscript{139} Scheffler, \textit{Boundaries and Allegiances}, 70.
\end{itemize}
the groundwork for resisting the objections. Alternatively, these duties can be classified as special responsibilities owed to co-nationals *qua* co-national. That would suggest that we owe things to our co-nationals on the basis of them being co-nationals. This description of political obligation would be hardly convincing to some liberals, as shared citizenship can be seen as morally arbitrary. No one chooses where or when they are born, it is pure chance that they are born in a particular state. Therefore, why should that act of chance impact their moral obligations? Alternatively, one could offer an account of political obligations from a virtue-based account. One could suggest that political obligations are needed in order to fulfill the requirements of being a good citizen. That is, taking on the burdens (and benefits) of citizenship requires that one fulfill these obligations. However, instead of offering a non-reductionist account of political obligations, we can describe them in the language of associative duties.\footnote{I discuss one famous account of political obligation as associative duty in chapter four that explores David Miller. One can also find a similar account of political obligations as associative duties in Ronald Dworkin *Law’s Empire*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).}

The second way that we can make these obligations more compatible with liberal egalitarianism is to present them as part of a ‘natural duty of justice’, as per Rawls’s and Waldron’s accounts. Rawls claims that the duty of natural justice requires us to support – thereby fulfilling our political obligations – the *just institutions that exist and apply to us*.\footnote{See: Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, 70-71; Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 115.} Yet this formulation of political obligation brings about the issue of application: how do we justify the application of institutions. Scheffler points to A. John Simmons’ account to show how Rawls’s notion is actually susceptible to the voluntarist objection in ways that make it non-tenable. Essentially, for Simmons, there are two ways of
understanding which institutions apply to us. First, institutions may apply to us by “…my birth and growth in a territory within which the institution’s rules are enforced.”142 This justification of application suggests that something beyond individual control is morally contingent. However, as expressed above, these factors are morally arbitrary as the place of someone’s birth is not something that they can be held responsible for, it is pure chance. The second justification is stronger in the sense that application relies on my having done things.143 This means that the institutions of the state apply to me in so far as I have consented to or accepted the benefits of these institutions.144 However, this justification is tantamount to a voluntarist account of political obligation.

Thus, by describing our political obligations as associative duties we may offer some more resistance to the objections specified in the previous section. Nationalist obligations are deeply held within most accounts of common sense morality. Most individuals would assume that they have political obligations to their co-citizens that they do not owe to non-citizens. This type of moral particularism is at odds with forms of egalitarianism, yet most liberals would accept both.145 The acceptance of both values as being inherently liberal does not, however, demonstrate their inherent compatibility or incompatibility. This means, then, that we must explore what particularism and egalitarianism require. Scheffler points out an important question that will present a serious problem for rooted cosmopolitans: “…if all people are of equal value and

143 Ibid., 150.
145 Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, 78.
importance, then what is it about my relation to my associates that makes it not merely permissible but obligatory for me to give their interests priority over the interests of other people?"146 Even by presenting a satisfactory account of political obligations as associative duties, we are still held by the constraining limits they place on our fulfilling of general duties, those owed to humanity as such.147 This may lead us to concluding that our particular obligations, expressed as associative duties, may always be in tension with our deeply held moral egalitarianism.148

One way that I conceive of resolving this issue is by analyzing these obligations as institutionally-bound associative duties. What this means is that obligations to co-nationals or citizens are generated and prioritized on the basis of an important institutional relationship. For example, citizens are bound by a large social institutional structure that causes them to be impacted by one another’s decisions. There are various ways of understanding the relationship of citizen to state and citizen to citizen, but we can see it as creating obligations of association through an institutional relationship. This means that any general duties that can be described under this structure (i.e. state-based sovereignty at the international level) must rely on a different justification or recognition of a similar institutional relationship at the global level. If we can successfully describe global obligations as being institutionally-bound as well, then rooted cosmopolitanism may be a viable theory. We may be able to describe a theory that adequately accounts for both particularism and global duties.

146 Ibid., 79; Again, Scheffler is rightly sceptical as to whether or not a satisfactory answer to this question can be offered.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
2.3 Redefining the Tension and Establishing the Criteria

The tension appears to be of particular concern for cosmopolitans who wish to avoid being labeled as ‘naïve’ or ‘imperial’. Those labels are typically applied to the strong moral positions described in chapter one, but even more moderate positions are susceptible if they are unable to account for our particular obligations in a meaningful way. Nussbaum’s and Goodin’s positions, for example, do not lend themselves well to particularist objections. While both admit room for particular obligations, these duties are based on an efficient fulfillment of our global duties. To give an example from Nussbaum, she contends that caring for one’s own child is done out of concern for children in general. She says: “To take one example, we do not really think that our own children are morally more important than other people’s children, even though almost all of us who have children would give our own children far more love and care than we give other people’s children. It is good for children, on the whole, that things should work out this way, and that is why our special care is good rather than selfish.”¹⁴⁹ This highlights the complexity of describing our particular duties in cosmopolitan terms. Nussbaum is likely correct that people do not consider their child to be worth more than other children, but her analysis misses something fundamental about our actual moral experience. We do not fulfill obligations to our children, spouses, or friends simply because it is the right thing to do (although that may factor into it), we act in a certain way towards these people because we are in a meaningful relationship with them and this necessitates special

¹⁴⁹ Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, 311.
treatment. As such, describing our particular duties as efficiently fulfilling general duties misses something important about how and why we act.

This questioning of Nussbaum’s ‘particularized general duties’ strategy does not, however, endorse all particularist claims. Nor am I prioritizing our particular duties above our general ones. Rather, I am simply bringing into question the relationship between particular and general duties. If our particular duties require independent justification, then how can we reconcile them with general principles? This is especially problematic once we look at the role of distributive equality in cosmopolitanism. If we are concerned with equality at the global level, then how can we justifiably devote an inordinate amount of resources to our associates who may not be in as much need as strangers? At the same time as a commitment to global equality needs to be reconciled with our particular loyalties, we need to recognize that our loyalties need to be reconciled with global equality. Hence, I am centrally concerned with describing the content of both sets of duties in a way that appeals to both particularists and cosmopolitans. Committing oneself to universal equality can place serious limitations on commitments to particularity. Likewise, committing oneself to particularist stances seriously limits one’s commitment to global responsibilities. Again, this invites the discussion of what both universal equality and particularity require of us, which occupies a central space in the rest of this work. While Scheffler does not admit that this tension is the result of mutually exclusive values, he does concede that any viable cosmopolitanism will require continual negotiation between ‘ineliminable distinctions’.

\[150\] Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, 130.
As I conceive of it, these distinctions may be ineliminable under current political frameworks. It may not be possible to reconcile our general duties with our particularist ones – especially when they are institutionally separated. In many instances our particularist duties (here I am mostly referring to nationalist and civic duties) are given priority both because we are in an institutionally important relationship with other in-group members, but also because the out-group members are necessarily excluded. Global obligations, then, have to be considered as a different kind of obligation and require a different justification and different description of their content. Surely, we cannot suggest that what we owe to citizens will be identical to what is owed to humanity writ large. At the same time, however, the lack of an identical set of institutions at the global level as exist at the state level need not require us to conclude that this is the only or even right way to understand international politics. The fact that global and particularist obligations are understood as in ineliminable tension should not lead us to conclude that the goals of rooted cosmopolitanism are misguided, but it is equally possible that something is amiss in the structure of statist and international politics.

In the end, Scheffler provides us with a criterion for judging whether or not a cosmopolitan position is viable. I use his criteria in the following chapters to determine to what degree conceptions of rooted cosmopolitanism are successful. In order to determine whether or not rooted cosmopolitanism is successful it must be an account that “…proves possible to devise human institutions, practices, and ways of life that take seriously the equal worth of persons without undermining people’s capacity to sustain their special
loyalties."\textsuperscript{151} Quite apparently, the success of rooted cosmopolitanism relies on some very real political changes.

Successfully navigating the tension will in some ways lead to a reconciliation of our ends. What I mean here is not that the tension itself will be resolved and cease to exist, rather it will (in the very least) make our ends not inconsistent with one another. It will also provide ways, either through moral deliberation or institutional practice, to fulfill both sets of duties. The type of rooted cosmopolitanism that I favour has a significant institutional element to it that will allow for the governance over international obligations without compartmentalizing or necessarily separating our local ones into a different sphere. The central problems of cosmopolitan thinking, issues such as poverty and the environment, are not national or international, there is an important area that overlaps multiple levels of governance. Our ability to adequately address these types of issues will, in part, depend upon the political tools at our disposal. Again, this does not mean that the tension will dissolve once we have a strong structure of global governance. Rather, what I am trying to show is that by engaging with the tension we may be able to develop ways to reconcile our ends.

It is important to note that although these are the criteria I use to examine the following forms of rooted cosmopolitanism, not all of the versions of the theory will incorporate all of these aspects. Some are more explicitly focused on culture, and some are more explicitly focused on justice. In these cases my focus is on what the authors are arguing. Nonetheless, the lack of incorporation of these aspects may mean that their

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. 129.
theory is insufficiently supported. Scheffler’s tension shows us the greatest obstacle facing cosmopolitan thought: how can we fulfill our global obligations without ignoring our particular ones or, the inverse, fulfill our particular obligations without ignoring our global ones. Of course, the simple response to this would bring into question the value of particular obligations. One could make the claim that we do not need to fulfill our particular obligations, thus presenting a very strong form of cosmopolitanism. However, Scheffler effectively argues why cosmopolitans need to take these obligations seriously. Additionally, he claims (and I think rightly so) that most people’s conceptions of morality include both a commitment to equality and a commitment to particular obligations. Importantly, most people do not perceive these as mutually exclusive positions. Ultimately, any successful account of rooted cosmopolitanism must effectively demonstrate how we can resolve the tension, how we can successfully fulfill both sets of obligation simultaneously. This may mean that rooted cosmopolitanism requires a perpetual cycle of negotiation about the institutions, values, traditions, and meanings in life.
Chapter 3

3 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Rooted Cosmopolitanism

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I assess Kwame Anthony Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism as it appears in his *Ethics of Identity* and *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. I focus on Appiah here as he presents an argument for rooted cosmopolitanism. His theory is primarily focused on the cultural aspect but it importantly incorporates moral cosmopolitanism. Given this, I argue that Appiah's position re-envision cultural cosmopolitanism in a way that may address Scheffler’s tension. Rooted cosmopolitanism, for Appiah, is centrally concerned with recognizing the value of different ways of life and fostering intercultural dialogue. At the same time, however, he is critical of political projects that essentialize culture.\(^{152}\) Appiah seems to take on a similar position to Scheffler when he argues that cultures need to change over time in order to survive. Nonetheless, he argues that we need to embrace the diversity around us and recognize that the way others live their lives is valuable. Rooted cosmopolitanism seems to be, above all else, a way for starting intercultural dialogue. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism offers a very important starting point in the discussion. However, I argue that he fails to

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account for important political elements in any substantive way. While establishing that the conditions for fruitful debate are necessary, they are far from sufficient. There are many points where Appiah and I agree, however I place more of an emphasis on political cosmopolitanism. I therefore have two substantive issues with Appiah’s work. First, his focus on culture fails to adequately account for the role of political institutions, and second he does not address the important role of power in intercultural dialogue. Nonetheless, I conclude that this version of rooted cosmopolitanism is helpful, if not fully formed. I begin in §3.2 with an overview of Appiah’s position and his rejection of Scheffler’s distributive objection, I then move to critically assessing his argument in §3.4 and §3.5.

3.2 Rooted Cosmopolitanism

This section of the chapter focuses on describing Appiah’s position. My focus here is on assessing his rooted cosmopolitanism and how Appiah responds to Scheffler’s distributive objection outlined in the second chapter. His argument appears to describe rooted cosmopolitanism primarily as a cultural form of cosmopolitanism. Appiah’s cosmopolitanism is informed by recognition of our cultural roots, which he sees as helpfully supporting our global obligations. In describing his position I aim to show that he is very much influenced by J.S. Mill and attempts to provide the conditions under which rooted cosmopolitanism is possible.

Many cosmopolitans are quick to point out that the processes of globalization have led a level of interconnectedness that promotes the practical (and possibly
inevitable) ends of cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{153} Appiah, however, begins his discussion of cosmopolitanism by expressing scepticism with this starting point, claiming that interconnectedness does not thereby place us in a single global community.\textsuperscript{154} More importantly, Appiah expresses scepticism about the concept of nationalism, which is oft-repeated in this literature. Yet, while he is sceptical about nationalism he later recognizes its force. Appiah is quick to avoid making any claims in support of political cosmopolitanism, arguing that cosmopolitanism is not aiming towards a world-state, which he appears to claim is synonymous with the ends of political cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{155} So, if it is not, as he contends here, a political project, then what is it?\textsuperscript{156}

Appiah’s cosmopolitanism distinguishes between moral and cultural forms, but he sees them as linked in an important way (though political cosmopolitanism is left out of the equation):

But the wishy-washy version of cosmopolitanism I want to defend doesn’t seek to destroy patriotism, or separate out “real” from “unreal” loyalties. More important, it isn’t exhausted by the appeal to moral universalism. I want, accordingly, to resist the sharp distinction that is sometimes made between “moral” and “cultural” cosmopolitanism, where the former comprises those principles of moral

\textsuperscript{153} See for example Dobson’s “Thick Cosmopolitanism” or Beitz’s \textit{Political Theory and International Relations}.


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 218.

\textsuperscript{156} Despite his claims throughout \textit{The Ethics of Identity} that rooted cosmopolitanism (and cosmopolitanism more generally) is not a political project, he does claim in \textit{Cosmopolitanism} that there must be some political work done. In response to determining what must be done to ensure individuals have their basic needs met he claims: “There are a few political cosmopolitans who say they want a world government. But the cosmopolitanism I am defending prizes a variety of political arrangements, provided, of course, each state grants every individual what he or she deserves...second, our obligation is not to carry the whole burden alone. Each of us should do our fair share; but we cannot be required to do more...Third, whatever our basic obligations, they must be consistent with our being, as I said at the beginning, partial to those closest to us: to our families, our friends, our nations; to the many groups that call upon us through our identities, chosen and unchosen; and, of course, to ourselves.” Kwame Anthony Appiah, \textit{Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers}, (New York: W.W. & Norton Co, 2007), 162-163.
universalism and impartialism, and the latter comprises the values of the world traveler, who takes pleasure in conversation with exotic strangers. The discourse of cosmopolitanism will add to our understanding only when it is informed by both of these ideals: if we care about others who are not part of our political order – others who may have commitments and beliefs that are unlike our own – we must have a way to talk to them.157

Here we first begin to understand the uniqueness of his position. As opposed to seeing it as a claim about political institutions, or the scope of justice, cosmopolitanism here is described more as establishing a global conversation. His cosmopolitanism can also be understood as a Millian cosmopolitanism.

John Stuart Mill's famed treatise *On Liberty* appears to serve as an influencing text for Appiah. Appiah's cosmopolitanism does not just celebrate difference for the sake of difference, rather it 'engages' with difference.158 Moreover, those theorists who argue that difference needs to be protected (i.e. Liberal multiculturalists) are engaging in 'spectator-sport diversity' according to Appiah. This means that they maintain diversity where it may not be relevant.159 Rather, diversity should be celebrated as it represents the variety of human life – the various ways that people can find meaning and live a good life. As opposed to aiming at a single world culture, Appiah's cosmopolitanism

158 Ibid., 222-223.
159 Appiah states: “Now, the diversity principle calls for the promotion of diversity for its own sake. To hold that diversity simpliciter is of value, you will not need reminding, is a very different thing from saying that a range of social forms is good because people are various, or that the freedom of association among them should be given wide berth, or that different forms of solidarity are important in human affairs. Obviously, too, external diversity does not describe a society filled with diversitarians. For whom, then, is the principle a principle? Plainly, its implicit constituency is the tribe of liberals. If the principle is more than a simple peacekeeping expedient, that is, one must conclude that the vista of diversity – the spectacle of the emperor's zoo so to speak – is essentially there for our appreciation...But spectator-sport diversity would seem to have more aesthetic than moral force.” Ibid., 149-150; Appiah's argument here is aimed directly at thinkers like Will Kymlicka who present a defense of liberal multiculturalism. The question remains – although not to be answered directly here – whether or not multiculturalism embraces diversity for the sake of diversity.
effectively engages in intercultural dialogue – we should understand others' ways of life, not simply reject them. Or in Millian language we should not attempt to shape people after one model:

If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can exist in the same physical, atmosphere and climate.  

Cosmopolitanism, for Appiah, then, is an engagement with others in the plurality of modes of life. Diversity should be respected and valued only because it represents the freely chosen ways of life that people lead. Valuing diversity for this reason shows a much deeper connection to Mill’s philosophy. Appiah states, in what could just as easily be from On Liberty, that diversity should be valued “…because it allows free people the best chance to make their own lives…”

As mentioned earlier, Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism makes little mention of political cosmopolitanism. In fact, in The Ethics of Identity, he is clearly moving away from a political project and towards a more normative one. Appiah argues that cosmopolitanism has a task:

To contemplate cosmopolitanism of this variety is to contemplate the task of cosmopolitanism, which is debate and conversation across nations. Within a legitimate polity, we can agree that all shall drive on the right; that torture shall be forbidden; that carbon emissions shall be restricted...But once we are speaking not

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161 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 104.
162 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 105; The language here is reminiscent of chapter three of On Liberty.
within but among polities, we cannot rely upon decrees and injunctions. We must rely on the ability to listen and to talk to people whose commitments, beliefs, and projects may seem distant from our own.\textsuperscript{163}

Many political cosmopolitans would be at odds with this statement. It would seem that rooted cosmopolitanism for Appiah is primarily a moral and cultural project: engage with difference and hope to understand it. However, in other places, he has made clearly political statements.\textsuperscript{164} The relationship between Appiah’s morally and culturally-motivated rooted cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism is more complex than first assumed. Indeed, my own position relies on acknowledgement of the importance of political and moral and cultural forms of cosmopolitanism. In my explanation of Appiah’s failure to consider the importance of political cosmopolitanism, I work to emphasize how the different forms are necessarily connected in rooted cosmopolitanism. In chapter six I conclude by arguing that rooted cosmopolitanism can be successful only insofar as it incorporates aspects of each form. In the next section I will develop a critical analysis of Appiah’s position. My aim is to see the ways in which Appiah’s theory can be used to account for Scheffler’s tension.

### 3.3 Project-dependent Goods and the Distributive Objection

\textsuperscript{163} Appiah, \textit{The Ethics of Identity}, 246.
\textsuperscript{164} For example, in \textit{Cosmopolitanism}, he claims that we have a basic moral obligation to help that will impact the way we interact with foreigners (i.e. engage politically with distant strangers). See: Appiah, \textit{Cosmopolitanism}, 162-166.
In this section of the chapter I explain the role of project-dependent goods and Appiah’s rejection of the distributive objection (described in chapter two). In this assessment I begin to explore the role of partiality in Appiah’s theory. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism outlined so far does not show how it can account for partiality. Rooted cosmopolitanism requires us to understand others: to understand their culture, their practices, their beliefs, and their conception of the good life. However, he is also clearly arguing for a moderate moral cosmopolitanism, one that embraces partiality. In this section of the chapter I assess his exploration of partiality and show how his theory responds to the distributive objection discussed in chapter two. Rooted cosmopolitanism, if it is to be successful, must account for partiality in some way. After all, the largest roadblock to articulating the theory comes in accounting for global obligations alongside our partial ones.

Like many other thinkers, Appiah begins his discussion of partiality with the assumption that any attack on universalism and equality is antithetical to liberalism, and (subsequently) problematic to cosmopolitanism. “Yet though cosmopolitan patriotism may be untroubling in practice, liberalism has been mightily troubled by it in theory. Isn’t patriotism, or any form of partiality, a defection from moral universalism?”165 Nonetheless, he appears to be committed to a form of cosmopolitan patriotism, one that he believes is consistent with moral universalism and one that can address the distributive objection as raised by Scheffler.

165 Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity*, 223.
For Appiah, partiality (in some form) is part of the lived moral experience, and can be consistent with moral universalism. One way to understand this would be to have a sort of 'universalist' partialism that is genuine and goes beyond being guided by abstract principles. That is to suggest that a universalist justifying partialism asks us to be “... responsive to...universal edicts that govern obligations toward those with whom you have some particular relation.” On this reading, I treat my friend differently than I would treat a stranger on the basis that friendship in general requires me to treat friends in a particular way. Appiah's partialism, however, goes in a different direction: I treat my friend differently not on the basis that they have the quality of friend, and friends deserve particular treatment qua friends; rather, I treat my friend differently because I hold a particular value in the relationship with that particular individual. Or, in Appiah's words: “You don't value your wife because you value wives generally, and this one happens to be yours.” Partialism cannot be universalized in the way that others have tried, at least according to Appiah.

He is distinguishing between partialism as it appears to be and partialism as we actually experience it. Appiah demonstrates this with comparative example that explains this important distinction that will (ultimately) come to be a used as a rejection of Scheffler's distributive objection:

Consider, by way of contrast, the motorist who, at the four-way stop sign by State and Main, cedes the right of way to a white Buick that arrived at the intersection

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166 Ibid., 225-226.
167 As I show below, this is the type of partialism that Martha Nussbaum would support. Nussbaum “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”.
168 Ibid., 226; This appears to be a variation of Bernard Williams’ famous ‘one thought to many’ argument. See: Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 173-179.
first. Here, the motorist is following the general rules of the road, and this particular car just happens to have arrived first at this particular intersection. Actual existing partiality admits of no *happens to*. Broadly speaking, then, the problem with universalizing accounts of partiality is simply that they seem remote from the attitude and emotion – the *evaluative affect*, let's say – of someone with special responsibilities.  

In the example of the motorist we have someone who is clearly following a universal edict that is partialized in the situation. That is, he yields the way to the Buick on the basis that the Buick happened to arrive first. Partial treatment is arrived at for no other reason than ‘the happens to’ justification. On the other hand he considers partialism as it exists in our daily lives. We are partial to our family, friends, colleagues, etc. In each of these instances our partiality comes not from following a universal obligation to treat particular people in certain ways, but rather from the fact that these people hold a particular relationship to us that we see as valuable. This is similar to the way that Scheffler defends partiality in a non-reductionist manner. In this way, then, most attempts to universalize partialism fail, as they do not fully account for the way that we care about others. The source of our particular obligations comes not from the existence of a particular type of relationship, but rather from the existence of the relationship that we hold with a particular person. At the same time, however, Appiah contends that we can universalize partiality in another way: we can admire partiality in others and abhor its absence - “We can admire loyalty that we don't share; the notion of “honor among thieves” can make sense to someone who isn't a thief. We do hold the relationships people have with their spouses to be valuable, and applaud Penelope's faithfulness to Ulysses. But none of this is why, in the end, you value *your* relationship with *your* 

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169 Ibid., 226-227.
Again, the reason I value my spouse is not because I value spouses generally, but because of the relationship that I have cultivated with her over time, and the meaning and significance that I draw from that particular relationship. This account of partiality also includes an implicit recognition of it as a valuable trait. As discussed in chapter two, partial treatment is necessary if we value social relationships. What we consider ‘significant’ relationships with others all generate special responsibilities that demand partial or preferential treatment.

This is a very important distinction between types of goods that we have or desire. There are some goods that can be considered transferrable and subject to distribution, and there are other goods that are not distributable or transferrable. Wealth, for example, is a good that can be transferred among people. When one is wealthy they do not care about which million dollars they have. Particularist goods, on the other hand, are non-transferrable in the sense that we value our particular friend, and a substitute will not suffice. “When it comes to your spouse, by contrast, you will accept no substitutes. And once we are concerned with particularist goods – or, for that matter, with what I'll be calling project-dependent values – Scheffler's “distributive objection” starts to lose its force; these are things that, by their nature, cannot be distributed.” Partialism is justified in the sense that it is required to live valuable human lives with others. We desire to have significant relationships with others that fill our lives with meaning and purpose.

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170 Ibid., 227.
171 Ibid., 227
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
However, this still seems to be at odds with the liberal and cosmopolitan requirement of moral equality. How can we ensure equality if we are treating people differently?

Appiah again provides a helpful distinction, this time between personal and political ideals. According to Appiah, the ideal of moral equality is a political ideal, which he claims is what social justice requires: “Social justice may require impartiality-or even-handedness, or fairness, or (under some construction) ‘neutrality.’ But social justice is not an attribute of individuals. An individual can no more be required to be impartial among his fellow creatures that he can be obligated to administer his own currency system.”

Equality requires that we all be treated fairly in the political sphere - when we appear in public no one group or individual is favoured over another in such a way as to put another at a disadvantage. Moreover, equality – in this sense – is guaranteed by the institutions of the state. Ensuring social justice is the job of the state, not required by individuals. This means that on the personal level we are not required to treat everyone equally. We can treat particular others differently than we treat strangers, provided that we give everyone what is due as a fellow human.

Equal treatment in the public sphere is at least guided by a moral minimum. What this minimum is is up for debate, as Appiah says. What we are obliged to do for others could be determined by the dictates of ‘fairness’, ‘even-handedness’, or ‘a harm principle’. This does not mean, however, that we have to treat everyone identically. It simply means that we cannot violate a person’s fundamental rights given to them by their shared humanity. This relates

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175 Ibid.; This implies political cosmopolitanism to a degree. I return to this notion later in the chapter.
back to the distinction Pogge makes between negative global obligations and positive particular ones. Our particular obligations can be discharged so long as they do not impact our negative global ones. Appiah, however, appears to defend a more nuanced account of the issue that does not provide a strict (and misleading) demarcation between negative and positive duties. Appiah’s defense of partiality recognizes that partial treatment is justified when practiced under a framework of social justice. That is, we are justified in treating our significant others differently than strangers so long as we provide strangers with a base-level of consideration. What we owe strangers is determined by the requirements of social justice, which can vary between contexts.

Appiah’s justification of partiality is similar to a Rawlsian understanding of just social conduct. Partiality and differentiated treatment are justified once we have secured and fulfilled the requirements of social justice at a public level. Once we have a well-ordered society framed around justice as fairness (in the liberal example), then partial treatment between individuals is appropriate. This, once again, brings rise to the issue of the content of partial treatment. For Appiah, and presumably Rawls, partial treatment is only justified as long as it does not violate the precepts of social justice. Strangers are due a basic consideration (determined by the principles of social justice in a given context) and beyond that we are free to treat them however we so choose. We can then dedicate more resources to particular individuals, but we are still beholden to the wider principles of social justice to help guide what can be considered valid partial treatment. The validity of the content of partial treatment can be determined by the requirements of social justice: does treating significant individual ‘A’ violate the rights of stranger ‘B’? Partiality, then, can be justified in this two-staged approach: first we guarantee social justice, and then we
allow partial treatment. Although the focus so far has been on treatment within a society, this argument can be extrapolated to the international and global level.

In chapter one I briefly explored Pogge’s ‘negative/positive’ schema of accommodation that is worth further consideration here. Though the thesis appears attractive and somewhat intuitive, it misconstrues our obligations by presenting them in a strict negative or positive setting. On Pogge’s reading, we have positive obligations that can be owed to significant others (i.e. the differentiated treatment generated by partiality), but these obligations cannot override or violate our negative general obligations. For example, I may want to do anything I can to assist my family, but I may not violate the fundamental negative rights of strangers in assisting them. The issue with this analysis comes when we look at what Pogge considers to be the fundamental negative obligations, and as I discussed in chapter one, it quickly becomes clear that our negative obligations will necessarily incorporate positive duties as well (e.g. the duty to not impose unjust economic institutions relies on an active change in the global economy). This does not mean, however, that we have to reject this two-staged approach to partiality. In fact, by describing partiality in this way we can make better sense of rooted cosmopolitanism. Partial treatment is only justified once the basic principles of global justice have been secured. This leads to a very important discussion of the requirements of global justice that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but discussed in detail in chapter six. Nonetheless, Appiah’s approach to partiality helpfully demonstrates that global justice and partial treatment are not necessarily antithetical or dichotomous. Importantly, this
may mean that rooted cosmopolitanism can account for the most difficult form of partial
treatment: preferential treatment to conationals.\textsuperscript{176}

In sum, partiality can be incorporated into a cosmopolitan framework, according
to Appiah. In some senses, he could argue that partiality is required for rooted
cosmopolitanism. Partiality is, after all, what roots cosmopolitanism. Appiah addresses
Scheffler's distributive objection by showing how there are certain goods that cannot be
distributed (at least not under the schema that Scheffler is imagining). Project-dependent
goods cannot be distributed: we cannot give the friendless friends; other goods, such as
money, can be distributed. Appiah further addresses Schefflerian concerns by showing
how the liberal requirement of 'equality' does not require equal treatment and isn't really a
rejection of the partiality that he has been discussing.

Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism focuses mostly on individual freedom. We, as
rational autonomous agents, have the ability to decide our identity for ourselves.
Moreover, we should respect the decisions of others who are living their freely chosen
lives. Appiah's forceful objections to multiculturalism can be understood in this light.
Further we can understand the wholly Millian character of his rooted cosmopolitanism.
The focus here is (mostly) on cultural cosmopolitanism, and hence we could see Appiah's
theory as an \textit{ethic of cosmopolitanism} rather than a \textit{cosmopolitan project} (which would be
much more politically driven). With that in mind, in the next section I move to look more
closely at what I perceive to be some of the limitations of this theory.

\textsuperscript{176} The role of nationalism and shared citizenship occupies chapters four and five.
3.4 Limitations of Rooted Cosmopolitanism

In this section of the chapter my aim is to address several key limitations of Appiah's theory. First, I argue that his focus is too narrow and fails to articulate the role of political cosmopolitanism. Second, I claim that Appiah's use of Mill, while commendable, misses some central issues surrounding individual identity (such as power relations in multi-national and multi-ethnic states). Finally, I reassess his response to Scheffler's distributive objection to show how even though some goods may not be able to be distributed, they will have distributive implications that impact both social and global justice. These three limitations will first be studied independently of one another followed by a brief conclusion wherein I show how each of these relates to one another. In the end, I conclude that Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism does not fully address the issues raised by Scheffler that I outline in chapter two, but still offers a brilliant entryway into reconciling cosmopolitanism with particularism through his defense of partiality.

3.4.1 Incorporating Political Cosmopolitanism into Rooted Cosmopolitanism

As shown above, Appiah’s focus is clearly on cultural cosmopolitanism. He goes as far as to say that the task of cosmopolitanism is not political – at least in reference to rights, duties, and institutions – but cultural.177 In many ways Appiah is correct that establishing intercultural dialogue is necessary, and (for the reasons he outlines) we should have respect for others’ cultures and projects. However, there is a very important

177 This is evidenced above and in Ethics esp. 222, 246.
element of cosmopolitanism that Appiah leaves out that impacts his argument nonetheless. Even if we are to suppose that his project is entirely culturally based, there will still be political elements involved, as I discuss below. Foremost among these is the fact that due to massive wealth inequalities many (arguably most) are unable to live what they consider to be a good life – they do not have the tools or the resources available to them to develop and pursue their life projects. Any form of cosmopolitanism, if it is to be viable, must address this issue in some form or another. Here, I argue that Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism implies one form of rights-based political cosmopolitanism that needs to be articulated.

He is correct that individuals should be free to pursue the good life as they conceive of it. This means that we should respect and celebrate the varieties of life paths that exist in the world. However, this appears to imply that individuals have the ability to pursue the good life. In many of the world's more affluent states, governed by functioning institutional bodies, these resources are readily available. Individuals have the ability to cultivate a wide variety of projects and goals that help shape their identity. However for many others this is simply not possible. They live, by no fault of their own, in states that are defunct, corrupt, or beholden to exploitative institutions. The limited resources that they have available to them are spent ensuring survival.

178 Here I should differentiate my argument from one that advocates multiculturalism. Kymlicka argues that the state should provide access to culture to individuals so that they can have the framework necessary to determine the good life. My argument encapsulates the spirit of Kymlicka's argument but deviates greatly from it. For an overview of this see: Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 162-206.
Some political cosmopolitans hold that more affluent states and individuals have a duty to change this situation. Now, without getting too much into the specific content of what we owe others, it is worth discussing how acknowledgement of this duty should drastically impact Appiah's claims. Although many cosmopolitans would agree that we owe something to others, it is not quite clear what that is. Some philosophers are content with saying we should avoid harming distant strangers, while others say we need to actively engage in changing the situation.

It is clear that Appiah defends a set of negative duties, he does claim that “...there are certain obstacles to a good life that ought not to be imposed upon them: needless pain, unwarranted contempt, the mutilation of their bodies. To recognize that everybody is entitled, where possible, to have their basic needs met, to exercise certain human capacities, and to be protected from certain harms, is not yet to say how all these things are to be assured...”179 This is congruent to acknowledgment of a global negative duty – we have a duty not to impose pain and harm on others. However, these negative duties, of ensuring ‘basic needs’, ‘human capacities’, and protection from ‘certain harms’, imply a basic political cosmopolitanism. There would need to be some institutional protections to guarantee harm avoidance and to adjudicate claims that arise. Moreover, in guaranteeing these negative rights we would need to actively change the global order as it currently exists.

Political cosmopolitanism tends to be concerned with international institutions and global governance. Although it is clear that Appiah's argument at least implies a very

179 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 163-164.
weak political cosmopolitanism (i.e. implicitly acknowledging the existence of rights across borders), he does not incorporate any stronger institutional argument. Yet, the rights-based account that he implicitly accepts would need to be reinforced by a well-ordered set of international institutions. Nonetheless, in some places it would seem as though he rejects this type of political cosmopolitanism. I take this to be one of the main shortcomings of his argument.

As discussed above, Appiah accepts a weak rights-based account of political cosmopolitanism, but he is oddly quiet on what is required when a political order exists in which individuals are being actively harmed, or in which their state (which he concedes is the optimal framework for guaranteeing individual rights) is egregiously harming others. In other words, the current international order continually violates individual rights; this is done both by traditional political actors (e.g. states) as well as non-traditional actors (e.g. transnational corporations). Understandably, Appiah's main concern in defending a form of cosmopolitanism is ensuring that it is consistent with obligations to associates. Yet, in focusing primarily on this, he misses the fact that individuals are unable to form even these most basic associations, which enliven their lives, due to the institutional order that exists. To put it more plainly, by narrowing his focus solely to cultural cosmopolitanism, Appiah's rooted theory ignores the strength of what we owe others. He states: “Any plausible answer to the question of what we owe to others will have to take account of many values; no sensible story of our obligations to strangers can ignore the diversity of the things that matter in human life. Cosmopolitans,

181 Ibid., 163-165.
more than anyone else, know this."\textsuperscript{182} It is curious why his cosmopolitanism fails to account for the basic resources that are required to sustain the variety of things that matter in human life, despite acknowledging them. One should have the ability to pursue the variety of things that could matter, secure from unjust laws, with the knowledge that they have access to clean water and basic housing that allows them to develop and fulfill their projects – to live their freely chosen mode, in other words. While he is certainly correct that we should accept and celebrate the responsibility we all have to cultivate our home culture and nation, he should recognize that many individuals do not have this ability, stemming (in part) from the fact that an unjust institutional arrangement exists.\textsuperscript{183}

There is a very clear influence of Mill in Appiah’s work. His theory is very concerned with individuality and autonomy, as highlighted here:

A politics that respects individuality, tries to give people as much control over their own lives as is consistent with ensuring that they do not derail the lives of others – cosmopolitanism, as I conceive it, pays individuality that respect. The citizen of the world wants, as we all do, to make her own life. She wants to do it, as many do not, enriched by the experiences of people who are not at all like herself. But she also wants others to be free to make their own lives by their own lights...\textsuperscript{184}

All of this is tantamount to a cosmopolitanized version of Mill. Indeed, he describes his cosmopolitanism as a globalized version of the harm principle.\textsuperscript{185} I think utilizing Mill here is a useful way of conceiving of cosmopolitanism, however it needs to be taken

\begin{footnotes}
\item[182] Ibid., 165.
\item[185] Ibid., 2380-2382, esp. 2381.
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further. There appears to be an underlying assumption that individuals will have access to the necessary resources to cultivate these rich identities, determine their unique conception of the good life, and have the ability to pursue it. However, in reality, this is not always the case. Many of the world's poorest have, through no fault of their own, been born into a situation in which they devote an inordinate amount of resources to survival. If Appiah's 'Millian cosmopolitanism' is to be actualized to any substantive degree then it must also offer inroads to the protections of basic human rights. Though this is something that is in Appiah's argument, the role and strength of international governing institutions is not fully addressed.

Ultimately I believe Appiah to be correct on why diversity matters, and that his account of rooted cosmopolitanism is starting from the right premise. However, I think he does not go far enough, or take account of what is required for individuals to lead their lives. I am not advocating a single world government, but I am arguing that we need to adjust the global institutional order to ensure that everyone has the ability to develop and pursue these goals. I do not think it necessary to offer comment on the specifics of a just institutional order here, as my aim is merely to show a shortcoming in Appiah's argument. There are many possible institutional arrangements that could be established, each with their own advantages and failings.¹⁸⁶ For example, some scholars take currently existing institutions and modify them to secure global justice,¹⁸⁷ while others look at the

¹⁸⁶ For a more detailed discussion on political cosmopolitanism (and institutional cosmopolitanism) see chapter one.
¹⁸⁷ For example: Robert Hockett looks to the Bretton Woods institutions, Darrell Moellendorf to the World Trade Organization, although Moellendorf sees issue with the WTOs current aims and policy objectives. See: Robert Hockett, “Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion”, in *Global Institutions*
possibilities of establishing new institutions that would be free from history.\footnote{Daniele Archibugi and David Held offer a strong account of institutional possibilities and the problem of history. See: David Held, “Democracy and the New International Order,” in \textit{Cosmopolitan Democracy}, eds. Daniele Archibugi and David Held, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 96-120; Daniele Archibugi, “From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy,” in \textit{Cosmopolitan Democracy}, eds.Daniele Archibugi and David Held, 121-162. (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).} Despite the variety of approaches, in many of these arguments institutional cosmopolitanism is used to reinforce moral cosmopolitanism or ensure cosmopolitan justice. If Appiah’s central claim is that individuals should be free to choose what is valuable to them and to be able to pursue their own goals, then there is some onus on affluent states. We should provide people with the basic resources needed to secure these goods, what they then do with their lives is up to them. Or, in the very least, we should not be actively taking away the needed resources, or propping up Potemkin regimes that support our foreign policy aims. Affluent states cannot be held accountable for the decisions individuals make once a proper institutional order exists. However, they can be held responsible for perpetuating an unjust institutional order. At the very least we should ensure that the institutional arrangement we support is not actively harming the fundamental interests of others. This requires a positive political cosmopolitanism that I see as absent from Appiah’s work.

Although I spend more time discussing political cosmopolitanism later, I should say that rooted cosmopolitanism – if it is to be successful – must account for both our special duties (which we acknowledge are part of the core of our moral framework) and our obligations to distant others. Appiah does not necessarily ignore what we owe others,
but he does not say enough on it, or acknowledge what is required of us to ensure that individuals can live a free, autonomous, and meaningful life. Further, his claim that project-dependent goods cannot be distributed like other resources, while correct, fails to account for the fact that our project-dependent goods are not independent of distributable resources, as discussed below.

3.4.2 'Millian Cosmopolitanism' and the Power Dynamics of Interculturality

Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism is clearly influenced by Mill; he does not shy away from acknowledging this. The influence of Mill in his work is not necessarily a negative thing; in fact Mill offers great insight to both liberalism and cosmopolitanism. The notion that other cultures matter because they matter to people in those cultures is extraordinarily poignant. However, the invocation of Mill leaves Appiah silent on the power dynamics that exist between cultural groups that make intercultural dialogue much more difficult than it first appears to be. For this reason, I believe that the second limitation of Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism can be accounted for by offering a simple adjustment to his theory. Simply put, individuals of different cultures are not engaging in debate on a level playing field, and we must account for this.

189 He acknowledges the influence of Mill numerous times in his work. See for example: Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 104-105; Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 37, 271-272, 165, 141-144, 153-154; His Millian roots are also implied earlier in “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” 625; Finally, he offers a very succinct overview of Mill in his “Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity” see: Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity,” Critical Inquiry 27 (2001): 305-332; esp. 311-313.
In an ideal form Appiah (and subsequently Mill) are right to suppose that we need to open up dialogue. However, intercultural dialogue is rarely (if ever) done at an equal level. Cultural groups are marred by history, by past relations, ideas about other groups, politically reinforced stereotypes, etc. that govern contemporary relations. This goes beyond racist ideas and extremist beliefs. External perceptions of who one is will have a great impact on how one deals with members of other groups. Charles Taylor, for example, goes so far as to suggest that without proper respect of who one is, the individual cannot have dignity in the public sphere. Nussbaum makes an argument for cosmopolitan education that could impact these perceptions and help institute a true politics of recognition, but Appiah dismisses it almost entirely. Nonetheless, I argue that incorporating cosmopolitan education into rooted cosmopolitanism could help account for this issue. Finally, Appiah's argument offers an avenue for engagement with Will Kymlicka's thesis (i.e. individuals need to have cultural resources protected to ensure they can form their own identity without overwhelming negative influence from the majority culture).

Intercultural dialogue is needed, however we have to recognize that the mutual respect and solidarity we hope to foster does not just occur. In order to actually facilitate a situation in which mutual respect between groups occurs, we need to engage in a critical analysis of our perceptions of others and what we perceive their perception of us.

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to be. It is clear that Appiah's goal – of valuing the variety of human life for what it is – is a desirable one, but it is not clear how we can achieve this goal.

Taylor and the 'recognition theorists' have much to offer to Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism. Individuals do not simply 'choose' their identity, Appiah would agree with this much, rather our identities are negotiated with others. Discovering 'who I am' in any meaningful sense must be done with others, it is a dialogical process that happens over time. Moreover, our sources of identity – those factors external to us which we identify as – are not received in themselves or 'as they are'. Discovering who we are, and (subsequently) presenting ourselves to the world as members of particular groups is a very political act fraught with contextualized meaning, and done in community. As well, when someone is received as a member of a group, they are immediately imprinted with what it means to be a member of that group. Now, in many instances this can be a non-political act, but again we have to remember that the degree to which aspects of one's identity matter will vary across contexts. This is especially true for sources of identity that we take to be non-political in our context.

For example, identifying as a supporter of the Toronto Blue Jays baseball club – though has meaning in a particular context, and implies various other aspects about my identity – is hardly political. Identifying as this club's supporter will not have a substantially negative effect on how others perceive me in most contexts, or necessarily

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imply how I am treated by others.\textsuperscript{193} This is much different than identifying as a Celtic Football Club or Rangers Football Club supporter in Glasgow. Although in both examples one is identifying as a sports fan and a supporter of a particular team, in the Scottish example, one's identity as a Rangers or Celtic supporter has great political meaning, and will determine how one is received in particular contexts.\textsuperscript{194} The sectarian connection to the Glasgow rivalry is a deep-seeded aspect of Scottish history and larger Scottish identity. All of this to say that what may seem as non-political sources of identity at first can be filled with political meaning.

Once we understand that individual identities are political by nature, then we can see the importance of recognition. Taylor argues, through Hegel, that we have a human need to be recognized as valuable.\textsuperscript{195} Appiah would likely agree with this and this seems to support his central thesis: we need to engage with others and respect them for who they are. The problem with this, however, is that 'who they are' is not something that is simply understood. Who someone is, what he or she identifies as, is something that is worked out internally and externally. It would seem as though Appiah is calling for a politics of recognition with his rooted cosmopolitanism. We should engage with others and see them

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\item[193] In some cases I could be subject to ridicule by other baseball fans, but in most cases supporting a baseball club in North America is an isolated source of identity – i.e. most individuals are able to compartmentalize this aspect of others’ identities, and won't use it to conclude other negative aspects about a person.
\item[194] The rivalry between the two clubs is complex and multi-faceted (like many European football rivalries). The Glasgow rivalry is centralized around sectarianism with the Rangers being the Protestant team and Celtic the Roman Catholic team. Similar rivalries exist throughout Europe. For example, in Italy supporting a particular club can speak to your support of fascism or communism. Even more complicated is the nature of club support in Spain where your affiliation to a particular club can correspond to your national affiliation. See: Ross Deuchar and Chris Holligan, “Territoriality and Sectarianism in Glasgow: A Qualitative Study,” Report of a study funded by the British Academy, 2008: 11-16.
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as valuable, we should recognize them as valuable people who have a conception of the
good life.

There are many points of congruence between Appiah and Taylor. However, it is
not clear whether or not Appiah recognizes the overtly political aspects of recognition.
Individuals of particular groups are received with pre-formed notions of what
membership in that group means. It is clear that he hesitates to endorse it on the grounds
that it could essentialize, or reify, cultural identities in such a way as to create monolithic
wholes that are not representative of a group or individual identity in a meaningful
way.\footnote{See: Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 107; Appiah does not fully endorse Taylor’s position and aims to
distinguish himself from it, but also is greatly sympathetic to his aims. See for ex. Ibid., 305 n.63.}
Recognition, it is argued, is necessary to avoid misrecognition of the individual.
As recognition is a vital psychological and emotional need, misrecognition can have a
serious impact on one's perception of self-worth and dignity. Taylor states: “...the
projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress,
to the extent that the image is internalized.”\footnote{Ibid., 232.}
The harm of misrecognition can be seen at
both an individual level and at the cultural level.\footnote{The violence of misrecognition is eloquently captured by Ralph Ellison in his Invisible Man. In this
much celebrated novel, Ellison’s narrator exemplifies the internalization of perceptions and the impact
on identity while exploring black nationalism, Marxism, and social identity. The book powerfully
opens: “I am an invisible man...That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a particular
disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of their inner
eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality...It is sometimes
advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often rather wearing on the nerves. Then too, you’re
constantly being bumped against by those of poor vision. Or again, you often doubt if you really exist.” Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, (New York: Random House, 1952; 1980 ed.), 3-4.}
a history of relations between the nations, it does not just occur on an equal level. One group enters the dialogue in a dominant position and the other in a subordinate position.\textsuperscript{199}

Appiah's goal with rooted cosmopolitanism is very similar to Taylor's with the politics of recognition. Both argue that we must recognize the legitimacy of others' conceptions of the good; it is an acknowledgement of difference. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism, though, does not explicitly explore the very political nature of intercultural dialogue. Who I am, although it needs to be worked out autonomously, cannot be separated from my identity as perceived by others. In many cases what others take me to be will not be neutral, it will be informed by history, prejudicial opinion, and state-based policy. Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism could be supported by incorporating an analysis of recognition or an acknowledgement of the complex (and very political) process of intercultural dialogue. Ensuring mutual recognition could be fostered in a scenario where we are self-reflective about our own cultural background, and other sources of identity.\textsuperscript{200}

In light of this, Appiah's conclusion of Nussbaum's call for cosmopolitan education seems to be a bit rash. At the very least, we should consider her claims a bit

\textsuperscript{199} Taylor, as well as other recognition theorists, take Hegel's master-slave dialectic to be a major influence on their theory. Hegel argues that we are both reliant on others for acknowledging our existence and we set ourselves in a relationship of dependence upon each other. The dominant group requires recognition from the submissive group, but true recognition would require destroying the relationship of dominance and dominated. See: G.W.F. Hegel, \textit{The Phenomenology of Spirit}, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 104-118.

\textsuperscript{200} Importantly we must consider that mutual recognition may require acknowledging the legitimacy of non-liberal forms of governance and political association. This concept is explored in James Tully, \textit{Strange Multiplicities: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7-29.
more seriously before dismissing them outright. Appiah states: “Again, I think this is a commendable ideal; but it would be a mistake to think that harmony among peoples could thereby be achieved. Proximity, spiritual or otherwise, is as conducive to antagonism as it is to amity.” Is Nussbaum really claiming this, however? It's not clear that she presumes that cosmopolitan education would create harmony among peoples. What is clear, however, is that her prescription for education teaches the student to recognize her particular loyalties to associates, but to also recognize “…humanity wherever she encounters it, undeterred by traits that are strange to her…” Cosmopolitan education appears to inculcate a self-reflective attitude that can help avoid the fallacy that one's way of life is the 'neutral and natural' way of life.

Nussbaum's cosmopolitan education programme offers four main arguments to justify modifying education's central aim to make it focused on cosmopolitan goals. First, she argues that through cosmopolitan education we can learn more about ourselves. By learning more about others and other ways of life we can come to see the unique nature of the way we live our lives. She uses the example of child rearing and parenting to show that the 'nuclear family' is not the most pervasive approach for raising children. There are many other acceptable ways that children are raised throughout the world. By looking comparatively at the way we do things as opposed to other cultures, we can see the similarities and differences that we share with others around the world. This could be particularly helpful for fostering intercultural dialogue.

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201 Appiah, *Ethics of Identity*, 256.
202 Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” 158.
203 Ibid., 159-160.
204 Ibid., 159.
Second, cosmopolitan education could help solve global problems.\(^{205}\) There are many problems facing the world today that are not isolated to a particular state or nation – pollution and climate change, economic challenges, etc. Nussbaum argues that in order to solve these issues “...we need not only knowledge of the geography and ecology of other nations – something that would already entail much revision in our [American] curricula – but also a great deal about the people with whom we shall be talking, so that in talking with them we may be capable of respecting their traditions and commitments.”\(^{206}\) By learning about other peoples we can come to acknowledge that solutions that seem viable to us would be abhorrent to others. Moreover, with a problem such as pollution and climate change, by exploring how others approach the issue we may find something that points to problems with the way we live (e.g. the commodification of nature).

Third, cosmopolitan education can reveal to us that our global obligations are real, and that they currently go unrecognized.\(^{207}\) Our education system already stresses the value of equality and universal values. However, we need to explore the fact that our way of life cannot be universalized. Nussbaum states, speaking of the American context: “If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.”\(^{208}\) Here she argues that partiality is allowed, but that it comes from a cosmopolitan origin. That is to say, we can treat our children special

\(^{205}\) Ibid., 159-160.
\(^{206}\) Ibid., 159.
\(^{207}\) Ibid., 160.
\(^{208}\) Ibid.
but not because they are our children, but because this type of treatment is good for children. 209

Finally, cosmopolitan education can allow us to make a consistent argument for the respect of cultures. 210 Most liberal forms of education include a notion of respect for others and for other cultures. However, Nussbaum contends that this attitude seems to be only reflected within a nation and as soon as someone lives beyond our state they move beyond our scope of concern:

But why should these values, which instruct us to join hands across boundaries of ethnicity and class and gender and race, lose steam when they get to the borders of the nation? By conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a deep and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to be depriving ourselves of any principled way of arguing to citizens that they should in fact join hands across these other barriers. 211

Inculcating the idea that all peoples are worthy of respect can help keep us from moving from a patriotic education that slips into jingoism. 212

Now, Nussbaum's arguments for cosmopolitan education do not necessarily imply harmony between groups. Certainly, even with the most cosmopolitan education there will still be situations in which the individual is forced to make judgments that negatively impact others. By learning about traditions around the world we can come to respect and revere them and the people who practice them. We can also then offer principled reasons why some traditions should not be practiced. Central to these would be traditions that

209 Ibid.; Appiah effectively defeats this claim with his 'happens to' argument. See: Appiah, Ethics of Identity, 226.
210 Nussbaum, 161.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
violates fundamental human rights. Nonetheless, cosmopolitan education can help us to become more self-reflective and avoid assuming that our way of life is the only way of life, or the natural way of life. Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism calls for this type of behaviour and thought process. Although Nussbaum's defence of partiality is weak at best, her argument cannot be outright ignored. At the very least, if Appiah is going to deny her claims then he should offer some alternative. Fostering good intercultural dialogue will require some self-reflection on ourselves, but current education policies are aimed at nation-building projects and making good citizens. Nussbaum's claim does not remove this aspect entirely; she argues that we need to shift focus to make world citizenship the central focus of education. While it could be argued that world citizenship should not be the central focus of education, it is hard to argue that we should not include it in any capacity, especially given the compelling claims she makes.

Although Nussbaum’s calls for cosmopolitanized education may not be the ideal solution, but it would at least offer a tangible way to engage with power relations between cultures. My focus on Nussbaum is a bit of a digress, but to reiterate my central point here, Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism needs to account for the ways in which intercultural dialogue is unequal in society. This is especially the case for many

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214 Creating a self-reflected community could also be established by taking Rorty seriously. Although I do not wish to incorporate an analysis of Rorty, he is worth mentioning here. Appiah is also quick to dismiss Rorty, but his 'liberal ironism' may be of use to us here. Rorty argues that we need to be aware of the contingency of our commitments, of ourselves, and of our beliefs, he states: “…one consequence of antirepresentationalism is the recognition that no description of how things are from a God's-eye point of view, no skyhook provided by some contemporary or yet-to-be-developed science, is going to free us from the contingency of having been acculturated as we were.” See: Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),13.
marginalized groups. Fostering strong cosmopolitan dialogue is definitely the right approach, but we need to incorporate some form of self-reflection as well as a way to equalize between groups before this is possible. If the goal is to change attitudes and beliefs about others, then Appiah needs to offer some sort of prescription as to how that can occur.

3.4.3 Reconsidering the Distributive Objection

Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to respond to Scheffler's distributive objection. Recall from the previous chapter that Scheffler's distributive objection presents a serious problem for cosmopolitans who care about partiality. If we, as cosmopolitans, care about universal equality and economic justice, then how can we justify partiality? Providing a successful response to this objection is crucial for any account of rooted cosmopolitanism. Appiah presents a response to Scheffler's objection, but his response is not adequate. In the following section, I show how Appiah's response works, and how, ultimately, his response fails to address the central concerns of Scheffler's objection. Appiah is correct that we need to differentiate between types of goods: between those that can and those that cannot be distributed. However, he does not recognize that even those goods that cannot be distributed will be impacted by (or have some correlational effect) with those that can be. In the end, I remain sceptical as to whether or not the distributive objection is something that can be 'solved' or if it's just something that needs to be continually balanced and negotiated over time.
In *The Ethics of Identity* Appiah is rightly concerned about Scheffler’s distributive objection. He argues that the objection is not as forceful as it appears to be. This is because we need to differentiate between the types of goods at play. For a distributivist, partiality and partial treatment will always be in tension with our core value of equality. Scheffler claims that in-group members will receive undue benefits by being in-group members, while out-group members will not receive these advantages.\(^\text{215}\) In the end, the distributive objection worries that those who are needier will not receive the resources they need due to the fact that they are out-group members. Scheffler states: “…the distributive objection sees associative duties as providing additional advantages to people who have already benefited from participation in rewarding groups and relationships, and it views this as unjustifiable whenever the provision of these additional advantages works to the detriment of people who are needier…”\(^\text{216}\) In response to this, Appiah argues that we need to distinguish what goods are being distributed.

There are certain goods that can be distributed, which I will call distributable goods for the purposes of this argument, and those that cannot, which I will refer to as project-dependent goods (to borrow Appiah’s terminology). Distributable goods that are subject to distribution – things like money, natural resources, and other material goods – are things that we do not necessarily care if we have *any particular* version of, so long as we have it. Appiah uses the example of money: “You may not mind whether you have this million dollars or that million dollars…”\(^\text{217}\) In the end, all that matters to you is that you have wealth, but it doesn't matter what serial number is on the money you have. The

\[^{215}\text{Scheffler, *Boundaries and Allegiances*, 56-57; See chapter two, especially 13-16.}\]
\[^{216}\text{Ibid., 58.}\]
\[^{217}\text{Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity*, 227.}\]
perceived good of wealth is separated from the actual material object; we care about the abstract idea of wealth, and what it can do for us. Hence, it makes sense that the material good, money, can be distributed. Material goods like money are subject to distribution as they are not ends in themselves – they allow us to pursue other goods. Project-dependent goods, however, cannot be distributed in the same way. The example that Appiah uses to demonstrate that these types of goods are not distributable is friendship: “...you value your friend not as a token of the type friend but as the particular person with whom you have a highly particularized relationship. A radical egalitarian might give his money to the poor, but he can't give his friends to the friendless. Particularist goods, even when they exemplify a good that is objective or universal, have this peculiar characteristic of being, so to speak, nontransferable.”

Appiah then moves to arguing that the source of our particular treatment is these project-dependent goods.

Partiality is not at odds with moral equality (the kind distributivists are concerned with) because the source of our partial treatment is not susceptible to distribution. Moreover, Appiah argues that 'moral equality' does not require equal treatment between individuals in the public sphere; rather it requires that citizens are treated equally by the state. This means that moral equality is not necessarily antithetical to partiality when we understand it. He further claims that we should be sceptical of a claim like the distributive objection as it is at odds with conventional moral norms.

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218 Ibid., 227.
219 Ibid., 228.
220 Ibid., 228-229; Interestingly enough, Scheffler considers a similar idea.
Appiah is correct that our project-dependent goods cannot be distributed in the same way distributable goods can. However, this may not be the beginning of a solution. At the core of the distributive objection is scepticism about our partial treatment of others (i.e. in-group vs. out-group). Economic justice and material equality are valuable goals pursued by many cosmopolitans, and as I've argued above, some form of redistribution may be required in order to fulfill the goals that Appiah outlines in his rooted cosmopolitanism. However, that's not really the issue here. My concern here is to show how our project-dependent goods are related to the distribution of material resources. Appiah's response to the distributive objection presents an important distinction between the types of goods – and ultimately the source of our partial treatment – but this does not effectively answer the distributive objection.

Appiah is correct that some of our partial treatment is not susceptible to distribution – I treat my wife the way I do because she is my wife, not because there is a universal edict of what it requires to be a good spouse. Further, we cannot distribute these types of goods in the same way that we can distribute material goods. In his words, I cannot give my friends to the friendless. These relationships that I cultivate with particular others will inevitably give rise to partial treatment. Nonetheless, my devotion of resources to my associates will also have an impact on others throughout the world. The fact that I devote a substantial amount of resources to my associates means that I cannot devote a similar level of resources to distant others, with whom I share no real

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While he presents this as a response to the distributive objection, it can also be seen as a successful response to Nussbaum's justification of partial treatment. She argues that partiality is acceptable as it is the best way to fulfill our global duties – you confer advantages on your own child as it is good for children everywhere. Appiah effectively demonstrates that this thinking does not correspond to the way we actually justify our treatment.
bond (apart from, perhaps, a weak sense of shared humanity). So while I may not be able to give friends to the friendless, I certainly can give resources to the friendless that they otherwise would not have, especially since my associates may present a less pressing need. In this way, partial treatment will dilute our ability to fulfill any duties we may have to humanity writ large. At the same time, however, the nature of my relationship to my associates, and the value that I place in that relationship, will give rise to duties and partial treatment. Hence the real force of the distributive objection: we may not be able to (nor required to, necessarily) give a principled justification of partial treatment to associates, but this type of treatment resonates with conventional moral thinking and is part of living a valuable human existence. The distributive objection is not something that can be addressed in a simple or succinct manner.

Additionally, Appiah’s response may provide an adequate justification for partial treatment to some associates, but it is a long way away from justifying similarly partial treatment to co-nationals or co-citizens. Some scholars have offered justifications of this type of treatment – shared citizenship is a schema of reciprocity or coercion forces us into this association. However it is still hard to claim that I should treat someone differently simply because they reside in a similar geographic area as me. The forces of nationalism become weaker still in a context such as Canada. The Canadian state occupies nearly 10 million square kilometers of area, has no less than three distinct national cultures, two national languages, at least four distinct 'regions', and a very diluted sense of national identity. Apart from being governed by the same central government, it is very hard to

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222 This may present a problem for Pogge’s analysis of negative duty and partial treatment.
say, as someone from Southern Ontario, that I share anything with people from Victoria, British Columbia, Halifax, Nova Scotia, or Iqaluit, Nunavut. Apart from being governed by the same federal government in Ottawa, what do I really share with these people that I don't share with someone from upper state New York, whose lifestyle and living conditions are probably much more similar to mine? There are definitely justifications for nationalism, but Appiah's response to the distributive objection does not present a convincing one. Appiah was not necessarily trying to justify nationalism, in fact he seems to be similarly sceptical of the strength of the concept, but responding to the distributive objection requires an analysis of nationalism. After all, the biggest hurdle facing global economic justice is not the fact that I spend resources on my family and friends, but its the devotion of an inordinate amount of resources to national projects by the state as opposed to shifting resources to needier projects around the world.

Justifying partial treatment is something that all rooted cosmopolitans will take great pains to do. However, the central virtues of rooted cosmopolitanism – those of universalism and partiality – may be essentially at odds with one another. Appiah and Scheffler are correct to argue that arguments for partial treatment and universal equality are at odds with our conventional moral thinking. It makes sense, in an intuitive way, that I would treat my associates differently than I would strangers, but this does not provide a principled reason why this is the case. Nonetheless, I may not be required to provide a principled reason as to why I treat my associates better than strangers, other than the fact that they are my associates and I value the relationship (which will give rise to particular duties to them). The more troubling task for partialists is to demonstrate that co-nationals are associates in the same way that my friends are giving rise to a similar set of special
duties. It's only a historical accident that I was born into this territory why should that
determine how I treat others who weren't born here? The role of nationalism and
partialism occupies a central space in the following chapters.

Appiah's treatment of the distributive objection helpfully distinguishes between
types of goods that we have and that some goods cannot be distributed. However, he does
not recognize the impact that our partial treatment will inevitably have on our possible
distribution of material goods. Nor does his response present an adequate response to the
larger problem presented by partial treatment, that being nationalism. Rooted
cosmopolitans must engage with Scheffler's distributive objection, but this does not
require them to present a resolution to it. It may not be 'resolvable', but it is something
that will always present an issue to cosmopolitanism. The fact that this principled
objection is at odds with conventional moral thinking does not mean it should be
disregarded, but rather that should direct us to critically assessing our conventional
thinking. Partialism can be justified by rooted cosmopolitans at some level, but it is still
very difficult to justify partial treatment to co-nationals, at least in the way that Appiah
justifies treatment to close associates.

3.5 Conclusion: Rooted Cosmopolitanism and Scheffler’s Tension

Appiah’s version of cosmopolitanism begins to offer a path to successfully
navigate Scheffler’s tension. He presents a theory that attempts to root cosmopolitanism
in intercultural dialogue. That is, he sees the value of cultural diversity and of bringing
'cultural lessons' to a global dialogue. While I have reservations about particular aspects
of his theory, he nonetheless offers a compelling account of the role of cultural identity in establishing global dialogue – between individuals, states, groups, etc. This type of culturally oriented dialogue will be vital when we are attempting to discover principles of global justice that are sensitive to context, or when we are speaking of what global equality requires. Thus, we could state that Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism is necessary but insufficient for responding to Scheffler’s tension. His theory highlights the importance of culture in identity formation, and moreover places emphasis on the role of intercultural dialogue.

The theory fails, however, to properly account for the necessary role of political institutions. More specifically, his theory begins to address political cosmopolitanism, but does not offer anything substantive about the role of distributive institutions. Although I focus on distribution in chapter five, it is worth noting here that if we are to ensure that individuals have the ability to cultivate cultural identities in a meaningful way, they will require basic resources. Thus, this form of rooted cosmopolitanism requires distributive apparatuses that can help ensure that basic needs are met. Appiah’s discussion alludes to the role of political institutions, but does not fully address the issue.

In this chapter I assessed Appiah’s account of rooted cosmopolitanism. Appiah shifts the focus of cosmopolitanism away from political institutions towards cultures. By doing so he presents a compelling account of cosmopolitanism that is consistent with partial treatment. Rooted cosmopolitanism, in this sense, attempts to determine how the partial treatment that we hold so valuable in our lives can be consistent with a commitment to cosmopolitan egalitarianism. As opposed to other forms of cosmopolitanism considered here, Appiah is not overly concerned with international
institutions, or a defense of state sovereignty. Rather, his cosmopolitanism represents a method of establishing global dialogue. We should value and respect the diversity of ways of living (the variety of people's conceptions of the good life) because those ways of life are valuable to them. While Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism avoids explicitly discussing the political repercussions, he provides us with a way of engaging with strangers and caring about them.

In testing Appiah’s thesis against the tension, it was found that his rooted cosmopolitanism presents a strong initial account of balancing partiality and universalism, but it is deficient in three ways. First, by focusing solely on the cultural goals, Appiah does not address the equally important political goals of cosmopolitanism. Although his argument implies a basic 'rights-based account', there is no room for a substantively political cosmopolitanism here. He relegates the task of cosmopolitanism to inculcating respectful intercultural dialogue, but does not explore the ways in which institutional change, resource transfer, and other political ends need to be met before this can be possible. One will be unable to value the freely chosen good life that someone is pursuing if all of his or her resources are devoted to survival. Second, his focus on cultural cosmopolitanism ignores the political nature of intercultural dialogue, and the inequalities that exist between groups. Individuals are not received by others as they are; who they are and who they present themselves to be (i.e. who they identify as) is fraught with political implications. Establishing respectful intercultural dialogue will require changing peoples' attitudes and beliefs about other groups. Two possible ways to establish this could be through Nussbaum's cosmopolitan education or Kymlicka's account of group-based rights. Appiah dismisses both of these arguments, but they are
worth considering and possibly including in an account of rooted cosmopolitanism. Identities are not just obtained and presented to others, ‘who we are’ is established by a complex relationship between who I, as an autonomous individual want to be, and who society thinks I am. As individuals we desire recognition of worth. Taylor's politics of recognition demonstrates the need for being recognized for who I am as a member of various groups. This much Appiah recognizes.\footnote{See his lengthy discussion in chapter three of the \textit{Ethics of Identity}.} Finally, Appiah attempts to address the distributive objection. Scheffler's distributive objection is something that is at the core of any account of rooted cosmopolitanism. A rooted cosmopolitan will need to effectively justify partial treatment while maintaining universal commitments. Appiah successfully demonstrates how we can justify treatment to our close associates – family, friends, and the like. However, he is unable to justify partial treatment to co-nationals, and exclusion of foreigners simply because they exist beyond my borders.

In the end, I think Appiah provides an important starting point for a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. His theory, while deficient in certain areas, nonetheless establishes several valuable features of a rooted cosmopolitanism. We should value diversity not for its own sake, but because it represents the variety of ways of life that people find valuable. Moreover, we need to foster healthy and respectful intercultural dialogue. We need to be able to converse across borders in a way that both respects the ways of life around the world, and can present principled reasons for certain ends when they come into conflict. Respecting others' culture does not require us to value their ends in themselves. Rather, we value the ends in an abstract way: the ends are valuable to
people in the way that our ends are valuable to us. This does not require us, however, to accept all ends that come into conflict with ours. Any objection to particular ways of life cannot be made from a cultural perspective; we must offer a self-reflective principled account of why a certain practice is wrong.

Appiah’s account demonstrates that rooted cosmopolitanism is not an end-game theory. It represents a starting point for intercultural dialogue and political action. The values that come into tension for rooted cosmopolitans – universalism and partiality – are ones that may always be in conflict. However, we can keep this in mind and renegotiate a balance between them in different contexts. Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism gives us some of these tools, and a place to begin building. His insights into the relationship between cultural identity, obligation, and our ability to see the world, help to form the foundation for rooted cosmopolitanism, but they do not offer enough on their own. Appiah’s theory, on its own, is unable to eliminate Scheffler’s tension, but it does provide a theoretical starting point. In the next chapter I aim to explore another theory that offers a different account of the tension.
Chapter 4

4 David Miller and Cosmopolitan Nationalism

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I explore the challenge that nationalism presents to cosmopolitanism. Nationalism can be seen as a challenge to cosmopolitanism as it sets limits on the scope of our obligations. More importantly, the nationalist challenge prioritizes some national obligations above global ones. Nationalists, such as David Miller, also tend to limit obligations of justice to the domestic (i.e. national) sphere, thus limiting the strength and content of our global duties. The limitations that nationalism necessarily places on moral and political obligations are problematic, but they may not be antithetical to the goals of rooted cosmopolitanism. That is, a strengthened understanding of our national obligations may be compatible (in some way) with cosmopolitanism. Given my preoccupation with partiality, nationalism may even be required in a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. National partiality is one of the more complicated forms of partiality, as it requires justifying partial treatment to strangers. Unlike defending partiality to family, friends, or other direct associates, national partiality requires that we justify preferential treatment to individuals who we may never interact with directly. The national relationship is, nonetheless, an important one worth considering. This partiality, however, needs to be balanced against our global obligations. Though some forms of nationalism require a rejection of global obligations, others – such as the ones explored here – present a minimalist cosmopolitanism. My goal, then, is to explore nationalist arguments to see in what ways nationalist partiality interacts with cosmopolitanism. I contend that the minimalist cosmopolitanism of David Miller offers an interesting
approach, but misconceives both our national and global obligations. Moreover, I contend that nationalism can be justifiable but it cannot require a blanket prioritization over our global obligations. I argue that we should not necessarily conceive of nationalist and global obligations as operating in separate moral spheres, they are importantly related and there is significant overlap between the two.

In the larger picture, I see the problem of nationalism as representing one case of the general tension between particularism and universalism that I have been exploring in the thesis. In this chapter I focus on the work of David Miller – a prominent scholar and ardent defender of liberal nationalism. I highlight Miller here as he has recently produced work that sets limits on global obligations and defends national responsibility. Additionally, his work on nationalism is comprehensive and worth studying in this project. Rooted cosmopolitanism needs to reconcile partiality with cosmopolitan obligations and national partiality appears to represent the most complex and troubling case. Miller’s work is of the upmost importance here as his nationalist position is framed around a rejection of (what he terms) ‘strong cosmopolitanism’.  

In this project, however, I aim to defend a version of cosmopolitanism that is compatible with partiality. As such, I conclude that Miller’s version of nationalism is problematic in the way that it prioritizes national obligations over global ones and how it separates our sets of obligations into two distinct spheres.

The nationalism Miller defends - moderate liberal nationalism - appears to be problematic for cosmopolitans. Nationalists, like Miller, argue that it is needed to foster

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224 I explore these distinctions in chapters one and two.
225 Liberal nationalism is a form of non-xenophobic nationalism that finds strength in the institutions and
solidarity, to encourage national projects, sustain the welfare state, and for a variety of other reasons. Some forms of cosmopolitanism are untenable, according to nationalists, as they disregard the moral and political salience of shared nationality. Here I challenge this notion by critically examining Miller’s work. Miller contends that the idea of national responsibility (i.e. that nations can, and ought to, be held responsible for their situation) diminishes the strength of cosmopolitanism. I argue against this and work to show that Miller’s conception of national responsibility is misconstrued. Further, his minimalist cosmopolitanism appears to imply much stronger support for global obligations than he admits. A version of rooted cosmopolitanism that takes nationalism seriously can be developed, but it would require a stronger version of both moral and political cosmopolitanism than Miller is willing to defend. Ultimately I argue that Miller’s nationalism fails to present a convincing argument for national responsibility framed against global obligations. Though his minimalist cosmopolitanism, if strengthened, may present a feasible approach to rooted cosmopolitanism, Miller does not acknowledge the degree of change that is required for the global minimum to be fulfilled. In the end I conclude that the minimalist position fails to recognize the strength of our global obligations, and it implies a much stronger version of cosmopolitanism than Miller describes. I begin the chapter with a brief exposition on the concept of nationality (as it emerges in his work) before moving on to addressing his minimalist position.

social structure within a nation. This can be understood in distinction from nationalism based on ethnicity. For a detailed analysis of the concept see: Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
4.2 On Nationality

David Miller has written extensively on the concept of nationality and presents a very intriguing defense of it. This part of the chapter engages with Miller’s nationalism as presented in his earlier works, *Citizenship and National Identity* and *On Nationality*. In both of these works he argues that shared nationality provides a strong basis for national political institutions and a sense of solidarity that helps identify our obligations to compatriots.\(^{226}\) Although it is controversial, Miller argues that nationalism is a force that is needed and could solve one of the most “…pressing needs of the modern world, namely, how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction.”\(^{227}\) This sense of solidarity is required, Miller argues, as a way to ensure that the large-scale political projects of the state can legitimately obtain the necessary resources to be fulfilled.

Miller claims that there are five criteria that set nationality apart from other forms of personal identity.\(^ {228}\) They are: *shared belief and mutual commitment; historical continuity; nationality as an active identity; connection to a place; and a common public culture*. It is important that I briefly explore these criteria as a way to show how nationality is distinct from other forms of group identity.

Miller’s first criterion of national identity is that members have a shared belief. Typically this shared belief is that they constitute a community with shared characteristics. Some of these shared characteristics can then go on to further define the

\(^{226}\) For the purposes of this argument I will use the terms compatriot and co-national synonymously.


nation (e.g. history, territory, etc.). For Miller, every nation must contain members who believe that they are part of a national group. Second, a national identity embodies historical continuity. By this Miller means that nations exist as historical communities - they exist through time. Members can draw on a shared history that can then be reinterpreted over time. The historical aspect of national identity also forms nationality into an ethical identity. Third, national identity acts as an active identity for individuals and the group. Nations, Miller argues, are groups that come together and act politically - political decisions are made, policy routes pursued. In many instances national action is not undertaken by individuals but by representative proxies (such as statesmen or national athletes). Fourth, nations are geographically defined. This claim implies two ways in which nations can be connected to a geographical location: they can either occupy a particular place throughout history, or nations can be tied to a particular place that holds historical significance (e.g. a ‘homeland’ that they have been expelled from). The difference here is that the location holding significance may not be the place where the nation currently resides, or for immigrants in a multiethnic society it could hold significance. In both cases location can help foster solidarity. This is especially true in the second case, where immigrants utilize the idea of a homeland to be distinct from the national community. Finally, nations share a common public culture. The shared culture here is not necessarily monolithic. Rather, the public culture merely offers a governing set of rules or “...understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life

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229 Ibid.
233 Ibid., 26.
In this way we can see the shared public culture as similar to an idea of
social mores. This final aspect of national identity incorporates the ‘substance’ of
nationality. Here we have the traditions, beliefs, customs, rituals, language, religions, and
other characteristics that make the nation what it is.

All of these factors taken together are what Miller claims distinguish nationality
from other forms of group identity. To recap, nationality (1) has a shared belief in its
existence, (2) exists historically and (presumably) into the future, (3) is an active identity,
(4) is connected to a geographical location, and (5) has a shared public culture or national
color. Exploring nationality and national identity is much more complex than just
associating it with five characteristics, and Miller would agree with this claim. With
national identity understood I now turn to exploring the relationship between nationalism
and cosmopolitanism.

4.3 National Identity and Cosmopolitanism

In this second part of the chapter I explore the way in which Miller claims that
nationalism presents a serious problem for cosmopolitans. As described in chapter two,
there may be a conflict between the goals of cosmopolitan egalitarianism and nationalist
particularism. Here I focus on Miller’s specific variety of nationalism and how he
attempts to describe a minimalist cosmopolitan stance that is based on recognition of the
strength of nationalism.

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234 Ibid.
235 Alexis de Tocqueville’s study Democracy in America explores the social mores of democratic America
to show the guiding principles and beliefs in society that determine right and wrong behaviour. See:
III, ch I.
Miller takes the relative strength of our national identities to propose an argument against strong cosmopolitanism:

Many have responded [to the effects of strong ethno-nationalism] by seeking to extirpate the idea of nationhood entirely, replacing it with the kind of internationalist humanism...perhaps best symbolized by the invention of Esperanto. These attempts seem to me misguided, for two main reasons. The first is simply that the majority of people are too deeply attached to their inherited national identities to make their obliteration an intelligible goal...The second reason for not taking [this type of] cosmopolitanism...to heart is that nationality has served and continues to serve a number of important purposes...  

I want to briefly consider the ways in which these two claims in support for national identity hold up to scrutiny. My claim here is that there are defensible forms of national identity, but these do not necessarily override the goals of cosmopolitanism (nor are they necessarily antithetical to cosmopolitanism). First I present an overview of Miller’s claims in his *National Responsibility and Global Justice* and then I show how Miller’s ‘minimalist cosmopolitan’ position is ultimately unsatisfactory. In the end, Miller’s claims against anything more than a very weak form of cosmopolitanism rests on a notion of national responsibility that does not take full account of the complex ways in which nations and the international system impact domestic affairs.

Like many others, Miller begins his analysis by determining what moral cosmopolitanism requires of us as an ethical doctrine. Here he offers the useful distinction between weak and strong moral positions, and begins to spell out what each of these requires.  

Miller seems to be at odds with stronger formulations of cosmopolitanism, ones in particular that are “…developed in opposition to a form of nationalism that holds that we owe more to our fellow nationals than we owe to human

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beings in general merely by virtue of the fact that we share with them the various cultural and other features that make up a national identity.” Many cosmopolitans would admit that certain relationships give rise to special responsibilities that can come into conflict with our ethical egalitarianism, but at the same time express scepticism that shared nationality can give rise to these types of special responsibilities. More importantly, cosmopolitans would question that we owe more to nationals on the basis of shared nationality.

In the preceding chapter, I offered an account of the way in which cosmopolitans can account for partiality in general; here my focus is on a particular instance of partiality. Miller’s goal is to show that shared nationality is not an irrelevant relationship. That is, special responsibilities, framed in terms of national obligations, cannot be ignored. Moreover, Miller may be prioritizing national obligations above global ones. Cosmopolitans, he claims, tend to consider national identity as a ‘morally arbitrary’ feature that does not warrant ethical consideration, this means that individuals “...are owed equal treatment as a matter of justice no matter which society they belong to.” Miller shows that we must consider what it means for a national identity to be morally arbitrary. In one way, national identities are morally arbitrary in the sense that they are arbitrarily obtained - we do not express agency in determining in which nation we are going to be members. The exception to this would be immigrants who express some choice in joining a nation, but they would also be born into a nation that they have emigrated from. However, in a second way, ‘morally arbitrary’ implies a claim about

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238 Ibid., 30.
239 Ibid.
moral treatment: “...it is a morally irrelevant characteristic, something we are bound to ignore when deciding how to act towards them.”\textsuperscript{240} As should be apparent at this point, Miller works to show that this is not the case. Nations, for Miller, are morally relevant in the sense that they constitute a group that can generate special responsibilities. If he is correct, then cosmopolitanism must work to reconcile a commitment to global obligations with differential treatment based on shared nationality. Cosmopolitanism, then, must account for the difference in treatment between in-group and out-group members. This gives rise, once again, to the distributive problem outlined in chapter two.

Although not all cosmopolitan obligations can be discussed in terms of distributive justice, there is certainly a distributive element to cosmopolitanism. Nationalists, then, must show how we can justifiably assign distributive priority to fellow nationals. If Miller can successfully demonstrate that shared nationality is morally salient, then cosmopolitans are tasked with determining how this impacts out-group members.

To show that nations can create special responsibilities Miller helpfully establishes three conditions. First, national identity and solidarity must be seen as intrinsically valuable; second, special duties must be integral to the idea of nationhood; finally, injustice cannot be integral to national attachments (“...in the way it is, for instance, to membership in a racist group.”).\textsuperscript{241} For Miller, national identity fulfills these three conditions.

First, although national identity can be seen as providing instrumental value in the way that individuals gain benefit from participation (i.e. reciprocity), Miller contends that

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 37-41.
the instrumental value we get from participation in a national group is secondary to the intrinsic value of national affiliation. Second, he argues that special duties are integral to nationhood. As outlined above, nations are active communities making political decisions that affect the lives of their members. The third condition is slightly more problematic as it would seem at first that nationhood (and the special duties that go along with it) necessarily would perpetuate global injustices (in that resources that could be devoted to foreigners will not be, thereby exacerbating global poverty, for example). Miller takes aim at Scheffler’s distributive objection and turns it around stating: “If our global responsibilities are to be understood in some other, non-comparative, way - for instance, as I suggested above, as an obligation to ensure that people everywhere have access to a minimum set of resources - then there is no inherent injustice involved in recognizing greater responsibilities to compatriots. Both sets of responsibilities can in principle be discharged at once.” Therefore, for Miller, a nation constitutes a group that can generate special responsibilities, but he argues that these responsibilities may not come into conflict with a weak cosmopolitanism that he later describes. However, this requires us to bring the question of whether or not this formulation of special responsibilities is plausible (i.e. that we can fulfill both our special duties to compatriots and our duties to humanity at large). I argue that Miller’s conception of national responsibility misconstrues the strength and sources of our global obligations. Moreover, I argue that his theory of national responsibility is implausible as it establishes criteria in

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242 Ibid., 37.
243 Ibid; The distinction between comparative and non-comparative forms of justice is described in much more detail in chapter five.
244 Ibid., 44. Here, Miller makes the claim that special responsibilities need not dilute our responsibilities to humanity writ large, but that they can act in addition to what we owe others.
which individuals are associated with a group that they may not have a reasonable way to influence decisions.

As I argued in the second and third chapters, while we may conceive of special responsibilities as only adding to our overall share of responsibility, they will (almost necessarily) dilute what we can realistically do for humanity in general. These duties will not always come into conflict, but in many cases they will. Miller recognizes this: “So a plausible split-level ethics that makes room for both global responsibilities and for special responsibilities to compatriots is going to have a more complex structure than either the strict priority proposal or the weighting proposal.” The strict priority proposal asserts that we give priority to one set of responsibilities and then move on to the second group, and the weighting proposal argues that we weight the relative value of both responsibilities (a context-specific approach). Miller maintains, however, that his approach is still plausible and that a global minimum is all that is required as a matter of justice. However, we are left wondering how are we to prioritize our obligations, and how can we effectively fulfill our global obligations. This is especially apparent once we recognize our finite ability to fulfill obligations – we have a set amount of resources (both material and immaterial) that we can utilize to fulfill obligations to others. This theory, then, relies on the existence of a global moral minimum to ensure that basic (cosmopolitan) needs are being met. This minimalist approach may be compatible with the type of nationalism being supported here, but we still need to qualify what the minimum is and what it would require. I argue in the next section that this minimalist

245 Ibid., 46.
cosmopolitanism fails to account for the significant changes to the current global structure.

Nonetheless, there is a certain attractiveness of the nationalist thesis that links the strength of national obligations to our ability to make effective change locally. At the national level there exists an extensive institutional structure (in addition to the shared public culture described in §4.2) that makes it possible for individuals to participate and fulfill obligations to compatriots. Described in this way, then, strengthening cosmopolitanism may require an analysis of the institutional structure that exists (or ought to exist) that allows us to effectively fulfill global obligations. This institutionalist argument is the focus of chapter six. My focus in this chapter is on dismantling Miller’s argument to identify the reasons why national responsibility (as conceived by Miller) is both implausible and undesirable. More importantly, I attempt to identify the reasons why his minimalist cosmopolitanism / liberal nationalist positions is incompatible with rooted cosmopolitanism. This does not mean that I conclude that nationalism is itself incompatible with rooted cosmopolitanism. Rather, I argue that prioritizing a particular group is actually required by rooted cosmopolitanism (i.e. it is the partiality that makes this form of cosmopolitanism ‘rooted’). However, when we prioritize co-nationals it must be done in such a way that avoids negatively impacting our global duties. Miller opts for a minimalist cosmopolitan strategy that is compatible with the current international arrangement, but I disagree with this conclusion. Moreover, I argue that his minimalist position implies a much stronger cosmopolitan claim than he appears to support. Before addressing his minimalist approach I first consider his defense of national responsibility that justifies minimalist cosmopolitanism.
4.4 Considering National Responsibility

So far I have only briefly have I addressed the role of cosmopolitanism in Miller’s philosophy. As I stated at the outset of this chapter, my goal here is twofold: first, I want to explore the concept of nationality; and second, I want to assess Miller’s conception of national responsibility as it relates to his cosmopolitanism (i.e. what I take to be his version of a rooted cosmopolitanism). In the end, the goal of this project considered more broadly is to analyze the ways in which cosmopolitan obligations and particular obligations interact. Arguably, obligations to compatriots present the greatest obstacle to cosmopolitan obligations. National identity is, in the end, a group identity that we may see as generating special responsibilities that can limit what we owe to others. After we come to terms with the existence of complex national identities and nationalism, it is prudent to explore national responsibility. Primarily for my purposes here, if nations can be seen as responsible for their actions then outside actors may not be responsible or obliged to aid as a matter of justice. In the inverse, if nations can be considered responsible for internal actions, then individuals would be right to prioritize co-nationals, as they would be linked in an important ethical chain of responsibility. Miller presents a very intriguing argument in favour of national responsibility. However, I argue that nations are responsible in some ways, but this may not necessarily change the strength of our global obligations to non-nationals. Moreover, establishing national responsibility requires assessing the extraordinarily complex context in which interactions between nations occur. As such, I conclude that we cannot assign collective responsibility to nations.
Miller claims that nations can be held responsible for their actions. My aim here is not to address issues of collective responsibility, but specifically explore the way in which Miller claims that nations are responsible. As such, I take collective responsibility to be a given. He states: “[My aim in this chapter is] to show that national responsibility, as a species of collective responsibility, makes (ethical) sense, and therefore that the people who make up a nation may sometimes properly be held liable for what their nation has done.” Miller’s argument for national responsibility proceeds in three steps:

1. He justifies the notion of collective responsibility.
2. He shows that the argument for collective responsibility can logically be extended to nations.
3. He claims that this argument for national responsibility can extend across time.

I will take the justification of collective responsibility in general as given in an attempt to avoid tangential exegesis. My focus, then, is on assessing whether or not collective responsibility can be assigned to nations, which would then delimit the scope of legitimate cosmopolitan duties. Again, if nations are responsible for internal affairs, then outsiders are not obliged to aid or assist, and nationals would be obligated to prioritize co-nationals.

### 4.4.1 Nations as Collectives

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248 Ibid., 112-113.
Miller develops his argument for national responsibility on two models of collective responsibility. The first, the like-minded group model, relies on a group having a shared set of goals, principles, or ideals that can be expressed. The second, the cooperative practice model, relies on democratic decision processes that allow for individuals in the group to express their voice. In what follows my aim is to show how we cannot hold nations responsible in the way that Miller suggests.

The second task in Miller’s national responsibility argument is to show that either model of collective responsibility can be extended to nations. Here I assess the nation as representing a like-minded group and then a group operating under the collective practice model. Miller claims that nations can meet both conditions, thereby extending collective responsibility to nations. However, I disagree with this position and show why we cannot simply extend either of the two models to create an across-the-board model of national responsibility. I do not necessarily offer a strict distinction between the models of responsibility here, as a nation could be seen as representative of one or both. I argue that assigning responsibility to nations is implausible and problematically shifts the focus away from cosmopolitan obligation.

Recall from §4.2 that Miller offers five criteria of a national identity. He invokes these to show how a nation operates as a like-minded group. He states: “Since members share both a common identity and a public culture - the first two features [of nationality] noted above - there is a prima facie reason to regard them as meeting this condition.”

Quite obviously, then, this argument rests on the precondition of an existing shared

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249 See: Ibid., 112-123.
250 Ibid., 127.
public culture and common identity. Miller does not naively suppose that nations are monolithic; he acknowledges that there is diversity in opinion and that not all nationals will hold the same beliefs as everyone else. However, he says that consensus is not required: “What is necessary to the existence of a nation is that the beliefs and attitudes in question should be generally held (and believed by those who hold them to be correct), not that they be held by every single member.” Additionally, we need to ensure that nations are acting on these shared beliefs. That is to say, the political arm of the nation embodies the beliefs and values of the nation. This will require, more or less, the existence of either a tenable form of self-government or democratic decision-making processes. In the first instance, self-governance is required as it ensures that nations are ‘governed from within’. What Miller means by this is that self-governance ensures that nations have the ability to govern themselves, this allows for the beliefs and values to guide policy. Hence, for Miller, the like-minded group model applies to nations that meet the above conditions. Every individual may not make political decisions, nor will everyone hold every single belief of the nation, but the decisions and policies pursued represent national policies and the nation is thereby responsible for their outcome.

In the second case, Miller claims that democratically self-governed nations can also represent the collective practice model: “Here the policies pursued by the state can reasonably be seen as policies for whose effects the citizen body as a whole is collectively responsible, given that they have authorized the government to act on their behalf in a free election...” In democratic nations, according to Miller, the processes

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251 Ibid., 125.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid., 128.
exist that allow for individuals to either help frame decisions or authorize representatives to make these decisions. Therefore, all that is required to show that nations can be collectively responsible is that we can demonstrate that nations are self-governing (in some fashion) and that the nation has the core features of national identity outlined in part one, particularly shared beliefs and values.

Miller then moves to assessing more complex cases. He questions, for example, the case for national responsibility with autocratic rule. In these cases he argues that national responsibility can still apply if we take account of two considerations. First, the ruling elite may embody the beliefs and values of the nation, as would be the case in a benevolent dictatorship, or any other ‘decent hierarchical society’. In this case, national responsibility still applies as the policies pursued by the state represent national aims. Second, Miller contends that the nation could be seen as collectively responsible when the subjects “... have a duty to resist it in the event that it begins to act in ways that are manifestly wrong, whether the wrongness takes the form of injustice to outsiders or simply of policies that are seriously damaging to the common interests of the nation itself.” So, despite the fact that the policies pursued by the nation, in these cases, may not represent the shared values of the nation nor have the processes in place for individuals to determine policy, he still considers the nation responsible.

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254 Ibid., 128; The term ‘decent hierarchical society’ is drawn from Rawls’s Law of Peoples where he argues that some societies may not be ruled in a liberal fashion but are nonetheless decent so long as the governing elite secure human rights and govern in the interests of all. These types of societies are typified by the existence of social cooperation. Rawls uses the famous example of his hypothetical "Kazanistan" to describe a society that exhibits the conditions of a decent hierarchy. See: John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

255 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 129.
Miller claims that nations can represent a cooperative practice so long as they fulfill two conditions: “First, as indicated earlier, nations are communities whose members see themselves as having obligations of mutual aid that are more extensive than the aid they owe to human beings generally...Second, nations provide their members with a number of public goods, foremost among which is protection of the national culture itself.”\textsuperscript{256} Miller’s second condition will lead to national responsibility so long as public goods are distributed fairly throughout society. What this may require, then, is that the preconditions for social justice - whatever they may be - be fulfilled before we can speak of national responsibility. If individuals in different subgroups within a nation are not allocated a fair amount of resources or public goods then they cannot be incorporated into a model of national responsibility. Further, if public goods are not fairly distributed throughout society, it is likely that the processes to affect change will either be closed off entirely, or individuals within disadvantaged groups will be unable to access them without undue burden. The limitations on national responsibility that I have been discussing are implied by Miller’s argument, but he explicitly states: “... where nations are subject to external or autocratic rule, it is usually difficult to identify acts undertaken by individual members or by the state as genuinely national acts, and so it becomes inappropriate to spread responsibility for those acts throughout the population in question.”\textsuperscript{257} His focus on democratic processes is not surprising, given his support for deliberative democracy exhibited elsewhere.\textsuperscript{258} Nonetheless, he concludes that it makes

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 130-131.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{258} In \textit{Citizenship and National Identity} he claims that nations should aim towards a deliberative ideal in so far as possible. He states: “... the community’s political institutions should approximate as closely as possible to the ideal of deliberative democracy. It should reach its political decisions through a process
sense to hold nations collectively responsible if they meet the conditions outlined above, and acceptance of national responsibility does not necessarily determine what global justice requires.\textsuperscript{259}

Given this interpretation of Miller’s argument, I argue that the conditions that he sets out for collective responsibility cannot be simply extended to nations. This suggests that nations do not act in the same way that either like-minded groups or cooperative practice groups do. It may be possible, however, to see the state as acting in such a way. That is to say, in most cases it is the state not the nation that is pursuing policy. Miller may be correct that in some cases the state represents national ideals, but this is not necessarily always the case. Moreover, the state is not simply the embodiment of a nation, national ideals, or a shared public culture. State policies will be influenced by these factors but they will not necessarily embody them. If the nation could be seen as a key actor in international politics, then Miller’s argument may have some credence. However, the ultimate authority to act rests with the state, not with the nation. This repudiation of his notion of national responsibility does not reject the idea of collective responsibility in general. Rather I argue that we need to have higher conditions for collective national responsibility, this is especially true to ensure that innocent individuals are not indicted with a collective.\textsuperscript{260}

\textsuperscript{259} Miller, \textit{National Responsibility and Global Justice}, 133.

4.4.2 Nations vs. States

Miller sets out a very complex argument for holding nations responsible for their decisions. However, I do not believe that it is appropriate to hold a nation responsible, at least in the way Miller argues. In contemporary international politics states must be held responsible for their actions. States are the only ones who can legitimately enact policy and pursue policy routes. Importantly, states are not merely embodiments of a nation or shared national identity. Yes, policies may reflect something that is distinct about a nation (e.g. the Canadian state will pursue distinctly ‘Canadian’ policy paths), but this does not necessarily mean that the state embodies a national ideal. However, I argue that responsibility must be assigned to states on two grounds: 1. The state is uniquely empowered as the sole legitimate political actor in the international sphere, and 2. Even if I conceded many points to Miller, pragmatically speaking the state must be held responsible - we can easily identify actors and direct causal links to assign responsibility for injustice. In this way, I argue that assigning responsibility to a nation has the potential to assign responsibility to many innocent individuals. Holding a state responsible holds much more normative and pragmatic appeal. It also allows us to focus our discussion on forms of nationalism (or partialism) that are compatible with cosmopolitanism.

First, I argue that we need to further explore the relationship between states and nations. Miller distinguishes state and national responsibility in three ways:

1. State responsibility muddles the role of individuals within the collective, thus making collective responsibility more disparate.

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261 Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice*, 152-156
262 Ibid., 112.
3. It might make pragmatic sense to hold a nation responsible for a state that no longer exists.\textsuperscript{263}

It is therefore important to separate the nation from the state, despite the preference of many scholars to use the term ‘nation state’. Pierik, for example, sees Miller’s distinction of the nation and state as a fundamental problem with his theory: “...the underlying problem in Miller’s argument seems to be his insistence on separating nations from states and on distinguishing national responsibility from state responsibility. In discussions on global justice...the notion of state and nation are inherently and inseparably intermingled.”\textsuperscript{264} Nonetheless, I think it is necessary to offer some distinction between a nation and a state, especially considering the fact that a nation, as Miller describes it, is rarely synonymous with a state. Though Pierik is correct that they are related, we still need to distinguish the two to ensure we are assigning responsibility properly. If we can successfully separate the nation (as a collective of nationals) from the state (as a policy-making institution) then we may be able to ensure that innocent individuals are not indicted when their state makes poor policy choices. Unlike Pierik, I think that by separating nation from state (at least in discussions of responsibility) we can have more fruitful discussions about global justice and other cosmopolitan tasks. This distinction, I argue, does not detract from discussions of cosmopolitanism; rather it works to reinforce them.

The state, if we are to take a liberal understanding, acts as an arbiter between internal interests that come into conflict. A nation, I argue, is not nearly as encompassing

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., 105-106.
\textsuperscript{264} Pierik, 480; Pierik gracefully sidesteps this discussion by shifting the debate: “…our primary interest should be the responsibility of political communities, and our general theories of global justice should take the responsibilities of these political communities as their focal point.” Ibid., 481.
as Miller asserts it to be in his *On Nationality*. A state can be composed of many different nations and people from different nations. These different nationalities enter into the political sphere and must adopt a civic nationality. Thus we must distinguish between nationality traditionally understood and ‘civic nationality’. What I mean by nationality traditionally understood is how most people would use the term ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’, and this includes Miller’s usage. This type of nationality encompasses all of the features outlined by Miller that I explored in the first part of this chapter (e.g. shared history, territory, rituals, etc.). Civic nationality is the nationality that individuals embody as citizens of a particular state. This can be seen as akin to Ignatieff’s civicism or Habermas’ constitutional patriotism.\(^{265}\) Individuals adopt, or buy in to, a public culture where conflicting nationalities can exist.\(^{266}\) Certainly a state’s policies will be reflective of the dominant national group, but this does not necessarily mean that they embody the nation’s shared beliefs or values. This process of nation-based policy is inevitable, a state must have an operating language (for example) for pragmatic purposes, not simply because it is the national language. It makes sense that a state would operate in the dominant nation’s language - a majority of citizens of the state speak that language. There will be, then, some overlap between a dominant nation and the institutions of the state. Moreover, to help develop solidarity and a sense of belonging, the state may participate in a variety of nation-building projects that help further solidify a national identity. However, the state is still a representative of peoples of many nations (in Miller’s sense), and state policy is not just the embodiment of the dominant nation.


\(^{266}\) Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is helpful here. See: John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),
To give an example, when we say ‘I am Canadian’ we can be speaking of either a Canadian nation in Miller’s sense, or that I am a citizen of Canada. These have different meanings and different implications for an argument for national responsibility. In one case, if we are active participants in Canadian nationalism, we may be said to be responsible for the direction of the national identity (which assumes an authorship ability), in the other we are citizens under the collective institutions of the Canadian state. If I am a citizen of Canada I am subject to Canadian laws, but I may also reject Canadian nationalism. Although Miller would likely agree that active rejection would allow me to separate myself from the responsible collective of Canadians, I argue that even passive rejection or non-participation is sufficient. Nonetheless, my active or non-participation in Canadian nationalism is entirely separate from my obligation to other Canadians to follow the laws and conduct myself in a particular way. I am, importantly, responsible for my actions as a Canadian to the Canadian state and to other Canadians. I am not, however, responsible for the actions of the Canadian nation (unless I am an active participant).

Additionally, we must factor into account that under the traditional notion of statehood and sovereignty, the state is the only political actor with the legitimate authority to act. To use Weber’s famous definition of a state: “…we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”\textsuperscript{267} The state is the only actor that we assign the right to enact policy and is the only one with that ability.\textsuperscript{268} Thus, we must hold states to


\textsuperscript{268} Jacob Levy agrees that states, not nations, should be considered responsible due to their distributive
be responsible for injustices (be they contemporary or in the past) in the way that Miller assigns responsibility to nations. Although this may seem as though I am splitting hairs between nations and states, this distinction has serious implications once we move beyond arguments of state or national responsibility into a claim for a stronger version of cosmopolitanism.

Secondly, even if we were to suppose that many of Miller’s points were correct, pragmatically we have to assign responsibility to the state. Even if Miller’s supposition that collective responsibility can be assigned to nations is correct, states are the ones that must ultimately accept responsibility and rectify injustice. This is due, in large part, to the fact that the state (in this case as the embodiment of a nation) can be identified as an actor and be implicated in a causal chain.

In some cases it is easy to establish a clear causal chain of events that can show a particular nation is responsible for an outcome. The 1994 Rwanda genocide provides an example of this - Hutu civilians were incited to systematically destroy any and all Tutsi in Rwanda. Although there were many propaganda efforts involved, responsibility could be assigned to the Hutu as a nation for the outcome of events in 1994. However, many other cases do not provide a clear causal chain of events. As Miller argues, it is very important to consider the capacity: “Once states are distributing benefits - and even physical protection is a benefit about which distribute decisions are made, as is perfectly evident when looking at the geographic unevenness of police protection in all countries - they face moral constraints about how and to whom they should be distributed.” Levy is quick to point out that it is the state who has the legitimate ability to generate this responsibility, not the nation. Although I agree with the premise, Levy and I do not share the same conclusion. Jacob T. Levy, “National and Statist Responsibility”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2008): 496.

difficult to explore the causal links with historic injustice. Additionally, we cannot simply claim that, ceteris paribus, if nation A did not exploit nation B, then nation B would achieve the same results as nation A did with resource X. Imperial states, for example, exploited African nations for particular resources that then went to the benefit of the European states. However, we cannot claim that without the intervention of imperialist states, these African nations would have achieved the same results with these resources. Technology was limited and the Europeans had a market established whereby resources obtained a particular value that then could be converted into benefits for the state. What is then owed is still contestable, but nonetheless it is clear that (for example) the Belgian state owes something to one of their former colonies, not the Walloon or Flemish people (assuming that we can demonstrate that Belgium gained from exploitation of their colonies).

Pragmatically speaking it can be very difficult to show either a valid or invalid title to a nation, simply due to innumerable factors involved in determining responsibility. It makes more sense to assign responsibility to a state when it can be clearly shown that policies enacted by the state (as the only legitimate actor in international politics) led to outcome X. Moreover the state is the only actor with the resources available in almost all cases of redress that are necessary for rectifying injustice (the exception to this would be in cases of offering apology).\textsuperscript{270} Miller’s analysis of national redress and historical responsibility oversimplifies a very complex process. Pogge describes this type of argument as ‘explanatory nationalism’\textsuperscript{271} – attributing poverty and injustice to domestic (national) forces. This type of argument wrongly oversimplifies the processes of

\textsuperscript{270} However, even in the case of apology the state, acting on behalf of a nation, is typically who offers the apology.
\textsuperscript{271} Thomas Pogge, \textit{World Hunger and Human Rights}, 15, 143-145.
interaction that take place, and it establishes too strict of a distinction between internal and external forces.

I believe that on one level, Miller’s claim is correct. That is, given condition A we can reasonably assign responsibility to group X. However, what I believe he fails to do is appropriately assign responsibility to nations. I argue this primarily because (1) nations do not meet the conditions he outlined, and (2) nations are not (ultimately) legitimate actors - states are. Additionally, Miller fails to show that nations and states are synonymous, which would bypass my second criticism. Finally, his claims of historic national responsibility are coherent, in so far as when condition A is met, responsibility can be assigned. But once again, I argue that responsibility in these cases should not be assigned to nations but must be assigned to states.

What does Miller’s argument imply for rooted cosmopolitanism, then? Primarily, if Miller is correct that nation’s should be held responsible for their actions, then outsiders are not responsible (as a matter of justice) for what happens inside a nation. In the final section of this chapter I argue against Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism and show why even a state-based model of responsibility is inadequate.

4.5 National Responsibility and Cosmopolitanism Broadly Considered

In this section of the chapter I explore the relationship between national responsibility (as outlined in §4.4) and cosmopolitanism. Quite apparently, if nations are to be held responsible for their actions, then cosmopolitan duties will be limited. This suggests that outsiders ought not be considered responsible for others if we can demonstrate internal (national) responsibility. I contend that Miller’s assignment of responsibility to nations misconstrues the international sphere of interaction. Thus, the
section begins by describing Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism – which he arrives at through a defense of national responsibility – and concludes with a rejection of his argument. I argue that the minimalist position depends upon a misunderstanding of responsibility, but even if I were to accept his national responsibility argument I believe that it implies a much stronger version of political and moral cosmopolitanism than he admits.

Miller argues against anything more than a weak cosmopolitanism, which should not be surprising given his comments on national responsibility. Against Thomas Pogge’s claim that affluent states are responsible for the poverty of others because of an unjust international order, Miller claims:

Pogge, as I have said, does not deny that the immediate cause of poverty in a particular society may be a defective set of economic and political institutions, or that the reason why some societies have institutions that are inimical to growth, while others have managed to develop institutions that allow them to escape from serious poverty over a generation or two, may lie deep in the history and culture of the societies in question. But he continues to attribute responsibility for poverty to rich societies by claiming, as already noted, that if the global environment were different, these natural factors would produce different results.

For Miller, then, societies must be held liable for the poor economic policies they pursue, and he goes to great lengths to show that the international order is not as fundamentally unjust as Pogge supposes it is. Miller rightly points out that “The question we should be asking about the global order, then, is whether it provides reasonable opportunities for societies to lift themselves out of poverty, or whether it places obstacles in their path that are quite difficult to overcome, requiring an extraordinary economic performance on the

272 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 240.
273 Ibid., 243, for example.
part of a developing society.”\textsuperscript{274} For Miller, the international order does offer this, but this does not alleviate us of any and all cosmopolitan responsibility (as a matter of justice). For Miller, we still have a duty of justice to ensure a global minimum standard.\textsuperscript{275} Anything we do beyond this minimum is done as a matter of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{276} Miller contends that we may, nonetheless, have responsibilities to the world’s poor in one of two ways.

First, a rich society is responsible to a poor one either because “… the past actions and policies of A have contributed to the present deprivation of P, and A therefore owes P material redress for the effects of those actions and policies, or merely because A is connected to P by virtue of their history of causal interactions, thereby giving A a special reason to respond to P’s present plight.”\textsuperscript{277} In other words, members of A have a responsibility to P if a link between the actions of A and the plight of P can be demonstrated. Second, Miller argues that affluent states have the responsibility to offer fair terms of cooperation to govern the relations with other states. As he says: “Given that, through economic globalization and in other ways, societies unavoidably have significant impacts on each others’ prospects, the rules governing these interactions must be fair to both sides. This is demonstrably not the case at present. Many societies are vulnerable to exploitation and other forms of injustice by powerful states, corporations

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., 241.
\textsuperscript{275} I do not explore his global minimum much beyond this. However, he argues that we can look to a list of fundamental human rights to show what is required by affluent states, as a matter of justice, to ensure everyone has a reasonable opportunity to live a good life.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., 248. Miller states: “… the thought here being that some responsibilities may give rise to duties that are not duties of justice. These other duties we might describe as humanitarian; they are duties that we have good reason to perform, without being required to perform them as we are required to perform duties of justice.”
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 249.
and other agencies.” Thus, states have to offer fair terms of cooperation so as not to exploit vulnerable nations or make them susceptible to poor/unfair economic agreements that could have serious and long-lasting implications on the outcome of state P.

Additionally, Miller argues that in certain cases remedial responsibility may still be owed, even after the first two responsibilities have been discharged. There still may be cases where a state is impacted by outside events that no one bears outcome responsibility for, such as a natural disaster. Therefore, in cases where outcome responsibility can be assigned to external actors, the first two responsibilities must be discharged, and when outcome responsibility cannot be assigned to external actors but the outcome is determined by external events nonetheless, remedial responsibility comes into effect.

Miller contends that in cases where a society’s plight is due to internal circumstances, either due to exploitation by a subgroup or due to cultural factors, another form of responsibility must be explored. In the first case, where a subgroup exploits the population and puts a significant amount of people in a vulnerable position, responsibility first lies with that subgroup. However, in many cases the subgroup that is dominating a population may not fulfill their responsibility, thus it falls to the next group - which could be international actors. Miller is rightly cautious here when he talks about what type of aid should be given in these circumstances, due to the various unintended consequences that could arise. The international community may, nonetheless, incur some responsibility

278 Ibid., 252.
279 Ibid., 254-255.
280 Ibid., 257-258.
in these circumstances.\footnote{Ibid.} In the second case, where cultural factors lead to chronic poverty, the international community has a responsibility to intervene, ensure a global minimum standard is achieved and ‘gently’ persuade the society to adopt different practices.\footnote{Ibid., 258-259.} Above and beyond these cases, outside actors should not be considered responsible (as a matter of justice) for the plight of the world’s poor.

Nonetheless, Miller contends that we do have duties of justice to non-nationals. Robert van der Veen helpfully summarizes Miler’s four types of duties of global justice. He states that these duties, which are linked to the global minimum principle can be distinguished as:

1. “The negative duty to refrain from infringing basic rights by our own actions…”
2. “The positive duty to secure the basic rights of the people who we are responsible for…”
3. “The positive duty to prevent rights-violations by other parties…”

These four duties of global justice are those that are implied by the global minimum principle that Miller endorses. I argue that, even though this list is very minimal it nonetheless implies a much stronger cosmopolitanism than Miller seems willing to admit.

Miller is sceptical of claims that affluent states are responsible for the plight of the world’s poor above and beyond this as it reflects, he claims, an inability to appropriately assign collective responsibility:

That is, [Pogge] does not allow people who are going about their daily business and are uninvolved in politics to distance themselves from the policies their governments may pursue; he assumes that everyone in these societies is included in
national responsibility for the harm they have inflicted on poor people in other countries, and can therefore be required to contribute to transfers to compensate for that harm. But why should the idea of collective responsibility apply in this case but not to people living in poor countries for the harms caused by their own institutions and practices?  

In other words, if affluent states can be held accountable for the plight of the world’s poor, then why can’t we hold poor states accountable for their own poverty? My goal is to briefly address this question, and in my response I begin to show why a global minimum (like the one favoured by Miller) requires a much stronger version of cosmopolitanism than the one he defends.

As Miller rightly shows, the causes of chronic poverty are diverse and complex. It is near impossible to attempt to determine a simple causal path between a set of actions and poverty within any given state. It would appear, then, preposterous to assign responsibility to the world’s affluent societies - despite the fact that they are the one’s best suited to offer assistance. He does admit that affluent states should be held responsible for outcomes to which they can be causally linked. Anything beyond this, he argues, affluent states cannot be held responsible for. However, I disagree with Miller on this conclusion. My argument against Miller advances in two phases: 1. Poverty is systematic, structural, and ultimately complex. 2. Even if we grant Miller’s argument for a global minimum, acknowledgement of a stronger version of cosmopolitanism is required to fulfill his goals.

Chronic and extreme poverty, the kind experienced by the world’s poorest cannot be attributed to a single set of variables. The current plight of the Congolese, for example, cannot simply be assigned to historic exploitation by Belgium, or by the power vacuum

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284 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 244.
created when the Belgians left, or by imposition of unfair economic agreements by international actors, or by poor economic policies pursued by the Congolese government. We cannot assign sole responsibility to any one of these factors, but rather must look at the problem as part of a larger systemic issue. As Miller himself claims:

But poverty in the developing world...is chronic; it has long-term structural causes; a life saved today may be lost for a different reason next year...The underlying point is that improving the lot of the world’s poor is a macro-level problem; it involves changing the general conditions under which they live - their domestic economic and political regimes, for instance, as well as the international context within which those domestic institutions operate.  

If we are going to look at assigning responsibility we need to look at both historic relations that may have impacted the outcome of a poor state, as well as current economic policies pursued by that state (and the possible connection between the former and the latter), as well as the larger international order in which this poverty exists. In almost every case, we would find that the plight of a poor society is not simply due to poor economic policies pursued by their government, but due to a very complex process. Additionally, even in the rare case where poor policy routes could be seen as the sole factor, we would need to assess the context in which those policy routes are being pursued. It is likely that this analysis would reveal deeper structural problems or external influence that leads them to pursue these policies.

In saying this, I am not making the claim that affluent states need to bear all of the responsibility for the plight of the world’s poor. Rather, some of the responsibility can be assigned there, but we also need to look at the context of interaction in which this poverty exists. More than likely, what is required is larger systemic change. This may take the

285 Ibid., 235-236.
form of international governance to ensure fair economic agreements between societies, or place restrictions on non-governmental actors who have the ability to exploit vulnerable populations (i.e. trans-national corporations), or some other form of structural change at the international level, both of which Miller argues are required. Affluent states are nonetheless responsible for supporting a system that is fundamentally unjust. As it is, many of the world’s poorest states do not have nearly the same opportunities for economic advancement as affluent states do. Again, the cause of this is multivariate and complex, but we could begin to show a connection between historically unjust economic relations between states and current economic plight. Moreover, affluent states are the ones that are best suited to fulfill the requirements of justice here. The idea is that we can take one of Miller’s principles to suppose a stronger cosmopolitan claim, or put another way, Miller’s argument for minimalist cosmopolitanism requires significantly more than he seems to think. If affluent states must - as a matter of justice - ensure fair terms of economic cooperation, then institutional and structural change is required at the international level.

Another way I can show that Miller’s argument implies a stronger cosmopolitanism is by showing how his principle readily extends a large amount of responsibility to affluent states. If we were somehow able to show that the economic plight of state A is due to the policies of state A - in its entirety - then we could assume that state A is entirely responsible for their outcome. However, ought implies can, and the world’s poorest states may not be properly equipped, as they are, to fight poverty at home. Responsibility then, according to Miller’s argument, would shift to ‘the next in line’. Responsibility shifts to those best suited to discharge what is due. In circumstances
where a state is pursuing detrimental policies and sustaining gross poverty within their borders, Miller’s argument implies that the responsibility to alleviate the situation shifts to the next group who can properly discharge it. In these cases, affluent states or an international body may be best suited. Alleviating poverty to such a degree as to fulfill Miller’s global minimum will require substantial structural change, which would impact the overall structure of sovereign statehood.²⁸⁶

Moreover, Miller needs to offer more productive ways of addressing global poverty. No doubt he, along with most everyone else, agrees that something needs to be done, but he does not offer much in the way of a useful strategy of addressing global poverty. Veit Bader argues that Miller’s assessment of global poverty is problematic on two levels. First, he claims that Miller offers no real practical attempt to solve global poverty, despite his commitment to the problem.²⁸⁷ Secondly, Bader argues that Miller does not give a split-level theory a fair shake. Although we need to assess problems at the traditional state level, Bader correctly argues that we need to look at sub-state, trans-national, supra-state, and other non-traditional political actors to see what roles they currently have in sustaining or alleviating global poverty, and how that role can be augmented to help further alleviate poverty.²⁸⁸ In the end it seems almost counterproductive for him to claim that there is a dire need to alleviate global poverty

²⁸⁶ For example, we could support a form of disaggregated sovereignty as explored by Charles Jones. See: Charles Jones, “Institutions with Global Scope: Moral Cosmopolitanism and Political Practice”, in Global Justice, Global Institutions, ed. Daniel Weinstock, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 8-9.
²⁸⁸ Ibid.
without considering the viability of a global institutional solution.\textsuperscript{289} This is especially the case when we consider the potential that global institutions have to offer, as Margaret Moore points out.\textsuperscript{290}

Finally, even if we were to suppose that everything Miller has argued is correct - that nations are collectively responsible, that all that is owed as a matter of justice is ensuring a global minimum, and that affluent states are not responsible for the plight of the world’s poor as cosmopolitans like Pogge insist they are - he does not offer us an avenue for adequately ensuring the global minimum. That is, ensuring fulfillment of a global minimum requires substantial institutional and structural change, which will have an impact on state sovereignty, and will require significantly more from affluent states than Miller contends. I agree with Miller that we need to ensure that basic rights are being protected and that all individuals have the minimum requirements of a good life guaranteed to them.\textsuperscript{291} This is needed, I argue, to ensure that individuals have the ability to then pursue whatever life paths they desire. However, achieving this global minimum is still going to require significantly more than Miller seems to support. Furthermore, ensuring that the world’s poorest have a basic minimum guaranteed to them assigns greater responsibility to affluent states - as those best suited to discharge the responsibility - than Miller claims.


\textsuperscript{290} Ibid. Although Moore sees this oversight on Miller’s part as being endemic in common-sense views of morality; see: Ibid., 514.

\textsuperscript{291} Although Miller and I would likely disagree with what is contained within the global minimum, cosmopolitan duties to others can be rightfully described in minimalistic terms. This helpfully avoids the issue of valuation between cultural and national groups. I discuss this much further in the following chapter on Global Egalitarianism and Nationalism.
Putting aside discussions of the causal links between affluent states’ behaviour and the plight of the world’s poorest, I want to briefly explore the idea of a global minimum. Miller sets out a list of basic human rights that should be guaranteed in order for individuals to have the basic resources to live a good life. He argues that a list of human rights can be used to fulfill the global minimum as they meet two criteria. First, a list of basic human rights can explain why “...rights-violations can impose relatively demanding obligations on third parties who are not themselves responsible for the violations.” Second, basic human rights have a universal appeal and cannot be disputed over questions of value. Miller contends, however, that we must keep this to a basic list of human rights so as to avoid failing to meet either of these criteria. He is wary of giving a concrete list of what is needed so as to avoid discussions of value and ethical justification, but his basis for supporting human rights remains groundless until he provides that ethical justification. Despite the fact that we would likely disagree on the basis of human rights, for the purposes of argument we will look at a very basic list of rights - those rights that need to be secured for an individual to live a ‘decent life’. This basic list of rights could include access to clean water, food, basic shelter, and basic education. Presumably one could begin to extend this list further to include rights needed to live a decent life, however that is not needed for my purposes. Although this list is very

293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
295 Leif Wenar points out that Miller fails to explain why we must have respect for human rights: “Yet Miller has still not explained why we have duties to respect human rights - he has not explained why respect for human rights is something we owe to each human being as such.” He continues by asserting that this failure on Miller’s part gives global egalitarians the advantage: “For the global egalitarian will have a powerful line of argument connecting equal human moral worth with duties to promote equal life chances.” Leif Wenar, “Human Rights and Equality in the Work of David Miller”, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 11 (2008): 405.
296 I’ll use the term ‘decent’ very loosely here to refer to the criteria needed for basic subsistence.
basic, and a list that Miller would likely agree with, we need to assess what would be required to ensure their protection.

In addition to the substantial impositions on state sovereignty that would be required, we must acknowledge that this places greater responsibility on affluent states to meet the global minimum. First, state sovereignty would need to be limited to ensure that resources could be directed to the proper channels - i.e. towards fulfilling the global minimum. Second, this requires placing responsibility on affluent states that have already ensured that these basic rights are fulfilled within their borders. Again we can arrive at this conclusion in two ways, either affluent states take on a greater share of responsibility as they are the ones best suited to discharge said responsibility, or they acquire the responsibility after other states have failed to fulfill the global minimum within their own borders. Both of these conditions, I believe, are consistent with Miller’s argument. However we also need to recognize that ensuring the fulfillment of the global minimum requires significantly more than Miller presents throughout his *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Granting the claim that states are responsible for happenings within their own borders (within reason), but that we also need to ensure that a global minimum is fulfilled will require serious structural change, and (likely) intervention in many states that currently are not fulfilling their basic responsibilities to their citizens. If we were to leave the international order as it is, responsibility shifts once again to affluent states to intervene in failing states to secure those basic rights. However, ensuring that a global minimum is consistently fulfilled would require having an international authority in place to enforce the minimum. This is based on the assumption that states will do what they can unless there is an authority in place to coerce them otherwise. Again, this would require -
as a matter of justice - that states cede some sovereignty to the international arena and lead towards a restructuring of the international order.

My claim here does not rest on the notion of a fundamentally unjust international order. Rather, my argument merely builds on what Miller’s argument implies:

1. If we assume that all people everywhere are due a global minimum as a matter of justice.
2. If we assume that that global minimum is currently not being met by a great number of states.
   (then)
3. The responsibility shifts to those best suited to discharge it (i.e. affluent states)
   (And)
4. Ensuring consistency in fulfilling the global minimum will require proper international governance.

In sum, Miller’s argument implies a much stronger version of political cosmopolitanism than he presents. Much in the same way that I argue in chapter one that Pogge’s ‘moderate cosmopolitanism’ implies positive duties, Miller’s ‘minimalist’ cosmopolitanism implies a claim about outsider responsibility and involvement that he seems hesitant to support. At the same time, I believe that Miller is correct when he argues that it is wrong to presume that the world’s poor are not active agents. As Moore explains Miller’s point: “...an acceptable theory of global justice has to strike the right balance between two aspects of the human condition: between regarding people as needy and vulnerable creatures who may not be able to live decently without the help of others, and regarding them as responsible agents who should be allowed to enjoy the benefits, but also bear the costs of their choices and actions.”297 Far too often cosmopolitans base arguments on the notion that the world’s poor are simply victims requiring our help and

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297 Moore: 505.
assistance, Miller and I would likely agree on this point. However, in the case of the world’s poorest we need to recognize the extreme and abject poverty that they are subjected to. Attaining the global minimum could be all that is required by cosmopolitans, but much more action is needed if that minimum is going to be fulfilled. Even a global minimum, like Miller’s, implies a fairly strong version of cosmopolitanism (relative to the weak and strong distinction set out by Miller).

Scheffler’s tension shows to us the conflict in our moral thinking. Miller’s argument attempts to sort this conflict by favouring our local duties, while minimizing our global ones. In doing so he attempts to provide a way in which we can consistently fulfill both sets of obligations. However, I have attempted to show throughout the chapter that Miller attempts to minimize our global obligations, but actually implies a stronger form of cosmopolitanism. It would appear that this form of cosmopolitanism is one that is weaker than the ‘strong cosmopolitanism’ described in chapter one (i.e. equality requires equal treatment), but sufficiently stronger than the moderate position offered by Pogge. While he elaborates criteria for fulfilling local obligations, he is unable to successfully respond to the demands of distant strangers. His minimalist position, I have attempted to show, is reliant upon a well-ordered international sphere – one that looks significantly different from what we currently have. Indeed, his allusion to the distributive function of international institutions gives strength to those who argue for global justice. In the end, I argue that Miller is unable to satisfactorily respond to the tension without looking at the

larger structural change that is necessary to fulfill his own criteria (as elaborated by van der Veer).

4.6 Nationalism and Rooted Cosmopolitanism

The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between moral cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and in this final section I hope to explore the implications that Miller’s nationalism has on rooted cosmopolitanism. At a very basic level, the requirements of nationalism seem to be antithetical to the goals of cosmopolitanism. I have worked to show that this is not necessarily the case, and in the next chapters I address this relationship further. Some forms of nationalism can be compatible with cosmopolitanism. Further, the nation can act as an important source of roots in rooted cosmopolitanism. This form of cosmopolitanism would be reflective of both moral and cultural claims – we can understand much of our moral framework and identity as being rooted in the nation. The form of nationalism advocated by Miller has great potential to become a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. He rightly understands the importance of the nation in several ways.

As a basis of our identity, the nation can help establish a sense of solidarity that then allows for the execution of vast political projects. The sense of solidarity exhibited at a national level is one that cannot be easily recreated. Miller also demonstrates that our relationship to conationals is not morally arbitrary in an important way. We have legitimate obligations to conationals that differ from our obligations to outsiders. Miller’s position is, however, a very minimalist cosmopolitan one, that we can see as emphasizing our roots over our global obligations. His priority is on fulfilling obligations more locally.
His theory is, nonetheless, consistent with the claims that Pogge makes about our global negative duties.

If we were to reach Miller’s ideal world – one framed around autonomous nations who all provide basic human rights for their citizens and are responsible for their actions – then much structural change needs to occur. Interestingly enough, the moral ground for this structural change may depend on a rejection of national responsibility. In a similar vein, if Pogge intends to guarantee the right of non-interference (for example) then the global marketplace will require significant change. The success of this change, however, may depend on international institutions of governance that are able to govern interaction between nations to ensure that basic human rights are met or that the negative rights are protected. In both cases we have a fairly non-controversial and minimal position that upon closer scrutiny requires much more. Miller wishes to avoid defending any form of cosmopolitanism that questions national responsibility, but as I have shown his argument may require it. I believe this helpfully demonstrates the strength of Scheffler’s tension. Despite his best efforts to resolve it by focusing more on particularism without entirely rejecting global obligations, Miller cannot avoid the claims of cosmopolitans.

Nationalist partiality is justified under the framework that Miller advances. Assuming a global minimum was in place and effectively governed, then we would be right to place priority on co-nationals. Although I disagree that a moral minimum is sufficient, it can act as a plausible basis for rooted cosmopolitanism. This requires that basic needs would be met across the globe and that we were still in an important institutional relationship with co-nationals that did not exist outside of the nation or state. Unfortunately, the moral minimum requires substantial change that would then place
individuals in an institutional relationship with distant strangers akin to the one currently exhibited at the national and state level. The minimalist position, therefore, appears to be defeatist in nature. If it were put in place, then it would be sufficient and would eliminate the need for discussions of global justice. However, I argue that to achieve Miller’s minimum we would need to place ourselves in an important institutional relationship that would simultaneously establish important relations of justice. The minimalist position is plausible, but it does not eliminate the need for discussions of global justice. I discuss this position at length in the sixth chapter here.

Miller’s nationalism leaves us unable to address some serious issues of global justice. While he advocates a global moral minimum, we are left unable to achieve that minimum under the model of national responsibility he presents. Rooted cosmopolitanism, if it is to be successful, may incorporate a fairly extensive schema of redistribution, one that seems to run contrary to Miller’s claims. What this discussion helps to demonstrate, then, is that rooted cosmopolitanism needs to address both where we start our deliberations and where they end. Moreover, Miller’s position highlights that the theory is about responsibility (moral cosmopolitanism) and identity (cultural cosmopolitanism), fulfilling both aspects of the discussion will require an analysis of political institutions.

4.7 Conclusion

My goal in this chapter has been to assess the principle of nationality and its potential to limit cosmopolitan goals. In the first part I explored Miller’s principle of national identity to determine how it is a unique source of identity that can generate
obligations that will impact our global obligations. In the second part I assessed his
claims of national responsibility and their impact on our global responsibility. Although
Miller presents a compelling argument for national responsibility, it is ultimately
unsuccessful. First, I argued that collective responsibility cannot be shifted to nations in
the way he supposes. Instead of holding nations collectively responsible, I argue that we
should hold states responsible. Second, I argued that although Miller is correct in
supporting a global minimum, he does not recognize what this implies for international
politics. Ensuring a global minimum is going to be fulfilled requires limitations on state
sovereignty and that affluent states take on a greater share of responsibility. In essence,
although I argue that his argument for national responsibility is unable to stand up to
scrutiny, I agree with Miller on many points. However, I argue that his commitment to a
global minimum implies a much stronger cosmopolitanism than he seems willing to
accept. This suggests that his minimalist position would imply a position that is
sufficiently stronger than weak cosmopolitanism, but resists the equal treatment issue of
strong moral positions. My aim in this chapter has been to show that even if Miller’s
argument is correct it implies a stronger cosmopolitanism than he appears to defend.
Nonetheless, as I will show in later chapters an acceptance of national responsibility does
not necessarily require a repudiation of global distributive justice or global
etalitarianism, as Miller insists that it does.\footnote{For example, Tan works to show that this is the case. As he states: “Claims of national responsibility by
themselves cannot defeat the case for global equality. There is a limiting relationship between global
justice and national responsibility, but the limiting effect is from the demands of global justice against
national responsibilities, not the other way around.” Tan, 458. This is explored in greater detail in the
next chapter.} Thus, Miller’s form of ‘rooted
cosmopolitanism’ could be seen as being too rooted – it emphasizes our local obligations

\footnote{For example, Tan works to show that this is the case. As he states: 
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responsibilities, not the other way around.” Tan, 458. This is explored in greater detail in the next chapter.}
in such a way as to limit our global ones. I argue that this misconstrues the relationship between local and global and wrongfully places limits on the scope of our obligations.
Chapter 5
5 Kok-Chor Tan’s Global Egalitarianism and Rootedness

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I continue the analysis from the preceding chapter. In particular, I address a response to Miller’s anti-cosmopolitan claims by presenting an argument for global egalitarianism. Since the larger theme of the thesis is rooted cosmopolitanism, the goal in this chapter is to assess the compatibility of global egalitarianism with the fulfillment of particular obligations. From a cosmopolitan perspective, the global egalitarian thesis is attractive, but it must be tested to see if it allows us to fulfill our particular obligations. A surface analysis of the theory may lead one to conclude that it is incompatible with our particular projects, or that it must necessarily conflict with nationalism (for example). However, through an analysis of the work of Kok-Chor Tan it will be shown that this may not be the case. The chapter focuses on Tan for two reasons: first, his argument presents an appropriate contrast to Miller’s anti-global justice position discussed in the previous chapter; second, the global luck egalitarian position can reveal more about the content of equality at a global level, and thereby further our discussion on the requirements of global justice. Once we begin to describe the content of justice at a global level we can then test its compatibility with particular obligations.

Here, I begin by describing Tan’s global egalitarian position. I describe how his luck egalitarianism is reconciled with support for particular obligations. Importantly, Tan focuses on the existing background structure of interaction to demonstrate what global justice requires. I then look at two specific arguments for particularity that emerge in Tan’s analysis: the instrumental and institutional arguments. The instrumental argument, also discussed in chapter one, claims that particular obligations are legitimate insofar as
they are conceived as an efficient way to fulfill global obligations, and the institutional argument grounds particular obligations in institutional participation. In the third section I question the appropriateness of global distributive justice as part of global egalitarianism. The chapter ends with a reflection on what Tan’s theory can offer to rooted cosmopolitanism, but, at the same time, how his focus on global obligations cannot be fully reconciled with particularist objections to cosmopolitanism (especially ones that Miller raises).

5.2 Tan’s Global Luck Egalitarianism & Partiality

In this section of the chapter my goal is to explore the work of Tan in relation to global egalitarianism. He argues that an endorsement of egalitarianism is implicit in cosmopolitan claims, but that does not necessarily conflict with our special obligations. Hence, for Tan an egalitarian cosmopolitanism can be a rooted cosmopolitanism. Importantly he sees luck egalitarianism as compatible with partiality on a liberal nationalist and patriot reading of partiality. Thus, I will begin by briefly describing Tan’s luck egalitarian position, how he globalizes it, and then moves to the two forms of partiality that he sees as compatible with (if not required by) cosmopolitan egalitarianism (i.e. liberal nationalism and patriotism). A majority of the analysis is focused on Tan’s *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism*, but incorporates some of his other work. In the section that follows (i.e. 5.3) I critically assess Tan’s thesis and his ability to resolve Scheffler’s tension.

Tan’s global justice is a variant of luck egalitarianism. He argues that global egalitarianism is required by, and best suited to fulfill, the goals of cosmopolitan justice.
Importantly, he considers distributive justice to be a core of global justice, and that “...distributive principles are not to be constrained or limited by state or national boundaries.” Additionally, he conceives of cosmopolitan justice as focused on both the individual and institutions. Thus, the locus of concern is going to be both with ensuring some sort of equality between individuals (fulfilling Pogge’s requirements), as well as an institutional concern for distributional equality.

Luck egalitarianism suggests that individuals should not be burdened or adversely affected by unchosen conditions. Tan argues that there is a direct analogue from a liberal argument for domestic egalitarianism to global egalitarianism:

As we do not say, in the domestic case, that every individual failure is due entirely to poor individual choice, likewise we cannot say that every national failure is due to a nation’s failure to take full responsibility for its self-determination. To do so is to assume falsely, that the global background context is beyond rebuke, and that the results of decisions made within that context are thus fairly and freely made.

Luck egalitarianism appears to have a logical shift from domestic justice to international justice. While the focus of most luck egalitarian arguments is on domestic interaction, Tan persuasively shows that contingencies of luck do not end at the national borders and we should thereby extend our deliberations on luck and justice into the global sphere.

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The question gets raised, then, what does global equality require? In his argument, global equality does not specifically refer to equality in “...actual holdings per capita for each nation...”, but more of equality with respect to the international institutional structure, or what he calls the ‘international order’ or ‘institutional scheme’.\(^{304}\) The focus is more on the rules and background context of interaction. He contends that this context is what determines the distributive outcome.\(^{305}\) Global justice, on this reading, must correct for the structural inequalities and vulnerabilities that exist that put some nations and individuals in a detrimental position based on an exploitative relationship. He is able to effectively demonstrate that this principle of global egalitarianism is one that liberal nationalists should implicitly endorse.

5.2.1 Cosmopolitanism and Liberal Nationalism

Tan is concerned with the potential conflict liberals face – a conflict I have described in chapter two. He argues that if implicit to liberalism is a claim about nationality and a claim about cosmopolitanism then there is a conflict: “The cosmopolitan liberal confronted by this challenge [of liberal nationalism] has two possible options by way of defending cosmopolitanism. One is by denying the doctrine of liberal nationalism...Another option open to cosmopolitans, however, does not deny liberal nationalism, but instead rejects the alleged incompatibility between cosmopolitanism and nationalism.”\(^{306}\) Tan falls on the latter side of this argument and rejects the apparent

\(^{304}\) Ibid., 109.
\(^{305}\) Ibid.
incompatibility. Rejecting the conflict requires that he define both the goals and content of global justice as well as the limits of liberal nationalism. In this sense, then, it would appear as though we may find a resolution to Scheffler’s tension within Tan’s work. The resolution of the tension here will rely on his ability to define the content of global justice as being inherently compatible with liberal nationalism. Alternatively, the task can be seen as setting the goals of global justice as inherent within liberal nationalism.

There are two reasons why liberal nationalism can present a conflict to cosmopolitanism. First, liberal nationalism presents a claim for nationalized institutions (institutions that reflect the shared identity of a people) that cosmopolitans may argue should be superseded by global institutions. Second, the cultural content of liberal nationalism (i.e. the shared values thesis) appears to conflict with the cosmopolitan claim for neutrality in regards to cultural attachments. Briefly stated, our social and political institutions, the domestic institutions that have a profound impact on our day-to-day lives, are representative of a particular nation. Despite my clear scepticism of the value of this claim in the previous chapter, here I will present a stronger defense of the idea. A society’s institutions are representative of their shared identity. To take a Taylorian approach, a society’s institutions are representative of the shared meanings held within that society. Although I explore this idea much further in the second section here, it is worth noting at this point that a particular society’s institutions hold significance in relation to a nation’s cultural identity. Tan’s second claim, that our obligations to

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307 Ibid., 87.
308 Ibid.
conationalists inherently conflict with our cosmopolitan obligations, is one that both nationalists and cosmopolitans can argue is false. As shown in the previous chapters it may be possible for individuals to fulfill their particular obligations while still fulfilling cosmopolitan goals. This does not, however, remove any scepticism from cosmopolitans about the weight and ethical significance of our particular attachments.\textsuperscript{310} Liberal nationalists have claimed that the only weight cosmopolitans can give to particular attachments is an instrumental one. For example, they could claim that cosmopolitans only value our local attachments as the best means to fulfill our cosmopolitan duties: Children the world over need to be cared for, I happen to be the parent of a particular child, therefore my efforts are best aimed at caring for this particular child due to the circumstances that allow me to most efficiently affect their life as opposed to a distant child. In this argument, caring for the child is not done out of a recognition in the value of the relationship \textit{in itself}, but the value and obligation are just instances of a cosmopolitan argument that children around the world require care.\textsuperscript{311} Cosmopolitanism, then, is understood to be in conflict with liberal nationalism on these two grounds. Tan’s goal is to show how the theory can account for these claims from nationalists. In the end, he argues that the tension between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism can be resolved, potentially presenting a resolution to Scheffler’s tension.\textsuperscript{312} Interestingly enough, although not surprisingly, Tan remains sceptical of claims for self-determination and national responsibility that would ignore the vulnerability of weaker nations.\textsuperscript{313}

\textsuperscript{310} Nussbaum provides what I take to be the clearest cosmopolitan argument against the ethical significance of our particular attachments. Her argument is explored more deeply in chapter one.

\textsuperscript{311} This type of reductionist account of obligation is discussed in more detail in earlier chapters.

\textsuperscript{312} Tan, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”: 433.

\textsuperscript{313} Tan, \textit{Justice Without Borders}, 102.
Liberal nationalists contend that self-determination is one of the core values of nationalism. That is to say, nations should be self-determining in so far as possible for several reasons. Kymlicka, for example, contends that self-determination ensures that a nation’s cultural context is secure, thus allowing for the space for individuals to cultivate meaningful life choices. Others, like Miller, for example argue that self-determination helps generate the shared values and sense of belonging required for social justice.

Importantly, the value of self-determination is seen as universal. It is not just valuable for a particular nation to be self-determining, but that all nations be self-determining. This value is applicable to all forms of nationhood, and is seen as one of the cornerstones of a shared nationality. As Tan states: “In as far as liberals do take the values of autonomy, justice, and democracy to be universal ideals, liberal nationalists have to affirm the universality of self-determination. The universality of self-determination stems from the universal values that liberal nationalists see self-determination to promote.” He advances this claim that self-determination is universal from the premise of egalitarian

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316 In addition to valuing the right to self-determination, Avishali Margalit and Joseph Raz provide five key characteristics that groups must have to obtain the right: 1. It is an instrumental argument; 2. The right belongs to a group; 3. The right is over a territory; 4. The right is conditional on being exercised to ‘secure conditions necessary for the prosperity and self-respect of the group’; 5. The group must respect the basic rights of its members and the right is conditional on the minimalization of damage to inhabitants; See: Avishali Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination”, in Global Ethics: Seminal Essays, ed. Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton, 181-206, (St. Paul: Paragon Books, 2008), 200-203; Originally published in The Journal of Philosophy, 87 (9) (1990), 439-461.

317 For more on this see the previous chapter on Miller.

318 Tan, Justice Without Borders, 112.
liberalism which he argues is inherently universalist in nature. Supporting self-determination means that liberal nationalists must support self-determination for all nations, not just their own. Notwithstanding the implications for multicultural and multinational states, national self-determination, according to Tan, is being undermined by the international order in which some nations are made vulnerable to the decisions and policies of others. Weaker nations may be more susceptible into accepting exploitative economic agreements, or may be more greatly impacted by the policy paths of stronger nations. Global egalitarianism, then, must work to correct this. Tan outlines two major preconditions for universal self-determination. First are the political and legal preconditions: “These include institutionalizing decolonization, prohibitions against unwarranted interference, the right to territorial and communal integrity and so on.” In essence, if the goal is to have nations be self-determining, then we must have the legal and political protections in place that create the right sphere for this to occur. Second are the economic preconditions. Tan argues that economic redistribution may be required to ensure self-determination. He states:

Thus, given the different ways economic deprivation can adversely affect a nation’s realization of self-determination (i.e., its ability to express and sustain its culture in a particular political sphere), it is imperative that liberal nationalists take a special interest in meeting people’s basic material needs. That is, to take self-determination seriously entails a genuine commitment to ensure that all nations enjoy the material conditions necessary for the exercise of national self-determination.

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319 Tan, “Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice”: 434
320 It is important to clarify at this point that although I go to great lengths to distinguish between nations and states in terms of ability to make political decisions in the previous chapter, here I am using the terms interchangeably, as that is what Tan does. It does not follow from this that the distinction collapses.
321 Tan, Justice Without Borders, 114.
322 Ibid., 115.
At this point one could conclude that if national self-determination is taken to be the core value which liberal nationalists look to attain, then all that may be required is a re-tooling of international institutions (for example, by strengthening the United Nations we could achieve the politico-legal preconditions necessary), and instituting something akin to a duty of humanitarian assistance to ensure basic material needs are met. If this were the case then Miller’s minimalist cosmopolitanism may be all that is required.\textsuperscript{323} By this argument, once nations are given the proper conditions in which to cultivate self-determination then our global duties have been met. However, Tan is quick to point out that the conditions for self-determination are \textit{necessary conditions} but not \textit{sufficient conditions} for fulfilling cosmopolitan justice.\textsuperscript{324} A structural power imbalance may still remain even after we have corrected for national self-determination. He states: “A nation that is able to meet its basic needs and is entitled to self-determination as a legal and political right, but that is poor compared to others, may still not be able to fully exercise this right in a situation of social and economic inequality. This is because wealth is, to a large extent, a relative factor rather than an absolute one in a shared economic space; the richer some are, the weaker the purchasing power of others, thus resulting in the different vulnerabilities of each with respect to the other.”\textsuperscript{325} Importantly, we must recognize the way in which power differentials impact independence and autonomy. As explained above, poorer nations may be more susceptible to entering into exploitative economic relationships that put them in a position of dependence and set them on a long-term path of poverty.

\textsuperscript{323} See the previous chapter for more on this position.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
Tan’s argument, nonetheless, does not require us to ensure self-determination without any influence from external factors. Rather, his point “...is that some countries are more vulnerable to global market forces than others because of differences in power relations, and hence are unequally situated with respect to other countries as a result.”

In the end, cosmopolitan equality commits us to a background context in which self-determination can be meaningfully exercised by all. Although it may not sound like much, commitment to this requires substantial changes in the international order and would place great limitations on the practices and policies of some of the stronger nations, though this would be done justly.

5.2.2 Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism

The second aspect of egalitarianism that Tan is concerned with is how cosmopolitanism can be reconciled with special concern for conationals. Tan states: “As I am defending it, cosmopolitan justice holds that distributive principles ought to transcend membership or citizenship. Yet, patriotic partiality, which entails that some individuals are entitled to special concern because they happen to be compatriots, appears to contradict this cosmopolitan impartialist ideal.” His goal here, then, is to show how this is not the case.

Tan begins this by explaining the assumptions behind this anti-cosmopolitan argument. He states that there are two main assumptions at play:

1. “...that patriotism as conventionally understood must be accounted for by the cosmopolitan view...”;

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326 Ibid., 119.
327 Ibid., 137.
2. “...that commonsense morality would require that we forgo cosmopolitanism in the event that cosmopolitanism is incompatible with patriotism conventionally understood.”

Quite apparently then, the success of Tan’s argument relies on his ability to show that patriotism is not desirable. Patriotism as it is conventionally understood, for Tan, appears to be an unconstrained patriotism. He states: “So arguing that cosmopolitan morality is a failed doctrine, because it does not succeed in accommodating conventional compatriot partiality in a world characterized by gross inequalities between countries, misses the motivation behind a cosmopolitan defense of moral partiality. While cosmopolitanism must allow space for patriotism, it need not be expected to allow space for the entire range of conventional patriotism.” For Tan, then, it appears as though patriotic partiality is acceptable in so far as it does not conflict with or constrain cosmopolitan justice.

The defense of patriotic partiality is often assumed to be a part of commonsense morality, and defines compatriot obligations as compatible with shared citizenship. However, Tan importantly shows that this thought should be reconsidered: “That which may appear to be a feature of commonsense morality may be on closer examination discovered to be objectionable or at least dispensable without violating our notions of the kinds of values that are integral to any meaningful human life.” Essentially, cosmopolitan justice must place some constraints on the conditions under which patriotic

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328 Ibid., 144.
329 Ibid., 144-145. It is worth comparing Tan’s understanding of patriotism with McIntyre’s. See: Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984).
330 Ibid., 145; my emphasis added.
331 This conclusion appears to be consistent with Pogge’s claims for negative rights in his “Cosmopolitanism: A Defense” explored in chapter one.
332 Tan, Justice Without Borders, 146.
partiality can be legitimately pursued. Tan contends that this does not necessarily reduce
the worth of patriotic concerns. \footnote{Ibid., 150.} Importantly he works to place the role of domestic
partiality within the larger sphere of justice: “Justice ought to constrain and (re)shape
our institutions; not the other way around. To say that we have to begin our theorizing
about justice from currently accepted institutional arrangements and practices as they are
as if these are given or inevitable, and that our conception of justice has to accommodate
this existing reality, is to misconstrue the role and point of justice.” \footnote{Ibid., 156.} Cosmopolitan
impartiality is not claiming that all individuals must be treated impartially and that we
cannot exercise partiality to others despite enjoying a meaningful relationship with them.
Rather, it requires that partiality be constrained by principles of global justice. Patriotic
ties that require us to violate principles of global justice are not desirable, and may run
against our liberal egalitarian ideals. Tan again returns to giving an analogue to the
domestic sphere: “And as people may opt to pursue and realize special ends and
associative ties within the rules of a just institutional setting, so may individuals pursue
particular ends and ties, including the commitment of patriotism, within the forms of a
just global institutional arrangement.” \footnote{Ibid., 157.} Tan appears to show that there can be space for
partiality and special obligations, but that they must not come into conflict with the
principles of global justice. It remains to be seen how effective this argument is to liberal
nationalists who contend that justice is only relevant within a particular society, not
something that occurs globally. Again it is important to show that liberal nationalists do
not argue that vulnerable others should be left to their own devices. Rather, some of these

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\footnote{Ibid., 150.}
\footnote{Ibid., 156.}
\footnote{Ibid., 157.}
theorists commit themselves to extensive cosmopolitan projects, but that these are not projects of cosmopolitan justice. Theorists like Miller, for example, argue that a global minimum is required, and that would reflect a very great positive change to the international order (and may commit him to much more than he argues for), but this still does not require a defense of, nor support for the claim of, global justice. Rather, these can be understood to be principles of global humanitarianism required by morality but not a matter of justice. Tan effectively shows that global justice is a coherent ideal towards which we must strive, and that domestic justice may rely on securing global justice. Nonetheless, he maintains that as part of a theory of global egalitarianism we must have global impartiality, but that this impartiality does not necessarily impact our associative obligations.

To briefly summarize his position, luck egalitarianism implies support for global equality. Cosmopolitan justice can be reconciled with partiality in at least two ways. First, we can reconcile cosmopolitan justice with liberal nationalism by demonstrating how liberal nationalists implicitly endorse universal self-determination; and second, we can see cosmopolitan justice as compatible with patriotic partiality, so long as the requirements of patriotism do not undermine global duties. Thus, we need not see special duties as constraining or limiting cosmopolitan duties. 336

Tan’s argument for global egalitarianism attempts to show that cosmopolitanism need not come into conflict with special concerns, nationalism, or patriotism. Rather, he argues that our various special obligations can be practiced and legitimately fulfilled under the conditions of a just global order. For Tan, a just global order requires

336 Ibid., 166.
egalitarianism. By egalitarianism he is not concerned with equal and impartial treatment between individuals, but rather equality in the international sphere in terms of ability to effectively participate within institutions as well as having a just and egalitarian structure by which nations can be self-determining. In sum, egalitarianism does not require equal treatment of all by all, but rather the existence of a just international order. It will require redistribution and a reexamination of current practices and the structure of the international order.

5.3 Questioning the Ability to Effectively Distribute Across Borders

Tan’s argument for global egalitarianism effectively incorporates an institutional approach to cosmopolitan justice. He is not only concerned with the equal moral worth of all individuals, but aims to show that we must focus on the background institutional context under which people live. The principles of cosmopolitan justice can only be effectively fulfilled once we take aim at international institutions, and potentially establish stronger global governance - either through formal governing institutions or through more informal paths. However, global egalitarianism cannot simply be analogous to domestic distributive egalitarianism. In fact, many may contend that we may have duties to distant others, and that we can even term these cosmopolitan duties, but that they do not require distribution of goods. Thus we must further explore what we mean by global egalitarianism: exactly what is susceptible to distribution under this framework?

A rejection of global egalitarianism can take on several forms, but I will only focus on one version of it here: the shared values thesis. This argument claims that the value and meaning behind goods is context-specific, that it would be incoherent to
distribute goods globally as they do not have shared meanings, and that it could represent an imposition on others. In other words, the value of goods can only be fully understood within a particular social context and that does not extend to the international sphere, it ends at one’s cultural context. In some ways this argument could be seen to trump claims for global distribution. However, I work to show that this may be compatible with Tan’s argument. His distributive scheme does not necessarily require distribution of culturally relevant goods in a way that is insensitive to context specific value and meaning. In fact, his argument for global egalitarianism can help create the conditions whereby different cultural and/or national groups are not as susceptible to the imposition of others. Global egalitarianism, then, may imply the establishment of conditions of opportunity whereby groups can cultivate socially-relevant goods. In this section I draw on the work of Charles Taylor and Amartya Sen.

Value and meaning of particular goods is rooted within our cultural contexts. That is to suggest, the ways in which we learn about goods, come to understand the meaning and significance of them, and apply them in a valuable and meaningful way in our lives is contextually driven. Charles Taylor, in his seminal essay “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” explains the notion of ‘meaning’. He argues that there are three conditions of the concept:

1. “Meaning is for a subject: it is not the meaning of the situation in vacuo, but its meaning for a subject, a specific subject, a group of subjects or perhaps what its meaning is for the human subject as such...”;
2. “Meaning is of something; that is, we can distinguish between a given element - situation, action, or whatever - and its meaning...”;
3. “...things only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the meanings of other things. This means that there is no such thing as a single, unrelated

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337 This claim is similar to one Walzer makes in his Thick and Thin, see especially chapter one.
meaningful event; and it means that changes in the other meanings in the field can involve changes in the given element. *Meanings can’t be identified except in relation to others...”*

To put this in slightly clearer words, and to bring it back to the subject at hand: we, as interpreting beings, can only determine the meaning of particular goods within the context in which we live. By context here we are talking about the socio-cultural environment in which we live: the language we speak, the economic class we are members of, the region we live in, and importantly, our national group. Goods attain different meanings in different contexts. All this to say that many goods, including those that are susceptible to (and perhaps required by) distributive justice, hold context-specific meaning. Moreover, as the emphasized section suggests, the meaning of a particular good can only be fully understood in relation to other goods. This discussion of meanings applies beyond material goods, however. Understanding the meaning and the value of most things that we can experience (both material and immaterial) requires interpretation of its meaning. All of our understandings of meaning are embedded within this conceptual framework.

If we are to presume that goods need to be distributed across borders then we must also recognize the contextually bound meaning that those goods will hold. That is to suggest that goods hold different values across borders. The problem of shared values cannot be ignored in a discussion of global distributive justice. Indeed, this problem leads some (such as Nagel) to conclude that it is incoherent to speak of distribution at a global

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339 This argument is similarly defended by Michael Walzer in his *Spheres of Justice*, my focus here is on Taylor given, what I take to be, his relevance to the overall debate. In the cosmopolitan literature Taylor’s work tends to be underrepresented.
level: “The world as a whole contains cultural and national communities representing such radically diverse values that no conception of a legitimate political order can be constructed under which they could all live…”\textsuperscript{340} It would appear as though the mere existence of cultural and national communities provides an impenetrable roadblock for distributive justice. Nagel concludes that “So long as the world is as divided it now is…the situation will not change.”\textsuperscript{341} Under the current international institutional order, he may be correct.

Similarly, Miller argues\textsuperscript{342} against global equality of opportunity, he claims essentially that we must consider the meaning of the idea in other contexts:

It is essentially the problem of saying what equality of opportunity \textit{means} in a culturally plural world in which different societies will construct goods in different ways and also rank them in different ways. The metric problem arises not just because it is hard to determine how much educational opportunity an average child has in society $A$, but because the meaning of education, and the way in which it relates to, or contrasts with, other goods will vary from place to place. We can only make judgments with any confidence in extreme cases; and in those cases, what seems at first sight to be a concern about inequality may well turn out on closer inspection to be a concern about absolute poverty or deprivation, a concern which suggests quite a different general understanding of global justice.\textsuperscript{343}

Ensuring distributional equality seems to be easy in theory, but once we begin the work of actually distributing goods (here principled in the notion of fair equality of opportunity), we quickly run into the problem of valuation across borders. Goods that are

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{342} Miller’s argument here is also inspired by Michael Walzer. See: Michael Walzer, \textit{Spheres of Justice}, especially chapter one.
\textsuperscript{343} David Miller, “Against Global Egalitarianism”, \textit{The Journal of Ethics}, Vol. 9 (2005): 64.
subject to distribution are social goods, which are dependent “…upon the way they are conceived by the members of [a] particular society.”

In addition to the ‘metric problem’, as Miller aptly puts it, we also have the issue of the pure incoherence of some goods to some societies. It is clear that different groups relate to goods in different ways, but what we also must acknowledge is that the way that some cultural groups interact with, or use, some goods is fundamentally at odds with the way in which other groups relate to that good. Margaret Moore helpfully demonstrates this through the example of natural resources. In one context, natural resources are understood as (i.e. they hold the meaning of) things that are to be extracted and used for our benefit, but other groups hold a much different relation with natural resources. Hence, she concludes that something like a natural resource tax fundamentally imposes a particular way of relating with goods on subjected groups.

Thus, it appears as though Tan’s argument fails to properly consider the role of plural meanings. In fact, Tan himself seems to ignore the salience of cultural membership and its relationship to valuation of goods: “…cosmopolitanism about justice holds that the baseline distribution of material goods and resources among individuals should be decided independently of the national and state boundaries within which individuals happen to be.” However, at least part of his argument can be quickly made to be compatible with the shared values thesis. Tan argues that national self-determination is

345 The use of this example appears to be motivated by Charles Beitz’s claims. See: Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979),139-140.
347 Ibid.
valuable, and it is valuable primarily for this reason: it provides us with the context necessary for making meaningful choices in our lives. His global egalitarianism simply requires that all nations have an equal ability to cultivate the space for shared values and providing a context of choice. This requires that we correct for power imbalances in the international arena. This does not necessarily lead to imposition or distribution of culturally embedded goods. This would merely lead to weaker nations being removed from a position of subjugation. Perhaps the most uncontroversial way (although it will not appeal to theorists such as Tan) would be to institutionalize this in a schema of negative rights. Pogge’s support for negative rights, however, does not fully encapsulate what global justice requires, as I explained in chapter one.

Endorsing this ideal would substantially help the living situation of many of those in abject poverty. However, it also grants significant space to groups to provide justifications for actions that violate fundamental principles of cosmopolitan justice defended in the name of ‘cultural practices’. This type of argument has been presented many times, and yet it remains to persuade cosmopolitans. Lee Kwan Yew, for example, famously promotes the idea of “Western” and “Asian” values to show that the idea of human rights is incoherent in some Asian countries, and fundamentally dichotomous to their conceptions of duty and obligation. As Amartya Sen states: “What can we take to be the values of so vast a region, with such diversity? There is no quintessential values that apply to this immensely large and heterogeneous population, that differentiate Asians as a group from people in the rest of the world.”

purported ‘Western’ or ‘European’ values and ideas actually developed in the East as well.\textsuperscript{350} In other words, as much as we are different, and as much as we hold different meanings for and values of particular goods, there are many shared meanings that transcend context. Sen’s contribution with the capabilities approach can help shift our focus away from the potential problems of the hermeneutic circle inherent to the shared values thesis.\textsuperscript{351}

By focusing on capabilities, as opposed to strict distribution of holdings per se, we have the ability to see to what degree individuals and groups have can pursue goals that they determine as valuable. Sen states:

For example, seeing opportunity in terms of capability allows us to distinguish appropriately between (i) whether a person is actually able to do things she would value doing, and (ii) whether she possesses the means or instruments or permissions to pursue what she would like to do (her actual ability to do that pursuing may depend on many contingent circumstances). By shifting attention, in particular, towards the former, the capability-based approach resists an overconcentration on means (such as incomes and primary goods) that Human Rights and Capabilities can be found in some theories of justice (e.g. in the Rawlsian Difference Principle).\textsuperscript{352}

In addition to providing a culturally sensitive metric for judging equality, focusing on capabilities can also ensure that groups are given the appropriate autonomy, while still securing fundamental human rights.

At this point it should be clear that there is a complex relationship between global and particular duties. Inasmuch as national groups ought to be given independence for

\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 14-16.


developing and cultivating cultural goods, there is a serious worry that individual rights can be sacrificed in the name of cultural good. For this reason, some have concluded that multiculturalism, as a domestic practice, ought to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{353} On the other hand, however, we have legitimate reasons to value our special relationships that generate particular obligations. This may give weight to the enduring nature of Scheffler’s tension. The strength of this conflict could lead one to reject global distribution or reject special duties outright.

However, the shared values thesis need not require us to conclude that distribution across borders is impossible (or will necessitate imperialism). Rather, the thesis may provide a better way forward. If we are to take seriously Tan’s focus on the background context of institutions, which I think we should, then we can see the focus on institutions as leading to the conditions of meaningful distribution. Again, we have shifted away from the distribution of material goods to the distribution of capabilities. This will, at some level, imply the distribution of actual goods. Principles of global justice focused on egalitarian distribution will be aimed at overseeing the appropriate distribution of material goods as they relate to the capabilities of particular individuals and groups. Thus, when two groups contest ownership over a set of resources, for example, we can appeal to the just distribution of capabilities. This requires complex analysis over the meaning and value of the resources for the groups. If global distributive justice is to be achieved, it will rely on the existence of the sort of institutional backdrop that Tan describes. The creation of these institutions, and agreement upon principles of justice rely on

intercultural dialogue. By focusing on dialogue we may be able to arrive at a fusion of ideals whereby we can move closer to objective criteria for global justice.

This dialogue, I believe, is what is firmly embedded in the spirit of Appiah’s work in his *Ethics of Identity*, explored in chapter three. This spirit, I argue, is necessary to a successful rooted cosmopolitanism - we ought to engage in dialogue with others in a self-reflective way that attempts to understand them on their terms. In this way, we can establish more effective political policies as well as fulfill the goals of cultural cosmopolitanism. Although it seems like a roundabout way of approaching cosmopolitanism, I contend that the hermeneutic project is inseparable from rooted cosmopolitanism. It provides the conditions for us to have dialogue that while respecting the other for who they are and understanding the histories and contexts in which dialogue occurs, still allows us to arrive at objective criteria for the distribution of goods.

Tan’s global egalitarianism, while approaching from the right spirit, fails to consider the role of cross-cultural dialogue in establishing cosmopolitan goals. However, we only need to extend his argument for national self-determination to see that ensuring self-determination equally for all would require dialogue of this sort. The goal for Tan is to protect self-determination for all so that every group has the ability to cultivate national projects without gross imposition or unfair advantage to one particular group. Theoretically speaking, if this were established then dialogue between groups would have to occur in this way. Thus, by modifying the institutional approach to focus more on establishing conditions of equal capabilities. Luck egalitarianism and the capability approach are not necessarily incompatible, and Tan’s focus on the background structure of interaction may be a useful point of convergence between the two ideas. This means
Tan’s argument may provide an adequate response to Scheffler’s tension. On this reading, particular and global obligations are made consistent with each other under a just institutional framework.

5.4 Tan’s Non-Instrumental Approach to Particular Obligations

In this final section of the chapter I explore a greater flaw in Tan’s work. I argue that he is unable to provide a non-reductionist argument for the worth of particular obligations. His justification of partiality depends on a prioritization of global obligations in such a way that liberal nationalists and other partialists would reject. His emphasis of the background context of interaction is very helpful and has a significant impact on the direction of rooted cosmopolitan arguments. Additionally, he is correct that focusing on establishing a just international order should take priority in the most extreme cases, but Tan is unable to respond to cases where comparison is much closer.

An instrumental approach to particular obligations does not constrain our global obligations but further reinforces them. Instrumentalists, like Goodin, contend that special obligations are “...assigned merely as an administrative device for discharging our general duties more efficiently.”354 Particular obligations then, the ones we hold to our fellow citizens, as well as family and friends, are just the most efficient way to discharge our general duties. Nussbaum makes a similar claim based on efficiency.355 Both of these instrumental approaches maintain the primacy of global obligations: our global obligations are presumed to be legitimate and particular obligations are legitimate in so

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354 Goodin, 685.
355 Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”.
far as they are derived from our global ones. Goodin explicitly states that particular obligations ought to be derived from our general (i.e. global) ones. However, the goal for rooted cosmopolitanism is to reconcile the tension that Scheffler outlines; that is, to present a justification for particular and global obligations without reducing one type of obligation to the other.

In establishing that there is a tension between particular and global obligations, Scheffler is presuming independent derivations of both sets. That is to say, approaching the tension, if we are to assume it is a genuine tension (which is questionable to some), requires us to derive both particular and universal obligations in a non-reductionist manner. Lenard and Moore effectively describe the tension and the goal of rooted cosmopolitanism in other words: “...cosmopolitanism and special duties are not in fact antithetical but deeply connected; that any plausible theory must articulate both the importance of our connections to others as well as our fundamental moral equality; and the most interesting questions surround precisely how to strike a balance between the two.” Although I discussed problems with the instrumentalist argument in chapters one and two, it is worth saying here that by describing particular obligations as ‘efficiently’ fulfilling global duties we fail to capture an important aspect of our moral consciousness.

356 He states: “Certainly it is true that, on this account, special duties derive the whole of their moral force from the moral force of those general duties. It may not quite be the case that, existentially, they are wholly derivative from general duties: we cannot always deduce from considerations of general duties alone who in particular should take it upon themselves to discharge them; where the general principle leaves that question open, some further (independent, often largely arbitrary) “responsibility principle” is required to specify it. Still, on this account, special duties are largely if not wholly derivative from considerations of general duty.”; Goodin, 679.
That is, when we fulfill obligations to those with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship, we tend to do so because we value that person, not because we see it as an effective way of ensuring global equality. To reiterate an example referred to earlier, I do things for my wife not because wives deserve a type of treatment, or that treating wives in a certain way in general is good for humanity and this one happens to be my wife. Rather, I treat her in a particular way because I value her and the relationship that I have with her. Quite apparently then, the instrumental approach fails to properly reconcile the tension.

In Tan’s approach he also misunderstands the claims of liberal nationalists in determining the worth of particular obligations. As a luck egalitarian, Tan’s goal is to rule out any morally arbitrary factor in having a salient impact on one’s life. He states:

...if we begin from an egalitarian conception of liberalism and want to marry that understanding of liberalism to nationalism, then the nationalism we get has to be an egalitarian nationalism. And as egalitarian liberalism begins from the basic idea that there are no principled differences between individuals on the basis of contingencies, or what Rawls has called factors that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (Rawls 1971, p. 15), so too must egalitarian liberal nationalism discount morally arbitrary facts about persons when it comes to determining their just global entitlements. And one arbitrary factor here would be people’s national membership.359

For liberal nationalists, however, national membership is not morally arbitrary in an important way. Indeed, principles of global justice ought to be reflective of our national attachments in some way. In the very least, considerations of just distribution should reflect the nationally and culturally bound meaning of particular goods.

Liberal nationalists, such as Kymlicka for example, argue that our national membership is morally salient in an important way. Kymlicka argues that our national attachments are what give us the ‘context for choice’. That is, by being able to participate

within a range of cultural institutions we are given the ability to develop and exercise our autonomy.\textsuperscript{360} As Lenard and Moore state: “...the point that liberal nationalists have made is that national groups are \textit{neither} morally arbitrary nor morally irrelevant: they provide a framework in which autonomy is exercised; they protect people’s cultural options, both by protecting the options themselves and by giving meaning to those options...”\textsuperscript{361} In this way, then, we can see that our national attachments hold some moral salience. This does not necessarily mean that they outweigh, should be considered prior to, or even negate our global obligations. Rather, this means that cosmopolitans need to consider the role they play in our lives.

Tan’s position requires further clarification at this point to demonstrate the way in which he effectively reduces the worth of particular obligations. As shown in the first section here, he believes that particular obligations (such as those to conationals) are legitimate in so far as they are constrained by principles of global justice. This does not necessarily reduce the worth of particular ties on its own.\textsuperscript{362} Again, he argues that particular obligations are legitimate so long as they do not violate general principles of justice. Hence, particular obligations are conditional on their being consistent with principles of global justice; this is a different claim than saying that particular obligations are derivative of global obligations (i.e. the instrumental strategy).\textsuperscript{363} Tan states: “We do not seek to explain a person’s conception of the good in terms of some general and abstract universal principle, but we nonetheless hold that the pursuit of that conception of the good is to be limited against certain standards of justice that are external to and

\textsuperscript{360} Kymlicka, \textit{Liberalism, Community, and Culture}, 165-166.
\textsuperscript{361} Lenard and Moore,
\textsuperscript{362} Tan, \textit{Justice Without Borders}, 150.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.
independent of that conception of the good.\textsuperscript{364} This in itself appears to be a legitimate principle of global justice that reconciles particular and global obligations: particular obligations are legitimate so long as they do not violate our global obligations. However, this still misunderstands the central point. On one level, Miller could respond here that the constraining thesis (particular obligations are constrained by global principles) is fine, but our global obligations are non-comparative. This reading of global obligations contends that they do not include distributive equality, but are solely concerned with protecting basic rights. But, there is a greater issue here still.

The problem appears to be one of priorities. That is, for Tan, global justice and global obligations appear to attain ethical priority over particular obligations. Again, particular obligations are legitimate conditional on their being constrained by principles of global justice. Liberal nationalists will find this to be unsatisfactory, as it does not recognize the moral salience of national ties. Moreover, the way that people experience their particular obligations does not reflect the priority that Tan presents. This would suggest, then, that there is still a tension between the global and that particular that cannot be resolved by adopting Tan’s global luck egalitarianism. Tan’s position commits him to hold that cosmopolitan obligations are more fundamental than our particular ones. Yet, this is not how they are expressed, nor experienced in every day life. Most people tend to feel that their particular obligations hold great moral weight independent of their global obligations.

Despite the fact that Tan’s luck egalitarianism misses a fundamental point about liberal nationalism, his argument still holds great merit. Particularly, the need for a just

\footnote{\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.}
background institutional structure is quite an attractive claim. Additionally, rejecting his claims of the priority of cosmopolitanism does not commit one to reject cosmopolitan justice. Rather, in attempting to develop a rooted cosmopolitanism one must strike greater balance between our global and particular obligations. That is to suggest that claiming that our particular obligations are constrained by our global ones is entirely legitimate; however, at the same time, we can suggest that in some cases our particular obligations constrain our global obligations. The establishment of a just institutional order can help avoid the problem of prioritization.

Cosmopolitans tend to have the strongest case for fulfilling global obligations in the absolute and extreme cases - those of abject poverty in the face of excessive wealth. Clearly in the most absolute cases, which may not be the fringe case by any means, fulfilling our global obligations should take priority. This is especially true when we consider the marginal expenses and burdens that the wealthiest would incur. However, how do we prioritize between the cases that are much closer together? As Miller states: “Global egalitarians faced with this challenge will probably respond that the most urgent cases are cases of gross inequality where no reasonable person could doubt that the resources and opportunities available to members of A are superior to those available to members of B. We are not primarily concerned about Iceland/Portugal comparisons...” And yet, there is something to be said that in these cases where opportunities, capabilities, or whatever metrics of comparison we adopt are much closer, then priority between global and local can reasonably shift. Global luck egalitarianism helpfully


366 Miller: 63.
illustrates that we should be focusing on the background context of interaction at the
global level, and that partiality is reasonable within that just international setting.
However, Tan’s argument fails to adequately address the concerns that liberal nationalists
and other partialists have about cosmopolitan egalitarianism.

5.5 Tan’s Rootedness and Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored global egalitarianism and tried to frame it as a
response to the nationalist position presented in chapter four. In the fourth chapter I
argued that Miller’s nationalist position focuses far too much on the rooted aspect of our
obligations, and forgoes support for any substantively cosmopolitan arguments. While
Miller argues for a minimalist cosmopolitanism, I contend that it is an insufficient
framework for fulfilling global obligations. In this chapter, I argue that Tan focuses too
much on the global and ignores crucial aspects of our roots. Tan’s cosmopolitanism is
very much political – he argues for the establishment of global institutions that can
govern (and be governed by) principles of justice. His political argument is grounded in
support for moral cosmopolitanism. He helpfully illustrates the need for focusing on
institutions at the global level. However, he is unable to account for our roots in an
important way.

If rooted cosmopolitanism is going to account for political institutions then we
must do a better job of balancing our priorities. As I argue, Tan prioritizes our global
obligations in a way that obfuscates the importance and strength of our local ones.
Moreover, his argument for distributive equality ignores the fundamental role that social
context plays in establishing the meaning and value of distributive goods. While I think
the goal of global egalitarianism is admirable, it may not be feasible, nor compatible with rooted cosmopolitanism. Tan’s emphasis on the role of institutions is helpful nonetheless. By shifting our analysis we may be better able to understand and account for the role of power at the international level. The role that international actors play on individual’s lives is complex and cannot be accounted for by focusing exclusively on the international level. It is a very complex relationship and one that will require ongoing interpretation. Yet, we can begin to build a theory of rooted political cosmopolitanism that reflects the impact of institutions at various levels.

Tan’s argument offers much to the rooted cosmopolitanism debate. Specifically his focus on the institutional background and the structure under which individuals and nations interact can help to achieve global equality, and this type of argument may not necessarily eschew particular obligations. There is no doubt that global justice takes priority in Tan’s work, but he still leaves room for particular obligations. While I argue that his position on global justice offers much insight into the theory, it needs to significantly change if it is to address the tension. Nonetheless there are two major shortcomings with Tan’s argument.

First, I addressed the problem of context and social goods. It was shown that the meaning and value of particular goods is embedded in certain contexts. Given this premise, attempting to ensure material equality across borders may not be feasible. Rather, we should aim our focus at engaging in cross-cultural dialogue to determine the areas where groups converge and where they differ, as well as shift our focus to the distribution of capabilities. This does not require abandoning principles of global justice, but rather can lead to a strengthened notion of global justice that is more reflective of
cultural difference. While I found that Tan’s argument does not give much thought to the problem of valuation of social goods, he does not appear to advocate global distribution in an overly problematic way. Tan’s egalitarianism can be seen as sensitive to context if we understand it to be concerned with the ability to participate in the global economy. Global egalitarianism may be a useful strategy in approaching cosmopolitanism, if we are also concerned with equality of capabilities.

Second, and more fundamental, Tan’s thesis prioritizes global justice and global obligations in a way that will ultimately be unsatisfactory to liberal nationalists. By arguing that national membership is a morally arbitrary category, Tan misses one of the central claims of liberal nationalism. That is, liberal nationalists argue that national membership ought to hold moral salience, as it provides individuals with the means for exercising meaningful autonomy. Tan’s constraining thesis is not necessarily incorrect; our local obligations ought to be constrained by our global obligations in many cases. Of note are the most extreme cases: the ones where incurring a slight inconvenience on the wealthiest would have a great impact on the world’s poorest. In cases such as these global obligations ought to take priority, this is not controversial. Further, there are many reasons to support the notion that some principles of global justice ought to always constrain particular obligations, such as a list of basic human rights. However, this does not mean that we should conclude that global obligations ought to always take priority. Tan’s version of global egalitarianism relies on prioritizing global obligations in such a way as to reduce the overall value of particular obligations.

Discussions of global egalitarianism may, nonetheless, lead towards a tenable form of rooted cosmopolitanism. Though I reject the notion of global distributive justice
as the distribution of material goods, if we understand distribution in terms of capabilities it may be able to provide the foundations for rooted cosmopolitanism. The theory needs to be able to account for our particular obligations without forgoing our global ones.

Framing a just international institutional arena on the distribution of capabilities and intercultural dialogue may provide the conditions for rooted cosmopolitanism to thrive.

The existence of a just institutional order framed on these principles may also lead to the resolution of Scheffler’s tension. Thus, by taking some of the ideas Tan presents and significantly augmenting them, we may be able to develop rooted cosmopolitanism from global egalitarianism. It remains to be determined, however, if we are able to provide a non-instrumental defense of particular obligations that does not undermine cosmopolitanism. In the final chapter I begin to explore what is required for this to occur.
Chapter 6

6 Constructing an Alternative Approach: Complex Open-Ended Rooted Cosmopolitanism

6.1 Introduction

In this final chapter I look at the possibilities for rooted cosmopolitanism. In what has preceded I explored three different approaches to the theory, in each of these approaches I found that there was something lacking. In each, my central concern was an attempt to reconcile our global obligations and our particular ones. In other words, my aim was to test how well each theory responds to Scheffler’s tension as described in chapter two. I found that none of these theories sufficiently reconciles our two sets of obligations or responds to the tension. All is not lost, however, as rooted cosmopolitanism may still be a viable theory if we recast our approach. In what follows, I explore the potential for a new theory of rooted cosmopolitanism that can adequately respond to Scheffler’s tension. First I explore the prospects for a theory of global justice in light of the strength of Scheffler’s tension. In the second section I look at the role of coercion and global justice through an assessment of Thomas Nagel and Laura Valentini. I conclude the project with a brief exposition of an alternative framework – complex, open-ended, rooted cosmopolitanism.

6.3 Assessing the Prospects for a Rooted Cosmopolitanism

Given the problems presented by Scheffler’s tension, in this section I explore the prospects for rooted cosmopolitanism. Scheffler’s tension presents a very serious problem for those that wish to commit themselves to the cosmopolitan ideal without shirking their
very real particular obligations. Again, as detailed above, our particular obligations play an important part in our moral lives - we crave social relationships and value them. At the same time, however, many would contend that global inequality exists at such a level as to be considered fundamentally unjust, or that all people - regardless of citizenship - are of equal moral worth. As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this project, the claim of ‘equal moral worth’ can take on many meanings - it can mean that all people are due some moral consideration, or it can mean that all people are due equal treatment. I argue that global justice plays a central role in a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism, but that occupies the central theme of the next section. In this section I begin to develop a coherent theory of rooted cosmopolitanism. To do this I begin with the question of moral agency. In doing so, I begin to unravel the question of what it means to be ‘morally equal’ beyond state or national borders. Although I remain sceptical of global egalitarianism, such as that purported by Tan, I argue for some form of global equality. Rooted cosmopolitanism, I argue must not be conceived of as ‘starting from’ the ground or as ‘starting from’ above (i.e. starting from the local and moving global or starting from the global and moving local). Rather, as I conceive of it, rooted cosmopolitanism employs a variety of strategies that demonstrate that we have multiple moral ‘starting points’. However, before sketching out the theory in detail, I begin by looking at our moral agency and our moral obligations.

In previous chapters I have addressed the question of moral agency through the lens of others. Here I go into more detail on this question in order to begin to develop an understanding of the source, and strength, of our moral obligations. As I attempt to show it is not really a question of communitarian moral thinking or cosmopolitan moral
thinking, nor it is a question of moral subjectivity or objectivity. Rather, what is more likely is that our moral thinking occupies both spaces (and hence the force of Scheffler’s tension). Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, can be understood as questioning both our moral starting point and our moral end point.\textsuperscript{367}

Moral agency begins from a particularist standpoint. By this I mean to say that we get our basic moral learning, the ability to understand and interpret concepts, the ability to form meaningful relationships with those around us, from our community. Following a similar argument to Taylor, our social framework provides us with the conceptual framework for understanding and interpreting the world around us. Indeed, many of our conceptions of morality and moral claims are inherently socially constructed concepts. This is not to suggest that morality is a culturally relative idea. Rather, here I am merely claiming that moral learning begins in our social context, this does not signal the end point. I think it is important that we recognize the social contingency of moral concepts, not because it could lead to weakened claims for global justice, but because it can actually help strengthen our conceptions of global justice and our ability (as well as motivation) to fulfill its principles. When I claim that morality is socially constructed I simply mean that what we recognize as morally true are those social norms that have been inculcated in us over time. In other words, much of our moral learning is cultural learning.

We understand ourselves, our identities, and our moralities, not through isolated thinking, nor through atomized decision making, but rather through engagement with our

community around us. As Taylor argues, identity formation is a dialogical process - understanding who we are as moral agents requires engagement with the community that helped form us.\textsuperscript{368} This is not to suggest that we are simply synonymous with our ends, or that all we need to do to know who we are is figure out what roles we play in our context, and properly play it. Rather, there is room for agency and choice within a weaker communitarian model. Although much of our individual identity is determined by unchosen context, we still have the ability to choose many factors about our identity, we have the ability to reject a role and adopt another. I argue that this works much in the same way that Kymlicka claims that we have the ability to make meaningful choices in life only when we have access to a cultural framework.\textsuperscript{369} Our social context (or cultural framework) provides us with the ability to interpret, understand, and rationalize the world around us. Only within particular contexts can we make sense of concepts and ideas and only with reference to other concepts and ideas within that same context. We operate within a field of meaning where language and action are interpreted in a particular way. This field is something that we all have - we are born into one, we move between fields throughout our lives, etc.\textsuperscript{370} Throughout our lives we incorporate new meanings, new moral ideas, and new fields into our identities. Our field of meaning can be geographically located, culturally located, and/or socio-economically located.\textsuperscript{371} Importantly, however, our field of meanings and social context changes over time.

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\textsuperscript{370} Here we can make sense of Appiah’s criticism of Kymlicka when he claims that it is odd to want to protect cultural contexts as we ‘can’t but have one’.

Moreover, it would be incorrect to presume that our field must be located within a particular geographic range. What is more likely the case is that our behaviours and beliefs (and moral concepts) are shaped by the institutions that govern our lives.

The notion of the morally constitutive community as drawn from Toni Erskine, I think, is very helpful in illustrating this point. She contends that we are morally constituted by relevant communities - both those that we have chosen to be apart of, and those unchosen ones into which we are born. However, I argue (along with Erskine) that the state need not operate as the sole - or even primary - morally relevant community. This is not to suggest that the state does not play an important role in the development of our moral agency. Rather, the state does play an important defining role, especially under the current arrangement of political association whereby the state is established as the most important political community of which we are members. This does not mean, however, that there are no other communities that we identify with that are morally salient, nor does this necessarily require that our identification with the state as a morally salient community be considered our primary source of loyalty or as the most important moral community in our lives. The notion of a dislocated morally constitutive community can help show to us that we can identify with and hold salient moral relations with non-geographically bound communities. These communities are identity groups that we belong to that are not defined by geography but by another feature. For example, people who are fans of a particular sports team would express solidarity with one another despite the fact that they may be from different places. Erskine claims that these dislocated

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372 For more on this idea of unchosen and chosen community see Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
communities can help extend our sphere of ‘equal moral standing’.\textsuperscript{373} This does not, I contend, remove us from a particularist moral starting point. Rather, it works to show that in contemporary political life the particularist starting point need not be located geographically.

Our identity, and the morally salient communities that help inform it, is composed of many different sources. Who we are as individuals is a question that can only be answered within context. How I present myself to others, and how others receive me, will depend upon the morally relevant communities I identify with. Certainly the state and the nation that I am born into will play a significant role in forming my identity and the special relationships that go along with it. However, I also identify with morally relevant communities beyond the state level. I identify with a variety of communities, some geographically bound, some dislocated (to borrow Erskine’s language), that all play a significant role in the formation of my identity and my ‘sphere of moral concern’.

Additionally, there is no reason to suppose that the state or nation ought to be considered the primary source of identity or morally relevant community. I think this is especially true in light of contemporary international politics whereby communication and interaction is increasingly cosmopolitan. Our moral claims are derived from our constitutive communities in an important way, but as Erskine has shown, these communities need not be geographically located.\textsuperscript{374} Sen, further, claims that understanding identity as fluid and not entirely constituted by geographically bound identity groups is vital. He contends that our understanding of belonging has a significant

\textsuperscript{373} Toni Erskine, \textit{Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 175.  
\textsuperscript{374} Amartya Sen discusses a similar concept to Erskine’s dislocated communities in his \textit{Identity and Violence}.
impact on obligation: “Indeed, the normative demands of being guided by ‘humanity’ or ‘humaneness’ can build on our membership of the wide category of human beings, irrespective of our particular nationalities, or sects, or tribal affiliations (traditional or modern).”\textsuperscript{375} Who we are, the groups we identify with, and the solidarity we express with others can be, and often is, done at a global level. We need not relegate human identity – and the obligations generated from identification with a group – to nationality or citizenship, as Sen points out individuals may not only share a nationality but “…can share other identities, such as a language, a literature, a profession, a location and many other bases of categorization.”\textsuperscript{376} Though he is referring to the multiple ways in which identities overlap within a nation or state, this is an equally valid description of cross-national identification.

If we take associative obligation to be the most defensible form of special responsibility, as I do in this project, then we must look to the communities with which we identify as members to see what our sets of obligations are. In this way, I believe, Erskine develops her embedded cosmopolitanism. The central task of her project is to build a substantively cosmopolitan position that incorporates the insights of moral experience from thinkers such as Walzer.\textsuperscript{377} Erskine is concerned with determining the ways in which a communitarian (“embedded”) starting point can allow us to develop an inclusive universalist position.\textsuperscript{378} For her, cosmopolitanism developed out of particularist moral starting points is possible only by looking to our dislocated communities, those that

\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., 353.
\textsuperscript{377} Of particular importance here is his \textit{Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad}.
\textsuperscript{378} Erskine, 40n.
are not tied to geography. We have special responsibilities to these people, then, through our association and identification as members with them.\textsuperscript{379} I think this is a very useful way to conceive of our identities and ourselves as moral agents - that it is complex and not necessarily tied to geographical place. We, as moral agents, are not bound to the borders of our state, even if they do give us important special responsibilities by way of association. Problematically, however, Erskine’s embedded cosmopolitanism does not provide us with a systematic response to addressing concerns of global justice - concerns that I take to be central to rooted cosmopolitanism.

What I take to be the largest failure of previous attempts at establishing a theory of rooted cosmopolitanism is the presumption of sovereign state-hood, or the state-based system as the primary unit of political association. I argue below that we may need to augment our notion of sovereignty and political association to better fit contemporary politics, and in doing so we can better establish global obligations as rooted in our morally constitutive communities. Rooted cosmopolitanism is only viable, I contend, insofar as it is considered as a claim about justice and political institutions. Tan helpfully demonstrates that global egalitarianism need not require that every state have the exact same set of resources. Global egalitarianism is a relevant idea so long as it requires a balancing of power at a global level. This requires that international institutions, such as the United Nations for example, be reformed (or created where necessary) to act as an equalizing measure to ensure that no one community is dominated and exploited under unfair terms of interaction, such as those that currently exist. This will further require the subjugation of entities that operate outside the governance of states that subject states and

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid, 176.
groups of people to unfair arrangements that only place them in a situation of further
dependence and bondage. Global egalitarianism should only be considered as a way to
conceive of the power relations between relevant political communities, and not
necessarily about the distribution of particular holdings. Under the current arrangement of
the international sphere, most of the power is located within a small set of states and
corporate entities, by strengthening global institutions we have the ability to mitigate the
power imbalances that exist and equalize the international sphere. Additionally, through
strengthening international institutions we may be better able to realize global justice.
Before further exploring rooted cosmopolitanism, I feel it prudent to briefly return to the
question of the site, scope, and focus of justice.

6.4 Global Justice Re-Considered

In this section of the chapter I briefly explore whether justice is global in scope.
As I argue above, our moral reasoning and obligations are particularist in origin. This
does not, however, entail anything about their scope. Certainly justice exists in the
domestic sphere - we are embedded in relations of justice at the national level. Despite
the fact that this is a fairly controversial statement to make in and of itself, I will take the
existence of national justice for granted. That is to say, obligations to compatriots can be
obligations of justice. This section proceeds as follows: first, I explore what about our
domestic situation establishes relations of justice; second, I argue against claims that
obligations beyond the state are simply duties of humanitarian assistance; third, I explain
how relations of justice exist at the global level.
Strong moral cosmopolitanism - the kind that claims that all humans are equal and owed equal treatment - comes under attack by liberal nationalists who argue that cosmopolitanism fails to account for the special responsibilities owed to co-nationals. This claim, I argue, proves to be the central tension of rooted cosmopolitanism - whether or not cosmopolitans can account for special duties. In accounting for these special duties, however, first it is worthwhile to assess if they are duties of justice or merely humanitarian assistance. The aforementioned liberal nationalists, of whom David Miller is one, claim that duties of justice exist at the national level and beyond that we may have duties of humanitarian assistance. In doing so Miller attempts to show that cosmopolitan duties do exist, in fact he gives a very defensible argument for global duties, but they fall short of duties of global justice. Although this may seem like splitting hairs, this distinction is important. A duty of humanitarian assistance, as discussed previously, is one that ought to be discharged and once fulfilled ceases to exist - they arise only under particular circumstances (e.g. natural disaster requiring relief) and once the circumstances return to ‘normal’ they cease to exist. A duty of justice, on the other hand, does not cease to exist once it has been fulfilled in a given circumstance; it governs relations between members of a group. Following a natural disaster, for example, a state may offer humanitarian assistance in the form of relief, once the situation returns to normal that duty ceases to exist or be relevant. A duty of justice, however, could be seen to govern ongoing relations between states, for example. This distinction is made much clearer in the discussion between Miller and Pogge where Pogge argues that above duties of

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humanitarian assistance, there are duties of justice that come in the form of negative duties (e.g. the duty to not subject a state or group of people to poor economic arrangements). My goal here is to first explore what establishes the duties of justice in the domestic sphere and to address why some have argued that this does not exist in the international sphere. In doing this I will focus my attention primarily on the argument from coercion. This is done primarily for two reasons. First, the version of the coercion argument as presented by Thomas Nagel\textsuperscript{382} is the one that I see as a defensible argument for special responsibilities to co-nationals. This is not to say that the coercion view is without fault. As Richard Vernon has pointed out, the coercion argument establishes “…too sharp a line between state and interstate organizations.”\textsuperscript{383} Vernon opts for a unique strategy that focuses on shared exposure to risk, which can avoid some of the problems of the coercion argument.\textsuperscript{384} Nonetheless, I contend that the argument from coercion can be utilized to lay the groundwork for cosmopolitanism. Secondly, I have already addressed other forms of the special responsibilities argument; most notably I have addressed Miller’s concerns of special responsibilities, national responsibility, and global justice in a previous chapter.

6.5 The Argument From Coercion


\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 62-63.
The argument from coercion is a useful way of conceiving of domestic justice and, as Nagel puts it, the ‘problem’ of global justice. Following Nagel, domestic justice is a well-defined area of political theory – there is a large literature dedicated to the idea and several well-accepted theories that attempt to explain it. According to Nagel, the nation-state is the “...primary locus of political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice...” I take this claim to be of central importance. So what is it particularly about the domestic sphere and the nation-state that Nagel takes to be of primary importance? His argument builds on Hobbes’s claim that justice can only be achieved within a sovereign state. He further contends that domestic (liberal) justice can attain equality only under the social structures that exist in the nation-state. Nagel’s argument, then, relies on both Hobbes’s and Rawls’s central claims; first that justice can only exist under a sovereign, and that equality - as a goal of justice - is only attainable under the social structure that exists in the nation-state. This has serious implications for the plight of global justice; if Nagel’s argument succeeds, then there can be no global justice. To put it in Nagel’s words: “If Hobbes is right, the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera. If Rawls is right, perhaps there can be something that might be called justice or injustice in the relations between states, but it bears only a distant relation to the evaluation of societies themselves as just or unjust...” It is clear that Nagel supports the Hobbesian claim that justice and sovereignty are inextricably linked.

386 Nagel, 393.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid., 394.
He supports this claim primarily as he sees justice as dependent on “...the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force.”\textsuperscript{390} Alternatively, put in Hobbes’s words: “And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.”\textsuperscript{391} Relations of justice, then, are established only under a sovereign who can enforce them. While he uses the Hobbesian notion of justice requiring a sovereign, he does not rely on the notion that justice is collective self-interest. Rather, Nagel contends that justice can be considered as a wider ideal aimed at the elimination of arbitrary inequality. Even with this definition of justice (which I take to be the Rawlsian understanding of justice as a political project), we still require a sovereign to effectively coordinate actions and motivations.

Nagel contends that the coercive institutions of the state create the conditions for relations of justice between individuals that do not exist at the international level. This does not mean that he argues that cosmopolitan justice (i.e. global justice) is not a possibility, just that it does not exist under the current framework. Indeed he claims that cosmopolitan justice is a possibility under a global federal system that mimics the institutional structure of individual states.\textsuperscript{392} For Nagel this is only a possibility, and not necessarily the most desirable outcome. Under the current institutional arrangement (i.e. nation-state sovereignty), we have duties of justice intrastate and duties of humanitarian assistance interstate. Again, for Nagel, justice “...is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation. It is, in the

\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} Thomas Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, chapter 17.
\textsuperscript{392} Nagel, 397.
standard terminology, an associative obligation.\textsuperscript{393} Following this claim, then, justice considered as an associative obligation presents an issue to cosmopolitans. Here, Nagel is simply presenting Scheffler’s tension in other language: we have special responsibilities - of which our associative obligations are one kind - that we do not owe to humanity writ large, yet we still have duties to humanity. In fact we may even have duties to humanity that are born out of a concern for equality, a concern central to liberal conceptions of justice. It is easy, then, to misunderstand a call for reduction of gross inequalities in the world, the cost of which would be quite small, as a call for justice. Indeed Nagel even admits that while it may be incoherent to call for global justice, this does not mean we live in a just world as it is. The gross inequalities, the ones that cause starvation and are the plight of the world’s poorest require action. That action, for Nagel, however, is not motivated from a duty of justice, but rather from one of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{394} Nagel, following Rawls, seems to contend that a moral minimum may be all that is required.

As justice is something that arises only under the conditions of a social structure that is coercively imposed, justice may not be possible at the global level. To continue his argument that justice is an associative obligation, Nagel contends:

Furthermore, though the obligations of justice arise as a result of a special relation, there is no obligation to enter into that relation with those to whom we do not yet have it, thereby acquiring those obligations toward them. If we find ourselves in such a relation, then we must accept the obligations, but we do not have to seek them out, and may even try to avoid incurring them, as with other contingent obligations of a more personal kind: one does not have to marry and have children for example.\textsuperscript{395}

\textsuperscript{393} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{394} Ibid., 396
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid., 397
The nation-state structure, as arbitrary as it may be, imposes on us a coercive institution that establishes a special relationship with fellow nationals. Within the state there exists a set of social institutions that govern aspects of our conduct and only under these conditions do we have the ability to coordinate our efforts in such a way as to make our projects viable. The social structure that exists, and the sovereign that governs it, give the nation-state the unique ability to put citizens into “...a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice.”

Although the point should be patently clear by now I should reiterate: for Nagel, relations of justice can only arise under institutional conditions of coercion, such as those exhibited in sovereign statehood. So the argument goes, justice cannot be global as there is no such coercive institutional structure.

Following this argument, then, we must question why the state holds the legitimacy to coerce us into relations of justice. Taking for granted the existence of the state, legitimacy derives from our ability to author the norms and rules of governance, at least this appears to be the case for Nagel. Following his Hobbesian argument, life under a sovereign authority is seen as desirable as it protects our self-interest from the arbitrary wills of others. Nonetheless, we are born into a state and do not have a choice in the matter, as such we ought to be given the opportunity to author the rules so as to ensure they allow for the actualization of justice. In other words, it ought to be democratic. Nagel claims: “A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is

396 Ibid.
not a voluntary association. I submit that it is this complex fact - that we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms.”

Again it is the existence of a defined set of social institutions that both imposes the norms upon us, but also gives us the ability to author the norms going forward in an effective way. Nagel’s argument relies on the lack of a set of coercive institutions at the global level. This does not mean that there are no global institutions that impact our lives. Nagel admits that there is a set of important international institutions that exist - global NGOs, the WHO, the UN, the EU, NAFTA, NATO, various international trade agreements, the IMF, and the International Court, for example. Yet, none of these represent the coherent set of institutions that impose coercion in the way that Nagel contends the nation state does. Indeed calls for socioeconomic equality are only coherent within the nation-state - “We are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong coercively imposed political community.” Further, Nagel places emphasis on the fact that membership in a nation-state is not one we actively choose, but one that is imposed on us. Of course the existence of international institutions that affect us is not something we choose either, it is also imposed on us. Nonetheless, he contends that these institutions do not impose the same level of relations as statehood does, and more importantly, they lack a sovereign authority. Precisely for these two reasons he contends that international institutions, as they currently exist, do not establish relations of justice at the global level: “Current international institutions...lack something that according to the political conception [of justice] is crucial for the application and implementation of standards of

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397 Ibid., 401.
398 Ibid., 400.
399 Ibid., 404.
justice: They are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed in the name of all the individuals whose lives they affect... Further, the current set of international institutions cannot impose relations of justice as they do not have the legitimate right to impose decisions by force. This requires that the argument for coercion critically incorporates both a coercively imposed set of institutions as well as the ability to author their direction. Nagel sees this as a critical failure of current international arrangements: “…they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally.”

Tied to the notion of sovereignty, then, (which Nagel sees as critical to the implementation of justice) is authorship or representation. We must, in some ways, be the authors of institutional policy; this could be done directly in a deliberative-participatory model or through representation.

Nagel’s argument closes speculatively, arguing that there is a future where global justice is a possibility. Curiously, though, that world is only born out of global injustice. He claims:

...I believe the most likely path toward some version of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global structures of power that are tolerable to the interests of the most powerful current nation-states. Only in that way will institutions come into being that are worth taking over in the service of

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400 Ibid., 405.
401 Ibid., 407.
402 Ibid., 405.
more democratic purposes, and only in that way will there be something concrete for the demand for legitimacy to go to work on.\textsuperscript{404}

Nonetheless, for our purposes here, he seems to end on the notion that arguments for global justice are incoherent under the current situation of international anarchy.\textsuperscript{405}

\section*{6.6 Coercion in the International Sphere}

If Nagel’s argument is correct - that coercion establishes relations of justice, and that the international sphere currently does not admit the level of coercion required - then the prospects for rooted cosmopolitanism are dim. This is primarily, as I contend, because one of the central tenets of rooted cosmopolitanism must be the fulfillment of principles of global justice discovered through particularist moral starting points. To briefly reiterate, rooted cosmopolitanism about justice attempts to account for global inequalities while maintaining a commitment to particular obligations (i.e. special responsibilities). If Nagel’s argument is correct, then, there may be no real concern for global justice in rooted cosmopolitanism. However, I contend that Nagel’s argument, while correct that relations of justice only arise under the conditions of coercion, fundamentally under represents the ways in which international institutions and global actors are unjustly imposing their wills (i.e. acting coercively). Thus, while I agree with him that sovereignty and the social structure of the state uniquely impose relations of justice among members, I disagree that the current status of the international sphere is one of mere anarchy and not of international injustice. Further, I argue that the international sphere admits a level of coercion that puts members (both states and individuals) in an important relation of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{404} Ibid., 411.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.}
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justice with one another. I contend that the types of coercion that currently exist in the international realm subject members to unjust and otherwise unfair conditions. In defending my account I must first provide a proper definition of coercion.

Plainly speaking, coercion is the act of persuading others with the use of (or threat of) force. This does not mean that coercion is simply synonymous with the use of physical force. Rather, it is marked by the fact that it leaves the coercee with an inability to choose to act otherwise, or in Laura Valentini’s words: “...the coercee has virtually no choice but to execute the coercer’s commands.”  

Further, coercion requires justification as it limits a person’s freedom - despite the fact that I want to run a red light to arrive at my destination quicker, I am coerced to stop as the threat of fines and penalties (as well as fears for my safety) compel me. Valentini formalizes coercion as follows: “...agent A coerces another agent B if A forseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on B’s freedom; compared to B’s freedom in the absence of A’s intervention (other things being equal).”  

Importantly this definition requires a responsible agent who coerces. For Valentini this could be an individual moral agent (“...an agent with the capacity to grasp, and act on, moral reasons and who can therefore bear responsibility for her/his actions.”), but it could also be a group. A group can be conceived of a morally responsible agent under certain conditions, primary to these is that the group must be organized with the purpose of meeting the general conditions of moral agency: “...namely

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406 Laura Valentini, *Justice in a Globalized World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126. Though there may be more prominent thinkers, Valentini’s work on addressing Nagel’s coercion thesis is quite thorough and helpfully demonstrates the way in which we ought to consider a more extensive view of coercion.

407 Ibid., 130.

408 Ibid., 131.
grasping reasons for action, and acting on their basis." Valentini contends that groups such as states, universities, churches, and hospitals meet these conditions as they have the ability to form a collective will. States, then, can be seen as imposing the type of interactional coercion defined above by Valentini that Nagel argues is required for establishing relations of justice among citizens.

Valentini further refines her definition of coercion by incorporating a notion of systematic coercion. While the interaction-based definition used above is certainly applicable to the claims Nagel makes, systematic coercion provides a further understanding that may allow us to better understand the just or unjust relations that exist in the international sphere. Systematic coercion is defined as “a system of rules S is coercive if it foreseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on some agents’ freedom, compared to their freedom in the absence of that system.” These rules may be formal or informal, but they must visibly show that individuals’ behaviour follows a ‘rule-governed pattern’. Thus, if we incorporate this definition into our understanding of coercion, then we need to look more closely at what systematic coercion (a) requires and (b) how it impacts individuals. Following Valentini’s definition, systematic coercion simply requires that there be a system of rules in place that visibly governs behaviour. She helpfully illustrates this with the example of capitalism. Capitalism can be said to be systematically coercive as “…the proletariat is appropriately said to be forced (coerced) to sell its labour because the structure of capitalism ‘is sustained by a great deal of

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409 Ibid., 133.
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid., 137.
412 Ibid.
deliberate human action’.” There is no single agent responsible for sustaining capitalism or coercing proletarians into following the rules. Rather, both the capitalist class and the existence of the rules governing the markets sustain capitalism. This dramatically changes the picture of international coercion. While Nagel’s understanding relies on a coherent set of institutions that govern (i.e. an agent), systematic coercion can be applied to a set of rules that govern behaviour. Valentini concludes that “For justice to apply, we only need a system of rules placing non-trivial constraints on freedom. This will obviously have important implications for the question of global justice since, at the global level, there are complex systems of rules, but there is no overarching global Leviathan.” The argument could be made, then, that the international arena currently admits a level of coercion required for establishing relations of justice - either between individuals or between states. I argue that the international arena is, importantly, different from the domestic arena in that the relations of justice are between groups and institutions (e.g. state-to-state, institution-to-state, etc.) as well as relations between individuals via transaction and interaction in the global economy. Thus, by adopting Valentini’s wider definition of coercion - one that I argue to be a relevant and accurate description of contemporary international politics - we can see that it is coherent to speak of global justice in addition to domestic justice. As the two forms of justice are not simply synonymous (i.e. global justice is not domestic justice on a much larger scale), we must look more closely at what is required, and what we mean by justice. Additionally, I argue that my claims here are fully consistent with Nagel’s arguments presented above; the

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414 Valentini, 144-145.
415 Ibid., 154.
difference between our conclusions emerges from a disagreement about the levels and
types of coercion that exist in international politics.

Nagel’s Rawlsian framework for domestic justice helpfully illustrates the type of
immense institutional structure required to establish the necessary social relations to
speak of justice. That is to say, if justice is concerned with socioeconomic equality, the
society in which we are describing must have a conception of equality from which to
draw. Thus, when Nagel speaks of being products and authors of the coercive system, he
is referring to the fact that our domestic institutions are part of our morally constitutive
selves, and we have the ability to guide and change the norms. I believe the content and
structure of domestic justice can follow the Walzerian claims about our ability to change
the system that, in some ways, ‘makes us’. I firmly believe that our moral starting point is
domestic - what we understand to be the content of justice will be unique to our context -
but this need not lead to a conservative understanding of our ability to criticize and
change social practices. Social change occurs, but it is not usually revolutionary, it tends
to be gradual and occurs when current practices and moral stances do not resonate with
other aspects of our identity. Returning briefly to Erskine’s notion of dislocated
communities we can see that moral learning can happen through membership in these
communities as well as through intercultural dialogue, such as championed by the likes of
Appiah and Taylor. The content of domestic justice relies on an overarching structure of
social institutions that provide us with the ability to understand and interpret the world
around us. This speaks to both the Walzerian, or communitarian, notion of pluralistic
conceptions of morality and moral concepts that they argue is context-specific, as well as
the Rawlsian idea that the content and structure of justice is something that is internal to a
society. Beyond that, for Rawls, we are speaking of the interaction between (ideally) well-ordered societies.\footnote{Rawls, Law of Peoples.} For either group, then, it becomes quite difficult to speak of justice globally.

Internationally, I argue, a similar structure of institutions exists, although they do not have the same pervasive structure that guides social relations that our domestic institutions have. This set of institutions, and here I am speaking particularly of the economic institutions, have both the ability to coerce agents as well as to create and sustain a system of rules that subjects others to unjust conditions. Nagel concludes that there is a group of international institutions that are not coercive in a way that establishes relations of justice. I argue, however, that if we look at coercion both as interaction (the type that Nagel appears to use) and systematic, then coercion at the international level is sufficient to establish relations of justice. Indeed I contend that these international institutions are an important part of the social structure that Nagel relies on domestically. I argue this particularly as international economic institutions - the Bretton Woods institutions specifically - provide a fundamental allocative and distributive function. As such, we ought to consider them as having the ability to establish relations of justice.\footnote{Frank Garcia, “Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions,” Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 10 (3) (2007): 462. 461 - 481} Moreover, following Simon Caney, these institutions can be seen as forming a (coercive) global basic structure comprised of “...a common set of regulations, codes, and practices which are the same everywhere and encompass all within their jurisdiction.”\footnote{Simon Caney, “Global Interdependence and Distributive Justice,” Review of International Studies, vol. 31 (2) (2005): 398. 389 - 399.}

Importantly, this interpretation of international coercion does not rely on an argument
from interdependence. That is, my claim is not that global justice exists due to a level of global interdependence between economies. Rather, my claim is that international economic institutions coerce agents into following a system that impacts the distribution of social goods both within and between societies.

Through extending our definition of coercion we can see that there is a sufficient amount at the global level to establish relations of justice. Nagel’s argument, however, also relies on the notion of joint authorship. That is, the coercive institutions that force us into relations of justice also include the ability to author their direction (i.e. they are democratic in some way). There is a definite lack of authorship at the global level, but I think that, following Nagel’s logic, this should be a call to establish democratic institutions. Under his conception of coercion, the international sphere is anarchic at best, but if we expand the definition to include Valentini’s systematic coercion then we can see that it is actually unjust. 419 Thus, my argument does not reject Nagel’s conclusions. He sees the establishment of global justice as requiring the international sphere to go through three phases: 1. Anarchy 2. Injustice 3. Justice. 420 By framing international coercion in the way that I have, we can conceive of the international sphere as unjust and requiring governance. The question now moves from the idea of global justice to the content of global justice.

According to Charles Beitz, justice governs the distribution and proper allocation of social goods. 421 By social cooperation Beitz is referring to the Rawlsian idea that

419 This is a similar argumentative strategy as the one employed by A.J. Julius. See: A.J. Julius, “Nagel’s Atlas”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (2), 2006), 176-192.
society is “...cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” As everyone is vying for access to social goods, principles of justice are required to identify the proper allocation of goods, and the institutions that can provide the allocative function. International economic institutions govern social distribution in many different ways. For example, trade law determines the types of trade that states, agents, and groups can enter into. Gross inequality has arisen in part because of certain agents receiving favorable treatment to the detriment of others, all while operating well within the bounds of current international trade and economic law. As I argue that international institutions currently make up the type of coercive network that imposes relations of justice, inequalities that directly arise from the institutions, or the system within which they operate, must be justifiable to all parties involved. Put in other words, the coercive system must be governed by principles of global justice. As shown in earlier chapters, it is quite difficult to conceive of an idea of global egalitarianism, or even speak of equality where a plurality of social values exists. What one society or group determines to be fair may be different than what another says is required by justice. The problem persists, then, of how we arrive at principles of global justice that will both ensure a sufficient level of socioeconomic equality while remaining sensitive to the cultural and contextual variations of the value of particular goods. The theory must necessarily be cosmopolitan in the way it addresses global justice, but communitarian (particularist) in the way it describes the principles of justice. Once again, Scheffler’s tension emerges as the specter

haunting cosmopolitanism. As I have shown that justice exists at the global level I will now move to exploring an approach to this issue.

6.7 Complex, Open-Ended, Rooted Cosmopolitanism: A Brief Sketch

In several of the previous chapters we have seen attempts to address this issue. I argue that these attempts have failed for a variety of reasons. Of these reasons the most important is an unnecessary compartmentalization of cosmopolitanism. Rooted cosmopolitanism in the variants explored here has been a rooted cultural cosmopolitanism (Appiah), a rooted political cosmopolitanism (Tan), or a rooted moral cosmopolitanism (Miller). Rooted cosmopolitanism, if it is to be successful, I argue, must account for the problem of inequality on a global level. Much like in the domestic arena, any inequalities that arise ought not to be arbitrary, and ought to be justifiable to those affected. In this final section of the chapter my aim is to provide a brief sketch of an alternative approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. This alternative approach will not attempt to fully address all issues presented in the thesis, nor is it necessarily seen as the final answer to Scheffler’s tension. I contend, however, that the real strength of the tension lies in the fact that our obligations are necessarily divided under the current institutional arrangement. My theory of rooted cosmopolitanism is termed complex and open-ended as it attempts to fuse all three variants of cosmopolitanism - cultural, political, and moral - while remaining hesitant to determine the exact structure of the institutions; it is deliberately vague. I contend that Scheffler’s tension is resolvable only

424 Although this claim for global justice is clearly Rawlsian in spirit, I do not endorse previous attempts to globalize Rawlsian justice such as that espoused by the early Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz.
insofar as we augment the way we approach and conceive of domestic and international spheres.

In the previous section my goal was to determine whether or not it made sense to speak of ‘global justice’ given the particularist starting point of our moral thinking and identity. I have shown that relations of justice emerge where there is a sufficient level of coercion sustained by either an agent (i.e. individual or ‘will forming group’) or a system that governs behaviour and interaction. Further, I argued that the international sphere exhibits this level of coercion, despite Nagel’s conclusion that the necessary level of coercion is not there. As international institutions currently govern the distribution of socioeconomic goods, I argue that global justice is a coherent idea. Moreover, removing the institutions that govern practice would likely not remove the relations of justice that exist internationally, as groups, states, and individuals now help sustain and ensure the stability of the system of coercion. Finally, I contend that the levels of inequality that currently exist at the global level are unjust insofar as they would not be justifiable to all of those affected. My conclusion, then, is that there ought to be principles of global justice that govern international institutions and guide the coercive system (in such a way as to make it justifiable). I argue that complex open-ended rooted cosmopolitanism may be able to provide a way to both discover the principles of global justice and establish a framework for global governance that I contend is necessary.

I should note that much of the theory is already embedded within the arguments explored in previous chapters. I am merely dwelling on certain implications and insights I have drawn from their arguments, or of what I perceive to be their failing. The section proceeds as follows: first I explore how principles of global justice can be discovered
through intercultural dialogue marked by a recognition of difference; second, I argue that through a federal system of global governance centered around disaggregated sovereignty, the political will and resources necessary to fulfilling these principles can be acquired; third, the shape of the institutions and the principles that guide them are open to change as necessary over time in order to best allow individuals and groups to fulfill both local and global obligations. In this way I contend that rooted cosmopolitanism cannot take one particular form. We cannot describe rooted cosmopolitanism as a particular set of institutions or particular principles of justice, rather the descriptions ascribed to it and the form it takes must necessarily change in order to be able to relevantly address both global and domestic obligations throughout time.

The particularist stance on our moral origins resonates with much of our lived moral experience. Who I describe myself to be, what my beliefs are, and how I understand my obligations to others will emerge out of my particular context. It is understandable, then, why we have plural conceptions of the good and multiple conceptions of the value of particular social goods. Determining a coherent description of ‘justice’ globally may seem problematic. While one group contends that what is just is ensuring that all people have access to particular goods, the value of those goods may not be universal. Thus, rooted cosmopolitanism must be marked by intercultural dialogue on the content, role, and function of justice. I argued above that domestic and international justice are different in that they are concerned with the distribution of different sets of goods. Arriving at principles of global justice marked by fairness and equality need not rely on one particular definition of fairness or equality. Discovering the principles of global justice that are fair to all relies on recognition-based intercultural dialogue.
I argue that the role of recognition is central here. Following the work of Appiah and Nussbaum, in order to fully understand what we want and what is fair requires engagement with ourselves as moral agents as well as a recognition that who we are, and what we believe is not an objective position. Recognition-based approaches, such as those championed by Taylor and debated by Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, can help to ensure that the principles of justice are not simply descriptive of one group, but applicable to all.\footnote{Charles Taylor, \textit{Malaise of Modernity}, (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1991); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, \textit{Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange}, (New York: Verso Press, 2003).} As we learned from Appiah, understanding who we are and where we come from is of primary importance. However, in learning who we are we need to avoid, as Nussbaum contends, developing the assumption that our way is the ‘normal’ way and that all other ways of life are abnormal or in some way inferior.\footnote{Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in \textit{For Love of Country}} Moreover, recognition-based approaches are marked by the genuine recognition of others and their ‘otherness’ as it is. The cultural cosmopolitans discussed in the first chapter highlight the contingency of cultural identities and their fluidity, which I think helps to inculcate our ability to critically reflect on ourselves and others. Certainly, this will require a significant amount of cultural learning that can be inculcated through education, but also through dialogue and interaction with others. This type of approach relies on a coming to terms with the past and with historical relations among groups, it requires shifting our perceptions of other groups and avoiding the misrecognition that can occur when we ascribe characteristics to groups that may not be representative of who they are. Recognition of our identity, Taylor argues, is a fundamental human need. He derives his account of recognition mostly from a reading of Hegel, which is unnecessary to discuss at length.
here. Nonetheless, it is important to note that we strive for recognition from others that we are valuable human beings. As Appiah argues, we need to be recognized as having something of value to offer to the human experience. A lack of this can lead to misrecognition, either through a refusal to acknowledge a particular way of life as valuable, or by ascribing characteristics that lead to negative perceptions of a group of people.

Recognition can be achieved through engagement with both our own cultural groups as well as with others. I believe that Nussbaum’s call for ‘cosmopolitan education’ is of fundamental importance here. As opposed to the nationalistic civic education that focuses on the uniqueness and greatness of our particular ways of life, such as the type we see through the use of ideas like American Exceptionalism and manifest destiny, cultural education should focus more on explaining our native cultures as one among many. Thus we may be able to approach our own cultural group more anthropologically, much in the same way we approach others. By doing so we can avoid chauvinistic notions that help cause misrecognition. The type of intercultural dialogue I argue rooted cosmopolitanism ought to be centered around is similar to that as argued by Appiah and Taylor. Recognition does not require us to abandon our cultural identities; rather it can help us celebrate them along with others.

Once we can achieve intercultural dialogue that genuinely recognizes other groups, then the principles of global justice become discoverable. Recognition-based approaches do not require that we equally value all ideas and stances. It does not mean that we need to give up our fundamental beliefs on essentially contested concepts like justice and equality. Rather, it simply requires that we value those who hold opposing
opinions as equal members; we don’t need to value or endorse their actual opinions. Intercultural dialogue allows us to discover what Taylor describes as horizons of significance - the areas where many of our significant ideas and beliefs converge. As opposed to having a dominant group determine principles that they deem fair and equal, they ought to be discovered out of dialogue among groups. We may be better able to understand the position of others if we recognize our differences. Through this, I argue, we can discover principles of justice that are applicable to all groups without appearing as domineering or imposing a particular way of understanding social goods on others.

This stance may seem somewhat controversial so I feel I should qualify it slightly. I contend that much can be achieved through recognition-based intercultural dialogue, however our most pressing issues of inequality - the plight of the world’s poorest, for example - is something that needs to be addressed first. There is a moral minimum that, I argue, can be universally agreed upon without making value-based judgments on the good. That is, I believe that there is a universal minimum standard of living that is applicable to all, regardless of the community in which they inhabit. Much of this is already apparent in my critique of Appiah in chapter three. In order to develop the culturally specific conceptions of the good and cultural projects we need access to particular resources. By removing the cultural valuations inherent to social goods, I argue that we can arrive at a list of necessary human goods. In a similar vein, Brian Barry argues that there is a human nature we can speak of - all humans, regardless of their

\[427\] This is a position that is readily accepted by several anti-cosmopolitans I’ve explored here, such as Miller, Rawls, and Nagel.
cultural background, require particular basic goods in order to live a decent life.\footnote{Brian Barry, \textit{Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism}, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 281-285.}

Although the term ‘decent’ appears to carry significant cultural baggage, here I am simply referring to a life where one has access to the necessary resources for sustainability - access to clean water, food, and shelter, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom from war, etc. Others, such as Sen and Nussbaum, have gone so far as to establish a set of capabilities that can be seen as similar to the primary goods that can address the real levels that an individual is able to develop and achieve their conception of the good. Above all else, I contend, that this moral minimum must be achieved in order to universally secure our biological needs and basic human freedoms. This is arguably one of the most pressing issues facing humanity. Once a baseline has been achieved we can begin to move towards recognition-based intercultural dialogue. Despite the similarity in approaches, Barry distinguishes himself from Taylor and the ‘culturalists’. Nonetheless, I find that the positions are compatible if we consider Barry’s claims about human nature to represent the minimal requirements. Once we have a minimalist list of human rights, then we can incorporate the intercultural dialogue that is a necessary part of global justice.

Through this dialogue we will discover principles that can help govern international institutions. However, as most of the issues of global inequality and injustice are not compartmentalized in the international sphere, fulfilling the principles of global justice will require altering political institutions. The insights gained from political cosmopolitans can help illuminate the need for, and the abilities of, global governing
institutions to properly govern international institutions. Some have argued for the strengthening of current international governing institutions like the United Nations, and others have argued that they are marred by history and new institutions ought to be developed.\textsuperscript{429} This is not the type of argument I am concerned with, despite its apparent importance. Rather, I am concerned with assessing the way that global governing institutions can work to address problems of global justice.

Rooted cosmopolitanism, I contend, ought to be marked by scepticism of state-based sovereignty. This does not mean I favour a world state or the eradication of states entirely. In fact, I believe that states provide an important distributive function alongside their ability to provide us with a morally salient identity community. What I argue for, instead, is a form of disaggregated sovereignty. That is, states ought to have sovereignty over certain matters but not over everything that happens within their borders. In particular, international institutions ought to be established that have jurisdiction over matters that move between intra and interstate. What I envision, then, is a federal system of global governance that can ensure the principles of global justice are fulfilled without requiring us to abandon our particular obligations. Institutions that currently exist, or would be created, would have jurisdictional authority over political issues that exist outside of the traditional jurisdiction of the state. The arrangement envisioned by Ayelet Shachar in her Multicultural Jurisdictions demonstrates the viability of this model.\textsuperscript{430}

As it stands, our obligations are falsely split. I believe that this is, in part, due to the unnecessary strength of state sovereignty. One of the reasons why Scheffler’s tension

\textsuperscript{429} See: Held and Archibugi
remains so strong is that we have limited resources, and a limited ability to effectively implement change at great distances. Proximity to our obligations is less and less of a problem as technological change has made it possible to see and experience virtually anything around the world. We have the ability to see into the lives of those that are affected by our actions around the world, we have the ability to travel great distances, and the ability to interact with people through the world on a daily basis. What we do not have, however, is an institutional network to effectively implement change and fulfill our obligations to others. Thus, institutions of global governance are needed that can more effectively allow us to fulfill our obligations to others.

The particular shape of the institutions is something that will necessarily change over time. Additionally, I argue that they ought not to be conceived of as either super or supra national. Their jurisdiction will reach above and below the state level as required to address issues. Most issues of global justice are not simply located in the international sphere, they are experienced locally and globally. Moreover, much of what we understand to be part of our global obligations can be fulfilled locally. The issue of climate change, for example, overlaps between our local and global obligations. That is, we owe to both our particular others and to humanity writ large a clean environment. Governing institutions that focus on the environment, then, would have jurisdiction that spans from the local to the global. Again, I am not concerned with the exact structure of the institution, just that they be marked by disaggregated sovereignty. Further, I contend that a federal model where issues and jurisdictional authority are subdivided between groups would be most effective.
Governing institutions are necessary as, following Nagel and Hobbes, covenants without a sword are just words. Looking at current international institutions we see massive exploitation, gross inequality, and abuse of the environment. States have entered into agreements and arrangements in the past to varying degrees of success. However, and as Canada’s recent withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol shows, states are not really held to their agreements. The ability to opt out is far too strong. Although I am optimistic about the prospects for global governance, it might prove to be one of the most challenging impediments to rooted cosmopolitanism. It’s likely that states won’t be willing to cede sovereignty until it is a necessity.

Finally, rooted cosmopolitanism ought to be marked by a willingness to change over time as necessary. In a different but related argument, Tariq Modood presents his theory of multiculturalism as one that is marked by an open-ended process of negotiation that is continually revisited.\(^{431}\) Similarly, I contend that rooted cosmopolitanism - understood as both a process of intercultural dialogue and institutional change - is one that ought not to be fixed. The intercultural dialogue marked by recognition described above, relies on constant change - change in the way we understand ourselves, what is meaningful to us, and change in the way we perceive others. More importantly, however, I argue that the institutional arrangements must be open to negotiation and change over time. Doing so can help ensure that the global institutions make sense for contemporary politics. As new problems and challenges to global and domestic justice emerge, new institutions may be necessary and old ones may be redundant or needless. As is likely apparent by now, one of the main motivators for this project is a firm belief that

contemporary international politics should not be governed by institutions set around the Peace of Westphalia. Again, state-based sovereignty is useful, it helps subdivide important political projects, makes it possible for us to fulfill these projects, and it serves an important distributive function. However, there is no reason to suppose that this should be the only way to subdivide jurisdictional authority. As issues will necessarily change over time, new institutional arrangements may be necessary. Moreover, by dividing authority to a variety of institutions, we may be better able to fulfill the principles of global justice.

Discovering what the institutions will look like is a long-term process that must be democratic. That is, all member groups (be they states, nations, or individuals) ought to have a say in the matter. Ensuring that institutions are democratic is beyond the scope of this project, but needless to say there is an immense literature on the topic. International democracy is a problematic issue, one that will require great political effort to ensure, but it is necessary if we are to avoid global tyranny.

6.8 On the Necessity of Moral, Cultural, and Political Cosmopolitanism

I take moral cosmopolitanism to be the main impetus behind rooted cosmopolitanism. The strength of Scheffler’s tension lies in the fact that people consider themselves to be particularists (i.e. holding particular obligations) at the same time as recognizing the moral equality of all (i.e. a weak cosmopolitan egalitarianism). The tension’s perceived irresolvability derives from the fact that under our current

432 Shachar., 119-122.
institutional arrangement, our obligations are unnecessarily split. In my analysis of rooted cosmopolitanism I take the following for granted:

1. We, as humans, have special responsibilities that I describe primarily (though not exclusively) as associative obligations.
2. All humans are fundamentally equal and arbitrary differences should not impact one’s life chances.
3. Current units of political association (i.e. states) provide an important distributive function that work to divide our obligations.

Given these statements, I wish to briefly explore why rooted cosmopolitanism must necessarily be moral, cultural, and political.

My central motivation in this project has been the conflict between a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism, as a claim about universal equality, and the fulfillment of our particular obligations. In this exploration I have been unable to find a convincing argument that supports the particularist claims to such a degree as to abandon my cosmopolitan stance. Nonetheless, I firmly contend that particularists have much to teach cosmopolitans about our moral starting points, about the way communities around us fundamentally shape our identity, and about the role of relationships on our moral framework. With this in mind I began to explore the ways in which we can arrive at a substantively cosmopolitan position that is amenable to the claims of particularists. In previous chapters I have attempted to determine which particularist arguments are sound, and those that I believe are coherent but do not necessitate anti-cosmopolitan conclusions. In particular, the claims of liberal nationalists who contend that the state-based system is necessary, I believe, misconstrue the ways in which our particular obligations are linked to institutional arrangements.

While I contend that the state-based system is important in separating our obligations and making large political projects tenable, I do not believe that states
represent the golden idol that some present them to be. There is an important cultural and national character embedded within the institutions of the state, a character that is necessary to fulfilling large scale political projects (including fulfilling the primary functions of socioeconomic justice). That character, however, exists below the state level in smaller scale political institutions (be they national, provincial, municipal, etc.), and I see no reason as to why it cannot exist at a larger level or in conjunction with these already existing institutions. The state system as it currently exists does not allow for individuals or groups to fulfill their global obligations alongside their particular ones. By augmenting international institutions and disaggregating sovereignty so as to allow for authority above and below the state level we may be better able to fulfill our obligations. What this would require would be the creation of (or extension of already existing) institutions that govern on a jurisdictional basis. By restructuring state sovereignty in this way we could remove the institutional barriers to governing international issues that overlap contexts. Given that both particular and global obligations are legitimate we ought to develop a way to fulfill both where possible.

Though cultural cosmopolitanism does not play as significant of a role here as the moral and political varieties, I contend that it is nonetheless important. The lessons we can learn from cultural cosmopolitans about the nature of cultural identities can help to better establish recognition-based dialogue. Scheffler’s cultural cosmopolitanism requires us to see cultural affiliation as part of a framework of ‘Heraclitean pluralism’. That is, he sees cultural identities as constantly in flux – new symbols, ideas, rituals, and traditions
are incorporated into a group and the meaning of older symbols change over time.\footnote{Scheffler, “Immigration and the Significance of Culture”, 93-125.}

Waldron, similarly, argues that we need not be deeply immersed within our cultural group and our cultural identity can borrow from a variety of sources (we can ‘wade in the cultural pool’, so to speak).\footnote{Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, \textit{University of Michigan Law Review}, 25 (1991), 751-793.} Incorporating a notion of cultural cosmopolitanism – i.e. that cultural identities are not fixed – may allow us to critically reflect on our own cultural identities as well as those of others. This critical reflection, I contend, is necessary if recognition-based dialogue is to be successful. Indeed having the ability to critically reflect on ourselves as well as others may allow us to better understand the claims of others, especially when they seem so otherwise foreign.\footnote{I have made a similar argument with regards to multicultural policy in Canada. See: Robert Maciel and Timothy E.M. Vine, “Redistribution and Recognition: Assessing Alternative Frameworks for Aboriginal Policy in Canada”, \textit{The International Indigenous Policy Journal}, 3 (4) (2012). Retrieved from: Retrieved from: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss4/3.}

In the end, Scheffler’s tension may not be entirely resolvable. There will likely be instances where we are still forced to choose between fulfilling one set of obligations against the other. However, this is the reality of fulfilling obligations in the first place. We have limited resources, and by fulfilling one obligation we are eliminating the possibility of fulfilling many others. Our choosing between which obligations to fulfill is something that is a necessary part of the lived moral experience - we cultivate many relationships and have many obligations deriving from them, at various points we have to choose between paths. Although this choice is far from easy in many cases, we still make the choice and use various factors to decide which way to go - the importance of the relationship, the direness of the situation, etc. Under current institutional arrangements
we are wrongfully forced into a position where we must choose between fulfilling local obligations and fulfilling global obligations. As a moral cosmopolitan, this is an issue. If we were to augment state-based sovereignty, and reconceive of our institutional relationship to the state and other institutions both below and above the state, we may be better aligned to fulfill both sets of obligations. This may not be the ideal solution, and it does not guarantee resolution of Scheffler’s tension. However, it removes the false dichotomy between global and local by giving us institutional access to fulfilling our global obligations. Moreover, it establishes as situation in which individuals have a much better ability to efficiently fulfill particular and global obligations. Finally, under this model, when there are times when we need to choose between obligations, individuals may have more theoretical resources at their disposal to make a reasonable decision of which way to go.

6.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to provide a brief alternative framework for rooted cosmopolitanism. This is a daunting task, and this chapter should not be taken to be an ending point. Rather, my goal is only to provide the starting point for conceiving of a viable rooted cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism, I argue, is only possible insofar as it takes account of our special responsibilities and associative obligations. That is, a viable cosmopolitanism is a rooted cosmopolitanism - one that recognizes that our moral experience is grounded in the various morally salient communities of which we are members. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I understand it, is an attempt at resolving a tension identified by Scheffler, one I discuss at great length throughout the dissertation.
Scheffler’s tension highlights how our particular and global moral obligations are in tension with one another. For a variety of reasons we are unable, or unwilling to fulfill both sets.

Here, I first attempt to show that Scheffler’s tension cannot be easily pushed to the side. It represents a fundamental tension that resonates with our lived experience. The desire to prioritize and fulfill our particular obligations to those with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship is at odds with a belief in human equality. Working through the particularist position I attempt to show that our moral starting point is particularist in nature, but this does not mean that our moral identities are coextensive with a single nation or state, as some contend. Rather, our moral identities extend well beyond the state; we identify with many non-territorial groups in an important and formative way. The existence of these identities, I argue, gives hope for rooted cosmopolitanism. Particularism does not represent nearly as great a threat to cosmopolitanism as it would first appear.

After determining that Scheffler’s tension is real, and that rooted cosmopolitanism is a coherent idea, I move to assessing what global justice is. Moral cosmopolitanism is at the heart of my cosmopolitanism, and it is at the heart of Scheffler’s tension. Simply put, without moral cosmopolitanism, there is no tension. With this in mind, I explore the relationship between institutional coercion and relations of justice. Following Nagel, I found that institutional coercion plays a significant role in establishing relations of justice among individuals. A further exploration of coercion, guided by the work of Valentini, demonstrated that similar, and sufficient, levels of coercion exist at the global level. This led me to the conclusion that it makes sense to speak of relations of justice at the global
level (i.e. global justice). Given this, I contend that current institutional arrangements at the international level have either created and sustained a fundamentally unjust system of coercion, or allow for unjust inequality to persist.

In the final section I briefly explore what rooted cosmopolitanism entails. I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism ought not to be fractured by moral, cultural, or political arguments. Rather, a successful rooted cosmopolitanism must account for each of the different types of cosmopolitanism. It is fundamentally moral in nature, and from that arises a cultural and political argument. Culturally speaking, rooted cosmopolitanism is marked by a commitment to recognition-based intercultural dialogue. This is similar to what is argued by Appiah, and explored here in chapter three. Recognition-based intercultural dialogue works to strengthen our perception of our global obligations, while at the same time providing a forum for debate and voice for oppressed groups. Rooted cosmopolitanism ought to also be political in the way it explores international institutions. As opposed to removing the state system, I contend that we should augment state-based sovereignty to better allow for us to realize the principles of global justice and fulfill global obligations. As I am only able to briefly explore this alternative approach, I should say that it is not fully formed. Moreover, the sketch I provide here is deliberately vague: rooted cosmopolitanism is marked by a global voice. It would go against my purposes entirely if I were to argue for a single set of institutions or a set of ideas that I call ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. Instead, I contend that it is necessarily complex, open-ended, and always open for negotiation as need presents itself. Successfully responding to Scheffler’s tension is a serious task and will require great philosophical and political effort. This is a project that is necessarily going to be long term and take a variety of
shapes over time. In this way I resist defining it as a particular idea or set of institutions. It is, however, defined by participation and recognition. I hope a rooted cosmopolitanism can emerge that provides the theoretical resources needed for discovering and fulfilling principles of global justice.
Conclusion

Rooted cosmopolitanism appears to have considerable potential at this point. The theory’s greatest potential seems to rest on the possibility of successfully navigating the tension between two fundamental areas of moral obligation. We have important moral obligations to particular others with whom we stand in a meaningful relationship that need to be reconciled with global obligations owed to humanity as a whole. In recent years cosmopolitanism has come under attack for failing to recognize the importance or strength of our particular duties. At the same time, cosmopolitans have replied that we cannot overemphasize our particular duties if they come at the cost of fulfilling our global duties. Hence, establishing a theory that can reconcile both is needed.

If rooted cosmopolitanism is to be a successful theory then it needs to be able to navigate the complex relationship between particular and global moral spaces. I believe that if we conceive of the theory as necessarily complex and open-ended then this may be possible. In my final chapter here I presented the outline to approaching this theory. I feel that I should reiterate here that I see this only as an initial step. The main task of this project was to assess previous instances of rooted cosmopolitanism, address why they are problematic, and begin to develop an alternative approach. Given the limitations of scope on a project such as this, I am unable to do more than present an outline for a new approach to rooted cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, I believe that my project brings together several prominent scholars in a unique way that reconceives of the central issues of rooted cosmopolitanism.

I began the project by bringing conceptual clarity to cosmopolitanism in general. If I am to be able to meaningfully explore rooted varieties of the theory, then I must first
offer clarification on the theory more generally. I therefore separated cosmopolitanism into three different types of claims: claims about morality, claims about political institutions, and claims about culture. I argue that cosmopolitan arguments typically have more than one type of claim. For example, political cosmopolitans tend to be influenced by a moral claim, but this is not necessarily the case. While I focus on distinguishing between three types here, it is important to note that the typology quickly collapses once we begin to assess cosmopolitan arguments. It is nonetheless important to clarify between the different types of claims that are being made so that I can better assess the arguments throughout the thesis.

In the second chapter my task was to elucidate Samuel Scheffler’s position and highlight the key tension that rooted cosmopolitanism attempts to address. Simply put, Scheffler’s tension is the tension between our particular and global obligations. In this chapter I described the tension in two different ways. First, I described it as a tension between general and associative duties. And second, I described it as a tension between egalitarianism and nationalism. Both versions of the tension represent a theme the runs throughout the remainder of the thesis. The first version questions the relationship between general and associative duties. This theme is perhaps the most important throughout the project; if we are to reconcile our global and particular ends then we must (I argue) find a way to reconcile our general and associative duties. The second version confronts egalitarianism with the limiting goals of nationalism. From this I take nationalism to be a particularly pressing form of particular obligation. While many cosmopolitans would be quick to admit room for special responsibilities to family and friends, they would be hesitant to extend the same for duties to co-nationals on the basis
of shared nationality. This suggests that familial and friendship-based obligations could be considered non-controversial (within reason). On the other hand, nationality-based obligations are very controversial, as the assign benefits to in-group members on the basis of, what can be described as, an arbitrary aspect of one’s life. Nonetheless, as I have discussed throughout the project shared nationality is a meaningful relationship that establishes important moral obligations that impact the strength and content of our global obligations. National obligations, then, cannot simply be dismissed as arbitrary.

The third, fourth, and fifth chapters each focused on a version of rooted cosmopolitanism. In the third chapter I explored Kwame Anthony Appiah’s rooted cultural position. There I argued that recognizing the role of cultural roots in developing our moral agency is of central importance, and intercultural dialogue plays an important role in cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, Appiah’s position fails to recognize the role of political cosmopolitanism, power in intercultural dialogue, and the strength of the distributive objection. For these reasons I concluded that Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism is unsatisfactory.

In the fourth chapter I addressed David Miller’s nationalist-minimalist cosmopolitanism. He rejects notions of strong cosmopolitanism in favour of national responsibility with minimal global obligations. I argued that the idea of national responsibility misconstrues the international sphere, and that it does not make sense to hold nations collectively responsible for their actions. Moreover, I concluded that Miller’s argument admits a much stronger version of both political and moral cosmopolitanism than he appears ready to defend. I therefore argued that nationalism, framed in this way, highlights an important source of our moral obligations, but that we
need to reconsider their relationship to our global obligations. Miller provides room for a very minimalist cosmopolitanism, but his argument implies much more. He appears to focus too much on our roots while forgoing our global obligations.

In the fifth chapter I explored Kok-Chor Tan’s global luck egalitarian position to see whether or not it was reconcilable with partiality. Tan sees a space for partiality under a just global sphere of interaction. I argue that his focus on the background context (e.g. the norms of international economics and governance) is helpful and can demonstrate how we can discover principles of global justice. Nonetheless, I argued that we need to look more closely at how we can effectively distribute across borders. While there should be space for global distribution, we need to recognize the problem of shared values so that we can more effectively distribute without disregarding our shared meanings. Additionally, I question his categorical prioritization of global obligations over particular ones. In the end I argued that Tan’s focus appears to be too much on the global level at the expense of particularism.

In the final chapter I described an alternative approach to conceiving of rooted cosmopolitanism. I argued that each of the previous chapters helped show some limitations as well as possible avenues for further exploration. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I conceive of it, is complex and open-ended. It is complex in the sense that it is predicated upon moral, political, and cultural claims. The theory is open-ended by being susceptible to change and re-negotiation throughout time. I argued that the success of rooted cosmopolitanism relies on the successful establishment of global governance that will augment current norms of state sovereignty. I contended that this is necessary as our national obligations are institutionally separated from our global ones. If we augment
state sovereignty and develop stronger forms of global governance then our two spheres of obligations may not be dichotomous. At the same time, establishing global forms of governance will rely on successful intercultural dialogue. I conceive of this as dialogue between individuals and between groups. In order to establish principles of global justice that are universal and sensitive to context we need to engage in dialogue with others that recognizes who they are and where they come from. This form of cosmopolitanism is rooted in the sense that partiality and particular obligations are made consistent with global ones. It depends on our ability to reconceive of our spheres of obligation not as distinct from one another but as part of one moral framework. We must, then, have the political and conceptual tools to respond to complex in ways that would be impossible from either a strict cosmopolitan or strict particularist perspective.

As I mentioned, I conceive of my approach as an initial step and one that warrants further analysis. I argue that rooted cosmopolitanism can be successful but it will take great theoretical and political work. If we wish to take Scheffler’s tension seriously, then we must come to terms with the demands of particularists and cosmopolitans. Rooted cosmopolitanism, as I have conceived of it, will allow us to have more fruitful discussions on the role, strength, and content of our moral obligations. Achieving a just global order is worthwhile, but it relies on our ability to elaborate principles of global justice that do not ignore our salient particular obligations. Rooted cosmopolitanism, then, appears to be a theory that makes this possible.
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